

1.3 Methodology

The objectives of this study, and particularly its concern with identifying limits, opportunities and instruments for donor assistance in a contemporary peace process of the Mozambican kind, demand qualitative insight into a complex policy process. Conventional project evaluations are inadequate for this purpose, as has been recognised in another recent evaluation with similar ambitions (footnote 7). A more comprehensive approach was therefore developed which involved three analytical components: policy analysis of decision-making processes, assessment of individual projects through a more conventional type of evaluation, and a sociological recording of what “peace” means at the village level.

1.3.1 Selection of themes and cases

The terms of reference call for a review of Norwegian aid activities in several specific areas that largely correspond to the peace component of aid as defined above. Within that component, the project portfolio was quite large (well over 150 projects), necessitating selection of cases for closer review. These were organised thematically according to the five main tasks identified in the peace agreement or presupposed by it:

(Footnote 7: See Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen, 1996, esp. vol. 2)
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- demobilisation
- demining
- rapid rebuilding
- repatriation and reintegration (of refugees and internally displaced persons)
- promotion of political pluralism (including human rights)

Within these categories, individual projects were selected because of their magnitude and/or centrality to the peace process (e.g. support for elections), or because they illustrated particular dimensions central to the transition process such as local capacity building or dealing with problems of dual administration.

The five themes were also pursued in the micro-level study carried out in three districts in Maputo province by the team from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. Their findings are not intended to be representative of what is happening in all the rural areas of Mozambique. Maputo is a special province and indeed, given the complexity of local histories, there is no representative rural district in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the case study points to achievements and tensions in international assistance to the peace process that may recur in several other rural districts.

A statistical analysis of Norwegian aid activity within the five categories in the 1990-95 period is presented in chapter 2, which also gives an overview of the general trends in Norwegian aid

to Mozambique in this period.

While reflecting the particulars of the Mozambican case, the five themes can easily be accommodated within a broader framework for comparative analysis. The UNRISD “War - torn Societies Project”, for instance, has developed a four-fold categorisation as follows: reforming security structures (e.g. demobilisation); (re)building political structures (e.g. towards political pluralism); removing war-time distortions and rebuilding economic structures (e.g. demining and rapid rebuilding); and reintegrating and empowering populations on the local level (e.g. through support for returnees) (footnote 8).

1.3.2 Criteria for evaluation

Problems of using conventional cost criteria for assessing activities of the kind identified here are numerous. In demining, for instance, the number of mines found may be an indication of efficiency, but hardly of effectiveness; the importance of the area cleared to social and economic transactions on the local level is a much more central criterion in this regard but harder to operationalise. As for demobilised soldiers, the World Bank’s major study of comparative demobilisation does not operate with cost-efficiency assessments across cases. but merely gives an absolute cost estimate per demobilised soldier in the different countries —and in local currency only (footnote 9). One reason is that the various demobilisation programmes occurred in very different circumstances. Moreover, there is hardly an adequate measure for the social value of a quietly demobilised soldier versus one with a gun on the loose. The UNDP report to donors on international assistance to the elections in Mozambique does not operate with measures of cost-efficiency. The main criteria applied were whether the elections were held, were declared free and fair, and were accepted by all. Since all these results materialised, the objectives of the elections were found to have been achieved (footnote 10). This study similarly applies qualitative criteria of stated objectives in relation to results.

Process criteria concerning administration (including co-ordination and follow-up) and choice of instruments (partners and channels) are used where relevant and where data was available. Where standard procedures were followed (e.g. use of UN Trust Funds), no effort was made to assess the procedures per se, but rather the appropriateness of the instrument to that particular situation. The

(Footnote 8: See Fagen (1995). A recent compilation of case studies has simpler categorization but covers essentially the same ground: political, social and cultural, and economic rehabilitation. See Kumar (ed.) (1997)

Footnote 9: See Colletta et al. (1996)

Footnote 10: See UNDP/DDSMS (1995)

(End p4)

more important question for this study is whether the special characteristics of a war-to-peace transition period suggest that particular process criteria should be adopted that favour speed, flexibility and innovation and acknowledge a higher risk factor than would be acceptable under more stable conditions. Rethinking along these lines with respect to lending policy is currently underway in the World Bank (footnote 11).

More generally, since the overall task is to examine the effect of Norwegian aid on a peace

process that was shaped by forces mostly beyond Norway's reach, the criteria for assessment must reflect a sense of historical timing. Was Norwegian aid timely and appropriate in relation to the agenda set by the formal process? Did Norway make any particular contributions to the peace process? Overall, these are the central questions for the evaluation.

1.4 Data collection and the study team

The study team consisted of Kate Halvorsen, Armindo Miranda (project co-ordinator) and Astri Suhrke (project leader) from the Chr. Michelsen Institute, and Alistair Hallam, Janne Lexow and Pamela Rebelo from the Nordic Consulting Group. Yussuf Adam led the team from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane for the study summarised in chapter 5.

Given the complexity of the subject matter, the study team established two reference groups which helped define the project at the outset, gave valuable advice throughout, and commented on the first draft. Most closely involved was our academic reference group composed of Bridget O'Laughlin, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Patricia Weiss Fagen, World Bank/UNHCR, and Alexander Costy, University of Toronto. A broader reference group composed of representatives of NGOs, the Norwegian private sector and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs met twice, at the outset of the project and towards its conclusion. Members were: Marit Sorvald, and Rolf Ree, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Anne Beathe Jensen, NORAD; Age Skagestad, Norwegian People's Aid; Nina Berg (and later Margaret Vikki), Norwegian Refugee Council; and Sivert Sande, Linjebygg A/S. A seminar at the University of Bergen, organised by Einar Braathen and members of his research team on Mozambique, provided valuable insight at an early stage of the work.

Data collection by the CMI/NCG team was carried out in mainly Oslo and Maputo, including interviews and archival work. (See Annex 2 for a list of persons interviewed). The unorthodox nature of the evaluation, and the wide range of themes and cases considered, made data collection a daunting task. Part of that burden fell in turn upon the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD, whose patience and dedication deserve special acknowledgement here. Initial problems of accessing some NORAD documentation were later solved. Numerous government and aid officials in Mozambique and Norway, representatives of the donor community in Maputo, UN agencies, international organisations, NGOs and independent experts co-operated generously.

1.5 Organisation of the report

The first draft of the present report ran into some 250 pages. Several readers commented that while the wealth of detail unearthed by the team was worth keeping for further reference, it might discourage the broader audience of nonspecialists which the study also aims to reach. In order to accommodate the conflicting interests of brevity and detail, the present version of the report contains the essence of the analytical narrative and findings in the first draft. A working paper presenting more detailed accounts of the issues reviewed will be published separately by CMI (footnote 12) to meet the needs of specialists.

(Footnote 11: See World Bank (1996) and Muscat (1995)

Footnote 12: Suhrke and Miranda (forthcoming).)

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In the present report, an overview of Norway's role in the peace process is given in chapter 2. This includes an examination of the policy process in Maputo during the implementation of the GPA and the related decision-making process on the Norwegian side. This chapter also presents a review and a statistical analysis of Norwegian assistance to Mozambique in the 1990-95 period. Chapter 3 examines the evolution in strategic thinking about Norwegian aid policy to Mozambique and how it reflected, or not, the changing rhythm of war and peace. To avoid distortions when analysing one actor, it is important to recall the broader context of the peace process. This is done in chapter 4, which recalls the causes of war as well as the reasons for peace, and outlines the agenda and institutions of the UN-supervised peace process specified in the CPA. The macro-economic framework for peace set by the parallel Bretton Woods process is also sketched for the 1990-95 period. The grassroots perspective as captured by the team of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane is summarised in chapter 5. The subsequent chapters 6-10 examine Norwegian financed activities in the "peace component of aid": demobilisation, demining, repatriation and reintegration, rapid rebuilding, and promotion of political pluralism. The concluding chapter 11 assesses the timeliness and appropriateness of Norwegian aid to the peace process, and revisits issues of Norway's strategic options in relation to peace-making in Mozambique.

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