

REGIONAL ANALYSIS

SYRIA

Q3 2014 | 13 OCTOBER 2014

This Regional Analysis of the Syria conflict (RAS) is now produced quarterly, replacing the monthly RAS of 2013. It seeks to bring together information from all sources in the region and provide holistic analysis of the overall Syria crisis. While Part I focuses on the situation within Syria, Part II covers the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries. More information on how to use this document can be found on page 2. Please note that place names which are underlined are hyperlinked to their location on Google Maps. The Syria Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that could complement this report. For more information, comments or questions please email SNAP@ACAPS.org.

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REGIONAL ANALYSIS SYRIA

13 OCTOBER 2014

PART A – SYRIA

1. OVERVIEW

1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During the last quarter, key changes occurred in the overall dynamics of the conflict, with new and fluctuating frontlines, higher intensity and increased regionalisation of the conflict, and significant changes in areas of control. These dynamics will further complicate any mediation for the newly appointed UN-League of Arab States special envoy, Staffan de Mistura. This quarter was mostly characterised by the Islamic State (IS) further engaging in fighting with government forces in new areas, expanding its activities closer to the capital against opposition forces and in Kurdish areas. These developments had a significant humanitarian impact and caused massive population movements both inside Syria and towards neighbouring countries. Syria is now the world's biggest internal displacement crisis, with an estimated 6.5 million IDPs. Overall, OCHA estimates that there are 10.8 million people in need inside Syria.

IS advances and armed violence:

In the last three months, IS has asserted its territory and its military capacity, and positioned itself in preparation for an intervention by the International Alliance. The armed group is now in full control of Ar-Raqqa Governorate – which is the first governorate totally out of Government of Syria (GoS) hands, and holds significant swathes of territory in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, and Deir-ez-Zor. It has also been clashing with various armed groups when spreading to new areas such as Rural Damascus, Damascus, and Homs. Meanwhile, Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) have gained substantial ground in Idleb, Hama, and to a lesser extent, Dar'a and Quneitra. The general escalation in violence has caused the displacement of thousands of people, with most significant population movements reported in Deir-ez-Zor, Aleppo and Al-Hasakeh.

Attacks on civilian infrastructure:

All parties to the conflict continue to target vital services and civilian infrastructure, disrupting basic services and raising serious protection concerns. In Aleppo city, damage caused to the main water pumping station by armed opposition groups in early June continues to result in water shortages for over 2.5 million people. Parties to the conflict widely disregard the special protection accorded to health and education facilities. Since the start of the conflict, almost 200 attacks on 140 medical facilities were recorded, and the UN documented 80 attacks on schools between January and August 2014.

Reporting:

Information available on the humanitarian situation, specifically primary data, is extremely limited in Syria. During the third quarter, media coverage of Syria was dominated by the IS threat, thus issues unrelated to IS activities were heavily underreported. In addition, other global crises, such as the Ebola outbreak and the bombardment of the Gaza Strip significantly affected media coverage of Syria. Despite the decrease in humanitarian information, there were significantly more reports available on Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor than in the second quarter. While some information from GoS held areas

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
and hard-to-reach areas is available, significant gaps remain. In many cases, restrictions on information sharing hamper SNAP's ability to form a comprehensive picture on several regions in the country

Funding cuts:

WFP announced significant funding shortfalls that will lead to immediate cuts to food assistance for affected Syrians across the entire region. In Syria, food baskets to about four million beneficiaries are expected to be significantly reduced to just 825 kilocalories per person per day beginning in November, compared to 2,100 kilocalories recommended in emergency contexts. The cuts are coming just as livelihood opportunities in the agriculture and constructions sectors will be further reduced due to the upcoming winter season.

Access:

While a record volume of food assistance in August was distributed by WFP through cross borders and cross lines deliveries, around 4.7 million people reside in areas categorised as hard-to-reach, including at least 241,000 people who remain besieged by either government or opposition forces. In these areas, access remains challenging, primarily due to insecurity and administrative hurdles. Overall, assistance reached approximately 27% of the 287 locations identified as besieged or hard-to-reach.



1.2 TIMELINE

Security Council resolution 2165: The UN Security Council adopted resolution 2165 on 14 July authorizing for -180 days- relief delivery across conflict lines and through four border crossings at Bab al-Salam, Bab al-Hawa, Al Yaarubiyah and Al-Ramtha with Turkey, Iraq and Jordan without requiring prior permission from the Syrian authorities. The resolution also intends to facilitate use of the most direct routes to people in need throughout the country, to allow for more efficient and timely delivery.

IS offensive on Ain al Arab/Kobani city: On 6 September, IS launched a sudden massive offensive against the Ain al Arab/Kobani using heavy weapons and machineries, seized earlier during battles in Iraq, on all possible fronts to the east, south and west of the sub-district. IS was able to take control of about 325 villages in the sub-district and forced an estimated population of about 250,000 to flee to Turkish lands. By the end of September, Islamic State fighters were only 3 kilometres away from Ain al Arab/Kobani with expectations that IS fighters will storm the city any day.

US-led coalition: On 23 September, a US-led coalition started carrying out airstrikes on areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Al-Nusra in Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqah, Al-Hasakeh, rural Aleppo and Idlib. The first week of military operations targeted oil fields and military bases controlled by the Islamic State as well as a grain storage facility in northern Menbij. Casualties following a week of airstrikes, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, include 103 IS fighters, 50 Al-Nusra fighters and 22 civilians. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that at least 73 fighters, most of which are from Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic factions, joined the Islamic state following the airstrikes while 162 others joined shortly before the coalition initiated military operations.

Funding shortfalls: The regional response to the Syrian crisis is under increasing pressure due to other emerging global crises. The cuts come at a particularly difficult time, with informal work opportunities reduced, increasing displacement movements and the onset of winter .




700 tribal members executed by IS: After weeks of fighting between fighters from the Sha'etat tribe and the Islamic State exhausted the former side, Islamic State fighters stormed the Sha'etat town along with other nearby towns and villages and reportedly executed 700 tribal members while taking hundreds of others as captives.

Ahrar Al-Sham explosion: On 10 September, a massive explosion hit one of the headquarters of Ahrar al Sham movement in Idlib, killing about 50 leaders of the movement. The nature of the attack is still unknown. Some reports talked about a gas attack, others talked about a suicide bombing. In any case Ahrar al Sham, one of the key players in fighting GoS, did not accuse any side of carrying out the explosion.

Vaccination campaign halted after the death of more than thirty children: A vaccination campaign against measles targeting 2.6 million children in Idlib and Deir-ez-Zor was halted following the death of more than thirty vaccinated children. An investigation later found out that a muscle relaxant, contained in similar packaging, was used instead of the dilute during the second round of vaccinations.

Shift in conflict dynamics: Several factors are suggesting that new alliances could emerge in the next quarter. Indeed, the swift push by IS has allowed the group to attract more fighters and to form alliances with small armed groups including splinter groups from Jabhat Al-Nusra. Attacks by the recently formed coalition on IS, Jabhat Al-Nusra and other Islamic factions is also likely to change conflict dynamics and push for more rapprochement between the attacked groups.

1.3 ARMED CONFLICT AND POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS



The proliferation of frontlines, higher intensity of conflict, and significant changes in areas of control are the key issues that characterised the third quarter compared to the second. The new developments can be summarised as follows:

- IS is increasingly engaged in fighting GoS forces in new areas;
- GoS forces lost Ar-Raqa;
- IS expanded its operations against opposition forces closer to the capital;
- IS invaded Kurdish areas in Ain al Arab/Kobani;
- The International Alliance against IS is starting operations inside Syria.

The majority of these developments had a significant humanitarian impact and caused massive displacement, including a major influx of refugees into Turkey.

Opposition VS GoS forces: Opposition forces in Idlib were able to make progress during the third quarter, building on gains made during the second quarter of the year. Wadi al Deif military camp was under tight siege by opposition forces and some surrounding checkpoints came under control of the opposition. The areas around the military base were subject to GoS aerial bombardment, including some barrel bombs, causing civilian casualties in Saraqeb, Ma'arrat an Nu'man, Ehsim, Jisr Ash-Shughour, and Harim. The capacity of GoS forces in Idlib is limited due to the high pressure of battles in rural Hama, which is not expected to change in the near future. Tensions were recorded as well in Idlib between different opposition groups, including tensions between Jabhat al Nusra and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front around Hafsargeh village in July, which hampered the coordination between the two sides in the battles in northern Hama (*Al Akhbar 2014/07/08, World Bulletin 2014/08/03, Syrian Observer 2014/09/01, ARA News 2014/08/07*). Infighting continued among opposition groups. In July, Jabhat al Nusra carried out a sudden offensive against opposition groups in northern Idlib and seized control of Harim, Salqin, and Azmarin towns near the border with Turkey. This strategic area is an economically active area due to the smuggling routes of oil and goods. (*As Safir 2014/07/23, Al Akhbar 2014/07/21, As Safir 2014/07/18*). On 10 September, a mysterious attack hit one of the headquarters of the Ahrar al Sham movement in Idlib, killing about 50 of its leaders. Ahrar al Sham has a history of conflict against GoS and IS. In 2014, several of its leaders were allegedly targeted for assassination by IS. This attack might be considered as the end of the movement as it has lost almost all its senior leaders, which might weaken the overall opposition efforts in fighting GoS, since Ahrar al Sham had a presence in almost all opposition-held areas in Syria and is a key power among Islamist opposition groups. (*BBC 2014/09/10*)

In Hama, intense clashes were reported during the third quarter, and opposition forces progressed further in the north and the centre of the governorate. The battle around the strategic town of Morek is ongoing, and the opposition fighters have the upper hand in this area that links Idlib with Hama. Morek is also a key area for GoS forces to control to be able to break the siege on Wadi al Deif military camp in southern Idlib (*ARA News 2014/07/18, As Safir 2014/07/18, Zaman al Wasel 2014/07/21, Al Hayat 2014/08/14*). Conflict in Hama moved towards the capital of the governorate, and opposition forces were able to progress quickly in the beginning of July and seized control of some GoS strongholds in the governorate such as Qamhaneh, Khattab, al Majdal, Karnaz and other areas. Opposition fighters took control of the military warehouses in Khattab and captured weapons that helped them progress towards the majority Christian town of Muhardeh, as well as Hama city. By mid-August, opposition fighters were able to take a strategic hill close to Hama military airfield, which allowed them to target the airport and limit its activity. This military airfield is the most active GoS military base in central Syria, and has been the launching point of airstrikes targeting Idlib, Hama and Aleppo governorates, and a gathering point for military convoys from the central governorates towards northern Syria. Muhardeh town, northwest of Hama city, was the subject of attacks by Jabhat al Nusra during August and September. The town has a strategic value because of its proximity to

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Hama city and because it provides electricity to it. In mid-September, GoS forces were able to force Jabhat al Nusra to retreat from Halfaya town near Muhardeh. GoS forces are expected to launch operations to take back the territory lost in Hama earlier in the year. The expected intensification of the conflict in the area is likely to affect civilians and cause new displacement, especially from areas such as Kafr Zeita, Khattab and Karnaz (*Daily Star 2014/07/27, AFP 2014/07/29, Daily Star 2014/07/31, Al Akhbar 2014/08/05, Syrian Observer 2014/08/14, As Safir 2014/08/25, SOHR 2014/09/07, As Safir 2014/09/11*).

Aleppo witnessed some key changes in the fronts of Aleppo city mainly. Opposition forces were in a difficult position in Aleppo city and the surrounding areas in the third quarter. GoS forces were able to finally seize control of the strategic industrial city in Sheikh Najjar, northeast of the city, on 7 July. Reinforcements were sent to Aleppo early July, which gave GoS forces an advantage in the Sheikh Najjar battle. These forces might now be used either to tighten the siege on opposition-held neighbourhoods in Aleppo or to attempt to open the supply routes between Aleppo city and the besieged towns of Nubul and Zahraa in rural Aleppo. Opposition forces are at risk of losing Aleppo due to the high pressure from both GoS and IS. It also lacks adequate fire power against GoS aircrafts that targeted their neighbourhoods several times with barrel bombs, causing big number of casualties among civilians and some displacement movements, especially in the neighbourhoods of Al Lairamoun, Bustan al Qasr, Bani Zeid. Opposition fighters have held their positions in the old city of Aleppo and have made street-to-street progress in some areas such as in Suleiman al Halabi and Hanano neighbourhoods and towards Hanano Military Barrack. Opposition fighters used again the technique of tunnel bombs in old Aleppo against GoS forces on 29 July, causing the death of about 13 Syrian soldiers (*AFP 2014/07/06, As Safir 2014/07/07, Al Akhbar 2014/07/07, Al Monitor 2014/07/11, Al Jazeera 2014/07/29, SOHR 2014/09/02, ReliefWeb 2014/08/03, AFP 2014/08/09, LA Times 2014/07/30, Al Jazeera 2014/09/07*).

In Deir-ez-Zor city, heavy shelling from GoS positions was recorded in brigade 137 and the military airport. In July, clashes were recorded between Free Syrian Army (FSA) groups and GoS forces; neither side has been able to achieve progress against the other inside the city since the beginning of 2014. The power balance in the city changed mid-July, after IS successfully took over the majority of opposition-held neighbourhoods. The FSA now has less power to fight GoS forces in the city after some of its battalions in the city had their weapons confiscated, especially those who refused to pledge allegiance to IS. GoS warplanes attacked some rural parts of Deir-ez-Zor governorate that are under IS control, such as Abu Kamal town (*SOHR 2014/07/22, ARA News 2014/07/27, SOHR 2014/08/12*).

In the central governorate of Homs, clashes between opposition forces and GoS forces were recorded during the last quarter, mainly in the northern parts of the governorate. Al Waar neighbourhood, home to about 350,000 IDPs, also witnessed clashes during this quarter. GoS forces targeted opposition-held areas in the governorate such as Ar Rastan, Huleh, Talbiseh, Ghanto, Um Sharshouh and Al Waar neighbourhood inside the city with shelling and aerial bombardment. No significant progress was achieved by either side in the governorate and it is not highly expected that any change will take place in the near future. The besiegement of Al Waar neighbourhood is expected to continue and could possibly lead to a truce agreement between oppositions groups positioned in the neighbourhood and GoS forces (*Al Jazeera 2014/08/10, Al Arab Al Yaum 2014/08/24, Al Bayan 2014/09/16, SOHR 2014/09/02, SOHR 2014/08/17*).

In Damascus and rural Damascus, clashes continued in the Qalamoun area between opposition fighters and GoS forces supported by Hezbollah and focused in the areas of Qara and Ras al Ma'arra, close to Lebanese border. Opposition fighters have adopted a fighting style that consists in not keeping a specific territory, but doing rapid raids against checkpoints to exhaust GoS forces and cause casualties, a strategy that has proved successful in causing casualties within Hezbollah and GoS forces. The area is expected to witness sustained conflict dynamics in the near future (*Al Akhbar 2014/07/16, As Safir 2014/07/18, Al Hayat 2014/08/14*). Clashes were also recorded in the strategic town of Maliha, the linking point between Eastern Ghouta and the capital. After a few months of severe fighting, GoS forces backed by Hezbollah were able to take control of the town on 15 August, which meant that opposition forces in Eastern Ghouta lost their main stronghold near the capital, which is likely to lead to future attempts by the opposition to re-gain control of the area (*Al Akhbar 2014/07/18, As Safir 2014/08/15*). In Eastern Ghouta, repeated shelling and aerial bombardment (using vacuum bombs occasionally) were recorded in various areas such as Duma, Mesraba, Arbin, Maliha, Zamalka and Kafr Batna (*ARA News 2014/07/24, AFP 2014/07/30, World Bulletin 2014/08/04, As Safir 2014/09/01*). Sporadic incidents of fighting were recorded in the last quarter in Western Rural Damascus areas, such as Zabadani, where Jabhat al Nusra attacked GoS check points in an attempt to infiltrate the city. If these attempts were to be successful in the future, a large scale military operation would likely be expected in the area due to its strategic position near the Lebanese border (*As Safir 2014/08/26*). Within the capital, the main focus of battles was in the eastern neighbourhood of Jobar, which is under opposition control. Jobar, which is considered a besieged area, has witnessed a very high level of destruction, and has been subject to continual attacks by GoS forces who used various types of weapons, including aerial bombardment and shelling. The response from opposition forces in the area was to launch mortar shells against GoS-controlled neighbourhoods in the capital. The battle of Jobar is expected to continue in the near future, with targeting of GoS controlled areas in the capital as the sole response of opposition groups. In the current situation, and given the continued shelling and bombing, there are two possible scenarios in Jobar: either GoS forces will be able to break into the city or a truce agreement will be reached, the latter scenario being more parobable in the near to mid-term future (*AFP 2014/07/14, AFP 2014/08/29, As Safir 2014/09/01, Reuters 2014/09/02, Al Akhbar 2014/08/04*).

In the southern governorates of Dar'a and Quneitra, opposition forces continued to make progress, albeit very limited. In Quneitra, opposition forces, alongside with Jabhat al Nusra, took hold of Zabdiya, Rasm al Halabi and Ain al Darb areas after clashes with GoS forces in July, and have been attempting ever since to take hold of the strategic area of al Hamidiya, which is considered an important GoS forces stronghold. In Dar'a, opposition forced seized control of the strategic town of al Sheikh Sa'ad near Nawa in mid-July; this town is key to disable the fighting power of the division 61 of GoS forces that was targeting Nawa. From Dar'a, opposition fighters launched an offensive at the end of July to control strategic areas in the south of Rural Damascus in an attempt to link opposition-held areas in Rural Damascus and Dar'a. This will potentially mean more support to opposition groups

“IS officially now controls Ar-Raqqa”

in Rural Damascus and more pressure on GoS in the capital. However, it is unlikely that this initiative will be successful. Dar'a city was targeted by GoS helicopters with barrel bombs, which caused casualties among civilians. In Quneitra, Israeli warplanes struck three GoS military targets in July after a rocket hit the Golan Heights falling on an open ground without causing casualties. Late August, clashes broke out between Jabhat al Nusra and United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) soldiers. The clashes started after Jabhat al Nusra took 45 UN observers hostage. Jabhat al Nusra demand was to be taken off the UN list of terrorist groups (*Al Akhbar 2014/07/10, AFP 2014/07/15, As Safir 2014/07/18, Syrian Observer 2014/07/25, As Safir 2014/08/30, As Safir 2014/09/01, As Safir 2014/09/02, As Safir 2014/09/03, ARA News 2014/08/01*).

IS VS GoS: In this last quarter, IS was highly engaged in fighting GoS forces, especially in Ar-Raqqa. Division 17, Brigade 93 and Al Tabqa military airport, used to be the long arm of GoS in the northern governorates, and were used to hit opposition and IS-held areas in the north of Syria. IS officially now controls Ar-Raqqa, which has become the first governorate in Syria totally out of the hands of GoS. The three military bases fell in the hands of IS, at a speed that exceeded expectations. In these three battles, IS demonstrated a very high capacity in terms of military power and planning, even though it lost a significant number of fighters. In Al Tabqa airfield for instance, reports talked about an estimated 400 deaths on IS side as a result of the battle. On a strategic level, the capture of these three bases does not limit the ability of GoS air forces to target IS-held areas, but it will force them to use more distant air bases to target the area, such as the ones in Homs governorate. There are various reasons for this military operation carried out by IS, including getting hold of the heavy weapons available in these bases and using them for fighting opposition forces or the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in the northern governorates, or as a contingency plan to contain GoS forces reaction in the event of an international effort against IS. The reaction of GoS forces to losing Ar-Raqqa was to target IS headquarters in the governorate and attack some civilian buildings (*Ara News 2014/07/28, Al Akhbar 2014/07/10, Daily Star 2014/08/07, Al Jazeera 2014/07/26, The Wall Street Journal 2014/08/24, Al Arabiya 2014/08/24, Daily Mail 2014/08/28*).

In Al-Hasakeh, IS fighters attacked Division 121 on 25 July, which is considered the most important GoS military base in the governorate. After having successfully infiltrated the base and seized control of its headquarters and a significant amount of weaponry, IS is likely to set its sights on capturing Al-Hasakeh city, which will lead to confrontations with GoS forces and PYD fighters who control part of the city. A car bomb attack targeting a centre for Al Baath party was reported on 25 July, the style of which was similar to IS attacks but no accusations were made. GoS forces reportedly targeted IS locations in the surrounding areas. (*Jordan Times 2014/07/25, AFP 2014/09/01, ARA News 2014/08/11*).

In the eastern parts of Hama, IS clashed with GoS forces around Bari Sharqi and to the east of As Salamiyeh areas (SOHR 2014/09/08).

In Homs, IS showed high interest in controlling more oil fields and attacked Al Sha'er gas field in Eastern Homs on 18 July, killing and executing about 270 people including employees. This attack is the biggest anti-government operation by IS in Homs. GoS forces were able to re-control the gas field again on 26 July and pushed IS away from it, killing about 100 IS fighters (Al Akhbar 2014/07/18, AFP 2014/07/19, Daily Star 2014/07/26, Al Akhbar 2014/07/28).

Opposition VS IS: Tensions rose between various opposition groups and IS over the last quarter, and spread into new areas such as Rural Damascus, Homs and Damascus.

In Aleppo, IS suddenly launched an offensive against opposition-held areas in the north of the governorate mid-July to cut the link between opposition forces in Aleppo city and the northern parts of the governorate. IS was able to gain control over Aghtrin town and it is likely that IS will now target Azaz and Mare'a. Azaz has a very high strategic value for opposition forces due to its border crossing with Turkey that is crucial for the provision of supplies and humanitarian assistance in their areas of control. Due to the latest developments, new alliances were formed between different actors. On this front, Kurdish forces, including YPG in Afrin and various opposition groups, agreed to coordinating their efforts in fighting IS in the area and blocking them from taking more areas in Aleppo governorate. Fighters from all these groups were fighting IS near Mare'a town, which was the target of shelling by IS forces based in Dwebiq, Aghtrin and close to Suran. IS is currently focused on fighting around Ain al Arab/Kobani and the new strikes by the International Alliance targeting the area, which means they will probably try to only hold onto their areas of control at this stage and in the near future rather than opening a new front (AFP 2014/08/14, As Safir 2014/08/21, SOHR 2014/08/24, Syrian Observer 2014/08/27).

In Deir-ez-Zor, the configuration of the conflict between opposition forces and IS was different, with a local tribe called Sha'itat being part of the battle against IS. Clashes between this tribe and IS started in the previous quarter on a small scale. However, in this last quarter, fighting intensified after IS requested the tribe to hand over its main town (Sha'itat town) and the weapons of the tribal fighters who were part of opposition forces in the governorate fighting against GoS. IS stormed all areas where this tribe has presence, especially in the eastern parts of the governorate, and executed an estimated 700 tribe members. By mid-August, IS had managed to stop the first tribal uprising and seize control of Sha'itat area (Al Akhbar 2014/07/05, Syria Deeply 2014/08/01, Syria Deeply 2014/08/06, As Safir 2014/08/07, As Safir 2014/08/11, AFP 2014/08/16, ARA News 2014/08/11).

In Homs, IS fighters withdrew from the northern parts of the governorate that are under opposition control. (As Safir 2014/08/25)


In Rural Damascus, clashes broke out between Army of Islam and IS in Eastern Ghouta at the end of June. Army of Islam, a main brigade in the Islamic Front, is considered the main fighting power against GoS forces in rural Damascus and controls most of the opposition-held areas in Eastern Ghouta and some parts of the southern neighbourhoods of Damascus city. The conflict spilled over to the southern neighbourhoods of Damascus, as well in Yalda and Babila. By August, Army of Islam was able to push IS away from the majority of the IS-held areas. This development means that IS does not have a certain limit to its ambition in controlling territory in Syria, and it is a reason to distract the stretched power of opposition fighters around the capital and a reduction in their capacity in fighting GoS (Al Akhbar 2014/07/03, Al Akhbar 2014/07/10, As Safir 2014/07/18, Syrian Observer 2014/07/23).

“IS military effort significantly escalated in an attempt to take over more of the Kurdish territory in Syria.”

YPG Vs IS: Significant changes occurred in the nature of the battle between IS and YPG forces in the last quarter. The geographic focus of the conflict between these two groups remained around the same areas, in Al-Hasakeh and Ain al Arab/Kobani, compared to the previous quarter, but IS military effort significantly escalated in an attempt to take over more of the Kurdish territory in Syria. In Al-Hasakeh, the conflict focused mainly on the southern parts of Qamishli district and some areas close to the Iraqi border as well as around Ras al Ain. It is now highly linked to the situation on the ground in Iraq, due to YPG's support to Peshmarga Kurdish forces fighting IS in Iraq. A significant change on this front is not very likely in the near future. IS has is very much focused on the Ain al Arab/Kobani area at this stage, however, that does not mean that it will relent its efforts. The possibility of car bomb attacks in YPG- controlled areas is high now and in the near future (ARA News 2014/07/24, ARA News 2014/07/29, As Safir 2014/08/21, SOHR 2014/08/22, Al Akhbar 2014/08/04, ARA News 2014/08/09, ARA News 2014/08/10)

The conflict between YPG forces and IS on Ain al Arab/Kobani front experienced substantial changes, after IS launched a major offensive on the area with big numbers of fighters and weapons seized from GoS military bases in Ar-Raqqa. Ain al Arab/Kobani, under siege from IS, has been the site of continual conflict between YPG and IS in the last year, but no significant progress from either side had been achieved until 16 September, when IS launched a sudden offensive against the area from the east, south and west of the sub-district. IS was able to seize control of about 60 villages in the sub-district and forced an estimated population of 250,000 to flee towards the city of Ain al Arab/Kobani and towards Turkey. Kurdish forces are likely to lose control of the area even with the international airstrikes against IS that forced IS fighters to slow their progress, especially on the eastern front. Ain al Arab/Kobani might fall in the hands of IS in the near future, which would have massive humanitarian implications. This would include major waves of displacement, especially towards Turkey, which is already hosting around 170,000-200,000 refugees from Ain al Arab/Kobani (USA Today 2014/09/18, The Independent 2014/09/25, Daily Mail 2014/09/23, Reuters 2014/09/24).

1.4 HUMANITARIAN POPULATION PROFILE (SEE ANNEX 1 FOR DEFINITIONS)



1. Figures are not mutually exclusive: e.g. some refugees registered prior to 2011 may also be displaced by current unrest


2. Of the 46,000 almost 87% are Iraqis. (UNHCR 2013/11/2/02)

3. The overall figure for Palestinians is the PRS pre-crisis count of 540,000 less those registered in host countries. 270,000 PRS are displaced within Syria. (UNRWA 2014/05/25)

4. All IDP and PIN figures are from the OCHO governorate report 2014.

5. Calculated by deducting IDPs from People in Need


1.5 DISPLACEMENT PROFILE



Syria is now the site of the world's biggest internal displacement. According to SNAP calculations (please refer to the Humanitarian Population Profile), the number of IDPs inside Syria is around 6.5 million. More than three years into the conflict, roughly 9,500 Syrians are being displaced each day, approximately one family per minute becoming displaced. (OCHA 06/14, UNHCR 25/09/14, Syria Deeply 26/05/14)

- **IDPs:** The recent estimates on the number of people displaced within Syria are as follows:
 - According to the Syrian Prime Minister, there are 6.7 million IDPs in Syria. (*Al-iqtisadi* 20/05/14)
 - Nationwide, 6.4 million people were estimated to be displaced as of June 2014, most residing in Aleppo, Rural Damascus, Idleb and Homs. (OCHA 06/14)
- **Palestinian refugees in Syria:** Out of approximately 540,000 Palestinians registered with UNRWA in Syria, over 50% have been displaced inside Syria. 11% of the Palestinian refugees in Syria fled to neighbouring countries. (UNRWA 12/09/14)

Palestinian Refugees from Syria across the region



- **Refugees:** According to UNHCR, about 3.2 million registered refugees in Syria's neighbouring countries. When including the estimated number of unregistered Syrian refugees across the region, the overall number stands at 4.4 million (please refer to the Humanitarian Population Profile). Meanwhile, less than 100,000 have been given asylum in Europe and a small number offered resettlement by countries such as Germany and Sweden. (UNHCR 25/09/14, EU 02/14)

Main displacements 2014 Q3:

Deir-ez-Zor: The escalation of violence in Deir-ez-Zor caused mass displacements during this period, due to fighting and IS advances in the governorate. In July, an estimated 130,000 new displaced were reported. In early August, IS' push on Sha'itat villages also caused the displacement of 75,000-100,000 people. The displaced reportedly headed to Baqaan, Hujayn, Al-Bahr, and Al-Shafa. (UNICEF 15/07/14, UN 21/08/14, Assafir 11/08/14, Al Akhbar 09/08/14, USAID 12/09/14) These numbers add to the estimated 440,000 IDPs in the governorate as of June, most of whom are located in Deir-ez-Zor city, Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin. (OCHA 08/14).

Aleppo: This quarter, IS advances in Aleppo have caused several waves of displacement. In July, thousands of Kurds were displaced from the outskirts of Ain Al-Arab/Kobani city towards the city centre which is inhabited by some 120,000 civilians (*Assafir* 08/07/14) and from Kafr Saghir village to Kurdish villages in Aleppo, especially Tal'ran town. (*Assafir* 08/07/14). In September, large-scale fighting in Ain Al-Arab/Kobani caused another mass wave of displacement (around 172,000 people) from the eastern and western outskirts towards the city and towards the Turkish border. The estimated number of refugees having crossed into Turkey stands at 169,000 people, but the number will be expected to increase rapidly if IS takes control of Kobani city, which might increase the number to up to 400,000 people according to UNHCR. (*Reuters* 22/09/14, *Reuters* 23/09/14).

Al-Hasakeh: Over the reporting period, violence between Syrian Army Forces (SAF), IS and other armed groups caused several instances of displacement in Al-Hasakeh. Between 18 June and 21 July, the UN indicated that fighting displaced several thousand people,

although no estimates are available for the governorate. (UN 23/07/14) In early August, fighting displaced up to 10,000 people from the villages of Al-Homr, Sabeh Secoor, Al Ghazl, Mjebra, Dube and Tahya, as well as from southern suburbs of Al-Hasakeh City to safer parts of the city and to Qamishli. (WFP 19/08/14) In September, 60,000 people reportedly fled Hasakeh City's Ghuweiran district over three days in response to GoS air raids. (AFP 01/09/14) Also, daily airstrikes on the southern rural villages of Al-Hole and Tal Hmis have allegedly displaced entire populations to poor neighbourhoods of Hasakeh City. (WFP 22/07/14)

Lattakia: Lattakia continues to be one of the governorates receiving the most IDPs due to its relative safety and the availability of services. In recent months, tens of thousands of people have fled fighting in Aleppo Governorate for the relative safety of the coast. However, the number of new arrivals this quarter is unknown. OCHA estimated the number of IDPs at 300,000 as of June. (OCHA 06/14)

2014 Q2: In the second quarter of 2014, the escalation of violence in Deir-ez-Zor caused mass displacements. By mid-May, more than 100,000 civilians had fled the fighting following weeks of intense clashes among the opposition groups. In June, the number grew up to 250,000 of IDPs fleeing the areas of intense fighting. In the city of Deir-ez-Zor, the GoS aerial bombardment on opposition-controlled areas also prompted around 100,000 individuals to flee towards GoS-controlled areas which have been overcrowded with IDPs. In Aleppo, displacements were witnessed from the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo towards the countryside following intense use of barrel bombings. It is estimated that another 250,000 were displaced during the second quarter, adding up to around 250,000 displaced in the first quarter. In IS-controlled areas, around 50,000 Kurdish citizens fled Al-Bab city in Aleppo towards unknown destinations. Other small-scale displacements were recorded, notably in Al-Hasakeh, northern Lattakia and Dar'a governorate, but information remained limited.

Returnees

Al-Hasakeh: Violence in Iraq reportedly triggered returns to Syria. In June OCHA estimated that the governorate contained 60,500 returnees. (OCHA 26/08/2014) In July and August, UNHCR recorded more than 10,000 Syrians returnees through the Pesh Khabor crossing, many likely heading to Al-Hasakeh. (UNHCR 31/08/14, UNHCR 15/08/14, UNHCR 31/07/14)

Rural Damascus: The escalation of violence in the Lebanese border town of Aarsal in August caused the returns of hundreds of Syrian families to Qudsaya. At the time of writing it is unclear whether these families returned to Lebanon or stayed in Syria. (Syria 360 10/08/14)

1.6 HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

Security Council resolution 2165: In an attempt to improve humanitarian access across the worn-torn country, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2165 in mid July authorising –for 180 days– relief delivery across conflict lines and through four border crossings at Bab Al-Salam (Turkey) Bab Elhawa (Turkey), Ya'robiyah (Iraq) and Al-Ramtha (Jordan) without requiring prior permission from the Syrian authorities. Although the Security Council resolution reportedly improved humanitarian access and the delivery of humanitarian aid, it failed to address restricted humanitarian access to more than 100,000 overwhelmingly Kurdish people in Kobani (Ayn Arab) City on the border with Turkey through the city's unofficial trade route with Turkey or the nearby official border crossings in Jarablus and Tell Abiad. (UNSC 2014/07/14, Zaman Alwasl 2014/07/15, Rudaw 2014/07/17)

In September, WFP reported dispatching food portions to a record-breaking number of 4.1 million people inside Syria in August, which was attributed to improved cross-line and cross-border operations following the July resolution, mainly through the Bab Al-Salam (Turkey) crossing with Turkey to reach Aleppo and Idleb and Al-Ramtha crossing with Jordan to reach Quneitra and Dar'a. A WFP report in August indicated that cross-line aid deliveries targeted 445,000 people during the six weeks

following the adoption of resolution 2165 (14 July-19 August), more than three times the 137,000 people targeted during the six weeks before the resolution (2 June-13 July). UN and partners sent 14 shipments of humanitarian aid from Turkey and Jordan crossings to the Governorates of Aleppo, Dar'a, Hama, Idleb, Lattakia and Quneitra. The shipments delivered food assistance to over 94,500 people, non-food items to more than 182,485, WASH supplies to some 66,760 people, medical supplies to some 151,100 and other items for 47,900 people. The first convoys were not coordinated with other actors delivering cross-border assistance outside the UN resolution. However, in September, there were efforts to develop common operational plans to avoid duplications and address identified gaps. (WFP 2014/09/02, WFP 2014/08/19, UNSC 2014/09/23)

Airlifted Assistance: On 22 July, the first of 23 planned WFP-chartered flights landed in the Qamishli airport to deliver food portions and medical assistance to some 4,000 people, following a first round of 15 airlifts to Qamishli between January and June. The aim was to deliver food portions and medicines to a total of 50,000 of the most vulnerable IDPs in northeastern Al-Hasakeh Governorate, one of the most difficult Governorates to reach by road, by mid-August. By the end of July, 10 airlifts were reportedly completed on behalf of WFP and UNICEF. According to a UN Security Council report, more airlifts were organised in August allowing for the delivery of food, NFI, and health assistance. The Security Council report also refers to assurances by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 17 September that the Nusaybin/Quamishli border crossing is open, but as of early October, the vital crossing point had yet to be opened for humanitarian access. (LogCluster 2014/07/17, WFP 2014/07/22, LogCluster 2014/08/08, UNSC 2014/09/23)


Besieged Areas: Access to an estimated 241,000 people residing in besieged areas, namely Madamiyet Elsham, Darayya, Eastern Ghouta, Yarmuk, Nabul and Zahraa, has slightly improved in comparison to the first two quarters of the year. However, ongoing fighting between opposing factions and tight movement restrictions still hamper humanitarian access to besieged areas. In early July, UNRWA reported gaining access to the besieged Palestinian camp of Yarmuk, with a current estimated population of 18,000, for the first time since May, delivering food and medical aid to more than 3,300 families in the camp. UNRWA also reportedly delivered WASH and health assistance. UNRWA and WHO also accessed the camp in August, providing assistance to up to 17,500 people with food assistance and smaller deliveries of NFI, WASH and health assistance. (USAID 2014/09/05, USAID 2014/07/17, USAID 2014/07/03)

UN, SARC and IOM regained access to the besieged area of Madamiyet Elsham in Rural Damascus in mid-July for the first time since October 2012 after a series of delays due to negotiations with the GoS on the quantities of humanitarian assistance to be included, truck movements and other procedures. The joint humanitarian convoy was able to deliver multi-sectoral assistance, such as WASH, NFIs and food, to approximately 20,000 people in the besieged area and 10,000 people in the non-besieged eastern and northern areas of Madamiyet Elsham. Syrian authorities restricted the delivery of medicines and medical assistance to the estimated 23,000 besieged people, however SARC was given exceptional permission for two mobile clinics to deliver 1,000 polio and regular immunisation vaccines. The besieged neighbourhood of Duma was accessed with food and medical assistance in August and September. An estimated 150,000 people residing in the besieged area of eastern Ghouta received WASH, medicines and medical aid from WHO in 9 September. However, the Darayya City in southern rural Damascus has reportedly last been assisted in October 2012. (LogCluster 2014/07/22, SARC 2014/07/17, OCHA 2014/07/30, UNSC 2014/09/23)

The destruction of the Siyasia bridge in Deir-ez-Zor City, the only bridge connecting the city's eastern part to the eastern outskirts, left IS fighters and an estimated 50,000 civilians in IS-controlled neighbourhoods completely trapped, with only the Euphrates river left as a means of accessing the eastern side of the city. The other three bridges to the city were already destroyed by conflict events during the three-year crisis. (NOW 2014/09/15)

Armed opposition groups, including Jabhat Al-Nusra, continue to besiege some 45,000 people in the predominantly Alawite villages of Nabul and Zahraa in Aleppo. No humanitarian assistance was able to enter the two villages since May. (UNSC 2014/07/23).

Populations in besieged areas estimated by the UN



*The UN defines besieged areas as those which are surrounded by armed actors and where there is no free movement of civilians or goods in or out of the area.

Source: UNSGs reports


Hard-to-reach Areas: An estimated 4.7 million people reportedly reside in so-called hard-to-reach areas, as defined by UN agencies in Damascus, due to the ongoing conflict and violent incidents. However, some hard-to-reach areas are reportedly accessible through cross-border activities from neighbouring countries. While the levels of access limitations and difficulty vary according to conflict severity and proximity to accessible border crossings, the main hard-to-reach Governorates are Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor due to access restrictions by IS, ongoing conflict and fears from IS targeting. 284,000 targeted recipients in Ar-Raqqa did not receive planned food assistance, while only 20% of a targeted 500,000 people received food dispatches in both Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh. Access to hard-to-reach areas slightly improved following the UN Security Council resolution 2165

“The destruction of the Siyasia bridge in Deir-ez-Zor City left IS fighters and an estimated 50,000 civilians in IS-controlled neighbourhoods completely trapped.”

and the Syrian Government's easing of access constraints and logistical blockades after the government imposed regulations on loading and sealing humanitarian convoys in April. According to a UN Security Council report in late September, assistance reached a total of 77 areas identified as besieged or hard-to-reach out of a total 287. (WFP 2014/08/05, UNSCR 2014/09/23)

The only remaining supply road to the opposition-held eastern part of Aleppo City is reportedly heavily damaged and subject to regular gunfire. In August, SARC and IFRC delivered food and hygiene aid to 16 areas in western Rural Dar'a while a joint WFP-UNHCR convoy delivered food rations to 10,000 people in opposition-held parts of Dar'a. (Inter Press Service 2014/07/11, WFP 2014/08/05, IPS 2014/08/11)

Populations in hard to reach areas estimated by the UN



*The UN has not published its definition of 'hard to reach' areas and some of these areas can be reached by cross-border humanitarian activities.

Source: UNSGs reports

Facilitating cross-border humanitarian access: On 11 September, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the UN that the official border crossings of Jdaidet Yacoub, Tartous port, Latakia port, Nasib and Nusaybin, are open for incoming humanitarian aid. The aid is then to be directly transported to UN or INGO storages upon authorisation from the crossing authorities without requiring the Governor's authorisation, a bureaucratic procedure that was often a setback for humanitarian convoys. (UNSC 2014/09/23)

Hostilities against humanitarian personnel and aid: Several humanitarian missions have been halted or postponed due to security-related difficulties varying from access restrictions to deliberate or unintended targeting of humanitarian workers and aid. SARC, WFP and UNRWA convoys and distribution points were targeted by gunfire and shelling leading to several injuries and halting humanitarian missions. 29 UN national staff members continue to be detained or missing while a British aid worker was executed by IS on 13 September, which reportedly still holds a number of other humanitarian workers. (UNSC 2014/09/23, WFP 2014/08/19)

1.7 POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

Armed violence: IS is expected to continue its activities and attempt to gain more ground, while consolidating its current positions. GoS forces are expected to push back, and airstrikes by the International Alliance are likely to lead IS closer to areas hosting civilians, which raises protection concerns and could trigger additional waves of mass displacement.

Shift in conflict dynamics: While infighting continues to run high between various armed groups, several factors are suggesting that new alliances could emerge in the next quarter. Indeed, the swift push by IS has allowed the group to attract more fighters and to form alliances with small armed groups, including splinter groups from Jabhat Al-Nusra. IS has also been disarming and neutralising groups refusing to pledge allegiance in many areas in its control. Additionally, the recent attack on Ahrar Al-Sham leaders is likely to hamper the overall opposition efforts in fighting GoS.

Funding shortfalls: The regional response to the Syrian crisis is under increasing pressure due to other emerging global crises. WFP dramatically slashes the provision of food assistance, both within Syria and in refugee hosting countries, while other agencies also face significant budget shortfalls. The cuts come at a particularly difficult time, with informal work opportunities reduced and the onset of winter.

Winterisation: Funding shortfalls coupled with a lack of preparedness leads to a limited and delayed winterisation response by humanitarian agencies. This particularly affects people living in sub-standard shelter, the majority of whom reside in informal settlements, particularly across northern Syria, where such sites have proliferated since the beginning of the year. Many areas hosting IDPs are subject to flooding and freezing temperatures, further deepening the vulnerability of the displaced.

Eviction of IDPs residing in schools: Although it is unclear whether the GoS would vacate IDPs from schools being used as collective shelters, the start of the school year is likely to result in thousands of IDPs being forced to find new shelter options. In 2013, some IDPs were relocated to alternative shelters, such as unfinished buildings, but given the lack of absorption capacity, most are forced to find their own accommodations. These groups are particularly of concern as the seasonal temperatures begin to drop.

“During the third quarter, media coverage of Syria was dominated by the IS threat and the US-led airstrikes, thus areas unrelated to IS activities were heavily underreported.”

1.8 DATA SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS

Information available on the humanitarian situation, specifically primary data, is extremely limited in Syria. To obtain a countrywide and objective picture of the needs and priorities, SNAP analyses a multitude of sources. In addition to consolidating the reports and assessments of humanitarian organisations, SNAP collates information from GoS, opposition groups, and media sources to research this document.

During the third quarter, media coverage of Syria was dominated by the IS threat and the US-led airstrikes, thus areas unrelated to IS activities were heavily underreported. In addition, other global crises such as the ebola outbreak and the bombardment of the Gaza Strip significantly affected media coverage of Syria. Despite the decrease in humanitarian information, there was significantly more reports available on Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor than in the second quarter.

While some information from the GoS held areas and hard-to-reach areas is available, significant gaps remain. In many cases, restrictions on information sharing hamper SNAP's ability to form a comprehensive picture on several regions in the country.

All these sources, however, are subject to specific limitations:

- **Syrian media:** Access for journalists to and within Syria is highly constrained. Freedom of press is limited and many media sources are dependent on political affiliations to continue to operate, leaving limited space for independent analysis. The media landscape in Syria is shaped by sources that are affiliated with the GoS, such as the state-run *SANA News*, and sources affiliated with the opposition, such as *Eqtsad*. Local activists are often vocal, however, they are increasingly threatened by armed actors, and it is difficult to verify their accounts. (*Guardian 2014/01/07, RSF 2013/12/18*)
- **Relief actors:** Movement for international and national organisations is severely limited and publications are subject to scrutiny by armed groups and the GoS. Assessments conducted by Damascus-based humanitarian actors must be approved by the GoS before publication. Publication of information or advocacy deemed controversial by any party to the conflict has direct implications on humanitarian access. Protection concerns, for instance, are considered too politically sensitive to be included in assessments or publicly available reports.
- **Monitoring systems:** The fracturing of the country into areas controlled by the GoS, contested areas and areas led by non-state actors makes a countrywide monitoring of the situation by one actor virtually impossible. Multi-sectoral joint assessments in Syria are similarly difficult and resource-intensive. Several monitoring systems, such as

the Early Warning and Response System (EWARS), WFP's monitoring of bread prices, and the Assistance Coordination Unit's (ACU) monitoring system (known as DYNAMO), are analysed by SNAP, however, the security situation hampers consistent, countrywide coverage.

1.8.1 Publicly available assessments and reports

Despite the constraints, several assessments and studies have been made available, including:

- **Displacement:** In July, OCHA updated its estimates of IDPs at the sub-district level, however, very little information is available on internal displacement movements and reporting on mass movements has decreased in recent months. There is also limited information on the number of returnees to conflict areas that have regained some stability, such as the Qalamoun region, parts of Rural Damascus and the old city of Homs.
- **Protection:** The opposition-aligned Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) tracks casualties among civilians and combatants in Syria, among other groups. The UN Secretary-General (mandated under resolutions 2139 and 2165) and the Commission of Inquiry of the UN Human Rights Council publishes periodic reports on the human rights situation in Syria, as does Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR).
- **Health:** The Early Warning and Response System (EWARS) publishes regular reports on health issues. However, communication channels are often interrupted and some areas are not included in the system. The ACU established a parallel surveillance system, known as the Early Warning Alert and Response Network (EWARN).
- **WASH:** There is limited information on the effect of the dry weather conditions on the availability of drinking water, crop production, and livelihoods. There were reports on water shortages and poor water quality in several governorates, especially Deir-ez-Zor.
- **Livelihoods and food security:** There are major information gaps on sources, availability and affordability of food for IDPs and host communities. A significant part of food insecurity results from economic access to food, given high costs. While WFP monitors the prices of food and other commodities, prices fluctuate significantly by locality and conflict dynamics. The number of people in need of nutrition assistance and the effects of IDP influxes on host communities are both underreported.
- **Shelter and NFI:** In the absence of a large-scale shelter assessment, numerous small-scale assessments are conducted, mostly focusing on the situation of IDPs in camps and collective shelters. However, no reports comprehensively assessed the overall damage to homes and shelters by the ongoing conflict.

1.8.2 Recent assessments

The following assessments have become available during the third quarter or are planned:

- OCHA published governorate profiles, including estimates of the number of people in need and IDPs at the sub-district level. (*OCHA 07/2014*)
- Save the Children International published a report on the impact of the conflict on children's access to education. (*SCI 09/2014*)
- The ACU finalised a report with data from March and April from its multi-sectoral monitoring system, covering much of the north and northeast of Syria, as well as some pockets in the south and central regions. While the data is outdated, in the absence of other recent multi-sectoral assessments, the findings were analysed by SNAP.
- REACH published reports on 1) camps and informal settlements in northern Syria and 2) urban profiles of Al-Hasakeh, Qamishly, Deir-ez-Zor city, and eastern Aleppo city. (*REACH 03/09/2014, REACH 28/08/2014, REACH 27/08/2014, REACH 27/08/2014, REACH 27/08/2014*)
- WHO and the Ministry of Health published quarterly reports on the functionality, accessibility, and damage to public hospitals and health facilities based on information collected through the Health Resources and Services Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS). (*WHO/MoH 14/08/2014, WHO/MoH 14/08/2014*)

1.8.3 Planned assessments:

- A multi-sectoral needs assessment covering much of the north and northeast of Syria, as well as some pockets in the south, is expected to be published in late October by the inter-agency Syria Assessment and Monitoring Initiative (SAMI) in Turkey.
- Nutrition and education assessments led by UNICEF and its implementing partners. The aim of the education assessment is to understand the challenges in access and quality of education across Syria in order to inform education programming. (*UNICEF 19/09/2014*)

2. COUNTRYWIDE SECTORAL ANALYSIS

Priority sectors

Although priority needs differ significantly by location, some generalisations can be made:

- Protection concerns are widespread and are the primary cause of Syria's humanitarian crisis. Human rights violations by extremist groups, particularly the Islamic State (IS), have become more apparent in this third quarter, with reports of public executions and harsh punishments to instil fear and ensure submission of the local population. Also, heavy weapons, barrel bombs, car bombs, and sniper fire continue to be used, contributing to the vast majority of all conflict-related deaths and injuries. All parties to the conflict continue to target vital services, and still widely disregard the special protection accorded to health and education facilities.
- WASH is a high priority, particularly in eastern Syria due to the high levels of conflict, as access to water resources is increasingly being used by opposition groups as a weapon of war. Across the country, more than four million people are in need of WASH services. During the summer months, water shortages and polluted supplies contributed to an increase in communicable diseases, which was frequently reported for IDPs residing in collective shelters.
- Access to food continues to be a priority across all governorates due to an expected shortfall in agricultural production. Those living in conflict zones and besieged areas are considered particularly at risk as they face limited availability and economic inflation. Poor households increasingly face difficulty in meeting their basic food needs as a result of reduced purchasing power, loss of income and livelihoods, and depleted savings. According to OCHA, almost 80% of the labour force – 2.67 million people, is out of work. Additionally, WFP announced significant funding shortfalls that will lead to immediate cuts to food assistance.
- Hostilities and direct targeting of the health care system have resulted in damaged health centres, shortages of supplies and staff, and limited access of affected populations to health care services. High temperature and water shortages during the summer months aggravated the risk of typhoid outbreaks, especially in densely populated areas and displacement camps where people live in unsanitary conditions and where availability of water for personal hygiene is further reduced. July witnessed a further increase in the outbreak of acute diarrhoeal diseases with the highest number of cases reported in Deir-ez-Zor; Damascus, Rural Damascus, Lattakia, and Aleppo. By September, suspected typhoid fever was the leading cause of morbidity.

2.1 PROTECTION


People in need	Not Available
Most affected areas	The most affected area and groups depend on the type of protection concern discussed – while particularly men residing in conflict affected areas are at risk of indiscriminate attacks and arbitrary arrests, women, children and those allegedly opposing extremist rule are most at risk in IS held areas.

2.1.1 Death toll

In August, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued updated casualty figures for the conflict, indicating that over 190,000 people had been killed between the start of the conflict and April 2014. The estimates on the number of casualties differ greatly per source, with casualty estimates in

August ranging from 114,000 to 260,000. In comparison, Iraq Body Count, a widely used source on Iraqi casualties estimates that around 174,000 people have been killed in the 10 years between 2003 and 2013. Most sources capture both military and civilian Syrian casualties, with estimates on the proportion of civilians ranging between 40% and 78%. (UNOCHA 28/08/2014, Syrian Revolution Martyr Database 08/204 SOHR 08/2014)

Number of Casualties - Syrian Revolution Martyr Database



Source: Syrian Revolution Martyr Database

2.1.2 Information gaps

Documentation of protection concerns is severely restricted, as human rights monitoring members of the UN Commission of Inquiry, OHCHR and United Nations continue to be denied access to Syria. Most of the needs assessments undertaken in this quarter shy away from protection related questions, to not jeopardise the safety of enumerators and respondents. As a result, information on protection concerns beyond the direct effects of the armed conflict is limited, with most information available focusing on the use of indiscriminate weapons and the human rights violations perpetrated by IS. (UNSC 21/08/2014, UNHCR 30/07/2014)

2.1.3 IS violations

Human rights violations by extremist groups, particularly IS, have become more apparent in this third quarter, with reports of public executions and harsh punishments to instil fear and ensure submission to its rule. For the first time there is credible evidence of the use of barrel bombs by IS during its offensive in areas in Aleppo. Advancements of IS in Deir-ez-Zor and Aleppo have led to large scale displacement flows, with unconfirmed reports of complete communities forcibly displaced by the extremist group. Over 172,000 people have fled IS violence or fear of harassment in northern Aleppo since 19 September. September, with reports of executions of civilians who remained in villages taken over by IS.

Amnesty has accused IS of “systematic ethnic cleansing,” including mass killings, of ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and although only limited information is available, it is assumed that IS is pursuing a similar strategy in Syria. (AFP 04/09/2014, AFP 20/09/2014, HRW 2014/09/01, UN 27/08/2014, Guardian 21/09/2014, Syrian Observer 21/08/2014)

2.1.4 Indiscriminate and disproportionate use of violence

UN Security Resolution 2139 (February 2014) ordered all parties to the conflict in Syria to end the indiscriminate use of barrel bombs and other weapons in populated areas. However, heavy weapons, barrel bombs, car bombs, and sniper fire continue to be used, contributing to the vast majority of all conflict-related deaths and injuries, and creating obstacles to the access to, and functionality of basic services. The type of locations targeted, including markets, shops, hospitals, schools, places of worship, and densely populated public areas demonstrate the intent to cause a high number of civilian casualties. Amidst on-going heavy aerial bombardments on Aleppo, Dar’a, Hama, Homs, Idleb and Rural Damascus, the Government of Syria has intensified its aerial campaign against the Islamic State in eastern Deir-ez-Zor and Aleppo in this quarter, killing at least 100 civilians. (HRW 30/07/2014, Col 12/08/2014, Reuters 08/09/2014, The World Post 06/09/2014)

Since February 2014, Human Rights Watch has documented over 650 major new damaged sites consistent with barrel bomb impacts in neighbourhoods of Aleppo city. Dar’a, Idleb, Hama and Damascus governorates have also been severely affected by barrel bombs. (HRW 30/07/2014, AFP 05/07/2014, AFP 10/07/2014, World Bulletin 03/08/2014, ARA News 03/08/2014, ARA News 10/08/2014)

Although the Government of Syria denies possessing or using cluster munitions, the Cluster Munition Monitor has documented almost 250 instances where cluster munitions have been used in the two-year period between July 2012 and July 2014. Initial reports of cluster munition use emerged in June 2012 and reported that use increased sharply in October 2012 as SAF intensified air-campaigns on opposition-controlled areas. Almost all of the over 1,500 documented casualties (97%) from cluster munition strikes and remnants were civilians. At the start of September, the use of cluster munitions by non-state actors was reported for the first time, with statements by local officials and photographic evidence indicating that fighters of the Islamic State have used cluster munitions in Ain al Arab/Kobani in Aleppo on two occasions. (Cluster Munition Monitor 28/08/2014, HRW 01/09/2014, HRW 30/07/2014)

2.1.5 Attacks on civilian infrastructure

All parties to the conflict continue to target vital services, resulting in interruptions to the supply of safe drinking water and electricity and disrupting access to health care and education. In Aleppo city, damage caused to the main water pumping station, Suleiman al Halabi, by armed opposition groups on 2 June continues to result in water shortages for over 2.5 million people. Parties to the conflict widely disregard the special protection accorded to health facilities. Physicians for Human Rights recorded almost 200 attacks on 140 medical facilities since the start of the conflict and the most recent WHO HeRAMS data indicates that by July, almost half of the public hospitals had been partly or fully damaged. The UN documented 80 attacks on schools between January and August 2014. There are no comparable UN figures for attacks on schools in 2013. However, the GoS reported in August 2013 that since the start of that year, 65 schools had been subject to attacks. Targeted attacks on religious shrines and places of worship are ongoing, with a recent analysis of satellite imagery illustrating the extent of the damage. (OCHA 16/07/2014, Col 12/08/2014, WHO 07/2014, PHR 20/09/2014, Al-Monitor 2013/07/11, Eqtsad 2013/07/14, Tishreen 2013/08/15, UNSC 24/03/2014, UNSC 29/08/2014, BBC 19/09/2014)

“An increase in reports of deaths in custody in Damascus due to injuries sustained during torture or illness due to a lack of access to basic services.”

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has reported that United States air-raids in northern Syria have damaged mills and grain storage areas. While the trade of wheat and oil is an important source of income for the Islamic State, targeted attacks on oil refineries and wheat stocks have an immediate impact on households’ access to food and fuel. (Reuters 2014/09/30)

2.1.6 Torture and ill-treatment of detainees

Widespread and systematic use of torture and ill-treatment of detainees continues to be one of the main protection concerns. Conditions of detention in facilities controlled by the GoS and armed groups are characterised by a lack of food, water, space, sleep, hygiene and medical care and denial of life-saving medicine. In its latest report, the Commission of Inquiry noted an increase in reports of deaths in custody in Damascus due to injuries sustained during torture or illness due to a lack of access to basic services between January and July 2014 compared to the second half of 2013. OHCHR recently concluded that violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, some of which may amount to war crimes, were committed by SAF, as well as by armed opposition groups on the former inmates of the Aleppo Central Prison. (UNSC 21/08/2014, Col 12/08/2014)

2.1.7 Besiegement and truces

The last estimate on the number of people with limited access to aid (from June 2014), indicates that 241,000 individuals are facing blockades of life-sustaining necessities and an estimated 4.7 million people reside in hard-to-reach areas. (UN 13/08/2014, UN 2014/06/20). During the reporting period, truce negotiations have led to the lifting of sieges in Qadam and Al Asali (Damascus) and negotiations are under-way in many parts of the country. However, an analysis of 26 truces showed that the agreed truces were significantly undermined by a lack of political will and resulted in only a minimal and temporary improvement of the humanitarian situation in affected communities. The research indicates how truce negotiations can result in further human rights violations, with instances of harassment of IDPs from besieged areas to force their return in order to increase pressure on opposition forces negotiating the truce. In Madamiyet Elsham this strategy reportedly forced the return of over 5,000 IDPs. (Integrity 06/2014, UNSC 21/08/2014)

2.1.8 Criminality

At the start of July, local media reported that a recently uncovered mass grave in Aleppo revealed bodies with missing organs. The lack of centralised law and order in many areas and general sense of impunity has contributed to the spread of criminality, with reports of criminal networks engaging in corruption, extortion, looting and human trafficking. (Assafir 23/07/2014, Fletcher 02/2014)

A recent assessment in IDP camps highlighted that security is a critical cause of concern for a majority of displaced Syrians staying in informal and formal camps. The main security concerns as reported by respondents are the presence of armed individuals within the camps as well as the lack of camp fences, security measures and guards to prevent and respond to criminality. In addition, IDPs reported a general sense of insecurity in camps fearing kidnapping and child recruitment. (REACH 07/2014)

2.1.9 Women's rights

Societal norms and access constraints severely limit the collection of data on the extent of gender-based violence (GBV) in Syria. However, GBV, directed at women and men, continues to be documented, with for instance ongoing reports of rape and sexual assaults of women at detention facilities in Damascus. (UNHCR 30/07/2014, OCHA 16/07/2014, Col 12/08/2014)

Violations against women in areas controlled by extremist groups continue. On 17 July, a woman was reportedly stoned to death by approximately 30 members of IS after being found guilty of adultery by an IS sharia court in Al Tabqa, in Ar-Raqqa governorate. During the last week of July, IS distributed leaflets listing restrictions on women's dress codes in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa, noting that violations would entail severe punishment. Meanwhile, reports were also received that other armed opposition groups are imitating IS in their treatment of civilians in areas under their control. For example, in Duma in Rural Damascus there have been reports of stoning for adultery by armed opposition groups. (UNSC 21/08/2014, CSM 21/09/2014)

2.1.10 Child protection

There are continued reports of severe protection violations against children in Syria, including GBV, exploitative child labour practices and child trafficking, killing and maiming, abduction, detention, early marriage and recruitment in armed conflict. UN human rights monitoring indicates that IS and other armed groups are forcibly recruiting boys, and media outlets have highlighted that IS established training camps to recruit children under the guise of education, training boys around the age of 14, but sometimes as young as 10, for combat. While reports prior to 2014 indicated that children associated with armed groups were predominantly engaged in support functions, there has been a confirmed trend of increased participation of children in active combat. (Col 12/08/2014, Syria Deeply 02/09/2014,

2.2 WASH

People in need	4,298,766 <i>SINA 11/2013, 111/270 sub-districts covered (41%)</i>
	4,066,000 <i>Dynamo 07/2014, 108/270 sub-districts covered (40%)</i>
Most affected areas	Al-Hasakeh, Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor governorates and rural Idleb

WASH is a high priority, particularly in eastern Syria due to the high levels of conflict, coupled with pollution of the Euphrates river due to informal oil refining activities. According to an ACU report, the majority of the assessed areas ranking WASH as a high priority are concentrated in eastern Syria. Furthermore, all assessed areas of Deir-ez-Zor reported that the WASH sector faced acute risk of deterioration in humanitarian conditions. In September, the ACU reported that aid actors have not been able to access water systems for chlorination primarily due to lack of chlorine supplies, followed by lack of access. As a result, dozens of cases of acute bloody diarrhoea have been reported in recent weeks. (ACU 24/09/2014, DYNAMO 07/2014)

“WASH is a high priority, particularly in eastern Syria”

A REACH assessment of camps and informal settlements in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, and Idleb identified WASH as the second top sectoral priority. Overall, WASH needs in informal settlements were higher in informal settlements than those found in camps. Compared to assessments in late 2013, WASH has risen in priority, which is likely due to the influx of IDPs in early 2014, low rainfall levels, and ongoing conflict, which placed increased pressure on limited water supplies available. Within the WASH sector, the provision of latrines was the most requested intervention. (REACH 09/07/2014)

Water shortages in Aleppo city have persisted since May, when opposition forces first took control of the main Sulaiman Al Halabi water station and cut off water to GoS-controlled areas of the city. Since then, shelling has damaged the Sulaiman Al Halabi water station and aid actors have not been permitted access to repair the system, affecting about 2.5 million people in both GoS and opposition-controlled areas of the city. The lack of piped water has led to major water shortages and a reliance on private wells, which are also vulnerable to contamination. The lack of water has led to skyrocketing prices for water, with one NGO reporting that 20 cubic metres of water are being sold for SYP 20,000 (USD 130). (OCHA 30/07/2014, SOS 12/09/2014)

A report from the ACU's humanitarian monitoring system, which covered 108 sub-districts (40% of all sub-districts) in 11 governorates, concluded that more than four million people (24%) out of 16.7 million covered in the assessment are in need of WASH services. Other key findings from the 108 sub-districts include:

- There are about 160 WASH assistance actors in the assessed areas.
- Assessed sub-districts rely on the following sources as their main source of water: 29% of sub-districts rely on the public water network, 26% rely on private wells, 24% on water tanks, 11% on water reservoirs, and 10% on lakes and rivers.
- 76% of sub-districts reported that the available water sources were considered drinkable, filtered or clean. 9% of sub-districts reported that water was contaminated. Areas with contaminated water sources were concentrated along the Euphrates river, which is likely a result of heavy pollution due to informal oil refining activities.
- 59% of reported reasons for lack of water refer to shortage in fuel (for water pumps), 17% shortage in water, 14% lack of water refer to shortages in water tanks, and 10% lack of water reservoirs. Other reliable sources noted that the lack of fuel is a major issue that faces the WASH sector across Syria. However, donors are frequently reluctant to fund the provision of fuel as it is unsustainable, expensive, and can be easily targeted and diverted towards military activities by all parties to the conflict. (PI 23/09/2014)
- The disposal of waste remains a high concern in Syria as it relies primarily on private contractors who are not well-monitored. 51% of sub-districts reported relying on

disposal into partially functioning public networks, the open, riverbeds, or irrigation canals, indicating that there is a very high risk of pollution of drinking water sources.

- WASH was identified as the first priority in about 20% of assessed sub-districts, second priority in 29%, and third priority in 17%. The majority of those ranking WASH as a high priority are concentrated in eastern Syria. 74% of all the assessed sub-districts reported having an acute risk in terms of potential WASH needs. Four governorates, (Deir-ez-Zor, Dar'a, Latakia, and Idlib) reported 100% of its assessed sub-districts with acute risk, indicating a link to areas experiencing persistent conflict (DYNAMO 07/2014)

Local organisations reported that Yarmouk camp had been cut off from the public water system in September, further exacerbating the spread of typhoid. UNRWA reported that it is undertaking some emergency reconstruction work to critical infrastructure, including some water and sanitation systems in some of the Palestinian camps in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Rural Damascus, as well as some rubble clearance. (Jafra Foundation 29/09/2014, UNRWA 03/10/2014)

During the summer months, water shortages and polluted supplies, contributed to an increase in communicable diseases, which was frequently reported for IDPs residing in collective shelters. SARC reported increases in hepatitis A, typhoid, diarrhea, and skin infections. UNICEF reported that four million people were at increased risk of health issues due to low levels of rainfall this year. (SARC 24/07/2014, UNICEF 09/08/2014)

2.3 LIVELIHOODS AND FOOD SECURITY

People in need	5,540,000 <i>SINA 11/2013, 111/270 subdistricts covered (41%)</i>
	5,160,000 <i>Dynamo 07/2014, 108/270 subdistricts covered (40%)</i>
Most affected areas	Most affected areas include those recording high food prices and limited livelihood opportunities. This very much depends on economic factors which widely vary from one location to another. Additionally, conflict-affected areas, hard-to reach areas and besieged areas in Governorates such as Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Al-Hasakeh, and Idlib, are affected by availability issues and receive little to no assistance due to access constraints.

2.3.1 People in need

The ACU Dynamo monitoring system reported that in May and June, in 108 sub-districts across Syria, 32% of the assessed population or 5.1 million people were in need of food assistance. Of those in need, 33% were identified as being in acute need of food assistance. The report also indicated that in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Idlib – in which over 50% of the sub-districts were covered – all or most assessed sub-districts reported moderate or acute risk of food insecurity. (ACU 06/2014)

According to OCHA in July, an estimated 6.3 million people are in need of food and agriculture assistance across the country, a difference in caseload which results from variations in methodologies and coverage between OCHA, the SINA and Dynamo. (OCHA 16/07/2014) Also, more than half the population was living in extreme poverty at the end of 2013 and unable to secure the most basic food

“According to OCHA in July, an estimated 6.3 million people are in need of food and agriculture assistance across the country.”

required for survival. (SCPR 12/2013) Those living in conflict zones and besieged areas face varying degrees of hunger, malnutrition and starvation, due to economic inflation coupled with an expected shortfall in agricultural production for upcoming seasons. (REACH 07/2014)

In camps and informal settlements, foods needs are also reportedly prevalent. According to REACH in August, 100% of assessed settlements and 92% of assessed camps identified food assistance within their top 3 priorities. (REACH 07/2014) According to REACH data, over the course of 2014, food assistance needs have consistently received the highest prioritisation in camps and informal tented settlements (ITS) in northern Syria. (REACH 08/2014, REACH 08/2014) This is believed to be partly due to the fact that camps and settlements are mostly covered by non-traditional actors, but the support of these actors has declined, and most of the NGOs do not provide regular food assistance in these settings.

2.3.2 Agricultural production

According to FEWSNET, harvesting of 2014 winter grains is complete, but reduced plantings and drought conditions in some parts of the country have negatively impacted yields and overall production. Estimates put the planting at about 21% lower than the amount planned at the start of the season, and in May, WFP and FAO had announced that national wheat production levels in 2014 may be 52% lower than in 2013. (USAID 05/09/2014). This is expected to result in higher food prices and increased food insecurity among crisis-affected households. (GIEWS 29/08/2014) The governorates of Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Dar'a, which previously produced roughly half of the nation's annual wheat harvest, are the most at risk. (WFP 04/2014) FAO estimates put the cereal harvest at about 2.4 million metric tonnes: about 2 million of wheat and 400,000 of barley and other cereals. (GIEWS 29/08/2014) Before the war, the average wheat production per year was around 3.5 million metric tonnes (Reuters 28/04/2014) Reduced agricultural output is due to high costs of production, reduced input availability, violence hampering access to crops and causing damage to equipment, power cuts, and dry conditions at the time of planting. Additionally, power cuts have had a significant impact as it affects consumption and availability of potable water, but also irrigation. The country normally relies heavily on food imports, amounting to almost half of the total domestic utilisation. Cereal import requirements are expected to increase in the 2014/15 to 4.53 million tonnes compared to this year's projected 4 million tonnes. (GIEWS 29/08/2014)

2.3.3 Availability

In the 108 sub-districts assessed by the ACU in May and June, over 1,140 bakeries were identified, but 38% were not functioning. Among the functioning bakeries, only 24% were public

bakeries. The primary reasons for bakeries not functioning were the lack of flour, fuel, and electricity. Shortages in yeast and insecurity were also a reported obstacle. (ACU 06/2014)

2.3.4 Availability Vs Accessibility

In general, access to, rather than availability of, food is the main food security issue due to high rates of inflation and unemployment, which reduce purchasing power. Despite the deterioration of the formal economy, a rising black market economy continues to grow. In contested and besieged areas, however, food shortages are significant.

2.3.5 Food prices and financial access

Factors for increased prices include reduced production, the economic impact of the conflict – which has severely diminished the capacity for food imports, and the rising cost of fuel – which is required to produce food and transport it to markets, and needed by households to cook. (USAID 05/09/2014, OCHA 16/07/2014)

Inflation particularly affects areas that are remote (Ar-Raqqa, Dar'a), or where security risks or besieged areas mean they are hard to reach for humanitarian organisations (Deir-Ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa). Indeed, disruption in the supply chain causes the goods to be more costly due to their limited availability and the security risks, resulting in an increased value of these commodities. Inflation is also reportedly very high in conflict-affected areas in central and southern Syria. (REACH 08/2014) In Ar-Raqqa, it is reported that food prices are controlled by IS leadership. Traders who manipulate prices are punished, warned and shut down if they are caught again. The group has also imposed Islamic taxes (zakat) on wealthy traders and families. (Reuters 04/09/2014) Similar events have been reported in Aleppo.

A recent joint assessment also determined that increasing food prices are especially affecting people living in areas that are not receiving bread subsidies. (USAID 05/09/2014)

At the end of June, the price of unsubsidised bread across Syria ranged from SYP 46 (USD 0.40) to over 300 (USD 3.70). Bread prices were generally the lowest in Damascus city while areas of Rural Damascus registered the highest prices. The stark contrast between these geographically linked areas is due to siege policies which have led to massively inflated prices. (ACU 07/2014) Before the crisis, the price of bread was subsidised at SYP 15. Since the start of the crisis, prices have increased significantly and by June 2014, the average price across the country stood at SYP 46, with large geographical variations and dynamic fluctuations.

2.3.6 Livelihoods and financial access

Poor households increasingly face difficulty in meeting their basic food needs as a result of reduced purchasing power, loss of income and livelihoods, and depleted savings. According to OCHA, almost 80% of the labour force – 2.7 million people, is out of work. (OCHA 16/07/2014) According to a recent REACH assessment, those in possession of food vouchers or e-cards have comparatively greater purchasing power in markets than those who are unregistered for assistance. Also, households living outside camp settings are more reliant on the fluctuating and at times unpredictable economic conditions in local food markets, which means they are at a greater risk of food insecurity. (REACH 08/2014)

In IS-held areas, there are reports that fighters and employees receive a salary from the armed group, with fighters and recruits receiving salaries between \$400 and \$600 per month (Reuters 04/09/2014) In many areas, IS salaries are the only source of income after the three years of conflict.

2.3.7 Coping strategies

According to recent assessments, 70% of informal settlements reported IDPs resorting to negative coping strategies to meet their basic food needs, such as selling assets, begging and borrowing money. These strategies were also reported in settlements receiving food assistance, which seems to indicate that the supply of foods remains insufficient. (REACH 08/2014)

2.3.8 Food assistance

In June and July, WFP dispatched food to respectively 3.42 million and 3.66 million people across 13 governorates, which corresponds to over 80% of the planned caseload of 4.25 million. According to the latest reports, 1.9 million people were reached as of mid-August, which represents a 31% increase compared to the same time in the July cycle. (UN 21/08/2014) Also, assistance reached 48 (approximately 17%) of the 287 locations identified as besieged or hard-to-reach. Food assistance by WFP and UNRWA reached about 470,000 people in 23 hard-to-reach areas compared to 95,800 people in 14 hard-to-reach areas during the previous reporting period. (UN 21/08/2014)

- Impediments to food assistance: Widespread insecurity, bureaucratic impediments and funding gaps continue to hinder access to populations in need. (OCHA 16/07/2014) In July, insecure routes particularly restricted the delivery of assistance in the northeast. As a result, an estimated 388,000 people could not be reached in Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh. (UN 21/08/2014) Over the reporting period, bureaucratic challenges also constrained food deliveries in areas in Rural Aleppo, Damascus and Idlib. (OCHA 16/07/2014)
- Funding shortfalls: Additionally, WFP announced significant funding shortfalls that will lead to immediate cuts to food assistance. In Syria, food baskets to about four million beneficiaries are expected to be significantly reduced to just 825 kilocalories per person per day beginning in November, compared to 2,100 kilocalories recommended in emergency contexts. (WFP 18/09/2014) Also, in mid-July, reports indicated that if current funding gaps persist, more than 700,000 people will be left without agricultural livelihood support, likely resulting in further decrease of crop production and increased dependency on food assistance. Finally, cash assistance and in-kind food distribution to 440,000 Palestinian refugees have already been reduced from 12 monthly cycles to just eight. (OCHA 16/07/2014)

2.4 SHELTER AND NFI

People in need	1,291,583 SINA 11/2013, 111/270 subdistricts covered (41%)
	1,507,000 Dynamo 07/2014, 108/270 subdistricts covered (40%)
Most affected areas	Aleppo, Homs, Idlib, Rural Damascus, and Quneitra governorates

Shelter and NFI provision remains significantly underfunded with only 7% of funds available from the SHARP request. With the approaching winter months, those residing in sub-standard shelter or in open spaces are particularly vulnerable. This includes identified groups such as those residing in informal settlements, which are particularly prevalent in

northern Syria, as well as those in makeshift shelters. Unsurprisingly, young children and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to the cold.

2.4.1 Fuel

Even with funding, there is unlikely to be much heating fuel assistance available due to the lack of sustainability, high costs, and fear of diversion to military actors and activities. The opposition's recent takeover of most of Quneitra governorate has led to spikes in fuel costs, which has had an immediate impact on access to clean drinking water. In contrast, in IS-controlled areas, gas is reportedly available at low prices as IS attempts to win local sentiment. (*AI Monitor 06/08/2014, Assafir 22/07/2014*)

2.4.2 Shelter

According to trusted sources, the number of IDPs residing in formal and informal camps identified in Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Idlib, and Latakia decreased slightly in the third quarter. Despite the slowed growth, winterisation needs (both shelter and NFI) of camp residents will be significant since many of the IDPs arrived after the previous winter months. (PI 18/09/2014)

According to humanitarian actors, about 120 IDP camp sites have been identified, with an estimated total population of 156,400. The vast majority of IDPs in camps reside in Idlib governorate. The slowed growth in the number of IDPs follows major increases (40% increase in population between January and May) in both the number of IDP camp sites and populations in IDP camps since the beginning of the year, primarily due to the offensive on Aleppo. The decrease in IDP camp population is attributed to a number of factors, including:

- While displacement remains high, the growth in the establishment of IDP camps and population have slowed compared to the first half of the year, when there was frequent displacement due to the conflict.
- Evictions and relocations have taken place but it was unclear how these took place.
- Improved verification of camp population estimates. (PI 18/09/2014)

A REACH assessment of IDP camps and informal settlements covered three of the same governorates as above, as well as Al-Hasakeh governorate, during the first quarter. Key findings include:

- A small minority of those assessed (110 families) were reportedly living in the open in Aleppo and Al-Hasakeh governorates.
- Shelter was ranked highest in the two informal settlements assessed in Al-Hasakeh governorate, while it was not among the top three priorities at the governorate level. Overall, shelter was the third highest priority, and was a higher priority in informal settlements than camps. Informal settlements are underserved in the shelter sector compared to the camps. Only 45% of shelters in informal settlements use manufactured tents compared to over 90% in camps.
- Humanitarian assistance appears to have helped mitigate a major shelter crisis due to the massive influx of IDPs in the early part of this year. Despite the major increase in shelter needs, the number of sites prioritising shelter as a top need decreased between December 2013 and March. (*REACH 09/07/2014*)

The ACU report concluded 9.4% of the assessed population (16.7 million people) is in need of shelter assistance; 3.4% of the total population was assessed as in acute need. Other key findings from the 108 sub-districts include:

31% of the housing in assessed areas was moderately to fully damaged. Overall, 44% of assessed sub-districts reported that housing was undamaged. According to a REACH report on Deir-ez-Zor city

from June, housing has experienced extensive damage, which has likely increased due to more recent clashes between IS, opposition groups and SAF. (*REACH 06/11/14*)

227 aid actors providing shelter and NFI assistance were identified in the assessed areas. This compares to over 300 actors involved in food assistance, which has also been frequently identified as the top sectoral need across Syria. (*DYNAMO 07/2014*)

UNRWA reported that it is undertaking some emergency reconstruction work to critical infrastructure in some of the Palestinian camps in Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and Rural Damascus as well as some rubble clearance. Palestinian areas have experienced major damage compared to other communities in Syria. (*UNRWA 03/10/2014*)

2.5 HEALTH

People in need	3,341,798
	<i>SINA 11/2013, 111/270 sub-districts covered (41%)</i>
	1,437,000
	<i>Dynamo 07/2014, 108/270 sub-districts covered (40%)</i>
Most affected areas	Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Dar'a, Rural Damascus

Despite opportunities for improved access provided by the UNSCR 2165 passed in July, health assistance has still been met with significant challenges. Recent reports have underscored the significant impact active conflict and violence have had on the provision of health services. Hostilities and direct targeting of the health care system have resulted in damaged health centres, shortages of supplies and staff, and limited access of affected populations to health care services. Taken together, the fragile health system is rendered less capable of meeting the health needs of the population, including vaccination efforts, particularly in low-resource areas and places seeing large influxes of IDPs. The most affected governorates include Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Dar'a, Deir-ez-Zor, and Rural Damascus.

The low rainfall and ensuing water shortages in the last quarter have led to a recent spike in skin diseases and diarrhoeal diseases, seeing an increasing number of cases of acute diarrhoea and typhoid fever across areas in both northern and southern Syria, including Aleppo, Deir-ez-Zor, Dar'a and Rural Damascus.

2.5.1 Preliminary impact of UNSCR 2165


The passing of UNSCR 2165 mid-July allowed delivery of medicines and medical supplies to new and hard-to-reach areas in Ar-Raqqa, Aleppo, Rural Damascus and Al-Hasakeh. Nevertheless, concerns remained over coordination of these activities, and restrictions were still imposed by the GoS in certain locations which caused delays to deliveries, as was the case with Madamiyet Elsham in Rural Damascus. (*UNSC 21/08/2014, OCHA 06/09/2014*)

2.5.2 Health Resources & Services Availability Mapping System (HeRAMS)

In June 2014, WHO and the Ministry of Health (MoH) published its second quarter report on the status of public hospitals and health centres throughout Syria. Through the report it was evident that the conflict continued to disrupt health-care services, and areas most heavily and persistently affected by conflict suffered greater negative impacts on the health system (*UN 21/08/14, HeRAMS 14/08/19, HeRAMS 19/08/14*).

- These included primarily the governorates of Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Dar'a, Deir-ez-Zor, and Rural Damascus.

HeRAMS Damage to MoH health facilities




Hospitals have been damaged in 12 of the country's 14 governorates. Out of 97 public hospitals, 35% are reported as partially functioning (i.e. experiencing shortages of staff, medicines and supplies); and 24% are reported as not functioning at all, with Aleppo, Dar'a, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs and Rural Damascus having the highest numbers of non-functioning public hospitals. Preliminary results from another HeRAMS assessment in September 2014 also showed that the highest numbers of non-functioning and health facilities were found in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqa. (OCHA 19/09/2014).

Of the 90% of public health centres reporting into the HeRAMS, there has been a significant increase in the number of health centres rendered partially functional or non-functional compared to the first quarter. Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Dar'a, Idleb, and Rural Damascus all reported greatest proportions of partially-functional and non-functional MoH health centres, and in total, 55% were reported fully functioning, 22% were partially functioning and 17% were non-functional. In terms of damage, 24% of centres were reported damaged and 56% were not damaged (the status of the remaining 20% was unknown). The greatest proportion of damage was recorded in Ar-Raqqa, Rural Damascus, and Idleb; it is of note that more than 60% of health centres in Aleppo did not report on their level of damage and as such damage figures in Aleppo are comparatively low.

“Out of 97 public hospitals, 35% are reported as partially functioning and 24% are reported as not functioning at all”

HeRAMS Functionality of MoH health facilities



2.5.3 Active conflict and targeting of health facilities and staff

As previously reported, areas with heavy fighting and inaccessible areas have been adversely affected and are having difficulties meeting the health needs of the population. Often, active fighting has resulted in damages to health facilities, endangering health staff, and rendering areas less accessible – hindering the passage of medicines, medical supplies and equipment and resulting in serious shortages.

- In July, Physician for Human Rights (PHR) issued a report highlighting how health staff and health facilities have been consistently targeted. The report highlighted that both GoS forces and anti-government armed groups, including IS, were responsible for carrying out destructive attacks on medical facilities and transportation, as well as harming health workers through arrests, torture and disappearances. Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa and areas in Damascus and Rural Damascus were highlighted as severely affected by these actions,

leaving their populations with greater unmet health needs and placing additional pressures on their already fragile health systems.

- In its August summary, PHR stated that 195 attacks on 155 separate facilities occurred between March 2011 and August 2014; the majority of attacks (90%) were committed by GoS forces. 146 attacks were deemed to be targeted attacks, whereby it was clear that the locations were deliberately chosen for destruction, in direct violation of international humanitarian law (IHL). The extent of the destruction of health facilities and hospitals was further confirmed and documented in the recent HeRAMS assessments. PHR further stated that 560 medical personnel were killed in the same timeframe, a large proportion resulting from GoS actions (45% of deaths were caused by shelling and bombing alone) (*Guardian 07/06/2014, Guardian 14/05/2014, PHR 07/2014, PHR 01/07/2014, PHR 08/2014*).

2.5.4 Increased risk for diarrhoeal diseases

Following low rainfall in the winter, the summer months saw water shortages throughout the country. The shortages of clean water raised the risk of diarrhoeal disease outbreaks such as typhoid; the risk of an outbreak was further heightened in densely populated areas, where people live in close quarters and unsanitary conditions, and where availability of water for personal hygiene is further reduced.

In July, the incidence of acute diarrhoea continued to increase with 5,500 cases reported in a single week. The highest number of cases was reported in Deir-ez-Zor, Damascus, Rural Damascus, Lattakia, and Aleppo. (*UNSC 21/08/2014*)

In September, suspected typhoid fever was the leading cause of morbidity in northern Syria with over 1,000 cases recorded. The majority of reported cases of typhoid were in Deir-ez-Zor, where access to safe drinking water is quite poor. Rumours and subsequent confirmation of typhoid cases in Yarmouk, Damascus in the same month were met with a relatively quick response, with the delivery of supplies such as antibiotics and water purification tablets. The concern over diarrhoeal diseases in southern Syria continued through September, with reports of increasing numbers of diarrhoeal diseases and typhoid cases in the areas of Duma, Rural Damascus (*PI 15/09/2014, ACU-EWARN 06/09/2014, UNRWA 22/08/2014, OCHA 16/07/2014*).

2.5.5 Vaccination campaigns

Measles: Starting in early 2013, measles became a growing concern as routine vaccination services ceased alongside breakdowns of the Syrian public health system. The outbreak was underscored with reports of an estimated 4,000 suspected cases occurring since January 2014. The latest reports indicate that there were 389 confirmed cases; given the limited availability of labs and testing capacity, confirmation of additional cases has been particularly challenging. (*UNSC 21/08/2014*). As such, a measles vaccination campaign of 1.3 million doses began on 15 June in GoS controlled areas. In parallel, a measles vaccination campaign targeting 1.35 million in northern Syria in IDP camps and communities in Idleb and Deir-ez-Zor began in late August.

- The campaign has been met with several challenges, including large population movements in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor in early September. Additionally, maintaining the necessary cold chain was challenged in areas where electricity was not available consistently – a concern highlighted earlier in the year when the polio vaccination was launched (*IFRC 16/04/2014*). The launch of the campaign was also slowed by coordination disagreements, highlighting the challenges of propping up basic systemic health services in areas outside of GoS control. Similarly, fighting between different armed groups also led to the halt of vaccination services in some areas (*Reuters 20/06/2014, OHCHR 13/08/2014, HWG 04/09/2014*).

“The eighth round of the polio vaccination campaign, conducted in June 2014, reached 2.7 million children under five across the country”

- The challenges culminated with the suspension of the vaccination campaign following the deaths of 15 children in Idleb, which occurred immediately following their vaccination. The campaign successfully vaccinated close to 50,000 children in Idleb and Deir-ez-Zor before the suspension. An initial finding from the investigation committee, formed by the Syrian National Coalition, determined that containers of a drug used as muscle relaxant were placed in the same refrigerator as the measles vaccine and the corresponding dissolvent; the deaths were caused as a result of the mixing of the two substances. Lack of funding and coordination challenges between involved parties hampered proper planning and monitoring of the campaign, and reports mentioned unqualified staff with poor training conducted the campaign in Idleb. There is concern over the loss of trust in the vaccinators and health services in the area – and the potential lengthy suspension of the campaign. Nevertheless, measures such as community engagement and monitoring activities will be taken in order to ensure the campaign can continue – and latest reports indicate the community still approves of vaccination efforts due to the high awareness of the risk of spreading communicable diseases (*Guardian 17/09/2014, Reuters 17/09/2014, Reuters 19/09/2014, HWG 22/09/2014, Measles Task Force 24/09/2014*).

Routine and polio vaccinations: Conducting both routine and specific immunisation activities, e.g. for measles or polio, remains a priority, particularly given that many areas across Syria have poor water, hygiene and sanitation conditions and limited health services. Despite having conducted several rounds of the polio vaccination campaign and having a relatively wide reach, concern remained in July over not being able to reach a sizeable number (~765,000) of children in hard-to-reach areas and the inability to reach children with sufficient rounds of the vaccine. Active conflict in certain areas makes it particularly difficult to reach certain communities and provide vaccination services, much as it affects overall functionality of health services (*Reuters 22/07/2014, OCHA 16 July*).

Nevertheless, the eighth round of the polio vaccination campaign, conducted in June 2014, reached 2.7 million children under five across the country, with four additional campaigns planned before the end of the year (*OCHA 16 July*).

2.5.6 Reproductive and maternal health

- In August 2014 the OHCHR reported that the lack of access to medical care has affected the health of women and their children. There have been reports of women in labour who were not allowed through government checkpoints and were thus forced to give birth in compromising conditions. In other cases, in besieged areas, women have given birth in unsterile conditions and without pain medication (*OHCHR 13/08/2014*).

- In July OCHA reported that 140,000 women were in need of reproductive health and family planning services, including safe delivery for 23,000 women in Aleppo, Al-Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, Dara, Idlib and Rural Damascus. This is especially a concern given the limited number of entities providing emergency obstetric care and safe delivery services – especially in border areas. Furthermore, should there be a rise in the trend of marrying girls below the age of 15, this demographic will be placed at increased risk. The practice of marrying girls at young ages can put them at risk of mental health issues and increases the likelihood of death in childbirth - a risk exacerbated by limited access to reproductive and prenatal care. (*Guardian 16/07/2014, OCHA 16 July, OHCHR 13/08/2014*).

2.5.7 Funding and administrative constraints

There have been increasing instances in which changes in funding streams and accountability mechanisms have slowed down health response activities.

- For example, in late June, a hospital in Atareb, Aleppo was facing closure as well, running up against the challenge of identifying a local partner through which it could orchestrate the financial arrangements necessary to support the hospital's functioning. In early September, a hospital servicing 5,000 people in Lattakia was risking closure due to lack of financial support. The impact of funding shortages on the functioning of health services was also highlighted in two assessments conducted in Al-Hasakeh City and Qamishli City (*Guardian 28/06/2014, REACH 26/08/2014, REACH 26/08/2014, HWG 04/09/2014*).
- Additionally, discussions on payment mechanisms have slowed down plans for rolling out the second phase of measles vaccinations in northern Syria. Gaps in funding for establishing close monitoring of the measles campaign might also be attributed to the incident that led to the deaths of 15 children in Idlib (*HWG 04/09/2014, HWG 22/09/2014*).

2.6 EDUCATION

People in need	Non Available
Most affected areas	Al-Hasakeh, Deir-ez-Zor, Homs, and rural Aleppo

Schools in Syria officially started the new academic year on 14 September. There are no new estimates of school enrolment or attendance for this school year. Given the deteriorating security and increased protection concerns in Al-Hasakeh and Deir-ez-Zor, it is expected that school attendance will decrease in these areas. (*UNICEF 19/09/2014*)


There were no reports on whether the GoS would vacate IDPs from schools being used as collective shelters during the summer school break. As in recent years, the start of the school year is likely to result in thousands of IDPs being forced to find new shelter options. Last year, some IDPs were relocated to alternative shelters, such as unfinished buildings, but given the lack of absorption capacity, most are forced to find their own accommodations. These groups are particularly of concern as the seasonal temperatures begin to drop.

The ACU report found that the education sector was a relatively low priority during March and April. 34 sub-districts (31% of assessed areas) ranked education as one of the top three sectoral priorities. (*ACU 06/14*)

- In the assessed areas, it was found that 61% of schools were functional. Sub-districts assessed in Homs, Hama, and Lattakia reported the lowest percentage of school functionality. However, the data is not representative of these governorates as the assessed areas were largely in contested or opposition-controlled areas, which are subject to higher levels of conflict compared to other areas of the governorate which were not assessed by the ACU.
- The top reason for the lack of functioning schools was the lack of funds available. The lack of security, inadequate buildings, and lack of staff were also cited as primary reasons for the lack of functionality.
- Colleges were found to be functioning at a higher rate than schools. There was a high proportion of non-functional colleges in Ar-Raqqa, which is likely due to the presence of IS.
- There is a relatively low number of education aid actors, with about 163 present in the assessed areas. In comparison, the food sector, which reported the highest level of need, reported over 300 actors present across the assessed areas.
- The ACU report found that the proportion of girls attending primary school was generally higher than boys in assessed sub-districts. In secondary school, attendance levels were equal among males and females, however, there are more pronounced disparities in governorates. For example, in Idlib, females make up 59% of students, however, in Deir-ez-Zor, the proportion is the opposite, with only 41% of females in secondary school. The variances are likely due to a number of factors, including the security context and the presence of ideological groups in the area.

3. GOVERNORATE PROFILES

3.1 ALEPPO



People in need	2,575,000
	OCHA 06/14
	1,681,000
	Dynamo 07/14, 25/40 sub-districts covered (63%)
	2,456,128
	SINA 11/13, 35/40 sub-districts covered (88%)

3.1.1 Key Issues and Possible Developments

Key Issues and Possible Developments Aleppo continues to be the most dynamic conflict zone in Syria, with various stakeholders and different fighting fronts. The impact of conflict on the humanitarian situation is severe: as of July, 2.5 million people are in need of water. In addition, access to health services is severely constrained due to the targeting and destruction of health facilities, lack of medicines and medical staff.

Conflict intensity, including intense shelling and barrel bombing, is expected to remain high in the short-term, and will likely cause more displacement waves in the event that new areas are targeted or the same areas are targeted with higher frequency and intensity (*ReliefWeb 2014/08/03, AFP 2014/08/09, LA Times 2014/07/30, Al Jazeera 2014/09/07*).


Continued clashes between IS forces and PYD are expected. If IS is able to seize control of Ain al Arab/Kobani, it is highly expected to focus in the next stage on taking over more areas north of Aleppo City to further isolate the city from its northern rural parts. This could entail further IS movement towards Azaz and Afrin, also controlled by Kurdish forces, which will trigger further displacement and exacerbate the needs of the population living in already besieged areas such as in Afrin district.

In the likely event that IS takes full control of Ain al Arab/Kobani, it is likely that movement of goods and people through the nearby crossing, already very limited as it is, will be even further reduced, with blockades on both the Turkish and the Syrian side. Expansion of IS held territory results in large protection concerns for the population under its control, with Kurdish men particularly at risk of summary executions and maltreatment.

3.1.2 Context

Aleppo governorate, which hosted 20% of the total Syrian population before the start of the crisis, has been subject to high levels of conflict since mid-2012. Much of Aleppo city has been destroyed during what has been some of Syria's fiercest violence, and residents suffer constant power cuts and frequent water shortages. Fighting and indiscriminate bombing, including the use of heavy weaponry such as barrel bombs, is widespread in the governorate causing large-scale displacement. Heavy clashes continued in the third quarter and compounded the already concerning humanitarian situation, clashes in and around Ain al Arab/Kobani have led to large scale displacement, while already fragile public infrastructure, particularly water supply, was further damaged during on-going barrel-bomb attacks and air-raids.

3.1.3 Armed conflict



Aleppo continues to be the most dynamic conflict zone in Syria, with various stakeholders and different fighting fronts - which have had a major humanitarian impact.

Continuous clashes are recorded between PYD and IS forces around Kurdish areas in Ain al Arab/Kobani. IS did not achieve any significant progress until mid-September, when the conflict shifted from clashes around the same areas into a large-scale offensive by IS forces on Kurdish-held areas. Within 3 weeks, IS forces were able to achieve significant progress and lay siege to Ain al Arab/Kobani town. Ain al Arab/Kobani will be expected to fall in the hands of IS soon, unless some significant power change takes place, including international support or intervention attempting to stop IS progress in the area, which includes more than merely aerial support. (*As Safir 2014/07/08, Al Akhbar 2014/07/10, Al Akhbar 2014/07/16, SOHR 2014/07/23, Syria Deeply 2014/08/01, ARA News 2014/08/12, AFP 2014/08/13, The Guardian 2014/09/21, IB Times 2014/09/21, Reuters 2014/09/23*).

GoS forces and opposition forces continue to be locked in combat both north of Aleppo City and in the old neighbourhoods of Aleppo City. The Syrian National Coalition announced early in July that GoS forces are preparing to launch a major assault on opposition-held areas to the north of Aleppo City. The industrial city of Sheikh Najjar, which contains some 1,000 factories, fell in the hands of GoS forces on 7 July. This area was a conflict zone since early 2013, due to its strategic location and its economic value. Opposition forces are expected to attempt to re-take the area, which will increase the likelihood of it remaining a conflict zone in the near future (*AFP 2014/07/06, As Safir 2014/07/07*).

In the old part of the city, opposition forces continued fighting GoS forces in the old neighbourhoods of Aleppo City. A tunnel bombing attack was recorded on 29 July killing about 13 soldiers; two similar attacks occurred in the previous quarter. Opposition forces reached slight progress inside Aleppo City, taking hold of some strategic buildings in Suleiman al Halabi and Karm al Jabal neighbourhoods, which enables them to put more pressure on the strategic Hanano Barracks (*Al Jazeera 2014/07/29*, *SOHR 2014/09/02*).

Intense shelling was reported throughout the last quarter on opposition-held areas in the old city of Aleppo, Al Lairamoun, Bustan al Qasr, Beni Zeid, Al Zahraa, Al Hamadaniya, Al Rashedeen and Hanano. Barrel bombs continued to be a lethal method used in Aleppo City and other areas in the governorate, such as Al Bab and Menbij, causing many civilian casualties.

Due to the complex nature of the conflict in Aleppo, various fighting groups are still attempting unification. There is an increase of ad-hoc agreements or alliances, yet these do not change the positions of stakeholders and their relationships across the country. For example, Kurdish forces, Jabhat al Nusra, and Jaish al Mujahideen created an alliance to fight IS in northern Aleppo, around Mare'a and Tal Refa'at. A new pattern emerging in the last 5 months is joint operations rooms shared by various groups - despite ideological differences. This new pattern is expected to replace the traditional unification initiatives between different opposition groups. For example, on 30 July, the Islamic Front announced that the main rebel factions in Aleppo have merged to fight under its banner, and the Burkan al Furat operations room created on 12 September aligned YPG and some opposition groups (including Tawheed Brigade) to work in western parts of Ain al Arab/Kobani, Shuyoukh, Sarin and Jarablus. On 30 July, the Islamic Front announced that the main rebel factions in Aleppo governorate have merged to fight under its banner (*Kurds Press 2014/09/12*, *Syrian Observer 2014/07/30*).

In the last quarter, IS also progressed in its battle against Syrian opposition groups in northern rural Aleppo. The most significant progress was recorded in Aghtrin, close to Azaz on the Turkish border, where IS forces coming from Al Bab and Menbij were able to control the area in a very short time. This highly affects the power of opposition forces inside Aleppo City, as IS is now able to control more of the supply routes between Azaz on the Turkish border and Aleppo City. The fear of IS attempting to go further towards Azaz and take over the border crossing has led to new alliances, such as the alliance between Islamic Front, Jabhat al Nusra and Kurdish forces. This alliance empowered these forces to stop IS from taking over Mare'a, another strategic town to the southwest of Azaz. If IS is able to seize control of Ain al Arab/Kobani, it is highly expected to focus in the next stage on taking over more areas north of Aleppo to completely isolate the city from its northern rural parts, and will attempt to progress towards Azaz and Afrin, also controlled by Kurdish forces (*As Safir 2014/08/14*, *AFP 2014/08/14*, *Al Hayat 2014/08/26*).

3.1.4 Access

All opposition-held areas received very little to no humanitarian assistance in the last 6 months due to significant access constraints (*OCHA 2014/08/28*). The situation is particularly severe in opposition-held eastern Aleppo. The only supply route into eastern Aleppo is heavily damaged and subject to targeted attacks and sniper fire. All supplies for the area including food, NFI and fuel for vehicles and generators are entered through this route (*IPS 2014/08/11*). In mid-August, as a result of negotiations with all parties, the ICRC received the authorisations it needed to deliver food, hygiene items, towels, blankets, mattresses, rechargeable lights, buckets and candles to over 30,000 people living in Jisr Al Hajj, across the opposition-held areas on the eastern side of Aleppo (*ICRC 2014/08/15*). Access to opposition-held areas in Aleppo is expected to decline in the near future; in fact, more restrictions are expected, especially if IS gains control of more areas in northern Aleppo, which will mean less access to the city via the main supply route stretching from Azaz to the eastern parts of the city.

Armed groups, including the Islamic Front, Jaish al-Mujahideen and Jabhat al-Nusra further continue to besiege Nubbul and Zahra, and no assistance has been able to enter the two towns since 8 May (*UNSC 2014/07/23*).

Due to the besiegement by IS forces and restricted border policies by the Government of Turkey (GoT), Ain al Arab/Kobani was facing acute problems with humanitarian access. Despite the passing of UNSCR 2165 in July, the four crossings specified in the resolution's text do not include the border crossing between Ain al Arab/Kobani and Turkey, neglecting an estimated 400,000 people living in Ain al Arab/Kobani sub-district, including many IDPs. This means that no urgently needed supplies, including medical supplies and other life-saving materials, will be able to reach the area directly (*Rudaw 2014/07/17*).

The risk of kidnapping and attacks on humanitarian workers in Aleppo remains high. Two Italian humanitarian workers were reported to have been kidnapped in the rebel-held parts of Aleppo City on 31 July (*Ara News 2014/08/07*). Checkpoints monitored by multiple armed actors as well as staff arrests and detentions have continued to hamper humanitarian operations (PI).

3.1.5 Displacement

According to OCHA, as of August 2014, Aleppo is hosting 1,787,000 IDPs. The largest number of IDPs (625,000) are concentrated in the western side of Aleppo City (*OCHA 2014/08/28*).

In July, thousands of Kurds were reportedly displaced from their villages in the eastern and western outskirts of Kobani City towards the city centre, which is inhabited by some 120,000 civilians (*Assafir 2014/07/08*). The large-scale battle on Ain al Arab/Kobani in September caused another mass wave of displacement, with people from eastern and western villages of the sub-district reported to be heading towards the town of Ain al Arab/Kobani, and attempting to cross the border towards Turkey. The estimated number of refugees having crossed into Turkey stands at 169,000 people, but the number will increase rapidly should IS take sudden control of Ain al Arab/Kobani town - which, according to UNHCR, might increase the number up to 400,000 people (*Reuters 2014/09/22*, *Reuters 2014/09/23*).

In August, villages in the outskirts of Aghtrin witnessed mass displacement due to clashes between IS and opposition factions. Activists from the area reported that hundreds of families left their homes in search of safety and security, and other reports indicated displacement from the city of Mare'a after IS fighters started shelling the city (*Assafir 2014/08/14*). Fighting increased between Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) in the area between Aghtrin, Al Qarama and Fafeen. This forced the secondary displacement of families further towards the rural areas north of Aleppo. Over 30,000 people are said to be affected by this fighting. (PI)

3.1.6 Humanitarian Needs

Health

Doctors and hospitals in Aleppo continue to be targeted, resulting in severe constraints to accessing health services. Due to the frequent targeting of health facilities, the location of medical facilities has to be kept confidential and changes frequently, further compromising access to, and the quality of health services (*IPS 2014/08/11*). According to Physicians for

Human Rights, as of July, Aleppo experienced the greatest number of attacks on health facilities, with 52 attacks, of which 13 were barrel bombs (PHR 2014/07/23).

Impact of indiscriminate attacks and barrel bombing: Furthermore, armed groups such as IS reportedly continue to detain and kill medical personnel, and occupy hospitals (UNHRC). It was reported that Al-Seddik Charity Islamic Hospital in Talmenes, Maarat An Numan and Al Quds in Aleppo City were closed temporarily due to AOGs not respecting the neutrality of medical facilities (PI). Due to the severe shortage of medical staff, including trained and specialised medical professionals, civil volunteers, oftentimes without adequate training, are reported to be the only available staff providing emergency health care in many instances. Training is particularly important in carrying out extraction procedures during search and rescue operations following barrel bombing, so as to prevent aggravating injuries, including paralysing spinal injuries. For the past four months, rescue workers have been receiving a salary from the government-in-exile and courses from a number of foreign bodies and governments. Entry-level first responders are given a salary of 175 dollars, while the heads of the various centres receive 200 (IPS 2014/08/18).

A recent study indicates that the civilian death toll in Aleppo since the start of the war is approximately 4,090, most of which (2,891) were killed by shrapnel from explosions, while the second reason behind the deaths is gunfire (sniper gunshots, random gun shooting or other) (Assafir 2014/07/23). One of the main protection concerns in Aleppo continues to be barrel bombing and indiscriminate targeting of the civilian population, particularly children. In July, heavy destruction was reported in Bab al-Nairab, al-Mashhad, and Maadi neighbourhoods (AFP 2014/07/11, Ara News 2014/07/18, AFP 2014/07/28, AFP 2014/08/09, AFP 2014/08/31, AlHayat 2014/08/17). According to medical personnel, most barrel bomb victims had multiple wounds and experienced burns, loss of eyesight and peripheral vascular injuries from blunt trauma to extremities, often leading to amputations (UNHRC).

Shortages of medicines, water and electricity: Medical staff reports that antibiotics, water, electricity and trained staff were in short supply or lacking entirely. Moreover, health facilities report the lack of funding as being an additional constraint to provision of health services: the local council can afford to provide funds only to some medical facilities that do not receive any from other donors (IPS 2014/08/11).

The lack of maintenance for vehicles and poor road conditions resulted in the death of patients unable to reach the few existing medical centres. Communication is possible only via walkie-talkie, because there is no mobile phone reception, further limiting effective referrals (IPS 2014/08/18).

Polio vaccinations are ongoing in the governorate. SARC Aleppo reported to have delivered the polio vaccine to the northern and eastern rural areas of Aleppo across the Aleppo-Damascus highway. This vaccination round was conducted by mobile teams in early September and will be followed by two campaigns between 9-23 October and 23-27 November (SARC 2014/09/04).

Protection

Protection abuses in Aleppo are perpetrated by a variety of armed groups and include arbitrary detention, summary executions and collective punishment as well as child recruitment. As IS has expanded its control of areas in eastern Aleppo governorate, public executions are reported in Menbij, Al Bab and Jarablus (OHCHR 16/06/2014, Ara News 2014/07/25).

Arbitrary detention and executions are often based on one's affiliation with a particular armed group or party to the conflict, theft, murder and other criminal acts. On 29 May, IS fighters in Menbij abducted 153 Kurdish schoolboys, aged 13 and 14 years old, as they returned to Ain al-Arab from Aleppo City, where they had taken their year-end examinations. As of August 2014, approximately 130 of the 153 students continue to be held. (STC 2014/09/18)

Based on reports of local Kurdish officials and photographic evidence, IS forces used cluster munitions on 12 July and 14 August during fighting around Ain al-Arab (Kobani). The area is still under the control of Kurdish forces from the People's Protection Units (YPG). This is believed to be the first known use of cluster munitions by the Islamic State, though GoS forces have killed and wounded civilians with air-delivered cluster munitions (HRW 2014/09/01).

Child Recruitment: All parties to the conflict were reported to have used children in non-combat support roles and to further recruit children for their combat operations. Popular Committees operating in Aleppo City were reported to have recruited and used children as messengers, informants and guards, which exposes them to retaliation and punishment. A member of an armed group stated that 16- and 17-year-old armed pro-Government fighters had been captured during military assaults, further stating that children caught performing reconnaissance for government forces would be detained indefinitely as a security measure.

Multiple accounts from Aleppo describe children aged 6-13 years used by government forces as part of coordinated military operations to locate armed group fighters prior to attack. Fighters operating in Aleppo acknowledged that their ranks contained children under the age of 18 (OHCHR 16/06/2014). Islamic Front-affiliated and other armed groups have recruited, trained and used children in active combat roles. According to an account about an IS training camp in Al-Bab, IS actively recruited children aged 14-15 to undergo the same training as adults, offering financial rewards. At the camps, the recruited children received weapons training and religious education. Doctors working in field hospitals in Aleppo reported that they regularly treat minors injured in combat. Parents explained that children in Al-Sukkari neighbourhood, Aleppo City, who joined armed group battalions around the age of 15 were motivated by poverty and desperation (OHCHR 16/06/2014).

Food

Prices of bread decreased significantly in Aleppo. As reported by ACU, the price of a bag of unsubsidised bread in July 2014 stood at about 77 SYP, whereas it stood at an average of 105 SYP in November 2013 (SINA 2013/11). The decrease could be linked to the fact that after IS took control of significant parts of Aleppo, it began providing wheat flour and fuel to bakeries, mainly due to their control of wheat silos in north-east Syria and oil-fields in the east, which provided the group with the necessary financial resources to subsidise or provide these commodities free of charge. In addition, in 2014 humanitarian assistance has been further provided to Aleppo, particularly in the form of wheat flour.

WASH

In July, an estimated 2.5 million people in Aleppo City were affected by water shortages following the shutdown and subsequent breakdown of three out of four of the city's pumping stations on 2 June. Water has stopped flowing not only into government-held areas, but into the majority of Aleppo City. Despite negotiations, technical experts and humanitarian actors have not gained access to the site near the Suleiman al Halabi pumping station to conduct necessary repairs, and so the pumping capacity remains at only 50%. As a result, up to 700,000 people in western Aleppo City and thousands more in the east are in need of urgent assistance to meet their minimum daily water needs. IDPs living in crowded shelters at the edge of the city and host communities lacking the financial resources to purchase drinking water are among the most affected.


Additionally, many people, including vulnerable children, are relying on unsafe drinking water found in a large number of wells in private compounds, thereby increasing their exposure to water-borne diseases. In some areas, bottled water is the only source of drinking water. Distributions to people in need are made via small networks, water trucking and installation of water tanks. While the repair of the pumping station remains the key bottleneck to responding to the water shortages, WASH partners in Aleppo are supporting alternative modalities to increase safe access to water, including the upgrading of 80 wells (OCHA 2014/07/30, SOS 2014/09/12, Al-Akhbar 2014/07/25). The water shortage has turned a vital resource into a hot trading item in a city where the price of 20 cubic meters of water has risen to 20,000 SYP (~130 USD). Additionally, some people have desperately tried to dig wells themselves (SOS 2014/09/12).

Education

In Aleppo, Damascus and Dara'a, armed forces use schools for military purposes, depriving children of education and exposing educational facilities to attack. The Saleh Jemel primary school in Al-Sabeel is used as military barracks and firing post. The school and the surrounding area are regularly shelled (OHCHR 16/06/2014).

Additionally, Save the Children reported in August that only 6% of children continue to attend school in Aleppo. (STC 2014/09/18)

3.2 AL-HASAKEH



People in need	582,000
	OCHA 06/14
	128,100
	Dynamo 07/14, 8/16 sub-districts covered (50%)
	653,800
	SINA 11/13, 11/16 sub-districts covered (69%)

3.2.1 Key Issues and Possible Developments

- Al-Hasakeh has seen ongoing fighting, primarily between IS and the YPG. Although overall conflict incidents appear to have declined, the last quarter has seen major disruptions as IS attempts to expand its territory.
- Widespread fighting and the control of roads by armed groups have severely limited both humanitarian access and the free movement of the local population. The UN has described Al-Hasakeh as “a besieged governorate.”
- Major limitations on information and assessment hamper accurate analysis of the situation in the governorate.
- Al-Hasakeh hosts an unknown number of IDPs: estimates vary wildly, from less than 200,000 to 320,000 or more. Though information about their locations is limited, many are concentrated in Hasakeh City and Qamishli, living in informal or inadequate shelters, facing shortages of food, medical care and water, and conditions of generalised violence.

- The vulnerable population also includes some 60,000 Syrian returnees, primarily from Iraq, and 9,000 recently arrived Iraqi refugees, who fled across the border in the face of IS' advance on Sinjar in August.
- Al-Hasakeh is vulnerable due to pre-existing poverty and an agricultural sector severely impacted by drought.

3.2.2 Context


Al Hasakeh is a large, predominantly rural governorate. To the north, the population is primarily Kurdish, to the south, Arab, though it is also home to a number of minorities including Turkmen and Yazidis. Its main economic activities pre-conflict were oil production and agriculture, and it has long suffered from high poverty levels, and a limited water supply. Al Hasakeh is particularly vulnerable due to the drought that has persisted since 2006, which has seriously damaged farmers' and herders' income and supplies. (WFP 28/08/2014, SARC 19/08/2014).

3.2.3 Armed conflict

IS continues its push to capture key areas and border crossings, to consolidate its core territories in northwestern Syria (Raqqa) and Iraq (Mosul, Fallujah), and divide and isolate its Kurdish opponents. Key conflict areas have included:

- **Jaza'a** – A small town near the Ya'robayah-Rabia border crossing, on the road connecting it to central Al-Hasakeh. IS has contested this area in what is likely to be an attempt to cut off Kurdish forces at the border from the rest of the governorate, and also as a base to advance on the border crossing itself. (Rudaw 04/08/2014, ARA 2014/07/24, ISW 22/08/2014, Syria HR 22/08/2014, Serpent Libertainre 22/08/2014, SOHR 29/08/2014)
- **Ras Al Ain** – Hasakeh's northwestern border crossing with Turkey, currently held by the YPG. IS control of the town would divide the Kurdish region of Syria, and could allow IS access to a flow of goods and fighters from Turkey. (Rudaw 04/08/2014, ISW 09/08/2014, ISW 08/07/2014)
- **Regiment 121** – A Syrian military base, with a commanding position in central Al-Hasakeh, which was used to target militants in the surrounding countryside. IS captured it on 27 August, after heavy fighting, and though local media have reported that Syrian Kurdish YPG forces quickly retook the base and surrounding areas, videos released in early August purport to show IS fighters taking control of the regiment's assets, including tanks, truck-mounted rocket launchers and long-range artillery. (ISW 08/07/2014, AFP 2014/07/24, Daily Star 07/28/2014, Assafir 25/07/2014, UNSC 28/08/2014, LWJ 06/08/2014, Huffington Post 07/08/2014, ARA 2014/07/27, ARA 2014/07/29)
- **Hasakeh City** – The governorate capital has seen ongoing conflicts between SAF and YPG, and between both and IS fighters, particularly in the eastern, predominantly Arab neighbourhood of Ghuweiran, which leaned towards IS control but was reportedly brought under control of combined YPG and GoS forces in September. (ISW 22/09/2014, Syria Direct 03/09/2014, ISW 08/07/2014, ARA 2014/07/26, Kurdwatch 07/08/2014, SOHR 29/08/2014, Syria Direct 14/08/2014, WFP 29/08/2014, Assafir 15/07/2014)
- **Qamishli** – A major city in Syrian Kurdistan, Qamishli is divided between the PYD and the Syrian Government, and access is limited due to the closure of the Turkish border, and IS control of many roads. (REACH 18/08/2014, ISW 08/07/2014, ISW 26/07/2014, ISW 03/07/2014, ARA 2014/07/26, ARA 2014/07/24)

Conflict incidents Al-Hasakeh Apr - Sep 2014



3.2.4 Access

Syrian Kurdish PYD controls the Ya'robayah border crossing into Iraq, however the Iraqi side, Rabia, was attacked by IS in early August, and along with the surrounding area has been the site of fierce fighting. (Al Akhbar 08/08/2014, Rudaw 05/08/2014, ARA 06/08/2014, ISW 02/09/2014, ISW 02/10/2014) The border crossing was one of those to be used for delivery of aid to opposition-held areas under UNSC 2165, but has been inaccessible. (UN 14/07/2014)

Simalka-Pesh Khabur informal crossing between Al-Hasakeh and the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KR-I) remains closed to Syrians to enter Iraq, but was used for the return to Iraq of Iraqis who had been evacuated to Al-Hasakeh from Sinjar through a safe corridor created by the YPG. (REACH 28/08/2014) The border has also been open for the return of Syrians to Al-Hasakeh from the Kurdish Region of Iraq. In July and August, UNHCR records more than 10,000 Syrians who returned, primarily to Al-Hasakeh. (UNHCR 31/08/2014, UNHCR 16/08/2014, UNHCR 31/07/2014, UNHCR 16/07/2014)

Al-Hasakeh has not benefited from the improvements in access resulting from cross-border delivery of aid to opposition-held areas, due to IS control of the major roads to Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, and the closure or inaccessibility of major border points. This both limits humanitarian access and essentially traps the population of the governorate, with the only way in or out being very limited flights to Damascus and Lattakia from Qamishli airport. All means of communication have frequently been out of service. (OCHA 26/08/2014, UNHCR 07/09/2014) On 22 July, UN agencies resumed airlifts to Qamishli. (OCHA 16/07/2014, WFP 05/08/2014, WFP 2014/07/22)

WFP estimates that more than 190,000 people in the governorate are in need of food assistance, and airlifts to Qamishli have reached less than 30% of them. (UNSC 28/08/2014, UNSC 28/08/2014, WFP 02/09/2014, WFP 29/08/2014) A single UN inter-agency mission reached Ras Al Ain to deliver core relief items in April, the only one since the beginning of the conflict. (UNHCR 30/06/2014)

3.2.5 Displacement

Estimates of displacement in Al-Hasakeh vary widely. According to SINA, in late 2013 there were 320,000 IDPs in the governorate. (SINA 31/12/2013) In June, OCHA estimated the number at 197,500. (OCHA 26/08/2014) This is one of three governorates in which OCHA's IDP estimate has actually decreased, from 207,000 in late 2013. (OCHA 16/04/2013) In July, ACU's Dynamic Monitoring Report (Dynamo) indicated there were 122,000 IDPs residing in eight of Al-Hasakeh's 16 sub-districts (not including Al-Hasakeh sub-district, reportedly one of the most affected). (ACU 08/08/2014)

The ongoing conflict means the number of displaced may have increased considerably since all of these assessments:

- The UN said fighting between IS, the SAF and other groups displaced 250,000 people in Deir-ez-Zor, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Hasakeh and the Kurdish areas of northern Aleppo between 18 June and 21 July. (UNSG 23/07/14)
- WFP reports that fighting in early August displaced up to 10,000 more people from the villages of Al-Homr, Sabeh Secoor, Al Ghazl, Mjebra, Dube and Tahya, as well as from southern suburbs of Hasakeh City to safer parts of the city and to Qamishli. There was also conflict-induced displacement from the town of Ya'robiyah. (WFP 19/08/2014)
- On 1 September, a Syrian opposition rights organisation claimed 60,000 or more had fled Hasakeh City's Ghuweiran district over three days in response to GoS air raids. (AFP 01/09/2014) Previous reports from August also cited large-scale displacement. (Syria Direct 14/08/2014)
- WFP reports that daily airstrikes on the southern rural villages of Al-Hole and Tal Hmis led to the displacement of entire populations to poor neighbourhoods of Hasakeh City. (WFP 2014/07/22)

In addition, IS' advance on Sinjar (northern Iraq) caused some 150,000 Iraqis to flee across the border into Hasakeh with the assistance of the YPG. Most later crossed back into Iraq via the Simalka-Pesh Khabur informal crossing, but as of 26 August, UNHCR reported that approximately 6,000 Iraqi refugees remained in Newroz camp, and an estimated 3,000 more were residing in nearby areas. (USAID 05/09/2014, USAID 2014/08/28)

OCHA also estimated Hasakeh had some 60,500 Syrian returnees in June. (OCHA 26/08/2014) In July and August, UNHCR records more than 10,000 Syrians who returned to Syria from Iraq through the Pesh Khabur crossing, many likely to Al-Hasakeh. (UNHCR 31/08/2014, UNHCR 15/08/2014, UNHCR 31/07/2014, UNHCR 16/07/2014)

3.2.6 Humanitarian Needs

As of June, OCHA estimated there were 582,000 people in need in Al-Hasakeh. In addition to the internally displaced and returnees, that number included about 324,000 people affected in their original communities. (OCHA 26/08/2014) Most affected areas include:

- Al-Hasakeh subdistrict: more than 60% of all people in need,
- Qamishli and Be'r Al-Hulo Al-Wardeyyeh subdistricts: more than 50% of all people in need,
- Ras Al Ain subdistrict: about 30% of people in need,
- Southern subdistricts of Areesheh, Markada, Shadadah and Hole, with small populations, but high proportions of people in need.

But in general, there is a serious lack of assessment information coming out of Al-Hasakeh due to the limited humanitarian access

Protection

Civilians are at risk from attacks by IS on civilian targets, indiscriminate attacks by GoS and YPG forces, and occasional infighting between GoS and YPG, or between Kurdish groups. Severe restrictions on movement mean much of the population of Al-Hasakeh has limited options for fleeing conflict zones.

In Hasakeh City, particularly the Ghuweiran neighbourhood, civilians have been exposed to injury from car bombs, grenade attacks, and mortar fire. (ISW 26/07/2014, ARA 11/08/2014, ARA 2014/07/29, ARA 2014/07/25) In mid-August, 11 civilians were killed in attacks alternatively attributed to SAF airstrikes and YPG bombardment. (Janes 18/08/2014, Anadolu Agency 13/08/2014, Mesop 13/08/2014) Similar concerns exist in Qamishli. (ARA 2014/07/24)

IS controls substantial amounts of territory in Al-Hasakeh, and all populations under IS rule are at risk of serious violence (see section 2.1 - Sectoral Analysis: Protection).

Health

Al-Hasakeh faces a serious shortage of health facilities, followed by shortages of medicine, staff and vaccines: Dynamo rates health care as the first priority need in six of the eight surveyed subdistricts in Al-Hasakeh. Of the surveyed population, 181 people are reported to have died from deterioration of health conditions, 80 of them children under 5 -- one of the highest rates in the country. (ACU 08/08/2014)

Of Al-Hasakeh's 91 public health centres, 35 are non-functioning, and 17 only partially functioning. Three of those have been destroyed, and six damaged by conflict. (WHO/MoH 06/2014-2) The government hospital in Ras Al Ain is non-functioning, and one of the two in Hasakeh City has been damaged, according to reporting by the WHO and the Syrian Ministry of Health. However, four of Al-Hasakeh's five public hospitals are functioning. (WHO/MoH 06/2014) Frequent power cuts affect the functionality of medical facilities overall, particularly vaccine storage. (IFRC 2014/04/16)

Small key-informant assessments in Qamishli and Hasakeh City (not covered by Dynamo) also indicate severe, life-threatening health issues in portions of both cities, and major concerns throughout. Highlighted issues include:

- Almost complete lack of emergency services in PYD-controlled areas of Qamishli, and in all of Hasakeh City, especially the contested eastern areas,
- Highly limited growth and nutrition services in all areas,
- Highly limited medical consultations in all areas,
- Insufficient vaccination coverage in all areas, major problem with communicable diseases,
- Lack of treatment for both chronic and communicable diseases,
- Lack of drugs and medications,
- Overall lack of health centres in PYD-controlled areas of Qamishli,
- Large numbers of conflict-related injuries in the eastern part of Hasakeh City,
- Overall, access to health services is better in Syrian government controlled areas than in areas controlled by the PYD, or contested areas. (REACH 26/08/2014-1, REACH 26/08/2014-2)

Livelihoods and Food Security

Dynamo estimates 128,000 people across the surveyed subdistricts are in need of food security assistance. Food security was rated the second or third priority need in all subdistricts surveyed. The report notes a serious shortage of functioning bakeries in the south, mostly due to lack of electricity, flour and fuel, secondarily to security issues and water shortages. Prices for subsidised bread in Al-Hasakeh are believed to be highest in the country, and public bakeries make up 80% of those surveyed.

Key-informant assessments in July indicated severe, life-threatening food security issues in portions of both cities, and major concerns throughout:

- Limited food availability and diversity in markets,
- Rising prices, and lack of resources to purchase food,
- Lack of cooking fuel,
- Non-functional bakeries due to lack of flour, electricity, and machinery,
- Loss of agricultural assets, and lack of resources to grow food.
- In the eastern zone of Hasakeh City, which includes the contested neighbourhood of Ghuweiran, worries about physical security and movement impediments such as checkpoints are also highlighted,
- At most risk are IDPs, particularly those in informal shelters, who are more prone to food insecurity in general, however local communities are also facing challenges. (REACH 26/08/2014-1, REACH 26/08/2014-2)

Prior to the conflict, Al-Hasakeh was heavily dependent on agriculture, but its resilience had been severely affected by years of drought, and the resulting loss of agricultural stock. The conflict has exacerbated these problems, creating long-term concerns about food security and recovery. (WFP 28/08/2014, SARC 19/08/2014, ARA News 2014/04/14)

WASH

Al-Hasakeh is facing significant water shortages, primarily due to frequent, prolonged power cuts and conflict damage to water networks. (UNICEF 14/07/2014) Reports indicate electricity is only available for 3-4 hours/ day in some areas of the governorate, including Qamishli. (UNHCR 07/09/2014, Daily Star 2014/05/22) A local news source reported that the continued power-related cuts in Qamishli City have left the population entirely dependent on digging wells, particularly in outlying areas. (ARA News 2014/06/12, Tishreen 2014/05/18) There are reports of displaced in Hasakeh City forced to drink from shallow, polluted wells and “holes in the ground.” (WFP 2014/07/22)

Dynamo rates water as the first priority in two southern subdistricts, second in two others, and third in two in the north. The area also has a low number of native water sources, of limited quality, particularly the south. (ACU 08/08/2014)

Assessments in Qamishli and Hasakeh City indicate severe, life-threatening drinking water issues in portions of both cities, and major concerns throughout. In addition to lack of power and fuel, highlighted concerns included damage to infrastructure, lack of water treatment chemicals, and in some places, physical constraints due to conflict. The situation in the contested eastern area of Hasakeh City is rated critical. (REACH 26/08/2014-1, REACH 26/08/2014-2)

A REACH assessment of two informal IDP settlements in Al-Hasakeh also indicated WASH as a severe issue. Neither camp met SPHERE standards: inhabitants were getting 6 litres of water /person /day, and averaged 56 inhabitants per latrine. These conditions may not be representative of IDPs in the governorate as a whole. (REACH 04/09/2014)

Information on the condition of sewage systems in urban areas, particularly those with large concentrations of IDPs, appears to be a major gap.

“Reports indicate electricity is only available for 3-4 hours/ day in some areas of the governorate, including Qamishli”


Shelter/NFI

Though reports indicate there are large numbers of IDPs staying in urban areas of Al-Hasakeh, information on their distribution, shelter situation, resources and intentions remains a major gap.

Education

According to Dynamo, 80% of schools in the half of Al-Hasakeh surveyed remain in service. (ACU 08/08/2014) However, it is worth noting again that Dynamo does not look at some of the governorate’s most conflict-affected areas. Detailed information about the condition and accessibility of schools governorate-wide remains a major gap, as is information on attendance.

3.3 AR-RAQQA



People in need	490,000 OCHA 06/14
	808,000 Dynamo 07/14, 10/10 sub-districts covered (100%)
	507,000 SINA 11/13, 7/10 sub-districts covered (70%)

3.3.1 Key Issues and Possible Developments

IS advance on and capture of the last GoS controlled military bases in Ar-Raqqa is a significant development, as this change in control on the ground will likely force the Syrian Government to be more active in combatting IS, using air raids and ground-to-ground missiles.

Access of humanitarian agencies functioning inside Syria to Ar-Raqqa is expected to stay highly restricted in the near future, due to insecure roads, restriction of movement and a high level of interference with humanitarian activities by IS.

IS has been responsible for severe protection violations affecting both the civilian population and


armed forces. Protection violations include beheadings, crucifixions and mass executions, child recruitment, and forced marriages.

High levels of damage to health infrastructure and reduced access to health facilities and disruption of vaccination activities in Ar-Raqqa have resulted in an increased morbidity in the Governorate, particularly affecting women, children and displaced populations. Cases of measles, typhoid and acute jaundice syndrome have been reported.

3.3.2 Context

Since March 2013, Ar-Raqqa city has been under control of AOG. On June 29, the IS claimed the city as the capital of its self-declared caliphate. Of all areas under its control, IS governance is strongest in Ar-Raqqa governorate and the population is subject to stringent regulations, affecting freedom of movement, trade and access to law and order. IS tightly controls media and humanitarian access. As a result, information available on the humanitarian situation is often unreliable and incomplete.

3.3.3 Armed Conflict



In the third quarter of 2014, IS captured the last three GoS-held military bases, and as such GoS forces have lost their remaining control of Ar-Raqqa Governorate. This is a significant development, as this change in control on the ground will likely force the Syrian Government to be more active in combatting IS, using air raids and ground-to-ground missiles. In response to losing its areas of control in the governorate, GoS struck Ar-Raqqa City, and the cities of Al Mansoura and Al Tabqa. The air strikes also targeted Ar-Raqqa

National hospital on 28 July, killing 5 civilians and wounding several others, including doctors and nurses (*Ara News 2014/07/28, Al Akhbar 2014/07/10, Daily Star 2014/08/07, Al Jazeera 2014/07/26*).

The dramatic loss of Ar-Raqqa and the large number of casualties of GoS forces caused great anger in the pro-government coastal areas of Syria, prompting some protests (*The Wall Street Journal 2014/08/24, Al Arabiya 2014/08/24, Daily Mail 2014/08/28*).

IS resources have been replenished with large amounts of weaponry from the captured GoS bases. Large numbers of fighters are reportedly joining IS from various tribes and from other opposition groups inside Syria. Given its current strength and access to resources, a defeat of IS on the ground in the near future is unlikely, whereas air strikes on their bases and strongholds will only be a short-term solution (*The Washington Institute 2014/08/27*).

There has been no significant changes in areas of control in northern Ar-Raqqa, where IS fights PYD, until mid-September. In mid-September, however, IS launched a large-scale offensive against PYD-held areas starting from the rural parts of Tal Abiad and Ain Issa. It was able to achieve significant progress in the area, and even lay the town of Ain al Arab/Kobani (Aleppo) under siege after 3 weeks of battles.

3.3.4 Access

Owing to insecure roads, which have prevented access since June, Ar-Raqqa remained the only governorate WFP was unable to reach with assistance (*WFP 2014/07/22*). The planned target for July could not be reached primarily due to insecure access routes, particularly in the northeast. As a result, approximately 284,300 people could not be reached with the planned food assistance in Ar-Raqqa (*UNSC 21/08/2014, ACU 2014/07*).

Access of humanitarian agencies functioning inside Syria to Ar-Raqqa is expected to stay highly restricted in the near future, due to IS closely monitoring and interfering with humanitarian activities. Only local partners can carry out humanitarian operations, although this has led to activities not being implemented due to a lack of local partners.

The border crossing at Akcakale, Turkey, the most direct route to reach Ar-Raqqa Governorate, has been closed to humanitarian assistance since January 2014. As a result, lifesaving food and medical supplies for Ar-Raqqa have to enter from the Bab Al Salama crossing, over 250 km northwest of Ar-Raqqa City, adding additional time, risk and cost to aid delivery (PI).

3.3.5 Displacement

No significant population movements were recorded in Ar-Raqqa in the last quarter, and available information about population movements is limited and by times contradictory. As of August, OCHA reported 177,000 IDPs with some 94,000 IDPs in Ar-Raqqa City alone as reported by REACH (*ACU 2014/07, OCHA 2014/xx/xx, REACH 2014/08*).

In the wake of US air strikes on IS strongholds in Syria in late September, there have been reports of people fleeing Ar-Raqqa City. It is reported that IS fighters are spreading among civilians and occupying FSA and old regime headquarters, which are in civilian areas. In the case of air strikes against these targets, civilian casualties are to be expected. To date, there is no information about the number of people fleeing Ar-Raqqa City (*Guardian 2014/09/16*).

There are unrecorded cases of displacement in the cities of Al Tabqa and Ar-Raqqa, where people who had been expropriated had to flee to various areas, including opposition-held areas in rural Aleppo and Idlib, and towards Turkey. It remains difficult to estimate their numbers with the absence of civil and humanitarian actors on the ground.

3.3.6 Humanitarian Needs

IS has reportedly begun to provide electricity, water, and salaries; controls traffic; and runs nearly everything from bakeries, schools, courts and mosques. Residents say much of IS's power lies in its efficient and pragmatic ability to govern and provide basic services, which have been absent or intermittent as a result of the conflict. IS leadership has separated military operations from civilian administration, assigning fighters only as police and soldiers (*Reuters 2014/09/04*).

Protection

In Ar-Raqqa, residents reported restrictions on basic rights and freedoms, including movement and assembly. The imposition of a strict interpretation of Shari'a Law previously unseen in the Syrian Arab Republic, setting out regulations on all aspects of life from food to movement, employment and religious observance, has restricted basic freedoms, particularly for women (*Reuters 2014/09/04*).

IS has been responsible for severe protection violations affecting both the civilian population and armed forces. Protection violations include beheadings, crucifixions and mass executions, child recruitment, and forced marriages.

SGBV: In July, a woman was stoned to death publicly in Tabqa by a reported 30 members of IS after being found guilty of adultery by an IS Shari'a court. It was the first execution of its kind by the IS group in Syria, and at least one more stoning was reported in the month of July in Ar-Raqqa City (*Daily Star 2014/07/18*). Violations against women further continued during the reporting period. In the last week of July, IS distributed leaflets listing restrictions on women's dress codes in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, noting that violations would entail severe punishment (*UNSC 21/08/2014*). There were multiple accounts of women who had appeared in public with their faces uncovered being beaten with sticks by patrolling IS fighters. Women were publicly lashed on 26 and 30 April in Ar-Raqqa City for failing to adhere to IS dress code regulations. Female members of IS sometimes administered the lashings (*UNHRC 2014/08/27*). There are also accounts of men being flogged for publicly accompanying an "improperly dressed" female relative.

Collective Punishment: Public squares in major cities such as Ar-Raqqa City have become the sites for amputations, lashings and mock crucifixions throughout Ar-Raqqa Governorate (*UNHRC 2014/08/27*).

Extrajudicial Killings: In July, IS fighters seized a Syrian army base in Ar-Raqqa, killing scores of troops and beheading some of them. The takeover of the base of Division 17 came as the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria said IS fighters accused of atrocities would be added to a list of war crimes indictees. In the two-day assault on the base in Ar-Raqqa, IS killed at least 85 soldiers, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported; more than 50 troops were summarily executed, while others were killed in a double suicide bombing and throughout the assault itself (*AFP 2014/07/26*). Some of the victims appeared to have been decapitated, their heads placed on sticks or metal poles in the centre of Ar-Raqqa City (*UNSC 21/08/2014*).

In Ar-Raqqa City, executions are said to regularly take place in El-Naim Square and at the Al-Sa'a roundabout. Executions were also reported in the sub-districts of Tabqa and Slouk. IS informs residents beforehand and encourages them to attend summary executions and collective punishments. In some cases, by-passers are forced to attend. Children have been

present at the executions, which take the form of beheading or shooting in the head at close range. Before executions, IS fighters announce the victims' crimes. Bodies are placed on public display, often on crucifixes, for up to three days, serving as a warning to local residents. Victims are usually accused of being affiliated with other armed groups, or of violating the IS criminal code. There have also been examples of the execution of men accused of being affiliated with the Syrian National Coalition, or of spying for the Government. The majority of those executed are adult men. IS has also executed several boys, aged between 15 and 17 years, who were reportedly members of other armed groups (UNHRC 2014/08/27).

Arbitrary Detentions: IS fighters reportedly beat individuals held and interrogated them in its detention centres in Ar-Raqqa and Aleppo governorates. Activists recently claimed the group holds more than 1,000 prisoners in secret prisons in Ar-Raqqa alone (*Daily Star 28/04/2014, Amnesty 19/12/2013*). Former detainees in IS detention facilities in Ar-Raqqa reported being held in overcrowded, insect-infested cells. The cells had neither light nor bedding. Detainees received inadequate food and were not permitted to communicate with anyone outside the facility. Forced disappearances, as well as denial of access to judiciary services, extra-judiciary detention and killings have also been reported (UNHRC 2014/08/27, *Guardian 2014/09/16*).

Child Recruitment: It was reported that IS is providing weapons and training to children in organised training camps. Subsequently, children were deployed in active combat during military operations, including suicide-bombing missions. In Ar-Raqqa, children from the age of 10 are reportedly recruited and trained at such IS camps. The recruitment and use of children under 18 is a violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, and using children below the age of 15 in active combat is considered a war crime (UNHRC 2014/08/27). Human Rights Watch further reported incidents of children as young as 10 years having to be treated for injuries suffered during training or service in the IS military camps in Tal Abiad. Children between 12 and 16 years recruited for military service by IS have been reported to serve as guards in prisons, tasked to punish prisoners, man checkpoints, and act as guards for Islamic courts run by IS (*HRW 2014/07, NYT 28/08/2014, ISW 07/2014*).

Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure: Assaults which damaged civilian infrastructure were reported in Ar-Raqqa City, and often carried out indiscriminately (UNSC 21/08/2014). In July, GoS forces bombed the city of Ar-Raqqa with ground-to-ground missiles, while the Syrian Air Force launched several air raids on the city. These GoS air raids over the city resulted in a few hits in the vicinity of the National Hospital of Ar-Raqqa, killing 5 civilians and wounding several others, including doctors and nurses (*Ara News 2014/07/28*).

Housing, Land and Property: There is a growing incidence of homes from local non-Sunnis who fled the area being appropriated in order to house IS fighters. Cases of expropriation have been recorded mainly in Tabqa and Ar-Raqqa cities. The affected families were mainly non-Muslim or secular residents, GoS employees, families supporting opposition groups or families of opposition fighters. Houses were mainly handed to IS migrants who came either from outside of Syria or from other governorates such as Aleppo. To date, there is no available estimate of how many houses have been confiscated and how many people were forced to flee (*Reuters 2014/09/04*).

Health

The public health system in Ar-Raqqa has been severely damaged. The poor health infrastructure and the large influx of IDPs into Rural Ar-Raqqa will further strain these limited resources. According to WHO, 50% of public hospitals in Ar-Raqqa are partially damaged and the vast majority of the 72 health centres are not functioning (42) or only partially functioning (28) (*HeRAMS 14/08/19, HeRAMS 19/08/14*).

Further reports confirm that the lack of medicines and staff are the most reported challenges

confronted by health services in Ar-Raqqa (*ACU 2014/07, Guardian 2014/09/16*).

The majority of reported morbidity in Ar-Raqqa in August were related to fever of unknown origin, acute jaundice syndrome and acute bloody diarrhoea (*ACU-EWARN 2014/09/06*). WHO revealed that there is a risk of a spread of typhoid to the IDP population, as availability of potable water is very limited. Ar-Raqqa is also among the three governorates most affected by measles, sharing a large burden of the 389 confirmed and 2,800 suspected measles cases recorded throughout Syria to date (double the number reported for all of 2013) (*UNSC 21/08/2014*).

Although UNICEF recently managed to vaccinate over 260,000 children against Polio in Ar-Raqqa, efforts are reportedly hampered by insecurity and the general disruption of the health system. This could further increase the risk of communicable disease outbreaks (*OCHA 2014/08/06*).

Education

School enrolment in Ar-Raqqa was reported to be very low, with a limited number of the 1,449 public schools operating in the governorate according to OCHA. In July, ACU assessed 1,166 public schools in the governorate, of which 68% (796) were found to be operational with a capacity for 109,000 students. None of the 6 reported colleges in Ar-Raqqa were functioning as of June. The main reasons given for schools being closed were the lack of funds and the lack of staff, followed by insecurity and the use of schools as shelters for IDPs (*ACU 2014/07*). There are around 100 schools in Ar-Raqqa City, 30 of which are closed due to severe damage incurred from shelling, vandalism or theft. A significant number of teaching staff have been displaced, creating a major gap in education services (*OCHA 2014/08/06*).

It was also reported that girls are more generally prevented from attending school if they don't have a male companion accompanying them to and from the classroom (*Syria Deeply 2014/09/08*).

IS has reportedly invested heavily in educational activities, inducting children into their ideology, with primary and secondary curriculums increasingly including religious education. Trusted local sources stated that IS is going to exclude several subjects from the curriculum this year, including geography, history and other scientific subjects. IS also announced earlier in August that only teachers who attend IS preparation courses on education will be eligible for teaching and receiving salaries in the new school year, which began in September; the ones who do not attend will be banned from their teaching positions. This will have a long term impact on both the comparability of curricula and educational standards across Syria, and the socialisation of a generation of students in a context different from the rest of the country.

The group also accepts women who want to fight; they are trained about "the real Islam" and the reasons for fighting. Islamic education groups are also held in mosques for newly arrived fighters, according to militants in Ar-Raqqa (*Reuters 2014/09/04*).

WASH

In August 2014, OCHA reported that Ar-Raqqa district had the highest WASH needs across the governorate, and was also identified as a priority area by almost all sectors. The governorate as a whole is considered as a hard-to-reach area (*OCHA 2014/08/06*). In July, 335,000 people were reported to be in need of WASH services by ACU's Dynamo (*ACU 2014/07*).

Livelihoods and Food Security

In July, ACU Dynamo reported that around 800,000 people (out of the Governorate's estimated total population of 1.53 million) are in moderate and acute need of food in Ar-Raqqa. The 109 bakeries in Ar-Raqqa reported that the lack of flour is the main reason for their non-functioning, followed by lack of fuel and electricity (ACU 2014/07).


It is reported that residents have limited access to markets, restaurants and public parks. IS checkpoints block the roads, impacting both the population's access to markets and food, as well as the availability of food and supplies to the markets. Women are further reported to have been prohibited from addressing male vendors in the street or travelling without a male relative accompanying them, making the simplest transactions an ordeal. During prayer times, shopkeepers are forced to close and everyone is expected to attend prayers at the mosque. Consequently, most residents scramble to run their errands between the five daily calls to prayer (Syria Deeply 2014/09/08).

IS has been reported to have maintained former government employees in management positions, who are also currently in charge of mills and distributing flour to bakeries. In addition, employees at the Ar-Raqqa Dam, which provides the city with electricity and water, have also remained in their posts. IS's willingness to use former Assad employees displays a pragmatism that residents and activists say has been vital to its success holding onto territory it has captured (Reuters 2014/09/04).

It is reported that food prices are controlled by IS leadership. Traders who manipulate prices are punished, warned and shut down if they are caught again. The group has also imposed Islamic taxes (zakat) on wealthy traders and families (Reuters 2014/09/04).

Fighters and IS employees receive a salary from a department called the Muslim Financial House, which is comparable to a finance ministry and a bank that aims to reduce poverty. IS fighters and recruits receive salaries between \$400 and \$600 per month, a sum sufficient to pay for a basic lifestyle in Syria's poor northeast. One fighter said poor families were given money; a widow may receive \$100 for herself and for each child she has (Reuters 2014/09/04). There are several reports of young men in Ar-Raqqa City having joined IS either because of fear or because of the wages provided by IS, which are also reported to be around \$400 per month (Guardian 2014/09/16). In many areas, IS salaries are the only source of viable income since the conflict began.

3.4 AS-SWEIDA




People in need	133,500
	OCHA 06/14
	Dynamo 07/14: N/A

3.4.1 Key issues and possible developments

In August, over one dozen Druze were reportedly killed by opposition groups in Dama village in the northwestern part of As-Sweida Governorate. There were conflicting reports from local media on the involvement of local Bedouin tribes, the moderate opposition forces, or Jabhat Al Nusra. The attack reportedly prompted SAF operations, which resulted in the killing of one opposition leader. Dama continued to be a hotspot in As-Sweida, with a Damascus-bound bus hitting an IED, resulting in five killed and nine injured. There is concern that this latest attack could inflame sectarian violence among the Druze and Sunnis in the area. (Kuwait News Agency 03/09/2014, Al Masdar 29/08/2014, Naharnet 18/08/2014, Al Monitor 08/2014)

Although it has been one of the least affected governorates to date, there are persistent concerns that As-Sweida is becoming increasingly affected by the conflict, which could lead to displacement of residents and possibly secondary displacement of IDPs who are sheltering there. The presence of Jabhat Al Nusra in neighbouring Dar'a Governorate is likely to be a key driver to the de-stabilisation of As-Sweida.

3.4.2 Context



Mountainous As-Sweida Governorate continues to be one of the least directly affected areas in Syria, however, its population is indirectly affected by weakened livelihoods, lack of fuel, increase in prices and limited access to goods and water supplies. The area is inhabited by Druze communities, which mainly support the GoS, although anti-government protests have sporadically occurred since 2011. Because of its relative stability, the Governorate became host to a growing number of IDPs many of which fled from neighbouring Dar'a. Other IDPs are also in transit towards the eastern Jordanian border crossings. IDP entry and residence in As-Sweida is restricted and closely monitored by GoS forces. (SHARP 2013/12/16)

3.4.3 Access

In June, UNHCR opened a field office in As-Sweida City to oversee its operations in the Governorate, as well as Dar'a and Quneitra. UNHCR was able to send assistance across the border to As-Sweida City and then to distribution points in southern Syria, without having to go through Damascus. (UNSG 21/07/2014)

“There are persistent concerns that As-Sweida is becoming increasingly affected by the conflict, which could lead to displacement of residents and possibly secondary displacement of IDPs who are sheltering there.”

3.4.4 Displacement

According to OCHA estimates, there are about 69,000 IDPs in As-Sweida in July, an increase from its December 2013 estimates of 52,000. About 60% of IDPs are concentrated in As-Sweida City sub-district. Due to restricted border crossings between Dar'a Governorate and Jordan, reliable sources say that more people are transiting through As-Sweida to enter Jordan through the eastern desert, a route which entails significantly more risks and hardship. (OCHA 07/2014, PI 2014/06)

3.4.5 Humanitarian needs


OCHA estimates that there are 133,500 people in need as of July, an increase of over 150% compared to estimates in December 2013. Estimates of IDPs also increased but more modestly by one-third, meaning that a larger proportion of those in need are non-displaced residents who have likely been affected by the IDP influx and the ongoing economic issues, including a lack of livelihoods and low levels of rainfall. (OCHA 07/2014)

During the third quarter, there was minimal publicly available information on As-Sweida, which already experiences under-reporting. Humanitarian information was only available in the health sector; however, there are ongoing concerns, particularly in the WASH and LFS sectors, which were likely affected due to low levels of rainfall.

Health


According to WHO and MoH, As-Sweida's public health facilities remained relatively unscathed by the conflict and continue to function at one of the highest levels in Syria. All three of As-Sweida's public hospitals are functioning (one of which is partially functioning), considered accessible, and have experienced no damage. Among the 92 public health centres, the Governorate records the highest proportion of those that are fully functioning and the second lowest percentage of undamaged facilities nationally. Only one public health centre was reportedly fully damaged and as a result considered non-functional and inaccessible. Despite the generally positive report of As-Sweida's health services, it is likely that they experience shortages of medicines and medical supplies as found across the country according to other reports. (WHO/MoH 14/08/2014, WHO/MoH 14/08/2014)

3.5 DAMASCUS/RURAL DAMASCUS



DAMASCUS

Rural DAMASCUS



People in need	Damascus: 819,950
	Rural Damascus: 1,654,000 ()
	<i>OCHA 06/2014</i>
	Damascus: 298,500
	Rural Damascus: 993,645
	<i>Dynamo 07/2014</i>
	Damascus: 0.15/1 subdistricts covered (15%)
	Rural Damascus: 16/36 subdistricts covered (44%)

3.5.1 Key issues and possible developments

SAF intensified operations on Damascus' eastern outskirts in Jobar and Duma neighbourhood, resulting in hundreds of casualties. These areas are considered particularly strategic for the opposition as it links opposition-controlled Eastern Ghouta (Rural Damascus) to central Damascus. Airstrikes on 2 and 3 September resulted in 10 civilian deaths in Jobar. Duma (Eastern Ghouta) was also subject to heavy attacks which killed 120 people and injured hundreds more in September. The military operation could be a prelude to a negotiated truce, particularly in Jobar, a tactic frequently used by the GoS in opposition-controlled areas of Damascus in the past year. (Al Akhbar 21/07/2014, AFP 22/07/2014, Reuters 02/09/2014, UN 24/09/2014)

In September, Yarmouk residents reported that the public water supply was cut off for most of the month, further exacerbating the health situation in the besieged neighbourhood. It was rumoured that water was cut to divert limited supplies to other parts of the City. In July, over 100 cases of typhoid were reported from the besieged Yarmouk camp due to a severe lack of clean water supplies and fuel to pump the water from wells. Patients went to the Palestine Hospital amid severe shortages of medicines and supplies due to the siege, although humanitarian aid agencies were able to deliver some medical supplies. (Al Akhbar 21/07/2014, Syrian News 21/07/2014, PI 30/09/2014)

According to OCHA estimates, the number of people in need in Damascus and Rural Damascus is 819,000 and 1.65 million, respectively. The numbers of IDPs are 410,600 in Damascus and 770,000 in Rural Damascus. Damascus Governorate has witnessed a 29% increase in IDPs and a 32% increase in people in need compared to OCHA's December 2013 estimates. Increases in Rural Damascus were minor. While the methodology and sources were not publicly disclosed, it is likely that with the ongoing conflict and border restrictions, more Syrians are being displaced to GoS-controlled areas, where assistance and services are more available and where there is improved security compared to opposition-controlled areas. (OCHA 07/2014)

UN gained access to Madamiyet Elsham for the first time since December 2012 after numerous requests by the UN were ignored, delivering humanitarian assistance to 20,000 people in the besieged areas of the neighbourhood and assisting 10,000 others in surrounding areas. However, Syrian authorities refused to allow the provision of medicines and medical supplies, although mobile clinics were permitted to provide direct treatment. The cross-line mission estimated that 23,000 people currently reside in the besieged area of Madamiyet Elsham. Despite agreements in December and May, the neighbourhood continues to be subject to sporadic shelling and major restrictions on the movement of people and goods in and out of the area. These restrictions have led to high prices of basic commodities and a lack of electricity, due to restrictions on fuel for generators. Only two trucks of food are allowed in each day, leading to strict rationing. Each family is allowed three pieces of bread each day. There is a severe lack of medicines and medical supplies, including vaccines. (SARC 17/07/2014, WFP 22/07/2014, WFP 22/07/2014)

In mid-August, a truce was negotiated between pro-government authorities, local leaders and opposition groups in Qadam and Asali in the southern outskirts of Damascus. The truce called for a ceasefire between armed groups; the withdrawal of SAF to checkpoints at the entrances of the neighbourhood; the release of detainees from the area, particularly women and children; the re-opening of main roads and the establishment of checkpoints. The agreement would also allow opposition fighters to keep their weapons and appoints them responsible for the security of the area. The UN reported that about 4,000 people have returned to the area. Meanwhile, residents of the long-besieged Darayya neighbourhood continued to push for a truce but activists claimed that GoS representatives had withdrawn from talks. (SOHR 21/08/2014, Syrian Observer 26/08/2014, UN 24/09/2014)



“SAF intensified operations on Damascus' eastern outskirts in Jobar and Duma neighbourhood, resulting in hundreds of casualties.”

3.5.2 Context

The Syrian capital and its outskirts remain a key strategic area of control. While the GoS has succeeded in using sieges and intensive airstrike campaigns to negotiate truces with various armed groups located in and around the City, fighting continues between GoS forces and opposition fighters. In addition, infighting among the different armed groups, including between Jabhat Al Nusra, IS, and others increased in the third quarter. The capital continues to be subject to sporadic shelling of civilian areas by opposition groups, leading to dozens of casualties. However, the most severe humanitarian conditions are found in the besieged areas, such as Yarmouk and Eastern and Western Ghouta, which lack access to goods and freedom of movement, and are frequently subjected to heavy attacks. Constraints in delivering humanitarian aid vary between Damascus and Rural Damascus, particularly due to siege tactics, which require GoS approvals from multiple authorities and armed groups.

The Qalamoun region is geographically, socially and politically distinct from other population centres in Rural Damascus. The mountainous area was an opposition stronghold until early 2014 when SAF, supported by Hezbollah, regained control. Despite the GoS' success, opposition fighters remained in hiding in the rugged terrain and continue to launch sporadic attacks against the GoS, which often spillover to Lebanon, as recently experienced in Arsal in August. In the Qalamoun region, the opposition will continue to face limitations due to the cut off of supply routes from Lebanon.

3.5.3 Armed conflict



Insecurity continued throughout Damascus and Rural Damascus during the third quarter. In Damascus City, violence was reportedly concentrated in Jobar, which was heavily targeted by shells and airstrikes. Residential areas of central Damascus witnessed sporadic shelling, particularly from opposition controlled areas in the southern outskirts. In mid-September, Islamist opposition groups announced a campaign to target Central Damascus with rocket fire. In Rural Damascus, infighting between IS and other opposition groups spread from Eastern Ghouta to the southern outskirts of Damascus, resulting in the expulsion of IS from Eastern Ghouta. (UN 24/09/2014)

Infighting between IS and the Islamic Army began in late June in Eastern Ghouta in a bid to push IS to retreat. In mid-July, infighting between the groups spread across other opposition areas, including the southern outskirts of Damascus. IS fighters retreated from Beit Sahm, Mesraba, Meeda and Yalda but remained in other parts of southern outskirts of Damascus. By mid-September, the groups had agreed to a ceasefire. (Al Akhbar 03/07/2014, Al Akhbar 07/07/2014, Al Akhbar 10/07/2014, Al Akhbar 17/07/2014, Al Akhbar 18/07/2014, Assafir 18/07/2014, Assafir 21/07/2014, Al Akhbar 21/07/2014, Assafir 22/07/2014, Syrian Observer 23/07/2014, AFP 12/09/2014)

By mid-August, SAF, supported by Hezbollah took over Maliha, Rural Damascus, forcing opposition groups to retreat to other parts of Eastern Ghouta. SAF was reportedly planning to then target Ein Terma. (Assafir 15/08/2014, Assafir 15/08/2014)

In the Qalamoun region (Qara, Ras El Maara), clashes between opposition groups on one side and Hizbollah and SAF re-ignited leading to the incursion into Aarsal, Lebanon in early August. In mid-August, opposition groups claimed to control three areas in Al Maara. (Assafir 18/07/2014, Al Hayat 14/08/2014)

3.5.4 Access

An estimated 196,000 people remain under siege in opposition-controlled areas of Damascus and Rural Damascus governorates, which host the lion's share of Syria's besieged population. The June ceasefire in Yarmouk camp has yet to be implemented, although limited amounts of aid is being allowed to enter. For UNRWA, access to Yarmouk has been largely dependent on the security situation and there have been sporadic incidents which have significantly hampered assistance to the camp. While most of the besieged populations have received sporadic international assistance, Darayya neighbourhood in particular has gone the longest without receiving any assistance. This is likely due to the strong GoS restrictions, due to the presence of a significant number of fighters. Negotiations are reportedly focused on the surrender of medium-sized weaponry and the release of detainees. (UNSG 21/08/2014, UNRWA 03/10/2014)

Despite a truce agreement in late June, which has yet to be fully implemented, UNRWA was not given access to the besieged Yarmouk camp until 7 July. UNRWA has been permitted to provide food and medical supplies to about 200-350 each day, however there have been a couple of seven to ten day periods where distributions were not permitted due to insecurity. Due to restrictions, two Palestinian reportedly died due to the lack of adequate medical care in August, according to reliable sources. (OCHA 30/07/2014, PI 19/08/2014)

3.5.5 Displacement

In mid-September, heavy clashes in Quneitra Governorate forced at least 25,000 people to flee to Qatana, Rural Damascus. The influx is expected to continue, further overwhelming the limited services and shelter available in Qatana. (ICRC 15/09/2014)

3.5.6 Humanitarian needs

No information was reported on livelihoods, food security, WASH or education during the reporting period.

Health

According to the WHO HeRAMS, the difference in the availability of public health services between Damascus and Rural Damascus is stark. This is due to the higher intensity of conflict in Rural Damascus as well as its high concentration of besieged areas, which lack access to basic medicines and medical supplies. Damascus, in comparison to other governorates, has a relatively high level of accessibility to assistance, medicines, medical supplies and health staff.

Damascus: Nationally, Damascus has one of the highest levels of functioning and accessible public health services. All 10 public hospitals are functioning, two of which are partially functioning, while only one has experienced damage. 84% of public health centres are physically accessible and provide services to the civilian population. 87% of health centres are partially or fully functioning and 93% have experienced partial to no damage. (WHO/MoH 14/08/2014, WHO/MoH 14/08/2014)

Rural Damascus: Nationally, Rural Damascus' public health services reported low levels of functionality and accessibility. 54% of its hospitals are functioning at some level and 54% are fully or partially damaged. In terms of accessibility, Rural Damascus' health centres are the fourth lowest, with 34% inaccessible to the majority of the civilian population. 34% of public health centres have been completely damaged. (WHO/MoH 14/08/2014, WHO/MoH 14/08/2014)

Protection

In late June, SAF reportedly targeted medical facilities in Jisrin in Eastern Ghouta. The airstrikes damaged health facilities and caused a number of injuries, including to health staff. These attacks further degraded the extremely limited health services available to the besieged area (UNSG 23/07/2014)

GBV continues to be a major issue throughout Syria and while there is overall a major shortage in available services, populations in Damascus and Rural Damascus appear to be the most served nationally, according to a Protection Cluster report. (Protection Cluster 14/08)

In late July, GoS shelled Maliha, Duma, and Adra, resulting in over a dozen civilian deaths. In early August, 44 people were killed during fighting between the SAF and opposition groups in Duma and Kfar Batna. Opposition shelling of central Damascus also resulted in the deaths of 16 people, including two children, and dozens wounded. (AFP 03/08/2014, AFP 06/08/2014)

Attacks on health facilities: During the third quarter, one health facility was reportedly attacked in Rural Damascus, although the exact location, casualties, or damage information were not reported. (UNSG 21/08/2014)

Attacks on aid workers: A SARC ambulance was targeted by sniper fire near the Palestinian Khan Eshieh camp on the Damascus-Quneitra road. In late August and early September, explosives struck hotels where many UN staff stayed, severely injuring one OCHA personnel. (UNSG 21/08/2014)

“The difference in the availability of public health services between Damascus and Rural Damascus is stark. This is due to the higher intensity of conflict in Rural Damascus as well as its high concentration of besieged areas, which lack access to basic medicines and medical supplies.”

Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI)


UNRWA reported that it is undertaking some emergency reconstruction work to critical infrastructure in Jaramana, Khan Eshieh, and Khan Dunoun Palestinian camps, as well as some rubble clearance. Palestinian areas have experienced major damage, as well as displacement compared to other minority communities in Syria. (UNRWA 03/10/2014)

It was reported that residents of besieged Eastern Ghouta are producing oil products by boiling plastic materials to extract fuel. A litre of fuel is said to sell for about USD 5. While this activity allows some locals to generate some income, the process also presents a number of health risks to the workers. (Syria Deeply 29/09/2014)

According to OCHA, there are 24 'official' collective shelters in Damascus, hosting an estimated 50,000 people. On average, each collective shelter is hosting over 2,000 people, indicating significant overcrowding as many collective shelters are former schools and other public facilities. In Rural Damascus, there are 140 official collective shelters but no information available on the number of IDPs residing there. (OCHA 07/2014)

Unlike previous RAS, there were no reports of attacks on gas pipelines, which frequently cause major shortages and electricity cuts in Damascus and Rural Damascus. This is likely attributed to low overall reporting in Syria during the third quarter.

3.6 DAR'A



People in need	517,000 OCHA 06/14
	170,000 Dynamo 07/14, 2/17 subdistricts covered (12%)

3.6.1 Key issues and possible developments


During the third quarter, conflict continued in Dar'a in population centres, including areas hosting displaced population. In Dar'a, aerial bombardments, including the use of barrel bombs, were reported in opposition-controlled areas of Dar'a City, Dael, Inkhel and Nawa. According to the UN, between 22 and 31 July, over 30 barrel bombs killed 10 civilians, of which five were children. (UNSG 21/07/2014, UNSG 21/08/2014, AFP 05/07/2014, UN 24/09/2014)

UN agencies began delivering cross-border aid directly to Dar'a Governorate from Jordan under UN Security Council Resolution 2165, providing food and NFIs to people in Dar'a City and Maalaqa, in Quneitra Governorate. Due to the challenges in post-distribution monitoring in Syria, it is unclear if there will be a measurable impact on the area's humanitarian needs. There continues to be weak coordination between the UN agencies engaging in cross-border assistance and other aid actors working in the Governorate. (WFP 02/09/2014, WFP 18/09/2014)

3.6.2 Context

Home to the first uprising in March 2011, Dar'a is an ancient transit route between Syria and Jordan, as well as the Gulf states. Since mid-2013, GoS forces asserted control over the Damascus-Dar'a highway but the proliferation of checkpoints on the road limited civilians' access to basic services, as arbitrary arrest detention and physical and sexual abuse were frequently reported to take place at such checkpoints. Since mid-2013, unofficial border restrictions have stemmed the flow of the displaced into Jordan, likely leading to a significant increase of IDPs within the Governorate. Between June and December 2013, the number of IDPs in Dar'a more than doubled from 180,000 to 372,000.

3.6.3 Armed conflict



Active fighting continued around Nawa, which is particularly strategic as the surrounding hills border Quneitra Governorate. The town of Sheikh Saed, south of Nawa, reportedly changed hands from SAF to opposition control in mid-July, which should help ease GoS attacks on Nawa City. (Al Akhbar 16/07/2014, Assafir 18/07/2014)

The ongoing offensive in Aleppo since the beginning of the year and the escalation of SAF efforts against IS in the east continue to divert military attention from the south. While the conflict is persistent in Dar'a, it has remained relatively predictable over the past year. (PI 2014/06/30)

Despite the relative predictability of conflict dynamics, infighting among Jabhat Al Nusra and other opposition groups are an ongoing threat. According to reliable sources, there is an unofficial truce between Jabhat Al Nusra and opposition groups following the May kidnapping of the head of the Dar'a Military Council, Ahmad Naame and five other commanders. However, in other areas of Dar'a, it was reported that Jabhat Al Nusra and opposition groups cooperated to allow the non-Jabhat Al Nusra fighters to control the Ramtha border crossing which witnessed the passage of UN cross border aid. (Assafir 14/07/2014, Assafir 18/07/2014, Daily Star 2014/05/05, The National 2014/06/01)

3.6.4 Access

Under UN Security Council Resolution 2165, UN convoys with assistance for 10,000 people were dispatched to Mzeireb and Dar'a City sub-districts in late July. While the UN reported that the area had not been assisted since the beginning of the conflict, other NGOs have been providing assistance to these areas for over one year. In July, the UN reported that there were negotiations with opposition

groups, including Jabhat Al Nusra to access the Dar'a Al-Balad area of Dar'a City, although it was unclear if they were successful. (UNSG 21/08/2014, UNSG 21/07/2014)

In September, WHO reported that it successfully dispatched medicines and medical supplies for about 108,000 people in Busra Esh-Sham, Hrak, and Jasim, all of which are considered hard-to-reach areas by Damascus based humanitarian organisations. (UN 24/09/2014)

3.6.5 Displacement

There was little new information available on specific displacement movements in Dar'a during the 3rd quarter. OCHA released new figures of IDPs in each governorate in July, which estimates that the number of IDPs has decreased by 28%. While there was no explanation for the decrease, it is assumed that many of the IDPs have become refugees in other countries, while others have returned to their areas of origin. Reports from UNHCR Jordan indicate an increase in the number of returnees in August. (OCHA 07/2014, CCM 26/08/2014)

3.6.6 Humanitarian needs

Protection

Protection against armed violence remains a key concern in Dar'a, particularly with the regular use of airstrikes and barrel bombs across the governorate. In July, two explosions in the Dar'a refugee camp for Palestinians in Dar'a City killed 12 people (nine Palestinian refugees and three Syrians) and destroyed four homes. According to UNRWA, there were not significant numbers of civilians remaining in the camp, however in recent months, some IDPs were returning to the camp. (UNRWA 17/07/2014, UNRWA 17/07/2014, UNRWA 11/08/2014)

Attacks on health facilities: According to the UN, two hospitals were attacked in Dar'a Governorate in September, however, there was no information available on casualties or damage sustained. (UN 24/09/2014)

Attacks on aid workers: In late August, one UNRWA staff member was killed during attacks on the Palestinian camp in Dar'a City while trying to flee. Also in late August, a SARC convoy was struck by shelling in northern Dar'a Governorate, injuring four SARC personnel and damaging two trucks. (UN 24/09/2014)

Health

According to WHO and MoH, 97% or 101 of Dar'a's public health facilities reported to the regular monitoring of functioning health facilities. According to the report, only about 30% of Dar'a Governorate's health centres are fully functioning. 44% are reportedly partially functioning and 24% are non-functional. Compared to other Governorates, data from Dar'a's public health facilities indicate that it has the 8th highest proportion of non-functional or non-reporting health facilities. This is the highest proportion in south and central Syria. About 55% of public hospitals in Dar'a Governorate are fully or partially functional and 77% are fully or partially damaged, which is the highest level nationally. The high level of damage to Dar'a's public health facilities is due to persistence of conflict throughout much of the Governorate and particularly concentrated in opposition-controlled areas of the south and southeast part of the Governorate. (WHO/MoH 14/08/2014, WHO/MoH 14/08/2014)


Health actors reported in Jordan reported that there was a decrease in the number of war-wounded evacuees to the Kingdom for health care in the past two months due to

improved health assistance at field hospitals in Dar'a Governorate. (Health WG 30/09/2014)

NFI and WASH

Contested areas continue to experience a lack of access to electricity in water due to the ongoing conflict in Dar'a, further exacerbating historical lows in rainfall. (UNSG 21/08/2014)

3.7 DEIR-EZ-ZOR



People in need	711,000 OCHA 06/14
	480,000 Dynamo 07/14, 11/14 subdistricts covered (79%)
	835,000 SINA 11/13, 13/14 subdistricts covered (93%)

3.7.1 Key issues and possible developments:

Deir-ez-Zor has witnessed major battles between the Syrian Armed Forces (SAF), IS and opposition forces in the last six months. During the reporting period, the Islamic State made major advances, taking most of the countryside, including the major power stations and oil fields. It also controls 90km of the border with Iraq including the Abu Kamal border crossing, and has reopened the roads which connect Deir-ez-Zor and Iraq. The majority of opposition-held areas in Deir-ez-Zor City are in IS' hands and have been completely under siege since mid-September, when an airstrike destroyed the last bridge in Deir-ez-Zor City, cutting off access to an estimated 50,000 people. The Al-Siyasiya Bridge, on the Euphrates River was considered the only path for humanitarian assistance to enter the city.


In its areas of presence, IS has reportedly been using extreme violence against populations resisting its control. Generally, reports indicate indiscriminate attacks on civilians, arrests and executions, forced recruitment and various restrictions. The physical safety of civilians is also of concern due to increased air raids by Syrian Armed Forces on IS/AOGs-held areas.

Although the overall security situation already rendered access extremely difficult across the governorate, IS's advances and takeover of Deir-ez-Zor are further hindering the delivery of vital humanitarian supplies as well as the free movement of commodities and people, aggravating the poor living conditions of IDPs and local populations. As of June, OCHA reported that an estimated 711,000 people are in need of assistance in the governorate.

3.7.2 Context

The oil-rich Governorate in eastern Syria is an important supply route and transit zone, which connects IS strongholds in Iraq to the one in Ar-Raqqa. Its population was around 1.2 million by 2011 estimates, with populated areas mainly along the Euphrates. It has witnessed major battles between the Government, IS and opposition forces in the last six months. In January and February 2014, opposition and tribal forces rose against IS, forcing it to withdraw. End of March, IS started their counter-offensive slowly pushing down from Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa into Deir-ez-Zor, via the Khabur and Euphrates rivers. These two rivers come together at al-Basirah, southeast of Deir-ez-Zor City. The opposition was expelled and IS seized large parts of the Governorate. Deir-ez-Zor City has been blockaded since June 3 when IS seized control of the Al-Siyasiya Bridge, on the Euphrates River. Until IS's return, the city was mostly in the hands of opposition forces, except for the al-Qusour and al-Joura neighbourhoods, which were and are still under Syrian Government control.

3.7.3 Armed conflict



Since it set aside its unspoken non-aggression arrangement with the Government in June, IS has taken a series of bases in northern and eastern Syria, and has advanced as well against Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), dislodging or disarming groups, one area of control after another. As of late September, IS controls most of the countryside in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate, including the major power stations and oil fields. It also controls 90km of the border with Iraq including the Abu Kamal border crossing, and has reopened the roads which connect Deir-ez-Zor and Iraq. (AraNews 17/07/14, Al Monitor 06/08/14, CNN 08/07/14) In Deir-ez-Zor City, the group holds the majority of neighbourhoods, except for three southwestern areas (Al-Qusour, Al-Joura and Al-Muwazafin) which are still at the hands of GoS. (REACH 08/14, Syria Direct 13/08/14, AlMonitor 06/08/14) However, they lost a vital supply route on 15 September when a suspected government airstrike destroyed the last bridge in the city, leaving IS-held areas completely under siege. (AFP 15/09/14, UN 24/09/14) The Government is also controlling key strategic locations on the outskirts of the city, namely the military airport (south) and Brigade 137 (west). (Syria Direct 13/08/14, AlMonitor 06/08/14)

While part of Al-Nusra has reportedly withdrawn from the area (Syria Deeply 11/08/14), other armed groups seem to have either pledged allegiance or have been coerced/defeated into disarmament. (AraNews 17/07/14, SOHR 22/07/14) Resistance was offered by the Sh'aitat tribe, which holds the villages of Abu Hamam, Kashkiyeh and Ghranij (Syria Deeply 01/08/14), but IS pushed back and killed over 700 tribal members in early August, 100 of them fighters, the rest civilians. (AFP 16/08/14, Assafir 11/08/14)

Syrian Armed Forces have reportedly been intensifying air raids up to 10 drives a day on IS/AOGs-held areas. Heavy shelling from the military airport and Brigade 137 was also reported along with sporadic ground clashes. (AraNews 14/07/14, AraNews 18/07/14, SOHR 14/08/14, AFP 14/09/14) Additionally, the international coalition has been carrying out strikes against IS since mid-September with US and Arab aircraft. The strikes have targeted armed vehicles, artillery, and IS bases and makeshift oil refineries, in a bid to weaken one of the group's main sources of financing. (AFP 29/09/14, AFP 28/09/14)

3.7.4 Access

Although the overall security situation already rendered access extremely difficult across the governorate, IS's advances and takeover of Deir-ez-Zor are further hindering the delivery of vital humanitarian supplies as well as the free movement of commodities and people, aggravating the poor living conditions of IDPs and local populations. According to WFP on 2 September, August marked the third consecutive month of interrupted access in Deir-ez-Zor. (WFP 02/08/14)

On 15 September, a suspected government airstrike destroyed the last bridge in Deir-ez-Zor city, leaving IS-held areas completely under siege and cutting off access to an estimated 50,000 people. The other three bridges in the city had already been blown up, by the regime and by AOGs, at various stages of the three-year Syrian conflict. (AFP 15/09/14, UN 24/09/14)

In the city, very little humanitarian assistance was delivered in June and July due to siege-like situations. Residents wishing to leave reportedly faced severe mobility restrictions, protection risks, and threats to their personal security. (REACH 08/14)

Access through roads linking Deir-ez-Zor to Damascus and Al-Hasakeh continue to be severely constrained as a result of the IS's efforts to block humanitarian and commercial access into the Governorate from Ar-Raqqah, Al-Hasakeh and the southern desert region — areas in which the group control all major access routes. (UN 23/07/14) Main crossing gates along the Euphrates are reportedly inaccessible. (REACH 08/14)

In early August, a cross-line WFP food convoy of 18 vehicles came under attack from an unknown group. Two truck drivers were killed, two wounded, and the content of 4 trucks was damaged or destroyed. The other 14 trucks (carrying assistance for up to 60,000 people) proceeded to Ar-Raqqah. The convoy was initially destined to hard-to-reach areas in Deir-ez-Zor: (WFP 19/08/14, UN 14/08/14) It would have been the first time since May that WFP food reached the governorate. (WFP 05/08/14, OCHA 16/07/14) Unverified reports by SOHR indicated that around the same date, a SARC convoy of 6 vehicles was redirected by IS from Deir-ez-Zor to Ar-Raqqah, and was hit by SAF airstrikes, leading to the injury of one of the drivers. It is unclear whether these reports relate to the same convoy, or if there were two separate attacks on two separate aid shipments. (SOHR 08/08/14)

3.7.5 Displacement

As of June, OCHA reported that there are over 440,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Deir-ez-Zor, most of whom are located in Deir-ez-Zor City, Abu Kamal and Al Mayadin. (OCHA 08/14)

Unverified reports indicated additional waves of displacement were recorded, with an estimated 130,000 new displaced in July and 75,000-100,000 people who fled IS advances on villages held by the Sh'aitat tribe in early August. The displaced reportedly headed to Baqaan, Hujayn, Al-Bahr, and Al-Shafa. (UNICEF 15/07/14, UN 21/08/14, Assafir 11/08/14, Al Akhbar 09/08/14, USAID 12/09/14)

“With IS now controlling most of the governorate, and SAF pushing back to maintain its last areas of control, the physical safety of the population is of great concern, and growing protection issues are reported, including execution, kidnapping, forced recruitment, and various restrictions.”

3.7.6 Humanitarian needs

As of August, OCHA reported that an estimated 711,000 people are in need of assistance in Deir-ez-Zor, which represents over half of the governorate's population prior to the crisis. IDPs are considered particularly affected. Priority needs include Protection, WASH, health and food security. (OCHA 08/14, Dynamo 07/14)

Protection:

With IS now controlling most of the governorate, and SAF pushing back to maintain its last areas of control, the physical safety of the population is of great concern, and growing protection issues are reported, including execution, kidnapping, forced recruitment, and various restrictions.

Executions and attacks by IS: The most violent attack by IS occurred in early August, when the group killed more than 700 people from the Sh'aitat tribe, whom they accused of apostasy. According to SOHR, 600 civilians were among the victims. (AFP 16/08/14, Assafir 11/08/14, AraNews 09/08/14) SOHR also reported that dozens of people from the tribe are reportedly held hostage by IS, although estimations vary from 150 to 1,800 people. (Reuters 27/08/14, ISW 22/08/14) On 26 July, a media activist was executed and left on public display in the city of Abu Kamal, after IS accused him of being part of Al-Kafan Al-Abyad, a group fighting IS in the governorate. (UN 21/08/14) Also, reports indicated that IS still hold an estimated 250 civilians, including approximately 160 migrant workers, who were abducted some six months ago while returning to Ain Al Arab/Kobani from Iraq. (UN 21/08/14)

Disarmament and recruitment: In August, IS called upon all armed groups to confirm and document their names and identities in the administrative offices of Deir-ez-Zor City, with the stated aim of enrolling them in a “condensed Shari'a course”. Those who do not register are at risk of being arrested, detained or executed. (SOHR 14/08/14, Al Monitor 06/08/14)

Other restrictions: During the last week of July, IS distributed leaflets listing restrictions on women's dress codes in Deir-ez-Zor and Ar-Raqqah, noting that violations would entail severe punishment. (UN 21/08/14, SOHR 14/07/14, SOHR 06/09/14)

SAF attacks: In July and August, air raids and shelling by SAF were recorded on positions held by IS, targeting headquarters and warehouses storing weapons and ammunition. In mid-July, AraNews reported tens of civilian casualties in such attacks in Deir-ez-Zor City. (AraNews 18/07/14) In late August, air raids reportedly killed 7 civilians across the governorate. (Now 26/08/14) In early September, similar events caused the deaths of 12 civilians when a missile hit a bus carrying passengers. (AraNews 04/09/14)

WASH:

According to ACU's Dynamo report in July, up to 480,000 people are in need of WASH services across 11 covered sub-districts (over 14 in total), including over 200,000 in acute need. The same report identified water/WASH as the first priority in nine of the 11 covered sub-districts in the Governorate, an increase compared to the previous report issued in May when only half of the 10 covered sub-districts had water/WASH as the first priority. (*Dynamo 05/14, Dynamo 07/14*) Continued high temperatures are expected to impact further the low level of the Euphrates, the main source for drinking water in the governorate. (*AI Monitor 06/08/14*) Also, recent fighting between AOGs, IS and SAF is suspected to have increased the water supply problem, with water supply infrastructure damaged, and water supply cut offs.

Health:

According to ACU's Dynamo report in July, up to 130,000 people are in need of health services across 11 assessed sub-districts, including over 10,000 in acute need. The same report identified health as the second or third priority in 7 of the 11 covered sub-districts in the Governorate. (*Dynamo 07/14*)

Functionality of health facilities in Deir-ez-Zor is becoming increasingly limited as the area is engulfed in fighting and attacks. The closure of transport corridors, particularly en route to Deir-ez-Zor City, reduces the amount of medications and medical supplies reaching the area and severely curtailing health services. According to the Health Resources Availability Mapping System as of June, none of the seven public hospitals are fully functioning in Deir-ez-Zor and two are completely out of service. Additionally, only 16 of the 95 health centres are fully functional. Another 50 function partially, and 21 are reportedly not functioning at all. (*UN 21/08/14, HeRAMS 14/08/19, HeRAMS 19/08/14*)

This is especially worrying considering the risk of epidemic diseases affecting the governorate. During the reporting period, reports indicated that the incidence of acute diarrhoea continues to increase, with the highest number of cases reported in Deir-ez-Zor (1,522) from 13 to 19 July 2014. (*UN 18/07/14*) Between 1 January and 19 July, 2,884 suspected cases of typhoid were reported across Syria, the majority of which (77%) were seen in Deir-ez-Zor Governorate alone. (*WHO 07/14*)

Livelihood and Food Security:


According to the Dynamo report in July, over 315,000 people are in need of food assistance across 11 covered sub-districts, including over 110,000 in acute need. The same report identified food as the second or third priority in 4 of the 11 covered sub-districts in the Governorate. (*Dynamo 07/14*) As of mid-July, the food security cluster also indicated that all districts of Deir-ez-Zor are considered high priority in terms of people in need of food assistance, and WFP indicated in September it has not been able to access Deir-ez-Zor since May. (*FS Cluster 14/07/14, WFP 02/08/14*) The limited agricultural production together with restricted humanitarian access to Deir-ez-Zor is likely to cause an increase in the number of people in need of food supply. According to the Socio-economic Monitoring Report issued by the Syrian Centre for Policy Research (SCPR) in May, Deir-ez-Zor showed a high rate of overall poverty with almost 80% of the population below the poverty line. The capacity of households to access food is expected to deteriorate further, as a result of high levels of unemployment, and reduced income generating opportunities. (*SCPR 27/05/14*)

In Deir-ez-Zor City, sieges in certain neighbourhoods have caused a depletion of market stocks, due to limited supply and residents purchasing greater quantities of food and NFIs to cope with the siege constraints. (*REACH 27/08/14*) As of August, markets in Deir-ez-Zor City were able to restock due to the opening of commercial routes with Iraq. This represents an improvement compared to mid-June when fighting caused most of the shops in the city to close due to the lack of food supplies. (*REACH 08/14, Zaman AIWsl 12/06/14*) However, high prices and ongoing inflation in essential commodities remained a concern and were mentioned as the first barrier to food access by key informants. (*REACH 08/14*)

Shelter/NFI:

According to the Dynamo report in July, over 54,000 people in Deir-ez-Zor are in need of shelter and NFIs support, including 13,000 people in acute need. (*Dynamo 07/14*) In urban areas, infrastructures and housing have reportedly been extensively damaged due to fighting since the beginning of the conflict (*REACH 06/14*), and while there is limited information, it is suspected that recent clashes between AOGs, IS and SAF caused further destruction. In Deir-ez-Zor City, which is now mostly controlled by IS except for the neighbourhoods of al-Joura, al-Kousour, al-Muwazafin, living conditions are reportedly similar in government and non-government-held areas. Electricity is only available a few hours a day at best. Gas is however reported to be abundant and distributed at a relatively cheap price (USD 12-18) by IS to gain more popularity. (*AI Monitor 06/08/14, Assafir 22/07/14*) In contested areas however, insecurity and insufficient availability of fuel cause reduced availability of services such as water and electricity. (*UN 21/08/14*)

3.8 LATTAKIA



- Conflict event (July - August)
- ✈ Civil airport
- ⚓ Ports
- Sub-district
- Border crossings**
- ⊗ Restricted access

People in need	363,500 OCHA 06/14
	7,400 Dynamo 07/14, 3/22 subdistricts covered (14%)
	920,800 SINA 11/13, 5/22 subdistricts covered (23%)

3.8.1 Key Issues and possible developments


The majority of the Governorate continued to be highly stable in terms of security, and is not expected to be subject to significant conflict in the last quarter of 2014. The humanitarian access conditions are not expected to change significantly in the last quarter of 2014 unless critical changes in the conflict dynamics and areas of control occur. No critical changes are expected in terms of further influx of IDPs.

3.8.2 Context

While the capital of the Governorate and its southern parts remained largely untouched and continued to be a main destination for IDPs from many other governorates in Syria, especially Aleppo, clashes continued to be recorded since July in northern and north eastern parts of Latakia, especially what is known as Kurds and Turkmen mountains in the sub-districts of Qastal Ma'af, Salma, Kansaba, and Kasab. Opposition fighters launched an offensive on 21 March and seized control of Kasab border crossing with Turkey and the nearby areas, but they lost control of it within 3 months and were only able to maintain control of a small area in Kurds and Turkmen mountains.

3.8.3 Armed conflict

Conflict incidents Latakia
Apr - Sep 2014



The fronts of Latakia witnessed no significant progress for either GoS or opposition forces. After losing the majority of the territory, opposition fighters were able to ascertain control of in the second quarter of 2014, they retreated to their original areas of control in Turkmen and Kurds mountains. The main conflict-related incidents recorded then were

shelling and barrel bombing of some opposition-held villages. The rest of the Governorate continued to be highly stable in terms of security, and is not expected to be subject to significant conflict in the last quarter of 2014.

3.8.4 Access

GoS-held areas in the Governorate continue to be highly accessible for humanitarian assistance, which is mainly delivered by operational actors from Damascus. A report of the official Syrian News Agency on 14 August stated that there were in addition small amounts of humanitarian assistance delivered through the local airport of the Governorate by the Russian Government. Local sources reported interference by the National Defense Army (pro-government militia) in the delivery of assistance targeting IDPs in Lattakia City and accused the local authorities of not being able to control the delivery (*Sana 2014/08/14, Orient 2014/08/25*) The situation is significantly different in opposition-held areas; the main access route to their territory is from Turkey through Badama in Idleb, a logistically difficult path with poor infrastructure and at risk of occasional attacks by GoS forces. The humanitarian access conditions are not expected to change significantly in the last quarter of 2014 unless critical changes in the conflict dynamics and areas of control occur.

3.8.5 Displacement

Lattakia continues to be one of the governorates receiving the highest number of IDPs due to its relative safety and the availability of services. In recent months, tens of thousands of people have fled fighting in Aleppo Governorate for the relative safety of the Mediterranean coast, where most live in temporary shelters. In June, ICRC and UNFPA reported that over a million people have arrived in Lattakia and Tartous since the beginning of the conflict, swelling the local population by 50%. (*ICRC 2014/07/11, UNFPA 2014/07/31, AlAkhbar 2014/08/07*) Accurate figures of number of IDPs residing in Lattakia have been difficult to obtain and the current estimates (as of June 2014) range between 300,000 IDPs as reported by OCHA (*OCHA 2014/08/06*) and up to 1 million. The majority of IDPs are said to reside in Lattakia City, in six collective shelters, of which Sport City is considered the biggest, besides the big number already living in rented accommodation and touristic facilities.

3.8.6 Humanitarian needs

Health

Health infrastructure throughout the Governorate has remained largely intact. According to WHO, more than 80% of the hospitals in Lattakia are fully functioning and 15% are partially functioning due to partial damage. 90% of the health centres in Lattakia were assessed to be accessible (*WHO HeRams 2014/06*). However the lack of medicines, health equipment and staff is hampering access to healthcare. Health facilities in Lattakia, Tartous and As-Sweida have been least affected by the armed conflict with almost all hospitals still functioning according to WHO. (*WHO HeRams 2014/06*)

Livelihood and food security (LFS)


The port in Lattakia is still fully operational. Since Lattakia Governorate was moderately affected by the conflict, it was regularly supplied with food and Non Food Items. However, food security was identified as an urgent priority in several sub-districts as reported by OCHA in the July Governorate profiles. In addition, FAO estimates that 4,000 farmers/herders households are in need of agricultural support.

WASH

In a city with a very high population density due to the large number of IDPs, the pressure on the water network in Lattakia was considered to be high in the last 3 months. The main source for

drinking water in the City is the Al Sen spring that covers about 85% of the consumption needs. Due to the long network and the multiple pumping stages to reach the city, the cost for each cubic meter of drinking water has increased. Electricity outages have further contributed to a reduction in the amount of water provided by the public network. Still, the rate of consumption is around 100 litres per person per day, which is an indication that there is currently no problem in water availability. However, with the continual overburdening of the water infrastructure and growing pressure, mitigating measures will be needed to ensure access to, and availability of water. Governmental projects of digging supporting water wells and replacing old networks in some areas could be such measures. (*Al Wehda Online 2014/07/13*)

3.9. HAMA



People in need	533,000 <i>OCHA 06/14</i>
	235,750 <i>Dynamo 07/14, 9/22 subdistricts covered (41%)</i>
	835,900 <i>SINA 11/13, 11/22 subdistricts covered (50%)</i>


3.9.1 Key issues and possible developments

Violent attacks and fighting in the north and east of the Governorate are raising protection concerns. Civilians in opposition and GoS areas fear the opposite side due to regular rocket and mortar attacks. The conflict is likely to further escalate in contested areas of the Governorate after GoS deployed Suheil al-Hasan, a colonel renowned for leading the thus far successful military operation on Aleppo City, to Hama in order to break the siege on Muhradah City and prevent Jabhat Al-Nusra from advancing in the Governorate.

3.9.2 Context

Known for its historical opposition to the ruling Ba'ath Party and subsequent government crackdown in 1982, Hama remains severely affected by more than three years of conflict due to its proximity to heavily contested areas in the north and central regions and its central position serving as the link between the country's southern and northern regions, which made the Governorate a strategic battleground among all parties to the conflict.

3.9.3 Armed Conflict



The Governorate is once again a major battlefield, with the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra and opposition groups pushing from northern and northwestern rural Hama, namely from their stronghold in Kafr Zeita, towards Hama City and the Islamic State pushing from eastern rural Hama towards As-Salamiyeh City. (Assafir 2014/09/03)

“A Governorate profile report published by OCHA in August indicated that by June, 245,000 IDPs were reportedly residing in the Governorate.”

Jabhat Al-Nusra shifted its focus to the Governorate in attempts to gain a firm ground following a series of defeats incurred by clashes with the Islamic State in Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor. On 23 August, Jabhat Al-Nusra received military reinforcements from Aleppo declaring the Muhradah City a military zone and beginning an offensive on the predominantly Christian City. At the same time, Jabhat Al-Nusra and opposition groups began pushing from western rural Hama to takeover the Hama military airport before targeting the GoS-held Hama City. However, Jabhat Al-Nusra and opposition attempts have so far been countered by government forces and paramilitary allies on the outskirts of Muhradah City and the Hama military airport with SAF regaining control over the Halfaya town, a previous Al-Nusra stronghold, and several villages in the perimeter of the Hama military airport. On 9 September, the Syrian Observatory reported that SAF and allied militant groups regained control of more than five towns and villages previously controlled by Jabhat Al-Nusra and opposition groups in northern and northwestern rural Hama. The battle for control over Murak City, the main opposition stronghold in northern rural Hama, is still ongoing. The City's importance lies in its position on the Idlib-Aleppo road and in its use as a supply line for opposition groups besieging the Wadi Al-Deif and Al-Hamidiya military bases in Idlib. (SOHR 2014/09/09, SOHR 2014/09/07, Assafir 2014/08/25, Assafir 2014/08/14, SOHR 2014/08/23, Assafir 2014/09/10, Assafir 2014/09/13)

The Islamic State are clashing with the SAF in the eastern outskirts of the strategic As-Salamiyeh City which connects northern Syria to its western and southern parts and is an important supply line to Aleppo City. (Assafir 2014/09/03)

3.9.4 Access

Access to the predominantly Christian City of Muhradah in northwestern rural Hama has become increasingly difficult after Jabhat Al-Nusra fighters launched an offensive on the City from its eastern borders near Halfaya. (Al Akhbar 2014/07/05)

3.9.5 Displacement

A Governorate profile report published by OCHA in August indicated that by June, 245,000 IDPs were reportedly residing in the Governorate, a 42% decrease in IDPs from the 423,000 IDPs reported by OCHA in December 2013. This can possibly be traced back to the return of some IDPs from Hama and As-Salamiyeh cities to their towns and cities in Muhradah, Suran and Kafr Zeita where 86,000 returnees were reported. IDPs in Hama are mainly concentrated in Hama City, Muhradah town and Kafr Zeita. Despite violence and instability in the Governorate, OCHA reported 121,500 people returning to their areas of origin in June. (OCHA 2014/08/26)

WFP reported in early September that some 100,000 people displaced to the cities of Hama and As-Salamiyeh were fleeing their homes in north-east of the Governorate due to the ongoing violence. (WFP 2014/09/02)

3.9.6 Humanitarian needs

Protection

Civilians residing in opposition-held areas of the Governorate have been subject to indiscriminate shelling by government forces while others residing in Hama City and other GoS-held areas have been subject to opposition shelling. At least five civilians were killed by opposition shelling on the town of Qamhana in northern rural Hama. The Syrian Observatory documented at least 28 civilian casualties during the first 11 days of September due to government shelling with barrel bombs and warplanes on opposition-held areas such as Kafr Zeita, Latmana and Tibet Elemam. (Syrian Observer 2014/08/24)


The Islamic State and opposition factions carried out executions in the Governorate. 5 August marked the execution of seven family members from the Ismaili minority group by the Islamic State in the Mzair'a town near the predominantly Ismaili As-Salamiyeh City. At least 14 others, including seven women, were reportedly executed by opposition groups in the Khattab village after being accused of cooperating with the Syrian authorities. (AFP 2014/07/09, Syria Deeply 2014/08/05)

Health

WHO and the Syrian Ministry of Health issued two quarterly reports in June on hospitals and health centres, indicating that out of 161 health centres in Hama: 16% are partially functioning and 8% are not functioning while 12% are inaccessible and 32% are either partially or completely damaged. Two hospitals, out of a total of 6 hospitals in the Governorate, are partially functioning 1 is not functioning at all, 2 are partially damaged. (WHO 2014/06-1, WHO 2014/06-2)

In early September, the Agha Khan Development Network signed a memorandum with Hama's municipality on developing an ambulance and emergency system in As-Salamiyeh City. The agreement includes cooperation on establishing a response team with the necessary training and equipment as well as rehabilitating the emergency department in As-Salamiyeh's national hospital and increasing the number of equipped ambulance vehicles. (Al Watan 2014/09/02)

3.10 HOMS



People in need	748,000 OCHA 06/14
	251,725 Dynamo 07/14, 5/23 subdistricts covered (22%)
	337,800 SINA 11/13, 8/23 subdistricts covered (35%)

3.10.1 Key issues and possible developments:


The neighbourhood of Al-Waer in Homs city remains the only opposition stronghold and is home to an estimated 400,000 civilians. As of late September, negotiations on a ceasefire between the Government of Syria (GoS) and Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs) were still to restart after a truce declared on 26 June was breached three days later following reports of shelling.

According to OCHA as of June, an estimated 748,000 people are in need of assistance in Homs governorate which represents a decrease compared to the one million estimation provided in April 2014. Most are concentrated in Homs City, Al-Waer, and northern rural areas such as Ar-Rastan and Talbiseh.

3.10.2 Context

Homs is geographically the largest governorate in Syria and extends from the borders of Lebanon in the west to Iraq in the east. It was one of the first areas affected by the conflict, and it hosts 1.8 million people as per 2011 estimates, with populated areas mainly concentrated in the west of the governorate. (OCHA 06/14) Since the beginning of the civil war, Homs has witnessed major violence between AOGs and GoS forces. Since March 2014, GoS gradually took back areas which had long been held by opposition forces, cutting key supply routes from Lebanon. In May, Homs City was fully regained by GoS after AOGs retreated from the old city in which they had been besieged for almost three years. (OCHA 06/14, AFP 02/05/14, Amnesty International 10/06/14, DW 02/05/14)

3.10.3 Armed Conflict



“According to OCHA as of June, an estimated 748,000 people are in need of assistance in Homs governorate.”

The neighbourhood of Al-Waer in Homs city remains the only opposition stronghold and is home to an estimated 400,000 civilians. In late May, SAF began to infiltrate Al-Waer neighbourhood. (Daily Star 12/05/14, Zamanalwsl 20/05/14) The area has been under a siege that has restricted food and fuel from entering the area for at least nine months. In early June, negotiations were put on hold after a failure by both sides to reach an agreement. The terms included: armed fighters handing in their weapons, wanted and defected fighters surrendering, the opening up of all roads to Al-Waer, releasing detainees and the evacuation of foreign fighters in return for releasing more than 40 men, women and children kidnapped from the Nobol and Zahra neighbourhoods of Aleppo. (Al-Akhbar 09/06/14) As of late September, negotiations on a ceasefire were still to restart after a truce declared on 26 June was breached three days later following reports of shelling. (UN 23/07/14)

In Rural Homs, some northern areas are still under AOG control. (OCHA 06/14) Reports also indicated that IS had been moving to areas under tighter IS control and have pulled out of parts of central Homs, allowing Jabhat Al Nusra to retake several areas. (AFP 24/08/14)

3.10.4 Access

According to OCHA as of June, there are still a number of hard-to-reach areas such as Al-Waer, Al Houla, Ar-Rastan, Talbiseh, Ghanto and Tir Maallah, which represent significant humanitarian concerns. Since the beginning of 2014, Homs UN hub sent relief assistance to Tir Maallah, Ghanto, Al Houla and Talbiseh. (OCHA 06/14) However, IS reportedly continues to be present along the main supply lines in rural central Homs, which hampers the delivery of aid. (UN 21/08/14)

3.10.5 Displacement

According to OCHA, the number of IDPs is around 560,000 people, half of them in Homs City (265,000). There are also over 100,000 returnees recorded. (OCHA 06/14)

3.10.6 Humanitarian needs

According to OCHA as of June, an estimated 748,000 people are in need of assistance in Homs (40% of the governorate’s population as per 2011 estimates), which represents a decrease compared to the one million estimation provided in April 2014. Most of them are concentrated in Homs City (340,000), Al-Waer and northern rural areas such as Ar-Rastan (89,000) and Talbiseh (46,000). (UN News Service 30/04/14, OCHA 06/14)

Protection

Attacks on civilians: Indiscriminate attacks on civilians continued during this quarter. On 1 October, a double suicide attack at an elementary school killed up to 50 people including over 40 children aged under 12 in a mainly Alawite neighbourhood in Homs City. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, and the event triggered significant social unrest, with reports indicating that hundreds of people took the streets and demanded the resignation of the local governor. (JRS 01/10/14, AFP 02/10/14, AFP 02/10/14)

In mid-September, government air strikes hit the opposition-held town of Talbiseh, killing nearly 50. (AFP 17/09/14)

Between 9 April and 12 June, 82 people were killed mostly by car bombs targeting Alawite neighbourhoods of Homs city. (AFP 12/06/14, Reuters 02/06/14, Daily Star 25/05/14, CrisisWatch 01/05/14, Daily Star 30/04/14, Daily Star 18/04/14, AFP 19/04/14, Zamanalwsl 12/04/14, AFP 05/04/14, AFP 09/04/14, Al Akhbar 12/04/14, PHR 07/14) Between 13 June and late July, an estimated 29 people were killed. On 27 and 30 July, two car bombs were detonated in government-controlled, predominantly Alawite neighbourhoods of Homs city, killing respectively 11 people in Al-Arman, and two people in Wadi Dahab. (UN 21/08/14). On 29 June, mortars landed in front of a school in Ar-Rastan, Rural Homs, killing four children and wounding four others. (UN 23/07/14) On 19 June, a car bomb went off near Maysaloun school in Al-Nuzha neighbourhood in Homs City; 11 civilians were killed and dozens injured. (UN 23/07/14)


Detainees: OHCHR received reports regarding the status of over 100 male evacuees from the Old City of Homs in February who are being held in different locations in Homs following their transfer from Al-Andalus school, where they were previously detained. 14 of them, including 11 civilians, were reportedly released in July, but the rest remains imprisoned and 45 await prosecution in anti-terrorism courts. (UN 21/08/14, UN 23/07/14)

Between 3 and 16 July, GoS stated that 1,205 individuals were pardoned, including 118 men detained in Al-Andalus, according to the Governor of Homs. OHCHR reported on the statement but indicated it was unable to verify the information. (UN 23/07/14)

Health

Functionality of health facilities in Homs has been limited for months due to previously high levels of violence and the subsequent destruction of health infrastructure. According to the Health Resources Availability Mapping System as of June, only one of the 14 public hospitals is fully functioning in Homs, 8 are functioning partially and 5 are completely out of service. However, 74% of health centres are reportedly functioning (209 out of 282); 41 functioning partially, while 66 did not report to the system. (HeRAMS 19/08/14, HeRAMS 19/08/14)

3.11. IDLEB



People in need	1,117,000
	OCHA 06/14
	590,450
	Dynamo 07/14, 19/26 subdistricts covered (73%)
	947,525
	SINA 11/13, 21/26 subdistricts covered (81%)


3.1.1.1 Key issues and possible developments

The Governorate has become home to some 708,000 IDPs escaping violence from their areas of origin in nearby Governorates. With winter coming soon, these IDPs are expected to face harsh conditions. There are fears that Al-Nusra front will further advance in the Governorate to control strategic opposition-held areas so as to compensate for their losses against the Islamic State in Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor and recent losses to government forces in northern Rural Hama. (OCHA 2014/08/26)

3.1.1.2 Context

A major battle front in 2013, the Governorate now seems slightly more distanced from the conflict as fighting parties shifted focus to other strategic and oil-rich areas, except for southern Rural Idlib due to its proximity to contested areas in northern Hama and eastern Rural Idlib because of its borders with Turkey and Lattakia.

3.1.1.3 Armed conflict



Although no major developments have taken their toll in Idlib, the Governorate still witnesses sporadic clashes and widespread aerial shelling on opposition-held areas. The relatively stable Governorate has been used as military barracks supporting Al-Nusra front and opposition groups fighting in Aleppo and Hama through the Saraqab and Khan Shaykun cities, both controlled by opposition groups.

In early September, Al-Nusra front and Islamic factions stormed the Wadi Al-Deif military base which has been besieged by opposition groups for almost 2 years along with the Mastumeh and Qarmid military bases in Ma'arrat An Nu'man. (Syrian Observer 2014/09/01)

An explosion targeted some 50 leading figures of the Ahrar Al-Sham movement during a meeting in September, 28 of which were reportedly killed including the movement's leader Hassan Aboud. There are conflicting reports as to who carried out the explosion and how it was carried out, with some opposition activists even saying that it was a gas attack. However, amid uncertainty on the source of the attack, it will likely lead to increased tensions between the movement and other opposition groups. (BBC 2014/09/10)

Al-Nusra front has advanced in the Governorate's western countryside, taking hold of 2 areas on the borders with Turkey and almost all of Rural Jisr-Ash- Shugur City after declaring their intention on establishing an Islamic Emirate. By the end of July, Al-Nusra front took hold of the Harem City on the Turkish borders, an important trade route used for smuggling oil and other products, the Bab Elhawa border crossing with Turkey and the nearby Sarmada town as well as the Salqin, Azmarin, Hafasraja, Zanbaqi and other areas in western Rural Idlib following clashes with opposition groups in those areas. Al-Nusra front reportedly evacuated their military bases and centres in Rural Idlib following the US-led coalition's airstrikes on the Islamic State, Al-Nusra and some Islamic factions. (SOHR 2014/07/31, Assafir 2014/07/23, Assafir 2014/07/18)

3.1.1.4 Access

Humanitarian access to the Governorate has improved significantly following the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 2139 which authorises humanitarian access through 4 non-government border crossings with Turkey, Jordan and Iraq without requiring GoS approval. In light of improved humanitarian access to hard-to-reach areas, WFP delivered more than 50,000 food rations to some 250,000 people through WFP partners in opposition-held areas in the Governorate and IDP camps in northern Idlib (WFP 2014/09/02)

3.1.1.5 Displacement

Although relatively less affected by the conflict than other Governorates, Idlib has been home to some 700,000 IDPs escaping violence from the nearby Governorates of Aleppo and Hama. IDPs also originate from conflict areas within the Governorate, especially from strategic areas on the borders with Hama, Lattakia and Aleppo such as Ma'arrat An Nu'man, Ariha, Jisr-Ash- Shugur, Khan Shaykun and Saraqab. A REACH report assessing an identified 103,013 IDPs in 67 camps and 5 informal settlements indicated that the majority of IDPs originate from Hama and most of IDPs in informal settlements come from Ma'arrat An Nu'man. (REACH 2014/06, OCHA 2014/08/26)

The report also indicated that many Idlib IDPs in camps and informal settlements occasionally return to their areas of origin to engage in economic activities, tend to farms and check on their family and belongings. The Governorate had the highest rates of return to areas of origin among the assessed 8 northern Governorates, especially among IDPs residing in informal settlements where 40% reportedly returned every few days in contrast to only 1% in IDP camps. REACH explained this disparity in that 89% of IDPs in informal settlements originate from Idlib, compared to only 42% in camps. However, local sources in Idlib reported that many civilians residing in areas regularly subject to aerial shelling

displace daily and return by nightfall when shelling ceases, making informal settlements the less costly option for a daytime escape from indiscriminate shelling. (REACH 2014/06)

3.11.6 Humanitarian needs

Protection

Civilians residing in opposition-held areas in the Governorate are subject to indiscriminate shelling by government forces. The Syrian Observatory daily reports civilian casualties due to government shelling in opposition areas such as Bannsh, Ma'arrat An Nu'man, Saraqab and Khan Shaykun. 1 September marked the death of 10 civilians, including five children, by air shelling on the town of Saraqab. Three civilians were also killed by opposition shelling on the predominantly Alawite town of Foah during the first two weeks of September. (SOHR 2014/09/01, SOHR 2014/09/12)

On 27 July, at least 40 people, including women and children, were killed by a suicide car bomb in the Atma town of Idlib, with 60 others reportedly injured. (Worldbulletin 2014/07/27)

Health

A REACH report in June comparing IDPs in informal settlements and camps, concluded that IDPs in informal settlements are more vulnerable to illness. Symptoms of diarrhoea, skin disease and respiratory disease are more common in informal settlements, especially in the districts of Ma'arrat An Nu'man and Idlib where 12% of the 1,026 IDPs residing there reportedly had skin disease and 6% had symptoms of diarrhoea. The vulnerability of IDPs in informal settlements is possibly the result of a lack or shortage of food, WASH and shelter assistance, whereas the situation in camps was not as severe despite that 3% of the camps lacked medical clinics. (REACH 2014/06)

A vaccination campaign targeting 2.6 million children against measles in Idlib and Deir-ez-Zor was halted following the death of 36 vaccinated children. An investigation later found out that a muscle relaxant, contained in similar packaging, was used instead of the dilute during the second round of vaccinations. (Telegraph 2014/09/16, Reuters 2014/09/17)

WASH

72% of IDPs in camps and informal settlements in Idlib reportedly receive trucked water while 28% rely on fixed sources. (REACH 2014/06)


Shelter

A REACH report identified 67 IDP camps in 7 camp groups: Atma, Aqrabat, Karama, Al Salam, Bab Elhawa, Kafarna Qah, and 5 informal settlements with a total population of 15,074 families/103,013 people. Of the assessed camps and informal settlements, 33 families live in the open air while 1,386 are in makeshift shelters. (REACH 2014/06)

Non-Food Items:

According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, fuel oil and gasoline prices increased by 100% in the Governorate since the start of the US-led coalition airstrikes on 23 September. Oil and gasoline merchants, who purchase crude oil from IS oil fields, increased prices reportedly due to fears of oil tanks being targeted by the US-led coalition during transportation. The price of one fuel oil barrel in the Governorate increased from 9,000-10,000 SYP to 18,000-19,000 SYP. The increase in the price of fuel oil and gasoline, used for ovens, heaters, power generators and agricultural machineries, will possibly have significant impact on bread and food prices in the Governorate. (SOHR 2014/09/28)

3.12 QUNEITRA



People in need	87,000
	OCHA 06/14
	Dynamo 07/2014: N/A

3.12.1 Key issues and possible developments


Jabhat Al Nusra and Islamist groups have reportedly seized control of the vast majority of Quneitra following intensive fighting in September, forcing at least 25,000 people to flee to Qatana in neighbouring Rural Damascus. More IDPs are expected due to ongoing clashes and the increasingly dire humanitarian situation across the vast majority of the Governorate. Even prior to the changes in control, access to Quneitra from both Damascus and through cross-border operations has been particularly difficult due to its geographical isolation, insecurity, and bureaucratic impediments. In September, the UN sent cross-border assistance into Maalaqa under Security Council Resolution 2165. However, other areas of the Governorate have experienced significantly more damage and high numbers of IDPs. (*Middle East Monitor 14/09/2014, ICRC 15/09/2014*)

Clashes broke out between armed groups and Filipino UNDOF soldiers in the Golan Heights buffer zone after Jabhat Al Nusra fighters took 44 Fijian soldiers hostage. A week after their capture, Jabhat Al Nusra issued a set of demands for their release, including the group's removal from a UN terrorist list and compensation for the killing of three of its fighters in a shootout with international troops, according to a Fijian official. 32 peacekeepers were rescued after they were surrounded and trapped by Jabhat Al Nusra. Other UN peacekeepers were able to flee from a different encampment that was also surrounded by Jabhat Al Nusra. On 19 September, the Philippines pulled out more than 240 UN peacekeepers from the Golan Heights two weeks earlier than planned due to high intensity of fighting and the threat of kidnapping. (*Deutsche Welle 19/9/2014, Assafir 30/08/2014, USAtoday 31/08/2014*)

Israeli warplanes struck three administrative and military targets in Quneitra, killing two security guards and two women in mid-July. There were some reports about Israeli shelling on Quneitra targeting SAF sites. In late September, Israel also shot down a SAF plane when it crossed over airspace in the Israeli-occupied part of the Golan Heights. (*Reliefweb 15/7/2014, al-Akhbar 16/7/2014, Reuters 23/09/2014*)

3.12.2 Context

Conflict incidents Quneitra
Apr - Sep 2014



This rural and sparsely populated Governorate is particularly delicate given its proximity to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. A 1974 armistice prohibits the GoS from engaging in military activity within the buffer zone that runs along the border between Quneitra and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Although the terms of the agreement have not been strictly followed, the GoS has avoided using significant airstrikes in Quneitra, allowing opposition forces more operational space. Nonetheless, Quneitra witnesses frequent clashes and shelling between opposition and GoS forces. OCHA estimates that 87,000 people or 97% of Quneitra's pre-conflict population are in need for humanitarian aid. (*OCHA 14/7/2014*)

3.12.3 Displacement

OCHA estimates from July concluded that about 72,000 IDPs are in Quneitra, an 8% decrease since its December 2013 estimates. This is likely due to the lack of available protection and shelter which have forced people to find refuge outside the Governorate. There are high concentrations of IDPs in Khan Arnaba with 40,000 IDPs, followed by 15,000 in Quneitra, 14,500 in Al-Khashniyyeh and 2,500 in Fiq. (*OCHA 14/7/2014, WFP 2014/05/20*)

3.12.4 Humanitarian needs

Health and WASH

Hundreds of people arriving to Al Koom shelter suffer from a severe shortage of drinking water and a complete absence of an effective sewage network. Children are being exposed

to the risk of communicable diseases. The lack of drinking water comes with reports about lack of rain and the ongoing conflict that affected the water infrastructure. (SARC 18/08/2014)

According to WHO and MoH, about 95% or 55 of Quneitra's public health facilities reported to the regular monitoring of functioning health facilities in the second quarter. According to the report, about 52% of Quneitra's facilities centres are fully functioning, 5% are reportedly partially functioning, and 38% are non-functional. When it comes to damaged health facilities, there is a big gap, as only 59% of the facilities reported data. Of those, 9% of them were reported as damaged or partially damaged, and the other 50% were reported undamaged. Accessibility to Quneitra's health facilities is a concerning issue as 43% of them were reported not accessible, which makes it the highest percentage nationally. As for hospitals, Quneitra has one hospital, which was reported as fully functional and not damaged. (WHO/MoH 14/08/2014, WHO/MoH 14/08/2014)

Food security and livelihoods

Quneitra is part of the county's vegetables and animal production areas, and it contributes significantly to its livestock production compared to its geographic size. FAO estimated that 2,570 farmers/herders families are in urgent need of agricultural support. (OCHA 14/7/2014)

Shelter and NFI

Due to major opposition gains in Quneitra, the GoS has reduced fuel shipments to the Governorate, nearly tripling prices. Fuel is particularly needed to pump water supplies, as IDPs are reportedly heavily dependent on water tankering, which is more susceptible to contamination than well water. (PI 09/2014)

Due to the persistent conflict in Quneitra, relatively high levels of displacement, and widespread destruction to housing, the large majority of IDPs have settled with host families, resulting in increased immediate need for adequate shelter. (OCHA 14/7/2014)

3.13 TARTOUS




People in need:	472,500
Tartous	OCHA 06/14
	Dynamo 07/14: N/A

3.13.1 Key issues

Although the Governorate has been distant from the widespread armed conflict, local residents and vulnerable IDPs are still in need of humanitarian assistance. Tartous is home to some 452,000 IDPs, mainly from Aleppo, Homs and Hama, who reside in rented apartments, government facilities and outdoor spaces. (OCHA 2014/06)

3.13.2 Context



Tartous with a pre-crisis population of 797,000 has been the most stable during more than three years of conflict making the Governorate a refuge for tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) escaping nearby conflict areas. Many businessmen are investing in the City and as such some private sector companies have relocated there due to the relative stability and the still functioning trade port. (Jadaliyya 2014/04/13, OCHA 2014/06).

3.13.4 Access

In June, joint convoys from ICRC and SARC delivered aid products to more than 450,000 people, 160,000 of which are IDPs, in the coastal cities of Tartous and Lattakia. In its largest operations during the Syrian crisis, WFP reportedly delivered humanitarian assistance to some 217,500 IDPs and local people-in-need in the Tartous Governorate. (ICRC 2014/07/11, WFP 2014/06)

3.13.5 Displacement

An OCHA report in June indicates that some 452,000 IDPs currently reside in the Governorate mainly in Tartous City, Mashta Hellou, Safita and Banyas, a 9% IDP decrease compared to OCHA's

December figures, 200,000 of these are reportedly in need of humanitarian assistance, mainly in Tartous City, Mashta Hellou and Banyas. ICRC reported that in recent months, tens of thousands of people have fled from violence in Aleppo to the relatively safer coastal areas, and that most of them are currently living in temporary shelters. (OCHA 2014/06)

3.13.6 Humanitarian needs

Health

472,500 IDPs and local residents are reportedly in need of humanitarian assistance in Tartous. An overburdened health system leaves many civilians without proper health care, particularly women who have been reportedly forced to give birth at home in unhygienic circumstances and without medical supervision due to the absence of skilled birth attendance. Because the area did not witness any violent attacks, hospitals and medical centres are still functioning but lack the capacity to withstand the increasing number of IDPs in the City. WHO reported only 3 partially functioning health centres out of an identified 164 health centres while the rest are fully functioning. (WHO 2014/06-1, UNFPA 2014/03/31, UN Children's Fund 2014/04/11, OCHA 2014/06)

Shelter

In a June report, OCHA identified 21 collective shelters in the Governorate with 1,600 families residing in them. Fourteen of the shelters are located in Tartous City and 7 in the other districts in the Governorate. While middle class people who fled to Tartous are mainly accommodated in rented apartments and chalets, other less well off IDPs live in government facilities and buildings, mainly in schools. (Jadaliyya 2014/04/13, OCHA 2014/06)

Protection

Although distant from conflict incidents, arbitrary arrests and deaths under torture trigger protection concerns in the Governorate's second most populated city, Banyas. The Syrian Observatory reported in late August that the Syrian intelligence informed the parents of an 18 year-old, detained almost two years earlier with his brother in Banyas City, that both their children died in detainment. Incidents of this kind are regularly reported in Banyas. The past 3 months have witnessed the death of at least 5 young men and women under torture in GoS detention centres, according to SOHR reports. (SOHR 2014/08/20, SOHR 2014/08/17, SOHR 2014/06)



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ANNEX

REGIONAL ANALYSIS SYRIA

13 OCTOBER 2014

PART B – HOST COUNTRIES

1. OVERVIEW

1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR in the region reached over three million during the third quarter with an increase of over one million refugees in the past 12 months. In September, the Islamic State's (IS) advances caused the largest refugee influx of the Syrian crisis, with 130,000 primarily Syrian Kurd refugees fleeing to Turkey in a 72-hour period, which exceptionally opened the Ain al Arab/Kobani-Muristpinar border crossing (closed since 1970). At the beginning of October, the number of Iraqi refugees approaching UNHCR in Jordan was higher than the arrival rate of Syrians to the Kingdom, due to de facto closure of the eastern border which left up to 5,000 people stranded in the no man's land. While increased border restrictions by Syria's neighbours reduced the rate of refugee arrivals compared to 2013, hosting capacities in the region are vastly overstretched as neighbouring countries are now facing influxes of Iraqi refugees.

The advance of IS in Iraq and Syria:

Despite western airstrikes and strong international rhetoric condemning IS' actions, the group continued to make territorial gains across eastern and northern Syria, as well as in Iraq. The transnational nature of the conflict is drawing in armed actors from both Syria and Iraq, as well as military involvement from western and Arab countries, further increasing the complexities of the Syrian conflict. In recent weeks, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq's (KR-I) Peshmerga forces, the People's Protection Unit (YPG) in Syria, and Kurdish fighters from Turkey joined forces against IS to protect Ain Al Arab/Kobani from takeover. The US and its Arab allies are also launching airstrikes against IS in Iraq and Syria, finding a common enemy with the Government of Syria (GoS), which is increasingly engaging in active fighting against IS. Meanwhile, some opposition groups, which had previously fought the YPG, are now joining forces with Kurdish armed groups against IS in the north and northeast of Syria.

IS' military victories have been accompanied by major protection concerns, including forced displacement, forced and early marriages, gender-based violence (GBV), summary executions, siege tactics, and forced conversion of religious minorities. Since the June takeover of Mosul, over 1.25 million Iraqis have been internally displaced, overwhelming the limited hosting capacities in the KR-I and inaccessible and insecure regions of central and northern Iraq. The growing insecurity has also spurred the return of at least 10,000 Syrian refugees from the KR-I. At the regional level, countries are imposing measures to limit the infiltration of IS, which also lead to a deterioration in the protection environment for Syrian refugees.

Political developments:

The third quarter witnessed significant political developments at the regional level, with an alliance formed between various international forces, followed by air strikes against IS locations in Iraq. This alliance expanded its area of operation to Syria in September, with the support of Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Jordan. In Turkey, protests erupted over the Government's lack of military intervention to protect Ain Al Arab/Kobani against IS in early October, leaving at least one dozen dead. The political position of Turkey in the war against IS is still not clear,

but indications are that the only way they would be part of this effort is if a buffer zone were created inside Syrian territory that can be a safe area for civilians and opposition fighters

Funding shortfalls:

WFP announced significant funding shortfalls that will lead to immediate cuts to food assistance for affected Syrians across the entire region. Refugees in Egypt will face perhaps the most drastic cuts, with over half of refugees no longer receiving food assistance. In Syria, the caloric value of food baskets to about four million beneficiaries are expected to be significantly reduced by half beginning in November (more than 60% below the global caloric value recommended in emergencies). The expected impact on food security, which is often the highest priority in Syria, may affect displacement patterns. The cuts are coming just as livelihood opportunities in the agriculture and construction sectors will be further reduced due to the upcoming winter season, further limiting refugees' coping mechanisms.

Increased tension between refugee and host communities:

Clashes in Lebanon and Turkey have triggered a major backlash against Syrian refugees, raising protection concerns. Following a brief lull during the second quarter, Lebanon's security once again sharply deteriorated in August with incursions from opposition fighters based in Syria's Qalamoun region into Aarsal. The fighting left dozens of security forces and civilians dead and resulted in heightened tensions between refugee and host communities. Dozens of refugee shelters in informal settlements were destroyed during the fighting, however, local residents have strongly opposed assistance to the refugees. Other recent incidents, rumoured to involve sexual harassment and a traffic accident in another incident, ignited violent protests by local residents against the presence of Syrian refugees in Istanbul and Gaziantep. Turkish authorities relocated up to 6,000 refugees from urban areas to camps and authorities threatened to relocate more, while hundreds of Syrian refugees reportedly left Gaziantep and dispersed to other Turkish cities.

Effects of dry weather:

The low levels of rainfall in the past year has led to a decrease in agricultural productivity, particularly in Lebanon and Turkey, and caused water shortages across the summer months. In Lebanon, fruit and vegetable production decreased, affecting both access and livelihoods for both refugees and impoverished host communities across the country. Meanwhile, it was estimated that Turkey's cereal production has decreased by 10% compared to last year, coupled with 10% inflation of food prices. Syrian refugees outside of the camps are thus facing increasing challenges to meet their basic needs.

1.2 POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

Funding shortfalls: The regional response to the Syrian crisis is under increasing pressure due to other emerging global crises. WFP dramatically reduces the provision of food assistance, both within Syria and in refugee hosting countries, while other agencies also face significant budget shortfalls. The cuts come at a particularly difficult time, with informal work opportunities and income reduced and the onset of winter, when NFI needs (clothing, electricity, and blankets) increase. As a result, some refugees decide to return to the uncertain security situation in Syria, while others are forced into increasingly dire circumstances and use of negative coping mechanisms, including survival sex, early marriage, and recruitment into armed groups.

Lebanon instability: Recent violent events in Aarsal ignite Lebanon's pre-existing sectarian tensions. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are unable to contain the conflict in the border areas, leading to the intensification of clashes in Tripoli and other hotspots. Lebanon's political parties mobilise and increase their sectarian rhetoric, leading to a nationwide escalation of sectarian conflict.

IS attacks on the KR-I: Flaunting the threat of western airstrikes, IS launches covert attacks, such as suicide attacks and car bombings, targeting security forces and western diplomatic missions in neighbouring countries. In the KR-I, civilians and IDPs, particularly religious minority communities, are also be targeted. The attacks further heighten tensions between host communities and IDP and refugee communities and raises significant protection concerns. Neighbouring countries further limit access for refugees into its territory, including Iraqi IDPs' access to the KR-I, fearing IS infiltration of displaced groups.

Winterisation: Lack of preparedness, coupled with funding shortfalls, leads to a limited and delayed winterisation response by humanitarian agencies. This particularly affects refugees living in sub-standard shelter, the majority of whom reside in informal settlements in Lebanon. Many areas hosting refugees are subject to flooding and freezing temperatures, further deepening the vulnerability of refugees.

Increased returns: Despite the escalation of violence spurred by IS, Syrian refugees steadily return to Syria due to their inability to survive, deep assistance cuts, high tensions with host communities, and rising insecurity in host countries, particularly Iraq and Lebanon. Most refugees choose to return to opposition-controlled areas, although these areas are increasingly shrinking, or GoS strongholds where there is a modicum of stability and availability of public services.

1.3 TIMELINE

Jordan tightened restrictions for refugees trying to enter the Kingdom with extensive screening processes which left thousands of people stranded in the no-man's land along the Jordan-Syria border with limited assistance. At the same time, the Government of Jordan instituted a new policy requiring those in host communities approaching UNHCR in host communities for documentation after 14 July to show GoJ permission papers in order to access protection and assistance from the UN and its implementing partners.

The Government of Turkey (GoT) announces its intentions to move urban refugees to camps amid high tensions and clashes between host and refugee communities in Istanbul and the border town of Gaziantep.

The largest refugee influx in the Syrian crisis to date occurred with 130,000 Syrians fleeing over a 72-hour period as a result of IS attacks on the border town of Ain Al Arab/Kobani. WFP announced significant region-wide food aid cuts to Syrian refugees. While many refugees in non-camp settings in Iraq, Lebanon, and Turkey were not receiving assistance before the cuts, those in Egypt and Jordan are likely to lack coping mechanisms to address the shortfalls.



July


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
Fighting in the Qalamoun region spilled into Aarsal in early August. Sporadic violence in and around the border town, already overwhelmed by refugees, and extremely tense due to political and sectarian tensions in the area, could further ignite violence in other parts of the country.

The GoJ reported that it cleared the no-man's land of stranded refugees and sent them to Azraq camp. Jordan joins US-led airstrikes against IS in Syria, along with Gulf countries, prompting IS and Jabhat Al-Nusra to call for attacks against countries involved in the airstrikes.

1.4 HUMANITARIAN POPULATION PROFILE (SEE ANNEX 1 FOR DEFINITIONS)



1. The figures are from the UNHCR report in September 25. In Lebanon, 10-20% of the registered population is estimated to be unregistered according to official sources.
2. The Government of Turkey updated its estimate of refugees to 1.35 million, according to the UNHCR emergency update in September.
3. Figures are from the UNHCR RRP6 Iraq reports in August
4. UNHCR RRP6 portal.
5. Registered by EU Governments.
6. Figures include those awaiting registration. Source: UNHCR
7. PRS displaced outside Syria according to UNRWA most updated figures on 25 May.
8. According to a Jordanian government official.



2. COUNTRIES

2.1 LEBANON

Displaced (see annex I for definitions)

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	1,151,000
% Living in Informal Settlements	15%
Palestinian refugees from Syria	53,000
Syrian returnees	Unknown
Host Communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown

Sources: UNHCR 09/14, OCHA 08/14

2.1.1. Key issues

- This quarter was marked by a very tense security situation in Lebanon. From mid-June to mid-July, three incidents of suicide explosions were reported in the Bekaa and Beirut. During the same period, the number of shelling and airstrikes decreased compared to the previous six weeks, with a dozen incidents mostly affecting the areas of Britel, Baalbek, Tfail and Arsal in the Bekaa. (OCHA 15/07/14, AFP 14/07/14)
- In early August, fighting in the Qualamoun area of Syria spilled over into Arsal, with heavy fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and armed elements from 2-5 August. Fighting caused the death of 17 soldiers, 42 civilians, and an unknown number of armed fighters. (AraNews 09/08/14, WorldBulletin 07/08/14) LAF eventually retook many of its positions and a ceasefire agreement allowed the majority of the armed elements to withdraw. (Assafir 08/08/14) However, some local sources reported that Al-Nusra and IS fighters were still moving back and forth to Arsal town, raiding houses and searching for locals considered to have cooperated with the Lebanese army during the clashes. (Assafir 25/08/14, OCHA 31/08/14) Additionally, security officials indicated that 19 soldiers and a dozen policemen are still missing and are presumed held hostage by armed groups. (WorldBulletin 07/08/14)
- In September, armed groups executed three Lebanese soldiers among the 19 captured during the Arsal clashes, which exacerbated communal tensions and sparked attacks on Syrian refugees. Clashes between the LAF and armed groups also continued in the east of the country, causing the death of an unknown number of LAF soldiers, Sunni fighters, and Hezbollah members. (ICG 01/10/14, UNHCR 10/08/14, OCHA 31/08/14, Assafir 05/09/14)
- Violence also spread briefly to Lebanon's coastal city of Tripoli, where Syria's war has exacerbated decades-old tensions between local Sunnis and Alawites. LAF soldiers battled gunmen after they opened fire on army positions in the city. A bomb also targeted an army patrol, wounding an officer and a soldier. (WorldBulletin 03/08/14) In Akkar, early August was characterised by intermittent shelling and gunfire, mostly at night, in areas close to the northern border and in Wadi Khaled. (OCHA 11/08/14)
- Informal settlements are mushrooming, from 250 in June 2011, 490 in June 2012, 840 in June 2013, to 1,400 in September 2014. They are currently hosting an estimated 15% of the registered Syrian refugees, although the proportion is as high as 30% in Akkar and Bekaa governorates.

“In early August, fighting in the Qualamoun area of Syria spilled over into Arsal, with heavy fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and armed elements”

1,151,000
Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration

53,000
Palestinian refugees from Syria

- According to the 2014 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR), 75% of interviewed households are considered food insecure, which represents an increase from the 68% noted in 2013. Although less than 0.5% are considered severely food insecure, over 12% face moderate food insecurity, and 62% face mild food insecurity. The food security situation was found to be relatively poor in Akkar and the Bekaa Valley, where 22% and 16% of households respectively were moderately and severely food insecure.

2.1.2. Possible developments

Armed violence and communal tensions: Recent escalation of armed violence in Arsal, along with incidents in other parts of Lebanon, has exacerbated social tensions throughout the country. The risk of an outbreak of intercommunal violence is very high, especially in areas hosting large numbers of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese.

Informal settlements and the onset of winter: According to projections based on UNHCR shelter surveys, it is expected that 55% of Syrian refugees will be living in unfinished houses, construction sites, and informal settlements by December 2014. This constitutes a major source of concern, especially with winter approaching.

Opening of refugee camps: In September, despite long-standing reservations by the authorities, Lebanon decided to set up two camps for Syrian refugees along its border with Syria. Discussions are ongoing on the modality of implementation, notably in regards to site selection. Estimates are that each camp could accommodate 10,000 people. (AFP 11/09/14)

2.1.3. Operational constraints

Events in Arsal in early August caused the prolonged interruption of assistance and related activities. To date, proper access to the population has still not been restored due to the tense security situation and increasing tensions between host communities and Syrian refugees, as well as between local communities and aid agencies. Discussions regarding rehabilitation of refugees' shelter options in Arsal were also perceived as unwanted, with Arsal community representatives stating that they object to any reconstruction or rehabilitation of informal settlements in the area until a lasting solution for the refugee situation in the town has been found. It is expected that tensions will dissipate once the compensation plan for local residents, whose properties were damaged by the clashes, has been initiated. Security forces and the municipality of Arsal have advised UN and NGO

partners not to enter the city, and to operate through local NGOs. Some lifesaving services such as WASH and health care are being provided by local partners. Syrian refugees are reportedly still not allowed to enter or exit Aarsal through the main road, and the roads leading to Ras Baalbek are also reportedly blocked. Reports indicate that Lebanese can exit and enter Aarsal unhindered. (WFP 19/08/14, UNHCR 10/08/14, UNHCR 21/08/14, OCHA 31/08/14)

2.1.4. Data sources and limitations

Six assessments were published in the third quarter of 2014:

- WFP produced the findings of the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR 08/14)
- REACH completed assessments on 1) Informal settlements in Akkar Governorate, 2) Host communities in Akkar Governorate, 3) a secondary data review and preliminary report on host communities across Lebanon. (REACH 09/14, REACH 09/14, REACH 07/14)
- Search for Common Ground published a report on social cohesion in Tripoli and South Lebanon (SGC 07/14)
- An interagency report analysed the situation of Syrian youth in Lebanon (IA 08/14)

Various assessments are ongoing:


- UNHCR is undertaking a baseline assessment on health care access for vulnerable populations (UNHCR 09/14)
- REACH/UNHCR are researching Prenatal and Maternal Health Access in Akkar (REACH/UNHCR 09/14)
- EU and UNDP are currently undertaking an environmental assessment of the Syrian crisis (EU/UNDP 09/14)
- UNDP is currently mapping risks and resources across Lebanon (UNDP 09/14)

Information gaps: There are significant gaps in information sharing regarding protection concerns and the situation of specific population groups:

- Refoulement and other incidents of forced return
- Unregistered Syrian refugees
- Lebanese returnees
- Palestinian refugees from Lebanon
- Persons with specific needs

2.1.5. Displacement

Displacement profile Lebanon



Syrian refugees


Entry restrictions:

In late June, the Ministry of Social Affairs informed the UN of a decision made at a ministerial committee to only welcome Syrian refugees coming from conflict-affected regions near the Lebanese border. It is unclear whether this has been implemented. (DailyStar 19/06/14)

New arrivals:

According to data collected by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) under the New Comers Programme, the number of identified individuals entering Lebanon decreased steadily from over 20,000 in March to about 8,250 in August:

Rate of new arrivals Lebanon (March - August)



While June and July saw the usual highest proportion of newcomers originating from Damascus, August showed a significant increase in the proportion of people arriving from Homs.

Registered refugees:

As of late September, 1,151,000 Syrians are registered as refugees with UNHCR in Lebanon and over 30,000 are awaiting registration. This means that over 50,000 refugees have been registered within three months since late June, which represents a slight decrease compared to the previous quarter. Refugees are currently living in over 1,700 locations, of which 1,400 are informal settlements. (UNHCR 03/14, UNHCR 09/14, UNHCR 01/09/14).

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS):

As of late September, heightened restrictions on entry to Lebanon and visa renewal for Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) introduced in early May remain in place. Since their introduction, PRS entry to Lebanon has been almost entirely limited to those transiting to a third country and some cases with confirmed embassy appointments. All PRS currently in Lebanon are required to regularise their legal status, while restrictions in place mean that many are no longer able to renew and are being instructed to leave the country. These restrictions have grave implications on PRS, including restrictions on movements and civil registration, such as birth or death certificates. (UNRWA 15/07/14)

Lebanese returnees:

Although IOM and the High Relief Committee (HRC) registered over 17,000 returnees by October 2013, the frequency of referrals received in 2014 suggests that the number of returnees greatly exceed the registered number. It is projected that there will be as many as 50,000 returnees in the country by end of 2014. (FSS 08/14)


IDPs:

Heavy fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and armed elements began in Arsal causing significant displacement, with over 900 Lebanese families temporarily moving from Arsal to other parts of Bekaa and beyond. As the fighting subsided, a majority of the displaced returned to Arsal. However, new displacement was reported due to intermittent fighting on 27 August. (OCHA 31/08/14)

Refugee returns:

Due to the escalation of violence in Arsal in early August, reports indicated that over 1,000 Syrian refugees who had been sheltering in the Lebanese town crossed back into Syria through the Masnaa border crossing. No update is available as to whether the displaced came back to Lebanon after clashes subsided. (AraNews 09/08/14, UN 21/08/14)

Population groups in Lebanon



2.1.6. Humanitarian needs and concerns

Protection

Armed violence:

The overall security situation in Lebanon remained tense during the reporting period with three incidents of suicide explosions in the Bekaa and Beirut in June-July (OCHA 15/07/14), and a peak in violence in the border town of Aarsal in early August which killed an estimated 42 civilians. (AraNews 09/08/14, WorldBulletin 07/08/14) As of late August, media reports indicated that Jabhat Al-Nusra and IS fighters are still moving back and forth to Aarsal town and stormed houses of those considered to have cooperated with the Lebanese army during the clashes. (Assafir 25/08/14)

Social tensions:

Following the escalation of tensions in Aarsal in early August, an inter-agency security assessment indicated in late August that inter-communal tensions were still running high. Local authorities indicated that tensions would hopefully dissipate once the compensation plan for locals, whose properties were extensively damaged by the recent clashes, has been initiated. (UNHCR 21/08/14)

Elsewhere in Lebanon, tensions between local communities and refugees are also of concern, due to the strain on resources and economic opportunities. Two assessments in the south, Tripoli, Akkar, and the Bekaa, indicated that in many cases, communities would prefer to reside in separate neighbourhoods, and have their children in separate school facilities. There are perceptions from host communities that refugees threaten their value system and disproportionately benefit from humanitarian assistance. These elements can explain the support from Lebanese for restrictive measures on refugees, such as curfew, and bureaucratic impediments that limits refugees' access to shelter and employment. (OCHA 15/07/14, REACH 07/14)

Legal status and documentation:

On average, 13% of refugees enter through unofficial border crossings and are not recognised as legally present in Lebanon. Also, refugees are also increasingly concerned after the general security demanded that they renew their residential documents after the initial 12 month residency expires, which costs a substantial amount that most cannot afford to pay. (Assafir 14/08/14) The consequences of irregular legal status are vast, not least relating to risks of arrest and detention, severe limitations on freedom of movement, limited access to livelihoods/employment, and civil registration, risk of exploitation, and problematic access to essential services, including birth registration. (UNHCR 06/14)

In addition, there have been increased reports of Syrian nationals receiving contradicting information from different parts of the government regarding the renewal procedure for residency permits in Lebanon. In some cases, this has caused Syrian nationals to be detained and sometimes deported when coming back to Lebanon, due to the lack of valid documentation. (PI 10/09/14)

Early marriage and gender-based violence (GBV):

There are no official statistics on child marriage in Lebanon, but many cases have been reported in several rural areas and have reportedly risen with the influx of Syrian refugees. Lebanese authorities are trying to limit the widespread issue with legislation that would give civil authorities a role in an area that is usually the preserve of clerics. Indeed, at the moment, religious tribunals handle all so-called personal status issues related to Lebanon's 18 officially recognised sects, including setting the age of consent. (AFP 18/08/14) In August, the National Body of the Affairs of Lebanese Women declared it was drafting a legal proposal to determine and set a minimum age for getting married. (Annahar 31/08/14)

“Following the escalation of tensions in Aarsal in early August, an inter-agency security assessment indicated in late August that inter-communal tensions were still running high.”

According to UNHCR in June, refugee women and children are disproportionately affected by GBV. Unaccompanied girls and adolescents, single heads of households, young mothers, and spouses, and women and girls living with disabilities are among the most at risk. 25% of survivors of reported GBV cases are under 18 years of age. (UNHCR 06/14)

Evictions and restriction on informal settlements: The situation in Aarsal created tensions in several towns across Akkar, notably the mass eviction by the local community of Syrian refugees from 25 settlements in Al-Hasina town. (Assafir 11/08/14) In Batroun, displaced residing on the banks of the al-Jouz river in al-A'ssi fields were evacuated based on a decision by Batroun's district officer. (Assafir 25/08/14) The residents of Batroun as well as parliament members, government officials, security branches, and municipalities also announced they will restrict the establishment of refugee camps and informal settlements, limiting refugees to reside in apartments and rented rooms. (Assafir 25/08/14)

According to a recent assessment in Akkar, 96% of settlements are located on private land. 87% refugees do not have formal contracts with the landlord, but many have long-term verbal agreements or have paid months of rent in advance. Tenancy is considered often unstable, with 29% of settlements at risk of forced relocation, with landlords being the main driving force. (REACH 09/14)

In Akkar and Bekaa governorates, saturated housing market and growing tensions between host communities and refugees are considered the main factors for the rise in threats of evictions, as well as actual evictions. In Wadi Khaled alone, 30 cases were recorded over 10 days in June, and a recent assessment of the 200 largest informal settlements in Bekaa showed an increase in potential eviction cases. (OCHA 15/07/14)

Curfews, detention:

Overall, tensions also caused an increase in restrictions impacting refugees' freedom of movement, with night curfews being reported in at least 45 municipalities throughout the country. (HRW 03/10/14) Additionally, an increase in arrests and detentions for lack of documentation has been reported in Tripoli, Akkar, and south Lebanon. (Assafir 08/08/14, OCHA 15/07/14)

Livelihoods and food security

Food security:

Food security is increasingly becoming a source of concern due to the declining economy and the impact of drought-like conditions. Average rainfall in 2014 was estimated at almost half of the annual average, which has resulted in a substantial decline in production, mostly

affecting fruits and vegetables. Subsequently, prices of these items have increased, limiting the economic access of the poor and vulnerable groups, mostly in Lebanon's poverty pockets concentrated in the north (Akkar and Dinnyeh), northern Bekaa (Baalkbek and Hermel), the south, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. (*Inter Press Services 22/07/14*) A recent assessment of host communities in Akkar confirmed that the vast majority of villages have seen increases in the cost of food staples, due to decreased trade opportunities with Syria and inflation. (*REACH 07/14*)

Syrian refugees:

According to the 2014 VASyR, 75% of interviewed household are considered food insecure, which represents an increase from the 68% noted in 2013. Although less than 0.5% are considered severely food insecure, over 12% face moderate food insecurity, and 62% face mild food insecurity. The food security situation was found to be relatively poor in Akkar and the Bekaa Valley, where 22% and 16% of households respectively were moderately and severely food insecure. By comparison, 6% of households in Beirut and Mount Lebanon were moderately and severely food insecure. (*WFP 22/07/14, VASyR 06/14*) Overall, 28% of refugee households resorted to emergency coping strategies this year, up from 22% in 2013. Over 80% of households reported having borrowed money during the last three months, compared to 71% in 2013. Half of the households had debts amounting to US\$400 or more. (*WFP 24/07/14*)

Host communities:

Various assessments have revealed that as the Syrian crisis has continued, Lebanese host community resilience has deteriorated in many locations. (*FSS 08/14*) Preliminary results from phase one of the OCHA/REACH Host Community Vulnerability Assessment indicate that Lebanese households were increasingly reducing the number of meals, borrowing money for food, purchasing food on credit, and purchasing lower quality or cheaper food, although these varied by region. Selling land or household assets, relying on remittances and depending on aid were also reported. (*OCHA/REACH 08/14*)

Informal settlements:

A recent assessment in Akkar indicated that residents of informal settlements are highly dependent upon assistance, credit, daily labour, and various coping mechanisms. This is mainly due to limited livelihood opportunities which results from limited mobility, high competition over jobs, economic constraints, and limited skills. According to the data collected, 16% of the adult population (over 18) assessed worked within the previous months, with an average of about 3 days per week. (*REACH 09/14*)

Palestinian Refugees:

A joint UNRWA/WFP assessment revealed poor food consumption patterns among PRS. Households reported spending nearly half of their income on food, with around 12% of households considered moderately or severely food insecure. 91% of PRS children did not meet the minimum acceptable meal frequency levels and 86% of them did not have acceptable dietary diversity. (*UNRWA/WFP 07/14*)

According to UNRWA, the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (PRL) is comparable to the situation of poor Lebanese, but restrictions placed on PRL's ability to work negatively impacts their income generation and therefore their food security situation. (*FSS 08/14*)

“According to the 2014 VASyR, 75% of interviewed household are considered food insecure, which represents an increase from the 68% noted in 2013. Although less than 0.5% are considered severely food insecure, over 12% face moderate food insecurity, and 62% face mild food insecurity”

Health

Access to health services:

According to an assessment conducted in Akkar, host communities ranked health services as a top concern, but indicated that healthcare was generally operating to the same low level as prior to the crisis. The report showed that there is a perception among Lebanese residents that refugees have better advantages in accessing health services. (*REACH 07/14*) The VASyR 2014 indicated that almost one-third of surveyed refugee households could not access needed health assistance. (*VASyR 06/14*)

In Tripoli, unverified reports suggested that some government hospitals stopped admitting Syrian patients needing dialysis starting August 2014, without specifying the reasons for this change. (*Zamalwsl 19/07/14*)

UNICEF reported that, in coordination with the Ministry of Public Health, it conducted an assessment of over 100 primary health clinics in the country to identify constraints for refugees and Lebanese host communities seeking access to health services. Findings have not been published yet. (*USAID 03/07/14*)

Informal settlements:

Due to poverty and substandard sanitation and shelter conditions, informal settlements show high rates of infections and preventable diseases, with reports of skin diseases, diarrhoea, fever, and respiratory ailments. Also, chronic diseases and serious illnesses are common and often untreated due to limited access to healthcare. (*REACH 09/14*)

WASH

Access to water:

According to OCHA in July, water scarcity and issues related to water quality were most severe in Akkar Governorate and in the Bekaa, and tend to affect cadastres which are considered most vulnerable in terms of concentration of refugees and poor Lebanese. (*OCHA 11/07/14*)

According to a recent assessment in Akkar, access to water ranked as one of communities' top concerns, with supplies impacted by environmental and meteorological factors, pollution due to inadequate wastewater management systems, and outdated infrastructure. However, key informants from host communities indicated that access to water has been moderately affected by the crisis. (*REACH 07/14*) The 2014 VASyR showed however that the proportion of refugee households with no access to drinking water increased by 5% to 33% in 2014. (*VASyR 06/14*)

Waste management:

In Akkar, sewage and coordinated wastewater management systems also ranked among communities' top concerns, and were said to fail to cope with the rising demand due to outdated or non-existent infrastructure. (REACH 07/14)

In Akkar, organised solid waste management was reportedly very affected by the crisis, but did not rank among top priorities among communities and access was said to be high throughout the governorate except in villages without municipalities. Also, localities hosting refugees reported that Syrian households lack access to containers and expressed the need for expanding garbage collection routes. (REACH 07/14)

Informal settlements:

In Akkar, WASH services in informal settlements are reportedly substandard and pose public health risks and long-term environmental concerns. Most have access to sources of drinking and domestic water, but issues were reported relating to water quality and means of storage. Access to latrines was also reported in most settlements, but in insufficient number, and most of them were assessed as substandard. Solid waste management was also reportedly insufficient due to low coverage of municipal garbage collection, which forces the refugees to dispose of solid waste by dumping them in the open or burning them. (REACH 09/14, Assafir 14/08/14)

Hygiene and baby kits:

According to the VASyR, the proportion of refugee households with no access to hygiene items increased to 40%, a 27% increase since the first assessment last year. (VASyR 06/14)

UNHCR also reported that due to funding shortage, the distribution of hygiene and baby kits had to stop abruptly. (UNHCR 30/06/14)

Shelter/NFI

Shelter issues affecting Syrian refugees: According to projections based on UNHCR shelter surveys, it is expected that 55% of Syrian refugees will be living in unfinished houses, construction sites, and informal settlements by December 2014. In the Bekaa, assessments showed congestion, low quality drainage systems, and great needs for shelter repair. Also, reports indicated that shelter conditions and winter needs are often more acute in sub-standard buildings than in informal settlements. (UNHCR 30/06/14)

Informal settlements:

Informal settlements are mushrooming, from 250 in June 2011, 490 in 2012, 840 in June 2013, and 1,400 in September 2014. They are currently hosting an estimated 15% of the registered Syrian refugees, although the proportion is as high as 30% in Akkar and Bekaa governorates. (UNHCR 01/09/14, OCHA 15/07/14)

Host communities:

A recent assessment in Akkar revealed that Lebanese residents of Akkar had inadequate housing options before the crisis, and the large influx of refugees has placed additional pressures on rental accommodations, especially for low rent accommodations. While a large number of refugees have settled in informal settlements, garages, and unfinished structures, most of them are staying in houses or apartments. Over 70% of key informants said that housing prices in their village were much higher than before the crisis. (REACH 07/14)

Electricity:

A recent REACH assessment in Akkar showed that electricity is the public service with the greatest level of access, and although it does not rank as a top concern among communities, key informants indicated the service was the most affected by the crisis, especially in communities which host informal settlements. Indeed, almost two-thirds of these settlements rely on network tapping – improvised connections to the main network which place a substantial burden on electricity supplies available to Lebanese residents, which often represents a source of tension between refugees and residents. (REACH 07/14, REACH 09/14)

Education

Based on UNHCR's current registration data, there are 459,900 Syrian, 21,000 Palestinian, 7,000 Lebanese returnees and 40,000 vulnerable Lebanese children in need of education services. Current response focuses on compensating for the low absorption capacity of the local schools, which shows a need for further investment in the public system. Indeed, refugees indicated that the main barrier to schooling is the lack of space. Secondary factors include cost of transportation, tuition fees, language, and safety concerns. (UNHCR 30/06/14)

For Lebanese nationals, reports showed that dissatisfaction over education varied widely by setting, but with grievances mainly centred on school management, and less on the impact of Syrian populations. (REACH 07/14)


2.2 JORDAN

Displaced (see annex I for definitions)

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	619,200
Palestinian refugees from Syria	14,500
Syrian returnees	100,000+
Non displaced affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown

Sources: UNHCR 2014/07/01, UNRWA 2014/07/01

*Some Syrians may be awaiting UNHCR organised transport to registration centres from more remote location.



“By early October, no new arrivals were reported and about 5,000 Syrians were stranded with the JAF denying humanitarian agencies access to the area.”

619,200

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration

14,500

Palestinian refugees from Syria

2.2.1 Key issues

- During the third quarter, refugees’ access to Jordan became much more risky and arduous at a time when humanitarian needs continue to grow in Syria. About 60% of recent arrivals reported fleeing IS-related events in the north, indicating that refugees are being forced to take even longer and more dangerous smuggling routes to access protection. According to UNHCR, the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) cleared the no-man’s land between the Jordan-Syria border in September, where hundreds of refugees were being held for screening for extended periods beginning in July. However, by early October, no new arrivals were reported and about 5,000 Syrians were stranded with the JAF denying humanitarian agencies access to the area. Satellite imagery from late September showed that there were about 130 suspected IDP shelters on the Syrian side of the Rubkan crossing, a 43% increase compared to late July. It appears that the GoJ is continuing to communicate its message of closed border to Syrians trying to flee to the Kingdom. (NYT 08/10/2014, UNOSAT/UNITAR 01/10/2014, IOM 03/10/2014)
- According to trusted sources, the number of refoulements of Syrian refugees has increased in September, particularly of those with invalid or outdated documentation or who have gone to Syria and returned back to Jordan. This places a significant number of refugees at further risk of refoulement. A July GoJ policy stated that Syrian refugees must show valid bailout documents (which are provided by the GoJ to show official permission to reside outside the camps) in order to obtain a UNHCR asylum seeker certificate and access UN assistance and public health and education services in non-camp areas. The policy will leave thousands with limited legal status, particularly refugees who have unofficially left Azraq camp, estimated at about 8,000.
- WFP is expecting massive cuts to the food assistance it provides across the region in October. While refugees in Jordan face less severe cuts compared to other countries, all refugees in host communities will receive food vouchers with half the value (USD 17) previously provided. Za’atari residents will experience a 18% reduction in voucher value. WFP has also shifted from blanket food voucher assistance and will exclude about 10% of registered Syrian refugees in non-camp settings. (UNHCR 29/09/2014)
- The Government of Jordan (GoJ) visibly increased its political stakes in the Syrian conflict, with its military’s direct involvement in the US-led airstrikes in northern Syria beginning in late September. While the IS presence is a major concern for Jordan and its citizens, its military involvement is likely to lead to increased justification of targeting by IS, and also help bring other extremist groups based in Jordan closer to IS. On the human rights front, Jordanian Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein became the High Commissioner of

the UN human rights office, and is expected to be a vocal critic of parties to the conflict in Syria and the region.

- The number of Iraqi refugees continues to grow, leading to increasingly stretched registration and assistance capacities, as well as assistance available among UNHCR and the small number of aid agencies. Between January and September, about 10,000 Iraqis have registered with UNHCR, about double the number registered throughout 2013. (PWG 10/09/2014, UNHCR 23/09/2014)

2.2.2. Possible Developments

Increase in refugees with limited legal status: The implementation of recent GoJ policies result in thousands of more Syrians (particularly refugees who have left Azraq camp unofficially) with limited legal status residing in host communities and Za'atari camp who lack access to UN assistance. This leads to an increase in very vulnerable refugee groups who are subject to exploitation, arrest, and/or possible refoulement and are pushed into further poverty.

Iraqi refugees further stretch capacities and negatively impact GoJ policies towards refugees: With ongoing pressure on Jordan's national security and overwhelmed by refugee influxes from Syria and increasingly from Iraq, the GoJ halts the provision of visas for Iraqis arriving via air (which has already been implemented for Syria nationals). Syrians arriving at the border also face increasing restrictions and the number allowed to enter Jordan and register as refugees decreases further.

2.2.3. Operational constraints

The refugee funding appeals process known as the 3RP is increasingly coming under the control of the Government of Jordan (GoJ), which did not initially include NGOs in the process. There is concern that humanitarian elements of some key sectors that do not fit the GoJ's framework, such as protection (which would fall under the justice sector), will be lost.

There continue to be challenges for many NGOs to obtain approval of refugee assistance projects by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC). Approval mechanisms are slow and agencies must include a significant proportion of Jordanians (between 30-50%) among their beneficiaries.

2.2.4. Data sources and limitations

11 assessments were published in the third quarter of 2014:

- REACH has published the following assessments: 1) drivers of tensions across sectors between refugee and host communities in 160 areas, with the Foreign Commonwealth Office 2) a food security assessment with WFP 3) a shelter assessment of Za'atari camp and 4) a national assessment of informal tented settlements (ITS). (REACH/WFP 07/2014, REACH/FCO 07/2014, REACH 07/2014)
- ARDD published two reports on: 1) the effects of fraud on the Syrian refugee community and 2) the use of psycho-social approaches in the provision of legal aid. (ARDD 07/2014, ARDD 07/2014)
- IMC published an assessment on non-communicable diseases. (IMC 07/2014)
- Save the Children International and UNICEF both published individual reports on early marriage. (SCI 17/07/2014, UNICEF 16/07/2014)
- Human Rights Watch published a report on Palestinian refugees in Syria (PRS) (HRW 07/08/2014)
- PU-AMI published an assessment on health in Zarqa Governorate (PU-AMI 07/2014)

Various assessments are ongoing:

- UNHCR and a number of NGOs are conducting a safety audit of Za'atari camp.
- ILO, Save the Children International, and UNICEF are conducting an assessment of child labour in Za'atari camp.
- The International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children are conducting a rapid household assessment among new arrivals in the camps to identify specific needs of adolescent girls.
- The Jesuit Refugee Service is undertaking an assessment of higher education services.
- The Danish Refugee Council is conducting an assessment in southern Jordan, including Karak, Ma'an, and Tafleeh governorates. The assessment will identify gaps in available services, coping mechanisms, migration patterns, and social cohesion. (DRC 24/07/2014)
- REACH is finalising thematic assessments on youth, education and health in Za'atari camp.
- ACTED, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture are finalising a food security and livelihoods assessment of Jordanians affected by the Syrian refugee influx.
- The Education Sector Working Group is in the process of finalising an inter-agency assessment of education needs in camp and host communities.

Information gaps: There are significant gaps in information sharing regarding protection trends monitored by UNHCR:

- refoulement and other incidents of forced return
- the number and reported reasons for spontaneous returns
- the number of refugees bailed out from the camps
- the number of refugees forcibly returned to the camps

The MoH/WHO epidemiological bulletins were first published in 2014 to track communicable diseases in non-camp areas, however there have been no new reports available since April.

2.2.5. Displacement

Displacement


1.4 million
Refugees



Border restrictions:

Given increasing restrictions by the Government of Jordan (GoJ) along its border with Syria, dozens of makeshift shelters were identified by the UN satellite agency on the Syrian side of the Rubkan border crossing. Between July and October, UNOSAT/UNITAR noted a 43% increase in shelters. Hundreds of Syrians were reportedly being held at transit sites in the militarised buffer zone along the eastern border for extended periods of time, with limited assistance and inadequate shelter. In the past year, the vast majority of Syrians entering Jordan must use the eastern border crossings, as the western border along Dar'a Governorate has largely been closed except for medical evacuations. (UNOSAT/UNITAR 01/10/2014, PI 2014/07/24, IOM 2014/08/01, UNHCR 2014/01/16, UNOSAT 2014/07/25)

Q3: New arrivals



New arrivals:

The rate of daily arrivals decreased in the third quarter compared to the first quarter of 2014. In the third quarter, an average of 163 Syrians were allowed to enter the country each day, which is about half the number of daily arrivals reported in January. (IOM)

Registered refugees:

619,200 refugees were registered in Jordan as of 29 September. UNHCR projects that there will be 700,000 refugees by the end of the year, while the GoJ is planning to assist 800,000 Syrian refugees. (RRP6 01/06/2014)

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS):

Around 14,500 PRS are recorded in Jordan by UNRWA, with about 100 newly recorded each month during the third quarter. About 200 PRS and their family members are being held in the Cyber City transit facility and are not permitted to enter the camps or urban areas of Jordan. Since a 2012 GoJ announcement that PRS would not be allowed to enter Jordan, the number of PRS in Jordan recorded by UNRWA remains low. Many PRS in Jordan are believed to be living in hiding due to fears of arrest and refoulement. The needs of PRS are not addressed in regional funding appeals for the Syrian crisis. (UNRWA 2014/07/01)

Unregistered refugees:

In August, the GoJ's Higher Population Council has stated that there are 1.4 million Syrians in Jordan, however, it is highly likely that this figure is significantly inflated. (Jordan Times 13/08/2014)

Syrian returnees:

Refugee returns continued to increase since the beginning of the year. About 500-750 refugees reportedly returned to Syria, primarily Dar'a Governorate, in July and August. Family reunification was reportedly a strong driver for returns, despite the acknowledged risk of insecurity and lack of assistance in Syria. (CCCM 15/07/2014, CCCM 19/08/2014)

2.2.6. Humanitarian needs and concerns


Protection

Legal status and documentation:

As of 14 July, those who leave the camps and approach UNHCR for asylum seeker certificates in urban areas for the first time must show bailout documentation to obtain an appointment. Without the asylum seeker certificate and a Ministry of Interior (MoI) service card, refugees outside of the camps will be unable to access free education or health services and will not be provided with WFP food vouchers. An estimated 200,000 Syrians have left the camps outside of the bailout process, however, the new policy is currently only applied to those approaching UNHCR for registration after 14 July. UNHCR reported that about 330 households have approached their offices in urban areas but lacked bailout documents. (Health WG 30/09/2014, PWG 10/09/2014)

There is concern that this policy could be further expanded in the future as refugees seek to renew their asylum seeker certificates in the future or through the MoI re-verification process. It appears that the GoJ is moving towards a more restrictive refugee encampment policy, which would also lead to a significant proportion of Syrians in host communities subjected to a number of protection issues, including limited access to basic services, unclear legal status, arrest, refoulement and/or separation of families. Already, the number of refugees forced to return to Za'atari camp has noticeably increased in recent months according to UNHCR. (PWG 16/07/2014, Jordan Times 02/08/2014, UNHCR 16/09/2014)

Number of forced returns from host communities to Za'atari



“UNHCR estimates that it is seeing about 100-150 new non-Syrian refugees each day – nearly as many as the number of Syrian arrivals”

An assessment of exploitation of Syrian refugees found that fraudulent schemes are well-known among communities. The most common type of fraud involved payments for services claiming to help expedite UNHCR registration, as well as registration with NGOs providing assistance. Other scams involved offers to secure housing or posing as property owners and taking lease payments. The sale of forged documents, including bailout documents, MoI service cards, and work permits was also prevalent. While UNHCR has made efforts to improve mass communication to refugees, there is a need for increased transparency and awareness-raising campaigns by all aid agencies and GoJ authorities of their respective processes to reduce the confusion among refugee communities. (ARDD 07/2014)

Child protection:

According to Jordan's sharia courts, which are responsible for legally registering marriages, the proportion of early marriages of Syrian girls (between the age of 15-17) among all registered Syrian marriages has increased from 12% in 2011 to 25% in 2013. In the first quarter of 2014, about 32% of all registered Syrian marriages were classified as early marriages. Both UNICEF and SCI reports found that early marriage was perceived as a form of security among Syrian refugees, given financial difficulties and the general sense of insecurity as refugees. Both agencies also reported that some Syrians used early marriage to circumnavigate GoJ restrictions, such as the bailout rules in the camps (which require a close relative for sponsorship), as well as those which bar single males from entering the Kingdom. (SCI 17/07/2014, UNICEF 16/07/2014)

ITS:

A REACH/UNICEF assessment found that the ITS population has increased nearly fourfold from 3,300 in December 2013 to over 15,000 in September. Very few (3.5%) children residing in ITS attended school and over 20% are working, indicating significant child protection concerns. Following the June ITS eviction of 1,300 people, the GoJ authorities confirmed that they will provide 48 hours notice to UNHCR of any planned evictions. However, reliable sources believe that the GoJ will avoid further evictions in the near future. The ongoing eviction threat is likely to result in residents dispersing to smaller and more rural settlements, where services are likely more scarce. (ITS TF 28/08/2014, REACH/UNICEF 02/10/2014)

Non-Syrian refugees:

UNHCR estimates that it is seeing about 100-150 new refugees each day – nearly as many as the number of Syrian arrivals. As with previous Iraqi refugees, the majority originate from Baghdad, however, there is an increasing number of those coming from IS-controlled

areas of northern Iraq. UNHCR reported high levels of trauma amongst new arrivals. Caritas has negotiated with the GoJ to provide visas to 1,000 Iraqi minorities while the charity is assisting them for six months.

Armed violence: Concerns of IS infiltration of Jordan remain high, although the GoJ and its international partners appear confident that IS supporters are relatively few in Jordan and also face divisions with Islamists who support Al Qaeda. Security officials detained tens of suspected IS supporters in Irbid, Salt, and Ruseifa who reportedly participated in a pro-IS rally near Amman. (*Al Jazeera 02/09/2014*)

Attempted infiltrations of the Jordan-Syria border by fighters continued and were also attempted on the Iraq-Jordan border during the third quarter. (*Jordan Times 20/08/2014, Jordan Times 17/08/2014, Al Ghad 24/08/2014, Al Rai 24/08/2014*)


In Ma'an, which has been Jordan's most restive region, tensions between Jordanian security forces and local communities significantly eased in August, following several attacks against security forces and threats against the GoJ. Tensions had been building over 19 wanted men and youth and in August, local leaders and families turned over four to the police. (*Jordan Times 11/08/2014*)

Livelihoods and food security

A recent national food security assessment was conducted by WFP and REACH, which covered nearly 8,000 Syrian registered refugee households (40,000 people). Key findings include:

- With the current assessment levels, food security is not a major issue among registered Syrian refugees. Of those assessed, 6% of them were rated as food insecure, 42% as vulnerable to food insecurity and 52% as food secure.
- Refugees in Ajloun and Madaba governorates had unusually high levels of poor food consumption scores and also had the highest levels of food insecurity. Balqa Governorate had the third highest percentage of food insecure refugees.
- Factors contributing to food insecurity include: high ratios of dependents to potentially economically productive household members; lack of education or skills; household members including unregistered members or widows.
- 74% of Syrian refugee households cited WFP vouchers as their main source of income and that 85% stated that they would not have sufficient access to food if WFP ceased assistance. The October reductions to food assistance will significantly impact the well-being of registered refugees. (*REACH/WFP 07/2014*)

Refugees and those vulnerable to food insecurity



Data Source:
WFP/REACH

Produced by: SNAP (ACAPS/MapAction)
Creation data: 03/09/2014

Host communities:

The Jordan-Iraq border has been sporadically closed since the takeover of IS in Iraq and a long-term border closure would negatively affect Jordan's export economy. Iraq is an important export market for Jordan, representing 20% of total Jordanian exports. Exports to Iraq doubled during the last few years from US\$530 million in 2007 to around US\$1 billion in 2012. (*World Bank 07/2014*)

The year-on-year inflation during the first five months of 2014 averaged at 3.3%. This compares with the average total inflation in 2013 that reached 5.6% following the gradual removal of fuel subsidies that put upward pressure on prices. (*FAO 08/2014*)

Public debt increased by six percentage points in the first quarter of 2014 compared to the same quarter of the previous year. Unemployment rate grew by 0.8% which makes it 11.8% in Q1 2014, while GDP witnessed a growth of 0.2% between Q4 2013 and Q1 2014. (*World Bank 07/2014*)

WASH

A recent national food security assessment, conducted by WFP and REACH, concluded that 30% of refugee households do not have access to sufficient amounts of water for drinking, cooking or washing activities. Key findings include:

- The governorates with the highest proportion of refugee households without access to sufficient amounts of water were Al Balqa (42%), Ajloun (39%) and Zarqa (34%) governorates.
- In contrast, refugee households residing in Aqaba and Tafleeh governorates recorded the highest levels of access to water with 97% and 92%.
- About 72% of households had an improved latrine facility with cement slab and flush; 26% had a traditional pit latrine; and approximately 2% of refugee households reported having no access to a latrine and instead practiced open defecation in a stream, bush or corner of their compound.
- Findings indicate that open defecation was most widely practiced in Kerak (20% of households), Balqa (18%) and Mafraq (4%) governorates. (WFP, REACH 06/2014)

Water consumption issues were a significant challenge during the summer months due to the increased demand. Some residents procured their own water storage tanks and other water-intensive appliances, such as washing machines. UNICEF said that Syrian refugees consume more than three times the amount of water per person compared to national consumption. This has led to a number of complaints by refugees over unfair distribution and attempts to increase aid agency oversight at water distribution points. A REACH assessment showed that 36% of refugees in Za'atari highlighted the need for WASH improvements as the top priority over other sectoral assistance. While the need for maintenance of WASH facilities was identified, the governance and management of water resources is also a likely key issue contributing to dissatisfaction. (CCM 2014/04/29, REACH 2014/05, CCM 2014/06/10, WFP 05/08/2014, UNHCR 05/08/2014)

Health

Health actors reported that there was a decrease in the number of war-wounded evacuees to Jordan for health care in the past two months due to improved health assistance at field hospitals in Dar'a Governorate. In the first half of the year, an average of 130 wounded were evacuated to Jordan. (Health WG 30/09/2014)

Reports of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) cases in Jordan have reportedly decreased since May and over the summer months. WHO most recently reported three cases in Jordan in May. Neighbouring Saudi Arabia has been most affected by MERS and it was feared that Ramadan and seasonal travel could increase transmission. There is still a potential risk with the October pilgrimage. (WHO 09/06/2014)

Nutrition:

In August, among 850 children medically screened upon arrival to Jordan, there was one case of severe acute malnutrition and four cases of moderate acute malnutrition identified. The global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate among Syrian refugees is very low, at 0.6% in August. This compares to 2% in July, all of which are well below the emergency threshold of 15%. (Health WG 30/09/2014)

Host communities:

The GoJ reported that 837,000 Syrians have accessed public health services in Jordan at a cost of JOD 37 million (USD 52 million).

“The GoJ reported that 837,000 Syrians have accessed public health services in Jordan at a cost of JOD 37 million (USD 52 million).”

Shelter and NFI

Due to harsh desert conditions and remote location, much of Azraq camp's infrastructure is not connected to the electricity grid. While solar power provides some light to family and communal areas, the lack of power connections available for household needs, such as refrigeration and lighting, is a major source of dissatisfaction for refugees. (WFP 05/08/2014)

In a bid to reduce the electricity bill in Za'atari camp, UNHCR decided to cut the power between 8 am and 1 pm each day starting 1 August, but the implementation was postponed until further notice. In addition, UNHCR planned to implement a flat-rate electricity bill for all camp partners connected to the main transformers. The overall plan is to start charging businesses in Za'atari for electricity and to install pre-paid metres. (UNHCR 12/08/2014, UNHCR 05/08/2014)


Education

School re-started on 24 August. UNICEF is continuing to register students in the camps. So far, 15,000 children have been registered in Za'atari camp. The total number of children eligible for education in Za'atari camp is 24,000 children, meaning that about 63% of children are registered. Last school year, 19,000 students registered, however, there was duplication in the registration system. (UNHCR 02/09/2014)

Host communities:

According to GoJ officials, about 89,000 Syrian children are attending public schools, and another 12,000 are in private schools.

2.3. TURKEY



Akcakale	25,876	Merkez A	9,881
Altinozu 1	1,369	Merkez K	16,817
Altinozu 2	2,655	Midyat	2,923
Beydagi	7,321	Nizip 1	10,394
Cevdetive	8,997	Nizip 2	5,067
Ceylanpinar	18,387	Nusaybin	5,429
Elbeyli Besiriye	24,046	Saricam	11,171
Islahive	9,775	Viransehir	14,336
Karkamis	7,678	Yayladagi 1	2,810
Kilis - Oncupinar	13,545	Yayladagi 2	2,988

Source:
Refugees: UNHCR, HIU

2.3. TURKEY (CONT.)

Displaced (see annex I for definitions)

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	1,029,500
Palestinian refugees from Syria	Unknown
Syrian returnees	181,200
Non displaced affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown

Sources: UNHCR 2014/07/01, UNRWA 2014/07/01

2.3.1. Key issues

- The growing number of Syrian refugees has put strains on Turkish host communities and pressure on labour and rental markets, resulting in increased social tensions between the two communities. Urban refugees, and among these particularly children, remain most vulnerable while information on their needs and coping mechanisms remains scarce.
- Pressure on local capacities to provide quality services is resulting in significant barriers to accessing health, protection, education and shelter and NFI services for refugees and particularly so for vulnerable urban refugees.
- Increasing inflation partially caused by reduced agricultural yields due to dry conditions, will affect food prices which, in combination with decreasing wages and high pressure on the employment market, could exacerbate both the situation of vulnerable Syrian refugees outside camps and host communities.
- The number of Yazidi refugees who fled from Sinjar amid ongoing attacks by Islamic State militants has rapidly increased to 16,000 in Silopi camp in Sirnak Province. Authorities are concerned that continuing waves of refugees may overwhelm local capacities and thus are looking for ways to stem their entry into Turkey.

2.3.2. Possible developments

As the number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey is expected to increase due to the instability of the security conditions in the areas of Syria bordering Turkey, individual cases are expected to continue to be a trigger for reactions and the relationship between the two communities might further deteriorate if no sustainable solutions are established to support both refugees and the host community. Tensions are expected to continue especially in areas close to Syrian borders and Istanbul, where violent protests were recorded and local authorities stated that radical actions will be taken to control the influx of Syrian refugees to Turkey's biggest city.

2.3.3. Operational constraints

Logistical access: Humanitarian access for agencies operating from Turkey into Syria is highly contingent on the status of the main border crossings. According to OCHA as of 5 September, only two of the 19 (including the unofficial ones) crossing points were open for humanitarian activities.

“Agencies responding to the influx of Syrian Kurdish refugees in Turkey noted that there is a lack of common situational awareness about the location and needs of the refugees and how to reach those who are most in need.”

The Tel Abiad border crossing, which has remained closed since January 2014, was reported to be open for humanitarian supply deliveries facilitated by the Turkish Red Crescent. This was the case on ad hoc days and only for pre-authorised cargo at the full discretion of the local authorities. The border remains closed for commercial and passenger traffic. (OCHA 14/09/06) Local authorities informed that Akcakale border gate is still officially closed. However, persons who want to return to Syria spontaneously, as well as those who voluntarily return from camps and prefer to cross into Syria from Akcakale to Tel Abiad are allowed to pass. The gate has been closed for security reasons for the last several months. (UNHCR 2014/09/03) It is one of three border crossings that are controlled by IS fighters on Syrian territory.

Erdal Ata, the Governor of Gaziantep denied that IS is using his province for training fighters before sending them to Syria. In response to video reports from earlier this week showing training facilities and uncontrolled borders between Turkey and Syria, Erdal Ata claimed this was fabricated as the location and time of the videos is uncertain. (Today's Zaman 2014/09/01) Islamic State insurgents have secured control of Jarablus and Tel Abiad, the areas bordering Turkey north of the city of Ar Raqqa, their major stronghold, in an effort to further ease the passage of foreign fighters and supplies. As a result, Turkey has significantly increased security measures both on entry for foreigners and along its borders. Only three of 13 border gates between Syria and Turkey were now fully open. (Reuters 2014/08/26)

In addition, Turkish police arrested a group of 19 militants affiliated with IS in Gaziantep. Turkish police is trying to control the flow of Jihadists from Europe and Caucasian countries through Turkish airports. (Daily Star 2014/09/04) More restrictions on the entry of foreign nationalities especially from countries known to be a source of foreign fighters to Turkey are expected, especially countries of North Africa, France, Belgium and other European and Central-Asian countries.

2.3.4. Data sources and limitations


In Turkey, there is little information regarding Syrian refugee household needs outside camps. The response is primarily led by the governmental agency AFAD, along with UNHCR in the camps, and few comprehensive assessments have been conducted by humanitarian organisations. Furthermore, most non-camp refugees are not registered so they have not been reached by the few assessments that have been carried out. (REACH 2014/08/31)

Agencies responding to the influx of Syrian Kurdish refugees in Turkey noted that there is a lack of common situational awareness about the location and needs of the refugees and how to reach those who are most in need.

No information is available on the needs of host communities and vulnerable urban refugees.

2.3.5. Displacement

Displacement profile Turkey



In a country that hosts more than 869,500 registered Syrian refugees according to UNHCR as of 29 September, some 75% of registered Syrian refugees live outside the refugee camps. Half of the registered population is reported to be children including about 15% adolescents. (UNHCR 2014/07/31) The total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey is estimated at about 1.35 million according to local Turkish sources with up to 900,000 living outside of camps. Although most of them are living in host communities or have rented apartments, many are exhausting their resources while struggling to make ends meet. (UNHCR 2014/07)

Entry restrictions:

With the rapid increase in the number of Syrian refugees and the limited capacity in the camps, Turkish authorities have adopted a system of staggered arrivals at the border. As such, in 2013 and into 2014, not all Syrians, in particular the undocumented ones, had unhindered access to Turkey. While Syrians with passports continued to enter without any problem through the official border crossings, those without passports, with the exception of medical emergency cases and a number of vulnerable groups including women and children, were only admitted to enter upon availability of placement in the camps. Owing to the security situation along the border, the official crossing points change on a regular basis with the exception of Bab-al-Hawa and Bab-al-Salama border crossings which have consistently been more frequently open. (UNCHR 2014/07/01)

Bab al-Hawa is one of the most used border crossings for both civilians and humanitarian operations. Syrians crossing the Turkish border from Bab al-Hawa have been repeatedly subject to threats and theft. Turkish gangs are reported to await Syrians who are not permitted entry and offer them illegal transportation to Turkish lands for a significant amount of money. Other reports talk of people being robbed and threatened by gangs. (Enabbaladi 2014/08/31)

The border crossings between Turkey and Kurdish areas in the north of Syria were closed in the last

“The GoT opened the borders on 19 September and by 2 October, the number of refugees who had crossed into Turkey reached about 169,000 people, overwhelming the response capacity”

3 months, with the exception of Ain al Arab/Kobani border crossing, where only medical cases with required documentation were able to enter Turkey. In the case of a massive IS offensive against Kurdish areas, the closure of the border crossing could have a significant impact. Indeed, population forced to flee could be stuck at the border surrounded by IS forces, with the Ain al Arab/Kobani crossing closed and no safe path for escape.

New arrivals:

A new massive wave of refugees was recorded in Sanliurfa province, mainly in the Suruc area, with Syrian Kurds from Ain al Arab/ Kobani sub-district fleeing the area which was the subject of a major attack by IS forces that started on 16 September. The attack with heavy weapons and big numbers of fighters forced the majority of the population in the eastern, southern and western villages of the sub-district to flee towards Ain al Arab/ Kobani town in an attempt to cross the border into Turkey. The GoT opened the borders on 19 September and by 2 October, the number of refugees who had crossed into Turkey reached about 169,000 people, overwhelming the response capacity in Turkey with urgent needs in shelter and food, as reported in a rapid assessment carried out in Suruc by SNAP/CARE International. The number of refugees is expected to increase significantly with unofficial sources citing an estimate of another 50,000-150,000 people waiting to cross in the town of Ain al Arab/ Kobani on the Syrian side. This new influx represents the biggest displacement influx into Turkey in such a short amount of time since the start of the Syrian crisis. The needs of the affected population are expected to be high and an urgent humanitarian intervention is required (ACAPS 2014/09/23) People have contended with living in crowded mosques or in some cases on the streets without food or money. Refugees were required to leave cars or livestock at the border when they entered Turkey and thus many still prefer to not cross in order to not give up their last belongings. Therefore it is further reported that several thousand refugees are stranded in a no man's land at the border between the two countries. (NPA 2014/10/10)

Challenges are reported in establishing the needs of refugees in the host communities. Persons of concern are moving around from village to village, which limits the time validity of the rapid needs assessments and response strategy. UNHCR further reported that some of the refugees who have fled to Turkey from the besieged Syrian town of Ain al Arab/ Kobani are seeking shelter in other parts of Syria as well as in Iraq's Kurdistan region. Some 1,750 people were reported to have crossed back from Turkey into north-eastern Syria near Quamishli in Al-Hasakeh, staying with relatives and friends. (UNHCR 2014/10/08)

On 4 September, AFAD announced that the total number of Syrians registered and assisted in the 22 camps located in 10 provinces was 220,751. The majority of refugees were reported to have crossed from Aleppo through Bab-al-Salama into Kilis. Camps register

on average 400 refugees on a weekly basis, but as the majority of Syrians do not reside in camps, the number is thought to be much higher. For refugees not approaching camps, there is a growing trend of people moving on: first, to urban areas of Turkey in search of employment and, secondly, towards the European Union either by land or sea routes. (FMR 2014/09/02)

A new agreement has been signed between the EU and Turkey to replace Syrian refugees' current visas with a one-year Humanitarian Visa, which will enable them to access formal employment. The new agreement is due to come into force on 1 September, and should be run jointly by the United European Immigration Centre and the Turkish Immigration Centre. The new visas will also include finger print verification, which will help both Turkey and the EU to monitor and identify illegal immigrants. Refugees who come to Europe with valid Turkish residencies will thus be sent back to Turkey as per the agreement (Syrian Observer 2014/08/08)

Registered refugees:

Some 60% of the estimated total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey have been registered. The majority of registered Syrian refugees are residing in host communities in rented accommodation. Registration of Syrian refugees continues to be undertaken by Turkish authorities. As no single authority registers the refugees, different registration procedures and enumeration initiatives have been developed for non-camp Syrian refugees. An important challenge in the registration remains the lack of awareness among refugees of the registration procedure and the benefits of registration in terms of protection and assistance. (UNCHR 2014/07/01)

In Adana, officials stated that the number of registered non-camp Syrians reached almost 27,000 while conceding that there may still be another 20-30,000 to register. (UNHCR 2014/08/18) In Iskenderun town of Hatay, the local officials informed UNHCR that they have registered more than 15,000 Syrians living in the town. Officials reported that, although they have registered almost all the Syrians living in the town, they occasionally receive more applications which they continue to process. (UNHCR 2014/07/16) According to UNHCR, the number of non-camp Syrians registered in Reyhanli is 43,100, of whom almost 86% are residing in Reyhanli town centre while the rest is in villages around Reyhanli. (UNHCR 2014/07/22)

Non-Syrian refugees:

The number of Yazidi refugees who fled from Sinjar amid ongoing attacks by Islamic State militants has rapidly increased to 16,000 in Silopi camp in Sirnak Province. The numbers of Yazidi refugees have significantly increased since the beginning of August, when between 600 and 800 refugees were reported in Silopi to an estimated 2,000 in mid-August and to 16,000 in the beginning of September. (UNHCR 2014/08/16, Global Post 2014/08/08). It was reported in the beginning of August that refugees are staying in a housing complex for earthquake victims, which was not deemed sufficient for long-term hosting and that alternate camp facilities will need to be prepared in the near future. (Global Post 2014/08/08)

There are reports of friction between Yazidi refugees and the local population in Sirnak Province. Only 2,000 Yazidi refugees are thought to have entered Turkey through legal crossings. Authorities are concerned that continuing waves of refugees may overwhelm local capacities and thus are looking for ways to stem their entry into Turkey. Refugees in Silopi camp have reported that those who did not have passports were not being allowed in and were being turned back by Turkish soldiers. Others said they paid smugglers up to USD 500 to be able to get across the border. While Habur is the official border point for those with passports, the tiny village of Ovacik, several miles south of Silopi, is the first stop for Yazidis crossing into Turkey without documents. Most people were reportedly suffering from dehydration and there were many cases of "psychological trauma". (IRIN 2014/08/18)

“Some 60% of the estimated total number of Syrian refugees in Turkey have been registered.”

2.3.6. Humanitarian needs and concerns

Protection

Syrian refugees continue to benefit from temporary protection in Turkey, with the Government being the provider of first response. Although the GoT has a robust legal system and national legislation to ensure protection to persons of concern, the large number of Syrian refugees has overwhelmed national structures and affected their capacity to cope with the needs of the population. (UNCHR 2014/07/17) For example, as reported by the Government, at least 50% of the refugee population are in need of psychological support. (UNCHR 2014/07/17)

Reproductive health and GBV issues are still seen as taboo by many, which makes it difficult to implement an adequate response. Significant organisational changes in the structure and leadership of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies and the Ministry of Health at the central and provincial levels have presented challenges for the coordination and implementation of programmes. (UNFPA 2014/09/02)

Child protection:

Half of the refugee population are children, of which an estimated 4.5% are married. Child protection and SGBV activities remain key priorities and areas of engagement for the Government and NGOs. (UNCHR 2014/07/17)

A Mercy Corps assessment on the needs of Syrian and Turkish adolescents in Gaziantep reported that vulnerable Syrian adolescents came from households with low socioeconomic status where up to four large families shared a single room. Turkmen Syrian families were particularly vulnerable and appeared to have fewer resources than other Syrians. (Mercy Corps May 2014)

Only 14 out of 40 adolescent Syrian boys (the younger ones) were attending school, as compared to only 1 out of 35 Syrian girls. All Syrian boys and nearly 30% of girls who participated in the assessment were reported to be working six days a week. Like many of their peers in Gaziantep, they work illegally in restaurants and small businesses or factories, where many face threats and abuse at the hands of business owners, work without any legal protections, and earn meagre incomes below the legal minimum wage. Adolescents are reported being the sole breadwinners in their families. (Mercy Corps 05/2014)

Livelihoods and social cohesion

Pressure on local capacities to provide quality services, on the housing rental markets and on the labour market have put a strain on host communities in Turkey and thus resulted in tensions between Syrian and Turks.

Social tensions between refugees and host communities were reportedly on the rise in the past months, with a higher frequency in 2014 compared to 2013, especially in cities hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees such as Gaziantep, where about 200,000-300,000 refugees are residing. Social tensions were also reported in large urban centres such as Istanbul, Izmir, Kahraman Mara'ash, Iskenderun and Hatay. Individual incidents occasionally triggered aggressive reactions against refugees, including attacks on Syrian shops and cars, popular protests and violent attacks against Syrians. In response to the violence, particularly in Gaziantep, the authorities have begun to move refugees from neighbourhoods which witnessed tensions, out of the city to camps in an attempt to diffuse the situation. In mid-August it was reported that some 7,800 Syrians would be moved to camps near the city, or to other sites in the neighbouring regions of Mardin and Sanliurfa. (BBC 2014/08/25, AFP 2014/08/25). Local media reported that some Syrians have already begun to move to other cities across Turkey including Konya, Kayseri, Izmir and Istanbul. (AFP 2014/08/15, Hurriyet Daily News, Daily Sabah 2014/08/24)

With the increasing number of violent incidents involving Syrians are being reported, problems are most noticeable in the southern cities of Gaziantep, Hatay, Sanliurfa and Kahramanmaras. Turkish officials have begun to take measures against growing hostility against Syrian refugees, issuing a statement that acknowledged the hostility toward the newcomers and vowing to fight discrimination. (Hurriyet Daily News 2014/08/27)

As the high number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey is not expected to reduce in the near future, but rather to increase due to volatile security conditions in the northern areas of Syria bordering Turkey, tensions are expected to continue. While there have been no official assessments to inform the needs in host communities and the livelihoods sector, humanitarian actors have observed that local capacities have not been capable of responding to the refugee influx, particularly with regards to waste management and basic needs. (UNCHR 2014/07/01) A local newspaper identified the main reason behind protests in Gaziantep to be the increase of house rents and unemployment rates. The newspaper indicated that rent prices tripled, with houses rented previously for TL 150 (USD 75) being now rented for TL 400 (USD 200). Turkish cities and towns located on the border with Syria are Syrians' preferred destination because of their proximity and relatively cheap prices. (Assafir 2014/08/15, IPS 2014/09/04, Todays Zaman 2014/08/10)

There are reports of Syrian refugees travelling all the way from provinces along the Syrian border to the Black Sea region to work as seasonal agricultural workers. This is pushing wages downwards, with daily rates in Kilis estimated to have declined from TL 60 to 20 (USD 30 to 10) per day. Syrians, willing to work for lower salaries than host community members, often crowd out local labour markets. This is particularly true for sectors such as construction, agricultural work, daily or temporary work and the service industry. For example, restaurants in some parts of southern Turkey often now employ young Syrian boys, starting from around 10 years old, to clear tables, wash dishes and translate for Arabic-speaking customers. (FMR 2014/09/02)


Yet, at the same time there are also reports that Syrian labour was a welcome relief for local labour market, at least in Gaziantep. In 2013, Gaziantep and Kilis were two of only three provinces in Turkey which reported a drop in the unemployment rate. While Syrian labour is informal and does not appear in statistics, they seem to suggest that there will continue to be a demand in Gaziantep for Syrian labour whether it is informal or not. (UNCHR 2014/07/01)

Food Security

As of late September, WFP budget shortfalls were expected to leave 77% of its existing camp-based caseload without access to food vouchers in October. An analysis of surveys and assessments conducted in 2013 prompted the Food Security Situation and Needs Update to conclude that 99% of camp-based Syrian refugees in Turkey who used e-cards had either a borderline or acceptable food

consumption score. However, the purchasing power of households using e-card is still affected by inflation as high food costs limit the amount of items they are able to purchase with the set credit. (REACH 2014/08/31) WFP reports that Syrian refugee households living in WFP/Turkish Red Crescent (TRC)-supported camps tend to be food secure, with roughly 80% relying directly on food assistance. (REACH 2014/08/31)

Expected cuts in WFP food assistance in Turkey



Assistance to refugees living in host communities is intermittently provided by social security groups and various NGOs, despite the fact that almost three times the number of camp-based refugees in Turkey are said to be living outside camps. A majority of these were not yet registered by December 2013 according to the final RRP6 report, so little comprehensive information about their needs is known. In addition, WFP noted that it did not have access to Yayladagi 1 and Yayladagi 2 camps during March and April 2014 because of security risks related to shelling that occurred near the Syrian border, where the camps are based. (REACH 2014/08/31)

The 2014 wheat crop suffered from drought in the autumn of 2013, which was then followed by cold weather. Spring rains improved soil moisture but the first estimates from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) indicate a 10% decrease in cereal production in 2014, compared to last year, to about 33.8 million tonnes. The latest figures from the TSI (July 2014) indicate an annual food inflation rate of 12.8% compared to a peak of 14.7% in May 2014. Earlier in 2014, food inflation averaged around 10%. The overall consumer price index in July 2014 stood at 9.3%. The weakening of the Turkish lira may likely increase the rate of inflation. (Reuters 2014/08/23) In addition, as the IS pushes closer to Turkey, trade routes have been affected and it is reported that they could be at further risk. Should IS expand its presence further to the Turkey-Iraq border, it could take a heavy toll on the USD 12 billion annual exports from Turkey into Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, further contributing to higher inflation. Fuel smuggled from opposition controlled regions in Syria could slow the growth of Turkey's own fuel market by as much as 3%, according to British Petroleum

Turkey. Turkey's fuel market was expected to grow between 4% and 4.5% in 2014, but the rise of illicitly smuggled fuel from Syria to Turkey could shave 1.5 to 3 points from expectations, with sales in the country's southern provinces well below what was predicted. While the overall volume of fuel being smuggled from Syria to Turkey is almost impossible to track, local industry sources have stated that it has reached around 500,000 tonnes. Licensed distributors sell gasoline at TL 4.5 (USD 2.25) per litre, while the equivalent can be purchased at the Turkey-Syria border for TL 1.1 (USD 0.55) per litre (Reuters 2014/07/09, Syria Deeply 2014/08/06)

Increasing inflation will affect the food prices and in combination with decreasing wages and high pressure on the employment market could lead to exacerbating both the situation of vulnerable off-camp Syrian refugees as well as the host community.

Health

Access to health services:

Distance to facilities, transportation costs and language barriers are the most important impediments to accessing health services for refugees. Some urban refugees approach family doctors, although most do not have access to interpreters to assist with the consultation process. The massive extra burden placed on host communities is overstressing (estimated by 30-40%) local health facilities and the health system at large in southern Turkey. A further concern is that due to the increasing pressure on government facilities and the language barrier some Syrian refugees living in urban areas are turning to registered and unregistered ad hoc clinics that are not integrated into the referral system. (UNCHR 2014/07/01) According to UNHCR, about 55% of non-camp refugees and one third of camp populations have difficulties obtaining required medicines. About 55% of refugees reported the need for psychological assistance.

The estimated number of women and girls of reproductive age among the Syrian refugees is almost 250,000, 40,000 of which are pregnant. (UNFPA 2014/09/02) A third of pregnant Syrian women were registered with complications and in need of reproductive health services. (UNHCR 2014/07/17) Clinically micronutrient deficiencies and anaemia were observed among children and pregnant and lactating women in the camps.

Some 10% of refugees report problems with non-communicable diseases, including hypertension, diabetes, cancer, asthma, and renal failure. This is aggravated by a number of observations by health workers, notably the increase in the risk of outbreaks of epidemic-prone communicable diseases including tuberculosis. Additionally, few NGOs are currently working to support Syrian refugee health services in Turkey. (UNHCR 2014/07/17)

UNICEF carried out an additional round of polio vaccination in June in Istanbul targeting Turkish and Syrian children under the age of five. The results from the campaign are yet to be released by the Ministry of Health. In Istanbul all 500,000 children under five in six districts with high numbers of refugees were vaccinated. Thus, more than two million children under five were reached. (UNCHR 2014/07/01)

Shelter/NFI

Shelter conditions have also been highlighted as one of the key needs for refugees both in and out of camps. AFAD's Field Survey reports that over 25% of Syrian refugees live in ruins or makeshift arrangements. Overcrowding is a predominant issue, with almost 30% of refugees in camps and 60% of refugees out of camps living with more than seven persons per housing unit. (UNCHR 2014/07/01)

As refugees have lived in camps for more than two years, maintenance and improvement of services remains critical. As reported by UNHCR, hygiene conditions in some of the camps are deteriorating below standard and will need to be enhanced to meet basic standards particularly in light of the upcoming winter season.

“According to UNHCR, about 55% of non-camp refugees and one third of camp populations have difficulties obtaining required medicines. About 55% of refugees reported the need for psychological assistance.”

As for households not living in camps but in rented accommodation, they have begun exhausting resources and vulnerable households are in need of NFI support such as bedding, kitchen sets and hygiene materials. The percentage of refugees claiming their basic needs are not being met is much higher for refugees living out of camps, where assistance has so far been more limited. AFAD's Field Survey shows that non-camp refugees claim to have inadequate sleeping materials (73%), heating (81%), kitchen equipment (71%), basic food items (75%) and clothing (77%).

For now, Syrians who are found to be living on the streets are being taken to temporary sheltering centres by local governors, a practice that, according to several ministers, is likely to continue (Hurriyet Daily News 2014/08/27). In Adana, the Religious Affairs officials reported that one of their challenges is the 190 Syrian families living in mosques in the city centre. One of the local NGOs in the city informed UNHCR that they have identified about 250 Syrian children in such situations, and they are working to identify up to 1,000 children for assistance. (UNHCR 2014/07/16) Informal estimates by actors on the ground suggest that there could be close to 100,000 Syrians living in Istanbul in insecure housing and working informally. Others may commute to Istanbul daily or weekly to work and then return to the areas they are registered in. (FMR 2014/09/02) In Mersin, 200,000 Syrians reside in urban settings. (UNFPA 2014/09/02)

Education

Attendance rates:

Currently, about half of the refugee population are under 18, of which 65% is expected to be of school-age (6-17 years), and 15% of pre-school age (3-5 years). (UNHCR 2014/07/17) To date, there are more than 344,500 Syrian school-aged children in Turkey (241,150 in host communities and 103,350 in camps) who would need sustained access to quality education. Although coordinated efforts by the Ministry of National Education, AFAD, UNHCR and UNICEF have contributed to an increase in enrolment of school-aged children in camps to 80%, children in host communities face ongoing challenges in accessing quality education. Many Syrian children in Turkey have missed up to three years of education and are in danger of becoming a lost generation. According to UNHCR, in the second half of 2014, 26,300 children will not have sustained access to schooling, which will increase the risk of child labour, early marriage, involvement in criminal activities, recruitment into armed groups and exposure to sexual and gender-based violence. (UNCHR 2014/07/01)

Formal enrolment into state schools requires that the Syrian student possess a foreigner ID number, which is issued only for those registered refugees who entered Turkey through a formal border crossing and with a valid travel document. Although it is expected that this

obstacle will be addressed in the context of the new Law on Foreigners and International Protection, it currently presents a challenge for many. Lack of Turkish language fluency prevents many from seeking access to state schools. However, there is often an insufficient number of centres to meet the level of demand for education, and the quality of education is compromised by insufficient teaching materials being available, lack of certification, reduced instructional time due to the need to have multiple shifts, and a reliance on volunteer teachers. School attendance is negatively affected by the cost of transportation, while the impact of the experience of war on children affects their wellbeing, attendance and ability to concentrate. Teachers also experience the after-effects of trauma and are in need of psychosocial support in order to effectively assist children.

The educational status of university students is slightly different: undergraduate students and students who finished high schools are eligible to enter Turkish universities after they submit the necessary documents. Still, the number of Syrian students who applied for Turkish universities this year was by far exceeding the available capacity to absorb this number by the Turkish higher education system. For example, Gaziantep University received about 53,000 applications for Syrian students for only about 120 open seats to absorb Syrian students for the educational year of 2014/2015. The main reasons for the surge in application numbers are that these students who are coming mainly from northern governorates in Syria have refrained from attending the main universities in Syria due to insecurity. In addition, many of them received their high school certificates in Turkey, particularly in schools supported by the Syrian Interim Government. Lastly, there are plenty of Syrian students who did not have access to higher education in the last 3 years and are still attempting to gain access in Turkey. The low capacity for absorbing Syrian students in universities of the neighbouring countries might be a motivation for many of this age group to try to reach Europe to receive education, mainly to countries like Germany where education is almost free in governmental universities. (*Hurriyet Daily News 2014/09/11*, *Institute For International Education 2014/07/25*, *UNHCR 2014/12/28*)

2.4. IRAQ

Displaced (see annex A for definitions)

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	215,387
% awaiting registration	0.9%
% residing in camps	41%
Unregistered	Unknown
Palestinian refugees from Syria	100
Iraqi returnees	Unknown
Host Communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown

Sources: UNHCR 30/09/2014

2.4.1. Key issues

- Border closures and ongoing conflict continue to prevent Syrians at risk from fleeing to Iraq.
- The majority of Syrian refugees in Iraq appear able to meet their basic needs, but protracted displacement is likely to increase overall vulnerability.
- Syrians living in host communities appear considerably more vulnerable than those in camps: many are spending their savings and more than half have incurred debts, averaging more than IQD 1 million (roughly USD 860).
- Syrian refugees in camps remain highly dependent on humanitarian aid, which is expected to decrease.
- The massive influx of Iraqi IDPs in 2014 has brought new needs, and is affecting both Syrian refugees and host communities.
- At least 10,000 Syrians have returned to Syria in July and August, possibly due to the increasing difficulty of life in northern Iraq.
- The coming winter will lead to increased needs for shelter, NFIs, food and fuel; with humanitarian funding decreasing and potential cuts to food and fuel assistance, this winter may see highly increased vulnerability.

2.4.2. Possible developments

A shift in IS tactics leading to bombings or other attacks on civilians within the KR-I is expected. Major attacks in the KR-I could stir resentment among the local population, fuelling community tensions, and would likely seriously limit the ability of humanitarian actors to reach populations in need.

A possible mass return of refugees to Syria remains unlikely, but could be spurred either by new conflict or increasing difficulty of living in the KR-I.

Rising tensions between host communities and refugees/IDPs, particularly Arab Sunnis, have been reported, and the continuation of this trend is highly likely. This is expected to result in more restrictions on the movement, accommodation and employment of refugees and IDPs, either formal or informal, which will increase their vulnerability. In a less likely scenario, communal or ethnic violence is possible.

“The KRG has requested that humanitarian assistance to refugees be focused on those living in camps.”

215,387

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration

100

Palestinian refugees from Syria

The re-opening of the KR-I border with Syria appears unlikely, however it remains possible that if IS continues to advance in Al-Hasakeh, then in response to either internal or external political pressure, the Kurdish Regional Government () will again allow Syrian refugees to enter; a situation which, in addition to the IDP crisis, could affect the fragile stability of the existing refugee population, as well as spurring further community tensions.

IS incursions into the KR-I proper seem improbable at the moment, due to the group's sustained losses across northern Iraq. However, a shift in conflict dynamics could create serious new displacement, directly affect access to refugee and IDP populations, and force international humanitarian actors to relocate.

2.4.3. Operational constraints

The KRG has requested that humanitarian assistance to refugees be focused on those living in camps. (UNHCR 31/07/2014) Like many policies, this is interpreted differently across the three governorates: In Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk officials have allowed aid to be distributed in urban areas, whereas in Erbil there has been considerable pressure to confine aid to camps. (PI 14/09/2014) This can be seen in the figures from a recent multi-sector needs assessment: 74% of urban refugees in Erbil reported not having received any assistance, compared to only 33% on Sulaymaniyah and 13% in Dahuk. (REACH 14/09/2014)

Al Obaidy camp, in Al Qa'im, Anbar, on the Iraqi-Syrian border, has been inaccessible to international humanitarian actors since June, as the area was taken over by IS. It is unclear how many of the roughly 4,500 Syrians registered in the camp and the nearby town remain there. (UNHCR 15/07/2014)

Two other camps for Syrian refugees, Akre and Gawilan, are located in disputed districts of Ninewa Governorate, and while these areas are currently under control of the Peshmerga they are very close to the front lines with IS, posing potential future access risks. Some 2,100 refugees also live in the urban areas of Kirkuk and Ninewa, and 1,400 are distributed across Iraq, where they may be unreachable. (UNHCR Dashboard, accessed 20/09/2014) The vast majority of Syrians, however, reside in the KR-I, which remains generally accessible.


Humanitarian access in Iraq has been greatly impeded by the recent intensification in armed conflict. More information on the broader access constraints can be found in ACAPS' briefing notes.

2.4.4. Data sources and limitations


The main sources used in this report are UNHCR updates, and a large multi-sector needs assessment (MSNA) conducted by REACH, and covering Syrian refugees both inside and outside camps in the KR-I, with data gathered between March and May 2014. (REACH 19/09/2014-1, REACH 19/09/2014-2, REACH 14/09/2014, REACH 04/09/2014) The MSNA provides a useful baseline on the conditions for Syrian refugees early in this year, however substantial changes in the situation due to the June and August IDPs crises mean that the data does not reflect the current situation.

The only other major reports released in this period were a focus-group study of Syrian and host community adolescents, and an assessment of the information needs of Syrian refugees. (Mercy Corps 28/07/2014, IMS 08/2014)

Humanitarian Access / Refugee Camp Locations in Iraq



2.4.5. Displacement



Entry restrictions:

The KR-I has been effectively closed to refugees for nearly two years. The last time a large number of Syrians was allowed to enter was in August 2013, when the Simalka-Pesh Khabur crossing was temporarily opened, allowing entry to 50,000 people in two weeks. In the past there have been reports of large numbers of Syrians concentrated in towns near the border, awaiting entry, but there are no signs this is still the case. (AFP 27/08/2013, PI 18/09/20134, SNAP 09/2013)

With IS' established cross-border presence in Anbar, Iraq, and Deir ez-Zor, in Syria, unofficial movements between the countries have increased, and this may include the movement of displaced Syrians. (UNHCR 07/15/2014, PI 05/2014)

Iraqi IDPs, in particular Sunni Arabs, have also faced challenges entering the KR-I, due to both closures of checkpoints and reports of discrimination. (REACH 19/09/2014, NYT 21/09/2014, OCHA 05/09/2014, IRIN 16/07/2014)

Registered Syrian refugees:

As of 30 September, there were some 77,000 Syrian refugee households registered in Iraq, comprising roughly 215,000 individuals. Less than 1% are still awaiting registration. These figures have remained relatively static for more than a year, decreasing slightly in the last quarter due to high levels of return to Syria, and to an ongoing biometric verification exercise that has reduced double-counting. (UNHCR 30/09/2014)

Unregistered Syrian refugees:

UNHCR has no number for unregistered refugees, but in the early 2014 MSNA, 94% of urban refugee households reported being registered with the agency, and essentially 100% of camp refugees did. The lowest rate found was in Erbil, where only 87% of urban refugees were

registered. (REACH 19/09/2014-1, REACH 14/09/2014) Unregistered Syrians, however, made up roughly 15% of recent returns to Syria through the Simalka-Pesh Khabur crossing.

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS):

Very little information is available about Palestinian refugees from Syria, but it is not likely they make up a population of notable size in Iraq.

Iraqi returnees:

From 2003 to the present, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were displaced by conflict to nearby countries including Syria, Jordan and Egypt. It is not clear how many of these may have returned, and what proportion of them might be vulnerable.

IDPs:

As mentioned in the note at the beginning of this chapter, some 1.8 million Iraqis have been internally displaced since the beginning of the year. Internal displacement has been ongoing in Iraq for decades, due first to the policies of the Saddam Government, then to invasion and civil war. There are no clear numbers, but many portions of the country host large numbers of people who were displaced in some previous crisis, and may still be vulnerable.

Syrian Refugee Returns:

In July and August, UNHCR recorded more than 10,000 Syrians who returned to Al Hasakeh, Syria through the Simalka-Peshkabour crossing. (UNHCR 31/08/2014, UNHCR 15/08/2014, UNHCR 31/07/2014, UNHCR 16/07/2014).

2.4.6. Humanitarian needs and concerns

Protection

Armed violence:

UNHCR records some 2,000 refugees living in urban areas of Ninewa and Kirkuk, and some 4,500 who were (as of June) living in or around Al Obaidy camp in Anbar. (UNHCR Dashboard, accessed 20/09/2014) All may face heightened risks of violence. Those in Anbar, like all civilians living under IS, may be vulnerable to extrajudicial killing, detention and torture, recruitment of child soldiers, gender-based violence, and a risk of death and injury from indiscriminate attacks by anti-IS forces.

Additionally, both Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs currently inhabit camps in the “disputed districts” of Ninewa and Diyala governorates, which are very close to front-line fighting and may have less protection than camps within the KR-I proper. Some camps were evacuated due to IS advances, but then subsequently repopulated. (UNHCR 15/08/2014, UNHCR 31/08/2014, WFP 02/09/2014, OCHA 25/08/2014, IRIN 15/08/2014, OCHA 16/08/2014)

Host community:

Rising tensions based both on resurgence of sectarianism in the wake of IS advances, and on the increasing strain on host communities caused by the arrival of massive numbers of Iraqi IDPs, may in future pose risks for both Syrian refugees and IDPs. (ACAPS 04/09/2014) Anecdotes suggest that problems are already present: there have been complaints about rising rents, KRG officials have been quoted in local media outlets blaming IDPs and refugees for rising crime rates (though no evidence supports this), and humanitarian agencies have reported high levels of tension since the recent influx of IDPs. (Rudaw 27/08/2014, REACH 18/08/2014, BasNews 22/07/2014)

“July and August, UNHCR recorded more than 10,000 Syrians who returned to Al Hasakeh, Syria through the Simalka-Peshkabour crossing.”

Legal status and documentation:

As of early 2014, 93% of Syrian refugees in camps in the KR-I reported having at least one member with legal residence, compared with only 41% of Syrian households outside camps. Since then, it is believed that the percentage of refugees with residency in both areas has increased. (REACH 04/2014, PI 18/09/2014)

Although residency is de jure necessary for refugees to be able to rent houses, obtain employment or access some public services, there is little evidence that refugees without residency face severe protection concerns. The MSNA found that the majority of refugees without residency were still earning income, and were only slightly less likely to do so than those with legal status. (REACH 14/09/2014) However the fear of interaction with the authorities may affect refugees without proper paperwork, particularly those of Arab origin, who are seen as a security risk by Kurdish officials. (REACH 04/2014, MEE 03/09/2014, PI 18/09/2014)

Multiple accounts suggest it has got easier for refugees to obtain residence cards, and refugees who are registered with UNHCR have access to a simplified procedure. But challenges remain and there are considerable differences between governorates: 89% of households in Dahuk reported having at least one member with a residency card, versus 34% in Erbil and only 5% in Sulaymaniyah. (REACH 14/09/2014)

Early marriage and gender-based violence (GBV):

Little reliable information is available on this issue, particularly since a UN Women report from Q2 2014 raised substantial controversy and backlash. In general, key issues remain harassment and negative perceptions of refugee women (both inside and outside of camps), a possible trend towards younger marriage, and domestic violence arising from the pressures of relocation and dependence. (UNHCR 15/07/2014, PI 18/09/2014)

Returns:

Significant protection concerns surround the return of large numbers of refugees to Syria, where they may face serious risks from armed conflict, lack of basic services and economic hardship. UNHCR does only limited exit interviews with returning refugees, but reasons given by those departing included family reunification, medical care, and inability to cope with the high cost of living in KR-I. (UNHCR 31/08/2014) In the MSNA, some families indicated an intention to leave Iraq for reasons including lack of employment opportunities, high costs of living and limited access to services. (REACH 14/09/2014)

Information collected by the MSNA suggests the food situation for refugees has been generally stable. Only 12% of refugee households settled outside camps across the KR-I reported a lack of food in the seven days prior to the MSNA, and food consumption scores were widely acceptable in host communities, and very good in camps. (REACH 14/09/2014, REACH 19/09/2014-1)

However, nearly 100% of refugees in camps receive WFP food assistance. WFP in late September, WFP aired concerns that due to budget shortfalls it would have to temporarily reduce the value of the food vouchers it provided in Domiz camp (nearly 70% of the assistance it distributes) from \$31/ person/month to \$25, and would suspend its school food programme. (REACH 19/09/2014-2, PI 17-20/09/2014, WFP 18/09/2014) As of publication, WFP reports having money to continue to provide vouchers at least through October, however the ongoing status of these programs remains uncertain. (PI 07/10/2014)

The baseline provided by the MSNA suggests that prior to the IDP influx, most refugees were in stable situations, though some were still in need, and long-term vulnerabilities existed due to the spending of savings and incurring debt. Indicators suggest that refugees in host communities are more vulnerable than those in camps (see figure).

Despite the challenges connected to obtaining residency and the right to work, 84% of Syrian households in KR-I host communities reported having at least one member employed, with only small differences between those with legal residency and those without. However, for a substantial minority, those incomes did not appear to be sufficient:

- 30% of households reported being unable to afford basic needs in the 30 days preceding the assessment. Needs that could not be met varied widely based on location, but rent and food were the greatest reported needs in all areas,
- 48% of households in Dahuk, and 31% in both Erbil and Sulaymaniyah reported having spent all of their savings,
- 52% said they had contracted debts since their arrival in the KR-I, with the average debt at more than IQD 1 million (USD 860). (REACH 14/09/2014)

UNHCR protection monitoring in Erbil Governorate indicates that Syrian refugees are moving from urban areas to camps, reportedly due to economic pressures and reduced ability to meet living costs, and likely connected to the increase of the IDP population. (UNHCR 31/08/2014)

The majority of refugees in camps also had access to income. Average incomes were somewhat lower than for non-camp refugees, but those in camps receive a higher level of assistance: nearly 100% receive WFP food vouchers or packages, do not pay rent on their shelters, etc. (REACH 19/09/2014-1, REACH 14/09/2014)

As both camp and non-camp populations depend on earned income, the pressure on job availability and wages from the IDP influx, and the possibility that employers may become less willing to hire refugees or IDPs, especially those without residence, may seriously increase vulnerability (and may have already done so since the MSNA was conducted in early 2014).


The MSNA suggests particularly high levels of vulnerability and inability to afford basic needs among refugees in host communities in Sulaymaniyah. The greatest impact of the IDP crisis has been in

“Refugees in host communities are more vulnerable than those in camps, 84% of Syrian households in KR-I host communities reported having at least one member employed, with only small differences between those with legal residency and those without. However, for a substantial minority, those incomes did not appear to be sufficient.”

Dahuk, where recent IDPs may now make up nearly 30% of the population. Both of these areas will merit attention in the future.

The use of child labour as a coping strategy was noted in both camp and non-camp contexts: of families in camps with a child missing school, 29% said at least one child was working. In urban settings in Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah the figure was 23%, and only 5% in Erbil. (REACH 19/09/2014-1, REACH 14/09/2014)

Livelihoods Indicators



Sources: REACH 19/09/2014-1, REACH 14/09/2014

Host Community:

The resilience of host communities in the KR-I remains un-studied, though some market and livelihoods assessments are planned or underway. However it is likely host communities' resilience to economic shocks is low, in part because a budget dispute with the central government has meant state salaries have not been paid since January. An estimated 70% of KR-I workers are on government payrolls. (*Secure Market Watch 22/06/2014*) In addition to the arrival of waves of IDPs, the increase in conflict has also been reported to have affected the private sector, leading to halting construction projects and business ventures. (*Shafaaq 02/10/2014, Niqash 25/09/2014, PI 17/09/2014*) KRG officials have estimated the cost of hosting IDPs at USD 146 million per month. (*OCHA 14/09/2014*)

Health

Access to health services:

In host communities, only 18% of refugees reported having problems accessing care, the primary one being cost. The lowest proportion of households receiving full care was in Dahuk, where the volume of demand was the greatest, possibly indicating a problem with health system capacity in that governorate. (*REACH 14/09/2014*)

In camps, 25% of households reported health access problems, notably due to lack of availability of treatment, (41%), followed by insufficient funds to purchase medicine at the pharmacy (33%). (*REACH 19/09/2014-1*)

The current IDP crisis is impacting access to health care for all population groups, including refugees, due to a high burden of cases in hospitals, including those wounded in conflict, and shortages of essential medicines, which occur frequently in public health facilities, despite large medicine donations from humanitarian actors. (*UNHCR 31/08/2014*)

WASH

Access to water:

Water and sanitation were not reported as primary needs by refugees in most KR-I host communities. (*REACH 14/09/2014*)

In camps, a large majority (78%) still reported sufficient access to drinking water, but with significant variation across camps. (*REACH 19/09/2014-1*) UNHCR has cited the poor water and sanitation situation in camps as an issue of primary concern. (*UNHCR 31/08/2014*)

Waste management:

The availability of water and sanitation networks is a major priority for recently arrived IDPs, who are living in informal shelters, often with substandard WASH facilities and limited privacy.

In conflict areas of Iraq, water infrastructure continues to be targeted by armed groups, and control of water is being used as a weapon. IDPs outside the KR-I also face serious issues with water and sanitation. More information can be found in ACAPS' briefing notes.

Shelter/NFI

Shelter issues affecting Syrian refugees:

Shelter was the primary self-identified need of non-camp refugees in the KR-I, primarily as it relates to rental support. Between 80-90% of non-camp refugees in KR-I were renting accommodation, with an average monthly rent (for those in single-family dwellings) of USD 280. Only 3% of households reported living in precarious types of shelter. (*REACH 04/09/2014, REACH 14/09/2014*)

Household items and shelter improvements were the primary self-reported needs refugees in camps: 36% reported household items as their top priority, and 28% said shelter improvement. (*REACH 19/09/2014-1*) 75% of refugees in camps are still living in tents, which are more vulnerable in winter months. (*REACH 04/09/2014*) UNHCR has cited delays in the construction of permanent living spaces for refugees in camps as a primary issue of concern. (*UNHCR 31/08/2014*)

Although all or nearly all of the Syrian refugees in KR-I have been present for a full year, and received winterisation support in 2013, the coming cold season may bring new problems: (*UNHCR 25/12/2013*)


- Some refugees who received winterisation supplies may have sold them,
- In 2013, the government subsidized heating fuel for refugees in camps, however this may not be repeated this year, (*PI 24/09/2014*)
- Fuel costs in the KR-I have risen with the removal of subsidies, and the higher costs may be a burden on families that have exhausted savings, or are facing difficulty finding employment, (*Kurdish Globe 08/09/2014*)
- Flooding may still be a problem: last winter, rain destroyed over 235 tents in Kawergosk camp, forcing refugees to relocate. (*ACTED 21/11/2013*)

Informal settlements: There are no known informal settlements of Syrian refugees in Iraq.

By contrast, the Iraqi IDPs who have recently arrived in KR-I, primarily from Sinjar and areas of the Ninewa plains, face serious shelter issues due to the volume of the influx. A high proportion of new IDPs in the KR-I (and in Anbar, to a lesser extent) are living in insecure temporary shelters including schools, churches, parks and abandoned buildings, and are poorly prepared for the cold season.

Education

Education indicators: School attendance among Syrian refugee children in host communities - KR-I




Education indicators

School Attendance among Syrian Refugee Children in Host Communities - KR-I

Education indicators

School Attendance for Syrian Refugee Children in Camps – KR-I



Education is currently a major issue in parts of the KR-I due to large numbers of IDPs who arrived in August taking shelter in schools. The start of the school year has already been delayed, from September 10 to October 22, affecting both host community and refugees attending government schools. Educational programmes for IDPs and refugees in the KR-I have also been suspended until formal schools can re-open. (Iraqi News 14/09/2014, PI 17/09/2014)

Attendance Rate: School attendance rates in the 2013-2014 school year were low in both camps and outside of them (see figures).

Among refugees in host communities, only 39% of children were attending schools, and 53% of all households reported no child attending school. The main reason reported for keeping children out of school was lack of funds, followed by differences in curriculum, then distance to schools. Child labour was very rarely given as a reason for non-attendance in Erbil (5%) and more commonly in Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah (both 23%). (REACH 14/09/2014)

In refugee camps, 58% of children were attending school, however there was variation from camp to camp, and especially across age groups, with attendance in higher grades disturbingly low. The main cited reasons for non-attendance were the lack of availability of a school in the camp at the right level (46%) and placement of the child in a level below its age group (35%). 29% said the child had to work. (REACH 19/09/2014-1)

In a more recent focus group assessment of Syrian refugee adolescents in host communities, many adolescent boys reported missing school because they had to work to support their families. Other issues cited, for both genders, included perceived problems with recognition of certificates from Syria, and occasionally because of the need to work, differences in language and curriculum, and overcrowding. Some Kurdish school officials reportedly refused to admit refugees, despite being legally obliged to do so. (Mercy Corps 28/07/2014)

IDPs are also expected to face substantial difficulties attending schools due to language and curriculum differences, and the major increase in crowding caused by the IDP crisis will exacerbate access issues for both groups, as well as increasing host community concerns over quality. (PI 21/08/2014)

Host Community: Host Community adolescents, in focus groups, expressed concerns over the quality of education they were receiving. (Mercy Corps 28/07/2014) The impact of the refugee/IDP crises on school system capacity are not fully understood, however a World Bank impact assessment is being planned, as well as a Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment of IDPs, which may answer some questions.

2.5 EGYPT

Displaced (see annex A for definitions)


Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration	139,900
Palestinian refugees from Syria	7,000
Syrian returnees	Unknown
Syrian migrants	Unknown
Host communities affected by the Syria crisis	Unknown

Source: UNHCR 01/10/2014

2.5.1. Key issues

- Refugees from Syria, including Palestinian refugees who fled to Egypt, will face some of the harshest food assistance cuts due to WFP budget shortfalls impacting the region. Beginning in October, WFP plans to reduce its caseload from over 100,000 to just 43,000 beneficiaries and the food voucher value will be halved to USD 15 per person per month. These cuts will significantly exacerbate the hardships faced by refugees in Egypt, following Government of Egypt's (GoE) fuel subsidy cuts in July, which led to an immediate 2.9% increase in inflation, particularly for food prices. In addition, the GoE began instituting a new system to limit subsidised bread to Egyptian nationals, causing increased bread prices for Syrians, as well as other non-Egyptians. When fully implemented, this will have a significant impact on Syrian refugees, who cite food costs as one of the top expenses, along with rent. (UNHCR 19/09/2014, WFP 19/08/2014, WFP 09/09/2014)

Expected cuts in WDP food assistance in Egypt



“Refugees from Syria, including Palestinian refugees who fled to Egypt, will face some of the harshest food assistance cuts due to WFP budget shortfalls impacting the region.”

139,900

Syrian registered refugees and awaiting registration

7,000

Palestinian refugees from Syria

- The high risk of being smuggled to Europe via sea routes was brought to the forefront by tragic reports of a boat carrying up to 500 people (including between 50-100 children) being attacked by smugglers after disembarking from Damietta. According to survivors' reports, the smugglers rammed the boat after the passengers, mostly made up of Palestinians from Gaza, Syrians, Egyptians, Eritreans and Sudanese, refused to board a different boat en route, as it was deemed unsafe. The UN human rights chief accused the smugglers of mass murder. Despite the tragic event, it is unlikely that the number of refugees and other migrants will significantly reduce. (UN 19/09/2014, Spiegel 23/09/2014)
- The number of people arrested and detained by Egyptian authorities for attempting to be smuggled via sea routes towards Europe remains high due to the continued restrictive policies by the Government of Egypt (GoE) against refugees from Syria, the challenges of day-to-day survival amidst Egypt's economic crisis, and inadequate assistance. Syrians continue to face major obstacles to obtaining residency permits, which have likely led to many lacking legal status to reside in Egypt. Others have been coerced to leave the country by the Egyptian authorities. Due to these factors, Syrians make up the majority (73%) of the more than 1,000 people arrested and detained this year. The GoE is releasing most of those detained, with nearly 800 people released this year and provided with three month residence permits. Most of those released are made up of families and those with close relatives in Egypt. Over 100 Syrians were identified by UNHCR to be in detention. (UNHCR 31/07/2014, UNHCR 22/07/2014, Daily News 08/05/2014, Al Monitor 07/2014)
- Similar to recent efforts conducted in Lebanon and Jordan, humanitarian actors in Egypt are beginning a vulnerability profiling exercise, as well as a verification exercise of registered refugees. UNHCR expects that the verification exercise will lead to a decrease in the number of registered refugees who are present in Egypt as many are believed to have left without de-activating their UNHCR registration, as required by Egyptian law. Similar to experiences in Lebanon and Jordan, both processes may lead to concerns with refugees losing protection and/or assistance being further cut back. (WFP 19/08/2014)
- An unknown number of Palestinian refugees from Syria who had originally fled Syria to Gaza fled to Egypt through the Rafah crossing during Israel's bombing campaign. According to Amnesty International, 15 PRS were detained after they crossed into Egypt on 9 August, where they had their passports confiscated by Egyptian authorities. The group was told that their only options were to return to Gaza or Syria. The group was taken to the Cairo airport, where 13 were forced to return to Syria. As of late August, the remaining two PRS

remain in detention at the airport. This incident illustrates both the acute lack of refuge for PRS in the region forcing them into multiple displacements, as well as the regular use of coercion by Egyptian authorities to force returns. (*Al Monitor 25/08/2014, Amnesty 15/08/2014*)

- Although the GoE delayed the deadline to November, the independence of NGOs (including civil society) in Egypt remains under threat as the new government requested NGOs to register under a restrictive 2002 law within 45 days of the announcement made in July. While the law is quite vague, it leaves room for significant government interference (including the ability to shut down organisations) in NGO operations with criminal penalties for lack of compliance. (*Guardian 31/08/2014, NPR 11/09/2014, ICNL 24/06/2014*)

2.5.2. Possible developments

Humanitarian aid is incapacitated by GoE restrictions: The GoE is unlikely to be able to fully implement the 2002 NGO law, however, authorities conduct raids on some local and international NGOs to coerce compliance. As a result, NGOs temporarily close their offices and put their operations on hold. This results in temporary delays in the provision of assistance to Syrians, as refugee service providers are also affected. After several months, operations resume but with even lower visibility.

Increasingly negative coping mechanisms: Refugees can no longer access subsidised bread and coupled with spiralling inflation and limited assistance, Syrians resort to increasingly negative coping mechanisms and are vulnerable to exploitation. More Syrians attempt the dangerous sea routes or use child labour, early marriage or survival sex to meet their basic needs. Some refugees use their limited remaining resources to return to Syria or attempt to seek refuge in Turkey or Lebanon.

Increase in smuggling and arrests: The number of Syrians attempting to reach Europe via dangerous sea routes continues to increase, as well as the number of capsized boats, leading to more deaths of those being smuggled, the majority of which are Syrian refugees. Some are also arrested and detained as they try to leave. While most are eventually released by Egyptian authorities, several hundred languish in detention – particularly young, single males.

2.5.3. Operational constraints

NGOs operating in Egypt face a number of capacity constraints due to GoE restrictions on accepting international funding. Registering international NGOs is also extremely challenging, which limits the further expansion of the humanitarian capacity. Funding for Syrians in Egypt is relatively low at 31% of the appeal, compared to other countries in the region. (*UNHCR 05/08/2014*)

The scattered nature of the Syrian refugee population in the Cairo metropolis, as well as across various Egyptian cities, is a major challenge for UN and NGOs, which struggle to provide accessible services to these invisible groups. For example, it was reported that 3,000 refugees in Mansourah had to travel 65 km to access and redeem food vouchers. WFP added a new distribution site to improve accessibility. (*USAID 05/09/2014*)

2.5.4. Data sources and limitations

During the third quarter, there were no publicly available assessments on refugees from Syria in Egypt. There is a noted lack of information available on the situation of Syrian refugees in Egypt. As a non-neighbouring country with Syria, it is perhaps the most neglected country within the regional response. Coupled with the operational constraints noted above, there is limited capacity in the humanitarian community, which is further exacerbated by the challenges of identifying and assessing vulnerable refugees in a challenging non-camp context. The vulnerability profile led by UNHCR should address many of these information gaps.

There is a lack of regularly updated information on:

- The locations where Syrian refugees reside
- School enrolment and attendance
- Refugees' access to basic services, including health, education, and protection and information on the quality of services
- The number of those whose legal status lapse and the underlying reasons
- The number and conditions of those detained
- The number and reasons for de-registration

2.5.5. Displacement


Displacement profile Egypt

139,501
Refugees



139,501
Outside of Camps

New arrivals: The number of new arrivals continues to drop drastically, particularly since mid-2013. Among registered Syrian refugees, about 1,400 reported that they arrived in 2014, compared to over 90,000 arrivals in 2013. (*UNHCR 22/07/2014*)



REPORTED MONTHS OF ARRIVAL

Registration:

As of 9 September, there were 139,900 registered Syrian refugees in Egypt. UNHCR projects that there will be 140,000 registered Syrian refugees in Egypt by the end of the year. In the last 5 months, over 4,000 Syrians newly registered, an increase of 3%. The vast majority of Syrians who approach UNHCR for registration in 2014 are not recent arrivals but are driven to register due to the lack of resources and coping mechanisms. Most registered Syrian refugees originate from Damascus and Rural Damascus and choose to reside in the greater Cairo area, Alexandria, and Damietta. There are also smaller groups in the far west and south, such as Hurghada and Marsa Matruh. (UNHCR 09/09/2014, UNHCR 22/07/2014, RRP6 01/06/2014)

As of mid-July, 3,600 people have de-activated their UNHCR registration. This is a significant increase in the number of de-activated registrations compared to 2013 due to increasingly repressive policies against Syrians. (UNHCR 22/07/2014)

Unregistered refugees:

At the end of 2013, the GoE estimated that there were around 750,000 Syrians in total in Egypt, meaning that approximately 600,000 Syrians are not registered as refugees. (Plan 2014/05/20, Alquds 2013/12/11)

Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS):

According to Human Rights Watch, the Palestinian Embassy in Cairo has registered nearly 7,000 PRS who arrived in Egypt between December 2012 and October 2013. Due to GoE restrictions barring UNHCR from assisting or protecting PRS, they are particularly vulnerable among Syrian refugees. Like other Syrian refugees, PRS have also been attempting to be smuggled to Europe and are exposed to the same discrimination as Syrians in Egypt. (Jadaliya 2014/01/28, WFP 2014/05/27)

“Those who arrived after mid-2013 are particularly vulnerable as they generally came with no assets or savings.”

2.5.6. Humanitarian needs and concerns

Protection

GBV:

In June, the outgoing interim President issued a decree criminalising sexual harassment and imposing more strict penalties. According to the decree, suspects can be jailed on the order of the prosecutor. UNHCR reported that several people have been sentenced under the new law, however, some women’s groups have said that the law remains weak. Sexual harassment, which has been a rising phenomenon in Egypt in recent years, has often been cited as a major concern among female refugees in Cairo. According to Syria Deeply, a seven-year old boy was raped by Egyptian minors. The victim’s family took his case to court, but the family of the accused threatened to have them deported and coerced them to drop their charges. (UNHCR 25/08/2014, Middle East Monitor 25/08/2014, CNN 05/08/2014, Syria Deeply 05/08/2014)

Livelihoods and food security

Syrian refugees reportedly rely heavily on savings to meet their basic needs. However, those who arrived after mid-2013 are particularly vulnerable as they generally came with no assets or savings. Similar assessments in other refugee-hosting countries have found that new arrivals are generally more vulnerable for the same reason. (UNHCR 31/07/2014)

The new Government of Abdel Fattah Al Sisi took major and unpopular steps towards budget reform by reducing fuel subsidies. This led to a 41% increase in petrol and a 175% increase in natural gas, the latter of which is used particularly by taxi drivers, causing some protests. In addition, the GoE is further trying to reduce its budget deficit by excluding non-Egyptians from accessing subsidised bread. However, a similar government effort in Jordan in early 2014, failed due to public complaints. According to the World Bank, Egypt’s macro-economic prospects are improving, with signs of economic growth, including significant increases in foreign investments and remittances compared to last year. (Economist 19/07/2014, World Bank 07/2014)

Host community:

Despite positive macro-economic signs, many of these policy efforts will most deeply affect Syrian refugees and other impoverished host communities in the short and medium-term. As a result of the cuts to fuel subsidies, food prices increased by 2.9%. According to assessments, Syrian refugees’ largest expense is on food and with bread a staple of the diet, the reduction of bread and fuel subsidies will make it more difficult for Syrians to meet their basic needs. (WFP 19/08/2014, WFP 09/09/2014)

ANNEX 1 – DEFINITIONS HUMANITARIAN PROFILE

Affected
.....

The number of affected refers to people affected by the violence in Syria. The number of affected can be divided in two groups: those non-displaced and those displaced.

Non-Displaced
.....

The non-displaced include all those within Syria that have been, directly or indirectly, affected by the conflict, including those who have been injured, have lost access to essential services, and those whose vulnerability has increased due to the impact of the unrest on livelihoods and access to essential services (OCHA 2012/06/05).

In addition, this group includes the host community, the people who are part of a community or family receiving affected people. Due to the stress placed on the host families and communities, they are considered part of the humanitarian caseload. As there is currently no information available on the needs of the host community, this group is currently excluded from this humanitarian profile.

Displaced
.....

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are those persons or groups of persons who are residing in Syria but who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict. (OCHA 2004)

Refugees and Asylum Seekers are those who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside Syria, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (UN 1951).

For the purpose of this document, the category 'refugees' includes those registered, awaiting registration as well as those unregistered – despite the fact that unregistered Syrians are technically not refugees as their refugee status has not been established. Within this group, the Iraqi and Palestinian refugees are in a specifically vulnerable position, both within Syria as outside.

Others of Concern - Persons who have been displaced by the emergency and form part of the humanitarian caseload, but do not fall into either of the above categories (e.g. migrants, returnees).

Other definitions
.....

In this report the term 'opposition forces' is used to refer to all armed groups and individuals engaged in armed conflict against the Government of Syria.

PREVIOUS SNAP REPORTS

Regional Analysis for Syria	January 2013 – September 2014
• Thematic reports	
• Aleppo governorate Profile	April 2013
Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria	June 2013
Impact of the conflict on Syrian economy and livelihoods	July 2013
Syrian border crossings	September 2013
Assessment Lessons Learned	September 2013
Lebanon baseline data	October 2013
Cross-border movements of goods	December 2013
Relief actors in Syria	December 2013
Jordan baseline data	December 2013
Palestinians from Syria	February 2014
Idlib governorate Profile	June 2014
Explosive Remnants of War	August 2014
Where is Lebanon heading now?	August 2014
Winterisation	October 2014
Scenarios	February/September 2013

All reports can be found on: <http://www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project>

FORTHCOMING SNAP REPORTS

- RAS (Part I and Part II) End January 2015

MAP DATA SOURCES

Administration: OCHA Common Operational Datasets. Syria IDP camps: U.S. Department of State HIU, WFP. Syria IDP movements: WFP. IDP Refugee camps: U.S. Department of State HIU. Informal tent settlements: UNHCR. Refugees: UNHCR. Infrastructure: Global Energy Observatory, OCHA, WFP. Conflict incidents: UNMAS. Border crossings: SNAP

How to use the RAS

This report is divided into two sections:

- Part A focuses on the situation in Syria, firstly by outlining the issues on a country level and afterwards, in more depth, on a sectoral level.
- Part B deals with the host countries Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq and Egypt and discusses the main humanitarian issues related to the crisis.

The RAS is intended as a reference document and the different parts and components can be read separately, according to information needs. While those working in a host country or a specific governorate might only be interested in small parts of the report, individuals working on a regional level can benefit from reading all sections.

The information in blue contains explanatory notes on the structure of this report while the information in red boxes outlines SNAP's analysis.

How to quote this document

The Syria Needs Analysis Project is established to support the humanitarian response by providing an independent analysis of the humanitarian situation of those affected by the Syrian crisis. We support the communication of humanitarian needs and agree to them being used by other organisations to this end. Please note that most information is derived from secondary data and the original source should be quoted when this information is used. The original source can be found at the end of a paragraph and whenever possible, the hyperlink to this source has been made available. All information which is not sourced is based on SNAP's own analysis and should be quoted as such.

Should you wish to reproduce the maps or other information within this document, kindly use [this link](#), to agree to the copyright terms and conditions.

Methodology – This desk study presents estimations of scale, severity and likely impact of a disaster. It aims to inform decision making for preparedness and emergency response and intends to complement and integrate assessment-related data from other agencies. Feedback to improve the RAS is welcome (snap@acaps.org).

Disclaimer – Information provided is provisional as it has not been possible to independently verify field reports. As this report covers highly dynamic subject, utility of the information may decrease with time.

References – ACAPS and MapAction would like to thank all organisations that have provided input to this report. Please note that all sources which are available online are hyperlinked (underlined, in brackets). Information sourced as 'PI' refers to personal interviews with persons unknown to the SNAP project. Information sourced as a 'Trusted Source' refers to information received from an actor known and trusted by the project.

