# SAVING LIVES TOGETHER

## A REVIEW OF SECURITY COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMANITARIAN ACTORS ON THE GROUND

POVERTY



christian aid

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Taskforce on Collaborative Approaches to Security launched *Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field* (the SLT framework) in 2006 to encourage and improve working relationships between humanitarian actors on the ground.[1]

This report is the outcome of a study by Christian Aid aimed at producing a baseline of data to test empirically common assumptions about the current functioning of the SLT framework and security arrangements of non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Previous efforts at evaluating SLT effectiveness have largely captured the experience of United States-based international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), United Nations agencies and UN Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS) field staff, saying little about the field experience of the wider NGO community, including that of small and national NGOs.

The Christian Aid-led study considered 205 anonymous responses to an online survey undertaken between 1 July and 31 August 2009, including 149 (73 per cent) responses from field-based staff. While, overall, respondents spoke positively of the continued relevance of the SLT framework, the results suggested that in the field, awareness of it remains poor and implementation minimal. Only 40 per cent of respondents and 30 per cent of those identified as being field-based said they were aware of SLT.

Results showed that through necessity and relationships cultivated over time, encouraging examples of successful security collaboration and coordination have emerged within the NGO community, some with valued UN involvement. Information sharing and joint training sessions were cited as being particularly useful for NGOs in the field. Security fora were identified as useful mechanisms for the channelling and communication of further improvements or initiatives, particularly to combat lack of awareness on the part of small and national NGOs, and limited inclusion of these organisations in collaborative mechanisms.

The findings also indicated that constraints to collaboration include poor awareness of joint security initiatives; limited financial and human resources; lack of professionalism within some sections of the humanitarian security sector; perceived one-way flows of information from the UN to NGOs; and poor UN engagement with and consultation of NGOs.

Complacency about security during periods of relative calm appears to be prevalent among some humanitarian agencies and donors, leading to reactive, rather than proactive, intervention. In some circumstances, NGOs are wary of sharing information, stemming from a desire to maintain independance, neutrality and, above all, access to populations.

The concluding section outlines recommendations to NGOs and other agencies which are aimed at addressing the obstacles to effective collaboration discussed above. These are intended to increase awareness of SLT by coordinating a 'roll-out' of the SLT framework, at headquarters level as well as in the field, to be led by the UN with the energetic engagement of NGOs.

It is important that individual organisations take time to understand and interpret the SLT framework, the use of which should be made mainstream through better headquarters-field communication and more clearly defined guidelines for implementation and participation in the process. Interagency security fora and networks could be key facilitators of an SLT roll-out. They could ensure broader reach to their membership bases, including smaller and national organisations, through communication and inclusion strategies.

There is a clear leadership role for the UN, which, to date, has not been effectively executed. The UN needs to devise clearer guidance mechanisms for the implementation of SLT in order to avoid further confusion over roles and responsibilities. This implementation strategy should be jointly agreed with key NGO security fora to achieve better coordination and collaboration at a local level. Dedicated resources for security management, both staff and funding, will need to be earmarked and provided by organisations. Donors should correspondingly encourage the systematic incorporation of security into NGO programme budgets, and provide funding for posts to coordinate security in the field as well as for independent information-coordination mechanisms for environments identified as sensitive.

# INTRODUCTION

## Overview

A number of deteriorating security situations and a lack of respect for International Humanitarian Law by non-humanitarian actors operating in areas considered by aid organisations to be humanitarian spaces continue to pose great challenges for international aid delivery. According to Bruderlein and Gassmann, the UN and NGOs alike are experiencing increasingly complex threats – due to expanded field operations in fragile contexts, the blurring of the distinction between civilians and combatants, new forms of warfare and greater availability of weapons – which have endangered notions of independence and neutrality alongside staff and operations.[2] Their study claims that a new paradigm has emerged under which the presence of international organisations and NGOs is no longer universally accepted and, as a result, they are having to deal with increased threats to security on top of their everyday activities.

The past few years have seen a rise in high-profile direct attacks against aid agencies, such as the ambush on a UN guesthouse in Kabul on 28 October 2009,[3] the assault on the office of international development charity Plan International in Mansehra in February 2008,[4] and the killings of 17 Action Contre la Faim employees in Muttur, Sri Lanka, in 2006.[5]

Evidence gathered by an independent research project conducted by the Overseas Development Institute in London and the New-York-based Center on International Cooperation shows that aid delivery is a risky operation.[6] Respect for the essential services provided by the relief, recovery and rehabilitation efforts of the humanitarian community can no longer be taken for granted.

The Humanitarian Policy Group study *Providing Aid in Insecure Environments* produced quantitative evidence to show that the absolute number of major security incidents (that is, those involving killings, kidnappings or serious injuries) has increased significantly since 1997, with more incidents in absolute, relative and proportional terms being borne by NGO staff.[7]

As expected, the safety and security of staff has become a growing concern for aid organisations, and has resulted in a concerted effort – for the most part, within larger organisations – to institutionalise security measures through improved policy and practice. Lack of staff and funding could be severe constraints to effecting much-needed security improvements within smaller organisations. Since these organisations tend to have a higher proportion of local staff, who therefore suffer higher incident rates, it seems that smaller NGOs, in particular, would benefit greatly from increased levels of security coordination and collaboration.

In recognition of the closer working relationships being established between UN agencies, IGOs and NGOs, a *Menu of Options* was launched in 2001 by the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) and Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, UNSECOORD, to provide a framework for collaboration on security issues within shared operational spaces.[8]

A study of the effectiveness of the *Menu of Options* carried out in 2004 found that implementation was limited due to a number of recurring difficulties, including personality clashes between key security actors, a lack of resources and constraints on information sharing. Divergent priorities, time constraints and approaches to security by potential collaborators were also said to be problematic. Awareness of the document was found to be poor, though it is difficult to determine whether this was a cause or a consequence of the lack of implementation.[9]

On the premise that the *Menu of Options* remained relevant and provided a sound framework for encouraging collaboration between actors in the humanitarian community, the IASC Taskforce on Collaborative Approaches to Security revised and relaunched it in 2006 as *Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field* (the SLT framework).[10]

In June 2009, UNDSS undertook a rapid survey to assess the current state of coordination among humanitarian actors achieved through the SLT framework.[11] The survey found that confusion over the roles and responsibilities expected of the UN and NGOs, dependence on personal relationships, and a lack of dedicated resources or capacity within UNDSS field offices had been the key factors hindering successful implementation of the SLT framework up until that point.

## Objectives of the study

This report is the outcome of a study by Christian Aid aimed at producing a baseline of data to test empirically common assumptions about the SLT framework and NGO security arrangements.

It is hoped that this will provoke objective evaluation of the framework's strengths and weaknesses, and informed discussion about the extent to which coordination between UN and NGO security mechanisms is functioning. Together with the comprehensive report which analyses the survey, recommendations are offered with the aim of strengthening the SLT framework, rendering it more accessible to smaller NGOs, and securing donor support for some common security initiatives.

## Need for the study

The 2004 IASC survey used to evaluate the effectiveness of the *Menu of Options* was primarily distributed through InterAction's Security Advisory Group and UNDSS field security coordination officers.[12] While its findings served as an important impetus for improvement, the survey largely captured the experience of US-based agencies and UNDSS field staff, saying little about the wider field experience, low levels of awareness, lack of resources, trust and inclusion and over-reliance on personal connections. Meanwhile, inadequate representation of the humanitarian community was encountered in the survey on SLT implementation undertaken by UNDSS in June 2009. Time constraints led to a low rate of response: 22 in total, 9 of which were from the UN and 13 from INGOs.

## Methodology

The analysis and recommendations presented in this report are based on an online survey undertaken by Christian Aid between 1 July and 31 August 2009, which captured a relatively large sample of 205 responses. A mixture of 43 multiple choice and open-ended questions was chosen for the questionnaire, in order to capture the experience of SLT implementation from a wide range of operating environments, organisations with varying mandates and programmes, and staff with varying levels of responsibility for security. The questions related to:

- awareness of the SLT framework

- participation in information sharing and joint security meetings facilitated by the UN

- membership of security fora

- budgeting and resources available for security initiatives

- experiences of joint training ventures

- receptiveness to common standards for security management within the humanitarian sector.

The questionnaire aimed to guide participants through SLT principles, encouraging reflection on related initiatives and, eventually, an overall evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the framework itself.

A link to the survey was distributed to security focal points and other NGO staff with specific security responsibilities, predominantly through the mailing lists of EISF and the Security Advisory Group of Action by Churches Together (ACT). This ensured broad representation of small and national organisations. Through these channels, the survey was able to tap into other NGO networks at headquarters level, as well as security coordination mechanisms in the field (the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), the Gaza NGO Security Office (GANSO) and the NGO Safety Program (NSP) in Somalia). NGOs not belonging to any specific mechanism were also accessed through country lists produced by the UN and others. Unfortunately, UN field level participation through the UNDSS office was very limited because of time constraints and tentative plans by the office to conduct a more elaborate follow-up to the June 2009 survey on SLT implementation. Geographically, the survey was distributed as widely as possible. However, the results display an emphasis on fragile operating environments stemming from heightened concern about them and because there are broader bases of representation in areas such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

## Limitations

The results presented here capture a far larger body of opinion than previous evaluations of the SLT framework and menu. Respondents were also drawn from a sample that is more representative of the various international actors operating within the areas targeted by the survey.

However, several weaknesses in the methodology should be acknowledged. Firstly, due to a lack of resources, the survey, which was conducted in English, was not translated into other languages to enable better representation from non-English speaking communities. On the whole, dissemination to organisations based in French and Spanish-speaking countries was limited, which is reflected in the low number of respondents from these countries.

Furthermore, 40 per cent of respondents belonged to two international organisations, although these respondents came from 29 distinct country locations. When controlling for 'organisational bias', virtually no difference in the overall results emerged.

Finally, had time and budget permitted, the analysis would have benefited from a 'triangulated' research methodology, which could have included in-depth interviews with a smaller sample of humanitarian security professionals, and in-country case studies.

# RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

## Overall findings

While, overall, respondents spoke positively of the continued relevance of the SLT framework, the results suggested that in the field, awareness of it remains poor and implementation minimal. The results showed that through necessity and relationships cultivated over time, encouraging examples of successful security collaboration and coordination have emerged within the NGO community, some with valued UN involvement. Information sharing and joint training sessions were cited as being particularly useful for NGOs in the field. Security fora were identified as useful mechanisms for the channelling and communication of further improvements or initiatives, particularly to combat lack of awareness of small and national NGOs, and limited inclusion of these organisations in collaborative mechanisms.

Constraints on collaboration cited included:

- poor awareness of joint security initiatives

- limited financial and human resources

- lack of professionalism within some sections of the humanitarian security sector

- perceived one-way flows of information from the UN to NGOs

- poor UN engagement with and consultation of NGOs.

Complacency about security during periods of relative calm appears to be prevalent among some humanitarian agencies and donors, leading to reactive, rather than proactive, intervention. In some contexts, NGOs are wary of sharing information, stemming from a desire to maintain independance, neutrality and, above all, access to populations.

There is an immediate need for coordinated 'roll-out' of the SLT framework, led by the UN with energetic engagement of NGOs. Use of the framework should be made mainstream through improved communication between headquarters and the field and more clearly defined guidelines for implementation and participation in the process.

## Overall awareness of the SLT framework remains poor

**Are you aware of the SLT framework? How did you come to know about SLT? Do you find SLT useful in improving security arrangements between NGOs, IGOs and the UN?**

- Only 40 per cent of all respondents – and 30 per cent of those identified as field-based – said that they were aware of SLT.

- Those based in Haiti and Sudan showed higher awareness in absolute terms, while those in Afghanistan, DRC and Pakistan showed alarmingly low rates of awareness.

- Staff of small and national organisations seemed less aware of SLT than staff of larger and international organisations (with 26 per cent and 33 per cent of the former expressing awareness, respectively).

- Of the 69 respondents who said they were aware of SLT and who gave their impressions of the framework's usefulness, 87 per cent suggested that the framework was useful for ensuring staff safety and security in the field, while 13 per cent said they felt it had no, or only minor use in the field.

- Irrespective of whether they were aware of SLT before taking the survey, respondents from national organisations were twice as likely as those from international organisations to consider it to be 'vital'.

- Several NGO respondents said they felt that SLT awareness among UN agency staff remains poor.

Overall, the survey indicated that awareness of the SLT framework among NGOs continues to be poor. Only 40 per cent of all respondents said they were aware of SLT, which was fewer than the 44 per cent of NGO and UN agency staff who had expressed awareness of the *Menu of Options* in 2004.[13]

According to the survey, respondents based in countries with high security risks showed similar awareness rates (37 per cent on average). Those based in Haiti and Sudan demonstrated better awareness in absolute terms with 5 of 7 (71 per cent) and 7 of 8 (88 per cent) respondents, respectively, indicating that they knew of the framework. Staff based in Pakistan showed the lowest rate, with 1 in 16 (6 per cent of) respondents based there saying they had heard of the SLT framework. In the DRC, this was 2 of 8 (25 per cent of) respondents.

**Figure 1: are you aware of the SLT framework?**



**Figure 2: through what source did you learn about the framework?**



The survey results indicate that staff of small and national organisations are less informed about SLT than those of larger and international organisations, with respective rates of awareness of 26 per cent and 33 per cent for the former groups. Awareness among in-country personnel with security responsibilities was also low at 34 per cent. Knowledge of SLT within large organisations appeared higher, with approximately 60 per cent of respondents from this category indicating awareness of the framework (see Annex 1 for survey participant demographics).

If the framework is to be successfully implemented to facilitate collaborative working, NGO and UN agencies must be aware of its existence, and must also understand it and any implications its implementation might have. SLT awareness rates among UN staff cannot be determined from this survey as there was very limited participation by UN security officers, and the questionnaire did not specifically ask about this.

The 2004 study conducted by IASC revealed that 100 per cent of the UNDSS personnel surveyed were aware of the *Menu of Options*. While this appears to be an impressive statistic, UNDSS officers are not solely responsible for engagement with other agencies, as each UN agency will have staff that engage with security issues and interact with the wider NGO community. Moreover, the experience of NGOs suggests that awareness of the framework among UN officers in particular country contexts remains poor. **There continues to be an urgent need for a concerted and coordinated 'roll out' of the security practices described in the SLT framework by NGOs and UN agencies.**

*'I am very keen [that] the SLT becomes the norm in collaborations, as I think the benefits are potentially vast. I find, however, that too few actors, even within UNDSS, are even aware of it. When they are, it takes promoting and reminding of the framework, which can be counterproductive.'*

Security networks and management structures within organisations were identified as important avenues for dissemination of the framework.

Dissemination through UN sources tended to come from those respondents who did not specify a country of operation – from which it can perhaps be inferred that they are based at headquarters rather than in the field.

Communication enables collaboration. Without sufficient awareness of meetings held to discuss security in the field, small and national NGOs in particular will continue to have only very limited access to security-related information, joint training opportunities, telecommunications and other forms of resource sharing.

**Respondents from the field requested more guidance, instruction and support from headquarters and management teams, in order to ensure that awareness of SLT becomes mainstream and to create possibilities and capacities for collaboration.** This is especially important where the sharing of assets or financial resources is concerned. These findings highlight the prominent role

of informal networks and security fora, and management structures in raising awareness of SLT between and within agencies, respectively.

Although findings indicate that implementation remains only partially successful, most survey respondents said they valued the framework. Even where SLT awareness has been low, and collaboration with the UN minimal or poor, some NGOs have been able to use the framework as an advocacy tool to lobby UN agencies and UNDSS for greater access to information and service provision.

> 'We have used Saving Lives Together as a basis for advocating to the UN for greater access to information and UN security services. This has not always been successful but it is a useful pressure point.'

## Coordination and collaboration is happening, but is more widespread and sophisticated in 'high risk' countries

**Does your organisation encourage collaborative working? Why have you/have you not participated in UN SMT meetings? Do you belong to a forum for security collaboration?**

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- The overall rate of participation of respondents in UN senior management team (SMT) meetings was 35 per cent, rising to 45 per cent for those in countries with high risks to security. Meanwhile, 25 per cent of respondents from national organisations said they participated in UN SMT meetings.

- Participation rates in broad-based security fora appeared to be much higher: 58 per cent of all survey respondents claimed membership, while 79 per cent of respondents in high-risk countries said they were members. National and small organisations appeared to be at a disadvantage, with rates of membership recorded at just 33 per cent and 51 per cent, respectively.

- 50 per cent of all respondents, and 33 per cent of those from national organisations, indicated that there were arrangements in their organisations to ensure resource-sharing among different agencies. Meanwhile, 66 per cent of those from high-risk countries said they were such arrangements in place.

- 37 per cent of all respondents (22 per cent of those from national organisations) noted that their organisations

participated in joint telecommunications mechanisms. However, as might be expected, those respondents working in high-risk countries (63 per cent) were more likely to cite such participation.

The survey indicates that significant levels of collaboration are taking place, which is perhaps unexpected considering that awareness of SLT is low overall. The results demonstrate that collaboration is happening at an interagency level, particularly on information sharing, telecommunications and security training. Encouragingly, higher levels of participation seem to be taking place in high-risk countries.

### Security fora

Far higher numbers of respondents reported participating in broad-based security fora than those who said they attended UN SMT meetings, with overall participation rates recorded at 58 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. Individuals working in high risk countries were able to report higher rates of participation in both, with 79 per cent and 45 per cent saying they participated in security fora and UN SMT meetings, respectively.

The majority of those who said they found participation in security fora useful commented that information exchange relating to incidents, potential threats, operational space, joint assessments, training opportunities and best practices was vital for their own planning as well as for working together with local partners. Survey data indicated that the sharing of security-related information (for 97 per cent of all respondents) incident reports and trend analysis (for 83 per cent of all respondents) and security trees (for 58 per cent of all respondents) at collaborative meetings were deeply ingrained practices.[14]

> 'Yes, I participated [in UN SMT meetings] when I was still field based and was one of the NGO reps of about 25 NGOs. A relationship of trust had been established and information flowed quite well. It really helped to establish a shared understanding of security even though it was always acknowledged that, at times, different approaches apply to UN and NGOs.'

One respondent noted particular added value when '[UN] DSS teams provided analysis, inference and advice on incidents instead of simply reporting them'. This practice was cited as being particularly helpful by respondents from smaller NGOs without dedicated security officers.

Meanwhile, some respondents identified as NGO security managers reflected that although beneficial in terms of increased information flow, some UN SMT meetings were

**Figure 3: forms of collaboration**



thought to be *'far too focused on UN security business'*, as one put it. Whether these meetings were useful was also largely dependent upon the personality of the UNDSS officer in charge and his or her willingness to engage with NGOs, respondents noted. UNDSS liaison officers based in Darfur were cited as an example of those who use the SLT framework well.

A lack of awareness of the framework emerged as the principle hindrance to participation in UN SMT and security fora meetings. **A simple, though potentially effective, intervention would be for lead agencies of NGO fora to think of strategies that they could employ to increase awareness of meetings and to broaden membership of SMTs.**

Where participation in meetings is limited to 'representatives' of a wider forum (for example, within the UN SMT), it is equally important that effective mechanisms are used to feed back information to members of the wider NGO security forum, rather than simply relying on a 'trickle-down' effect.

Again, strategies for communicating joint training opportunities to organisations could also be improved. Respondents noted that most senior management figures attend general coordination meetings regularly, but not specialised logistics or security meetings. Offers to provide training could be made at broader gatherings to increase awareness of such opportunities.

## Resource sharing

50 per cent of all respondents answered that arrangements were in place in their organisations to ensure resources are shared with other agencies. The remaining half either said they did not know or they believed that there were no arrangements for sharing resources, which is in line with other evidence resulting from the survey of low-awareness levels of SLT and a lack of guidance from managers.

Those respondents who said they shared resources noted that this was most commonly done with 'sister agencies', such as organisations belonging to ACT or the Save the Children Alliance. 25 per cent of the 90 people who responded to this question indicated that 'special arrangements with NGOs' existed, and a further 25 per cent indicated that sharing occurred between the 'UN, INGOs and NGOs'.

Overall, nearly all of those who said they contributed resources for others to share were from international organisations, while most of those who said they received resources to share from others were from smaller organisations.[15]

## Interagency telecommunication

Survey responses suggest that while NGOs are participating in joint telecommunications mechanisms, the overall rate is quite low, with just 37 per cent of all respondents confirming this is taking place. Rates differed depending on the context. As expected, a higher number of respondents from high-risk countries – 63 per cent – said that this was taking place.

Long implementation periods and delays due to state regulations were cited as hindrances to establishment of shared telecommunications mechanisms. Respondents observed that when systems are initially set up, compliance with radio-room checks were good. However, over time, as security situations became less tense, compliance decreased and radio call systems eventually broke down. Staff recruitment is also cited as a problem in north, south and west Darfur, with difficulties in appointing and retaining field security officers within the UN contributing to the poor operation of telecommunications systems in some areas.

> *'The security communication system between agencies (via mobile phone, SMS and VHF radio) is well established but it suffers from the high staff turn-over, and the recent expulsion of 13 major INGOs [by the authorities] disrupted almost everything in northern Sudan. Collaboration between agencies has really helped all INGOs to manage security much better though, and it is, overall, very positive.'*

### Joint training

Of all the respondents, 40 per cent said they had participated in some form of joint security training. Notably, participation in joint training appeared higher among respondents from high-risk countries (at 55 per cent) but significantly lower for those respondents from national organisations (at 17 per cent).

Although there is some discussion to support the proposition that national staff are more exposed to risk than expatriates in the field,[16] and that they are often under-invested in, it should be noted that staff nationality was not considered in this survey. Many international organisations are devolving to regional centres and increasing their hiring of local staff, whose training cannot be disaggregated in this survey.

## Information sharing is a priority for all types of organisations, yet significant barriers persist

**Does your security policy permit information sharing with other agencies? What prevents you from sharing information? Does your organisation have MOSS? Do you consider MOSS to be necessary?**

- 88 per cent of respondents from international organisations and 61 per cent from national organisations said their organisations permitted information sharing.

- 10 per cent of all respondents said they were not aware of their organisation's policy on information sharing.

- A third of all respondents indicated that their organisations allow information sharing only with NGOs.

- Two-thirds of all respondents said that in their organisations, information sharing takes place at headquarters as well as field level, predominantly through informal channels. There appears to be an imbalance between respondents from small organisations and those from mid to large organisations – 47 per cent of the former group said they operate through formal channels compared to only 25 per cent of the latter.

- 71 per cent of all respondents said their organisations make use of Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS). When results from the two highest-responding INGOs were removed from the sample, as a means of controlling for 'organisational bias', the figure was just 56 per cent.

- The size of the organisations appeared to have little bearing on whether they used MOSS. However, the use of MOSS was cited as being far more common among respondents from international organisations (77 per cent) than from national organisations (22 per cent).

The sharing of security-related information and analysis seems by far the highest priority in terms of coordination. Out of the full survey sample, the majority of respondents (88 per cent) indicated that their organisation's security policy permitted the sharing of information. Similar rates were seen across various sizes and types of organisation, with the exception of national organisations. Only 61 per cent of respondents from this group said they could share information, and a relatively higher percentage (28 per cent) were unsure if this was permitted.

The survey results indicated that a significant proportion of information exchange takes place through informal channels. Overall, responses suggested that the majority of information sharing takes place at both headquarters and field level (67 per cent cited this) with some sharing being carried out at the field level only (according to 21 per cent). The manner of sharing tends to be informal (62 per cent confirmed this) though formal arrangements also take place (according to 38 per cent of respondents). **Since participation rates in formal meetings and collaboration mechanisms appear to be considerably lower for small NGOs, these organisations seem disadvantaged on both accounts.**

Both UN and NGO respondents highlighted that the sharing of potentially sensitive security information raised pertinent questions about the security and the handling of this information, as well as the need for discretion by individuals and for maintaining confidentiality. Some also expressed concern that naming local partner organisations in the public domain could result in them receiving serious threats to their security which they are inadequately resourced to tackle. It was noted that although there has been a drive towards resourcing organisations with skilled professionals to manage and advise on security issues, field officers are often tasked with this on top of other responsibilities and are not always appropriately skilled.

Because of different reporting formats and in some cases different software used by organisations, quality and comparability of information can be obstacles to collaboration. **There is a clear need for professional-skills training for NGO staff covering information management, data collection, incident analysis, evaluation and lessons learnt. Further work needs to be done to agree on common understandings, and a set of standards should be established to improve flow and quality of information shared.**

The use of coordination mechanisms and independently funded information clearing houses, such as ANSO, GANSO and NSP, could make coordination and information sharing much more effective and should be considered as part of a model for managing future complex emergencies. They provide essential services such as information sharing, incident analysis, reporting, sharing of training opportunities and other interagency opportunities. Most importantly, they act as an intermediary for the sharing of information between the UN, host governments, military bodies and the NGO community. This tends to benefit all stakeholders while imposing little burden on each.

> *'Centralised information/training office [should be established] to allow greater access to security measures for smaller NGOs and reduce reliance on external consultancies. These clearly exist in the form of ANSO and GANSO and should become more frequent, certainly in the highest-risk environments.'*

According to survey results, interpersonal relationships persist as an important basis for sharing, especially where information is deemed sensitive and circulated on a 'need to know' basis. Responses suggest that some organisations lack clear internal policies on information sharing (the survey results indicated that 10 per cent of all respondents were unsure of their organisation's policy on sharing information) while those that have these lack clear, systematic processes outlining what can be shared and with whom. **Organisations would benefit from revisiting and revising their security policies to give clearer guidance and support to field staff on which information can be shared, when and with whom.**

Some respondents from the UN and some major INGOs expressed frustration at what they perceive as a one-way exchange of information. Although the survey results suggest that the overwhelming majority of organisations encourage and permit their staff to share information, there does seem to be disappointment among some at a perceived lack of information sharing in security fora. One respondent based in an area with high security risks cited a persistent *'lack of will by the headquarters of some agencies'* to share information outside of their own organisations. This has sometimes led to the repetition of near-identical security incidents, the respondents said.

The perhaps surprising level of receptiveness to MOSS is significant, considering that, in the past, anecdotal evidence has suggested that measures such as this have been seen as a hindrance to effective programming and collaboration.

## There is clear evidence of growing investment in humanitarian security and increased professionalisation within the sector

**Are security concerns budgeted for in your annual financial planning? Do arrangements for resource sharing between different agencies exist? Is your agency a contributor or recipient of resources? What key resource gaps still exist?**

- Overall, 50 per cent of respondents said their organisations budgeted for security concerns in consolidated appeals. Responses suggest there is a gap in financial planning for security in consolidated appeals between organisations of different sizes and between national and international organisations. 62 per cent of respondents from mid to large organisations said their organisation budgeted for this, compared to just 44 per cent from small organisations, while 55 per cent of respondents from international organisations said their organisation did this, compared to only 25 per cent of respondents from national organisations.

- Budgeting for security in annual planning seemed much more common overall (73 per cent of all respondents said their organisations did this). Again, there seems to be a gap in practice between mid to large (86 per cent) and small (64 per cent) organisations, and between international (77 per cent) and national (41 per cent) organisations.

- 82 per cent of those who said their organisations budgeted for security noted that security training was included in this. However, only 3 of the respondents from national organisations (9 per cent of this group) said their organisations budgeted for security training. The survey results indicate that other common components for which organisations budget are communications equipment (74 per cent of all respondents and 15 per cent of those from national organisations cited this) and physical security (63 per cent overall and 9 per cent of respondents from national organisations cited this).

- Of the global sample, 40 per cent said they had participated in some form of joint security training. Again, participation seemed higher in high risk countries (with 55 per cent of respondents citing this participation) and significantly lower within the sample of national organisations (with just 17 per cent of respondents noting that they had participated in this).

**Figure 4: Investment in security**



The survey results suggest that increasing receptiveness to investment in security measures exists, and a trend towards strategic planning in this respect is evident. Approximately 75 per cent of all respondents indicated that their organisations budgeted for security through annual plans.

Some respondents also said that allocations are made for the hiring of dedicated security personnel, staff-security training, and assessment and advisory services for field-based teams.

It appears from this that large organisations have greater capacity to budget for security concerns. Small and national organisations should not be left to fall behind in this respect. Interestingly, one INGO respondent noted that donors are often unwilling to fund security measures when times are 'calm'. Another respondent pointed out that *'due to sensitivities, security requirements are rarely accurately captured in appeals or other processes'*. Our survey results suggest that organisations operating in high-risk areas do not appear to be budgeting more strategically than those that are not. Resource sharing is, however, more common in high risk countries, with 66 per cent of respondents from this group citing this, compared to just 50 per cent overall.

82 per cent of all respondents said their organisation provided funding for staff security training, but only 3 of these respondents were from national organisations. Almost as high a proportion said that communication equipment and physical security were funded. Some respondents said funding was provided for specific security-staff positions, security assessments, safety equipment and evacuation costs. Existing resource gaps identified by 142 respondents include financial resources (56 per cent), inadequate communication between agencies (51 per cent), joint field-security coordinators (44 per cent), dedicated security focal points (30 per cent) and management support (39 per cent).

Although over 50 per cent of respondents said they were aware of joint training programmes, several complained that access, availability, quality and relevance of these could not be guaranteed. While courses held by providers such as RedR were generally well received, UN training for INGOs was felt by some to be *'rather too orientated towards the UN situation and funding, instead of practicalities for NGOs'*.

> *'Our experience has been mixed. [Training has been] useful when the facilitators have managed to stay more at practical and realistic levels. There has been frustration when the facilitators have focused more on the theory of security and removed from the realities.'*

Dedicated security focal points are a valuable resource, but staff often do not possess the necessary skills and time to prioritise and engage effectively in security initiatives. Although on the rise, the number of dedicated security professionals remains inadequate to manage security concerns in country operations. 97 per cent (42 of 43) of the dedicated security officers among the respondents were employed by INGOs.

**Continued investment in specialised skills training (for example, security analysis and planning) tailored to the needs of NGO staff (in security or programmes) will be key to improving humanitarian security practices**. Increased security awareness and information sharing should also be encouraged in relatively low risk, relatively stable countries in which SLT arrangements are not necessarily in place and in which there may not be such a rich history of NGO collaboration.

## The vulnerability of national organisations

The survey results indicate that the SLT framework, as it is currently being implemented, has had limited success in reaching national NGOs (NNGOs). Factors cited as affecting participation include the non-inclusion of national organisations in some highly politicised contexts, resource constraints, and the position of INGOs rather than NNGOs as gatekeepers of information exchange and collaboration with the UN.

In response to a perceived increase in targeted attacks on aid agencies in insecure environments, there has been a shift by many organisations towards the practice of 'remote management'.[17] This is premised on the notion that national

**Figure 5: profile of national organisations**



Figure 5 shows a horizontal bar chart comparing National Organisations (grey) and Overall (red) across the following categories:
- Aware of SLT
- Participation in UN SMT
- Participation in security fora
- Security budget allocated in appeals
- Security budget allocated in annual planning
- Participation in joint telecommunications
- Participation in joint training
- Adoption of MOSS

X-axis: 0% to 80% in 10% increments.

staff and organisations are less vulnerable than international staff in the field to potential threats. National actors have assumed prominent roles in aid delivery as INGOs have increasingly devolved responsibility, with the aim of sustaining access to populations in need in extreme environments. The corresponding transfer of risk to partners is not always coupled with the necessary support for the development and maintenance of adequate security measures.

The survey suggests that further work must be done to involve national organisations more in security collaboration. The survey results indicated that only 33 per cent of respondents from NNGOs were aware of the SLT framework, and that these organisations had an alarmingly low rate of participation in security fora, joint initiatives on training and telecommunications. Without awareness of SLT, national partners will continue to have only very limited access to opportunities that could have significant benefits for the security and safety of their staff and programmes.

**NGO security networks could become champions of addressing national partners' concerns. They could also take on the role of gatekeepers in bridging the**

**information and communication gap between the UN and national organisations.**

One way forward could be to establish a consortium to seek funding from donors for a parallel security capacity development initiative for national implementing partners in select high-risk environments. The initiative could include security training for national staff, development of generic security tools, and the deployment of field security officers both to support security mainstreaming for national partners and to act as a reference point for wider security collaboration with SLT stakeholders.

## Working with the UN

The results indicated that, in some contexts, INGOs and national partners are wary of collaborating with the UN, preferring to work solely through NGO-only mechanisms. Due to divergent mandates and threat profiles, humanitarian NGOs tend to adopt softer approaches to security, which are not always compatible with protection and deterrence strategies pursued by the UN. NGOs need to be seen as independent entities adhering to humanitarian principles in order to be accepted within local communities and in complex environments by the various groups holding power and having control over violence levels. Open collaboration with the UN on security issues could severely affect programme implementation as well as staff security.

> *'As long as the UN maintains an integrated approach linking political [and] military to humanitarian objectives, an openly visible collaboration on security management might hamper our ability to assist people in need under the control of the different warring parties. It is indicative that some people in certain UN agencies... share this concern.'*

The data presented here supports this finding. Although participation in UN SMT meetings seemed better institutionalised in high-risk countries, only 25 per cent of respondents from field locations in Afghanistan indicated that they participated in these meetings. In the majority of responses from this country, the respondents reflected that ANSO acts as an alternative mechanism forming an independent link for the sharing of relevant information between NGOs and the UN.

Some respondents cited poor understanding of humanitarian contexts or of NGO working cultures by UN personnel as impediments to collaboration, commenting that '*ex-police and soldiers are not always the best people to support NGO or UN staff*'. Results suggest that working

relationships with the UN continue to be personality dependent.[18] Respondents from NGOs said they sometimes felt that UN officers were unwilling to be open, treating them as 'clients' rather than partners, and often failed to consult them. Some respondents reflected that although beneficial for increasing the flow of information, the worth of UN SMT meetings depended upon the personality of the UNDSS officer in charge. Developing personal relationships with these officers is vital because as one respondent noted, *'some UN field security officers still have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) mentality'*, meaning a reluctance to work more openly and informally.

From an NGO perspective, there appears to be an increasing expectation that the UN should 'take the lead' in initiating collaboration on security. Several respondents commented that UN officers or UNDSS staff came across as very 'hands off', and did not instigate or communicate joint ways of working. Many respondents from NGOs said they resented that the UN had never 'offered' or 'provided' opportunities for joint training or inclusion in collaborative security mechanisms. On a positive note, when UN officials have been approached for assistance, they have often been willing to help, some respondents note.

> *'UNDSS representatives seldom take an initiative to "bring in" NGOs. However, [when] approached, most UNDSS bosses are quite cooperative. The problem is that NGO representatives do not know the UN possibilities and the SLT document.'*

The process for implementing SLT is very unclear, and detailed procedures have not been articulated. Neither NGOs nor UN agencies have been assigned, or have actively assumed, distinct roles or responsibilities. This creates difficulties when evaluating implementation, or attempting to hold individuals accountable. Since it is generally better resourced than NGOs, with more access to security information countrywide, many feel that the UN should assume its position as the natural 'leader', communicating and advancing collaborative mechanisms. **To enhance the success of SLT arrangements, the roles and responsibilities of all actors must be clarified. There must also be clearer articulation of the terms of engagement between UN agencies and partner organisations.** Confusion in this respect has undoubtedly delayed effective implementation.

NGOs must take on a proactive role in fashioning these terms of engagement. The SLT framework has already been identified by NGO staff as an important advocacy tool for NGOs to employ when engaging with the UN. A more constructive and coordinated engagement with the SLT framework on the part of NGOs could include focal points within NGO security fora to promote awareness of the concerns of international and national NGOs and to maintain regular contact with the UN SMT. While the UN must assume leadership on SLT by devising a clearer guidance mechanism for implementation – rather than leaving this to 'the discretion of the DSS country team' – NGO fora should also maintain clear stances and guidelines for engaging in the process. As one respondent pointed out: *'Relations with the UN are better if we are organised in a group of INGOs.'*

At the time of writing this report, efforts have begun to enhance mechanisms to support and strengthen the implementation of the SLT framework. An inaugural conference on security collaboration among the UN, IGOs and NGOs convened by the IASC Steering Group on Security was held at the end of 2009. The conference promoted greater common understanding of security issues, and a more conducive environment for building stronger collaboration. Recommendations focused on four areas identified as barriers to effective SLT implementation: broadly, the requirement for consistent funding for SLT initiatives, the need for a joint SLT training package, enhancement of monitoring and evaluation of SLT implementation, and reinforcement of the country security focal point system.

Immediate and encouraging results have been the agreement to develop a fundraising strategy for security initiatives, and to establish an SLT task force to review the text of the SLT document and convert the recommendations into 'achievable short and long term tasks'. Clarification of the role of NGOs within the SLT framework has yet to be addressed. However, it is hoped that NGO interaction in the various working groups set up to meet these commitments will assist in developing clearer positions and strategies to ensure that the security needs of national organisations are provided for. It is positive that UNDSS has taken forward the agenda of achieving a common understanding of SLT, by compiling and distributing a briefing document entitled *What is 'Saving Lives Together'?*.[19] This 'how-to' guide, which details background to and functions of SLT, has been disseminated throughout UN and NGO security networks.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations outline suggested actions to be taken by NGOs and other agencies with the aim of addressing the obstacles to effective implementation discussed above. Suggested interventions are oriented towards a surge in awareness of the SLT framework, at headquarters level as well as in the field, and ensuring a broader reach that includes smaller NGOs and national partners. The clarification of roles and responsibilities expected of the various actors – together with pushing for and provision of sufficient dedicated financial and human resources – will be key to successful implementation.

## Recommendations for NGOs

• Each agency needs to make its policy on security collaboration clear, and to provide guidelines and support from management to field teams in implementing these policies within their individual operating environments.

• Security personnel need to understand how their respective agencies interpret SLT and in what capacity they can engage with joint initiatives (such as those for sharing information and human/financial resources) under the framework. Information and interpretation of the SLT framework needs be incorporated into individual-agency security training or inductions.

• Investment in professional NGO security management within organisations, including resources for dedicated security personnel where this is considered necessary, safety and security training, and skills training for information management, needs to be continued.

## Recommendations for interagency fora/networks

• Security fora, such as EISF and InterAction, should support and promote establishment of security networks as good practice for security collaboration and information sharing in all environments. This should also include areas where security management is neglected due to the misperception of contexts as lower risk.

• Interagency security fora should develop communication and inclusion strategies to extend their reach to smaller and national organisations.

• Common standards and guidelines should be developed for all members on information sharing and security training to ensure consistency and usefulness of information shared.

• As part of their roles, fora/network lead agencies should promote and disseminate information to their members, especially national and small NGOs, to increase awareness and knowledge of the SLT framework.

• Clear context-specific positions and guidelines should be developed in order to establish precise terms of engagement with the UN and the SLT framework (including UN SMT meetings).

• Proactive engagement needs to be encouraged through UNDSS teams and representation of security fora at UN SMT and other collaborative security meetings. This should include the appointment of specific NGO representatives.

## Recommendations for the UN

• The UN must assume leadership of SLT, while ensuring that this remains a collaborative exercise in which varying organisational mandates and operational modes are respected.

• A clearer guidance mechanism for implementation must be devised by the UN in order to prevent further confusion over roles and responsibilities. In addition, SLT protocols for information sharing, joint training and telecommunications mechanisms need to be clarified.

• It should be ensured that SLT awareness is included in security training courses for UN agencies. This training should include understanding of NGO security management cultures.

• Sufficient security resources – including both timely and adequate staff and funding – must be provided in order to implement SLT successfully. The position of DSS SLT liaison officer in Darfur, for example, remained unfilled for a long period despite readily available financial resources.

• Interagency liaison officers should be selected on the basis of necessary experience and readiness to engage constructively with NGO representatives. Increased senior level engagement will help to balance project level interaction, which is often based on particular personalities. UNDSS should consult with NGO forums (EISF, InterAction) on the best approach to developing the role profile and selection of liaison officer positions recruited at headquarters level.

• In partnership with key NGO fora, the UN should develop a jointly agreed implementation strategy for achieving better coordination and collaboration.

- A clear policy on the inclusion and role of national implementing partners within SLT implementation needs to be established and articulated.

## Recommendations for donors

- Dedicated security resources for funded security field-coordinator posts and independent information coordination mechanisms need to be earmarked and allocated for identified sensitive environments.

- Donors should encourage the systematic incorporation of security into NGO programme budgets by making explicit their willingness to fund security systematically or providing funding incentives to NGOs that budget strategically. This should include the provision of funding incentives to support and encourage the establishment of security networks or interagency fora as good practice for collaboration in all environments. Such encouragement is particularly important when supporting programmes in areas of fluctuating stability.

- A parallel security capacity-building and support mechanism should be established for small INGOs and national partners excluded from participation through SLT. Resources would need to be made available to support personal security training, security management courses, and the deployment of country-level liaison officers tasked specifically with developing security tools, information management and field coordination for the benefit of these partners.

## Further research

- Research into factors enabling the successful implementation of information exchange models – such as ANSO, GANSO, NSP – should be carried out to evaluate the potential for replication within relatively low-risk, relatively stable countries, as well as in prominent high-risk areas.

# ENDNOTES

**1** Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 2006, *Saving Lives Together: a Framework for Improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field*, 66th Working Group Meeting, November, available at www.clients.squareeye. com/uploads/eisf/documents/ SLT_amended_1.pdf  [accessed 18 January 2010].

**2** Claude Bruderlein and Pierre Gassmann, 'Managing security risks in hazardous missions: the challenges of securing United Nations access to vulnerable groups', *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 19, 2006, pp63-93.

**3** 'UN mourns staff members killed in Kabul attack', UN News Centre, 30 October 2009, accessed 4 January 2010, www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID=32787&Cr= afghan&Cr1

**4** Church World Service-USA, 'Pakistan Humanitarian Forum condemns the brutal attack against Plan International', *Reuters AlertNet*, 29 February 2008, accessed 4 January 2010, www.alertnet.org/ thenews/fromthefield/284081/ 120430075426.htm

**5** Action Contre La Faim, Sri Lanka, *The Muttur Massacre: A Struggle for Justice*, Study Report, June 2008, accessed 4 January 2010, www. justiceformuttur.org/fileadmin/ contribution/Site_Muttur/en-savoir- plus/EXE_RAPPORT_SRI_LANKA_ An.pdf

**6** Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Katherine Harver, 'Providing aid in insecure environments: trends in policy and operations', *HPG Report 23*, September 2006; Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Victoria DiDomenico, 'Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 Update', HPG Policy Brief 34, April 2009.

The 2006 HPG report provides the most comprehensive global statistical dataset on violence against aid workers, drawing on previous compilations, web searches of new agencies and international wire services, published and internal aid agency reports and local media

A 2009 update to this study records 752 separate incidents of major violence against aid workers, affecting 1,618 individuals between 1997 and 2008. The update report echoed the results of the 2006 HPG study in finding that, in the long term, incidents involving national staff continue to increase at a higher rate than those involving international staff, relative to their numbers in the field.

There has been a 177 per cent increase from the annual average of major incidents since 1997, with a particularly steep increase over the past three years. The period 2006- 2008 saw an 89 per cent increase from the period 2003-2005. Stoddard et al. state that when measured against the expanding aid worker population, the data reaffirms the

finding that there is a rising rate of attacks per 10,000 aid workers.

**7** See note 6.

**8** See note 1, Annex II.

**9** See note 1, Annex V.

**10** See note 1, Annex I.

**11** *SLT Survey June 2009*, available at www.clients.squareeye.com/ uploads/eisf/documents/SLT_ Survey_REPORT_JUNE_09.pdf [accessed 22 January 2010].

**12** See note 1, Annex IV.

**13** See note 1, Annex V.

**14** Although security information is being shared across the board, we are unable to make inferences on the type and quality of this. Similarly, where respondents have access to incident reports and trend analysis, the timeliness and relevance of these documents varies greatly.

**15** In hindsight, this question was not appropriately worded to accurately reflect what is stated under point 5 of 'Sharing resources' in the SLT framework ('develop a local inventory for sharing specialised security related resources'), to indicate specifically which resources we meant. Interpretation by the respondent should therefore be questioned.

**16** See note 6, p32.

**17** Remote management here refers to a broad set of approaches used by agencies to continue the delivery of

aid in highly insecure environments, where the presence of international staff members is kept to a minimum. In most of these situations, management of the humanitarian programme is carried out at a distance, or outside of the crisis affected country by international staff and increased responsibility regarding implementation of the programme is given to national staff and organisations (see note 6, p38).

**18** 'Personality clashes' were not cited as a significant barrier to participation in UN SMT meetings in our survey, however. Most frequently, challenges regarding personalities were expressed when discussing awareness of or participation in joint mechanisms.

**19** *What is 'Saving Lives Together'?*, available at: http://clients.squareeye. com/uploads/eisf/documents/SLT_ training.pdf [accessed 11 January 2010].

# ANNEX 1
# PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS

**Breakdown of survey respondents by type of organisation**

National
International

33, 16%

172, 84%

## Type

205 respondents from at least 72 organisations[1] took part in the survey, 84 per cent of whom were from international NGOs (INGOs) and 16 per cent from national NGOs (NNGOs). Although higher rates of participation from national NGOs would have been preferred, the response rate exceeded that of any previous survey of this kind. Nationality of the respondent was not recorded separately, so we are unable to analyse trends according to local and non-local staff members.

**Breakdown of survey respondents by size of organisation**

Medium/large (500+ employees)
Small (1 - 499 employees)

80, 39%

125, 61%

## Size

The size of the organisation is inferred from the number of employees – and the only information we have on this comes from respondents' answers. 61 per cent of respondents said they were from small organisations (1-499 employees), and 39 per cent from medium/ large organisations (more than 500 employees). Medium and large organisations were grouped together with the assumption that they will have similar resource and operational capacities on the ground.

**Breakdown of survey respondents by organisational HQ location**

Europe
Africa
Americas
Asia

102, 50%

27, 13%

51, 25%

23, 12%

## Headquarters location

Half of all respondent organisations had headquarters based in Europe, all of which were INGOs. 25 per cent were based in the Americas, with 86 per cent of these being INGOs, and 14 per cent NNGOs. The rest were fairly evenly spread between Africa and Asia. As described in the Methodology section on page 3, the survey was distributed through a number of NGO security networks, including EISF and the ACT Security Advisory Group, which have extensive European memberships.

**Breakdown of survey respondents by position/title**



71, 35%
24, 12%
19, 9%
62, 30%
29, 14%

- Dedicated Field Security Officer
- Dedicated HQ Security Officer
- Country Manager
- Programme staff member as SFP
- Other

**Profile of respondents from high risk countries**



- National
- International

Afghanistan, DRC, Haiti, Pakistan, Sudan

# Security responsibility

The majority of respondents had some level of responsibility for security. 21 per cent were 'dedicated' security managers/officers, either in-country (12 per cent) or at headquarters level (9 per cent). 44 per cent were programme (14 per cent) or country managers/officers (30 per cent) with security responsibilities. On further inspection, 25 (35 per cent) of the 71 respondents who selected 'Other' were dedicated security personnel[2]. A further 10 (15 per cent of) respondents were directors or heads of region.

# Geographic (field location)

149 respondents identified 49 countries as their current field location (not as their country of origin). Severely underrepresented countries/regions include the Caribbean Islands, India, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Iraq, Israel, Israel/occupied Palestinian territories, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia and Zimbabwe. The DRC, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Haiti are identified as 'high risk' due to the complexity of these operating environments, and the frequency and gravity of security incidents recorded there. Each of these countries made up more than 4 per cent of the 149 respondents who indicated their location. Being high risk, the need for collaboration and implementation of SLT is vital, and their experience as a group will be looked at in detail in order to identify potential areas for improvement.

**Endnotes**

**1** Responses from different country programmes of the same NGO alliance were counted as one organisation.

**2** Job titles included head of security, security advisor and officer (not necessarily programme officers) with security focal point duties.

# ANNEX 2
# SLT SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

## Introduction

Thank you for taking time to complete our survey. It should take about 15 minutes.

### The Saving Lives Together Framework

The Saving Lives Together (SLT) is a framework for improving security arrangements among IGOs, NGOS and the UN in the field and was launched by the Task Force on Collaborative Approaches to Security in 2006. The framework outlines 10 principles that were thought to mitigate the degree of danger faced by field personnel, given that the humanitarian working environment is becoming increasingly risky.

### Purpose of the Survey

The aim of this survey is to determine the extent to which we as a relief and development community are implementing and maximising the benefits from the SLT framework. Since the last review of the framework there has been some evidence that security collaboration between the UN and some NGOs has improved. We are particularly interested in looking at how the framework is being implemented, both formally and informally, by the NGO community and whether there has been a positive impact for national partners and smaller INGOs. The survey will aim to establish if and where there is scope for improvement. All responses to the survey will remain anonymous. Questions marked with * are mandatory.

### Author of the Survey

Christian Aid is a leading UK relief and development charity which operates in over 50 countries. Please see this link to our website: www.christian-aid.org. In conducting this survey, Christian Aid works in collaboration with the European Inter-agency Security Forum (EISF) Secretariat.

## About you and your organisation

1. Name of Organisation:*

2. Type of Organisation:*
   - ☐ International
   - ☐ National

3. Number of employees:*
   - ☐ 1-499
   - ☐ 500 – 999
   - ☐ 1000+

4. Where are the headquarters of your organisation based?*
   - ☐ Europe
   - ☐ Africa
   - ☐ Asia
   - ☐ Americas
   - ☐ Oceania

5. Position/Title of Respondent:*
   - ☐ Dedicated Country/Field Security Officer in Charge
   - ☐ Dedicated Headquarters Security Officer in Charge
   - ☐ Programme member serving as focal point for security management responsibilities
   - ☐ Country Manager/Director
   - ☐ Other (please specify)

6. Please specify YOUR country of operation (for field staff only)*

7. Are you aware of the Saving Lives Together (SLT) framework?*
   - ☐ Yes
   - ☐ No

8. How did you come to know about SLT?

- [ ] From UN sources
- [ ] Through line management
- [ ] Online search
- [ ] Word of mouth
- [ ] Through security networks
- [ ] Other (please specify)

9. My organisation:

- [ ] Encourages inter-agency collaboration
- [ ] Discourages inter-agency collaboration
- [ ] Does not address the question of inter-agency collaboration

## Collaboration in a UN Security Management Team with participation of NGOs and/or IGOs

1. Have you participated in the meetings of the UN Security Management Team?

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No
- [ ] Don't know

2. If yes, have you found it useful?

- [ ] Yes (please specify why below)
- [ ] No

3. Have any of the following contributed to your experience as to why you have not participated or have not found participation useful?

- [ ] Not aware of any meetings
- [ ] Non-inclusion
- [ ] No dedicated security focal point
- [ ] Inadequate (human/financial) resources
- [ ] Do not consider it necessary
- [ ] Personality clashes

- [ ] Organisational policy prohibits participation
- [ ] Other (please specify)

## Convening broad based fora for field security collaboration and information sharing

1. Do you belong to a forum for security collaboration (at area, country or sub-office levels) that meets regularly?

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No
- [ ] Don't know

2. If yes, which forum?

3. Have any of the following information been shared at the meetings?

- [ ] Security related information
- [ ] Incident reports and trend analysis
- [ ] Joint operational planning, as appropriate
- [ ] Security management plans
- [ ] Common evacuation plans
- [ ] Security trees
- [ ] Other (please specify)

4. Have you found participating in these meetings useful?

- [ ] Yes (please specify why below)
- [ ] No

5. Have any of the following contributed to your experience as to why you have not participated or have not found participation useful?

- [ ] Not aware of any meetings
- [ ] Non-inclusion
- [ ] No dedicated security focal point
- [ ] Inadequate (human/financial) resources
- [ ] Do not consider it necessary

☐ Personality clashes

☐ Organisational policy prohibits participation

☐ Other (please specify)

## Including staff security concerns in consolidated appeals

1. Are staff security concerns budgeted for in your appeals processes?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. Are staff security concerns budgeted for in your annual planning?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

3. If yes to either of the above, on what activities has the budget allocation been spent on?

☐ Staff security training

☐ Communication equipment

☐ Security escorts/staff protection costs

☐ Site physical security

☐ Other (please specify)

Sharing resources

1. Are there any arrangements in place to ensure resources are shared amongst the different agencies?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. If yes, who are they between?

☐ UN, INGOs and NGOs

☐ Sister agencies (e.g. ACT, Save the Children Alliance)

☐ Special arrangements with NGOs

☐ None of the above

3. Has your agency been a contributor or recipient of resources?

☐ Contributor

☐ Recipient

☐ Both

☐ Neither

4. What resource gaps exist?

☐ Joint field security coordinators

☐ Dedicated security personnel/ security focal points within the organisation

☐ Inadequate communication between agencies

☐ Financial resources

☐ Management support

☐ Other (please specify)

## Facilitating inter-agency telecommunication

1. Are you aware of any inter-agency telecommunications mechanism in place?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. Have there been opportunities for you to participate in these mechanisms?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

3. Who are involved in these mechanisms?

☐ UN, IGOs, INGOs and NGOs

☐ Sister agencies (other like minded agencies whom your organisation has partnerships)

☐ INGOs and NGOs

☐ NGOs only

☐ Not involved

4. Please comment on your experience

## Collaborating and consulting in security training

1. Are you aware of any joint security training opportunities in your area?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. Did you participate in any joint security training?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

3. Please comment on your experience

## Sharing information

1. Does your security policy permit you to share information with other agencies?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. At what level does information sharing take place?

☐ Headquarters

☐ Field

☐ Both

☐ Neither

3. What is the manner of information sharing?

☐ Formal

☐ Informal

4. With which agencies do you share information?

☐ With NGOs only

☐ With UN and NGO agencies

☐ UN agencies, IGOs and NGOs

5. Please comment on any obstacles to sharing information?

## Identifying minimum security standards

1. Does your organisation have Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS)?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. Does your organisation subscribe to any inter-agency MOSS agreed upon jointly with other agencies and adopted in the field?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

3. Does your organisation consider MOSS as necessary?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

## Seeking adherence to common humanitarian ground rules

1. Have any common ground rules for humanitarian action been developed locally with respect to security issues?

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Don't know

2. What are these common ground rules?

☐ Curfew times

☐ Movement control

☐ Code of conduct

☐ Use of weapons

☐ Information sharing

☐ Training

☐ Other (please specify)

## Your perceptions of the Saving Lives Together (SLT) framework

1. The preceding questions have guided you through the 10 SLT principles and have asked for your experiences of putting these principles into action. Please indicate below to what extent you find the SLT framework useful in improving security arrangements between IGOs, NGOs and the UN?

☐ Not useful at all in ensuring field staff safety and security

☐ A minor contributory factor towards field staff safety and security

☐ Has some usefulness along with other non-collaborative measure

☐ It is an important factor in ensuring field staff safety and security

☐ A vital factor necessary in order to ensure field staff safety and security

2. Please use this space to detail any other thoughts on how security collaboration can be improved between the UN, IGOs and NGOs in the field.

## Thank you.

Please leave your email address if you would like to be contacted with the results of the survey.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Christian Aid is a Christian organisation that insists the world can and must be swiftly changed to one where everyone can live a full life, free from poverty.

We work globally for profound change that eradicates the causes of poverty, striving to achieve equality, dignity and freedom for all, regardless of faith or nationality. We are part of a wider movement for social justice.

We provide urgent, practical and effective assistance where need is great, tackling the effects of poverty as well as its root causes.

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