



**communicating with
disaster affected
communities**

Typhoon Bopha Learning Review

A Review of UNOCHA's
Communicating with
Communities (CwC)
Work

Full Report

December 2013

Acknowledgements

This Learning Review was made possible by the generous support provided by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

Special thanks go to the UNOCHA Global Communications with Communities (CwC) Coordinator, as well as staff stationed in the Manila Office, Davao sub-office and the surrounding hubs for their excellent logistical and administrative support.

The author would also like to extend sincere thanks to individuals from all the organisations who gave up time to participate in interviews and provide their insights and suggestions.

Many thanks to the CDAC Network Members and Secretariat staff who provided editorial support in completing the review and to copy editor Thomas Yocum.

For further information on the content of this review, contact Nicki Bailey, Research and Learning Officer, CDAC Network Secretariat: nicki.bailey@cdacnetwork.org.

For more information on the CDAC Network, visit www.cdacnetwork.org #commisaid

Any opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of UNOCHA, the Director of the CDAC Network Secretariat, or CDAC Network Members.

About the CDAC Network

The goal of the CDAC Network is that communities affected by crises are supported to better withstand, and recover from, humanitarian emergencies through active engagement in decisions about the relief and recovery efforts in their country.

To achieve this, CDAC Network Members are committed to mainstreaming the provision of life-saving information and communication with crisis affected communities into emergency preparedness and response. They do this by supporting humanitarian response through coordinated communication that makes use of appropriate media and communication tools and platforms. Members also focus on how partnerships, particularly with new humanitarian actors such as media development organisations, telecoms companies and the private sector, can deliver more effective and locally appropriate outcomes.

The CDAC Network is unique in terms of who it convenes: humanitarian and media development organisations and, increasingly, technology providers. By collaborating across traditional boundaries, CDAC Network Members increase mutual understanding of the challenges they face and identify opportunities for partnership in order to bring about innovative and effective field practice and, ultimately, a more sustainable and improved response. Members seek to build capacity together, share learning and research, and advocate to ensure that two-way communication with affected communities becomes a predictable, consistent and resourced element of crisis resilience, response and recovery.

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Acronyms

AAR – After Action Review

ACF – Action Contre la Faim

AFP – Armed forces of the Philippines

CAP – Consolidated Appeal Process

CASS – Coordinated Assessment Support Section

CDAC-N – The Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities Network

CFSI – Community and Family Services International

CoP – Community of Practice

CwC – Communication with Communities / Communication with Affected Communities

DA-PCA - Department of Agriculture – Philippine Coconut Authority

DHN – Digital Humanitarian Network

DSWD – Department of Social Welfare and Development

ECHO – European Commission – Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection

FAQs – Frequently asked questions

GPH – The Government of the Philippines

HCT – Humanitarian Country Team

HRC – Humanitarian Response Consortium

IDP – Internally displaced person

IFRC – International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent

INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation

IOM – International Organisation for Migration

LGU – Local Government Unit

MDA – Media Development Agency

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NDRRMC – National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council

OCD – Office for Civil Defense

PAGASA – Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration

PIA – Philippine Information Agency

PCTWG – Provincial Communication Technical Working Group

PIO – Public Information Officer

PNP – Philippine National Police

RNA – Rapid Needs Assessment

ToR – Terms of Reference

UN – United Nations

UNDAC – United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination

UNFPA – United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

WFP – World Food Programme

WVI – World Vision International

1. Background

Typhoon Bopha was the strongest of 16 typhoons to hit the Philippines in 2012. The typhoon, known locally as Pablo, struck the east coast of the southern island of Mindanao on 4 December 2012, flattening houses and infrastructure and destroying huge areas of agricultural land, which the majority of the population depends upon for their livelihoods.

Typhoon Bopha was the world's deadliest storm in 2012, reportedly affecting 6.2 million people, killing at least 1,000 people and displacing close to 1 million¹. At the time, it was also the costliest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines: the overall damage was estimated by the Philippine Department of Agriculture to be US\$750 million, with an estimated 14,176 hectares of banana plantations and 101,000 hectares of coconut farms destroyed².

Since typhoons do not commonly make landfall in eastern Mindanao, many communities affected by Typhoon Bopha had not experienced such a powerful weather event for more than a century, and were severely underprepared. In addition, many communities did not understand the severe weather warnings issued in advance of the storm's arrival, wrongly assuming that Typhoon Bopha's Category 5 rating on the Saffir-Simpson hurricane wind scale³ was the weakest type of typhoon, rather than the most powerful: a super typhoon.

Typhoon Bopha hit the provinces of Agusan del Sur, Compostela Valley, Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur the hardest. Communities on the coast between Lingig and Caraga were the worst affected, including people living in Cateel, Boston and Baganga municipalities in Davao Oriental province. The Government of the Philippines (GPH) led the disaster response and accepted the offer of international assistance on 7 December 2012.

Prior to Typhoon Bopha's arrival, many people in living in eastern Mindanao were already struggling. Davao Oriental and Agusan del Sur are two of the 15 poorest provinces in the Philippines, with food insecurity and acute malnutrition in children higher than the national average⁴. Eastern Mindanao is also a stronghold of the New People's Army (NPA) – a guerrilla group that forms the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The population, which is mainly indigenous, have been affected by constant clashes between NPA and GPH security forces for 46 years, making it one of the longest running conflicts in the world. And although the local population suffer violence and continued displacement as a result of this conflict, it receives little attention within the Philippines or internationally due to its remote location.⁵

When the typhoon hit, preparations were underway for Mindanao's May 2013 local mid-term elections. Allegations of politicians taking credit for aid in order to secure votes quickly spread and were rife throughout the disaster response. Perceptions of unequal aid allocation created simmering tensions among the population that finally boiled over in January 2013 when more than 5,000 people barricaded the national highway, protesting that government relief efforts were prioritising areas that held more votes.⁶

As part of the emergency response to the typhoon, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) led a 'Communication with Communities' (CwC) Working Group initially within the Protection Cluster, and subsequently under the Coordination Cluster, intended to function as a cross-cluster technical support service and communication coordination mechanism.

¹ UNOCHA, *Philippines (Mindanao) Humanitarian Action Plan 2013: Typhoon Bopha/Pablo Response – An Action Plan for Recovery* (Revised January 2013).

² Multi-agency, *Emergency Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods Assessment for Typhoon Bopha (Pablo), Philippines – January 2013 Key Findings*. (Philippines 2013)

³ <http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutshws.php>

⁴ UNOCHA, *Philippines (Mindanao) Humanitarian Action Plan 2013: Typhoon Bopha/Pablo Response – An Action Plan for Recovery* (Revised January 2013).


⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Living in the shadows: Displaced Lumads locked in a cycle of poverty* (Geneva 2013)

⁶ IRIN, 'Allegations of aid politicization ahead of elections', IRIN News, 22 February 2013.

UNOCHA worked closely with GPH departments, humanitarian agencies and national telecommunication companies, with the aims of improving access to vital information for affected communities and ensuring that their voices were heard and considered in the response. The objectives of the UNOCHA CwC project were:

1. To improve access to information for survivors of Typhoon Bopha
2. To improve the capacity of responding agencies to listen to disaster affected communities at the agency and system levels
3. To coordinate communication work undertaken as part of the emergency response to the typhoon

Map 1: UNOCHA Typhoon Pablo Social Media Map (Coordinated Assessment Support Section, OCHA Geneva)⁷:



⁷ for a map showing the affected population and storm track, see Annex 1

2. Purpose and Objectives of this Review

The purpose of this learning review is to document lessons learned from the UNOCHA CwC project in response to Typhoon Bopha. The review aims to document what happened, the enabling and impeding factors affecting the project, and to ascertain whether key informants perceived there to be an added value to CwC activities undertaken and coordinated within the wider humanitarian response.

It also aims to identify examples of good practice and capture lessons on what worked well, what did not work well, and what tools and processes could be developed to facilitate a more effective response in the future. The review also examines UNOCHA's remit and where CwC work might fit within its current mandate and in the wider humanitarian system. This was a point that was frequently raised in interviews. The full Terms of Reference of this learning review can be found in Annex 2.

Objectives

The specific objectives of this review were to:

- Use all available information to document CwC activities and their perceived impact by key informants, from project inception (December 2012) to the time of data collection (July 2013).
- Identify good practices that contributed to UNOCHA's CwC response achieving its three core objectives:
 - a. Improving access to information for survivors of Typhoon Bopha
 - b. Improving the capacity of responding agencies to listen to disaster affected communities
 - c. Coordinating communication work undertaken as part of the typhoon response
- Assess the role of UNOCHA as a communication coordination mechanism with partners involved in the response, and identifying ways in which UNOCHA's CwC response strengthened partners' ability to coordinate communication work and carry out more effective two-way communication activities.
- Determine what UNOCHA staff and partners consider worked well during the response, what did not work well, and why, and identifying the challenges of coordinating a communication mechanism in this context, including what helped to make it work, and what participants would do differently next time.
- Determine how agencies perceived their own communication activities and decided what kind of information they wanted to communicate, including how they seek funding for communication activities, what they know about UNOCHA's communication work and whether they tried to coordinate with this, and what lessons can be learned.
- Assess what worked well, considering the context within the activities that were implemented, with the aim of incorporating lessons learned in future responses.
- Collect and organise any documentation, such as tools and proposals developed throughout the project, for review and refinement and possible use in future responses.

3. Methodology

This learning review used a qualitative approach and aimed to examine both the process and the outcomes of UNOCHA's CwC project. To accomplish this, in-depth information was obtained from key informants about their experiences and perceptions of the CwC project undertaken as part of the Typhoon Bopha response.

3.1 Data Collection

Data was collected by:

1. A desk-based review of key documents related to UNOCHA's CwC response in the Philippines, as well as documentation, primarily end of mission reports, made available by partners⁸.
2. A series of qualitative, semi-structured interviews – conducted in country where possible or by telephone/e-mail – of 47 key informants, including:
 - UNOCHA staff based in the Manila Office, the Davao sub-office and the coordination hubs in affected provinces
 - Representatives from all agencies and organisations involved in the CwC Working Group and/or resulting activities
 - Representatives from each cluster active during the response
 - Representatives from local and international NGOs, UN agencies, private companies and other actors involved in the response
 - Representatives from the local media who attended UNOCHA's media briefing
 - A representative from a disaster affected community involved in two UNOCHA initiatives

Potential key informants involved in the CwC Working Group were suggested by UNOCHA. Representatives of other agencies were also identified through CDAC Network Members and through interviewees suggesting further contacts. A full list of key informants can be found in Annex 4. And an outline of interview questions can be found in Annex 5.

3.2 Data Analysis

The data collected for this review was analysed using framework analysis, which aims to produce policy-orientated findings and involves summarising data within a thematic framework⁹. This approach is commonly used in applied policy research, as well as in health and social care research, and was deemed to be the most appropriate for this study as it offers a systematic way of analysing qualitative data when answers to specific questions are required. Data was organised into a thematic framework that was developed based on issues emerging from the interviews. Most of the themes were derived directly from the interview questions, although additional themes were added according to emerging data.

Distinct thematic frameworks were then developed to analyse data from UNOCHA staff, key informants involved in the communication project, and staff from other organisations involved in the response. These frameworks were designed to capture information outlined in the objectives of the learning review and other clear themes that arose during data collection.

The May 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review¹⁰ identified the six key elements of an effective communication coordination mechanism as: credibility; establishment and maintenance of appropriate coordination mechanisms; strategic leadership; integration with the existing humanitarian system; training and capacity-

⁸ see Bibliography in Annex 3.

⁹ J. Green and N. Thorogood, *Qualitative Methods for Health Research*, 2nd ed. (London, SAGE Publications, 2009)

¹⁰ C. Ljungman, *CDAC Haiti Learning Review: Final Report* (Belgium 2012)

building; and advocacy. This framework was considered during the data analysis.

Finally, the data was triangulated between different key informants' accounts to ensure the findings were as representative and dependable as possible.

4. Findings

4.1 The CwC Response to Typhoon Bopha

This review examines the CwC response to Typhoon Bopha in seven phases:

1. UNOCHA CwC preparation work
2. UNOCHA CwC work during the first week
3. Establishment of the CwC Working Group – December 2012
4. Activities undertaken through the CwC Working Group – January to March 2013
5. Establishment and activities of the Provincial Communication Technical Working Group – April to July 2013
6. UNOCHA CwC activities – April to July 2013
7. CwC work undertaken by other actors throughout the response

4.1.1 UNOCHA CwC preparation work

As Typhoon Bopha approached the Philippines, the UNOCHA Global CwC Coordinator was already in Manila working to coordinate the implementation of a CwC pilot project in the Philippines. As part of this pilot project, UNOCHA planned on employing a dedicated National CwC Officer in its Manila Office to focus on building CwC as a 'sector' within humanitarian responses in the Philippines, with the capacity to deploy in case of emergencies. The aim of the project was to pilot a coordination/technical support function helping agencies to do more work in this area by focusing principally on information management, advocacy and funding.

4.1.2 UNOCHA CwC work during the first week

On 5 December 2012, the day after the typhoon made landfall, the Global CwC Coordinator initiated the online needs assessment process,

requesting that the UNOCHA Coordinated Assessment Support Section (CASS) in Geneva activate the Digital Humanitarian Network (DHN)¹¹.

The DHN was able to support the needs assessment process by sourcing, verifying, geo-locating and mapping all pictures and footage of damage posted on social media sites following Typhoon Bopha's landfall¹². The map includes 126 data items that were made available online between 4 December and 6 December 2012.¹³

Building on the preparations for the CwC pilot already in place, the Global CwC Coordinator was able to deploy from Manila to Davao City almost immediately after the typhoon's landfall, setting up a cross-cluster CwC coordination mechanism as part of the response. However, as UNOCHA Philippines had no Public Information Officer (PIO) in place, the Global CwC Coordinator was also required to cover PIO duties. And because the PIO work was seen as a priority, the Global CwC Coordinator's capacity for focusing on CwC work during these initial weeks was significantly reduced.

In spite of this, the Global CwC Coordinator achieved substantial results during the first week of the response, including contributing to a CwC section in the daily UNOCHA situation report. Between 4 December and 7 December 2012, when the GPH accepted the offer of international assistance, this included daily updates about the status of telecommunication in affected areas; free charging facilities provided by telecommunication companies in areas without electricity and free calling services in evacuation centres; and the GPH use of social media to share updates and information with the population. The Global CwC Coordinator also liaised with telecommunication companies, GPH agencies and the Philippine National Union of Journalists in order to ascertain the impact of the typhoon on local media and the state of the communication infrastructure in affected areas.

¹¹ <http://digitalhumanitarians.com/>

¹² see Map 1, Section 1, page 10

¹³ UNOCHA CASS, *OCHA Social Media Mapping and Analysis of Typhoon Bopha* (Geneva, 6 December 2012)

The Global CwC Coordinator succeeded in having questions on communication capacity and information needs included in the common Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA) tool¹⁴. The RNA was carried out between 5 December and 7 December 2012 by a United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team. Due to circumstances on the ground, the UNDAC team opted to use a direct observation approach rather than asking community members and local officials to complete questionnaires. The common RNA tool was therefore used as a reference. Data was disseminated to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) on 8 December 2012, including observations on mobile phone coverage and basic information on communication channels, such as radio, phone, word of mouth and GPH bulletins in most of the *barangays* (villages) covered.

By the time the Bopha Action Plan for Response and Recovery was launched on 10 December 2012, the Global CwC Coordinator had worked with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and Community and Family Services International (CFSI) to develop CwC projects that were successfully included in the emergency Flash Appeal. These two projects, cumulatively valued at US\$700,000, were initially listed under the Protection section of the Appeal. However, when the Appeal was revised on 23 January 2013, CFSI withdrew its project due to a lack of staff capacity to implement it, and the IOM project was listed under the Coordination and Cross-cutting Issues sections.

This inclusion of CwC was significant, marking the first time CwC initiatives had ever been included in a Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP). The IOM project was based on the IOM CwC response to Typhoon Washi in December 2011, along with similar work undertaken in Haiti following the 2011 earthquake. The project aimed to work with all responders to improve information provision and two-way communication with disaster affected communities, particularly by supporting existing GPH initiatives. Although the IOM project was ultimately not funded through the Appeal, parts of this project later received financial support from the European Commission – Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO).

¹⁴ see Annex 6

During this period, regular updates were also circulated to CDAC Network Members through the CDAC Network Secretariat, and links were made with IOM, Merlin and Save the Children, with an invitation for other responding Members to join the CwC Working Group.

4.1.3 Establishment of the CwC Working Group – December 2012

By 19 December 2012, the Global CwC Coordinator had generated a mailing list of agency representatives interested in joining a CwC Working Group designed to function as a cross-cluster technical support service and communication coordination mechanism¹⁵. The Global CwC Coordinator was also in contact with the relevant GPH actors, such as the PIA and the DSWD, and circulated information about DSWD and PIA weekly radio programming, as well as inviting agencies to participate in a press conference organised by the PIA on 21 December 2012. Because the PIA needed to develop its own coordination mechanism that made use of its network of GPH information officers within different government ministries, the CwC Working Group's first meeting was not held until 27 December 2012.

Based on previous CwC responses in Haiti and Pakistan, the CwC Working Group was initially established under the Protection Cluster. However, during the response to Typhoon Bopha, the Protection Cluster was overwhelmed and lacked CwC technical capacity, so when the CAP was revised in early January 2013, the group transferred to the Coordination Cluster. Members of the Working Group included Action Contre la Faim (ACF), Community and Family Services International (FSI), Globe Telecommunications, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC), IOM, PIA, Plan International, Save the Children, SMART Communications, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) (although some of these agencies attended only once). The CwC Working Group initially met weekly, and then later fortnightly. It was co-led by the Government's Regional DSWD office and UNOCHA, and had a seat at the interagency cluster meeting.

¹⁵ see Annex 7

4.1.4 Activities undertaken through the initial CwC Working Group – January to March 2013

From January 2013, a number of CwC activities were initiated by agencies and coordinated through the CwC Working Group.

Following the typhoon, IOM was able to rapidly establish a field presence, collecting frequently asked questions (FAQs) and other key information needs from disaster affected communities from 12 December to 22 December 2012. IOM field staff asked community members about their main concerns and collated the answers. Although there was no clear methodology, IOM tried to ensure that women, men, youth and the elderly were all represented. The top five questions were ranked according to how often they were asked and the urgency with which they required attention. These questions primarily focused on information around food provision, shelter assistance and family assistance cards. The PIA and DSWD also gathered FAQs from their information officers in the affected areas.

In mid-January 2013, as a result of these exercises, IOM supported the DSWD in producing a series of waterproof posters and flyers detailing how to obtain family access cards. Waterproof posters with information about shelter and livelihood assistance were also disseminated to relevant clusters and affected *barangays*. IOM continued to collect FAQs from communities, collating and passing to clusters every three weeks.

Also in mid-January 2013, the Global CwC Coordinator worked to ensure that CwC was included as a distinct section in briefings to the donor mission, as well as briefing and lobbying clusters to include CwC in their strategy documents. Although it was too late to include CwC in cluster projects in the revised Appeal, individual clusters were introduced to the CwC Working Group who then began considering how they could best share information on their activities and elicit feedback from the affected populations.

The CwC Working Group was also able to build upon the resources of its members. In late January 2013, the Food Cluster participated in a DSWD radio programme based on contacts made within the Working Group. From mid-December 2012, the DSWD and the PIA used the Working Group email list to invite clusters to participate in their weekly

radio programmes. Clusters were given the opportunity to provide information about their response work, disseminate important messages and answer questions from the affected population. The DSWD and the PIA only became aware of each other's radio programmes through their mutual participation in the CwC Working Group. This demonstrates the importance of convening local level platforms which can foster and facilitate collaboration.

Following the Food Cluster programme, the WASH, Nutrition and Shelter Clusters were also scheduled to participate in additional programmes in the following weeks. Ultimately this did not happen, primarily as a result of language barriers; the radio stations needed cluster representatives who could speak Tagalog or one of the local languages, but unfortunately none of the agencies had staff with those language skills operating at the cluster level.

At the end of January 2013, IOM worked with the DSWD to support a helpline that DSWD initiated shortly after the typhoon made landfall. From 10 December 2012, DSWD had been operating a helpline, allowing people to call or text with queries or complaints. DSWD regularly compiled requests from the helpline and disseminated this information to relevant clusters for review and response. But because DSWD lacked the capability to manage the helpline alone, UNOCHA asked IOM to include funding for a helpline staff member in its project proposal. Although the IOM project was not funded through the Appeal, IOM was able to divert funds to support this initiative, and a helpline staff member began work. Later in the response, IOM had the necessary funding to map information from the helpline onto a virtual CrowdMap for use by humanitarian agencies¹⁶. The CrowdMap showed 139 queries were registered from 10 December 2012 to 25 March 2013. These were organised by cluster topic, enabling clusters to quickly view relevant queries. Feedback showed that members of disaster affected communities were pleased to see their comments made public.

On 29 January 2013, UNOCHA organised a local media lunch to bolster contact between local media and humanitarian agencies. Forty journalists attended and requested information on

¹⁶ <https://bopharesponse.crowdmap.com>

a range of topics, including food, shelter and funding. The media lunch was intended to be the first in a series of similar media events, however, due to a lack of organisational capacity and a decision at the country level that further engagement with local media was potentially problematic, no additional media activities were arranged. The National CwC Officer did later facilitate a local media press briefing on food distribution, at WFP's request, on 26 February 2013.

At the beginning of February 2013, UNOCHA began orientating newly-recruited international and national frontline NGO staff on 'Humanitarian Principles and the Humanitarian System'. The population's lack of understanding of international humanitarian response was identified as a significant security issue for agencies, and the CwC Working Group felt that enhancing understanding among NGO staff was key in addressing this.

Once the orientation process was underway, the DSWD asked UNOCHA to provide the same training to its municipal information officers so they would also be better equipped to answer questions on the international response. As part of this initiative, a one-page document explaining basic humanitarian principles, translated into all local languages, was prepared for agencies for use in their outreach work. This document was particularly useful in advance of the May 2013 elections, when aid was at risk of politicisation by the media and political parties.

On 2 February 2013, the Global CwC Coordinator handed over to a National CwC Officer¹⁷. The National CwC Officer continued organising fortnightly meetings of the CwC Working Group, contributing to situation reports and humanitarian bulletins, conducting orientations on Humanitarian Principles in UNOCHA field hubs for national and international NGO staff, and remaining involved in subsequent CwC activities.

Working Group partners also introduced innovative ways of reaching affected communities. On 16 February 2013, the DSWD and SMART Communications launched their 'Baranguay Fiesta Caravan'. The initiative began in early January 2013 when SMART Communications approached the

Working Group to ask how it could contribute to the response efforts. The Working Group developed a concept based on UNOCHA staff's previous experience of using 'caravans', or mobile theatre road shows, in emergency responses in Kenya and Haiti. SMART Communications suggested using its existing Baranguay Fiesta Caravan model: a mobile entertainment marketing tool normally used to sell SMART products in remote areas. DSWD and SMART Communications agreed to collaborate on this initiative, which was rolled out in Cateel.

The main aim of the caravan, which provided games and entertainment, was to enable the GPH to interact with affected communities. Community members also had an opportunity to ask questions of the participating humanitarian agencies, including IOM, UNHCR and UNICEF. This methodology was used as a psychosocial intervention that could bring the community together, provide relief from the trauma of the typhoon and indicate to the community that the government and humanitarian agencies were interested in their views. An estimated 300 people attended the caravan event held in Cateel in February 2013. A further event planned for Nabuturan was postponed due to local elections in May 2013 and was never rescheduled because the original CwC Working Group had disbanded.

The CwC Working Group also developed initiatives to involve affected community members. On 26 February 2013, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA and WFP held an inter-agency community consultation in Kidawa Barangay, Municipality of Laak, Compostela Valley Province. The aim of the consultation was to meet with community members to better understand their perspectives and to explain the work and principles of humanitarian agencies.¹⁸

Kidawa Barangay was selected because it was considered to be under-served by humanitarian assistance due to its remote location. The community also had the additional challenges of having a higher number of indigenous people and being affected by both conflict and the typhoon.

¹⁷ see ToR in Annex 8

¹⁸ UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOCHA & WFP, *Mission Report: Interagency Community Consultation in Baranguay Kidawa, Laak Municipality, Compostela Valley* (Philippines, 26 February 2013)

Participants in the consultation included *barangay* officials, 'Purok' (district) leaders from Kidawa and LS Sarmiento *barangays*, farmers, the president of the Parents-Teachers Association of Kidawa, and representatives from womens' groups and the elderly group of Kidawa.

The event raised a variety of issues that were in turn relayed to the relevant actors, such as the WASH Cluster and Department of Agriculture representatives. It was intended that the consultation would form the basis of an inter-cluster package of information for future consultations, allowing one agency to collect required information on behalf of all clusters. Unfortunately, the scheduled future consultations did not take place. A number of reasons were cited by key informants, including a lack of cluster agreement about holding additional consultations, concerns about one agency collecting information on behalf of others, and fears of raising expectations among the affected community, because agencies had already organised where they were working and were not flexible to change if required.

Following the handover from the Global CwC Coordinator to the National CwC Coordinator, the original CwC Working Group held four fortnightly meetings but they were poorly attended with rarely more than two organisations present. The primary reasons cited for the decrease in attendance were that many of the more active members of the group had returned to their posts in Manila or transferred to other countries, causing the group to lose momentum, and that many of the clusters were now only operating at the provincial rather than the regional level and could no longer attend meetings in Davao City. As a result, the National CwC Officer determined that effective regional CwC coordination was no longer feasible, and the original Working Group stopped meeting at the end of March 2013.

4.1.5 Establishment and activities of the Provincial Communication Technical Working Group – April to July 2013

As the relief efforts took shape, the Provincial Government in Davao Oriental became interested in the CwC Working Group, recognising the need for a similar coordination mechanism between GPH agencies. In April 2013, the Provincial Government requested that IOM and UNOCHA

support the establishment of a Provincial Communication Technical Working Group (PCTWG) at the provincial level as part of the province's 'Building Back Better' programme.

The PCTWG is comprised of representatives from the DSWD Regional Office, the Department of Agriculture – Philippine Coconut Authority (DA-PCA), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the PIA, Humanitarian Response Consortium (HRC), Oxfam, IOM and UNOCHA. The group is chaired by two provincial offices – the provincial local government unit of Davao Oriental and the provincial Social Welfare and Development Office (PSWDO) – although IOM also takes a lead role, and is expected to continue its work after the emergency phase is complete.

The PCTWG began meeting in late-April 2013. It has been supporting clusters in developing and disseminating important messages, including translation, printing and distributing posters to the affected population, before the clusters cease operations. Following a request from the PCTWG, IOM ran a technical training session for municipal information officers, provincial information links and local media covering news writing, humanitarian reporting, the humanitarian system and CwC. The training was intended to build local communication capacity in humanitarian response and to develop a coherent communication structure in the province. The training was funded by an ECHO grant provided to IOM. As part of this grant, IOM works with other members of the group to distribute radios to isolated communities as part of disaster preparedness and asks agencies to share information on projects and beneficiary criteria to display in affected communities. IOM also plans to partner with a local radio station to broadcast 30 second information blasts on weather forecasting in the event of emergencies.

4.1.6 UNOCHA CwC activities – April to July 2013

In late April 2013, a series of After Action Review¹⁹ (AAR) workshops were held in the four disaster affected Mindanao provinces. Although not coordinated by the PCTWG, these workshops were led by led by the Office for Civil Defense (OCD) and

¹⁹ UNOCHA, *Report: The After Action Review/Lessons Learned Workshops – Typhoon Bopha Response* (Philippines 2013).

UNOCHA and for the first time included representatives of the affected population, based on recommendation of the National CwC Officer and reflecting the UNOCHA focus on CwC during the response.

After Action Reviews are typically held 100 days after a response is initiated and are designed to bring actors together to document what worked well and to identify any gaps in relief provision. Participation is normally limited to UN agencies, international and national NGOs and government representatives. However, in the case of the Typhoon Bopha response, opinions were also sought from representatives of communities in the four worst affected provinces of Compostela Valley, Davao Oriental, Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Sur. As part of this process, three 'responders' workshops were held in Compostela Valley, Agusan del Sur and Davao Oriental from 8 April to 16 April 2013. Three structured community consultations were held in the same locations from 24 April to 20 April 2013. Between eight and 20 participants from each *barangay*, representing a range of ages and backgrounds, attended each of the community consultations.

The consultations focused on the themes of preparedness, early warning, and response and delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNOCHA and INGO staff facilitated focus group discussions, which highlighted key concerns that often differed to those raised by responding agencies, such as the lack of an effective early warning system and insufficient information about service provision during the response.

In addition to supporting the group activities listed above, most of the other activities undertaken by the National CwC Officer were organised bilaterally with individual agencies. Since the original CwC Working Group had disbanded, the UNOCHA focus shifted to implementation of specific activities rather than coordination of CwC work between agencies and the GPH. Given that clusters were less active, and Working Group attendance was low, UNOCHA felt that regional CwC coordination was becoming a lower priority. Some key informants from UNOCHA and other agencies also felt that coordination declined because the National CwC Officer did not have prior experience in coordinating with international actors, and preferred to work bilaterally or with local networks.

One of the main responsibilities of the National CwC Officer at this stage was supporting HRC-Oxfam to implement a series of six, two-way communication forums covering 37 *barangays* in affected provinces. These 'Affected Population Forums'²⁰ were held in June and July 2013 and were designed to facilitate discussion between affected communities and their local government units (LGUs). The forums provided a platform for the community to raise issues and ask questions about longer term recovery plans. They also gave the LGUs an opportunity to explain their response strategy and to better understand the main issues affecting communities. Based on the result of the forums, action plans were developed detailing agreements between communities and LGUs, and copies were distributed to LGUs and *barangays*. HRC-Oxfam requested that UNOCHA jointly facilitate this initiative in order to increase its credibility and legitimacy, and to encourage government participation. UNOCHA accepted the opportunity as part of the CwC project.

One of the key issues highlighted in the AAR was the problem created by widespread confusion about weather warnings, which resulted in many people incorrectly thinking Typhoon Bopha was the weakest category of typhoon, rather than the most powerful. In response to the AAR feedback, UNOCHA worked with the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration [PAGASA] to run a series of community workshops on weather warning systems. The workshops were designed to help people better understand weather warning systems, along with any actions required in the event of a storm warning. The importance of awareness-raising of weather warnings had also been identified as a priority in early February 2013 by members of the CwC Working Group, as rumours of another impending typhoon resulted in people unnecessarily leaving their homes. At the time of this review, workshops had been held in two *barangays* – Lambajan in Davao Oriental and Andap in Compostela Valley – and additional workshops were planned.

Also during this period, UNOCHA for the first time included CwC in its standard technical training with local government on information

²⁰ UNOCHA, 'Typhoon Bopha Affected Population Forums Report by HRC-Oxfam and OCHA', *Relief Web*, 1 August 2013.

management and coordination. The one-hour discursive session, which used local examples, highlighted the importance of reliable information for families affected by disaster and emphasised the differences between informing donors or the media, and providing useful information to the affected population.

The UNOCHA Head of Information Management in Davao, who had prior experience in CwC work, suggested including this session, given that UNOCHA was already focusing on CwC in the response. The sessions were led by a member of UNOCHA hub information management staff who had previous experience of working with local NGOs. Three training sessions were held, with 104 participants in total, of which 70 per cent were government staff and 30 per cent from local NGOs. The 14 most severely affected municipalities were targeted and training was provided to the main emergency responders – the Office for Civil Defence (OCD), DSWD and technical staff from the governors' and mayors' offices at provincial and municipal levels. UNOCHA also worked with NGO consortiums to identify local NGOs not often included in training sessions. In Baganga municipality, the OCD representative decided to integrate CwC into disaster preparedness planning as a result of the CwC training session.

4.1.7 CwC work undertaken by other actors throughout the response

In addition to the activities of the CwC Working Group, CwC initiatives were also undertaken by GPH departments, telecommunication companies and humanitarian agencies, including both group and non-group participants. Among those agencies not involved in the group that were interviewed for this review, a few (usually those not based in Davao City) said they were unaware that the group existed, but the majority said they were too busy with other cluster meetings to attend. One key informant was unable to attend Working Group meetings due to other commitments, but said they appreciated receiving e-mail updates from the group.

Although it is not possible to capture information about all of the response initiatives introduced outside of the CwC Working Group, some of the additional CwC activities developed during the response to Typhoon Bopha are outlined below.

Throughout the response, the DSWD information office produced a two-page newsletter, *'Pahibalo'*, in the local dialect, which was inspired by IOM's newsletter during Typhoon Washi. This newsletter provided affected communities with information on the response and advertised the helpline number. The DSWD also held a daily media briefing, and by 12 December 2012 had set up an information desk in Davao providing the latest information on the relief effort to the public.²¹

UNICEF, an active member of the CwC Working Group during the response, conducted a behaviour change communication campaign called 'Mothers against Malnutrition'. UNICEF also developed an agreement with SMART Communications, based on their connection through the Working Group, focussing on texting nutrition messages to mothers. And although Merlin was not involved in the original Working Group, it is now also developing a health messaging project with SMART Communications.

All the International NGOs interviewed for this review discussed the feedback mechanisms they had in place in their programmes. This usually consisted of a telephone number included on the items they were distributing. Some of the organisations also operated a complaints desk during distribution periods. In August 2013, World Vision International (WVI) piloted a beneficiary satisfaction survey in the affected area using mobile phones to input data. The IFRC deployed a beneficiary communication expert at the beginning of the response and included funding for beneficiary communication as part of their appeal. The IFRC emphasised the importance of their volunteers, who were usually members of the affected community, in their CwC work²². Some international and local NGOs assigned community facilitators to maintain close contact with affected families. As well as the Affected Population Forums, HRC-Oxfam prepared handover documents for LGUs as part of its exit strategy, detailing the work undertaken in the area including lists of beneficiaries and building plans.

²¹ <http://www.gov.ph/2012/12/12/dswd-sets-up-media-center-for-public-inquiries-to-assist-relief-efforts-in-davao-oriental/>

²² Philippine Red Cross, ICRC and IFRC, *Case Study: Typhoon Bopha – Communicating to save lives*. (Philippines 2013)

Many of the clusters were also active in CwC work. The Protection Cluster distributed posters on anti-trafficking, violence against women and child-friendly spaces, and worked to raise awareness of abuse and other protection issues through face-to-face community consultations. The WASH Cluster agreed a deal with SMART Communications sending hygiene promotion text blasts. The lead of the Early Recovery Cluster developed a communication strategy²³ around a debris clearance cash-for-work scheme. Although this predominantly focused on enhancing information sharing between partners, the general public, including local media, were identified as key target audiences. And the Early Recovery Cluster requested support from the PCTWG in developing posters advertising cash for work schemes.

Private sectors actors also joined in the relief effort. Vodafone deployed its Instant Network at the beginning of the disaster, providing SMART mobile services to support relief operations and the affected population in and around Baganga municipality, which was the most severely affected by the typhoon²⁴. The network was available for use by everyone and free calling stations were offered for people with no phone, power or credit. This instant mobile phone network, which is carried in three suitcases, was a collaboration between Vodafone, Télécoms Sans Frontières and SMART Communications. It remained in place until the SMART tower in Baganga was repaired. SMART also launched an appeal that raised US\$2.5million for the typhoon response. This money is being used for a number of construction and health projects in collaboration with SMART's business partners. Following Typhoon Bopha, SMART also signed an agreement with the Philippine National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) on SMS communication with local government in the event of future disasters.

When fieldwork for this review was completed, the focus for the GPH and the humanitarian agencies was shifting to the early recovery phase and preparedness for the next humanitarian response in the Philippines. For UNOCHA, this means

returning to the original plan of employing a National CwC Officer in Manila who can build on lessons learned from the responses to Typhoons Bopha and Washi and further develop networks, policy and protocols around CwC in preparation for future emergencies.²⁵

4.2. Enabling and Impeding Factors to CwC Work

The response to Typhoon Bopha illustrates some of the problems encountered by national and international organisations working to communicate with disaster affected communities. While capacity, experience, coordination and advance preparations were all key to the successes of the CwC work, the size and strength of the storm and the destruction of communication networks, and the scope and complexity of a wide array of actors and agencies working to reach those in need, combined to create significant challenges.

Key informants frequently cited CwC capacity in the Philippines – within the GPH, national telecommunication companies and humanitarian actors in country – as one of the main enabling factors for the effectiveness of the emergency communication response. This capacity was complemented by advance planning and preparedness through the development of networks and dialogue around CwC, and the prioritisation of CwC, both within the framework of the institutional response, and as a result of consultations with affected communities as initiatives were implemented.

The impeding factors cited by the informants were more diverse, including a lack of experience in large scale emergency response in the affected areas of the country, the complications resulting from local elections being held during the early recovery phase, and language barriers between the humanitarian actors and the affected population. Difficulty obtaining funding also led to a lack of capacity to carry out CwC work. Other challenges related to UNOCHA's role in CwC activities.

²³ UNDP, *CERF-DMP/ER Communications Strategy: The Early Recovery Cluster in TS Bopha response*. (Philippines 2013)

²⁴ M. Warman, 'Mobile Network in a Suitcase' helps Typhoon Pablo refugees', *The Telegraph*, 14 December 2012

²⁵ UNOCHA Philippines did employ a National CwC Officer who, supported by the UNOCHA Regional CwC Coordinator, has been active in coordinating and advocating for CwC work in the responses to the Bohol Earthquake and Typhoon Haiyan.

4.2.1 Enabling factors

The development of a system of effective preparedness measures, such as pre-existing clusters, allowed the GPH to quickly mobilise its response once Typhoon Bopha had cleared the Philippines. The GPH information provision structures and experienced use of social media made CwC work easier to set up. This was complemented by the strength and capacity of the national telecommunication companies, and the development of a UNOCHA CwC pilot project prior to the storm's arrival.

As the response to the disaster took shape, dedicated and experienced staff were able to ensure that CwC was properly placed on the response agenda, including as an element of the RNA and questionnaires and discussions with affected communities.

Key informants highlighted seven significant enabling factors to the CwC work:

1. GPH capacity in humanitarian response and CwC
2. Articulated need by GPH for improved communication with the affected population
3. Strong capacity of telecommunication companies
4. Developed networks through UNOCHA CwC pilot project preparation
5. International and national staff experienced in CwC
6. Inclusion of communication needs questions in the RNA
7. Dedicated CwC staff in UNOCHA and other agencies

1. GPH capacity in humanitarian response and CwC

Pre-existing clusters and information provision structures

The GPH has a permanent cluster system in place, with the capacity to lead humanitarian clusters and draw on lessons learned from previous disasters. This system provides an opportunity to initiate effective preparedness measures, such as

the planned UNOCHA Manila CwC pilot project. The system also involves a network of information officers operating within GPH departments at the municipal and provincial level who are responsible for public information provision and are coordinated by the PIA. Significantly, the PIA conducted disaster preparedness orientation sessions with information officers prior to Typhoon Bopha, who were then able to use SMS to report back to the PIA during the response. The PIA representative interviewed for this review reported that agency information officers in some areas were ahead of the NDRMMC in reporting the number of deaths from the disaster.

The PIA is mandated to provide timely, relevant and accurate information to aid the public in decision-making.²⁶ The agency is engaged in both information gathering and information provision, and is therefore an obvious partner for humanitarian responders carrying out CwC projects. Because CwC was not previously prioritised as part of humanitarian responses in the Philippines, this was the first time that the PIA was involved in the cluster system.

Advanced use of mobile technology and social media

The GPH has a system for using social media and mobile technology in disasters that is more advanced than most humanitarian agencies. One key informant reported that the DSWD typically assign a staff member in Manila who is responsible for daily monitoring of social media sites during emergencies. According to the situation reports, by 5 December 2012, the GPH was already using the Google Crisis Map platform to show evacuation centres and hazard warnings and had set up a Google PersonFinder website as part of the response.

Based on previous experience of Twitter use during the Manila floods in 2012, the GPH officially endorsed the hashtag #pabloph for all Twitter messages relating to this emergency as soon as Typhoon Bopha (known locally as Pablo) entered the Philippines. In Davao, the DSWD set up a helpline and was receiving calls and SMS messages by 10 December 2012. And the PIA already had in place the SMART Communications

²⁶ PIA Citizens Charter: <http://news.pia.gov.ph/>

InfoBoard service²⁷ to manage SMS feedback coming in from information officers during the response.

2. Articulated need by GPH for improved communication with the affected population

On 15 January 2013, approximately six weeks after the typhoon and the influx of international aid, there were demonstrations by affected communities frustrated by a lack of information on the use of aid funds²⁸. The GPH advocated better communication with the affected population to prevent riots and to protect agency staff. This was discussed by the Undersecretary of the Office of the Cabinet Secretary at the national level and by DSWD at the Davao City level, where the importance of obtaining feedback from the affected population was also highlighted.

The DSWD in Davao City, as co-lead of the CwC Working Group along with UNOCHA, was particularly supportive of this two-way communication work. The fact that the GPH highlighted lack of information as a security issue helped the UNOCHA Global CwC Coordinator to advocate clusters including CwC in their approach and engaging with the Working Group.

3. Strong capacity of telecommunication companies

The capacity and involvement of Philippine telecommunication companies was cited by international agency staff as an enabling factor in CwC work. As described earlier, the main telecommunication companies, SMART and Globe, offered free charging stations in the immediate response phase, and Vodafone deployed its Instant Network in Baganga to support relief operations and affected communities.

The telecommunication agencies were also able to support dialogue between humanitarian agencies and the affected population by offering free 'load' (credit) to people who provided feedback and later offered their InfoBoard and SMS blast systems to humanitarian agencies, such as UNICEF, Merlin and the WASH Cluster, for mass SMS messaging.

The relationship between the telecommunication companies and the humanitarian agencies was, at least in part, brokered by the CwC Working Group. SMART also supported various GPH agencies with SMS services, including the Barangay Fiesta Caravan marketing tool.

4. Developed networks through UNOCHA CwC pilot project preparation

Before Typhoon Bopha arrived in the Philippines, the Global CwC Coordinator had already initiated discussions with UN agencies, international and national NGOs, the GPH and telecommunication companies about the recruitment of a dedicated National CwC officer as part of a pilot project.

As a result, a network of interested contacts was already in place and CwC was already on the agenda of a number of key actors, paving the way to set up a working group and place for CwC activities on clusters' agendas.

Links developed with the PIA were particularly useful in bringing the PIA into the CwC Working Group. Despite the extensive network of information officers with a mandate to provide information to the community, the PIA was not systematically involved in humanitarian response and had not previously been involved in the cluster system prior to joining the Working Group.

5. International and national staff experienced in CwC

There was a number of international staff from IOM and UNOCHA with experience of working on CwC in Haiti involved in the initial response. Key informants from humanitarian and government

²⁷ <http://www.theinfoboard-smart.net/about.php>

²⁸ <http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2013/01/17/dswd-yields-to-protesters-demand-for-10000-sacks-of-rice-for-pablo-victims/>

agencies said they found it useful to learn from the experiences of these staff.

Importantly, a number of national staff interviewed for this review had been involved in the response to Typhoon Washi and explained how they had employed learning and used their experience from that typhoon in the response to Typhoon Bopha. IOM was particularly engaged in CwC activities in camp management during the Typhoon Washi response, and the IOM initiative of developing a newsletter for the affected population was replicated in the Typhoon Bopha response by the DSWD.

6. Inclusion of communication needs questions in the Rapid Needs Assessment

The Global CwC Coordinator was present when the RNA tool was developed, and was therefore able to ensure questions on information needs and communication channels were included. Although the tool was ultimately not used, inclusion of these questions resulted in data on mobile phone coverage and available communication channels being collected as part of the direct observation approach. However, it is not clear how this information was used by UNOCHA or whether other agencies used it in response planning, as UNOCHA staff were the only key informants who mentioned the needs assessment during interviews for this review.

7. Dedicated CwC staff in UNOCHA and other agencies

The majority of key informants believed that having a full-time National CwC officer placed CwC much higher on the response agenda. The advocacy undertaken by the Global CwC Coordinator from the beginning of the response, along with the appointment of a National CwC Officer, resulted in a continuous focus on CwC within UNOCHA itself and its inclusion in situation reports, the CAP, the AAR and UNOCHA technical training. However, there was an acknowledgement by some agency staff interviewed that advocating for the inclusion of CwC within clusters,

coordination of agencies' CwC initiatives, and technical support with messaging was very time consuming, and required dedicated capacity.

IOM and WFP key informants reported that having a dedicated staff member, such as a communication officer or accountability officer, with responsibility for CwC work, gave their agency the capacity to engage in the CwC group and participate in joint activities. One participant reported that once IOM received ECHO funding, it was useful for other agencies to have the IOM Communication Coordinator able to focus on CwC full time, providing a common response.

UNICEF and IFRC also deployed experienced CwC staff in the initial stages of the response, and participants of the CwC Working Group said that they felt they benefited from their support. Some key informants reported it was difficult for their agency to find time to participate in the Working Group as they did not have dedicated capacity, and the main participants ended up being agencies with strong communication departments.

4.2.2 Impeding factors

The size and strength of Typhoon Bopha, and the level of the subsequent international humanitarian response, created unique challenges for CwC work. GPH agencies in Eastern Mindanao were overwhelmed by the effects of both the storm and the requirements of the relief efforts. There was limited information available about how best to communicate with affected communities, compounded by language issues, a lack of available resources, a damaged communication network and mistrust between aid organisations and local media. The local election cycle increased the risk of aid decisions being interpreted by the affected population as politically motivated. And confusion over the role and operational activities of the CwC Working Group and the UNOCHA Global CwC Coordinator, as well as lack of funding and high staff turnover, combined to further complicate CwC efforts.

Key informants highlighted 10 significant impeding factors to the CwC work:

1. Government agencies in Eastern Mindanao were overwhelmed

2. The DSWD and the PIA were not accustomed to working together at local level
3. Lack of information about how best to communicate with affected communities
4. Cluster level staff could not speak the languages used by the affected population
5. Location of CwC Working Group meetings
6. Local elections held less than five months after the typhoon hit
7. Wariness by humanitarian organisations of engaging with local media
8. High staff turnover within UNOCHA, and disparity in experience and understanding of CwC
9. Confusion over the role of the Global CwC Coordinator
10. Difficulty obtaining funding for CwC work

1. Government agencies in Eastern Mindanao were overwhelmed

The size and strength of Typhoon Bopha, and the level of the subsequent international humanitarian response, created unique challenges for government agencies in Eastern Mindanao. Although the Philippines cluster system functions effectively at the national level, local governments in the affected areas did not have a clear understanding of how a cluster system should work, and did not know how to interact with the international humanitarian agencies involved in the response.

Some local government representatives interviewed for this review explained they did not feel they had the experience to lead clusters, and they were unsure what information they could share with international agencies. Having never worked with humanitarian actors before, they said they initially had little understanding of the function of the international groups, how long they would stay, and how government and humanitarian systems could be coordinated effectively.

2. The DSWD and the PIA were not accustomed to working together at local level

Even within local government, structures had not necessarily been established around working together following a disaster. The DSWD and the PIA, who both became members of the CwC Working Group, were neither fully aware of each other's work nor accustomed to working together. For example, before coming together as part of the Working Group, they were not aware of each other's weekly radio programmes.

The agencies were also equally unfamiliar in working with external organisations, with both DSWD and PIA representatives requiring a letter from UNOCHA requesting their involvement in the CwC Working Group. Key informants from humanitarian agencies explained that although there was a network of information officers in place at provincial and municipal levels of government, there was no clear structure for how these officers should communicate in a disaster. At the municipal level, the role of an information officer is usually secondary to their official role.

3. Lack of information about how best to communicate with affected communities

Information about the best way to communicate with affected communities was lacking throughout the response. Other than limited radio station scanning undertaken in January 2013 by the Global CwC Coordinator when driving around affected areas, no timely assessment of access to radio stations was carried out, and there was no formal assessment of the most effective way to send and receive messages from the local population. And although questions about communication channels were included in the RNA, the data provided from the direct observation exercise were limited to mobile phone coverage and incomplete information on communication channels. It is also not clear how UNOCHA used this information in planning CwC activities.

In the initial days of the response, the Global CwC Coordinator reported that it was often difficult to

obtain information from telecommunication companies on their coverage in affected areas, due to the commercial implications of providing information about where their networks were failing. Additionally, the information they were able to provide was intended for public relations rather than operational purposes, as they had no prior experience of contributing information to humanitarian situation reports, and did not even systematically share this information with the government.

Key informants reported that the size of the affected area was a challenge in terms of communication, as the population was not gathered in camps as it had been after Typhoon Washi, and communities in different areas spoke different languages and had access to different communication channels.

There was also insufficient capacity to undertake an assessment of media needs, although ultimately this was not required as journalists were not significantly affected by the typhoon. The Global CwC Coordinator attempted to contact the Philippines National Union of Journalists, which had organised a relief effort for journalists after Typhoon Washi, but was unsuccessful.

4. Cluster level staff could not speak the languages used by the affected population

Although some local staff spoke some of the local languages, most of the staff working at the cluster level, at least initially, were either international staff communicating in English, or Filipino staff deployed from Manila who spoke Tagalog and other Filipino languages. And as no communication assessment was carried out, information on languages understood by the affected communities was not available to the Global CwC Coordinator.

It was suggested the primary reason clusters were not eventually able to participate in the DSWD and PIA radio programmes was the lack of staff able to communicate in the six main local languages. One agency reported that it took a long time to get text for posters and flyers translated, as local staff were busy working closely with affected communities.

Two key informants mentioned the benefit of the National CwC Officer, who was from Davao, being able to support their agencies with translation of posters into two local languages.

5. Location of CwC Working Group meetings

Although from late January 2013 other clusters were meeting closer to affected areas, the CwC Working Group continued to hold its meetings in Davao City, making it difficult for agencies based far from Davao City to attend. One key informant felt this distance led to a disconnect between the Working Group and people in the affected areas, as staff who were communicating with affected communities on a daily basis could not attend the Working Group meetings.

6. Local elections held less than five months after the typhoon hit

Local elections in May 2013 increased the risk of aid decisions being interpreted by the affected population as politically motivated. Some key informants felt the political tension due to the election schedule meant that CwC should have been seen as a higher priority by international actors, ensuring the affected population understood that humanitarian agencies were separate from the GPH and other political parties.

The elections led to a community consultation in Compostela Valley being cancelled, and to heightened wariness amongst humanitarian agencies of engaging with local media lest the agencies' motives be misinterpreted as political.

7. Wariness by humanitarian organisations of engaging with local media

Local media were often perceived by humanitarian agencies to be either left wing or on the side of the government. As a result, some humanitarian agencies were wary of engaging with local media due to concerns about accuracy. This was cited by

a number of participants as a challenge to using local media to increase communication with the affected population. Some participants felt that the local media did not fully understand humanitarian work. There were no media development agencies (MDAs) involved in the response to Typhoon Bopha to broker collaboration between media and humanitarian agencies, because the storm did not substantially impact local media capabilities and the media environment in the Philippines is generally seen to be well developed. Some participants felt that greater engagement with local media on humanitarian reporting would have been useful.

Local media representatives interviewed said that they appreciated the media meeting organised by UNOCHA in January 2013, and that they would have appreciated similar events being held regularly. However, they also reported no difficulty in contacting humanitarian agencies individually, particularly since obtaining contact details at the event. Some of the media representatives interviewed felt they received too much information at the meeting, and that too many journalists were present resulting in limited time to ask questions and formulate interesting stories.

8. High staff turnover within UNOCHA, and disparity in experience and understanding of CwC

After the Global CwC Coordinator left, there was a lack of clarity about what the CwC Working Group was trying to achieve, and UNOCHA's role within it. The UNOCHA team that followed, both in terms of staff members responsible for CwC and the Heads of the Davao sub-office, did not have as much experience in CwC work as the initial team and was therefore sometimes less able to support the CwC initiatives within UNOCHA.

Additionally, the staff member employed as the National CwC Officer did not have the same level of experience in CwC as the Global CwC Coordinator, and this had an impact on the National CwC Officer's capacity to coordinate CwC work. Despite working very effectively within local networks, the National CwC Officer felt it was

difficult to influence decisions due to the perceived hierarchical nature of most aid agencies.

In terms of management of the CwC role, different Heads of the Davao sub-office had various levels of understanding and experience in CwC work. UNOCHA staff, most of whom were actually standby partners, do not receive training on CwC or accountability from UNOCHA, and had no experience of UNOCHA previously engaging in this field of work. This led to uncertainty about where CwC fit within UNOCHA's mandate. Although team members endeavoured to support the National CwC Officer, this lack of clarity had implications for management of the role.

UNOCHA staff turnover was also a factor, along with other agencies who reported that experienced CwC staff who were initially deployed later returned to their usual positions. Replacement of these experienced staff with those less experienced is obviously not unique to this response or to CwC work, and points to a need to build capacity among less experienced staff, particularly in the Philippines where the culture of disaster preparedness provides opportunities for capacity building.

9. Confusion over the role of the Global CwC Coordinator

The Global CwC Coordinator's dual responsibility as PIO at the beginning of the response led to diminished CwC capacity and confusion over the coordinator role within the CwC Working Group. Some participants of the CwC Working Group were unclear whether the Working Group's focus was on communicating with beneficiaries or external donors, as participants felt that information traditionally sought by the UNOCHA PIO was being requested from the CwC Working Group. This situation is not unique: other UNOCHA CwC staff members have also been required to act as PIO following disasters, highlighting a global challenge for UNOCHA in resourcing PIO and CwC work.

The Global CwC Coordinator felt greater capacity at the beginning of the response would have resulted in more being achieved at an earlier stage. Examples include carrying out an assessment of the impact on local media,

convening the CwC Working Group earlier (particularly linking with GPH actors), engaging clusters in time to influence project proposals submitted to the Appeal, and organising an earlier media briefing.

10. Difficulty obtaining funding for CwC work

Despite one project being included in the Appeal and extensive UNOCHA advocacy work with donors, funding for CwC work was difficult to obtain. The IOM project was not funded through the Appeal, which was most likely because the whole response was under-funded. However, IOM reportedly managed to include a CwC budget line in its CERF proposal that focused on shelter assistance. Based on the FAQ exercise and IOM's CwC work during Typhoon Washi, IOM was invited to submit a CwC proposal to ECHO that was successfully funded. One INGO reported including a CwC funding line which was refused by a donor. And representatives from other agencies felt global advocacy is required to ensure donors include CwC in their funding criteria.

5. Conclusions

5.1 Added Value of the CwC Working Group as a Communication Coordination Mechanism

Most key informants felt that the CwC Working Group added value by maximising the sharing of information and expertise and by avoiding duplication. Furthermore, Working Group members felt that they had succeeded in raising the profile of CwC within the GPH, certain humanitarian agencies and within the typhoon response as a whole.

5.1.1 Value added by the CwC Working Group

According to key informants, the CwC Working Group added value to the response in two key ways:

1. Maximising resources and avoiding duplication
2. Raising the profile of CwC within the GPH, within agencies, and within the response as a whole.

1. Maximising resources and avoiding duplication

CwC Working Group members said they appreciated the opportunity to share information between clusters and felt that by working together on certain initiatives, particularly the FAQs and the DSWD helpline, they pooled their resources and avoided duplication. The value and importance of the Working Group is highlighted by the fact that once the initial Working Group disbanded and activities were planned bilaterally, there were incidences of duplication.

The DSWD and some agency staff who had not previously been involved in a large disaster response said they felt well-supported by the Working Group, particularly as there was no similar mechanism operating at the GPH level. They appreciated learning from other people's

experience of CwC in disasters, for example, CwC work carried out by IOM after Typhoon Washi, or the experiences of staff involved with the CDAC Haiti initiative, and applying this learning in the Typhoon Bopha response.

2. Raising the profile of CwC within the GPH, within agencies, and within the response as a whole.

The strong focus on CwC from the beginning of the response helped to raise the profile of CwC and changed the way people discussed communicating with disaster affected communities.

A DSWD representative felt that the profile of CwC work has been raised within the DSWD as a result of the activities undertaken, and that colleagues realised the importance of gathering and responding to information needs and obtaining feedback from communities. The CwC initiatives during the response led to the Provincial Government of Davao Oriental requesting support to establish the Communication Technical Working Group at Provincial level, which will eventually be led by GPH information officers and include local media representatives.

Aside from the DSWD, some participants from humanitarian agencies also felt UNOCHA's focus on CwC within the response helped them to advocate for better information provision within their agencies. A representative from the WASH Cluster explained that although the WASH Cluster is strong on hygiene promotion messaging, it had not previously considered the importance of displaying beneficiary criteria, which was an important consideration in this response.

Some humanitarian agencies were already very strong on CwC work, notably IOM, WFP, UNICEF and IFRC, and were also responsible for raising the profile of CwC alongside UNOCHA. One donor (ECHO) became interested in CwC work as a result of IOM's work in response to Typhoon Washi and the FAQ exercise in Typhoon Bopha, and

subsequently funded IOM to undertake further work in this area.

5.1.2 Elements of an effective CwC coordination mechanism

As previously noted, the 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review²⁹ identified the six key elements of an effective communication coordination mechanism as: credibility; establishment and maintenance of appropriate coordination mechanisms; strategic leadership; integration with the existing humanitarian system; training and capacity building; and advocacy.

The following section outlines how closely the CwC response to Typhoon Bopha met these elements according to the key informants interviewed for this review. 'Good practice points' generated by the research for this review are also included for some of the elements.

1. Credibility

"There must be trust in the coordinating body and its competence. The coordination processes must be inclusive, democratic, and based on honest brokering."

– 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review

The CwC Working Group sought to be credible and inclusive as it brought together actors from the GPH, humanitarian agencies, international and national NGOs and the private sector. The technical expertise, experience, ideas and motivation of the Global CwC Coordinator were well respected and key actors, including the DSWD and IOM, reported feeling well supported in carrying out coordinated CwC work during the initial phase of the response. Technical support with messaging, including translation, was reportedly appreciated by clusters. A number of participants from the GPH and humanitarian agencies felt they learned the value of clear and directive messaging to affected populations.

²⁹ C.Ljungman, *CDAC Haiti Learning Review: Final Report* (Belgium 2012)

Participants did not discuss whether the CwC Working Groups' processes were democratic, although a number of informants felt UNOCHA was the only humanitarian actor capable of leading such a group (alongside GPH agencies) due to its neutral stance and ability to broker relationships between GPH, humanitarian and private actors.

Some participants felt that although the idea of the CwC Working Group was strong, it lacked a clear collective vision and agreed purpose that risked reducing its credibility. Participants felt some of the coordination functions became confused, and the scope and purpose of the communication was occasionally unclear, such as communication with beneficiaries, media, or donors. Some key informants felt this confusion led to participation in the Working Group sometimes being ad-hoc as participants were not clear on the purpose of the meetings. This confusion is most likely due to the Global CwC Coordinator initially acting as PIO.

Some informants highlighted access as a problem, noting that the CwC Working Group continued to meet in Davao City when other clusters had moved closer to affected areas, which meant agencies based further away could not participate. Also, no local NGOs or members of the affected populations participated in the Working Group, possibly due to its location.

Good practice point: Clusters appreciated technical support with messaging, including translation, from the CwC Working Group

2. Establishment and maintenance of appropriate coordination mechanisms

"There must be systems to coordinate among actors and share information in timely and relevant ways."

– 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review

The CwC Working Group worked to ensure there were appropriate coordination mechanisms in

place to ensure information was prepared and shared both within the Working Group, and in some instances with the affected population through regular meetings and strategic information management.

Coordination meetings

The CwC Working Group held fortnightly meetings with the GPH, UN agencies, international and national NGOs and the private sector, as well as meeting with local media. Key informants reported that sharing information in these meetings was useful and prevented duplication between agencies. It was felt that the meetings were particularly beneficial in ensuring CwC initiatives undertaken by agencies were supporting those already being carried out by the GPH. However, some participants felt too few clusters attended the CwC Working Group and that interest remained within a smaller, separate and select group. This was compounded by representation by agency rather than cluster, and participating agencies were usually those with strong communication capacity, such as a dedicated communication officer or accountability officer, as others did not have capacity.

A number of inter-cluster activities were successfully coordinated through the group, such as the FAQs exercise, the Barangay Fiesta Caravan, dissemination of information from the DSWD helpline, and the DSWD radio programme. Participants also reported that some agencies carried out CwC work outside of the coordination of the Working Group.

Good practice point: Bringing government, humanitarian agencies and private sector together helped to avoid duplication and maximise resources available for CwC work.

Good practice point: The DSWD felt supported as co-leads of the CwC Working Group, as activities were mainstreamed with existing DSWD activities.

Information management

The CwC Working Group worked to ensure there was effective messaging and strategic information

management to help maintain efficient coordination mechanisms. E-mails about Working Group materials and activities were circulated, although some participants felt information was distributed irregularly and did not reach everyone involved. One key informant who was unable to attend the meetings appreciated the e-mail updates, highlighting the importance of wide information sharing to engage as many actors as possible.

In terms of sharing information with the wider response, key informants had mixed view about the various initiatives. The FAQ exercise questions were seen to have been disseminated successfully with the various clusters via e-mail. However, key informants had mixed views about the effectiveness of the DSWD helpline³⁰. Some participants felt the transfer of information from the helpline to the clusters took too long. Other participants commented on the value of the CrowdMap, which was created by IOM and shared on the Humanitarian Response website³¹. Situation reports, including a section on CwC work, were posted on this site and one cluster used the platform to share its communication strategy.

Many of the national staff working across the response who had not previously worked with UNOCHA praised its coordination of the '3Ws' data ('who, what and where' – detailing which agencies are carrying out what work, and where). However, none of the participants mentioned a '3Ws' of CwC, showing who is doing what were in terms of CwC, or any comparative mapping of CwC work.

3. Strategic leadership

“A coordinating body must have a solid understanding of the sector and an overall vision of how coordination can contribute to a more effective and efficient response. This entails understanding the complementarities of different agencies’ comparative advantages, the ability to

³⁰ Key informants reported the helpline received between 10 and 200 queries. According to the CrowdMap site, 139 queries were received by the helpline between 10 December 2012 and 25 March 2013.

³¹ <http://philippines.humanitarianresponse.info>

identify possibilities for synergies and joint initiatives, and what assessments are needed.”

– 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review

The Global CwC Coordinator worked to provide strategic leadership by assisting agencies in acquiring funding for CwC work, through support in writing and submitting project proposals to the Consolidated Appeal, and through lobbying donors to support CwC projects during the donor mission. Although this was ultimately unsuccessful for most agencies, participants reported feeling able to raise the profile of CwC work within their agencies as a result. The majority of participants found having a CwC focal point within UNOCHA beneficial, as UNOCHA is in a position to influence the overall humanitarian response.

Although the CwC Working Group did develop a coherent strategy³², it is unclear how widely this was shared within the Working Group and within the humanitarian system as a whole. Some Working Group members and other key informants were unclear about the focus and purpose of the Working Group, suggesting the strategy should have been disseminated more widely, and emphasised in Working Group meetings.

The CwC Working Group successfully brought together agency and GPH actors, and was seen as effective in identifying comparative strengths and opportunities for agencies to work together. Key informants felt that the FAQs initiative was an example of strong strategic leadership, as it coordinated different agencies’ information from affected populations and distributed it to clusters. This enabled clusters to initiate more effective information provision strategies, and improve their programming where required. In terms of other strategic joint initiatives, key informants involved in the HRC-Oxfam Affected Population Forums explained that UNOCHA’s involvement was a useful strategic move, as it bought credibility and neutrality to the process, as well as an interest from other actors and engagement from provincial and municipal governments.

Although strategic leadership was seen as initially strong, key informants felt that the Working Group lost some of its cohesion when the Global CwC Coordinator left and it eventually disbanded. This was particularly problematic for IOM, which succeeded in procuring funding to run a cross-cluster CwC service as part of the response. The original idea was that IOM would be supported by UNOCHA and the Working Group, which had unfortunately stopped meeting by the time the work started. Although UNOCHA still had a dedicated member of CwC staff, IOM felt it did not receive the support it had expected, and found asking for information from agencies and clusters difficult as IOM does not hold the same neutrality or information-sharing mandate as UNOCHA.

Good practice point: Having a dedicated CwC focal point within UNOCHA with the capacity to advocate kept CwC high on the agenda of the whole response

Good practice point: Inviting telecommunication companies to the CwC Working Group provided agencies with easier access to their services

Good practice point: Writing language on CwC into the Consolidated Appeal meant that two CwC projects were included

Good practice point: The FAQ exercise was perceived as the most useful activity coordinated through the Working Group as it highlighted what information the affected population were lacking, enabling clusters to fill those information gaps

4. Integration in Humanitarian Coordination System

“A coordinating body in emergencies needs a firm grasp of the humanitarian system and its structures. It needs to interact and coordinate with other humanitarian sectors and actors.”

– 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review

³² see Annex 9

The CwC Working Group worked to ensure integration with the humanitarian system by participating in the inter-cluster coordination meetings, which presented an important opportunity to interact with other clusters. It was intended that a representative from the Working Group should attend all cluster meetings, but this never happened. Some participants felt too few clusters were engaged in the Working Group and some felt CwC should be streamlined within cluster responsibilities. Others said that representation in the Working Group by cluster rather than agency would have been more beneficial, ensuring all clusters were present and would have achieved more effective integration within the humanitarian coordination system. Some noted that participating agencies were usually those with dedicated communication or accountability officers and therefore had greater capacity.

Some key informants felt it was a mistake to position CwC under the Protection Cluster in the response to Typhoon Bopha. Key informants identified the Coordination Cluster, where the group eventually transferred, as a more appropriate fit, although this will likely vary in the future depending on the capacity available in clusters during a particular response.

The CwC Working Group was perceived to be communicating effectively with the clusters regarding the FAQ initiative. This helped raise the profile of CwC, and clusters were receptive to this exercise as it helped them recognise gaps in their community outreach strategies. For example, the Early Recovery cluster found out that communities did not know about the cash-for-work scheme. However, participants felt queries received by the DSWD helpline were not fed back to clusters as effectively as possible, and that not all clusters were engaged. They noted that a helpline receiving queries about the whole response requires support from all clusters in order to be effective, and to ensure queries and complaints are responded to.

There was reportedly some resistance from clusters in terms of UNOCHA or other agencies collecting feedback from affected populations on behalf of the whole response. For example, some agencies raised concerns that the HRC-Oxfam Affected Population forums, which UNOCHA helped facilitate, could raise expectations of communities, because UNOCHA is unable to

respond to agencies and has no jurisdiction over clusters. Similar concerns were raised about the inter-agency community consultation in February 2013, which was organised too late as agencies had already obtained funding and determined where they were working. Aside from these concerns, the inclusion of representatives of the affected population in the AAR was beneficial, as the community representatives highlighted separate issues to those raised by the GPH and humanitarian agencies.

5. Training and Capacity-building

“While not necessary for coordination per se, training and capacity-building is sometimes performed by cluster leads. In a developing area such as communicating with disaster affected communities, that has a significant new technologies component, this function would be relevant.”

– 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review

Some CwC Working Group members, primarily the DSWD, IOM and UNOCHA, organised a number of training and capacity-building initiatives throughout the response. Participants attending the ‘Humanitarian Principles’ workshops felt they were informative and relevant, and national staff reported feeling more comfortable working in communities once they had a clearer understanding of the principles behind their work.

The technical training for municipal and provincial information officers and local media led by IOM was greatly appreciated by participants, and was deemed an appropriate activity to build local communication capacity in humanitarian response. One of the *barangay* residents said that the training on weather warnings made communities feel more secure. Although these trainings were relevant, some key informants felt it was not within UNOCHA’s remit to carry out the training and that they could have been undertaken by a more relevant stakeholder. Two informants felt more work should have focused on capacity-building of the local media in humanitarian reporting, as

engagement with this group was relatively short-lived.

UNOCHA staff involved in the standard information management and coordination training for local government felt including a session on CwC was very effective, as it raised the profile of CwC in local government and engaged local government officials in thinking about the importance of reliable information provision in a disaster. They said that using images and examples from local contexts was extremely effective, such as in demonstrating where local government were already 'doing CwC', and participants were particularly engaged when the session was run as a discussion. This session was initiated by UNOCHA staff with a pre-existing interest in CwC, and was included as a result of UNOCHA's focus on CwC throughout the response.

A number of key informants mentioned that in the Philippines context the GPH is ahead of humanitarian agencies in the use of new technologies, therefore capacity building in this area was not necessarily required.

Good practice point: Including CwC in standard UNOCHA information management and coordination training for GPH officers was effective in raising the profile of CwC in local government

Good practice point: Technical CwC training for municipal and provincial information officers and local media is building local communication capacity for the next emergency

6. Advocacy

"A coordinating body should provide a focus for joint advocacy."

– 2012 CDAC Haiti Learning Review

During the initial weeks of the response, the Global CwC Coordinator undertook extensive advocacy to

ensure CwC was included in the RNA, the Consolidated Appeal, briefings to the donor mission and in daily situation reports, as well as ensuring CwC was on the agenda of cluster leads.

Although no collective advocacy initiatives were attempted as a group, CwC Working Group participants felt the existence of the Working Group and the focus on CwC in UNOCHA definitely raised the profile of CwC in the response, particularly in terms of situating CwC on the agenda of the GPH. Initiatives such as the FAQs and the inclusion of the affected population in the AAR proved to be useful advocacy tools, highlighting the value of listening to affected communities in disaster-response planning.

Once the original CwC Working Group had disbanded, key informants suggested that the National CwC Officer focussed more on implementation than advocacy. The reasons given for this were two-fold: advocacy was no longer seen as key priority because CwC was already on the agenda of most clusters, some of whom were actively approaching UNOCHA and the GPH with requests for support; and the National CwC Officer had less experience of advocating within the cluster system, despite working effectively within local networks.

Good practice point: Including the affected population in the AAR was beneficial as it highlighted different issues to those raised by GPH and humanitarian agencies

5.1.3 The UNOCHA role in CwC Coordination

A major theme arising from the interviews conducted for this review was the question of UNOCHA's role in CwC. The following section summarises these discussions, and suggests how UNOCHA might structure its CwC work in the future.

Should a CwC coordination mechanism exist? If so, in what format?

Although not discussed in all interviews, opinion was divided about what form CwC coordination should take within the humanitarian system. A few respondents felt that if CwC was a separate cluster, it might generate wider interest and

participation and hold a clearer mandate and more credibility. However, the majority of key informants felt there are already too many clusters and that CwC should be mainstreamed into existing clusters. Some thought that rather than functioning as a separate cluster, CwC should be part of the ToRs for each cluster with a CwC focal point in each cluster. They thought that the role of these focal points could be to provide technical support and advocate for CwC within each cluster. These focal points could form an inter-cluster Working Group, which would facilitate information sharing and minimise duplication between clusters.

It was also suggested that an UNOCHA-led CwC coordination mechanism was not required in every response, but may be appropriate when many agencies arrive with little local knowledge, or in a situation where responders are not communicating effectively with affected communities.

In terms of leadership, opinion was divided as to whether UNOCHA should lead on CwC work, as there are other agencies and initiatives with greater expertise and resources in this area. Alternatively, it was acknowledged that UNOCHA is the only humanitarian agency that is neutral and holds systematic sharing of information between agencies as part of its mandate.

How does CwC work fit with the UNOCHA mandate?

There was some confusion among UNOCHA staff and other participants about where CwC fits within UNOCHA's mandate, and whether UNOCHA has the capacity to be involved in CwC work.

UNOCHA's mandate in humanitarian response is for coordination, information management, advocacy, humanitarian financing and capacity-building. UNOCHA is able to use its mandate and neutrality to encourage agencies to share information to improve the overall response, and has the capacity to advocate for CwC work within the humanitarian cluster system.

Traditionally, UNOCHA does not undertake implementation or service delivery unless it is absolutely necessary (i.e. to fill a gap), and some key informants raised concerns that UNOCHA does not currently have the capacity or expertise to fill gaps in CwC work. It therefore risks duplicating

efforts of agencies who are more experienced in this work. The PAGASA weather training and HRC-Oxfam affected population forums are examples where some informants, predominantly UNOCHA staff, felt UNOCHA could have advocated for other actors to carry out the activities. Informants from other agencies also stressed the need for UNOCHA to concentrate on coordination of CwC work, thereby supporting others to carry out the actual implementation.

A number of key informants raised concerns about whether UNOCHA should be conducting community consultations and risk raising community expectations when it is not a service delivery agency and cannot respond to the community's concerns, although it can advocate for cluster responses.

Overall, key informants felt that UNOCHA needs to be clearer on what its role is in CwC work in a number of areas:

Coordination

Participants felt there was an opportunity for UNOCHA to be the coordinator of CwC work, since UNOCHA has a mandate to encourage sharing of information between agencies. Through coordination, UNOCHA can support agencies that are funded to do CwC work to coordinate with others, thereby delivering comprehensive information provision that does not overlap and confuse communities. UNOCHA also has the potential to engage players who are not usually involved in the cluster system, such as the private sector telecommunication companies, the media and media development agencies, all of whom can offer support to agencies' work.

Information Management

Since UNOCHA is already mandated to facilitate information sharing between humanitarian and government actors about humanitarian responses, some informants felt UNOCHA could share more information with affected communities such as situation reports, funding information and beneficiary criteria. This is often undertaken by individual NGOs. Members of affected communities were involved in cluster meetings during the response to Typhoon Washi, but not during the response to Typhoon Bopha, something

informants suggested should be considered during future events.

Capacity-building

The inclusion of a session on CwC in the standard UNOCHA technical training for local government was well-received and succeeded in increasing the interest in CwC. It was suggested this could be mainstreamed within UNOCHA's work.

Advocacy

As demonstrated through the work of the Global CwC Coordinator, there is a clear role for UNOCHA in advocating for CwC work to be prioritised by governments, clusters and agencies during emergency responses. Some informants felt UNOCHA could have advocated harder, ensuring representatives from all clusters were involved in the CwC Working Group.

Humanitarian Financing

Given the difficulty agencies had in obtaining funding for CwC initiatives, there is a clear opportunity for UNOCHA to support agencies in financing CwC, both through its own funding mechanisms and through advocacy with other donors. Two projects were successfully included in the Appeal during this response, but were not funded, most likely because the whole response was under-funded.

Filling Gaps

In the later stage of this response, UNOCHA staff felt they were taking the opportunity to 'fill the gap' as they had a National CwC Officer in post, rather than focusing on advocacy for others to do so. Most informants felt UNOCHA does not have the capacity or mandate to undertake community consultations, although it was recognised that supporting another agency to do this (such as in the case of the HRC-Oxfam Affected Population Forums) added legitimacy to the process.

5.2 Lessons Learned

The interviews with key informants and a review of the enabling and inhibiting factors influencing CwC work in response to Typhoon Bopha provide

10 important lessons that can be learned for future responses:

1. CwC is not the same as external communication, and different staff may need to be involved
2. The UNOCHA CwC focal point acting as PIO can lead to confusion about the focus of CwC
3. Pre-crisis planning and network building enables a more effective response
4. CwC needs to be linked with agendas agencies already care about
5. Experience and certain skills of CwC staff and their management is important
6. Monitoring and evaluation of information provision is often overlooked
7. Inter-cluster community consultations require clear agreements and buy-in
8. In-depth communication needs assessments are beneficial
9. Use appropriate communication channels at the right time
10. Agencies engaged in CwC work at field level are not necessarily the same as those involved in global conversations on CwC

1. CwC is not the same as external communication, and different staff may need to be involved

A CwC Working Group requires clear agreed objectives and a strong collective vision, and it needs to be explicit that the focus of a CwC Working Group is on enhancing communication between humanitarian responders and the communities who have been affected by the disaster. It must be clear that this is separate to agencies' external communication activities with donors or the media, which are aimed at informing the public as well as increasing the visibility of the organisation.

Ensuring programmatic staff are involved and engaged in CwC initiatives is essential, although when they hear 'communication', agencies often ask communication officers (whose remit is usually external communication) to participate. One informant stressed that since providing

information is inextricably linked to the way relief operations are rolled out, and that feedback from affected populations has implications for how programmes continue, programmatic staff must be involved in CwC initiatives.

2. The UNOCHA CwC focal point acting as PIO can lead to confusion about the focus of CwC

Linked to lesson 1, if the UNOCHA CwC focal point is also acting as the PIO, CwC capacity is reduced and other actors become confused about the focus of CwC in the response. Because the PIO role demands a significant amount of time during the initial stages of an emergency, there is often little time left to work on CwC planning, such as convening actors to work on CwC initiatives. UNOCHA CwC staff involved in other disasters have also been required to take over the PIO role, again leaving them with reduced capacity to undertake important CwC work.

3. Pre-crisis planning and network building enables a more effective response

The Global CwC Coordinator's preparatory work in developing networks of agencies interested in CwC work made it easier to set up a Working Group and meant that CwC was not completely unfamiliar for some actors. However, these relationships were still relatively new, and would have been more effective if actors had a clearer understanding and defined strategies of how they could work together.

When international humanitarian agencies deploy to an area that has not previously encountered a large-scale disaster response, a considerable amount of pressure is put on the local system in terms of determining how the two systems can work together. For example, key informants from GPH agencies felt they were not able to make decisions about information sharing that may fall outside of their agencies' usual practice. If clearer protocols about communication and sharing of

information were in place prior to an emergency, these barriers could be overcome.

Developing an understanding with telecommunication companies prior to a disaster could also be beneficial, such as obtaining operationally useful information rather than public relations material for situation reports.

There are a number of tools that could be pre-developed to reduce response time. Key informants felt having access to messages already translated into local languages would be of huge benefit. One agency reported that translating posters and flyers into local languages was a long process, because the staff who spoke local dialects and would be able to translate were busy working with communities in the field. It was felt preparing of materials in advance, particularly translating the Infoasaid message library into local languages, would help enable a more efficient response.

4. CwC needs to be linked with agendas agencies already care about

In order to engage agencies and clusters in coordinated CwC work, it needs to be tied to agendas they already prioritise, such as staff security. During the Typhoon Bopha response, agencies became more interested in CwC work when the GPH warned of security risks if agencies did not better explain their work to local communities.

The FAQs exercise was successful in engaging clusters, as it highlighted gaps in information provision that was hindering the effectiveness of some cluster interventions.

From an advocacy point of view, different agendas may be important to different agencies and clusters. For example, informants from the WASH Cluster, which is strong in CwC in terms of hygiene promotion and behaviour change, explained it had not previously considered the need to communicate its beneficiary criteria to communities.

5. Experience and certain skills of CwC staff and their management is important

The response to Typhoon Bopha underscored the need to have the appropriate staff in place to help ensure efficiency and effectiveness. This was particularly important for the National CwC Officer role, which requires experienced, confident and competent individuals with effective coordination and advocacy skills, able to manage clusters, networks and other groups.

It was also clear that the capacity of UNOCHA staff to manage a National CwC Officer was dependent on the prior CwC experience of the manager. Because CwC has not traditionally been part of the UNOCHA remit, staff felt they required additional support and guidance to perform effectively.

6. Monitoring and evaluation of information provision is often overlooked

Monitoring and evaluation of information provision is important in order to determine whether affected communities have received and correctly understood the information provided. There was no evidence of evaluation of information provision initiatives in the response to Typhoon Bopha, making it difficult to determine whether these initiatives worked and the community received the information they required. In the future, evaluating these initiatives will enable any necessary changes to be made, and will help build the evidence base around effective information provision methods.

Building evidence around the effectiveness of CwC initiatives will also help agencies to obtain funding to carry out similar work in the future. In the Typhoon Bopha response, IOM was eventually funded by ECHO to carry out its common service CwC project based on the success of the FAQs exercise and its CwC work during the response to Typhoon Washi.

7. Inter-cluster community consultations require clear agreements and buy-in

When coordinating inter-cluster community consultations or feedback mechanisms, protocols must be agreed about how information will be used and queries responded to. Some clusters expressed concerns over UNOCHA or another agency collecting feedback from the affected population and being unable to respond to all of the issues raised. In order to have the support of clusters and agencies for these initiatives, it must be made clear that their purpose is to collect general feedback; specific issues will be passed on to relevant clusters; and for agency specific issues people will be referred directly to that agency.

8. In-depth communication needs assessments are beneficial

Although some information is better than nothing, including questions in a common RNA is unlikely to gather all information required to undertake effective CwC work. Although the RNA tool was not ultimately used, including the questions was beneficial as it guided the UNDAC team's direct observation, and provided some limited information about communication channels. However, a more in-depth assessment would have been able to provide additional information, such as radio stations accessed by communities, ease of mobile phone use and which languages communities could read/speak in different areas. An assessment of how local media had been affected by the typhoon would also have been useful.

9. Use appropriate communication channels at the right time

Even though mobile phone use is high in the Philippines, some informants felt the DSWD helpline was ineffective. In the initial stages of the response, electricity and mobile networks were inoperative in remote areas. While communication by mobile phone was eventually possible, in the initial stages it was necessary for cluster/agency

representatives to visit and talk to communities directly. Although unfeasible in this instance, a more in-depth communication assessment would have been useful in the initial stages of the response to determine how best to communicate with more isolated communities.

SMART Communications were also keen to share the lesson that SMS technology should only be used when appropriate, and that SMS messages, due to their length, are often best used in collaboration with mass media or when recipients have been trained to understand the message beforehand. They warned that coordination was necessary to ensure affected populations were not inundated with messages from different agencies.

10. Agencies engaged in CwC work at field level are not necessarily the same as those involved in global conversations on CwC

At the moment, CDAC Network Members who are active at head office level are not necessarily the same organisations who are active in CwC work during a field response. Key informants interviewed from CDAC Network member agencies in the Philippines often did not know their organisation was part of the Network, highlighting that this knowledge often rests at head office level. This was also mentioned in the CDAC Haiti Learning Review.³³

5.3 Meeting the CwC Project Objectives

Overall, key informants felt that the UNOCHA CwC Project succeeded in raising the profile of communication with disaster affected communities in the humanitarian response to Typhoon Bopha.

As noted above the original objectives of the UNOCHA CwC project were to:

1. Improve access to information for survivors of Typhoon Bopha
2. Improve the capacity of responding agencies to listen to disaster affected communities at the agency and system level
3. Coordinate communication work undertaken as part of the response to the typhoon.

During the course of the response, some of the objectives of the project were realised, while others were less successful due to a variety of factors.

From key informant feedback and author analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that objective 2 was relatively well addressed. The CwC Working Group coordinated a number of initiatives that brought the voice of the affected population to the attention of the clusters, such as the FAQs exercise and inviting members of the affected population to the AAR. UNOCHA supported the local government in listening to affected communities by supporting HRC-Oxfam in running the Affected Population Forums. This was the first time community members were able to hold a dialogue with local government, and the initiative generated positive feedback from a community members. Additional feedback from this initiative indicated that communities understood the difficulties faced by local government in raising funds to respond to the disaster.

Objective 3 was met to a certain extent by bringing different actors, including the GPH, humanitarian agencies and private companies, together around CwC activities. The majority of key informants felt the existence of the CwC group facilitated information sharing and reduced duplication between agencies' work. Coordinating government and humanitarian agencies' CwC activities was noted as an important achievement, which resulted in some examples of agencies supporting existing government initiatives such as the DSWD helpline and radio programme (although the reach of these initiatives remains unclear).

Nevertheless, much of the CwC work that took place during the response was not coordinated by the CwC Working Group. In addition, the UNOCHA CwC coordination activities lost some focus and momentum when the CwC Working Group moved

³³ C. Ljungman, CDAC Haiti Learning Review: Final Report (Belgium 2012)

from the regional to the provincial level. There was also a lack of clarity about the purpose and focus of the Working Group, despite the ToR for the Working Group being relatively clear³⁴. This lack of clarity seems to be a result of staff turnover and the emphasis that different staff placed on priority areas, as well as the fact the Global CwC Coordinator was also acting as PIO.

Finally, it is not possible at this time to determine whether Objective 1 was met. There was no evidence to suggest information provision initiatives were monitored for their success in reaching the affected population, so it is difficult to know if they had an impact on communities' access to information. Feedback from communities during the AAR, which was that they did not have enough information about the response, suggests this was not the case. This indicates that in order for these initiatives to make a real difference to the affected populations' experience, CwC needs to be more effectively mainstreamed within humanitarian response.

³⁴ see Annex 7

6. Recommendations

Based on the research and suggestions and comments made by key stakeholders, this review makes a number of recommendations.

For UNOCHA Philippines

1. Build on interest in CwC and resulting initiatives

UNOCHA should capitalise on the interest in CwC work generated by the response to Typhoon Bopha and build on initiatives developing as part of its ongoing pilot project. Examples include the CwC Technical Working Group set up in Davao Oriental Province and a Humanitarian Communications group recently set up by UN agencies in Manila. There seems to be interest at the national level to create a CwC coordination mechanism within the Philippines cluster system that would bring together GPH agencies, humanitarian responders, the media and the telecommunication companies. This group could develop systems of working together and prepare materials to facilitate a more effective CwC response during future emergencies.

Relationships should be built with the PIA, which holds the mandate within GPH for information provision and collecting information from disaster affected communities. The PIA already expressed an interest in the message library during the UNOCHA CwC pilot project set up in Manila. Protocols for working with telecommunication companies and the Philippine National Union of Journalists could facilitate a more effective CwC response in emergencies and would build on strong existing capacity within the Philippines.

UNOCHA could play a lead role in bringing these actors together and sharing lessons learned and technical expertise as part of the Manila CwC pilot project.

2. Develop required tools

UNOCHA should develop tools in preparation for the next humanitarian response in the Philippines. Key informants suggested these tools should include:

- Guidelines on establishing a helpline and CrowdMap in an emergency
- Localisation of the Infoasaid message library as a key part of preparedness work into all local languages where there is a risk of disaster occurring. There was high demand for this from participants, as it would save time during an emergency response, and ensure materials are available in the correct languages. However, given that at least 120 different languages are spoken in the Philippines, these would need to be prioritised, and the task will likely need to be conducted at the local level.

For UNOCHA worldwide

1. Determine UNOCHA's role in coordinating CwC and train staff accordingly

UNOCHA should consider how to proceed with mainstreaming CwC as part of its humanitarian response work. To facilitate this, UNOCHA should review its role and parameters in CwC according to its current mandate. If it does continue to provide system-wide coordination support to CwC, UNOCHA should decide where this capacity sits within its structure, as well as within the cluster system. Greater clarity within the humanitarian system on UNOCHA's role and parameters in this work will help other actors to better engage with it.

Once decisions have been made about the UNOCHA role and priorities in CwC work, UNOCHA emergency response staff should be briefed, guided and supported in undertaking and

managing this relatively new area of work for the agency.

2. Mainstream three of the Typhoon Bopha initiatives into standard UNOCHA emergency response

CwC initiatives will always be context-specific and should be determined by information and communication needs assessments. However, UNOCHA should consider mainstreaming three initiatives that were considered the most useful activities undertaken by the CwC Working Group, and which are in line with UNOCHA's current mandate:

1. The FAQs exercise
2. Including representatives from the affected population in an AAR
3. Including CwC in UNOCHA standard technical training on information management and coordination

For the CDAC Network

(The CDAC Network Secretariat and CDAC Network Members, which includes UNOCHA)

1. Develop an advocacy strategy around mainstreaming CwC in humanitarian response

This should include advocacy for:

- Inclusion of CwC in standard cluster guidelines and other system level mechanisms
- Regardless of what form a CwC coordination mechanism might take in a humanitarian response, since this will likely differ depending on the context and scale of the disaster, the CDAC Network should advocate

for CwC integration into IASC guidance on effectively running clusters³⁵, as well as other IASC guidance, such as the operational framework for accountability to affected populations³⁶.

- Systematic monitoring and evaluation of CwC initiatives in order to determine their effectiveness
- Previous work undertaken by Infoasaid, the IFRC³⁷ and other agencies in developing indicators and methodologies to measure CwC should be consolidated, tested and built upon. Clear field-level guidelines on how to monitor and evaluate CwC work should be created and widely disseminated to support humanitarian actors.
- Mainstreaming of CwC as a budget line in UNOCHA-managed pooled humanitarian funding mechanisms and other donor funding mechanisms
- The CDAC Network should also lobby donors to encourage CwC as part of their funding criteria. Although CwC work is not particularly expensive, it requires dedicated capacity and resources in order to be effective as part of an agencies' response

2. Consider how to enable effective field level collaboration

The CDAC Network Secretariat should consider, along with its Members, how it can more effectively enable collaboration between CDAC-Network Members at the field level. Examples of this collaboration might include further development of the Field Coordination Community of Practice (CoP) and leveraging funding for joint initiatives by Members at the field level.

³⁵ IASC, *Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response* (Geneva 2006)

³⁶ IASC, *Operational Framework for making programming more accountable to affected populations* (Geneva)

³⁷ IFRC and Infoasaid, *Generic M&E Framework for measuring impact of communications interventions*

3. Develop a series of tools and resources for use in future disasters

The CDAC Network, through the work of its Field Coordination CoP, as well as work managed by the CDAC Secretariat, should collate and build on existing documents to develop a series of tools in advance of future disasters. These will be for adaptation locally and should include:

- A one-page leaflet about CwC
- Briefing packs on CwC for Cluster Leads
- ToR for CwC working groups at regional/country level
- ToR for CwC Coordinator role
- A free downloadable 'how to' practitioners guide to CwC
- A modular, quality-assured training programme on CwC for humanitarian practitioners
- Templates for inclusion of CwC work in flash appeals/funding proposals, including budget and narrative outlines for different scenarios
- Guidance on effective monitoring and evaluation of CwC initiatives


This Learning Review was written prior to Typhoon Haiyan (known locally as Yolanda), which struck the central Philippines in November 2013. A number of the recommendations made in this report were taken into account during the response to this disaster.

A Learning Review of the Typhoon Haiyan response will be undertaken in mid-2014. This will examine UNOCHA's role in that response, as well as the role of the wider CDAC Network, including Network Members and the Secretariat.

Annexes

ANNEX 1	Map Action UNOCHA Map, showing affected population, storm track and estimated storm surge height as of midday 5 December 2012
ANNEX 2	ToR Learning Review
ANNEX 3	Bibliography
ANNEX 4	List of Key Informants
ANNEX 5	Interview Guide
ANNEX 6	Rapid Needs Assessment Tool for Typhoon Bopha Response
ANNEX 7	ToR CwC Group
ANNEX 8	ToR CwC Officer Role
ANNEX 9	UNOCHA CwC Project Strategy

Annex 1: MapAction Typhoon Bopha – Affected Population Map 5 December 2012



Terms of Reference

UNOCHA Philippines Learning Review

Background: UNOCHA Communication with Communities Project

Typhoon Bopha was the strongest of 16 typhoons to hit the Philippines in 2012. The tropical cyclone struck the east coast of Mindanao on December 4th. It was the world's deadliest storm in 2012 and was reported to have killed at least 1,000 people and displaced close to 1 million. Typhoon Bopha is the most southerly typhoon ever recorded in the western Pacific and, unlike in other parts of the Philippines, there was little community preparedness or resilience to the storm. Communities living on the coast between Lingig and Caraga were the worst affected, including people living in the Cateel, Boston and Baganga municipalities in Davao Oriental province. The government of the Philippines led the disaster response and accepted the offer of international assistance on December 7th.

As part of the emergency response, UNOCHA led a 'Communications with Communities' group within the Protection Cluster, which was intended to function as a cross cluster technical support service and communication coordination mechanism. UNOCHA worked closely with Government departments, humanitarian agencies and local mobile phone providers, with the aims of improving access to vital information and ensuring that the voices of affected communities were heard and considered in the response.

The 'Communications with Communities' response began in the initial days after the cyclone struck. Although some work with communities is still on-going, a number of the clusters have left, or are preparing to leave, which is why the learning review is being planned for July 2013. Funding for the 'Communications with Communities' project (i.e. the post of the Communications with Communities Coordinator) came from UNOCHA Manila, who had already previously agreed to fund a national staff member to support a coordination pilot.

Purpose and Focus of the Review

The purpose of this review is to learn lessons from the response provided by UNOCHA to the crisis, the focus of which was coordination.

A key objective of the CDAC Network is to build the evidence base around the added value of communications coordination mechanisms in disaster response. These mechanisms function with the overarching goal of improving communications services for affected communities, including improving two way communications within humanitarian operations.

It is intended that this review will build on learning reviews already undertaken of CDAC Haiti³⁸, as well as the less formal CDAC Pakistan initiative³⁹, and contribute towards building a knowledge base about the

³⁸ Ljungman, C., 2012. *CDAC Haiti Learning Review: Final Report*. Channel Research: Belgium

key elements involved in setting up and running an effective communication coordination mechanism during an emergency response.

It will attempt to document the added value of such activities being undertaken, identify good practice, and capture lessons about what works well, what doesn't work, and whether there are any tools and processes which could be developed to facilitate a more effective response in the future.

This learning will be synthesised and efforts will be made by the CDAC Network to ensure lessons are taken into account by CDAC Network member agencies and others in future responses.

It is hoped that this learning review will also contribute to the development of a standard model of capturing learning about communication coordination mechanisms, which CDAC Network members will be able to use to review future projects.

Objectives of the Review

The specific objectives of the review are to:

- Use all available information to document 'what happened', from project inception (December 2012) to current situation (July 2013).
- Identify good practices which helped UNOCHA's Communication with Communities response to achieve its core objectives of:
 - 1) Improving access to information for survivors
 - 2) Improving capacity of responding agencies to listen to affected communities
 - 3) Coordinating communications work undertaken as part of Typhoon Bopha response
- Assess the role of UNOCHA as a communication coordination mechanism with regard to the partners involved in the response. Identify ways in which the UNOCHA Philippines response strengthened partners' ability to coordinate around communications, and carry out more effective two way communication activities. Identify practices which worked well, and those which didn't work so well.
- Determine what UNOCHA staff and partners felt worked well during the response, what didn't work so well, and why. What were the challenges of coordinating a communications mechanism in this context? What helped to make it work? What would participants do differently next time?
- Determine how agencies perceived their own communication activities – what kind of information did they want to communicate? How did they seek to get their communication activities funded? Did they know about UNOCHA's communication work and did they try to coordinate with this? What lessons can we learn from this?
- Taking into account 'what worked well', consider the context within which these practices were implemented, with the aim of being able to take this learning forward in future responses
- Collect and organise any documentation (tools, proposals, etc) developed throughout the project, for possible development and use in future responses.

³⁹ Abud, M., 2010. *CDAC Pakistan Representative, October-December 2010, Final Report*

Methodology

Methodological approach

The learning review will seek to examine both the process and the outcomes of UNOCHA's Communication with Communities project.

Process reviews focus on understanding the 'how' and are often undertaken for new interventions where the viability of implementation is not well known in advance. They are appropriate in collaborative interventions, where documenting collaborative process is important for understanding how outcomes are achieved in order to be able to replicate or adapt future interventions accordingly. Outcomes will also need to be examined within this review, in order to identify which practices worked well, and which didn't work so well.

The review will use a qualitative approach, and the methodological framework will be structured around a selection of the OECD-DAC Criteria (relevance/appropriateness; coverage; efficiency; effectiveness; impact; and coordination).

Data Collection

Data will be collected through the following means:

- Desk-based review of all key documents related to UNOCHA's response in the Philippines, as well as any documentation which can be made available by partners
- Qualitative interviews (in country or by telephone/email) with key informants, including:
 - Representatives from all agencies and organisations involved in the Communication with Communities group and/or activities which resulted from it (including UNOCHA staff)
 - Representatives from each cluster (cluster lead if possible, or active member)
 - Representatives from other local and international NGOs, media development agencies, UN agencies, private companies and others involved in the response.

A list of key informants and their contact details will be made available to the researcher by UNOCHA. Key informants will also be asked for contact details of others they think it would be useful for the researcher to talk to, in order to get as wide a range of accounts as possible. An interview schedule will be organised prior to the trip with informants who are still in the Philippines, and others who are no longer in the Philippines will be contacted by email or telephone.

Data Analysis

The data will be analysed using framework analysis, which aims to produce policy-orientated findings and involves summarising data within a thematic framework⁴⁰. It should ensure a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the data collected. For this review, separate thematic frameworks will be developed to analyse data from UNOCHA staff and those involved in the communications project, and as far as possible staff from other organisations involved in the response. These frameworks will be designed to capture information outlined in the objectives of the learning review.

The CDAC Haiti Learning Review (May 2012) identified the key elements of a communications coordination mechanism as being credibility; establishment and maintenance of appropriate coordination mechanisms; strategic leadership; integration with the existing humanitarian system; training and capacity building; and advocacy. This framework will be taken into account during the data analysis.

⁴⁰ Green J, Thorogood N. Qualitative Methods for Health Research. 2nd ed. London: SAGE Publications 2009.

In terms of validity, it will be important to interview as many people as possible who were involved in the response, to ensure the findings are as representative as they can be. Data will be triangulated between the different accounts to ensure the findings are as reliable and dependable as possible.

Potential Limitations

Potential limitations of the study are:

- The list of key informants will be provided by UNOCHA, which may represent a biased sample. The researcher will try to explore contacts outside of those provided by UNOCHA, through the CDAC Network, and through asking participants for other contacts.
- Some of the key informants will have moved on to other programmes, or may be away during the period of data collection. In this case, the researcher will attempt contact by email/telephone, but it is possible the number of key informants will be limited.
- Limited resources mean that the views of the affected population will not be sought in this study. It will focus on learning from the point of view of organisations involved in the emergency response. Every effort will be made to include data already collected by organisations articulating the views of the local population.

End Product

The learning review will be completed by the CDAC Networks Research and Learning Officer. The first draft of the completed learning review report will be completed by the 16th of August, depending on when the Research and Learning Officer is able to travel to Philippines to undertake the qualitative interviews. It is estimated the report will be ten to fifteen pages long. It is envisaged that short a 'lessons learned' or a 'best practices' sheet will also be developed by the end of August, dependant on the findings from the review. It is expected that a further piece of work will be undertaken at a later date to synthesise findings from this review, alongside learning reviews from CDAC Haiti and CDAC Pakistan.

Initially the report and other outputs will be shared with UNOCHA and all organisations (including governmental, non-governmental and private) who were involved in the response. As this learning review is intended to contribute to the evidence base around coordination of communications with disaster affected communities, all outputs will be circulated to CDAC Network Members, and published as resources on the CDAC Network website for a wider audience.

Timescale

The envisaged timescale is as follows:

3 rd June – 5 th July	Desk study
	Interview schedule and trip organised
9 th – 18 th July	Data collection in Philippines
18 th – 25 th July	Data analysis
26 th July – 16 th Aug	Drafting report
16 th Aug	First draft of report completed

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Annex 4: Key informants interviewed

1	Abangan, Jeanevive	PIA Region XI, Information Officer
2	Addawe, Joseph	OCHA, Information Management Analyst
3	Austin, Caroline	ICRC, Beneficiary Communications Consultant
4	Bacal, Christie	IOM, Information and Communications Officer
5	Benham, Carla	World Vision International, Community Accountability Specialist
6	Bercasio, Dave	IOM, Head of Davao Office
7	Bhandari, Meena	UNICEF, Communications Specialist Consultant
8	Calleja, Kristine	ACF, Communication & Advocacy Officer
9	Choudhury, Zia	OCHA, Accountability Advisor
10	Concepcion, Nova Clotario	SMART Communications Inc., Community Partnerships
11	Davies, Stewart	OCHA, Regional Communication with Communities Coordinator
12	De Cuyper, Wouter	OCHA, Head of Hub
13	Duron, Carmela	DSWD Region XI, Regional Information Officer
14	Fagan, Orla	OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officer / Public Information
15	Gerald	Andap Baranguay, Baranguay Book Keeper
16	Ghalib, Sayed	Merlin, Project Coordinator Mindanao
17	Guerra, Cynthia	Plan International, Humanitarian Response Coordinator
18	Guisto-Robelo, Geronimo J.	UNDP, Early Recovery Advisor
19	Isberto, Ramon R.	SMART, Head of Public Relations
20	Jabay, Carenne	IOM, Communications Officer
21	Jain, Arjun	UNHCR, Head of Office
22	Lee, Cynthia	ICRC Delegation to the Philippines, Communication Coordinator
23	Lee, Kevin R.	A Single Drop of Water, Executive Director
24	Ma. Lourdes, Eudela	OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Assistant
25	Madrazo, Albert	ICRC, Communication Officer
26	Mellejor, Lillian	OCHA, Communication with Communities Officer
27	Munoz, May	OCHA, Information Management Officer
28	Navidad, Conrad	IOM, Head of Davao Office
29	Nebreja, Mei	WFP, Communications & Partnerships Team
30	Oberg, Sobia	OCHA, Head of Office
31	Oks, Ene-Mei	OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officer
32	Opulencia, Sheena Carmel	ACF, WASH Information Manager
33	Paslangan, Faz	CFSI, Head of Hub
34	Pedrico, Gerry	PAGASA, Meteorologist
35	Pulido-Constantino, Kalayaan	Oxfam, Advocacy, Campaigns and Communications Coordinator
36	Quijada, Gerry	HRC, Advocacy Officer
37	Rajagopalan, Manasi	OCHA, Information Management Officer

38	Rala, Reine Kathryn	Save the Children, Communications Officer
39	Schmidt, Mel	OCHA, Head of Davao Sub Office
40	Serrano, Almudena	WFP, Programme Officer
41	Sophie, Nuon	OCHA, Head of Hub
42	Sotto, Romel H.	Philippine Red Cross, Relief and Operation Officer
43	Susanti, Ivy	OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officer
44	Tapawan, Beatrice	WFP, Communications Officer
45	Tordesillas, Charlene	WFP, Communications & Partnerships Team
46	Wall, Imogen	OCHA, Global Communications with Communities Coordinator
47	Yoshida, Akiko	OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officer

Annex 5: Interview Guide

1) During the response to Typhoon Bopha, OCHA organised a 'Communication with Communities' (CwC) group, which was co-led by OCHA and the DSWD. The group was initially functioning as a kind of 'sub-cluster' under the Protection cluster, and had the following objectives:

- To improve access to information for affected communities
- To improve capacity of responders to listen to communities
- To coordinating communications work undertaken as part of the response

Did you hear of this group, and participate in it? Why / why not? And did you hear of/were you involved in any other initiatives led by OCHA which focused on communication with affected communities?

2) What kind of activities were undertaken by this group/by OCHA in terms of CwC?

3) Did you feel there was value added of this group existing and/or these activities being undertaken? What was the value added (if any) for your agency? And for the response in general?

4) Were there initiatives which worked particularly well, and why do you think that is? Is there anything you'd like to see happen as part of a response again?

5) What could have been better? How could the group/initiatives have gone further towards reaching their objectives? Is there anything which could be done differently next time?

6) Are there any lessons to be learned from the CwC work undertaken during this response? This could be for your agency or for the humanitarian sector as a whole?

7) Do you think the existence of this group raised the profile of CwC within the response?

8) Do you think there is a need for a mechanism which has the capacity to coordinate CwC work between responders in an emergency? Should this be the role of UNOCHA?

9) Could you tell me a bit about the CwC activities your agency undertook during this response (either as part of, or separate from the group)? How did you get this work funded?

10) What were the challenges and enabling factors to carrying out CwC work in this response?

11) Is there anything which could be developed during the preparedness phase which would enable a quicker and more effective CwC response in the future?

Annex 6: Rapid Needs Assessment Tool for Typhoon Bopha Response

RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Form No.: _____

Natural Disaster Scenario (72 Hours)

1. Assessment team information												
1.1 Organizations participating:							1.2 Date(s) of assessment (DD-MM-YYYY): _____					
1.3 Name of team leader:					1.4 Contact Details:							
1.5 Number of days since emergency event occurred:					1.6 Date the event (started):							
2. Geographic information												
2.1 Province:					2.2 Municipality/City:							
2.3 Barangay:					2.4 GPS Coordinate (Decimal Degree):							
2.5 Name/Position of Person interviewed:					2.6 Contact Details:							
3. Demographic data												
3.1 Total population of Barangay or location visited (Pre event):												
3.2 Affected population (count)												
Families		Women	Men	Persons with Disability		Children (under 18)			Total population			
				Male	Female		Girl	Boy	Total			
						Under 2						
						3-5						
						5-12						
						13-17						
3.3 Are IDPs present? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No												
If yes, number of IDPs staying in:	Inside Evacuation Centers					Outside Evacuation Centers						
	Families:			Individuals(Total):		Families:		Individuals:				
				Male:				Male:				
				Female:				Female:				
				Children (below 17):				Children (below 17):				
3.4 How many people are dead, missing, or injured due to the disaster event?												
Deaths					Missing				Injured			
Adults		Children			Adults		Children		Adults		Children	
Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	

4. Relief Effort /Assistance

4.1 Has the community received any assistance? Yes No

if yes, Kind of assistance provided

4.2 Item	When provided (in days)	Qty	Source
<input type="checkbox"/> Blankets	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Cooking Utensils	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Clothes	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Food	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Hygiene Kit(s)	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Medicine	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Mosquito Nets	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Tents	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Water	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Water Kit(s)	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Voucher/Cash	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities
<input type="checkbox"/> Others _____	_____	___	<input type="checkbox"/> Gov't <input type="checkbox"/> NNGO <input type="checkbox"/> INGO <input type="checkbox"/> International Org. <input type="checkbox"/> PRC <input type="checkbox"/> Church <input type="checkbox"/> Private Entities

4.3 Are there IDPs with the following special needs, and if so, how many?

- persons with severe disability: _____ female headed households: _____ elderly persons: _____
 adolescent/children headed households: _____ pregnant women:(<16 yrs)_____ (16- 19 yrs)_____ (20 yrs)_____
 lactating mothers: _____ Other special needs (specify)

5. Shelter

5.1 Housing Damage

5.2 Number or Percentage of totally damaged houses

_____ #
 _____ %

5.3 Number or Percentage of severely damaged houses (Walls, roof and column collapsed, hanging wall etc.)

Habitable	Inhabitable
# %	# %

5.4 What are the main shelter concerns?

- Lack of privacy Personal safety Security of assets Other (specify)

6. Food Security

6.1 Do people have access to foods in the area? Yes No

6.2 What are the main sources of food in the area? Household food stocks Household garden/farm

- Local Market Humanitarian aid from the local government Humanitarian aid from the national government

Others: _____

6.3 What percentage of the households still has food stocks? 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

6.4 How long are the available food stocks expected to last?

- Less than a week 1 week 2 weeks 1 month or more

6.5 Do people still have access to the local market? Yes No

6.6 If NO, what are the reasons why people no longer have access to the local market?	
<input type="checkbox"/> No money to buy foods <input type="checkbox"/> Prices of commodities have increased <input type="checkbox"/> No available supplies of commodities <input type="checkbox"/> Market was destroyed/physically inaccessible Others, specify: _____	
7. Water Supply	
7.1 Availability of total clean water requirement (15 liters /person/day)?: ___ Yes ___ No	
7.2 Alternate water source available? (<i>can be made available for primary use</i>) <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
7.3 Primary water source: Drinking Water and cooking (<i>protected or safe</i>)	7.3.1 Condition:
<input type="checkbox"/> Open Well <input type="checkbox"/> water trucking <input type="checkbox"/> Bore hole /Hand pump <input type="checkbox"/> Stream/river <input type="checkbox"/> Storage/collection container <input type="checkbox"/> Piped water system <input type="checkbox"/> Others	<input type="checkbox"/> Working <input type="checkbox"/> Damaged (Repair required for minimum supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Contaminated (<i>or at risk of contamination</i>) <input type="checkbox"/> Destroyed <input type="checkbox"/> Water Turbid <input type="checkbox"/> Others
7.4 Primary water source: Bathing and washing (<i>protected or safe</i>)	7.4.1 Condition:
<input type="checkbox"/> Open Well <input type="checkbox"/> water trucking <input type="checkbox"/> Bore hole /Hand pump <input type="checkbox"/> Stream/river <input type="checkbox"/> Storage/collection container <input type="checkbox"/> Piped water system <input type="checkbox"/> Others	<input type="checkbox"/> Working <input type="checkbox"/> Damaged (Repair required for minimum supply) <input type="checkbox"/> Contaminated (<i>or at risk of contamination</i>) <input type="checkbox"/> Destroyed <input type="checkbox"/> Water Turbid
7.5 Distance of primary water source: <input type="checkbox"/> HH connection <input type="checkbox"/> <100m <input type="checkbox"/> >100m	7.6 Do affected families have water containers with lid available at HH level used for storage? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
7.7 Number of families in need of water kits: _____	7.8 Do affected families have water containers with lid available at HH level used for water storage? Yes _____ No _____
8. Water purification/treatment	
8.1 Is there any possibility of water contamination at the source or pipeline or risk of contamination? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
8.2 If contaminated, contamination is likely <input type="checkbox"/> Storage <input type="checkbox"/> Transmission	
8.3 What types of treatment/disinfection options do you suggest? <input type="checkbox"/> Boiling <input type="checkbox"/> Chlorination <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
9. Sanitary Facilities	
9.1 Affected population with access to functioning sanitary facilities(e.g. latrines): <input type="checkbox"/> 0-24% <input type="checkbox"/> 25-49% <input type="checkbox"/> 50-74% <input type="checkbox"/> 75- 100%	
9.2 Are there separate toilet/bathing facilities for men and women? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
9.3 Do the toilets have locks fitted from the inside? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
9.4 Are toilets and the area around them well lit? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
9.5 Number of families in need of sanitation tools: _____	9.6 Number of families in need of hygiene kits _____
9.7 Adequate personal hygiene supplies available (soap, sanitary cloth/napkins) <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	9.8 What is the level of knowledge of hygiene practices?: <input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Fair <input type="checkbox"/> Poor

9.9 What types of toilets do people use? <input type="checkbox"/> Bowl No of HH: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Pit latrines No of HH: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> No toilet No of HH: _____	9.10 What WASH related diseases after the emergency: Diarrhea: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Number of cases: Malaria: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Number of cases: Skin diseases: <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Number of cases:
9.11 Is there a need for support on septic tank emptying? : <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 9.11.1 If yes, how many households need septic tank cleaning support: _____	
9.12 Are provisions and facilities for water and sanitation available in the evacuation centers/community shelters? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
10. Hygiene	
10.1 Did the Barangay receive hygiene kits? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
10.2 If yes, how many household have received and when? _____ households received on _____	
10.3 How many households needs hygiene kits?	
11. Health	
11.1 Main health concerns: <input type="checkbox"/> Diarrhea <input type="checkbox"/> Infections <input type="checkbox"/> Vomiting <input type="checkbox"/> Dehydration <input type="checkbox"/> Respiratory <input type="checkbox"/> Trauma <input type="checkbox"/> Others _____	
11.3 Functioning health facilities: <input type="checkbox"/> Primary Health Care without Doctor <input type="checkbox"/> Hospital <input type="checkbox"/> Primary Health Care with Doctor <input type="checkbox"/> None	
11.4 Are the primary health care services and service providers accessible? <input type="checkbox"/> 15- 30 minutes' walk <input type="checkbox"/> 1 hour walk or commute <input type="checkbox"/> Longer than 1 hour	
11.5 Where are pregnant women referred? <input type="checkbox"/> RHU <input type="checkbox"/> District Hospital <input type="checkbox"/> Provincial Hospital <input type="checkbox"/> Traditional Birth Attendants <input type="checkbox"/> Private doctors <input type="checkbox"/> Private hospitals <input type="checkbox"/> Others	
11.6 Availability of essential drugs/medicines/medical supplies <input type="checkbox"/> adequate <input type="checkbox"/> 3 days <input type="checkbox"/> 1 week <input type="checkbox"/> 2 weeks <input type="checkbox"/> 3 weeks <input type="checkbox"/> 1month <input type="checkbox"/> inadequate	
12. Nutrition	
12.1 Is there information on infants that are exclusively breastfed? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 12.1.1 If yes, please specify percentage of infants: _____	
12.2 Have infant milk products (e.g. milk formulas) and/or baby bottles/teats been distributed since the emergency\disaster? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No 12.2.1 <input type="checkbox"/> If yes, by whom? _____	
12.3 What percentage of infants in the area are formula fed\formula dependent? <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> <10% <input type="checkbox"/> 10-25% <input type="checkbox"/> >25% <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know	
12.4 Are there clearly identified breastfeeding areas in the evacuation centres <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
12.5 Is there any existing capacities and activities on the following Programs? Vitamin A capsule supplementation for children 6-59 months: <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes Iron-Folic Acid tablet distribution for pregnant and lactating women: : <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes Multiple Micronutrient Powders/Iron Syrup/Iron Drops for children 6-23 months of age: : <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes Management of children with moderate and severe acute malnutrition: <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	
13. Protection/Child Protection	

13.1 Have there been reported cases of separated/unaccompanied children (including orphans)? Yes No.

13.1.1 If yes how many? Girls___ Boys___

13.2 What are the things being done to help them, if any? By whom?

13.3 Has there been any information (confirmed and unconfirmed) about cases of Gender-Based Violence (e.g. rape, human trafficking, forced prostitution, intimate partner violence/domestic violence, sexual harassment, sexual abuse, verbal or psychosocial or economic abuse, physical abuse)? Yes No.

13.4 Sex: Male Female Age:

13.5 Have they been referred to service providers such as police, social workers, and legal aid? Yes No.

13.6 What are the existing protection mechanisms present in the evacuation sites/communal shelter?

Security patrols (police, security patrol organised by affected population Female police

Violence against Women (VAW) Desks Community Protection groups

13.7 Is there an existing reporting mechanism for protection related incidents? Yes No

13.7.1 If yes, which kind of incidents : General Protection Incidents Child Protection Incidents GBV Incidents

13.8 What services can be assessed by GBV/VAW survivors?

Medical Legal Psycho-social Shelter Security (police protection) Others

13.9 Have some children shown extreme behaviour changes that is worrying parents and caregivers (for example, a) not eating b) not speaking, c) not sleeping?) Yes No Are these widespread or isolated?

13.10 What kind of support and coping mechanisms are available to help them and their carers and community resource people, if any?

13.11 Do children and women, especially the most vulnerable, ie indigenous peoples, female headed households, persons with disabilities, living in institutions, have access to food?, NFIs? Shelter? Yes No

13.11.1 If no what are being done to address these?

14. Emergency Education

14.1 How many children/teaching personnel were affected by the disaster and resulting suspension of classes?

Pre-school children: 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

School-children: 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Day care workers: 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

Teachers: 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%

14.2 When will classes resume? In less than a week after more than week? Indefinitely

14.3 No. of children staying in the evacuation centers. _____ Under 5 yrs. _____ 5-12 yrs. _____ 13-17 yrs

14.4 What are the most urgent educational needs right now in the area? Check which ones apply:

Identify location for classes Replacing children's school supplies Water & sanitation at learning sites

Repair of damaged buildings Replacing teaching supplies/kits Others, (specify)_____

Replacing educational materials Integrate affected children to other schools

15. Emergency Telecoms/Communications

15.1 Has commercial services been disrupted/damaged in the area? Yes No

If yes, expected time/day/week to restore? _____

<p>15.2 Is telephone working in the area?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p>15.2.1 If not, how soon are these services expected to be restored? <input type="checkbox"/> A day or two <input type="checkbox"/> Less than a week <input type="checkbox"/> More than a week</p>	<p>15.3 Is there mobile phone and 3G/HSDPA/EDGE/GPRS signal from the Telecoms company?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Smart <input type="checkbox"/> Smart Bro</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Globe <input type="checkbox"/> Globe Tattoo</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Sun <input type="checkbox"/> Sun Broadband</p>
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15.4 Is there adequate capacity for communication with affected people? Yes No Main means of communication:

Radio Television Phone/text Internet/Email Word of mouth Government Other:

15.5 Is there an existing radio club/association? Yes No

If yes, what are their names? _____

What percentage of the affected population uses/has access to a radio club? ___%

15.6 What are the main information needs for the affected people? General situation Situation at home Information on family members

What aid is coming Weather forecast Health advice Security information Other (specify):

16. Access

16.1 Accessibility by road: No By: Car 4WD 6 Wheeler Truck 10 Wheeler Truck

16.2 Travel time to affected area:

16.3 Best estimate (in number of days) when earliest the transport infrastructure can be recovered near to pre-disaster level.

Roads _____ days

Railway _____ days

Air-transporter _____ days

Other: _____

Annex 7: Terms of Reference – Communication with Communities Working Group

Communications with Communities Working Group – Responding to Typhoon Bopha - Davao, Philippines

Terms of Reference

Background:

The Communications with Communities Working Group was established at Davao level on 28 December, 2012 jointly by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in Mindanao in collaboration with the United Nations and Non-Governmental Organisations. Private sector actors (telecommunications organisations) and media associations are also included within the group's membership. The broad aim of the group is to improve two way communications with disaster affected communities. The group will endeavour to: facilitate listening and responding to feedback arising from affected men, women and children; facilitate the communications of the same to communities; and improve the sharing of information regarding the response to those affected. Further, the group aims to inform the non-affected populace on ongoing humanitarian responses and rehabilitation of those affected calling them to action to contribute to these efforts, and to ensure equitable access to information on who is entitled to assistance.

Objectives:

- Bring together all actors working in communications with communities, including the private sector and local media, to develop an effective and fully coordinated system for sharing information with disaster survivors and listening to their concerns.
- Facilitate two-way communication flow with disaster affected communities through the most appropriate channels.
- Design and support ways in which those affected by this disaster can access the information they need about available assistance from all actors.
- Design and support ways in which humanitarian responders can listen more effectively to the needs and concerns, especially concerning information, of those affected
- Advocate across the response for more systematic information sharing with those affected.
- Provide technical support to clusters and agencies, including the government, where required to improve their capacity to share information with those affected.
- Ensure consistency in information and advice provided to affected communities, particularly by working with relevant line ministries and clusters (e.g. advice on how best to secure a tarpaulin, or home-treat basic illnesses).
- Work together to research and understand the communications environment in order to ensure that communications work is based on a sound understanding of how different communities within the response share, access and evaluate information.
- Source and share existing best practice and research work in communications (e.g. knowledge attitudes and practices studies).
- Support transparency and accountability initiatives (e.g. by supporting dissemination of information about government hotlines or other sources of information).
- To consult, plan and implement dynamic public information messages, activities and products on all aspects of the humanitarian community and government response.

Frequency/Timing of meetings:

- The group will meet at least once a week – schedule can be reviewed depending on needs.
- Location – DSWD offices.

Expected Results:

- Information about the response, particularly concerning available services, is shared systematically with survivors in appropriate formats.
- Information needs of survivors are systematically and regularly identified and met.

- Feedback from survivors is systematically collected and shared with responders, and thus influences project design and humanitarian policy.
- The capacity of individual agencies (including government bodies) to deliver good quality communication work as an integral part of the response is improved.
- Beneficiaries, including persons with specific needs, take part in decision-making process through two way communication.

Chairpersons:

The DSWD office will chair the group with UN OCHA taking the co-chair role in addition to drafting, dissemination of minutes and follow-up on action points.

Annex 8: Terms of Reference – Communications with Communities Officer

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Communications with Communities Officer Davao, Philippines

Drafted by Imogen Wall, Global Coordinator, Communications with Communities
wall@un.org

Background and rationale

On December 4th 2012, the island of Mindanao was struck by a Category Five typhoon known internationally as Bopha and locally as Pablo. The storm caused widespread damage and affected millions of people, particularly in Southern Mindanao and in the provinces of Compostela Valley and Davao Oriental.

The President of the Philippines accepted the Humanitarian Coordinator's offer of international assistance and in partnership with DSWD OCHA mobilised to support coordination of the response. As part of this, offices were established in Davao City and on the coast of Davao Oriental.

As part of this response, and to support DSWD in its efforts to ensure a community led and inclusive response, OCHA deployed a specialist in communications with communities as part of the response. The specialist supported the inclusion of communications work in the Appeal and established a communications with communities working group as a cross cluster technical support service hosted under the Protection cluster. The specialist also offered technical communications support to the clusters and agencies operating in the response.

As per the original workplan for 2013, OCHA is now recruiting a national communications with communities specialist to join the team in Manila. Given the needs in Mindanao following Typhoon Pablo and the need to provide continuing support to the response, and the opportunity to establish communications with communities work as part of an ongoing response, this staff member will be deployed to Davao on recruitment, to take over and develop the work started by OCHA's international communications with communities coordinator. This TOR lays out the tasks and expectations as per this work in Davao, with reference to the overall TOR of the Communications with Communities officer (which includes deployment in support of emergency response).

Results Expected

The Communications with Communities officer will lead a cross cluster Communications with Communities Working Group under the Protection cluster which will bring together all actors (government, international and local responders and private sector) working in this sector. They will also be expected to provide technical

guidance on communications with communities work to clusters and agency partners, as well as to OCHA itself. It is anticipated that the group will be co-led by government authorities. Specific activities will include:

With regard to the communications with communities coordination group:

Working with government partners, initiate, convene and facilitate meetings of the communications with communities working group and ensure that it is well managed and action -and results- orientated, with decisions clearly communicated to relevant cluster partners and stakeholders.

Serve as the main entry point for government and national partners to all international actors working on communications with communities.

Facilitate all activities undertaken by the group, initiating them where necessary, including group needs assessments, multi agency information campaigns and collective advocacy, with a view to building a coherent sector and network of partners working in this area.

Initiate and manage web platforms where necessary (including space on OCHA websites such as Humanitarian Response) to share all materials related to communication, including messaging, need and assessment results, radio and TV material, and content designed for social media and SMS.

Advocate with national and international humanitarian personnel, civil society organizations and government bodies active to promote the two-way exchange of information between humanitarian actors and the affected population and provide technical advice where possible/requested.

Provide particular support to efforts focussed on listening to affected communities and collecting their perspectives, ensuring not just that this is systematic but that these perspectives are fed back into system level project and policy work at cluster and overall humanitarian leadership level, including advocacy work.

Support all group members in fundraising for the activities which they propose, and ensure all fundraising efforts are coordinated and based on an adequate evidence base and gaps analysis. Where requested, broker and initiate partnerships between organisations to fill gaps and meet needs.

Ensure representation and active participation of the communication with affected communities component at key relevant meetings. In particular, represent the service in inter-cluster coordination fora as appropriate and advise clusters on the best way to make use of available Communication with Communities services.

Facilitate and coordinate needs assessments and analysis related to Communications with communities, including assessment of information needs of communities, damage assessments of communications infrastructure. Lead the group's analysis of sector-specific gaps and priorities and facilitate the development of strategies and tools to address them.

Produce regular updates (situation reports) summarising progress, achievements and identifying gaps and challenges, covering all activities where possible, for input into OCHA sitreps and other information products where relevant.

Ensure appropriate coordination with the relevant national authorities.

In partnership with the government, work on the design of appropriate transition strategies for the group including how coordination mechanisms and membership will change during the transition from the emergency to recovery and develop and implement an exit strategy.

Work with the CDAC Network on developing appropriate M+E for the Communications with Communities group and ensure this are implemented. Make adjustments to the overall strategy and programming as appropriate. Advocate for capture of experiences, lessons learned and successful initiatives.

Provide technical advice and support where required to clusters and agencies on best practice in design and implementation of communications work.

With regard to OCHA

Design and produce any necessary public information campaigns (eg What Is Humanitarian Response?) for affected communities

Advise OCHA staff on implementing best practice in communications with regard to their activities in country

Support OCHA in improving accountability and transparency measures, working especially closely with IM and HIC staff

Support to liaison with local media

Recommend and develop communication solutions through new technologies

Work implies frequent interaction with the following:

National and local government authorities, staff at all levels within OCHA, UN agencies (particularly cluster lead agencies), NGOs and the wider humanitarian community, as well as national counterparts, relevant national government departments and donors. This to include local private sector and civil society (eg media associations) and affected communities themselves.

Representatives of other UN humanitarian agencies and other member organizations in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, UN Mission and Member State personnel with responsibility for information management, humanitarian issues, and non-governmental organization representatives.

Delegations, government officials, and partners in universities and research institutes, etc.

Communications and Information Services Branch in OCHA New York and Geneva

Every effort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of December 2013.

Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities
(CDAC) Network Secretariat
196 Old Street
New City Cloisters
London, EC1V 9FR
United Kingdom
info@cdacnetwork.org

www.cdacnetwork.org
[facebook.com/commisaid](https://www.facebook.com/commisaid)
twitter.com/CDACN