UNHCR's engagement with integrated UN missions

Report of a
lessons learned workshop

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Policy Development and Evaluation Service

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Executive summary

This report summarises the discussions at a workshop held in Geneva on 20 and 21 November 2008. The aim was to capture key lessons from headquarters and field experience in engaging with integrated UN missions, with the aim of defining key objectives to be pursued in UNHCR's engagement within an integrated UN presence in country operations where UN peacekeeping or political missions are deployed, and informing future policy and operational guidance.

Discussions were structured around a draft policy guidance note, which sought to identify eight key policy goals which might be pursued by UNHCR. This covered issues such as the relationship between the integrated approach and UNHCR's mandate for refugee protection and solutions, and its role in relation to internal displacement; the implications of integration for humanitarian action; the integrated mission planning process (IMPP); security management; security of beneficiaries; return and reintegration; rule of law and reconciliation; mission services and assets; and staff secondments. The key components of the draft policy guidance were broadly endorsed by participants, however it was felt that some proposed goals should be nuanced or expanded.

The starting point for the discussions was that integration is now a key element of the operational landscape, and that UNHCR should engage decisively in this process. Significant recent developments include June 2008 Policy Committee decision, which confirmed integration as the 'guiding principle' underpinning UN engagement in operations where peacekeeping or political missions are deployed.

Participants saw the integrated approach as offering significant opportunities for enhanced delivery of the 'solutions' component of UNHCR's mandate, and linking this to broader conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes. Other opportunities were identified in the potential role of integrated missions in contributing to the protection of civilians, including through support to return and reintegration and in enhancing the security of IDP and refugee camps.

Participants nonetheless highlighted the potential risks of integration in situations where confict is still ongoing or a peace consolidation process has not yet taken root. In such situations too close an alignment between humanitarian agencies and UN political or peacekeeping actors may undermine the perceived neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian action and pose a threat to humanitarian space. In such situations structural integration (locating the Humanitarian Coordinator function within the mission) should be avoided, and the form of integration adopted (if at all) should be minimal.

Participants emphasised the need for substantive senior management commitment to strategic engagement with integrated missions at all stages of their development and deployment. It was suggested that as well as developing a clear policy and strategy on engagement within an integrated UN presence, a clear strategy should also be developed for each situation in which integration was tabled, to be jointly pursued by UNHCR staff at country level, in New York, and at Headquarters. Participants also encouraged UNHCR to invest efforts in fostering open and informed attitudes

by UNHCR staff to the integrated approach, through education, training and appropriate career development opportunities, including strategic secondments.

Background and workshop rationale

1. On 20 and 21 November 2008, UNHCR's Division of Operational Services (DOS) and the Policy Development and Evaluation Service (PDES) co-sponsored a workshop on UNHCR's engagement with integrated UN missions. The workshop was facilitated by Fedde Groot (DOS), Jeff Crisp (PDES) and Vicky Tennant (PDES).

2. A total of 34 UNHCR staff members took part, together with external participants for some sessions from the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Department for Political Affairs (DPA), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). A list of participants is attached at Annex 1.

3. The workshop was organised as part of a process of ongoing reflection on the changing institutional context within which UNHCR operates, and in particular, on developments aimed at securing greater integration and coherence in the work of the United Nations and humanitarian actors.

4. An important element of this process has been the deployment of integrated UN missions incorporating peacekeeping, political, humanitarian and development components. It has nonetheless been recognised that despite UNHCR's extensive engagement with integrated missions in a variety of contexts, policy and operational guidance remains lacking.

5. Accordingly, the workshop brought together UNHCR staff who had been seconded to integrated missions, who had participated in the integrated mission planning process (IMPP) at New York and field level, and who had held senior posts in UNHCR country operations where integrated missions were present.

6. The workshop sought to capture lessons from HQ and field experience, with the aim of defining the key objectives to be pursued in UNHCR's engagement with integrated missions and informing future policy and operational guidance.

7. Discussions were structured around a draft guidance note prepared by PDES (attached at Annex 2), which identified eight proposed goals for UNHCR's engagement. This report summarises the key conclusions emerging during the discussions on each of these proposed goals, and should be read in conjunction with the draft guidance note.

Integration and UNHCR

Proposed Goal 1: To maximize opportunities presented by integration for better delivery of UNHCR's protection and solutions responsibilities through effective partnerships, whilst maintaining the autonomy and operational effectiveness of UNHCR's refugee mandate.

[Validated, with an emphasis on the need for strong strategic support from UNHCR's senior management.]

8. The workshop was opened by Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Assistant High Commissioner (Operations) who highlighted that the 'integrated approach' as applied in operations where UN peacekeeping or political missions have been deployed is one aspect of a broader drive towards more collective engagement by the UN at country level.

9. To date, there has been considerable reflection in-house on the implications for UNHCR of the Delivering as One process and the humanitarian reform process, but much less on integrated missions. Ms Cheng-Hopkins outlined what she saw as the key opportunities and risks presented by the 'integrated approach'.

10. Opportunities included better partnerships, a more coherent engagement in transitional contexts, possibilities for enhancing the physical security of beneficiaries, situating UNHCR's engagement in the context of broader peacebuilding processes, strengthened collective engagement in the pursuit of solutions (return, reintegration, rule of law), and cooperation on information sharing and logistics.

11. Risks included the tension between collective forms of engagement and the non-transferable nature of UNHCR's refugee mandate, the risk of undermining humanitarian space through too close an association with military and/or political actors, the potential de-prioritisation of humanitarian action, cumbersome bureaucracies, and over-burdensome security arrangements. She nonetheless concluded that the opportunities presented outweighed the risks, particularly in transitional contexts where there is a clear need to work more closely with political and development actors.

12. In the discussion which followed, participants emphasised that integration was now a key element of the operational landscape, and that whether as a matter of choice or necessity, UNHCR must engage decisively in this process. It was emphasised that there is a need for clarity about what is meant by integration. In the past, the focus was on 'structural' integration of the humanitarian, development and political UN presence through the incorporation within the mission of the multi-hatted DSRSG/HC/RC position.

13. However the current approach, reflected in the June 2008 Policy Committee decision, is more holistic, with structural integration viewed as one aspect of integration but not mandatory in all situations. The language of the Policy Committee decision accordingly refers to an 'integrated UN presence' rather than to 'integrated missions'. UNHCR should encourage flexible approaches in which form follows function, rather than a 'one size fits all' approach.

14. There was some discussion of the differentiated nature of UNHCR's mandate. Participants emphasised that UNHCR should clearly assert its mandatory responsibility for refugee protection (including assistance) and ensure that its leadership role is not undermined through diffused lines of accountability. However, on issues such as return and reintegration, internal displacement and support to host communities, effective collaboration is key to effective mandate delivery. Similarly, the pursuit of solutions to displacement is fundamentally linked to broader political and peacebuilding processes, and will generally be best pursued through integrated strategies.

15. Participants also emphasised that UNHCR should consider how its mandate intersects with broader conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes, and how it can draw on its expertise relevant to these issues as the nature of conflict and international engagement in conflict resolution and peacebuilding evolves. In this respect, UNHCR should consider what it can 'bring to the table' in its engagement with DPKO, DPA and other partners. Relevant elements include:

- a regional dimension;

- longstanding field presence and knowledge;

- existing operational capacity, which may be drawn on for support in the start up phases of a mission;

- relevant expertise, which may be made available to multi-dimensional missions through staff secondments; and

- an understanding of the root causes and consequences of conflict acquired through sustained engagement with affected populations.

16. There are also important links between the issues and populations of concern to UNHCR and the objectives of integrated missions. Issues such as resolving displacement, the political dimensions of return, and minority rights are often critical elements in the peace-making and peacebuilding process. UNHCR should seek to build on these synergies.

17. It was pointed out that the process of engagement with peacekeeping and political missions is in many respects inherently different from that with other UN agencies. Security Council mandates are vertical, focusing on a specific situation, whilst those of specialised agencies are horizontal and thematic, looking for example at food security, refugees or children.

18. There are also significant differences in mindset, working culture and modus operandi, which must be understood if we are to work together effectively. Some participants nonetheless felt that UNHCR and DPKO staff share a similar action-oriented mindset, and that the differences in working culture should not be over-stated.

Integration and humanitarian action

> *Proposed Goal 2: Integration arrangements should enable and facilitate humanitarian action, with a particular focus on protecting humanitarian space and maintaining a flexible approach to the location of humanitarian coordination.*
>
> *[Validated, with reference to be made to the link between UNHCR's 'solutions' mandate and broader peace consolidation processes.]*

19. The discussion on proposed Goal 2 opened with a presentation by Antonio Donini, Senior Researcher at the Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and Team Leader for the Humanitarian Agenda 2015 research project. This focused on the constraints, challenges and compromises affecting humanitarian action in conflict and crisis settings.[1] Mr Donini highlighted that a key finding emerging from this research is that the humanitarian enterprise is increasingly disconnected from the perspectives and needs of those on the ground. He highlighted what he saw as two key flaws in the integration agenda.

20. First, he argued that the coherence agenda is essentially northern driven, linked to the concept of 'joined-up government', and is overly-focused on process and structure rather than on results. He disputed the idea that complex problems could be solved by simple solutions, and cited the 'hastily formed networks' concept as one arrangement which can prove more effective than a top-down 'coherence' approach, depending on the situation.

21. Second, he suggested that the concept of integrated missions was a symptom of a fundamental misunderstanding of humanitarianism and human rights work. He highlighted the tensions between mandates emerging from Security Council Resolutions on the one hand, which are situation-specific and emerge from political compromises, and humanitarian principles and human rights / refugee protection mandates on the other, which derive their legitimacy from overarching norms.

22. He saw a fundamental contradiction in harnessing these to Security Council mandates and to the political agendas that underpin these. In his view, in the integrated mission context, politics would always 'trump' humanitarianism. Few SRSGs have a humanitarian background.

23. Mr Donini highlighted that integrated missions are now being deployed in a range of situations including both genuinely post-conflict contexts and those where conflict is still ongoing. Integrated missions are not necessarily managed in a way that addresses the evolution of situations over time.

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[1] The final report of the Humanitarian Agenda 2015 project was published as *the State of the Humanitarian Enterprise,* Donini et al, Feinstein International Center, 2008. Updates on Iraq and Afghanistan were published in 2009. Available on https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center.

24. The way in which situations are categorised has a profound impact on the way international engagement is managed. For example, Afghanistan was categorised as 'post-conflict' from 2002, which has shaped the way the UN, donors and NGOs have engaged, with NGOs working as implementing partners for the government on the National Solidarity Programme without analysing the implications for their neutrality and independence.

25. The categorisation as 'post-conflict' has also inhibited donor investment in humanitarian, as opposed to reconstruction activities. The Afghanistan example also highlights that it is difficult to 'disintegrate' a mission once it is structurally integrated, with OCHA only recently re-establishing a separate office.

26. In conclusion. Mr Donini confirmed that the 'coherence agenda' is here to stay for now, and that agencies such as UNHCR and OCHA should seek to confront the issues of principle that this raises in a more effective way, including through more direct engagement with member states on these issues.

27. He nonetheless wondered whether integration, coherence and multi-dimensional peacekeeping in the long term might not provide opportunities for promoting a more modest humanitarianism de-linked from political agendas, and urged that we remain ready to adapt to future changes in the operating environment.

28. The following conclusions emerged from the debate which followed. UNHCR's mandate encompasses but also extends beyond the realm of purely 'humanitarian' action (in the traditional sense of saving lives, alleviating suffering and protecting human dignity). It also includes the pursuit of permanent solutions to displacement, which implies a link to addressing the causes of displacement and the resolution of conflict.

29. In situations which have genuinely moved into the peace consolidation phase, integration provides an important opportunity for UNHCR to link this aspect of its mandate delivery (for example, on issues such as return and reintegration, land and property, minority rights and reconciliation) more decisively with broader conflict management and peace consolidation processes involving other actors.

30. Integrated missions are however increasingly deployed in situations of ongoing conflict and humanitarian crisis. The June 2008 Policy Committee decision clarified that integration will also apply in such situations. This presents greater dilemmas than in clear post-conflict contexts, particularly as regards the maintenance of 'humanitarian space.'

31. We should recognise that peacekeeping and peace consolidation are inherently political processes and that whilst the UN may aspire to play a mediating role as guardian of a peace process or political settlement, it will often not be perceived as neutral, at least by some political actors and their constituencies, particularly if they remain outside or are otherwise marginalised by the ongoing political process.

32. There is a real risk in such situations that humanitarian UN agencies may be perceived as aligned with political agendas, with consequences for the perception of humanitarian actors and the space for neutral and impartial humanitarian action. There is thus a need to analyse the level of conflict and fluidity of situation when

determining the shape that integration will take. If the situation is genuinely post-conflict, there is much more scope for a truly integrated approach.

33. The Policy Committee decision incorporates a welcome focus on a shared vision and common strategic planning rather than structural integration, and this approach is reflected in draft guidance documents on the Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) and Strategic Assessments. The challenge is how we as humanitarians can position ourselves to influence more effectively the design and subsequent evolution of an integrated presence and mission mandates.

34. As part of the UN, we have to some extent to live with contradictions. We cannot aspire to the same degree of independence as, for example, the ICRC or a humanitarian NGO. We must recognise that the humanitarian family is diverse, and reconcile our role in building national protection capacity, including the capacity of government institutions (as, for example, in Afghanistan), with our humanitarian mandate.

35. Nonetheless, whilst we are a part of the UN (and perceptions of us will always be shaped by this reality), there is evidence that actors on the ground do draw distinctions between humanitarian actors and other parts of the UN. Maintaining such a distinct identity can play an important role in ensuring humanitarian space in ongoing conflict situations.

36. We should bear in mind that situations evolve over time (in both negative and positive ways), and that the way we define a situation shapes the lens through which we view it and consequently the nature of international engagement. It can be difficult to attract donor support for humanitarian activities in a situation defined as 'post-conflict' for example.

37. UNHCR's presence may both pre-date and post-date the presence of a multidimensional mission. Conversely, a mission may remain after UNHCR's departure (as in East Timor). Sustained engagement, longevity and maintaining a distinct identity play an important role in securing and maintaining humanitarian space. Decisions on how to engage with integrated missions should take a long-term perspective, taking into account the consequences of the departure of either UNHCR or the mission.

38. The centre of gravity of integrated missions currently tends to lie with the political and security components (both in terms of resources and strategic priorities), and to some extent with the reconstruction and development components. This may be particularly the case where there is an interest in presenting a political transition as a 'success story'.

39. UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies should seek to ensure that humanitarian concerns and priorities remain high on the agenda in such situations. This may entail advocating for and facilitating the identification of senior mission staff, particularly in the DSRSG/RC/HC post, with humanitarian backgrounds. In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to press for the separation of the RC and HC functions.

Influencing the mandate, structure and functions of integrated missions

40. The session opened with a presentation by Johan Cels, currently Representative in Japan and formerly Senior Policy Advisor at LO New York. He stressed the importance of understanding and being able to influence the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), which was developed in part in response to concerns from humanitarian agencies that they were not sufficiently included in the process of designing and establishing an integrated mission. He also highlighted the need to distinguish between DPKO and DPA-led missions, and to ensure that UNHCR links effectively with relevant departments at UN Headquarters.

41. Mr Cels provided a brief overview of the process for establishing an integrated mission. The first stage is the Strategic Assessment (SA). This may be initiated by (inter alia) the Secretary General, members of the Policy Committee, the UN Country Team (UNCT), or the Integration Steering Group.

42. The SA is conducted by a country-specific Integrated Task Force, normally led by DPA, and is primarily an internal, Headquarters-driven process, consisting of a desk review and in some cases a field visit. Based on the SA, strategic options are presented to the Policy Committee, which determines whether to maintain the current arrangements or whether a new or revised UN strategy (which may or may not include an integrated presence) should be adopted.

43. Where an integrated presence is proposed, an Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) is established to lead the IMPP. Humanitarian and development agencies participate through a 2+4 formula: UNDOCO, OCHA and four representatives from the UN Funds and Programmes, and Agencies may participate based on their involvement in the country in question. In situations with large refugee or IDP situations, UNHCR is normally considered for inclusion.

44. A key element in the IMPP is the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). This is a critical opportunity for UNHCR to raise issues relevant to populations of concern. If missed, it becomes extremely difficult to bring these in later in the process. The UNHCR country office has an important role to play at this point, and through its field presence has a considerable comparative advantage.

45. Key products emerging from the IMPP process are:

- the mission concept (which shapes the concept and structure of the mission)

- the support concept (which shapes the 'marching orders of the SRSG, and frames the allocation of resources)

- the Secretary-General's report. In some situations, especially highly political ones, the scope for UNHCR to influence this is limited. In others, such as Chad, we have been able to play a key role in influencing the mandate (as set out in the Security Council Resolution) through high-level advocacy with Security Council members.

46. The Security Council mandate also goes through regular revisions over time, and it is therefore important that field offices have the capacity to influence the drafting of these reports, and to ensure that UNHCR's 'issues' are reflected. These must be coordinated with and backed up with effective advocacy at Security Council level by the New York office.

Recommendations on influencing the mandate, structure and functions of integrated missions:

(i)   In situations involving large refugee or IDP populations, UNHCR should be engaged at all stages of the IMPP, from design ('crafting and drafting') to implementation. In certain circumstances UNHCR might even wish to propose a mission. Clear criteria should be agreed with DPKO on when UNHCR will be part of the IMTF.

(ii)   UNHCR should develop a 'corporate policy' on each situation where integration is on the table, with a supporting team (HQ/NY/field) to support the process. This should incorporate engagement in planning and set-up as well as a strategy for ongoing engagement.

(iii)   There is a clear need for senior management support and commitment to this process. On occasion, it may be appropriate for the High Commissioner to intervene directly or through the IASC.

(iv)   For each country situation in which integration is tabled, UNHCR should seek to identify a roster of staff who have worked in country or have expertise in integrated missions who can be deployed at the planning and set-up stage. (This could be to the UNHCR field office, as part of a TAM, or as a secondment to the mission.)

(v)   UNHCR should seek to influence and contribute to the Secretary General's report and to mission mandates. It is important to be aware of the implications of wording – e.g. missions should be charged with 'facilitating' or 'enabling' humanitarian action rather than 'coordinating'.

(vi)   The drafting of the Security Council Resolution is a political process. As such, there is a need for political engagement with member states and Security Council members. It may be appropriate to target the member state chairing the drafting process, and to engage EXCOM members.

(vii)   The importance of advocacy and building coalitions should be emphasised. UNHCR should foster partnerships with other humanitarian agencies, NGOs, and protection-minded member states. Given its dual mandate, it can also work through both OCHA and UNDOCO. The Office should also seek to engage with regional organisations, such as the African Union and EU (who are increasingly engaged in regional peacekeeping missions), and with Member States through these.

(viii)   UNHCR must engage proactively and constructively in the Integration Steering Group, the first meeting of which was held in December 2008. This will play a key role in policy-making on integration. UNHCR should seek to

table the issue of humanitarian space as an important agenda item for this group.

(ix)   There is a need to formulate internal strategic guidance on engagement with planning processes, including prioritisation on where to engage in the IMPP process at the New York level (including criteria for determining which task forces to prioritise), to avoid ad-hoc and reactive engagement.

(x)   There is a need to strengthen the capacity of field offices to influence the drafting of the quarterly Secretary-General's report, and to ensure that relevant issues are included. It is also important to maintain an ongoing relationship with the strategic planning unit within a mission, which links the military component with the humanitarian/development components. Liaison officer functions should be established in certain operations. There is a range of entry points at field level – SRSG, DSRSG, Force Commander, Chief Administrative Officer.

New developments and future prospects for integration

47. This session was chaired by Pierre Bertrand, Director, Liaison Office New York and opened with presentations from Sally Fegan-Wyles of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), Eiko Ikehaya (DPA), Madelene O'Donnell (DPKO) and Amjad Abbashar (OCHA).

48. In the presentation by DPKO, reference was made to the increasing interdependence of the efforts of the UN on the ground, pointing to, for example, the links between security and livelihoods, return of displaced populations, and rule of law. Peacekeeping missions are increasingly deployed in the life-saving phase of humanitarian action, and our efforts are therefore interdependent.

49. We need to look at how we can reconcile issue of humanitarian space with the imperative of working together, and to broaden the discussion beyond that of structural issues, to look more at joint planning. In this respect, we should work together selectively, around areas where it makes sense, in a realistic and pragmatic manner. The important role of the Integration Steering Group was highlighted and UNHCR was urged to help shape the agenda for that group, and to identify the key tasks which it should undertake.

50. The DPA presentation highlighted that the Policy Committee decision has now clarified that the integrated approach will be applied to all DPKO and DPA-led missions. DPA missions are diverse in terms of size, mandate and duration. Some are already fully structurally integrated (such as Iraq) and others semi-integrated (such as Lebanon).

51. The challenge is to develop principles which can be flexibly applied to such diverse situations. DPA is therefore reviewing mission by mission how the Policy Committee decision will be implemented. Awareness-raising is also taking place within DPA to ensure that staff understand what is meant by the integrated approach.

52. The PBSO presentation outlined the process currently under way for drafting the Secretary General's Report on Peacebuilding and Early Recovery. Ms Fegan-Wyles highlighted the UN's critical role in leading the international response in countries emerging from conflict, and its unique potential to bring together the political, military, humanitarian, early recovery and development components of an effective response.

53. To do this effectively, key weaknesses must be addressed. There should be a focus on a time narrow window when hostilities have ceased, and on delivering a rapid peace divided whilst at the same time developing a basis for sustainable development. She identified a number of critical gaps: in strategy, in funding and in capacity.

54. On strategy, she highlighted the need for one clear overarching strategy to guide the engagement of the UN, which identifies the UN's particular contribution and

links effectively with national and other partners. On funding, she highlighted the need for rapid and flexible funding mechanisms which complement, and do not diminish, those available for humanitarian action.

55. On capacity, she highlighted both the need to get international expertise in quickly, and the need for all actors (including humanitarians) to work much more effectively on building the capacity of national partners.

56. The OCHA presentation highlighted that the Policy Committee decision refers to an 'integrated UN presence' and not 'integrated missions'. Six key elements of the decision were highlighted: clarification of the involvement of DPA; the inclusion of ongoing conflict situations; the focus on strategic coherence rather than structural integration, the reference to maximising the collective and individual impact of the activities of UN agencies; the reaffirmation of humanitarian principles; and the assertion that 'form should follow function'.

57. The draft policy instruction on OCHA's structural relationship with an integrated UN presence was presented. This has been developed in order to ensure a consistent and clearly articulated approach to the issue of structural integration, and was developed in part in response to issues which arose during the Strategic Assessment for Somalia.

58. The draft policy instruction proposes that the following factors be considered in reaching a decision on the degree of integration: the level and degree of fluidity of conflict and likely impact of structural integration on perceptions of humanitarian actors; the role and views of non-UN humanitarian actors; the role of national authorities (in particular, whether they are able to provide assistance impartially).

Security management

Proposed Goal 3: Security management arrangements should be designed to enable and facilitate humanitarian action.

[Validated, but with an emphasis on the need to consider staff and beneficiary security together, linked to Goal 4.]

59. Participants noted that the security landscape has changed in the aftermath of the Baghdad and Algiers attacks. Staff believe that there has been too much of a shift towards reinforcing security hardware rather than understanding and mitigating risk. In integrated missions, the mission leadership plays a key role in security management, with the SRSG generally designated as Designated Official (DO), with the DSRSG/RC/HC serving as Deputy DO. Whilst UNDSS generally continues to exercise a key role, the military and other components of a peacekeeping mission also frequently take on an important role in security management, sometimes without the same humanitarian awareness.

60. Participants expressed the view that current approaches to security management do not always sufficiently take account of the humanitarian imperative to alleviate suffering, and that there is a need for a better balance between ensuring staff security and maintaining and expanding access to beneficiaries.

61. Participants felt that in theory, integration should enable greater interaction between the security, political and military components of the UN presence, and thus enable more sophisticated analysis and enhanced access, but in general it was felt that there were few concrete security-related results emerging from integration.

62. The SRSG's position gives him/her access to a wide range of information, and some took the view that it was appropriate that the DO function is exercised by the SRSG. Others nonetheless felt that whilst the quality of information and analysis is frequently good, decisions taken are not always appropriate, and may be influenced by political considerations. There is also sometimes political pressure to reduce the security phase.

63. Participants cautioned that there is a need to balance the immediate objective of accessing beneficiaries (and for which military escorts may be desirable) against the mid to long-term objective of maintaining humanitarian space by ensuring that humanitarian actors are perceived as neutral and impartial, and which may militate against using military escorts

Recommendations on security management:

(i)   For each mission, clear principles should be adopted regarding the delineation of responsibilities between the civilian and military wings of a mission.

(ii)   UNHCR should retain its own field safety capacity, and be assertive in retaining a role in security management, particularly in the start-up period of a mission. Good coordination and delineation of roles (agency security responsibilities, mission responsibilities, DSS responsibilities) are crucial.

(iii)   The Deputy DO should come from a humanitarian background.

(iv)   Security decisions should be decentralised as much as possible, drawing on area-based knowledge.

(v)   UNHCR should advocate for flexibility on staff ceilings.

(vi)   Security management should better integrate input from national colleagues, and UNHCR should draw on its extensive field presence to contribute to security management.

Security of beneficiaries

Proposed Goal 4: Where appropriate, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions should undertake responsibility for ensuring the physical security of refugees and IDPs, working in close collaboration with UNHCR.

[Validated, but with the term 'ensuring' to be replaced by 'contributing to'.]

64. In situations of ongoing conflict and displacement, the deployment of a peacekeeping mission may have a crucial role in securing the physical security of IDPs and refugees. Security Council 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians provides an important framework in this respect.

65. However, participants believed that the wording of this goal should be fine-tuned to better define the conditions in which the contribution of mission should be sought, and that it should be emphasised that security is primarily the responsibility of the host state.

66. For example, peacekeeping missions may be mandated to provide support to host governments in maintaining the civilian character of refugee and IDPs camps and settlements, in line with Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006). Support may also be provided to reinforce security within displaced communities: for example, the policing and rule of law component of a multi-dimensional mission may provide training and support to local law enforcement personnel and others engaged in camp security.

67. Peacekeeping troops may also play an important role in preventing attacks on displaced populations, through a dissuasive presence, and in exceptional circumstances may even assist in the evacuation of populations or the establishment of humanitarian corridors to enable populations to reach safety.

68. Where appropriate, UNHCR should promote the inclusion of specific provisions for the security of refugees and IDPs in the mandate of a mission, support the development of appropriate tools, and advocate for sufficient capacity to discharge this function.

69. It was felt that a broad 'protection of civilians' mandate is not necessarily enough, and that (where appropriate) mandates should make explicit reference to displaced populations in order to ensure that their needs are sufficiently prioritised (although even then, under-resourced deployments may limit the capacity of the mission to deliver). In some situations there may be a link to regional or international peace and security.

Recommendations on security of beneficiaries:

(i)   Globally, UNHCR should invest in training and strengthening the knowledge of its own staff on the UN system, peacekeeping operations and the Integrated Missions.

(ii)   In peacekeeping operations with a mandate to contribute to the security of displaced populations, there should be a close dialogue with the mission. UNHCR should invest in educating peacekeeping troops and mission staff on refugee protection standards, and train its own staff on the role and responsibilities of the mission.

(iii)   UNHCR should work with DPKO to ensure the provision of advance information to local and displaced populations: for example, on why there will be a military presence, and what the peacekeeping contingent will and will not be able to do.

(iv)   UNHCR should develop criteria on when it is appropriate to advocate for a 'protection of civilians' mandate.

(v)   UNHCR should engage with countries of asylum to manage expectations regarding the impact of a peacekeeping presence, for example to counter arguments that an international military presence means that all or part of a country can be considered 'safe'.

Information-Sharing

Proposed Goal 5: To secure an effective information-sharing platform, and access to public information services, as crucial elements of integration.

[In principle validated, but to be re-worded to reflect a two-way process of information-sharing]

70. UNHCR's presence in a country frequently pre-dates that of the mission, and its field presence also provides UNHCR with access to considerable local information. UNHCR also has access to a considerable range of information relevant to the causes and consequences of conflict, which may be analysed and synthesised for use in strategic assessments.

71. UNHCR should therefore seek to improve its own information management, and should establish channels to ensure that important information reaches the SRSG. UNHCR clearly however needs to maintain an independent role as regards reporting and advocacy in relation to populations of concern.

72. UNHCR should aim to contribute to and shape the information and reports being prepared by the mission, to ensure that issues of concern are properly analysed and reflected. UNHCR should continue to promote streamlined information-gathering. Here the Protection Cluster has an important role to play in developing collective monitoring and information management systems.

73. Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure that the information generated informs strategic assessments and reports, within a common framework which respects confidentiality and other data protection principles. Somalia was highlighted as a useful example in this regard.

74. Missions also collect a wealth of information and generate detailed and wide-ranging reports, for example on political, security, military, human rights and other issues. Whilst much of this is confidential and/or coded, in some operations extremely effective information-sharing mechanisms have nonetheless been established.

75. Currently, this is rather ad hoc, and UNHCR should promote the establishment of more systematic mechanisms, such as having humanitarian agencies participate in daily military briefings or having political and/or military officers attend UNCT meetings to provide briefings. It was highlighted that information sharing must also cover political information. Much information also stays at country level, so effort must be invested in establishing direct field contacts.

76. There was some discussion of the issue of public information and advocacy, and the extent to which a collective communications strategy may be appropriate. Whilst there was a consensus that a collective approach may bring considerable advantages,

it was emphasised that agencies must retain the autonomy to develop messages related to its own mandate.

Recommendations on information-sharing:

(i)   UNHCR (DIPS) should issue updated guidance on protection and returnee monitoring (already under development);

(ii)   UNHCR should work through the Protection Cluster to develop integrated protection and human rights monitoring systems which include the different needs and perspectives of a range of stakeholders, including national actors. In general, further analysis of the relationship between Integrated Missions and the cluster approach is required;

(iii)   UNHCR should advocate for a more structured system of information-sharing and management (including political and security information) which is less based on ad hoc relationships. DPA is a particularly important source of political analysis and has close contacts with a wide range of actors.

Return and reintegration

77. The return and reintegration of displaced populations is frequently a crucial component of peacebuilding. UNHCR should articulate and build on the synergies between these processes. An integrated UN presence offers an important framework within which collective approaches to reintegration may be pursued, and linkages established with national reconstruction and development processes.

78. Participants highlighted the following ways in which missions could play an important role in the facilitation of return and support to reintegration:

- opening up access, for example, ensuring the de-mining of return routes that might not otherwise have been prioritised;

- contributing to the security of return areas;

- opening up channels of communication with government ministries that might not previously have been considered as UNHCR counterparts;

- providing information on areas of return;

- facilitating access to collective funding mechanisms for reintegration activities;

- facilitating the development of national / collective strategies on return and reintegration, and promoting the harmonisation of strategies for the return and reintegration of all displaced populations (IDPs and refugees);

- enabling access to mission assets, for example for road rehabilitation, QIPS in return areas and in certain circumstances, even transport of returnees and personal possessions;

- addressing sensitive political issues around return;

- linking return and reintegration of displaced communities with complementary programmes such as transitional justice and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

79. Participants highlighted the need to support strong and expert leadership within return, reintegration and rehabilitation (RRR) units in missions, as well as the

important role of National Steering Committees to harmonise and coordinate IDP and refugee return and reintegration and in standard-setting and policy-making.

80. They also noted the importance of engaging early on budgeting and resource allocation within the mission, and at a later stage, with the Project Approval Committee as a useful entry point.

Recommendations on Return and Reintegration:

(i)   Ensure that references in mission mandates to the facilitation of return are appropriately worded and in line with international standards and UNHCR policy, and that roles are appropriately defined. Security Council Resolution 1674 (which includes 'the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons' as a standard element of mission mandates where relevant) should be used to help craft mission mandates;

(ii)   Develop a clear advocacy strategy to counter political pressure for premature returns;

(iii)   Establish a roster of UNHCR return and reintegration experts for secondment to missions and to governments;

(iv)   Elaborate a UNHCR policy and implementation strategy on IDP returns and other durable solutions, which clarifies the nature and extent of UNHCR engagement;

(v)   Support capacity development on return and reintegration by bringing UNHCR expertise to develop tools and engaging in advocacy on standards (including on the harmonisation of IDP and refugee return standards). Concrete commitments to this effect should be included in a revised MOU or similar agreement with DPKO;

(vi)   Encourage missions to work with UNHCR, governments and other partners to develop comprehensive strategies which include solutions other than return.

Reconciliation, rule of law and human rights

Proposed Goal 7: To develop partnerships on reconciliation, rule of law and human rights as part of a broader strategy for promoting the restoration of national protection capacity.

[Validated, but with the explanatory text to be expanded]

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81. Participants saw important opportunities for cooperation at both headquarters and field levels on rule of law issues, particularly in the context of strengthening national protection capacity as part of a comprehensive durable solutions strategy. They suggested that we need to better understand how we can work with DPKO on this element.

82. Current developments within DPKO aimed at strengthening its rule of law functions (including police and corrections) are extremely promising. However some pointed out that this process is still in the early stages, and that its operational impact remains to be seen. Nonetheless, there is significant potential for effective cooperation, and UNHCR should seek to contribute to this process in a constructive way.

83. At country level, it was suggested that one of the challenges in engaging with missions on rule of law issues is the plethora of units working on different aspects, such as child protection, human rights and rule of law. Efforts should be invested in understanding and engaging with these various functions. It was also suggested that UNHCR needs to become better at explaining protection standards (for example, in relation to voluntary, safe and dignified return) to external audiences.

84. It was highlighted that the key opportunity presented by an integrated mission is on joint planning and strategy development. It was noted that implementation of rule of law programmes is conducted primarily by UNDP, not the mission.

85. Participants highlighted that engagement on rule of law should not be seen in terms of a potential source of funding for UNHCR projects, and that opportunities to secure funding from missions for programme delivery are extremely limited. QIPS budgets may offer some limited funds for discrete 'hardware' projects such as the rehabilitation of police stations, however care needs to be taken not to duplicate the work of other agencies.

86. Participants also highlighted the need for more engagement with missions on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and others associated with fighting forces, and particularly on the link with reconciliation. However, it was recognised that the level of UNHCR engagement in DDR needs to be carefully crafted.

Recommendations on Reconciliation, Rule of Law and Human Rights

(i)   UNHCR should be pro-active and practical, and focus on direct engagement at country-level; Concrete cooperation on land and property issues should be prioritised;

(ii)   Secondments to rule of law units should be considered;

(iii)   Cooperative and creative approaches should be pursued to ensure the allocation of trust funds and peacebuilding funds to critical rule of law projects, working with missions and other UN partners

Mission services and assets

> *Proposed Goal 8: To harness the use of mission services and assets including flights, logistics, GIS and other technical support, in support of UNHCR's operations and those of other humanitarian actors.*
>
> *[Validated]*

87. Participants highlighted the need to improve predictability of the use of assets and to better coordinate administrative issues before and during the deployment of a mission, and after its departure. This also applies to missions which are already up and running. At the same time, UNHCR should consider what it can contribute (such as technical support) in exchange for access to mission assets and services.

88. The importance of engagement at the mandate development and budget planning stage was highlighted. It was noted that DPKO is funded from assessed contributions, which are subjected to increasingly thorough scrutiny by the Fifth Committee. The latter may be more conservative than the Security Council, and closely scrutinises possibilities of duplication.

Recommendations on access to mission services and assets

(i) Access to mission assets and services (eg logistics, medical, security) should be included in a global agreement with DPKO, but also tailored for each country situation;

(ii) Strategic engagement in the assessment and mission development is crucial. Access to mission assets and services should be addressed in the IMPP. Particular attention should be focused on securing the insertion of language on eg use of trucks by the UNCT in the support concept;

(iii) Key entry points in the mission should be targeted for engagement on this issue – for example, the Chief Administrative Officer rather than the SRSG. Relationships with mission administration on key functions such as procurement are also key.

(iv) Access to assets and services should be monitored on an ongoing basis. Where necessary, UNHCR should engage directly with donors on problematic issues (eg, on lack of flight priority);

(v) UNHCR should seek to inculcate a 'do no harm' approach within its own operations and within the mission. A large UN presence frequently inflates staff salaries and housing prices, and may undermine existing capacity by drawing off staff and expertise. Common strategies should be adopted to minimise and mitigate these effects.

(vi)   UNHCR should seek to secure access to used mission assets, especially when missions draw down.

Staff secondments

89. There was a consensus that staff secondments play an important role in shaping mission priorities and strengthening their capacity to engage on displacement-related issues. UNHCR staff have a significant body of diverse experience, and have much to contribute. Secondments can also play an important role in staff development.

90. However, to date, secondment arrangements have frequently been ad-hoc and based on the career development aspirations or the availability of an individual staff member rather than a strategy for engagement in a given operation. Participants saw a need for a high level commitment to pursuing and securing secondments, together with a clear policy and strategy. UNHCR should be clear how and why it seconds staff – particularly where a staff member is seconded on non-reimbursable loan.

91. For UNHCR, the core purpose is to insert displacement-related issues into the mandate and agenda of a mission. It was nonetheless noted (by staff who had previously been seconded) that there is a tension in this respect. Once seconded, staff take on the identity and functions of the new agency, with different reporting lines. Secondments must nonetheless match the strategic interests of both parties.

92. A review of UNHCR human resource policies is currently under way, including a review of secondments and inter-agency mobility. It was recognised that the issue of secondments to integrated missions should be an integral part of a broader career management policy.

Recommendations on Staff Secondments

(i)   There is a need for high-level commitment to staff secondments, together with a clear policy and strategy.

(ii)   UNHCR's corporate strategy on a given situation, developed at the outset of a mission, should include a secondment component. LONY should play a key role in identifying secondment opportunities.

(iii)   The number of staff who benefit from secondments should be expanded. Consideration should be given to facilitating a larger number of secondments for shorter periods.

(iv)   A roster of staff for secondment or non-reimbursable loan to integrated missions should be established. This should include staff with expertise in key target functions (eg. RRR and rule of law) and geographical expertise, and should include senior staff at the Humanitarian Coordinator and Deputy HC levels.

(v)   A system for short-term 2-3 month secondments should be established. Secondments at the start-up phase of a mission can be extremely valuable, both to DPKO and UNHCR.

(vi)   There should be a system for regular contact between secondees and the relevant Bureau throughout the secondment period (currently secondees are a forgotten commodity whilst on loan).

(vii)   A re-absorption strategy should be put in place which recognises and uses the experience gained by the staff member. This should incorporate de-briefings and the identification of postings which capitalise on the knowledge and experience gained. Currently, returning staff are often not placed.

(viii)   Disincentives to secondments (such as the lack of recognition for seniority and promotion purposes) should be removed. Secondments should be fully reflected in the staff member's fact sheet.

(ix)   Efforts should be made to address currently incompatible administrative procedures for staff loans, to make these more structured and systematic.

(x)   UNHCR should solicit secondments from DPKO and other agencies as a means of increasing awareness of UNHCR's perspective and mandate.

(xi)   UNHCR should be open to seconding national staff.

Conclusion

93. There is a need for sustained commitment by UNHCR's Senior Management to strategic engagement with integrated missions at all stages of their development and deployment. Workshop participants were 'cautiously optimistic' about the opportunities presented by the integrated approach, noting that it is now a key element of the operational landscape, with which UNHCR must decisively engage.

94. UNHCR should develop clear a policy and strategy on the integrated approach, backed up operational guidance for field and headquarters staff.

95. A corporate policy and strategy should be developed for each situation in which integration is being contemplated. A task force should be established for each situation drawing in cross-divisional focal points at HQ, New York and country level.

96. Efforts should be invested in fostering open and informed attitudes by UNHCR staff to the integrated approach, through education, training and appropriate career development opportunities.

Further Reading

1. Policy Committee Meeting, 25 June 2008 - Summary Record of Discussion and Decision of the Secretary General No 2008/24, issued on 26 June 2008

2. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the 'Capstone Doctrine') DPKO 2008

3. Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, DPKO 17 January 2006 (endorsed by the Secretary-General in a covering note dated 9 February 2006)

4. Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations. An independent study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group. EB Eide, AT Kasperen, R Kent and K von Hippel, May 2005

5. Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Final Report, The State of the Humanitarian Enterprise, A Donini, L Fast, G Hansen, S Harris, L Minnear, T Mowjee, A Wilder, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2008

6. Information Note on Cooperation between UNHCR and DPKO, December 2003, and covering letter, 7 April 2004

7. Policy Compendium Note on United Nations Integrated Missions and Humanitarian Assistance, Oxfam International, January 2008

8. Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations, A Report on Findings and Recommendations, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2008

9. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008 (Briefing Paper), Centre on International Cooperation at New York University

10. DPKO background note on UN peacekeeping operations, 20 June 2008

11. The Importance of Humanitarian Actors in Peace Operations: The Need for Effective Coordination (draft Rev 1, October 2008) Troeller, Gary

12. An Assessment of UNICEF's Engagement with Peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations, Praxis-CIC Humanitarian Research Team, August 2007

Annex 1: Draft Guidance Note

Workshop on UNHCR's Engagement with Integrated Missions
20-21 November 2008

DRAFT GUIDANCE NOTE FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY

A. Introduction

1.   The external environment within which UNHCR operates is constantly evolving. Effective delivery of the Office's mandate requires the agility to maximise opportunities arising from this changing landscape, and to influence it in ways which facilitate, rather than inhibit, the delivery of protection and pursuit of solutions for populations of concern to UNHCR.

2.   This guidance note examines the implications for UNHCR of a key trend in the institutional context in which it works: the evolving role of UN peacekeeping operations, and in particular, the emergence of 'integrated missions' as the dominant institutional arrangement for UN engagement in countries emerging from conflict (or, increasingly, where conflict is still ongoing). It is a preliminary draft, designed to provide a basis for discussions at a workshop on UNHCR's engagement with integrated missions to be held in Geneva in November 2008, and will be developed further to reflect the outcome of those discussions.[2]

3.   The concept of integration has evolved from an initial focus on structure to a broader emphasis on an integrated approach and planning process. Integration has been most recently described as a 'strategic partnership' between a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office on the one hand, and the UN Country Team on the other, under the leadership of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) or Executive Representative of the Secretary General (ERSG) 'that ensures that all components [of the UN system] operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.'[3] In the majority of cases, integration has entailed combining the functions of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator into that of Deputy SRSG, creating a 'triple-hatted' DSRSG/HC/RC.

4.   To date, despite extensive engagement with integrated missions in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Kosovo,[4] Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC, Burundi, Iraq, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, Chad and the CAR, there has been a gap in UNHCR policy and operational guidance on this topic. The primary aim of this paper is to analyse the key areas of intersection between UNHCR's operations and integrated missions, and to assist workshop participants in identifying priority objectives to be pursued in relation to each of these areas, together with the main strategic inputs required to advance these.

5.   The paper focuses primarily on UNHCR's relationship with DPKO-led multidimensional peacekeeping missions and UN political missions to which the principle of integration has been applied. The latter includes missions operating alongside non-UN military presences (which are, however, deployed with Security Council endorsement) such

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[2] The development of the integrated missions concept has links with other parallel efforts to secure greater coherence in the work of the UN and humanitarian actors: the 'Delivering as One' initiative in the development sphere, and the humanitarian reform process. Policy guidance on these was issued in UNHCR IOM/FOM 069/2008 (see *Policy Guidance on "UNHCR's engagement in the United Nations Delivering as One Initiative" and on "Humanitarian Reform and UNHCR's Refugee Mandate"*.
[3] Decision of the Secretary General No 2008/24, issued on 26 June 2008
[4] UNMIK was not originally formally designated as an integrated mission, however humanitarian and development components were structurally integrated through the combined DSRG/RC/HC function.

as ISAF in Afghanistan and the Multi-National Force in Iraq. It should also be noted that a significant number of peace-keeping operations are increasingly being undertaken by regional forces (such as the AU in Somalia and the EU in Chad) or hybrid UN-regional forces (such as in Darfur).

B. Background

6.   There has been a decisive shift in the nature and extent of UN peacekeeping operations since the early 1990s. The end of the Cold War saw the emergence of an increasingly assertive Security Council and a proliferation of internal conflicts. One consequence was a significant expansion in the UN's peacekeeping role: some 76% of all UN peacekeeping operations deployed since the establishment of the UN were mandated after 1990. The peacekeeping function continues to expand – in 2005 69,000 military and police personnel were deployed in DPKO-led peacekeeping operations; today the number is 86,500, together with 23,500 civilian personnel.[5]

7.   The 1990s also saw a significant evolution in the objectives of peacekeeping operations, which moved from maintaining the status quo (inter alia, by supervising and monitoring ceasefires), to a multidimensional approach designed to provide more comprehensive support to the transition from peace to stability.

8.   Multidimensional peacekeeping operations, which generally employ a mix of military, police and civilian staff, are currently typically deployed in the aftermath of violent internal conflict to support the implementation of a peace agreement. Whilst the majority of current operations conform to this model of robust, consent-based peacekeeping, there are also a number (such as those in Darfur, Chad and the CAR) where there is arguably no real peace to keep, or where peace agreements fail to hold (such as in the DRC) and peacekeeping takes on a more ambitious (and controversial) stabilisation function.

9.   The objectives and activities of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation are defined by its mandate, as set out in the relevant Security Council resolution(s). Typically, as well as monitoring ceasefires, these may involve the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, support to the development of governance capacity and representative political institutions, rule of law, human rights, security sector reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and election support. Mandates are also shaped by three generic Security Council resolutions: Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security (calling for gender mainstreaming in all peacekeeping operations), Resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict, and Resolution 1674 (2006) on protection of civilians.

10.   The last of these reaffirms a commitment to ensuring that the mandates of peacekeeping operations, where appropriate, include provisions regarding (i) protection of civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical danger; (ii) the facilitation of the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) 'the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons'.

11.   Multi-dimensional missions evolve over time. Their dimensions and role may be particularly significant at crucial phases, such as key elections or DDR. They may be preceded by a political mission or a regional peacekeeping operation, and may be succeeded by an integrated office headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG), as in Sierra Leone.

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[5] See DPKO background note on UN peacekeeping operations, 20 June 2008. There are currently 15 DPKO-led peacekeeping missions and 3 DPKO-led political and/or peacebuilding missions, with a total annual budget of $7.1 billion.

12.   The concept of integration links multidimensional peacekeeping missions with broader UN efforts in support of peace consolidation. It emerged from the 1997 report of the Secretary- General, *Renewing the United Nations – a Programme for Reform*, and was reinforced in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000) – the *Brahimi Report.*

13.   The rationale was that to provide effective support to the transition from conflict to stability, the humanitarian and development strategies of the UN should be integrated into the overall peacekeeping effort. Initial guidance reinforced the leadership role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) vis-à-vis the UN system-wide presence, and called for the RC/HC to serve as the Deputy SRSG in multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions, thus linking the humanitarian and development activities of the UN Country Team formally with the mission through these structural linkages.

14.   Integration is now the driving force underpinning the UN presence in transitional contexts. Following a meeting of the Policy Committee earlier this year, in which the High Commissioner participated, integration was reaffirmed as 'the guiding principle for all conflict and post-conflict situations where the UN has a Country Team and a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation or political mission/office, whether or not these presences are structurally integrated'.[6] Integration is described as a 'strategic partnership' between the UN mission and the UNCT, under the leadership of the SRSG (or ERSG) 'that ensures that all components [of the UN system] operate in a coherent and mutually supportive manner, and in close collaboration with other partners.'

15.   The Policy Committee decision emphasizes that country-level arrangements should be flexible and context-specific, and may take different structural forms. The emphasis is placed on joint strategic planning, agreement on objectives and activities in support of peace consolidation, and agreed mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.

16.   A particular focus is placed on the establishment of shared analytic and planning capacity and an integrated strategic framework. Reference is made to humanitarian principles, respect for humanitarian space, and the need to facilitate effective humanitarian coordination with all actors. The decision provided for Headquarters task forces to be established for each country with an integrated presence, and an Integration Steering Group to meet on at least a quarterly basis.

17.   The Policy Committee decision reinforced key components of guidelines on UN peacekeeping operations issued by DPKO in early 2008 and known as the *Capstone Doctrine.* This describes an integrated mission as one in which there is a 'shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the UN presence at country level, with integrated analysis and planning as a key component.[7] Structural integration 'should be driven by an assessment of whether or not it will add any real value and improve the impact of the United Nations engagement.' Integration 'does not mean that all UN actors on the ground should be physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure…. Moreover, while the

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[6] Decision of the Secretary General No 2008/24, issued on 26 June 2008
[7] *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, DPKO 2008 pp53-54.
Structural integration essentially means that the functions normally undertaken by a UN agency are incorporated directly within the mission itself, so that the agency (normally) ceases to have an independent presence. An example is the structural incorporation of human rights functions: normally, OHCHR has no independent presence where a multi-dimensional mission is present, but supports the mission in its selection of international human rights staff, with Human Rights Advisors retaining a secondary reporting line to OHCHR. Humanitarian coordination may be fully incorporated, partially incorporated (eg where there is a DSRSG/HC/RC within the mission supported by a separate OCHA office), or not structurally incorporated (eg where the HC function remains outside the mission (as is the case in Darfur).

members of the UNCT come under the overall authority of the SRSG/Head of Mission, in reality, they are governed by mandates, decision-making structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from those of the UN peacekeeping operation.'

18.   Essentially, the current doctrine focuses less on the structural incorporation of humanitarian and development functions and activities within the multi-dimensional mission, but rather on the development of a shared strategic vision, joint planning, and effective coordinated action, with the DSRSG/RC/HC providing the link between the mission and UNCT members, and also with other humanitarian and development actors. The human rights function is however generally fully incorporated within the mission, with the head of this component retaining a separate reporting line to OHCHR.[8]

19.   The leadership role of the SRSG should nonetheless be underscored. In an updated note of guidance issued by the Secretary-General in 2006, the SRSG is described as:

> The senior UN representative in the country, with overall authority over the activities of the United Nations. He/she represents the Secretary-General and speaks on behalf of the United Nations in a given country. The SRSG establishes the overall framework that guides the activities of the mission and the [UNCT] and ensures that all the UN components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach.' (Para 5)

> 'While recognizing that UN agencies are responsible for the implementation of their mandated activities, the SRSG may request a given agency to re-orient its planned interventions in line with the broad strategic objectives of the mission, subject to the agency's mandate and available resources.[9]

17.   This raises a number of questions regarding the relationship between the High Commissioner's refugee mandate and the SRSG's leadership role at country level. The implications of the integrated approach for individual agency mandates – including UNHCR's - will be discussed further below.

C.   *Areas of intersection with UNHCR operations*

20.   The emergence of integration as a driving principle has developed significant momentum over the last decade. This has significant implications for UNHCR operations, given that forced displacement is generally a prominent feature of the conflict and post-conflict contexts in which multi-dimensional peace-keeping missions are deployed, and as such where UNHCR has some of its largest and most complex operations.

21.   Integrated missions or offices are in place in four of the five countries of origin with the largest refugee populations still outside their borders: Afghanistan (UNAMA), Iraq (UNAMI), Sudan (UNMIS and UNAMID) and the DRC (MONUC). For the fifth, Somalia, which hosts an AU peace-keeping presence, integration has featured heavily in discussions on the shape of future UN engagement. These countries and others such as Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) also feature large IDP populations for whom UNHCR has assumed protection responsibilities. Although to a lesser extent, missions are also present in some countries hosting large refugee populations, such as Chad (MINURCAT).

22.   There are three broad categories of situation in which UNHCR may find itself operating in the context of an integrated UN presence. It should be emphasized that there is

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[8]Decision of the Secretary-General 2005/24
[9] *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions*, DPKO 17 January 2006 (endorsed by the Secretary-General in a covering note dated 9 February 2006)

no fixed template, and some overlap between each of these phases. In exceptional cases, a single country may even have different geographical areas in different phases.
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1) Ongoing conflict. It is noteworthy that the Policy Committee note provides for integration in all 'conflict and post-conflict' situations where there is a UNCT and multi-dimensional mission or political mission/office. The inclusion of 'conflict' situations highlights the tendency towards more robust peacekeeping operations, in which a definitive settlement has not yet been reached, and also covers situations where a political mission is seeking to facilitate a conflict resolution / national reconciliation process. In such situations ongoing displacement may be occurring and the Office may be engaged in IDP operations (protection, emergency shelter, camp coordination and camp management) and refugee operations in-country (particularly if the conflict has regional dimensions) or in neighbouring countries. Examples: Sudan (Darfur), Chad, DRC, Iraq.

2) Transitional phase. In the early aftermath of a peace settlement, the presence of peace-keeping troops (or other international force) may facilitate the restoration of security and a multi-dimensional presence may play an important role in supporting DDR, elections and early security sector reform, governance and rule of law inputs. Government capacity may be weak, particularly outside urban capitals. Humanitarian assistance may continue to play an important role initially, but increasingly, take on an early recovery dimension. Large-scale IDP and refugee returns may occur, including to urban areas, and UNHCR is likely to be directly engaged in voluntary return of IDPs, voluntary repatriation and reintegration activities. (Examples: South Sudan).[10]

3) Peace consolidation. In this phase there is likely to be a drawdown of troops and a shift from a security / recovery to a developmental approach. A peace-keeping mission may be scaled down or replaced by an integrated office headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG). UNHCR is likely to be focusing on support to the development of national protection capacity, the incorporation of return areas in national reconstruction and development programmes, and securing solutions for residual caseloads. It may be scaling down its operations and moving towards disengagement. (Example: Sierra Leone, Liberia).

23.   While there are some generic objectives which should underpin UNHCR's engagement with integrated missions, those to be pursued in a given context will also be shaped by the specific circumstances the mission or integrated office is being established, bearing in mind that situations change and what may seem to be a 'Category 2' situation can easily move into Category 1. Afghanistan and the DRC are current examples of this.

D. *Eight priority goals*

24.   The integrated approach is now a reality, and an increasingly key feature of UNHCR's operating environment. As such, it is essential that UNHCR positions itself to take maximum advantage of the opportunities this presents in order to bring about enhanced protection and sustainable solutions for its beneficiaries, drawing on extensive experience with integrated missions already acquired during the last decade. At the same time, there is a need to be alert to potential risks, and to ensure that these are identified and countered through effective engagement from the outset.

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[10] The definition of 'transition' adopted by the UNDG Working Group on Transitions is 'the period in a crisis when external assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile ceasefires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equity.'

> *Proposed Goal 1: To maximize opportunities presented by integration for better delivery of UNHCR's protection and solutions responsibilities through effective partnerships, whilst maintaining the autonomy and operational effectiveness of UNHCR's refugee mandate.*

25.   Integrated missions offer a crucial opportunity for UNHCR to link more effectively with other parts of the UN system in pursuit of its mandate for protection and solutions. In certain cases, police deployments and/or a military presence may be crucial to the physical security of beneficiaries and/or enabling humanitarian access. Solutions to displacement are also fundamentally linked to the achievement of political solutions, in the management of conflict and the restoration of security, and in the re-establishment of state capacity to provide for the rights and interests of its citizens. In these areas, integrated missions offer real opportunities to advance UNHCR's protection and solutions mandate within a broader peace-building perspective, and to engage more effectively with the political complexities of transition.

26.   Engagement with integrated missions should nonetheless be guided by two defining principles:

27.   *First*, specificity and complementarity of mandates. Whilst there are important synergies between refugee protection and solutions and the broader peace-making and peacebuilding process, effective delivery of the refugee mandate requires a certain independence from the political, military and security objectives of a mission, the ability to engage in independent advocacy on key issues, and the capacity to engage in cross-border or regional approaches which may go beyond the mandate of a country-specific mission.

28.   Maintaining appropriate standards of refugee protection (including assistance) requires leadership and effective implementation capacity. Under his mandate, the High Commissioner is accountable to the General Assembly for refugee protection and solutions. The full integration of refugee protection within the mandate of a multi-dimensional mission (along the lines of the human rights function, as described above) is not an option. However, there are some areas of UNHCR activities – in particular, IDP operations, and durable solutions for both refugees and IDPs, where the mandate is more nuanced and responsibilities are shared with other actors. Here, the potential for direct joint engagement through integrated approaches is greater.[11]

29.   Nonetheless, even integration in its current form, as a strategic partnership between the UNCT and the mission, incorporates a degree of ambiguity when it comes to overall leadership on mandated activities. Under the Statute, the High Commissioner is accountable for his refugee responsibilities to the General Assembly, to whom he reports through ECOSOC. The High Commissioner and Secretary General are nonetheless urged to 'make appropriate arrangements for liaison and consultation on matters of mutual interest'. However, the Secretary General's 2006 guidance note, referred to on page 3 above, whilst making reference to individual mandates nonetheless gives the SRSG 'overall authority' over the activities of the UN at country level, reporting to the Secretary General through the USG for Peacekeeping Affairs.

30.   The latest guidance – encapsulated in the Capstone Doctrine - makes reference to individual agency mandates and reinforces that integration should stem from collaboration and dialogue, and not be driven by a top-down approach. Reference to respect for agency mandates also appears in the latest draft guidelines on the strategic assessment process.

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[11] For further discussion of the non-transferrable nature of the refugee mandate, and the implications this has for coordination and accountability arrangements under the cluster approach, see IOM/FOM 069/2008.

UNHCR should continue to promote awareness of the particular nature of its mandate and those of humanitarian actors, and should be alert to arrangements which may dilute leadership or accountability for refugee protection. Advocacy should emphasize the complementary and mutually reinforcing nature of UNHCR's mandate and those of multi-dimensional missions.

31.   *Second*, operational effectiveness. UNHCR must remain a clear vision of the key areas in which integration can contribute to the delivery of its mandate and tailor its engagement around those areas. UNHCR's capacity is limited and its involvement with integrated missions should be selective and effective. Coordination with integrated missions can be a cumbersome process, particularly as the functions within missions are often stove-piped and intra-mission coordination often less than optimal.

32.   The sheer size of multi-dimensional missions (with total civilian staff levels in excess of 20,000 as compared to 6,000 UNHCR staff) means that UNHCR must select its entry points carefully and strategically. The level of inputs such as training, staff secondments, and involvement in assessment, coordination and planning processes must be gauged and monitored accordingly.

> *Proposed Goal 2: Integration arrangements should enable and facilitate humanitarian action, with a particular focus on protecting humanitarian space and maintaining a flexible approach to the location of humanitarian coordination.*

33.   Peacekeeping missions have in some cases played an important role in enabling access to beneficiaries in situations where this would otherwise not have been possible. Security Council Resolution 1674, which provides for the facilitation of humanitarian assistance as a standard component of mission mandates, provides a further basis for this role.

34.   Nonetheless, the centre of gravity of multidimensional missions currently lies in their political and security role, with a primary focus on delivering stability. Integration has been interpreted in some quarters as a one-way transfer of power into DPKO, resulting both in a shrinkage of humanitarian space and at the same time, insufficient prioritisation of humanitarian and recovery functions. These are frequently slower to be established than other parts of the mission and almost invariably understaffed. In large peacekeeping missions, the military component may not necessarily see the value in consulting or working with humanitarian actors.

35.   At the same time, in situations where conflict is ongoing or not yet fully resolved, the incorporation of humanitarian coordination and support functions within a political or a multi-dimensional mission can have significant negative consequences for humanitarian space.

36.   A series of recent studies by the Feinstein International Centre have highlighted the impact of integration on the perception of UN humanitarian agencies as neutral and impartial players, and the negative effect this has had on access to beneficiaries. This is particularly problematic in situations where there is as yet no peace to keep (Category 1 situations), however it should be borne in mind that few transitions are straightforward. If the mission is perceived as politically aligned, or it fails to deliver anticipated benefits such as security (as recently in the DRC), the perceptions of UN humanitarian actors may also be dramatically affected. The situation is even more problematic in cases where UN political missions are linked to a non-UN military presence, as for example, UNAMI and the multi-national force in Iraq.[12]

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[12] UN Security Council Resolution 1546 formalises the reliance of UN agencies on the MNF for their security, presence and mobility in Iraq.

37.   Humanitarian actors also continue to have concerns about the engagement of peacekeeping troops in 'hearts and minds' activities, which may include Quick Impact Projects (QIPS) potentially at odds with broader programming goals. Efforts have been made to address these concerns through DPKO guidance which provides that these should not be conceived as humanitarian projects and should be coordinated with the HC. In the DRC, the DSRSG/HC/RC was fully involved in decisions on when such projects would be undertaken, and such approval and coordination mechanisms are also provided for in the 2006 Guidance Note.

38.   Tensions may also arise between the political goals of the mission's leadership, and their tendency to 'outpace' humanitarianism. Tactically, peacekeepers may need to keep one faction at arms length, while at the same time, for humanitarian actors, maintaining parallel lines of communication with non-state actors may be an important aspect of ensuring beneficiary protection.

39.   Integration may also have a significant impact on international and national NGOs, for whom perceptions of neutrality may also be affected through their association with the humanitarian coordination function or their role as the implementing partners of UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies. The incorporation of the support function provided by OCHA within the missions in Liberia and Afghanistan met heavy opposition from NGOs, and in the latter country a separate OCHA office has recently been reopened. To date, there has been little examination of the relationship between the 'cluster approach' and integrated missions, and in particular, the impact integration has on the willingness of non-UN actors to engage in cluster coordination arrangements).

40.   Such situations present very real dilemmas for humanitarian agencies. One response has been to focus on the location of the humanitarian coordination function. Recent draft guidance prepared by OCHA proposes a 'one foot in, one foot out' configuration as the 'default' arrangement for this function.[13] This provides for a DSRSG/HC/RC inside the mission, supported by an OCHA office located both structurally outside the mission and in separate premises. In Category 3 contexts, where the intervention is shifting towards recovery, a 'two feet in' approach may be appropriate. In those where peacekeeping forces are playing a more robust stabilization role, the HC/RC may even be located outside the mission (a 'two feet out' approach.

41.   There is to some extent a tension between pragmatism and principle in the relationship between multi-dimensional missions and UN humanitarian actors such as UNHCR. On the one hand, close engagement with the military component of the mission may help to enhance the mission's role in facilitating access to beneficiaries and enhancing their security. In the DRC, whilst OCHA remained outside the mission, there was nonetheless close coordination on protection issues, with MONUC co-leading the protection cluster with UNHCR.

42.   It may also enable more effective interaction on issues such as the use of QIPs, which some have argued are in any event primarily implemented in areas to which humanitarians do not have access. On the other hand, close association with military actors, even UN peacekeeping forces, may have long term consequences for humanitarian action in a given context, particularly where the situation deteriorates. The impact on perceptions of humanitarian agencies who remain in-country after the departure of peacekeepers should also be borne in mind.

43.   UNHCR must remain alert to the implications of integration for humanitarian space. In general, the more complex the security situation and the more robust the mission's mandate,

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[13] Policy Instruction: OCHA's Structural Relationship Within an Integrated UN Presence (Draft 3.9, 2008)

the more problematic integration becomes for agencies. UNHCR must maintain a strong advocacy strategy in both the pre-deployment and implementation phases. In general, the Office should promote the approach adopted by OCHA described above, and if necessary should advocate strongly for humanitarian action to remain outside the integration arrangements, as was done successfully for Somalia in early 2008.

44.   At the same time, advocacy should also focus on enhancing the mandate and capacity of missions for facilitation of humanitarian action in accordance with Resolution 1674 (2006) – even where humanitarian coordination is located outside the mission structure.

> *Proposed Goal 3: Security management arrangements should be designed to enable and facilitate humanitarian action.*

45.   As already noted, the presence of a peacekeeping mission may enable access to populations that humanitarian agencies would otherwise be unable to reach. In locations such as Darfur (where UNAMID is still only at 50% of its mandated deployment capacity) and the DRC, peacekeepers have been able to open up and maintain road access in areas of ongoing insecurity, and to provide helicopter access to remote locations. Peacekeeping forces have also arranged medical and security evacuations, and provide security for field missions (although again, travelling with armed DPKO escorts has implications for external perceptions of humanitarian agencies and thus for humanitarian space).

46.   Despite this, there is some evidence that security arrangements in the context of integrated missions are not sufficiently shaped by the imperative of alleviating suffering through humanitarian action, and in many cases are overly restrictive. In integrated missions, the SRSG is also the Designated Official, responsible for the security of all UN personnel, with the DSRSG as Deputy. He is advised by an Integrated Security Management Team, which is generally composed of DPKO, UNDSS and UNCT representatives.

47.   Field experience tends to suggest that in this scenario, arrangements tend to become more restrictive and follow a 'one size fits all' approach. For example, after the issuance of ICC arrest warrants earlier this year, the UN security phase in Khartoum was raised to Phase 3, making it a non-family duty station. This did not affect DPKO, whose staff were deployed on mission status, but had a huge impact on UNCT members, for whom huge costs and disruption were occasioned owing to the evacuation of staff and their families. Khartoum nonetheless remains a family duty station for NGO staff. More restrictive approaches to security than usual have also been evident in the DRC.

48.   Where possible, UNHCR should advocate for security management to be located closer to the DSRG/HC/RC function, with support from UNDSS located outside the mission structure. The aim should be greater humanitarian ownership of security assessment and management process. The long-term consequences of linking security management closely with a UN or regional peacekeeping presence should be borne in mind, including the potential consequences of troop withdrawal.

> *Proposed Goal 4: Where appropriate, multi-dimensional peacekeeping missions should undertake responsibility for ensuring the physical security of refugees and IDPs, working in close collaboration with UNHCR.*

49.   In situations of ongoing conflict and displacement, the deployment of a peacekeeping mission may have a crucial role in securing the physical security of IDPs and refugees. Security Council 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians provides an important framework in this respect.

50.   Where appropriate, UNHCR should promote the inclusion of specific provision for the security of refugees and IDPs in the mandate of a mission, and also support the development of appropriate tools, and advocate for sufficient capacity to discharge this function. The mandate for MINURCAT in Chad provides an interesting model in this respect, although as the mission is still only in the deployment phase, in the process of replacing EUFOR, it will be important to monitor how this works in practice. For MINURCAT, reference to refugee and IDP security was incorporated in the mandate as a result of extensive lobbying and active engagement in the strategic assessment and integrated mission planning process.

51.   As well as the deployment of peacekeeping forces in refugee-hosting areas, the policing component of a multi-dimensional mission may be able to provide training and support to local law enforcement personnel and others engaged in camp security. Peacekeeping missions may also be able to provide support to host governments in maintaining the civilian character of refugee and IDPs camps and settlements, in line with Security Council Resolution 1674 (2006).

> *Proposed Goal 5: To secure an effective information-sharing platform, and access to public information services, as crucial elements of integration.*

52.   Integrated approaches can provide an excellent opportunity for UNHCR to access extensive and highly relevant information in frequently dynamic and difficult environments. Missions may have information on political and security developments which have an impact on persons of concern, or on new displacement. Missions generate regular and extensive reports such as milobs briefs, sitreps, internal reports, and human rights information. In Sierra Leone, the mission was able to provide information on security in potential return areas. To date, however, experience suggests that the level of cooperation and modalities for information sharing vary from mission to mission, and even within one mission, depending on the geographical area.

53.   UNHCR should promote effective and regular information-sharing with the mission. This should not be a one-way arrangement: UNHCR also has access to information which may be of use to the mission and can also share such information when it is in the interests of beneficiaries. Due regard must however be had the sensitivity of any information and when it is in the interests of its beneficiaries. For example, concerns were raised in Darfur that humanitarian agencies were being requested to share information with monitoring agencies not perceived as neutral.

54.   It is nonetheless important that UNHCR maintains independent channels of communication with host governments and other actors, and does not become wholly reliant on one source of information. It should be recalled that UNHCR is frequently present in a country before a multidimensional mission is deployed, and it is important to continue to preserve pre-existing channels of communication.

55.   Experience has been mixed on the issue of access to public information services such as UN radio. This can be an important communication tool, particularly for awareness-raising on protection issues and the provision of information on areas of return. In some cases however, space has tended to be given to humanitarian agencies when it is convenient for the mission, rather than seen as part of the mission responsibilities. On occasion, UNHCR operations have lost visibility by being reported as activities of the 'UN' and by implication, the mission itself. Early and proactive engagement at the planning stage is need to ensure appropriate levels of access and to promote appropriate visibility.

> *Proposed Goal 6: To develop strategic partnerships with missions on the voluntary return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees, and the local settlement of IDPs, and to secure the inclusion of this function in mission mandates where appropriate.*

56.   Multidimensional and political missions have in the past played a key role in securing durable solutions for IDPs and refugees, and in particular, in providing support to the voluntary return and reintegration process. Through engagement with the political component of the mission, UNHCR should advocate for the participation of refugees and the internally displaced in peace processes. Wherever possible, their rights and interests and solutions to displacement should be incorporated in peace agreements.

57.   In Kosovo, UNMIK played a key role in the facilitation refugee and IDP returns under Annex 7 of the Dayton Agreement, and in Liberia UNMIL played an important role in facilitating IDPs returns. Similarly, in South Sudan, UNMIS RRR is responsible for the coordination of the return and reintegration of IDPs, and UNTAET also played an important role in voluntary repatriation and IDP returns in East Timor.

58.   Resolution 1674 now includes 'the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons' as a standard element of mission mandates where relevant. UNHCR should seek to build on this to the maximum extent possible, whilst ensuring that appropriate protection standards are met, and that the political dimensions of return (particularly around elections or censuses) do not result in diminishing protection standards.

59.   Mobilising mission capacity and assets can significantly contribute to the return process. Ensuring security in return areas and mine clearance are areas in which substantial support has been provided in a number of countries. Other potential areas are road rehabilitation and the use of assets such as transport facilities and water tankers.

60.   Where appropriate, and particularly in the case of large-scale IDP returns, consideration should be given to the establishment of an inter-agency office within the mission to develop strategies, coordinate and implement the assisted return process, as was done in East Timor, Liberia and Kosovo (for example). UNHCR should be actively engaged in such arrangements, which provide a potential vehicle to ensure a coordinated approach designed around a strong protection framework.

61.   It should nonetheless be noted that in many cases, the RRR is understaffed and under prioritised within the mission structure. Whilst UNHCR can provide support through secondments, there is also a need to support DPKO efforts to develop a pool of independent expertise in this area. The mission may also be encouraged to take a lead role in securing the integration of those IDPs who elect not to return.

62.   Integrated approaches can provide good opportunities to link reintegration more effectively with the broader recovery process, to achieve better coordination with other actors, and to promote the insertion of reintegration and support to returnee areas in national reconstruction and development planning processes. UNHCR should push hard for a peace dividend in the aftermath of conflict, with a high-level commitment to the provision of basic services and livelihoods support. UNHCR should also advocate for a more systematic engagement with non-UN actors in joint planning processes.

63.   Integrated missions also provide a potential mechanism to link IDP and refugee reintegration to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and others associated with armed groups. To date, these two processes have been conducted separately, however, given that ex-combatants and the displaced are frequently returning to the same communities, a community-based approach which links the two processes is a logical way forward.

64.   In Liberia, UNHCR was approached for advice by UNMIL on the repatriation of foreign ex-combatants, and whilst declining to become directly involved, draft parameters for UNHCR engagement were prepared by the Africa Bureau and DIP in 2004. The information note on cooperation between DPKO and UNHCR developed in December 2003 also sets out a number of potential areas for cooperation in this respect.

Proposed Goal 7: To develop partnerships on reconciliation, rule of law and human rights as part of a broader strategy for promoting the restoration of national protection capacity.

65.   As well as social and economic reintegration, missions can play an important role in supporting the restoration of national rule of law and governance capacity. Here, UNHCR activities in support of the restoration of national protection capacity should be designed within this broader framework, and partnership opportunities should be pursued where it appears that effective implementation capacity exists. Particular areas of potential partnership may be land and property law and support to national protection actors such as human rights commissions. Potential areas for cooperation identified in recent meetings between UNHCR (DIPS) and DPKO have included the possibility of Joint Legal Assistance Centres, and support for DPKO capacity-building on housing, land and property.

Proposed Goal 8: To harness the use of mission services and assets including flights, logistics, GIS and other technical support, in support of UNHCR's operations and those of other humanitarian actors.

66.   The issue of access to mission assets and services by UNHCR and other humanitarian actors has been a complicated one. Multidimensional missions, funded through assessed contributions, have access to a huge range of resources which, if harnessed, can provide significant support to UNHCR operations. These include flights, logistics support, telecoms maintenance, shared premises and use of accommodation. In practice however, UNHCR's experience in this respect has been mixed, involving complex cost recovery schemes and a lack of priority accorded to non-mission users.

67.   Flights are one example which is often cited. On the one hand, access to mission flights can avoid reliance on unsafe commercial airlines and create efficiency savings by avoiding the expense of providing independent services. In some locations however (such as South Sudan), UNHCR has been obliged to maintain its own air service as UNHCR staff were not given priority on UNMIS flights and is present in locations not covered by UNMIS, or where services are infrequent. The issue of lack of priority for non-mission staff has also proven to be a significant problem in the DRC, where staff are entirely dependent on MONUC flights to certain locations but do not have priority access. In situations of ongoing conflict, where clearer separation from the military component of the mission may be advisable, it may be appropriate to advocate for the maintenance of a separate air service such as UNHAS, and avoiding the use of military aircraft.

68.   In general, there is a need for more effective and strategic engagement on the issue of access to mission assets and services at an earlier stage. Only if activities are built into mission mandates can resources be mobilised around them. Mandates sometimes include provisions relating to the facilitation of humanitarian actors, but usually 'within its capabilities'. More decisive wording is required and as they have important financial implications, the provision of common services must be incorporated into mission budgets. As such, focused early engagement is required if mission resources are to be effectively mobilized in support of UNHCR mandate objectives.

E. Strategic engagement – two key activities

69.   To date, UNHCR's strategic engagement with multi-dimensional missions has been shaped by two significant elements: 1) engagement in strategic assessments and integrated mission planning process; and 2) secondments to key functions. This section sets out some key features of UNHCR's engagement in these activities to date, and identifies issues for further discussion.

(i)   Strategic Assessments and the Integrated Mission Planning Process

70.   Experience to date has demonstrated that direct engagement in the strategic assessment and Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is essential if critical issues of concern to UNHCR are to be addressed in the mission design and implementation process. Mission activities and resources are defined by Security Council mandates, and as such, influencing these at an early stage is crucial.

71.   Set out below are some key entry points in which UNHCR should be fully engaged in order to maximise its influence on the shape and activities of integrated missions.

   a) Participation in the quarterly meetings of the Integration Steering Group (at ASG level);
   b) Engagement in Strategic Assessments, which aim to conduct a system-wide situation analysis and define possible options for UN engagement;
   c) Participation in the discussion on and participation in Technical Assessment Missions, such as the one for Chad;
   d) Providing input into the draft report of the Secretary General to the Security Council;
   e) Lobbying the Security Council and other member states;
   f) Early involvement in the discussions on the budgetary allocations of future missions. If UNHCR wants to be able to tap into logistical support of IM in the future, it needs to ensure that this is included in the mission statement and that sufficient resources are indeed allocated.
   g) Taking part in the IMPP from the start and through a mission's life cycle, and ensuring that it is appropriately linked to other processes such the CCA/UNDAF;
   h) Engagement in coordination mechanisms established at country level, and where appropriate, in the development of joint work plans and programmes;
   i) Participation in the Headquarters-level task forces established for each mission;
   j) Participation in discussions on mission drawdown and exit.

72.   Further discussion is required of how UNHCR can maximise its engagement in each of these processes, and the respective roles of country offices, Bureaux and the New York Office in this respect.

(ii)   Secondments

73.   A significant number of UNHCR staff have been seconded to multi-dimensional missions, primarily to return, reintegration and recovery (RRR), and to the position of DSRSG/HC/RC. One DPO staff member was also seconded to UNHCR (DOS) for a period of one year. To date, however (and with a small number of exceptions), secondments have not been undertaken in a strategic manner as a means of advancing key goals, but instead on a

rather ad hoc basis, based on the initiative and interest of an individual staff member and on his/her availability at the time candidates for a particular post are being sought.

74.   There is a need for a more strategic means of identifying posts in specific operations in which it would be in the interests of the agency to place a UNHCR staff member, identifying a suitable candidate, presenting him/her to DPKO and, if necessary, lobbying for his/her appointment. In certain circumstances, where a position is of particular interest, it may be appropriate to offer a secondment on the basis of a non-reimbursable loan. Responsibilities for identifying suitable posts and proposing candidates should be agreed. An arrangement for pre-identifying interested staff with appropriate functional and communication skills may be required. Consideration should be given as to which functional areas should be targeted (civil affairs, protection of civilians, RRR, DSRSG/HC/RC office?) and at which level (working level, management, DSRG/RC/HC?). Should UNHCR consider the secondment of national staff? Procedures should be in place to encourage that staff understand the purpose of their secondment and what is expected of them, that they stay in touch with and update UNHCR during their secondment, and to ensure that all seconded staff are fully de-briefed on their return.

75.   Crucially, there is also currently no established procedure for re-absorbing secondees back into UNHCR, and capitalising on the knowledge and expertise they have acquired. There is currently no clear means of recognising and using the experience they have gained (often at a more senior level than their personal grade). UNHCR's career management system does not currently reward secondments to integrated missions, despite their obvious value to the organisation.

6. Conclusion

76.   This draft paper has sought to identify the main implications for UNHCR's mandate and operations arising from the adoption of the integrated approach as the defining model for UN engagement where UN peacekeeping and political missions are deployed. It has identified eight key goals which should be pursued, and briefly discussed two current methods of engagement employed by UNHCR: through staff secondments and engagement in integrated mission planning processes and other headquarters-driven processes.

77.   Further discussion is now required on additional concrete actions to be undertaken in order to advance the goals identified. These will be the subject of discussion in the course of the November 2008 workshop. The following may however be considered:

(i)   Conclusion of a memorandum of understanding with DPKO, replacing the December 2003 information note;
(ii)   The inclusion of material on integrated missions and peacekeeping / peacebuilding in training for UNHCR staff;
(iii)   Standing Operating Procedures for engagement in IMPPs;
(iv)   A secondment strategy;
(v)   Guidelines for engaging with regional peacekeeping forces and/or troop-contributing countries.

PDES
12 November 2008

UNHCR's engagement with integrated missions

20 and 21 November 2008
Centre de Conferences Varembé, 9 Rue de Varembé

Day 1
Thursday 20 November 2008

08.30 - 09.00 hrs	Registration and coffee.
09.00 - 09.10 hrs	Welcome by Jeff Crisp.
09.10 – 09.30 hrs	Introductions, purpose of workshop (summary of background paper), adoption of agenda.
09.30 – 09.45 hrs	Welcome and introductory statement by Ms Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Assistant High Commissioner for Operations.
09.45 – 10.15 hrs	Plenary discussion (Goal 1)
10.15 – 10.45 hrs	"Implications of UN integrated missions for humanitarian action", presentation by Dr. Antonio Donini, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.
10.45 - 11.00 hrs	Coffee break.
11.00 – 12.30 hrs	Plenary discussion (Goal 2).
12.30 – 14.00 hrs	Lunch
14.00 – 15.15 hrs	Influencing the mandate, structure and functions of integrated missions: Strategic assessments, mission mandates and the IMPP. Plenary discussion.
15.15 – 15.45 hrs	Coffee break and walk to MBT (Operations Room, level -1).
15.45 – 16.00 hrs	Preparation of video link
16.00 – 17.00 hrs	"New developments in and future prospects for integration"; session by video link with OCHA, DPKO, DPA, PBSO
17.00 – 17.30 hrs	Summary and closure
17.30 – 18.30 hrs	Reception.

Day 2
Friday 21 November 2008

09.00 – 11.00 hrs   Overview of the programme for the day.

                             Breakout Groups

                             Group 1:
Security management (Goal 3)
Security of beneficiaries / protection of civilians (Goal 4)

                             Group 2:
Return, reintegration and early recovery (Goal 6)
Rule of law and human rights (Goal 7)

                             Coffee break during the session

11.00 - 12.30 hrs   Reporting back; plenary discussion.

12.30 – 13.30 hrs   Lunch

13.30 – 14.30 hrs   *Breakout Groups*

                             Group 3: Mission services and assets (Goal 8)
Group 4: Information sharing and public information (Goal 5)

14.30 – 15.00 hrs   Reporting back and plenary discussion.

15.00 – 15.45 hrs   Staff secondments (plenary discussion).

15.45 – 16.00 hrs   Coffee break.

16.00 – 17.00 hrs   Framework for UNHCR/DPKO partnership

17.00 – 18.00 hrs   Summary and wrap-up

18.00 hrs   Closure.

*Discussions will focus on the eight proposed goals set out in the draft guidelines attached (pages 4-9), and will address the following questions:

1. Is this an appropriate goal? Should it be re-formulated or nuanced?
2. What has been our experience so far on this issue? What lessons can we draw?
3. What concrete action can be taken to advance this goal (at country level or more generally)?

Participants are requested to come prepared with specific examples of their own experiences or the experiences of their offices on these issues, and with examples of good practice and/or specific proposals as to how these should be addressed.

Annex 3: List of participants

Name	Functional Title	Operation(s)
HQs		
1. Dominik Bartsch	Operations Manager, Sudan/Chad Operations	LONY, DPKO
2. Ahmed Baba Fall	Senior Food Aid Coordinator, DOS	Burundi
3. Greg Balke	Snr Prot. Officer, DIPS	
4. Angela Li Rosi	Head, Policy Unit, RBE	
5. Sajjad Malik	Chief of Section, DOS	Sudan
6. Pascale Moreau	Dep. Dir, Asia Bureau	Kosovo
7. Tammi Sharpe	Snr. Policy Advisor, RBA	Liberia
8. Francois Reybet - Degat	Snr. Policy Advisor DFAM	Afghanistan
9. Chiara Cardoletti	Policy Officer, RBE	Afghanistan
10. Saber Azam	Acting Dep. Dir, DER	Cote d'Ivoire, Kosovo
11. Ralf Gruenert	Chief of Section, IGO	DRC
12. Salvatore Ippolito	Senior Advisor, DOS	"Delivering as One"
13. Julia Schtivelman-Watt	Chief of Section, DHRM	DHRM
14. Raouf Mazou	Deputy Director, DOS	Liberia
SECONDEES		
15. Oluseyi Bajulaiye	Dep. Humanitarian Coordinator	Sudan
16. Ousseni Compaore	Directeur des affaires politiques et civiles, chef du Bureau MINURCAT, Abeche	Chad
NEW YORK		
17. Penninah Munoru	Snr Policy Advisor, LONY	LONY
18. Lim-Kabaa, Wei-Meng	Dep Dir, LONY	LONY
ASIA		
19. Johan Cels	Representative, Japan	LONY
AFRICA		
20. Eusebe Hounsokou	Representative, Cote d'Ivoire	DRC
21. David Snider	Snr Regional Field Safety Advisor, Kenya	FSA Nairobi
22. Guillermo Bettocchi	Representative, Somalia	Somalia
23. Valentin Tapsoba	Representative, Sierra Leone	Burundi, Sierra Leone
ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS (SELECTED SESSIONS)		
24. Judy Cheng-Hopkins	AHC(O)	
25. Arnauld Akodjenou	Director, DOS	
26. Pierre Bertrand	Director, UNHCR, New York	

27. Mireille Girard	Chief of Protection Capacity Section, DIPS	
28. Ann Blomberg	Senior External Affairs Officer, Inter-Agency Unit, DER	
29. Antonio Donini	Feinstein International Center, Tufts University	
30. Sally Fegan-Wyles	PBSO Consultant, Former Director of DOCO	
31. Eiko Ikegaya	Political Planning Unit, DPA	
32. Madalene O'Donnell	Best Practices and Training Unit, DPKO	
33. Amjad Abbashar	Humanitarian Officer, Integrated Mission Office, OCHA-NY	
FACILITATORS		
34. Jeff Crisp	Head of Service, Policy & Evaluation	
35. Vicky Tennant	Senior Policy Officer	
36. Jane Janz	Assoc. Policy & Evaluation Officer	
37. Fedde Groot	DOS	