

HPG Research Report

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A review of emergency food security assessment practice in Ethiopia

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About HPG

The Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice. It conducts independent research, provides specialist advice and promotes informed debate.



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Review of Emergency Food Security Assessment Practice in Ethiopia

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Contents

Acronyms	iii
Glossary of key terms	v
Foreword	vii
Executive summary	1
Chapter 1 Introduction and rationale for study	3
1.1 Background	3
1.2 Origins and focus of the study	3
1.3 Clarification of assessment types and process	4
Chapter 2 Complex livelihood and political contexts with extreme food insecurity	7
2.1 Livelihood complexity	7
2.2 Political complexity	11
2.3 Review of food security issues in Ethiopia	11
2.3.1 Emergency needs and safety nets	13
2.3.2 The institutionalisation and political economy of food aid	13
2.4 Role of WFP in food security in Ethiopia	14
Chapter 3 Overview of EFSA practice in Ethiopia	15
3.1 Evolution of EFSA in Ethiopia	15
3.2 Current practice of EFSA in Ethiopia	15
3.3 Recent initiatives to improve EFSA	16
Chapter 4 Critical review of current EFSA practice	19
4.1 General issues	19
4.2 Technical issues	20
4.3 WFP institutional issues	21
4.3.1 Funding and structure	21
4.3.2 Independence and advocacy	22
4.4 Planning issues	22
4.4.1 Seasonality	22
4.4.2 Region-based information systems, products and analysis	23
Chapter 5 Key themes and options	25
5.1 Assessing chronic versus transitory needs	25
5.2 Assessing the role of markets	26
5.3 Assessing non-food responses	27
5.4 Assessing the effects and impact of food aid	28
Chapter 6 Conclusions	31
Annexes	33
Annex 1 Changes in food security-related theory and practice	33
Annex 2 Ethiopia Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA)	35
Annex 3 Summary of key changes and actors	39
Annex 4 Livelihood zones in SNNPR	41
Annex 5 People consulted	43
Annex 6 Terms of reference	45
Bibliography	49

Lists of figures

Figure 1	Interagency Needs Analysis Framework	5
Figure 2	Average share of ODA by ten largest bilateral donors, 1997–2002	10
Figure 3	Sectoral share of ODA, 1997–2002	10
Figure 4	The problem of food security in Ethiopia	12
Figure 5	People needing food aid, Somali Region	13
Figure 6	Food aid appeals and distributions	14

List of tables

Table 1	Characteristics of emergency assessment types	5
Table 2	Position of ENA within humanitarian/food security information systems	6

List of boxes

Box 1	Livelihood diversity – some examples	10
Box 2	A summary of the typical EFSA process	15
Box 3	Food aid: too little or too much?	17
Box 4	HEA livelihoods approach	20
Box 5	Is there a credibility gap?	22
Box 6	The annual appeal documents	23
Box 7	Crisis as opportunity	26
Box 8	FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAM) – rubber stamp or opportunity for holistic analysis?	28

List of maps

Map 1	Ethiopia map (regional)	7
Map 2	The geographical limits of different rainfall systems in Ethiopia	8
Map 3	The relationship between altitude and rainfall in Ethiopia	9
Map 4	Livelihood map, SNNPR (Annex 4)	41

Acronyms

BOARD	Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
DfID	Department for International Development
EC/EU	European Commission/Union
EGTE	Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise
EW	Early Warning
EWS	Early Warning System
EPSP	Emergency Preparedness Support Programme
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
FAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FS	Food Security
FSAU	Food Security Analysis Unit, Somalia
FSCB	Federal Food Security Coordination Bureau
GOE	Government of Ethiopia (Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia)
HDI	Human Development Index
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
MERET	Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to more Sustainable Livelihoods
MOARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
NCFSE	New Coalition on Food Security in Ethiopia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI/HPG	Overseas Development Institute/ Humanitarian Policy Group
PCI	Pastoral Communication Initiative
PIM	Project Implementation Manual
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SDPRP	Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
SERA	Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities
SC UK	Save the Children UK
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
SRS	Somali Region State
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	US Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

Glossary of key terms

<i>Belg</i>	Secondary rainy season starting around February
<i>Bellmon</i>	A USAID-led analysis of national food production to determine whether monetization of specific quantities of certain imported food commodities will have a negative effect on production
<i>Deyr</i>	Secondary rainy season in lowland areas starting around October
<i>Kebele</i>	The level of government below <i>woreda</i>
<i>Gu</i>	Primary rainy season in lowland areas starting around March
<i>Kremt</i>	Main rainy season (starts in late June)
<i>Meher</i>	Harvest period Nov/Dec (cereals) and Jan/Feb (pulses) following main kremt rains
<i>Woreda</i>	District level, below Zone, which is below Region

Foreword

In recent years, the need has grown for improvement and standardisation of methods for emergency needs assessments to respond to criticisms and suggestions from NGOs, food aid practitioners and donors. The World Food Programme, as the leading UN agency responsible for food aid, has been taking important steps to address this issue by developing a Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) handbook and through research works on assessment methodologies.

However, it is also essential for WFP to know how emergency needs assessments have been carried out in practice. This is because the reality of needs assessments is often different from the ideal. Striking a balance between the reality and the ideal is one of the challenges of needs assessment.

For this reason, WFP's Emergency Needs Assessment Branch (ODAN) believes that 'reality checks' are important tasks. As a first example of such a 'reality check', a meta-analysis was undertaken to review the practice of emergency needs assessment in Ethiopia. Between five and eight million Ethiopians have been chronically food-insecure for decades, and there have been a number of emergency needs assessments. These assessments have given rise to arguments and discussion. We believe that an objective and neutral meta-analysis will be a great help, not only to future emergency needs assessment practice in Ethiopia but also in our on-going efforts to improve emergency needs assessments generally.

May 2006

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Executive summary

This study reviews the practice of Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA) in Ethiopia as it relates to food security. It is meant to inform efforts by the World Food Programme (WFP) to improve ENA practice globally. It considers the question of overall rigour in needs estimation, and explores the ability of assessments to analyse the role of markets, non-food response options, chronic and transitory needs and the impact of food aid.

As part of its overall efforts to improve ENA practice (in particular the European Commission (EC)-supported SENAC process), WFP/ODAN contracted ODI to conduct a critical review of ENA practice in Ethiopia, as a case study on emergency assessments in contexts of protracted food insecurity. While neither a comprehensive review of general food security and vulnerability issues, nor an exercise to develop an improved methodology *per se*, the study examines recent ENA practice and related critiques, focusing on weaknesses in current practice and opportunities for strengthening it. It is hoped that the findings will be of relevance to actors within Ethiopia, as well as those concerned with improving practice globally.

The term ENA is clarified, with the study preferring the more specific term Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA). This reflects a broader perspective than the determination of food needs (as would be the case with an Emergency Food Needs Assessment, or EFNA), while keeping the focus on food security as opposed to the other sectoral needs included in a broader ENA.

The study reviews the complex livelihood and political context within Ethiopia, along with the inertia created by many years of massive humanitarian need, and notes that this complexity and inertia have a direct bearing on EFSA practice – both in terms of the analytical demands of EFSA and the ability to make dynamic improvements to the system.

A review of the evolution of EFSA in Ethiopia shows a long history of expert inputs and significant investment by both the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) and international actors in EFSA practice. An EFSA system exist, and is officially endorsed by the GoE and supported by key international actors. The technical credibility of that system, however, rests on a mixture of non-systematic methods, and is ultimately based on negotiations between assessment teams, government agencies and international agencies – a process that is open to wide-ranging biases at all stages (community, district, regional and national levels). This may inflate or suppress actual humanitarian needs, depending on the interests of particular actors. These concerns are widely known by the different stakeholders within Ethiopia.

These issues notwithstanding, the combined efforts of the GoE, donors, NGOs and UN agencies have largely provided adequate information to inform interventions (complementary to people's own survival and coping capacities) designed to prevent large-scale famine in Ethiopia in recent years. Even so, this study identifies both an imperative need to strengthen EFSA practice, and a number of opportunities for doing so.

While clear opportunities exist on the methodological side, improving EFSA practice requires significant institutional and political will. The GoE is undergoing rapid change, and this affords an opportunity to provide visions and ideas for improved practice. There is also critical awareness by international actors of the need to improve EFSA practice globally, and as such now is a good time to channel that energy, expertise, financial resources and commitment towards improving EFSA in Ethiopia and elsewhere.

All actors – GoE, donors, implementing agencies, beneficiaries – should demand evidence and sound analysis to inform decisions about food security policies and appropriate forms of intervention. They should be prepared to challenge assessment findings on the grounds of technical rigour. In this regard, the process would benefit from incentive/disincentive mechanisms that acknowledge and reward sound practice. Without this consistent pressure and demand for sound analysis, even the most credible, evidence-based methodologies will be easily sidelined.

In summary, the key opportunities for strengthening EFSA identified in this study include the following.

Concepts, analysis and indicators

- Clarify and reduce to a core minimum the key indicators for monitoring, to provide the basis for a manageable, reliable monitoring system that permits livelihoods-based analysis.
- Promote understanding and awareness among all actors to broaden thinking from the current 'food availability' focus towards operationalising a broader understanding of food security based on access, availability and utilisation.
- Incorporate structural analysis (political, economic, environmental, social) into the current operational definition of chronic vulnerability for the PSNP, which currently emphasises a functional approach based on previous food aid receipts.
- Clarify the term 'non-food response' such that the potential for enhanced food security analysis is not obscured: that is, to ensure that EFSA include analysis

of all available options for mitigating food insecurity, not necessarily food aid *per se*.

- Identify measurable indicators that warrant a food aid intervention at the outset, agreeing on the anticipated changes in those indicators resulting from the intervention, and monitoring the indicators to understand the intervention impact.

Assessment approaches and methodology

- Explicitly and systematically incorporate an ‘evidence-based’ approach to all assessment work, drawing on available secondary data as well as appropriately collected primary data.
- Incorporate quantitative field methods where appropriate to complement current field practice, which is mostly qualitative.
- Develop improved, relevant and geographically expanded baseline information on livelihoods.
- Time and plan EFSA activities more closely around the relevant seasonal time period for various livelihood and climatic zones of Ethiopia.
- Explicitly explore the possibilities of market interventions to mitigate food insecurity for a particular emergency (e.g. subsidies, policy shifts, communication of market data to traders and the public).

- Explicitly draw on the available market reports in the overall analysis of humanitarian needs, with reference to market impact, fluctuations and other factors.

Systems, structures and linkages

- Strategically and explicitly integrate EFSA within an overall humanitarian/food security information system, including baseline data, early warning/monitoring, emergency assessment, impact evaluation, context monitoring and programme evaluation.
- Place greater emphasis on regional-based analysis (which would be more livelihood- and season-appropriate), as opposed to the current emphasis on central analysis, including through capacity-building and strengthening institutions at decentralised levels.
- Make explicit linkages between the WFP-led chronic vulnerability index (CVI) and the identification of chronically food-insecure beneficiaries for the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).
- Ensure adequate human and financial resources are available for analysis proportional to the complexity of the Ethiopian context, including considering expanding VAM capacity to meet both internal (to WFP) and external information and coordination demands.

Chapter 1

Introduction and rationale for the study

1.1 Background

This study reviews recent Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA) practice in Ethiopia as it relates to food security. It is meant to inform efforts by WFP to improve ENA practice globally. It considers the question of overall rigour in needs estimation, and explores the ability of assessments to analyse the role of markets, non-food response options, chronic and transitory needs and the impact of food aid. The study notes the apparent irony that, while Ethiopia has one of the longest histories of emergency assessment practice with relatively high expert input (including from WFP), current annual ENA practice is largely based on negotiations between assessment teams, government agencies and international agencies – a process that is open to wide-ranging biases at all stages: community, district, regional and national. This can lead to actual humanitarian needs being inflated or understated, depending on the interests and perspective of particular actors.

The humanitarian situation in Ethiopia is precarious, and it has been suggested that poverty and vulnerability to food insecurity are increasing (Sharp and Devereux, 2003). In addition, there are implications for long-term development of continuous large-scale emergency programming, and enormous financial implications flowing from cyclical emergency programming (an annual average of \$282 million between 1997 and 2002). Given these, the current emphasis on negotiations, as opposed to systematic and credible technical procedures for determining emergency food security needs, is alarming. Divergent views concerning the Government of Ethiopia (GoE)/international community Flash Appeal in May 2005 reflect the lack of consensus that results when credible analysis is not the basis for determining humanitarian needs (see Chapter 4 for further discussion).

While concerted efforts to improve current practice are warranted (and have been widely recognised as such by key actors for many years), the Ethiopia context poses numerous challenges to improving ENA practice. Key to this discussion is the unique political environment, in which WFP and other humanitarian actors are obliged to work largely within the GoE's agenda, and according to its expectations. While on the one hand close collaboration with the GoE is laudable and consistent with goals of ownership, rights-based approaches and capacity-building, on the other this proximity can compromise the independence of humanitarian agencies and the objectivity of assessments.

Additional complicating factors for ENA practice in Ethiopia include the sheer scale of humanitarian needs (ranging from five to fourteen million people in need in

recent years), the high degree of livelihood complexity throughout the country, the variety of shocks to which people are exposed, and the complexity of seasonal patterns across the country. Less obvious factors affecting ENA practice are the inertia created by years of food aid provision; the geopolitical significance of Ethiopia; and a 'famine-fear' syndrome among humanitarian actors.

Given that Ethiopia has experienced famine of horrific scale and has the potential to do so again, some analysts have credited the GoE, humanitarian actors and current ENA practice (despite its apparent weaknesses) with providing adequate information to inform the interventions necessary to have generally avoided widespread famine in recent years, although there have been pockets of crisis (Lautze et al., 2003).

The present study, while recognising the accomplishments of the GoE and humanitarian agencies, presents a critical examination of current ENA practice. It considers in particular ways of enhancing the linkages between ENA problem analysis and decisions about appropriate interventions.

1.2 Origins and focus of the study

Concern with ENA practice is not unique to Ethiopia. Globally, the integrity and comprehensiveness of ENA have been increasingly questioned, with donors, NGOs and UN agencies actively seeking to improve assessment methods and promote more holistic emergency food security interventions. Examples of global initiatives to improve food-related ENA practice include developments related to the SPHERE standards; the SMART process; the FAO-Netherlands Partnership Programme; USAID/FEWS NET's recent initiatives; SC-UK's on-going efforts at improving livelihoods analysis; CARE and DFID's leadership on the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach; the IASC Needs Analysis Framework relating to the Consolidated Appeals Process; and efforts by World Vision, Oxfam and other leading food security agencies. These initiatives coincide with recent studies that also highlight the need for improving ENA practice (e.g. Darcy and Hofmann, 2003; Levine and Chastre, 2004; Devereux 2003 & 2004).

With support from the European Commission (EC), WFP's Strengthening Emergency Needs Assessment Capacity (SENAC) initiative draws together good practice to date to develop clear guidelines and methods for conducting food-related ENA. WFP has produced a substantial manual with guidelines and methods for conducting Emergency Food Security Assessments (June 2005), emanating from a process that included intense consultation with experts

(WFP, 2003). The SENAC initiative is launching field implementation with new regional assessment positions to develop and pilot specific methodologies.

As part of its broader review of ENA practice, WFP/ODAN contracted the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to conduct a critical review of assessment practice in protracted emergencies. Ethiopia was suggested as a case study due to the protracted and complex nature of humanitarian needs there, the long history of ENA practice and the relevance of key themes, including the relationship between chronic and transitory needs and the impact of food aid. While the study focuses on Ethiopia and considers its numerous unique factors, most of the key lessons learned and recommendations have relevance to any comparable situation of protracted food insecurity.

The study was conducted by a team of consultants led by ODI with extensive experience in Ethiopia and of ENA practice. It included three visits to Ethiopia, a review of agency and academic literature and interviews with a wide range of key informants (see Annex 5 for a list of interviewees). Limitations of the study include the fact that it is not based on an empirical analysis of how 'right', 'wrong' or 'appropriate' ENA results have been; instead, the findings are based on the perceptions of key actors, triangulated from various perspectives, and the academic literature. A draft of this paper was reviewed by four peer reviewers from academic and more applied perspectives, the WFP Ethiopia office and WFP ODAN. While all the reviewers provided valuable insights and suggestions, responsibility for the final draft rests with the study team alone.

The study adopts the following working assumptions:

- WFP and other emergency actors are committed to international standards of emergency relief, including SPHERE, WHO and their own progressive agency policies.
- ENA analytical frameworks should be based on the commonly agreed pillars for food security analysis: access, availability and utilisation.
- There is a demand for good-quality information and accountability by key decision-makers, with regard to the rigour and holistic nature of the analysis.
- It is desirable for WFP to play a leadership role in food security analysis.
- Food security analysis has a broader meaning than food aid/needs analysis.

While the focus of the study is on ENA practice itself, rather than the broader topic of food security and vulnerability issues in Ethiopia, the subject necessarily requires a brief review of food security issues in general, and of the political and livelihood contexts in particular. These are reviewed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 of the report provides an overview of the evolution of ENA practice in Ethiopia, as well as

describing current practice and recent initiatives. Chapter 4 provides a synthesis of critical reviews of current ENA practice. Chapter 5 examines more closely four key themes which are problematic for ENA: chronic versus transitory needs, the role of markets, non-food responses and assessing the impact and effect of food aid. Throughout Chapters 4 and 5, reviews and critiques of current practice are followed by suggestions for strengthening it. The conclusion, Chapter 6, emphasises the need for strong demand for good-quality information and the technical accounting of findings among key decision-makers, such as the GoE, implementing agencies and donors. Without such demand and such accounting, there is little incentive to take the necessary measures to ensure technically sound ENA.

This study does not seek to design an alternative ENA method. Rather, it offers a critical review of current practice, identifying weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. Previous methodological development is noted in Chapter 3, and it is hoped that the current study will inform subsequent efforts.

1.3 Clarification of assessment types and process

What questions are needs assessments designed to answer? An assessment of any kind should be driven and organised around key questions to inform decision-making, with clear expectations of how, to what depth and in what form those questions will be answered. While basic in nature, different types of assessments require different types of key driving questions, with important implications for the required methods. Within the broad field of 'humanitarian assessments', there are a number of different concepts and terms that are easily confused, but conceptually distinct, and which if not distinguished can lead to muddled methods. These terms include Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA), Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) and Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA).

The table below describes the core distinctions between these types of assessments.¹ These are nested, meaning that EFNA is a subset of EFSA, which is a subset of the broader ENA. Note that, across and even within many agencies, there is a lack of consensus on the meaning of these terms.


The IASC CAP sub-working group released an Interagency Needs Analysis Framework in April 2005. This illustrates the broader perspective of an ENA, and how food security is nested within that framework. It is shown in Figure 1.

Clear determination of the assessment type will have defining implications for methods, and for who (which

¹ This typology is not necessarily endorsed by WFP. Rather, it is meant to highlight the point that different assessments require different information and lead to different types of response.

Table 1: Characterisation of emergency assessment types

Assessment type	Overall driving question	Scope of response
EFNA	What are the food aid needs of the population and what role can food aid-based interventions play in meeting these needs?	Targeted food aid distribution
EFSA	What are the causes of food insecurity (transitory and chronic) at different levels, and what options are available to mitigate immediate problems and promote long-term food security?	Integrated short-, medium- and long-term responses to directly increase food access involving resource transfer (e.g. food or cash assistance), directly related sectoral interventions and enabling policy adjustments
ENA	What is the broad range of sectoral needs in the event of an emergency/disaster?	Multi-sectoral inputs including health, education, infrastructure water/sanitation, protection, food security and environment

Figure 1: Interagency Needs Analysis Framework

agencies and types of expertise) should be involved. In acknowledgement of the limited scope of an EFNA, the forthcoming WFP assessment guidelines are entitled Emergency Food Security Assessment Guidelines – clearly embracing a more encompassing understanding of food insecurity beyond a food needs assessment *per se*. While conceptually robust, in actuality conducting such an assessment directly challenges conventional practice, and requires different types of actors than are normally involved in emergency assessments.

For the purposes of this study, the most applicable term is Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA), which is consistent with usage in both the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and WFP's recent assessment guidelines. This reflects a broader perspective than the determination of food needs, while keeping the focus on a holistic understanding of food security as opposed to other sectoral needs. This report uses the term EFSA in reference to food security and related needs assessments in Ethiopia.

There is a trend among UN agencies to conduct joint Emergency Needs Assessments, with the goal of identifying the 'basket' of inter-related sectoral needs in response to a humanitarian crisis. While ultimately desirable for coordinated planning across many sectors (see CAP NAF Guidelines, April 2005), there are analytical drawbacks to such an 'all-in-one' assessment approach, in that it can dilute the methodological rigour of any particular sectoral analysis (i.e. different sectors usually require distinct methods, timelines and expertise). The ODI report *According to Need?* (Darcy and Hofmann, 2003), recommended closely coordinated but distinct sectoral assessments to ensure the technical integrity of individual sectors, as well as maximum coordination.

Particularly in the context of protracted emergencies, EFSA should not be considered in isolation, but should be seen as part of a broader food security information and analysis system. Such a system has a number of precursor and follow-up components to the EFSA process itself (Table 2).

The precursor components add technical rigour and efficiency to the EFSA, whereas the follow-up components link EFSA to programme implementation, including design, advocacy and exit criteria.² While the this study focuses on the EFSA component, where relevant it also examines links with other components.

As Darcy and Hofmann point out (2003), assessment should be considered an ongoing process, not simply a front-loaded activity designed to justify funding proposals and determine the number of intended beneficiaries. This is particularly true in protracted situations, where there is a tendency (as in Ethiopia) to determine needs on the basis of previous estimates of 'numbers affected'. Situations change and the food insecurity profile may look very different from one period to the next.

² Drawing on the work of Watkins and Maxwell (2003), among others, the Food Security Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSAU) has developed a Food Security Analysis System (FSAS) that articulates the inter-linkages between core analytical components, as opposed to a more linear approach, as outlined in Table 2, FSAU Technical Series (November 2004).

Table 2: Position of EFSA within humanitarian/food security information systems

Component	Frequency of analysis	Information categories/questions addressed
1. Baseline vulnerability and poverty assessment	Infrequent (every 5 years, or when context changes)	What are the basic livelihoods of groups? What are known or likely hazards: natural, environmental, social, economic political? What indicators should be monitored? Who are the most vulnerable groups?
2. Early Warning	Continuous	Indicator trend analysis: is there a problem developing? Where and how quickly is it developing? What are its geographic dimensions? Where would an in-depth assessment(s) be concentrated?
3. Emergency Food Security Assessment	As needed – regular and/ or <i>ad hoc</i>	What is the nature and what are the dimensions of the problem? How long is it going to last? Who are the most vulnerable groups? What and how much is needed: what is the best response?
Programmatic interventions (based on information generated, but not part of information system, <i>per se</i>)		
4. Impact Evaluation	Regular intervals (while programme is ongoing)	Is the intervention achieving the intended result? What adjustments are necessary (response, quantity, targeting)?
5. Context Monitoring	Continuous	What are the possibilities for exit, recovery or transition for longer-term responses?
6. Programme evaluation and lessons learned	Periodic	How can the overall programme (information system, preparedness, response) be improved? Are programmes upholding humanitarian principles?

Source: Maxwell and Watkins, 2003

Chapter 2

Complex livelihood and political contexts with extreme food insecurity

2.1 Livelihood complexity

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, requiring continuously high levels of humanitarian and development assistance. It is also remarkable in its livelihood and political complexity: a function of diverse human and physical geography and a long history of a strong central authority. These factors have direct bearing on the design and technical rigour of EFSAs.


Ethiopia's poverty and vulnerability to food insecurity make it a place of recurrent emergencies. An estimated 5–6m people are considered chronically food insecure – that is, they require some type of resource transfer (traditionally food aid) to meet their minimal food requirements every year. In recent years, between 2m and 7m additional people have been deemed to be transiently food insecure – that is, slipping into and out of a need for food assistance. The distinction between chronic and acute food insecurity – the

inability to meet food needs in the short term – remains problematic (see below). In recent years, notable emergency conditions have prevailed in parts of Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, Afar, the Southern Nations Nationalities and People's Region (SNNPR) and Somali. This covers six of the country's nine regions, and the majority of its population.

Ethiopia has the second largest population in Africa, estimated at 72m people in 2004 (UNDP, 2003), and ranks 169th of 175 countries in the Human Development Index.³ Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) purchasing power parity is \$810, one of the lowest in the world and less than half the average of \$1,831 for sub-Saharan Africa (UN HDR, 2004). An estimated 44% of the population are undernourished, with 47% of children under five underweight, and 52% stunted.

³ It is 139th out of 144 in the UNDP gender-related development index.

Map 1: Map of Ethiopia (Administrative Regions)



Ethiopia is a large country, geographically and by population size, and is extremely complex in terms of the diversity of rural livelihoods. The vast majority of the population, over 80%, live in rural areas (UNDP, 2003), and agriculture accounts for 45% of GDP. Altitude variation is extreme and there are two major weather systems, giving rise to multiple seasonal cycles in different parts of the country. Altitude varies between 125m above sea level and 4,620m, with significant landmass and populations at different levels. The seasons in Ethiopia are determined by the ITCZ (Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone), which comes in from the west and ultimately covers the north-west third of the country, and the Indian Ocean system, which moves in from the south-east and eventually covers the south-east third. Maps 2 and 3 indicate the two weather systems and the relationship between altitude and rainfall.

Understanding seasonality and rural livelihoods in Ethiopia is critical to interpreting events and indicators and planning for assessments and responses. It is also a major undertaking. Recent efforts have attempted to do this on a sub-national scale – livelihood mapping exercises have been conducted for Somali region⁴ and SNNPR,⁵ and give some indication of the

4 As part of the development of an early warning system for the region, through SC UK and DPPC, initiated in 2001.

5 Ongoing at present, supported by USAID and FEWS NET, with the DPPC.


contextual complexity. The map in Annex 4 provides such an example, for SNNPR, where each zone represents easily distinguishable livelihood patterns, based on types of crops grown and livestock owned, and seasonal patterns of economic activities.⁶ See also Box 1 for a brief description of three livelihood zones, and the food security-related issues they face.


As a result of the climatic variation, a wide variety of crops is grown in Ethiopia, including staples such as barley, wheat, teff, maize, sorghum, enset, potatoes and other tubers.⁷ In addition, pulses are widely grown, and a variety of fruit and vegetables is found in many areas. Ethiopia is one of the world's largest producers of high-quality Arabica coffee, with approximately 700,000 smallholders producing the vast majority, and providing

6 The livelihood mapping indicated here is based on the HEA approach. One limitation of HEA-based mapping is that it is typically a function of geography and household economy and is weak at bringing out politically-related vulnerability. There is a wealth of different livelihood-related research on Ethiopia, e.g. Rahmato, D. and Y. Amared. See Lautze et al. (2003) for a comprehensive reference.

7 Enset is also known as false banana. Enset and tuber production are not recorded in the CFSAM, although these are important staple food sources for significant numbers of people. Failure to monitor such crops results in failure to anticipate or follow deteriorating food security for such farmers.

Map 2: The geographic limits of different rainfall systems in Ethiopia



Map 3: The relationship between altitude and rainfall

work for many others.⁸ That is an increasingly important smallholder cash crop in certain areas. There are also many different patterns of population migration, both amongst traditionally mobile populations such as pastoralists, and among many highland farming communities, where seasonal migration for labour is a critical livelihood strategy. In general, farming households in Ethiopia have small landholdings, and crops are almost entirely rain-fed.

Livestock accounts for over 20% of GDP, and is critical for farming and pastoral communities (EC/IGAD, 2000, quoted in Lautze et al., 2003), and is a major indicator of wealth for most rural communities. Major livestock species include cattle, camel, horses, donkeys, mules, sheep, goats and chickens. Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists are a significant population group. They have also been historically marginalised and excluded from power and access to state resources. They are found in many of the outlying, lowland areas of the country, such as Somali and Afar regions and Borena and South Omo zones, politically sensitive areas where Ethiopia borders Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan.

8 This sector has been hard-hit in recent years by the collapse in price of coffee in the global market, but this factor is not well incorporated into food security assessment systems.

The implications of this diversity for EFSA include a) the appropriate timing for assessments; b) the difficulties of interpreting data and information; c) the scale of developing a (standardised) baseline or reference understanding of local livelihoods; d) the variety of indicators/data/information required to understand the different groups; and e) the variety of food security issues facing the different groups.

The *hawl* is known for its lack of permanent water sources and reliance on livestock sales exported to the Gulf, through northern Somalia. Commonly consumed foodstuffs, such as pasta, rice, sorghum and maize, are imported through Somalia. Local marketing opportunities for meat and milk sales are poor, given the lack of significant urban settlements. The Somali shilling is a more common currency than the Ethiopian Birr.

Wealthier households have more livestock than poorer households, and in some areas own *birkas*,⁹ from which they can sell water in dry seasons. Due to the lack of milk marketing opportunities, milk consumption meets about half of annual food needs for the wealthier two groups, and about a quarter for poorer households. Remaining food needs are met through purchases from the proceeds

9 Concrete-lined, sunken, household water reservoirs fed by run-off rainwater.

Box 1: Livelihood diversity in Ethiopia – some examples

Highland belg-dependent farmers. One of the areas in receipt of food aid for many years, and considered chronically food insecure, is the highland belg-dependent zone of North Wollo.¹⁰ At an altitude of 2,000–3,500m, with the major harvest after the minor belg rains, the dominant crop is barley, with wheat, oats, pulses and flax also common, as well as cows, oxen and sheep. Many different kinds of crop and livestock sharing arrangements are practiced.¹¹ Landholdings are small, between 0.5 and 1ha of agricultural land and 0.05ha of grazing land. The number of landless is increasing,¹² and land degradation is common.

The population can be divided into four groups. The so-called middle and richer groups have small numbers of cows and oxen, and often rent out land to poorer groups. The poorest group includes very small landholders, new couples, returnees and the displaced, as well as the disabled and the elderly.

Poorer groups are dependent on food aid to meet between two and four months of their needs, even in ‘normal’ or ‘non-drought’ years,¹³ although it is common that aid does not arrive at the most appropriate time. Both groups have to purchase at least one-third of their remaining food requirements, in addition to what they grow. The major income source for these two groups is seasonal labour in the maize- and sorghum-producing lowlands, between January and May, although contracting malaria or HIV/AIDS is a recognised risk of doing this. In theory, public works projects could be making a contribution to addressing some of the underlying causes of people’s food insecurity.¹⁴

¹⁰ Includes the higher-altitude areas of Delanta Dwent, Meket, Gubalafto, Gidan and Wadla *woredas*.

¹¹ Many different relationships are formed, particularly between the poorer and richer segments of society, in order to combine oxen, labour and other agricultural inputs, or gain access to, for example, milking animals.

¹² New couples may only get enough land for their homestead plot.

¹³ SC UK (2000); Sharp et al. (2003).

¹⁴ Looking at the impact of those projects is beyond the remit of this study.

*Jimma coffee and maize farmers.*¹⁵ The mid-highland areas of Goma *woreda*, Oromiya region, are not traditionally considered food insecure. However, livelihoods have been eroded in recent years as the price of coffee has fallen.

Rainfall varies between 1,200 and 2,400mm per year here, with a long rainy season from February/March to October/November. Coffee and maize are the dominant crops and the most important contributors to household food and income, with sorghum, teff, wheat, barley, pulses, chat and oil crops also grown.

Wealthier households tend to have more land and livestock (1–2 oxen and 1–2 cows) than poorer households, who have less or no land (newly married couples with no land are particularly notable) and few animals, and rely heavily on a variety of seasonal employment activities, especially picking and processing coffee.

In 2003, these farmers complained about their third consecutive ‘bad year’, due to low coffee prices and poor cereal production. Research shows that their disposable income had fallen by 40% between 2000 and 2003. As well as facing lower cereal production and coffee prices, many were having to cope with the effects of the restructuring of the coffee marketing system as the Ethiopian economy moves towards a market-based system. Farmers find it difficult to switch to other crops given their long history with coffee and the lack of other obvious marketable choices, except chat.

Somali region pastoralists. The *Warder* pastoral livelihood group covers a very large geographic area, incorporating the *hawd* area of Somali region, which extends into north-west (Somaliland) and north-east (Puntland) Somalia. Management of camels and shoats dominate local livelihoods.

¹⁵ This example is given to illustrate some of the problems faced by coffee farmers, some of whom, in neighbouring SNNPR, were initially missed in the 2003 crisis, partially due to the lack of monitoring of the impact of lower coffee prices.

of livestock sales. Poorer households, due to their relatively small livestock numbers, have to supplement livestock-related income by working, which may include collecting bush products (firewood and wild foods), *birka*-related watering and maintenance and petty trade, as well as by receiving social gifts from wealthier households.

As a historically marginalised and neglected area, Somali region suffers from poor government capacity and a severe lack of public services such as health (human and livestock) and education, and is prone to periods of insecurity.

This population group, after several poor rainfall years in the late 1990s and early 2000s combined with economic factors such as a livestock ban in the Gulf, has faced very difficult times.

Related to the complexity and fragility of livelihoods noted above is the fact that Ethiopia has extremely high levels of malnutrition. The Millennium Development Goals on hunger are measured by malnutrition rates, and nutrition underpins six of the MDGs – reducing hunger, gender inequality, child mortality and disease, and improving education and maternal health. The very high prevalence of HIV/AIDS also has a significant bearing on nutritional status and household food security, particularly given the resulting shifts in dependency ratios. While the links between nutrition, health, food security and poverty have long been known, these links are only now beginning to be made in information systems and reflected in assessment practice. Aiming to achieve a substantial reduction in levels of acute and chronic malnutrition provides the basis for establishing positive goals (short and long term) for food security interventions in Ethiopia.


2.2 Political complexity

The Ethiopian political landscape has been shaped by a long history of rule by a small number of elites. Following the overthrow of the Emperor, Haile Selassie, the country was ruled from 1974 to 1991 by the Derg, which imposed a centralised Marxist–Leninist system of government, including a prolonged period of state terror (Lister, 2004). The current ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), took power after a transitional period following the military overthrow of the Derg in 1991. The Ethiopian and Eritrean governments fought a war over a border disagreement in 1998–99.

Various commentators have described the workings of the government as opaque (Lister, 2004). Although many GoE policy and strategic documents embrace principles of transparent and more participatory governance, in reality such 'opening up' is open to question (Lister, 2004).¹⁶ As may be expected in a tightly controlled political environment, the potential for politicising information is great (Sandford, 2002).

Ethiopia's geopolitical position, combined with US President George W. Bush's declaration of 'no famine on my watch', ensures that Ethiopia continues to receive significant amounts of overseas development assistance, in particular from the US government (see Figure 2).


Figure 2: Average share of ODA from the ten largest bilateral donors 1997–2002



However, given the population size and the needs of the country, ODA is relatively low, averaging \$13/person/year in 1998–2002, compared with \$23 for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, and \$21 for least-developed countries. Of that, the humanitarian and relief sector dominates all other individual sectors, averaging \$282m/year, of which the

vast majority has been food aid. In an 'emergency' year, the share may jump to about half of ODA (UNDP, 2003).

Figure 3: Sectoral share of ODA, 1997–2002



Ethiopia has been undergoing a structural transformation in recent years, one of the main components of which has been the decentralisation of political and administrative structures. In principle, this is seen as a positive development given the size of the population and its poverty and diversity. However, given the country's history of central control, empowering and building the capacity of regions is an enormous undertaking.

The UN Country Team is currently exploring the potential for its own decentralisation, alongside the government's (UNDAF/personal communication with UN Resident Representative). Several initiatives to improve early warning and emergency needs analysis are currently region-based.

2.3 Food security issues in Ethiopia: a review

Ethiopia has a long history of famine and near-famine conditions – most recently in 2002–2003 – and remains extremely poor. The distribution of large amounts of food aid over the years is one result of these two facts – 700,000MT/year on average over the last 15 years. Famine and food insecurity have been most concentrated in Amhara and Tigray regions.

Improving food security is recognised within the Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Paper (SDPRP) as a central concern of government. The poverty reduction strategy has 'agricultural development-led industrialisation and food security' as one of its four key pillars or building-blocks.¹⁷ Food security programmes are acknowledged to be a 'subset of poverty reduction

¹⁶ The May 2005 election is an interesting juncture in the nature and evolution of democracy in Ethiopia.

¹⁷ The other three are Justice and Civil Service Reform; Governance, Decentralisation and Empowerment; and Capacity Building.

interventions'. The food security strategy in turn claims to address the 'supply and demand side', at national and household level, 'taking into account the diversity of the national economy'. The three pillars of the strategy are: increasing the availability of food through domestic (own) production; ensuring access to food for food-deficit households; and strengthening emergency response capability.

The conceptualisation of food insecurity and poverty in Ethiopia is described in Figure 4.

Food Security Programme, Vol. 1

The New Coalition on Food Security in Ethiopia (NCFSE)¹⁸ identifies the following as key constraints in food insecurity:

- Recurring drought
- Limited sources of alternative incomes
- Population pressure
- Limitations in technology


¹⁸The Food Security Coalition claims to reflect a new partnership among government, development partners (donors, UN, NGOs, etc.), civil society, and the private sector and involving the social mobilisation of the people themselves; it builds on the PRSP/SDPRP. Commentators have noted how the formation of the NCFSE and its work was the fortunate result of a relatively short burst of energy after the last major emergency and before staff turnover and the next big emergency got in the way.

- Lack of product diversification and market integration
- Limited capacity in planning and implementation
- Environmental degradation
- Limited access to credit

While the language of the SDPRP and the 'diagrammatic' depiction of food security constraints appear to be based on sound principles, actual EFSA practice suggests that the details of problem analysis and the operationalisation of the conceptual framework have major weaknesses. In terms of the development of government policies, Teshome points out that 'there is a general lack of systematic problem diagnosis/identification in Ethiopia' (Teshome, 2002: 5). The Joint Partner Review of the Ethiopia SDPRP additionally comments that 'government and donor policies commonly suffer from a "missing middle" ... a lack of clear linkage between analysis and policy choice' (DAG, 2003: 4).

While emphasis is given to the demand, household and access side of the food security equation in the above policy documents – to complement the supply, national and availability side – there is limited evidence that an improved understanding of household food access and local livelihoods is reaching the food security community in Ethiopia in a practical sense. This is discussed further below.

Figure 4: The problem of food security in Ethiopia



2.3.1 Emergency needs and safety nets

In the last couple of years a major programmatic shift has been taking place in Ethiopia concerning food security. This is based on the development of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The PSNP is framed within the Food Security Programme, a recent initiative of the NCFSE.

The stated rationale for the PSNP is to address the food needs of the chronically food insecure through multi-year predictable resources, rather than through a system dominated by emergency humanitarian aid. Crucially, this involves a shift from food to cash as the primary input (PSNP PIM, 2004). The programme is in its first year of implementation, and is strongly supported in principle by both donors and the government. The idea is that cash is a more flexible resource for households, and may act as an incentive for increased agricultural production by increasing demand. A multi-year cycle also 'buys time' to better plan appropriate interventions for this group, and thereby breaks the cyclical emergency appeal process and potential dependence on food aid.

The development of the PSNP has also created a new arm of the government, the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB), whose mandate is to manage the PSNP. Previously, the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC) had managed the entire food insecure caseload (the DPPC remains responsible for early warning, emergency needs assessments and emergency response coordination). This separation of roles is creating some instability and uncertainty, for the DPPC in particular. The influence associated with managing food aid is shifting away from the DPPC, and the Prime Minister has declared that he wants Ethiopia out of the food aid/emergency 'business' within the next five years.

Concerns have also been raised about the speed with which the PSNP has been adopted and the scale on which it is to be implemented, and therefore the human and systems capacity required (interview, Sandford).¹⁹ Notably, however, there has been little or no serious analysis of *who* the chronically food insecure are, and *why* they are in such a position. Some suggest that such analysis has in fact been done by regional government.²⁰ Others argue, pragmatically, that making this programmatic shift was a necessary first step, and that the analytical component can be developed later. In any case, there remains much uncertainty surrounding chronic food insecurity.


2.3.2 The institutionalisation and political economy of food aid

Years of receiving very large quantities of food aid have led to the institutionalisation of food aid-related processes and

mechanisms in Ethiopia, of which the ENA is one. Various incentives for different actors may serve to perpetuate the status quo. The monetary value of food aid includes large international and national transport costs paid to private transport companies.²¹ The scope for using and abusing food aid is inevitably large. Commenting on the multi-agency assessments in particular, Lautze et al. highlight that 'these exercises can be vulnerable to political influence at all levels', and thus can lead to potential abuses of humanitarian assistance (Lautze et al., 2003: 53).

Research on food aid targeting in Ethiopia in 1997 highlights the risk that, as 'institutional capacity' in the food aid distribution system develops over time, such investment creates a strong incentive to maintain food aid regardless of needs (Clay et al., 1997). Devereux (2005) asks why, after the emergency of 2000 in Somali region, 'needs' (and by implication food aid distributions) have stayed so high, particularly when targeting in Somali region is poor. This study suggests that one answer lies in the inability of the ENA process to take due account of other possible mitigation strategies.

Figure 5: People needing food aid, Somali Region



Source: Devereux (2005) from DPPC (2003)

The implications of these various factors for improving EFSA include: (1) given the central role of GoE, technical improvements cannot be decoupled from GoE institutional structures and development strategies; (2) the current period of rapid transition within the GoE (including elections and emerging new institutions such as the FSCB) requires awareness of shifting roles and centres of power; (3) the long history of massive humanitarian assistance creates both institutional and conceptual inertia that can limit change; and (4) incentives to continue current practices, as well as disincentives to change, may exist within donors, contractors, agencies and national and sub-national government. Identifying and addressing these factors may be essential to progress.

¹⁹ Recent reports highlight the government's own acknowledgement of delays in implementation due to its lack of experience with the new modalities, as well as earlier donor delays in funding (IRIN, 29 June 2005).

²⁰ If so, this information is not widely known or available.

²¹ For example, the latest WFP PRRO, valued at around \$780m, indicates that approximately half of the overall budget accounts for the value of the food itself and half for the cost of international and national transport and associated expenses.

2.4 The role of WFP in food security in Ethiopia

Figure 6 shows the economic importance of food aid, and the upward trend in food aid distributions. Both factors place WFP firmly at the centre of issues concerning food security. WFP is an actor in the development field²² as well as in emergencies, and therefore its power and responsibility in terms of improving food security analysis and processes should not be underplayed.

The value of the most recent PRRO for Ethiopia (2005–2007) is about \$780m, for 1.4m MT of food aid, of which approximately half is the value of the food itself.²³


²² For example, the MERET (Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to more Sustainable Livelihoods) programme aims to 'identify and react to some of the root causes of food shortages ... and ... generate assets and food security options for the rural people of Ethiopia'.

²³ The majority of the remainder will be accounted for by international and in-country transportation costs. Direct operating costs for WFP, out of the PRRO, are just under \$12m a year.

This must make WFP one of the single largest economic entities in the country outside of the government.

With an emphasis on food aid distribution, WFP clearly plays a major role in food security, handling 30–40% of national food distributions. The government and national and international NGOs handle the remainder. Within the Early Warning Working Group (EWWG) and the ENA process, WFP is the largest contributor in terms of logistics support, and contributes significantly in terms of human resources. WFP has also played an important and positive role in the safety nets programme, based on its general and development programme experience. Through the Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) office, WFP has at various times acted as a centre for information exchange and analysis, and has been an important player in attempts to improve the ENA methodology.

Figure 6: Food aid appeals and distributions



Sources: WFP, non-WFP and Total assistance: WFP, INTERFAIS (2005); Appeals: Devereux (2005) from DPPC (2003).

Chapter 3

Overview of current EFSA practice

3.1 The evolution of EFSA in Ethiopia

The history of EFSA-related activities, such as early warning, crop assessments and nutrition surveillance, goes back to the 1970s and 1980s, and the major famines in each of those decades. While under development, the systems focused on areas known to be most vulnerable to food insecurity, i.e. where famines were known to have occurred. Annex 1 describes changes in food security-related theory and practice, with reference to Ethiopia. Broadly speaking, this shows a move away from an exclusive focus on food supply to a greater concern with food access and (latterly) with livelihoods and the factors underlying household poverty.

By the mid-1990s, government and non-government actors were doing their own assessments. In 1993, a National Policy on Disaster Preparedness and Management was developed, and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission became the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Commission (DPPC). In 1996, the EWWG was formed in order to harmonise assessments under the DPPC (see Annex 2 for a chronology of methodological discussions within the EWWG, and Annex 3 for a summary of key developments in relation to methodological issues).

The methodology sub-group of the EWWG, formed soon after the EWWG itself, has been a hive of activity on this subject ever since; its participants have gone through different cycles of discussion, disagreement, agreement and piloting. The following is a summary of the agencies involved in trying to improve the EFSA in recent years:

- SC UK – development of RiskMap programme in the mid/late 1990s, based on the Household Economy Approach (HEA).
- UNDP – development of the current early warning and needs assessment system, through a technical secondment to DPPC, in the mid/late 1990s (with WFP).
- WFP – consultant hired to work with the EWWG to improve the EFSA methodology, in 2001/02.
- SC UK – consultant hired to continue work of previous WFP consultant, through the EWWG, in 2003/04.
- FEWS NET – current and ongoing initiative building on work of previous SC UK consultant, through the DPPC.

The underlying orthodoxy in Ethiopia has been explained as a ‘food-first bias’ linked to the use of a ‘food availability decline’ model for food security analysis (Lautze et al., 2003).²⁴ This has its roots in the prevailing

²⁴ Lautze et al. (2003) argues that ‘leading humanitarian agencies in Ethiopia theorize famine as the outcome of food shortages leading to starvation. Termed a “food first bias”, this has been the prevailing model of famine theory in Ethiopia since the 1970s’.

understanding of food security in the 1970s and early 1980s.

While the safety net programme, the increasing inclusion of ‘non-food’ items in the Humanitarian Appeal and current initiatives to improve early warning and EFSA reflect a significant change in the thinking and practice related to food security, it is still unclear whether these initiatives will transform the means of analysis and EFSA practice. They do, however, offer significant opportunities.

3.2 Current practice of EFSA in Ethiopia

The EFSA process is organised through the EWWG. The EWWG is chaired by the DPPC, and has FEWS NET as its

Box 2: The typical EFSA process

The EWWG decides the dates for the assessment and seeks financial and human resources to run the exercise. The Methodology sub-group prepares background materials and reviews, and revises the existing checklist/reporting format. Team leaders and team members are identified, and half-day briefings of the assessment approach and relevant materials are organised in Addis Ababa and in regional capitals.

At the regional level, zones and *woredas* to visit are identified, based on simple criteria and available time, and discussions and field visits are undertaken to zones, *woredas* and *kebeles* – field observations and discussions with communities and government staff are undertaken, using the guideline/checklist. Reports are prepared at the zonal level by the teams and presented to regional governments for further discussion and then dissemination to the federal level.

Assessment guidelines²⁵ include the following: objectives and terms of reference for the assessment; various suggestions and reminders regarding good practice (e.g. to conduct regular team briefings and debriefings, to compare the current situation with seasonal norms, to get a balance of worst and lesser-affected areas, so as not to ask leading questions; to consider factors such as rainfall, crop production, pasture, livestock production, water conditions, market conditions; to follow the ‘thought process for relief eligibility consideration’).

Quantitative information to be collected includes estimates of needy population, crop area and production, market prices and livestock numbers, for which tables are provided.

A reporting format is provided and reports, with beneficiary figures, are compiled at zonal level and forwarded to regional and federal levels for finalisation.

²⁵ These run to about 25 pages.

secretary.²⁶ The EWWG has various sub-groups. The Methodology sub-group is the forum through which methodological issues are raised and discussed. It also prepares background material for assessments.²⁷

Three to four government-led, multi-agency assessments are carried out each year. The main assessment takes place in late November/early December, after the main meher rains. An assessment after the smaller *belg* rains is also common, and mid-season assessments may also take place. The main assessment typically takes 20 days and involves up to 20 teams of several people, with contributions from government ministries, NGOs, UN organisations and donors. The assessment is a major logistical effort, with the mobilisation of the assessment teams and visits and meetings to all regions and selected zones, *woredas* and *kebeles*.

The process has been described in the following terms:

In summary, each team visits a large number of weredas and the majority of time is spent in discussions with wereda officials. The topics covered in these discussions include: land, population, crops, rainfall, production prospects and constraints, livestock condition, prices, additional food and cash income sources, human health, education and relief (many of these topics are disaggregated by agro-ecological zone). Discussions with farmers and community members and direct observation of crop conditions are secondary components of the assessment (SC UK, 2004).

Following discussions and fieldwork, the team develops a qualitative rating of current conditions for each of seven income sources (cash and food): crop production, livestock production, wage labour, petty trade, petty commodity production, wild food and remittances. The ratings are on a scale of 1–5, with 1 representing ‘much better than normal’, 3 ‘normal’ and 5 ‘much worse than normal’. A final rating for the *woreda* as a whole is calculated as a weighted average of the seven individual ratings. In order to calculate needs (beneficiary numbers and duration), team members compare the current *woreda* rating with previous years’ ratings, and refer to historical data on beneficiary numbers and food aid distributed (SC UK, 2004).

In practice, it appears to be common knowledge that there is no standard approach or method. A number of different means are used to calculate beneficiary numbers²⁸ and, in some cases, the team spends a large amount of time negotiating beneficiary numbers with *woreda* officials (*ibid.*; Sandford, unpublished).

²⁶ Members include WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, MoA, MoH, CSA, FSCB, FEWS NET, SC UK, CARE, Concern, ACF, EC, NMSA, EMA, WV, CIDA

²⁷ Chaired by DPPC, core members/contributors are WFP, FEWS NET, SC UK and MoA

²⁸ Some examples of methods:

- a) the number of people the planned harvest yield should feed – the number of people the actual yield should feed = the number of beneficiaries;
- b) same as (a) but with an adjustment for ‘coping mechanisms’;
- c) harvest-dependent population – the number of people this year’s expected actual yield will feed equals the number of beneficiaries, plus an adjustment for other income sources.

3.3 Recent initiatives to improve EFSA

The current official early warning and EFSA system is based on work done in the mid/late 1990s through the UNDP secondment mentioned above, with the support of WFP. The system is indicator-based: indicators are weighted according to local relevance. It is designed to collect data in order to prioritise *woredas* affected by food insecurity, and involves the use of analytical software to facilitate analysis.

The current system is not fully operational. A USAID-funded retrospective analysis of the 2002/03 crisis indicates that the current early warning system ‘relies on climatic and crop production indicators’, is ‘overly complex’ and is ‘essentially not operational’ (Anderson and Choularton, 2004: 10). In practice, assessments are based to a large extent on *ad hoc* observations and intuition, complemented by rainfall and crop production forecasts. As the report states: ‘assessments dominate the food security early warning process ... and cereal production dominates needs assessments’. There is strong government ownership of this system, and it has been difficult for the government to accept that it has not worked. That said, the scale and transparency of the Ethiopian system is in many ways remarkable. Given enormous capacity constraints, the system involves a wide range of stakeholders, from virtually all levels of government, as well as international actors.

As the official system was being developed in the mid-1990s, SC UK was developing the food economy methodology and a complementary analytical software programme, RiskMap. This difference in methods became the subject of serious personality and institutional clashes, the legacy of which is still felt today. In more recent years, particularly from 2000, the methodology sub-group of the EWWG has been through a much more collaborative and constructive period of discussion, problem identification and piloting of new methods. As a result, many of the weaknesses of the current system are well known, at least to a more technically-minded audience. The major issues that have been raised, and initiatives implemented as a result, are summarised below (K. Hedlund, private communication; Chapman, 2005):

- In 2000, WFP introduced a questionnaire that attempted to standardise the method for calculating beneficiaries. This consisted of a qualitative assessment of changes in major sources of income, translated into a quantified percentage change in numbers affected. In the absence of comprehensive baselines in all affected communities, this percentage change was applied to the historical average of beneficiary figures.
- In 2002, the WFP consultancy attempted to provide a standard questionnaire that calculated the food gap based on changes in household sources of income, and proposed a sampling scheme based on livelihood zones. The questionnaire was piloted but perceived problems remained, including how to get reliable

information from the field. The EWWG, including WFP, did not recommend the questionnaire for use, but all involved recognised the importance of the process in helping to identify specific areas of concern.

- Also in 2002, a series of discussions was held on chronic versus transitory food insecurity. These discussions included definitions and the issue of fluid 'membership' of these groups. The utility of defining these groups in an emergency needs assessment was contrasted with the utility of defining these groups in relation to the type of intervention being proposed.
- In 2003, SC UK hired a consultant from the Food Economy Group to address the concerns raised through the work of the WFP consultant and through the EWWG in general.²⁹ As a result, a package of assessment training and guideline materials was developed and piloted.
- Between 2003 and 2005, the WFP VAM unit attempted to introduce more quantitative tools to enable teams to reach a more objective assessment of food security and to address the issue of capacity-building. These tools included a Pictorial Evaluation Tool used during the *meher* assessment in 2004, and a 'hotspot' list (based on EW indicators collected throughout the year) to determine the sites to be visited during the *belg* assessment in 2005.

The major technical issues of concern over recent years have generally been in the following areas (Chapman, 2005; Sandford, 2002):

- Sampling biases and geographic coverage.
- Obtaining information from households and communities (as well as government officials) with a reasonable degree of rigour.
- Triangulation/reliability of findings.
- Too much emphasis on cereal production, rather than capturing all relevant food, income and coping strategy information.
- How to quantify change – with reference to what baseline information and by percentage or in absolute quantities.
- The balance between qualitative and quantitative information.
- Converting qualitative and quantitative data into beneficiary numbers and food aid needs.
- The distinction between chronic and transitory food insecurity.

The major political and institutional issues of relevance include:

- Training sufficient staff.
- Using methods appropriate to the capacity of participants.

²⁹ SC UK has been involved in early warning and needs assessments for many years in Ethiopia, in Amhara and in Somali region, working closely with the DPPC and attempting to demonstrate the utility of HEA as an appropriate analytical framework and tool.

- Political and institutional will to make changes and use evidence-based results.

In terms of specific EFSA methodological development, the SC UK HEA-based system is the latest concerted effort, but it has not yet been taken up officially.

Interviews with WFP, FEWS NET and SC UK staff who participated in the piloting of the current HEA efforts indicate a general consensus that these new tools and techniques are an improvement over current needs assessment practice, and addressed most of the concerns raised through the EWWG. That said, EWWG members highlight several concerns with HEA, especially when considering its use on a large scale:

- The technical expertise required and the extent to which the process can be automated.
- Investment in such a system needs to be judged against an assurance that its analysis will be used.
- Quality control of data generated from community focus groups.

The government has not given its endorsement. Reasons given to the study team include:

- The DPPC regards the methodology as too complicated and too time- and labour-intensive.³⁰
- The SC UK focal point in the methodology sub-group left, so the group lacked follow-up.
- In the Somali region piloting exercise, the methodology identified slightly lower levels of need than the normal needs assessment process.

Box 3: Food aid: too little, or too much?

There is a common perception that any food security assessment methodology will lead to lower estimates of requirements for food aid. This is not necessarily the case – SC UK analysis in Amhara region (SC UK, 2000) generated a much higher estimated food/income gap than that reached through the existing EFSA system. Another pilot exercise, in Somali region, gave results that were very similar to those reached using the usual method (interview with S. Mohamed, SC UK). The common perception in the country, including by the government at national level, is that food aid needs are commonly inflated at lower levels. Clearly, where there is no clear method, all of the above outcomes will occur at different times, and in different places.

³⁰ DPPC was interviewed in the study, although not directly questioned on the reason for not taking up these newly developed tools. These are therefore the views of the other participants in the pilot, who have either previously worked for the DPPC and/or currently work closely with them. As mentioned elsewhere, the timing of the study, close to the election and with the uncertainty around the future of the DPPC and FSCB, made for difficult interviewing conditions.

Although the tools developed have not yet been officially endorsed, one of the outcomes of the process has been the development and pilot-testing of a livelihood-based needs assessment system in SNNPR Region.³¹

A related initiative is the commissioning of SC UK by the Pastoral Community Development Project (a World Bank project) to develop an early-warning system for pastoral regions of the country – Somali, Afar, Borena zone (Oromiya), S. Omo zone (SNNPR). This work is based on the experience of SC UK in Ethiopia, particularly in Somali region, and methodologically it is grounded in the HEA approach. The immediate goal is not to conduct regular (food) needs analysis, but rather to develop a community-based early-warning monitoring system linked to contingency planning and non-food responses. There is, however, a close compatibility between this system and the SNNPR system.

Another important initiative is the development of a nutrition information system at the Emergency Nutrition Coordination Unit of the DPPC. This will use bi-annual nutrition screening data from the Emergency Outreach

³¹ This is funded by USAID, under the Emergency Preparedness Strengthening Programme (EPSP), and implemented by FEWS NET, with the support of the FEG, and the support and involvement of federal and regional DPPC.

Strategy programme.³² This work is led by UNICEF, in collaboration with government ministries and WFP. As part of the development of this programme, UNICEF and DPPC are trying to involve the Ministries of Health and Water much more closely, thereby widening the sectoral understanding of, and responses to, the underlying causes of malnutrition and food insecurity.³³ Other developments under discussion include improving the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment methods, and the EC's attempts to improve the cereal market information system.

While all of these developments intend to link with the Food Security Programme and the NCFSE, there is a notable and acknowledged lack of conceptual and practical discussion of the linkages between these potentially complementary components of an overall food security and nutrition information and assessment system. Nor is it clear that past lessons are being incorporated into project and programme design.

³² EOS is described as a targeted large-scale child survival and nutrition initiative, aimed at providing services to over 6.7 million under-fives in 325-food insecure woredas.

³³ The National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM, 1993) has always indicated the appropriate involvement of other relevant line ministries, coordinated through the DPPC, but this has only happened to a limited extent in general (Chapman, 2005).

Chapter 4

A critical review of current EFSA practice

4.1 General issues

On 4 May 2005, the international community and GoE issued a joint Flash Appeal for an additional \$48.3 million on top of the previous Joint Humanitarian Appeal in January 2005 for \$272 million, of which over 50% of resources were for food aid. Among key analysts within the GoE, UN, NGO and donor community, however, there were widely differing perspectives on the severity of the situation and the need for a flash appeal, which also extends to differing explanations as to why the Flash Appeal was launched (ranging from political to technical to institutional motivations) – a reflection of the general lack of credibility in current needs assessment practice in Ethiopia.

In contrast to widely acknowledged concerns with technical rigour and credibility, however, reviews and evaluations have highlighted the success of the early warning and needs assessment system in terms of preventing widespread famine (Lautze et al., 2003). This apparent success, however, disguises flaws in the system with regard to problem formation, the efficient targeting of resources and missed opportunities to address food insecurity in a more holistic manner. Most importantly, there has been a failure to take adequate account of more localised food crises, and of the general impoverishment and erosion of capacity that recurrent crises have on the households affected.

This section offers an overview of the key problems in EFSA practice, followed by a more detailed critical review considering technical, institutional and planning issues. Options for strengthening practice are identified within each of these areas.

As previously noted, significant efforts have been made over the years to improve the EFSA process within a very complicated livelihood and political setting. The existence of the EWWG, and the work of the Methodology subgroup, particularly between 2000 and 2003, has been instrumental in opening up the EFSA to critical review, and piloting new methods. Many of the weaknesses of the current system are well known among key actors.

There is still no uniform approach or method in practice. The critique and recommendations set out here are therefore aimed at a more general level, particularly in terms of the processes that could lead to improvements, rather than technical details concerning the different methods being used.

The WFP consultant mentioned above summarised the process as ‘a synthetic estimate of needs based on the

admixture of qualitative ratings and historical quantities’ (Riley, 2001). Limitations of the process as identified by the Methodology group include:

- The large amount of time spent with *woreda* officials at the expense of household and community-level discussions.
- The fact that there is no single way to estimate beneficiary needs from the qualitative *woreda* vulnerability ratings, with the conclusion that the process is too subjective.
- The reliance on historical quantities of assistance as a reference point, rather than determining absolute current needs.
- The lack of linkages between the needs assessments and official baseline and monthly monitoring data (the early-warning system).
- The timing of the assessment in the pre-harvest period, when crop and livestock production for the following period may not yet be clear.
- The focus on crop production at the expense of other food and cash income sources (quoted in SC UK, 2004).

The task of improving the EFSA is as much, or indeed more, a political decision than a technical one. Without widespread recognition of the weaknesses of the current system, and of the potential of a more integrated food security information and assessment system, there is little point in making minor adjustments to the current EFSA. Given the scale of the EFSA, a major capacity-building exercise, with high-level support, would be required to change the practice of (emergency) food security analysis.

FEWS NET and SC UK are seen as the driving forces for change in EFSA-related food security analysis, offering (and piloting with the government) an alternative approach building on past experience. Regardless of the merits of these two initiatives, other options are as yet not forthcoming. There are, however, other related initiatives that do not directly address the EFSA issue, but that can certainly be complementary. The UNICEF Emergency Outreach Strategy (EOS) nutrition screening programme is one such; others include improvements to the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) and the monitoring and evaluation system of the safety nets. What is lacking in all of these initiatives is an operational analytical framework and overall system design that places these initiatives and actors within an overall system. This offers a major opportunity for WFP.

4.2 Technical issues

The DPPC guideline/checklist provides a broad range of relevant food security factors and issues to consider and gather information on, but does not constitute a workable analytical framework or a methodology for helping the user to identify food insecure populations. As a result, participants are forced to discuss and negotiate around general information and perceptions in order to come to a number or numbers (of beneficiaries and food aid needs) using familiar methods, e.g. a variety of local food balance calculations, with limited reference to baseline and trend data/information (Sandford, 2002; SC UK, 2004; interview with Z. Ewnetu).

In addition, the current EFSA does not clearly position itself within an overall, integrated Humanitarian/Food Security Information and Assessment System (as described in Table 2), linking baseline information to trend data and emergency needs assessments (Chapman, 2005; Anderson & Choularton, 2004). As the WFP consultant highlighted:

The EFNA would benefit enormously from prior, detailed information on the local structure of livelihoods and local vulnerabilities and capacities, including (a) seasonality of activities; (b) sources of food and income; (c) expenditure patterns; (d) historical incidence of emergencies; (e) 'normal' levels of variability of production, incomes and expenditures; (f) traditional emergency coping behaviours, among others (Riley, 2001).

A focus on these two areas would give WFP an opportunity to step back, and contribute to the basic design and fundamental aspects of an overall food security information and assessment system. The basic components of such a system can be described as:

- Baseline.
- EW/Outcome indicators.
- EFSA.

Baseline. There is a wealth of information on local food security and livelihood patterns in Ethiopia, the result of research by a wide range of actors. Not all of this information is comparable, but it certainly appears to be under-utilised. However, as indicated by Riley, the range of useful information would include:

- Distinct livelihood or economic groups.
- Exposure to shocks or hazards.
- Political factors that affect vulnerability.
- Population information by livelihood or economic group.
- Crops grown, livestock accessed.
- A history of food security-related issues and conditions.
- An understanding of wealth within groups.
- Aspects of seasonality, as they determine crop, livestock and other economic activities.
- Patterns of access to food and income, and expenditure.
- Coping strategies in bad years.

Box 4: The HEA livelihoods approach

By noting the recent methodological trends related to the Household Economy Approach, this study is not endorsing HEA above other approaches and methods, but suggesting the current attention on methodological development presents a major opportunity to develop standardised information and understanding across a large area of Ethiopia.

By using this information, and possibly enriching it further, WFP need not be committing itself to HEA as an analytical tool: HEA can be reduced to different components: a) a foundation for livelihood baseline information which can be utilised in many ways; b) an *approach* for identifying and organising relevant food security and livelihoods related information; c) a guide based on its historical *methods* for information gathering – PRA/RRA, semi-structured questionnaires, specific training; and d) as an *analytical tool* for quantifying changes in access to food and income.

- Trend data – prices, terms of trade, production, yields, giving parameters for 'normal' and 'abnormal' conditions.

Currently and coincidentally, two major ongoing initiatives should develop consistent, comparable food security-relevant livelihood baseline information (DPPC/PCDP/SC UK and DPPC/FEWS NET) on a large-scale – regional and sub-regional. Both initiatives are working through the government, although they have slightly different purposes and are working out means of coordination and harmonisation. They provide an obvious means by which WFP could enrich its baseline livelihood understanding. WFP could also add to these HEA-based baselines by bringing other research to deepen the analysis, and linking the findings to its own *woreda* vulnerability profiles.

Useful products could include:

- Livelihood maps.
- Detailed livelihood profiles.
- Seasonal maps – with clear linkages to monitoring systems.

Contributing and/or gaining access to such information would have a number of uses:

- Identifying appropriate monitoring indicators.
- Helping to interpret indicator information.
- Contributing to identifying expected hazards/shocks.
- Contributing to identifying the underlying causes of food insecurity and livelihood insecurity for different livelihood groups.

EW and outcome indicators. The current official computer database and analytical software of the DPPC is not functional (Anderson and Choularton, 2004).

There has been a tendency for early-warning systems in Ethiopia and elsewhere to collect large amounts of trend data with little analysis of the utility of the data. This may also be the case for the current market price information systems in Ethiopia.³⁴ The possibility of reducing the number of indicators to a minimum, manageable and useful number is currently being raised (discussions with FEWS NET/EPSP and SC UK).

Greater clarity is needed over the utility and reliability of different indicator information. Some indicators are most useful as early signs of impending problems, some as confirmation that a situation has deteriorated, and some as both.

EFSA practice. Current EFSA practice, although guided by the DPPC's agreed assessment guidelines, is not rigorous as it does not follow a consistent methodology or analytical framework. The system essentially uses qualitative judgements and negotiation. The most obvious basis by which figures are generated from year to year is to adjust them up or down on the basis of whether expected or actual rainfall and cereal production are better or worse than last year.

Rigour is a function of approach, method, triangulation and consistency. It relates to the objectives set. Rigour does not imply precision – there is a limit to the accuracy of findings in information-poor environments, and there is no point in providing more precise information than is needed for the response.

Qualitative judgement and negotiations are not intrinsically a problem, and may well serve to draw out local knowledge from lower-level government officials, but if information is not organised through an appropriate conceptual frame-work and grounded in evidence from the field, the process is based on very little but a few individuals' personal perceptions.

Technical rigour can also be strengthened by incorporating statistically valid quantitative methods into the EFSA, such as household and anthropometric surveys. While potentially a daunting task over large areas and population groups, at the least survey techniques could be utilised for small areas, or as an intensive effort to establish a reference understanding of vulnerability. In addition, a number of national surveys (e.g. DHS, MICS and the national census) offer opportunities to triangulate rapid assessment information with more statistically valid data.

The starting point for improving technical rigour is to acknowledge that different approaches and methods exist, and

³⁴ The EC has funded the market price database of the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise for some years and has proposed the development of a new market price system. This has been rejected by government on the basis of the 'Woreda-net' project, which will connect all woredas in the country and through which the government is hoping to design a market price information system.

that much of the data being used is of differing reliability (Sandford, 2002). A common analytical framework and approach could then be developed. Different methods and information may be necessary for very different livelihood groups, e.g. crop-dependent versus livestock-dependent.

4.3 Institutional issues for WFP

4.3.1 Funding and structure

Given Ethiopia's size and complexity, and WFP's size and prominence as a leading agency in food security and emergency needs assessment, adequate resources need to be available to meet the continuous and complicated demands for good-quality information.³⁵

The nature of recurring emergencies over such a large and complex country creates high and unpredictable demands on staff time and energy. This is noted for the VAM unit in particular, in Addis Ababa and in the field. Methodological and technical development (as well as reliable information collection and verification) need concerted time and concentration, and are very difficult in such an environment.

The VAM unit itself has changed considerably in recent years, increasing from two staff in 2000 (one national, one international) to its current complement of five (two international, three national). There has also been a significant turnover of staff, especially in the last six months, with three experienced national staff members moving on (only one of whom has remained in the country in the same area of work).

While relations are good between WFP HQ (VAM and ODAN) and the country office VAM unit, the perception of the country office is that HQ is not sufficiently aware of the Ethiopian operating environment and the food security- and EFSA-related analytical issues and constraints. While HQ is generally responsive to requests from the country office, a more proactive approach and engagement with the country office, particularly in addressing some of the more fundamental and strategic aspects of food security analysis, would be beneficial.

Addressing many of these issues depends on organising the VAM unit to meet both internal and external demands for information, and providing adequate funding to do so.

Meeting internal demands and activities

- Fulfilling day-to-day internal operational information requirements.
- Providing analytical input into programme strategies.
- Organisation and storage of information – databases, filing systems.

³⁵ Capacity issues other than those relating to WFP are beyond the scope of this study. However, the capacity questions discussed here should be seen in the light of the need to support good assessment practice more generally, including the work of the DPPC in this area.

Meeting external demands and activities

- Developing deeper, broader food security analysis.
- Contributing to methodological developments within the EWWG.
- Networking and interacting with external partners.

Meeting these demands is a large task for the current VAM unit structure. A senior analyst could be added to ensure that both internal and external demands for VAM input are better met, and coordination could be improved with other relevant agencies, including FAO.

A concern about staff progression and advancement was mentioned to the study team, at international and national levels. The level of these posts and the possibility of their progression could usefully be assessed.

Increased funding for VAM is consistent with the recent external auditors' report to the Executive Board. The Anderson and Choularton (2004) report also recommends increasing the capacity of FEWS NET in Ethiopia.

4.3.2 Independence and advocacy

Current EFSA practice is not perceived as credible by key actors, with the result that information and analysis is subject to manipulation and lacks rigour. This applies directly to the multi-agency assessment and appeal, where some actors within the UN have suggested that they have been co-opted by the government.

Questions have been raised about the reliability of different types of primary data, including crop production estimates (Sandford, 2002).³⁶

Achieving substantial changes in any environment requires access to a good network of 'decision-makers' and 'technicians' bringing to the table practical ideas and suggestions. Informal networks with government and other agencies are particularly important, and were highlighted by two UN country representatives during the course of this study.

Box 5: Is there a credibility gap?

There is reason enough for different actors – particularly donors – to question the rigour and objectiveness of the EFSA. It is, however, worth noting that, regardless of the credibility of information systems, prejudices about the accuracy of information and findings are often encountered. Donors often bypass information systems and use their own experts to determine whether a response is required, what scale the response should be, or whether the type of response falls within their mandate.

There are many entry points for engagement, including through the M & E system of the Safety Net Programme, next year's SDPRP/PRSP process, the DPPC/SC UK and DPPC/FEWS NET initiatives and the UNICEF EOS nutrition screening programme. Coordination around food security-related information and analysis and the EFSA is considered poor, with WFP not as visible as it has been in the past. Explanations for this include a lack of regular meetings of the EWWG and its sub-groups, as well as WFP's high staff turnover in recent months.³⁷

Different food security agencies and methods have been in competition in Ethiopia for years, ultimately to the detriment of the profession and the people these agencies are meant to help. Although this has been much less the case in recent years, the current transition period in the country appears to be making communication and coordination particularly difficult. There are opportunities for WFP to add significant value, by assisting the DPPC in bringing relevant stakeholders together, in order to acknowledge the EFSA's weaknesses and build consensus around a common approach, developing linkages between different components of an overall system.

4.4 Planning issues

4.4.1 Seasonality

The timing of the current EFSA is closely associated with the meher season, which is generally agreed to be the most important period of the year for the largest number of chronically food-insecure households. However, over recent years the number of different livelihood groups affected by food insecurity has expanded into, and within, other regions, e.g. SNNPR, Afar and Somali region.

Although assessments have expanded to account for seasonal variation, there is currently a lack of accessible documentation on the different seasonal calendars relevant to the different livelihood groups of Ethiopia.³⁸ There are four main seasonal patterns, *meher* and *belg* and *gu* and *deyr*,³⁹ and each of these seasons has slightly different 'normal' start and end times across the country,⁴⁰ and different significance for the different livelihood groups.

Preparing timelines of seasonal calendars for many generic (livelihood-based) population groups would be relatively simple and potentially very useful. With this information, the importance of particular times for particular indicators would be identified, which is critical for monitoring the

³⁷ It is also recognised that 2005 may be a particularly difficult year with the instability within the DPPC, the formation of the FSCB, and the turnover of staff within the DPPC, SC UK and FEWS NET, as well as the elections.

³⁸ It was pointed out to the study team that there are detailed seasonal calendars produced by the MoARD, but it is clear that, whether from the MoARD or other sources, limited use is being made of them.

³⁹ Particular names will vary from location to location.

⁴⁰ For example, the ITCZ weather front moves from west to east over several weeks.

³⁶ The Ministry of Agriculture and Central Statistical Authority produced different crop production figures for the last harvest.

development of the season and ultimately for influencing the appropriate time for assessments (or information-gathering) in particular areas.

4.4.2 Region-based information systems, products and analysis

Information dissemination and use for DPPC purposes has involved collecting at the bottom and transmitting to the top (Chapman, 2005). Use of data and information has been extremely limited at the lower levels of government, *woreda*, zone or region (Sandford, 2002; Chapman 2005). This is consistent with Ethiopia's history of centralised government.

The ongoing decentralisation process will take time, and major capacity-building will be required to empower regions to build their own systems and conduct their own analysis. The UN is also exploring the possibility of decentralising. As noted earlier, current initiatives to improve early warning and EFSA are region-based.⁴¹ WFP already has a significant presence at the regional level, through its sub-

offices and VAM focal points,⁴² and thereby good networks with regional government actors.

Improving information collection and analysis through the DPPC (and FSCB) at the regional level may offer some potential. Reviewing WFP's experience in Somali Region, where it has worked closely with the DPPC/SC UK early-warning system, would reveal constraints and opportunities to developing a more regional approach. WFP is well placed to conduct a review of the constraints to, and opportunities for, improving EFSA on a regional basis, investigating the institutional dynamics, reliability and use of data and information, as well as the motivations and vested interests of different actors.

⁴¹ DPPC/SC UK in Somali Region; DPPC/FEWS NET in SNNPR; DPPC/PCDP/SC UK forthcoming in Afar, as well as South Omo Zone in SNNPR, Borena Zone in Oromiya, and Somali region.

⁴² WFP is the most decentralised of the UN agencies, as the government has been resisting the general decentralisation of the UN. This study finds that the current VAM focal points have very limited capacity to do food security analysis work on top of their original workload and over very large areas.

Box 6: The Annual Appeal documents

The major output of the assessment findings, analysis and process is the annual Humanitarian Appeal for Ethiopia.⁴³ The 2005 Appeal organises findings and 'needs' into the following sectors:⁴⁴

- Food (in metric tonnes and cash equivalent)
- Health and Nutrition (including supplementary food)
- Water and Sanitation
- Agriculture
- Disaster Response Capacity Strengthening
- Overall Coordination

The Appeal documents generally describe the methodology of the assessment as follows:⁴⁵

predominantly qualitative and in order to substantiate information from zonal and woreda officials, teams used rapid rural assessment techniques (such as interviews with key informant and on the spot inspection of crops, livestock, pests, pasture and market conditions) where situations permitted. Interviews were conducted at woreda level with local officials, communities and house-hold. Teams evaluated the main food security indicators: 1)

⁴³ The 2005 and 2004 documents were reviewed for this study along with an example of an actual zonal (the first or lowest level at which findings are converted in to a report) and regional food security/harvest report, which feed directly in to the final Appeal. The Humanitarian Appeal reports are easily found on the internet. The 2005 Appeal is found at <http://www.ocha-eth.org/Reports/downloadable/jointGivUNAppeal2005.pdf>

⁴⁴ The 2004 Appeal also included HIV/AIDS, Child Protection and Education. The review of the 2004 Appeal in the following year's appeal found that these sectors were insignificantly funded.

⁴⁵ The 2004 Appeal has an appendix on 'methodologies for determining needs'.

weather conditions; 2) Meher production and market conditions; 3) other income sources, wage labour opportunities and purchasing power; 4) livestock holding and productivity; 5) performance of cash crops such as coffee and chat; 6) movement of people/migration. Team briefed and debriefed at the federal, regional and zonal level.

The documents contain some discussion of the conceptual and operational changes occurring in the country, such as the need to move away from a 'food first' approach, the separation of chronic from acute food-insecure caseloads, and the need for 'non-food' interventions. There are also references to ongoing operational concerns, such as difficulties in the targeting of food aid.

In terms of the food security components, all of the documents, from zonal to national, have brief summary statements under many of the headings identified in 1) to 5) above. The emphasis is generally on rainfall and crop production, with resultant comments on water and pasture availability and possibly very brief references to areas such as market and price issues and labour opportunities.

From a critical perspective, none of these documents, from the lowest to the highest level, move beyond rather general background statements that justify or support the final figures for beneficiary numbers, tonnages and required funds. There is no intermediate analysis process or more detailed information or reports behind the final Appeal summary.

In addition, there is some concern about the lack of clarity with regard to the (expanding) 'non-food' sector, in terms of what constitutes emergency or chronic problems and needs. For example, the 2004 assessment included equipment for schools. Without greater clarity, the 'non-food' component runs the risk of being perceived as a free-for-all funding mechanism.

Chapter 5

Key themes and options

Over the course of the past three years, WFP ODAN and VAM have hosted a series of EFSA consultative workshops with experts from many agencies, fields of expertise and geographic regions (WFP, 2003). Four key themes emerged as special challenges for good practice: distinguishing between chronic and transitory food insecurity; assessing the role of markets; assessing non-food response options; and assessing the effects and impact of food aid. In addition to reviewing the overall rigour of EFSA practice, the current study gives specific attention to the ability of current practice to address these key themes. For each, a brief review of key issues is followed by a description of current practice in Ethiopia, and options for strengthening assessment practice.

5.1 Assessing chronic versus transitory needs

The determination of chronic versus transitory food insecurity has critical implications for the type and duration of intervention measures. Whereas transitory food insecurity brought on by a sudden shock may be adequately addressed through the immediate provision of resource transfers or other short-term responses, chronic food insecurity requires a long-term commitment, not only to ensure that people's immediate survival needs are met, but also to address the more structural and long-term factors that lead to chronic food insecurity (Macrae and Harmer, 2004).

An extension of the discussion on chronic food insecurity is that of destitution. Devereux (2003) argues that destitution is distinct from the concept of chronic poverty: whereas 'chronic poverty' emphasises duration, 'destitution' stresses severity. Similarly, the severity of food insecurity should be distinguished from the question of duration or recurrence. In practice, periods of acute food insecurity – the inability to access adequate food in the short term – may be a recurrent feature of life for many. The distinction between acute/transitory and chronic food insecurity is to that extent an artificial one. Many families hover permanently close to the minimum subsistence threshold, and are chronically vulnerable to shocks which take them below that line.

As described above, the Productive Safety Net Programme (2004) is an attempt to address longer-term needs for chronically food-insecure people. While reviewing the potential efficacy of the PSNP in achieving this goal is beyond the remit of this study, what is relevant is the ability of assessment practice to distinguish chronically from transitorily affected groups.

Current practice in Ethiopia utilises two general approaches to this challenge of distinguishing chronic from transitory

food insecurity. These can be characterised as: (1) a *functional approach*, which emphasises the previous history and duration of food aid receipts for identifying beneficiaries; and (2) an *indicator approach*, whereby chronically food-insecure *woredas* are defined and ranked by statistical analysis of a number of variables related to food insecurity.

The PSNP Implementation Manual (GoE, 2004) provides clear guidance for identifying chronically food-insecure *woredas* and households. This is in line with the functional approach. The Manual defines chronically food-insecure *woredas* and households as:

(a) Chronically food-insecure *woredas*:

- For the purposes of the Safety Net, a *woreda* is considered chronically food insecure if it (a) is in one of eight regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNP, Afar, Somali, rural Harari and Dire Dawa), and (b) has been a recipient of food aid for a significant period, generally for at least each of the last three years.
- According to the DPPC list of *woredas*, 262 *woredas* currently satisfy the two conditions stated above.

(b) Chronically food-insecure households:

- For the purposes of the Safety Net, a household is considered chronically food-insecure if it is located in one of the 262 chronically food-insecure *woredas* (as defined above); and
- has been assessed by a mix of administrative guidelines and community knowledge to have faced continuous food shortages (usually three months of food gap or more) in the last three years and received food assistance.
- This also includes households that suddenly become more vulnerable as a result of a severe loss of assets and are unable to support themselves (last 1-2 years).
- Any household without family support and other means of social protection and support.
- In the first year of the Safety Net programme, the community food security task force establishes a baseline list of chronically food-insecure households. This list will be updated each year (GoE, 2004).

While the emphasis of this approach is on the previous history of receiving food aid, the guidelines do allow for the inclusion of households that have experienced a sudden shock, or that are without social support.

Certainly, a programme of this size (the PSNP expects to benefit roughly five million people annually) will require clear and consistent guidelines, and those outlined above are an attempt at clarity and consistency. That said, there remain

at least three concerns. First, inasmuch as the identification of PSNP beneficiaries is based on past receipts of food aid, and given that the system used to identify previous food aid recipients is of questionable validity, the use of this mechanism could perpetuate previous mis-targeting. Second, given that the beneficiary list will be updated each year, in the absence of any indication of more robust assessment methods under development the PSNP beneficiary selection risks being driven by negotiation, which is open to bias and influence from non-technical factors. Third, while the functional definition of previous food aid receipts is meant to be objective and easily operational, it risks taking attention away from the structural issues that lead to chronic vulnerability.

On this last concern, it is important to note that the PSNP guidelines make explicit reference to linkages between the PSNP and other food security programmes, noting that PSNP inputs (cash and food) are not enough to address chronic vulnerability, and are best accompanied by interventions that address structural issues.

The indicator approach is well illustrated by the Chronic Vulnerability Index (CVI), an analytical effort led by WFP VAM. The CVI is a statistical tool that brings together a number of socio-economic indicators related to food security into a single index value. This allows for the relative ranking of woredas.⁴⁶ The CVI has been in development for several years, and interim results are available. However, there is as yet no broad consensus as to their validity.

In principle, the CVI is a means to identify and rank woredas based on an analysis of more structural factors. This can only be achieved, however, if the indicators selected are based on a sound conceptual framework, and if the interactions between the variables (including issues of weighting and auto-correlation) are well understood. The VAM unit is trying to improve the CVI through consultative meetings. The CVI approach has the potential to place greater emphasis on understanding the structural

Box 7: Crisis as opportunity

There is significant scope as part of the EFSA process to embrace the concept of ‘crisis as opportunity’ – meaning a crisis creates critical awareness of, and attention to, conditions of food insecurity, and thus is an opportunity to channel attention towards support (political, financial, technical) for often-neglected and more intractable long-term problems. To seize these opportunities requires explicit linkages between short- and long-term problem analysis and response.

⁴⁶ A similar statistical aggregation technique is Principal Components Analysis, which has been used by WFP VAM in several countries not only to do rankings, but also to identify clusters of administrative units with similar vulnerability characteristics, which supports strategic programme development to address key aspects of vulnerability.

dynamics of chronic food insecurity, which would assist in developing more strategic interventions beyond food/cash assistance and work programmes. It may also enable more attention to the structural causes of food insecurity.

In addition to addressing specific methodological issues noted above, it may also be possible to make more explicit linkages between the CVI and the PSNP *woreda* selection process. The spatial correlation between these two results should be analysed for consistency and difference: where differences exist, there is an opportunity for further analysis as to the reasons why and, programmatically, justification for inclusion in the PSNP. From the EFSA perspective, the CVI is currently used as a reference for cross-checking assessment findings within WFP, but it is not systematically part of the EFSA. To enable more systematic use of the CVI, typologies of *woredas* could be developed with similar structural characteristics, and this information could be provided in summary form to assessment teams.

5.2 Assessing the role of markets

The forthcoming WFP EFSA Guidelines place significant emphasis on understanding the role of markets as an integral part of an EFSA. While EFSA interest in market analysis lies ultimately in understanding household food security, market analysis typically requires a macro analytical perspective, with scales of analysis ranging from community, to national to international levels.

Key questions from the new WFP EFSA Guidelines concerning market analysis include:

- Do markets in normal times work well enough to ensure food availability at national and local levels?
- What is the maximum extent to which increases in food supply – as a result of different interventions (e.g. in-kind, cash, local purchases) – can take place without introducing substantial market distortions (e.g. discouraging flows from surplus areas to deficit areas)?
- What are the estimated price impacts of planned humanitarian interventions? (It is helpful here to have an overview of price changes in earlier large-scale market transactions and humanitarian interventions.)
- How would existing market linkages be affected as a consequence of humanitarian interventions?
- Is it possible to design a portfolio of interventions (instead of a single large intervention) to minimise the impact of a single large commodity-based intervention (e.g. food aid complemented with cash transfers and policy measures)?
- To what extent can the market meet the demand for food now and in the coming months?
- What are the constraints, if any, to market functioning?
- What contingencies could enhance or further inhibit the capacity of markets to meet demand?

Assessing the role of markets is critical to EFSA practice in terms of understanding: (1) a key indicator of food insecurity (i.e. market price fluctuations and their livelihood impacts); (2) market interventions that may directly mitigate food insecurity without the use of food aid *per se*; and (3) the potential negative impacts of humanitarian interventions on market systems, which may have long-term negative consequences on production and trade.

When considering the degree to which the role of markets is incorporated into assessment practice, it is important to recognise that such analysis can occur as part of the interagency field assessment, as well as through other, complementary studies that focus more on macro-level analysis. As for the DPPC-led inter-agency assessment, the field checklist includes questions about market issues as they relate to household food access. As noted previously, however, there is no rigorous system for consistently collecting and analysing this information, and the implications for food insecurity.

Inasmuch as market analysis is meant to answer the macro-oriented questions above, such information is best gained from separate, but potentially complementary, studies. Recent studies include: (1) the report on cereal availability in 2004/05 (WFP, EC and SIDA); (2) the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions; (3) the MOARD report on agricultural input and product marketing strategy and implementation mechanisms; and (4) the USAID-supported Bellmon study.

Market monitoring is undertaken by several institutions in Ethiopia, including the Central Statistical Authority, the Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), the Bureau of Agriculture and the Bureau of Medium and Small Enterprise and Industry Development (BoMSEID). NGOs and UN organisations monitor prices in their project areas. None of these market information systems is integrated; they are made up of different types of information and commodities, and are rarely complete. Only limited analytical use is made of them (ODI-SC UK Cash Review Draft, 2005).

The EC has a strong interest in improving the understanding of cereal markets, particularly in light of its preference for cash over food aid. A 2003 report to the Commission has a brief description and overview of the Ethiopian grain marketing system, with reference to many documents and Ethiopian experts. The EC has also been supporting a market information system through the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise for some years, and is keen to fund a food grain market information system, although this is potentially not consistent with the government's commitment to the Woreda-Net communications system, which is supposed to include market information.

While the studies noted above are informative with regard to the possibilities of local procurement, monetisation, the potential effects on markets of humanitarian responses and market trends, there are at least two ways in which their contributions could be strengthened for overall food security analysis.

One option is for the analysis to explicitly explore the possibilities of market interventions – in their own right – to mitigate food insecurity for a particular emergency (e.g. subsidies, policy shifts related to increasing access to food, communication of market data to traders and the public). In particular, there seems to be a significant opportunity to expand the current scope of the CFSAM to more explicitly consider market interventions (the pros and cons) in mitigating food insecurity.

The second and more obvious option for strengthening market analysis is to draw explicitly on the reports noted above in the overall analysis of humanitarian needs. The current DPPC-led inter-agency assessment report does not make such explicit linkages, and as such seems to exclude information that would be useful for comprehensive market analysis.

5.3 Assessing non-food response options

The problematic term 'non-food response' has at least three possible meanings: (1) key sectoral needs in response to an emergency (i.e. as outlined in the IASC CAP Needs Analysis Framework, including shelter, water, food security, education, infrastructure, HIV/AIDS, health); (2) in the phrase 'non-food items', to signify the provision of such goods as utensils and clothes; and (3) responses other than the provision of food aid *per se*, that directly aim to increase food access or availability.

From the broad ENA perspective, the term 'non-food response' implies humanitarian needs in sectors other than food aid *per se*. While such needs usually exist, used in this way it is still problematic in that it can disproportionately privilege food aid over other sectoral responses (over 50% of the current Ethiopia humanitarian appeal is for food aid).

More problematic from a food security (i.e. EFSA) perspective, the term 'non-food response' is readily interpreted by most practitioners to mean other sectoral interventions, and so diverts attention from the range of response options aimed at *directly increasing food access, availability and utilisation* in the short term, which do not involve food aid *per se* (e.g. market interventions, policy shifts, cash assistance, international advocacy of human rights, complementarity with health interventions).

There has been much recent debate on cash assistance (grant or in exchange for work) as a complement or alternative to food aid. One of the key recommendations of

a recent ODI study (Harvey, 2005) is that assessments typically do not conduct adequate problem analysis that would highlight a potential role for non-food responses such as cash (e.g. distinguishing food availability from food access problems), and link that analysis to a variety of response options, including increasing food access through directly increasing purchasing power.

It would be short-sighted, however, to focus the discussion of non-food responses on cash alone. The range of possible non-food responses is potentially quite large, but tends to be ignored in favour of the food gap-and-fill perspective. Current EFSA practice in Ethiopia emphasises the idea that ‘non-food response’ means ‘other sectoral responses’, as opposed to a holistic response to food insecurity specifically. The DPPC-led inter-agency assessment guidelines emphasise that food security interventions are meant to fill a food gap (typically with food aid), as opposed to addressing the multiple causes of food insecurity.

At the field level, analytical frameworks can be developed that encourage a broad understanding of food insecurity, and that link this causal analysis to response options that include, but are not limited to, food aid. In this way, analysis would be engaged in both the problem and the solution; the analysis would take into consideration a deeper understanding of food insecurity, and would explore options for mitigating the problem. At the macro level, there is wide scope for expanding the current focus of CFSAMs to include similar problem/solution analysis that would include policy, market, advocacy and other options

5.4 Assessing the effects and impact of food aid

Understanding the effects and impact of food aid requires that other key components of the Humanitarian Information System described in Chapter 1 are in place. In particular, an analyst must have some baseline reference of key indicators (either for a ‘normal year’ or for a period of time just prior to the intervention), a monitoring system that tracks changes in those indicators, and the analytical capacity to determine to what degree any correlation of monitoring indicators with interventions is due to the intervention itself, or some other cause.

WFP currently conducts a Food Aid Utilisation and Impact Study (FAUIS) following emergency responses. It is not clear, however, how this study is linked to actual assessment information, or how it can distinguish correlation from causation. Indeed, with the conventional expectation that food aid will ‘roll over’ to the next season, little attention is paid to the actual impact of a given intervention.

The FAUIS methods for assessing the impact of food aid do not appear to refer to available livelihood baseline or reference information and descriptions. Therefore it is not

Box 8: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions – rubber stamp or opportunity for holistic analysis?

The CFSAM is a routine and integral component of annual needs assessments in Ethiopia. Indeed, it is commonly viewed as a ‘stamp of approval’ for GoE agricultural production estimates, and its findings are a reference point for the final ‘Appeal’ figures. While an important exercise, the CFSAM is criticised by key actors on two distinct counts: (1) it is viewed as too uncritical of agricultural production estimates and does not make explicit efforts to reconcile other information sources, such as the Bellmon study (even within the GoE there was disagreement on production estimates for the previous *meher* season); and (2), while recognised as a pillar of information for food security analysis, the CFSAM’s emphasis on food availability tends to dictate the overall problem/solution analysis.

With its macro and potentially broad perspective on food security, the CFSAM is uniquely placed to engage in more holistic analysis of the causes of food security – not only identifying gaps in food availability, but also critically examining the range of causes of food insecurity, and thus the range of potential short- and long-term interventions. While such a mandate differs from the historic focus of CFSAMs, there is a great need for a forum for such holistic analysis, which could either be woven into the existing CFSAM structure or explicitly added as another step in the annual assessment process.

FAO and WFP are currently undergoing a global review of the CFSAM’s scope and methods, with the aim of improving methods and relevance to overall food security analysis.

easy to interpret findings, and findings may be generalised over different population/livelihood groups.⁴⁷

WFP’s MERET development programme (Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transition to More Sustainable Livelihoods) has relatively recently been assessed, and it appears to have had very encouraging results, particularly in terms of community perceptions of improvements in their income and food security status. The MERET reports also have useful background information on the local livelihood characteristics of the target populations. It is not clear whether or how the

⁴⁷ The FAUIS used the Coping Strategies Index (CSI) tool developed by WFP and CARE. The CSI manual stresses that a certain amount of ‘up front’ work is required, particularly to identify ‘the right list of coping behaviours’. While this study is by no means a critique of the FAUIS, the discussion in the ‘lessons learned’ paper on the FAUIS (WFP, 2003) suggests that this was indeed a problem. For example, knowing what the traditional hungry period is for different livelihood groups (pastoral, agro-pastoral, pure farming, etc) would help to determine whether it was appropriate for Afaris to receive regular food aid distributions between January and August (as happened), and, for example, how this affected normal or distress coping strategies.

content of MERET reports is absorbed by the VAM unit in order to increase its understanding of local food security issues in project areas, and perhaps to cross-check with other sources of information that describe food security conditions and issues in the same areas/woredas.

The impact of food aid is also linked to entry/exit criteria. Having clear criteria that are linked to international standards around when to intervene would also provide a measure of when to exit. Such standards also ensure consistency as to when and how to intervene in an emergency situation. One example of such standards is the Somalia FSAU Food and Livelihood Security Phase Classification, which utilises consistent criteria – linked to internationally accepted standards – for classifying populations as being in a Humanitarian Emergency, in a Livelihood Crisis, or at Alert and non-Alert status (FSAU Technical Series September 2004).⁴⁸ Focusing on specific indicators for entry/exit criteria not only provides a measure of project impact, but can also direct strategic planning on how best to achieve the intended outcome.

⁴⁸ This approach is currently being developed for the DPPC/PCDP/SC UK Pastoral Early Warning System in Ethiopia.

Whereas a general goal of reducing food insecurity is rather abstract, an aim of (say) reducing malnutrition from 18% GAM to 10% GAM for a given population is a clear and measurable objective that can guide strategic thinking.

Understanding the impacts of food aid would be strengthened through the clear identification of measurable indicators at the outset of a crisis that are relevant to a given livelihood system, and to monitor those indicators throughout programme implementation. While the ‘outcome’ indicator of nutrition is one obvious data source, others exist. One option, used as part of the FAUIS, is the Coping Strategies Index (CSI), developed by WFP and CARE. The CSI tracks the degree to which a given population is engaged in coping strategies that are directly linked to the severity of food insecurity. The utility of CSI is in its longitudinal analysis (meaning before, during and after the intervention). Additional indicators of food aid impact include market prices, the migration flows of people and livestock, health status and school attendance rates. To monitor such changes would require establishing a data collection and analysis system that is directly linked to anticipated changes in key indicators in the wake of an intervention.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

While famines in Ethiopia have largely been avoided in recent years, there remains a pressing need to improve the quality and credibility of current EFSA practice. It is imperative to build a consensual understanding of the nature and magnitude of food security crises, lest the government, donors and agencies fail to accept and act on assessment findings, misdirect limited resources or pursue potentially damaging interventions. The current annual needs assessment is a mixture of non-systematic methods, and is ultimately based on negotiations between assessment teams, government agencies and international agencies. Negotiation is not intrinsically a negative process. Indeed, current practice benefits greatly from local knowledge and potential transparency. Rather, EFSA practice needs complementary and more explicit evidence-based analysis that is systematic and consistent, with analytical frameworks that enable more in-depth understanding of food access, availability and utilisation. Strong conceptual frameworks concerning food security analysis exist within the key government policy documents; the challenge is to adequately operationalise these in the EFSA.

In addition to improving general credibility, opportunities exist to expand the current EFSA emphasis on food aid needs towards a more holistic problem analysis that identifies structural issues associated with chronic food insecurity, examines the role and impact of markets, explores non-food responses to food insecurity and investigates the impact of a food aid intervention.

Addressing the opportunities for strengthening practice identified in this report is not an easy task: many of these issues are not new to the various actors, and notable

attempts to improve practice have been made in the past. This report highlights a number of factors that make EFSA practice particularly challenging in Ethiopia. While the GoE rightly remains central to the EFSA process, WFP in particular is being called upon by international actors to play a greater role.

Addressing the multitude of issues required to improve EFSA is likely to require creating the space (time, financial and political) to step back and address fundamentals of food security information systems. There is a wealth of knowledge and experience of direct relevance, much of it found within the Ethiopian experience. However, day-to-day operational demands limit the time and energy available to think about the bigger picture, and to develop practical steps to achieve an overall systems approach and analytical framework that can connect existing efforts and components of a system, and clarify the roles of different actors. The current transitional period in Ethiopia, while creating many uncertainties about the future, offers immense opportunities as new relationships, mandates and expectations are emerging.

Perhaps the ultimate limitation (or, rather, potential driving force) towards improving EFSA is not to be found in improved methods *per se*, but in the extent to which governments, implementing agencies and donors *demand* better, more credible and more relevant information. Assessment missions should be asked to substantiate findings, and the process would benefit from incentive/disincentive mechanisms that reward and acknowledge sound practice. Without consistent demand, even the most credible evidence-based methodologies will be easily sidelined.

Annex 1

Changes in food security-related theory and practice (with reference to Ethiopia)

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Conceptual shifts	<p>Global food security: dominance of global and national food supply concerns.</p> <p>Introduction of 'Nutrition Surveillance' by UN after 1974 World Food Conference – led to two-tier operational system: 1) supply-based system (FAO) for estimating need; and 2) indicator systems for local access.</p> <p>1975–85: food supply to food access shift.</p>	<p>Entitlement theory (Sen, 1981); individual and household access.</p> <p>'Golden era' of food security in development thinking.</p> <p>1975–85: food supply to food access</p> <p>Objective indicators to subjective perceptions.</p>	<p>Poverty, not food security (1991–95)</p> <p>1996 – World Food Summit (increased food production or consumption and access).</p> <p>'Food first' to broader 'livelihoods' perspective.</p> <p>Objective indicators to subjective perceptions.</p>	<p>Livelihoods and vulnerability emphasis.</p>
Definitions of food security	<p>'Availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs ... to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption ... and to offset fluctuations in production and prices' (UN 1975).</p>	<p>'Access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life' (World Bank, 1986).</p>	<p>The viability of the household as a productive and reproductive unit (not) threatened by food shortage (Frankenberger and Goldstein, 1991).</p>	
General development of information and assessment systems	<p>CFSAM – Food supply-dominated.</p> <p>Discussion of other methods e.g. 'functional classification' – a livelihood based classification (Payne, 1976)</p>	<p>Indicator-based systems: rainfall, prices, nutrition.</p> <p>CFSAM – food supply dominated.</p>	<p>Introduction of access-based information systems: livelihood baselines + indicators for prediction, the assessment of need and impact evaluation. Increased access-based assessments.</p> <p>CFSAM – food supply; increased recognition of access issues.</p>	<p>Increased emphasis on livelihood-based information systems – for early warning, vulnerability and poverty monitoring and analysis.</p> <p>CFSAM under review</p>
Ethiopia-specific events	<p>1971–75: sequence of rain failures. Excess mortality approx. 30,000. Significant livestock losses.</p>	<p>1983–85: sequence of rain failures. Eight million affected. Estimated mortality of up to 1 million people. Tigray and Wollo most affected.</p>	<p>1990–93: rain failure and regional conflicts. Estimated 4 million people suffering food shortages.</p> <p>1993–94: 4 million people requiring food assistance, including demobilised army and Somali refugees.</p> <p>1994: 5.6 million requiring food assistance. Most affected area Borena pastoral lowlands and SNNPR especially Wolayta.</p>	<p>1999/2000: 10 million people requiring food assistance primarily <i>belg</i>-dependent and pastoralists mostly in Somali Region; some <i>meher</i>-dependent.</p> <p>2002/2003: 12.5 million people requiring food assistance, primarily <i>meher</i>-dependent farmers agro-pastoralists in the east, pastoralists in the north-east (Afar) and <i>belg</i>-dependent in the south.</p>

(continued)

Annex 1 (continued)

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Ethiopia early-warning systems	<p>EW Dept. established within Relief and Rehabilitation Commission following 1974 famine. Donors provided strong support at the establishment phase but funding was cut considerably as donors disagreed with the policies of the Derg regime.</p> <p>Introduction of 'food supply matrix' (Hay, 1974) in RRC, which contained elements of livelihood analysis.</p> <p>National system based on crop assessments by Ministry of Agriculture.</p>	<p>No EWS, constraints on collecting information due to war. However there was a Nutritional Surveillance Programme, no objective information dissemination.</p> <p>Nutrition Surveillance Programme in Wollo, Wolaita, Hararghe, Ogaden – important contribution to EW but political interference.</p> <p>Limited early donor response to famine.</p>	<p>Mature early-warning systems (DPPC, VAM/WFP, FEWS/USAID, NGOs), greater cooperation/information-sharing with GoE, warnings initiated in June 1999; EWS in pastoral areas insufficient.</p> <p>Continuation of Nutritional Surveillance Programme (DPPC/SC UK) (early 1990s–2001).</p> <p>Development of National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (1993). DPPC replaces RRC and initiates annual needs assessment and appeals.</p> <p>Establishment of Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration.</p>	<p>Focus on DPPC capacity-building, DPPC Information Centre created, WFP/UNEUE/FEWS NET technical and financial support, EWS in Somali Region fully functioning, inadequate early-warning system in SNNPR and Afar Region.</p>
Ethiopia food aid response		<p>Sufficient, however assistance arrived after the majority of deaths had occurred (Jun–Dec 1994).</p>	<p>Sufficient, however assistance arrived after the majority of deaths had occurred (April 1000).</p>	<p>Sufficient, though with record requirements (1.5m MT) rations reduced (Jan–Jun).</p> <p>Increased local purchase of food aid from 2001.</p>

Adapted from Devereux and Maxwell, 2001, with inputs from WFP SMG background paper, John Seaman

Annex 2

Ethiopia Emergency Needs Assessment (ENA) – Chronology of EWWG Methodology sub-group and methodological issues (SC UK, 2005)

Year	Methodological issue/event
1998/1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road bias • Focus on <i>woredas</i> (no hh or community interviews) • No recognition or reference to hh coping mechanisms • Wide geographic coverage • Inadequate time for quality interviews • Time of assessment not conducive to seeing production • Baseline information fragmented and inconsistent • Extensive checklists which have no relation to baseline information • Chronic/acute division required by donors, but problematic
1999/2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weighting system for income and food price ratings • No recognition of actual problem or change • Production shortfalls captured through proxy indicators • No interviews with hhs or communities • No reference to expandability of options or coping mechanisms • Problems with chronic vulnerability index ratings developed by WFP and field-tested in previous assessment • Division between chronic and acute not solved by methodological adjustments
2000/2001	<p>Three main problems identified by EWWG:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes to formats required <i>Solution:</i> To change the <i>woreda</i> relief assistance forms (requirement for identification of problems per location and numbers in need per agro-ecological zone) • Chronic vulnerability index – general agreement that use of ratings upwardly biased figures in areas where it was high (4–5) and underestimated where ratings were low (1–2) <i>Solution:</i> To revisit indicators and look at ways to include stakeholder participation in rating per <i>woreda</i>. However, no consensus on whether indicators would be used as ‘baseline’ information or used in calculation • Current vulnerability – agreement on need to revisit methodology and address issues related to food, income, expenditure and expandability in reference to current year problem <i>Solution:</i> EWWG methodology sub-group tasked with proposing changes. Three different formats developed and presented in an effort to reach consensus. Initial presentation by SC UK, with adjustments made by WFP/CIDA/SCUK. Second format presented by DPPC with few changes to address issues identified. Third format was an attempt to combine the two proposals. DPPC refused to use the ‘combined’ methodology in needs assessment, but agreed to pilot in following assessment with guidance from the Methodology sub-group
2001/2002	<p>Consultant with experience of tackling similar issues in other countries identified by WFP (Frank Reily). Objectives of consultancy included:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Improvements to methodology proposed (through review of three versions proposed by sub-group) (2) Greater coordination and consistency in application of the methodology (3) Decentralisation of needs assessment process with capacity to implement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultant visited three times September 2001: fact-finding and consensus mission (field trip to East Hararghe) October 2001: stakeholder consultations, etc. December 2001: piloting in North Shewa • Key issues investigated: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) normal vs. last year as reference year (2) income vs. expenditure as basis for estimate of what people have (3) PRA/RRA vs. individual hh surveys

(continued)

Annex 2 (continued)

Year	Methodological issue/event
	<p>(4) proportional piling vs. direct measurement of income or expenditure (5) level of detail required in interviews (6) how and how far to project into future (7) what should be included in 'needs' category (8) feasibility of proposed methodology (logistics, etc.) (9) measurement errors – biases from key informants</p> <p><i>Solution:</i> Consultancy seemed to raise more questions than answers. Consultant produced a draft <i>Pilot Food Aid Needs Assessment (FANA) Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide</i>, which served as starting point for further methodological refinements in the following year</p>
Mar–Dec 2002	<p>Based on consultant's work a number of issues needed further refinement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key issues: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) tools required for field work (2) reference year vs. coming year (3) food gap calculation to improve non-food requirements (4) steps to be followed in food gap calculations (5) determining numbers/duration once food gap established – how? (6) How to divide chronic and acute (7) Reference to last year and extent of information required (8) Design of questionnaire • Pre-test of checklists, tools etc in Oct 2002 in Nazareth • Review of pre-test, further refinement agreed <p><i>Solution:</i> Summary of consensus around all these issues produced by group following retreat and guidelines submitted to EWWG with adjustments</p>
2001/2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methodology from 99/00 still applied by DPPC-led multi-agency needs assessment teams, with minor adjustments
August 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEG contracted to pilot needs assessment for pastoral/agro-pastoral communities in Harshin and Shinile Districts of Somali Region as part of SC UK's EW project • Utilisation of FEG spreadsheet to estimate requirements • Non-food requirements also included • Key EWWG members included in exercise
Nov–Dec 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FEG lead Deyr assessment across Somali region and estimate food and non-food requirements <p><i>Issues</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Methodology considered sound • Region and some areas not happy with fact that methodology reduced requirements
Jan–Feb 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID fund further piloting in Amhara region • FEWS contracted as part of wider EWWG effort • Two food economy zones across three woredas selected • Assessment completed in Gubalafto and Sekota/Bugna • Findings presented to EWWG • Debate about key issues/constraints to methodology continued
June 2004	<p>Key issues following piloting exercise</p> <p><i>Strengths</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies those in deficit, for how long, and when – through a step-by-step objective/quantitative analysis • Gives details on how people are living – sources of food, income and expenditure patterns, coping mechanisms, etc. • Triangulation of information collected from different sources – uses a combination of primary and secondary data as well as qualitative and quantitative information • Uses PRA tools to get more reliable information

(continued)

Annex 2 (continued)

Year	Methodological issue/event
June 2004 (continued)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Requires us to analyse as we go along – ‘on the spot’ analysis to sort out discrepancies, allowing us to readjust while we are still in the field • Findings lead to better targeting – identify the neediest populations • Quantifies coping options/expandability • Captures detailed changes from baseline • Analysis is logically structured and findings are transparent and plausible <p><i>Weaknesses</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource-intensive (money, time, dedicated and well trained staff, logistics) • Too much averaging of interviews concealing detailed facts can potentially lead to wrong conclusion • Respondents are fatigued by time-consuming interviews • Purposive sample village selection can bias final picture • Classification of livelihood zones very complex – agro-economic zones, altitude, livelihood, dher ‘dependent’ and ‘belg dependent’, pastoral and agro-pastoral • Secondary data problem – missing, issue of reliability, timeliness, etc. • Variation within livelihood zone and wealth groups in reference year • Making predictions over the coming year – have to make educated ‘guesstimates’ regarding price changes, etc. • Difficulty of conducting baseline and current assessment at the same time • Separating chronic from current problems a challenge • Non-food part not well-studied – more subjective information and not operationally useful <p><i>Suggestions for improvement</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ENA should be done only in affected areas – EWS should give correct signal on potential problematic areas • While ENAs will mainly focus on ‘Access’ and ‘Utilisation’ parts of food security, MoA/CSA/FAO can do ‘Supply’ or ‘Availability’ side • Capacity of DPPC staff should be built for ultimate handover of whole process • Initial ENAs should be conducted by local/zonal staff while federal/regional staff will do validation assessments on a sample basis • Chronic food-insecure areas that are not affected should be studied using other methods rather than covering them using HEA during ENA • Baseline data should be conducted using proper household survey – survey results should lead to classification of areas into homogeneous livelihood zones • Some inconsistencies in baseline noted – when baseline data was collected trained interviewers were not experienced enough – baseline needs to be updated soon • Intensive training on HEA and ENA and RRA for <i>woreda</i>/zone/regional/federal staff that is relevant for assessments • Assessment duration should be short to ensure better participation by agencies • Assessment instruments should focus on the most important information for the current season, shortening interviewing time • More investment on baseline survey and ENA by donors should be encouraged • Interview forms should be systematically designed on computers to enable faster data entry; analysis of formats should be more automated to make the process more interesting, easier and standardised • Less motivation/interest by local/zonal/regional government participants could make sustaining the process difficult • Standard reporting formats (operationally useful reports) should be designed and should be kept precise/short

Draft ENA guidelines produced and presented to EWWG (June 2004); final draft pending

Annex 3

Key changes and actors (based on SC UK, 2005)

Year	Key events	Main issues	Main output	Key actors	Pivotal change
1996	Workshop organised to agree on assessment issues	Various assessments with different findings Need for objective means of assessing needs, rather than subjective	EWVG formed	WFP/DPPC	Agreed to consensus-based rather than contradictory findings
1999	Indicator-based methodology (quantitative) proposed based on EWS	Combination of chronic and current vulnerability ratings to assess needs Qualitative ratings for food and income later quantified	Lack of agreement about methodology	WFP, SC UK, CARE, CIDA, DPPC, FEWS, FAO, UNICEF	Methodology sub-group provided with challenges to change
2000	Revisit methodology based on feedback from EWVG and partners	Issues around chronic vulnerability rating (PPND) Issues around method for assessing current vulnerability (proxies used for all)	Disagreement about methodology (3 proposals put forward) Government refusal to use revised methodology in needs assessment Commitment to pilot in upcoming <i>belg</i> assessment	DPPC, FEWS, WFP, SC UK, CIDA	Changes within WFP and FEWS staff FEWS and Chemonics interested in Ethiopia and HEA
2001	Consultant with needs assessment experience in other countries identified by WFP and contracted on behalf of EWVG and Methodology sub-group	Issues around methods of collection and RRA/PRA tools, etc.	Lack of clarity around a range of technical issues FANA methodology step-by-step guide	SC UK, FEWS, WFP, DPPC	Despite changes in group composition, core small group continued Key group members changed organisations but remained within group (shifts within DPPC, CIDA, WFP and FEWS)
Mar–Dec 2002	Revision of key issues and areas of disagreement (regular meetings, field testing and a retreat)	Ongoing debate about field data collection issues, etc.	Consensus around key issues and pilot testing of tools etc; proposed guidelines Draft guidelines to EWVG	SC UK, FEWS, WFP, DPPC	Core group able to move ahead with small number


(continued)

Annex 3 (continued)

Year	Key events	Main issues	Main output	Key actors	Pivotal change
2003 (?)	Formation of pastoral sub-group by EWWG to monitor changes in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas	Huge amount of funding etc. being put into EW improvements in pastoral areas (FAO and other actors not involved in other EW and ENA efforts)	Improved coordination of efforts aimed at improving EW in pastoral areas of country	DPPC, SC UK, FEWS	DPPC recognised that SNRS programme can assist wider efforts
2003	Formation of task groups (sectoral sub-groups) as part of EWWG	Primarily due to another emerging crisis in 2002/03 and need for improved sectoral coordination	More focus on non-food requirements Supposed to be working on methodologies for sectors	Government line ministries & wider range of NGOs	Emergency required this level of coordination and areas most affected (pastoral and agro pastoral) required multi-sectoral response
Aug 2003	Pilot test in Harshin/ Shinile districts of SNRS	Planned needs assessment exercise as part of project	Created forum to revisit methodology in different context	FEG contracted Key EW people included	Consultant experienced and convincing
Nov–Dec 2003	FEG – <i>deyr</i> assessment conducted in all of SNRS	Same as above	Practical application of HEA framework for assessing emergency requirements	FEG contracted Key EW people included	Use of experienced consultant and institutional links to functioning EWS in SNRS (DPPC-SC UK)
Jan–Feb 2004	FEWS consultants (USAID-funded as part of SC UK project) Pilot in ANRS, Gubalafto, Sekota/Bugna	Opportunity to include more EWWG actors in piloting methodology further	General agreement on methodological issues and draft ENA guidelines June 2004	SC UK, DPPC, FEWS, WFP, USAID, UNICEF	USAID-funded and included new SERA (Strengthening Emergency Response Abilities)
FEWS Nov 2004	Preliminary livelihood zoning conducted in SNNPR through FEWS	Clusters vs. food economy or livelihood zones (3 <i>woredas</i> per zone)	Part of new project focused on one region (SNNPRS)	FEWS, DPPC/B, USAID initiative	FEWS awarded by USAID contract to do HEA zoning, baselines and link to needs assessment methodologies FEG highly involved SERA changes to EPSP (Emergency Preparedness Strengthening Programme)

Annex 4

Livelihood Zones in SNNPR



Source: FEWS NET

Annex 5

People consulted

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Volli Carucci	WFP MERET Programme Manager
Paul Turnbull	WFP Head, Emergency and Preparedness Unit
Mark Ludwick	WFP Consultant – Weather Insurance
Dr Yihene Zewdie	WFP, Safety Net Adviser
Zelalem Ewnetu	WFP Field Monitor and VAM Focal Point (Nazaret)
Perrine Geniez	WFP VAM
Mihret Bizuneh	WFP VAM
Fikire Negussie	UNICEF, seconded to DPPC for ENCU
Judith Sandford	USAID Safety Net Adviser
Suleiman Mohamed	SC UK
Cassandra Chapman	SC UK
Nigiste	FEWS NET Country Rep (ex WFP/VAM)
Marc Rubin	UNICEF, Head Emergency/Early Warning and Disaster Preparedness
Bayene Haile	Food Security Coordination Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Head of Safety Net and Food Security Programmes
Alistair and Patta Scott-Villiers, Sarah Wilson	Pastoral Communication Initiative, UN OCHA
Laketch Mikael	World Bank Rural Development Specialist
Modibu Toure	UN Resident Representative
Francoise Leonardi	EC Grain Market Expert
Zaudu	EW Head, DPPC
Alemu Asfaw	FEWS NET Country Rep
Berhane Woldetensai	Independent Consultant
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Steve Perry	USAID, EPSP
Brian Bacon*	Food For Peace, Regional Office
Pedro Carrillo*	USAID Southern Tier Initiative Program Manager
John McMahon*	USAID
Vivienne (?)*	UNICEF

* consulted as part of roundtable discussion.

Annex 6

Project Terms of Reference and Work Plan

Proposal to Emergency Needs Assessment Branch (ODAN) Regarding In-depth Food Security Assessment in Ethiopia

Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

13 January 2005

1. Background

WFP emergency needs assessments typically depend on funding from WFP relief operations in the concerned country. Donors, media and aid partners have become increasingly critical of the narrow link between needs assessments and food aid responses. They are concerned that objectivity of analysis is hampered when assessments conducted by operational agencies are mainly used to substantiate a request for funding. Moreover, the need to recoup expenditures for assessment missions introduces a bias against conducting assessments where it is judged unlikely that programme funds will be forthcoming. Occasional independent “reality checks” and some up-front funding for assessments that are not automatically dependent on a later food intervention have been identified as important complements to WFP’s on-going practice of emergency needs assessments.

The existing needs assessment schemes address food insecurity by focusing on precisely estimating the current food gap. This is problematic in a number of ways, not least because it assumes a distinction between food and non-food needs that is hard to maintain in practice. Moreover, the underlying causes behind recurrent emergency food needs are insufficiently addressed in existing schemes, in part due to time, budget, and resource constraints. A series of recent studies and consultations have identified the specific shortcomings of the current WFP emergency needs assessments which arise from assessment approaches and methodologies. To address these issues, ODAN is working to refine and standardize approaches and methodologies in order to improve the quality, validity, credibility, and transparency of the WFP’s emergency needs assessments. This is being done in part by drafting and improving an Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) Handbook.

Against this background, ODAN is commissioning an in-depth assessment aimed at identifying and analyzing the shortcomings and missing points in earlier assessments in a chronically food-insecure country, Ethiopia. This is expected to contribute to the WFP’s understanding of good needs

assessments practice in situations of recurrent food crises. It is also intended to contribute to an ECHO-funded project to strengthen WFP’s emergency needs assessment capacities by addressing the four thematic areas (see Section 3.).

2. The HPG Proposal

Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in London, is one of the world’s leading teams of independent researchers on humanitarian policy issues. Its recent work has included a study on emergency needs assessment (*According to Need? Needs assessment and decision-making in the humanitarian sector*, HPG Report 15) and on measuring impact (*Measuring the impact of humanitarian assistance*, HPG Report 17). It is currently engaged on projects looking at livelihoods and agriculture, and at non-food (particularly cash) alternatives in humanitarian emergencies.

It is proposed that HPG/ODI should undertake this piece of work on behalf of ODAN, according to the terms of reference and budget set out below. It would do this by commissioning and managing relevant experts to undertake the field work and write up the results, providing technical and general management support, as well as editing and ensuring the quality of the outputs. ODI would be specifically responsible for:

- Identifying and managing relevant expert consultants
- Providing logistical and administrative support for the field visits as coordinated by ODAN
- Providing advice and management support to the field teams
- Commenting on and editing the draft and final reports, and ensuring that they do not reflect a bias towards any particular needs assessment method
- Production of final report by 30 June 2005

3. Objectives

The specific objectives of the project are:

- Through a meta-analysis based on desk study and field observation, to draw the lessons learned from earlier

assessments and to identify shortcomings or missing points in earlier assessments.

- To contribute to further refining and improving the quality of WFP's emergency needs assessment, by providing recommendations on the methodologies in general and specifically for Ethiopia.
- To provide a case study of Ethiopia for a number of thematic issues on emergency needs assessment, including:
 - (i) The role of the market: To identify the potential role of markets in responding to food crises, informal cross border trade, formal commercial trade, national import capacity, price data and market integration/functioning needs to be analyzed. Additionally, market intervention as an alternative response option should be discussed.
 - (ii) Non-food response options: As a catalyst and supportive element to food security, non-food responses and multi-sectoral approaches are generally reported to be effective but insufficiently addressed in emergency food security assessment frameworks. Therefore, appropriate ways to incorporate non-food factors into the assessment phase needs to be considered.
 - (iii) Chronic versus transitory food insecurity: Chronic versus transitory food insecurity is a useful distinction that assists in defining appropriate responses. There is, however, ambiguity in defining and differentiating between chronic and transitory food insecurity. Practical methods are needed for differentiating chronic and transitory food insecurity in assessments.
 - (iv) Effects and impacts of food aid: Potential effects and impacts of food aid on both targeted and non-targeted households in the intervention areas and on markets need to be incorporated into emergency needs assessment frameworks. The effects and impacts of food aid need to be considered on two dimensions (a) direct and indirect, and (b) positive and negative.

The relative weighting to be given to each of these will depend on discussions in-country. In addition, the project may identify other topics which merit further attention, such as how to improve knowledge on population statistics or on needs in urban areas.

More generally, following preliminary discussions with the WFP Ethiopia Country Office, it was agreed that the project team would review the current practice of emergency food needs assessment in Ethiopia, and recommend ways of enhancing the contribution of WFP to the assessment process, including questions of institutional collaboration.

The following specific questions have been identified to help guide the review.

1. What is the relationship between the assessment of emergency food needs and the assessment of safety-net requirements (transitory vs chronic requirements)? What different processes are required for each, and how are they related?
2. How can the requirement for (and appropriateness of) non-food interventions such as cash for work and voucher schemes best be gauged through assessment? How are the relative merits of food and non-food interventions best assessed and their impact evaluated? How can the question of food aid 'dependency' best be assessed?
3. What should be the 'exit criteria' for the provision of emergency food aid - and how does this relate to the entry criteria? To what extent is this context specific? To what extent is it related to the existence of adequate safety-net provision?

4. Scope of work

An in-depth assessment of recurrent emergency food assistance needs will be conducted by representatives from ODI in Ethiopia. The team from ODI will comprise of five experts (see "7. Team Composition" below).

The specific activities will be as follows:

4.1 Review of country food security situation using secondary sources

A review of relevant secondary sources, including reports and survey findings of assessments conducted by donors, Government, UN agencies, NGOs, research organizations etc, will be conducted. The aim of this review, which will be predominantly conducted as desk-exercise, will be to develop a broad understanding of the nature and severity of food insecurity in the target country and of the strengths and weaknesses of assessment methods used to date. At this stage, possible key background variables and proxy indicators are screened and selected.

4.2 Review of methods and findings from WFP's recently conducted needs assessment

In consultation with WFP's in-country assessment team, the methods, processes and findings of the most recently conducted assessment for the country in question will be analyzed. This will include an analysis of the design, the indicators and the methods that were used and applied in the assessment. It will also include a critical review of the findings and recommendations that arose from the assessment. Activities 4.1 and 4.2 will be used to prioritize which of the four thematic issues (i.e. the role of markets, non-food responses, chronic versus transitory food insecurity, and the effects and impacts of food aid) or major other issues should be addressed in activity 4.3 in each country.

4.3 In-country studies to consider the thematic issues

Using both qualitative and quantitative data, the ODI team will test the feasibility of options for improving the needs

assessment in the target country with special attention to the four specific thematic issues. To the extent possible within the constraints of the assessment, these themes will be analyzed using secondary data sources⁴⁹ and taking into consideration institutional capacities.

4.4 Preparation of report containing policy recommendations

A report for the target country is required to: (i) identify and highlight the major strengths and limitations of WFP's current food security and needs assessment approaches (including methods and processes) in situations of chronic food insecurity; (ii) make recommendations on them; and (iii) present a case study on the four selected thematic issues. The emphasis should be upon actions that WFP can take within its current mandate; any recommendations that could be implemented under a modified WFP mandate or by

other partners should be identified as such. Debriefing or presentation of the recommendations will be made in the target country.

5. Outputs

A written report will be prepared in the context of the target country. Format, length etc. to be agreed.

6. Target countries

Ethiopia

7. Team Composition

Project Leader	James Darcy
Field Team Leader	Nick Haan
Field Food Security Specialist	Nisar Majid
Food Security Specialist 1	Paul Harvey
Food Security Specialist 2	John Seaman

Project Leader, ODI (HPG):

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