



# Understanding the Processes of Urban Violence: An Analytical Framework

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Crisis States Research Centre  
Development Studies Institute  
London School of Economics

Giulia Agostini

Francesca Chianese

William French

Amita Sandhu

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## Executive Summary

As of this year half of the world's population is estimated to be living in cities<sup>1</sup>, therefore, an understanding of conflict and violence within an urban space is increasingly important. This paper's output is an analytical framework, which examines the processes that lead from conflict to violence. Defining violence as *the manifestation of distorted power relationships produced by the complex interaction between risk factors*, the paper assumes that it is the interaction of these risk factors, which creates the processes that lead to violent outcomes. Risk factors are viewed as *existing conditions that could potentially culminate in violence*.

Based upon a threefold taxonomy of violence, rooted in existing literature, three exemplary cities were chosen and analysed. These cities are Nairobi, Kinshasa, and Bogota, which respectively typify economic, political, and social violence. The cases demonstrate coinciding and context specific processes, with three significant points of overlap being identified:

- **The Primary Nexus:** Is envisioned as the point where there is a significant alignment of common processes, and the point at which the potential for violence is extremely high. These processes are: a crisis of governance, unequal access to economic opportunity, economic decline, and the naturalisation of fear and insecurity.
- **Secondary Nexuses:** Are the points of overlap between two of the case cities, where the potential for violence is significant, but not as likely as in the primary nexus.
- **Context Specific Processes:** Highlight the unique manner in which risks factors interact to produce violence in each of the cities.

This analysis led to the production of a two-stage analytical framework. These stages are not mutually exclusive, as an understanding of the first stage is essential for the second stage to be meaningful. The first stage is the contextualisation of the urban environment under examination, in order to understand the interaction between risk factors as they produce the processes leading to violence. While the second stage extracts these processes for the purpose of comparison to the processes that constitute the primary nexus. An alignment of processes should be viewed as an indicator of the high potential for violence within the urban environment being examined, however, processes are understood to be summative in nature, and thus, the more processes present, the more likely it is that violence will occur.

In addition to the production of a framework, the analysis demonstrates how the interaction between risk factors creates processes leading to violent outcomes. As a policy conclusion, given that processes are the result of this interaction and that they are difficult to influence or change in and of themselves, a focus on prevailing risk factors is suggested in order to mitigate urban violence.

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<sup>1</sup> UN-HABITAT 2006.

## I. Introduction<sup>2</sup>

*"[Urban] Space is by its very nature full of power and symbolism, a complex web of relations, of domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation"* (Doreen Massey in Blomley, Delaney and Ford 2001).

Urban space is characterised by conflict (see Esser 2004; Graham 2004; Rodgers 2004a and 2006b), but what is of interest to us is the way in which conflict can become violent. Violence is generated when risk factors interact in a situation of conflict. We define risk factors as *existing conditions that could potentially culminate in violence*. It is not the risk factors in themselves that are producing violence, as they are necessary but not sufficient conditions for violence to occur. For our purposes violence is defined as *the manifestation of distorted power relationships produced by the complex interaction between risk factors*<sup>3</sup>. This definition and the subsequent analysis are specifically based on urban spaces seen both as exemplary of wider processes, and as having distinctive features embedded in the urban reality. Our analysis makes a significant break with past literature on urban conflict and violence as it adopts a process-based perspective - the focus is on the interaction between risk factors.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on urban violence. This literature review develops a framework for this paper, and provides a taxonomy for the choice of the three case studies. Section 3 discusses the methodology used and presents our hypothesis. Sections 4, 5 and 6 provide case studies that exemplify violence within an urban context. Section 7 develops the analysis and produces the general analytical framework. Section 8 concludes this paper.

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<sup>2</sup> This paper was commissioned by The Crisis States Research Centre, under the theme *Cities and Fragile States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction*, as part the programme's second phase. See appendix I for the Terms of Reference.

<sup>3</sup> This definition is the operational definition to be used in the paper, see appendix II for further definitions.

## **II. Literature review<sup>4</sup>**

In order to frame urban violence various authors use different models. Between them the ‘ecological’ model<sup>5</sup> presents no single cause to explain violence (Rosenberg et al. 2002). Similarly, Moser and McIlwaine identify the interrelation between structure, identity and agency as the key process that creates a specific situation of violence (2004a). Structural violence is present in a community when citizens cannot realize their potential, or when insight and resources are monopolized by a group and used for other purposes (Galtung 1969). However, for the purposes of our study structural violence will not be discussed because its broad inclusivity permits many different factors to be considered structural causes of violence.

In order to typify violence it is helpful to view it as an instrument used to obtain different goals (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter 1999) or to impose one’s wishes (Keane 1996 in Moser 2004). Therefore, violence can be divided into social violence, being mainly interpersonal and motivated by the “will to get or keep social power and control”; economic violence which is “motivated by material gain and can take the form of street crime, drug-related violence and kidnapping; and political violence which is “inspired by the will to win or hold political powers” (Moser and McIlwaine 2004a, 60). This threefold definition constitutes the taxonomy of violence employed within this paper.

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<sup>4</sup> Before proceeding with this literature review, it is important to underline that it is condensed and limited to the economic, political, and social division of violence. It cannot, and does not, try to discuss the vast literature existing on urban violence and conflict, dealing only with material strongly associated to the paper in order to frame the analysis.

<sup>5</sup> The ‘ecological’ model explains violence as the product of a combination of factors at different levels – individual, interpersonal or relational, institutional or communitarian, structural or societal (Rosenberg et al. 2002).

i. Economic violence

Most of the authors concerned with economic violence agree that urban inequality and poverty produce unequal access to economic opportunity and are the significant determinants of crime and violence (Bourguignon 1999; Fajnzylber, Loayza and Lederman 2002; Muller 1985):

“due to frustration and insecurity and the presence of absolute and relative poverty, the urban poor are forced to resort to crime and violence...[R]ising expectations and a sense of moral outrage that some members of society are getting rich while others are denied even the most basic levels of existence has been a well known source of...discontent in the poorest as well as richest countries” (Zaidi 1999, 5-7).

In addition, societal transformation and development policies are also causes of economic conflict, being at the heart of contemporary urban violence. Structural adjustments can lead to socioeconomic dislocation and weakening of already frail states, and mismanaged transitions can lead to violence and crime (Winton 2004). Furthermore these processes lead to economic decline that deepens economic disparities and forces the poor into seeking illegal economic gains.

A further condition for economic violence to occur is the existence of the informal sector and the discriminatory treatment of the state and the elite towards it. As De Soto (1989) outlines, the presence of the informal sector expresses the incapacity of the legal economy and the judicial system to guarantee to the majority of the population economic rights and participation. When this is the case, the poor find a means of gaining livelihood in the illegal economy.

ii. Political violence

Political violence contains a wide range of violent outcomes, one of these is “the normalization of violence [which] requires a system of norms, values or attitudes which

allow, or even stimulate, the use of violence” (Cruz 1999a in Winton 2004, 167), and mainly culminates in a form of state violence. Another form of political violence perpetrated by the state is the lack of reform within the police and judiciary or the inability to provide legitimate institutional control over violence. This de-legitimation is described in the literature, as it relates to drugs, as what Dowdney calls ‘narcocracy’ (in Winton 2004). Drug traffickers left as rulers of poor communities and low-income neighbourhoods, impose their own norms “construct[ing] a simulacrum of governmental control” (Pengaleso 2005, 6). The state’s failure in providing security for the citizenship opens the path to a wide range of arrangements that are conducive to violence.

When the state is not able to take into account resident needs of security and safety, different organisations for protection are formed. Often high-income citizens decide to adopt private means for their safety and this can imply the substitution of the police. This process of privatisation has devastating consequences for those who remain outside the protected areas (Lemanski 2006; Rodgers 2004b and 2006b). This state or elite led spatial organisation, often taking the form of what Graham (2004) calls ‘urbicide’, is a form of segregation and marginalization that involves the deliberate destruction of urban infrastructures for political purposes, and produces increased insecurity, polarized and divided cities (Bollens 1998; Graham 2004; Robins 2002).

Forms of clientalism and political tribalism for control of the state or corruption within the state’s institutions are another form of political violence. Often this is expressed during or immediately after armed conflicts. Demobilized ex-combatants can form armed bands and the presence of firearms in general circulation implies a failure of the state security system. It is



important to underline that armed conflict, conceived in this way, is not a cause of violence but acts to promote it (Winton 2004).

### iii. Social violence

The label 'social violence' is used for describing a wide range of acts, which depending on the perspective taken can exemplify economic or political violence, as well as social violence (Winton 2004). In this vein, forms of social violence can coexist with, or be motivated by, economic violence. This is clear in the case of gangs. Considering the gang phenomenon from an economic perspective, its economic nature is clear, but here it is important to also consider the social aspect of the phenomenon. Gangs are formed as a response to social and economic exclusion of youth and represent an alternative societal membership in communities where social capital is lacking (Winton 2004; Rodgers 2005a and 2006a; Moser and Winton 2002).

To the same degree, the spatial organisation of cities and the creation of gated communities are expressions of social as well as political violence. They work towards the disintegration of public spaces enhancing social division and segregation (Beal 2002; Bollens 1995). Another overlapping form of violence is the use of force enacted by the police against marginal populations. The targeting by police of undesirable groups through extrajudicial killings and social cleansing, are as much a form of social violence as they are political violence. This imposition of 'everyday violence' on poor neighbourhoods produces the atomisation of social life and the disappearance of traditional institution that leads to a disintegration of the social fabric and interpersonal links. This produces a naturalisation of fear and insecurity rooted in the growing vulnerability and routinised violence, resulting in the creation of perverse social institutions, such as vigilante groups (Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Shaper-Hughes 1992; Winton 2004).

A more hidden form of social violence is gender violence, often considered as a man's way to assert his masculinity, such as the culture of *machismo* in Latin America that ensures control over resources and decision-making (Moser and Winton 2002). Finally, the stigmatisation of a certain strata of the population as naturally criminal and violent, opens the path to pervasive stereotypes and dehumanisation. This perception creates an imaginary other that terrorizes society, creating a pretext for their exclusion from political, economic and social life (Jensen 2006; Costa Vargas 2006).

#### iv. Concluding remarks

As we have seen, the different types of violence form a continuum (Moser and McIlwaine 2004a) with different manifestations often having similar causes. This is due to the interdependent and self-sustaining relationship between the kinds of violence examined. Marginal populations exemplify this vicious circle as they are both the victims and perpetrators of violence (Klevens, Duque and Ramírez 2002).

To conclude this literature review we want to underline the major consequences of violence.

Violence affects;

“Labour as an asset when it limits access to jobs, Human Capital as an asset when it limits access to education and health facilities by both users and providers, Social Capital as an asset when it reduces trust and cooperation between community level social organizations, Household relations as an asset when it limits the capacity of households to function effectively as a unit, Productive assets when it destroys housing – the urban poor's most important productive asset” (Moser 1996 in Heinemann and Verner 2006, 7).

This quote highlights the serious consequences of violence on the economic, political, and social development of cities.

### III. Hypothesis and Methodology

#### i. Methodology

Using the taxonomy discussed in the literature review above, three cities were chosen to exemplify economic, political, and social violence. These are Nairobi (economic violence), Kinshasa (political violence), and Bogotá (social violence). In addition to the taxonomy these cities were chosen using the following criteria; population size, the availability of academic and other material, correlation with the Crisis States Research Centre's phase two framework, and the absolute clarity of evidence of violence within the cities<sup>6</sup>. An important qualification to be made is that we are aware of the limitation of this taxonomy, such as the overgeneralization of processes that are often very particularistic and embedded in the different realities of particular cities. Therefore, the taxonomy, and the subsequent analytical framework, is an instrument strictly dependent and limited to the contexts we have studied. However, and despite its limitations, the taxonomy was useful in the selection of representative case studies and the production of the final analytical framework.

#### ii. Hypothesis

The background research conducted for this paper demonstrated that urban violence is characterised by context specific risk factors. We assume that it is the interaction of these risk factors, which creates the processes that lead to violent outcomes. The follow case studies are expected to elaborate on and prove our hypothesis.

### IV. Case Study Nairobi, Kenya<sup>7</sup>

*“What started decades ago as a trickle of low-level crime such as a pick-pocketing has swelled into what some now call a tidal wave of violent robberies, burglary, rape of minors and carjacking” (BBC News 26 February 2007).*

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<sup>6</sup> Nairobi was not listed in the initial selection of cities provided by the Terms of Reference, however, following the subsequent analysis it became apparent that it was the best case to typify economic violence.

<sup>7</sup> See appendix III for a more detailed case study.

## i. Historical Background

Kenya became an official British colony in 1920. The colonial system was non participatory in nature and Africans were completely excluded from the colonial government. For this reason, at the end of the Second World War, Kenya's African citizens began to express their discontent towards the British. This widespread upheaval resulted in the creation of the first African party. The Kenya African Union (KAU), created by Jomo Kenyatta, was a national party that in the 1960s reformed into the Kenyan African National Union (KANU). In 1963 KANU won the elections and the same year independence was granted with Jomo Kenyatta as the country's first president.

“From independence in 1963 up to the mid 1980s, Kenya was one of the most politically stable and peaceful countries on the continent. In the East Africa Region, she remained a heaven of peace and security, as her neighbours were engrossed in endless civil wars” (Gimode 2001, 297). Kenya's political and economic stability has been attributed by historians to the dynamic and charismatic leadership of Kenyatta<sup>8</sup>. When Kenyatta died in August 1978, the presidency passed to Moi, a member of the Kalenjin ethnic community.

Under Moi, Kenya moved in an authoritarian direction, becoming a one-party State in 1982, with KANU as the only legal party. In 1991, due to the growing domestic and international pressure to democratisation, political pluralism was finally re-established. This opened the way to a multi-party election in 1992, in which KANU won and Moi was re-elected. Moi's regime came to an end, after 24 years, with the elections held in December 2002, in which a coalition of opposition parties won and Moi's former vice-president Mwai Kibaki, was elected President by a large majority.

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<sup>8</sup> From the Kikuyu ethnic group.

ii. Main Processes Leading to Violence

“From the mid-1980s began a wave of criminal violence, which has intensified with time. This gradually became endemic throughout the country, especially in Nairobi” (Gimode 2001, 298). UN-Habitat conducted a victimisation survey in Nairobi, between May and August 2001, to assess the level of the violence experienced by Nairobi’s citizens. The results of the survey were striking: 37% of all Nairobi’s residents had been a victim of a robbery and 22% a victim of a theft at least once during the previous year. 18% had also been physically assaulted. This survey demonstrated astonishing levels of crime and fear within Nairobi.

How did the peaceful Nairobi of the 1960s, headquarter of United Nations agencies, destination of tourists, capital city of the most politically stable country of East Africa, turn into what is now called “Nairobbery”, a city of extreme violence and fear? Furthermore, why “compared to similar cities, [are] crime levels...far higher in Nairobi” (UN-Habitat 2002)? In order to answer these questions, the main processes leading to economic violence and their complex interaction will be analysed. The following table shows the main processes and the connected risk factors that lead to economic violence in Nairobi.

Risk Factors	Main Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of a legitimate political system</li> <li>▪ Lack of a functioning judicial system</li> <li>▪ Criminalisation of the police force</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> <li>▪ Ethnic heterogeneity</li> <li>▪ Class conflict</li> <li>▪ Unplanned urban development</li> <li>▪ Unequal land distribution</li> <li>▪ Disintegration of the social fabric of society</li> <li>▪ Social exclusion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Crisis of Governance</li> <li>▪ Marginalisation of the Poor</li> <li>▪ Spatial Segregation</li> <li>▪ Structural Adjustment Programs</li> </ul>

a. *Crisis of governance*

The crisis of governance in Kenya has developed from the lack of legitimacy and accountability within the government. In reality, Kenya’s stability was based for a long time

on a one-party political system, which was more similar to a totalitarian regime than to a democratic one. Moi legally banned political pluralism in 1982; furthermore the constitution existed only nominally, as Moi's word was law (Gimode 2001).

Another factor that has contributed to this crisis is the criminalisation of the police force. The Kenyan Police Force is very poorly remunerated, housing conditions are humiliating and the vehicles and guns used are old and in a state of disrepair. "It appeared that because of the hardship under which the police force operated, a considerable portion of members got involved in criminal activity of one kind or another against citizens they were supposed to protect" (Gimode 2001, 321). As a result, the police have increasingly come to be feared and hated by Nairobi's citizens. "The various measures taken by the citizens to get a degree of security are testimony to this crisis of governance" (Gimode 2001). Having realised the apparent impotence and inability of the law enforcement authorities, Nairobi's citizens, living in a state of fear and defensiveness, since the 1990s started to protect themselves through the use of "Mob Justice"<sup>9</sup>. For example, during the last three months of 1993, the police reported 110 criminals killed by mob justice (Gimode 2001).

*b. Politicisation of ethnicity*

Ethnicity can be an extremely useful tool for a political leader to perpetuate his power (Muigai 1993), Moi used it when political pluralism was re-introduced in the 1990s. Moi's reaction to the threat of losing his absolute power was to unleash state-sponsored violence on Kenyan citizens. This led to the eruption of widespread ethnic violence in the Rift Valley Province. The so called "ethnic clashes" that began in 1991 were clearly politically motivated, although the government denied it (Kahl 2006). The Kalenjin, Moi's ethnic group,

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<sup>9</sup> For a detailed discussion of mob justice see appendix III, p 26.

were fighting the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya and Luo communities, all associated with the opposition, to expel them from the Rift Valley.

The involvement of national and local government elites was demonstrated by the failure of Moi's regime to prevent the spread of violence (Kahl 2006, 123). The Kenyan police, which in the past have always reacted quickly to contain violence and insecurity in the country did not take action. In Nairobi, the headquarters of all political movements, and the city where the majority of battle for political pluralism were fought, Kenyans lived in a state a fear. In fact, soon after the first ethnic clashes, riots and lootings exploded in the city, while the police force was used to violently disrupt peaceful rallies and demonstrations (People, June 12, 1997 in Gimode 2001).

*c. Marginalisation of the Poor*

The unequal colonial system was characterised by a class society with the Europeans on top, the Asians – the dominant force in the commercial and trading sector – in the middle and the Africans on the bottom (Ahluwalia 1996). Africans were excluded from commerce and trade and did not hold important positions in the colonial administration (Manundu 1997). Following independence the power and economic structure did not change. The passage from one regime to the other constituted the replacement of a white elite with a black one, however, the underlying inequalities remained (Nichols 1968). Since independence there has been a huge gap between the urban slum dwellers and the rural peasant masses on one side, and the powerful elites on the other (Otiso 2002).

Furthermore, the class based justice system is a major cause of criminal impunity and insecurity in Kenya. The rule of law should establish equality and ensure justice to all citizens; however, in a class-based country such as Kenya, laws are based on the dictates of

capital and are “an instrument of class domination, driven by property considerations and not human at all” (Gimode 2001, 314). In Kenya two sets of laws exist: one for the poor and one for the rich, who are able to “buy” justice.

*d. Spatial segregation*

Unequal access to land, one of the main characteristics of the Kenyan class society, is especially intense in Nairobi, where 55% of the African population is crowded into only 4% of the total residential land area (K’Akumu and Olima 2007). In Nairobi racial segregation was a practice of the colonialist system meant to achieve a spatial separation between the politically and economically dominant white population and the indigenous black people. (Desouza 1988 in K’Akumu and Olima 2007).

With the end of colonialism, restrictions on in-migration were abolished and, as a consequence, the population of Nairobi almost doubled every ten years (K’Akumu and Olima 2007). A class-based system of land allocation, together with the lack of formally regulated land markets, disadvantaged the poor and forced them to obtain land informally, often through illegal occupancy (Otiso 2002). As a consequence, the number of informal settlement dwellers in Nairobi grew from an estimated 500 in 1952 to 22,000 in 1972 and multiplied to 111,000 in 1979. Currently almost 70% of total Nairobi population live in informal settlements (Otiso 2002). However, informal settlements occupy just over 5% of the land designated for residential purposes in the city (K’Akumu and Olima 2007). This means that the majority of Nairobi’s population is crowded into a very limited part of the city.

*e. Structural Adjustment Programmes*

The deepening of economic inequalities caused by the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) can explain “more than other factors, a great deal of violent crime that characterized



Kenya” (Gimode 2001, 236). The first SAP was seriously implemented in Kenya only in the early 1990s. In this same period police statistics and reports from the mass media showed a sudden increase in crime in Kenya (Gimode 2001). The SAPs provided a standardised set of economic reforms that instead of fostering economic growth pushed Kenya’s economy into stagnation and recession. In fact, between 1986 and 1989, the GDP growth rate was 5.8% per year, while in 1990 after the implementation of SAPs it fell to 4.3% and in 1991 to 2.2%. Finally, in 1992 GDP growth was 0.4% per year and it did not improve for all the 1990s (Gimode 2001).

The SAPs generated “poverty, unemployment and an attendant wave of criminal violence and insecurity in the country as a whole and especially in Nairobi” (Gimode 2001, 328). The consequences of the economic decline were particularly harsh for the urban poor. The SAPs decreased the dominance of the “urban bias” from the policy scene (Riddell 1997) and generated a dramatic fall in the real income of the urban poor (Manundu 1997). Moreover, the SAPs produced an increase in urban unemployment from 13% in 1989 to 17.7% in 1999 (UN-Habitat 2002; Manundu 1997).

### iii. The Current Climate

The drastic reduction of subsidies for health and education rendered these services inaccessible to most of the urban poor (Gimode 2001). Massive increases in the numbers of urban poor and the worsening of their situation (Manundu 1997) within the context of a crisis of governance and the further marginalisation of this group generated significant tensions and frustrations and consequently the situations rapidly degenerated into violence and crime. In fact, the urban poor were “diverted towards active crime by the social forces that do not provide them with a chance to earn a decent, gainful living” (Gimode 2001, 314).

## V. Case Study Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo<sup>10</sup>

*"Violence, injustice, extortion, systematic abuse of human rights, impunity, extra legal actions of police and private guards permanently accompany life in Kinshasa. Military violence is not easy to contain in an urban setting where weapons and military experts come from different countries and for various interests. The hope of a better future becomes more uncertain in a world dominated by army and police violence, and abusive tribunals"* (Nlandu 1997).

### i. Historical Background

During the Belgian rule, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi were governed as a single colonial entity. Between 1937 to 1955 Belgium moved thousands of peasants of the Banyarwanda origin to Eastern Zaire in order to alleviate demographic pressure in Rwanda, a situation further exacerbated during the Rwandan revolution (1959-1961) when a large number of Tutsi's fled into Eastern Zaire. On June 30th, 1960 Zaire was granted independence from Belgium and in 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko, Chief of Staff of the Army, consolidated total power by ousting the President and Prime Minister. In January 1972 Mobutu issued a decree whereby all natives of Rwanda and Burundi who had immigrated to Zaire before 1950 were granted Zairean citizenship. The result was that the Banyarwanda, and Tutsi's particularly, gained significant political positions, which they used for economic gains. This caused great resentment on the part of other Zairians, forcing Mobutu to invalidate the decree in 1981, strictly defining Zairian citizenship based on ethnic origin. This new definition created high levels of ethnic conflict between indigenous and migrant populations, ultimately leading to violent clashes (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999).

The corrupt manner, with which the state operated, during Mobutu's regime, inspired growing opposition movement, the strongest of which was lead by Laurent Kabila. The 1996-1997 Zairian War is largely attributed to the presence of the 1.2 million refugees along the

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<sup>10</sup> See appendix IV for a more detailed case study. Note that violence in Kinshasa must be understood as a microcosm of the wider political context of the DRC.

Rwandan/Zaire and Rwanda/Tanzania border (Adelman and Rao 2004). The Interahamwe, the Hutu militia group that orchestrated the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi's during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, controlled many of the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire and used international aid resources as well as arms shipments to equip themselves in an attempt to launch further attacks against the Tutsi's. The defeat of the Interahamwe by Kabila with the help of Ugandan troops as well as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) cleared the path to power for Kabila in Kinshasa. He installed himself as President in May of 1997 and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite Kabila's seemingly resolute political appeals which initially gave hope to the Congolese population for a less corrupt government, Kabila's government operated quite similarly to his predecessor.

A rapidly growing opposition movement toward Kabila, as well as continued ethnic warfare in the eastern provinces, finally culminated in the formation of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD). This party, largely made of Banyamulenge, met in Goma on August 12, 1998 with a list of political grievances regarding the corrupt manner with which President Kabila was ruling the country. This marked the beginning of the Second Congolese War in which the RCD took control of Goma and fought to topple Kabila in Kinshasa. Despite the signing of the 1999 ceasefire agreement, the Lusaka Accords, the conflict raged on and on January 16th 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated, and his son – Joseph Kabila – took over the Presidency. In July 2006, the first democratically held elections since independence took place and Joseph Kabila was installed as the first democratically elected President of the DRC.

## ii. Main Processes Leading to Violence

The following table provides a synthesis of the main processes and risk factors that are evident in Kinshasa.

Risk Factors	Main Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic decline</li> <li>▪ Dilapidated health and education infrastructure</li> <li>▪ Lack of legitimate and adept state apparatus</li> <li>▪ Clientalism,</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> <li>▪ Investment in private vs. public welfare</li> <li>▪ Presence of rebel para-military groups in civilian refugee camps</li> <li>▪ Monetary and material aid stocked in refugee camps</li> <li>▪ Ethnic Heterogeneity</li> <li>▪ Cross-border tension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Post-Conflict Stress</li> <li>▪ Crisis of Governance</li> <li>▪ Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations</li> <li>▪ Politicisation of Ethnicity</li> <li>▪ Geopolitical and Regional Instability</li> </ul>

*a. Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations*

The geopolitical instability of the eastern DRC, caused by ethnic strife in neighbouring Rwanda and the resulting influx and current presence<sup>11</sup> of approximately 1,218,544 refugees from both Rwanda and Burundi, has played a key role in the perpetuation of political violence in Kinshasa. The needs that originate from the numbers of protracted refugee cases, as well as the presence of unruly militia troops who terrorize refugee camps, using them as a military sanctuary, exceeds the capacities of Kinshasa's over-stretched socio-economic infrastructure. This stress has manifested itself in continuous violence in Kinshasa.

“...More fighting stems from armed “bandits” who use their weapons on the civilian population to exhort money and goods...all fighting affects urban life in so far as the subsequent displacement of people from warring villages to urban centres has a real effect on the already limited resources within any given Congolese city in which the population must share” (MONUC Key Issues, 2007).

*b. Politicisation of Ethnicity*

Proxy armies, militia groups, and the state have pursued their own micro-interests and engaged in actively politicising ethnicity in Kinshasa. Adelman and Rao (2004) draw attention to the fact that the arrival of one million Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC in the wake of the Rwandan genocide became a resource to be mobilised domestically and internationally; domestically because refugees could be used to neutralise the opposition threat in the case of an election, and internationally because Mobutu characterised the conflict

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<sup>11</sup> See appendix V.

as an attack on the country's sovereignty (Adelman and Rao 2004).

In addition, the politicisation of ethnicity in the DRC has manifested itself in violent rape. “Rape has been used consciously, and with the utmost callousness as a weapon of war. The result: a petrified population, deserted villages and what will most probably turn out to be a severe HIV epidemic” (UNHCR 2007, 16). Although much of this violence is localised in the eastern DRC, its ramifications are heavily felt within Kinshasa. The Joint Initiative on the Fight against Sexual Violence towards Women and Children, which includes the Congolese government, NGOs and the UN, reported that from the outset of the war in 1998 to 2004, there were 1,162 cases of rape and sexual violence in Kinshasa (WatchList 2006, 28).

*c. Crisis of Governance*

The DRC's Kinshasa-based government is fragile and dilapidated as a result of Mobutu's regime. A regime based upon a system of patronage in which public and private resources were blurred, and state structures were fragmented (Adelman and Rao 2004, 138). Laurent Kabila's presidency was marked by an inability to restore peace and security to the Congolese, being characterised by corruption, votes-catching, embezzlement of public funds, repression of democratic forces, political assassinations, wholesale massacres, impunity, violence and ethnic hatred, and the populations exclusion from the benefits of the DRC's natural resources (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999). Forced displacement, killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for economic gain were directly linked to armed groups' control of natural resource extraction sites in Kinshasa (WatchList 2006, 35). The dilapidated judicial system has resulted in hundreds of cases of arbitrary and politically-motivated arrests in Kinshasa by unruly and state-run security forces. For example:

“The political instrumentalisation of the RG[Republican Guard]...represent a threat to all Congolese...The case of one civilian, arrested, beaten and illegally detained...by RG soldiers after making an

innocuous political comment on a taxi-bus, is a good illustration of a typical case, whereby people are arrested on the pretext that their actions or opinions are “a threat to State security” in order to extract a ransom for their release” (MONUC Human Rights Division 2007, 10).

The political violence resulting from the crisis of governance in Kinshasa has necessitated the strong presence of MONUC, the UN's Mission in the DR Congo, and the world's largest peacekeeping force.

*d. Post Conflict Stress*

Kinshasa's post-conflict setting displays a number of characteristics that fuel violence. Inflation, the collapse of large enterprises, a decline in real wages, and capital flight all contribute to the declining quality of life in the city (Rakodi 1997). The city's administration is characterized by massive absenteeism, obvious disorganization, poor control over urban development, and a nonexistent capacity to adapt due to limited financial resources. Despite this weakness, stake-holders in governance are highly powerful and corrupt, and take advantage of institutional decay and deterioration (Rakodi 1997). Thousands of street children living in Kinshasa are involved in various forms of violence, and reportedly being highly susceptible to recruitment by militia groups. The widespread availability of arms, where the street price for a weapon in Kinshasa during 2003 was US\$200 (WatchList 2006, 39), further generates insecurity and violence, threatening the nation's peace process. These processes have allowed violence, especially the possession of arms, to permeate the boundaries of the military and routinise violence amongst civilians.

iii. Current Climate

Numerous cases of politically motivated torture, arrest, disappearance, execution, and scare tactics occurred in Kinshasa following the July 2006 electoral campaign. This is "...combined with the perception on both sides that these manifestly illegal acts go entirely unpunished, provided armed men with an excuse to take matters into their own hands" (MONUC Human

Rights Division 2007, 10). This was exemplified when 84 fishermen were arbitrarily arrested, detained in underground pits, threatened and tortured by RG soldiers in Tshatshi military camp within Kinshasa (MONUC Human Rights Division 2007). This volatile mixture of violence in Kinshasa has caused much international concern over the DRC's relative stability in the post-war context. The EU condemned the looting and rape committed by troops in Kinshasa during fighting between the opposition leader Jean Pierre Bemba's bodyguard and the army during March 22, 2007 (MONUC 03.27 2007). In response to this political violence, the UN's peacekeeping mission MONUC moved two military companies into Kinshasa from other parts of the DRC (MONUC 03.23 2007). The most recent political violence in Kinshasa has further caused the population to internalise high levels of social stress, fear and insecurity, which perpetuates violence within the city.

## VI. Case Study Bogotá, Colombia<sup>12</sup>

*“Colombia for much of this century has suffered levels of death from violence—about 25,000 cases a year, these days—that luckier countries see only in time of war. A series of recent reports suggests that the effects of such violence are biting into the social fabric”* (The Economist 1999).

### i. Historical Background:

Cited as a Latin American success story, Colombia is a striking contrast of sustained institutional stability and extreme violence (Thoumi 1995). The assassination of “Jorge Eliecer Gaitan” on April 9th 1948 “...led to urban riots in...[Bogotá]...known as the Bogotazo, which spread to the rest of the country and started the 10-year civil war, La Violencia (“The Violence”)” (Skinner 2004, 1). The riots were an expression of the poor's deeply rooted feeling of exclusion from Colombian political and social life (Braun 1985). In 1958 the two factions negotiated a power sharing agreement, which excluded other political parties, and although it ended in 1974, it served to emphasise the dichotomy between the elite

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<sup>12</sup> See appendix VI for a more detailed case study.

and other. This dichotomy remains and underlies the current civil war, between the Government of Colombia and the guerrilla groups<sup>13</sup> (Braun 1985; Skinner 2004; UN-HABITAT 2005). Moser and McIlwaine note that La Violencia was “deep, lasting and extensive” (2004a, 42), beginning a process of displacement that changed Colombia forever, forcing many of the rural poor into slums and poverty within an urban environment<sup>14</sup>.

Violence within Bogotá must also be understood in connection to the globalisation of the drug industry. Michael Taussig argues that in order to understand the role played by the drug industry today, it is important to examine Colombia’s history. “...If it was gold that determined the political economy of the colony, it is cocaine – or rather the U.S. prohibition of it – that shapes the country today” (Taussig 2004, xi). Comprehending the influence of the illegal drugs industry within Colombia is very important to understanding social violence in Bogotá. Moser and McIlwaine note that the urban poor had a ‘strong’ relationship with the cartels, citing the creation of jobs as a positive side to their presence (2000, 63-64). Thus the importance of the cartels during the early 90s changed the structure of the illegal industry, with both the guerrilla and paramilitaries increasing their reliance on the drug industry in order to sustain their military operations (Thoumi 2002).

## ii. Main Processes Leading to Violence:

Bogotá is embedded in this history, providing a haven for the elite and powerful of Colombian society (Braun 1985), while drawing in the less fortunate, as all cities do, with jobs and dynamism, being characterised by a dichotomised relationship between rich and poor, extreme violence<sup>15</sup> (Mockus 2004, 2), and significant social segregation (Skinner 2004,

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<sup>13</sup> The FARC and ELN

<sup>14</sup> During *La Violencia* 2 million people were displaced, and since 1985 3.1 million people have been displaced from rural areas (UN-HABITAT 2005).

<sup>15</sup> In 2002 there were 22 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants down from 80 per 100,000 in 1993 (Mockus 2004, 2).



2). The following table demonstrates the main processes and the connected risk factors that lead to social violence in Bogotá.

Risk Factors	Main Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ De-legitimisation of the state – government complicity in illegal activity</li> <li>▪ Lack of a reliable judicial system</li> <li>▪ Control of the economy by the elite</li> <li>▪ Culture of silence and <i>La ley de defensa</i></li> <li>▪ Unequal access to land</li> <li>▪ Presence of conflict in the countryside</li> <li>▪ Disintegration of the social fabric of society – especially within the home</li> <li>▪ Social exclusion</li> <li>▪ Economic Recession</li> <li>▪ Lack of economic opportunity, land, and security</li> <li>▪ Presence of cartels, guerrilla groups, and paramilitary</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic Decline and Unemployment</li> <li>▪ The Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations</li> <li>▪ Role of the Illicit Drugs Industry and Addiction</li> <li>▪ Naturalisation of Fear and Insecurity</li> </ul>

*a. Economic Decline and Unemployment*

Having experienced steady economic growth up until the 1980s, Colombia has experienced a period of economic decline, with the associated consequences of rising unemployment and disillusionment (Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a; Thoumi 1995). These economic problems have been coupled with an attempt in Bogotá to ‘clean up the city’, with Mayors paying significant attention to removing the unwanted from the streets. In doing so the municipality has significantly reduced opportunities for self employment – i.e. street vending (Mockus 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2000). Restrictions on self employment opportunities coupled with area stigma and a prejudice against those from barrios has significantly reduced the opportunities for the marginalised to gain formal employment (Moser and McIlwaine 2000). For all social groups unemployment and economic decline play an important role in creating conflict, as unemployment does not absolve you from your responsibility to feed your family, to “meet obligations”, this is often seen to lead rapidly to robbery or worse (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 62).

*b. The Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations*

With approximately 1 million people being displaced between 1999 and 2004, due to the ongoing conflict, Colombia's cities have grown rapidly, with 76 percent of the population now living in urban areas (Aristizabal and Ortiz Gomez 2004; UNHABITAT 2005). Coupled with the processes of paramilitary demobilisation (The Economist, March 27, 2007), the influx of displaced people has caused significant tension as new and old populations are forced to mix, competing for land and jobs (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 65). The lack of obvious opportunities for formal tenure regarding land rights for the displaced and marginalised, has created a situation where insecurity and service under-provision are the norm. The associated insecurity of livelihood and the introduction of an unknown population has created tension within Bogotá's marginal communities, further eroding the community's social capital (Aristizabal and Ortiz Gomez 2004; UN-HABITAT 2005).

*c. Role of the Illicit Drugs Industry and Addiction*

The drug industry is not solely an economic phenomenon; it is tied to Colombia's social problems. "Colombians realise that the illegal industry was a catalyst in a process of social decomposition..." (Thoumi 2002, 114). Colombian society, especially the urban youth (both rich and poor), has seized upon the illegal drugs as way into a world they are excluded from (Briceno-Leon and Zubilaga 2002; Taussig 2003, 197). This process has been greatly facilitated by the low price of drugs in relation to alcohol. Moser and McIlwaine noted that "One joint of marijuana was cheaper than a bottle of beer..." (Moser and McIlwaine 2004b, 52). In a culture that already accepts alcoholism as the norm the role played by this price differential is devastating.

The role of drugs cannot be ignored, they are part and parcel of violence within Bogotá. The high levels of tolerance within Bogotá's communities, emphasises the absolute pervasiveness

of illegal drugs within society. Tolerance produces conflict; between those who deal drugs, gangs who seek to protect their ‘turf’, police who are looking for a cut of the profits, and within families (Moser and McIlwaine 2000). Social tolerance decreases as drug related violence increases; this highlights the view of drugs as function of other forms of deprivation and as an outlet for frustration (Moser and McIlwaine 2004b). The illegal industry is pervasive in all aspects of Bogotá life. Politically as part of a process that has destroyed people’s faith in the institutions of the state (Carrigan 1993). Socially the industry has catalysed ‘social decomposition’ and the generation of perverse social capital and institutions within all social classes (Moser and McIlwaine 2000).

#### *d. Crisis of Governance*

As stated above, illicit drugs play a central role in undermining the role of the state within Colombian and Bogotá society, with the police being viewed as the perpetrators of violence, encouraging consumption and drug abuse for their own benefit (Moser and McIlwaine 2000). Moreover, the lack of an efficient and unbiased judiciary has created a situation in which the government has been de-legitimised and perceived as powerless. As a consequence the poor would prefer to follow their own “law of arms”, *la ley de defensa*<sup>16</sup>, taking matters of justice into their own hands (Carrigan 1993; Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 87-88; Thoumi 2002). These processes have combined to produce ‘perverse social institutions’ (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 78-81; Thoumi 1995 and 2002), such as gangs and groups that commit social violence in the pursuit of power, with complete disregard for the state as the enforcer of the law (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 81).

#### *e. Naturalisation of Fear and Insecurity*

The presence of a ‘culture of silence’ within Bogotá perpetuates a situation whereby violence begets violence, creating a condition where communities have no other option but to turn to

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<sup>16</sup> Law of defence or mob justice

violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a/b; Thoumi 2002). The prevailing culture of violence is a function of ongoing conflict and segregation within Colombia society that politically, economically, and socially legitimises violence (Carrigan 1993; Thoumi 1995 and 2002). *La ley de defensa* (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 87) has a central role in propagating violence. Providing those who have no control, the sensation that they have some control (Carrigan 1993; Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Thoumi 2002). This culture of violence is not solely the realm of the poor and marginalised. During the heyday of the drug cartels, violence was perpetrated against, and by, a whole range of different people, the poor and rich alike (Thoumi 1995 and 2002).

### iii. The Current Climate

From interaction between the above stated processes stems intra-family violence within Bogotá. Bogotá is a special case within Colombia, with very high rates of intra-family violence found within its communities<sup>17</sup> (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 31). Intra-family violence is connected to a lack of employment opportunities (especially for males), insecurity and frustration at exclusion from mainstream social life – the inability to obtain what others are perceived to have, and of male constructions of masculinity (*machismo*) and female submissiveness (Briceno-Leon and Zubilaga 2002; Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a/b). Much of this violence is associated with sexual abuse of children – often linked to drug abuse (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 32). Intra-family violence demonstrates how the processes discussed combine to produce a highly volatile situation perpetuating a society imbued with violence. These processes, although not solely social in nature, are heavily embedded within Bogotá's social life. It is worth recalling Taussig's advice that "...Far too much attention is spent on the headline grabbing drama of the state versus the guerrilla...the more fundamental

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
<sup>17</sup> See appendix VII.

issue...is the sordid everyday one of grinding poverty, street crime, and the nightmare life of kids” (Taussig 2003, 197).

## VII. Analysis

The case studies describe violence as a progression with underlying causes rooted in history and developed into risk factors in the present. As stated in the introduction, it is the interaction of risk factors that produce the processes, which lead to violent outcomes. The case studies demonstrated overlapping and context specific processes. *Figure 1* shows the overlap between the three cities’ processes, permitting the identification of primary and secondary nexuses as well as context specific processes. These points are discussed in turn below.

*Figure 1*



Before proceeding it is important to emphasise that these processes are produced within each city by context related risk factors as shown in Appendix VIII.

### i. The Primary Nexus

The primary nexus is envisioned as the point of overlap where there is significant alignment of common processes within all three cases. It is the point at which the potential for violence is extremely high. These processes are: a crisis of governance, unequal access to economic

opportunity, economic decline, and the naturalisation of fear and insecurity. As the case studies demonstrated this overlap manifests itself in the different types of violence: economic, political, and social. The following analysis treats each process individually.

*a. Crisis of Governance*

Within each of these urban environments violence manifests itself through a crisis of governance. As Winton highlights, a crisis of governance is provoked by clientalist politics, corruption, and internal power struggles within the state (2004, 169). These crises take different shapes, ranging between the failure of the judicial and law enforcement systems, to authoritarian one party rule. The case of both Kinshasa and Nairobi highlight the detrimental effects of a clientalist and authoritarian state in de-legitimising the state's roles as a social and political actor, where the state no longer functions, and cannot guarantee peace and security for its citizens. The interaction between the illegal drugs industry, the state, and other actors has also served to de-legitimise and replace the state, as is demonstrated by the case of Bogotá, and so called narcocracy (Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Penglase 2005). In all three cases the crises of governance undermined judicial and law enforcement mechanisms, forcing citizens too seek alternative methods of conflict resolution and security.

*b. Unequal access to economic opportunity*

These urban environments generate violence through the elite's monopolisation of access to formal economic activity and resources. Moreover, the case of street vendors in Bogotá demonstrates the vulnerable nature of the informal market, open to manipulation by the urban elites. By suppressing this informal employment opportunity the urban elites effectively forced street vendors to seek alternative and illegal forms of livelihood. In Kinshasa, unequal access to economic opportunity was largely due to the state's mismanagement of valuable mineral resources and inability to generate employment, while Nairobi highlights how

historical economic inequalities persist and act as a hindrance to socio-economic empowerment. Within the literature, this process is outlined in the discussions of poverty, frustration and a sense of exclusion, all of which are viewed as leading to and producing violence (Bourguignon 1999; Zaidi 1999). As discussed, all three of the cases highlight how a lack of economic opportunity, particularly for the urban poor, forces urbanites to seek other forms of illegal income which, in turn, leads to and produces violence.

*c. Economic decline*

All three cases have demonstrated how economic decline, whether in the wake of crisis or not, leads to increasing unemployment, inequality, frustration and eventually violence. Nairobi provides an absolutely exemplary case of this process. The structural adjustment programmes that were initiated during the early nineties, instead of fostering economic growth, forced Kenya's economy into stagnation and recession leading to increasing levels of crime. Once again, the literature reviewed emphasises how economic decline that leads to increasing poverty produces violence (Fajnzylber, Loayza and Lederman 2002; Muller 1985).

*d. Naturalisation of fear and insecurity*

As violence becomes routinised, it inadvertently becomes self-sustaining and perpetuates fear and insecurity. This, in turn, affects the urban population in a perverse manner. As Shaper-Hughes (1992) emphasised routinisation of violence creates an atmosphere in which 'everyday violence' is perceived as natural and perpetuates a perverse state of order. In Nairobi's case, fear and insecurity of the police force dissuades citizens from seeking their protection. Similarly, the prevailing culture of silence in Bogotá illustrates how the process of the naturalisation of violence produces a breakdown of social cohesion, which in turn leads to escalating violence. The impunity which characterises acts of violence within Kinshasa produces a society in which violence takes on a form of normality. Winton (2004) has noted a

similar phenomenon with regard to lynching and vigilante groups. This naturalisation of fear and insecurity plays a clear role in the perpetuation of urban violence.

## ii. Secondary Nexuses

Secondary nexuses are seen as points of overlap between two of the case cities, and a point where the potential for violence is significant, but not as likely as in the primary nexus. There are three secondary nexuses: The marginalisation of the poor, an alignment between Bogotá and Nairobi's common processes; politicisation of ethnicity, derived from the overlap between Nairobi and Kinshasa; and the mixing of displaced and local populations, the intersection between Bogotá and Kinshasa.

### *a. Marginalisation of the poor*

As the cases of Bogotá and Nairobi demonstrate, the marginalisation of the poor is the systematic exclusion of this group by the elite from urban social and political life (as well as economic life, though this category falls within the primary nexus). The process makes itself known in different forms within both cities. In Bogotá, for example, the poor are excluded from the social and political life of the city through location – situated in slums not well connected to the urban core – and through the process of declining social and political capital. This process, as emphasised in the literature, develops out of the interaction between intra-household violence, and the role of illegal drugs, the formation of perverse social institutions (i.e. gangs) within the community (Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Moser and McIlwaine 2004a; Winton 2004). Nairobi exemplifies physical marginalisation of the poor through their unequal access to health and education services. This is a process that developed from the exclusionary nature of slums and a history of class segregation. Various authors discuss this process through the use of urban space and planning in order to exclude and divide marginal



groups from the elite (Beall 2002; Bollens 1998 and 2006; Robins 2002; Rodgers 2004 and 2006).

*b. Politicisation of Ethnicity*

Nairobi and Kinshasa illustrate how the use of ethnicity for political objectives may create or intensify ethnic conflict. In Nairobi, the state actively engaged in propaganda which polarised the ethnic groups leading to land disputes and eventually culminating in violent ethnic clashes. In the case of Kinshasa, the state capitalised on existing cross-border ethnic sectarianism, and engaged in xenophobic propaganda in order to perpetuate ethnic conflict which in turn, guaranteed political gains. The state's role in capitalising on ethnic disputes, through the divisive use of partiality in national ethnic and citizenship policy, further politicises ethnicity and illustrates that the existence of ethnic disputes in an urban context has the potential to incite high levels of violence.

*c. Mixing of displaced and local populations*

The mixing of new and old populations, exacerbated by the rapid influx of displaced peoples, creates significant frustration, anger and tension between the two populations that left unchecked eventually leads to violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a). Within Bogotá, the influx of the displaced into an urban environment that already suffers from unemployment and underemployment significantly increased the potential for violent conflict between communities and households – by forcing people into illegal activities or unnecessary competition for employment. Kinshasa demonstrates this process through the complex interaction of refugees and internally displaced people in a context already characterised by cross-border tension and regional instability. The potential for violence within this situation is greatly increased, as is well documented in the case of Kinshasa, by external political and social actors determined to construct political and economic gains from

the situation. These cases demonstrate how the absolute potential of violent outcomes is exponentially increased by the rapid introduction of new and foreign populations.

### iii. Context Specific Processes

There are a number of context-specific processes that highlight the unique manner in which risks factors interact to produce violence in each of the cities. In the case of Bogotá the prevalence of the illegal drugs industry has become a key underlying factor within the urban context, affecting all levels of society. This, in turn, has led the drug industry to become a self-perpetuating process producing extreme levels of violence. As the aforementioned example highlights it is essential to consider a city's contextual characteristics when analyzing urban violence, as these characteristics produce context specific processes.

### iv. A General Analytical Framework

Returning to the objective for this paper – the production of a general analytical framework – and drawing on the above discussion, two key stages are identifiable. The first stage frames the urban environment for examination, while the second stage extracts the processes for the purpose of comparison. These stages are not mutually exclusive, as an understanding of the first stage is essential for the second stage to be meaningful. Together these two stages constitute the analytical framework.

#### *a. The First Stage*

*Figure 2*





Figure 2 graphically represents this stage. Its objective is the contextualisation of the urban environment under examination, in order to understand the interaction between risk factors as they produce the processes leading to violence. The stage begins with the identification of the underlying causes of conflict, which are viewed as historically significant in creating context specific risk factors. Next, these factors must be identified based upon the definition provided in the introduction and the extensive list in Appendix IX. The interaction between these risk factors establishes the main processes producing violence. Finally the violent outcomes of these processes must be examined.

*b. The Second Stage*

It consists of the extraction of processes identified in the first stage and their comparison to the processes that constitute the primary nexus, see Figure 3. An alignment of processes should be viewed as an indicator of the high potential for violence within the urban environment being examined. However, it is important to highlight that processes are understood to be summative in nature, and thus, the more processes present the more likely it is that violence will occur.

Figure 3: Comparison Example



As the processes are summative in nature, a subsequent comparison should be made between the processes of urban environment under examination and the secondary nexuses and the context specific processes identified in the analysis.

A caveat to this framework is that it has been developed using three cities. This means that the conclusions drawn have been restricted by the limited number of case studies. This, in turn, implies that our framework provides necessary but not sufficient conditions for violence.

## **VIII. Conclusions**

This paper has examined the theoretical literature and studied three cases of significant urban violence, demonstrating how the interaction of risk factors creates the processes, which lead to violent outcomes – a validation of the initial hypothesis. The resulting product has been a framework that highlights the role processes play in producing violence. It demonstrates necessary but not sufficient conditions for violence to occur. Considering this limitation, this framework is useful as a policy tool having localised four central processes that are predominant in violent cities. Given that processes are the result of an interaction between risk factors and difficult to influence or change in and of themselves, as a policy conclusion we advise that in order to mitigate urban violence, a focus on prevailing risk factors is essential.

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## I. Terms of Reference

### *Understanding the Determinants of Urban Violence*

#### i. Background

The Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) has now entered its second phase of research, running from 2006 to 2010. Phase 2 of the Programme is focused on specific themes that are central to our understanding of state crisis, collapse, survival and reconstruction. The research programme has been divided into 3 themes, one of which is “Cities and Fragile States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction”. This component of the research departs from the following premises:

- There is a close historical relationship between cities and state making and we seek to demonstrate how cities in fragile states - as social, economic, political and spatial entities - can promote or prevent the unravelling of the state. Cities can be constitutive spaces for state formation and therefore an understanding of the conditions under which this is likely to occur, or be undermined, is central to our project.
- Cities have always played a role during times of war, whether as locations of refuge and protection or of siege and attack. Moreover, in recent years, the vulnerability of cities as objects of war and targets of terrorist attack has become abundantly clear, such that the centrality of cities in contemporary warfare is now indisputable. In this context, we will explore how changing trends in warfare are transforming the role of cities in processes of state collapse and reconstruction. Violent conflict can limit the reach and legitimacy of national states and when state collapse is imminent, or where reconstruction is underway, city-level actors can play a key role in promoting peace and stimulating economic recovery.
- Over the past two decades, many cities around the world have become characterised by rising forms of violence, insecurity and illegality. Our research considers these characteristics to be constitutive of state fragility. As sites of high crime and insecurity, cities themselves have today become new theatres of war and are rapidly becoming associated with, or indeed paradigmatic of, a broader form of 'twenty-first century urban warfare'.

In order to understand the role of cities in processes of state-making, crisis and breakdown, sixteen cities have been selected for in-depth historical and empirical study and comparative analysis. These include: Maputo, Lusaka, Kinshasa, Bogota, Karachi, Dar es Salaam, Peshawar, Jalalabad, Pemba, Gulu, Goma, Kabul, Ahmedabad, Managua, Kigali, Medellin.

#### ii. The Project

The consultants will review existing literature concerning the determinants and of urban conflict and violence and provide a basic analytical framework for assessing risk factors in a given urban context. The students will then be asked to employ a simple taxonomy of violence (social violence, political violence and economic violence) to select 3 case study cities – to be drawn from the list of cities noted above – that exemplify the analytical framework they have developed. In so doing, the consultants will help advance both the theoretical and empirical objectives of the Cities programme.

#### iii. Expected outputs

- A literature review summarizing past studies of the determinants of conflict and the outbreak of various forms of violence in urban areas.
- A basic analytical framework for assessing the risk that conflict in urban areas will precipitate violence.
- Three case studies that demonstrate the applicability of the analytical framework developed. The students will be expected to provide 1 exemplary case study for each of the kinds of violence noted above, namely social, political and economic violence.
- A 1-2 page executive summary of findings.
- Bibliography and references

## **II. Definitions of Violence**

“Violence is a response to frustration that is mainly caused by the difference between what people have and what they think they are entitled to” (De Soto 1989).

“Violence is not a spontaneous phenomenon but, all above, the product of a society characterized by inequality and social exclusion. It is a distortion of social relationships generated within social structures – family, school, peer group, neighbourhood, police, justice – which can no longer fulfil their role” (Vanderschuren 1996).

“A three-fold categorization of political, economic, and social violence provides a useful classification. These are identified in terms of the primary motivating factor, either conscious or unconscious, for gaining or maintaining political, economic or social power through force or violence” (Moser and McIlwaine 1999, 205).

“[Violence is] the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (The World Health Organisation 2002 in Moser 2004, 4).

### III. Long Case Study of Nairobi

*“Residents of Kenya’s capital have become accustomed to high crime levels in the city they know as “Nairobbery” but a recent wave of brutal attacks has still managed to shock them”.* (BBC News, 9 February 2007)

*“What started decades ago as a trickle of low-level crime such as a pick-pocketing has swelled into what some now call a tidal wave of violent robberies, burglary, rape of minors and carjacking”* (BBC News 26 February 2007)

As a UN-financed survey, conducted in 2001, suggested, Nairobi’s residents are more likely to be robbed or assaulted than people that live in Johannesburg. Nairobi is obviously experiencing a high level of economic violence and violence in general. For this reason Nairobi has been selected as a case study to analyze how the complex interactions of risk factors have caused the present situation.

#### i. Historical Background

##### a. Colonial Period

The history before the colonial period consists largely of the evolution of the different language groups and the interactions among them that created 42 different ethnic groups. In 1895 a British protectorate was declared over the region, with the aim of protecting the route to Uganda, whose strategic position was very important at that time. Kenya officially became a British colony in 1920. Unlike Tanzania and Uganda, two other British colonies, Kenya had a large European settler presence, which had a strong influence on its political, economic and social structure (Ahluwalia 1996). In particular, the colonial administration was forced to always consider the interests of the settlers when taking policy decisions and, as a consequence, the settlers held economic power thanks to an unequal distribution of land and to massive government subsidies. Furthermore, the colonial system was non-participatory in nature with Africans being completely excluded from the colonial government. For this reason, from the end of the Second World War, Kenya’s African citizens began to express their discontent towards the British. The widespread discontent brought about the creation of first African party: the Kenya African Union (KAU), a national party with a wide support created by Jomo Kenyatta.

The revolutionary feelings exploded in the Mau Mau Rebellion in the beginning of the 1950s. During the years of the revolution thousands of African were killed, especially from the kikuyu ethnic group, the most affected by the unequal colonial rules, while others were placed in concentration camps and political leaders, such as Jomo Kenyatta, were imprisoned. However, this rebellion forced the British to reevaluate colonial rule and finally, in 1960, Britain agreed to have a conference with the African leaders to discuss the future of the colony. During the conference the ban on African Political parties was lifted. The Kenyan African Union reformed into the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) and Jomo Kenyatta, was released from prison becoming the leader of KANU. At the same time another party was formed: the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) by a number of prominent leaders from Kenya’s smaller ethnic groups, which feared exclusions from the political scene by the Kikuyu. In 1963 KANU won the elections and soon thereafter a series of defections led to the collapse of KADU, leaving Kenya with a de facto one-party political system. Independence was granted, following the elections, with Jomo Kenyatta as the country's first president.



### *b. Post Independence Period*

“From independence in 1963 up to the mid 1980s, Kenya was one of the most politically stable and peaceful countries on the continent. In the East Africa Region, she remained a heaven of peace and security, as her neighbours were engrossed in endless civil wars” (Gimode 2001, 297)

This climate of stability and peace had a positive impact on tourism and foreign investment, which assured Kenya steady economic growth in the first years following independence. Moreover, Nairobi was the only city in a developing country to become the headquarters of numerous United Nations Agencies. Kenya’s political and economic stability has been attributed by historians to the dynamic and charismatic leadership of Kenyatta. When Kenyatta died in August 1978, the presidency passed to Moi, a member of the Kalenjin ethnic community.

Under Moi, Kenya moved in the direction of an authoritarian regime, becoming a one-party State, in 1982 Kenya, with KANU as the only legal party. Moi also tried to shift the ethnic basis of the state away from the Kikuyu community and towards his own ethnic group the Kalenjin, and in this way he created the basis for the future ethnic tensions. In 1988 the widespread discontent that followed the elections brought the demand for the re-establishment of a pluralistic regime. However, the more this demand and discontent grew the more Moi insisted that pluralistic politics were not suited for Kenya. The turning point was the attention and the interest of the international community on the democratization process in Africa. In May 1990, the United States Ambassador of Kenya, Smith Hempstone stated that U.S. would give preference in giving foreign aid to democratic countries (Muigai 1993). Furthermore, in 1991 a consultative meeting was held in Paris by a group of donors and multilateral institutions interested in supporting the economic development of Kenya. During the meeting was decided to defer for six months the commitment of aid to Kenya and to link it to the implementation of democratic reforms (Muigai 1993).

In 1991, thanks to the growing domestic and international pressure to democratise, political pluralism was finally re-established. This opened the way for multi-party election in 1992, which KANU won and Moi was re-elected, although opposition parties won about 45% of the parliamentary seats. Moi’s regime came to an end, after 24 years, with the elections held in December 2002, in which a coalition of opposition parties won and Moi’s former vice-president Mwai Kibaki, was elected President by a large majority.

### ii. Main Processes leading to Violence

“From the mid-1980s began a wave of criminal violence, which has intensified with time. This gradually became endemic throughout the country, especially in Nairobi” (Gimode 2001, 298). At the end of the 1980s the international press started to picture Kenya as an unsafe tourist destination. By the 1990s Nairobi was described by United Nation papers as a “troubled, dangerous metropolis in which foreign investors are likely to encounter child beggars and even deadly violence” (Gimode 2001, 301). As described by Gimode (2001) the main criminal activities in Nairobi are: bank robbing, car-jacking, house breaking in residential estates, street muggings and snatchings.

UN-Habitat conducted a victimization survey in Nairobi, between May and August 2001, to assess the level of the violence experienced by Nairobi’s citizens. The results of the survey were striking: 37% of all Nairobi’s residents had been a victim of a robbery and 22% a victim of a theft at least once during the previous year, 18% had also been physically assaulted. Furthermore, 52% of all the residents of Nairobi worried about crime all the time and 35.2%

most of the time. The survey showed astonishing levels of crime and fear. A further form of (economic) violence is eviction. In Kenya, historically, the authorities have always had a repressive attitude towards informal settlements. The demolition of informal settlements was an ordinary policy of the colonial and post-colonial governments. However, violent demolition of slums has been on the rise since the 1990s (Otiso 2002).

How did the peaceful Nairobi of the 1960s, headquarter of United Nations agencies, destination of tourists, capital city of the most politically stable country of East Africa, turned into what is now called “Nairobbery”, a city of extreme violence and fear? Furthermore, why “compared to similar cities, crime levels are far higher in Nairobi” (UN-Habitat 2002)? In order to answer this question the main processes of economic violence and their complex interaction will be carefully analyzed. The following table shows the main processing and the connected risk factors that lead to economic violence in Nairobi.

Risk Factors	Main Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of a legitimate political system</li> <li>▪ Lack of a functioning judicial system</li> <li>▪ Criminalisation of the police force</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> <li>▪ Ethnic heterogeneity</li> <li>▪ Class conflict</li> <li>▪ Unplanned urban development</li> <li>▪ Unequal land distribution</li> <li>▪ Disintegration of the social fabric of society</li> <li>▪ Social exclusion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Crisis of Governance</li> <li>▪ Marginalisation of the Poor</li> <li>▪ Spatial Segregation</li> <li>▪ Structural Adjustment Programs</li> </ul>

*a. Crisis of governance*

“Every government should demonstrate efficiency in preventing and controlling crime, because it’s a basic obligation of the government to guarantee security and peace for its citizens” (Clifford 1974), and when a government is unable to fulfil this role, its legitimacy should be questioned. However, this can not be done in a totalitarian regime. In fact, as stated by Gimode (2001) political stability and democracy are a big contributor to security, but Kenya has always experienced political stability and has never had a civil war. The crisis of governance in Kenya comes from the lack of a legitimate and accountable government. In reality, Kenya’s stability was based for a long time on a one-party political system, which was more similar to a totalitarian regime than to a democratic one. The media was controlled by the government and was just a tool of Moi’s propaganda and until the 1990s political dissidents were imprisoned or expelled from the country.

Another important factor that contributes to the spread of violence in Nairobi is the criminalization of the police force. The Kenya Police Force is very poorly remunerated, the housing conditions are almost humiliating and the vehicles and guns that they use are old and in a state of disrepair. As a result “it appeared that because of the hardship under which the police force operated, a considerable portion of members got involved in criminal activity of one kind or another against citizens they were supposed to protect” (Gimode 2001, 321). Some members of the police were believed to hire their uniforms and guns to gangs for a percentage of the loot. Furthermore, some of the crime committed in Nairobi could not have been possible without the knowledge of the police. Human Right Watch in its World Report for 2002 reported that as the rate of violent crime climbed, reports of police corruption, harassment, use of excessive force and unlawful confinement became the routine. The result of such brutalities has been that Kenyan Police have increasingly come to be feared and hated.

“The various measures taken by the citizens to get a degree of security are testimony to this crisis of governance” (Gimode 2001). In fact, the lack of confidence in the state and in the police encouraged Nairobi’s citizens to resort to self-help options. Gimode (2001) notes that a common complaint among citizens is that when criminals are handed over to the police, the latter release them, on the grounds of insufficient evidence. Moreover, it is common practice for powerful criminals to bribe policeman and magistrates to go free. Having realized the apparent impotence and inability of the law enforcement authorities, Nairobi’s citizen, living in a state of fear and defensiveness, have started to protect themselves in various ways.

The part of the population that can afford it has closed themselves into gated estates with high wall and electric fences. Private security guards mushroomed at the entrance of estates, offices, banks, restaurants, malls, etc. In the lower income areas, vigilantes groups were formed by the residents themselves. Furthermore, since the 1990s a phenomenon called “Mob Justice” evolved in Nairobi as a reaction to the state inability to eradicate crime. Citizens have decided to exact justice themselves. It involves, a gangster, a robber or even a petty thief, against whom an alarm has been raised being pursued by the mob and when caught, being stoned to death (Gimode 2001). In the last three months of 1993, the police reported that 110 criminals had been killed by mob justice. The use of violence as a tool for self-justice has become accepted by society, as shown by the declaration in early 1990s of Miruka Owuon, a member of parliament: “if the government could not protect its people, then the people had the right to take up arms and go to war against the attackers” (Kahl 2006).

#### *b. Politicization of ethnicity*

Ethnicity can be an extremely useful tool for a political leader to perpetuate his power (Muigai, 1993) and Moi tried to use it when political pluralism was re-introduced in the 1990s. Moi’s reaction to the threat of losing his absolute power was to unleash state-sponsored violence on the Kenyan citizens. This led to the eruption of a widespread ethnic violence in the Rift Valley Province. The so called “ethnic clashes” that began in 1991 were clearly politically motivated, although the government denied it (Kahl 2006). The Kalenjin, Moi’s ethnic group, were fighting the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya and Luo communities, all associated with the opposition, to expel them from the Rift Valley. These ethnic clashes created a situation in which members of different ethnic groups, who have peacefully coexisted for decades, came to view one another with hatred and fear (Kahl 2006). The clashes were between different ethnic groups but were based on the willingness to secure economic resources (land in particular) and, above all, political power.

The involvement of national and local government elites was demonstrated the numerous statements by national and local politicians that were clearly designed to spark violence. Furthermore, the attacks by the Kalenjin were surprisingly similar, suggesting coordination by the elites (Kahl, 2006). Finally, “state complicity is strongly suggested by the failure of Moi’s regime to prevent the spread of violence” (Kahl 2006, 123). The Kenyan police, which in the past have always reacted quickly to contain violence and insecurity in the country, did nothing. In Nairobi, the headquarters for all political movements, and the city where the majority of battle for political pluralism were fought, Kenyans lived in a state a fear. Soon after the first ethnic clashes, riots and looting exploded in the city (People, 12 June 1997), with the police being used to violently disrupt peaceful rallies and demonstrations (Gimode 2001).

### *c. Marginalization of the Poor*

The colonial system, as mentioned above was extremely unequal in nature and was characterised by a class society with the Europeans on top, the Asians – the dominant force in the commercial and trading sector – in the middle and the Africans on the bottom (Ahluwalia 1996). The Africans were excluded from commerce and trade and did not hold important position in the colonial administration (Manundu 1997). Following independence the power and economic structure did not change, the passage from one regime to another only brought the replacement of white elites with black ones, but the underlying inequalities remained (Nichols 1968). In other words, “independence merely Africanized the colonial class structure without substantially altering the form and function of the economy, the state and political or legal structures” (Otiso 2002). Since independence there have been huge gaps between the urban slum dwellers and the rural peasant masses in one side, and the powerful elites. The elites had no interest in changing the country political economy because it allows them to acquire unrestricted amounts of land, wealth and political power (Otiso 2002).

The class basis of the administration of justice is also a major cause of impunity and insecurity in Kenya. The rule of law should establish equality and ensure justice to all citizens. However, in a class-based country like Kenya, laws are based on the dictates of capital and are “an instrument of class domination, driven by property considerations and not human at all” (Gimode 2001, 314). In Kenya Two sets of laws exist, one for the poor and one for the rich, where rich people are able to “buy” justice. This system gives the wrong incentives to the poor, who are criminalised for their poverty status and as a consequence tend to become recalcitrant criminals. Unfortunately the poor in a class society “are always in the wrong side of the law, whether they actually transgress it or not” (Gimode 2001, 315).

### *d. Spatial Segregation*

“Land is Kenya’s obsession, as order is in Germany’s” (Christopher Leo 1984). One of the main characteristic of the Kenyan class society was and still is an unequal access to land and economic resources since the colonization period. In fact, Kenyan society has always been characterized by the grabbing of available land by the rich and powerful, while the Africans lost their land during colonization. For this reason, “access and rights to land are a key issue of contestation in Kenya and the main reason for ethnic rivalry and clashes in the past” (Amnesty International 1998). The unequal access to land is especially intense in Nairobi, where 55% of the African population is crowded into only 4% of the total residential land area (K’Akumu and Olima, 2007).

In the city of Nairobi racial segregation was a practice of the colonial system that prevailed as late as the early 1960s (Desouza 1988 in K’Akumu and Olima 2007). In fact, during the colonial period the planning laws relegated the African and Asian population in certain area of Nairobi. North and East were the Asian sector, East and South East the African sector and the North and the West were the European areas. Nairobi was the physical space of the European power in Kenya and urban spatial design was meant to achieve a residential separation between the politically and economically dominant white population and the indigenous black people. For this same reason, the colonial government also imposed restrictive rural to urban migration law in order to keep the numbers of the African urban population low.

When the colonial state ended, the market took over and perpetuated the unequal land distribution (K’Akumu and Olima 2007). With the removal of in-migration restrictions, at the end of the colonial period, the annual growth rate of Nairobi rose from 6% between 1948 and

1962 to 9.3% between 1962 and 1969 (Muwone 1980). In absolute numbers the population of Nairobi grew from 342,764 in 1963 to 509,000 in 1969 and in the following years Nairobi's population kept skyrocketing and almost doubled every ten years. 827,000 people lived in Nairobi in 1979, 1,324,000 in 1989 and 2,143,254 in 1999 (K'Akumu and Olima 2007). The rapid urban population growth, due to the arrival of migrants from the rural areas in search of a job, brought also to an increase in the growth of informal settlements, because of the lack of a national housing policy framework able to respond to the fast growing needs of the urban population and especially of the poor.

In fact, the class-based system of land allocation, together with the lack of formally regulated land markets, mainly disadvantaged poor people and forcing them to obtain land informally, and often through illegal occupancy (Otiso 2002). As a consequence, the number of informal settlements dwellers in Nairobi grew from an estimated 500 in 1952 to 22,000 in 1972 and multiplied to 111,000 in 1979. Currently almost 70% of total Nairobi population live in informal settlements (Otiso 2002). However, informal settlements occupy just over 5% of the land designated for residential purposes in the city (K'Akumu and Olima 2007). This means that the majority of Nairobi's population is crowded in a very limited part of the city and is living in extremely deprived living conditions, which shows the huge inequalities embedded in the land distribution of Nairobi. The Police Commissioner's Report for 1997 attributed the escalation of criminal violence in Nairobi to a high population. Even if population growth can not be considered as a major cause of violence, the fast growth of Nairobi population combined with a context of unequal land distribution has created conflicts over scarce resources and enormous inequalities.

*e. Structural Adjustment Programmes (The Trigger Factor)*

In a context of a crisis of governance, criminalization of the judicial systems and unequal access to resources, the deepening of economic inequalities caused by the Structural Adjustment Programmes can explain "more than other factors, a great deal of violent crime that characterized Kenya" (Gimode 2001, 236). The World Bank and the International Monetary Found wanted Kenya to restructure its economy from the late 1980s. However, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was seriously implemented only in the early 1990s. In this same period police statistics and reports from the mass media showed a sudden increase in crime in Kenya (Gimode 2001). The SAPs demanded that Kenya to remove price controls in the economy, remove subsidies on fertilizers, transport and fuels, and lower those on education, health care and other social services, and finally devalue the Kenyan Shilling.

Instead of fostering economic growth these economic measures pushed Kenya's economy into stagnation and recession. In fact, between 1986 and 1989, the GDP growth rate was 5.8% per year. While in 1990 after the implementation of SAPs it fell to 4.3% and in 1991 to 2.2%. Finally, in 1992 GDP growth was 0.4% per year and it did not improve during the 1990s (Gimode 2001). The consequences of economic recession were particularly harsh for the poor and the lower-income part of the population. The SAP generated "poverty, unemployment and an attendant wave of criminal violence and insecurity in the country as a whole and especially in Nairobi" (Gimode 2001, 328). In particular, the consequences of the Structural Adjustment Programme were especially deep in urban areas because it decreased the dominance of the "urban bias" from the policy scene (Riddell, 1997).

The deregulation of commodity prices made the price of almost all essential commodities increase. Furthermore, the devaluation of the shilling led to a fall in real prices of non-tradable goods. Producers of non tradable goods included small holders who produced

subsistence food, workers in the informal economy and others whose output was not traded outside the country. Hence, the urban poor experienced a fall in their real income due to the decline of the price of the goods they produce (Manundu 1997). The SAP reduced the level of demand in the economy, which led to a decline in the demand for labour, both in the formal and the informal sector. As a consequence, urban unemployment increased and income of the urban poor fell dramatically (Manundu 1997). Urban unemployment rate increased from 13% in 1989 to 17.7% in 1999 (UN-Habitat 2002).

### iii. The Current Climate

The drastic reduction of the subsidies to health and education rendered these services out of the reach for most of the urban poor. Large numbers of students dropped out of the education system because they could not afford it (Gimode 2001). Cities became less attractive as the cost of living rose, subsidies were removed, public services drastically reduced, and employment opportunities shrank (Riddell 1997). Therefore, while the urban elites, the main beneficiaries of the SAPs, experienced a rapid rise in their real income and assets, the number of urban poor had increased dramatically (Manundu, 1997). Massive increases in the number of urban poor and the worsening of their situation, generated tensions and frustrations (Manundu 1997), which in a context described above rapidly degenerated in violence and crime. In fact, the urban poor were “diverted towards active crime by the social forces that do not provide them with a chance to earn a decent, gainful living” (Gimode 2001, 314). Furthermore, the SAP also had an impact on the social structures of the urban society: “declining real income create enormous emotional and psychological strain to an individual and often leads to the weakening of family and community structures” (Manundu 1997).

Crime, as stated in the Safer Cities report on Nairobi in 2002, is not directly linked with poverty, but is more a consequence of the exclusion from social services, education, health care, governance and politics. In the specific case of Nairobi, this economic, social and political exclusion of the lower classes of the population has been caused by an illegitimate political system, an unjust judicial system, an unequal access to land, economic opportunities and basic services as health and education.

#### IV. Long Case Study of Kinshasa

*"Violence, injustice, extortion, systematic abuse of human rights, impunity, extra legal actions of police and private guards permanently accompany life in Kinshasa. Military violence is not easy to contain in an urban setting where weapons and military experts come from different countries and for various interests. The hope of a better future becomes more uncertain in a world dominated by army and police violence, and abusive tribunals"* (Nlandu 1997).

The following case study will illustrate how the state became the focal point for inciting political violence in Kinshasa. In this regard, the violence in Kinshasa must be understood as a microcosm of the wider political context of the DRC. Kinshasa, capital of the present day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), hosts the second largest urban population in Sub-Saharan Africa after Lagos. The city is also characterized by one of the highest population growth rates on the continent. Historically, Kinshasa was never surrounded by towns therefore the increasing internal density within Kinshasa is also accompanied by what Rakodi calls a lack of urban tradition (Rakodi 1997). Rakodi asserts that this may be the underlying cause for the government's inability to match infrastructure with high-density population requirements. However, the current lack of capacity for urban infrastructure development as well as the ensuing levels of political violence in Kinshasa may be attributed to much more underlying political causes than a mere lack of urban tradition. In order to highlight some of the main processes of violence in DRC which manifest through the interaction of various risk-factors, it is necessary to examine the historical context in which the state operated.

##### i. Historical Background

During the Belgian rule, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi were governed as a single colonial entity. The population of Rwanda and Burundi is made up principally of three dominant ethnic groups: the Hutu's, Tutsi's and Twa. Banyarwanda is the name given to those in the group who originated from Rwanda specifically. The three ethnic groups began immigrating to eastern Zaire as far back as the 18th century in between in the hills of Mulenge between Bakavu and Uvira in the South Kivu province of Zaire. Because of this regional linkage, this entire group is called Banyamulenge. Between 1937 to 1955 Belgium moved thousands of peasants of the Banyarwanda origin to Eastern Zaire in order to alleviate the demographic pressure in Rwanda, a situation further exacerbated during the Rwandan revolution (1959-1961) when a large number of Tutsi's fled into Eastern Zaire. On June 30th, 1960 Zaire was granted independence from Belgium and in 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko, Chief of Staff of the Army, consolidated total power by ousting the President and Prime Minister. In January 1972 Mobutu issued a decree whereby all natives of Rwanda and Burundi who had immigrated to Zaire before 1950 were granted Zairean citizenship. The result of this was that the Banyarwanda, and Tutsi's particularly, gained significant political positions which they used for economic gains through land ownership in the North and South Kivu provinces. This caused great resentment on the part of other Zairians, forcing Mobutu to invalidate the decree in 1981, and strictly defining Zairian citizenship based on ethnic origin. This new definition created high levels of ethnic conflict between indigenous and migrant populations, ultimately leading to violent clashes (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999).

Numerous land disputes between indigenous groups of the North and South Kivu provinces and the Banyarwanda created much ethnic conflict and mortality in the region. Nzongola-Ntalaja (1999) argues that the Zairian government fueled the conflict with xenophobic appeals in the 1990's as well. An extreme example of a xenophobic appeal was the radio

broadcast by South Kivu Deputy Governor Lwasi Ngobo who announced that if the Tutsi Banyamulenge did not leave Zaire within a week, they would be put in camps and exterminated (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999, 6). In addition, to this, Nzongola-Ntalaja asserts that much of the conflict in eastern Zaire could be attributed to the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda; the assassination of the first democratically elected President of Burundi, the Front Democratique Burundais (FREODEBU) leader Melchior Ndadaye; and the genocide in Rwanda.

Mobutu secured loyalty during his regime from his political appointees through a system of patronage and impunity. Mobutu financed parties in order to create a strong buffer against opposition parties. In 1991, the military of Zaire plundered the formal economy and engaged in looting of private wealth that caused up to \$890 million in property damages (Adelman and Rao 2004). Due to the decline in economic output, the state engaged in printing of currency which resulted in hyper-inflation. In addition, his regime operated under this patronage within the context of a declining resource base. The state effectively consolidated power over the formal economy, however, used it to purchase political power rather than increasing reinvestment in the economy or redistributing it to social welfare or infrastructure. Declining investment led to declining output domestically and globally, therefore since the state did not have cash resources it used public resources for private gain, further blurring the distinction between public and private resources. Similarly, although Mobutu was unable to redistribute wealth, he still honored cronies with political positions and therefore engaged in a form of clientalism which resulted in his further political entrenchment. Beyond this, Mobutu's relationship with security forces, such as the police force, ensured that all his political appointees were immune to any form of prosecution (Adelman and Rao 2004).

During Mobutu's regime there was growing opposition movement against the corrupt manner with which the state operated, the strongest of which was led by Laurent Kabila. Kabila had led cross-border rebel operations as early as 1965 against the Mobutu regime with no success, however his growing support from other rebel groups and opposition parties allowed him to make alliances that would be strategically useful in the 1990's when he would come to power in Zaire. In addition, during the 1980's he made contacts within the Ugandan government and these contacts would secure a geopolitical alliance that was necessary when Rwanda and Uganda were looking for Congo to intervene in the eastern Zaire crisis.

The 1996-1997 Zairian War can be largely attributed to the presence of the 1.2 million refugees along the Rwandan/Zaire and Rwanda/Tanzania border (Adelman and Rao 2004). The Interahamwe, the Hutu militia group which orchestrated the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi's during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, controlled many of the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire and used international aid resources as well as arms shipments to equip themselves in an attempt to launch more attacks against the Tutsi's. The defeat of the Interahamwe by Kabila with the help of Ugandan troops as well as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) opened up the path to power for Kabila in Kinshasa. He installed himself as President in May of 1997 and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo. Despite Kabila's seemingly resolute political appeals which initially gave hope to the Congolais population for a less corrupt government, Kabila's government operated quite similarly to his predecessor.

A rapidly growing opposition movement toward Kabila's, as well as continued ethnic warfare in the eastern provinces finally culminated in the formation of the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD). This party, largely made of Banyamulenge, met in Goma on



August 12, 1998 with a list of political grievances regarding the corrupt manner with which President Laurent Kabila was ruling the country. Corruption, misappropriation of funds, nepotism, votes-catching, and reign of the arbitrary were all some of the factors which they listed as characteristic of the Kabila regime. Other factors listed embezzlement of public funds (leading to the growing impoverishment of the population); incapacity of the regime to restore peace and security; repression of democratic forces; political assassinations; wholesale massacres; arbitrary imprisonment; impunity; violence and ethnic hatred; authoritarian rule; and the exclusion of people from the benefits of natural resources (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999). This marked the beginning of the Second Congolese War in which the Congolese Rally for Democracy took control of Goma and fought to topple Kabila in Kinshasa.

The Congolese Rally for Democracy stated that it wished to topple Kabila's government and provide a democratic government characterized most importantly by legitimacy. The formation of this party was supported by the Uganda, Rwandan and Burundian governments, who, disgruntled with the DRC government, broke their alliance with Kabila and turned against him. Kabila, in turn, shifted his alliances toward Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola.

Despite the signing of the 1999 ceasefire agreement, the Lusaka Accords, the conflict raged on and on January 16th 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated by one of his staff in a failed coup attempt against the Kabila government. Joseph Kabila, Laurent Kabila's son, took over the Presidency ten days later. Many rebel and opposition movements staged attempted coups against the new Kabila government. However in July 2006, the first democratically held elections since independence were held. Jean-Pierre Bemba, opposition leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, served as Vice President from 2003 to 2006 and ran in the Presidential election against Joseph Kabila in 2006. However, Joseph Kabila took 45% of the votes in the election and was thus democratically installed as President of the DRC.

ii. Main Processes Leading to Violence

The following table provides a synthesis of the main processes and risk factors that are evident in Kinshasa.

Risk Factors	Main Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic decline</li> <li>▪ Dilapidated health and education infrastructure</li> <li>▪ Lack of legitimate and adept state apparatus</li> <li>▪ Clientalism,</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> <li>▪ Investment in private vs. public welfare</li> <li>▪ Presence of rebel para-military groups in civilian refugee camps</li> <li>▪ Monetary and material aid stocked in refugee camps</li> <li>▪ Ethnic Heterogeneity</li> <li>▪ Cross-border tension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Post-Conflict Stress</li> <li>▪ Crisis of Governance</li> <li>▪ Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations</li> <li>▪ Politicisation of Ethnicity</li> <li>▪ Geopolitical and Regional Instability</li> </ul>

a. *Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations*

The geopolitical instability of the eastern DRC region, caused by the historical ethnic strife in neighbouring Rwanda and the resulting influx and presence of approximately 1,218,544 refugees<sup>18</sup> from both Rwanda and Burundi in the DRC today, has played a key role in the perpetuation of political violence in Kinshasa. The needs which originate from the numbers of protracted refugee cases, as well as the presence of unruly militia troops who terrorize

<sup>18</sup> See appendix V.

refugee camps and use them as a military sanctuary, exceed the capacities of Kinshasa's already over-stretched socio-economic infrastructure. In addition, this stress on the infrastructure has manifested itself in continuous violence in Kinshasa:

“...more fighting stems from armed “bandits” who use their weapons on the civilian population to exhort money and goods...all fighting affects urban life in so far as the subsequent displacement of people from warring villages to urban centres has a real effect on the already limited resources within any given Congolese city in which the population must share” (MONUC Key Issues, 2007).

Although much of the conflict exists in the east of the DRC “...all Congolese...have been affected one way or another by the troubles: through interrupted food and medical supplies, decayed or destroyed infrastructure, and lack of investment.” (UNHCR 2007).

#### *b. Politicisation of Ethnicity*

Proxy armies, militia groups, and the state have pursued micro-interests and engaged in actively politicising ethnicity in Kinshasa. Adelman and Rao (2004) also draw attention to the fact that the arrival of one million Rwandan refugees in eastern DRC during the wake of the Rwandan genocide became a resource to be mobilised domestically and internationally. Domestically because the refugees helped neutralise the threat of the opposition in the case of an election, and internationally because Mobutu tried to characterise the conflict as an attack on the country's sovereignty (Adelman and Rao 2004).

In addition the politicisation of ethnicity in the DRC has manifested itself in violent rape based upon ethnicity. “Rape has been used consciously, and with the utmost callousness as a weapon of war. The result: a petrified population, deserted villages and what will most probably turn out to be a severe HIV epidemic” (UNHCR 2007, 16). It is important to recall that although much of this violence is seemingly localised in the eastern DRC, its ramifications are felt heavily within Kinshasa. The Joint Initiative on the Fight against Sexual Violence towards Women and Children, which includes the Congolese government, NGOs and the UN, reported that from the outset of the war in 1998 to 2004, there were 1,162 cases of rape and sexual violence in Kinshasa (WatchList 2006, 28).

#### *c. Crisis of Governance*

The DRC's Kinshasa-based government is fragile and dilapidated as a result of Mobutu's regime, which was based on a system of patronage in which public and private resources were blurred, and state structures were fragmented (Adelman and Rao 2004, 138). Laurent Kabila's presidency was marked by an inability to restore the peace and security afforded to the Congolese, corruption, nepotism, votes-catching, reign of the arbitrary, embezzlement of public funds, repression of democratic forces, political assassinations, wholesale massacres, impunity; violence and ethnic hatred; and the deprivation of people's right to say in the management of natural resources (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1999). Forced displacement, killings, sexual assaults and abuse of power for economic gain were directly linked to armed groups' control of natural resource extraction sites in Kinshasa or in the vicinity (WatchList 2006, 35). The deteriorating judicial system has resulted in hundreds of cases of arbitrary and politically-motivated arrests in Kinshasa by unruly and state-run security forces such as the Republic Guard:

“The political instrumentalisation of the RG[Republican Guard]...represent a threat to all Congolese...The case of one civilian, arrested, beaten and illegally detained...by RG soldiers after making an innocuous political comment on a taxi-bus, is a good illustration of a

typical case, whereby people are arrested on the pretext that their actions or opinions are “a threat to State security” in order to extract a ransom for their release” (MONUC Human Rights Division 2007, 10).

The political violence resulting from the crisis of governance in Kinshasa has necessitated the strong presence of MONUC, the UN's Mission in the DR Congo, and the world's largest peacekeeping force.

#### *d. Post Conflict Stress*

The post-conflict setting of Kinshasa suffers from a number of characteristics which fuel violence. Inflation, collapse of large enterprises, decline in real wages, and capital flight all contribute to the declining quality of life in the city (Rakodi 1997). The weak city administration and authorities of Kinshasa are characterized by massive absenteeism, very poor filing, obvious disorganization, poor control over urban development, and poor capacity to adapt due to limited financial resources. Despite the state's weakness, stake-holders in governance are highly powerful and corrupt, and take advantage of the institutional decay and deterioration (Rakodi 1997). Thousands of street children living in Kinshasa are involved in various forms of violence, either as victims or perpetrators, and have been reported to be highly susceptible to recruitment of militia groups. Lastly, the widespread availability of arms in the DRC continues to generate insecurity and violence and to threaten the nation's peace process. According to the Small Arms Survey in 2003, the street price of a weapon in Kinshasa was US\$200 (WatchList 2006, 39). This has allowed the possession of arms to permeate the boundaries of the military and routinise violence amongst civilians.

According to Rakodi, many social groups have emerged out of the harsh context of city life which include: 'sparrows' (children abandoned by their families and living on the streets); 'fighters' (fighting for survival); 'balados' (petty thieves); and 'beggars'. These groups are excluded from the redistribution processes and end up plundering and ransacking (leading to increased instability in the urban context). Soldiers of the national defense forces engage in plundering civil Congolais, particularly in the form of looting crops, to make up for low salaries (Rakodi 1997).

### iii. Current Climate

Numerous cases of politically motivated torture, arrests, forced disappearances, executions, and scare tactics have occurred in Kinshasa following the July 2006 electoral campaign, and this "...combined with the perception on both sides that these manifestly illegal acts go entirely unpunished, provided armed men with an excuse to take matters into their own hands" (MONUC Human Rights Division 2007, 10). The MONUC Human Rights Division has also recorded that the worst case which exemplifies the RG as perpetrators of violence is when 84 fishermen were arbitrarily arrested, detained in underground pits, threatened and tortured by RG soldiers in Tshatshi military camp in Kinshasa.

In addition, the events of March 22, 2007 are reflective of the high occurrence of political violence in Kinshasa. The violence originated over the guard of opposition leader Jean Pierre Bemba, who refused to be integrated into the national army before the deadline of March 15th, 2007. The political violence in Kinshasa has caused much international concern over the DRC's relative stability in the post-war context. The EU has condemned the looting and rape committed by troops in Kinshasa during this eruption of violence (MONUC 03.27 2007). In response to this political violence, the UN's peacekeeping mission MONUC moved two military companies into Kinshasa from other parts of the DRC (MONUC 03.23 2007). The most recent political violence in Kinshasa has caused the population to internalise high

levels of social stress, fear and insecurity which further perpetuates violence within the city.

## V. UNHCR Statistics on Refugees and Asylum-Seekers for the DRC

Refugee population, end of year – main origin (main nationalities in 2004)

Origin	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Angola	108,338	108,284	87,687	137,000	150,000	175,420	186,879	184,201	123,714	98,383
Sudan	94,192	96,529	61,181	31,100	68,000	72,910	75,009	75,781	45,060	45,226
Burundi	117,902	30,226	47,004	20,000	19,200	19,760	19,485	19,374	19,552	19,400
Uganda	12,611	17,289	44,289	2,000	3,240	13,020	20,751	23,012	18,953	18,953
Rwanda	1,100,642	423,561	37,000	35,000	33,000	46,280	30,414	20,510	19,743	11,816

Note: Taken from the UNHCR Statistical Yearbook, 2004.

## VI. Long Case Study of Bogotá<sup>19</sup>

“Colombia for much of this century has suffered levels of death from violence—about 25,000 cases a year, these days—that luckier countries see only in time of war. A series of recent reports suggests that the effects of such violence are biting into the social fabric” (*The Economist* 1999).

### i. Historical Background:

Colombian history is a striking contrast of sustained institutional stability and extreme violence (Thoumi 1995). Often cited as the Latin American success story, there exists a much darker and virulent side to the past and present of Colombia. Bogotá as Colombia’s capital shares in this history, consistently providing a haven for the elite and powerful – the policymakers – of Colombian society (Braun 1985), while drawing in the less fortunate, as all cities do, with jobs and dynamism. Given the innumerable possible starting points from which to begin to examine Colombia’s history, its effects on the present, and the role that Bogotá has played within it, it is worth emphasising only one.

For all practical purposes, this is April 9<sup>th</sup> 1948. On this day “...the charismatic leader of the Liberal Party, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan...was assassinated. This led to urban riots in the capital [Bogotá], known as the *Bogotázo*, which spread to the rest of the country and started the 10-year civil war, *La Violencia* (“The Violence”)” (Skinner 2004, p. 1). Braun has highlighted how these riots emanated from the poor’s deeply rooted feeling of exclusion from Colombian political and social life (1985). Most importantly this event emphasised the significant division between classes within Colombian society. In 1958 the two conflicting factions the Liberals and the Conservatives managed to negotiate a power sharing agreement for peace, however, this ‘peace’ did not smother the flames of rebellion, serving to emphasise the dichotomy between the elite and other (Braun 1985; Moser and McIlwaine 2004a; Skinner 2004; UN-HABITAT 2005). The two party power sharing agreement excluded other political parties and although this agreement ended in 1974, but this deep-seated division has remained and underlies the current civil war, between the Government of Colombia and the guerrilla groups (for all practical purposes the FARC and ELN) (Braun 1985; *The Economist* 2007a; UN-HABITAT 2005). Moser and McIlwaine note that *La Violencia* was “deep, lasting and extensive” (2004a, 42), beginning a process of displacement that changed Colombia forever, forcing many of the rural poor into slums and poverty within an urban environment<sup>20</sup>. Any understanding of violence within Colombia, and principally urban violence, must be embedded within this historical context.

Condensing twenty years of history, violence within Colombia (and Bogotá) must be understood in connection to the globalisation of the drug industry. From this emerged all of the economic, social, and political consequences that are connected with a country being so deeply entangled in this global industry (Taussig 2003 and 2004; Thoumi 2002). Michael Taussig argues that in order to understand the role played by the drug industry within

<sup>19</sup> This work is a literature review, based upon Caroline Moser and Cathy McIlwaine’s research on Colombia, along with numerous journal articles, these authors bear no responsibility for the conclusions drawn. Much of the literature used pertains to the urban poor, unavoidably biasing the case in this direction. This is not a significant weakness, as this section of the population experiences violence most directly.

<sup>20</sup> To emphasise the importance of displacement as a process in Colombia only requires a couple of statistics. During *La Violencia* 2 million people were displaced and since 1985 3.1 million people have been displaced from rural areas (UN-HABITAT 2005).

Colombia today it as important to look at the history, as it is to look at the present. In this vein it is important to highlight a very powerful quote:

“The Gold Museum is also silent about the fact that if it was gold that determined the political economy of the colony, it is *cocaine* – or rather the U.S. prohibition of it – that shapes the country today. Not to talk about cocaine, not to display it, is to continue with the same denial of reality that the museum practices in relation to slavery. Like gold, cocaine is imbued with violence and greed, glitter that reeks of transgression” (Taussig 2004, xi).

As this quote highlights all too well not only the sinister nature of cocaine – and illegal drug industry in more general terms – but also its extreme interconnectedness with Colombian society. Comprehending the influence of the illegal drugs industry within Colombia is therefore equally important in reaching an understanding of violence in Bogotá.

The origins of this illegal industry are rooted in the production of marijuana during the mid-1960s. It is not of utmost concern, relevant only inasmuch as it “...infused Colombian entrepreneurs with the awareness of other potential illegal sources of wealth” (Thoumi 2002, 104). What followed was, and is, far more insidious and has played a formidable role in shaping Colombia and Bogotá, socially, politically and economically (Carrigan 1993; Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004b; Taussig 2003 and 2004; Thoumi 1995). This process began with the growing influence of the drug Cartels (most notoriously the Medellín and Cali cartels) within the country’s social, political and economic climate, during the 1980s.

Within this context Moser and McIlwaine note that the urban poor had ‘strong’ relationship with drug traffickers and in fact noted some positive aspects to their presence, as the cartels were linked to the creation of jobs and the fall of the cartels brought about a significant reduction in low skilled employment opportunities (2000, 63-64). Mary Roldan emphasises how different cities responded to the influence of the cartel. Contrasting Medellín to Cali and Bogotá, Roldan suggest that in Medellín the elites fought to keep organised crime out of the property markets and construction industry and thereby managed to dilute the economic decline that accompanied the fall of the cartels in the early 1990s. This is was not to be the case in Cali and Bogotá both of which experienced rather sharp economic declines (Roldan 2003). This discussion serves to emphasis the significant role that the cartels played during their heyday. During the early 1990s changes in government policy and the external influence of the United States combined to reduce the importance of the cartels within Colombia. This process changed the structure of the illegal drugs industry, seeing a multiplicity of new actors fill the shoes of older actors, specifically the increasing reliance of both the guerrilla and paramilitaries on the drug industry to sustain their military operations (Thoumi 2002).

## ii. Main Processes Leading to Violence:

The process of integrating the varying histories of Colombia, civil conflict and illegal drugs, produces the understanding of violence within Bogotá. It is important to remember that Bogotá as the capital city will have accrued at least some additional benefits from the central government. Moreover, Colombia is unique among other Latin American countries as its “...population is not concentrated in one megalopolis, and this in turn reflects the radical decentralisation of the country with its strong regional subcultures and fractured government” (Taussig 2003, 192). Though according to Reinhard Skinner, Bogotá is still a primate city with the next biggest city in Colombia being Medellín with a population approximately half the size of Bogotá (2004, 74). With a metropolitan area population of 7,881,156<sup>21</sup> (DANE

<sup>21</sup> Note that Bogotá DC (District Central) has a population of 6,776,009 (DANE 2006).

2006) Bogotá’s primate status is not as pronounced as in other Latin American Cities, having only 17% of Colombia’s population (Skinner 2004, 74).

Although the former suggests that Bogotá is unique, it is equally clear that Bogotá remains a Latin American city to its core. As a city, it is significantly socially segregated, with the north containing the affluent communities, while the south is home to the marginal and poor (Skinner 2004, 2). Bogotá is not insulated from the national climate, it incorporates all aspects of this climate into a condensed urban environment and an environment still characterised by a dichotomised relationship between the rich and poor, an environment of extreme violence<sup>22</sup> (Mockus 2004, 2). In order to reach the desired understanding of violence in Bogotá, this section will examine the five core processes within the city, which are: economic decline and unemployment; the mixing of displaced and local populations; the role of the illicit drugs industry and addiction; a crisis of government; and the naturalisation of fear and insecurity. The following table demonstrates the main processes and the connected risk factors that lead to social violence in Bogotá.

Risk Factors	Main Processes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ De-legitimisation of the state – government complicity in illegal activity</li> <li>▪ Lack of a reliable judicial system</li> <li>▪ Control of the economy by the elite</li> <li>▪ Culture of silence and <i>La ley de defensa</i></li> <li>▪ Unequal access to land</li> <li>▪ Presence of conflict in the countryside</li> <li>▪ Disintegration of the social fabric of society – especially within the home</li> <li>▪ Social exclusion</li> <li>▪ Economic Recession</li> <li>▪ Lack of economic opportunity, land, and security</li> <li>▪ Presence of cartels, guerrilla groups, and paramilitary</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic Decline and Unemployment</li> <li>▪ The Mixing of Displaced and Local Populations</li> <li>▪ Role of the Illicit Drugs Industry and Addiction</li> <li>▪ Naturalisation of Fear and Insecurity</li> </ul>

*a. Economic Decline and Unemployment*

Having experienced significant and steady economic growth up until the 1980s, Colombia, and Bogotá, have experienced a period of relative economic decline, including a recession in 1999, with the associated consequences of rising unemployment and disillusionment (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 61; Moser and McIlwaine 2004a; Thoumi 1995). This economic problem has been coupled with an attempt in Bogotá to ‘clean up the city’. Recent Mayors have paid significant attention to removing those who are unwanted from the streets, and creating a culture that rejects violence, in doing so the municipality has significantly reduced opportunities for self employment – i.e. street vending (Mockus 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2000 64). The restrictions on self employment opportunity are coupled with barriers faced by the poor to gaining any form of formal employment. Importantly area stigma, exclusion because of a certain association with a location, a prejudice against those from *barrios*, has significantly reduced the opportunities for marginalised within Bogotá (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 57 and 68-69). For the poor, and for the wealthy, unemployment and economic decline play an important role in creating conflict, as Moser and McIlwaine highlight just because you have no work, does not absolve you from your responsibility to feed your family, or to “meet obligations”, a process that is often seen to lead rapidly to robbery or worse (2000, 62).

<sup>22</sup> In 2002 there were 22 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants down from 80 homicides per 100,000 in 1993 (Mockus 2004, 2).



*b. The Mixing of Displaced People and the Local Population*

Related to the issues of economic decline and unemployment, are the problems faced by the displaced and marginalised populations. With approximately 1 million people being displaced between 1999 and 2004, due to the ongoing conflict, Colombia's cities have grown rapidly, with 76 percent of the population now living in urban areas (Aristizabal and Ortiz Gomez 2004; UNHABITAT 2005, 30 and 36). Coupled with the processes of paramilitary demobilisation (The Economist 2007b), and economic decline, the influx of displaced people has caused significant tension as new and old populations are forced to mix, competing for land and jobs (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 65). It is important to note that "access to land and housing are marked by illegality and violence" (UN-HABITAT 2005, 29). Nora Aristizabal and Andres Ortiz Gomez have emphasised the importance of access to land within Bogotá, noting the important socio-economic divisions within the land market, and specifically regarding the different options available to the urban poor. The authors discuss the various options available at all socio-economic levels within Bogotá, stressing the minimal – and solely illegal – options available to the poorest strata of the population<sup>23</sup>.

The lack of obvious opportunities for formal tenure – legal recognition – regarding land rights for the displaced and marginalised, has created a situation where insecurity and service under-provision are the norm (Aristizabal and Ortiz Gomez 2004; UN-HABITAT 2005, 37...). Significantly there are cases of communities becoming more integrated into the formal urban structure of Bogotá either through municipal initiatives or forcible community action (Peattie and Aldrete-Hass 1981). However, "...even if there has been important advances, and even if the amount of non-statutory neighbourhoods has been greatly reduced, these efforts are still not enough, and there are many families lacking tenure security and property rights" (Aristizabal and Ortiz Gomez 2004). Core emphasis of this dissuasion is the relationship between the displaced and marginal with access to land and employment. The lack of ownership and the associated insecurity of livelihood, combined with the introduction of an unknown population has created tension within Bogotá's marginal communities, as the community's social capital is further eroded (Aristizabal and Ortiz Gomez 2004; Graham 2004; Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a; UN-HABITAT 2005).

*c. Role of the Illicit Drugs Industry and Addiction*

The drug industry is not simply an economic phenomenon but it is also deeply tied to and related to the social problems within Colombia. As Thoumi states, "Colombians realise that the illegal industry was a catalyst in a process of social decomposition..." (2002, 114). As the Colombia's history is very clear, illegal drugs, addiction and the illegal industry that has grown from it plays an absolutely critical role in understanding conflict within Bogotá. In a society that already faced a serious addiction problem in relation to alcohol – a fact that is neglected and denied by many – the introduction of illicit and highly addictive drugs has created significant social and economic conflict (Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004b; Thoumi 1995). Tied directly into the ideas of prohibition and transgression, Colombian society, and especially the urban youth (both rich and poor), have seized upon the illegal world of drugs as way into a world they have often been excluded from. It is this conceptualisation of the world that riddles Colombian society (Briceno-Leon and Zubilaga

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23 Note that Colombia's Constitutional Court has summarised the situation of displaced people as follows: 92 percent have unsatisfied basic needs; 80 percent are indigents; 63.5 percent live in precarious dwellings; 49 percent lack adequate public services; 23 percent of children under 6 are malnourished; 25 percent of boys and girls aged 6-9 do not go to school; and 54 percent of persons aged 10-25 do not attend any education system (UN-HABITAT 2005, 37).

2002; Taussig 2003, 197; Thoumi 1995 and 2002). This process has been greatly facilitated by significantly low price of drugs in relation to alcohol.

“One joint of marijuana was cheaper than a bottle of beer – the former cost between 300 and 500 pesos (US\$ 0.19–0.30), compared to 800 pesos (US\$ 0.50) for the latter...and even a bottle of brandy (US\$ 5.60) cost more than a gramme of the most expensive hard drugs, cocaine and *perico* (US\$ 5 for good quality)” (Moser and McIlwaine 2004b, 52).

In a culture – especially an urban culture that is already far more tolerant (Moser and McIlwaine 2004b, 52) – that already accepts alcoholism as the norm the role played by this price differential is devastating. The high levels of tolerance that can be found within Bogotá only serve to emphasize the absolute pervasiveness of illegal drugs within society.

Moser and McIlwaine emphasise the importance of tolerance of drug abuse, suggesting that tolerance decreases with a related increase in violence associated with abuse (where abuse refers to drugs). Stating that “only when substance abuse threatens the social order, usually because of the links between violence and crime, is tolerance undermined” (Moser and McIlwaine 2004b, 62). This point connects to the above discussion regarding the prevalence of tolerance within Bogotá, it highlights the view of drugs as function of other forms of deprivation and as an outlet for frustration that people are willing to look past, up until the violence associated with it causes difficulties for the community – economically and socially. However, the tolerance of the illegal drugs does produce conflict between those who deal drugs, gangs who seek to protect their ‘turf’, police who are looking for a cut of the profits, and within families (Moser and McIlwaine 2000). In other words, the illegal drugs industry brings conflict into Colombian society, be it in the form of cartels fighting ‘wars’ over territory, or two addicts robbing to obtain the money necessary to maintain their habit (Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Thoumi 1995 and 2002).

The fundamental importance of the illegal industry is its malicious infection of all aspects of Bogotá life, not only from the economic perspective, but also from the political and social perspective as well. Economically the illegal industry has played a significant role in the lives of both the rich and poor, with a “Bogotá police report” suggesting that “...up to 350,000 young men...are or have been involved in the drug trade” (Harlow and Gillespe 2006). Politically the illegal trade has been part of a process that has destroyed people’s faith in the institutions of the state. Ana Carrigan highlighted just how significant this process has been. With regard to the assault on the Palace of Justice in 1985, she suggest that destruction wrought by the military and insurgents during the assault was the culmination of a process of de-legitimation of the state apparatus, with this attack being the final straw in a long process (Carrigan 1993). Socially the illegal trade has taken its toll, catalysing ‘social decomposition’ and generating perverse social capital and institutions within all social classes (Moser and McIlwaine 2000). The illicit industry, the drugs trade, cannot be ignored it is part and parcel of Colombian society and to understand the crisis of governance within Bogotá, it is essential that this understanding be grounded within this illicit industry.

#### *d. Crisis of Governance*

As stated above, illicit drugs play an absolutely central role in undermining the role of the state as a positive actor within Colombian and Bogotá society. Combined with the view of the police, as the perpetrators of violence, encouraging consumption and abuse (of drugs) for their own benefit (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 85). The lack of an efficient and unbiased judiciary has created a situation in which the government has been de-legitimised, perceived as powerless – or uncaring – and where the poor would prefer to follow their own “law of

arms”, taking matters of justice into their own hands (Carrigan 1993; Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 87-88; Thoumi 2002). These processes have combined to produce ‘perverse social institutions’ (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 78-81; Thoumi 1995 and 2002), such as gangs and groups committing social violence in the pursuit of power, with complete disregard for the state as the enforcer of the law (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 81).

*e. Naturalisation of Fear and Insecurity*

Perhaps one the more disturbing facets of life within Bogotá revolves around the ‘culture of silence’ (Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a/b; Thoumi 2002). As the 2005 UN-HABITAT report notes “...the most significant element absent in Colombia is a culture of respect for people’s rights” (29). The acceptance of a ‘culture of silence’ perpetuates a situation in Bogotá’s society whereby violence begets violence. This forces Bogotá’s communities into a situation where a culture of violence prevails. The government is perceived as, and is, powerless to prevent conflict from occurring – being complicit in much of it. The growth of perverse social institutions related to intra-generational violence (youth exclusion from society) and illegal drugs is highly influential in many of Bogotá’s poorer and marginal communities (Briceno-Leon and Zubilaga 2002; Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Thoumi 1995). Combined with deteriorating social institutions and trust in them, cyclical relationships that produce violence between people and within families, and economic decline and desperation, *la ley de defensa* (law of defence) or the law of arms (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 87) has a central role in propagating violence in order for those who have no control, to feel as though they have some control (Carrigan 1993; Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Thoumi 1995 and 2002).

It is important to note that this culture of violence is not solely the realm of the poor and marginalised. During the heyday of the drug cartels, violence was perpetrated against a whole range of different people, the poor and rich alike (Thoumi 1995 and 2002). While the continuing role of the paramilitaries and guerrillas perpetuate political violence on a terrible scale. In fact Taussig notes that the paramilitary also exists for another reason – not just as a counter to the guerrilla or for money – but from the elites’ fear of delinquency and the poor (2003, 200). In other words, the elite fear losing control over society. Thus the prevailing culture of violence within Bogotá is clearly not a function of ongoing conflict and segregation within Colombia society that politically, economically and socially legitimises violence (Carrigan 1993; Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a/b; Roldan 2003; Taussig 2003 and 2004; Thoumi 1995 and 2002).

iii. The Current Climate

The processes that lead to violence within Bogotá’s communities are highly complicated and convoluted in nature. Drugs play an absolutely essential role within the process, breeding a climate of fear within communities, reducing peoples mobility (especially at night), eroding the social capital of a community and increasing the barriers to possible solutions to violence both within and outside of the home (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 55). But there are other factors at work that are just as significant. The importance of culture of violence can not be understated, as this lack of faith in the countries institutions produces a feeling of hopelessness and a resort to ever more violent acts in order to survive (Carrigan 1993; Taussig 2003 and 2004; Thoumi 1995 and 2002). Furthermore the linkages between drugs, a culture of violence, economic factors and the displaced populations, cannot be ignored; as from this interaction stems much of the violence within Bogotá. Many of these different interactions can be clearly seen within the outcome of intra-family and intra-generational violence. The discussion of these two outcomes forms the conclusion of the case study.

Bogotá is a special case within Colombia, with very high rates of intra-family violence found within the city's different communities (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 31)<sup>24</sup>. Within marginal urban communities intra-family violence is considered to be an absolutely fundamental problem. This problem is connected to a lack of employment opportunity (especially for males, though not exclusively), insecurity, frustration, and exclusion from mainstream social life – the inability to obtain what others are perceived to have, and of male constructions of masculinity (*machismo*) and female submissiveness (Briceno-Leon and Zubilaga 2002; Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a/b; Taussig 2003 and 2004). Significantly much of this violence is connected to the sexual abuse of children – an action often associated with drug use (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 32). The consequences of intra-family violence are oft-cited as the erosion of social capital within the household and between households and neighbours and communities, as individuals look inwards in order to avoid having to deal with the surrounding violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2000; Thoumi 1995 and 2002). As if the problem of intra-family violence was not enough, it has been directly related to the erosion of future human capital formation, and an explicit distrust of the state, producing a vicious circle of continuing violence (Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 40-41).

Tied directly to intra-family violence is the role played by intra-generational violence, or the transmission of violence and violent behaviour between generations. While seemingly less important, this type of violence is extremely consequential within Bogotá (Bahamon 2005; Moser and McIlwaine 2000). It relates to the transmission of intra-family violence, playing an integral role in the above described vicious circle. As parents do not understand the world their children live in, contributing to violence – between parents and children – and exclusion – leading youth to seek other forums for social acceptance (Bahamon 2005; Moser and McIlwaine 2000, 94-95). Within the broader social realm the intra-generational transfer of violence reproduces a culture that permeates Bogotá. Intergeneration violence acts as a transference mechanism passing on violence – both intra-family and external violence – between generations, perpetuating the decline of social capital and increasing violence<sup>25</sup> (Bahamon 2005; Mockus 2004).

Importantly intra-family and intra-generational violence combine the processes discussed above to create a highly volatile situation that perpetuates a society imbued with violence and increasingly prevents a solution to this cyclical situation (Moser and McIlwaine 2000 and 2004a/b; Taussig 2003 and 2004; Thoumi 1995 and 2002). These are the most powerful of the processes that create violence within Bogotá and although not solely a social, and often very economic in nature, they are heavily embedded within Bogotá's social life, as following quote emphasises:

“Mr Mockus felt that *los machos* should take a night off to ponder the fact that they cause most of Bogotá's violence. He wanted to provoke debate, and the media obliged with a flood of articles on violence inside the family, the division of household chores and the importance of teaching Bogotáños civic behaviour. *Los machos* came off badly on all counts. As for the curfew, this had dramatic results: with the men corralled indoors, the city's murder rate and road accidents both fell by 80%, and other serious crime by 30%” (The Economist 2001a).

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<sup>24</sup> See appendix VII.

<sup>25</sup> Bahamon (2005) notes that this process can be broken, but there remain a significant percentage of those who are exposed to intra-family violence as a youth who pass it on to subsequent generations.

It is important to remember Taussig's advice. "...Far too much attention is spent on the headline grabbing drama of the state versus the guerrilla. For the more fundamental issue in many ways is the sordid everyday one of grinding poverty, street crime, and the nightmare life of kids" (Taussig 2003, 197). This is emphasised by the fact that "the percentage of people living below the official poverty line rose from 35% in 1997 to 49.6% in 2000. During the same period, income inequality grew: the Gini coefficient rising from 0.52 to 0.56" (Skinner 2004, 9).

These points only serve to emphasise the conclusion to be distilled from this case. The processes at work are continuing to, and will continue to, interact with the many points of conflict within Colombian society producing everyday violence that remains extraordinarily high. On an up-beat note, it is worth emphasising Mockus claim that the homicide rates in Bogotá have decline from 80 per 100,000 to 22 per 100,000 persons (Mockus 2004, 2). This is a positive assessment for violence in Bogotá, and one would suppose it has much to do with addressing the culture of violence within the city's society, as the economic data certainly is not nearly as hopeful. Clearly there is a role to be played in addressing nexus between economic decline and unemployment, the mixing of displaced people and the local population, the role of the illicit drugs industry and addiction, the crisis of government, and the naturalisation of fear and insecurity if there is to be significant decreases in violence within Bogotá.

## VII. Table Reporting Violence in Colombia

### Types of Economic, Social and Political Violence by Community, Colombia (%)

Type of Violence	Embudo, Bogotá	14 de Febrero, Bogotá	Jerico, Bogotá	Amanecer, Bucaramanga	Rosario, Giron	El Arca, Cali	Portico, Medellin	Cachicamo, Yopal	Colombia Chiquita, Aquazul
<b>Economic</b>									
Drugs	18	22	12	15	33	12	11	9	-
Insecurity	4	13	14	15	9	16	11	18	15
Robbery	9	17	15	28	15	25	7	16	8
Loitering (vagancia)	-	3	3	9	25	-	2	2	3
Gangs <sup>a</sup>	-	2	10	3	-	7	18	2	2
Prostitution	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	5	-
Subtotal	31	57	54	71	83	60	51	52	28
<b>Social</b>									
<i>Inside the Home</i>	11	10	16	6	11	13	5	7	8
Intra-family Violence	11	10	16	6	11	13	5	7	8
<i>Outside the Home</i>	32	28	22	15	1	10	33	11	10
Fights	23	20	10	8	1	4	13	4	5
Deaths	8	2	2	3	-	-	20	5	-
Alcoholism	-	6	4	3	-	5	-	2	2
<i>Encapuchados (hooded men)</i>	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Other <sup>b</sup>	1	-	6	1	-	-	-	-	3
<i>Outside or Inside the Home</i>	15	2	4	6	4	-	2	-	7
Rape	15	2	4	6	4	-	2	-	7
Subtotal	58	40	42	27	16	23	40	18	25
<b>Political</b>									
Police Abuses	11	3	2	1	-	8	7	-	2
Guerrilla Forces	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	2	-
War	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	26	-
Paramilitary Forces	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	22
Assassinations	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	18
Private Security Forces	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	-	-
Extortion	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
Threats	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Displaced People	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5
Subtotal	11	3	4	2	1	18	9	30	47
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

Note: Taken from Moser and McIlwaine 2004a, Appendix 6.

<sup>a</sup>Gangs were classified as an economic form of violence due to their close links with theft.

<sup>b</sup>This includes *machismo*, discrimination, and mistreatment of children in the streets.

### VIII. Risk Factors to Processes Table

Processes	Risk Factors Nairobi	Risk Factors Kinshasa	Risk Factors Bogotá
<i>Primary Nexus</i>			
Crisis of Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ One party state</li> <li>▪ Lack of a reliable judiciary</li> <li>▪ Criminalisation of police force</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Authoritarian regime</li> <li>▪ Clientalism</li> <li>▪ Lack of functioning judicial system</li> <li>▪ Corruption</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of a reliable judicial system</li> <li>▪ De-legitimisation of the state – government complicity in illegal activity</li> </ul>
Unequal Access to Economic Opportunity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Colonial creation of a class society</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Misappropriation of national resources by the elite</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Control of the economy by the elite</li> </ul>
Economic Decline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Structural Adjustment Programs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ High levels of military expenditures</li> <li>▪ Mismanagement of natural resources</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Economic Recession</li> </ul>
Naturalisation of Fear and Insecurity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Lack of a reliable judicial system</li> <li>▪ Criminalisation of the police force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Long term war and conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Culture of silence</li> <li>▪ <i>La ley de defensa</i></li> </ul>
<i>Secondary Nexus</i>			
Marginalisation of the poor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Presence of a class society</li> <li>▪ Unequal access to education and health services</li> <li>▪ Presence of fortified enclaves</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Unequal access to land</li> </ul>
Mixing of displace people and local populations		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Presence of refugee camps in proximity to or within national borders</li> <li>▪ Presence of rebel or para-military groups in civilian refugee camps</li> <li>▪ Large sums of monetary and material aid stocked in refugee camps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Presence of conflict in the country-side</li> <li>▪ Lack of economic opportunity, land, and security</li> </ul>
Polarisation of ethnicity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ One party state</li> <li>▪ Ethnic heterogeneity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Ethnic heterogeneity</li> <li>▪ Authoritarian regime</li> </ul>	
<i>Context specific processes</i>	Spatial segregation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Class society</li> <li>▪ Unequal land distribution</li> </ul>	Post-conflict Stress: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Dilapidated health and education infrastructure</li> <li>▪ Instable state apparatus</li> <li>▪ Unemployment</li> </ul> Geopolitical and Regional Instability: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ War in Border countries</li> <li>▪ Foreign</li> </ul>	Process of Drugs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Government tolerance of drugs</li> <li>▪ Lack of cohesive family structures</li> <li>▪ Presence of cartels, guerrilla groups, and paramilitary</li> </ul>

## **IX. List of Risk Factors**

- Illegitimate political system
- Corruption
- Clientalism
- Limited financial resources of the state (i.e. non-investment in social welfare)
- Ethnic heterogeneity
- Militarisation of society
- Presence of organised crime
- Lack of opportunity or accessibility to:
  - o Education
  - o Health
  - o Formal economic employment (i.e. high unemployment)
- Lack of formal public mechanism for security: judicial system and police force
- Loss of cohesiveness within the family unit
- Weakened social significance of the family
- “Masculinity” of the society
- Unequal gender relationships
- Criminalization and exclusion of the poor
- Availability of Guns
- Availability of Drugs
- Disintegration of the social fabric of the society
- Youth’s frustration
- Discrimination against particular social groups
- High population density in a context of resource scarcity
- Instability of the State’s foreign relations
- Unequal spatial organisation of the city
- Social acceptance of violence
- Media portrayal of violence
- Mob Justice and Lynching
- Lack of Independent Mass Media
- Class conflict
- Uncontrolled immigration and refugees influx
- Significant societal conflict or trauma:
  - o Political transition
  - o Post- conflict stress
- Absence of community and grass-roots organisations
- Influence of regional conflicts on the city
- Unplanned urbanization



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