#### Statement of Work

### SOUTHERN AFRICA DROUGHT EVALUATION

## I. Background

Southern Africa faced one of the worst droughts in decades in 1992. The drought devastated crop, particularly maize, reduced scarce water availability in many areas and placed the lives of some 18 million people at risk from starvation and disease. In countries also affected by conflict or insecurity the drought added to already catastrophic conditions, placing additional heavy burdens on people who could no longer cope with further adversity.

FAO/WFP crop and food supply assessment missions, in cooperation with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), estimated that the aggregated cereal production of the ten drought-affected SADC countries had fallen to six million metric tons (MT); about half of the normal production in 1992/93. The cereal import requirement of these countries was estimated in March 1992 to be at a level of 6.1 million MT, compared with less than 2 million MT in a normal year.

In response to the drought, emergency food aid shipments to southern Africa have reached unprecedented levels. As of December 31, 1992, US emergency food aid was 2.3 million MT valued at \$(dollar sign)650 million for the region, an increase of over 1.4 million MT from previous years. Non-food emergency assistance also reached an all time high for the southern Africa region with FHA/OFDA providing over \$37 million and AFR/SA providing \$59.9 million through December 31, 1992.

The objective of relief assistance is to save lives. Evaluations of relief efforts thus must assess the achievements of the international relief community toward this overall goal. The U.S. contribution also needs to be placed into the context of the total international relief effort.

It is in this context that an assessment of the USG emergency program is conceived. This assessment will provide the opportunity to taking stock of USG successes, lessons learned and deficiencies in delivering emergency assistance. It is hoped that this review will contribute to improving the effectiveness of USG emergency aid responses and will develop new models or document existing ones that can be used by other donors and host governments.

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# II) Objectives

1. To provide data on the overall international relief effort including the validity of the initial assessments, the appropriateness of the response measures employed, the US role

in the international effort and, to the extent possible, a comparative analysis of this effort with past relief efforts of similar magnitude

- 2. To assess the timeliness, appropriateness and impact, of emergency food and non-food assistance to the Southern African Drought Emergency (SADE) and suggest means of improvement.
- 3. To assist USAID Missions, AID/Washington, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), host governments and other donors in programming future emergency, rehabilitation disaster prevention activities and in improving Washington/field donor coordination by providing A.I.D. (and the donor community) with lessons learned regarding the planning, design, implementation and evaluation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.
- 4.To Identify conditions under which import mobilisation and internal food distribution were both efficient and cost-effective in meeting drought response objectives.

# II) Scope of work

The following questions are illustrative of the kind of issues that should be examined in depth by the team in carrying out the objectives of this evaluation. Emphasis, of course, will vary from country to country and will depend on the particular type of intervention being examined and the degree of severity of the emergency situation. Priority should be given to information gathering and analysis leading to improved programming, design and exploitation of new options for the formulation of emergency food and non-food relief programs.

## A. Causes of the Emergency

- Food deficit due to the drought emergency in southern Africa
- To what extent was the country's food problem related to agricultural and macroeconomic policies that may discourage local agricultural production and marketing rather than the drought? Has the drought caused any tangible change in agricultural policies? (End p91)

B. Host Country Preparedness and Contingency Planning

- Do national procedures exist in the affected countries for responding to emergencies? Are they followed when an actual emergency occurs?
- How did the internal and external coordination of the drought response affect the overall efficiency, impact and cost - effectiveness of each country's drought emergency response?

- Identify what combination of public and private sector roles led to appropriate timely, efficient and cost-effective responses by both host country governments and donors.
- Describe the types and levels of public and private sector security stocks, distribution mechanisms and how they were used, if they were used, in the disaster situation.
- What planning activities could be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the affected country's government to respond more effectively to structural and emergency food deficit situations?
- Review drought prevention/mitigation actions: farming practices, crop diversification, soil/water conservation measures, food security stocks, storage/transport losses, seed production, etc.
- How does the local population normally deal with food shortages and how can this traditional coping behaviour be reinforced?
- How effective were the early warning systems/weather forecasting services (FEWS project, etc.)? Will these systems remain in place for the future? Will SADC install an early warning system as part of its activities?
- What was/is the impact of pests (army worms/locusts) and plant disease?

## C. Donor Coordination

- How effective were the USG early warning systems and coordination?
- Were adequate mechanisms (including telecommunications systems) in existence or were they established to coordinate assessments of donor requirements and implementation efforts?

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- How successful was the U.N. World Food Programme and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Assistance in coordinating assistance, delivering assistance, etc. and how did they interact with each other and other groups responding to the drought?
- What was the role and responsibilities of international, US and/or local non-governmental organizations/private voluntary organizations?
- How do donors' methodologies for calculating food and non-food needs and their system for reporting on food deliveries, donor pledges, etc. relate to those of the UN? Are they adequate?

- What were the successes and failures of donor coordination and the role of donor meetings and appeals.
- What was the role of SADC and was it effective in responding to the drought needs of the member countries?
- What was the role of South Africa? How well did cooperation among regional transport authorities work, and what factor influenced the success of those efforts? Did early estimates of South African port and rail capacity overestimate the difficulties of handling projected food imports? If so, why?
- What role did WFP play in transport coordination?

# D. Needs Assessment

- What were the types of information collection system (e.g., rainfall analysis, nutrition surveillance), analysis procedures and use of data for early warning, assessment of requirements, declaration of disaster, design of programs, estimation of food input, etc. used by A.I.D., the UN, host governments?
- Was the logistical capacity of the government, USAID and the private sector adequately taken into account in determining food aid levels?
- Evaluate the accuracy, rapidity, integrity and appropriateness of A.I.D.'s needs assessment process?
- Was there any effort to monitor prices in the local market as a measure of determining food shortages?
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# E. Project Design

- How were the target areas and groups of beneficiaries selected?
- Describe the demographics of the beneficiary population. Did the majority of food and/or non-food assistance go to a specific group (e.g., farmers, urban poor, displaced persons, refugees)?
- Were local food preferences and food consumption patterns of the target population as well as local market prices adequately considered in the choice of commodities and the selection of distribution systems?
- Which mechanism was the most effective in providing food aid to the beneficiary (WPP, host government, PVO, etc.) Did this vary based on the type of beneficiary; e.g., getting food to markets versus targeted feeding?

- By the type of recipient (malnourished children, adults, etc.) which type of food aid implementation was the most effective (FFW, general distribution, targeted feeding, etc.)
- Were necessary complementary inputs (i.e., seeds, vaccines, materials, technical assistance, environmental impacts assessments) incorporated into the food emergency program?
- To what extent had participation of beneficiaries and utilization of already existing organizational structures/resources, particularly local non-governmental organizations, been built into responses?
- How can the basic food problem best be addressed with emergency food aid? With commercial?
- How were costs a factor in the design of the emergency response program? What budget limits, if any, were established by the respective host government (s)?
- Were provisions for termination of emergency food aid and/or transition to rehabilitation and longer term development foreseen during the planning stages?
- Were linkages with regular food and non-food aid programs and other complementary resources explored?
- Were disincentives introduced by the provision of massive quantities of PL 480 food? (End p94)

## F. Management, Monitoring and Evaluation

- Did the host governments, UN, USAID Missions, AID/W, PVOs and local community groups effectively organize themselves to manage the emergency? How vigilant were these groups in protecting themselves from becoming overextended? What emphasis was placed on institution-building and the enhancement of local resourcefulness? Did they utilize guidelines for assessing environmental impacts? Were these guidelines effective? What was the role of the Peace Corps and other USG agencies? How did the different Bureaus within A.I.D. interact? What was the role and utility of the Southern Africa Drought Task Force? Discuss in terms of relief planning, organization, resource allocation (the Africa Disaster Assistance Account), post crisis rehabilitation and longer term sustainability.
- What are the policies/practices of local governments and donors in the management, monitoring and evaluation of emergency programs and what was their varying im pacts on large commercial farmers and small, subsistence farmers?
- How can management, monitoring, oversight and evaluation be improved?

## G. Timeliness of Emergency Response

- Discuss the effectiveness and quantify the exact time frames for the following:
  - -- Needs assessment
  - -- Approval process for food and non-food projects considered
  - -- Procurement of commodities
  - -- Delivery of commodities to the country
  - -- Internal distribution of food and non-food aid to the target population
  - -- Arrival of technical assistance
- Describe constraints, i.e. logistical/organizational /political bottlenecks, and how and
  if they were overcome. Was the WFP regional logistical unit in Harare and its subset
  in Johannesburg effective? Suggest ways of expediting these procedures in the future
  Was private sector transport, handling and storage used effectively in
  (End p95)

the response to the drought and, if not, how can it be improved?

- If food commodities arrived late, were appropriate actions taken to avoid disincentive effects on local production and marketing?

### H. Program Results

To the extent possible and, taking into account the constraints inherent in disaster situations

the evaluation team will present evidence of the effectiveness/impact of emergency interventions in terms of the following:

- Targeting: extent to which areas and/or victims with greatest need are being reached. Was better targeting achieved as the drought progressed?
- Appropriateness and adequacy of USG food and non-food intervention. Were resources allocated appropriately if or maximum effectiveness?
- Coverage: percentage of the affected population being assisted (by the United States, by other donors)
- Increased availability of food in target areas and consumption by vulnerable groups
- Incentive/disincentive effects on agricultural production/prices/incomes
- Improved nutritional and health status of target groups
- Decreased infant and child mortality

- Demographic effects: population movements to centres and urban areas, age/sex distribution, etc.
- Dependency/self-reliance: Have the relief programs weakened the self-help capacity of individuals and community groups? How can program be organized better to reempower individuals and strengthen local decision-making and resource generation/productivity?
- Policy and institutional reform: How has the emergency affected ongoing food strategy plans and price restructuring efforts? How has the emergency intervention strengthened the capacity of the national and local governments as well as local NGOs to respond more effectively to future emergencies?
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# I. Policy Issues

The following issues are complex and deserve separate studies in themselves. They are extremely important in thinking about programing options and will provide a useful backdrop

for discussions and future interventions. As appropriate, the team should address these concerns in the context of recommendations for program improvement/redesign and lessons

#### learned:

- Relative effectiveness (impact and costs) of various distribution modes (e.g., general free distribution, maternal and child health, supplementary feeding programs, food for work, monetization, triangular transactions, rehabilitation activities), consideration of alternative distribution mechanisms and the extent of the relief effort's decentralization/regionalisation.
- Comparative advantage and cost-effectiveness of different food distribution channels (WP, PVOs, host governments) and criteria for selecting among them.
- Linkages with regular food aid program and other development assistance activities, how to use them to prepare better for future emergencies as well as to assess the effect a disaster has on them in the short term. This includes the following:
  - a. What effect do emergency activities have on the Mission's regular program and their strategic objectives? Should we consider these on hold' while an emergency takes place? Should funding for them be decreased and moved toward the emergency?
  - b. How should disasters affect the composition of the Mission program? Should the Strategic Objectives in their regular development program take this into

account and, if not, why?

- c. Can ongoing activities be redirected to assist the drought? To what extent should they?
- The capacity and ability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to act independently of political constraints.
- How food emergency programs can be planned to support sector and macroeconomic policy reforms and strengthen food self-reliance, disaster prevention and longer term development initiatives.
- Criteria for determining when and how emergency programs should be phased in and out.

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- The role that donor coordination (food and non-food needs assessments standardized methodologies, centralized assistance/pledge information) does/should play in maximizing the effectiveness of emergency responses.

# IV. Evaluation Approach and Duration

During the first week of the assessment, the Contractor will draft scopes of work for team participants. All team members then will meet in Washington, D.C., to review and clarify the

scopes of work, develop field protocols for site visits and for interviews with local officials

and program participants, as well as to hold discussions with key A.I.D., USDA, State Department and PVO officials in Washington.

After this prefield analysis is completed, the teams will proceed to the southern Africa region,

as coordinated by the Contract's Chief of Party, to carry out field investigations: review additional documentation, interview key US Mission personnel, host government, PVO and other

donor officials and inspect appropriate field sites. Specific attention should be devoted to capturing the perceptions of program participants, either through structured interviews or informal conversations in their own language. The field work will be carried out in approximately 36 working days per team member. For Mozambique the field work will be

carried out in approximately 20 working days per team member

While in the field all logistical support costs will provided by the contractor and not by the

Missions. This includes travel and transportation (surface and air), lodging, office space, office equipment and supplies, etc.

The teams will inform the Mission of the countries visited of areas that will be considered.

Upon return from the field, each team will review its findings and will prepare a draft country

report. When all the country studies have been completed, Mission comments received and

the final reports prepared, the Contractor's core technical staff will prepare a synthesis of findings and recommendations, drawing out lessons learned about what works, what does not

work and why, from both the operational and policy perspectives.

AID/Washington and USAID Missions would be expected to collect all existing data and reports and other relevant records for the team before their arrival to the countries being identified. To the extent possible, USAID Missions should provide logistical support for the

team while in-country.

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Total duration of the evaluation will be approximately three months with a target completion date of September 21, 1993.

### V. Country Selection

All drought- affected countries in the southern Africa region, including South Africa and excluding Angola, which received USG food and/or non-food assistance will be assessed. The region will be broken into four areas, each of which will be visited by one team, as follows: 1) Zimbabwe and South Africa, 2) Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia, 3)

Zambia and Malawi, and 4) Mozambique.

### VI. Team Composition and Level of Effort

In conducting these country assessments, the contractor will provide at least four teams of specialists; one team for each of the areas specified above. Given the range of skills required

to carry out this scope of work and the short time frame, the background of these specialists

will vary, but all of the following areas of expertise must be represented:

- Language skills and country specific experience
- Agricultural economics
- Public health/nutrition
- Rural Water
- Social Anthropology
- Food Logistics
- PL 480 Program Regulations and WFP Procedures
- Policy analysis/program design/evaluation
- UN System
- Disaster Management

The team leaders will be on the contractor's core technical staff. While continuity in the evaluation team is assumed, it is not essential for the same consultants to go to all the countries.

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### VII. Reports

The team will submit a report on each country as well as a synthesis containing an analysis of

those factors that appear to determine program effectiveness. recommendations on how A.I.D. can improve its programming of emergency food aid and non-food aid and lessons learned. Before departure from each country, the team will have engaged the USAID in a dialogue concerning their findings and recommendations. The draft country reports are due to

AID/Washington no later than two weeks after each team has returned to the United States.

Fifty copies will be delivered. The Missions will be asked to complete their reviews and respond with comments by cable within two weeks of receiving the draft. The Contractor will

conduct a debriefing in Washington for AID and all interested parties within one month of

the return of all teams. The final report (including an executive summary and synthesis of findings, recommendations and lessons learned) will be completed by the Contractors within

two weeks of receiving all Mission comments. Fifty copies of this report will be delivered to

FHA/OFDA, who will distribute to all interested parties including FHA/FFP, AFR/SA, SADIF, LEG, CDIE and InterAction.