Two Years On

At the end of September 2013, there were over 700,000 registered Syrian refugees in Lebanon according to UNHCR and more than a million on Lebanese territory according to the figures assumed by the Lebanese government. Three quarters of the refugee population are women and children, spread out geographically in over 1,200 locations across Lebanese territories. The majority of Syrian refugees are found in the Bekaa valley and North governorates, followed by Beirut and the South.

The influx of Syrian refugees in the course of 2013 rapidly transformed the emergency into a crisis, made worse by shortage of funding by regional and international donors. Furthermore, there is no legal protection framework in place for refugees in general in Lebanon given that Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol; the modus operandi between the Lebanese Government and the UNHCR is based on an Memorandum of Understanding tailored for the Iraqi 2003 refugee crisis, while the UNHCR is pushing for a new MoU taking into consideration the challenges of the Syrian crisis. The available limited resources has pushed UNHCR and partners to cut back on assistance to families, and to target only the most vulnerable according to set criteria starting October 2013.

Given the social and economic conditions in the country, non-assisted Syrian families who do not meet the vulnerability criteria of UNHCR, will find it increasingly difficult to find autonomous sources for livelihood. Efforts to secure a trust fund for Syrian refugees and host communities must be expedited to avoid the negative consequences of unemployment, poverty, and tension between both the refugee and host communities.

ALEF raises concern over the following trends: Syrian refugees’ UNHCR registration card does not entitle them to refugees’ status in the eyes of the Lebanese authorities, thus their stay functions still based on the Lebanese residency law which requires constant renewal. The refoulement of some refugees at the border by the General Security; imposition of illegal curfews by municipalities on Syrian nationals; rising levels of violence and retaliation against Syrian refugees within host communities; continued arrests by security forces and deportation orders by the judiciary; arbitrary detention and torture of detainees and prisoners; the involvement of representatives of political parties and official security agencies in communal conflicts; and the increased vulnerability of women and girls to forced and early marriages as well as survival sex and various forms of GBV. Although stakeholders have facilitated access to social services, health assistance conditions exclude vulnerable refugees, while the strain on educational and health services due to soaring demand has resulted in decreased quality and shortage of supply.

With Syrians now making up more than 20% of the population, the resilience, which has long been attributed to the Lebanese as a unique survival asset, has been the fine line separating the country from breakdown. The international community and UN agencies have relied on this asset in their policies of encouraging and reinforcing ‘hosting’ solutions, while ‘resettlement’ remains a non-viable option for regional and Western governments, and refugees alike. However, as can be noted in the changes in local responses and reactions to the Syrian refugee crisis two years on, resilience is a finite resource especially if coupled with insecurity and economic deprivation. The Syrian refugee crisis is arguably no longer solely about the management of displacement. The broader goal of providing protection to Syrian refugees can no longer be realised without addressing Lebanon’s security and economic concerns, particularly in light of indicators of direct and indirect threats to national and human security.