

A SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS OF METROPOLITAN PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI

STRATEGIC CITYWIDE SPATIAL PLANNING



SUMMARY REPORT

Strategic Citywide Spatial Planning:

A situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Haiti

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEC	Assemblée de la Section Communale
CAMEP	Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CASEC	Conseil Administratif de la Section Communale
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDS	City Development Strategy
CNRA	Commission Nationale à la Réforme Administrative
DGI	Direction Générale des Impôts
DSNCRP	Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté
EDH	Électricité d'Haïti
EPPLS	Entreprise Publique de Promotion des Logements Sociaux
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTIH	Groupement Technologie Intermédiaire d'Haïti
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
IHSI	Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique
INARA	Institut National de la Réforme Agraire
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
ME	Ministère de l'Environnement
MEF	Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances
MICT	Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales
MINUSTAH	Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de Haïti
MPCE	Ministère de la Planification et la Coopération Externe
MTPTC	Ministère de Travaux Public, Transport et Communications
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
ONACA	Office National du Cadastre

PESTLE	Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Legal and Environmental factors
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SNEP	Service National d'Eau Potable
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme

FOREWORD



In February 2010, Haiti, particularly the capital Port-au-Prince was hit by an earthquake that caused extensive damage and loss. In 2008-2009, prior to the earthquake, UN-Habitat undertook an urban planning assessment of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, which hosts more than 40% of the Haitian population. A key finding is that Port-au-Prince is at the epicenter of several challenges and stresses facing Haiti. These include not only earthquakes but also other natural

disasters, poverty, weak governance, and the absence of urban planning. In this context, communities and civil society organisations are key players. Similarly, coordinating multiple urban actors becomes essential.

UN-Habitat's situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince provides a thorough background to the city's situation in terms of urban development and planning, and presents a way forward for future planning of the metropolitan area.

This publication makes a case for a participatory approach engaging all key stakeholders in urban development. Such an approach is especially needed in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince, where municipalities are asking for support from central government to develop and implement local planning and to deliver basic services. Another key area is the need for institutional capacity building to better enable municipalities and their partners to deliver basic urban services to the city's residents.

The Citywide Strategic Planning approach presents the key steps for initiating and implementing a strategic planning process in support of sustainable urban development. It attempts to address three strategic planning questions: Where are we today? Where do we want to be? How do we get there? The publication also covers the wider aspects of housing and urban infrastructure as well as the socio-economic situation which constitute key components for achieving sustainable urbanization.

It is our hope that all the urban stakeholders working in Haiti and in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area will find this publication useful in their ongoing attempts at recovery and reconstruction and with a view to building back better.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka".

Dr. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka
Executive Director, UN-HABITAT

1. HISTORICAL BACKDROP

1.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND ON HAITI

Haiti is situated in the Caribbean on the island of Hispaniola, which it shares with the Dominican Republic to the east. The two countries have formally been separate entities since 1697, when Hispaniola was divided between France and Spain, and have experienced very different developments from that time onwards. For the past 30 years Haiti

has been regarded as the dark side of the island because of its troubled political and economic situation.

The country's nine million inhabitants speak Haitian Creole. French is the official language, but much less used by ordinary people. Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, is situated on the bay of Port-au-Prince in the southern part of the country. Other important cities are Gonaïve, Cap-Haïtien and Jacmel.

FIGURE 1: Map of Haiti



Source: Geology care

1.1.1 HISTORY AND POLITICS¹

Haiti gained independence from France in 1804, after a long slave revolt. Independence did not resolve the inequalities in land ownership that Haiti had inherited from its colonial period. The minority mixed-race upper class kept its privileges even after the colonists left.

The political history of Haiti after independence is one of incessant revolts, coups d'état and uprising. In 1957 Dr Francois Duvalier, known as "Papa Doc", was elected president but soon turned the democratic state into a dictatorship. His oppressive rule marked the beginning of the emigration wave, especially to the US. At his death in 1971 his son Jean-Claude, called "Baby Doc", took over the presidency.

¹ Information from the following sources has been used: Sletten, P & Egset, W (2004), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), The Economist Intelligence Unit (August 2007), World Bank (2006), www.wikipedia.org.

After mounting pressure both from within the country and internationally, the regime collapsed in 1986 and was followed by a number of military governments.

Elections were finally held in late 1990, and saw the young priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide secure a convincing victory. Aristide wanted to implement major reforms, such as separating the police from the army, reorganising the agricultural sector, redistributing land and fighting corruption. This infuriated the army and another military coup was carried out in 1991. The military rule was ruthless, especially on Aristide's supporters and around 5,000 of them were killed.

International sanctions were imposed, but it was not until the US deployed its military and threatened an invasion that Aristide could be reinstated as president in 1994. The US forces left the country and were replaced by UN troops responsible for keeping the peace. In 1995 democratic elections were held and René Préval, backed by Aristide, was elected.

The next elections were held in 2000, when Aristide once again won. However the opposition boycotted the elections. The weak condition of the government led to intensified violence, which lasted for several years. In 2004 Aristide left Haiti, but whether he was forced into this by the US or went voluntarily is still disputed. The UN intervened to try to keep the fragile peace. After a few months, these soldiers were replaced by the UN peacekeeping mission, commanded by Brazil.

Many of the slum areas in Port-au-Prince were strongholds of Aristide and intense fighting happened between the residents and the Haitian police.

The gangs in the slums, which were originally more of a political force, transformed into criminal gangs specialising in robbery and kidnapping.

In this fragile situation, new elections were held in 2006. They were considered fair overall and saw the return of René Préval as president. Since then the security situation has improved but there are still outbreaks of violence, especially in the informal settlements of Port-au-Prince. The UN has a peacekeeping force of more than 7,000 soldiers in the country and their presence in Port-au-Prince is obvious.

1.1.2 POVERTY AND ECONOMY

The reasons for Haiti's poverty are numerous. The combination of political insecurity, corrupt leaders, natural disasters, migration of academics and skilled workers, unfavorable trade agreements and poor administration together form an explanation that is a first step to understanding the situation.

Haiti is the poorest country in the western hemisphere. Not only are Haitians generally poor, they also have low access to vital public services such as water and sanitation, education and health care. The low service delivery by the Haitian national and local authorities has created a country where only half of the population is literate², where infrastructure in practice has collapsed and where almost half of the population is undernourished. The situation has only improved slightly in recent decades. For those who have access to services, the quality and consistency of these still vary enormously between different areas and different income groups.

² School enrolment rate is as low as 55% for children aged 6-12.

Haiti is one of the world's most unequal societies. The richest 10% has almost 50% of the country's total income, whereas the poorest 10% only has 0.7% of the income³. Most of Haiti's poor households are way below the poverty line, with an average income of 0.44USD per day (Republic of Haiti, 2006).

The informal sector is dominant in the country, employing around 70% of the total workforce, mostly in agriculture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006). Unemployment is extensive, especially amongst young people. Almost 50% of the inhabitants in metropolitan Port-au-Prince are reportedly unemployed (World Bank 2006). More women than men are unemployed and girls are also more likely than boys not to attend school or to leave school prematurely.

Remittances count for more than one-fourth of the total GDP in Haiti, principally coming from Haitians living outside the country (Sletten & Egset, 2004), but also from migrant workers who get employment in the major cities.

1.1.3 DEMOGRAPHY AND URBANISATION

Haiti is one of the most densely populated countries in Latin America, with 310 inhabitants per square kilometre (World Bank, 2006). To get an idea of the population pressure, it has been calculated that there are at least 925 inhabitants per square kilometre of arable land (Université de Quisqueya, 2000), which is similar to Bangladesh and gives an insight to Haiti's fast urbanisation.

The urbanisation rate in Haiti has been substantial since the 1950s and is projected to continue to increase.

Haiti has not yet reached the same levels of urbanisation as the rest of the Caribbean. With only 40% of its population living in urban areas in 2007, Haiti is far below its nearest neighbours: Dominican Republic (66%), Puerto Rico (98%), Jamaica (60%) and Cuba (75%) (www.unfpa.org). In Latin America and the Caribbean together, almost three-quarters of the population live in urban areas. With Haiti's weak agricultural and other rural production, its urban population is sure to increase.

1.1.4 GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALISATION

According to the World Bank's Governance Indicators⁴, during the past ten years Haiti has witnessed a slight decline in most of the indicators from an already very low level. Haiti is ranked among the bottom five out of 212 countries. In Transparency International's corruption ranking for 2007, it is placed as the 177th out of 179 countries⁵.

The following quote from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) gives an insight to the status of Haiti's public institutions:

"Haiti's political, judicial and security institutions have been riven by dictatorship, military intervention and instability, and remain extremely weak. Political structures are prey to personal ambition and factionalism among politicians, while the judicial system suffers from inadequate resources, inefficiency and corruption."

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
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³ Human Development Report, <http://hdrstats.undp.org>

⁴ World Bank's Governance Indicators, which measure voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and corruption http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_country.asp

⁵ Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2007, www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi

FIGURE 2: General Organogram for Municipalities in Metropolitan Port-Au-Prince.



Source: Mairie de Carrefour (all terms are in French).

The 2006 elections and the resulting stability since have at least created the necessary prerequisites to implement the constitution, which was ratified in 1987.

Decentralisation is now the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. However, few practical changes have taken place so far and there are still many political and economic interests that divert the process in other directions. The central government does not appear to be ready to devolve power and resources to lower levels.

The Municipal Councils in Haiti have, in many cases, managed to do something when it comes to local public administration despite unclear mandate and scarce resources. As the constitution is not fully operational, most of the “normal” responsibilities for municipalities, such as provision of water and sanitation, waste management, spatial planning and traffic management, remain at national level.

Most of the municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince – Carrefour, Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas, Kenscoff, Pétion-Ville, Port-au-Prince and Tabarre – are larger than in the rest of the country and have more resources. They all have a similar organization, but with different

number of staff and in some areas different tasks due to circumstances and capacities. Figure 2 shows the general organization.

Despite limited funds at local level, many municipalities have been active and have tried to implement what little they can with scarce resources. In metropolitan Port-au-Prince several of the eight municipalities (see figure 3) have taken steps towards assuming greater responsibilities for their areas. They have also initiated an informal co-ordination group for metropolitan Port-au-Prince, but not many meetings have been held and the group needs to be strengthened.

FIGURE 3: The locations of the eight municipalities in metropolitan Port-au-Prince



Source: National Centre for Geospatial Information

1.2 CITYWIDE STRATEGIC PLANNING

Citywide strategic planning refers to a more holistic, inclusive and integrated planning approach; one that takes the whole city into consideration and where a pro-poor focus, good local governance and gender equity are important foundations.

In most developing countries, conventional urban planning approaches are inadequate. The reasons are many. Often the planning laws and regulations in developing countries are inherited from former colonial administrations, resulting in legislation that is not adapted to the environment it is applied in. For example, standards are too high when it comes to construction norms or rules for joint land ownership are too inflexible. Some urban plans in these countries focus only on the formal parts of the city, thus ignoring a large part of the population and contributing to increasing segregation. Other plans, on the contrary, focus only on improving the informal or slum settlements, disregarding the gains to be made from seeing the city as a unit.

1.2.1 ESTABLISHING A VISION AND A STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN

In brief, the strategic planning approach addresses three vital questions:

- Where are we today?
- Where do we want to go?
- How do we get there?

The strategic action plan could include planning principles (including policy development and revision of legislation), strategic medium-term action plans, processes for continuous city consultation and establishment of cooperation and communication structures. The strategic action plan

should be accompanied by a system for monitoring and follow-up.

Situation analysis and spatial analysis

The foundation of the process is to analyse the present situation to get a starting point, a kind of baseline. The analyses and mapping exercises that are carried out do not have to be too detailed as facts and information can be added later according to specific needs but should provide a basic picture of the city.

A situational analysis can be done using rapid assessment methods, such as the Rapid Urban Sector Profiling for Sustainability developed by UN-HABITAT. It can also use analysis of existing material on the city in question, coupled with interviews and workshops with the stakeholders identified in the process. The situational analysis content includes demographics, housing, land management, urban infrastructure, security, urban environment, institutional settings, and management capacity.

A spatial analysis - a general representation of the city using basic maps or drawings should be made at an early stage. The spatial analysis will pinpoint the structural elements of the city (road networks, drainage systems, markets, topographic features or historic patterns) and describe these with a geographical perspective. Risk-prone areas in terms of natural disaster are identified, and parts of the city where the most vulnerable people live. The spatial analysis works very well as foundation for decision-making, as it explains a complex reality with a few lines.

Vision and overall objectives

The vision should be clear and realistic and represent the residents’ desired future for their city. For stable countries the vision could be set a couple of decades in the future, whereas the time span for fragile or post-conflict states should only be five to ten years. In order to make the vision more manageable, it should be supported by a set of overall objectives to guide the development efforts throughout the planning period. These overall objectives will be of fundamental importance for monitoring the process.

Strategic action plan and medium-term action plans

Starting from the vision, the overall strategic action plan is developed. Planning principles and the medium-term action plans take shape guided by the vision and the strategic action plan.

Both the strategic action plan and the medium-term action plans could be created using the back-casting method (see figure 4). Starting with a future goal (the vision), the

actions required to reach that goal are developed. The medium-term action plans should be realistic and contribute substantially to reaching the vision.


1.2.2 PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS OF CITYWIDE STRATEGIC PLANNING

Local ownership, participation and coordination

The citywide strategic planning process should be locally owned, not donor-driven. It is central that there are strong and committed leaders for the process, normally provided by Mayors or other politically elected figures, but subject to the local environment, the leadership could be located in a relevant Ministry or a special unit set up for planning purposes.

The authorities shall strive to initiate (or maintain) partnerships with different groups such as other governmental bodies, civil society and private sector groups. In resource-poor countries or cities it is vital to have solid ties with the private sector.

FIGURE 4: The road towards the vision. Through envisioning the future objectives, the overall strategic action plan is decided upon. Medium-term action plans are then created for shorter periods of time, with incorporated checkpoints for periodical monitoring.



Private sector companies will not enter a partnership without there being something in it for them; however, in most cases, areas of mutual interest can be found where co-operation can take place.

The citywide strategic planning should not be an isolated project but instead endeavour to incorporate other development initiatives and complement what is already being carried out. Harmonisation and coordination between different interventions is key for the strategic planning.

Quick win projects to build commitment

Demonstration projects have the advantage that they will strengthen the stakeholders' confidence and build trust with donors. Such 'quick win' projects are especially important in the beginning of a citywide strategic planning exercise. They provide opportunities for early responses during the planning process to urgent needs, as well as valuable feedback to the on-going planning process.

Mapping of 'drivers'

Another starting point for strategic planning could be the analysis of 'drivers' and 'impediments' of the (non-) development of the city and its economy, for both the formal and the informal sectors. Identification of markets and other trading centres, as well as transport system that encourages trade, are some of the conditions to investigate, but other, more hidden drivers also need to be pinpointed.

Right to the city

Another basic principle for the citywide strategic planning is the "right to the city" (UN-HABITAT and UNESCO 2005), translated here as equal access to land, housing, public space and basic services. To introduce a rights-based approach in urban development also brings

with it the opportunity to talk about the citizens' responsibilities. Rights and responsibilities agreements can be realised through social contracts between local authorities and local communities, and/or between central and local governments.

Resource mobilisation and use of local resources

As many financial resources as possible should come from the city itself and not from outside donors. If local resources from municipalities, national government, private sector, NGOs and individual citizens are used the result tends to be more sustainable and more strategic, as the prioritisation is carried out more carefully. Only the most urgent and strategic activities will be implemented if local resources are used to a larger extent.

In most developing countries, it is impossible for a city to finance implementation of action plans entirely from its own pockets but it is important that the donor funding only constitutes a part of the resources and that resource mobilisation is included early in the process.

Continuous capacity building

Capacity building is not only necessary for experts – planners and technicians – but maybe more so for the staff who will use the citywide strategic plan in their daily work, such as service providers, notaries, building inspectors. If staff are not competent in using and implementing the plan, it might not be worth developing it in the first place.

Similar training needs are usually found also among political decision-makers. But there is another target group of equal importance for capacity building, namely the stakeholders involved in the planning process.

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Private sector
companies will
not enter a partnership
without there being
something in it for them.”

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Children in on of Port-au-Prince numerous slums photo © Å. Forsman

In order to execute wisely their roles as vital contributors and members of the planning process, they need to know at least the basics of strategic planning. Being part of the process, they will “learn by doing”, but still an initial training would be a great advantage.

Capacity building is not a one-time event, but has to be established as a process to last for many years to come.

2. URBAN LAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN PORT-AU-PRINCE

In this section, elements and issues of importance to urban planning are presented. It describes the situation on the ground in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, while simultaneously offering entry points for the analyses and recommendations in the following sections.

2.1 URBAN TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENT

Around 30% of Haiti's population live in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, where 90% of the country's total investments and formal jobs are found (Republic of Haiti 2003). This heavy concentration of the economy in one city is not good for the national economy, but explains some of Port-au-Prince's attraction power.

If the current urbanisation rate continues, which is likely, more than four million people will live in the metropolitan area within the next ten years. The pressure on infrastructure, land, housing and services, already untenable today with 2.7 million inhabitants, will be even more unsound in the near future unless mitigating measures in the form of urban planning are undertaken.

2.1.1 CITY PROFILE

Port-au-Prince was established in 1749, when the French sugar farmers and other important economic actors created a capital for the their colony Saint-Dominique. By the end of the 18th century, the city had

9,400 inhabitants.⁶ Up until the mid 20th century, Port-au-Prince grew slowly but steadily with little change in the city's management and design.

Between 1950 and 1970 Port-au-Prince's population more than doubled, from 150,000 to 350,000. Decreasing mortality due to advances in health care, better employment opportunities than in the countryside, and heavy investments by state and other actors in industries and other businesses all contributed to this rapid population increase.


The road network was improved during this time, which made it easier to either move to the city or to commute. Most of the people in this early migration wave found houses in formal areas, which grew more dense. Suburbs surrounded the commercial centre in central Port-au-Prince, where all business took place (Republic of Haiti 2003). By the end of the 1970s other, smaller centres emerged.

Between 1982 and 1995 the urban population tripled (see figure 5). The economic crisis made it necessary for people to move from the countryside to the cities, especially the capital, in search of employment. With so many people moving rapidly into Port-au-Prince, the need for shelter, basic services and markets increased.

⁶ Commission pour la commémoration du 250e anniversaire de la fondation de la ville de Port-au-Prince (1999)

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Concentration of the
economy in one city
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national economy”

FIGURE 5: Population increase in Port-au-Prince.



Sources: Republic of Haiti (2003), Republic of Haiti (2007), The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), CLED/ILD (1998).

Government housing schemes failed to supply adequate housing, especially for the poor, who built their own dwellings, occupying or renting private or state owned land. The provision of basic infrastructure and services could not keep up with the rate of urbanisation, and public services deteriorated rapidly, apart from for the wealthiest people.

From the 1980s Port-au-Prince became more divided. In one part there was water and sanitation, with formal, large properties with green lawns. In another part, chaotic urbanisation took place without basic services, where the plots were illegal or at best informal, often tiny and built on dangerous land such as dump sites or steep hillsides. The so-called “bidonvillisation” of Port-au-Prince had come to stay.

During the past decade, increasing numbers of NGOs and international organizations began working in the slums and poor parts of Port-au-Prince. Between 2004 and 2007 about 33 million USD was spent on different slum upgrading programmes in Port-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti 2007).

Unfortunately, these interventions have not followed any urban planning or regulations, they have been badly coordinated, often overlapping, and without local anchoring in the municipalities or other local government. On average, 75,000 migrants have moved into metropolitan Port-au-Prince every year during the past 20 years (World Bank 2006).

More than half of today’s population in metropolitan Port-au-Prince originally lived elsewhere, and in the informal areas more than 70% of the inhabitants came from the countryside (GHRAP 2008). In some areas in the capital the annual increase in population is 8%. The rural migrants, whose main reason for moving is greater economic opportunities, normally end up in informal settlements. Of the new migrants, one-third move to already built areas, which means that the density is increasing, and two-thirds move to new informal and often peri-urban settlements (Republic of Haiti 2003).

2.1.2 URBAN PLANNING

The responsibility for spatial planning of metropolitan Port-au-Prince rests with the central government, which also takes care of most management, maintenance and provision of infrastructure and basic services. The municipalities are marginalised.

There is no legally approved master plan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Several plans with different geographic and thematic scope have been developed, most with assistance from donors, but they have neither been endorsed nor institutionalised. In practice, they have not served as a proper framework for spatial and social development but only as inspiration for a few random interventions.

Aside from the absence of an adequate master plan, the statistics and basic information of metropolitan Port-au-Prince are scattered and only randomly updated. Neither the central government nor the municipalities have databases or registers with reliable information on numbers of inhabitants, infrastructure, legal status of land, or access to services.

According to the Ministry of Planning there are more than 50 institutions that share the responsibility of managing metropolitan Port-au-Prince

(Republic of Haiti 2003). The responsibilities for metropolitan development and management are dispersed in a maze of government institutions, agencies, departments and divisions without any coordinating agency. Duplication and gaps are common.

2.2 HUMAN SETTLEMENTS

Port-au-Prince is a densely populated city, characterised by what many Haitians call wild urbanisation (urbanisation sauvage). The small hills surrounding the city are being covered with dwellings of different quality, many of them situated precariously on steep slopes and in danger of being washed away by the next torrent or hurricane. Other slum dwellers, in the centre of the city, risk flooding due to their location in the bottom of the basin of Port-au-Prince.

2.2.1 PHYSICAL CONDITIONS FOR LAND AND HOUSING

More than half of the informal settlements in Port-au-Prince are located in ravines and gullies and are susceptible to inundation. Flooding is also the main threat for those who have chosen to reside on wetland areas close to the sea.

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FIGURE 6: Overview of parts of Pétiion-Ville. The map shows the crowded living situation on the hills to the left, neighbouring a planned settlement.



Source: Google Earth 2008



In Port-au-Prince, it is common to build on landslide prone areas Photo © Å. Forsman

For most informal settlements in Port-au-Prince, the absence of a grid plan makes it difficult to provide services such as water, electricity and garbage collection to individual households. Most of the inhabitants in the slums do not have access roads between their plots.

Many families cannot obtain loans for buying land and/or building a house. Instead they build the house slowly using available cash, taking five, ten or even 15 years to finish. This piecemeal way of building is widespread in poor as well as in affluent parts of Port-au-Prince, and is also encouraged involuntarily by the tax regulation that exempts partly built houses from property tax.

2.2.2 FORMAL AND INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Few Port-au-Prince residents have legal titles to their land. Even in the more wealthy areas of the city the normal procedure, when selling and buying a property, is to go to a public notary who makes a declaration of ownership. The problem is that there can be several claims to the same

property, as there is no cadastre or official register of ownership. The ownership or transfer of ownership is normally not registered by local authorities or the legal system and is therefore not fully secured.

The land and property belonging to the state of Haiti is divided in two groups: public and private property. The state's public property is not transferable and consists mainly of public spaces such as roads, lakes, rivers, parks, cemeteries and shorelines. The state's private property can on the other hand be appropriated by an individual or juridical person, and this property falls under the jurisdiction of the General Revenue Office (DGI).

The rules for buying and renting state-owned and privately owned land are different. In both cases it is a cumbersome, expensive and long procedure to become the lawful owner of a property. One of the many steps in the process involves the actual transcription of title at the DGI which can take between one and two years. For these reasons, most people do not even try to acquire land.

BOX 1: low-cost public housing gone amiss

The Public Enterprise for Social Housing (EPPLS) has had a shortage of funds for the last decade and has thus not provided much housing lately. Even when there was funding, production capacity was inadequate. One example of public housing done by the EPPLS is just north of Cité Soleil, in a small suburb called Village de la Renaissance. Originally, the housing scheme of 700 apartments was planned for inhabitants from Cité Soleil who needed to be relocated when a public road was built where they lived.

However, corruption resulted in occupation of the houses by civil servants instead. The cost of the apartments, 1,000 gourdes per month, is far too expensive for most of the inhabitants in Cité Soleil, where typical monthly rent is 100-200 gourdes per month. The Village de la Renaissance is not an exception in Port-au-Prince or Haiti. Housing schemes constructed for poor people have often been used for political gain. The problem with the production of public housing is its extremely low scale of production, which hardly makes a dent in the enormous housing deficit.

Source: visit in Cité Soleil in March 2008.

Instead they lease land and build a house, rent a house or get property on the informal market.

In many cases landowners in Port-au-Prince who obtain their land legally still have problems with illegality or extralegality. Building and planning regulations, subdivisions of land and other laws are not easy to adhere to. The urban legislation that should encourage participation in the formal land and housing sector instead works as an incentive for people to resort to the informal sector.

BOX 2: Local NGO aims to change building standards

The Haitian NGO Fondation Connaissance et Liberté (FOKAL), is amongst the few civil society organizations in the country working with land and property issues. FOKAL is mainly a cultural NGO, focused on democracy and social change. Its programmes target education and cultural and political awareness raising, but it has recently employed a city planner to strengthen its work in urban areas.

FOKAL, in collaboration with the Port-au-Prince municipality, the EU and several international and national NGOs, has started a project to create a botanical garden in the slum area Martissant also working with the surrounding neighbourhoods on issues such as property, land access and building norms. Reduction of local violence, access to water and sanitation and improvement of the education will also be part of the programme. FOKAL wants to carry out an in-depth study of the communities around the park, including their access to land and their housing situation. The NGO hopes it can initiate small pilot projects on construction norms, which in the future may be used for policy purpose within the Port-au-Prince municipality.

For more information on FOKAL, see www.fokal.org

2.2.3 LAND REGULATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS

The policies and legal framework for land issues are dispersed, contradictory and in most cases not implemented. Even though there are many layers of administration set up to manage legal procedures regarding land, there is an absence of a wider framework and general policies on how land should be administered and managed.

One of the reasons for the weak policy foundation is that the institutions that are supposed to execute the policies do not possess the necessary capacity. Another obstacle for registration of leasehold and freehold is that the civil registry is incomplete: around 40% of Haitians lack identification documents and are not considered “legal”. The identity cards used for the elections in 2006 are, however, being recognised as a legally binding document, which means that more and more people are eventually getting into the legal system.

It is very difficult for laypersons and even experts to know to which authority to turn to for what services concerning land administration. Other entities might be involved as well in different land procedures.

The inefficiency of keeping separate systems for land information is obvious. The authorities are not held accountable for the land transactions as the registers are complicated to access and not designed for information retrieval. The Haitian land sector has no anti-corruption safeguard and corruption is rife.


There are no special land tribunals where ownership issues or other conflicts regarding properties can be resolved. The court of law is already overburdened with civil and criminal trials and is not the proper venue for settling land rights cases.

Although property and land issues are considered to be important and even potentially explosive in Haiti, there are very few initiatives to deal with the issues. However in the beginning of March 2008 an informal, inter-ministerial reference group on land, property and human settlement was created with representatives from the main government agencies.

2.3 BASIC SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

In many places in Port-au-Prince, basic services (water, sanitation, roads) are not provided for the population due to difficult access to the area. In some informal areas the houses are built too close together for any pipes to be laid, sewers or drainage to be installed or roads to be built. In other areas the access problem is related to the hilly topography. Some slums are so prone to flooding that any infrastructure built would be destroyed by heavy rainfall.

FIGURE 7: Water provision in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. The difference between 1985 and 2005 in type of service provider is striking. In 1985 the state was the main provider. In 2005 private providers are almost as important.



Source: CAMEP (undated).

One solution to the malfunctioning of state-provided basic services is to rely on private providers. This is an option for the more wealthy but not for the poor as services from the private (often illegal) sector are too expensive. Another common solution is for NGOs and local community organizations to provide services such as water supply or electricity in a community.

The Government of Haiti admits that the residents of metropolitan Port-au-Prince who can afford to detach from the public service system they usually do (Republic of Haiti 2003). They produce their own electricity with a generator or solar panels, they use mobile phones instead of landlines, they get water from private suppliers and a private company collects their garbage.

2.3.1 WATER AND SANITATION

There are two authorities responsible for delivery of drinking water in metropolitan Port-au-Prince; Centrale Auto-nome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable, CAMEP, and Service National d'Eau Potable, SNEP.

In the 1990s CAMEP carried out a project together with NGOs to construct water kiosks in some of the informal areas where it is too difficult to install pipelines (Republic of Haiti 2003). Local water committees now manage the water kiosks. But publicly provided water is getting more rare, as figure 7 shows. From having had almost the whole market in the 1980s, the public utilities now only have about half of the market.

“*In the whole of Port-au-Prince, there is no major waste processing*”



Piles of garbage blocking a street in downtown Port au Prince Photo © Å. Forsman

BOX 3: **Three quarters of solid waste is not collected**

Martissant, a mostly informal area in the municipality of Port-au-Prince, produces 160 tons of waste every day. According to recent research, only 25% of this is collected by the municipality or private entrepreneurs. Of the 75% remaining, half is burnt in shallow pits or by the road or in the backyard. The remaining 60 tons is left elsewhere. Some solid waste is recycled or reused, but most ends up in the rivers, on the streets, in gullies, the sea and in open channels transporting both sewage and water.

Liquid waste disposal is even worse. There is no sewage system, all wastewater simply flows from the house onto the street where it will join a river or water channel flowing to the sea. Many water sources in Martissant have been contaminated as a result.

Even for people with individual water taps the access is irregular and often the water is not suitable for drinking. Many of the more affluent inhabitants, larger hotels and restaurants, have disconnected from the public service and get water from private water trucks. For the poorer residents the solutions range from public service water, to buying from water trucks, from neighbours or from private providers. Between 25 and 50% of the city's residents have access to safe water.⁷

There is no system for purification or other treatment of wastewater in Port-au-Prince and many parts of the city lack rainwater drainage systems. Instead the rainwater, which is combined with the wastewater and other polluted water, flows down the gullies, along open water channels and the few existing gutters, ending up in the sea. The Ministry of Public Works has a master plan for drainage, proposing to build five major rainwater drainage channels (Republic of Haiti 2003). So far, one has been completed, for the centre of the city.

2.3.2 WASTE MANAGEMENT

Only half of slum residents have access to latrines. Most households in the slums use onsite sanitation where the waste from the pit latrines and septic tanks is collected from that point and not flushed into sewers. Leaks or overflows of human waste contaminate the water system causing health risks for the whole city. People with no access to latrines defecate wherever there is a reasonably private place – behind the house, on the riverbank or wherever suitable - leading to groundwater contamination and disease. According to UNICEF only 34% of the population in Port-au-Prince has access to adequate sanitation.

In the whole of Port-au-Prince, there is no major waste processing or recycling and no well-managed landfill. There are three large dump sites which are not sufficient for a city approaching three million inhabitants.

⁷ Republic of Haiti (November 2007), WHO and UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for water supply and sanitation www.wssinfo.org, World Bank (27 April 2006)

Even in the more affluent parts there are garbage heaps on street corners, waiting for days or weeks to be picked up or are burnt to get rid of the stench.

The Service Métropolitain de Collecte des Résidus Solides does not have the means to manage the enormous amount of waste produced daily in Port-au-Prince. In the richer areas private companies collect the garbage, but in the poor communities there is nothing. Solid waste that is not picked up is piled in the streets, in gullies and in open rainwater and wastewater channels, where it blocks the flow and causes flooding with filthy water.

Much of the garbage is burnt, directly on the street or in garbage pits in the gullies or backyards, polluting the air. Very little recycling takes place and no sorting, with waste from households, industries, hospitals and slaughterhouses being mixed and either burnt or buried together.

2.3.3 TRANSPORT

From early in the morning the roads in Port-au-Prince are crammed with cars, ‘tap taps’ (shared taxis in the form of covered pickup trucks or mini buses with vividly painted decorations), buses, motorcycles and pedestrians. Some 85% of the country’s traffic is concentrated in metropolitan Port-au-Prince (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006). The roads are in bad condition and are a mix between dirt and tarmac surface. In the older parts of the city the roads are surfaced, although worn out and often dusty and corrugated.

Public transport in Port-au-Prince has been totally privatised for the past 20 years. The tap-taps (mini buses) are the core of the public transport and are one of the cheapest ways to travel. There is a great number of them so passengers rarely have to wait.

Despite the fact that walking is by far the most common means of transport in Port-au-Prince, no policy or plan takes this into consideration, and the road or transport projects ignore it (Henriquez, Linonel 2000). The poverty of Port-au-Prince has made it the only city in the Caribbean where walking is more common than motorised transport.

The city is not planned for pedestrians. In the old parts of the city, pavements exist but are crowded with merchants, goods and garbage and thus nearly impassable. In other parts of the city there are only very narrow pavements or nothing at all, so people have to walk on the road, in danger of being hit by vehicles. Regardless of the many walkers, vehicle pollution in Port-au-Prince is bad, and is bound to get worse in the near future as the traffic increases.

Apart from road-based traffic, Port-au-Prince also has a number of harbours and an international airport, all of which are important for the planning of the city as they constitute entry and exit points for both people and goods. The harbours receive almost all of the imports of goods and likewise are responsible for exporting goods produced in Haiti. All fuel that is imported passes through the ports. As the harbours are all centrally located, this increases the transport, congestion and pollution.

“*Walking is by far the most common means of transport in Port-au-Prince*”

2.4 HUMAN AND NATURAL RISKS

Both human and natural risks must be considered when urban planning is concerned, as they both can endanger the sustainability of the physical and social environment.

2.4.1 SAFETY AND SECURITY

A World Bank report considers urban violence in Haiti to be one of the main obstacles to poverty reduction, noting that “violence and insecurity in Port-au-Prince’s slums in particular have undermined the political process, fuelled conflict, and negatively affected development and reconstruction efforts” (World Bank 2006).

When discussing violence and insecurity, it is easy to focus on crimes such as kidnapping and murder, for which Haiti has become notorious. But the most common form of crime is domestic violence against women and children. Local women’s organizations observe that domestic rape is a very frequent though seldom reported crime.

There has been a rise in the occurrence of gang rapes and politically motivated rapes in the past decade. Increased use of hard drugs and a steady influx of small arms have encouraged criminal gangs to commit more violent crimes such as rape or gang rape, murder and physical abuse. Protection businesses and kidnapping have also become more widespread in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Some 58% of the capital’s inhabitants said they felt unsafe most of the time in their own home and in their neighbourhood, compared to 15% in the countryside (World Bank 2006).

Despite a recent initiative to increase the size of the Haitian police force, there are still more private security officers than police officers in the country (World Bank 2006). The

United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti is active in reinforcing and developing much needed capacity in the Haitian police force. In 2007 there was a slight decline in violent crime numbers, probably due to the stable political situation.

2.4.2 NATURAL DISASTER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

Situated in the Caribbean, right in the hurricane belt, Haiti is exposed to tropical storms and hurricanes every year. Even less serious weather conditions can cause injury and damage to people and property, especially more vulnerable people, such as those living in slums.

In 2004 (and also 2008) Haiti was hit by flooding and hurricanes that killed more than 4,000 people and left 20,000 homeless. Since then, smaller disasters have occurred regularly, also with loss of life and property although not at the same scale. Disaster preparedness in the country is low, despite regular storms and heavy rains. In addition to weather hazards, Port-au-Prince is exceptionally ill-prepared to cope with the increased risk of more unstable weather patterns, rising sea levels and warmer temperatures. An assessment of people living at risk from natural disasters, especially flooding and landslides, should be done to estimate the number of people that can potentially be affected and ultimately will need to be relocated.

For all the natural disasters, the risks could be lowered substantially if spatial planning existed and planning regulations and building codes were followed. Allowing houses to be constructed in drainage zones, densely packed together on steep hills and on marshy, instable or contaminated ground, worsens the impact of natural disasters.

BOX 4: Evacuation of children from violence-prone areas

Bel Air is an old, poor settlement in Port-au-Prince where the inhabitants have proper land titles but not much more. The Brazilian NGO Viva Rio plans to improve the area’s access to water and sanitation. During the baseline survey Viva Rio realised that one of the main challenges in implementation is the security situation in the area.

The results of the baseline survey’s data was clearly at odds with national statistics. The population pyramid for Bel Air showed few children between the ages of five and 19.

After further study the NGO found out that the reason for the absence of children was that parents sent their children away during times of insecurity.

During the first baseline survey the political and security situation in the area was poor. On average, one child per family moved out from Bel Air in times of insecurity and political struggles in the area. Around 13,000 children, out of a total population of 80,000, were temporarily sent to relatives or friends in calmer parts of Port-au-Prince, or out to the countryside.

For more information on Viva Rio, see www.comunidadseguridad.org

3. ANALYSIS OF CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The analyses in this section are made to bridge the gap between the current situation in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and the recommendations for future actions that follow in section 4.

3.1 INVENTORY OF URBAN PLANNING AND LAND STAKEHOLDERS

The stakeholders of urban planning and land interventions in metropolitan Port-au-Prince consist of all individuals, groups and institutions that can affect or be affected by urban planning, urban development and land management. The stakeholders include potential beneficiaries as well as those who could be adversely affected. Most of the stakeholders in metropolitan Port-au-Prince have been presented earlier, and their interests and impacts have partly been covered.

In figure 8, the key players are the municipalities and the relevant ministries. They should preferably move towards the upper right corner, where they would have greater influence over the situation, with keen interest in managing urban planning processes.


Looking at the overall picture, it is troubling that so many of stakeholders have a low or neutral interest in urban planning. In an ideal situation, the level of interest would be higher, and a few stakeholders would be given increased power. The important point is that all stakeholders make their voice heard and influence decisions.

3.2 EVALUATION OF CITYWIDE PLANNING SCENARIOS

Due to the politically sensitive situation and the general instability in Haiti it is difficult to judge the general direction of the country in terms of human development. Therefore, three fundamentally different scenarios representing potential futures have been visualised for the country and the capital.

It is assumed for all three scenarios that the urbanisation rate will remain high, as all predictions point in that direction. The scenarios have been devised to evaluate what type or level of citywide strategic planning can be realistically developed and implemented in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

FIGURE 8: Level of institutional interest and power. The positions of the different groups show where they are today and the arrows for some of them show where they should ideally be. Light/yellow circles represent national stakeholders, dark/green circles = international stakeholders.



Scenario 1. **Return to political instability**

Scenario 1 means a return to political turmoil, as the result of a coup d'état, revolution, rebellion, election fraud, mass demonstrations or other events. The international community will lose faith in the Haitian state, donors will withhold funding or return to humanitarian assistance. The UN troops will be reinforced. Tension between people from different political fractions and with different incomes will increase and lead to violence.

Political factors: The central Government takes back its monopoly and becomes even more centralised, but it is still a weak state without enforcement power.

Economic factors: Haiti's economy declines further, causing a deterioration basic services such as water and sanitation, health and education.

Social factors: Increasing poverty and inequality, combined with the politically sensitive situation lead to more crime and political violence. Gangs take control of communities and rule over their own little kingdoms.

Technological factors: Infrastructure is destroyed by riots or lack of maintenance and the state does not have capacity to restore it.

Legal (and institutional) factors: There is a return to lawlessness, corruption thrives. People mistrust the government authorities. The informal sector gains in importance from an already high level.

Environmental factors: The control system breaks down for all sectors and for the environment this means increasing degradation. The water supply system in the metropolitan region risks collapsing.

Scenario 2. **Continuing stable political climate but with weak economy and institutions**

Scenario 2 represents a situation where the relative political stability from 2007 is re-established, however the societal development is slow. This scenario, probably the most likely, (as described in sections 1 and 2) represents a continuation of the situation in 2007.

Political factors: The decentralisation process is advancing slowly. The municipalities will still not have power or resources to perform "normal" tasks such as planning, service provision, infrastructure.

Economic factors: No real development of the economy. Food prices rise. More and more food needs to be imported. Donor money will however be more readily available, both as donations and as loans.

Social factors: Inequality persists even though people slowly are getting less poor. The trust in the national and local Government is low. Outbreaks of gang violence happen but are rare. Demonstrations and riots due to soaring food prices and unemployment occur now and then.

Technological factors: No major changes from current situation.

Legal (and institutional) factors: Capacity development will take place in certain state bodies, according to donor interest. There will be a few strong institutions but the majority of them will remain weak.

Environmental factors: No major changes in policy or enforcement, so environmental destruction continues.

Scenario 3. **Institutional, economic, political and social improvements**

Scenario 3 is the most desirable but least likely of the three scenarios.

Political factors: Decentralisation and devolution will be implemented with support from government from all levels. Municipalities will have more power and resources and will take on more responsibilities, especially regarding city planning and provision of basic services and infrastructure.

Economic factors: The economy is steady, not decreasing. The donors are confident in the (new) Government and make long-term commitments.

Social factors: Decreasing inequality and slowly decreasing poverty. Less violence in the streets as employment rate goes up and education is improved.

Technological factors: Due to the stabilised economy, more services will be provided on a regular basis, which means that access to electricity and Internet will be more widely available. New mobile or Internet services will emerge, such as banking.

Legal (and institutional) factors: National capacity development strategies are put in place and implemented. There is a slow improvement in the overall institutional, human and organizational capacity, both in government and civil society. New laws are passed that institutionalise the constitution and activate the decentralisation process.

Environmental factors: Stronger environmental policies and control leads to a more sustainable metropolitan area. Problems are not resolved, but at least the environmental damage does not continue unabated. Situation for its residents. Section 4 investigates future avenues for metropolitan planning and development.

4. FUTURE ACTIVITIES AND POLICY PRIORITIES

The informal settlements and the slums of Port-au-Prince are permanent. The people and most of the houses are there to stay. The slum cities that have been created are permanent cities, and may change over time like any city, but they will not disappear.

Therefore, the solution to the low living standards in the slums cannot be found in isolated slum upgrading projects, but requires the development of the whole metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Slum prevention could also be achieved through proper use of planning tools such as spatial plans and regulations on land subdivision.

Decentralisation has been an objective for the Haitian state officially since 1987, when the constitution emphasised the importance of a decentralised state. In reality, there are today even larger gaps between central and local governments, perhaps as a result of competition for resources. The large-scale or so-called 'grand corruption' has its foundation in the government structure and behaviour, and affects the whole society, undermining its political and economic stability and allowing corruption to thrive in other sectors.⁸

Urban planning involves land use, land administration and construction, thus it is a corruption-prone area with strong individual and political interests. This makes it a priority area for interventions also for anti-corruption and accountability reasons.


Responsible planning and land administration can decrease corruption and graft.

The three main avenues that this situational analysis suggests are:

1. Establishment of a metropolitan agency with these major tasks: coordinating all bodies with a stake in urban planning and development in metropolitan Port-au-Prince; developing planning policy, regulations and legal frameworks; delegating implementation and ensuring an efficient execution of the citywide strategic plan.
2. Development of a citywide strategic framework for metropolitan Port-au-Prince with major planning principles, enabling and controlling rules, regulations and tools that will set the agenda for spatial, social and economic development in the capital. In parallel with the development of a strategic framework, several demonstration projects should be implemented to keep the process moving and generate feedback.
3. Reinforcement of the municipalities. The municipalities will be in the centre of all metropolitan development and need to be strengthened. Regardless of how long the decentralisation process takes, the municipalities would benefit from gradually increased responsibilities coupled with increased assistance for capacity building and institutional strengthening.

⁸ Transparency International & UN-HABITAT (March 2004)

FIGURE 9: Set-up of the metropolitan agency. The networking function is the most important for the agency, which will coordinate all relevant stakeholders.



4.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF A METROPOLITAN AGENCY

The idea of a co-ordinating body for the metropolitan area appears in many of the documents and plans for improving the living standard and environment in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Although most stakeholders agree on the necessity of such a body, the idea has not been executed. Reasons for the non-accomplishment of a coordinating agency are, amongst others, restricted financial means and lack of political will.

Apart from securing funding and political will, it is crucial to keep the structure of the agency simple and basic, such as is shown in figure 9.

The metropolitan agency should be small and not necessarily with autonomous legal responsibility. In order for the agency to still have the legal and political instruments to fulfil its mission, it could be housed under one Ministry.

The agency's main tasks are to:

- Coordinate stakeholders
- Coordinate the strategic framework
- Policy development
- Develop regulations and legal frameworks
- Delegate responsibilities

The agency should set up a framework, planning principles, regulations and development standards. These should be enforced and controlled by national government, municipalities and/or community wards. It is important that the metropolitan agency is not responsible for implementation, which should be carried out by central government and, increasingly, the municipalities.

The agency should be responsible for coordination of all government bodies with a stake in urban development. This is the most important of its tasks and also the most politically sensitive.

Strong political support from all involved parties and all levels is necessary for the co-ordination and cooperation to work. The agency should also interact with civil society, the private sectors and development partners.

4.2 METROPOLITAN STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The administration in Port-au-Prince is exceptionally weak. A fully-fledged citywide planning process is difficult to implement within the present institutional setting and level of capacity. It is instead suggested that a more general citywide scheme be developed; called the metropolitan strategic framework.

4.2.1 BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PLANNING PROCESS

Citywide strategic planning is more holistic and more participatory than traditional urban planning. Although the difference may seem small, it actually means changing the whole process, making it more demanding and complex.

Therefore, a stronger institutional foundation is a necessity. In the case of metropolitan Port-au-Prince, an incremental approach towards citywide strategic planning is suggested, starting with a citywide strategic framework that sets the rules of the game, which will constitute the foundation for the future citywide strategic plan.

Prerequisites for undertaking citywide strategic planning

- Political commitment
- Relevant legislation in place, for example, concerning decentralisation
- Local authority with enough capacity, resources and mandate for planning and implementation

- Reliable and updated maps and other basic information available
- Mechanisms for public participation and representation of women and vulnerable groups
- Longer-term funding to ensure implementation
- Enabling environment for close cooperation between national and local authorities

4.2.2 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR THE METROPOLITAN STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Many of the steps in a full-scale citywide strategic planning process also apply to the more limited variety that is recommended for metropolitan Port-au-Prince. See box 5 for the major steps in developing the metropolitan strategic framework.


Several of the listed activities can and should take place simultaneously. The goal is to develop the framework in a participatory manner. This means that the process, managed by the metropolitan agency, encourages different stakeholders from state and non-state organizations to express their views, needs and ideas. The private sector should be included in the consultations from the start. The main ownership of the process must be within the state, with as many of the activities taking place at municipal level as possible. The participatory process and consultations thus serve at least two purposes: to ensure ownership that achieves a more sustainable framework, and to build capacity amongst stakeholders.

Alongside the development of the citywide strategic framework, implementation work should start. It is better to start small-scale implementation while still developing the framework.

BOX 5: Steps for developing the Metropolitan Strategic Framework

1. Ensure that there is adequate political support and leadership and that all stakeholders have ownership over the process. Establish a core team that will be responsible for the process.
2. Define what "metropolitan strategic framework" implies for metropolitan Port-au-Prince; choose an entry point of great importance for the metropolitan development, such as land issues or waste management.
3. Initiate the process by defining roles of stakeholders; prepare work plan and budget.
4. Review key documents, including relevant legislation, to benefit from past experience and specify potential barriers in the process. Continue the analysis of the current situation, e.g. with a spatial analysis and/or rapid assessment of different areas.
5. Arrange a brainstorming event with the stakeholders and define a common vision and overall objectives for the metropolitan strategic framework.
6. Prepare the overall strategic action plan and get the metropolitan strategic framework agreed upon by the key stakeholders.
7. Revise the metropolitan strategic framework to match laws and regulations so it can be formally endorsed by the government.
8. Market the overall strategic plan, disseminate it to stakeholders and ensure that the involvement remains high.
9. Hold regular follow-up meetings to check the progress against benchmarks. Revise the framework/action plans according to any new needs.
10. Continue capacity building - not only while the plan is developed but for many years into the future.

FIGURE 10: Three levels of municipal coordination. 1. metropolitan coordination through the metropolitan agency, 2. coordination between municipalities, 3. coordination within each municipality.



If strategic interventions are being implemented at an early stage, it will also assist the framework development process in terms of feedback. Early implementation projects provide opportunities for quick response to urgent needs, building confidence among the public and other stakeholders that strategic planning delivers real benefits.

4.2.3 COMPONENTS OF THE METROPOLITAN STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

The content of the citywide strategic framework will be developed following the structures described above. Regardless of what content the metropolitan strategic framework will have, it needs to encompass issues of equity, gender sensitivity, sustainability and affordability. Decisions should be taken at lowest level of government and with as much public control of implementation and budget as possible.

Without steering the process in a certain direction, it is useful to give

examples of what types of issues will be covered by the framework.

Some of these components have already been presented in the 2003 Government plan for metropolitan Port-au-Prince (Republic of Haiti 2003). As much information as possible should be used from this to avoid reinventing the wheel. Other documents that have been produced should also be reviewed relatively early in the process.

Many of the residential services in metropolitan Port-au-Prince are already provided by private companies (see figure 7 for water provision). The tendency is towards more privatization and more involvement of the informal business sector in service provision. Instead of combating this development, the metropolitan area could take a proactive step and make it easy for the informal sector to become formal. Many of the private service providers are not illegal, merely informal. The state should be responsible for the coordination and control of the providers to ensure a fair market with equal access to these services.

4.3 REINFORCEMENT OF THE MUNICIPALITIES

The metropolitan strategic framework is an umbrella for interventions carried out at a municipal or local level. In different parts of the metropolitan area, people have different needs and the situation on the ground differs between municipalities or community wards. In order to increase the municipalities' capacity, it is important to incrementally increase their mandate and responsibilities.

4.3.1 CO-ORDINATION

The major co-ordination at metropolitan level will be managed by the metropolitan agency described above. However the municipalities also need to coordinate between themselves. There is already a municipal group of the eight metropolitan mayors that wants to focus on retrieving responsibilities and resources for the municipalities; in other words to put decentralisation into practice. In reality not much has happened.

In Martissant, the municipality of Port-au-Prince has tried to bring together the different actors to share information. This is probably the best example of coordination, although it is not entirely effective. There are several NGOs working in the area that only recently became aware of the coordination initiative.

It would be useful to create more formal coordination groups within each municipality, assisted by groups at lower levels in the community wards, that would not only harmonise the projects and avoid duplication and bias towards specific settlements, but also ensure that the interventions are in line with the main metropolitan framework.

4.3.2 DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

In addition to the metropolitan agency and the metropolitan strategic framework, a few practical projects, should be carried out in order to strengthen the capacity of the municipalities. The demonstration projects help prove the rationale for the metropolitan strategic framework, while working towards a full citywide strategic plan.

The project ideas given are meant to serve as inspiration and can be developed further, based on discussions with stakeholders.

Examples of demonstration projects

Growth control

The idea is to manage the growth of metropolitan Port-au-Prince through indicating plots in the most growth prone areas, which will be identified during the development of the metropolitan framework. The respective municipalities will be responsible for marking plot limits according to a grid plan. The municipalities will also control where people settle within the grid plan, on demarcated subdivisions.

The purpose is firstly to ensure that people do not construct houses in areas prone to flooding, landslides, pollution or other hazards, secondly to manage the growth of the city so that the municipality will be in control of where new construction takes place and thirdly, to make certain that infrastructure can be put in place easily and at lower cost than in unplanned housing areas.

A city of walkers

To walk is the most environmentally friendly means of transport, yet it is not promoted in the city structure. It is also the cheapest mode of transport. All new roads being built and all improvements of existing ones – primary as well as secondary and smaller – should include sidewalks and pedestrian crossings designed with safety in mind.

Private sector engagement

There are already a few examples of private companies engaged in urban development projects in Port-au-Prince, in particular in the informal and slum areas.

In Cité Soleil for example, there are many private companies that build new schools, parks or other public places. This type of isolated project should be encouraged, as all efforts are needed, but metropolitan Port-au-Prince should also develop a strategy for cooperation with the private sector.

The strategy could involve different projects. One example could be that a company or group of companies becomes responsible for keeping a certain street or neighbourhood clean. Another idea used in other cities with good results is that companies are offered to “adopt a light” through paying for a streetlight that the company can use for advertising.

Protection from natural disasters

Port-au-Prince and its inhabitants are exposed to natural disasters such as flooding and landslides, as well as to manmade disasters such as fires. Ways to mitigate the effects of flooding include constructing retaining walls to control flooding for the most vulnerable parts of the coastline; establish escape routes and safe places for when a disaster occurs. In the long term, people in dangerous areas, such as on steep hills and along the coastline, need to be relocated to other areas.

Regardless of what types of demonstration projects are implemented, the emphasis should be on policy influence, on building stakeholders’ capacity and on following the planning principles that are part of the metropolitan strategic framework. Remember that a failed demonstration project could be worse than no project at all, so the projects should be carefully planned.

4.3.3 CAPACITY BUILDING

One of the first capacity building activities is a needs assessment. It identifies the needs in detail and specifies what kind of capacity development would best suit the particular municipality.

Corruption in the land sector in Haiti is rife, especially in Port-au-Prince, where land values are higher, as is the competition for land. Corruption is more widespread when there is lack of transparency, when there is a monopoly situation, when rules and regulations are complicated and when the public cannot easily control the distribution of the good in question.⁹ All of this is true for the land sector in Port-au-Prince.

Ways for municipalities to counteract corruption and low accountability include more openness and better organization and division of roles. Rules and regulations need to be simplified and made understandable to the citizens. Accurate and updated information on land ownership, distribution of basic services, poverty and other key municipal data should be made available to the public. The capacity building needs assessment should not only cover technical skills but also attitudinal capacity such as gender equality, focus on pro-poor and affordable basic services, and equity in access to information.

There are many possible capacity building interventions for institutional strengthening and organization, but only a few for human capacity building. The reason is that human capacity building is more specific and not much can be said before the needs assessment is carried out.

⁹ Transparency International & UN-HABITAT (March 2004)

4.4 IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS

Most previous development plans of Port-au-Prince were never carried out. Inadequate funding, low initiative, lack of capacity, political support and commitment from civil servants and politicians alike were some of the reasons that were given in the April 2008 stakeholder workshop. Most of the problems could be solved or at least mitigated with capacity building, clarification of roles and responsibilities and institutional strengthening, so this is where to focus interventions.

Another challenge is the powerlessness of the municipalities. Many of the municipalities are nevertheless trying to gain more influence with their scarce resources and unclear mandate and there are many examples that can be shared between them.

To avoid creating yet another urban plan that is not implemented, the process must be transparent and information on it made available for stakeholders and also the inhabitants in the whole metropolitan area. The structures must be clear and easy to access so that the citizens know where to turn to inform themselves or to influence the process.

Another lesson is that if the planning takes place at a high level, the municipalities will not implement it. They must therefore be at the core of the process, from the start, even though the administrative and political system does not yet give them the authority to formally lead the process.

To carry out activities and policies proposed in the previous section, some short recommendations are given. For the implementation it is also important to put extra effort into developing systems to measure results and avoid risks, and therefore these issues are looked upon as well in this section.

4.4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATE ACTORS

The proposed activities will mainly be planned and implemented by the municipalities and the state. Civil society will be part of the process, but will not take on the roles of implementation or coordination.

Both the metropolitan agency and the work to develop and implement the citywide strategic framework can also serve as a way to increase local level influence. From today's very low level of responsibility for most of the municipalities, an expansion in the scope of their tasks would imply that more staff is needed. One way of solving this problem could be seconding staff from the line ministries to the municipalities.

If Haiti's Government chooses to embark on a metropolitan strategic framework for Port-au-Prince, staff must be made available to the already very stretched municipalities. The most obvious way of solving this problem is with salary increases, but this may not be financially possible.

4.4.2 BENCHMARKS AND INDICATORS

In all interventions a monitoring system is needed to track progress, measure results and apply the lessons learnt to the ongoing process. The basic requirements for any monitoring system are benchmarks (or checkpoints) and indicators. These not only assure the residents and donors that they get value for their tax money or funding, but also, and more importantly, they will be a tool in the implementation of the process.

Benchmarks measure progress at certain reference points in time and indicators identify exactly what will be measured. When the benchmarks have been identified and agreed upon, a baseline will be developed so that the starting point is clear.

Information for the baseline will come mostly from existing documents, such as the 2003 development plan, UN reports, government statistics and municipal statistics. Others will have to be found through interviews or small assessments of certain issues (Republic of Haiti 2003).

The indicators are specified by the means of verification, which for the media campaign above could be; number of people reached by the campaign, number of people in low-income areas involved in the process as a result of the campaign, percentage of the reached population that improved their knowledge in a certain area. Setting actual numbers for the indicators makes it possible to measure if a benchmark has been achieved.

4.4.3 RISK ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT

There will be risks that are external – that cannot be controlled by the intervention – such as natural disasters and conflicts. Other risks are internal – can be controlled and managed by the intervention – such as the design of the intervention and the management. Some risks fall in between – can only partially be controlled and influenced – such as the political environment with its policies, institutions and political will. Risk assessment looks at all of these. *[the full version gives a more in-depth description of risk assessment issues]*

Political instability

If there are more changes of government and new staff in the ministries and municipalities, it will be difficult to keep the political support and also the continuity of the intervention. The proposed mitigation of the possible impact of such a situation is to start small, start with a strategic

framework that can adapt to the political situation and also allow for scaling down if need be.

Slow decentralisation

The decentralisation process in Haiti is slow, which will negatively influence the proposed metropolitan strategic framework. On the other hand, the framework will in itself support the decentralisation process, as it increases the responsibilities of the municipalities. While working to influence the decentralisation process, the framework will have to accept the limitations that follow from the centralised environment and adapt its activities to the reality.

Ownership by municipalities

The municipalities are overstretched, with so many emergencies to deal with on a daily basis that they do not have time for planning or coordination. Apart from capacity building to increase efficiency at the municipalities there are other measures that could be taken. Secondment of staff from the ministries to the municipalities is one solution. Another way forward is to lobby for a clarification and possibly upgrading of the municipalities' role. Development partners should be involved in the lobbying, as they normally have access to powerful politicians.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The overwhelming institutional confusion of the city's administration, closely linked to the lack of coordination, needs to be dealt with. This study is a guide to how such a change can be initiated. The establishment of a metropolitan agency is a key requirement in order to initiate a more holistic and integrated strategic planning of the city.

Metropolitan Port-au-Prince should start small with a process that can be attained. The city and all stakeholders should agree on a realistic vision. The metropolitan strategic framework must be tailored to the needs and capability of the stakeholders in Port-au-Prince.

Most of the funding can come from metropolitan Port-au-Prince, including the key city stakeholders including the private sector, and not from outside development partners or donors. The intervention thus more focused and sustainable, targeting the most urgent needs of the city. Development partners should not be left outside the process, but be seen as catalysts. They should be used for technical expertise, sharing experiences and assisting in putting pressure on the politicians for support and for fast-tracking the decentralisation process.

This study makes clear that there are huge gaps between the state and the civil society that will have to be bridged. The residents do not feel included in the state and they do not have the opportunity to influence decisions concerning their daily lives. The state on the other hand feels that the residents, and in particular the NGOs and CBOs, are pushing their own agenda, without any will to coordinate with the authorities. Provision should be made for residents' representatives to participate in and contribute to planning and delivery of basic services. The metropolitan agency should be designed to that end.

For metropolitan Port-au-Prince to develop positively, the major stakeholders will have to agree on a way forward and commit themselves to work in that direction. It will not be easy to merge the many different opinions on how the metropolitan area should develop and views on who will be in charge of different sections. Communication, coordination and participation do not happen by chance but are achieved through hard work. When a shared vision of the future is agreed upon it will be easier to commit to that work.

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THE GLOBAL LAND TOOL NETWORK

The main objective of the Global Land Tool Network (GLTN) is to contribute to poverty alleviation and the Millennium Development Goals through land reform, improved land management and security of tenure.

The Network has developed a global land partnership. Its members include international civil society organizations, international finance institutions, international research and training institutions, donors and professional bodies. It aims to take a more holistic approach to land issues and improve global land coordination in various ways. These include the establishment of a continuum of land rights, rather than a narrow focus on individual land titling, the improvement and development of pro-poor land management, as well as land tenure tools. The new approach also entails unblocking existing initiatives, helping strengthen existing land networks, assisting in the development of affordable gendered land tools useful to poverty-stricken communities, and spreading knowledge on how to implement security of tenure.

The GLTN partners, in their quest to attain the goals of poverty alleviation, better land management and security of tenure through land reform, have identified and agreed on 18 key land tools to deal with poverty and land issues at the country level across all regions. The Network partners argue that the existing lack of these tools, as well as land governance problems, are the main cause of failed implementation at scale of land policies world wide.

The GLTN is a demand driven network where many individuals and groups have come together to address this global problem. For further information, and registration, visit the GLTN web site at www.gltn.net.

ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION

This situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince gives in-depth background to the city's condition in terms of urban development and planning. The report maps a way forward for future planning of the metropolitan area. It argues that the main stakeholder for any urban development intervention should be the state, and more precisely the municipalities. The municipalities in Port-au-Prince need support in planning and delivering basic services.

The challenges and opportunities for a decent urban livelihood in Port-au-Prince have been analysed, and are followed by recommendations on the most effective type of spatial planning and/or land related interventions. The situational analysis of metropolitan Port-au-Prince focuses on citywide planning with an urban land perspective. The term "citywide" embraces the whole metropolitan region. The situational analysis also covers the wider aspects of housing, urban infrastructure and the socio-economic situation.

The situational analysis provides major stakeholders with the necessary background information and hands-on recommendations to initiate a citywide planning process in metropolitan Port-au-Prince.

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