Cities, Conflict and State Fragility - Working Paper no. 85 - Cities and Fragile States

Author(s)
Beall, j., Goodfellow, T and Rodgers, D.
Publication language
English
Pages
35pp
Date published
01 Jan 2011
Type
Research, reports and studies
Keywords
Conflict, violence & peace, Urban
Organisations
UK Aid

 

Cities have long been connected with processes of bureaucratisation and state building, as
they have been to conflict and war. In bringing these two associations together Charles Tilly
(1992) provided a useful analytical linchpin by famously highlighting the interaction between
cities and war making as a critical factor in state making. He showed how in early modern
Europe urban merchants struck bargains with medieval power brokers when agreeing to help
fund wars aimed at extending or consolidating sovereignty. The intersection of cities, states
and violent conflict remains significant today, although it manifests in different and more
complex ways, particularly under conditions of state fragility.
Cities have changed, states have changed and armed conflict itself has changed. Many cities
in contemporary fragile states emerged as sites of colonial extraction. Urban elites today do
not possess the same autonomy from states that provided the European urban merchant
classes the bargaining power they were able to exercise historically. Further, in many
developing countries state power holders tend to access capital from abroad rather than
domestically, or fund their activities in ways that do not depend on taxation from cities. As
taxation is generically a key component of state building, and as an urban tax base is
generally considered critical, this uncoupling of taxation and the state-making enterprise
constitutes a significant departure from the historical experience of mature economies. Lastly,
and most pertinent to our argument is that conflict itself is changing. In this respect cities are
increasingly critical locations and therefore crucial sites of political engagement and policy
intervention.
To understand these changes, we frame our discussion in relation to three forms of conflict
and how they impact upon cities. In brief, sovereign conflict refers to situations where
international actors are directly and explicitly involved in the war in question. Civil conflict
refers to violent conflict between two or more organised groups one or more of which claims
to represent part of the state itself. The struggle is for control of state institutions and/or
territory within sovereign boundaries (though there may be outside intervention). Civic
conflict refers to a broad array of conflict that tends to take place in cities. Our concern is not
with constructive contestation but rather with destructive and violent manifestations of civic
conflict including, for example, gang warfare, violent crime, terrorist acts, religious and
sectarian riots, spontaneous rebellions and violent protests in response to perceived state
failures. Civic conflict may spill beyond city boundaries but is associated with the distinctly
urban quality of proximity to, and the visibility of, government.
In sovereign conflicts cities – and capital cities in particular – are seen as particularly
significant territory, so that ‘securing the city’ can become an overriding priority. This can
persist during post-war ‘reconstruction’ processes, which often see international actors pour
into cities where their involvement in decision making is often at the expense of local needs
and actors, with implications for future civic conflict. Historically civil conflict has often
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taken root in rural areas, meaning that even though cities are often the ‘prize’ to be won they
can remain spaces of relative security during the war. Under these circumstances cities can
become relatively autonomous, turning away from what is left of the state and seeking
protection instead from other actors, including rebel groups, with important implications for
state consolidation. Civic conflict is ultimately a reactive expression of grievance by urban
populations vis-à-vis the state or other urban actors. It is important to note that it is not the
fact that cities are inherently alienating that leads to civic conflict, but rather how power is
structured in urban spaces.
Our research suggests that civic conflict is on the rise, in relative if not absolute terms. This is
linked in part to civil wars being in decline and being associated with urbanisation processes
that sometimes result in civic conflict. Where civil conflicts spiral into civic ones, they
become increasingly urban in character. External intervention in sovereign conflicts can also
give rise to new conflicts – particularly in cities – even where the aim is ‘post-conflict’
reconstruction. Civil and sovereign conflicts can erode the state at city level, for example
when cities that are struggling to cope with the impact of surrounding conflict become more
dependent on financial transfers from the centre or where non-state actors become providers
of urban services and compete with state institutions for legitimacy.
Urban politics are critically important to the way social tensions and antagonisms are
managed in cities. We identify four ways in which this occurs: i) manipulation of contestation
into violent conflict; ii) deferral and/or suppression of contestation; iii) clientelist cooption of
the aggrieved; and iv) fostering of generative engagement. Each of these has a distinct impact
on state fragility through processes of state erosion, consolidation and transformation. The
third and fourth of these approaches offer the best route for avoiding conflict in the medium
and long term; but only the last is likely to allow for state transformation and dynamic
development.
Civic conflict can be positive and creative, but when violent and destructive it represents a
significant contemporary threat to human security, state consolidation and development.
Peace settlements and reconstruction processes brokered nationally need to take careful
account of their impact on urban populations and the state at city level. ‘Post’-conflict urban
stability cannot be taken for granted, especially in the context of state fragility, while
reconstruction efforts can actually undermine the potential of cities to accommodate inclusive
political coalitions that promote development and state transformation in the city and beyond.