



2006:6

Joint Evaluation

Claude de Ville de Goyet
Lezlie C. Morinière

The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response

Executive Summary

The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response

Executive Summary

**Claude de Ville de Goyet
Lezlie C. Morinière**

Joint Evaluation 2006:6

This publication was originally published by Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) and can be ordered from: <http://www.alnap.org> or alnap@odi.org.uk

This digital edition is a special version only published in Sida's publication data base and can be downloaded from: www.sida.se/publications.

Joint Evaluation 2006:6

Authors: Claude de Ville de Goyet, Lezlie C. Morinière.

The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida, Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision.


Commissioned by Sida, TEC, Actionaid, BMZ, CIDA, Coraid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision.

Copyright: The authors and the organisations commissioning the evaluation.

Date of Final Report: July 2006

Published by: Edita

Art. no. SIDA61334en



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response: **Executive summary**

July 2006

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26 December 2004.

The TEC is managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) of agencies and TEC staff are hosted by the ALNAP Secretariat. The CMG provides general oversight and direction for the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. Since February 2005 CMG members have included representatives from: *Donors*: Danida, SDC and Sida; *UN agencies*: FAO, OCHA (Chair), UNDP, UNICEF and WHO; *NGOs/Red Cross*: CARE International UK, AIDMI, IFRC and World Vision International; *Networks/research institutes*: the ALNAP Secretariat and Groupe URD.

The TEC has three main aims:

1. To improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longer term recovery and development.
2. To provide accountability to the donor and affected-country populations on the overall tsunami response (from the point of view of TEC member agencies).
3. To test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation.

More information on the TEC can be found in the TEC's Synthesis Report and on the TEC's website: www.tsunami-evaluation.org

The TEC's thematic evaluations

This evaluation is one of five thematic joint evaluations undertaken by the TEC. The other four studies in the series comprise: coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries; impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities; the funding response to the tsunami, and links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in the tsunami response.

This evaluation is published alongside these other four studies together with the TEC's Synthesis Report, making a set of six. The Synthesis Report draws together learning and recommendations contained in these TEC studies as well as over 170 additional reports.

ISBN: 0 85003 808 1

© TEC

London, July 2006

Suggested citation: de Ville de Goyet, C & L Morinière (2006) *The role of needs assessment in the tsunami response*. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing the source is acknowledged. ALNAP, which facilitates the TEC, would appreciate receiving details of its use. Requests for commercial reproduction should be directed to ALNAP. Contact: alnap@odi.org.uk

For further copies of this publication please contact:

ALNAP

c/o Overseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge Road

London SE1 7JD, UK

Tel: + 44(0)207 922 0300

Fax: + 44(0)207 922 0399

Email: alnap@odi.org.uk

Website: www.alnap.org

This report represents the views of the authors only. They are not necessarily those of the managing or funding agencies.


Management of the evaluation

This evaluation was managed by representatives from FAO, SDC and WHO.

To assist these agencies with the implementation of the evaluation, the International Centre for Migration and Health (ICMH) was contracted to facilitate administrative and logistical support.

Financial contributions to the evaluation

This TEC evaluation was made possible through the financial support of BMZ (Germany); CIDA (Canada); DFID (UK); FAO; SDC (Switzerland); USAID (United States); WFP; and WHO.



Executive summary

The tsunami struck the Indian Ocean region on 26 December 2004. In the 14 affected countries, over 225,000 people died or are still missing. Overall, an estimated two million people have been directly or indirectly affected, and 1.7 million of these were internally displaced.

This evaluation is one of five thematic evaluations undertaken by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) on the international humanitarian response to the tsunami. The other four in the series cover: coordination; the impact of the response on local and national capacities; linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development; and the funding response to the tsunami. This report evaluates the adequacy, appropriateness and effectiveness of the assessment of need in the first three months after the tsunami. It focuses on the impact of assessment on the response of international agencies and institutional donors and, ultimately, on the affected populations.

Over 300 officials or actors from over 50 agencies were interviewed for this study in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and seven donor countries. National consultants and research associates assisted in the review

of approximately 200 reports prepared in the first months after the tsunami. Non-structured interviews with 135 affected individuals were also conducted during the field visits.

There are several distinct types of needs assessment that are not easily compared:

- assessments of short-term, fast-changing and most immediate humanitarian needs, such as health, food and shelter, in contrast with assessments of damage and loss (economic valuation of recovery needs)
- cross-sectoral assessments versus more specialised thematic or sectoral surveys
- formal, structured and often scientific assessments as compared to descriptive compilations fuelling situation analysis
- assessments available or intended for general, common use as opposed to those left unshared and kept for internal agency planning.

The main body of this report reviews assessments intended to influence the decision making of the international community at large. Most findings focus

particularly on UN or interagency reports, as needs assessment from the Red Cross movement were not formally available to the evaluators. Selected sectoral or thematic assessments – on health, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, livelihood recovery (in particular fishing) and shelter – are reviewed in greater depth in the annexes to this report.

General findings

The following criteria are used to describe the needs assessments: timeliness, coverage, validity, coordination and continuity. The effectiveness of needs assessments is reviewed in terms of added value, dissemination and influence on appeals and decisions.

Timeliness of humanitarian needs assessment was determined by the capacity of the agency to identify qualified personnel, mobilise logistical means and inform the decision makers on the magnitude of need. Many actors rushed to the affected areas in an attempt to identify the most urgent needs of the affected population in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The mass media, not the UN or another humanitarian body, was able to provide early and 'convincing' comprehensive formal assessment of immediate needs. If the timeliness of UN and Red Cross assessments directed to a broad audience was questionable, the assessments carried out by agencies for their own planning were, by design, timely, as decisions were dependent on the outcome of those assessments.

Needs assessments for recovery, especially the damage and loss assessments carried out by the international financial institutions (IFIs), were remarkably early compared to what has been achieved in other disasters. In Indonesia, recovery assessments were initiated within days of the tsunami.

Providing comprehensive coverage of needs was difficult, given the geographical scope and magnitude of the impact. In fact, no cross-sectoral humanitarian needs assessment covered all affected areas even in any single country. Wider geographical coverage was achieved in thematic humanitarian surveys (on nutrition, food and disease surveillance) and in specialised livelihood assessments (on food and shelter, for instance) but coverage was best achieved by the economic macro-assessments of damage and loss.

Little information on methodology is available to judge the validity of the many needs assessments reviewed. A few shortcomings are evident, however: the lack of a unique format for rapid assessments; the variable definition of who is affected and eligible for assistance; and the tendency of assessors to disregard local coping capacity as if none of the needs were or would be met by national or local actors. The confusion about target population and the number of potential beneficiaries was still a major issue at the time of the evaluation (September 2005).

Coordination was best in countries with a strong government, such as in Thailand, India and the Maldives. A serious effort toward international coordination of initial needs assessment was noted in Sri Lanka where donors, UN agencies and one single NGO joined forces, and in Indonesia in the case of the inter-agency health assessment from the USS Abraham Lincoln air carrier.

Humanitarian needs change very fast as assistance pours in and priorities of the affected households shift toward recovery. The humanitarian community was not able to monitor the evolution of those short-term needs on an ongoing basis, except in a few limited sectoral areas (for instance, communicable diseases risk and, at times, food availability). Humanitarian needs assessments rapidly became obsolete.

Household livelihood needs (for example, for boats and housing) changed less quickly, and mechanisms were progressively put in place to monitor those needs in real time.

The above technicalities would be inconsequential if the needs assessments were effective in guiding the international response. Although internal assessments (those carried out by agencies for their own programming) may have been effective, assessments intended for public use by other actors were not so. The slow moving humanitarian needs assessment did not drive the initial humanitarian response. The availability of enormous amounts of funds in search of activities was the driving force.

A major weakness was the absence of any perceived added value of those humanitarian assessments for decision making. Other factors included the lack of analysis and compilation of a comprehensive picture of what the priorities ought to be, the climate of 'competitive compassion' preventing the dissemination of internal reports and data to other actors, and the extreme pressure from donors (public and government) to use the funding promptly. In brief, the mass media seems to have been the prime if not only influential source of information on needs for individual or institutional decision makers, outside the affected countries. Reports from the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC) or the Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT), the UNDAC equivalent in the Red Cross system, notoriously failed to influence their respective constituencies.

As a result the international response was a poor match for the real aspirations of the people affected by the tsunami, who felt over-assessed but not consulted – as

shown by the non-representative sample of households interviewed in this evaluation and the more comprehensive survey within the TEC evaluation on local capacity (see TEC Capacities Report, 2006). A notable exception was the empowerment of affected households achieved through several cash-based programmes implemented by the Red Cross and NGOs.

Conclusions

Many, if not all, of the shortcomings noted by the evaluators have also occurred in past sudden-impact natural disasters, from Hurricane Mitch in Central America to the earthquakes in Gujarat (India) and Bam (Iran). Undoubtedly, there were also unique circumstances affecting the tsunami response: the fact that Southeast Asia is an area of important geopolitical and economic transition; Aceh's civil conflict taking place in the largest Muslim country in the world; the presence of many tourists among the victims; and timing coinciding with holidays in much of the Western world. Above all, however, the intensity of media coverage and the literally overwhelming generosity of the public distinguish this disaster rather than its geographical scale, logistical constraints or the security and political environments.

Generous funding not only exceeded the absorption capacity of an overstretched humanitarian industry, and deprived it of its customary excuse for built-in systemic shortcomings, but also led to the proliferation of new actors with insufficient experience (and therefore competence) as well as to established actors venturing into activities outside their normal area of expertise. Finally, the relative excess of funding was a disincentive to assess, to coordinate and to apply the results of the few collective assessments.

This evaluation compared the performance of livelihood recovery needs assessment to assessment covering short-term humanitarian needs. Assessment in the first few days presents a formidable challenge compared to that carried out weeks later. The short life of humanitarian needs also renders assessment obsolete almost as soon as it is completed. Finally, fewer (and often more experienced) agents focused on recovery, while a plethora of often inexperienced actors organised the more immediate and visible humanitarian activities. Humanitarian agencies have much to learn from the successful approach adopted by the IFIs: expedient cooperation among all partners (above all, the national governments), significant influx of expertise and visibility, and use of teams of analysts to reconcile and compile the various sources of information.

Assessments should differentiate and prioritise between different types of need: those resulting from pre-existing conditions, those truly life-threatening, those that are better met locally and, finally, those perceived as priority by the 'beneficiaries' themselves rather than by the assessing agencies. Too often situation reports and assessments served the interests or mandate of the assessing agency more than those of the potential beneficiaries.

Assessments were carried out by a large number of organisations or teams created for and dedicated to the purpose of generating or managing information. This evaluation reviewed organisations including UNDAC, the Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC), FACT, the sectoral or cluster lead agencies, and numerous bilateral teams.

- UNDAC needs significant strengthening. Scarce human resources focused more on coordinating the large number of partners in Indonesia than on contributing to the assessment and analysis of new and useful information

portraying unmet need. It is urgently necessary to rethink the whole donor-based concept of UNDAC.

- HIC is an excellent initiative in the aftermath of natural disasters. It should become part of a broader UN knowledge management capacity with a more analytical as opposed to archiving function. Documents available in HIC archives were out of date and not often of practical relevance.
- Interviews and documents received through informal networks strongly suggest that the Red Cross movement's FACT had no more impact on the decision to dispatch the Emergency Response Units (ERUs) of participating Red Cross Societies than UNDAC had on governmental and non-governmental interventions. The audience of Recovery Assessment Team (RAT) reports was restricted to the Red Cross movement. Their influence on guiding the recovery response toward the priorities of affected families could not be ascertained.
- UN agencies leading a given sector (or cluster under the new OCHA terminology) are responsible for both informing and guiding the response in their area of expertise. The direct execution of relief projects distracted some of the agencies from this primary responsibility. A contradiction between technical priorities (identified locally through needs assessment) and those adopted at policy level (in headquarters) affected the credibility of the lead agency in some sectors.
- Three international actors played an increasingly important role in the aftermath of the tsunami: the IFIs that acted earlier and with better coordination than in past disasters; the foreign military whose interventions were massive albeit costly; and of course the mass media that indirectly

influenced (and arguably determined) most of the key strategic decisions at public and government level in the Western world. Interaction of humanitarian organisations with the latter two actors was largely ineffective.

- One source of needs assessment was systematically overlooked: the national and district authorities. All international assessments relied heavily on data collected by local authorities. The weakness at national levels, especially in Indonesia, was in the validation, compilation and dissemination of these raw data. A modest external investment in building national capacity would have gone a long way toward providing a consolidated picture of needs – the ‘big picture’ that, in the opinion of many donors and decision makers, was sorely missing from the overall response.

Many government agencies and NGOs carried out censuses of subgroups of the affected populations. Most of the affected households in Sri Lanka are probably registered into several independent databases. Some registers are cross-sectoral but limited to the clientele of a specific NGO or Red Cross Society; others are thematic but nationwide (on agriculture, fishery, welfare, or housing, for example). A centralised common database would have been possible and far more effective.

Overall, the international humanitarian response to the tsunami was insufficiently evidence-based. Despite the weakness in needs assessment, however, the response was arguably effective. Effectiveness, in all fairness, was the least to be expected given the large amount of funds (around US\$8,000) allocated per survivor. Efficient it was not. The response was often excessive in areas or sectors granting more visibility and, at times, was outright inappropriate. As documented in some sectors, the problem was not merely technical but political.

Agencies organising assessments were too often unwilling to use their findings to discourage self-serving forms of assistance. This observation leads to the most fundamental question: why invest in initial, formal cross-sectoral humanitarian assessment, if the results are mostly irrelevant to key decision making?

Recommendations

The 17 recommendations are derived from this evaluation, and suggest steps toward the following overall objectives to improve international needs assessment:

- The international community should adopt a more pragmatic approach to needs assessment (recommendations 1–5).
- Transferring back to the affected populations the power of decision making will alleviate the need for thematic assessment by outsiders (recommendation 6).
- Streamlining the many currently duplicating or competing assessment mechanisms will improve the quality of the assessment (recommendations 7–10).
- The mass media will continue to play a determining role (recommendation 11).
- New financial and administrative arrangements are essential to mobilise assessment teams rapidly and effectively (recommendations 12 and 13).
- A change of attitude is required – quality control and accountability should be brought into the world’s largest ‘unregulated industry’ (recommendations 14–16).
- All affected individuals or households should be registered in a central database, also including details of their situation and needs (recommendation 17).

1. The UN and Red Cross should either invest massively in rapid humanitarian needs assessment or stop pretending that assessment influences decision making.
2. Donors and agencies should continue investing in early, high quality needs assessment for livelihood recovery.
3. All should invest in building national assessment capacity (preparedness).
4. Future assessment should be conducted jointly with national authorities and be the subject of formal agreement made in advance of any future disaster.
5. Initial rapid assessment with national government should make greater use of remote sensing (satellite imagery).
6. Adopt a cash-based response when possible.
7. UN and Red Cross should join forces to support the government in the rapid initial assessment of need.
8. The UN should integrate all assessment support components of its response (UNDAC, HIC, and UNJLC) into one knowledge management programme. Human and material resources for coordination and assessment should be clearly separated.
9. OCHA should increase its capacity to analyse data and provide a comprehensive consolidated and ongoing picture of the needs and gaps.
10. Specialised sectoral lead agencies should not be distracted from their primary assessment and coordination functions and drawn into direct implementation of humanitarian activities.
11. Embedding mass media representatives in rapid assessment teams should be more seriously considered.
12. Funding should be earmarked and routinely made available for rapid assessment.
13. UN procurement and recruitment procedures must be improved to secure immediate human resources and logistic support. If not possible, outsourcing should be considered.
14. Past the immediate emergency, donors should make their funding conditional upon solid assessment and a clear plan for monitoring the evolution of need.
15. The UN should improve the reliability of the estimated number of affected individuals and their needs. It should also proactively discourage inappropriate forms of assistance.
16. Assessment capacity should be one criterion in the proposed international accreditation of humanitarian organisations.
17. All affected individuals/households should be registered in a central database managed jointly by the national authorities, the UN and other international actors.

Joint Evaluations

1996:1 The international response to conflict and genocide: lessons from the Rwanda experience: Synthesis Report

John Eriksson, Howard Adelman, John Borton, Krishna Kumar, Hanne Christensen, Astri Suhrke, David Tardif-Douglin, Stein Villumstad, Lennart Wohlgemuth

Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996.

1997:1 Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO Evaluation Synthesis Study.

Stein-Erik Kruse, Timo Kyllönen, Satu Ojanperä, Roger C. Riddell, Jean-Louis Vielajus

Min of Foreign Affairs Finland, OECD-DAC, Sida, 1997.

1997:2 Measuring and Managing Results: Lessons for Development Cooperation: Performance Management

Derek Poate

UNDP/OESP Sida, 1997.

2003:1 Local Solutions to Global Challenges: Towards Effective Partnership in Basic Education. Final Report. Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic Education in Developing Countries.

Ted Freeman, Sheila Dohoo Faure

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CIDA, DFID, Department for Foreign Affairs Ireland, EU, BMZ, JICA, Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy Burkina Faso, Danida, Norad, Sida, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank. 2003.

2003:2 Toward Country-led Development : a Multi-Partner Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework : Synthesis report

Carol Lancaster, Alison Scott, Laura Kullenberg, Paul Collier, Charles Soludo, Mirafe Marcos, John Eriksson, Alison Scott; Ibrahim Elbadawi; John Randa,

World Bank, OED, CIDA, Danida, Norad, ODI, JICA, Sida, 2003.

- 2005:1 Support to Internally Displaced Persons: Learning from Evaluation. Synthesis Report of a Joint Evaluation Programme.**
John Borton, Margie Buchanan Smith, Ralf Otto
Sida, 2005.
- 2005:2 Support to Internally Displaced Persons: Learning from Evaluation. Synthesis Report of a Joint Evaluation Programme: Summary Version**
John Borton, Margie Buchanan Smith, Ralf Otto
Sida, 2005.
- 2005:3 Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001- 2005: From Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom; A Joint Evaluation. Main report**
Danida, Sida, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Copenhagen, DFID, Development Cooperation Ireland, BMZ, 2005.
- 2005:4 Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001–2005: From Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom; A Joint Evaluation. Summary**
Danida, Sida, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Copenhagen, DFID, Development Cooperation Ireland, BMZ, 2005.
- 2005:5 An Independent External Evaluation of the International Fund or Agricultural Development**
Derek Poate, team leader, Charles Parker, Margaret Slettevold ...
IFAD, Sida, CIDA, 2005.
- 2006:1 Joint Evaluation of the International response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report**
John Telford, John Cosgrave, contribution Rachel Houghton
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Action aid, AusAID, BMZ CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, Sida, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision, 2006.

2006:2 Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities

Elisabeth Scheper, Arjuna Parakrama, Smruti Patel, contribution Tony Vaux

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ, CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, Sida, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision, 2006.

2006:3 Coordination of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-affected countries

Jon Bennett, William Bertrand, Clare Harkin, Stanley Samarasinghe, Hemantha Wickramatillake

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ, CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, Sida, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision, 2006.

2006:4 Funding the Tsunami Response: A synthesis of findings

Michael Flint, Hugh Goyder

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ, CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, Sida, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision, 2006.

2006:5 Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the Tsunami response: A synthesis of initial findings

Ian Christoplos

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ, CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, Sida, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision, 2006.

- 2006:6 The role of needs assessment in the Tsunami response – Executive summary**
 Claude de Ville de Goyet, Lezlie C Morinière
 Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Actionaid, AusAID, BMZ, CIDA, Cordaid, Danida, Dara, Irish Aid, DFID, FAO, IFRD, Federal Min for Economic Cooperation and Development Germany, JICA, Min des Affaires Étrangères France, Min des Affaires Étrangères Luxembourg, Norad, NZAID, DEZA, Sida, UN, UNDP, UNFPA, Unicef, Usaid, WFP, WHO, World Vision, 2006.
- 2006:7 Evaluation of Coordination and Complementarity of European Assistance to Local Development: with Reference to the 3C Principles of the Maastricht Treaty**
 Robert N. LeBlanc and Paul Beaulieu
 Sida, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austria, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development Cooperation. Belgium, Min. des Affaires étrangères/Direction General de la Cooperation International, France, Department of Foreign Affairs Development Co-operation Division, Ireland and Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Directorate-General for International Cooperation, the Netherlands, 2006.
- 2007:1 Evaluation of General Budget Support – Note on Approach and Methods. Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994–2004**
 AFD, DFID, MOFA, NZAID, USAID, AusAID, BMZ, JBIC, NORAD, Danida, SECO, CIDA, JICA, Min of Foreign Affairs Spain, Portuguese Development Cooperation, Sida, 2007.
- 2007:2 Evaluating Co-ordination, Complementarity and Coherence in EU development policy: a synthesis**
 Evaluation Services of the European Union, Sida, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Austria,
 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development Cooperation. Belgium, Min. des Affaires étrangères/Direction General de la Cooperation International, France, Department of Foreign Affairs Development Co-operation Division, Ireland and Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Directorate-General for International Cooperation, Netherlands, 2007.

2007:3 Evaluating Democracy Support: Methods and Experiences.

Sida, Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2007.

2007:4 Peer Review Evaluation Function at the World Food

Programme (WFP). Peer Panel Members: Jock Baker, Stefan Dahlgren, Susanne Frueh, Ted Kliet, Zenda Ofir. Advisors to the Panel: Ian Christoplos, Peta Sandison Sida, BMZ, UNEG, WFP, 2007.

2008:1 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation: Lessons from Botswana, Eritrea, India, Malawi and South Africa: Synthesis Report

Anneke Slob, Alf Morten Jerve

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

2008:1:1 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation: Summary of a Joint Donor Evaluation

Jesper Heldgaar

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

2008:1:2 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation: India Country Case Study

Albert de Groot, CK Ramachandran, Anneke Slob, Anja Willemsen, Alf Morten Jerve

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

2008:1:3 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation: South Africa Country Case Study

Elling N Tjønneland, Pundy Pillay, Anneke Slob, Anje Willemsen, Alf Morten Jerve

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

2008:1:4 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation: Eritrea Country Case Study

Teferi Michael, Rudy Ooijen, Anneke Slob, Alf Morten Jerve

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

**2008:1:5 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation:
Malawi Country Case Study**

Esther van der Meer, Arne Tostensen, Anneke Slob, Alf Morten Jerve

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

**2008:1:6 Managing Aid Exit and Transformation:
Botswana Country Case Study**

Sida, Netherland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida and Norad, 2008.

Charity Kerapeletswe, Jan Isaksen, Anneke Slob, Alf Morten Jerve

**2008:2 Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris
Declaration: Phase One Synthesis Report**

Bernard Wood, Dorte Kabell, Nansozi Muwanda, Francisco Sagasti

International Reference Group comprising members of the DAC Network on Development Evaluation, 2008.

**2008:3 Joint Evaluation of Citizen's Voice and
Accountability: Synthesis Report**

Alina Rocha Menocal, Bhavna Sharma

Commissioned by Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (Belgium) – DGCD, Danish International Development Assistance – Danida, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany) – BMZ, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC, Department for International Development – DFID, 2008.

**2009:1 Anti-Corruption Approaches: A Literature
Review**

Arne Disch, Endre Vigeland, Geir Sundet

Commissioned by Asian Development Bank - ADB, Danish International Development Assistance – Danida, Department for International Development - DFID, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad, Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation - SADEV, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida, 2009.

2009:2 Public Financial Management Reform Literature Review

Carole Pretorius, Nico Pretorius
(Evaluation Report EV698)

Commissioned by Department for International Development – DFID, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida, Canadian International Development Agency – CIDA, African Development Bank – AfDB, 2009.

2009:3 A ripple in development? Long term perspectives on the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: A joint follow-up evaluation of the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)

Emery Brusset (team leader), Mihir Bhatt, Karen Bjornestad, John Cosgrave, Anne Davies, Adrian Ferf, Yashwant Deshmukh, Joohi Haleem, Silvia Hidalgo, Yulia Immajati, Ramani Jayasundere, Annina Mattsson, Naushan Muhaimin, Adam Pain, Riccardo Polastro, Treena Wu.

Commissioned by LRRD2 Joint Steering Committee, Sida, Norad, Danida, the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs, CIDA, BAPPENAS, Indonesia; BRR, Indonesia;

Ministry for Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka, Ministry for National Building, Sri Lanka; ISDR, Bangkok; IFRC, Bangkok; CARE International; OCHA; UNICEF, 2009.

2009:3:1 A ripple in development? Document review: Annotated bibliography prepared for the joint follow-up evaluation of the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) in responses to the Indian Ocean tsunami

John Cosgrave, with the assistance of: Emery Brusset, Mihir Bhatt, Yashwant Deshmukh, Lucia Fernandez, Yulia Immajati, Ramani Jayasundere, Annina Mattsson, Naushan Muhaimin, Riccardo Polastro

Commissioned by LRRD2 Joint Steering Committee, Sida; Norad; Danida; the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs; CIDA; BAPPENAS, Indonesia; BRR, Indonesia; Ministry for Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka; Ministry for National Building, Sri Lanka; ISDR, Bangkok; IFRC, Bangkok; CARE International; OCHA; UNICEF, 2009.

2009:3:2 A ripple in development? Long term perspectives on the response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami: A joint follow-up evaluation of the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) – Summary Report

Emery Brusset (team leader), Mihir Bhatt, Karen Bjornestad, John Cosgrave, Anne Davies, Adrian Ferf, Yashwant Deshmukh, Joochi Haleem, Silvia Hidalgo, Yulia Immajati, Ramani Jayasundere, Annina Mattsson, Naushan Muhaimin, Adam Pain, Riccardo Polastro, Treena Wu.

Commissioned by LRRD2 Joint Steering Committee, Sida; Norad; Danida; the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs; CIDA; BAPPENAS, Indonesia; BRR, Indonesia; Ministry for Plan Implementation, Sri Lanka; Ministry for National Building, Sri Lanka; ISDR, Bangkok; IFRC, Bangkok; CARE International; OCHA; UNICEF, 2009.

2010:1 Evaluation of the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) 2007–2010.

Anne Thomson, Dennis Chiwele, Oliver Saasa, Sam Gibson

Commissioned by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark – Danida, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida, Irish Aid, 2010.

2011:1 Supporting Child Rights – Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries: Final Report

Arne Tostesen, Hugo Stokke, Sven Trygged, Kate Halvorsen

Commissioned by Swedish International Development Agency – Sida and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad, 2011.



The Role of Needs Assessment in the Tsunami Response Executive Summary

This evaluation is one of five thematic evaluations undertaken by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) on the international humanitarian response to the tsunami. This report evaluates the adequacy, appropriateness and effectiveness of the assessment of need in the first three months after the tsunami. It focuses on the impact of assessment on the response of international agencies and institutional donors and, ultimately, on the affected populations.

SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden.

Visiting address: Valhallavägen 199.

Phone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Fax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64.

www.sida.se sida@sida.se