



# MEETING FOOD NEEDS IN THE SAHEL THROUGH GOVERNMENT CASH TRANSFERS: THE EXPERIENCE OF SENEGAL

**Final report**

NATHALIE CISSOKHO



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE



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Chip activation for payment of food aid to recipients in Boutoukfoura, in the department of Goudiry. (DGPSN)



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The Cash Learning Partnership

Cover photo: Lys Arango/ACF Senegal.

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# ACRONYMS

<b>ACF</b>	Action Contre la Faim
<b>ACTED</b>	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development ( <i>Agence pour la Coopération Technique et le Développement</i> )
<b>ADIE</b>	State Information Technology Agency ( <i>Agence de l'Informatique de l'État</i> )
<b>ANSD</b>	National Statistics and Demographics Agency ( <i>Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie</i> )
<b>ARC</b>	African Risk Capacity
<b>CaLP</b>	Cash Learning Partnership
<b>CAPSU</b>	Autonomous Universal Social Protection Fund ( <i>Caisse Autonome de Protection Sociale Universelle</i> )
<b>CDPE</b>	Departmental Committee for Child Protection ( <i>Comité Départemental de Protection de l'Enfant</i> )
<b>CH</b>	Harmonised Framework ( <i>Cadre Harmonisé</i> )
<b>CILSS</b>	Inter-governmental Committee against Drought in the Sahel region ( <i>Comité Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel</i> )
<b>CLM</b>	Task Force against Malnutrition ( <i>Cellule de Lutte contre la Malnutrition</i> )
<b>CORRIANS</b>	Group for a Heightened Response to Food and Nutritional Security in Senegal ( <i>Collectif pour le Renforcement de la Réponse à l'Insécurité Alimentaire et Nutritionnelle au Sénégal</i> )
<b>CSA</b>	Food Security Commission ( <i>Commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire</i> )
<b>CT</b>	Cash Transfer
<b>DAN</b>	Food and Nutrition Division ( <i>Division de l'Alimentation et de la Nutrition</i> )
<b>DGPSN</b>	General Delegation for Social Protection and National Solidarity ( <i>Délégation Générale à la Protection Sociale et à la Solidarité Nationale</i> )
<b>DIREL</b>	Livestock Directorates ( <i>Direction de l'Élevage</i> )
<b>ECHO</b>	Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid ( <i>European Commission</i> )
<b>EWS</b>	Early Warning System
<b>FAO</b>	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
<b>FSN</b>	National Solidarity Fund ( <i>Fonds de Solidarité Nationale</i> )
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product HEA Household Economic Analysis
<b>HKI</b>	Helen Keller International
<b>IDA</b>	International Development Association
<b>MEPF</b>	Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organisation
<b>OBS</b>	Livestock Protection Operation ( <i>Opération de Sauvegarde du Bétail</i> )
<b>OPM</b>	Oxford Policy Management
<b>PMT</b>	Proxy Means Test
<b>PNASAR</b>	National Support Programme for Food Security and Resilience ( <i>Programme National d'Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire et la Résilience</i> )
<b>PNBSF</b>	National Family Allowance Programme ( <i>Programme National de Bourses de Sécurité Familiale</i> )
<b>PNR</b>	National Response Plan ( <i>Plan National de Riposte</i> )
<b>UNDAF</b>	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
<b>PSE</b>	Programme for an Emerging Senegal ( <i>Plan Sénégal Emergent</i> )
<b>PUSA</b>	Food Security Contingency Plan ( <i>Plan d'Urgence pour la Sécurité Alimentaire</i> )
<b>RNU</b>	Single National Register ( <i>Registre National Unique</i> )
<b>SE-CNSA</b>	Executive Secretariat - National Food Security Committee ( <i>Secrétariat Exécutif – Conseil National de Sécurité Alimentaire</i> )
<b>SNPS</b>	National Social Protection Strategy ( <i>Stratégie Nationale de Protection Sociale</i> )
<b>SNSAR</b>	National Food Security and Resilience Strategy ( <i>Stratégie Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire et de Résilience</i> )
<b>TFP</b>	Technical and financial partners
<b>UHC</b>	Universal Health Coverage
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Fund
<b>USAID / FFP</b>	U.S. Agency for International Development / Food for Peace
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

## SUBJECT OF THE CASE STUDY

Sahelian countries have formulated policies aimed at protecting those households most vulnerable to seasonal shocks, through the introduction of cash transfers as a social safety net. They are also addressing issues related to resource and coordination with a view to taking full charge of the response to those among their population in chronic need. By building capacity to implement a cash transfer system to meet chronic poverty, and by accelerating the transition from an in-kind to a cash transfer-based aid response during busy seasons, Senegal is among those countries to have made the most progress in the transition from seasonal responses led by non-governmental humanitarian actors to coverage by a national social protection system.

**This case study lists the factors that have enabled progress to be made by the Senegalese government in taking charge of the response to seasonal needs through cash transfers, and outlines the challenges yet to be overcome in upscaling and ensuring that such responses are sustainable.**

The case study does not offer a response to specific technical challenges on the ground in Senegal, but rather documents them and identifies sound practices and recommendations for governments and non-governmental actors providing seasonal or long-term cash transfer schemes in other countries in the region facing similar constraints, such as chronic need, limited national resources, implementing social protection frameworks and government cash transfer schemes, and technical and institutional challenges. The progress made in Senegal in enabling a role for government to respond to the needs of the most vulnerable among its population, and in operationalising the seasonal shock response effort, may offer some insights for neighbouring countries. In addition to this case study, CaLP works to facilitate dialogue at regional level in order to share experiences and disseminate best practice among other countries.


## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# INTRODUCTION

## BACKGROUND AND NEEDS

Like the rest of the Sahel region, Senegal's poverty rate is high, at 46.7% or approximately six million people, leading to significant chronic food and nutritional need.<sup>1</sup> According to the World Food Programme (WFP), 17% of the population is affected by food insecurity, including some areas (concentrated within five regions) where severe and persistent acute malnutrition has been prevalent since 2012. The March 2018 Harmonised Framework estimated the number of people presently facing a food and nutritional crisis situation at over 300,000, with the number expected to peak at over 735,000 (of which 30,000 in Phase 4) during the hunger gap.<sup>2,3</sup> Despite the reduction in chronic malnutrition rates among children under 5 between 2010 and 2016, 2018 has proven particularly challenging in some areas of the Sahel, underlining once again the vulnerability of the population in certain regions of Senegal.<sup>4</sup>



Source: EDS-C Demographic and Continued Health Surveys for 2010, 2012-2014, and 2015-2016.

1 2011

2 CILSS, "Harmonised Framework for analysis and identification of risk areas and communities experiencing food and nutritional insecurity in Sahel and West Africa (CH) – Regional analysis of acute food and nutritional insecurity – Current situation (March-May 2018) and projection (June-August 2018)", March 2018.

3 Known as the emergency level (humanitarian aid focused on populations identified in levels 3 (crisis) to 5 (famine).

4 Triggering a declaration of L3 emergency within WFP in the Sahel, in particular Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 5.8 million people are forecast to be in food insecurity across the Sahel, an increase of 50% on 2017, potentially peaking at 6.5 million during the hunger period (June to September).

Chronic malnutrition rates of around 15% nationally, coupled with more severe occurrences in some years, highlight the difficulty in providing an adequate response to food and nutritional need in Senegal. Faced with the need for structural support systems on one hand, and flexibility to respond to episodic shocks on the other, the roles and responsibilities of development actors and humanitarian actors often overlap.

Throughout West Africa, both groups have worked since 2014 to improve mutual understanding and definition of relevant concepts such as "social protection", "social safety nets" and "cash transfers".<sup>5</sup> Despite this, arriving at a definition of a crisis requiring specific support, which may involve non-governmental actors and which would engage an institutional response from government remains difficult, with rapid development of political frameworks and national strategies for social protection, but limited capacity and resources. These challenges were addressed at the [learning workshop](#) hosted in Dakar by the Regional Platform for Social Protection in April 2018, during which the experience of Senegal was shared.

## RESPONSE

Although the government launched its cash transfer scheme to combat structural poverty in 2013, pilot schemes conducted with the support of partners have accelerated the transition from in-kind to cash transfer distributions in addressing seasonal needs during the hunger gap.

This has occurred amidst efforts by Senegal since 2017 to implement the "*New Way of Working*" established at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016 in Istanbul, which sought to increase cooperation among key actors, including strengthening the linkage between emergency situations and development. This has happened in the case of seasonal cash transfers implemented by NGOs and incorporated within Response Plans over the past three years, and have helped shape the government's response strategy. Gradually, as humanitarian funding fell and the government developed its vision and the capacity to deliver cash transfers, the emphasis shifted from seasonal responses towards prevention, by developing structural measures at government level and supporting vulnerable communities to develop resilience, in order to reduce dependence on emergency responses.

Since 2012, Senegal has rolled out a number of social protection measures, including the equal opportunity card and Universal Health Coverage (UHC). Senegal is also one of the most advanced countries in the region with respect to cash transfers by government. However, while the government's commitment to CTs is now evident, its ability to leverage the scheme to meet seasonal needs remains a challenge, and raises questions in terms of the positioning of programmes within the institutional framework, their alignment with policy frameworks and planning, as well as the intrinsic issues of targeting and budget. Scalability of programmes remains an issue over the longer term, particularly in relation to funding and capacity building, as well as the adaptability of programmes to the Sahel region.

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<sup>5</sup> See [discussion paper](#) from the learning event hosted by CaLP and UNICEF in Dakar in June 2014.



# 01. GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF THE RESPONSE: SUCCESS FACTORS

## A POLITICAL PROJECT

### Commitment to cash transfers

As a social protection mechanism and emergency response, the design of cash transfer systems varies considerably between countries. While all governments have incorporated the schemes in their strategic social protection frameworks, bolstered by regional initiatives,<sup>6</sup> they are at different stages in their awareness and adoption of the mechanism. Some countries therefore maintain a "pilot" approach, with short-term planning based on available opportunities (e.g. external funding) and with limited coverage. Response efforts during seasonal peaks across the Sahel region are still mostly confined to non-governmental humanitarian actors.<sup>7</sup>

Senegal therefore stands out with its willingness to take ownership of the cash transfer initiative. In his 2012 presidential election campaign, Macky Sall announced the creation of a social protection fund with an annual budget of 120 billion CFA francs.<sup>8</sup> Elected in February 2012, the President quickly introduced the first social protection measures to be incorporated within a package of support measures at all stages of life, including Universal Health Coverage, an equal opportunities card to facilitate access to education, training, employment, transport and access to health care for disabled citizens, reductions in the price of foodstuffs, price controls on gas, free health care for children under 5 and senior citizens, and a number of major and/or long-term treatments.<sup>9</sup> Included in this package were cash transfers through the National Family Allowance Programme (PNBSF).

**Established in October 2013, the PNBSF was designed to respond to chronic poverty and to build capacity and resilience among the poorest households.** It expanded rapidly (see chart below) and is expected to cover 400,000 households in 2018. In addition to cash transfers issued by the Senegal Postal Service to the poorest households,<sup>10</sup> the scheme includes four annual awareness sessions addressing the priority areas of health, civil status, education, as well as a session looking at the scope of the scheme.

<sup>6</sup> In particular, "African Union Social Policy Framework for Africa" (AU-SPF), 2008

<sup>7</sup> Cash transfer social safety nets implemented by government agencies in the six Sahel countries as part of the World Bank's Adaptive Social Protection project covers 486,177 households (approximately 3 million recipients) over the year. As a comparison, the WFP estimates that 6.5 million people would require food aid for the 2018 hunger period.

<sup>8</sup> Le Populaire: "Macky Sall, leader of the "Macky Coalition 2012"; 20 January 2012, <http://www.seneweb.com/news/Politique/macky-sall-leader->

[de-la-laquo-coalition-macky-2012-raquo-laquo-nous-allons-proposer-la-limitation-de-l-rsquo-age-de-tout-ca\\_n\\_57957.html](http://www.seneweb.com/news/Politique/macky-sall-leader-de-la-coalition-macky-2012-raquo-laquo-nous-allons-proposer-la-limitation-de-l-rsquo-age-de-tout-ca_n_57957.html)


<sup>9</sup> The vision of an "integrated" system is contained in the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS), whose "short-term" aim for the next 10 years is to "reform the Social Protection system to ensure more efficient use of resources, system improvements in favour of a more inclusive form of social protection".

<sup>10</sup> Recipients covered by the social safety net support project receive cash via Orange Money (15% of the amount of allowances).

## The response to food and nutrition crises



Alongside this structural approach, **the Senegalese government has for a number of years developed Food Security Emergency Plans (PUSAs)**, also known as Response Plans, coordinated by the Executive Secretariat for the National Food Security Committee (SE-CNSA), in response to food needs arising during the hunger gap. This has involved distribution by the Food Security Committee (CSA) of food aid (typically rice) to areas impacted by crises. Such in-kind distributions often experienced delays, with rice sometimes reaching recipients after the hunger gap, as occurred in 2015. Rice and cereal warehouses located throughout the country are often empty or rarely used, thus failing to offer the required response capability. **Furthermore, with imported rice continuing to supply functioning markets, cash transfers appear more suitable.**

A cash transfer pilot scheme in response to the hunger gap was therefore conducted in 2017 by the CSA for the General Delegation for Social Protection and National Solidarity (DGPSN) in conjunction with the SE-CNSA in the Goudiry and Malem Hoddar departments, funded by the World Bank's *Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Multi-donor Trust Fund*.<sup>11</sup> The project provided assistance to 8,175 households at a cost of just over one billion CFA francs. **This initial pilot demonstrated that another form of aid was possible, and accelerated the transition from in-kind distribution to cash transfers in response to shocks.** The President then stated his intention that most if not all future food aid distributed during the hunger gap should take the form of cash transfers.



<sup>11</sup> Multi-donor trust fund of \$11 million in 2016.

While 2018 is proving a particularly tough year in the region, with as many as 6.5 million people impacted by food insecurity during the hunger gap between June and September, coupled with one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world, the Senegalese government has taken initiatives to prevent further deterioration. Drawing on the experience of the 2017 pilot project, an early cash transfer was completed at the beginning of 2018 in Matam and Podor, with 1.3 billion CFA francs disbursed to 30,608 households, funded by government with help from a Japanese development fund and implemented by the CSA.<sup>12</sup>



Source: CILSS, *Harmonised Framework for analysis and identification of risk areas and communities experiencing food and nutritional insecurity in Sahel and West Africa (CH) – Regional analysis of acute food and nutritional insecurity – Current situation (March-May 2018) and projection (June-August 2018), March 2018*

<sup>12</sup> The Potor, Matam, Ranérou, Kanel, Tambacounda and Goudiry areas are particularly susceptible to food insecurity, with 319,000 in a food crisis situation before the hunger gap (March to May), with 750,000 (47,000 households)<sup>12</sup> forecast to be in a food crisis situation during the hunger gap. (National Food Security Committee (CNSA), April 2018)

TABLE 01

SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT-LED CASH TRANSFER INITIATIVES

	COORDINATION	IMPLEMENTATION	VALUE OF CASH TRANSFERS	FUNDING
PNBSF	DGPSN	Postal Service	25,000 CFA francs / quarter	Government & World Bank
2017 Pilot (PUSA)	DGPSN (with SE-CNSA)	CSA	45,000 CFA francs / month (max.)	World Bank


**These interventions demonstrate the political will of the Senegalese government to elevate the role of government cash transfers as both a structural response to chronic poverty affecting a section of its population, and as a more effective seasonal response, previously characterised by delayed distribution of foodstuffs and/or cash transfers by non-governmental actors.** The change was thus described by the Executive Secretariat of the CNSA at the announcement of the response plan: "We won't wait for the situation to worsen, which is why the Government has decided to take the bull by the horns. Partner organisations then come in as a back-up. (...) We have implemented strategies so that we can act now, rather than react later".<sup>13</sup>

## GOVERNMENT CASH TRANSFERS WITHIN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

A few months after President Macky Sall was elected, the DGPSN was established under the auspices of the Office of the President in February 2012. It assists the President in formulating social protection and national solidarity policy, implements and contributes to monitoring and evaluation of policies (e.g. PNBSF), coordinates the National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS), and is involved in mobilising funds. Mechanisms used in response to crises, such as the National Solidarity Fund (FSN) and the CSA are also included in DGPSN programmes. The DGPSN is funded by budget allocation from government, subventions and donations, and bilateral and multilateral cooperation funds. The Steering Committee is made up of one representative from the Office of the President, Office of the Prime Minister, various Government departments and two representatives from the forum of non-governmental actors.

**The introduction of a single body reporting to the highest office of government was a positive factor in ensuring the development of coherent government action in the area of social protection, including shock responses.** It also facilitated engagement with stakeholders in central and local government, through the recruitment of regional coordinators. However, implementing the structure and defining roles and responsibilities in relation to pre-existing organisations has not been straightforward.

<sup>13</sup> Le Soleil newspaper, 25 April 2018.



The Executive Secretariat of the National Food Security Committee (SE-CNSA), formed in 1998, oversees implementation of the National Food Security and Resilience Strategy (SNSAR) established in January 2016 and operationalised through the National Support Programme for Food Security and Resilience (PNASAR), developed in line with the Programme for an Emerging Senegal (PSE; discussed later). It prepares and coordinates National Response Plans (PUSA) in conjunction with partner organisations to meet seasonal food and nutritional needs, and is also responsible for targeting and monitoring the response effort. However, the CSA (Food Security Committee), which reports to the DGPSN, is responsible for its implementation, which now involves cash transfers since pilot operations in 2017. **The institutional integration of the CSA within the DGPSN has facilitated incorporation of emergency responses during seasonal peaks within social protection policy, with responsibility shifting to the DGPSN.** Food insecurity response plans are therefore always coordinated by the SE-CNSA, but as an integral part of social protection policy, with implementation overseen by the DGPSN in collaboration with the SE-CNSA.

The DGPSN strives to engage the expertise of the various state agencies as much as possible in implementation of these programmes, including the National Statistics and Demographics Agency (ANSD) and the State Information Technology Agency (ADIE) to take care of information and management systems and the Proxy Means Test (PMT) application used in targeting. This helps ensure that plans achieve buy-in and are credible and sustainable.

The Delegation also coordinates the PNBSF and creates a linkage with other social protection measures such as UHC and the Equal Opportunity card (whose recipients are automatically eligible for allowances).

## Cash transfers within the strategic framework

The primary strategic framework that guides government action in Senegal is the Programme for an Emerging Senegal (PSE), which is the "medium and long-term economic and social policy benchmark"<sup>14</sup> to accelerate movement towards emerging country status by 2035. Social protection is included in strand two which addresses human capital and offers an integrated vision of social protection measures, referring to the role of the various social policy tools, such as non-contributory safety nets, while addressing the specific needs of groups such as workers and pensioners, young children and disabled people. The PNBSF and CMU are among the four major projects under the PSE.

The National Social Protection Strategy (SNPS) was revised in 2015 and published in June 2016 to reflect the priorities set out in the PSE. It demonstrates the political commitment to social protection set out above, explaining in particular that "Senegal is introducing a major paradigm shift in development policy by viewing social protection as an investment in much the same way as infrastructure, and not a charge." The aim of the strategy to 2035 is to "build a social protection system that is accessible to all Senegalese citizens, providing each with a guaranteed basic income and illness cover, but also a general safety net for those affected by shocks and crises that could cause them to fall into poverty and to help build resilience when faced with social risks." The strategy therefore aims to meet the structural needs of vulnerable groups, while providing for crisis response (Aim 5 "Build community resilience to shocks and disasters").

**Government cash transfers in Senegal now meet two objectives: the response to structural poverty and the response to seasonal peaks.** While the SNPS accords importance to cash transfers in the response to structural poverty through the PNSBF, these were not mentioned in the crisis response, as this normally involved in-kind distribution. The experiment conducted with the support of the World Bank since 2017 has altered this view of CTs, which are now fully recognised as an emergency mechanism. All responses are now coordinated by the DGPSN, and it is essential that the various uses for CTs are fully set out; they may serve to bridge the gap between structural and emergency responses in helping to build resilience among vulnerable communities, or they may seek to decouple these operations, depending on their design and implementation (e.g. targeting, budget, frequency, etc.).

**In this context, coordination with humanitarian and development partner organisations in implementing CTs in Senegal is essential, in order to support and encourage the transition to government-led responses to the needs of vulnerable communities.** The UNDAF<sup>15</sup> therefore dovetails with priority areas in the Programme for an Emerging Senegal. The humanitarian work programme for 2018 refers to "the gradual handover involving development actors and state agencies".<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning: "Overview of the Programme for an Emerging Senegal" <http://www.finances.gouv.sn/index.php/finances/136-resume-du-plan-senegal-emergent>

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Development Assistance Framework  
<sup>16</sup> [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018\\_senegal\\_plan\\_de\\_travail\\_humanitaire.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2018_senegal_plan_de_travail_humanitaire.pdf)

## PARTNERS

### The World Bank

#### **Social safety net support project**

The social safety net support project is implemented by the DGPSN. It is funded by a loan from the International Development Association (IDA) and the World Bank to the Senegalese government. The project went ahead in spite of, and was subsequently added to, the PNBSF. Its activities are not separate from the DGPSN remit, but are aimed at supporting the Delegation in its various missions, as well as strengthening the institutional framework and systems relating to the PNBSF and social safety net operations across Senegal. The social safety net project assisted management of the Single National Register (RNU) to develop the social register, through technical support in its design, funding for identification surveys and funding for the information and management system.

The social safety net support project assisted the PNBSF in creating a system for implementing the scheme at local level, through recruitment of local NGOs in every region of the country. The project also assisted in designing and producing the tools to raise awareness around health, civil protection and education deployed as part of the programme. The project also funded 15% of family social security allowances.

#### **Multi-donor Trust Fund**

This programme aims to minimise the impact of climate change and other shocks, thereby reducing the cost of emergency operations. This fund, worth \$11 million and made available to the government in 2016, is an initial tranche of funding from the World Bank to operationalise cash transfers.

More generally, the World Bank provides technical and policy support to the Senegalese government in developing government cash transfer schemes and in capacity building for these social safety nets to be adaptive (or reactive) in responding effectively to seasonal shocks. In particular, it supports the government in establishing operational thresholds used in effective Early Warning Systems (EWS), to ensure consistency and speed in response efforts (discussed later). Assistance from the World Bank builds the DGPSN's capacity to meet its commitments and to coordinate with partners, increasing the pace of transition to government-led operations.

## Non-governmental humanitarian actors

The government works closely with "social operators" (i.e. NGOs) paid by the government through the social safety net support project, in order to take charge of all "population monitoring" activities in implementation of the PNBSF; social operators host awareness sessions and handle claims and complaints using relays. These relays each track 50 households, with each supervisor responsible for 20 relays (equal to 1,000 households), ensuring that the programme is tightly monitored at local level. The PNBSF is therefore backed where possible by existing programmes. This was the case for the Guédiawaye resilience project delivered by Helen Keller International (HKI), and the women's tontines supported by a local NGO in the Médina area of Dakar.

Social operators also work with the RNU, with a significant number using it for targeting operations linked with food security programmes. Humanitarian partners work with the SECNSA in developing the PUSA, offering expertise in their target areas determined according to the priorities of the Plan.

NGOs that are members of the Group for a Heightened Response to Food and Nutritional Security in Senegal (CORRIANS) have made a significant contribution through specific interventions during the hunger period (see table below). However, **the gradual reduction in available humanitarian funding in Senegal has led to the transition towards a government-led response**, creating new roles for humanitarian partners and refocusing humanitarian efforts on more severe crises. The 2018 humanitarian response programme, which identified a funding requirement of \$16.8 million, receives only 30.7% of funding from this source.<sup>17</sup> CORRIANS members therefore offer their expertise to government, such as completion of targeting studies to inform methodological decisions taken in expanding the Single National Register, by combining the strengths of the various approaches adopted, inclusion of the Oxfam household socio-economic profiling study in Guédiawaye and Piline in the SNPS, and the support of ACTED in developing a system of accountability for government.

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<sup>17</sup> June 2018. This is almost as much as for the whole Sahel region, at 33%.



TABLE 02


NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS PER PROGRAMME

	MEASUREMENT UNIT	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
National Food Insecurity Response Plan (CSA)	Individuals measured according to no. of tonnes distributed				252,000	684,614
National Food Insecurity Response Plan (ONG et PAM)	Individuals	N/A	N/A	N/A	274,673	254,149
Agriculture disaster fund	Data not available					
Catastrophe prevention and management	Data not available					
National Solidarity Fund - FSN	Individuals				1,167	2,665
Flooding prevention and recovery fund	Flooding prevention and recovery fund					
Agricultural insurance	Individuals	1,511	2,257	9,751	13,559	19,690

Sources: Senegal, Social Protection Spending Review, Rougeaux (2017); 2015 Response Plan Review, Republic of Senegal (2016); 2015 Response Programme for Senegal, Republic of Senegal (2014).

Few actors are engaged in cash transfer initiatives, but assistance outside of government support structures are still required in 2018. With funding from the US government via USAID-FFP, the WFP has distributed food vouchers to 22,000 vulnerable people in the Matam department of Senegal. USAID-FFP has also supported ACF in its operations in Podor, assisting 15,050 recipients in 2,150 vulnerable households.

UNICEF has also provided technical and financial support to the government for measures aimed at children. This support focuses on three primary areas: strengthening the data system, improving public finances and assisting local authorities, and has produced a pilot cash transfer scheme in the Kolda region, with transfers disbursed by the Departmental Child Protection Committee (CDPE). The pilot scheme has been a learning model for the government in implementation of the PNBSF (in particular for targeting and support measures). UNICEF has also contributed to the government's implementation of the Social Budget Monitoring Centre (OSBS), which tracks social spending and seeks to achieve optimal impact among children.



Source : Oxford Policy Management, 2016

Partners therefore occupy a number of roles in the expansion of social protection in Senegal. The Oxford Policy Management (OPM) conceptual framework for shock-responsive social protection systems<sup>18</sup> highlights a range of approaches have been adopted across the world, which tend towards greater integration, including:


- **Shadow alignment with the RNU and PUSA for previous responses**
- **Horizontal and vertical expansion in severe crises**
- **Refocusing efforts on groups with specific needs**
- **Backing for additional operations**

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.opml.co.uk/projects/shock-responsive-social-protection-systems>

## 02. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF UPSCALING

### FUNDING FOR UPSCALING

Around thirty social protection projects and schemes have been developed by the Senegalese government, ten of which accounted for approximately 93% of the total budget spent in social protection in 2015<sup>19</sup>. 40 billion CFA francs have already been released by the government for delivery of the programme to 400,000 households in 2018 (less than 0.5% of GDP). Despite the rapid expansion of the programme, the needs of communities remain significant,<sup>20</sup> and the issues of child education, health care, along with the rapidly changing demographics of Senegal, raise questions about the sustainability of funding for and scaling of the PNBSF.<sup>21</sup> The chart below indicates that with greater investment as a proportion of GDP, the coverage rate for those in poverty in a typical year would increase considerably to above 50%.



Source: Carlo del Ninno, Pierre Fallavier, and Sarah Coll-Black. 2016  
Protecting the Vulnerable in the Drylands of Sub-Saharan Africa

<sup>19</sup> SNPS

<sup>20</sup> According to UNICEF, 49% of children under 18 live in poor families.

<sup>21</sup> Annual population growth rate of 3.08%.

Macky Sall's election manifesto mentioned that the cost of social policy (primarily Family Allowance, Basic Universal Health Coverage and the Retirement Bonus) would be "funded entirely by cost cutting measures elsewhere in the budget (120 billion CFA francs)" and that long-term funding would be covered by levies "on highly profitable activities" (e.g. telecoms, mining and extracting, pharmaceuticals and tobacco, financial transactions).

**Allowances are at present mostly funded by the national budget, but all operational costs and 15% of allowances are funded through lending by the International Development Association (IDA).** The total loan is \$40.5 million, of which \$25.7 million is earmarked for cash transfers under the PNBSF. \$4.9 million has been earmarked for additional essential measures to establish and expand the programme and for sustainable impact (e.g. information, education and communication campaigns to promote investment in preventive health care, hygiene, nutrition, childhood development and education).

**Tax revenues are the main funding issue with respect to government social safety nets.** The government intends to improve its performance in this area<sup>22</sup> and to increase the tax ratio from 14.8% to 20% in order to broaden the tax base and increase the overall tax take. To achieve this, the government intends to modernise tax administration procedures such as through the development of innovative tools (e.g. online declarations, remote payments, e-taxes, etc.), as well as better addressing specific areas, in particular the issue of taxation for the informal sector. This can only be achieved if the economic climate in the country continues to be favourable (the budget deficit was 2.9% of nominal GDP in 2017, and is forecast to be 3.5% in 2018, with a growth forecast for 2018 of 7% (7.2% in 2017)).<sup>23</sup> While Senegal has a vibrant economy, with 407,882 companies recording a combined annual turnover of 11.35 trillion CFA francs, 97% of companies operate in the informal sector. 3% of the formal sector generate 70% of total revenue.<sup>24</sup> Formalisation of the private sector is one of the major challenges faced by the social protection system, with the International Labour Organisation offering expertise in this area.

Other sources of funding are being explored, as addressed in the April 2018 workshop hosted by CaLP and the regional forum for social protection in Dakar, such as:<sup>25</sup>

- a. **Enlisting the help of religious organisations to raise funds that could finance social protection schemes (e.g. solidarity month in Mali and Burkina Faso);**
- b. **Abolish subsidies on some non-essential products and tax luxury items;**
- c. **Exploiting opportunities presented by corporate social responsibility to fund social protection.**

**In addition to the funding challenges in upscaling, accountability in the social protection system is a key issue for its expansion, and is essential for the transparency and governance of programmes.** This concerns communication about the programme, creation of a monitoring system by recipients, and management of claims and complaints.

<sup>22</sup> Despite a reduction in the tax ratio from 15.7% in 2016 to 14.8% in 2017, the tax take has increased over this period, from 1.791 trillion CFA francs in 2016 to 1.845 trillion CFA francs in 2017. Source: Le Soleil, "Broadening the tax base: Senegal wants to raise rates to the normal community level", 15 April 2018

<sup>23</sup> Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Planning

<sup>24</sup> ANSD

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.cashlearning.org/downloads/recommandations200418vf.pdf>

## FUNDING FOR CRISIS RESPONSES

### The pace of funding

**Timeliness of the crisis response is critical to preventing more households from falling into extreme poverty**, through negative coping strategies to deal with shocks (e.g. selling livestock, reducing the number of meals, etc.), and to minimise the cost burden of response (i.e. in terms of spread and the cost level). The response to recurring shocks usually impacts heavily upon investment opportunities for development and capacity building among vulnerable communities.<sup>26</sup> The Sahel region's exposure to the effects of climate change could in the case of Senegal reduce GDP by 8% between now and 2030 (World Bank, 2017). The response to food crises is part of the PNASAR, which makes reference in its sub-programme V ("Improving the mechanism for prevention and management of food crises"<sup>27</sup>) to the role of social protection in achieving these objectives, in particular expanding the PNBSF programme. Timely funding for the response to seasonal shocks is also critical.<sup>28</sup> In the past (such as in 2015 and 2017), the late approval of the PUSA (developed by consensus using output from the Harmonised Framework<sup>29</sup>), led to delays in securing funding and therefore to delays in implementation on the ground. Lessons were learned from this experience, and the government intends to increase its rapid response capacity, such through early estimates of the number of households at risk using data from the Early Warning System (EWS), and by improving coordination among different actors to allocate optimal resources in priority areas identified by government and to fill in the gaps. The partnership with the World Bank is particularly strong in the area of crisis responsiveness. In order to ensure funding is secured in a timely manner, the World Bank recommends the following actions by government:

- **Cost analysis of a "normal" annual response, typical variations from year to year, and the frequency of more severe shocks. Costs include the value of transfers to recipients and all operational costs.**
- **Based on the above simulation, identifying the appropriate combination of tools to apply in the response to food insecurity. Alongside this, it is important to support private insurance schemes targeting less vulnerable groups.**
- **Introducing the policy tools identified and, in conjunction with accounting departments of implementing organisations, developing tools and procedures to ensure smooth and timely funding disbursement arrangements.<sup>30</sup>**

### Availability of funding

Efforts to secure funds for crisis responses should first of all identify what the government can cover based on the national budget, and the circumstances and measures by which external funds should be raised. The graph below, taken from research by the World Bank, indicates that covering regular-to-severe need in Senegal would require less than 1% of GDP. **External support does however remain essential.**

<sup>26</sup> In 2011, approximately \$4 billion dollars were spent on humanitarian aid in the Sahel and horn of Africa, more than 10 per cent of total international development aid to all of Sub-Saharan Africa (*World Bank, Agence Française de Développement, Cervigni, Morris, 2015*)


<sup>27</sup> This sub-programme accounted for [315 or 135? (possible source error)] billion CFA francs, approximately 13% of the total programme cost

<sup>28</sup> DGPSN, CaLP workshop, 19-20 April 2018

<sup>29</sup> SE/CNSA, Livestock Directorate (DIREL), Task Force against Malnutrition (CLM), Food and Nutrition Division (DAN), Technical and Financial Partners (TFP) and NGOs

<sup>30</sup> Branders N., Coudouel A., Rougeaux S., Senegal: Using appropriate social protection measure in effective shock response - the case study of responses to food insecurity. World Bank, 2018

## MEETING FOOD NEEDS IN THE SAHEL THROUGH GOVERNMENT CASH TRANSFERS



Source: Carlo del Ninno, Pierre Fallavier, and Sarah Coll-Black. 2016  
Protecting the Vulnerable in the Drylands of Sub-Saharan Africa

Resources mobilised by the government in response to shocks remain insufficient and erratic. For example, the 2015 Recovery Plan, which addressed three areas (food assistance, nutrition and mixed farming or assistance to livestock at risk), was allocated a total budget of 36.2 billion CFA francs, but the share for implementation was 14 billion CFA francs - 43.6% of the budget. 61% of this funding was raised through the African Risk Capacity<sup>31</sup> trust fund, into which the Senegalese government pays an annual contribution (insurance premium).

According to the World Bank, "Over the period 2010-2015, total spending on shock response programmes accounted for between 4% and 8% of total social protection spending, ranging between 4 and 12 billion CFA francs annually over this period. Public expenditure to replenish food buffer stocks accounted for between 20% and 50% of total spend on shock response over the period." Over the same period, humanitarian funding used by NGOs continued to account for a significant share of the crisis response, as they declared payments totalling over 2.3 billion CFA francs<sup>32</sup> to households facing food insecurity in 2015 alone (Food Security Sectoral Group, 2016).

Indeed, aside from the inclusion of the crisis response in the original Finance Act (LFI) and the mechanisms illustrated above, other funding sources are limited and somewhat unpredictable.

<sup>31</sup> African Union agency established in 2012 that introduced an insurance system to help member states address food shocks related to climate change. Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Gambia, Malawi and Kenya are members, along with Germany and the United Kingdom, which

provide financial support.

<sup>32</sup> This figure is taken from the Partners Review of the Food Security Sectoral Group, 2015. WFP-funded transfers were deducted from the total amount.

**Funding from donors:**

A significant proportion of the food insecurity response is funded directly by international donors. They provide direct funding to NGOs and the government.

**Emergency Response Fund.**

This fund was established under the Finance Act for the Ministry of Finance between 2010 and 2013, to be used in emergency situations and upon triggering of the ORSEC plan. In practice, it was only used for such purposes in 2011. In 2010, 2012 and 2013, the amended Finance Act allocated these funds to other areas. This area is no longer present in the Finance Act.

**Budget reallocation,**

by way of the amended Finance Act. The MEFP may reallocate unused funding to response efforts for shocks and catastrophes. However, it is a lengthy process and requires presidential approval.

**Management reserve under the government budget.**

This reserve accounts for approximately 5% of the central government budget and is intended to address needs not specified in the LFI. Although it can in theory be used in response to shocks and catastrophes, it is not reserved for this use. It is exhausted every year and used for other purposes.

Source : World Bank, 2018

## CAPACITY BUILDING FOR SCALABLE CASH TRANSFERS

A number of contextual factors help facilitate cash transfers in Senegal: functioning markets, with product availability and general price stability, as well as the presence of payment facilities throughout the country<sup>33</sup> (although their capacity and responsiveness need improvement). Government efforts, supported by the World Bank, to establish the Single National Register is also essential. However, the capacity to take full charge of the response to seasonal crises encounters a number of specific challenges, institutional and financial, as described above, but also in terms of expertise:

- **Setting thresholds and parameters for a shock:** The government lacks the tools to define procedures for triggering an emergency response. This would enable a reduction in response times and therefore the cost of response efforts.
- **Operational tools to increase response effectiveness<sup>34</sup>:** in operational terms, there is currently no shared system or local facility for payment or claims.
- **Data validity:** as is the case throughout the Sahel region, the response to seasonal shocks, typically implemented by non-governmental actors, uses output from the Harmonised Framework (CH). SECNSA makes improvements to its EWS in order to obtain objective, high-quality indicators and contributes to the definition of action thresholds.

33 DGPSN

34 The first two items were obtained from the World Bank in Senegal, 2018

To meet these challenges, the government mainly draws upon the expertise of state agencies, as outlined above, while avoiding reliance on outside sources. However, the expertise of its partners is also engaged as part of ongoing dialogue between these actors and government.

## SINGLE NATIONAL REGISTER AND TARGETING

At present, the register covers 452,000 households in Senegal. Its continued expansion is aimed at quickly reaching 513,000 households, roughly equivalent to the poverty rate in Senegal of 46.7%. One of the strengths of the RNU is that it is able to bypass the process of identifying households in each shock, which is very costly and could lead to duplication of effort by partners. The intention of the President is for the RNU to be used for all CT operations implemented in Senegal (including efforts to combat food insecurity coordinated by SECNSA). The DGPSN pays ANSD to carry out surveys and the ADIE applies PMT targeting for government-led programmes.

The creation, expansion and updating of the register do however encounter challenges, as explained by the DGPSN at the CaLP workshop in April 2018; should the register be used even though it is incomplete, at the risk of excluding recipients? In reality, collecting the information required to create the register without taking any action is difficult for people to accept and risks causing tensions. On the other hand, ensuring that all partners approve and align with the register can take time, and may prolong the period in which different targeting and action approaches occur in parallel.


Despite these challenges, five regions have already updated the register with assistance from social operators on the ground, who worked with community-based groups on the project.

The RNU aims to include all recipients of social programmes: the PNBSF (whose aims relate to education, poverty reduction, nutrition, self-sufficiency and protection from shocks), UHC, PUSA, and the Self-sufficiency and Employability scheme (aimed at young people and women), in order to create a single system for identifying recipients. Although diverse groups can be impacted, studies have shown a strong correlation between poverty and vulnerability in the case of Senegal, justifying the use of PMT (economic targeting) for CTs to various vulnerable groups.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, households not in chronic poverty may still be vulnerable to shocks, in particular in regions exposed to recurring shocks.

<sup>35</sup> For example, poor households are impacted more heavily by shocks than those households not in poverty; twice as many poor households report being impacted by a shock in the past 12 months, and households in the bottom quintile are 20 per cent more likely to have experienced a shock in the year preceding the survey as those in the top quintile.

Households below the poverty line, most often in rural areas, have fewer resources available to cope with shocks. The majority of households affected by a shock that report not having a response strategy are poor, and have to deal with significant loss of livestock and agricultural output. (World Bank - Heriot-Watt University 2017)





Source : World Bank, 2018

Non-governmental actors working in Senegal used HEA, which raised concerns over whether government-led programmes could actually reach recipients covered in their operations.<sup>36</sup> **Outside of Senegal and throughout the region, targeting has become a major challenge in the transition from responses led by outside partners in favour of those implemented through government programmes.** However, the HEA method is considered too costly (in terms of time and human resources) by the government to be used extensively. A comparative study of targeting methods has shown that while differences exist, there are significant commonalities.<sup>37</sup> According to the DGPSN, it is possible to configure the RNU to adapt to a "humanitarian" targeting process in the event of a crisis. Non-governmental humanitarian actors have worked with the DGPSN to prepare a robust questionnaire that would enable expansion of the register.

Community-based groups have been set up throughout the country to receive claims and complaints. In the event of an exclusion error, operatives will conduct on-site checks to determine if a household should be included. Information is collected on tablets connected to a server and synced automatically, facilitating expansion of the RNU.

<sup>36</sup> HEA - Household Economic Analysis

<sup>37</sup> This study comparing the targeting method for the RNU, which documents the poorest households, and the targeting methodology based on the HEA, establishes a positive correlation between indicators for food and nutritional insecurity, and poverty indicators such as per

capita consumption (Diagne, 2017). These concepts are inseparable in the case of Senegal and are difficult to differentiate, which suggests that when responding to households affected by a shock, the difference between targeting based on poverty or food insecurity appears minimal (World Bank, 2018).

## VALUE OF CASH TRANSFERS

The amount, frequency and duration of cash transfers is a determining factor in its impact. When designing programmes, the aim of the operation must determine the most suitable approach to ensure that recipients' progress meets expectations. Operations whose aims clearly diverge could therefore be developed using different amounts.

TABLE 03

TABLE OF VALUES FOR EACH CASH TRANSFER SCHEME IN SENEGAL

PROGRAMME	AMOUNT DISTRIBUTED	HOUSEHOLD	FREQUENCY	DURATION
PNBSF	25,000 CFA francs	Fixed	Quarterly	5 years
WFP (vouchers during hunger period)	5,000 to 40,000 CFA francs depending on household size	Up to 8 per household	Monthly	3 months
PUSA	Up to 45,000 CFA francs	Up to 9 per household	Monthly	3 months
National Solidarity Fund (FSN)	280,000 CFA francs <sup>38</sup>	Fixed	In the event of disaster	One transfer

Throughout the region,<sup>39</sup> social operators are generally aligned with government cash transfers, although the calculation method and amount is not known or fully understood. Ongoing efforts in many countries in the region to define a minimum basket of expenditure (basket defined using the "basic needs" approach rather than by sector) have prompted governments to consider the question of coherence between the aims of cash transfers, the needs of populations and available resources. **Do available resources and distributed aid actually facilitate achievement of set objectives?**

In all cases, disparities between the amounts call for effective coordination between actors and good communication in relation to programmes and recipients, in order for the objectives of transfers to be well understood and for communities to understand why transfers disbursed at the same time might be for different amounts.

<sup>38</sup> 100,000 CFA francs of cash transfers, plus an in-kind transfer equal to 80,000 CFA francs, plus an additional cash transfer of 100,000 CFA francs in the event of death of a household member.

<sup>39</sup> In Mali, the government and humanitarian partners reached agreement

on an annual amount, but while government cash transfers were disbursed monthly, operations by non-governmental actors focus on the hunger period, providing intensive and focused aid, in addition to the planned, structural government aid.

## LESSONS LEARNED

In many respects, Senegal may be held up as an example for developing cash-based social safety nets in the Sahel region:

- **Clear political vision for the arrangement**
- **Strong financial and technical engagement**
- **Rapid expansion of programmes**
- **Leadership at government level in the transition to government-led responses to the needs of vulnerable communities, with gradual alignment by non-governmental actors**
- **Strong institutional integration with emerging clarification of roles and responsibilities**

The government bought into the arrangement for cash transfers as a way of reducing vulnerability to shocks and combatting structural poverty, as well as achieving a social impact in areas such as education, health and integration of vulnerable groups, by developing this arrangement as an integral component of social protection and through additional measures: "Improving socio-economic conditions for vulnerable groups, by enabling vulnerable groups to access resources and factors of production, by improving the system for social integration for vulnerable groups, by improving disabled access to equipment, by providing care for children in need, the disabled and military amputees, and by strengthening and expanding the mechanisms for social transfers" (PSE).

Thanks to the experiences shared by partners and donors, the government has expanded its original vision through the PNBSF, in order also to transform the type of shock response from emergency food aid (in-kind) into monetary aid.

**The case of Senegal serves as proof of the feasibility and appropriateness of developing cash-based social safety nets in the Sahel region, with a clear political vision and investment at various levels of government despite limited means,** to reduce structural poverty and take action on the various social causes of poverty. However, the ability of these programmes to meet the food and nutritional needs of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in Senegal does raise some issues:

- **The RNU has seen rapid development, but doubts remain as to its capacity to integrate all those in need, as well as regarding the targeting method adopted;**
- **Additional financial investment is required to upscale programmes, in particular in response to seasonal peaks;**
- **Technical support from outside partners is still necessary in order to develop and strengthen the systems and tools to help achieve upscaling.**

These challenges are not insurmountable and significant progress has been made in just a few years, which would suggest that while the transition from a persistent emergency response to a structural response using government cash transfers does present challenges, it is not impossible to achieve.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

- The social register must aim as far as possible for full completeness, in order to ensure that those vulnerable to shocks - but not necessarily the poorest - can be included and accounted for in emergency operations.
- Governments can draw inspiration from a wealth of experience in Latin America and East Africa in particular in the expansion of registers at low cost within a short time frame. Mass registrations, harmonised forms and self-declaration points are among the experiments that could be replicated depending on the challenges faced in each country (e.g. level of decentralisation, distances, urbanisation, etc.). NGOs already with a significant presence throughout the country - in particular local actors - are valuable partners for expansion of the register.
- Clarifying the roles and responsibilities of actors according to the context - a single regional model would not be effective - in particular based on the institutional arrangements, which must be adapted to the political and administrative framework at national level.
- Maximising synergies with existing programmes of additional measures, to prevent a piecemeal approach and to help recipient households out of poverty.
- Maximising expert dialogue between government and non-governmental actors; the added value provided by non-governmental actors is not limited to implementation.
- Renewing government efforts to increase the share of the national budget allocated to cash transfers to facilitate improved coverage.

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The Cash Learning Partnership

Countries in the Sahel region have all embarked on the development of social safety net policies using cash transfers to protect the most vulnerable households from seasonal shocks. They face similar coordination and resourcing challenges to meet the chronic needs of their people. Senegal is one of the most advanced countries in making the transition of seasonal responses from non-governmental humanitarian organizations to the national social protection system.

This case study aims to list the various factors that have led to this progress, and the remaining challenges in ensuring scalability and the durability of these solutions. It identifies good practices and lists a series of recommendations for actors involved in seasonal cash transfers and facing similar constraints.

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