

EVALUATION SUMMARY

THE PROJECT

1. The ODA response to the devastating cyclone that hit the Bangladesh coast on 29 April 1991 was to finance both relief and rehabilitation programmes. A total of (GB Sterling) £11.5 million was allocated: £6.5 million for relief and £5.0 million for rehabilitation. In the end, £10.2 million (88% of funds) were spent, £4.26 million on relief and £5.94 million on rehabilitation.
2. The overall objectives of the relief programme were minimising further loss of life and reducing human suffering through the provision of emergency relief, including food, shelter, clothing and medicine.
3. The overall objectives of the rehabilitation programme were not stated by ODA, but were inferred by the evaluators to consist of supporting the rehabilitation of communities devastated by the cyclone, by rapidly responding to local needs.
4. An early decision was taken to channel assistance mainly through NGOs, rather than government, in view of their better record in delivering and targeting relief supplies effectively. Some money was also given to international organisations (UNDRO, EC, League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) and to the Ministry of Defence for deploying a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel with helicopters to assist in the relief efforts.

THE EVALUATION

5. The evaluation was undertaken in February 1993 by a team consisting of a socio-economist. (also team leader), a civil engineer, and an institutions specialist, all from Britain; and a health specialist, civil engineer and economist from Bangladesh. The team was required to evaluate ODA's relief programme and review the on-going rehabilitation programme.

OVERALL SUCCESS RATING

6. The ODA relief programme was judged to have been **successful** in terms of its objectives. It is estimated to have met the needs of about 8 percent of survivors in the worst-affected areas numbering roughly 33,000 families or 200,000 individuals. The rehabilitation programme is still being implemented and mainly involves construction of multipurpose cyclone shelters and houses. The rehabilitation projects may prove to be broadly successful, though there have been shortcomings in appraisal, monitoring and implementation. Insufficient account was taken of people's need for employment and income generation in the months after the disaster.

MAIN FINDINGS

7. The speed and effectiveness of ODA's relief programme was impressive, and more rapid than those of most other donors.
8. Overall, the NGO programmes financed by ODA were successful in preventing starvation and reducing suffering in some of the worst-affected areas. Almost all people received relief supplies within a week and there were no significant shortages while the relief programme lasted.
(End p 1)
9. The decision to channel most of ODA's relief finance through large NGOs with proven records in disaster management was appropriate and resulted in rapid implementation of efficient and generally well-targeted relief programmes. The programmes of smaller NGOs were not as effective in targeting relief supplies to women and other vulnerable groups.
10. It was difficult to assess the relative cost-effectiveness of different NGO programmes, although it is clear that there are wide differences in the unit costs of relief commodities charged to ODA and in transport and management overheads.
11. The **UK** military intervention "Operation Manna" was an effective, if expensive, way of supplying Government food and other provisions to off-shore islands and of ferrying relief workers. It would have been even more effective if the vessel had arrived earlier, during the survival relief phase.
12. Rehabilitation Projects financed by ODA were mainly longer-term (e.g. multipurpose cyclone shelters, housing). Short-term employment and income generating projects, which were urgently needed in the six months following the relief phase, accounted for only a small part of the programme.
13. For many rehabilitation projects the design stage gave insufficient attention to technical and social aspects. Thereafter, appraisal was inadequate and monitoring was not systematic. For all these reasons the impact of many rehabilitation projects is likely to be less than it would otherwise have been.

LESSONS LEARNED

(a) Bangladesh - specific

14. NGOs in Bangladesh provide a generally effective relief delivery system and are likely to continue to do so.

15. In the longer term, the Government of Bangladesh needs to develop its capacity to respond quickly and effectively at times of disaster.

(b) General

16. ODA and NGOs need to work together to improve the framework for, and quality of, the proposals and reports submitted by NGOs. Feedback is also required on actual impact and cost effectiveness.

17. Better understanding is needed of the coping strategies of people living in cyclone-prone areas in order to improve the design of relief and rehabilitation programmes.

18. Restoring safe water supply from groundwater after a cyclone or similar disaster is the most important step towards averting a large-scale outbreak of diarrhoeal diseases. Water purification tablets do not have an important role and disinfecting with bleaching powder may not be effective.

(Foot note 1: Since the evaluation visit in February 1993, ODA has revised its procedures. After a process of consultation with NGOs, Emergency Aid Department has issued "Humanitarian Assistance: Guidelines on Project Proposals and Project Reports".)
(End p 2)

19. For maximum effectiveness in responding to sudden onset disasters, UK military resources, if they are to be used, need to be deployed quickly after the event. Given the time and cost of mobilisation, an early but informed decision needs to be taken on whether to deploy such resources.

20. After the relief phase of a disaster, special attention needs to be given to short term employment and income generating activities.

21. Where ODA is to be involved in rehabilitation, NGOs need guidance on ODA's strategy for the particular disaster and individual proposals need greater technical, social and economic appraisal and monitoring than took place in this case.

(End p 3)

EVALUATION SUCCESS RATINGS

The Overall Success Rating for a project is allocated on a scale from **A+** to **D** according to the following rating system:-

Highly Successful (A+): objectives completely achieved or exceeded, very significant overall benefits in relation to costs

Successful (A): objectives largely achieved, significant overall benefits in relation to costs

Partially Successful (B): some objectives achieved, some significant overall benefits in relation to costs

Largely Unsuccessful (C): very limited achievement of objectives, few significant benefits in relation to costs

Unsuccessful (D): objectives unrealised, no significant benefits in relation to costs, project abandoned

The judgment on the Overall Success Rating is informed by a tabulated series of judgements on individual aspects of performance, including the projects contribution to achievement of ODA's **priority objectives** (listed in the upper section of the table). First an assessment is made of the relative importance in the project of each criterion or objective, which may be **Principal** or **Significant**; or, if not applicable, it is marked “-”. Where no specific objective was established at appraisal, the importance assessment is given in **brackets**. Each performance criterion is then awarded a rating, based only on the underlined sections of the five-point scale above. An asterisk (*) indicates a provisional rating.

Project Performance Criteria	Relief Programme		Rehabil. Programme	
	Relative Importance	Success Rating	Relative Importance	Success Rating
Success				
Economic Liberalisation	-	-	-	-
Enhancing Productive Capacity	-	-	-	-
Good Governance	-	-	-	-
Poverty Impact	Principal	A	(Principal)	B
Human Resources: Education-	-	-	Significant	B*
Human Resources: Health	(Principal)	A	-	-
Human Resources: Children by Choice	-	-	-	-
Environmental Impact	(Significant)	A	(Significant)	B
Impact upon Women	(Principal)	B	Significant	B*
Social Impact	(Principal)	A	Principal	B*
Institutional Impact	(Significant)	B	(Significant)	B
Technical Success	-	-	(Significant)	B
Time Management within Schedule	Principal	A	(Principal)	B
Cost Management within Budget	Significant	A	(Significant)	A
Adherence to Project Conditions	(Principal)	A	(Principal)	B
Cost-Effectiveness	(Significant)	B	(Significant)	A
Financial Rate of Return	-	-	-	-
Economic Rate of Return	-	-	-	-
Financial Sustainability	-	-	(Significant)	C*
Institutional Sustainability	(Significant)	B	(Significant)	C*
Overall Sustainability	Significant	B	(Principal)	B

OVERALL SUCCESS RATING
(End p 4)

A

B