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TOMORROW IS A NEW DAY

Supporting Community-Level Conflict Resolution and Reintegration
of Ex-Militants to Promote Stability in the Niger Delta

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT



September 2013

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List of Abbreviations

ARDA	African Radio Drama Association
CDC	Community Development Committee
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CEHRD	Centre for Environment, Human Rights, and Development
DRP	Developing Radio Partners
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
EU	European Union
FGN	Federal Government of Nigeria
IMESO	Institute for Media and Society
IRC	Information and Resource Centre
JTF	Joint Task Force
LGA	Local Government Area
LPC	Local Project Committee
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
NDDC	Niger Delta Development Commission
NIDPRODEV	Niger Delta Professionals for Development
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development –Development Assistance Committee
PAG	Project Advisory Group
PIG	Project Implementation Group
SDN	Stakeholders Democracy Network
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
TND	Tomorrow is a New Day
TOR	Terms of Reference
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

Map of the Niger Delta



Executive Summary

The people of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria have experienced multiple deprivation, exclusion, weak governance, and corruption as well as insecurity and ongoing conflict over several decades despite the continued increase in oil and gas revenues. Indeed, it is tension over the allocation of oil revenue which has been a key driver of conflict creating tensions between the Niger Delta and the Federal Government of Nigeria, between communities and multinational oil companies, between the security forces and the militant groups and at local level, it has created tension and division between communities, which have sometimes manifested themselves as 'ethnic conflicts'. The oil industry has generated huge wealth for Nigeria but has created layers of conflict in the Delta region while contributing very little to real sustainable development.

The Tomorrow is a New Day (TND) Project was funded under the EU Instrument for Stability and implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in seven trend-setting communities in three Niger Delta states; Rivers (Okrika, Ogu and Kpor communities), Delta (Oporoza and Koko communities) and Bayelsa (Amassoma and Kaiama communities) It was designed to support community reconciliation, to influence wider conflict dynamics and support the Presidential Amnesty and DDR process. The seven communities are very different in several key aspects including the size of the communities, the conflict history and legacy, the number of ex-militants in the area, and the relationship between these and the communities and between the security forces and the communities.

The TND project was based on an integrated approach to peacebuilding which involved working with a range of stakeholders and combined community-based interventions with broader media programming. It was implemented through three Nigerian implementing partners; the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD), Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) and the Niger Delta Professionals for Development (NIPRODEV) and drew on the expertise of three other technical partners, namely the Institute for Media and Society (IMESO) the African Radio Drama Association (ARDA) and Developing Radio Partners (DRP) . The project targeted a number of groups in these communities focusing in particular on women, youth, ex-agitators and security forces.

There is considerable evidence that the TND project has achieved most of the main results envisaged, apart from those related to media components and the proposed community radio stations. This element of the project was critical to the efforts to reach a wider audience in neighbouring communities and to impact on conflict dynamics in the wider Delta region. However, the decision by the Federal Government of Nigeria not to issue community radio licenses as proposed had a negative impact on the TND project and limited its effectiveness in this regard. The project has made good progress and has contributed to important changes in the seven communities.

Getting this project up and running in a tight timeframe, engaging local communities and establishing new structures and processes in a complex and challenging environment has been a significant achievement. The project has addressed a number of the conflict drivers in the Niger Delta and there is a good alignment between the key issues identified by local communities and the project activities. The focus on the inclusion of marginalised groups, on community empowerment and on building capacity to address key issues in the community was designed to address the longstanding deficits which have blighted the Delta region and contributed to the culture of violence and conflict and ultimately to the growth of militancy.

The 2009 Presidential Amnesty Programme removed the main threat from the militant groups although there are concerns that it is a temporary measure with no overall strategy for re-integration of the ex-agitators into communities and no real effort to generate employment for the thousands of ex-agitators who signed up for the process. The failure to build on the initial steps and to develop a more sustainable reintegration process has created a dangerous situation on the ground with many ex-agitators angry and frustrated with the government and their former leaders and an increasing risk that some will return to militancy. One of the weaknesses of the Amnesty process is that it was a top-down process with no local ownership and as a result it lacked credibility –a crucial factor in sustainable peace. The TND project has helped build legitimacy for the amnesty process at community level and contributed to sustainable peace by supporting communities to take ownership of key issues and challenges in their communities - conflict, marginalization and exclusion, and issues related to re-integration. The gaps and weakness in the Amnesty and DDR process and the need for community level re-integration indicate that TND is highly relevant to the overall context in the Delta.

The processes and structures developed under TND has enabled the communities to identify and address local problems and to develop appropriate local responses, facilitated inclusion and reduced some of the barriers to re-integration. The project has created coalitions and networks in the local communities which have facilitated the active engagement of previously excluded groups namely, youth, women and ex-agitators and has addressed several of the fractures in society in the Delta, particularly between communities and the security forces, between communities and ex-agitators and between the chiefs/elders and youths. This is demonstrated by the shift in attitudes towards ex-agitators and towards the Amnesty and DDR process. At present almost three quarters of those surveyed in the seven communities feel that the Amnesty process has contributed to reconciliation and want to see the process expanded to ensure that more ex-agitators are re-integrated. Overall TND has been effective in engaging with ex-agitators and in developing inclusive structures which facilitate re-integration and this highlight the value of inclusive and grassroots processes and structures with a good level of local ownership.

The lack of participation and involvement in decision making is recognised as a major challenge in the Delta region. One of the main contributions of TND in the region is the evidence of a significant improvement in the number of people who feel that they are now involved in decision making (60% of those surveyed as opposed to the situation at the baseline when two thirds stated that they were not involved in decision making). TND has focused on building local capacity in conflict transformation and advocacy and on creating inclusive structures and processes such as the LPCs, the town hall meetings, trauma healing events and small local development projects. These have demonstrated to communities that many of these issues can be resolved within the communities and that they can take ownership of their own development. Traditional disputes resolution mechanisms are discredited and ineffective, there is low levels of trust between communities and the security forces and in many cases, the formal justice system is weak or non-existent. There have been significant improvements since the baseline study in how communities see their role in development and peacebuilding and in their capacity to resolve conflicts in a non violent manner. However, care needs to be taken about the capacity of these communities to deal with more complex community conflicts. For example, these related to the oil industry and political and ethnic conflicts which have damaged these communities in the

past. There is a need for additional training and protocols before community members engage in these more complex mediation processes.

The combination of activities implemented in the communities and the synergy between them has had a positive impact on the underlying factors and has clearly contributed to the creation of more cohesive, peaceful and stable communities. There appears to be an increased sense of empowerment and motivation within these communities. This is reflected in the increase in the level of involvement in decision making, an overall improvement in relationships within these communities, more inclusive processes and increased confidence about their own role in the community and the capacity of the communities to deal with conflict.

The final evaluation has identified important changes in three key building blocks of peacebuilding; attitudes, trust and relationships. There is considerable evidence that there has been significant shift in attitudes with a more positive and inclusive approach being exhibited. A key aspect of the TND project has been building bridges and relationships within and between communities and there are clear indications that relationships have been built and strengthened and bridges built along several of the fractured lines in society in the Niger Delta with significant changes in the levels of trust within the communities and an overall improvement in cohesion, unity and togetherness. However, the communities are isolated and the impact on the key actors is confined to local pockets around the communities. There does not appear to be mechanisms in place to connect this change into the next level where it could begin to impact on overall development and potentially on wider conflict dynamics and “peace writ large”. The fractured nature of the ex-agitators, the lack of involvement by Federal and local government and challenges of working with the Nigerian security force have all limited the overall impact of the project. Despite this, TND has made real progress and provides a model of good practice for work of this nature and a beacon of hope in a region where there are limited examples of either of these.

TND was a highly intensive project and the integrated approach has created synergy and generated momentum at local level and demonstrated to the communities that real change can take place. However, care needs to be taken to nurture local capacity and not to overburden local structures in the rush to implement a project within a very tight timeframe. There was a need for a longer lead in time and for more flexibility in the timeframe of TND. The integrated nature of the project and the level of synergy is a key strength but it also holds risks as problems in one area can have a knock on effect across the board.

The problems in the Niger Delta are deep-rooted and complex and efforts to address these challenges require a sustained multi-sectoral approach and integrated programmes which work at different levels (grassroots and civil society, local and state government as well as Federal levels)

There is considerable evidence that the TND project has built local capacity, increased hope and made people aware that they can take control of their own development process and use their own indigenous resources to achieve things for themselves. This awakening and the fact that there is a good level of local ownership does point to a strong likelihood that some of the benefits of TND will be sustainable. Nevertheless, there are some concerns around sustainability particularly regarding the Information and Resource Centers (IRCs) which were still in the early stages of development as the TND project draws to a close. SFCG and its partners need to continue to keep a careful watch on the dynamics at local level and to support the IRCs through the next critical phase of their development.

The final evaluation identified a number of important learning points which need to be taken on board in future work in the Niger Delta Region. There are problems with applying a fixed model in communities where there are major differences in the context, the conflict dynamics and the relationship between the communities and ex-agitators. This highlights the need for increased consultations at the planning phase, a longer lead in time and a more nuanced approach which takes account of the specific local context. There are a number of factors which make re-integration a particularly difficult process in the Delta and there are risks that communities take a simplistic view of re-integration. The key learning point is that re-integration is a process, not an event and that it requires sustained efforts from both the communities and the ex-agitators if it is to work and that there is a need for ongoing and effective communication with the wider ex-agitator constituency. The TND project opted to provide an integrated programme in these communities and through this approach it has built bridges to the ex-agitators, established credibility with them and there appears to be good relationships in place. TND should use this as a platform to do more specific work with ex-agitators and to reach out to those who are disillusioned with and/or not engaged in the Amnesty process.

Overall the TND Project has made a valuable contribution to the Amnesty process and overall stability in the Niger Delta by developing a bottom-up and context-specific model which demonstrates that local communities can contribute to these processes if they are empowered and given the right support. TND is, however, a relatively short-term project which was implemented in a small number of communities. In order for the benefits to be sustained and built on, there is a need for more long term approaches. The work in the seven trend setting communities and with ex-agitators in these areas needs to be reinforced and deepened so that the important gains made over the last 18 months are not lost. The project has shown the value of community-led processes and this approach should be replicated in other communities where there are identified problems around community cohesion and re-integration.

The socio-economic and political context and the unique set of factors which have caused underdevelopment, persistent poverty and ongoing conflict in the Delta region requires a multi sectoral approach and the combined resources of key groups of stakeholders (Federal and state governments, International donors and the oil companies) The lack of engagement with these key actors has been a weakness in TND so far and much more needs to be done to develop linkages with decision makers and to create partnerships and synergies. It is essential that the capacity, the approaches and the structures which have been developed under TND is built on and connected into the wider political and economic context in the Delta. In particular there should be increased focus on linking the participating communities into more substantial economic development initiatives so that both the communities and the ex-agitators to see a real “peace dividend. SFCG has unique expertise in peacebuilding and now needs to connect its work on the ground with wider socio-economic initiatives in order to embed the progress on the ground and to develop a model of work which can address the huge problems in the Delta.

Summary of Recommendations

1. The TND project should be extended and be scaled up to incorporate existing trend setting communities and a number of additional priority communities while retaining its strong focus on community led re-integration.

2. Any future TND project should develop more focused strategies which targets ex-agitators including those not engaging in the Amnesty process.
3. There should be increased emphasis on strategic coordination with key actors in the Niger Delta especially the Presidential Amnesty Commission.
4. SFCG develops more strategic partnerships with other development actors including Federal and state government agencies, international donors and the oil companies in order to create more synergy on the ground and to generate a “peace dividend” in the communities where it operates
5. More context specific interventions should be developed for target communities which are based on an in-depth analysis of local conflict dynamics and other factors and that donors be flexible in this regard and provide scope for agencies to respond to the specific context in which they are operating.
6. SFCG should build on the strong foundation laid in phase one of TND to develop structured early warning and rapid response initiatives in the seven communities and that protocols and systems be developed for future community level mediation and conflict resolution
7. Priority should be given to providing ongoing support to the IRCs in both the short and medium term
8. There should be increased opportunities for both project partners and participating communities to network, to learn from each other and to coordinate activities.



Oporoza

1. Introduction

1.1. Background

The Tomorrow is a New Day (TND) project was funded by the EU under its Instrument for Stability and implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG) in three states, Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa in the Delta region. The project aimed to contribute to stability and to support the amnesty process in the Niger Delta by support community conflict resolution and reconciliation in 7 ‘trend-setting’ areas and by leverage changes in these ‘trend setting’ communities to influence conflict dynamics across the Delta region. This final evaluation was carried out in July - August 2013 with the purpose to identify reinforced social cohesion within target communities and to document evidence suggesting beginning of a spillover effect in surrounding communities. Findings from this evaluation will be used to improve programming on a Phase II of the project.

The evaluation aimed to map changes in the seven “trend setting communities” where TND was implemented, to identify any spillover effects in the neighbouring communities and to identify the extent to which this project contributed to the Amnesty process and sustainable peace in the Niger Delta. The evaluation involved an extensive fieldwork phase in the three states which included a survey in the seven communities, focus groups discussions with key stakeholder groups in the communities as well as interviews with SFCG staff, partners and other informed third parties. Section 2 provides an overview of the process undertaken in carrying out the evaluation.

1.2. Overview of the Evaluation

The final evaluation of the TND project was carried out over an eight week period from mid July to early September. 2013 and was carried out by a two person team Sean Mc Gearty (Team Leader) and Benjamin Abidde (A profile of the evaluation team is provided in Annex 10) The evaluation involved an extensive fieldwork phase over a 17 day period comprising FGDs, KIs and a community survey in the seven “trend- setting communities” The purpose of the evaluation was to identify reinforced social cohesion within target communities and to document evidence suggesting beginning of a spillover effect in surrounding communities.

The evaluation applied four of the OECD/DAC peacebuilding evaluation criteria¹, relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. The evaluation matrix in Annex 4 provides an outline of the main evaluation questions which were addressed. The scope of the evaluation was the seven communities in the three states i.e. Amassoma and Kaiama communities in Bayelsa State; Koko and Oporoza communities in Delta State; and Kpor, Ogu and Okrika communities in Rivers State. The evaluation also examined the impact of the project on neighbouring communities. The evaluation was implemented in 5 phases as follow:

(i) Inception phase: Desk research was carried out and an extensive set of project documents were reviewed including the baseline report, project document, interim project evaluations and monthly project reports (A list of documents reviewed is provided in Annex 9) Evaluation questions were developed and plans drawn up for the fieldwork phase.

¹OECD (2012), *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results*, DAC Guidelines and References Series, OECD Publishing.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264106802-en>

(ii) Fieldwork planning phase: A key component of the evaluation was the community survey – which surveyed 764 people in the target communities. The design and planning of this survey was carried out during the first part of the fieldwork phase and involved; finalisation of the survey questionnaire, a two day training programme for surveyors and supervisors, field testing of the survey in Kpor community and logistical planning for conducting the survey in the seven communities. The survey was designed to capture changes in the seven trend setting communities and was based on the original baseline survey carried out by SFCG at the start of the project.

(iii) Field work phase: This phase comprised, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, site visits, and the community survey as well as further desk research.

Table 1: Overview of data collection

Activity	No
Focus group discussions	16
Key informant interviews	30
Site visits	8
Community surveys	764

Key informant interviews: KIIs were carried out with SFCG staff, project partners, representatives of State governments, Federal institutions, NGOs and other informed third parties. A total of 30 people were interviewed broken down as follows;

Table 2: Summary of KIIs

Category	No.
SFCG staff	11
TND partners	9
Others –government agencies, NGOs, academics and journalists	10
Total	30

A list of those consulted is provided in Annex 3

Focus Group Discussions: FGDs in the target communities were a central component of the evaluation and in total the evaluation team carried out 13 FGDs. The average number of participant in the FGD in the communities was 12 giving an overall figure of 156 people consulted in this way. A further 3 FGDs were carried out with other stakeholders.

Table 3: Summary of FGDs

Focus groups	No
Trend setting communities	13
Neighbouring communities	1
Project partners	1
Community surveyors	1
Total	16

A list of FGDs is provided in Annex 2

Site visits: Over the course of the fieldwork the evaluation team carried out 8 site visits to projects carried out as part of the solidarity event component of the project. This included site visits to IRC buildings (Koko and Kaiama) toilets (Oporoza and Koko), and a number of other smaller projects, such as walk ways and bridges (Oporoza), bus stops (Koko), and street lighting (Kaiama).

Community Survey: The community survey was carried out over a 5 day period in the seven communities by a team of 28 surveyors (4 per community). The surveyors worked in pairs (an interviewer and a note taker) and the work was overseen by a team of seven supervisors. The target was to interview 100 people in each community, with a particular focus on young people and women. The actual number of people interviewed was 764. The results of the survey is presented in section 4 below and the questionnaire is attached in Annex 5. The survey monkey system was used for the survey.

(iv) Data entry and analysis phase

The process of checking and data entry of the survey data was carried out in Portharcourt over a one week period in August by a team of 14 data entry personnel. The evaluation team then carried out an analysis from the survey as well as data from the FGD, the KIIs and document review.

(v) Reporting phase

The reporting phase involved 3 steps. A draft report was drawn up and submitted to SFCG for review by the project team and TND partners. A second draft was then produced for review by SFCG. Based on feedback from this review a final report was drawn up.

Limitations

The evaluations faced a number of limitations. The key one being that key elements of the project, particularly the establishment of the IRCs were still on-going. A number of other activities (training of IRC volunteers) were ongoing or only recently completed. So in some of these cases it was too early to fully assess these activities at this stage. A second limitation was the difficulty in accessing key people in the Niger Delta due to the fact that key agencies such as the Amnesty Commission are based in Abuja while a number of key informants were not available due to holidays or travel during the fieldwork phase. Inevitably, the logistics of travel in the Niger Delta was also a limitation and restricted time available in the seven “trend- setting communities” and particularly the coverage of the neighbouring communities (i.e. the 14 communities that were included in the project through the “come and see” and “go and tell” component). In order to comply with EU requirements the final evaluation was carried out before completion of the project and while there was ongoing implementation of activities. As a result some of the final activities carried out in July- august 2013 have not been included in this evaluation. This is particularly true for the IRCs which were only being finalised and equipped at the time of the evaluation.



Focus group discussion Kaiama

2. Context

The Niger Delta region has an estimated population of 32 million and has experienced ongoing conflict and a lack of development since Nigerian independence in 1960. The region is now recognised as being among the most underdeveloped in Nigeria and on many fronts it has stagnated over the last couple of decades despite the continued increase in oil revenue. A range of socio-economic political and governance factors combine with insecurity and shifting conflict dynamics to make the Niger Delta a challenging environment for both development and peacebuilding work. The situation is exacerbated by weak governance, a lack of democratisation, and the exclusion of large sections of the population from decision making. Efforts to address these issues are often undermined by corruption and a powerful and lucrative patronage system. A major study carried out by the Woodrow Wilson Centre² identified five key issues that have blocked development and the search for stability in the Delta;

The first is a trend toward social fragmentation rather than social cohesion; second, a flawed federal system worsened by poor governance; third, limited economic opportunities associated with an oil-based economy; fourth, a political culture oriented toward informal networks rather than civic rights; and fifth, the weak capacity of the state to ensure the security of its citizens. These issues are rooted in the underlying socio-political structures and culture of Nigeria as a whole. Together they constitute a set of circumstances that are not merely causes of discontent and foci of protest but also sources of manipulation and profiteering by political, criminal, or militia actors who incite violence to further their interests.

The Delta region exhibits many of the traits of the so-called resource curse – i.e “the tendency of states with large reserves of natural resources such as oil and diamonds to be less developed than similar states lacking such resources”³ Tension and violent conflict over the allocation of oil revenue has afflicted the area for several decades. It has created conflict between the Delta Region and the Federal Government, between communities and oil companies, and between the security forces and the militant groups. It has also poisoned relationships at local level dividing neighbouring communities – often along ethnic lines and created division within communities. For many people in the Delta the security forces are the only organ of government which they have any regular contact with on a regular basis and in many cases this is a negative experience. The security forces – particularly the police - are poorly trained and motivated and in the eyes of most people are considered to be corrupt, inefficient and prone to using excessive force.

The Nigeria Police Force, has a long history of engaging in unprofessional, corrupt, and criminal conduct. Over the years, this unwieldy force—Africa’s largest—has proved difficult to effectively manage and control and has become largely unaccountable to the citizens it is meant to serve. for many Nigerians the police force has utterly failed to fulfill its mandate of providing public security. Indeed, 80 years after its birth, members of the force are viewed more as predators than protectors, and the Nigeria Police Force has become a symbol in Nigeria of unfettered corruption, mismanagement, and abuse⁴.

²Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta; A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change (Paul Francis Deirdre Lapin & Paula Rossiasco (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 2011)

³Escaping the Resource Curse; Edited by Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz New York: Columbia University Press, 2007

4 Everyone’s in on the Game; Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigeria Police Force: Human Rights Watch 2010



Riverine community Delta State

The reality of life for the majority of residents of the Delta is an ongoing struggle for survival in the midst of significant wealth. The levels of poverty are recognised as being among the highest in the country and it is estimated that over 50% of the people live on \$2 a day or less and 70% live below the poverty line. Healthcare and education provision is weak or non-existent and nearly 40% of the population is illiterate. The environmental degradation caused by the oil industry has damaged and, in many cases, destroyed the traditional livelihoods of considerable numbers of people who were dependent on fishing

and agriculture –adding further to the hardship experienced by these communities.

The UNDP describes the region as suffering from “administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict.” Communities are forced to live in extreme poverty in the midst of substantial wealth and the exclusion of the vast majority of people from the benefits of these resources has reinforced the overall sense of injustice and exclusion and contributed to a buildup of resentment and frustration, particularly among the youth. The combination of this paradox of poverty in the midst of wealth, a divisive political system, exclusion and ongoing violent conflict have created a fragmented society with multiple fractures and limited social cohesion. While considerable sums have been invested in community initiatives by oil companies there is limited evidence of any extensive or sustained impact on the ground.

Neither the deployment of a Joint Task Force (JTF), which has been accused of committing grave human rights violations, nor the establishment of a specialised commission and a federal ministry charged with addressing development issues in the Niger Delta have visibly contributed to improving the situation in the region. The oil majors’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, including quite significant community assistance and development programmes, could not fill the void generated by the Nigerian government’s failure to deliver on development and improved governance.⁵

The failure of both Federal and State governments to implement real reform and to use the resources at their disposal to promote effective and sustainable development was highlighted in a recent decision by the Community Court of Justice of Economic Community

⁵Elites, Oil and Violence mitigation in the Niger Delta; Institute of Development Studies; (Policy brief no. 35 May 2013)

of West African States (ECOWAS) which found that the Federal Government had failed to protect its people from environmental damage caused by oil companies.

The Federal Government also failed to stop private oil companies from polluting the land in the region thereby destroying their opportunity to earn a living. Federal Government failed to provide an environment for the people of the region to have healthy and standard living. There is no modality by government to protect the people of the Niger Delta to ensure that foreign companies do not violate their human rights⁶.

In general, and outside a handful of well run organizations, the CBO and CSO sector is weak and fragmented and has suffered from a lack of sustained support. The situation at community level is further complicated by intergenerational issues which impact on efforts to promote community development and cohesion. The traditional structures concentrated power in the hands of the the male dominated elders and chiefs and this has tended to exclude young people and women, leading to further alienation of a sizable proportion of the population. This has been exacerbated by perceptions that the elders are benefiting from the oil companies revenue at the expense of the community.

The Presidential Amnesty process

The scale and intensity of the conflict increased considerably in the 2003 -2009 period as the number of militants increased and the groups acquired more sophisticated equipment and weapons. As a result of the violence and kidnappings oil production fell sharply and in 2008 and 2009 it is estimated to have fallen by 1 million barrels per day (from 2.2mbpd to 1.2mbpd) with an estimated loss of \$18bn to the Nigerian economy.⁷

In addition to the major conflict between the militants and the Government there have been ongoing ethnic conflicts (particularly between the Ijaw and Itsekeri). The Delta area is made up a mosaic of different ethnic groups and inevitably the range of problems in the region, competition over resources, weak rule of law and a hardening of social identities have led to ethnic tension and on a few occasion violent conflict. At local level there have also been conflict between the oil companies and communities over land acquisition and environmental damage, and conflict between neighbouring communities over ownership of land and oil 'host community' status and oil revenue.

Over the years the oil industry has been a key driver of conflict and has fuelled associated criminal activities in the region. The industry has generated huge wealth for Nigeria and the Delta states but disputes over the distribution of this wealth have created layers of conflict in the region and between the region and Federal authorities. The increase in income in the region has fuelled division, conflict and corruption while contributing very little to real sustainable development. The overall context has created a fertile ground for ongoing criminal activities and violence which has been very profitable and created a "war economy" with huge revenue being made from oil bunkering and contracts from oil companies. This problem has continued and even increased since the Amnesty with ex-militants being active in illegal oil bunkering while also benefiting from contracts to guard the pipelines. Oil

⁶Quoted in TND monthly Report Dec. 2012: Author Unknown. (14 December, 2012). ECOWAS court slams Nigeria on Niger Delta neglect. *PM News*. Retrieved from <http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/12/14/ecowas-court-slams-nigeria-on-niger-delta-neglect/>

⁷Conflict in the Niger Delta ; More than a Local Affair. United States Institute for Peace (Special Report 217 June 2011)

production is now back at its peak level despite the loss of an estimated 400,000 barrels per day through illegal “bunkering”.

The situation on the surface has improved considerably as a result of the Presidential Amnesty Programme which has removed the main threat from the various militant groups



operating in the Delta Region. Around 26,000 “militants” have joined the process so far and considerable numbers have completed training and education programmes both in Nigeria and other countries. However there are serious concerns that the amnesty process is not a real sustainable solution to the issues in the region and that the weaknesses of the process will result in an eventual return to violence in the region. A USIP report on the situation in the Delta (June 2011) gave a pessimistic assessment of the Amnesty and the prospects for it leading to stability in the region.

Gas flaring at oil installation in Delta state

“The government still has not produced a credible work plan to address the many complex and holistic issues of demobilization and development needed to achieve peace. Few practitioners would defend a two-week course as likely to reorient armed group members, particularly if follow-up remains in doubt. And apart from early token handovers, there has been no serious effort at disarmament or any real acceptance that militias have handed in a significant portion of their arsenals..... Since 2009 the chances for converting the amnesty into something more than a temporary cease-fire have largely eroded”⁸.

The underlying factors which fuel conflict in the region remain largely untouched and in some cases are getting worse. The levels of poverty and unemployment have remained persistently high despite the vast wealth generated in the region from the oil industry. Poor governance and corruption has created suspicion and mistrust between the state and citizens and in many areas of the Delta the rule of law is weak and local government services are virtually non-existent. This is compounded by the low levels of trust between the communities and the police and the fact that traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are discredited and ineffective.

The erosion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of chiefs is particularly challenging to the local social order, since the settlement of disputes is one of the customary responsibilities of traditional leaders. As the legitimacy and impartiality of traditional authorities are compromised, the ability of communities to resolve conflict in a non-violent way is further weakened⁹

⁸Conflict in the Niger Delta; More than at Local Affair. United States Institute for Peace (Special Report 217 June 2011

The Amnesty process has now been in place since 2009 and there are conflicting views regarding both its effectiveness and its future. There are concerns among commentators that it is a short term solution which has attempted to buy peace in order to allow oil production to proceed. The Amnesty process and the election of Goodluck Jonathan from the Delta region as president provided a unique opportunity and should have created a momentum for real change in the region. However this has not happened and the population has not experienced any real improvement in their lives.

“Beyond contributing to the fragile pacification of the Delta, these processes have not led to any tangible changes in the way the federal and regional governments administer and distribute the country’s natural resource wealth, nor how they address grievances, poverty, criminality and violence in the Delta and beyond”¹⁰.

Consultations carried out during the evaluation identified four key issues related to the Amnesty which are pertinent to the TND project. Firstly the focus of the Amnesty Commission DDR has been exclusively on the individual ex-agitators through training and a monthly stipend. There has been no strategy for reintegration into communities and no attempt made to support this process on the ground. Secondly the core issue for most ex-militants is the lack of jobs –even when they have completed good quality training. Thirdly it is widely accepted that the system has been abused and that many of those who benefited under the Amnesty process were not in fact militants. Finally the leaders of the militants groups who have benefited hugely from the process and resulting contracts have exploited their own members.

This combination of factors is creating a dangerous situation on the ground with many ex-agitators angry and frustrated with the government and their former leaders. While some have returned and been accepted into their communities there are still considerable barriers for others and these have not been able to return. While reintegration into the community will not resolve the failings of the amnesty process it would provide a certain level of stability and reduce the risk of a drift towards criminality or a return to militancy.

The Amnesty process has created a further layer of division and conflict, among different ex-agitators (those who have benefited from the amnesty process and those who haven’t) and between the ex-agitators and communities who are still fearful and suspicious of the ex-agitators, particularly those from outside their own community. There is consensus that the situation is still very delicate and that the failure to address the underlying causes of conflict and increasing dissatisfaction with the Amnesty process could lead to a drift back to violence. The scheduled ending of the Amnesty process in 2015 and the fact that this is an election year has the potential to create a volatile situation on the ground.

“The situation in the delta remains fragile and will likely return either to intermittent conflict or full-blown insurgency within six to eighteen months if a “business as usual” approach is taken to interventions. The amnesty process opened a door for stabilization but did not reduce the long-term potential for violence or deal with root conflict issues”¹¹.

⁹Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta; A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change (Paul Francis Deirdre Lapin & Paula Rossiasco (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 2011)

¹⁰Elites, Oil and Violence mitigation in the Niger Delta; Institute of Development Studies; (Policy brief no. 35 May 2013)

¹¹Conflict in the Niger Delta ; More than a Local Affair. United States Institute for Peace (Special Report 217 June 2011)

3. Tomorrow is a New Day: Project overview

3.1. Summary of TND

The Tomorrow is New Day (TND) project has been implemented by SFCG in 7 communities in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states in the Niger Delta. The overall objective was to support the long-term stability and results of the Amnesty Process and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in the Niger Delta. The 7 communities were Koko and Oporoza in Delta State, Kaiama and Amassoma in Bayelsa State and Kpor, Ogu and Okrika communities in Rivers State. These 7 communities were described as “trend-setting communities” i.e. geographic communities that exert a strong influence on conflict dynamics in the surrounding area, holding the possibility of violence or peace “spilling over” to neighbouring areas. The specific Objectives of TND were:

- ◆ To support community conflict resolution and reconciliation in 7 ‘trend-setting’ areas;
- ◆ To leverage changes in these ‘trend setting’ communities to influence conflict dynamics across the Delta region;
- ◆ To facilitate access to information and dialogue inclusive of marginalised and alternative voices in the Delta.

The project has been supported under the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability and received total grant of € 5.3 to cover an 18 month period from Jan 2012 to June 2013. TND was implemented through three Nigerian implementing partners; the Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) covering Rivers State, Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) covering Bayelsa State and the Niger Delta Professionals for Development (NIPRODEV) working in Delta State. In addition, the project drew on the expertise of three technical partners two of which were Nigerian; the Institute for Media and Society (IMESO) and the African Radio Drama Association (ARDA). The third technical partner was Developing Radio Partners (DRP) based in the USA. The TND project design is based on SFCG’s extensive experience of peacebuilding in Africa over the last 18 years. It is based on an integrated approach that combines multiple tools with target groups at different levels (individual, community, regional) a strong commitment to partnership and local ownership and a methodology which combines community-based interventions with broader media programming.

3.2. Project Outputs and Results

TND provided an integrated strategy in the seven communities which together offered the communities a comprehensive package of support. The project targeted a number of groups in these communities focusing in particular on women, youth, ex-agitators and security forces and provided a broad set of responses which can be clustered under 6 broad headings:

- I. Training and capacity building (in conflict transformation, advocacy, media, the management of the IRC and security sector reform).

- II. Community mobilization and decision-making or self-improvement: solidarity events - town hall meetings and solidarity events (i.e. the provision of small scale community infrastructure and facilities).
- III. Media projects: Awareness raising and dissemination of information (Development of Information Resource Centre's, participative theatre, radio programmes and comics) designed to address the key issues in these communities.
- IV. Networking opportunities with other "trend setting communities" and with neighbouring communities through the "come and see" and "go and tell" visits.
- V. Development of inclusive structures to mobilize communities and to implement programmes at local level (Local project committees, dialogue processes and IRC management structures)
- VI. Trauma assessment and healing.

The key results set out for the project included:

- I. Barriers to reintegration and community healing, including bad attitudes and mind set, lack of information or misinformation, and lack of concrete opportunities, are reduced in the targeted communities;
- II. Targeted communities have a collective, inclusive vision of reintegration, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence for the future;
- III. Coalitions within communities bringing in women, youth, community leaders, ex-militants together for problem-solving, community policing, and trauma healing are developed;
- IV. Communities have strengthened capacity for conflict prevention, early warning and rapid response;
- V. New channels of information and dialogue, namely Information Resource Centres, and theatre for change are established in the three Delta states ;
- VI. Marginalised groups, and most specifically youth, women and ex-militants, have access to a platform for airing their concerns, ideas, and grievances for consideration by their peers and decision-makers.

3.3. Changes to the Project

There were 2 main changes to the project from original design.

The original plan was to establish community radio stations in the seven communities and this strategy was intended to extend the reach of the project to up to 600,000 people in the three Delta states. However this element could not be implemented as it has not been possible to get licenses for these community radio stations. SFCG negotiated an alternative strategy with the EU which involved the establishment of Information Resource Centres (IRCs) in 6 of the communities. This change has had two significant impact on the project –it has considerably reduced the reach of the project and to a large degree has limited it reach to the 7 trend setting communities and to some extent into the fourteen neighbouring communities and the delay in getting the IRCs approved and set up has meant that they are not fully operational as the project draws to a close.

The original plan was to work in six communities – two in each of the three states. However there was some confusion at the start in Rivers State regarding the location of the project. The project was due to based on Okrika but was instead started up in the neighbouring

community of Ogu. When the mistake was discovered preliminary work had been carried out and expectations raised and SFCG felt it could not abandon the community of Ogu. Okrika was recognised as a priority community with significant militant activity and ongoing conflict and it was considered essential by the EU that the project be implemented there. In order to deal with this situation SFCG with the agreement of the EU established an additional- seventh - project in Okrika. However the budget was capped and as a result the resources were split between these two communities. This has had a knock on effect on implementation of the project in both Okrika and Ogu. In the case of Okrika the project was late starting and had a reduced budget despite the fact that this is the largest and most conflict affected community of the seven in the TND project. In the case of Ogu there was insufficient resources to set up an IRC which is one of the key components of the project. It is not clear why an error of this scale occurred and this points to the need for more consultations and closer linkages on the ground during project start up.

3.4. Summary of Main Outputs

The statistics are based on the most recent TND monthly report to the EU (July 2013). While all statistics could not be verified there is considerable consistency with data collected through FGD and site visits in the communities during the evaluation.

- ◆ TND has worked with 28,000 direct beneficiaries since the project commenced in Jan 2012. Of this figure 52% were female, (46%) male and just over 1% were ex-agitators.
- ◆ The base line survey involved a total of 2098 people – 1788 through the community survey and a further 310 through FGDs and KIIs.
- ◆ The largest events in terms of participants were the participatory theatre and video screenings with over 9,000 participants. A further 1,000 were involved in a media questionnaire.
- ◆ The town hall meetings have been a key activities in terms of numbers. A total of 2888 people attended 46 meetings in the seven communities. The level of participation of women was high at 47%. The most active state was Delta with 1561 people participating in 24 meetings. The project held 46 out of a planned 72 town hall meetings (64% of the target)
- ◆ The largest activity was the Conflict Transformation training with 1090 participants (evenly spread across the 3 states) of which 44% were female and 8% were ex-agitators.
- ◆ The ex-agitators were particularly active in the initial baseline consultations (75 participants) the conflict transformation training (88 participants) and town hall meetings (55) across the 3 states. However the level of participation is low in some activities while in other cases data is not available.
- ◆ It is not clear how many individual ex-combatants have actually engaged in project activities. However it does appear that there is a core group of 50 -70 ex-agitators across the seven communities (average of 7 to 10 per community) who have been regularly involved in project activities and are linked into a wider circle of ex-

agitators who engage in occasional activities or are kept abreast of developments through their representatives.

- ◆ In general, the level of participation by ex-agitators has been lowest in Rivers State (only 2 were involved in the LPC formation and agenda setting). The striking feature in Rivers is the level of engagement of female ex-agitators where 14 attended the Conflict Transformation training and 10 attended the Advocacy training.
- ◆ The solidarity events were important in mobilising the communities. A total of 18 events were held out of the 30 planned (60% of the target) On average around 200 people took part per event (total 3658 people). It is also significant that 47% of these were female. However, the level of participation by ex-militants in these events is very low with only 15 being recorded (13 in Delta, 2 in Bayelsa and none in Rivers state).
- ◆ The level of participation in the trauma healing catalysing events was low with only 248 participants across the 3 states.
- ◆ There has been considerable progress on the establishment of the IRCs despite the delays in getting this component off the ground. TOT has been delivered by Developing Radio Partners to 12 people on Healthy Station and 17 people received journalism training from IMESCO. The six IRC groups (boards of governors, management committees and volunteers) have received extensive training over a three month period (3 days per week). A total of 159 people (35% female) have engaged in this training to prepare them to run the IRCs. Buildings or sites have been provided by the 6 communities¹² and renovation /building of the centre's has been completed to a high spec with each centre having a cyber cafe and transmission room capable of transmitting radio programmes (should the licensing issue be resolved). and transmitters procured).
- ◆ Security sector training was provided to 550 members of the security forces in the 3 states with participants drawn from all arms of the security forces (Joint Task Force, police, and civil defense and vigilante groups). However the number of dialogue programmes between communities and the security forces has been low with only 3 of the planned 18 completed.
- ◆ Overall the number of activities were lower than projected in several key activities including Town hall meetings (64% of target) solidarity events (60% of target) community –security force dialogue (17%)

3.5. Progress towards Targets

TND set itself an ambitious set of targets for each of the 7 communities as well as some overarching targets for the region. Progress towards the achievement of some key targets (Additional details provided in Annex 6)

¹²IRC's will be set up in 6 communities – the exception being Ogu in Rivers State.

Target: Support community conflict resolution and reconciliation in 7 'trend-setting' areas. The survey indicates a substantial improvement in all 7 communities - 83% have positive views/opinions/views towards safety and security in their communities.

Target: Leverage changes in 7 'trend setting' communities to influence conflict dynamics across the Delta region. 60% of evaluation respondents are aware of action activities via media programming, radio, and IRCs. There is a good level of awareness of TND in communities (54 % reported that they were aware of TND and 25% have participated in a TND event). IRCs were not operational so awareness probably raised through other avenues particularly town hall meetings. It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to assess the level of awareness in the neighbouring communities but the fact that the radio component did not happen would have reduced this considerably.

Target: Communities have strengthened capacity for conflict prevention, early warning and rapid response. Target: At least 80 interventions undertaken by Local Project Committees or their members leading to resolution or referral. Communities report that there has been increased local conflict resolution by both LPCs and participants from the Conflict transformation training programme. 80% of the people surveyed think that their communities are now better able to resolve conflicts non- violently compared to 2 years ago.

Target: Communities have a collective, inclusive vision of reintegration, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence for the future. Evidence of more cohesive and inclusive communities from the survey and FGDs. Overall communities feel that there has been a significant improvement in these areas.

Target: Coalitions within communities bringing women, youth, community leaders, ex-militants together for problem-solving, community policing, and trauma healing are developed. Diversity of stakeholders participating in different action activities. The project has been very effective in this regard. LPCs, town hall meetings and advocacy groups all contributing to more inclusive structures at local level with women, youth and ex-agitators participating in solidarity events.



**Focus group
Amassoma**

4. What has changed?

4.1. Overview of the community survey

This section provides an overview of the current situation in the seven “trend setting communities” where TND has been implemented. It explores the views and perceptions of these communities on issues related to safety, peace and reconciliation and community cohesion and examines the extent of change on these issues over the last two years (covering the approximate period in which TND has been implemented) This is based on a combination of the survey conducted among the wider population and FGDs with stakeholders in the communities. Attitudes and perceptions on issues such as security, cohesion, and peace are shaped by a complex interplay of factors.

The general improvement in security, as a result of the Amnesty process will undoubtedly shape people’s views and this wider context provides a backdrop to the more specific changes which can be seen in the seven communities. Based on feedback from the survey there are other peacebuilding activities going on in all seven communities with just over one third of those surveyed stating that they had taken part in a peacebuilding activity apart from TND. This figure was particularly high in Kpor (63%) and also in Okrika (44%) and Oporoza (42%). Despite this there was limited evidence of any other substantial peacebuilding activity on the ground in these communities and this factor did not emerge during the FGDs. This does have some implications for the evaluation as it makes attribution more difficult. However, the focus of the evaluation is on the contribution of TND and the combination of the survey and the FGDs provides solid evidence of a real contribution in key areas. Where possible the findings from the survey are compared to the situation at the time the baseline survey was carried out. Differences in gender and by age are highlighted where these are notable or where the similarity in findings are considered important. However in many cases there is no significant difference between genders or across the age groups. Some additional findings from survey are provided in Annex 11

The findings are clustered around 4 main themes

1. Attitudes towards reconciliation
2. The Amnesty process and reintegration
3. Community cohesion
4. Involvement in decision making

The results of the survey have been triangulated with the outcomes of the FGDs carried out by the evaluation team. During the FGDs, communities were asked to identify and then rank the most significant change in their community and to map changes in relationship between stakeholder groups over the last two years. These participative exercise involved over 150 people drawn from the LPCs, IRCs, and other TND activities and identified what the communities themselves considered important. (A summary of the results of the FGDs is provided in Annex 7).

The level of awareness of TND is quite high at 54% across the 7 communities with 25% actually taking part in some TND activity – mainly town hall meetings. Engagement in TND activities varies considerably across the 7 communities. The highest level of engagement is in Oporoza (50%) while the lowest was in Okrika and Ogu (10%) Although the number of people surveyed who had participated in TND is small (190) it is nevertheless substantial enough to make comparisons with the wider population surveyed in the seven communities.

4.2. Attitudes towards peacebuilding

It is clear that there is a high level of interest in peacebuilding in these communities with 88% stating that they had a role in contributing to peace. This is consistent across gender and ages with only a slightly lower figure (83%) in the over 41 age group. The main factor preventing people from taking part is a lack of awareness of peacebuilding activities (46%). There is evidence that participation in TND activities has impacted on this. Of those who had taken part in TND activities, 97% felt that they had a role in peacebuilding versus 87% in the wider population.

Table 4: Blocks to participation in peacebuilding

Question: What prevents you from taking part?

Response	%
Not aware of peace-building activity	45.7%
Not interested	15.2%
Not given the chance (No opportunity given)	28.8%
Other	2.4%
Other	7.9%

There is a high degree of confidence that the community is able to resolve conflict non-violently, with 80% of respondents feeling that their communities are better able to resolve conflict.

Table 5a: Capacity to resolve conflict (overall)

Question: Do you think people in your community are better able to resolve conflicts non-violently compared to 2 years ago?

Response	%
Yes	80.4%
No	9.6%
May be	7.7%
Don't know	2.3%

There is a good level of consistency across the 7 communities with a particularly high score in Ogu (93%). This may be attributed to the fact that the participants on the conflict transformation course in Ogu set up a mediation centre which is directly involved in conflict resolution. There is also consistency across the different age groups and between men and women. Participation in TND activities has also had an impact on this issue with 85% feeling that communities were better able to handle conflict.


Table 5b: Capacity to resolve conflict (by community)

Question: Do you think people in your community are better able to resolve conflicts non-violently compared to 2 years ago?

Community	Koko	Oporoza	Kaiama	Amassoma	Kpor	Ogu	Okrika
Yes	73.60%	84.30%	64.30%	84.20%	88.40%	93.10%	74.00%
No	18.90%	7.40%	23.50%	5.00%	2.70%	3.00%	7.70%
Maybe	6.60%	8.30%	8.20%	5.00%	6.30%	4.00%	15.40%
Dont know	0.90%	0.00%	4.10%	5.90%	2.70%	0.00%	2.90%

While Kaiama is the lowest at 64%,% it is still significant that almost two out of three people feel that the community is better able to resolve conflict nonviolently. However there is still a level of caution about reconciliation in these communities with just 54% feeling that reconciliation is possible in their community. On the positive side, only 2% feel it is not possible with 42% more doubtful. The views of male and female respondents were exactly the same on this issue. **However, the younger age groups are more positive on this issue with close to 60% of them feeling that reconciliation was possible. The impact of TND is very clear on this question with 67% of those who participated in TND feeling that reconciliation was possible while only 50% of the wider survey population felt it was possible.** TND has targeted young people with a particular focus engaging them in community activities and decision making and bridging the inter-generational gap which has marginalised young people. **There is consensus among the communities that security has improved in their areas with 80% feeling that it had improved and only 7% feeling it had got worse. The other 13% said there was no change. Those surveyed attributed this mainly to improved policing (40%) and increased community togetherness & unity (31%).** Building community cohesion and togetherness and promoting inclusion have been a core element of TND activities.

Diagram 1: Improvement in community security (in the 7 communities)



4.3. The Amnesty process and reintegration


There is now a more positive view of the Amnesty and DDR process among people in the target communities. At the time of the baseline study an average of 54% of respondents felt that “the Amnesty process had contributed to reconciliation in their community.” This ranged from 43% in Kaiama and 45% in Amassoma to a high of 63% in Oporoza. The figures at present are considerably higher in all communities with the average now at 73%. This ranges from 59% in Koko to 92% in Oporoza. There has been a noticeable improvement in all 3 states with Bayelsa showing the most significant change. At the time of the baseline, the average for the two communities (Kaiama and Amassoma) was 44%. This has now increased to 69% - an increase of 64% and indicates there have been important changes in how these communities perceive the ex-agitators and the overall Amnesty process.

Table 6: Contribution of the amnesty process to reconciliation

Question: Do you think that the amnesty process has contributed to reconciliation in your community?

Response	Percent
Yes	73.1%
No	16.5%
Don't know	10.4%

Diagram 2: Contribution of the amnesty Process to reconciliation by age



There is also a high level of willingness in the communities to work with ex-agitators with almost three quarters stating that they “would be willing to work with ex-militants/ex-freedom fighters in your workplace/community”. Furthermore three quarters of respondents feel that ex-agitators can play a positive role in the community. These figures indicate that there has been a real change in views regarding the Amnesty process and ex-agitators. The baseline report indicated that those who felt the process had contributed to reconciliation ranged from a low of 43% in Kaiama to a high of 63% Oporoza.

Table 7: The Amnesty process


Percentage of respondents who felt that the Amnesty process had contributed to reconciliation in their community - Comparison between baseline and final evaluation

	Koko	Oporoza	Kaiama	Amassoma	Kpor	Ogu	Okrika	Average ¹³
Baseline	55%	63%	43%	45%	60%	61%	–	54.5% (av. of 6 communities)
Final Evaluation	59%	92%	67%	71%	68%	80%	75%	73% (av. of 7 communities)

This indicates an overall change in sentiment towards the amnesty process with a 34% increase in those who felt it had contributed to reconciliation in their community.

Diagram 3: Those who feel the Amnesty process has contributed to reconciliation (Before and after TND)

Question: Has the amnesty process contributed to reconciliation in your community



¹³Note: The baseline survey was not carried out in Okrika. Therefore the average for the baseline survey is based on 6 communities while the average for the final evaluation survey is based on all seven communities

Communities were also asked if they felt the amnesty process should be expanded, scaled back or stopped. Again there was a very positive view with 72% feeling that it should be “expanded to ensure more ex-agitators are re-integrated” A total of 18% feel that it should be scaled back or stopped altogether. There are some important differences across the communities and even within states on this issue.

In Okrika only 35% felt that it should be expanded while almost a quarter felt it should be stopped and a further 18% felt it should be scaled back. There are marked differences within Rivers State with attitudes being much more favourable in both Kpor and Ogu. In Kpor, the figure for those who feel reintegration should be expanded is 86% and in Ogu it is 75%. The highest figure among the seven communities was in Oporoza where 98% of respondents felt that re-integration should be expanded. The survey also indicates that Koko community has considerable reservations about re-integration with close to one third feeling that it should be scaled back or stopped. Similarly almost a quarter of respondents in Koko felt that the amnesty process had not contributed to reconciliation.

These highlights the importance of local factors in the re-integration processes and the need for projects to be geared to the specific local context. In Oporoza the ex-agitators are considered to be part of the community and therefore the concept of re-integration is not as big an issue there. However there are still practical issues to be addressed. On the other hand the community in Koko is more suspicious of ex-agitators while in Okrika the situation is much more complex due to the presence of ex-agitators from different groups and recent violence between these groups.

Table 7: Views of communities on the future direction of the re-integration process

Question (Should the process of re-integrating ex-agitators be)

<i>Community</i>	Koko	Oporoza	Kaiama	Amassoma	Kpor	Ogu	Okrika
<i>Expanded to ensure more ex-militants are re-integrated</i>	56.10%	98.00%	73.00%	69.70%	86.30%	75.50%	35.40%
<i>Stay at the same level</i>	13.30%	1.00%	10.60%	8.10%	9.80%	10.20%	22.00%
<i>Be scaled back/reduced</i>	7.10%	0.00%	0.00%	5.10%	1.00%	1.00%	18.30%
<i>Be stopped altogether</i>	23.50%	1.00%	16.50%	17.20%	2.90%	13.30%	24.40%

Interestingly there are no major gender differences on issues relating to reintegration. Women expressed more reluctant reluctance to work with ex-agitators than men (66% for women and 78% for men) However, the key point is two thirds of women are willing to work with them and 74% of female respondents feel that the amnesty process has contributed to peace in their community (the equivalent figure for men is 76%). Another interesting figure to emerge is that slightly more women than men feel that the re-integration process should be expanded (73% of women and 70% of men). There is a good level of consistency across the age groups although the 18 -29 age group is a bit more positive regarding reintegration.

Participation in TND activities has had a positive impact on people views of ex-agitators

and the Amnesty process with 80% feeling that the process should be expanded (the equivalent figure in the overall survey population was 69%). This group was also more positive towards working with ex-agitators and more positive about the role of ex-agitators in community life.

These figures indicate that there has been a significant shift in attitudes towards ex-agitators in all communities. The baseline study indicated that there was a lot of resistance and even fear towards ex-agitators in most of the communities.

4.4. Involvement in decision making

Community members are motivated and positive about their possible role in the community and in decision making. The vast majority of those surveyed feel they have a role to play both in the development of their community and in maintaining peace in their community even though only one third felt they were involved at present. The level of participation in communities activities such as town hall meeting etc is also quite high at 60% (28% felt the statement “I participate regularly in community activities” was very true while 31% felt it was true. Those who had participated in TND activities were stronger on these points with 60% indicating very true for the two statements “I have a role to play in development and I have a role to play in peacebuilding. The equivalent figure for those had not engaged in TND was 37% in both cases.




The survey indicates a substantial change among these communities since the baseline data was collected. At that time around two thirds stated that they were never involved in decision making with only a small number (10 -15%) stating that they were always involved. The figures from the final survey indicate that around 60% now feel that are involved in community decision making mainly through the town hall meetings. These findings are backed up by the findings of the focus groups where engagement in decision making was identified as a significant change. Examples of this are;

Focus group discussion; Oporoza

- ◆ There is now a high level of decision making involving various groups –men women, youth (Kaiama)
- ◆ Involving all sections of the community (Koko)
- ◆ Women representation on the council of chiefs (Kpor IRC)
- ◆ Women and youth participation and involvement in community decision making process. (Kpor LPC)
- ◆ Less marginalisation of groups especially women in the decision making process (Okrika)

Community members are motivated and positive about their possible role in the community and in decision making. The vast majority of those surveyed feel they have a role to play both in the development of their community and in maintaining peace in their community. Communities also feel that there has been an improvement in relationships between the community and local Government with 55% feeling that it had improved, 24% felt it had stayed the same and 9% felt it had got worse.

Diagram 4 : Involvement in community life at end of TND project



This change is very evident when we examine the situation in the individual communities. For example the people of Kaiama felt excluded from decision making at the time of the baseline with 67% stating that they were never involved in decision making in their community. At this stage 38% of people had participated in town hall meetings. By the end of the project there had been a clear shift with 60% stating that that they now participated regularly in community activities (including town hall meeting) and 75% feel confident to engage in community activities. The figure for actual involvement in decision making is still low but has nevertheless improved with a lot less people feeling excluded. At the project end 58% felt involved in decision making although the majority (48%) felt somehow involved. There was a considerable decline in the numbers who stated that they were not involved with only 40% holding this view as opposed to 67% at the baseline.

Diagram 5 : Community participation in Kiama (at baseline)





Diagram 6: Community participation in Kiama (at end of TND)



While there is still a lot to do in terms of community participation there is sufficient evidence here to show that the TND approach has contributed to increased engagement in community activities and decision making with less people feeling excluded from these processes.

4.5. Community cohesion

A key issue relating to both community cohesion and re-integration is the levels of trust and the quality of relationships within the communities. **It is clear that there has been a significant shift in perceptions of the security forces over the last 2 years with 78% of respondents feeling that there had been a change in relationships and 94% of these expressing the view that relationships had improved.**

Table 8a: Relationships between security forces and the community

Question: Looking back over the last 2 years, do you think that relationships between security forces and the community have changed?

Response	%
Yes	78.0%
No	12.0%
Don't know	9.9%

Table 8b

Question: If yes, how did it change?

Response	%
Improved	94.1%
Got worse	3.1%
Don't know	2.8%

There are reasonably good levels of trust towards the security forces with over three quarters having some level of trust towards them (44% stating that they trust them a lot and a further 34% stating that they trust them a little).

Table 9a: Levels of trust towards security forces (overall)

Question: How do you trust the security forces protecting your community?

Response	%
A lot	44.0%
A little	34.1%
Not at all	19.3%
I don't know	2.6%

However, there are some notable differences among the communities on this issue. The figures for Okrika, Oporoza and Kaiama are quite negative with almost one third of respondents stating that they do not trust the security forces. Oporoza –at 37 % had the most negative view. This can be directly attributed to the history of conflict in this area and the attack by the JTF in 2009. There were still significant numbers in both Kaiama and Okrika who trusted the security forces a little – Okrika 46% and Kaiama 40%. In Amassoma, Kpor, and Ogu around half those surveyed trusted the security forces a lot. **The most significant statistic on this issue is in Koko where 73% stated that they trusted the security forces a lot and a further 23% trusted them a little. These figures are well above the average for the seven communities where 44% stated that they trusted the security forces a lot. While it is difficult to attribute this figure to a single intervention it is clear that the work of TND with the security forces in Koko (training and dialogue) has paid dividends and led to a significant improvement in relationships.**

Table 9b: Levels of trust towards security forces (by community)

Question: How much do you trust the security forces protecting your community?

Community	Koko	Oporoza	Kaiama	Amassoma	Kpor	Ogu	Okrika
A lot	72.60%	33.60%	29.50%	50.50%	50.00%	48.00%	22.00%
A little	22.60%	26.20%	40.00%	37.60%	31.30%	36.00%	46.00%
Not at all	3.80%	37.40%	26.30%	9.90%	17.00%	14.00%	27.00%
I don't know	0.90%	2.80%	4.20%	2.00%	1.80%	2.00%	5.00%

The majority of respondents also feel that relationships between the ex-agitators and the police has got better with 71% stating that it had improved. Ogu and Okrika have particular high scores on this issue at 85% which is somewhat at odds with the negative views towards ex-agitators in Okrika. Interestingly in Koko this figure is lower at 46% and again indicates issues around re-integration in this community. **An important point is that none of the communities feel that these relationships have got worse. The levels of trust is common between men and women with slightly more women having a lot of trust in the security forces (45% for women and 43% for men) while the same number (74%) feel that relationships have improved.**

Diagram 7: Levels of trust towards security forces




Table 10a: Relationships between the ex-agitators and police (Overall)

Question: Looking back over the last 2 years, do you think that relationships between ex-militants/ex-freedom fighters and the police has

Response	%
Improved	71.3%
Stayed the same	9.6%
Got worse	2.0%
Don't know	17.1%

Table 10b: Relationships between the ex-agitators and police (by community)

Question: Looking back over the last 2 years, do you think that relationships between ex-militants/ex-freedom fighters and the police has

	Koko	Oporoza	Kaiama	Amassoma	Kpor	Ogu	Okrika
Improved	46.20%	73.10%	62.60%	71.30%	76.40%	86.60%	84.70%
Stayed the same	21.70%	7.70%	11.00%	6.90%	10.00%	5.20%	4.10%
Got worse	2.80%	2.90%	5.50%	2.00%	0.90%	0.00%	0.00%
Don't know	29.20%	16.30%	20.90%	19.80%	12.70%	8.20%	11.20%

Findings from the survey and the FGDs indicate that there has been important shift in the seven trend setting communities. Communities used different terms to describe the concept of cohesion including togetherness and increased unity. The picture that emerges is that there have been important changes in key elements relating to cohesion (relationships, levels of trust, inclusion and involvement in decision making) and a clear view among communities that things have improved over the last two years. The feedback from those involved in the TND project (LPCs, IRC volunteers etc.) provide strong evidence that the combination of TND activities has changed how people perceive others in the community, how different groups relate to each other and how these communities perceive their own role in decision making and the development of their communities.


The type of change which the communities felt were most significant in this regard included;

- ◆ Attitudes have changed (Kaiama)
- ◆ Improved cohesion among various groups in Amassoma (Amassoma)
- ◆ Improved community behavior and changes in perception/mindsets (Kpor)
- ◆ Drastic reduction in youth restiveness and unrest (Okrika)
- ◆ Reduced leadership tussle (Okrika)
- ◆ Enhanced peace and unity between community youths and men and women (Oporoza)
- ◆ Community youths are better engaged in development projects (Kaiama)
- ◆ Attitudinal change of individuals (Amassoma)
- ◆ A lot more awareness about community issues and development (Kpor)
- ◆ Improved community behaviour and change in perception/mindset ways to resolving conflicts and peace building (Kpor).

Both the survey and the FGDs also indicate an improvement in dispute resolution and increased awareness of and involvement in the development of these communities.

There have been some changes in how people say they would respond in particular situations and what approaches they would apply between the baseline and the final evaluation survey. An analysis of three scenarios in five of the target communities (Amassoma, Koko, Oporoza, Kpor and Kaiama) indicates that there is more willingness to get support from others and a corresponding decline in those who feel helpless and state that there is no point in responding in these situations. In the case of Amassoma there is a significant change with only 8% of respondents feeling it is useless to respond when there is an oil spill as opposed to 20% at the time of the baseline survey. These are small shifts in how these communities state that they would respond in particular circumstances but do indicate an increased sense that people can take control and can get support when faced by challenges. While these figures do indicate positive changes in the target communities there are also some contradictory findings which point to a deterioration in some areas. One example relates to the how people would respond if police demanded a bribe. There has been an overall increase in the number of people who now feel it is useless to respond which is attributable to considerable increases Oporoza and Amassoma. Also in Oporoza and Amassoma up to one fifth of respondents stated that they would be afraid to act if the police demanded a bribe. This again highlights the importance of local factors in these situations and the need for more specific research to identify what is supporting and blocking these changes on the ground.

Diagram 8: Community responses: Comparison between baseline and end of project



5. Analysis of Tomorrow is a New Day

5.1. Relevance

The root causes of conflict which have driven decades of violent conflict in the Delta region were identified as being key factors at local level during the baseline study carried out by SFCG. This study identified unemployment, lack of community development, partiality in the Amnesty Process⁴, restless youth, tussles between politicians and/or local leaders, and exclusion from decision-making (especially of youth, women, and ex-militants) as significant drivers of conflict in the seven communities. TND was designed to respond to these issues, to support community level conflict resolution and the re-integration of ex-agitators in order to promote stability in the Niger Delta.

One of the weaknesses in the Amnesty and DDR process is the absence of a strategy to support and facilitate the actual reintegration of ex-agitators in the community. As a result there does not appear to have been much progress in this regard and in most cases the local communities and the ex-agitators have been left on their own to deal with the complex issues surrounding re-integration. **TND provides a model of how this process can be done and how local communities can take the lead. The gaps and weakness in the Amnesty and DDR process and the need for community level re-integration indicate that TND is highly relevant to the overall context in the Delta.**

There is a good alignment between the key issues identified by local communities and the TND project activities. The baseline survey and consultations carried out as part of the evaluation highlighted a number of critical issues on the ground particularly the lack of engagement and participation, conflict between youth and elders, suspicion and lack of trust towards ex-militants, lack of information/misinformation, and an overall lack of cohesion and togetherness. **The menu of activities provided by TND are geared to address these issues and the process of implementing them has built a level of ownership and capacity and enabled the communities to take on these challenges. Both the project objectives and the actual activities are highly relevant to the local reality in these communities and to the wider context in the Delta region.**

5.2. Effectiveness

There is considerable evidence that the project has achieved most of the main results envisaged, apart from those related to media components and the proposed community radio stations. In particular it has created coalitions and networks in the local communities which have facilitated the active engagement of previously excluded groups namely, youth, women and ex-agitators. Local communities highlighted the role of a number of elements of the TND project in this regard; the town hall meetings, the Local Project Committees, the solidarity events and the Conflict transformation training. The context in these communities (as set out in the baseline and described in the FGDs during the evaluation) was one where there were no opportunities or mechanisms for communities to interact and engage around common issues and agendas. Some aspects of the local structure were contributing to the exclusion of groups –in particular the elders and to a lesser extent the CDCs.

The Town hall meeting was noted as being hugely important as they gave a voice to these groups for the first time. The fact that they were a traditional mechanism in these communities meant that they were less threatening to the existing power structures when they were revived under TND. The response of the communities and the turn out appears to

be very good and feedback from all seven communities very positive. Those consulted noted that there was real participation, that people were heard (including those previously excluded) that real issues were addressed, that problems were solved and strategies agreed to tackle some of the challenges faced by the communities.

The connection and synergy between these and the solidarity events is also important. Several communities noted that work carried out under the solidarity events were first brought up and discussed at the Town hall meetings.



Focus group with security forces in Koko

Having this linkage is very important as it demonstrates real results and prevents the Town hall meetings being seen as a talking shop where issues are raised but nothing happens. The solidarity events are important in themselves as they demonstrate that these communities can achieve things by working together on a voluntary basis for the “public good” and also show that different sections of the community can contribute in different ways. Providing opportunities for youth to work constructively for the good of the community and to demonstrate their voluntary commitment is important both for the young people themselves and the elders who tended to exclude them from community decision making. The process of carrying out physical work where youth, women and elders work together appears to have been a motivating and an empowering process.

The processes and structures developed under TND has enabled the communities to identify and address local problems and to develop appropriate local responses, facilitated inclusion and reduced some of the barriers to re-integration. Those who are centrally involved – the LPCs and IRC volunteers have to some extent developed a shared vision for the future of their communities and how local effort can change things. Other processes which were effective in this regard were the community -security force dialogue in Koko community, and the advocacy training in all seven communities. The police –community dialogue appears to have been particularly useful for both the community and the security forces. It helped clarify the role of the different sections of the security forces in the community (police, JTF, and Civil Defense) facilitated two way communications and began to build relationships and understanding.

The underlying problems with the security forces (corruption and inefficiency combined with the fact that many of those that were trained were later transferred) are beyond the scope

of the TND project but nevertheless have reduced the effectiveness of this component of the project.

In other cases such as Amassoma where security training was provided this does not seem to have been as effective and communities did not identify any real change. The key point is that the training combined with well planned private and public dialogue between the security forces and the community can improve the relationships and pay dividends for the community as has happened in Koko. However delays in implementing these dialogues in other communities has reduced the effectiveness of the training provided and the overall effort to improve community-security force relationships. Nonetheless these have still been some significant improvements in relationships across all seven communities.

TND has been effective in engaging with ex-agitators and in developing inclusive structures which facilitate re-integration. There is clear evidence that the project has contributed to a significant change in attitude towards the Amnesty/DDR process and re-integration. At the time of the baseline study 54% of people in these communities felt that the Amnesty process had contributed to reconciliation. This figure has now increased to an average of 73% in the seven communities. There are also notable improvements in peoples willingness to work with ex-agitators and the majority of those surveyed (72%) want to see the Amnesty /DDR processes “expanded to ensure more ex-agitators are re-integrated”. These figures combined with the results from FGDs in the communities point to important changes in attitudes among community members towards re-integration and highlight the value of the TND approach which focused on inclusive grassroots processes and structures.

It is difficult to quantify both the overall numbers of ex-agitators who have participated in the TND programme (directly or indirectly via their representatives) or the numbers who have been actually “reintegrated.” There are a number of factors which make it difficult and possibly unhelpful to try to count those reintegrated. Firstly, in some communities there is a lack of clarity about the identity of ex-agitators, secondly the need for re-integration differs considerably across the seven communities and thirdly the definition of reintegration is unclear and may even vary within a community and critically between the community and the ex-agitators. Findings from the survey and the FGDs indicate that the communities are generally positive towards re-integration and feel that good progress has been made on this issue. There is clear evidence that sentiment towards ex-agitators and the amnesty process has improved considerably in the seven communities.

There are concerns that some of the communities may not have grasped the full complexity of the reconciliation process and the perspectives of the different stakeholders, victims, the ex-agitators themselves and the wider community. While important steps have been taken in these communities there is a need to continuously review progress and to ensure that there is real re-integration and not just the token engagement of a small number of representatives of the ex-agitators. This points to the need for ongoing work with these communities and the ex-agitators to explore these issues and to both widen and deepen the re-integration processes, which have begun in these communities. (This issues is addressed further in the section on learning below)

The communities are very positive about the advocacy training and a number of them indicated that the practical nature of the training has enabled them to put the learning into practice and engage constructively with decision makers. While this has had limited impact on the ground so far it is important learning for the communities to be able to advocate around issues which are important to them. There are a number of examples of

communities starting to apply the learning and to begin to advocate with local government and in one case with the ex-agitators.

A key result for TND relates to the provision of information and awareness raising to address the critical gaps in these areas. The project has used a number of mechanisms including radio programmes (Day Dawn Break, Sweet motherland) film screenings, participative theatre as well as avenues such as the training and town hall meetings. The radio programmes appear to have been very effective in raising awareness and opening up a debate on some of the key issues in the Delta region (both related to conflict and wider development challenges). The fact that these programmes were in pidgin and geared towards a wider audience (including those with limited education) has increased their effectiveness as a vehicle to reach the wider masses with important messages. The phone-in element of the programme was also popular and increased the scope for debate among the wider population.

The overall effectiveness of this strand of work has been limited by the failure to set up the community radio stations as originally proposed as well as the delay in getting the IRCs operational. The IRCs have the potential to be important sources of information to the six¹⁴ communities and into the surrounding areas and there is considerable excitement among these communities regarding these centres. It is evident that the lack of awareness and information gaps is a problem which limits development and contributes to conflict escalation in communities. Providing accessible and independent information is hugely important in these communities and the IRCs can be a flagship initiative in this regard. However these face a number of challenges which could impact on their sustainability and reduce their effectiveness. (These are examined in the section on sustainability below) The Conflict Transformation training has had a positive impact and there is evidence from the FGDs and the survey that communities feel more able to handle conflicts and highlighted occasions where this had happened. Those who participated in the Conflict Transformation training felt they could be proactive and deal with some local conflicts. The town hall meetings are also an effective mechanism as the community can explore issues before they reach the point where conflict is seen as the only solution. **A key lesson for the communities is that many of these issues can be resolved within the community. This is particularly important given the situation on the ground across the Delta region and the weaknesses of both formal and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. There have been significant improvements since the baseline study in how communities see their role in peacebuilding and their capacity to resolve conflict non violently.** At present 80% of people in the seven communities feel that their community is now better able to solve conflict non violently than it was before TND started and 88% feel they have a role in contributing to peacebuilding.

However, care needs to be taken about the capacity of a community to deal with more complex community conflicts such as conflicts related to the oil industry and political and ethnic conflicts which have damaged these communities in the past. The mediation project which has evolved in Ogu is a good example of a community taking up the initiative and doing something concrete about local conflicts by providing mediation and other services to the community. However the members appear to be inexperienced and with limited training

¹⁴The community of Ogu will not have an IRC due to budget constraints and the fact that it was not intended as a trend setting community. – Initially it was planned to have 6 communities but the project was actually implemented in 7.

and there are significant risks both for this mediation project and the overall TND project in Ogu should this go wrong. There is a need for additional training and protocols before community members engage in mediation.

In overall terms some of the targets were quite ambitious given the challenges of working in the Delta region and the relatively short time frame of 18 months for this project. In particular it was not feasible for these communities to take on issues related to community policing, the creation of concrete opportunities for ex-agitators, or to have structures in place for early warning and rapid response. The Conflict transformation training provides a good platform for further work on conflict resolution at local level including community mediation, early warning and rapid response mechanisms. However these need to be formalized and additional training provided if they are to be effective and avoid some of the risks outlined above.

The strategy of working with neighbouring communities was an innovative effort to widen the impact. This networking between the target communities and these neighbouring communities has been positive for both sides. The neighbouring communities have seen the potential of a project of this nature and the benefits of communities being inclusive and working collaboratively. The community of Ajogbodudu (neighbouring Koko) has used the learning from their links with Koko to deal with conflict between themselves and a palm oil company in their area. However the problems in these communities are deep and complex and require sustained and integrated interventions as has been demonstrated in the seven trend setting communities.

It is too ambitious to expect these communities to take on these issues on their own or to see any significant changes in attitude there. The fact that the community radio stations have not been set up and that the IRCs have not yet become operational means that the effectiveness of the work in the neighbouring communities has been reduced. In addition the time frame was very short as the “go and tell and come and see” component could only get underway when the target communities had got moving and had something to show. Overall, it is too early to see any change and probably too ambitious to expect these links to lead to change in attitude. There are risks that expectations have been raised in these communities about a follow up project and that the benefits of the links with the trend setting communities could be exaggerated by the neighbouring communities to strengthen the case for a project in the future.

TND was a highly intensive project which aimed to simultaneously implement a range of activities in the seven communities over a relatively short period of time. It required hands-on approach by SFCG programme staff and partners as well as the active involvement of the local communities particularly the LPCs. **This level of engagement has generated momentum at local level and the integrated approach has created synergy and demonstrated to the communities that real change can take place. However there are risks with the approach and some evidence that it has put a lot of pressure on the LPCs – who are the face of the project on the ground.**

Care needs to be taken to nurture local capacity and not to overburden local structures in the rush to implement a project within a very tight timeframe. There was a need for a longer lead in time especially in more complex communities such as Okrika and a need to reinforce progress at each stage and build more slowly. There is also a need for more flexibility in the timeframe particularly on the establishment of the IRCs where the end of project deadline is putting a lot of pressure on new and inexperienced community structures. **The integrated nature of the project and the level of synergy is a key strength. However, it**

also holds risks as problems in one area can have a knock on effect. SFCG and its partners need to continue to keep a careful watch on the dynamics at local level and ensure that potential problems are ironed out early on. In particular, there is a need to support the IRCs through the next critical phase of their development.

There is also scope to strengthen both internal and external co-ordination in order to improve effectiveness. Links with Amnesty Commission appears to be weak - even though the project is designed to support the process. There is limited contact or liaison apart from the Project Advisory Group (PAG) and even there this is limited. This lack of contact weakens the projects strategic co-ordination and ultimately limits its effectiveness. The Project Implementation Group (PIG) appears to be the main mechanism for structured co-ordination between the partners and SFCG. However these meetings are limited to the senior personnel in the partner organisations and therefore do not deal to any great extent with the issues and concerns of the programme staff or the day to day work of the projects in the communities. There is valuable learning taking place across the project and there would be merit in regular structured events to bring together the programme staff (SFCG and partners) to share approaches and learning, address the challenges and possibly develop more joint activities. The LPC's highlighted the value of the mutual visits at the start of the project as it provided opportunities for sharing and learning. There would be merit in having more of these shared activities between the different communities both within states and across the region. This should involve both the LPCs and the IRC volunteers.

5.3. Impact

The factors driving conflict in the Niger Delta are complex and shifting. The primary drivers are a mix of poverty and unemployment, exclusion and exploitation, political manipulation, resource disputes which are sometimes linked to ethnicity as well as corruption and criminality. The TND programme focused its efforts on the area of exclusion and marginalisation, empowering and building cohesive and peaceful communities. It is clear that the project is addressing critical issues driving the conflict and by working both directly and indirectly with ex-agitators and with the security forces the project is also seeking to bring about change among some of the key actors in the conflict.

The evaluation has identified important changes in three key building blocks of peacebuilding; attitudes, trust and relationships. There is considerable evidence (through FGDs at community level, through the community survey and through the evidence of communities coming together) that there has been significant shift in attitudes with a more positive and inclusive approach being exhibited. The lack of participation and involvement in decision making is recognised as a major challenge in the Delta region. At the time of the baseline two thirds of those surveyed stated that they were not involved in decision making. The situation at the end of the project shows a marked improvement in this regard with 60% of those surveyed now stating that they are involved in decision making. It appears that the lack of opportunity to engage with each other in a structured and meaningful way was blocking these communities. TND has created hope and opened the door for these people to engage and contribute. Small successes on the ground have been important in creating a momentum and shifting how people viewed other sections of the community. **The project has also increased the levels of trust both internally among different section of the communities, and in particular communities it has increased trust between communities and ex-agitators and between communities and the security forces.** The

increased levels of trust between the security forces and the local community in Koko is an important impact which has the potential to have a ripple effect in the area. The relationship between the security forces, and the community is problematic across Nigeria and figures from the Afrobarometer (2005) quoted in the Woodrow Wilson Centre report indicate very low levels of trust towards the police - with 72% indicating that they either did not trust the police at all or only a little and 71% believing that all or most members of the police were involved in corruption.¹⁵ The levels of trust towards the military are higher. At the time of the baseline nearly half those surveyed in the seven communities did not trust the security forces. There has been a notable improvement on this issue with 78% of those surveyed now indicating that they trusted the security forces to some extent (44% trust them a lot and 34% trust them a little) and only 19% state that they do not trust them. There is a clear view among the communities that these relationships have improved – 78% stated that relationships had changed and 94% of these felt that it had improved over the last two years. These figures indicate a considerable improvement from the situation when the baseline survey was conducted. The data from the evaluation survey is not directly comparable with the Afrobarometer data above as the Afrobarometer figures relates to the police rather than the overall security forces. However there are strong indications that the improvement in relationships and the levels of trust in the seven trend setting communities is well above the national average for Nigeria.

A key aspect of the project has been building bridges and relationships within and between communities. There are clear indications that relationships have been built and strengthened and bridges built along several of the fractured lines in society in the Niger Delta. In particular, the evaluation has identified improvements in the following relationships; between elders and youth, between communities and security forces, and between communities and ex-agitators. The survey and the FGDs indicate significant changes in the levels of trust within the communities and an overall improvement in cohesion, unity and togetherness. One of the key findings from the survey is that all communities feel better able to resolve conflict peacefully with 80% feeling that this had improved over the last two years. Another important indicator of impact is the extent to which communities appear able and willing to initiate their own peacebuilding interventions. The communities are certainly motivated to do more and to work for peace and members of the LPCs and the IRC volunteers appear committed to doing more to promote peace and cohesion at local level. There are a few examples of where communities have implemented additional activities. The Mediation centre in Ogu is a good example of this although there are some issues relating to this project. Participants on the conflict transformation training have been active in transferring on their learning and attempting to resolve local disputes. There are also some examples of people applying the learning from the advocacy training and starting to do their own advocacy work.

TND has addressed several of the driving factors in conflict in the Niger Delta, exclusion, marginalization, the lack of information, and the low level of capacity to deal with grievances and handle conflict. The combination of activities implemented in the communities and the synergy between them has had a positive impact on these underlying factors and has clearly contributed to the creation of more cohesive, peaceful and stable communities. The project has also engaged two of the key actors in the conflict;

¹⁵Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta; A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change (Paul Francis Deirdre Lapin & Paula Rossiasco (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 2011) (P 51)

ex-agitators and security forces and has also worked with another important constituency the youth. There is evidence that the project has brought about change among the ex-agitators who have engaged either directly or indirectly and to a lesser extent among the security forces.

Key question regarding impact is the scale of these changes, whether they are sustainable and whether they can lead to more substantial engagement between these groups. It is clear that TND has positively impacted on attitudes, trust and relationships at local level in the seven communities. **However the communities are isolated and these pockets of change are not at present substantial enough to impact at a wider state or regional level or to bring about change in overall relationships along the main fractures in Delta society (between communities and ex-agitators, between the communities and security forces and between security forces and ex-agitators)** They do provide models of good practice and beacons of hope in a region where there are limited examples of either of these.

The overall impact on the key actors is confined to local pockets around the communities – five communities where there are significant number of ex-agitators and one community where there has been more substantial work with security forces. There does not appear to be mechanisms in place to connect this change into the next level where it could begin to impact on overall development and potentially on wider conflict dynamics and “peace writ large”. The fractured nature of the ex-agitators and the lack of clarity about structures and leadership make it difficult to impact at a wider level on this constituency. The wider political context is likely to dominate the attitudes and behavior of the ex-militants. Likewise it is difficult to gain traction with the security forces given the number of sections involved, the continuous transfer of personnel and the overall culture within the services.

A further limitation on impact is the lack of involvement by government (federal, state or local) in the project. This is a much wider challenge as both state and local government is



weak and in some cases local government is effectively nonexistent in these communities. The advocacy training has enabled communities to begin to make contact with their local authorities and to constructively engage with them. However weaknesses in local government mean that the project has had no real impact in this area. The project has had limited engagement with state and federal agencies and this element of the project needs to be strengthened considerably.

Oporoza community

One of the side effects of the project has been an improvement in relationships between the two ethnic groups -the Ijaw and Itsekiri – who have been involved in a number of violent

conflicts over the last decade. The mutual visits between the participating communities and the fact that communities spent a few days with each other appears to have brought about a change in attitudes – even if this is relatively modest given the scale of this ethnic conflict.

5.4. Sustainability

There is considerable evidence that the TND project has built local capacity and increasing indications that local people are using this to deal with local issues with increased levels of hope and motivation are evident in these communities. . The structures and processes created (town hall meetings, LPCs, dialogue and training) have all contributed to more cohesive and capable communities with increased resilience to conflict risk. At this stage this resilience would relate to internal rather than external conflicts. Given the nature and complexity of conflict in the Delta it would be unrealistic to expect these communities to be able to respond to the wider conflict dynamic although increasing number of people in the communities are more likely to resist provocation and to avoid conflict.

The key theme which emerges across the communities is that this project has opened their eyes and made them aware that they can take ownership and use their indigenous capacity and resources to achieve things themselves. This awakening and the fact that there is a good level of local ownership does point to a strong likelihood that some of the benefits will be sustainable. The project has also demonstrated the value of cooperation and of bringing in those who had been traditionally excluded. Each of the communities has carried out some infrastructure works (water, lighting, roads, bus stops etc.) and six of the communities will have new flagship IRCs. Ogu has set up a smaller mediation project which provides some community and business services. The communities have seen the benefit of coming together and this new awareness and approach should be sustained in the short to medium term.

However there are a number of concerns regarding sustainability both in terms of the overall effects of the project and a number of specific elements of it.

TND has focused heavily on the seven communities and made progress at this level.

However it has not engaged very actively with other key stakeholders in the Delta region and has failed to create strong linkages with these stakeholders particularly Federal and State Governments and the Amnesty Commission. While this presents challenges it must be a priority for any further work in the region. The participating communities have actively engaged with SFCH and welcomed the small scale projects which were developed as part of TND. However there is a need for more substantial economic development initiatives in these communities and for both the communities and the ex-agitators to see a real “peace dividend” **TND has not created the necessary linkages with Nigerian Development Agencies, other international actors or the oil companies to create more effective synergies on the ground. The context in the Niger Delta and the unique set of factors which have caused such underdevelopment and driven much of the conflict requires a multi sectoral approach and the combined resources of these major stakeholders (the Nigerian authorities, international donors including the EU and the oil companies) SFCG has unique expertise in peacebuilding and now needs to connect its work on the ground with wider socio-economic initiatives in order to embed the progress on the ground and to develop a model of work which can address the huge problems in the Delta.**

The weaknesses of the state and local government are recognised as an underlying causes of dissatisfaction and a key driver of conflict in the Delta region. There is a high level of distrust and suspicion among local communities towards these institutions. TND has done valuable

work around advocacy but more needs to be done to build awareness among these institutions of what has been done through TND and efforts made to develop strategic relationships between the communities and local government. The training and dialogue work with security forces provides a good model for work with other government agencies.

The IRCs have been late starting and the volunteers will only get access to the equipment in the closing few weeks of the project giving them little time to get hands on experience. While the committees have received training and are highly motivated there are likely to be teething problems in getting these centres operational. There are also concerns regarding the sustainability of IRCs given that the volunteers have no experience of managing a project of this scale. The centres visited were high quality, substantial new or refurbished building which will require security, maintenance and cleaning. The volunteers have examined sustainability and feel that the centres will be income generating. However, this is unlikely to happen in the short term and it is unclear how the project will sustain itself and build the business in the interim. A second related issue is the pressure that this push for sustainability creates and a risk that it will divert the project away from its core role which is providing information to the community. There are other issues related to the centres – the risk that the project becomes overly focused on the centre rather than the service and the need to get out to the many people (those with little or no education) who need information but will not go into a centre of this nature. In the case of Koko the location will also act as a barrier to the use of the centre by all sections of the community which will impact on both its effectiveness and sustainability.

The LPCs are a key component of the TND project, representing the face of the project at local level and are critical to the sustainability of the initiative including the IRCs. The LPCs have shown a lot of commitment and in the majority of cases appear to have worked well – given the challenges which inevitably face a new community structure drawn from all sections of the community. There is however a level of dissatisfaction among the LPCs with the relationship with the project (partners and SFCG) some of this is related to the lack of resources for the LPCs and the fact that this was not built into the budget . Some LPC members also feel that they are excluded from decisions made by partners and SFCG. The fact that the partners and programme officers are in general not based in the communities and are mainly in Port Harcourt may be a contributing factor in this regard.

6. Learning and Good Practice

6.1. Learning

The evaluation has identified a number of important learning points relating to work around reintegration and community cohesion in the Niger Delta. These include;

VI.1.1. Responding to local circumstances.

The seven communities are very different in several key aspects including the size of the communities, the conflict history and legacy, the number of ex-militants in the area, and the relationship between these and the community and between the security forces and the community. These differences are particularly evident in the case of Okrika which is much bigger and more fragmented than the other communities and has experienced higher levels of militancy and violent conflict. The situation there was further complicated by the mix up over the location of the project and the resulting later start and the split in resources between Okrika and Ogu. The scale of the challenges in Okrika was highlighted in the trauma assessment carried out by SFCG which noted that;

*The community was a hotbed of militancy and cult related crisis for much of the 2000s. The area has witnessed cult, chieftaincy and militia violence of bloody dimensions. In fact, the gangs like Icelanders and Bush Boys owed their origin to the Okrika area. Even in the era of amnesty, the communities are still affected by the activities of these groups.*¹⁶

Forming one LPC and to trying to organise town hall meetings for the entire community was not appropriate given the size of the community. It is also clear that the level of division and the legacy of recent conflict points to a need for more in-depth work such as mediation and dialogue in advance of setting up the project to ensure that it is really engaging with all sections of the community and is on a secure footing to develop new structures and strategies.

Likewise there can be significant difference between communities in the same state – as in the case of Koko and Oporoza in Delta state. Despite these difference the budgets for each community was fixed and SFCG adopted a similar approach in all seven communities and as far as possible implemented the same type of activities in them all. **However these differences point to the need for a more nuanced approach which takes account of the specific local context. Applying a one size fits all approach is not most effective way of working in a complex environment of this nature.** However it is important to point out that despite this, significant progress was made in each of the seven communities. The approach adopted in the trauma healing assessment is a good example of a response which is attempting to deal with the local context and issues by actively engaging the communities in the research and design of the response. (see below).

VI.1.2. Working with the Security Forces

Attempting to bring about any change in how the Nigerian Security services interacts with local communities is a daunting task given culture and history of these services. There is a high level of mistrust and fear towards the security forces in these communities.

¹⁶It's time to heal the wounds? An assessment of traumatic experiences and needs in six 'tomorrow is a new day' project communities in Nigeria's Niger Delta: Search for Common Ground (March 2013)

The TND project delivered training to 550 members of the security forces focusing on issues such as community policing and human rights. The project intended to deliver a parallel series of dialogue workshops between the police and the communities but this had only happened in the case of Koko. As a result the training programmes are stand alone events and not integrated into the overall strategy at community level. The impact of one off training course will inevitable be limited due to the culture and norms on the Nigerian Security forces and the regular transfer of personnel. **However in the case of Koko the project has demonstrated that training combined with dialogue processes at local level can change perceptions and improve relationships on the ground.** There was clear evidence of increased understanding and improved relationships between Koko community and the security forces. The initial private dialogue sessions also appear to have been important in building relationships and confidence between the two sides and in preparing them for the potentially more difficult public discussion.

6.1.3. Reintegration of ex-agitators

There are a number of factors which make re-integration a particularly difficult process in the Delta. The fact that the militant groups were fragmented and did not have coherent goals or structured leadership systems means that it is difficult to develop co-ordinated approaches at local level. The amnesty process has caused further fragmentation among ex-agitators (some militants did not sign up while some who did have not benefited and former leaders have been accused of exploitation) The situation is further complicated by differences in relationships between ex-agitators and the communities –something which emerges strongly among the seven communities in the TND project.

There are a number of important issues emerging which need to be examined closely in order to develop effective approaches capable of dealing with these issues. Firstly, who defines re-integration and secondly what does it look like at community level. There are risks that communities take a simplistic view of re-integration and assume that it is only about changing the mindsets of the ex-agitators and/or having a number of them participate in community activities. This emerged strongly during consultations in Kaiama but was also present in other communities. The community was of the view that re-integration was effective and that improved relationships between the ex-agitators and the community was one of the main changes over the previous two years. However in Kaiama the ex-agitators did not agree and felt that things had not changed from their point of view. The fact that they were active members of the LPC does demonstrate a certain level of acceptance and engagement in the community but clearly there are dangers in making definitive statements about reintegration. **The key learning point is that re-integration is a process, not an event and that it requires sustained effort from both the community and the ex-agitators if it is to work.**

A second issue relates to the ex-agitators representatives and the extent to which they actually represent their constituency. There is evidence that the original leaders of the militants have exploited the situation and there are risks that the community representatives could become gate keepers and possibly exploit their new relationships with the communities. There appears to have been a decline in the number of ex-agitators directly involved in the projects and as a result the role of these representatives as a conduit to the wider ex-agitator groups has become more important. **Care should be taken to ensure that these representatives actually speak for the group and that there is effective communication with the wider ex-agitator constituency.**

6.1.4 Planning

The problems related to the radio licenses and the issues around the location of the project in Ogu/ Okrika point to a need for more methodical planning and for fall back plans when working in an unpredictable environment such as Nigeria. A considerable part of the project was based on the assumption that the licenses would be secured within a tight timeframe. When this did not happen there were considerable delays before a replacement strategy (the IRCs) was developed and agreed. This has limited the overall effectiveness of the TND project and the delay has put a lot of pressure on everyone to try to get the IRCs up and running before the project end. This delay has also created problems regarding the sustainability of the IRC which are discussed above. The lack of clarity about the location of the project in Rivers State has also had a negative impact on both the Ogu and Okrika projects and highlights the importance of a comprehensive consultation process involving local authorities and chiefs. It also highlights the needs to work with local partners and staff who are familiar with issues on the ground and for close co-operation between SFCG and partners at this stage in the project cycle.

6.2. Good Practice

The TND project has made significant progress in a short period and has applied some models of good practice which have the potential to be replicated in future work of this nature.

6.2.1. The Local Project Committees

Setting up the LPCs and using them as a focal point and entry point for further work has been particularly effective and has filled a major gap in local community infrastructure. By bringing in and integrating the key target groups the project promoted cohesion and demonstrated the value of more inclusive structures from the outset. It has also shown that reintegration can work and that ex-agitators have a role to play in community life.

6.2.2. Trauma healing assessment

Trauma healing presents challenges particularly in communities which have experienced multiple conflict and trauma over the last decade (from militant violence, from security force attack and as a result of ethnic violence). In addition there are challenges in trying to carry out community level trauma healing when the victims are often looking for more individual support and in many cases reparations. TND provided a structured and integrated approach to assessing trauma in the communities by working closely with the communities themselves to understand the context and the extent of trauma in each community and to identify local resources and suitable approaches to attempt to deal with this trauma. The approach was based on a comprehensive assessment in each community carried out by a three person team (a trauma healing advisor, a psychologist and a local researcher). The process was designed to be inclusive and to hear the voices of all sections of the community including victims. It was based on reconciliation and empowerment of the communities and focused on building trust within the communities. The process was also designed to build on the other TND structures such as the LPCs and town hall meetings. However this element of the project would require a lot more time and further work on the ground by teams with expertise in trauma. The short term nature the project has limited this work and there is scope for much more to be done in any future initiative. While short term processes of this nature cannot deal with the trauma which results from a decade of conflict it is an important step and critically it has engaged with the victims and attempted to develop more local

responses. However this process needs ongoing and specialised support to ensure that it actually achieves this and deal in a meaningful way with trauma in the communities.

6.2.3. Capacity building

TND has invested considerable effort and resources to build capacity at two levels and to create a solid foundation for further work in the Delta. It has provided training to over 2,000 people in the local communities in four main areas; conflict transformation (1090 participants) advocacy training (360 participants) IRC training (120 participants) and security force training (550 participants) In addition, the project has provided a number of intensive training and TOT programmes which have created a pool of skilled peacebuilding practitioners in the Delta region and at national level. This included; participatory theatre training (42 participants), healthy stations (12 participants) journalism training (17 participants) and video based workshop facilitation (16 participants)

This two pronged approach has ensured that the TND project had the necessary reach and the resources to work simultaneously in seven communities across three states. A good example of this is the training proved to the six IRC committees. This comprehensive three month programme included training in management, journalism and marketing and has created a solid foundation for the IRCs – a key component in the overall strategy of the TND project with the potential to contribute to more long term and sustainable peacebuilding in the Delta.



7. Conclusions

The TND project was designed to build inclusive and integrated communities where the voice of all sections of the community could be heard. Through this bottom up approach the project worked to create a context where there would be increased likelihood that ex-agitators would feel accepted and engage in community life, that disaffected youth would feel more involved and less likely to join any criminal or future militant activities and that women would have a more active role in community life and decision making. The focus on the inclusion of marginalised groups, on community empowerment and on building capacity to address key issues in the community sought to address the long-standing deficits which have blighted the Delta region and contributed to the culture of violence and conflict and ultimately to the growth of militancy.

The TND project is based on SFCGs analysis of the context in the Niger Delta in the post Amnesty period and a recognition that there is an urgent need for sustained and locally owned peacebuilding interventions which provide a more holistic response to both re-integration and the many conflict related problems affecting communities. It recognizes the complex drivers of conflict in the region, the need to mobilize communities to take ownership of this process and the need to support reintegration of the thousands of ex-agitators (both those who signed up under the Amnesty process and those who did not) One of the weaknesses of the Amnesty process is that it was a top-down process with no local ownership and as a result it lacked credibility –a crucial factor in sustainable peace. **The TND project has helped build legitimacy for the amnesty process and contributed to sustainable peace by supporting communities to take ownership of key issues and challenges in their communities - conflict, marginalization and exclusion, and issues related to re-integration.**

The absence of a comprehensive strategy for re-integration, combined with growing dissatisfaction among ex-agitators as well as an ongoing problem of disaffected youth indicates that TND is highly relevant to the context in the Niger Delta. **The overall aim of the project as well as the specific interventions in the target communities are very appropriate and timely and aligned with real needs on the ground.** A real integration process requires a holistic approach, with real change among the ex-agitators and critically it requires change in the host community and a more inclusive approach. The TND approach of creating more inclusive communities and in parallel facilitating the integration of ex-agitators provides a very effective and appropriate model of good practice.

The TND project has addressed a number of the driving factors of conflict in the Delta such as exclusion and marginalization, loss of hope, a lack of information and low level of capacity to deal with grievances and to handle conflict in a non-violent manner. It has demonstrated that local communities are willing to take up these challenges and to try to build more inclusive and peaceful communities. It indicates that there is a good level of motivation on the ground and a commitment among these communities to deal with difficult issues by engaging in new processes, setting up new structures and genuinely trying to create more inclusive communities.

The combination of activities implemented in the communities and the synergy between them has had a positive impact on these underlying factors and has clearly contributed to the creation of more cohesive, peaceful and stable communities. **There appears to be an increased sense of empowerment and motivation within these communities. This is reflected in the increase in the level of involvement in decision making, an overall improvement in relationships within these communities, more inclusive processes and**

increased confidence about their own role in the community and the capacity of the community to deal with conflict The survey and FGD point to notable changes in several key areas between the situation at the baseline and at the end of the project including;

- ◆ The perceptions of communities regarding the Amnesty and DDR process and attitudes towards ex-agitators and their potential role in the community
- ◆ The communities level of ownership of development and peacebuilding processes and the awareness that communities can take responsibility for their own development and for resolving local conflicts/
- ◆ The increased participation in decision making in the communities particularly among those who have traditionally been excluded; women, youth and ex-agitators.
- ◆ Improved relationships and increased levels of trust both within the communities and between these communities and the security forces..

There is also evidence that those who participated directly in the TND activities are more positive on several key issues and more likely see themselves as having a role to play in both peacebuilding and development in their community. **The critical point is that the impact of the TND project is not confined to this relatively small group and the survey indicates that the project has had a ripple effect in the trend setting communities and has contributed to an overall sense of ownership and empowerment and an improvement in several key area such as inclusion, cohesion, stability and peace.** However it has not yet been able to make a meaningful impact in neighbouring communities or on conflict dynamics in the wider Delta region.

Both the projects themselves and the process of implementing them (setting up inclusive LPCs, providing large-scale training, and implementing solidarity events have all combined to create momentum and synergy. These points to the value of an integrated approach which offers a package of activities and have sufficient scale to work on different issues simultaneously. However there are some risks with this approach as absorptive capacity is low and there is a danger of overburdening new community structures.

The TND project opted to provide an integrated programme in these communities and did not specifically gear services or support to the ex-agitators. This approach has a lot of merit as it treats the ex-agitators as members of the community and starts the integration process from the ground up. However consideration needs to be given to the difficult issues which block reintegration in these communities and how to deal with the challenges from the perspective of the communities – particularly the victims - and from the perspective of the ex-agitators. **The approach used so far has been firmly rooted in the local communities and one of the key strengths of the project is the level of community ownership. Through the work on the ground TND has built bridges to the ex-agitators, established its credibility with them and there appears to be good relationships in place. TND should use these two elements as a platform to do more specific work with ex-agitators and to reach out to those who are not engaged at present and who are unable or unwilling to reintegrate.**

There appear to be a lack of clarity about ex-militants in these communities and what the issues are on the ground. There would be merit in consulting them in more depth to assess the situation and to identify issues and threats to security. There is growing evidence that ex-agitators who are being excluded are becoming frustrated. TND is providing a link for

them and in some cases appears to be their only source of support and information. SFCG should explore how it can use these to firstly clarify the situation relating to ex-agitators in the relevant communities and then to see how any new project can respond to these issues more effectively.

The survey has found that there are other peacebuilding activities in these communities. However the concentrated nature of TND and the level of activity in these communities would point to it being a significant driver of these changes and to conclude that overall the project has made a valuable contribution to building stability and sustainable peace in these communities. **What is also important is that it has demonstrated that there is real potential to bring about change in the Delta by working in an integrated fashion at grassroots level.** Numerous research projects have identified the problems of the Niger Delta and the difficulties of changing a culture of exclusion and hopelessness where violence is seen by many people as the only effective response. **TND has restored a sense of hope in these seven communities and provided neighbouring communities with an example of what can be achieved through local effort and collaboration. It has started to build social capital and to facilitate communities to work for the public good.**

Overall the new structures developed under TND have been effective in building local ownership, in promoting inclusive dialogue and in supporting local re-integrations. The LPCs are project based at the moment and focused on the TND project. Efforts should be made to reinforce and support the LPCs and to work out a strategy to maintain these structures and to widen their remit to take on more peacebuilding and development project. They are ideally placed, have credibility and experience and reasonable capacity to take on a wider development role in these communities. The IRCs have the potential to become vital resources in these communities and models for further work in the region and it is important that these are supported over the medium term.

TND also provides valuable lessons for the overall re-integration process and demonstrates how local communities can contribute to this if given the right support and encouragement. It also demonstrates that re-integration requires two interlinked approaches – working with communities and with the ex-agitators and highlights the need for a more comprehensive community based approach to re-integration in the Delta region. The TND project has made good progress and has contributed to important changes in the seven communities. **Getting this project up and running in a tight timeframe, engaging local communities and establishing new structures and processes in a complex and challenging environment has been a significant achievement. The project has built a solid platform in these communities and all stakeholders (local communities, TND partners and SFCG staff) have learned valuable lessons about implementing peacebuilding and community cohesion programmes in the Delta region.** The problems in the Niger Delta are deep-rooted and complex and efforts to address these challenges require a sustained multi-sectoral approach and integrated programmes which work at different levels (grassroots and civil society, local and state government as well as Federal levels)

TND has made a valuable contribution to the Amnesty process and overall stability in the Delta region in two key areas. Firstly, it has helped stabilise the seven target communities by initiating and supporting locally owned processes which have led to changes in attitudes, increased trust and community cohesion and which have facilitated inclusion

and re-integration of ex-agitators at local level. Secondly, the project has developed a bottom-up and context-specific model which demonstrates that local communities can contribute to these processes if they are empowered and given the right support. It has shown that communities are willing to take ownership and provide leadership in peacebuilding and re-integration processes. TND is, however, a relatively short-term project which was implemented in a small number of communities. In order for the benefits to be sustained and built on there is a need for more long term approaches. The work in the seven trend setting communities and with ex-agitators in these areas needs to be reinforced and deepened so that the important gains made over the last 18 months are not lost. The project has shown the value of community-led processes and this approach should be replicated in other communities where there are identified problems around community cohesion and re-integration. Linked to this is the need for more strategic approaches which create increased linkages with decision makers in the Delta region and with the core groups of ex-agitators.

While there has been good progress on the ground there are a number of issue which have limited the overall impact of the project and which need to be given more prominence in any future initiatives in the Delta region. **To a large extent the project has worked in isolation from the wider political and development context and needs to build closer relationships and strategic alliances with key actors in these areas in order to create wider and more sustainable impacts. The lack of engagement with local and state governments is also a weakness and much more needs to be done to raise awareness across this sector, build capacity of local government and develop more partnerships between the communities and the relevant local and state agencies. It is essential that the capacity, the approaches and the structures which have been developed under TND is built on and connected into the wider political and economic context in the Delta. The context in the Niger Delta and the unique set of factors which have caused such underdevelopment and driven much of the conflict requires a multi sectoral approach and the combined resources of these major stakeholders and SFCG now needs to connect its work on the ground with wider socio-economic initiatives in order to embed the progress on the ground and to develop a model of work which can address the complex and deep rooted problems in the Niger Delta.**

8. Recommendations

The following recommendations are hereby made:

1. It is recommended that the TND project be extended and be scaled up to incorporate existing trend setting communities and a number of additional priority communities (either neighbouring communities or new communities) in the three states of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta. Priority communities should be ones where there is an identified high level of ex-agitators with limited support for re-integration and/or problems related to reintegration.
2. It is recommended that TND retain its strong focus on community led re-integration and that it applies an integrated multi-sectoral approach to its work while being careful not to overburden community structures or rush implementation.
3. It is recommended that any future TND project should develop more focused strategies which targets ex-agitators. These should include strategies to widen and deepen the process in order to reach out to more ex-agitators including those not engaging in the Amnesty process.
4. It is recommended that there should be increased emphasis on strategic co-ordination with key actors in the Delta region especially the Amnesty Commission. This should include a strategy to disseminate the results and lessons from TND to key decision makers in the amnesty process and at local and Federal government level.
5. It is recommended that SFCG develops more strategic partnerships with other development actors including Federal and state government agencies, international donors and the oil companies in order to create more synergy on the ground and to generate a “peace dividend” in the communities where it operates.
6. Consideration should be given to building on the relationship with ex-agitators to develop an advocacy group(s) to facilitate communication and relationship building and to work with different stakeholders in the Delta region (other ex-agitators, local communities, security forces, disaffected youth and at a strategic level with decision makers).
7. It is recommended that more context specific interventions be developed for target communities which are based on an in-depth analysis of local conflict dynamics and other factors. Issues such as conflict history and legacy, the number of ex-agitators and their relationship with the community as well as the scale of the community and other socio-economic factors need to inform the specifics of the interventions.
8. It is recommended that there be scope for a pre-development phase in communities where there have been recent conflict or particular complex issues. This would allow time for more in-depth community dialogue and for these communities to have more say in the project design.

9. It is recommended that Donors be flexible in this regard and provide scope for agencies to respond to the specific context in which they are operating and have the scope to apply the most appropriate responses in that particular context.
10. It is recommended that SFCG builds on the strong foundation laid in phase in one of TND to develop structured early warning and rapid response initiatives in the seven communities.
11. It is also recommended that protocols and systems be developed to ensure that project participants and community structures are engaging in conflict resolution in a structured and coordinated manner and that there is clarity about responsibilities and associated risks.
12. It is recommended that priority be given to providing ongoing support to the IRCs to enable these projects to get up and running and to overcome the inevitable teething problems which will occur. This should cover the critical gap between the end of TND and any future phase 2 project.
13. It is recommended that SFCG puts in place a strategy to provide ongoing mentoring and support to the IRCs in particular in the lead up to the elections in 2015 where it is vital that the IRCs maintain their independence.
14. It is recommended that there should be a concluding celebration event or events for all the LPCs. This would be an opportunity for reflection, sharing, learning and celebrating the work of TND.
15. It is recommended that the role and function of the PIG be expanded to enable it to deal with programme issues and that regular events be organised where there are opportunities for SFCG programme staff and partners have opportunities to reflect, to learn from each other and to co-ordinate activities.
16. It is also recommended that there be increased emphasis on networking among the participating communities both within the three states and across the Delta region.

ANNEX 1: LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

Chom Bagu	Country Director SFCG Nigeria
Chika Emeh	Project Manager SFCG Nigeria
Lena Slachmuisjlder	Vice President, Programs SFCG Washington
Mike Jobbins	Senior Programme Manager, SFCG Africa
Unyime Johnson	Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager SFCG Nigeria
Shaya Gregory Poku	Deputy Project Manager, SFCG Nigeria
Patience Dassah	Finance and Administration Manager SFCG Nigeria
Vanessa Corlazzoli	Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Manager SFCG Washington
Alexandra Noll	Programme manager - Instrument for Stability; European Union Delegation to the Federal Republic of Nigeria
Elizabeth Nwibie	Programme Officer SFCG Nigeria
Juliet Nwachukwu	Programme Officer SFCG Nigeria
Diana Bokolo	Programme Officer SFCG Nigeria
Eucharior Uranta Okonkwo	Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development
Michael Gbarabe	Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development
David Vareba	Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development
Ifeoma Olisakwe	NIPRODEV
Ihekaibe Chinyere	NIPRODEV
Paulinus	Stakeholder Democracy Network
Rosemary	Stakeholder Democracy Network
	Journalist with FM Warri
Charles Bassey	IMESO
Tony Ile	Bayelsa State
Dieyne Pepple	River State Sustainable Development Agency
Mark Anikpo	Centre for Ethnic and Conflict Studies Portharcourt
Judith Asuni	AA Peaceworks
Joel Bisina	Amnesty Commission
Dan Alebech	Amnesty Commission
Kevin O Brien	Shareholder Alliance for corporate Accountability
Christy Atako	MD, Niger Delta Development Commission

ANNEX 2: LIST OF FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

1. Koko Local Project Committee
2. Security Forces in Koko District
3. Koko IRC volunteers and other TND participants
4. Oporoza Local Project Committee
5. Oporoza IRC volunteers and other TND participants
6. Kiama Local Project Committee
7. Kiama IRC volunteers and other TND participants
8. Amassoma Local Project Committee
9. Amassoma IRC volunteers and other TND participants
10. Kpor Local Project Committee
11. Kpor IRC volunteers and other TND participants
12. Ogu Local Project Committee
13. Okrika Local Project Committee
14. Ajogbodudu (Neighbouring community)
15. Tomorrow is a New day partners
16. Community Surveyors

ANNEX 3: EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

TERMS OF REFERENCE External Evaluation Consultant(s) – Nigeria

[Jobs](#)

Port Harcourt-Nigeria

Summary

Search for Common Ground- Nigeria is seeking an experienced consultant(s) to carry out the project evaluation for “Tomorrow is A New Day”. The program is funded by the European Union. This term of reference (TOR) defines the work that must be carried out by the external consultant(s). It provides a brief outline of the project, specifies the scope of the evaluation, and outlines key deliverables. The evaluation will take place in **May- June of 2013**.

Background Information

- ◆ 1.1 Organizational Background
- ◆ Search for Common Ground (SFCG) is an international non-profit organisation that seeks to help conflicting parties to understand their differences and act on their commonalities. SFCG’s mission is to transform how individuals, organisations, and governments deal with conflict – away from adversarial approaches toward cooperative solutions. Headquartered in Brussels, Belgium and Washington DC, USA, with field offices in 28 countries, we design and implement multifaceted programmes that aim to resolve conflict and prevent violence. In December 2011, SFCG received a grant from the European Union’s Instrument for Stability to implement: *Tomorrow is a New Day*. The *Tomorrow is a New Day* project contributes to the Nigerian National Amnesty Process by focusing on reconciliation and reintegration of ex-militants at the community level. The **overall objective** of Tomorrow is a New Day project is to support the long-term stability and results of the Amnesty Process and DDR in the Niger Delta. SFCG and partner organizations aim to do this through the following two specific objectives: (1) Support community conflict resolution and reconciliation in 7 ‘trend-setting’ areas^[1]; (2) Leverage changes in these ‘trend setting’ communities to influence conflict dynamics across the Delta region;
- ◆ Expected results include:
- ◆ Targeted communities have a collective, inclusive vision of reintegration, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence for the future;
- ◆ Coalitions within communities bringing in women, youth, community leaders, ex-militants together for problem-solving, community policing, and trauma healing are developed;
- ◆ Communities have strengthened capacity for conflict prevention, early warning and rapid response;
- ◆ Barriers to reintegration and community healing, including lack of information or misinformation, bad attitudes and mind set, and pessimism, are reduced across the region covered by radio broadcast;
- ◆ Non-target communities are inspired to implement community reintegration, reconciliation, and conflict prevention activities and

mechanisms in their own locations.

The primary **project activities** include the creation of local project committees, conflict transformation training, advocacy training, journalism training for community information resource centers personnel, collaborative small-scale development events, town-hall meetings, training of security sector forces, trauma healing events, and airing re-integration themed radio drama. The key beneficiaries groups for this project are: ex-militants/ex-combatants, community residents, community leaders and influential actors, and local police and security forces. The SFCG *approach to evaluations* is grounded in the guiding principles of our work: participatory; culturally sensitive; committed to building capacity; affirming and positive while honest and productively critical and valuing knowledge and approaches from within the context. SFCG- Nigeria will expect that this approach be applied to the “*Tomorrow is a New Day*” final evaluation, and that the evaluation to be carried it out in consultation and in participation with key relevant stakeholders including, implementing partners, and where appropriate community groups or key civil society individuals

Summary of Position

The External Evaluation consultant or a team of consultants will independently measure the program’s results. Consultant(s) will lead the project final evaluation using mixed-methods research design, combining quantitative and qualitative information and will be expected to document why various approaches were effective and others less effective. The evaluator consultant(s) will be responsible for designing the final Evaluation methodology, carry out the evaluation; and produce the final evaluation documents (including an Academic Paper). The evaluation will help ascertain whether the community stabilization approach should be replicated in other states of the Niger Delta or the need for scale-up activities in the project’s communities. The evaluation is also needed to drawing key lessons learned to contribute to organizational learning. The main users of the final evaluation include SFCG, implementing partners and the European Union Delegation (EUD) in Nigeria. Secondary audiences are community beneficiaries, other organizations with similar interventions in the Niger Delta – UNDP, Presidential Amnesty Committee, Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), and the peacebuilding community at large.

[1]“Trend setting communities” are geographic communities that exert a strong influence on conflict dynamics in the surrounding area, holding the possibility of violence or peace “spilling over” to neighbouring areas.

Overall Evaluation Goal:

The intended study is an end-of-program evaluation to identify reinforced social cohesion with target communities, and documents evidence suggesting beginning of a spillover effect’ in surrounding communities.

Specific Evaluation Objectives:

- i)** To assess the achievements of planned outputs and results.
- ii)** To assess the change in community feelings towards safety and acceptance between baseline and final evaluation and to provide rationale for project scale up.
- iii)** Consolidate forward-looking recommendations and review the validity of the Theory of Change to inform future project designs.
- iv)** Provide advice for SFCG’s strategic reflection and learning on its

work supporting peace-building Evaluative Criteria The evaluation should consider and respond to the following questions. These questions address themes based on the standard international criteria to guide all evaluations of development assistance developed by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) on development.

Effectiveness

1. **a.** What results were achieved by the collaborative problem solving events?
2. **b.** What results were achieved by the conflict resolution training activities?
3. **c.** Did advocacy training achieve its stated outputs and outcomes?
4. **d.** To what extent was reconciliation achieved between communities and security sector forces?
5. **e.** What percentage of evaluation respondents who are aware of action activities via media programming?
6. **f.** Which project activities were effective and which ones were less effective?

Impact An analysis of the short- and long-term effects of the project, including positive, negative, intended, and unintended effects. These effects can be measured at different levels and should follow the "results chain" (inputsà outputsà outcomesà results (impacts)).

1. **a.** Has the project succeeded in achieving its results?
2. **b.** Are there unintended consequences or unexpected gains from the project?

Potential Sustainability

1. Are there linkages between project activities and community recovery?
2. **b.** To what extent do the project activities support recovery and long-term peace in the communities?
3. **c.** To what extent will the project infrastructural interventions be managed without donor input?
4. **d.** To what extent will the peace writ-large support new developments in project communities

Scope of the Evaluation

Time period and project components The final evaluation is due for the last two months of the project (May/June 2013). The evaluation should focus on Tomorrow is a New Day Project activities under objectives 1 & 2 mentioned above. The study is limited to Amassoma and Kaiama communities in Bayelsa State; Koko and Oporoza community in Delta State; and Kpor, Ogu and Okrika community in Rivers State. Neighboring communities involved in exchange visits are also part of the evaluation.

Available Data

On hiring the external evaluator, project documents including baseline data, baseline report, M&E plan, monitoring data, donor reports, mid-term evaluation, and newsletters will be made available to consultant(s) for review of relevant available knowledge regarding the program and its impacts. Additional References or Resources can also be found on the project website:

<http://tomorrowis anewday.org/>

Main methods or Techniques to be used

The evaluation technique should involve a mixed-methods research design, combining quantitative and qualitative information and will be expected to document why various approaches were effective and others less effective. The intention is to provide information to on-going peace-building work in the Delta. The methodology might consist of semi-structured interviews with a broad cross-section of the communities and project participants, conducted by the evaluator, aided by surveyors. If necessary the evaluator may be assisted by the project DME Manager to code and score these interviews to also enable quantitative, and qualitative analysis. The methodology will be reviewed by the SFCG DM&E Manager DC who will provide feedback before field work commences. She will also provide feedback to the final evaluation document.

Schedule

The consultant will prepare an evaluation schedule to operationalize and direct the evaluation. The schedule will describe how the evaluation will be carried out, bringing refinements, specificity and elaboration to the terms of reference. It will be approved by the project director and the Country Director and act as the agreement between parties for how the evaluation will be conducted.

Tentative Timeframe

Activity	Estimated Due Date
Evaluation Planning	March 2013
Evaluation Launch	March 2013
Review of project documents	April 2013
Submission of detailed Evaluation Plan & Methodology (Inception Report)	April 15 th , 2013
Refresher Training for Evaluation team for Final Evaluation	May, 2013
Data collection	May, 2013
Data entry and collation	May 2013
Presentation of initial findings	June 1 st 2013
Submission of draft final evaluation report	June 18 th 2013
SFCG/Partner Circulation of draft report for feedback to External Evaluator	June 20 th 2013
Submission of Final Evaluation Report	June 26 th 2013

Logistical Support

SFCG will provide preparatory and logistical assistance to the evaluator(s), which include:

1. Background materials (project proposal, meeting notes, reports, et cetera)
2. Meeting, phone, email communication
3. Quantitative and qualitative documentation of project activities (surveys, attendance lists, activity forms, training evaluations, media scorecards etc.)
4. Assistance in identifying potential interviewees
5. Technical assistance from project DME Manager and Institutional

Learning Team DME Manager

6. Field visit logistics (travel logistics, accommodation arrangements)
7. Meeting arrangements with local project committees, stakeholders and beneficiarie

Governance and Accountability

SFCG's DME Manager, Washington will represent the organization during the evaluation. The evaluation manager is responsible for:

- ◆ Guidance throughout all phases of execution
- ◆ Co-facilitating with the Project DME Manager, the participation of other stakeholders (Implementing Partners, LPCs and beneficiaries in validating results)
- ◆ Coordination of the organization's internal and partners' review process.

Evaluation Consultant(s) Key Deliverables

- ◆ A Final Desk Review Report
- ◆ An Inception Report (April 15th, 2013)
- ◆ Data Collection Methodology
- ◆ Meeting to review of Preliminary findings in the Field.
- ◆ First Draft of Evaluation Report
- ◆ Second Draft of Evaluation Report
- ◆ Final Draft of Evaluation Report (June 26th 2013)

ANNEX 4: TOMORROW IS A NEW DAY EVALUATION MATRIX

Criteria & description	Key Evaluation question	Supplementary	How judgement will be formed
<p>Effectiveness The extent to which the project has met its intended objectives, or is likely to do so. To what degree the envisaged results have been achieved.</p>	<p>Has the tomorrow is a New Day project intervention achieved its purpose, or can it reasonably be expected to do so on the basis of the outputs and outcomes? To what extent has it supported long term stability and the amnesty & DDR process in the Niger Delta? How has it addressed the barriers to reintegration? What results were achieved by different programme elements (collaborative problem solving events, conflict resolution training, advocacy training, media work, infrastructure developments To what extent was reconciliation achieved within communities and between communities and security sector forces. Has it resulted in new and more inclusive networks and coalitions?</p>	<p>Is the theory of change based on valid assumptions? What major factors contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of objectives? Has the intervention achieved different results for women and men and boys and girls? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the methods and approaches used by SFCG to implement the programme How effective are the local structures and mechanisms in dealing with conflict (conflict prevention, early warning and rapid response) and in fostering inclusive dialogue and decision making Has the programme engaged the right/key people (i.e. people with a significant impact on the conflict) Has the programme responded to changes in the wider context in the Delta region?</p>	<p>An assessment of the extent to which the programme has contributed to the Amnesty process and DDR in the Delta and how it has contributed to community healing, community conflict resolution and increased stability in the region. The extent to which it has supported local structures and mechanisms, built local capacity and empowered local communities to undertake their own conflict resolution activities and sustain peace in the Della region Assessment will be based on the perspectives of different groups of stakeholders and as far as possible an assessment of how the situation in target communities has changed over the last year (either positively or negatively) the</p>

			factors that contributed to this change and the contribution of SFCG to this change
<p>Impact The wider effects of the intervention - positive or negative, intentional or unintentional. The effects of the intervention on the key driving factors and actors of the conflict,</p>	<p>How has the situation changed in the Delta region and what, if any, has been the contribution of the Tomorrow is a New Day project to those changes? How has the programme contributed to the amnesty and DDR processes and influenced conflict dynamics in the Delta region To what extent has it contributed to a positive collective and inclusive vision among communities? To what extent have local communities been empowered and able to undertake/support community healing and conflict resolution Has the programme impacted significantly on key conflict or peace factors? What key drivers of conflict and were affected and how? Is there evidence of a multiplier effect within the 7 “trend setting communities” and beyond these in neighbouring</p>	<p>Has the intervention impacted policy? What changes can be ascertained in attitudes, behaviours, relationships or practices Did the programme contribute to the strengthening of local structures and mechanisms and building local capacities? Has this facilitated inclusive dialogue and the inclusion of marginalised groups/communities? Where and how have these contributed to conflict resolution Where and how has the programme built and strengthened relationships among key actors /groups Are there unintended consequences or unexpected gains from this project?</p>	<p>Evidence that the work of SFCG has led to real changes at different levels – among programme participants at the level of local communities and civil society Within local structures and systems including security and policing, radio stations at political and policy level in wider society Evidence that the programme has created new opportunities for marginalised people to engage in conflict resolution, that there is local ownership and buy in. Evidence that the programme has strengthened local structures and mechanisms and that these are being used and contributing to conflict resolution Evidence that the activities and</p>

	communities.		outcomes of the programme are directly related to issues that are central to peacebuilding in the Delta region
<p>Sustainability</p> <p>The extent to which the work and benefits are likely to continue/be sustained after the end of assistance. Sustainability includes the probability of continued long-term benefits and resilience to risk over time. It also includes “ownership” of the peacebuilding processes.</p>	<p>To what extent do the project activities support long term peace building and reconciliation in the communities?</p> <p>Is there evidence that local communities (incl. marginalised groups, young people, & women) are empowered, have ownership and opportunities to actively engage in further conflict resolution work</p> <p>Has the project established a platform for further conflict resolution work? How has the programme strengthened local capacity and assisted local peacebuilding mechanisms.</p> <p>To what extent will the project infrastructural interventions be managed without donor input</p> <p>To what extent will the peace-writ large support new developments in project communities?</p>	<p>To what extent has the building of ownership and participation included both men and women?</p> <p>Does the intervention contribute to the momentum for peace by encouraging participants and communities to develop their own initiatives?</p> <p>Has a meaningful “hand-over” or exit strategy been developed with local partners or actors to enable them to build or continue their own peacebuilding initiatives?</p> <p>Has the programme contributed to reform of local structures or political institutions or mechanisms that deal meaningfully with grievances or injustices?</p> <p>What elements are most likely to be sustainable and what factors contribute to their sustainability.</p>	<p>An assessment of the likely long term benefits of the programme in the target communities (while recognising that this was a relatively short intervention)</p> <p>An assessment of how the programme has strengthened local structures and mechanisms and built local capacity and the extent to which these will be able to maintain the work.</p> <p>Evidence that communities have undertaken or plan to undertake further conflict resolution activities. Evidence that communities feel empowered, have greater capacity and increased confidence and feel an increased sense of ownership around conflict resolution.</p>



Search for
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ANNEX 5: SURVEY TOOL

TOMORROW IS A NEW DAY: EVALUATION SURVEY TOOL

PART 1: PRE-SURVEY DATA: The surveyor should fill this out before the survey begins.

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding
1.1	Surveyors name	
1.2	Community	
1.3	Local Government Area (LGA)	
1.4	State	
1.5	Date of survey	
1.6	Start Time	End Time

PART 2: INFORMED CONSENT

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding
2.1.	Hello. My name is _____ and I am helping Search for Common Ground (SFCG), an international peace building NGO. We are conducting a survey to gather data on the views of the people on issues related to participation in community affairs, community security, conflict resolution. We have randomly selected you to take part in the survey. Participation in the survey is voluntary and you are free to decline to answer any or all questions. The results will be kept confidential and anonymous. It will take about 20-30 minutes to complete. Will you participate in this survey?	(1) Yes____ (2) No____
2.2.	Signature of Surveyor:	Signature of Note Taker

PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SURVEY PARTICIPANT

	Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
3.1	Age	(1) 12 -17 __ (2) 18 – 29 (3) 30 – 40 (4) 41+	Tick 1
3.2	Gender	(1) Male _____ (2) Female _____	
3.3	Education	(1) Never Attended School____ (2) Primary School____ (3) Secondary School ____ (4) Technical/Vocational Training____ (5) Tertiary/University____	Tick the highest level completed
3.4	Occupation	(2) Employed: (Public Servant, Private Sector Employee, NGO or Local Worker)____ (4) Unemployed____ (3) Self employed (Trader, Farmer/Fisher folk ,hunter etc) ____ (5) Security Services (Police, etc____ (6) Other	Tick the one that most applies

PART 4: TOMORROW IS A NEW DAY PROJECT AS A PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITY

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
4.1	Have you heard about Tomorrow is a New Day (TND) Project?	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know	Tick 1 only.
4.2	Have you taken part in a TND Project?	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know	Tick 1 only If no skip to 4.4
4.3	If yes, what activity?	1. Town Hall Meetings _____ 2. Day Don Break and Sweet Motherland Radio Dramas ____ 3. Trauma Healing Activities _____ (4) Video Screenings _____ 5 Solidarity Events _____ (6) Advocacy Trainings _____ 6 Conflict Training _____ (8) Participatory Theatre _____ 9 Come & See Visit and Go & Tell Visit _____ 10 Information Resource Trainings _____	Tick all that apply
4.4	Have you taken part in any other reconciliation/peacebuilding activities in the last 2 years (apart from TND)	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know _____	Tick 1 If no skip to 4.6
4.5	What encouraged /helped you to take part in peacebuilding ?		Open question -write answer
4.6	If no, do you think you have a role in contributing to peace	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know _____	Pick 1
4.7	What prevents you from taking part ?	(1) Not aware of peace-building activity _____ (2) Not interested _____ (3) Not given the chance (No opportunity given) (4) Other _____	Pick main 1 If other describe it

PART 5: ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECURITY AND STABILITY

Change in your community in relation to security over the last 2 years (positive or negative)

Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
5.1 Looking at security in your community over the last 2 years do you think the situation has	(1) Improved ___(3) Stayed the same ___ (4) Got worse ____	If it improved skip to 5.3.
5.2 If you feel it has got worse what do you attribute this to	(1) Not enough security ___ (2) Lack of community togetherness/unity _____ (3) Disaffected youth _____ (4) Other _____	Tick 1 If others describe it
5.3 If you feel it has improved, what do you attribute this to	(1) Improved policing _____ (2) Work of NGOs and CBOs, etc ____ (4) Acceptance of ex-militants/ex-freedom fighters____ (5) Increased community togetherness & unity____ (6) Media messages _____ (7) Other _____	Tick 1 If others describe it
5.4 Do you think people in your community are better able to resolve conflicts non- violently compared to 2 years ago ?	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) Maybe _____ (4) I don't know _____	Tick 1 only.
5.5 How would you describe your community's opinions/views towards safety and security ?	(1) Positive____ (2) Negative _____ (3) I don't Know _____	Tick 1 only

PART 6: ATTITUDES REGARDING RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
6.1	Is there a need for reconciliation between groups in your community?	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know	Tick 1 only.
6.2	Do you think that reconciliation in your community is possible?	(1) Yes ___ (2) Possibly _____ (3) No ___ (4) I don't Know ___	Tick 1 only.
6.3	Has the view of your community on reconciliation changed over the last 2 years ?	(1) Yes_____ (2) No_____ (3) I don't know _____	Tick 1 only If no skip to 6.5
6.4	If yes, how has it changed ?	(2) Improved _____ (2) Got worse _____ Don't know	Tick 1 only
6.5	What needs to happen in order to build peace in your community ?		Open question - write answer

PART: 7 ATTITUDES TOWARDS SAFETY AND SECURITY

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
7.1	How do you trust the security forces protecting your community?	(1) A lot _____ (2) A little _____ (3) Not at all _____ (4) I don't know _____	Tick 1
7.2	Looking back over the last 2 years, do you think that relationships between security forces and the community have changed?	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know	Tick 1 If no skip to 7.4
7.3	If yes, how did it change?	(1) Improved _____ (2) Got worse _____ (3) Don't know _____	Tick 1
7.4	What contributed (either positively or negatively) to this change in your community?		Open question – write answer

PART 8: THE AMNESTY AND DDR PROCESS

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
8.1	Do you think that the amnesty process has contributed to reconciliation in your community?	(1) Yes ____ (2) No _____ (1) I don't know _____	Tick 1 only
8.2	Looking back over the last 2 years, do you think that relationships between ex-militants/ex-freedom fighters and the police has	(1) Improved ____ (2) Stayed the same ____ (3) Got worse _____(4) Don't know _____	Tick 1 only
8.3	Do you think that ex-agitators can play a positive role in the community?	(1) Yes ____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know _____	Tick 1 only
8.4	Would you be willing to work with ex- militants/ex-freedom fighters in your workplace /community?	Yes _____ No _____ Don't know _____	Tick 1 only
8.5	Should the process of re-integrating ex-agitators in communities be.....	(1) Expanded to ensure more ex-militants are re-integrated _____ (2) Stay at the same level _____ (3) Be scaled back/ reduced _____ (4) Be stopped altogether _____	Tick 1 only
8.6	Please, give reason for your answer above		Open question –write answer

PART 9: PARTICIPATION AND ENGAGEMENT IN DECISION MAKING

No.	Category/question	Answer and coding	Instructions
9.1	Do you think the relationship between Local government and your community has	(1) Improved ___ (2) Stayed the same ___ (3) Got worse ___ (4) Don't know _____	Tick 1
9.2	Should your community be more active and involved in decision- making ?	(1) Yes _____ (2) No _____ (3) I don't know _____	Tick 1
9.3	What things prevent communities from playing a role in decision-making ?	(1) A lack of awareness and knowledge ___ (2) A lack of confidence ___ ____ (3) No opportunity to take part ___ (4) People feel excluded ___ (2) (5) Not interested _____ (6) Other _____	Tick 1

PART 10: YOUR OWN ENGAGEMENT IN THE COMMUNITY

No.		(1) Very True	(2) True	(3) Somehow	(4) Not true	(5) Not true at all	(6) I don't know
10.1	I have a role to play in the development of my community						
10.2	I have a role to play in maintaining peace in my community						
10.3	I participate regularly in community activities such as town hall meetings, projects, programs etc.						
10.4	I feel confident to participate in my community's activities for development						
10.5	I am involved in decision-making in my community						
10.6	I know how to complain about my community problems						

11. SOCIAL COHESION AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

Surveyor: "I'm going to ask you about how you would respond in a variety of hypothetical situations. Please choose the response that is closest to how you might actually react."

Category/question		Answer and coding						Instructions
	How would you act if	I would be afraid to act	I would act on my own	I would get support of someone who is well placed to respond	I would try to mobilise my community to respond	Its useless to respond	Other	
11.1	Your neighbours house was attacked							Tick 1
11.2	The security forces demanded a bribe							Tick 1
11.3	The community was beating a suspected thief in public							Tick 1
11.4	There was an oil spill							Tick 1
11.5	There was threat of floods in the area							Tick 1

Surveyor's Comments

Signature of Supervisor _____ Date _____

ANNEX 6 : PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVEMENT OF TARGETS

Objective	Targets	Progress towards targets
Support community conflict resolution and reconciliation in 7 'trend-setting' areas	10% improvement in community feelings of safety and acceptance between baseline and final evaluation	The survey indicates a substantial improvement in all 7 communities
Leverage changes in 7 'trend setting' communities to influence conflict dynamics across the Delta region	60% of participants in go-and-see or come-and-tell visits who cite visits' roles in changing attitudes or stereotypes 60% of evaluation respondents who are aware of action activities via media programming, radio, and information recourse centre's (IRCs)	Evidence that these activities have had a positive impact in some communities but difficult to assess actual change in attitudes. There is a good level of awareness of TND in communities (54 % reported that they were aware of TND. IRCs not operational so awareness probably raised through other avenues. Town hall meetings cited as the activity which most people had participated in.
Facilitate access to information and dialogue inclusive of marginalised and alternative voices in the Delta	50% of community members interviewed in Final Evaluation citing the information resource centre's as their most significant source of information 75% of community members interviewed from marginalised groups affirming that IRCs "reflects views of people like me" (disaggregated by gender, age and social group)	IRCs not operational. Despite this the FGDs indicate that there has been an improvement in access to information - the training, solidarity events and Town hall meetings are possible sources
Barriers to reintegration and community healing, including bad attitudes and mind set, lack of information or misinformation, and lack of concrete opportunities, are reduced in the targeted communities	50% of ex-militant respondents who feel accepted in their community 85% of people interviewed who cite activities emerging from this project as positive contributors to their sense of security and acceptance	Different and even contradictory views were expressed by ex-agitators on reintegration. A full assessment of the views of ex-militants was beyond the scope of this evaluation. The survey indicates a major change in communities perceptions around security
Targeted communities have a collective, inclusive vision of reintegration, reconciliation, and peaceful coexistence for the future.	At least 72 public forums or other communication and consultation activities held by the Project Committees 85% of evaluation respondents who report being "satisfied" with the direction and results of the action	Evidence of more cohesive and inclusive communities from the survey and FGDs. Overall communities feel that there has been a significant improvement in these areas.
Communities have strengthened capacity for conflict prevention, early warning and rapid response	At least 80 interventions undertaken by Local Project Committees or their members leading to resolution or referral	Communities report that there has been increased local conflict resolution by both LPCs and participants from the Conflict transformation training programme. However not possible to quantify numbers or outcomes.
Coalitions within communities bringing women, youth, community leaders, ex-militants together for problem-solving, community policing, and trauma healing are developed	Diversity of stakeholders participating in different action activities, disaggregated by age, gender, and war-time status	The project has been very effective in this regard. LPCs, town hall meetings and advocacy groups all contributing to more inclusive structures at local level with women, youth and ex-agitators participating
5 Models of successful community reintegration of ex-militants are established	30% of ex-militants interviewed who are successfully reintegrated in target communities 75% of community members who express attitudes favourable to the reinsertion of ex-militants At least 5 out of the 7 communities engaged through exchange visits cite approaches that they view as valuable to use in their own	There are challenges in quantifying number of ex-agitators and in defining re-integration. Clear evidence that communities are more favourable towards ex-agitators and re-integration. Communities see value in approaches used in "trend setting communities" but difficult for them to implement without support.

	context from what they have seen and heard.	
Barriers to reintegration and community healing, including lack of information or misinformation, bad attitudes and mind set, and pessimism, are reduced across the region covered by radio broadcast.	<p>20% of ex-militant respondents from non-target communities who feel accepted in their community</p> <p>50% of community-members interviewed from non-target communities who cite attitudes favourable to the reintegration of target communities</p> <p>10% of community members interviewed from non-targeted community who cite IRCs programming emerging from this project as positive contributors to their sense of security and acceptance</p>	<p>In-depth research in non target communities was beyond the scope of the evaluation.</p> <p>The IRCs were not operational at the time of the evaluation so not possible to assess.</p>
Non-target communities are inspired to implement community reintegration, reconciliation, and conflict prevention activities and mechanisms in their own locations	non-target community respondents who can cite initiatives undertaken within their own community that emerged from what they learned via the radio, participatory theatre, video screening or site visits	Evidence from one neighbouring community of positive initiatives as a result of “come and see/go and tell” visits.
New channels of information and dialogue, namely Information and Resource Centres, participatory theatre and video dialogues are established in the Delta Region	<p>6 new community-run information centres’s registered by the CAC and producing and broadcasting information through new channels at the end of the action.</p> <p>60 social communicators (including youth/women/ex-militants journalists, theatre actors, video facilitators) actively engage in producing and broadcasting information</p>	<p>IRCs ready to operate and groups in 6 communities ready to disseminate information.</p> <p>Delays have meant that the IRC have not yet had an impact in either target or neighbouring communities.</p> <p>Low participation by ex-agitators in this area.</p>
Marginalised groups, and most specifically youth and women, have access to a platform for airing their concerns, ideas, and grievances for consideration by their peers and decision-makers.	At least 40% of voices featured in a sample of media programmes (including theatre, video discussions, and locally produced radio programs) are diverse. disaggregated by age, gender, war-time status, and livelihood	Not applicable yet. But evidence that the committees are aware of the issues and prepared to engage with diverse voices in the community.

ANNEX 7 : SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN THE 7 TREND SETTING COMMUNITIES

Top 3 changes as identified and prioritised by the communities themselves. In Kiama and Kpor this exercise was done by 2 groups (the LPC and a mixed groups of other TND participants) while in the other 5 communities it was a combined activity involving members of the LPC and others

Community	Top 3 changes ((based on community ranking exercises in FGDs)
Kiama IRC	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. There is now high level of decision making involving various groups - men, women and youths2. Community youths are better engaged in development projects3. More opportunities for external development initiatives
Kiama LPC	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Attitudes have changed2. Improved relationship between ex-militants and the community3. Physical change (water lighting IRC building)
Oporoza community (combined)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Rehabilitation of the community water project by NNPC2. Improved access to toilet facility3. Improved conflict resolution /
Koko community (combined)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Physical improvements /solidarity events2. Involving all sections of the community3. Improved relationships between security forces and community/ Helping those affected by trauma
Ammasoma (combined)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Attitudinal change of individuals2. Improve cohesion amongst various groups in Amassoma3. A little community development
Kpor IRC	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Peace and unity in the community2. Women representation in the Council of Chiefs3. A lot more awareness about community issues and development
Kpor LPC	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Improved community behaviour and change in perception/mindset ways to resolving conflicts and peace building /2. Improved peace and unity in Kpor3. Chieftaincy tussle resolved
Ogu LPC	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The community has been able to settle conflicts through dialogue and out of court. Settled dispute amicably without outside interference2. Some youths have acquired skills and some of them are gainfully employed3. Poor environmental culture
Okrika	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Drastic reduction in youth restiveness and unrest2. Reduced leadership tussle3. Reduced clashes between secret cult groups

ANNEX 8: Bibliography

Securing Development and Peace in the Niger Delta; A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change (Paul Francis Deirdre Lapin & Paula Rossiasco (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 2011)

Elites, Oil and Violence mitigation in the Niger Delta; Institute of Development Studies; (Policy brief No. 35 May 2013)

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
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Tomorrow is a New Day Baseline Report : SFCH, Developed in 2012 Last revised April 2013


Tomorrow is a New Day Monthly Reports

Tomorrow is a New Day Project evaluations

Annex 9: Sample of data from participative exercises in FGDs
Relationships in Kpor community



Relationships in Amassoma community



Significant change : Amassoma community

2013 - TND

What are the changes?

- ① It has brought about conflict resolution.
 - ② Learningness to Oporoga Community
 - ③ It has brought about conflict resolution in the Community.
 - ④ Peace to the Community
 - ⑤ It make other communities to know about the TND Programmes
 - ⑥ It makes available Pull Shield
 - ⑦ It has enhance peace btwn the youths, women and men
 - ⑧ It has enhance proper management of waste in the Community
 - ⑨ It brings development in the Community.
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- ⑩ It has helped us in channelling the abandoned water project by NNPC
 - ⑪ little little Intergration of ex-Agitators
 - ⑫ It has helped us in toilets problems.

Annex 10: Profile of the evaluation team

Sean Mc Gearty (Team Leader) has worked for over 20 years on peacebuilding programme with experience in Northern Ireland, Afghanistan, Haiti and Liberia. He has extensive experience of evaluating peacebuilding interventions and has worked on evaluations for a number of major peacebuilding agencies including the UNDP, Search for Common Ground, the Humanitarian Dialogue Centre, the International Centre for Transitional Justice and the Special EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland. Sean is an experienced peace building practitioner having worked in different capacities in a number of complex conflict environments. Over the last three years he has worked with the Glenree Centre for Peace and Reconciliation on a peacebuilding programme in Afghanistan and has been involved on ongoing basis in peacebuilding work in Northern Ireland. He has expertise in conflict analysis and research, mediation and the facilitation of dialogue processes and training and capacity building. Sean is the Director of Consensus Research (www.consensusresearch.ie) which specialises in the design and evaluation of peacebuilding programmes and has worked on several major evaluations with Channel Research.

ABIDDE, Bekebi Benjamin holds a Masters Degree in Agriculture and various professional qualifications in sustainable development and programme design and management. He has over 27 years working experience in the Niger Delta and beyond with particular interest in agricultural and rural extension; sustainable community development, project management, training, capacity building, advocacy, conflict mitigation, natural resources management and environment education.

He has expertise in the use of participatory methods, tools and techniques as well as in conducting socio-economic baseline studies for development programme planning, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation. He currently provides technical advice and services to various clients drawn from government, local communities, the organised private sector, civil society, local and international donor agencies in areas of peace building, training, community profiling, programme planning and implementation; participatory M&E.

Abidde Benjamin is currently serving as the lead consultant to the World Bank assisted Fadama 3 Project IN Bayelsa State providing training and technical advice local farmers and fishermen as well micro and small enterprise owners. He had one time co-facilitated the final evaluation of the World Bank assisted LEEMP Programme in nine (9) core benefiting states of Nigeria.

Annex 11: What has changed?

S/N	Main Areas and Themes	Baseline	Final Evaluation
1	Community Survey	A total of 1,822 people surveyed in 6 of the 7 communities. Number of surveys was 1,739; number of FGDs was 31 and 27 KIIs. Set target quotas of 35% men, 30% women, and 35% youth.	A total of 764 people responded to the survey in the 7 communities. 15 FGDs held in the 7 communities with approximately 150 people consulted. Set target quotas of 60% men and 40% women.
	Sex and Age	49% of respondents were male and 51% were female. 40% of participants were youth (ages 12-29) and 60% were adults (ages 30+).	52.7% of respondents are male and 47.3% are female. 45.8% of participants are youth (ages 12-29) and 54.2% are adults (ages 30+).
	Education	50% of people surveyed had finished secondary education, 16% finished primary education, and 22% went to university or technical/vocational training. 10% had never attended school.	49.1% of people surveyed had finished secondary education, 20.2% finished primary education, and 16.7% went to university or technical/vocational training. 10.2% had never attended school.
	Professions/Occupation	41% of participants as self-employed; 23% were unemployed; 13% were students or apprentices; and 20% were employed.	38.6% of participants as self-employed; 33.4% are unemployed; 17.8% are employed; 1.9% are of security services; 8.2% are engaged in other occupation.
	Level of trust towards security forces	<p>40% of Kaiama residents reported that they did not trust the security agencies protecting their community.</p> <p>48% of respondents in Amassoma did not trust the security agencies protecting their community.</p> <p>66% of Kpor community members feel the least safe when dealing with issues related to police or security forces.</p> <p>40% of community members stated that police and JTF were somewhat trusted.</p> <p>27% of Ogu respondents did not trust the security forces at all; 4% reporting they were unsure if they trusted them.</p> <p>37% of Oporoza community members stated that they do not very well trust the police and</p>	<p>78% of respondents think that relationships between security forces and the community have changed; 12% thinks otherwise; 9.9% don't know.</p> <p>44% of respondents stating that they trust the security forces a lot; 34.1% stating that they trust them a little; 19.3% do not trust them at all.</p> <p>37 % of Oporoza respondents do not trust the security forces had the most negative view.</p> <p>Okrika 46% of Okrika and 40% of Kaiama respondents trusted the security forces a little.</p> <p>73% of Koko respondents trusted the security forces a lot; 23% trusted them a little.</p>

3	<p>The Amnesty process and reintegration</p>	<p>security forces.</p> <p>An average of 54% of respondents felt that “the Amnesty process had contributed to reconciliation in their communities.” This ranged from 43% in Kaiama and 45% in Amassoma to as high as 63% in Oporoza as indicated below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 43% of survey respondents were convinced that the Amnesty Process has contributed to reconciliation in Kaiama Community; 19% saying it had not, 27% saying somehow, and 12% responding “I don’t know.” ▪ 73% of survey respondents were optimistic about reconciliation in Amassoma and only 6% saying they felt it was not possible. ▪ 60% of Kpor citizens surveyed stated that they felt that the Amnesty Process had in fact ‘dealt with’ the problem of militancy. ▪ 98% of survey respondents in Koko Community were optimistic about the possibility of reconciliation in their community. ▪ 55% of survey respondents were convinced that the Amnesty Process has contributed to reconciliation in their community; 8% saying no, 26% saying somehow, and 11% saying “I don’t know.” ▪ 63% of survey participants reported that, yes, they did think that the Amnesty Process contributes to reconciliation in Oporoza. <p>The average for Kaiama and Amassoma Communities was 44%. The baseline report indicated that those who felt the process had</p>	<p>The amnesty process has contributed to reconciliation in all the project communities as the figures from the final evaluation are considerably higher with the average now at 73%. This ranges from 59% in Koko to 92% in Oporoza.</p> <p>This has now increased to 69% - an increase of 64% and indicates there have been important changes in how these communities perceive the ex-agitators and the overall Amnesty process.</p> <p>73.1% think that the amnesty process has contributed to reconciliation in the communities; 16.5% thinks otherwise while 10.4% don’t know.</p>
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		<p>contributed to reconciliation ranged from a low of 43% in Kaiama to a high of 63% Oporoza.</p>	
	<p>Level of involvement in decision making and community activities</p>	<p>2/3 of respondents stated that they were never involved in decision making; 10 -15% stating that they were always involved.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 10% of survey participants are always involved in decision-making in Kaiama, and 68% reported that they never are involved. ▪ 66% of survey participants said that they were never included in decision-making in Amassoma. ▪ Despite the fact that some groups are marginalised from decision-making processes, 33% of participants surveyed felt that they had a role to play in the community. ▪ 40% of survey participants in Oporoza said they are not always involved in decision-making in their communities. On the other hand, participation in town hall meetings was very high, with 80% of respondents having attended a town hall meeting with community leaders. ▪ 30.26% of survey respondents in Koko Community said that people who participate in decision-making in Koko all the time are the elders’ council and the youth leaders. 58.9% of respondents have never participated in decision-making in Koko. ▪ 65% of survey participants in Ogu stated that they are never involved in decision making in Ogu, and only 19% stated that they are involved in decision making in 	<p>60% of respondents are now involved in community decision making. 60% of respondents participate regularly in community activities.</p> <p>60% indicated that they have a role to play in community activities.</p>

		<p>Ogu.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 59% had ever attended a town-hall meeting with community leaders.▪ 28% of Ogu respondents stated that they were involved in decision making. 11% of women surveyed felt that they were involved in decision-making.▪ 52% of women surveyed felt that they had a role to play in developing the community.	
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