

MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

1. From 2nd May to the 4rd June 2005, at the request of the European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), a team of two external consultants (WatSan Expert Anton Rijdsdijk and Public Health Expert Dr. Michael Andreini), evaluated ECHO financed actions in Haiti for 2004. The consultants discussed the projects with both ECHO's staff, representatives of ECHO partners, as well as beneficiaries. As a result of this close cooperation, the evaluation visited nearly all the field project sites in Haiti.
2. Haiti, one of the poorest and most unstable countries in the world, has suffered from a series both man-made and natural disasters in recent years. In December 2003, Haiti suffered from floods. In January 2004, a revolt against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was forced into exile at the end of February, caused a great deal of disturbance and violence in the country. In May, torrential rains in the south of the island destroyed about 5,000 homes and killed more than 2,000 people. On top of this hardship, Haiti was struck a few months later by hurricane Jeanne, which caused extensive flooding, and left 3,000 people dead in Ennery and Gonaïves. At present, Haiti has an interim government and the UN force MINUSTAH provides its security.
3. ECHO, with a budget of nearly EUR 13 million (the second largest donor of emergency relief funds for 2004), supported a wide variety of projects ranging from water and sanitation to agriculture, health and nutrition, and communications and co-ordination. This approach was well justified in view of the complex emergency in Haiti.

ECHO'S POSITION IN HAITI

4. Emergency aid in 2004 made up only a small portion of the total aid to Haiti. At present Haiti needs most development projects, however well-targeted emergency project may quickly alleviate the most urgent needs of the local population. In addition, the humanitarian situation still justifies the presence of ECHO. There is a clear need in the water and sanitation sector, but due to the complexity of these projects and the requirements to make these project sustainable, emergency projects are not the preferred option in this sector.
5. The health interventions might continue, as interruption of these projects might effect the most vulnerable population. The relevance of both health and food security is unclear as there are no reliable data available.
6. Although ECHO staff did a good job and had a realistic view of the situation, they were, due to the lack of a staffing, in no position to carry needs assessments or taken action if projects had difficulties. Apparently no one had given early warning to ECHO in view of the impending political crisis, as ECHO's decision was two weeks after the departure of Aristide.

RELEVANCE

7. In general, the projects were appropriate to the situation. Most relevant water projects were the responses to the floods in the south-west of Haiti and the Jeanne Floods. The same applies to the small-scale rehabilitation and food security project in the agricultural areas near Gonaïves and Ennery. The projects in response to the political crisis in the northern towns of Cap Haitian and Port-de-Paix had a lower relevance, as the situation was not as disastrous as after the floods. In particular, the Oxfam-GB response in both cities might have been a bit excessive. The support given to the water supply company CAMEP in Port-au-Prince would have been relevant if it had targeted emergency repairs, rather than the replacement of worn-out equipment. The ECHO-sponsored telecommunications and OCHA co-ordination projects were very relevant during the chaos of the civil unrest.

8. The ECHO financed actions tried to understand the health and nutrition situation, control excess disease and injuries, and provide well-coordinated health care services to the most vulnerable segment of the population. The projects evaluated were highly relevant and addressed these well-identified basic emergency needs. However, incorporating the projects into action plans was not successful in all accepted projects. Proposals that did not use the logical frame matrix planning did less well than they could have.

EFFICIENCY

9. The efficiency of the ECHO projects was reasonable, as the input of staff (expensive expatriates) was modest and the methods used appropriate. Only Oxfam-GB in the northern cities could probably have used methods that are somewhat more efficient and fewer expatriate staff. The Cost/Beneficiary Ratios of the water delivery projects, varied from EUR 5 to EUR 8, while the projects with mainly emergency rehabilitations ranged from EUR 9 to EUR 86 for the FAO rehabilitation of the irrigation infrastructure. However, in view of the respective and expected achievements, these costs are not excessive.

10. Organisations performing similar activities had similar cost. Therefore, the determination of the health and nutrition projects' 'Value for Money' is difficult, as the line items for different projects varied according to the activities carried out. Operations were carried out correctly by most organisations, but poor institutional health resources and an inadequate ability to manage the available human resources reduced the operational capacity of some projects.

EFFECTIVENESS

11. The water delivery projects were effective as they prevented the outbreak of diseases during the floods. Most projects were carried out punctually and appropriately, and were flexible enough to adapt to the changing external factors of the diverse crises. The effectiveness of the emergency rehabilitation projects was reasonable. However, the quality of construction should have been better in several cases.

12. Poor estimates of the organisations' capacity to successfully undertake several health and nutrition projects meant that a few projects failed to be most effective at a time when they were most needed. PAHO was unable to receive sufficient human resources on the ground to produce needed outputs, UNICEF was held back by internal management delays, and the IFRC were not able to respond on time due to logistical and management problems.

13. The coordination and communication projects by IFRC and OCHA were less effective than they should have been. Especially, the IFRC project has put constraints on ECHO's partners. But, thanks to the resolution of the political crisis, no staff member was harmed and no project had to be cancelled.

IMPACT

14. The impact of the Oxfam-GB project in Cap Haitian and Port-de-Paix was high but short-lived, as people returned to the contaminated water sources, and the situation remained difficult at the end of the project. The effectiveness of the ACF project rehabilitations in Port de-Paix was higher, but was compromised by the poor water supply network. The greatest impact was achieved by organisations that focused on areas of Primary Health Care and emergency response to victims of natural disaster or violence, which reduced human suffering to a large extent. For the most part however, although the coverage was commendable, this positive impact was short-lived.

SUSTAINABILITY

15. The real emergency relief projects left few sustainable elements behind, or had little impact on the development of Haiti. A good degree of sustainability was achieved by those organisations whose programmes were tied into existing Haitian structures. In addition, several projects had some after-care activities (Oxfam-GB and ACF), teamed-up with a development partner (Oxfam-GB with LWF in the South East Haiti), or had a follow-up project by other donors. However, the sustainability of some rehabilitation projects is compromised by the poor quality of constructions, such as important water pipelines.

HORIZONTAL ISSUES

16. Security had been a problem for most of the NGOs, especially during the Jeanne floods in Gonaïves. OCHA reports the looting of aid convoys, harassing of staff and violent demonstrations. A reliable radio network, an early co-ordination and information policy and no constraints on OCHA staff would have benefited the NGO's operations. ECHO's partners paid sufficient attention to gender issues as most projects targeted directly or indirectly vulnerable people like women with children.

17. In view of sustainability, some ECHO partners maintain long-term cooperation with Haitian ministries and institutions, while others organised aftercare activities of their projects. These development strategies should be further pursued.

CONCLUSIONS

- I. ECHO supported a wide variety of projects, not only the more conventional health, nutrition and water and sanitation projects, but also agricultural and communication projects. In view of the complex and extended crisis in Haiti, this wider view was well justified and the vast majority of the projects are considered to be appropriate and reasonably successful;
- II. In general, most NGOs and IOs acted professionally in their operations. The progress under difficult security situations in an extremely poor country is greatly recognized by this evaluation team. However, the technical quality of some of the constructions leaves room for improvement. Occasionally NGO's did some work on structures, unrelated to the disaster, and this should have been done in development, not emergency projects;
- III. ECHO field experts have a realistic picture of the capacities and performances of the NGOs. ECHO's monitoring of the Haiti funding at the time (well done under the circumstances) acknowledged a few problem projects, but was unable to facilitate solutions. More ECHO presence could have made needs assessments more independent, and could have improved quality control and ECHO's visibility during the crisis;
- IV. Although ECHO reacted two weeks after Aristide left Haiti, ECHO could have been more proactive in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the period before Aristide's downfall. It is possible that, if OCHA had been in place from the beginning of January, early warning signals might have sped up the reaction of ECHO. As MINUSTAH has taken over, it is likely that future crises will be better monitored;
- V. The lack of a reliable radio network (IFRC) and the constraints on OCHA staff did hamper to some extent the operations of NGO's but no staff members were endangered. However, the problems might have been more serious if the political crisis had lasted longer;
- VI. The Logframe approach in the project documents was not done consequently. Thus, NGOs often failed to discuss the OVIs in their final report. Impact assessment of projects for final reports will improve monitoring and self-evaluation. For example, in 14 health and nutrition projects evaluated, only RC-FR and CARE completed internal evaluations of the projects. In the WatSan sector, only ACF and Oxfam-GB consequently used this method. In those examples, the NGOs were better able to assess crosscutting issues such as gender and security. The degree of ownership beneficiaries and other stakeholders had in the projects, the level of institutional capacity, and financial and technical issues, were much easier to gauge in terms of the impact the intervention had on the crisis;
- VII. The link with development of most ECHO projects is weak or non-existent. This is not a failure, but inherent to the nature of most projects (emergency relief with some short emergency rehabilitation). However, some projects could have been

more sustainable if the NGO's had followed the right approach. Fortunately this is a minor issue, as some organisations (like ACF and Oxfam-GB) tried to organise aftercare, or prepared follow-up projects. It is appreciated that the organisations had good co-operation with the local authorities (SNEP, MOPH, CNN to name just a few), which will add to the sustainability of the projects and will improve ECHO's status in Haiti. In this respect, the visibility of ECHO could be better as the name of ECHO is largely unknown among local authorities;

- VIII. The lack of good quality humanitarian data in most of the sectors made it difficult to assess the need for further involvement (under present conditions) of ECHO in Haiti. Obviously, there is an urgent need in nearly all of the sectors in which ECHO was already involved in 2004, but the question is if emergency projects are the right approach in this situation. Projects in the water sector and agricultural reconstruction projects are probably less feasible as they require long-term involvement and (for water projects) an approved country strategy. Due to the lack of data it is unknown if emergency food aid projects are required. However, the results of a survey on nutrition will be available soon. In the health and nutrition sector only RC-FR, CARE, and to some extent UNICEF, had programming that could be continued in development aid, based on the needs understood by the emergency projects. Other partners have reproduced an improved version of their first emergency project (ID and PSF), and have continued managing the outputs implemented during the crisis (PAHO), or developed another emergency response project (MSF's evaluation project).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- I. Despite some shortfalls in their performance, ECHO should continue with well established NGOs which are not only well prepared for a disaster, but could offer a sensible aftercare strategy and have relations with Haitian counterparts;
- II. Although the staff of the ECHO Office for the Caribbean did a remarkable job monitoring the many projects, the complexity of Haiti warrants that there should be an ECHO staff member especially for Haiti if major crisis reoccurs. It also could be useful to carry needs / impact assessments by ECHO staff rather than leave this to NGOs and IOs. As DFID has similar programmes, one could consider joint studies with them;
- III. The use of a log frame matrix in planning a project, with its ability to improve monitoring and self-evaluation of activities during implementation, is recommended to all partners. Of about half of the NGO projects evaluated (e.g. MSF, PSF, CARE, ID, RC-FR, and ACF) all took advantage of a log frame matrix and profited, especially in the areas of project effectiveness and impact. Because of these projects' improved monitoring and evaluation ability, each could easily follow up their projects with an impact assessment in the final report;
- IV. In the case of Haiti, emergency rehabilitation activities after an emergency should be sustainable and fit in with the development strategy as much as possible. Even without a strategy, organisations should put emphasis on issues such as

ownership, cost recovery (except for the very vulnerable) and availability of spare parts. The emergency rehabilitation should be restricted to disaster-damaged items, and not include worn-out equipment, as these items are not included in the ECHO mandate, and may hamper the self-reliance of the local population. The co-operation with local institutes and authorities should be continued.

- V. Data collection and preparing strategies (WatSan, Health, Poverty, etc) should have priority in the near future as the lack of these limits the relevance and impact of (proposed) projects, could weaken the existing (semi-) government institutes in Haiti and will negatively effect the sustainability. Limited (assuming that the situation does not worsen) assistance of ECHO funding could continue. The continuations of health projects make more sense than WatSan or agricultural rehabilitation projects. Food aid projects might be relevant too, but it is recommended to wait until the results of the forthcoming nutrition survey are available