



**2011**

**Horn & East Africa**

**Drought Response**

**– Real Time Evaluation**

**FINAL REPORT - 25 January 2012**

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## Executive Summary

This report contains the findings and recommendations arising from a Real Time Evaluation (RTE) conducted for CAFOD on its Drought Response programme in the Horn and E Africa.

Throughout 2011 drought worsened across the Horn and East Africa following successive failed rains. The price of staple foods rose to unaffordable levels for many people, and weak animals and the collapse of livestock markets reduced people's income and ability to buy essential foodstuffs. The epicentre of the drought hit the poorest people in the region in an area straddling Kenya, Northern Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, where families rely heavily on livestock for survival.

In July 2011, the UN officially declared two regions of Somalia as in a state of 'famine'. At its peak INGOs and UN estimates showed over 3.5 million people affected in Kenya, 4.5 million in Ethiopia and 3.5 million in Somalia. International recognition as to the scale of the problem increased dramatically in July 2011.

CAFOD's response to the drought was in line with other INGOs across the Region. The Sector as a whole experienced the same challenges as CAFOD in terms of a lack of resources pre-July 2011 and whilst they "saw the crisis coming" from late 2010, agencies struggled to respond at the scale needed until international media picked up the story in late June and available funding rose dramatically, which then created a need to get funding to partners quickly.

CAFOD is responding to the needs of communities affected by the drought and conflict in 6 countries across the Horn and E Africa: Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, S Sudan, Eritrea and Tanzania. CAFOD to date has raised over £8.1million for the Horn and E Africa Drought Response. To date over 165,000 beneficiaries have been supported by this response.

CAFOD's drought response programme is built on the back of its existing long-term programmes and partnerships across the region in all cases except Somalia (where CAFOD is responding through sister agencies). This has the potential to be one of the programme's key strengths in particular in terms of links to DRR work and building communities resilience to inevitable future shocks as well as addressing short and long-term causes of recurring food insecurity.

The RTE was based on standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness; efficiency; effectiveness; connectedness and sustainability; coverage; and coordination and coherence. It also included a light examination of impact.

Key Findings found that CAFOD's Horn and E Africa Drought Response programme is in general both relevant and appropriate and builds on the strength of long term partnerships in the affected areas across the region. There is an opportunity to improve regional working, and explore possibilities to build on programmatic coherence adding depth and focus to the programme in the recovery phase.

The overall impression is that funds were and are being used efficiently and appropriately. There is room for improvement in particular in the areas of Financial Management,

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Communications and Advocacy linked to a fine tuning of PCM and CAFOD's Ways of Working in Emergencies.

Overall, although slow to get started in some areas, the programme is effective and will on the most part achieve its objectives on time. Lessons learnt from previous responses are being incorporated into the current response. There is good potential for building on regional learning and sharing of experiences across countries from this response.

Although there were the usual coordination challenges of too many agencies chasing the same partners in the initial phase, CAFOD is building on its relationships with sister agencies and partners to coordinate joint planning and programming and the overall impression is that CAFOD has coordinated well across the region

The Drought Response Programme is found to have a good focus on vulnerability across the board and to have incorporated some level of beneficiary accountability in all partner responses. There is an awareness of Conflict Sensitivity more as an approach rather than systematic tool. Although it is still early days to measure impact, there are already some good examples across the region of immediate impact in the First Phase.

Finally, the report presents a number of Key Recommendations under each evaluation criteria heading. The report finishes by recognising the importance of picking up on the Key Findings and Recommendations in subsequent evaluations (to include beneficiary and partner perspective) to ensure that CAFOD and its partners continue to improve and learn and address the causes of recurring food insecurity and strive to work to improve communities resilience to future hardship that will inevitably come.

## **SECTION 1: Introduction**

This report contains the findings of a Real Time Evaluation (RTE) conducted for CAFOD on its Drought Response programme in the Horn and East Africa. The findings represent a snapshot of opinions based on almost 30 interviews, both individual and group, carried out from mid November – mid December 2011 and it is important from the outset that the findings are read in this context. The research was entirely interview based guided by the evaluation questions and it is recognised that some findings may be entirely subjective and are not backed up by field-based evidence.

It is hoped that the findings and subsequent recommendations are useful and practical and will provide a useful platform for reflection going into Phase II of the programme.

### **1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Real Time Evaluation**

CAFOD is committed to assessing and improving the quality of its humanitarian programmes. In order to meet this commitment, and create space for those engaged in the emergency response to “step back” from its work, CAFOD has begun to make use of Real Time Evaluations.

The overall purpose of this RTE is to enable CAFOD Management and Emergency Response Team(s) to learn from implementing the programme to date and to make improvements so that the programme is effective in meeting the needs of disaster affected populations. The Terms of Reference (ToR) for this RTE are attached in Annex I. The RTE is primarily an internal learning exercise. It draws where relevant on learning from a previous evaluation of drought response in East Africa (CAFOD East Africa Drought Response Programme 2007; CAFOD Drought Programme Framework<sup>1</sup> and Timeline<sup>2</sup>), and another recent CAFOD emergency response (Haiti) to determine if lessons from previous experiences were incorporated or not, and why. The RTE took place at the end of the first phase of the response.

#### **The objectives for this RTE are:**

1. To review the response against established criteria and recommend immediate changes that can improve the emergency programme.
2. To promote a learning approach within CAFOD.
3. To identify good practices and successes to use more widely and lessons learned in this response.
4. To identify persistent weaknesses for organisational learning and recommend how they can be addressed.
5. To identify the successes and limitations of CAFOD Ways of Working in Humanitarian Context and PCM in this response.

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<sup>1</sup> Annex V

<sup>2</sup> Annex IV

## **1.2 External Environment in the Region**

### **Drought in the Horn and East Africa<sup>3</sup>**

Throughout 2011 drought worsened across the Horn and East Africa following successive failed rains. The late 2010 rainy season failed completely in many parts of the region, and the April-May 2011 rains also were well below average. Parts of North Eastern Kenya received just 10% of the usual level of rainfall.

The price of staple foods rose to unaffordable levels for many people, and weak animals and the collapse of livestock markets have reduced people's income and ability to buy essential foodstuffs. The price of animals plummeted by half while the cost of cereals soared. In many areas up to 75% of livestock were lost. Malnutrition rates rose to above 20% in Kenya and 31% in Somalia.

Food security in lowland and pastoral areas of Eastern and North Eastern Kenya, Southern Ethiopia and large parts of Somalia was severely affected. The epicentre of the drought hit the poorest people in the region in an area straddling Kenya, Northern Tanzania, Ethiopia, Somalia Eritrea and Djibouti where families rely heavily on livestock for survival.

In July 2011, the UN officially declared two regions of Somalia as in a state of 'famine'. At its peak INGOs and UN estimates showed over 3.5 million people affected in Kenya, 4.5 million in Ethiopia and 3.5 million in Somalia.

International recognition as to the scale of the problem increased dramatically in July 2011. The Government of Kenya declared the drought a national disaster and appealed for international assistance. On the 5<sup>th</sup> July, CAFOD launched an appeal for the drought response. On 6<sup>th</sup> July 2011, the British based Disaster Emergencies Committee (DEC) launched its own appeal targeting Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia.

### **How the Sector in general was/is viewing and responding to the drought**

CAFOD's response to the drought was very much in line with other INGOs across the Region. The Sector as a whole experienced the same challenges as CAFOD in terms of a lack of resources pre-July 2011 and whilst they "saw the crisis coming" from late 2010, with plenty of early warning information, agencies struggled to get into gear until the media picked up the story in late June. There was found to be a "...failure of early intervention at the time, and on the scale, that was required"<sup>4</sup>. Save the Children's initiative to bring a BBC crew into the Somali refugee camps in Dadaab, Kenya, at the end of June, attracted intense international media attention and triggered the launching of appeals for many of the major agencies at the beginning of July (including DEC and CAFOD) and an upscale of funding across the Sector.

There was in general across the Sector a missed opportunity and a lack of any real attempt in fundraising materials at communicating in any depth to the public around underlying causes of drought and what agencies were doing to tackle these. Fundraising communications were in general dumbed down and there were several examples of INGOs using negative imaging for example of passive children.

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<sup>3</sup> Information taken from CAFOD 2011 Horn and East Africa Drought Response Framework

<sup>4</sup> DEC RTE – Consultation Draft 11/12/11

Most INGOs have tended to build their responses on the back of existing programmes and partnerships. Initial findings from the DEC RTE show that this approach has “...played to existing strengths and competencies...and ensured that for the most part, there was a good ‘fit’ between relief responses and longer term programmes”. DEC agency responses are found in general to be “generally effective and appropriate”, quality found to be “generally high” and accountability and responsiveness to aid recipients was found to be in general “an area of comparative strength” among DEC members.

Within Caritas, Caritas Internationalis was only engaged in a very limited way which left coordination very much up to individual Caritas agencies on a bilateral level. This was well coordinated in S Sudan and Eritrea as programmes and coordination mechanisms were already existing. However in Kenya, many Caritas agencies were trying to work with the same partners causing coordination challenges which will be picked up on further in the report. Both Caritas Kenya and Caritas Ethiopia did launch appeals in August. There was also a separate appeal for Somali refugees in Kenya. CAFOD launched the Eritrea Caritas appeal in September.

### 1.3 Internal Context

CAFOD is responding to the needs of communities heavily affected by the recent drought and conflict in 6 countries across the Horn and East Africa: Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, South Sudan (through DEC funding, Caritas Australia/AusAid funding and CAFOD appeal funding) and Eritrea and Tanzania (through CAFOD appeal funding). CAFOD to date has raised over £8.9million<sup>5</sup> for the Horn and East Africa Drought Response (£4.75million CAFOD Appeal, £2million DEC allocation, £2.1 million other sources (AusAid, Caritas network for Eritrea, WFP). To date over 165,000 beneficiaries have been supported by this response.

**Table 1: Beneficiaries Reached in Horn & E Africa Drought Response Phase 1**

Country	Planned no. of Households	Planned no. of individuals	Beneficiaries reached (individuals)
Somalia	900	5,400	5,400
Kenya	14,113	84,678	84,678
Ethiopia	3,000	18,000	19,000
South Sudan	22,000	25,000	33,307
Tanzania	1,204	7,229	7,229
Eritrea (Under 5s)		23,000	(to start Jan 2012)
Marsabit Kenya (under 5s)		9,700	15,711
<b>Total</b>		<b>173,307</b>	<b>165,325</b>

CAFOD’s drought response programme is built on the back of its existing long term programmes and partnerships across the region in all cases except Somalia. In Somalia (new area for CAFOD), CAFOD is responding through sister agencies Trócaire and CRS as well as in the Somali refugee Camp Kambios, Dadaab in Kenya. CAFOD is the Facilitating Partner in the Eritrea joint Caritas response and have not incorporated this under DEC funding. Tanzania was also not included under DEC funding due to its small scale and pockets of need. South Sudan is included in the overall response as it was deemed important to keep focus on South Sudan at such a critical time (South Sudan Secession on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011) as well as ongoing

<sup>5</sup> See Annex VII for Table showing CAFOD Income and Allocations breakdown 2 Dec 2011.

food insecurity and LRA displacement. Moreover, the Horn and East Africa Appeal took away any chance of launching an appeal for South Sudan.

### *Programme Management*

As the response was across the majority of the Horn and East Africa Region, different management and implementation structures were used. An Emergency Management Team (EMT) was created to respond to the overall regional response, consisting of Horn and East Africa Regional Manager; Head of Humanitarian Programmes – Africa; Regional Emergency Coordinator – Horn and East Africa; Humanitarian PDFO; East Africa Regional Programme Manager; East Africa Emergency Programme Manager (on appointment in October 2011). Africa Media Officer and Humanitarian Communications Advisor were invited to some meetings. For the purpose of this RTE, the response was treated as one programme, split into individual country responses. Country Management Teams were set up for Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia and S Sudan reporting to the REC. ToR for the Regional EMT and Country Management Teams were agreed – see CERT ToR Horn and E Africa attached in Annex VI.

The Regional Drought Response Programme is managed from the Nairobi Regional Office under the Regional Emergency Coordinator who reports to the EMT.

The individual country responses are managed in different ways. Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea and Tanzania humanitarian programmes are managed primarily from the Nairobi office with inputs from the UK. S Sudan response is managed within its own existing country structure and Ethiopia response within the joint CAFOD SCIAF Trócaire (CST) office structure.

### **1.4 Real Time Evaluation Methodology**

An external consultant who had previous experience of CAFOD's Ways of Working in Humanitarian Contexts collected the minimal data required to reflect upon project progress and accomplishments and identify good practices. The consultant primarily collected qualitative data through interviews (27 interviews in total both individual and group) with CAFOD staff, some key partners (4 partners across 3 countries) and 1 external sister agency representative. The RTE was primarily focussed on how CAFOD has responded to the crisis in the Horn and East Africa, and although the impact on beneficiaries is beyond the scope of this RTE, other evaluations should examine this.

Data collection was based on standard OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness; efficiency; effectiveness; connectedness and sustainability; coverage; and coordination and coherence. It also included a light examination of impact. Under each criterion, specific evaluation questions were drafted for the humanitarian context (26 questions in all). As the humanitarian response is on-going the questions were both retrospective and looking at what was actually happening at the time of research. The Interview Questionnaire is attached as Annex II and the List of Interviewees as Annex III.



## **SECTION 2: Key Findings**

### ***2.1 Relevance / Appropriateness (Were and are we doing the right thing?)***

The impression from this RTE is that CAFOD's drought response is both relevant and appropriate building on the strength of long term partnerships in the affected areas across the region.

#### **1. Needs Assessment**

- Overall, needs assessments were focused on where CAFOD has long term programming in collaboration with partners, in consultation with communities and in discussion with other Caritas.
- There were some examples of good practice across the region. For example, multi-agency needs assessments carried out in Ethiopia and in South Sudan. Emergency standards training previously carried out with partners across the region influenced the assessments (eg SPHERE, LEGS). (Sphere training was carried out by CAFOD for its Kenya partners in May 2010 and LEGS in May 2011).
- Whilst the responses were, in general, all based on some form of needs assessment, there is still room for improvement across the board. Some partners themselves admit that needs assessments are a weakness and that more thorough data is needed to respond comprehensively but say they lacked financial resources to gather this data prior to the CAFOD appeal. The impression is that this has improved now and the gathering of data is more organised and built in as part of the programme. Proposal writing and proposal review skills were also found in need of some improvement (both partners and CAFOD staff).
- On the whole partners and communities were engaged and involved in the needs assessment, design and implementation of the response. In some cases however there was a disconnect between what the partners submitted and the final proposal suggesting that partners may not have been engaged as much as they could have been in some cases. In some cases it is suggested that partners may have taken advantage of the changes in CAFOD staff to introduce project changes. This was resolved further down the line through partner workshops. This could also be linked to the process of programme staff reworking partner's proposals to CAFOD's PSGA format. Confusion was also caused initially by having too many different CAFOD staff members communicating with partners. This has now much improved by designating 1 CAFOD contact person per partner.

#### **2. Regional Working**

- The programme is spread over 6 very different country contexts. The strategy and focus is at country level. The humanitarian programme is not currently

being pulled together as a regional programme. Regional strategy and focus is unclear. This appears to be the same for many INGOs across the region. There appear to be a number of reasons for this:

- The complexity of working across 6 very different country contexts.
- Resources appear to be more focused on Kenya due to the location of the Regional Office in Nairobi.
- Technologically communications across the region are problematic in certain areas making it difficult to sustain a regional telephone / Skype conversation.
- Although there was a lot of work done on Regional and Country based EMTs, there is still a lack of consistency in terms of representation of all countries on the Regional EMT<sup>6</sup>. Ethiopia CST joint office and South Sudan are not sufficiently represented on the EMT. The East Africa Emergency Programme Manager sits on the EMT but Ethiopia and South Sudan are represented through the Regional Emergency Coordinator (REC) and Regional Manager (RM) but not through a Programme Manager. This has contributed to a feeling of being out of the loop in terms of decision-making, communications and information flow on the part of both Ethiopia and S Sudan.
- There is no regional forum or joint structure such as a Regional Emergency Response Team under the EMT to provide an opportunity for Humanitarian Programme Coordinators / equivalent representative from each country to work together, provide support, promote regional / programmatic working, share experiences and learning at field / operational level. This could be linked to Ways of Working being more tuned to country based humanitarian responses rather than regional. Only the REC and RM has links with all country offices.
- The Drought Response Programme has provided good opportunity for humanitarian and development teams to work together and has on the whole been very positive. There is however an underlying organisational dilemma which is played out through differences in approach to the drought response programme. The approach so far has been cautious and careful to remain manageable within current partner capacity linking to longer term programmes rather than support partners to scale up in any significant way and deliver more quicker. On the other hand there are questions coming from a number of interviewees around whether CAFOD should have been more ambitious, more co-implementation with certain key partners (in terms of devoting more staff time to work side by side with partners), more focused in terms of depth over breadth. It is too early to say which approach will deliver better results in the longer term, and beyond the scope of this evaluation, but these questions around strategy and approach should be picked up and discussed as part of Phase 2 planning and in subsequent

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<sup>6</sup> See the CERT ToR Horn and E Africa in Annex VI for composition of Regional EMT and Country EMTs.

evaluations to inform future humanitarian learning. Many interviewees have found that the ability to discuss, compromise and reach a common approach has been really beneficial.

- There is no built in space in the programme for regional learning and sharing. There are real opportunities to share learning and experience and explore possibilities to build on programmatic coherence adding depth and focus to the programme in the recovery phase in a few strategic locations with a few strategic partners.

## **2.2 Efficiency (Were / are we using funds appropriately?)**

- The overall impression is that funds were and are being used efficiently and appropriately.
- The major issue was around significant delays in getting funds out to partners once the CAFOD and DEC appeals had been launched. This was caused by a combination of different factors:
  - a. Blockages in PCM.
  - b. Lack of humanitarian staff familiarity on how to use PCM effectively.
  - c. A lack of clarity over roles and responsibilities of financial management and financial accounting for the appeal which caused confusion and delays in setting up the financial framework on the back of the appeal (see further comments below under Financial Management).
  - d. Delays in sign off in particular when key signatories were away and updating authorised signatories on PCM.
  - e. Delays in getting quality information from partners.
  - f. A lot of disruption in terms of staff movement exposing gaps in effective programmatic and operational management and contributing to a lack of drive in particular in August. Decisions were made at senior management level but not followed up on. A repeated problem was the absence of someone always on top of progress with appropriate knowledge to chase and follow up paperwork through the system, ensuring delays were minimised, ensuring proposals got to approval stage and funds disbursed and received by partners in a timely manner.
- There are some questions around strategy arising from a number of interviews which have been raised in the previous section as to whether fewer partners in fewer locations and a more focused programme would have been more efficient use of funds. These questions can be picked up in future planning and evaluations.

## **3. Financial Management**

- There was, and still is to some extent, a lack of clarity around financial management of the regional response. Key findings coming out of this report include the following:

- Roles and responsibilities for financial management of humanitarian programmes were not sufficiently clear. There were no clear guidelines or immediate support on how to set up a financial framework for a major response once an appeal is launched and a lack of clarity around who should be responsible for doing this. This was in part linked to a lack of proactive leadership from the Finance Department on how to organise the financial management of an appeal and financial accounting set up on the back of an appeal as well as a lack of awareness amongst humanitarian staff in where / who to go to for support. This led to difficulties and delays in setting up the financial framework for the overall response (in particular how accounting for funds allocated to different countries was to be done as well as the allocation of budget codes and authorised signatories) on the system. An income allocation tool was set up from the outset.
- Humanitarian staff are not adequately prepared or trained to carry out the initial setting up of the overall financial framework efficiently and should not be expected to carry out this initial financial accountancy setting up work in any case. There was an expectation of more proactive support, guidance and leadership from the Finance Department in particular in terms of setting up the financial framework as outlined above and at the same time a sense of frustration from the Finance Department that they weren't being sufficiently informed as to what was going on. Roles and responsibilities were confused and linkages between the Finance Department and Humanitarian Teams were too weak.
- There is a clear need to develop guidelines including a template for setting up and managing a financial framework for a major response on the back of an appeal, clarifying roles and responsibilities, linked to PCM and incorporated into Ways of Working.
- There is an identified weakness in terms of finance communication links between South Sudan and Head Office.
- In Ethiopia, there are plans to streamline paperwork into one system as currently Programme Officers (POs) have to complete both Trócaire and CAFOD PCM formats. There was an identified need for more support to ease the burden on POs. At the time of writing they are in the process of hiring a Programme Finance Officer to support both development and humanitarian programmes. The Ethiopia office recognises now in hindsight that they could have done with an additional Finance Officer earlier specifically for humanitarian programmes. Support received from the Humanitarian PDFO was very much appreciated and welcomed.

#### **4. Ways of Working**

- Ways of Working has on the whole worked well in this response and provided a good set of structures particularly at a corporate and senior management level however this report has picked up on a number of areas where it could be made more effective in particular at a field / operational level:

- Ways of Working is more geared towards corporate and senior management level. There is a need for more field based Ways of Working operational guidelines for decision making, building and developing a humanitarian programme at field level, responsibilities and timelines.
- Ways of Working is more tuned to country based sudden onset crisis. There is a need to fine tune to ensure that regional humanitarian responses are catered for eg ensuring all affected countries are sufficiently represented on the EMT as well as exploring the feasibility of setting up a regional more operational / field based structure such as a Regional Emergency Response Team (ERT) below the EMT.
- Ways of Working is more tuned to sudden onset crises. In this instance there were trigger points and early warnings but these were not robust enough to trigger a response. This problem was much in line with other INGOs, donors and Governments across the region who were not triggered into concerted action until July 2011 despite the several early warning reports. Ways of Working needs to be looked at again to ensure slow onset crises are catered for sufficiently.
- Whilst the EMT was up and running quickly and had regular meetings, there appears to have been a duplication of roles between the IEG and EMT which needs to be looked at.
- The ERT was late in being set up and needed more clarity in terms of mandate, specific roles and responsibilities and specific guidelines to ensure it was set up and managed in a timely and effective way. This led to confusion, added to delays and lack of clear decision making at field level.
- The Programme and Humanitarian teams prioritised the Horn & East Africa humanitarian response work until the ERT was in place. This, on the whole, was very positive given their familiarity with long term partners etc. There is however a need for CAFOD to reiterate both to programme and humanitarian staff that all other non urgent work needs to be put on hold. Clear timelines are needed so that staff can plan to go back to their core tasks as soon as practical.
- There was, and to a certain extent still is, a lack of clarity around financial management (see comments under Financial Management). The Ways of Working Financial Section needs updating to include clear guidelines on who does what when, roles and responsibilities and provide a template for setting up a financial framework on the back of an appeal.
- There were real weaknesses in Comms in particular in the initial few days – first week just before and following the appeal launch. Ways of Working needs to incorporate a Comms / Media component in the overall guidelines for major humanitarian response.
- Comms / Media suggest that a representative sits on the IEG in major humanitarian responses to ensure Comms are included in the overall priorities from day 1.

- HR provided critical support to the Humanitarian Response. HR suggests that a representative sits on the IEG in major humanitarian responses to ensure HR are able to support the response appropriately from day 1. There are concerns however that the IEG would become unworkable with too many representatives.
- CAFOD missed an important opportunity in the initial few weeks after the appeal was launched to do some meaningful advocacy work around underlying causes of drought and what CAFOD was / is doing to tackle them. A simple Advocacy component needs to be developed and incorporated into Ways of Working to ensure that advocacy is included as part of any major humanitarian response.

## 5. PCM

- PCM is a useful tool but there are key issues with PCM that caused unacceptable delays in funding reaching partners and frustration amongst staff and partners. This needs addressing in order for the system to work efficiently and in a timely manner for humanitarian response. They relate to a) the system which needs amending and b) the ability of staff to use the system:
  - The system is slow and cumbersome and tuned to development programme needs rather than emergency. There are too many hoops to jump through at each stage. There needs to be a faster process for emergency programmes.
  - Sign off and authorisation procedures of PCM documentation are bureaucratic and causing unacceptable delays. There is a particular problem when managers are out of the office or away and documentation can linger in inboxes for days without being authorised. There are also questions around the number of signatures required.
  - There were inconsistencies with the system in terms of inputting of information in the field offices that did not subsequently show up on the system eg budget codes, budget holders. This may in part be due to staff not being familiar enough with the system and linked to lack of competence in financial systems and procedures but needs to be investigated.
  - There were unacceptable and unexplained delays in updating changes of managers / budget holders / authorised signatures on the system which caused frustration amongst staff and partners.
  - Humanitarian staff in field offices and the UK are not as accustomed to using the PCM system as programme staff and need to either be trained appropriately and / or refreshed and / or be able to call on programme colleagues to work along side them when needed in a humanitarian response.

### **2.3 Effectiveness (Are we achieving what we planned?)**

- Overall CAFOD's drought response programme, although slow to get started in Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia, is effective and will on the most part achieve its objectives on time.

#### *Pre-July*

- CAFOD could and should have responded quicker. One of the key barriers pre-July was a lack of funding until international media highlighted the story. The international media pressure as a result of Save the Children bringing journalists into Dadaab Somali refugee camps in Kenya at the end of June was the trigger for CAFOD, DEC and other INGOs to get into gear. Early warnings and triggers were coming out from Nairobi to London but these were either not sufficiently weighty or alarm bells were not loud enough to trigger a response or any upscale in funding. No formal requests came through for GEB funding. The discussion was around the regional investment in DRR and its impact. In addition, the focus in terms of contingency planning in the region was on S Sudan at that time due to S Sudan's Secession on 6<sup>th</sup> July. This took focus away from the unfolding E Africa drought. CAFOD needs to look at its early warning systems and ensure that the organisation is responsive enough to slow onset crises. *This was the same across the Sector. All humanitarian agencies, donors and Governments were not triggered into action until graphic international media images came out in late June.*
- There is a general feeling that CAFOD and its partners could have been more proactive and touting for funds pre-July with pre-prepared plans - although an upscale in funding was not forthcoming until July. (OCHA funding was achieved in Ethiopia but unsuccessful in Kenya (Isiolo proposal). S Sudan and Eritrea had access to on-going funding. Somalia was a new area for CAFOD post July).

#### *Post-July*

- Once CAFOD and DEC's appeals were launched early July, CAFOD should have geared up quicker. There were a number of reasons for these delays some mentioned already:
  - a. Delays in getting funding out the door to partners due to a combination of factors already mentioned (PCM blockages, delays in sign off, too much disruption caused by movement of key staff, lack of drive and proactive follow up of paperwork to push through approvals, delays in getting quality information from partners.)
  - b. Unanticipated success of the CAFOD and DEC appeals which meant dramatic changes in budgets and plans over the first months.
  - c. Gaps in effective management and drive partly due to the disruption caused by a combination of too many senior managers and key staff being away at the same time in particular in August. There was too much movement which exposed weaknesses. Decisions were being

made at a senior EMT level but not necessarily being followed through or chased up effectively. Although all posts were covered or replaced, there were gaps (see Timeline in Annex IV).

- d. CAFOD could have been better prepared by having pre-developed concept notes and contingency plans.
- e. ERT / RERT should have been set up earlier – this was too slow and responsibilities, timeline and mandate unclear.
- f. Complexity of the response – spread over 6 different country contexts – all other INGOs experienced similar challenges and delays. Political sensitivities in many of the affected countries also caused delays.

## 6. Key Successes

### *Overall*

- Responses are well focused in areas where CAFOD feels it can make a difference and in a scale that it feels is manageable.
- Good collaboration between programme staff and humanitarian staff.
- Close interaction with partners, not trying to steamroll them.
- Good coordination at management level – followed Ways of Working – EMT, IEG and CEG.
- Pre-existing network of traditional partners across the affected region.

### *Ethiopia*

- Successfully accessed OCHA co-funding (pre-DEC and CAFOD appeals) which enabled an earlier response to the drought.
- Getting multi-agency assessments up and running.
- Setting up cash learning programme in Borana.
- Partner's capacity linked to humanitarian standards (LEGS, SPHERE, etc).
- Cash transfer programmes for vulnerable groups.

### *Kenya*

- Water interventions – water structures now full of water.
- Cash transfers – direct impact on household food security.
- CAFOD technical support to partners.
- Adherence to humanitarian standards (eg SPHERE).
- Beneficiary accountability – complaints handling mechanism being implemented.

### *S Sudan*

- Incorporating South Sudan into the Regional Drought Response was a positive move (as the Horn & East Africa drought appeal took away possibility for running a CAFOD appeal for South Sudan).

### *Eritrea*



- That CAFOD were / continue to be able to work there and CAFOD's refusal to give up.

#### *Somalia*

- Able to quickly work in Somalia through pre-existing relationships with sister agencies – Trócaire and CRS and subsequently in Kambios Camp in Dadaab (Kenya) with CRS.

## **7. Key Challenges**

#### *Overall*

- Trying to do too much – breadth over depth.
- There were partners who may have benefitted from CAFOD being more co-plementational (in terms of working together side by side maybe embedding staff more with partners to assist programme planning and delivery). There was a sense of an organisational reluctance to do this.
- Difficult to coordinate and manage all kinds of relationships.
- Needs assessments need improvements – still rusty going into phase 2 in terms of baselines.

#### *S Sudan*

- Internal grant management capacity of partners.
- Partners finding and retaining staff – due to insecure funding and challenging environment.

#### *Ethiopia*

- Managing communications to CAFOD, Trócaire and SCIAF in initial stages when staff were overstretched.
- Capacity of partners and commitment of local government - weak local coordination in terms of response.
- Scale of the problem much bigger than intervention – beyond the capacity of partners.

#### *Kenya*

- Capacity of partners – reluctance on the part of certain Bishops to recruit more staff.
- Security in the region – especially in Marsabit, Maralal and Isiolo.
- Banking network for cash transfers not reaching more remote villages.

#### *Somalia*

- Trócaire's reluctance to accept CAFOD's second phase DEC funding because reporting requirements were too onerous (and ample more flexible CI partner funding available).

*Eritrea*

- Political sensitivities making it difficult to include Eritrea in any communications material.

**8. Staffing structure and capacity**

- General feeling that CAFOD have learnt from other responses and have staffed up this emergency response well.
- Decisions were being made at EMT level but were not followed through at programme / operational levels. There was a lack of drive in certain periods leading to delays and paperwork not being chased through the system (see earlier comments). Management were in flux in particular in August which exposed weaknesses in terms of decisions being allowed not to be followed through / chased. There were a lot of senior managers and other key staff away all at the same time for a variety of reasons contributing to disruptions and discontinuity and inevitably affecting quality and slowing processes down. Although there was every attempt to cover these positions, it may have been more about how these positions were allocated and managed. It is unclear whether some of these roles were fully and appropriately covered or whether it was a case of being overstretched, double jobbing and not delegating? There were delays where posts were not covered for periods of time (see Timeline in Annex IV).
- IEG / EMT became too bogged down in the 'micro' and servicing needs of different parts of the organisation and not enough time or space was devoted to overall programme strategy and direction in particular in the early critical phase.
- There was a perception from a significant number of respondents that "none of the senior managers seemed to be around" both in the UK and Nairobi. This appears to be mainly in August. This comment needs to be weighed up against the inevitable reality of senior managers being overstretched during this period.
- The Comms focal point was vacant also at the time in Nairobi and recruitment of replacement although fast tracked again caused discontinuity at critical time.
- The Senior Emergency response Officer (SERO) – key surge for the region left in the critical phase and although he was quickly replaced, this caused disruption and there were delays in getting his replacement into post. Also his replacement did not take on the wider regional remit but was focused on Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea and Somalia drought response.
- The programme team were used as surge in Kenya until the ERT was in place. Whilst this on the whole worked well, the ERT should have been set up earlier. More clarity was needed on timelines and the organisational priority to drop existing non-urgent work (including humanitarian staff).
- A Regional ERT or similar regional structure / forum should have been set up also from the very beginning.

- Staffing was scaled up to support Kenya and Somalia responses and was deemed to be sufficient in South Sudan and Eritrea. South Sudan had already benefited from scale up in lead up to Secession.

#### *Ethiopia*

- The Ethiopia office was under pressure in terms of staffing with the key Humanitarian Coordinator leaving at a critical time<sup>7</sup>. Whilst they did recruit some new staff (2 POs), the reality was more double jobbing than scaling up. CST Ethiopia's staffing needs may still need to be looked at.
- There is an identified weakness in terms of administration in CST Ethiopia (filing systems of project documentation, etc), although an administrator has now been recruited.

#### *Recruitment*

- Overall seems to have worked really well, quick recruitment time and good support from HR.
- HR Adviser brought in to provide full time specific support for recruitment of emergency personnel for initial period – worked well.

## **2.4 Connectedness and Sustainability (Does the response link to longer term programmes?)**

CAFOD's drought response programme is well linked to longer term programmes. This has the potential to be one of the programme's key strengths.

### **9. CAFOD's added value**

- Working with long term traditional partners, well linked, good sustainability – strong LRRD.
- CAFOD's approach is appreciated by its partners: "CAFOD listens!" "CAFOD are a partner not a donor – we share, we're open, they give us technical support and advice", "...always come with support not criticism...understand the region better than others" – but CAFOD need to know when to step in and be more assertive. CAFOD should be able to support partners capacity to deliver more better.
- DRR work over past few years.
- Humanitarian standards work over past few years.

### **10. Communications**

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<sup>7</sup> See learning document prepared by Trócaire on staff leaving and staff retention in CST Ethiopia.

- There were real Communication weaknesses in this response in particular in the initial critical first few days / weeks but also in terms of information flow to supporters over the subsequent months:
  - There was a critical information gap in the first few days / week both pre and post appeal being launched which needs to be addressed. Information was given to media the weekend before any appeal had been decided on or launched, saying that CAFOD was effectively open for business, taking donations and giving CAFOD's phone number. Comms staff were subsequently inundated with phone calls from supporters over the following 36 hours seeking a lot more information than Comms staff had as to what CAFOD were doing as no decisions had as of yet been made (or at least not communicated to Comms). Donations were unable to be earmarked to an appeal fund but instead directed to GEB.
  - E Comms happened too late to be useful in terms of providing the initial Comms information needed. E Comms met on Tuesday 5<sup>th</sup> July pm but Comms staff needed information on what CAFOD were doing since first thing on Monday morning. Comms/Media suggest that a Comms / Media representative sit at IEG as well as CEG level to ensure it is included in priorities and not left out (even as observer).
  - There were delays in sign off of Comms materials (including web site updates) due to key managers being away / unavailable / overstretched, combined with need for 2 or 3 signatures. Q+A was needed within 24 hours but took 3 days for sign off. Web site material was 3 weeks out of date 5-6 weeks into the appeal. Unavoidable political sensitivities around language and wording when talking about most of the affected countries also slowed down the sign off process. Sign off needs to be looked at and simplified without compromising quality.
  - There was no Comms / Media strategy in place. There is a need to develop a Comms / Media Strategy / template / component for major humanitarian response and incorporate into Ways of Working. This needs to include clarity on roles and responsibilities in Comms.
  - There is a perception from Comms / Media that their work is not sufficiently prioritised at EMT level or respected enough or needs understood at field level.
  - There was a need to streamline communication requests in the initial stages to ease the burden on field staff (too many requests coming from several different people simultaneously).
  - There were challenges and poor flow of information coming from the field throughout the first few months. Since August, sitreps are supposed to be coming in from the field every 2 weeks. It is unclear whether these are being circulated correctly / widely enough and whether they represent all 6 countries in the regional programme. The first sitrep was in September. Sitrep 2,3 and 4 were not circulated until 22 December 2011. Blockages seem to be more about the absence of the assigned media person to

compile the sitreps due to other work assignments rather than delays in sign off and circulation. This needs to be investigated and resolved.

- The Comms post in Nairobi was in process of being recruited (see earlier comments under Staffing - Pg 9).

#### *Communications between country offices and regional office*

##### *Ethiopia*

- There were and still are weaknesses around linkages and communications to the Regional Office for a number of reasons impeding proper engagement and regional working. (See earlier comments under Regional Working re lack of consistency in terms of representation on EMT, pg 2).
- There was too much pressure on the Ethiopia CST joint office to meet the demands of all 3 partner agencies in particular in the initial stages of the regional response. The Development programme works well by designating a lead agency for different programmes. The feasibility of designating a lead agency for the humanitarian programme in Ethiopia needs also to be explored for more efficient working.

##### *S Sudan*

- S Sudan feel out of the loop in terms of regional drought response programme decision-making and in terms of decisions directly affecting S Sudan programme. (See earlier comments under Regional Working re lack of consistency in terms of representation on EMT and absence of any regional forum under EMT, pg 2).

### **11. Lesson learning**

- Lessons learnt from previous responses are being incorporated. Examples as follows:
  - A move away from direct food aid towards different types of interventions such as cash programmes..
  - Linking of water interventions to longer term work.
  - Haiti in terms of staffing up.
- There is no space built in for regional learning and sharing across countries but there are opportunities now in Phase 2 planning to make space for this.
- There are some good learning documents within country programmes in the region which could be shared.
- A key lesson learnt from this response is that CAFOD could be better prepared for slow onset crisis – contingency plans, pre-prepared proposals, pre-prepared Q+A, media/comms strategy, financial strategy/template and advocacy analysis around underlying causes. (Contingency planning was focused at the time on S Sudan in lead up to Secession taking focus away from E Africa drought).

## **2.5 Coverage (Who and how many people are we reaching?)**

### **12. Targeting**

- General feeling is that it's still early days to say whether funding went to the right places but overall sense across all countries is that the targeting criteria and methodology were appropriate at community, household and individual levels.
- The targeting in terms of countries is seen as appropriate:
  - The epicentre of the drought was Somalia which although it was not CAFOD's area pre July, it was seen as appropriate, given the context, to fund sister agency Trócaire and CRS in Somalia and subsequently CRS in Kambios camp in Dadaab.
  - S Sudan – not strictly drought related but it was agreed that it was strategically important on basis of food insecurity and continuing displacement to include in overall response. The Horn & East Africa drought appeal took away the possibility of running a South Sudan appeal.
  - Eritrea, although included as part of the drought response, was deliberately not named and not included in DEC funding because of political sensitivities.
  - Tanzania was included in overall response but not as part of DEC as only pockets of need in specific areas.

### **13. Conflict Sensitivity**

- Apparent that conflict sensitivity is being incorporated more as an approach rather than a systematic tool. Sense that across all of the affected countries, a conflict sensitive approach is critical or partners would not be able to work there.
- More hit and miss across the country programmes – sense that its more rooted in personal experience and that there is awareness of it as an issue rather than systematic practice. There is an identified need to do training for staff and partners as appropriate.
- Most partners have been trained on Do No Harm.
- In Kenya some partner workshops on conflict sensitivity were carried out in August/September. All programmes include some aspects – Maralal piloting aspects of conflict sensitivity. The Peacebuilding Officer has been involved in design from the beginning and as conflict began in Northern Kenya, plans were adjusted slightly to incorporate peace-building activities.
- In S Sudan, for example, conflict sensitivity was taken into account for example considering how humanitarian assistance to one group would impact on the other. Both IDPs and hosts in Mvolo / Mundri area were targeted with food distribution to minimise tensions.
- In Ethiopia, the focus so far has been on Do No Harm.

#### **14. Vulnerable groups**

- There is a clear focus across the board on vulnerable groups but unclear if / how CAFOD verifies that they are the most vulnerable.
- Sense across all countries of both building on traditional practices of communities themselves identifying most vulnerable and an introduction of more systematic vulnerability criteria and tools.
- Good examples of project design being amended to take most vulnerable into account eg direct cash transfer instead of cash for work for most vulnerable.

#### **15. Beneficiary Accountability**

- Most partners across all affected countries have incorporated some level of beneficiary accountability into their programme.
- Kenya partners received training early 2011. Complaints handling mechanisms have been established in a number of Kenya projects which are used to handle accountability issues including review of activities and priority setting to ensure that priorities of the community are considered first. The mechanism is still in test phase and is in plan to roll out across all partners.
- Traditional mechanisms are also used across the region – eg feedback from communities through their parish to the partner and through village committees.
- In Ethiopia, each partner has downward accountability plan in place (post CAFOD training) but is still a work in progress – no independent complaints mechanism in place yet but do have traditional practices through gatherings and committees.
- General appreciation that CAFOD prioritised this area and has helped to give focus. Follow up work from UK focal point has been requested by CST Ethiopia and S Sudan in terms of further technical training needs for staff and partners on downward accountability.
- In Somalia, Trócaire have questionnaire now in place for community feedback and downward accountability forms an essential part of being able to continue working there.
- Eritrea partners have complaints handling mechanism in place and have done partner accountability training and built upon lessons learnt.

### **2.6 *Coordination and Coherence (How are we working with others?)***

#### **16. Coordination**

- Although there are challenges and a recognition of the time and commitment that coordination takes, CAFOD are doing well at coordinating across the board at all levels which has helped improve organisational profile in some areas.
- At corporate level there is a high commitment to coordination.

- CI was slow to engage. CAFOD were reluctant to get involved with Caritas Kenya and there was a feeling that it was someone else's turn to step up to the mark because of historical difficulties. Trócaire and CRS supported writing of the EA but there was no facilitating partner as such. The Country Forum didn't function well enough to ensure partners weren't overwhelmed and CAFOD did not appear to participate in this forum at critical time. CAFOD could have engaged more at Caritas coordination meetings, in particular in August and September.
- Within Caritas, at field level, there were coordination challenges at the beginning with shared partners, agencies coming in with lots of funding, everyone trying to be visible. This involved a lot of staff time in terms of bilateral discussions and delays and amendments to project plans with partners who were overwhelmed.
- There is a sense that CAFOD could do more to support Church partners to engage in coordination and to understand the benefit. There is a sense that Caritas still see coordination through a Church lens and not in terms of coordinating with INGOs.
- There is also a request from partners to receive more feedback from CAFOD from the coordination meetings that they attend.
- There are examples of joint programming in Phase 1 and more planned for the second phase with sister agencies eg with Trócaire and Caritas Kitui.
- Joint partner workshops were run in late August / early September as part of Phase 1 and as part of Phase 2 in November in Kenya and more are planned to share experiences as part of second phase across the board.
- In S Sudan there are good coordination mechanisms already set up for both external coordination and within CI and good participation.
- In Ethiopia there is weak local coordination in terms of partners and local government. A lot of staff time went into setting up multi agency coordination for assessments.

#### **17. Funding sources**

- Major issue was going from very little funding pre-July to receiving significant quantities of funding post-July in short space of time. Figures kept changing quite dramatically. The unanticipated and evolving levels of funding made planning and budgeting a challenge. Appeals in the past had not raised much. The success of the CAFOD and DEC appeals exceeded all expectations.
- Only started thinking big after CAFOD decided to go for an Appeal. The international media highlighted the drought, acting as a major accelerator and opening up the floodgates to funding. Should CAFOD have been more proactive in raising the alarm before the BBC coverage in Dadaab? There were attempts at raising the alarm but CAFOD's focus was distracted by the Secession in S Sudan and other crises so it didn't plan well enough. This was the same for most other agencies.
- Sense that there was very little institutional funding around pre-July. CAFOD did approach OCHA in Nairobi but funding was not available.



- DEC appeal was not anticipated. There was a need to spend large amounts effectively and timely which was daunting but was achieved. DEC worked well although reporting requirements are increased as DEC funding is shared out across partners across countries.
- Ethiopia was successful with OCHA funding (pre DEC and CAFOD appeals) and subsequently Irish Aid.
- There was a potential opportunity for DfID funding post July. DfID invited a consortium of British agencies to submit proposals for the recovery phase and CAFOD were not invited. Possible reasons include CAFOD not being engaged enough with DfID and CAFOD's lack of visibility on the ground (branded as Caritas).
- Kenya was successful with AusAid funding (post DEC appeal).
- CAFOD's own appeal was more successful than anticipated.
- Demands coming from other parts of the organisation eg Comms – took programme staff away from programme design and servicing needs of donors.
- A decision was made not to apply for ECHO funding (– less incentive in July period due to success of CAFOD and DEC Appeals).
- The focus of the PDFO on the drought response programme appears to have worked well and been appreciated across the board.

## ***2.7 Impact (Is what we are doing likely to be making a difference)***

### **18. Measuring Impact**

- It is early days to look at impact although there are good examples of immediate impact in the first phase across all country programmes in the following areas:
  - Water interventions – water harvesting structures and community tanks are full of water, in use and making a difference.
  - Cash programmes – immediate impact on household food security, enhanced dignity to beneficiaries able to buy their own food in the markets, improved local economy.
  - Livestock programmes – increases in terms of production.
- It is unclear what sort of baselines CAFOD partners have been gathering in order to be able to assess impact. This is a potential weakness which needs addressing as part of Phase 2 planning.
- General agreement that there is room for improvement – improve regional programmatic working, link to longer term, use opportunity to focus on DRR and support capacity building for partners.

## **SECTION 3: Key Recommendations**

### **3.1 Relevance / Appropriateness**

#### Needs Assessment / Evaluations

1. Incorporate improving partner and staff capacity on doing needs assessments, proposal writing, proposal review and ensuring that partners are truly engaged in project design into Phase 2 as appropriate.
2. Ensure partners and beneficiaries are central to subsequent evaluations for this particular humanitarian response.

#### Regional Working

3. Ensure all 6 countries are represented consistently at EMT level.
4. Explore opportunity and potential benefits of working towards a more regional programme – make space for opportunities to share learning and experience and explore ways to build on potential programmatic coherence adding depth and focus to the programme in a few strategic locations with a few strategic partners.
5. Explore feasibility and potential benefits of setting up a RERT or regional structure beneath the EMT to promote regional programmatic focus, support and learning.
6. Incorporate the questions raised in this report around strategy and focus as part of phase 2 planning discussions and include in future programme evaluations to inform future humanitarian response and learning.

### **3.2 Efficiency**

#### Financial Management

7. Develop practical field based guidelines and template for setting up the overall financial framework for a major response on the back of an Appeal and linked to PCM. Clarify roles and responsibilities of financial management in a major humanitarian response, who should be setting up the overall financial framework, and ensure awareness of where, and who, to go to for support. Add to Ways of Working. Ensure Finance staff are made available at the critical early stage of the response.
8. Ensure humanitarian staff are adequately trained and prepared and that finance work is included in job descriptions at appropriate levels.
9. Look at ways of strengthening linkages between UK Finance Department and the Humanitarian Team – both in the UK and field offices. Management to encourage staff to be more proactive in terms of seeking information and support.

## Ways of Working

10. Review Ways of Working in light of findings in this report to include the following:

- Look at developing field level operational “Ways of Working” – guidelines for decision making, building and developing a humanitarian programme at field level, roles and responsibilities and timelines.
- Ensure Ways of Working adequately caters for regional humanitarian responses as well as country based responses. Incorporate clarity around country based ERT and regional ERT remits and structures, roles and responsibilities and timelines. Ensure EMT remits, structures, roles and responsibilities are sufficient for major regional humanitarian responses and that EMT and IEG roles are not duplicated.
- Update Finance section to include template and clarity around who does what when in a humanitarian response, how to set up a financial framework once an appeal is launched, who should be doing this, and where to look for support (as per Recommendation 7).
- Develop simple Comms / Media strategy and procedure for major humanitarian response to incorporate into Ways of Working and clarify roles and responsibilities of Humanitarian and Comms /Media staff.
- Explore feasibility of including Comms/Media and HR representative on IEG (even as observers) or find suitable alternative acceptable solution in major humanitarian responses.
- Ensure Ways of Working is sufficiently tuned to slow onset crises and incorporates effective and sufficiently robust early warning procedures and trigger points.
- Develop simple Advocacy strategy and procedure and incorporate into Ways of Working to ensure Advocacy is part of any major humanitarian response from the outset.
- Ensure EMT minutes and key decisions (strategy, comms and funding) are properly recorded, key document drafts are finalised and all key documentation is stored centrally.

## PCM

11. Review PCM in light of the findings in this report to include the following:

- Ensure all humanitarian staff in UK and field offices are appropriately trained in how to use PCM and receive regular refresher training as appropriate.
- Ensure Humanitarian staff are aware of where they can receive appropriate support. As well as strengthening linkages with the appropriate departments / teams, this could include calling on development staff to work alongside them to help resolve PCM issues when needed in a major humanitarian response.
- Explore feasibility of fast track documentation for initial phase of emergency programmes.

- Look at sign off mechanism and authorisation procedures to ensure this process is timely and efficient – such as sign off when managers are out of office and reduction in number of signatures required.
- Investigate and resolve issues of updating – eg info being updated in the field and not showing up on the system, delays in updating changes of managers etc. This should include clarification on roles and responsibilities such as who should do the updating.

### **3.3 Effectiveness**

#### Staffing Structure and Capacity

12. CEG, IEG and EMT need to ensure that there is sufficient follow up and support once decisions are made and factor in adequate management and programme resourcing (both short term and long term) into planning to ensure that decisions are followed through efficiently and effectively at emergency management and programme / operational levels and quality is not compromised by too much disruption and staff being too overstretched.
13. Ensure adequate IEG time and space is devoted to overall programme strategy and direction from the very beginning and documented. CAFOD's Director, International Director and Head of Humanitarian Department need to reiterate corporate responsibility to prioritise humanitarian work in a major crisis and put all non-urgent work on hold. This includes humanitarian staff who need to drop their existing non-urgent pieces of work and prioritise setting up humanitarian response in a major crisis and the option of recalling critical staff on leave.
14. EMT need to be clear on how long development staff are expected to prioritise humanitarian work eg ToR for 6-12 weeks with clear handover.

#### *Ethiopia*

15. Review staffing needs in Ethiopia to ensure fully staffed and working at full capacity and salary scales are appropriate etc Look at ways of retaining staff in terms of career progression, regional work experience, etc.
16. Follow up with CST Ethiopia to see if support is needed to resolve administration weakness.

### **3.4 Connectedness and Sustainability**

#### Comms

17. Develop a Comms / Media strategy / template for major humanitarian crisis and incorporate into Ways of Working (as per Recommendation 9 under Ways of Working)
18. Explore feasibility of including Comms / Media representative to sit in on IEG (even as observer) or find alternative appropriate solution (as per Recommendation 9 under Ways of Working)

19. Speed up sign off of Comms materials (are 2 or 3 managers really needed?) – appoint 1 key manager who will engage with Comms for first few weeks of appeal to ensure it is being appropriately prioritised.
20. Streamline and coordinate comms requests to the field to ease burden on programme staff especially in the initial phase of a major humanitarian response and clarify roles and responsibilities. Second dedicated Media and Comms staff to a major humanitarian response from the beginning.
21. Ensure sitreps are being received every 2 weeks and circulated fully as well as being posted up on central system. Ensure sitreps are being signed off in a timely manner and represent all 6 countries in regional programme.
22. Ensure that all Humanitarian Job descriptions have some reference to Comms.

*Communications between country offices and regional office*

*Ethiopia*

23. Work together with Ethiopia CST office to find appropriate ways to improve communications and linkages.
24. Explore feasibility of designating lead agency for CST Ethiopia humanitarian programme.

**Lesson learning**

25. Look at ways to build in space for regional learning and sharing across countries in Phase 2 planning.
26. Share learning documents regionally and incorporate learning from country programmes into regional learning doc.
27. Work with Learning Team to draw up summary document of lessons learnt in recent major humanitarian responses and post on central system / circulate.
28. Incorporate lessons learnt from recent major humanitarian responses into agenda of one of the first EMTs – present summary of lessons learnt from last few major emergencies (Add to Ways of Working).
29. Ensure that CAFOD is more proactive and better prepared across the organisation for slow onset crises – contingency plans, pre-prepared proposals, pre-prepared Q+As and advocacy analysis around underlying causes.

### **3.5 Coverage**

**Conflict Sensitivity**

30. Review need to do conflict sensitivity training with staff and partners across the region as appropriate given each different country context.

**Beneficiary Accountability**

30. Beneficiary Accountability focal point in UK to follow up on identified training and support needed in S Sudan and CST Ethiopia.

### **3.6 Coordination and Coherence**

#### Coordination

31. Look at ways of encouraging partners to engage more in coordination and encourage staff to feed back to partners on coordination meetings attended. Work more closely with Northern Caritas agencies to ensure coordinated Caritas representation at UN / INGO coordination meetings.
32. Work more closely with Northern Caritas agencies and the National Caritas to ensure a more coordinated response at Diocese level to reduce burden on partners and avoid causing delays and frustration in planning and implementation.

### **3.7 Impact**

#### Measuring Impact

33. As part of Phase 2 planning ensure that sufficient baseline data is being gathered across all programmes so as to be able to demonstrate impact.

## **SECTION 4: Concluding Remarks**

CAFOD's Horn and E Africa Drought Response programme is in general both relevant and appropriate and builds on the strength of long term partnerships in the affected areas across the region. There is an opportunity to improve regional working, and explore possibilities to build on programmatic coherence adding depth and focus to the programme in the recovery phase.

The overall impression is that funds were and are being used efficiently and appropriately. There is room for improvement in particular in the areas of Financial Management and Communications linked to a fine tuning of PCM and Ways of Working.

Overall, although slow to get started in some areas, the programme is effective and will on the most part achieve its objectives on time. CAFOD experienced the same challenges as other INGOs across the Sector, the major barrier being a lack of funding pre-July 2011 and a subsequent slowness to get funding to partners and projects post-July. This was due to a number of contributory factors as outlined in the report combined with too much disruption caused by staff movements at that time inevitably leaving staff overstretched.

The response is well linked to longer term programmes and this has the potential to be one of the programme's key strengths in particular in terms of links to DRR work and building communities resilience to inevitable future shocks as well as addressing short and long-term causes of recurring food insecurity.

Lessons learnt from previous responses are being incorporated into the current response. There is good potential for building on regional learning and sharing of experiences across countries from this response.

The overall impression is that CAFOD has coordinated and is in general coordinating well across the region. Although there were the usual coordination challenges of too many agencies chasing the same partners in the initial phase, CAFOD is building on its relationships with sister agencies and partners to coordinate joint planning and programming.

The Drought Response Programme is found to have a good focus on vulnerability across the board and in general to have incorporated some level of beneficiary accountability in all partner responses. There is an awareness of Conflict Sensitivity more as an approach rather than systematic tool.

Although it is still early days to measure impact, there are already some good examples across the region of immediate impact in the First Phase.

As stated in the Introduction, this report is based on a number of key interviews with staff from across the organisation as well as some partners (partners were limited and beneficiaries were not included at this point but should be central to subsequent evaluations

for this humanitarian response). Findings and conclusions are therefore based on an overall impression derived from qualitative data and not backed up by field based evidence or substantive documentary evidence. It is hoped that the Key Recommendations are helpful and practical going into the Recovery Phase.

Finally, it will be important to pick up on a number of the Key Findings and Recommendations in this report in subsequent evaluations (to include beneficiary and partner perspective) to ensure that CAFOD and its partners continue to improve and learn and address the causes of recurring food insecurity and strive to work to improve communities resilience to future hardship that will inevitably come.



**Glossary of Acronyms**

AusAid	Australia Aid
CEG	Corporate Emergency Group
CERT	CAFOD Emergency Response Terms of Reference
CI	Caritas Internationalis
CST	CAFOD SCIAF Trocaire (joint office)
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
E-Comms	Emergency Communications Group
EMT	Emergency Management Team
ERT	Emergency Response Team
IEG	International Emergency Group
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LEGS	Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards
LRRD	Link Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance
OECD/DAC	Committee
PCM	Programme Cycle Management
PDFO	Programme Development and Funding Officer
PO	Programme Officer
REC	Regional Emergency Coordinator
RERT	Regional Emergency Response Team
RM	Regional Manager
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SCIAF	Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund
SERO	Senior Emergency Response Officer
WFP	World Food Programme