




Humanitarian Access SCORE Report: Northeast Nigeria

Survey on the Coverage, Operational Reach,
and Effectiveness of Humanitarian Aid



Humanitarian Access SCORE Report: Northeast Nigeria

Survey on the Coverage, Operational Reach, and Effectiveness of Humanitarian Aid

Abby Stoddard, Paul Harvey, Monica Czwarno, and Meriah-Jo Breckenridge

January 2020

Humanitarian Outcomes

www.humanitarianoutcomes.org



www.aidworkersecurity.org



SCORE reports

Under the CORE research programme, supported by the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Humanitarian Outcomes is conducting remote surveys of crisis-affected populations in hard-to-reach areas to gain their perspectives on access to aid and the effectiveness of the humanitarian response. The results of the surveys on coverage, operational reach, and effectiveness (SCORE), together with key informant interviews and other contextual data, help identify the humanitarian actors that have achieved the greatest presence and coverage. Humanitarian Outcomes designed a survey instrument, containing a mix of closed- and open-ended questions to target populations in particular geographic locations through random dialling to mobile phones. Our survey provider partner, GeoPoll, trains enumerators to conduct computer-assisted telephone interviews. Surveys conducted to date include the six states of northeast Nigeria, and four provinces in Afghanistan. Further SCORE reports are planned for Afghanistan and Central African Republic. The survey instrument and downloadable response data are available at <https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/projects/coverage-operational-resources-and-effectiveness-core>





Summary

Humanitarian access in the conflict-affected states of northeast Nigeria has been highly constrained since the start of the current humanitarian response in 2016. An estimated 1.2 million Nigerians living outside the government-controlled areas in those states are completely cut off from humanitarian assistance, while several million more are obstructed to varying degrees in their ability to reach—and be reached by—critical aid.¹ A combination of insecurity, the actions of the parties to the conflict, and the lack of strong and concerted advocacy across international diplomatic and humanitarian actors has made northeast Nigeria one of the most challenging operational environments for aid organisations. This report, based on a survey of affected people, analysis of operational presence, and key informant interviews—including with organisations identified as the most present and effective—examines these challenges.

Our partners completed computer-assisted telephone surveys with 460 people living across northeast Nigeria, and a follow-up survey of 104 respondents in Borno exclusively. Key survey findings are as follows.

- ▶ Across all states, respondents were largely positive about aid having met their basic needs (apart from in Taraba, which is not covered by the international response, and where respondents reported having received little food aid.)
- ▶ In Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, insecurity, diversion by local authorities, poor roads and military restrictions were reported as the main obstacles to humanitarian access.
- ▶ A handful of organisations were named by affected people as being the most effective at access. As a group, international NGOs were seen as the most competent aid providers, while Nigerian NGOs were found to be far more consultative with communities.
- ▶ Local councils were cited as potential alternative humanitarian providers.

¹ The 1.2 million figure is cited in the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)'s Humanitarian Needs Overview 2020. However, some estimates have been as high as 1.7 million (Access Working Group) and 2.7 million (REACH, 2019a).

The crisis in northeast Nigeria

Nigerians living in the north-east have endured varying levels of armed conflict since 2009, when the jihadist insurgent group Boko Haram announced its goal to form a province of the Islamic State in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in 2013, launching a police and military response in the region.

In 2014, the conflict gained wider international attention after the mass kidnapping of female students from Chibok (Borno), and the ensuing 'Bring Back our Girls' global campaign. Although in recent years it has lost much of the territory it once controlled, Boko Haram/ISWAP and associated insurgent factions continue to terrorise the region with military-style offensives and other violence, including suicide bombings and kidnappings. The Nigerian military's strategy of garrisoning areas and creating 'super-camps' for displaced people has exacerbated both insecurity and displacement, and increased people's reliance on humanitarian aid. The conflict has significantly disrupted economic activity and further emphasised the stark socio-economic divisions between the north and south of the country.

As of 2019, an estimated 7.1 million people in northeast Nigeria were in need of assistance, including 2 million displaced by the conflict, a large proportion of whom are living in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within garrison towns established by the Nigerian military. Humanitarian assistance provided by international aid agencies has largely been confined to these garrison towns. As of late 2019, an estimated further 1.2 million people are in need of aid outside the Nigerian military zones and, by all accounts, unreached by and unable to access humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2019). The UN reports that many of those who have made it out of the insurgent-controlled areas are malnourished and 'report being held for years in hostage-like situations by NSAGs [non-state armed groups] with no access to basic services, and suffering abuse' (OCHA, 2018).

The humanitarian presence

Initially slow to scale up, the humanitarian presence in northeast Nigeria has grown rapidly since 2016 from just the handful of operational NGOs and UN to over 80 local and international organisations that collectively employ an estimated 4,000 aid workers.² As at the end of 2019, these included: 37 Nigerian local and national NGOs (L/NNGOs); 34 international NGOs (INGOs), eight UN entities (including OCHA and the International Organization for Migration (IOM); and four Nigerian government entities.³

The bulk of the operational aid presence is concentrated in the three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, where the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency.⁴ These three states,

² The slow scale-up meant that huge and acute humanitarian needs were barely met earlier in the crisis. FEWS NET reported that famine was likely to have occurred in Borno, killing an estimated 2,000 people in Bama local government area (LGA) alone between January and September 2017 (Edwards, 2017, p. 4).


³ Operational presence data from [OCHA 3/4Ws](#) and Humanitarian Needs Overviews, and Humanitarian Outcomes' Global Database of Humanitarian Organisations (GDHO).

⁴ There is evidence that the true scope of the conflict extended at least to Gombe and Bauchi (Falode, 2016). *Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018* listed all six northeastern states Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Taraba, and Bauchi—as crisis-affected (OCHA 2017). Despite citing 2.6 million people in need in Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi, no specific information for humanitarian response plans or 3W information is available for those states.

and Borno in particular, are the epicentre of the conflict, and are home to most of the people in need of aid. The other three northeast states of Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba also have needs, however. The concentration of international humanitarian funding in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe raises concerns this will become a pull for humanitarian presence and result in coverage gaps in the other states.


The majority of people we surveyed reported having received aid (Figure 1). [NB: This makes it likely that our survey did not reach sizeable numbers of people trapped in inaccessible areas and so responses should be interpreted in that light.] The exception was in Gombe, where over half of the respondents reported needing aid but not receiving it.

Figure 1: Respondents' recipient status



As is common in many humanitarian emergency responses, the people surveyed responded that food was the most prevalent form of aid they received, and protection the least. Health/medical care, clean water and cash assistance were the next most commonly reported types of aid received (Figure 2).


Figure 2: Types of aid received



Note: NFI = non-food items.

Across all states, respondents held largely positive views on whether the aid they received met their basic needs (Figure 3). Pluralities in all states reported ‘mostly yes’ and a majority of responses were on the positive end of the spectrum. Women in Taraba were the exception, with most female respondents answering ‘not really’ or ‘not at all,’ possibly because these respondents also reported receiving little food assistance (Taraba not being part of the official international response) unlike in other states where food was the most prevalent form of aid received.

Figure 3: Did the aid cover your basic needs?




Access obstacles

Described by one INGO representative as a ‘perfect storm’ of access constraints, in northeast Nigeria humanitarian actors face an extremist and highly violent insurgent group, a powerful national military engaged in an aggressive counter-insurgency campaign and limiting information and movements, and limited diplomatic leverage from donor governments to advocate for humanitarian access (as the conflict is not an international political priority). Moreover, donor government policies prohibiting partners from making contact with or even inadvertently benefiting the insurgents ‘indirectly’ though their programming have increased the legal and operational risks to humanitarian organisations and further disincentivised access.

Compounding these external obstacles to access, humanitarian actors have varied in their appetite for risk and ability to push for expanded access, both individually and collectively. Additionally, because humanitarian crisis conditions are relatively recent in Nigeria, many of the humanitarian agencies were newcomers to the area and/or had been previously focused on development programming prior to 2016. The constellation of obstacles has resulted in an access situation in northeast Nigeria that an INGO interviewee described as equalling that of extremist-held territories of Syria.


The CORE survey asked people both about the obstacles they encountered accessing aid, and their opinion of the obstacles faced by humanitarians in reaching them. In Borno, the state most affected by conflict, the two most commonly reported obstacles for people to access aid were that it was ‘unsafe to reach it’ and that ‘local authorities took it’ (Figure 4). In Adamawa and Yobe, diversion by the authorities was reported as a bigger obstacle than insecurity, and significant numbers of people also reported the aid available was ‘too far away.’ In the other three states less affected by the conflict, the largest numbers of respondents reported ‘no obstacles.’

Figure 4: Obstacles to people accessing aid



Similarly, when asked their opinion of the biggest obstacles to aid workers reaching them, respondents from the less conflict-affected states (Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba) were more likely to report no obstacles, while in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, poor roads, insecurity for aid workers and restrictions by the national military were more frequently reported (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Obstacles to humanitarian access



Insecurity

In control of roughly 40 per cent of Borno, insurgent forces pose a significant threat to aid operations as well as to the affected people who would access them.⁵ In addition to widespread violations of human rights and international humanitarian law against civilians, the group has kidnapped and executed aid workers, making clear that they associate these groups with the enemy and will not respect international humanitarian law regarding the obligation to allow secure access for aid to reach people in need.

⁵ 'Boko Haram effectively runs four of the 10 zones inside Borno, near Lake Chad, but the army and the government are reluctant to admit the counter-insurgency is failing' (Wintour, 2019).

Figure 6: Attacks on aid workers in Borno

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Kidnapped	0	1	1	7
Killed	0	3	5	3
Injured	2	1	0	0
	2	5	6	10
Complex attack	0	0	5	0
Shooting	0	4	0	1
Kidnapping	0	1	1	9
Unknown	2	0	0	0

Government/military obstruction

Initially reluctant to acknowledge a humanitarian crisis and call for international help, the Nigerian government has placed severe constraints on aid agencies that have responded. Movements are restricted even within the government-held areas, and to be allowed to work, humanitarian organisations have had to compromise on normal operating principles. For example, armed military escorts are required for civilian travel and to transport goods on certain roads, which not only compromises humanitarian neutrality but, also creates additional risk for the humanitarians because the military is the primary target for attack. The military, which reportedly has a long-held distrust of the international humanitarian community from the days of the Biafran war, has categorically stated that nothing should be moved without their prior permission, and is particularly restrictive around the ‘3 Fs’ (food, fuel and fertilizers). The government and military have repeatedly stated that they see the restrictions as necessary in order to protect humanitarian workers from insurgent attacks.

The national military is effectively prohibiting organisations from working outside the garrison areas or making contact to negotiate with the insurgents. Since August 2019, the Nigerian army has moved out of some garrisons—consolidating the number of army-run displaced people’s camps from 40 to 22 so-called ‘super camps’. Pulling troops back from remote operating bases has improved military morale, but it has increased insecurity as insurgents regain territory and trading corridors. As one INGO representative remarked, ‘the Maiduguri-Damaturu road has become bad we don’t have humanitarian road access to Maiduguri any longer. Only air access to Borno remains.’

Organisations that the government suspects of violating the restrictions have been temporarily shut down. In 2019 this happened to Action contre la Faim (ACF) and Mercy Corps—two major INGO actors in the northeast—after the government accused them of ‘aiding and abetting terrorism’ by allegedly supplying Boko Haram with food and medical supplies (Wintour, 2019). They have since been allowed to resume operations following high-level negotiations and external diplomatic support. During the month’s gap, however, few of their activities in the remote locations were covered by other organisations and people lost access to vital aid. A year earlier, UNICEF was similarly ordered to shut down its operations in the northeast but was allowed to continue following a meeting between the agency and the military the following day. In addition, NGOs have reported that the military comes to humanitarians for information, asking for reports on what NGOs saw in the field, and for lists of aid recipients.

According to international interviewees, the national government is adamant that the principles of humanitarian action in war do not apply in this context, and they are not receptive to arguments for better access. One UN official paraphrased the military’s response to humanitarians as follows: ‘You are not neutral in this country; you are here at our invitation.

Don't we protect you? Don't you fly in and out of our military bases?' For their part, humanitarians cannot deny the close operational association with the military. 'We are only in the military zones, it's just a fact', said one interviewee. 'The military would gain territory, come back to the hubs, and then off go[es] the humanitarian community.'

Lack of international prioritisation

Although donor governments have assisted in pushing the government to reinstate the suspended INGOs, many interviewees complained of less-than-forceful diplomatic efforts to advocate for humanitarian action in the north-east generally. Western governments do not see this particular internal conflict as a political priority, they observed, and even if they did, with humanitarian assistance representing less than one per cent of Nigeria's US\$500 billion economy, 'it is unrealistic to think we have an influence over the government'.

In 2016, IOM established a series of humanitarian hubs which helped to expand presence beyond Maiduguri into Borno's other towns and regional centres (IOM, 2016). In 2018 and 2019, World Food Programme (WFP) greatly expanded its presence, and the logistics cluster appointed a civil-military coordination and access officer who negotiates humanitarian movements with the Nigerian military and authorities on a daily basis in conjunction with OCHA CMCoord functions. UN agency staff at the field level expressed the opinion they were doing as much as they could to negotiate access but that more support was needed at a higher political level.

Interviewees talked about a lack of common red lines and very limited push back from the humanitarian community on restrictions and demands from the Nigerian military. Interviewees noted that there was still no possibility of negotiating with Boko Haram, and very limited opportunity to expand access beyond garrison towns. Indeed, the government's changed military strategy in 2019, which entails pulling back from some towns, has led to continued insecurity and increased hostility to the international aid presence, further restricting access.

Counter-terrorism laws and regulations enacted by the US government and other major donors have, according to interviewees, created additional fear and disincentives to forge a common approach to opening a dialogue with Boko Haram/ISWAP—a group sanctioned by the UN, the European Union, and the US treasury. The regulations include vague language around prohibiting any activities that will 'directly or indirectly benefit' sanctioned groups and individuals. But more critically, from the standpoint of the Nigerian military, communication with the insurgents is off-limits and would incur severe penalties on any aid organisation that attempts it, even if it would not benefit the insurgents in any way.

Limited collective action and individual initiative by humanitarians

The existence of the Nigerian military as a major player distinct from government has meant that the usual NGO strategy for gaining acceptance and access (through community leaders, and local authorities such as deputy governors) has been ineffective. According to NGO interviewees, there is a functional civil-military (civ-mil) coordination group at the local level in the northeast, but a real gap remains at the national level in Abuja, where the humanitarian country leadership has not been able to make headway with the military on issues of international humanitarian law in conflicts, or to increase understanding of how NGOs operate and models of aid in protracted conflicts, such as market-based approaches and livelihoods or protection programming.

Coordination between and across UN agencies and NGOs was described by international interviewees as particularly fragmented and politicised, with divergence on everything from the number of people in need to outreach efforts with the government. In one example of the dysfunction, when the government recently appointed the first ever Minister of Humanitarian

Affairs, and as a UN interviewee recounted, ‘Instead of joining in a common approach, we saw a race to her door’. Given that the government is also fragmented across ministries and localities, years of failure to forge a common negotiating platform has cost the humanitarian response in time and effectiveness.

Adding to the problem is the fact that Nigeria has long been a development aid context, and many view the development and humanitarian spheres to be engaged in a zero-sum competition for resources and attention in the context. The double-hatted chief UN representative is thus pulled in two directions. INGOs complain that the UN humanitarian leadership has been sidelined and is not operationalising the access strategy it set in 2018, while UN interviewees counter that they are making progress on all parts of the strategy apart from the issue of negotiating with non-state armed groups on which the government has been intransigent.

But while collective action to counter government interference and the threat of insurgent violence might be lacking, interviewees also admit that individual approaches to gaining access are not particularly strong. In the words of one INGO representative, ‘While NGOs are happy to say it is Nigerian government—and some donors—that block our access, most of us don’t have a coherent access strategy yet. The mindset just isn’t there.’ A system that was slow to change gears from development to humanitarian modes of operation was also cited as a reason for a weak response to access challenges.

Other challenges: logistics and information gaps

In addition to the insecurity associated with travelling by road in conflict-affected areas, the roads themselves can be challenging for transporting goods, and many operations require helicopter access. There is also no functioning banking system, so cash needs to be physically transported, also prompting military concerns of potential diversion to insurgent groups.

The lack of information available to both affected people and the humanitarians attempting to reach them causes additional problems. According to a REACH report (2019), ‘Residents of hard-to-reach areas had little to no information on the availability of humanitarian aid services in LGA capitals. FGD [focus group discussion] participants attributed this limited awareness to some OAG [organised armed group] restrictions on cell phone and radio ownership; poor mobile network coverage, in areas where cell phones are not prohibited; and misinformation provided to the public by OAGs, including being told that that security forces will kill anyone arriving from hard-to-reach areas’. In turn, restricted access has also meant that humanitarians might be working without adequate situational awareness. An InterAction/Humanitarian Outcomes report in early 2019 found that ‘movement restrictions in Nigeria curtail risk awareness across operational organizations and, thus, informed analysis,’ which evidently continues to be the case (Hamsik, 2019, p. 9). As a UN interviewee for this study remarked, ‘I have not seen a single document that has good analysis of the human terrain. We don’t understand enough’.


The most present and effective aid providers

Stipulating that the overall humanitarian access situation in the BAY states (Borno, Adamawa, Yobe) of northeast Nigeria is highly constrained and is not meeting the needs of significant numbers of people inside the contested areas, certain humanitarian actors have stood out as achieving comparatively good access under the circumstances.

Overall, respondents in the three most affected states rated the INGOs most highly as a group in terms of their effectiveness in getting aid to where people need it, followed by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement entities, then local/national NGOs, UN agencies, and local authorities, in that order (Figure 7). This stands in contrast to some other

emergency contexts, where local civil society organisations have built up a stronger capacity, and have a strong comparative advantage in accessing places that internationals cannot.⁶ Interviewees confirmed that L/NNGOs and INGOs are working side by side in all accessible places in northeast Nigeria.

Figure 7: Which entities have been best able to reach populations in need with aid?



According to survey responses, and corroborated by interviews, the following organisations were named as the most effective in reaching people with aid according to their entity type:


INGOs	L/NNGOs	UN agencies
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Center for Community Health Development (CCHD)	WFP
Save the Children	Herwa Community Development Initiative (HCDI)	UNICEF
ACF		

Humanitarian actors interviewed maintained that, unlike in other contexts, L/NNGOs do not have a major comparative advantage when it comes to secure access to operate—they are subject to the same constraints and threats as are their international counterparts.

A follow-up survey asked people in the conflict-affected states more about the actors that scored high for access, and what they attributed this to (Figure 8). Most respondents cited either competence at delivering aid, or relations with local authorities as the key factors in achieving better access. A stark difference emerged between the local organisations and their international counterparts, however. The Nigerian organisation named best at access achieved this, according to survey respondents, by being better at consulting with the local community.

⁶ 'Local civil society in northeast Nigeria was relatively underdeveloped before the response scale-up and remains so... Many L/ NNGOs interviewed for this study expressed a lack of familiarity with the international humanitarian system, programs, principles, and financing mechanisms. Local organizations are relatively small with technical capacities focused in one or two sectors. Many implement small, activity-based grants and expressed a willingness to learn and grow' (Hamsik, 2019, p. 10).

Figure 8: What do you think explains their success?



Interviews with representatives from some of the humanitarian organisations named as effective provided the following self-reflections on what makes for success in presence and reach, as well as the weaknesses that remain.

Strengths and advantages:


- ‘We are investing in a forward approach to reaching people, training staff in negotiations and principles, and having them go out and engage with communities and local authorities.’
- ‘We work with small local vendors (shopkeepers) in remote areas our staff can’t access. They have their own delivery pipelines and we reimburse them for providing goods to the people that have our vouchers. This helps create small economies, even in garrison town where livelihoods are difficult, and makes gives room for recovery. It is also much safer and more dignified for people to access aid this way—no waiting on long lines at distribution points on specific days.’
- ‘We developed a training on principles, intended to get staff and partners up to speed on a humanitarian as opposed to development mindset and approach; there are not many trained humanitarians around.’
- ‘Our approach prioritises reaching people in need and working backward from that, as opposed to meeting the government’s objectives as a first priority.’
- ‘We have a higher risk threshold/appetite than other INGOs, in large part due to our being present since before the crisis and having gained familiarity and built acceptance among the local populations, as well as a pre-existing programme infrastructure that gave us an operational edge.’
- ‘Being more confident that the communities know us, we have the right networks to assess the risk more precisely. For this reason, when new areas become accessible, we are among the first ones to go.’
- ‘We have the capacity and network to monitor the real situation on the ground, including many field staff monitoring on a daily basis, training teams, and reporting into the network. First, we invest in the capacity to understand the context on the ground, and second, we train our teams to be able to go out and respond to the environment, navigate checkpoints, and negotiate. It’s a long process.’

Areas for improvement:

- ‘We do not have our own definition of access or indicators to measure whether we are getting better at it or not. We need to work on this.’
- ‘We have no contact with Boko Haram and know of no guidance on how to even approach them in negotiations. We need to bring in additional expertise for this particular armed group and treat it as a special project.’
- ‘There are a lot of very capable Nigerians who can be recruited and trained. We are trying to reduce the reliance on expatriates and increase Nigerian leadership internally.’
- ‘Community engagement is the way out of this trap [of being only able to access people in military-designated areas]. They were the ones that chased out Boko Haram. We need to relocate the [humanitarian] hubs to be closer to communities.’
- The UN country leadership needs to prioritise civ-mil coordination at the highest levels nationally. The UN structure needs to do what it can to bridge the gap between the military and civilian government response. At the ground level, all of us get local permissions and have relationships with checkpoints, but there is a huge gap at the senior level.

A common theme in the above reflections was the importance of better outreach to communities and localising the aid response within them. This was echoed in the surveys of affected people as well. In addition to citing community consultation as a key factor in successful access (Figure 8), survey respondents were asked if other types of actors could potentially fill the role of humanitarian provider in places traditional humanitarians were unable to reach. The single most commonly referenced group in this regard was the local council (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Who else could provide aid that you could reach safely?



The fact that humanitarian actors face extremely limited access options in northeast Nigeria does not, they admit, mean they cannot and should not do better in terms of developing individual and collective strategies to extend their reach. Organisations individually and collectively need to continue to push for improved access within the constraints of the operating environment. As set out in the 2018 strategy, advocacy at all levels with the Nigerian government and military, with non-state armed actors if that becomes feasible

and—critically—with local communities needs to continue and intensify. Aiding only those that are most reachable, as opposed to attempting to reach those most in need, falls short of humanitarian principles.

Knowing that over a million people are not able to access services or be reached by any humanitarian assistance, and are likely to be facing severe humanitarian needs and suffering, is deeply alarming and should spur international pressure for action.

Acronyms	
ACF	Action contre la Faim
CCHD	Center for Community Health Development
Civ-mil	civil-military
CMCoord	Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN)
HCDI	Herwa Community Development Initiative
IDP	internally displaced person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
INGO	international NGO
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISWAP	Islamic State in West Africa Province
LGA	local government area
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NFI	non-food item
L/NNGO	local/national NGO
NGO	non-governmental organisation
OAG	organised armed group
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance
SCORE	surveys on coverage, operational reach, and effectiveness
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

Resources, references and further reading

ACAPS. (Various). Nigeria special reports. Retrieved from: www.acaps.org/country/nigeria/special-reports

BBC News. (2015). Nigeria's Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-31784538>

Brechenmacher, S. (2019). Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria after Boko Haram, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042>

CIVICUS. (2018). Journalist Jones Abiri finally released, Media stakeholders reject press council bill. Retrieved from <https://monitor.civicus.org/newsfeed/2018/10/19/journalist-jones-abiri-finally-released-media-stakeholders-reject-press-council-bill/>

Edwards, J. (2017). *Case study. North-east Nigeria*.

Falode, J. A. (2016). The nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram war, 2010-2015: A strategic analysis, *Perspectives on Terrorism*, pp. 41-52.

Hamsik, L. (2019). *NGOs and risk: Managing uncertainty in local-international partnerships. Case studies: Northeast Nigeria & South Sudan*.

Humanitarian Outcomes. (2019). CORE research programme resources, available at <https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/projects/coverage-operational-reach-and-effectiveness-core>

International Crisis Group. (2019). Latest updates, Nigeria. Retrieved from <https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/november-alerts-october-trends-2019#nigeria>

IOM. (2016). New humanitarian hubs set to serve millions in northeastern Nigeria. Retrieved from <https://www.iom.int/news/new-humanitarian-hubs-set-serve-millions-northeastern-nigeria>

OCHA. (2017). *Humanitarian needs overview 2018*.

OCHA. (2018). *Humanitarian needs overview 2019*.

OCHA. (2019). *Humanitarian needs overview 2020*.

REACH. (2019a). *Nigeria. Multi-sector needs assessment*.

REACH (2019b). *Situation overview: humanitarian needs and displacement dynamics in hard-to-reach areas of Borno State (August 2018-April 2019)*.

Stoddard, A., Hamsik, L., and Czwarno, M. (2019). *NGOs and risk: managing uncertainty in local-international partnerships. Good practice and recommendations for humanitarian actors*.

Wintour, P. (2019). Nigeria warned it risks humanitarian disaster by expelling charities. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/nigeria-warned-it-risks-humanitarian-disaster-by-expelling-charities?CM>