

Real Time Evaluation of Tearfund's Haiti Earthquake Response

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Tearfund Haiti Earthquake Response 2010 - Executive Summary

This is a report of a Real Time Evaluation of the response by Tearfund UK (in partnership with Tearfund NL) to the Haiti Earthquake which took place on January 12 2010. As a result of the earthquake, an estimated 250,000 people were killed, 300,000 were injured, and 1.3 million people were displaced. The prime purpose of the evaluation was to learn from the second phase of the response, which started in mid-February following the initial emergency response phase, and to identify lessons both for the remainder of Phase 2 (until July 30 2010) and for Phase 3, which is envisaged as the recovery and reconstruction phase. . The methodology followed included a review of documents, individual and group meetings, site visits, and field observation of two cluster meetings.

The Earthquake resulted in enormous humanitarian needs for temporary shelter, medical help, food and water, and Tearfund was able to respond to at least some of these initial needs relatively quickly through its established partners. Given the scale of the disaster Tearfund decided at an early stage to go operational and deploy its Disaster Management Team (DMT). Since its partners were mainly in Port au Prince itself, it decided to deploy DMT in some of the worst affected rural areas (Leogane and Gressier) about 60km to the east of the capital.

Tearfund's initial decision was to support partners to make cash grants of between \$50 and \$65 (US), and this approach was appreciated by both partners and displaced people. In Leogane Gressier Tearfund undertook a high quality assessment between February 5th and 12th, and though the results of the assessment were used quite rapidly within Tearfund, it took over six weeks for the final assessment report to come out.

DMT's initial choices both in terms of sectors, and areas, were highly appropriate.

The response so far has been consistent with Tearfund's statement of values. There have been problems with the terms and conditions of national staff but this is more an issue of consistency in applying Tearfund's values rather than any major departure from the values themselves. As regards Accountability to beneficiaries, there is both plenty of awareness around this issue and plenty of informal feedback, but the planned 'Community Liaison Officers' are currently in the process of being recruited and were not yet appointed at the time of the RTE. In the partner programme, it is not quite clear whether the partners view their relief phase as a once-off exercise, or if they see themselves having a continuing relationship with the same communities and being involved in reconstruction.

As regards effectiveness, in spite of various constraints DMT has clearly achieved a huge amount in Leogane Gressier. There have been good personal relationships between the partners' and DMT programmes, but there could have been greater synergy and mutual learning between them. In spite of a promising start, the trend now is towards two separate operations. The problem is that whilst the Disaster management Director in Teddington owns the Haiti earthquake response strategy, no one person in Tearfund, either inside the country or in the UK Office, has overall management responsibility for the delivery of the integrated programme, including overall allocation of human resources and technical support.

As regards the effectiveness of partners, they responded well and reasonably promptly in the relief phase of the earthquake response. Now that this phase is past, there is an

entirely natural wish, both in some partners and possibly also in the Regional team, to get back to 'business as normal' and continue funding the kind of projects that were supported before the earthquake as soon as possible. A key finding is that there remain huge short-term needs in Port au Prince even in sectors like education in which most partners have excellent contacts and expertise. While most schools have recently opened, they are often working in very difficult conditions, under plastic sheeting in a deteriorating condition that at best is very hot and is no real protection against heavy tropical downpours.

As regards DMT's involvement, there is an admirable energy and enthusiasm to the response so far. Both Tearfund's chosen areas, sectors, and overall strategy appear highly appropriate, and no major changes are needed. A huge amount has been done in a very short time in delivering project outputs, and in relation to establishing two different office bases and recruiting local staff. However staff shortages, especially at the level of Area Co-ordinator (AC) and Project Managers have resulted in a slightly unbalanced programme, in which there has been quite rapid progress in education, and to a lesser extent in WASH, but far less progress in the other sectors of shelter and livelihoods which were highlighted in the assessment. The major constraint facing the programme at the time of the RTE was the failure to recruit and deploy both sectoral Project Managers and long term international staff for senior posts including the post of Programme Director, and Area Co-ordinator. The report emphasises the need for international staff to be French-speaking, and proposes intensive French language tuition for long term posts.

In relation to 'connectedness', in Phase 2 DMT have established good working relations with other local actors including the CASECs, but nationally DRR needs to be a stronger focus across the whole programme. This is already included in the strategy for Phase 3, but in order to implement this strategy stronger links need to be established with other key players involved in both DRR advocacy and action. Also a high priority needs to be given in Phase 3 to identifying local institutions with complementary expertise to that offered by Tearfund, especially in agricultural development and micro-finance.

As regards coverage, the education programme has so far been very successful, but inevitably it has tended to benefit whole communities, rather than individual poor families. A major focus of Phase 3 should therefore be to help more individual households restore their livelihoods and shelter after the Earthquake.

On co-ordination Tearfund has been actively participating with the relevant UN 'clusters' in Leogane and is clearly respected. At the national level the PD has been fully involved with the different NGO networks in Port au Prince, but the main focus has been on operational issues. Given that DEC agencies are likely to be facing similar problems relating to staff recruitment, co-ordination, and logistical and transport issues more contact with DEC agencies would be very helpful

As regards lessons for the future, DMT, While the initial decision by DMT not to emphasise French language skills when recruiting was understandable, there is now a conscious effort by the UN to hold more cluster meetings in French, in order to be more inclusive of government representatives and local NGOs, and it is therefore relatively more important that the majority of international staff are able to speak some French.

3.1 Broader Management Recommendations for Tearfund

In future emergency responses in HIAF countries, one person based in country should be appointed with overall strategic responsibility for the delivery of the overall programme (DMT and Regional Team)

Tearfund should merge the areas into a single management unit with an AC and base manager,, whilst retaining an office and logistical base at Ton Gato.

In relation to HR and recruitment Tearfund should:

- Ensure that all staff working in an emergency response have a good understanding of Tearfund's HR policies, especially in relation to initial contracts for all national staff: this should not be left to the discretion of individuals;
- be cautious about paying for accommodation and food for staff, and avoid verbal promises or creating expectations amongst local staff that cannot be fulfilled. In order to retain staff, longer term contracts should be offered for Phases 2 and 3.
- Keep DMT structures as simple as possible and be prepared to adapt them to different national contexts;
- In recruitment make more strategic use of its Integral partners in Canada, and the USA (e.g. World Concern, World Relief)

Since in countries like Haiti registration can be a time-consuming process, Tearfund should give greater priority to registration in all HIAF countries, and ensure that this effort is resourced.

3.2 Recommendations for Tearfund in Haiti

Tearfund should aim for a more truly 'joined-up' approach for the future phases of its earthquake response programme in Haiti, with a single overall co-ordinator based in Port au Prince

Partners, with close support from the CR and DMA, need to give greater priority to funding more 'reconstruction' or 'transitional' projects (e.g. temporary shelters, repairs to damaged schools and other facilities) that enable people to make immediate improvements to their lives. This would also be an extremely good opportunity for Tearfund to deploy its Construction and Education Advisors in support of partners. Tearfund needs to give greater priority to supporting these kinds of transitional projects both in Haiti and in similar emergency responses elsewhere.

For these kinds of transitional projects Tearfund needs to use a rapid grant approval mechanism where appropriate. The RTE recommends that for the reconstruction phase of an emergency like this, Tearfund needs to create a very short emergency proposal template for partners to use when preparing proposals above £5000 (which is the current upper limit for fast-track proposals).

There is a need for a continued exchange of information between partners and communities, so that communities are encouraged to express their needs to the

partners, and the partners are actively seeking out and passing on information about future assistance including the re-housing of people living in tents

Tearfund should undertake more joint planning with World Relief and World Concern to establish what resources they plan to mobilise for Haiti both in the next 6 months and the longer term, and what international advisors they intend to deploy. This could assist a more co-ordinated response in the next phase.

Whilst both shelter and livelihoods are included in the plans for Phase 3, the emphasis so far in Phase 2 has been on education. The priority in Phase 3 should therefore be to improve delivery in relation to these plans: the priorities for DMT are to ensure some kind of transitional shelter for the poorest families, in the Leogane Gressier area, and also to implement Livelihoods programmes for this same group in close consultation with local agencies with more experience of livelihoods in relation to Haiti.

In order to support its reconstruction objectives in Leogane Gressier Tearfund should consider entering into new partnerships with local agencies with relevant skills and experience.

3.3. Recommendations for DEC

Given the very common delays in re-housing people after a major earthquake like that in Haiti the DEC rule requiring 30% of funds to be spent in first 6 months should be adjusted to allow 30% of the funds to be spent in the first year.

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Tearfund Haiti Earthquake RTE

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Introduction

This is a Real Time Evaluation of Tearfund UK's response in partnership with Tearfund NL to the Haiti Earthquake which took place on January 12 2010. The prime purpose of the evaluation was to learn from the second phase of the response, which started in mid-February following the one-month emergency response phase, and to identify lessons both for the remainder of Phase 2 (until July 30 2010) and for Phase 3, which is envisaged as the recovery and reconstruction. As is appropriate for an RTE this report is reasonably concise, and does not intend to give equal weight to all the issues proposed in the TOR. Rather it is selective and aims to focus on the issues judged of greatest importance for Tearfund staff and partners.

1.1 Methodology

This RTE was undertaken in a period of just over 2 weeks, and began with an initial review of documents, and briefing with Tearfund UK in London. This was followed by a 12-day field visit to Haiti during which we undertook individual and small group meetings with TF staff & partners, field visits to project sites, and observation of two cluster meetings (on Early Recovery and Education) in Leogane. An 'Evidence Tool' (as proposed in the ALNAP RTE Guide) was used to help link the data collected to the major questions in the TOR. The findings were presented to Tearfund staff working in Haiti before departure, and their response to the findings is included in this report. In addition there was extensive discussion and feedback on an earlier draft of this report, and much of this feedback has been included in this final version. Alison Claxton, a Tearfund staff member, helped set up this RTE and accompanied the consultant on the visit to Haiti.

One gap in this RTE is that we did not undertake any 'benchmarking' – analysing Tearfund's performance in comparison with other INGOs, especially other DEC members. A DEC Monitoring Mission in the near future would serve this purpose and would complement well the findings of this evaluation.

1.2 Context

The Haiti earthquake was one of the worst earthquakes ever in terms of loss of life, with a devastating impact on buildings both in Port au Prince and other areas.¹ The death toll is estimated at 250,000. In addition 300,000 people were injured, 1.3 million people were

¹ Apart from the Indian Ocean Earthquake and resulting Tsunami of December 2004, the only other comparable earthquake in terms of death toll in the last 50 years was the Tangshan Earthquake in China in 1976.

displaced and 3 million people affected. The death toll would have been far greater had the earthquake occurred earlier in the day when children were still in schools, the vast majority of which were badly damaged or destroyed.

Many Government buildings including the Presidential Palace were destroyed, as was the main UN Office, and key staff in both the UN and Government agencies were killed. As the World Bank argues: “several factors make the response in Haiti especially overwhelming: the breakdown of social order and a fragile security situation, the near-complete loss of governance structures, and the failure to impose even minimum quality standards on the construction industry. Complicating matters will be the unprecedented scale of the charitable donations earmarked for emergency relief, and the arrival of many agencies new to the country, tending to prioritize unilateral action over coordination.”²

The one advantage for Tearfund in this grim scenario was that the agency has been working in Haiti for many years, and its natural partners, the Evangelical churches, play a key role in Haitian society, especially in the provision of education. The earthquake therefore offered Tearfund an unusual opportunity for an integrated response, which could combine the strengths of its partner programme, with Tearfund’s operational approach through its DMT. This report tries to assess how much Tearfund has been successful in its response in combining these two elements.

1.3 Summary of the Tearfund Response (January - May 2010)

Initially communication both within Haiti, and between Haiti and the outside world, was very difficult, and it took at least five days before telecommunications could be restored. Tearfund was able to respond to initial needs relatively quickly through five partners (World Relief Haiti, CEEH, ACLAM, FEPH/FONHEP and UEBH). In this phase the focus of assistance was to meet the immediate needs of displaced in Port au Prince and outside, including medical assistance, food, water, temporary shelter, psycho-social support, and cash grants.

However since the scale of the emergency much exceeded the capacity of partners to respond, Tearfund decided at an early stage to go operational and deploy its Disaster Management Team (DMT). Since its partners were mainly in Port au Prince itself, it also decided to deploy DMT in some of the worst affected rural areas (Leogane and Gressier) about 60km to the east of the capital.

2. Findings

This section aims to answer the major questions raised in the TOR.

2.1 Appropriateness and relevance

- *Has the assistance provided by our agency met the needs of the population?*

² *Response to the Haiti Earthquake: Evaluative Lessons* (Evaluation Group, World Bank 2010)

The needs in the first month were enormous, and it was not possible for any one agency to say if they had met these needs. Partners spoke vividly about how, within hours of the earthquake, those who had compounds found every corner occupied by frightened survivors looking for any kind of relief. Whether they liked it or not, these partners had to respond, and with its in-country presence, Tearfund was in an excellent position to support them. The decision to support survivors with cash rather than relief in kind was both consistent with current thinking in the humanitarian sector, and was especially useful given the amounts of food aid and NFIs that did, albeit too slowly, start being distributed. The amounts given in cash grants varied between \$50 and \$65 per household – a tiny amount but we saw examples of how women had been able to use these grants to purchase stocks of goods to re-start their small trading businesses.

It is difficult to comment on the initial allocations, but the size of total grants to partners varied between about £90,000 and £139,000. The highest capacity partner, ACLAM was able to access far more than this from its US parent organization World Concern and even though these sums were far greater than they had ever previously received from Tearfund, partners did not report any particular difficulty in handling these initial grants. All of these grants which were mainly used for immediate cash assistance, food, and NFIs were appropriate and were appreciated, especially since there were initial delays in accessing assistance from other sources.

With partners all based in Port au Prince the CR and DMT felt it would be most appropriate for Tearfund to work in some of the worst affected rural areas, Leogane and Gressier, and to focus on communities, rather than only the more accessible roadside camps which initially tended to attract the most relief assistance. This was an excellent decision which offered DMT the opportunity to undertake a broad-ranging relief and recovery programme in a needy rural area. Tearfund's assessment, undertaken between February 5th and 12th is of a very high standard, and was praised by the Co-ordinator of the Early Recovery cluster in Leogane. Though the results of the assessment were used quite rapidly within Tearfund, it did however take over six weeks for the final assessment report to come out as the authors were very busy with programme implementation

This assessment provided the opportunity for Tearfund's response in Leogane Gressier to be based on people's own needs and priorities. The survey found that, "the community's main concerns in rank order are shelter, food, and then schools. Children's state their main concern as food, followed by school and shelter while for both men and women the top concern is shelter ...The most frequent requests for assistance (as apposed to concerns) in rank order are schools, livelihoods, shelter, health, food, and water." At the time, many people were having to shelter relatives from Port au Prince in damaged houses or other makeshift accommodation, and the survey argued that, "a more robust transitional shelter will be required at the earliest possible opportunity." The conclusion of this section is therefore that **DMT's initial choices both in terms of sectors, and areas, were highly appropriate.**

2.1.2 Tearfund's Quality Standards and Accountability to Beneficiaries

Tearfund's quality standards are contained in an admirably brief document of one page plus a supporting field guide which partners found extremely useful. Tearfund's values are necessarily general, and as such are challenging to evaluate against, especially when assessing a response which has been running for less than 4 months. Rather than going through the full list, this report will assume that the default position in Haiti is that

the earthquake response by both partners and DMT is in full compliance with these standards, and will only comment where there appear to be problems.

On **values**, the standards state that, “We are committed to outworking our core values through our staff.” At the time of this RTE, some staff were worried that Tearfund was not living up to its values given recent changes in conditions of service (with the withdrawal of free food and accommodation in return for a cash contribution). The RTE concluded that Tearfund had not breached its core values, but that there was perhaps too wide a range of interpretations of this problem: a minority of international staff argued that, “local staff are also our beneficiaries” and said that in order to retain them, Tearfund needed to be as generous as possible. The majority view was that terms and conditions needed to be fair, but should not be greatly better than those offered by other INGOs in Haiti. An underlying problem is simply the quite rapid shift (and contrasting management styles) between the more ‘family’ atmosphere of the first month, when local staff were still coming to terms with the earthquake and they shared accommodation and food with international staff, and the more ‘professional’ and formal staff relationships required for scaled-up implementation involving a far greater number of local staff.

However this appears to be more a question of consistency in applying Tearfund’s values rather than any major departure from the values themselves: the key lesson in relation to local staff and values is simply the need for greater consistency of approach by DMT and the avoidance of verbal promises, tend to encourage unrealistic expectations among staff about their future pay and conditions. Some specific recommendations are made in the final section.

In relation to **accountability** to beneficiaries and the HAP agenda, there is a need for some realism about how much can be achieved in three months: some staff in Haiti suggested that Tearfund might at least distribute brief leaflets explaining who they are and their commitment to the HAP agenda, but this has not yet been done in the case of Haiti (though leaflets have been designed and are now awaiting distribution), though there has been plenty of informal feedback both from communities and other stakeholders.

In relation to **participation**, this is a strong feature of DMT’s Education Programme, with strong involvement by teachers, and some excellent volunteer facilitators running the children’s clubs. The supply of written **information** to beneficiaries is more limited so far: ideally perhaps when DMT undertakes a CFW programme, it should put up a notice describing the total cost, and total number of days paid for, but this would involve a cost in terms of management time and materials, and in Haiti there is every chance that the notice would be quickly stolen! The aim now is to recruit ‘Accountability’ or ‘Community Liaison’ Officers who will be able to work full time on these issues.

In the partner programme, it is not quite clear whether the partners view their relief phase as a once-off exercise, or if they see themselves having a continuing relationship with the same communities. In the latter case **there is a need for improved exchange of information**, so that communities are encouraged to express their needs to the partners, and the partners are actively seeking out and passing on information about future assistance including the re-housing of people living in tents. At present there is a sense of powerlessness and frustration amongst the homeless.

The RTE could find no evidence of any formal **feedback** mechanisms in the DMT Programme or Partner Programmes visited, but there are already plenty of informal feedback mechanisms within DMT as a result of freely available contact information (phone, SMS and community/stakeholder meetings). DMT 'Accountability' or 'Community Liaison Officers' are now being appointed. There remains a need to ensure accountability to beneficiaries, as a cross-cutting issue throughout DMT's response, especially if the staff recruited do not have any previous experience on this issue.

Advocacy remains a difficult area as since the Earthquake there are a large number of donors urging different policies on a government which even before the earthquake had a very weak capacity. The RTE coincided with the arrival of an international advocacy consultant appointed by Tearfund who should be able to provide more informed advice on this issue.

2.2 Effectiveness

• *Are the agency's interventions broadly on course to achieve their purpose?*

In this RTE we assessed Tearfund's effectiveness at 3 levels – the overall effectiveness of the total operation, and then the particular effectiveness both of the response in the first four months both of the partners and DMT itself.

The first of Tearfund Guiding Principles for its Emergency Responses is that *Emergency Response requires proactivity and collective ownership across the whole organization*. In spite of this principle, in relation to overall effectiveness the RTE found that there is scope for greater synergy and mutual learning between the partners' and DMT programmes. The Country Representative was very much involved in the initial decision to separate DMT and Partners geographically, and this made some sense in the first phase, given their very different sectors of expertise, differing modes of operation, and the major needs in Leogane/Gressier where no partners were working. In the initial phase of the response, coordination and cooperation between DMT and the Regional team was excellent and the Tearfund advisors spent a considerable amount of time with partners, but this contact has reduced more recently, as a result of both personnel gaps and a lack of requests from the Country Rep and partners

Two partners, World Relief, and ACLAM/World Concern, are INGOs with access to technical support from their parent organizations in the USA. For the other, local NGO partners the earthquake did offer an important opportunity for them to scale up their operations in order to respond to the huge needs. The question now is whether they will be able to build on the unique position held by faith-based NGOs working in Haiti, and whether Tearfund will be able to provide long term support in this capacity development. At the time of this RTE given the shortages of staff and heavy work commitments in Leogane Gressier, DMT was finding it hard to offer the local partners much technical advice, but both the Education and WASH advisors interviewed would be very happy to offer more advice if requested. The problem is more deep-seated and institutional, in that this bifurcated approach means that whilst the Disaster Management Director in Teddington owns the Haiti earthquake response strategy, no one person in Tearfund, either inside the country or in the UK Office, has management responsibility for the delivery of the integrated programme, including overall allocation of human resources and technical support.

This report would stress that there have been strong personal relationships and good co-operation between the Country Representative and the DMT Programme Director and his staff. There have also been a number of well-received training sessions, on such issues as Project Cycle Management, Tearfund's Quality Standards, Finance, DRR, and Peer Counselling, including input from sectoral advisors and DMT finance staff. However both DMT and the Country Representative have separately recruited their own Construction/Shelter Advisors – which hardly seems an optimal use of Tearfund's resources, though the RTE was told that there was enough work for both advisors.

The table below illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of both partners and DMT in phase 2 of the response:

	Partners	DMT
Strengths	Knowledge of Haiti and 'how things work' Many able to work through local churches and mobilize volunteers	Expertise from other disasters Able to mobilize experienced staff & implement quickly
Weaknesses	Operations & offices damaged by Earthquake; no previous experience of a disaster of this scale. Sectoral expertise mainly in education, not in other key areas like shelter.	Lack of French or Creole-speaking staff Little previous knowledge of Haiti Limited in-house expertise in key areas of the response (especially shelter & livelihoods) Facing major recruitment challenge (for long term posts)
Opportunities	To scale up operations & increase relevance at all stages of the response; To build capacity making full use of DMT advisors and other expertise, especially on DRR	To deliver a high quality reconstruction programme in Leogane-Gressier area; To work closely with partners
Threats	Could become overstretched? May not be able to meet the expectations of their members?	Lack of long-term senior managers; Delays in importing key supplies (e.g. vehicles.)

This table is a rough summary but it at least serves to illustrate the potential benefits of a more truly integrated one-Tearfund response. One example quoted by partners in terms of where they would have liked more support was logistics – an area where DMT has huge experience but partners faced major challenges – but one must also acknowledge that in the start up phase all Tearfund staff in Haiti were working under enormous pressure. In HR, the Country Rep has been helpful in providing general information about HR issues in Haiti, but in the initial response to the earthquake, Tearfund's Regional Team mainly employed national staff as consultants at a very high rate, which

was considerably above what DMT would normally expect to pay. One such local consultant was seconded to support DMT's assessment. Thus while there has been some co-operation at the operational level, the definite trend now is towards two separate operations. . **The RTE recommends that Tearfund should aim for a more truly 'joined-up' approach for the future phases of its earthquake response programme in Haiti, with a single overall co-ordinator probably based in the country.** (See Recommendations section below).

2.2.1 The Effectiveness of the Partners' Response

The immediate grants made to partners after the Earthquake included NFIs and cash grants, both for their own staff and others; as well as funds to enable them to repair damaged offices or to move to temporary premises. As discussed above, both partners and Tearfund responded well and reasonably promptly in the relief phase of the earthquake response. Now that this phase is past, there is an entirely natural wish, both in some partners and possibly also in the Regional team, to get back to 'business as normal' as soon as possible. Thus one partner saw the priority as 'removing the IDPs from its school compound', so it could re-open its school (though their staff also spoke about the need to give the same IDPs some assistance in their places of origin). The RTE did not feel this partner had any understanding of the needs of the displaced, or that they could access funds from Tearfund and many other agencies to help these people: their priority in accessing funds from Tearfund was to rebuild office and continue their pre-earthquake activities.

The Country Representative is well aware of this capacity gap, and has been working closely with the DMA to help the partners scale up their response. However in discussions about future priorities, some partners were requesting that Tearfund assist them with school fees. Even though this is a great need, especially for the poorest families, it is a problem that pre-dates the earthquake, and should not be a priority for Tearfund support at this stage.

But it is not entirely clear whether the Regional Team as a whole has internalized the huge opportunities and challenges of this emergency. On some issues like advocacy, with the engagement of an advocacy consultant, there is indeed progress, but our conclusion was that a conceptual gap was emerging between the immediate relief responses and the much longer term, and far more expensive, proposals that some partners were working on at the time of the RTE.

A key finding is that there remain huge short-term needs in Port au Prince even in sectors like education in which most partners have excellent contacts and expertise. While most schools have recently opened, they are often working in very difficult conditions, under plastic sheeting in a deteriorating condition that at best is very hot and is no real protection against the heavy tropical downpours that are now becoming more frequent. Certainly in one school visited in Port au Prince (*Nazon Evangelical School*) there was still a need for rubble removal, and the Principal pointed out the need for a careful demolition of the old, damaged school and the construction of some temporary classrooms. It is possible that UNICEF or another donor may have plans to help schools like this, but if so the people we met were not aware of these plans. The key point is that neither the partners themselves, nor even Tearfund's Disaster Management Advisor, were aware of the possible sources of funding for this kind of work through Tearfund accessing other donors, and they have not so far been encouraging partners to contact

the schools with which they are linked to see what immediate help can be given to help them to establish some transitional premises. **This would also be an extremely good opportunity for Tearfund to deploy its Construction and Education Advisors in support of partners.** It is possible that Tearfund in the UK may also be missing an opportunity to bring in entirely new donors interested in funding this kind of physical reconstruction work on a modest scale.

These findings point to a need for Tearfund's partners to be more aware of the very considerable resources available and be able to access this funding promptly. A fast track funding mechanism was used to arrange medical funding for partners in the first days of the response, but at the time of the RTE partners were writing more 'developmental' proposals that will take a long time to approve, and these applications were not really focussing on the more immediate needs of the displaced. **We recommend that partners, with close support from the CR and DMA, give priority to be funding more 'transitional' projects (e.g. temporary shelters, repairs to damaged schools and other facilities) that enable people to make more immediate improvements to their lives. This would also be an extremely good opportunity for Tearfund to deploy its Construction and Education Advisors in support of partners. Tearfund needs to give greater attention to these kinds of transitional projects both in Haiti and in similar emergency responses elsewhere.**

The RTE recommends that for the reconstruction phase of an emergency like this, Tearfund needs to create a very short emergency proposal template for partners to use when preparing proposals above £5000 (which is the current upper limit for fast-track proposals).

2.2.2. Effectiveness of DMT Programme in Leogane & Gressier

In the three months since the assessment in February much has been achieved by DMT. The staff are often quite self critical, but there is an admirable energy and enthusiasm to the response so far. A huge amount has been done in a very short time in relation to establishing two different office bases and recruiting local staff. 1,600 people participated in the four weeks of cash for work started by the Uplands AC in March, while 1500 farmers have received red bean or corn seed supplied by FAO, and the red beans were still being distributed at the time of this RTE. However long and short term staff shortages, especially at the level of Area Co-ordinator have resulted in a slightly unbalanced programme, in which there has been quite rapid progress in education, and to a lesser extent in WASH, but far less progress in the other sectors of shelter and livelihoods which were highlighted in the assessment.

Given the total amount of humanitarian funding available it is surprising that there are not more agencies working in education in Gressier Leogane. Some argue that the reason for this is that at the very start, when agencies did their initial damage assessments, people's major concerns related to getting temporary shelter, food, and water, rather than education. It could also be that there are fewer INGOs prepared to focus on education than, say, medical issues, or that most agencies prefer to work in the more visible and accessible areas nearer Port au Prince and the main roads. Whatever the reason, Tearfund has taken on a considerable task in education including building 6 temporary schools, undertaking teacher training, and distributing school kits (supplied by UNICEF) to over 2,000 children. At the time of the RTE the construction teams were fully engaged in constructing temporary shelters for schools, and no progress was being

made in relation to individual shelter, but this may now change given the recent arrival of DMT's Construction Advisor. **The RTE felt that the education programme was progressing well, but that Tearfund needed to get back to the more balanced programme envisaged in the approved strategy for the response combining shelter, livelihoods, WASH and education.**

At the very outset of the programme, for reasons of road access, Tearfund decided to establish two DMT 'sites', known as Lowlands (run from Leogane), and Uplands (run from Ton Gato.). However the two areas are not culturally different, and do not represent two different or culturally distinct administrative areas: in addition some 'Upland' areas are in fact only accessible from the 'Lowlands', and DMT's plans for both areas are the same. In view of the workload, the RTE does recognize the need for separate teams (e.g. for education and construction) but believes that both teams can come under the same overall management structure.

The major reason why this decision is now causing problems has been the delay in deploying senior international staff to fill the two AC positions. After discussion the RTE concluded that **Tearfund should merge the areas into a single management unit with an AC and base manager,, whilst retaining an office and logistical base at Tom Gato.**

What are the biggest obstacles to achieving the interventions' purpose?

Apart from the issue of a more 'integrated' response between the DMT and Regional Team discussed in section 2.2, the major constraint facing the programme at the time of the RTE was the failure to recruit and deploy long term international staff for senior posts including the posts of Programme Director, and Area Co-ordinator. Tearfund has been relatively successful in mobilising very able short term staff, including the outgoing Programme Director and Temporary Area Co-ordinators, but everyone accepts that while this kind of deployment is unavoidable in the relief phase, it is very much second best for Phases 2 and 3. Tearfund has given priority to longer term recruitment as part of a long term HR strategy, but has so far found it difficult to fill some key posts.

The disadvantages faced by such short term staff are relatively obvious. First, if they do not speak much French or Creole before they come, there is no time for them to learn it, and as a result they face a major communication problem in Haiti. In Phase 3, relationships with other agencies and local government representatives are likely to be more important. Also there is a strong move both in Port au Prince and Leogane to hold more Cluster meetings in French so that Haitian staff, both from Government and local NGOs, do not feel excluded.³

Secondly the frequent changes of senior staff are confusing for all those with whom they have working relationships, especially the national staff: This is of course a far broader problem throughout the humanitarian system, and most agencies face high turnover in the first 3 months after a major emergency. What DMT does need to focus more on is ensuring better handovers between staff, and ensuring more consistency on issues like HR. Many of the problems of local staff morale, and arguments about appropriate pay and conditions of service, stem from the fact that these staff have got different messages

³ In this respect Haiti is different from, for example, Darfur, where the majority of national staff speak English and cluster meetings are also held in English.

from different international staff members (not helped by the language problem.) Thirdly short-term staff have little time to build relationships with other players – for example other agencies, local Mayors, government contacts, and Cluster members, and the gaps in long term senior management have resulted in Advisors becoming managers by default to try to fill the different gaps.

• *What, if any, changes could we make to the programme to make it more effective?*

Both Tearfund's chosen areas, sectors, and overall strategy appear highly appropriate, and no major changes are needed. As argued in section 2.2 above, the DMT programme needs to be rebalanced to ensure progress is made in shelter and livelihoods, and partners need to be encouraged to support some 'Quick Impact' reconstruction projects, for instance in the schools with which they are associated.

One issue under discussion at the time of the RTE was the question of whether one project site was enough for DMT given the scale of need in, and funding for, earthquake recovery work in Haiti. This issue needs to be resolved very soon, so that plans can be made, but the conclusion of this RTE was that at least initially it would be wisest to stick with a single management unit. A feature of DMT's programme is that a lot needs to be done in a relatively small geographical area. It needs to build up a strong management unit at Leogane and expand outwards from there in terms of a more diversified programme.

The RTE's Recommendations therefore relate more to management rather than other programme areas:

International staff: Given the recruitment problems, which are likely to remain, Tearfund should aim to reduce the number of senior international appointments in Haiti. The change recommended above would save one Area Co-ordinator at this stage, but a long term Base Manager (national or international) is still recommended.

Tearfund are fully aware that international staff need to come for longer and are in the process of recruiting longer-term staff for all key posts (a number of which have now been recruited, including Finance and HR Managers). Given the importance of language skills, the RTE would suggest though that if Francophone staff cannot be found, staff with some basic French but some proven expertise for learning languages should be recruited and given a 2-week immersion course in French before deployment.

DMT needs to ensure that advisors work within a proper management structure, and have the appropriate 'distance' from day-to-day implementation (this is a criticism of Tearfund itself, and not of the individual advisors who have done an excellent job trying to fill management gaps).

As the best qualified staff for Haiti with the appropriate language skills are likely to be living in the USA, Canada, or France and not the UK or New Zealand. recruitment efforts in these other countries need to be stepped up: an MoU with World Relief Canada is already in place which includes supporting recruitment for Tearfund across Canada, discussions are underway with World Relief US to develop a similar arrangement as well as with Integral partners in European countries. However if these networks cannot produce suitable candidates it may even be worth considering sub-contracting key appointments like the PD to a professional NGO headhunter.

National staff. Even before the Earthquake, many educated Haitians were working in other countries, and local recruitment for levels of Programme Manager and above, was difficult. Now, with so many agencies trying to recruit a similar profile of staff after the earthquake, local recruitment is likely to be an even greater challenge. The assessment of this RTE is that given these rather unpromising circumstances, Tearfund has in fact done quite well, and has some strong and dedicated staff with good potential. But it may be difficult to retain the best qualified staff unless terms and conditions are improved soon.

2.3 Connectedness and sustainability

• *What types of longer-term development issues are most affected by the response and how?*

The earthquake has deepened the livelihoods crisis for the majority of people in Haiti who are desperately poor, and there are an estimated 500,000 people living under canvas with little prospect of being re-housed in the next 6 months. The key issue is that many of those who lost their homes, especially in Port au Prince, had no legal standing as tenants, and they will not probably be able to return to rebuild their homes in the same locations. Neither Tearfund partners or DMT are directly involved in these issues. However DMT hopes that by offering Cash for Work and supporting the re-opening of schools and opening new children's clubs in rural areas, in addition to the assistance to the resident population some of the people who returned to these areas at the time of the earthquake may be encouraged to stay. There is little evidence to substantiate this hope, and it will be worth trying to monitor migration patterns in the future. There are still distributions of relief items and Cash for Work in Port au Prince, so it is possible that people may want to return for fear of missing out on these benefits.

The major opportunity presented by the Earthquake would seem to be the promotion of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) through both the partners' and DMT programmes. DRR training was already being offered to partners before the Earthquake and since then it has been incorporated in DMT's teacher training programme. In Phase 3, as laid down in Tearfund's strategy, DRR needs to be a stronger focus across the whole programme, and stronger links need to be established with other key players involved in both DRR advocacy and action.

Implementing this strategy will require that all construction work and site selection take full account of different disaster risks, especially hurricanes and floods. DMT does not as yet have a strong agricultural component in its programme, but it is clear that much of the agriculture in the hilly areas, with crops grown on terraces less than a meter wide on deforested hillsides, is not sustainable. There is a strong need for Tearfund to continue to forge closer links with, and possibly even fund, other networks in Haiti which are working on these crucial DRR issues and can contribute their experience to DMT's work in Leogane/Gressier.

As regards 'connectedness' **a high priority needs to be given in Phase 3 to identifying local institutions with complementary expertise to that offered by Tearfund.** A local micro-credit and farmers' organization, APKF requested the assessment team in February for help in re-capitalising some of the small enterprises which had been damaged in the earthquake. The feasibility of this suggestion needs to

be investigated as a matter of urgency, but before committing itself Tearfund needs to learn more about micro-finance from other micro-finance institutions in Haiti, especially Fonkoze which has been supported by Opportunity International: Tearfund has already had contacts with local microcredit organizations, but these need to be built upon.⁴

2.3.1 Re-building of churches

An issue raised by partners and the Country Representative is whether or not Tearfund should consider helping partners rebuild damaged or destroyed churches. This is a difficult issue, as Tearfund might be criticized if it funded the reconstruction of churches while thousands of people were still living in tents.

Even so there could be a case for some selective assistance to church reconstruction where the buildings have multiple uses – including schooling, and a community centre as well as just a church. Such reconstruction work can have an important psychological as well as practical impact at the community level. There would also need to be a significant local contribution, and one idea might be for Tearfund to offer a fixed cash amount, which would give an incentive to partners to repair churches wherever this is a realistic possibility. Ideally this kind of work might be funded from new sources of funding, for instance from special appeals through churches in the UK, rather than from normal donations.

2.4 Coverage

- *Which group has benefited most from our assistance, how and why?*

According to partners, in the first month the most vulnerable were sometimes left out from (other NGO's and agencies') distributions of food and other items as distributions were chaotic and those at the front of the queue tended to receive the most: more than one distribution in downtown Port-au-Prince was apparently hijacked by armed gangs. ACLAM therefore identified the poorest beneficiaries very quietly in the late evening, gave them vouchers, and told them where to come to receive relief distributions very early in the morning. Partners quickly learned to rely on their church contacts for relief distributions.

As regards the cash grants made through partners, it is unlikely that many of these would have gone to better-off people as after the earthquake richer people were far better able to find alternatives to camping in very overcrowded church and school compounds, or even living on the streets. Similarly Cash for Work programmes are usually seen as 'self-targeting' in that better off people are unlikely to be attracted to relatively hard physical work for a minimum wage. However in Port au Prince the RTE talked to one young woman living in a church compound who had been excluded from another donor's Cash for Work programme on the grounds that she was pregnant.

The Needs Assessment report said that, "There is a need to ensure that the most vulnerable in society are targeted by all programme sectors; especially children, widows and those injured by the earthquake (Feb NA)." In the education programme, the Children's Clubs target children who might not otherwise get to school, but in the schools

⁴ See www.fonkoze.org

themselves there is something of a crisis relating to the payment of school fees, and because of this there is a risk that the poorest families will not in the long term be able to pay school fees.

As discussed with staff, in order to supplement the original Needs Assessment Tearfund should now collect more detailed household level information about the impact of the earthquake impact on shelter, and the numbers of people still hosting displaced friends or relatives. This same survey should also investigate the most feasible way of helping people restore their livelihoods, whether through cash grants, loans, or a combination of both. **In summary, a major focus of Phase 3 should be to undertake more household level interventions to assist families restore their livelihoods and shelter after the earthquake.**

2.5 Coordination

• To what extent has our response been coordinated with the efforts of the broader humanitarian community and the government?

DMT has been actively participating with the relevant UN ‘clusters’ in Leogane and is clearly respected. Although there should be abundant funding available, as already noted, there is still insufficient support for the restoration of education, at least in Leogane/Gressier, and so far there is no duplication by other agencies of what Tearfund is trying to achieve in education.

At the national level the Programme Director has been fully involved with the different NGO networks in Port au Prince, but the main focus has been on operational issues, especially the continuing transport crisis caused by the long delays in clearing vehicles through Customs. This issue had not been resolved at the time of the RTE and as a result Tearfund was incurring double costs – the costs of storing the vehicles in the port, and the costs of hiring vehicles to replace them.

Given that DEC agencies are likely to be facing similar problems relating to staff recruitment, co-ordination, and logistical and transport issues, there seems to be surprisingly little contact with other DEC agencies, either formal or informal. There is good relationship with Save the Children in Leogane who are also working in education, but more informal contact in Port au Prince would be very helpful not only in helping resolve some of the common problems being experienced, but also in helping Tearfund understand how well its response is going compared with that of other DEC members.

Co-ordination with government is more difficult, but the most fruitful contact appears to be through the Education Cluster in Leogane, which is especially well-facilitated by UNICEF. Thanks to this cluster, the local Ministry of Education is aware of Tearfund’s programme. In contrast there was no government representation at all in the Early Recovery Cluster led by UNDP in Leogane.

3. Key Learning & Recommendations

• What examples of innovative good practice can be seen in our response?

One interesting idea was to combine the post-earthquake assessment with some informal psycho-social counseling (by encouraging people to share their experiences of the disaster). The education programme has done well to include some short-term training of teachers as well as the provision of temporary shelters for schools.

• What general lessons can we draw from this response for our preparation for future response?

One lesson is that Tearfund should never underestimate the importance of language & communication when planning & setting up programmes. The initial decision by DMT to try to identify the best available people, and not to prioritise language, was understandable, but there is now a conscious effort by the UN to hold more cluster meetings in French, in order to be more inclusive of government representatives and local NGOs. Non-French speakers are at a disadvantage in these meetings.

Related to this is the need for greater flexibility in management structures in DMT: there is a sense of 'one size fits all' whereas a more context-specific response might be more appropriate. For instance Leogane is so close to Port au Prince that arguably more staff could be based there, and only a minimal number of staff should remain with the PD in the capital. Tearfund in the UK has already queried whether its staff in Haiti are in the most appropriate location, and it may be worth revisiting this issue in the near future.

3.1 Broader Management Recommendations for Tearfund

In future emergency responses in HIAF countries, one person based in country should be appointed with overall strategic responsibility for the delivery of the overall programme (DMT and Regional Team)

Tearfund should merge the areas into a single management unit with an AC and base manager,, whilst retaining an office and logistical base at Tom Gato.

In relation to HR and recruitment Tearfund should:

- Ensure that all staff working in an emergency response have a good understanding of Tearfund's HR policies, especially in relation to initial contracts for all national staff: this should not be left to the discretion of individuals;
- be cautious about paying for accommodation and food for staff, and avoid verbal promises or creating expectations amongst local staff that cannot be fulfilled. In order to retain staff, longer term contracts should be offered for Phases 2 and 3.
- Keep DMT structures as simple as possible and be prepared to adapt them to different national contexts;
- In recruitment make more strategic use of its Integral partners in Canada, and the USA (e.g. World Concern, World Relief)

Since in countries like Haiti registration can be a time-consuming process, Tearfund should give greater priority to registration in all HIAF countries, and ensure that this effort is resourced.

3.3 Recommendations for Tearfund in Haiti

Tearfund should aim for a more truly ‘joined-up’ approach for the future phases of its earthquake response programme in Haiti, with a single overall co-ordinator based in Port au Prince

Partners, with close support from the CR and DMA, need to give greater priority to funding more ‘reconstruction’ or ‘transitional’ projects (e.g. temporary shelters, repairs to damaged schools and other facilities) that enable people to make immediate improvements to their lives. This would also be an extremely good opportunity for Tearfund to deploy its Construction and Education Advisors in support of partners. Tearfund needs to give greater priority to supporting these kinds of transitional projects both in Haiti and in similar emergency responses elsewhere.

For these kinds of transitional projects Tearfund needs to use a rapid grant approval mechanism where appropriate. The RTE recommends that for the reconstruction phase of an emergency like this, Tearfund needs to create a very short emergency proposal template for partners to use when preparing proposals above £5000 (which is the current upper limit for fast-track proposals).

There is a need for a continued exchange of information between partners and communities, so that communities are encouraged to express their needs to the partners, and the partners are actively seeking out and passing on information about future assistance including the re-housing of people living in tents

Tearfund should undertake more joint planning with World Relief and World Concern to establish what resources they plan to mobilise for Haiti both in the next 6 months and the longer term, and what international advisors they intend to deploy. This could assist a more co-ordinated response in the next phase.

Whilst both shelter and livelihoods are included in the plans for Phase 3, the emphasis so far in Phase 2 has been on education. The priority in Phase 3 should therefore be to improve delivery in relation to these plans: the priorities for DMT are to ensure some kind of transitional shelter for the poorest families, in the Leogane Gressier area, and also to implement Livelihoods programmes for this same group in close consultation with local agencies with more experience of livelihoods in relation to Haiti.

In order to support its reconstruction objectives in Leogane Gressier Tearfund should consider entering into new partnerships with local agencies with relevant skills and experience.

3.3. Recommendations for DEC

Given the very common delays in re-housing people after a major earthquake like that in Haiti the DEC rule requiring 30% of funds to be spent in first 6 months should be adjusted to allow 30% of the funds to be spent in the first year.

Hugh Goyder
23/06/10

Appendix 1

List of People met in Haiti:

Jean-Claude Cerin –Country Representative
FEPH – Christon St.Fort
Christon Domound, Country Director ACLAM
Bunet Exantus –Programme Co-ordinator, ACLAM
Pastor Glibert – Executive Director CEEH
Wigo Rigaud –Assistant Pastor CEEH
Gaston Jean – Director – UEBH
Louis D’Or Josuel – Co-ordinator, Education

Dussap Jean Gerald – Construction Supervisor – Ton Gato
Education Team, Ton Gato:
Villarson Fariel
Obed Cazeau
Tamara Olicoeur
Flore Anne Lucama
Construction Team – Leogane:
Hevelt Chegehus
Rod Lauredant
Dehayard Cidoles
David San Surin

Govinda Tidball – DMA
Ian McInnes – Programme Director
Bruce Coffey –DPD
David Markley – Finance Manager
Fernandez Sejero – Logistics Manager
Katie Wilson – HR Manager
Betsy Baldwin -Haiti - Lowlands - Area Coordinator
Jodel Pierre – PM Education
Tom Newby – Construction Advisor.
Annie McCulloch – Education & Psychosocial Advisor
Matt Fletcher – WATSAN Advisor
Lynsey Pollard – Temporary AC
Janet Whalley – PSO.
Christina Anderson – Advocacy Consultant

Appendix 2 -Itinerary:

April 29	Briefing – Tearfund – Teddington
May 4/5	Flight: London-New York-Port au Prince
May 5	Briefing of CR and DMT staff
May 6	Meetings with partners: FEPH, ACLAM
May 7	Meetings with CEEH & UEBH
May 8	Individual Meetings with Tearfund staff
May 9	Finish individual meetings; report writing
May 10	Field visits to Leogane Gressier & meetings with national staff
	Attend Early Recovery Cluster Meeting
May 11	Field visits in Ton Gatou area
May 12	Meetings with national staff at Leogane; Attend Education Cluster Meeting
	Evening: return Port au Prince
May 13	Report writing; presentation to Tearfund staff
May 14	Meetings with Advocacy consultant, & feedback meeting with Christon Domoud, ACLAM. Report writing
May 15	Flight: Port-au-Prince-New York-London
May 16	Return London