

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I. Introduction

In 2000 ECHO began channelling relief to Zimbabwe to save lives and alleviate the suffering caused by Cyclone Eline. With the onset of a severe and well publicized drought in 2002, ECHO stayed and eventually opened an office in January 2003. With land reform, other political and economic developments, and another drought in 2005 the crisis evolved but continued to be primarily characterized by: (i) severe shortages of staple food, drugs, water, fuel and energy; (ii) hyperinflation (200-1,200%); (iii) the collapse of government funded services and social safety nets; and (iv) deepening rural and urban poverty. Equally ECHO's portfolio evolved guided by the changing nature of the crisis and by responses based upon best practices in humanitarian aid (HA). So far, five DG ECHO humanitarian aid decisions have benefited Zimbabwe with a total commitment of Euro 80.26 million of which the first two decisions (totalling Euro 38.26 million covering the period 2002 – 2003) have since been positively evaluated in 2004.

II. Purpose and Methodology

Purpose

The subject of this Evaluation are the ECHO-funded humanitarian operations in Zimbabwe during the period 2004 and 2005, to which Euro 30 million was committed through two Decisions each with a budget of Euro 15,000,000: (i) ECHO/ZWE/210/2004/01000; and (ii) ECHO/ZWE/210/2005/01000. Total expenditure from these two decisions was Euro 29,160,758.22 (Euro 14,223,254.22 for 2004 and Euro 14,937,404.00 for 2005) apportioned approximately per sector as follows: food security 35%; food aid 15%; water, sanitation, health and nutrition 42%; IDPs 6%; HA coordination (1%); and ECHO country programme management 1%.

The evaluation fulfils Article 18 of Regulation (EC) 1257/96 which requires the Commission to “regularly assess humanitarian aid operations financed by the Community” in order to (a) establish whether they have achieved their objectives and (b) produce guidelines for improving the effectiveness of subsequent operations. The evaluation addresses these two issues at three levels of ECHO's strategy: Global; Operational; and Sector.

Methodology

The evaluation team started its mission in Brussels with a full briefing by DG ECHO, AIDCO and DG DEV during the period 3 – 6 July 2006. An in-country phase followed from 7 – 28 July 2006 during which the experts held in-depth meetings with the ECHO Technical Team, the Head of the EU Delegation to Zimbabwe and relevant professionals within the EC Delegation. Interviews were held with 13 ECHO Partners, half of which were subsequently randomly selected for detailed project follow-up through beneficiary interviews in targeted districts. At least two partners per thematic area and one district per partner were randomly selected for these field visits. Homogeneity in packages of assistance offered per thematic area enabled the team to emphasise depth, as opposed to breadth of coverage of operations. At the end of the country visit, the Team shared their preliminary findings and recommendations with ECHO Partners through a Workshop. Their comments enriched this Report.

III. Main Conclusions

Global Objective

Analysis of strategy and methodology of elaborating decisions: In 2004 and 2005 Zimbabwe was no longer in a classic emergency situation. Transitory vulnerability initially caused by Cyclone Eline in February 2000 and then by drought in 2001-3 had declined. However, the population in chronic vulnerability was increasing as a result of: (i) economy-wide impacts of land reform; (ii) HIV and AIDS (1.8 million infected; and 1.3 million children orphaned); (iii) inappropriate economic management policies; (iv) declining capacity for service provision in the public sector; and (v) consequences of Operation Restore Order/Murambatsvina (Annex 1).

The objective of continuing “*to support the implementation of an integrated emergency intervention to reduce extreme vulnerability of the population groups at particular risk in Zimbabwe*” underlying DG ECHO Humanitarian Aid Decisions 2004 and 2005 was thus not only needed but well aligned with Articles 1 and 2(b) of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid. Article 2(b) in particular provides for provision of necessary assistance and relief to people affected by longer-lasting crises “*especially where their own governments prove unable to help*”. Zimbabwe was clearly in this situation of protracted humanitarian crisis and declining state service delivery capacity. Hence not just ECHO but other donors (USAID and DFID) pursued similar protracted relief and recovery operations.

ECHO’s change in strategy in 2004-5 from classic relief to a value-adding package of instruments geared at addressing both short-term needs and the link to rehabilitation and development, was aligned with its objective to improve aid effectiveness, reduce vulnerability and prepare for exit which was achieved to some extent in agriculture.

Whilst the shift in strategy was important, **ECHO’s mandate, tools, timeframe and procurement rules in some instances became too restrictive for this medium-to-long term development objective.** The limitation of ECHO’s Financial Regulation/Framework Partnership Agreement was evident through interventions in WATSAN, agricultural recovery and health/nutrition which could not provide the needed funding or capacity building support to critical government institutions (DDF, AGRITEX, etc) and compromised programme delivery, aid effectiveness and sustainability of results.

With above average rainfall received during 2005/6 season, problems in Zimbabwe’s rural water sector are no longer to do with natural disasters per se but declining government and community capacities to service and repair the bush pump. This problem arises from scarcity of foreign exchange, inflationary costs of spares, lack/or high cost of transport to move spares to water points, and attrition of trained pump minders due to HIV and AIDS and emigration. The solutions to these problems are multi-faceted and would be more successfully addressed by **interventions with multi-year programming cycles and more holistic scope** than just “community- or non-state-actor - oriented”. Given the weak link between water coverage statistics and disease outbreaks, such programmes should ideally go beyond just repairing boreholes and **fully embrace sanitation and hygiene education** as well as other household needs in the context of a more elaborate “**water for life**” concept (Section 6.3).

In addition, ECHO’s nutrition and home based care interventions needed to be complemented by the supply of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) in order to have more impact. Since ARVs are best procured and distributed as a social welfare programme through state systems,

implementation of this component was not possible within the *modus operandi* of ECHO. Without ARVs, ECHO's home-based care interventions ran the risk of not only limited impact but duplicating WFP's Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) funded by the EC Food Security/Food Aid Budget Line and hence, had to be handed over to the EC Food Security/Food Aid Budget Line for integration into WFP's VGF programme. Under the circumstances, the EC is faced with a choice of **whether to perpetuate relief through ECHO operations** (which will have natural limitations with respect to impact and sustainability vis-à-vis underlying causes) or to **unveil new longer term development programmes** that can work with all stakeholders concerned to holistically revitalise collapsing systems that hitherto used to provide critical safety nets for the same vulnerable groups and once worked perfectly; thus allowing smooth phasing out of humanitarian aid. This dilemma equally confronts the EC and its Member States as it does other donors because of the political implications of funding such programmes in the context of the current impasse over governance issues in Zimbabwe. Hence renewed efforts are needed at **thawing the political stalemate** between the Zimbabwe government and the international community in recognition of the worsening plight of the poor.

In the context of partly frozen EC and other donor aid, by continuing with its operations in 2004-5, **ECHO filled a practical gap in both humanitarian and developmental aid**. In the rural water sector, ECHO was the largest single source of support. In agriculture, ECHO (in collaboration with FAO and ICRISAT) was first to complement relief with productivity enhancement packages that other donors have begun scaling up, eventually enabling ECHO to exit.

New initiatives in water, food security and OVC sectors, funded by the EC and/or other donors, are starting to improve resource-flows towards rehabilitation and development in Zimbabwe, namely: (i) EC-funded ACP-wide Water and Sanitation NGO Call For Proposals facility; (ii) the EC Food Security/Food Aid NGO Call for Proposals Facility; (iii) the pool-funded Programme of Support (PoS) for Orphans and Vulnerable Children in Zimbabwe; (iv) the EC-funded Micro-irrigation programme for smallholder farmers; (v) EC-funded STABEX 1995 Support to Farmers Unions and Farmers; and (iv) DFID-funded Protracted Relief Operation. Even in relief many donors are also funding priority areas such as IDPs. These create space for ECHO to **refocus on its mandate, restructure its portfolio, and possibly phase out some of its actions** (especially those of developmental nature) that are now in duplication with the new initiatives.

Assuming that these new initiatives are effective, and Zimbabwe is not struck by another natural or man-made disaster in the near term, this realignment could already in 2007 or at the latest in 2008 see **ECHO further reducing its allocation for Zimbabwe** as it concentrates on "unmet needs" and "areas of distinct comparative advantage and value-addition".

The analysis or formula used by ECHO to allocate resources between sectors is not clear. Some **flexibility to reallocate resources** between sectors on the basis of actual demand through Partners could be incorporated into future Humanitarian aid Decisions.

For its analysis of needs, DG ECHO largely depended on technical assessments carried out by thematic working groups individually or as part of UN-coordinated CAP. The information is useful for a macro-level picture but lacks district level disaggregation which is critical in matching aid response to actual need (see Section 3.3 on water and sanitation). Due to politicisation of HA information in Zimbabwe there is added value in DG ECHO investing in **independent needs assessments and feasibility studies** to inform its future decisions.

Coordination, coherence and complementarity: ECHO's financial support towards sectoral coordination of HA through specialised UN Partners proved valuable. Coordination of

emergency agricultural recovery programmes through FAO had high pay-offs: reduced duplication of assistance, greater coverage of most vulnerable groups, better harmonisation of approaches and more synergy in the package of support.

As the EC Delegation now manages a larger portfolio of programmes financing similar activities to those of ECHO in the water, food security, and OVC sectors, a mechanism to **formalise and strengthen coordination** is now needed between the technical team in the ECHO Country Office and that in the EC Delegation to strengthen complementarity and eliminate any unnecessary overlap.

There is scope for ECHO to use its competitive advantage in quick procurement and distribution of hardware items (and to some extent infrastructure rehabilitation) to **complement the programme activities managed by the EC Delegation** (funded by EDF and AIDCO resources) which could **focus more on longer-term issues of capacity building and institutional development**. In addition, as ECHO will be managing the Food Aid operations of the EC starting January 2007, there is also scope for ECHO's new relief mandate to complement on-going development activities spearheaded by the EC Delegation, through tested approaches such as food-for-asset creation.

Added Value and LRRD: ECHO added value to humanitarian programmes by funding their coordination. By jumpstarting technology adoption in smallholder agriculture, ECHO was successful in creating the model for LRRD which the Food Security NGO Call for Proposals facility and the new EC micro-irrigation programme can build upon. In the water sector, the necessary LRRD effect could not be generated as it needed in part **working with an already established system**, such as that put in place by government, DDF. Nevertheless, the new EC Water Facility presents an opportunity for ECHO to handover some of its activities such as drilling of new boreholes, hygiene and sanitation education and training of community institutions which are more of a developmental nature.

Seeing as child nutrition is complicated by HIV and AIDS and successful nutrition therapy and HBC require **attention to ARVs**, more predictable forms of support such as 10th EDF, Global AIDS Fund or Budget Support are more suitable to finance these actions than ECHO.

Operational Strategy

Due to the short-term mandate of ECHO, the focus at sector level was on achieving outputs. Many Partners **exceeded their output targets but this did not always translate into impact**. Restoration of water for instance did not necessarily translate into a reduction in cholera outbreaks nor did distribution of drip kits always result in increased food output. In future more outcome focused M&E systems are needed.

The specific timing of **ECHO's window** (March to Feb) did not allow for post-harvest impact assessment in the case of emergency agricultural programmes nor was it appropriate for WATSAN projects especially in cases of delayed signature of Agreements in Brussels. All partners had to suspend their activities during the rainfall period as roads were inaccessible. PHHE sessions were equally affected because most of them were conducted in the open. In future, ECHO might want to consider **adjusting its implementation window for water and sanitation projects to October to September**.

Although geographic targeting was good, less attention was paid to sharpening precision of individual targeting. In agriculture, the noble objective to target assistance to those able to use new technologies lacked an upper limit of inclusion for some of the interventions. Due to rapid changes in livelihood systems caused by HIV and AIDS, macro-economic instability and emigration, the vulnerable groups can no longer be geographically targeted nor identified

using traditional screening criteria like type of house, land ownership, household headship, marital status, or the burden of orphans (Section 3.1.2). **Sharper instruments for targeting need to be developed** on the basis of new empirical evidence on coping mechanisms especially when dealing with highly mobile and politicised groups (like IDPs).

With the high staff turnover in humanitarian NGOs, slow adaptation to relief by development NGOs and the emergence of relief NGOs with no experience working in Zimbabwe, the pool of dependable partners remained small for ECHO. ECHO faces a practical problem: that of insufficient number of partners if it tightens further its partner screening criteria. As Zimbabwe's humanitarian crisis gets protracted ECHO might have to **emphasise partner institutional development** as opposed to selective partnership building (Section 7.1).

Sector Strategy

Food security: ECHO's interventions in this sector during 2004 and 2005 filled a critical but non-conventional humanitarian gap, as most donors focused on food aid and shunned agricultural recovery. By broadening its package of assistance from just seed and fertiliser to new and more adapted farming techniques, ECHO enhanced the effectiveness and impact of its traditional instruments. However, ECHO's financing window was too short for drip kits, conservation farming, capacity building for local seed multiplication systems, and some elements of livestock rehabilitation and development. ECHO innovated by providing relief assistance to livestock-dependent communities but **missed the opportunity** to also restore assets of the ultra-poor (Section 6.1.1).

Water and sanitation: ECHO's WATSAN interventions reached 10% of the country's population and had positive sanitation spin-offs that also benefited OVCs and the elderly. Its implementation fell short by **marginalising women in the project cycle**, thereby compromising durability of results. As more women are taking over the responsibility of village pump minding, ECHO partners may need to weigh the suitability of this technology vis-à-vis others in relation to natural abilities of women to carry spares and fix the broken down components (Section 6.1.2). In addition, as the scarcity and cost of spares continues escalating, the question of **economic-appropriateness of the bush pump** needs re-examination, as does the issue of **the future role of the government**, especially DDF (Section 3.3.6). Priority should now be given to identifying and testing appropriate, affordable technologies, which have lower operation and maintenance requirements. As support to government is outside ECHO's mandate, **the necessity of other EC instruments** to rebuild service provision in the water sector becomes apparent (Section 6.1.2).

Internally Displaced Persons: Recognition by Zimbabwe of a right to have access to land for earning a livelihood and ownership of land for a permanent dwelling has so far been the stumbling block to resolving the plight of the growing mobile vulnerable population. Forced evictions of the vulnerable continue until today, though on a smaller scale than in May-July 2005 (Sections 3.5.1, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, 3.5.6). Whilst support to IDPs fits squarely within ECHO's mandate, three challenges confront ECHO. First is **determining the nature and magnitude of need** both in terms of the old case load of ex-commercial farm workers and the new caseload brought about by Murambatsvina. The **situation of rural IDPs is different from that of urban IDPs with the latter generally being in more acute situation than rural IDPs that have been getting humanitarian assistance for the past few years and some have been offered land and have gradually integrated into mainstream agricultural and/or other economic activity**. The needs of both quickly evolve even in a short space of time depending on income earning opportunities and forthcoming support from relatives. IDPs are highly mobile and even **ECHO partners lack precise information on the location**

of some and the exact size of the case load, partly due to absence of a robust tracking system (this would be politically sensitive). The main shortcoming of previous assistance to IDPs has been the absence of interventions to take care of their health needs. Whilst some of the IDPs are in designated camps in urban areas and their needs can be quantified others have reintegrated with their extended families, or settled on state land scattered in various parts of the country. Those that are not in camps also need support but are more difficult to find and target. Second, is **defining a clear exit strategy for support to IDPs to avoid the risk that they end up** better off than hosting communities (Section 6.1.3). Third, is **identifying the type of assistance that is feasible** within the peculiarities of Zimbabwe's policy context. For example, urban council bye-laws prohibit the construction of Blair latrines in urban areas, which limits the range of options for sanitation interventions for urban/peri-urban IDPs.

As ECHO looks into the future, therefore, **a proper situational analysis of IDPs** (mapping study) is vital as a starting point to inform future actions. Secondly, the **strategy should be phased on the basis of the space and conditions provided by the Government** for ECHO to intervene through its specialised Partners (such as IOM and UNICEF). As a number of donors are also providing support through the same Partners for the same target group, it is paramount that ECHO's actions continue to be strongly coordinated with those of other donors. The emphasis of ECHO should be on gap-filling. Where the Government has not provided land for permanent dwelling of IDPs, Type "A" assistance, comprising primarily **basic and temporary assistance**, should continue to be given mostly as non-food items (existing ECHO mandate) and food aid (new additional ECHO mandate). Such assistance may include temporary water supply (wells, mobile water tanks, etc); mobile clinic (only for basic care), temporary shelter, sanitation, etc. For IDPs that are eventually allocated plots, ECHO should graduate its assistance to Type "B" that provides **basic but permanent assistance** in the first year (such as boreholes, durable sanitation facilities, and basic components of shelter; clinics; and schools); and in the second year upgrade to Type "C" assistance that will facilitate exit - life skills and livelihoods training. Type "C" assistance may also include agricultural inputs (tillage, seed, fertiliser and agricultural chemicals). At Type "B" phase, ECHO could be innovative in introducing the concept of mobile doctors/panel doctors (doctors who volunteer to provide a service but with logistical and other forms of support from the ECHO partner) which could be passed onto other forms of EC support that could take over from ECHO and provide longer term development assistance (Type "D" assistance) from Year 4 onwards. At the same level (Type "B"), ECHO could in partnership with others provide the permanent shelter, **confining itself to minimum conditions** (superstructure and roofing materials) whilst others complement ECHO by providing brick moulding assistance to the IDPs. ECHO could also use its **food aid resources for public works** (food for asset creation) that help to build the social infrastructure needed by the IDPs before ECHO can exit.

Home-based Care for PLWHAs: Although valuable care was given, which alleviated the suffering of 3,500 families in three districts, and longer term impact was addressed through information, education and communication (IEC) on HIV-AIDS prevention to beneficiaries at food collection centres, defining a credible exit strategy to wean the project from cyclical external funding proved a big challenge. At present, the pipeline to the 3 districts is maintained by a WFP Integrated HIV-AIDS Programme serving 16,000 PLWHAs in 8 provinces. The experience proved that ECHO can provide some support but HBC should ideally be funded by a **more predictable (preferably pool-funded) aid instrument** which can be there for the long haul and can also provide ARV treatment and case monitoring in addition to basic care. As ECHO starts to manage global EU Food Aid operations in January

2007, the choice will be to continue complementing this larger Integrated HIV-AIDS effort by funding WFP or to handover this programme to more relevant EC/donor instruments that can provide both relief and development support on a long-term basis to PLWHAs.

Orphans and Vulnerable Children: The number of OVCs (last estimated in 2003 to be 1.3 million) continues to grow as more parents/care-takers die due to HIV-AIDS. In the 7 districts targeted, ECHO enabled school fees to be waived for 2 of every 5 OVCs amongst 5,200 needing help to stay in school. The Partner “block grants” that funded latrines or rainwater harvesters in schools, in lieu of cash for OVCs’ school fees, were an effective “passport” for enrolment and retention of OVCs in schools. However, these grants did not address the strategic needs of women that built latrines or repaired boreholes (Section 6.1.5).

Many **needs of OVCs remain unmet** as about 4 out of every 10 OVCs still lack access to essential food aid, health or education (UNICEF 2004 Survey). The mandate to reduce extreme vulnerability can be expected to be met when ECHO starts managing EU Food Aid operations, assuming greater humanitarian space is opened by GoZ. Through that instrument, it is essential that ECHO continues to **enable WFP and NSAs to maintain and expand the food aid pipeline for VGF**, including for school-based feeding of OVCs. Although in 2006, a pooled fund of USD \$40 million (PoS) is being made available to NGOs to enable OVCs to access essential education, health, social and legal services, **clothing and other NFIs remain unmet needs** for OVCs to remain in school. Assuming that food aid coverage for OVCs will expand under EU Food Aid operations, **ECHO could fill the gap by procuring NFIs, adding value to PoS grants to NGOs** to reduce extreme vulnerability, consistent with its mandate during a chronic humanitarian emergency (Sections 3.6.1 through 3.6.6). In the long run, such non-food items can be incorporated into the PoS, after ECHO has demonstrated how it works and its positive impact.

Prevention and Treatment of Severe Malnutrition in Children below 5 years of age: There are linked steps in the prevention of severe childhood malnutrition, involving household food security, episodic access to food aid, safe water, environmental hygiene and sanitation, access to health care and drugs and better nurturing by care-givers. ECHO’s experience confirms that **household food security is essential to sustain the gains of nutritional therapy** once the child has recovered and been discharged from a TFC. Current work by the EC, ECHO, DFID, FAO and others to reinforce household food and nutrition security strategies as well as access to safe water and the mitigation of HIV-AIDS impacts is a positive step towards reducing extreme vulnerability. With such inputs there is added value to fund, through an appropriate EC instrument, **home-production of fortified peanut butter to help children to sustainably recover from malnutrition whilst in their homes**, following the Malawi model (3.4.1 to 3.4.6).

By funding coordination of Partners to identify and treat severely malnourished children at community-level with drugs and nutritionals, referring to the district TFC if a child cannot be treated near home, ECHO reinforced the link between nutrition and HIV-AIDS interventions. One community malnutrition pilot site is linked to an NGO providing PMTCT by sharing EC-funded transport resources. The experience has shown that with therapeutic foods and sound nurturing, 3 out of every 4 severely malnourished children can recover. Recovery chances are less for the severely malnourished already HIV-infected. Therefore, **reducing extreme vulnerability of children to malnutrition needs primary HIV-AIDS prevention** so that parents are HIV-free before conceiving a child. Changes in sexual behavioural would be

required to reinforce with all adults the measures to reduce HIV risk, and can only be achieved through longer term programmes.

IV. Main Recommendations

Global Objective

Recommendation 1: After careful analysis of needs and gaps in aid responses, DG ECHO should restructure its portfolio of interventions in Zimbabwe with the view to refocusing on its mandate and, from 2007 onwards, start progressively phasing out those interventions that can be handed over to more suitable instruments such as: (i) the EC Food Security Budget Line; (ii) the EC Water Facility; (iii) the EC Micro-irrigation programme; (iv) EC Microprojects programme; (v) DFID's PRO; (vi) the Programme of Support for OVCs; and (vii) any other new programmes, when they become fully operational. Holding all things constant, this realignment should be expected to see ECHO already in 2007 or at the latest in 2008 reducing further its allocation for Zimbabwe as it concentrates only on "unmet needs" and in "areas of distinct comparative advantage".

Recommendation 2: A formal mechanism for ensuring coordination and complementarity between programmes funded by the EDF, ECHO and AIDCO should be developed and operationalised at EC Delegation/ECHO Country Team level.

Recommendation 3: The EC should through appropriate instruments, continue supporting HA coordination and policy advocacy through the most specialised UN partners (OCHA, FAO, UNICEF and IOM). The Food Security Budget Line for instance is best placed to takeover from ECHO the funding of coordination of agricultural recovery programmes.

Operational Strategy

Recommendation 4: ECHO should review, document and share information on best practices in targeting in each sector to assist Partners with low targeting effectiveness to improve their approaches. ECHO may need to commission a study to undertake a comparative analysis of targeting approaches to inform the development of such a publication and to organise a Partners Workshop to share these experiences.

Recommendation 5: ECHO in collaboration with other programmes of the EC Delegation, should periodically run in-country training sessions on Project Cycle Management and project proposal writing to strengthen Partner capacity.

Recommendation 6: Approval and signing of Partner Agreements should be speeded up in Brussels in order to enable Partners to implement their programmes ahead of the rains.

Recommendation 7: ECHO might want to explore feasibility of **adjusting its implementation window for water and sanitation projects to "October to September"**.

Sector Strategy

Specific Recommendations for the Food Security Sector

Recommendation 8: Depending on quality of rainfall, in 2006/7 DG ECHO may phase out its agricultural assistance programme in Zimbabwe in favour of more holistic interventions by AIDCO no later than February 2008. In the meantime, ECHO could continue with a targeted, smaller and more market-friendly portfolio in 2007 that is strongly coordinated with activities funded by the FSBL to avoid duplication. To allow the use of more market-friendly approaches in aid delivery ECHO may consider expansion of the FPA after first assessing feasibility.

Recommendation 9: As livestock is as central to livelihoods of poor communities in NR IV and V as crops are to the rest of the agro-ecological regions, the EC through relevant development instrument(s) should consider supporting a comprehensive package of assistance to rebuild livestock assets of the ultra poor in Natural Regions IV and V. The intervention should be modelled along best practice such as developed by the Heifer Project International Zimbabwe or by BRAC's Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction Programme in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, ECHO could continue with small livestock projects as part of relief.

Specific Recommendations for the Water and Sanitation Sector

Recommendation 10: In recognition of the large need and the limitations of the ECHO mandate, the EC should influence other donors to set up/pool-fund a comprehensive programme of support to resolve on a sustainable basis challenges affecting the WATSAN sector in Zimbabwe. Whilst this is being set up ECHO can in the meantime handover the drilling of new boreholes to the beneficiaries of grants from the EC Water Facility. Any new interventions by ECHO Partners should be guided by a Protocol on LRRD and gender issues in WATSAN.

Recommendation 11: The EC should support research into alternative technologies for the bush pump, such as the "rope and washer" technology for water points less than 30 metres deep.

Specific Recommendations for Cross-Cutting Themes of Management of Malnutrition, IDPs, OVCs

Recommendation 12: To guide ECHO's 2007 programme, a **nationwide IDP mapping study should be commissioned in 2006** covering both the old caseload of "commercial farm displacements" and the new caseload of "urban displacements" to obtain a full picture of the magnitude and geographical location of unmet needs. Where IDPs have not yet been allocated land for permanent dwelling ECHO should continue with **basic and temporary assistance** consisting of food aid, basic health care, water and sanitation, and other critical non-food items. For IDPs allocated land for permanent dwelling, ECHO's assistance **should graduate to more sustainable but still basic interventions**. For the latter group, ECHO's support should be programmed in such a way as to be **handed over after 3 years to other EC and non-EC longer-term programmes** which should **equally cater for** deserving cases in **IDP hosting communities** to prevent inequitable development. In the 3 years, ECHO should consider feasibility of **using food aid for asset creation** to rebuild critical social and economic infrastructure necessary for reintegration of IDPs into normal life.

Recommendation 13: DG ECHO or a more appropriate instrument of the EC could add value to mitigating the impact of HIV-AIDS through joining-up with the new Programme of Support for OVCs. School-based feeding of OVCs and bulk procurement of clothing, shoes, stationary/other NFIs would complement the PoS grants for longer-term NGO strategies that enable OVCs to remain in school or to train for a livelihood. ECHO funding of NFIs for OVCs should be to kick-start the approach and demonstrate how it works and the positive impacts so as to encourage its eventual mainstreaming into the PoS and exit of ECHO.

Recommendation 14: The EC ought to consider proposals from ECHO Partners to pilot the Cottage Industry-style production of fortified peanut butter, drawing from the experience of Malawi, in order to strengthen community-based management of current levels of severe childhood malnutrition in children.

V. Main Lessons Learned

1. In food security crises, emergency livestock support programmes are as essential to livestock-dependent vulnerable communities as seed and other types of support are to crop cultivating communities, such needs should be identified and incorporated into relief.
2. Agricultural relief and recovery programmes can be a fast and effective vehicle for promoting large-scale technology adoption if farmer capacity building can be incorporated into the relief.
3. In a complex emergency, UN coordination can play a crucial role in confidence building between policy makers, implementers and donor agencies resulting in greater humanitarian space.
4. Capacity building of state institutions that provide direct support to the community such as the District Development Fund is necessary if relief is to graduate into recovery and development. This calls for a closer partnership between DG ECHO and DG DEV in water projects than hitherto achieved.
5. Under guidance and training from a competent Partner, local NSAs (FBOs and CBOs) can master sufficient practices and procedures for bringing organised humanitarian services, food and NFIs to mobile vulnerable populations.
6. Resourcefulness and creativity of the involved partners are critical for working towards the LRRD objective in linking OVCs to essential services. The preferred combination joins local IP efforts with sound guidance from a lead Partner, converging in successful care delivery such as the instances in which NSAs guided by lead partners are enabled to bring humanitarian relief to OVCs and mobile vulnerable populations.