

# IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response



Prepared on behalf of the  
Inter-Agency Humanitarian  
Evaluation Steering Group  
October 2014

By Teresa Hanley, Rusty Binas,  
Julian Murray and Baltz Tribunalo

© 2014 United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Two United Nations Plaza  
New York, NY 10017, USA

<http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/programme-cycle/space/evaluation>

The evaluation was conducted by Teresa Hanley, Rusty Binas, Julian Murray and Baltz Tribunalo from Valid International, and managed by Victoria Saiz-Omenaca from the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Funding for the evaluation was provided by UN-OCHA, UNICEF, WFP and FAO.

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent those of the members of the Inter Agency Standing Committee, Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation Steering Group, or of those institutions of the United Nations system that are mentioned herein. The designations and terminology employed and the presentation of material do not imply any expression of opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or of its frontiers or boundaries.

Photo: IRIN/Jason Gutierrez, November 2013

## Contents

Executive Summary.....	v
Acronyms.....	xiv
Acknowledgements.....	xv
Map of the path of Typhoon Haiyan and of the Affected Population .....	xvii
<b>1. Introduction to the evaluation .....</b>	<b>17</b>
1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation .....	17
1.2 Country Context.....	18
1.3 Emergence Response and Strategic Response Plan.....	18
<b>2. Methodology.....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>3. Results: Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by disaster? .....</b>	<b>24</b>
3.1 Strategic Response Objective One .....	24
3.2 Strategic Response Objective Two.....	26
3.3 Strategic Response Objective Three .....	29
3.4 Strategic Response Objective Four .....	32
3.5 Strategic Response Objective Five .....	34
3.6 Relevance .....	36
3.7 Timeliness of responses .....	40
3.8 Key lessons and issues 3.8.1 Critical importance of in-country preparedness: .....	41
<b>4. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?.....</b>	<b>42</b>
4.1 Needs assessment and planning.....	42
4.2 Coordination and implementation of the international response .....	43
4.3 Factors which strengthened national systems .....	47
4.4 The transition from emergency response to recovery .....	49
4.5 International response engagement with national civil society .....	50
4.6 Key lessons and issues .....	51
<b>5. Coordination: Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof? .....</b>	<b>52</b>
5.1 Coverage.....	52
5.2 Cross cutting issues .....	54
5.3 Collective management and leadership.....	58
5.4 Key Lessons and Issues.....	59
<b>6. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied? .....</b>	<b>61</b>
6.1 Preparedness .....	61
6.2 The Assessment tools .....	61
6.3 The Planning tools.....	62
6.4 The Response Monitoring and Results Measurement tools .....	66
6.5 The Evaluation tools .....	66
6.6 The impact of L3 status .....	67
<b>7. Conclusions and recommendations .....</b>	<b>70</b>
7.1 Overall assessment .....	70
7.2 Conclusions and Recommendations regarding the four Evaluation Questions .....	72

**List of Annexes .....77**

Annex 1 Matrix - summary evaluation findings and recommendations  
Annex 2 IAHE terms of reference  
Annex 3 Detailed methodological note  
Annex 4 Evaluation matrix  
Annex 5 IAHE itinerary  
Annex 6 Evaluation tools  
Annex 7 List of persons interviewed  
Annex 8 Qualitative and quantitative analysis  
Annex 9 List of acronyms  
Annex 10 Bibliography

**List of Figures**

Figure 1. Community feedback loop ..... 37  
Figure 2. Government and Inter-agency assessment and planning processes and timelines..... 45  
Figure 3. Comparison of numbers of international and national staff in response (UNDSS) ..... 47  
Figure 4. Emergency response and recovery linkages..... 49  
Figure 5. Humanitarian Programme Cycle ..... 62  
Figure 6. A possible revised HPC planning cycle for a large-scale sudden-onset disaster..... 65



## **Executive Summary**

### **Introduction**

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) made landfall in the Central Visayas region of the Philippines on 8 November 2013. Over 6,000 people were killed and some 4 million were left homeless, in an area that already suffered high levels of poverty. On 12 November 2013, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) formally activated an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide level 3 (L3) emergency response to the typhoon.

### **Country context and response**

The Philippines is a middle income country with a well-developed national disaster management system. In advance of landfall, the Government activated its system, pre-deploying a senior team to Tacloban and then initiating a major relief effort. The Government of the Philippines (GPH) accepted the offer of international assistance and declared a State of Calamity across the affected areas. The GPH developed its plan - entitled Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda (RAY) - based on rapid, local level and sectoral assessments which it launched on 16 December.

### **The inter-agency response**

In coordination with the Government of the Philippines, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) began preparations for response in advance of Haiyan making landfall. UNDAC was pre-deployed to Manila ready for travel to the affected areas. Within four days of the typhoon, the HCT released a Humanitarian Action Plan. A massive response was launched with 462 surge personnel deployed within three weeks. The 12-month Strategic Response Plan was published on 10 December 2013. Its total budget of US\$ 788 million was 60% funded.

The inter-agency response forms only part of a larger set of responses to the emergency including that of the GPH, the private sector, Filipino and broader Asian civil society and the Filipino diaspora. On 4 July 2014, the GPH announced the end of the humanitarian phase of the Haiyan response. Largely in response to this, the HCT took a decision to close the SRP on 31 August 2014.

### **The evaluation**

The inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE) aims to provide an independent assessment of the extent to which planned collective objectives set in the SRP have been met. It also assesses the extent to which response mechanisms of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle and Transformative Agenda have successfully supported the response.

The evaluation considers the overall inter-agency response within the scope of HCT coordination. It does not evaluate the government response nor is it intended to replace agency or sector-specific evaluations. Rather it aims to add value by a focus on the collective results and learning from the overall inter-agency response. Following preliminary data gathering in July-August, a four-person evaluation team spent three weeks in the Philippines in August-September 2014 to undertake field work across the three regions covered by the SRP as well as in Manila. Methods included systematic, inclusive community consultations, key informant interviews and group discussions. Three feedback and validation workshops in Tacloban and Manila with government

representatives, humanitarian agencies, HCT and the IAHE in-country advisory group were important opportunities to refine emerging findings.

## Findings

### **Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster? <sup>1</sup>**

The inter-agency response effectively contributed to emergency needs being met through a timely and relevant immediate response. Initial assistance was appropriately prioritised with a focus on key risks such as communicable disease outbreaks, food insecurity, lack of clean water, emergency shelter and protection. Key cross-cutting challenges were also identified early on, including problems of land rights and supply chain bottlenecks, though strategies to address these have taken time to develop. However, the extent to which the inter-agency response contributed to the overall results is difficult to assess in the absence of more data on assistance outside of the inter-agency coordinated system.

Key interventions included:

- pre-deployment of UNDAC and considerable support from domestic and international militaries which enabled a rapid response and access to remote areas
- early restoration of water supplies including in Tacloban
- rapid gearing up of health and surveillance services as well as re-establishment of the immunisation service
- development of a differentiated approach to food security combining cash, food and NFI distributions relevant to local market conditions
- large-scale provision of emergency employment which also helped to re-establish public infrastructure such as drainage canals, roads and public spaces
- timely distribution of rice seed and associated agricultural inputs enabling local food production to resume with some crops back to normal and even higher levels in 2014
- early identification of key protection issues such as loss of legal documentation
- rapid establishment of temporary learning spaces for girls and boys.

The response was characterised by the rapid self-recovery of the Filipino people who, within days, mostly returned home and were rebuilding at least makeshift shelter and seeking to rebuild their livelihoods, though often via use of high cost credit. The IAHE found that the agency response needed to be better able to adapt and customise its activities to support early recovery. While blanket, standard responses to food, water, health and shelter needs were appropriate and effective in the immediate phase of the response, it became apparent that there was a need for more tailored responses that go beyond enabling households to meet immediate basic needs but also to restore livelihoods quickly.

---

<sup>1</sup> During the inception phase of the evaluation the IAHE guidelines were adapted to ask "To what extent are SRP objectives appropriate and relevant to meet humanitarian needs, and have systems been established to measure their achievement? To what extent are the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?" This broader question is addressed through the evaluation in EQ1 and EQ4.

Communities were dissatisfied with the range of beneficiary targeting systems used by agencies, and wanted more consistent and transparent systems across agencies and the response. Vulnerable groups were given some priority in the distribution of assistance. But, with some exceptions e.g. protection and health programmes focused on women and children, there was limited evidence of early phase programmes being designed to meet the particular needs of vulnerable groups particularly older people and people with disabilities.

When the SRP ended on 31 August 2014 the key remaining humanitarian need was made up of 5,400 households (24,785 individuals) displaced by Haiyan and still living in tents, evacuation centres or bunkhouses. In addition a further 95,000 households remained particularly vulnerable because of the poor quality of their shelter, though these poor conditions may pre-date Haiyan.

The significant results of the response cannot yet be considered sustainable, due to the vulnerability of some of the affected population to new extreme weather events, and delay in sustainable livelihood and shelter solutions. The success of the recovery phase now will be key to ensure their sustainability.

#### **Engagement with national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response**

The international community engaged well with Government disaster response and risk reduction systems at the preparedness stage and in the immediate days following the typhoon. However, the overall magnitude of the disaster and the strength of the inter-agency response overwhelmed some government units, and, as a result, the international and national coordination mechanisms diverged along separate paths for quite some time. While there are many examples of excellent cooperation, and government officials at all levels appreciated both the assistance and the extra technical and coordinating capacity provided by the international community, there was also a strong sense that some international surge staff did not understand national systems or capacity and instead bypassed them.

The inter-agency surge did deliver an effective response, but one that side lined many in-country staff, failed to adequately join up with national systems, and ended up creating parallel structures for planning and coordination. Strong leadership, practical measures such as co-location, former institutional working relationships and a focus on practical solutions helped bring the national and international systems back together for some very successful cooperation in implementation. While inter-agency operational priorities drove the response, its structures and processes were not adjusted sufficiently nor early enough to take account of the international community's complementary role in this middle income country with an established albeit stretched government disaster management system. In addition, the IAHE found limited evidence of effective engagement between the international response, and national and local civil society.

## **Transition**

Transition includes change in (a) the nature of affected people's needs (emergency to early recovery); (b) the type of programme approaches to meet changing needs (humanitarian to recovery to development); and (c) structures and systems for coordination of assistance (HCT to UNCT, closure of clusters).

Lack of familiarity with the capacities of a middle income country, differences between the international and national planning timeframes, and different views on the boundaries and linkages between emergency relief, early recovery and recovery, all contributed to a difficult process of transition from relief to recovery programming. The transition to recovery was complicated by the fact that sectors and regions recovered at different paces, and by uncertainty regarding the government's capacity and timetable to begin large-scale recovery programmes. Furthermore, underlying this is a conceptual tension between the host government's sovereignty and leadership of disaster response in its own country, and the international humanitarian community's principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The culmination was the Government's announcement in July of the end of the humanitarian phase and closure of humanitarian clusters.

The international system's limited range of programming modalities to flexibly support early recovery are a shortcoming. Transition was further complicated in the Haiyan response by the absence of a full assessment of the remaining humanitarian needs before the HCT decision to close the SRP early. The focus of transition planning in Haiyan was on coordination structures.

### **Coordination within the inter-agency response**

Coordination mechanisms were well-funded and rapidly established, and the cluster system functioned as planned. Excellent civil-military coordination greatly assisted the early stage of the response. While there is some unevenness in the geographic distribution of assistance in relation to needs, the IAHE found no evidence of serious, sustained coverage gaps.

Coordination processes and tools were helpful in guiding agencies to avoid duplication, but were resource-intensive and struggled to deal with the range of organisations working in the Philippines outside of the SRP and its coordination mechanisms. Lighter coordination mechanisms were most effective. At times, agencies' own agendas complicated the process of forming a common cluster approach. The response demonstrated the value of thematic advisers when they provide practical input to the operations and work as a team supporting inter-cluster functions. Building on this experience, additional preparedness measures which build national capacity in thematic areas and partnerships with the private sector will be valuable for future responses.

Four features of the Haiyan response highlight the value of inter-cluster coordination beyond the conventional cluster system: the extensive use of cash by several clusters, the dynamic needs of communities moving rapidly into early recovery, the multiple challenges (access to services, livelihoods, protection) faced by families without a shelter solution, and the success of Communication with Community (CwC) and Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) mechanisms at gathering community-wide (rather than sector or agency-specific) feedback.

In dealing with tough, cross-cutting housing, land and property issues, the HCT leadership was assisted by the provision of solid, technical advice from the outset. The HCT was slow to take action but, nevertheless, HCT advocacy and guidance did eventually go on to have a positive impact on the overall response.

### **Cash**

Cash transfer programming was employed on an unprecedented scale. At least 45 international humanitarian agencies implemented cash transfer programmes (CTP) within the inter-agency response. Considerable levels of cash were also distributed by government agencies, private companies, civil society organisations, and individuals, including Filipinos overseas. Four agencies alone in the inter-agency response distributed around \$34 million, benefitting 1.4 million disaster-affected people. The experience confirmed the effectiveness of CTPs as a flexible means to support people's own recovery when conditions are favourable. At the same time, the use of cash approaches across clusters in the same regions and markets presented coordination challenges to ensure collective positive impacts. Further work is needed to understand best how to harmonise cash approaches across sectors, as well as on effective targeting and conversion to sustainable livelihoods.

### **Application of IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance**

The components of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) were applied rigorously, and in many cases newly-developed tools were applied for the first time. Under exceptionally tight timeframes they were produced on time, and with high quality. However, interlocutors questioned their suitability to the realities of a large-scale sudden onset disaster, and whether the significant effort and opportunity cost invested in them, particularly in the SRP, was justified. The HPC outlines a logical sequence for the response, starting with needs assessment, which then leads to identification of strategic priorities and an overall results framework. Cluster plans are then derived from this framework, projects developed, and costed. In the Haiyan case, some of these steps were truncated and some tools were developed in isolation. In particular, assessment and planning documents were not causally connected and the SRP was issued before the results framework was fixed, contributing to the challenge of reporting the results. The L3 status significantly supported the rapid scaling-up and resourcing of the response. Greater attention to adapting to local conditions and collective approaches would have further strengthened it. The concept of empowered leadership was new, and not universally understood.

### **Factors contributing to results and performance**

A number of characteristics of the Philippines created highly favourable conditions for an effective disaster response. These include its lower middle-income country status, relatively good health and education indicators, a vibrant local economy, an established and experienced national disaster management system and a government which accepts its responsibility to protect the rights of citizens. Furthermore, in the affected areas, there was an absence of significant civil conflict. Key external factors included large-scale public sympathy, media coverage, significant diaspora support, long-standing links with important aid donors, and the absence of a high profile "competing" disaster at that time. The combination of these underlying contextual factors contributed to its high level of funding and to the effectiveness of the early response.

## Assessment of the inter-agency response by SRP objective

SRP Objective	IAHE assessment <sup>2</sup>	Comment on the inter-agency response
1. Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production, and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services.	High	There is clear evidence that people have met their food needs and avoided nutritional deterioration. The mixed response of cash and food was appropriate and followed a differentiated approach according to market conditions. Early support to restart agricultural production notably in rice was an important contribution. Current progress is vulnerable to future shocks if livelihoods are not restored to pre-Haiyan levels quickly.
2. Families with destroyed or damaged homes, including the displaced population, attain protective and sustainable shelter solutions.	Medium-Low	The response addressed emergency shelter needs, and has improved the quality of shelter for people in transitional housing. The focus on self-recovery was appropriate, but more attention was needed to the supply of quality materials, and to measures to ensure that the well-crafted shelter cluster messages to support safer building techniques translated into safer shelter. Overall, the response was underfunded and fell short of its targets.
3. Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries.	Medium-Low	The response addressed immediate needs through extensive emergency employment programmes which enabled people to meet urgent household needs and also contributed to restoring basic infrastructure and access. But long-term use of such programmes is not appropriate and it does not contribute to sustainable livelihoods. The development of programmes to support more sustainable, non-agricultural livelihoods beyond emergency employment has been slow and underfunded. Direct support for farming and fishing helped a portion of the affected population begin to resume their livelihoods though numbers are below target. A lack of sustainable livelihood options is a key obstacle to the relocation of families in displacement centres.

<sup>2</sup> Ratings are based on the IAHE team's judgement, taking into account IAHE findings on inter-agency response effectiveness, relevance and timeliness. Ratings go in order of High/high-medium/medium/medium-low/low.

<p>4. Prevent increases in mortality and morbidity and the outbreak of communicable diseases through immediate access to basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and health services.</p>	<p>Medium</p>	<p>The response addressed emergency health and sanitation needs, successfully contributing to the prevention of outbreaks of any communicable diseases despite the high risk environments. Early recovery targets are behind schedule, although ambitions go beyond humanitarian needs to address pre-existing sanitation and healthcare issues.</p>
<p>5. Affected people quickly regain access to community and local government services, including basic education and a strengthened protective environment.</p>	<p>High-Medium</p>	<p>The initial education response was effective at getting girls and boys back to school in temporary learning spaces two months after Haiyan, but consolidation with teacher training and government-led permanent construction has since lagged. The initial protection focus on resolving lost documentation as well as Child Protection and GBV was appropriate, but insufficient attention was accorded at the outset to land and property rights – which have emerged as one of the main obstacles to both protection and durable solutions for a significant population.</p>

## Recommendations

	Priority <sup>3</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>1. Remaining humanitarian needs</b> In coordination with the government, maintain an overview of the remaining humanitarian needs, with a particular focus on the 5,400 households in tents and displacement centres, and be ready to offer assistance if needed.</p>	<b>Critical</b>	<b>HCT</b>	<b>Immediate</b>
<p><b>2. Cash transfer programming</b> Set up a practice-oriented research project to learn from the large scale use of cash-transfer programme approaches in the Haiyan response. Include consideration of a) the results of CTPs for communities and local economies; b) benefits and challenges of different modalities; c) areas where standards would add value and d) consistent monitoring approaches to support inter-cluster approaches that benefit households and communities as a whole.</p>	<b>Learning opportunity</b>	<b>IASC Working Group</b>	<b>Short-term</b>
<p><b>3. Restoring livelihoods</b> Build up livelihoods capacity in the international response system e.g. through a roster of livelihoods experts, to more effectively and rapidly link emergency activities to the early restoration of livelihoods. Focus on transfer from emergency employment to sustainable livelihoods, and on solutions for non-agricultural contexts. Develop a range of flexible assessment and programme instruments.</p>	<b>Important</b>	<b>EDGs</b>	<b>Medium term</b>
<p><b>4. Preparedness for major emergencies (L3)</b> In middle-income countries which are highly vulnerable to sudden onset disasters and have strong national capacity in disaster management, international actors should prepare together with the government for major disasters and a possible L3 response. Use detailed scenario planning to work through how the international response needs to adapt in order to play its complementary role in these contexts. Start with and document the Filipino scenario planning and in it clarify, among other factors, the roles of international personnel e.g. as cluster co-leads, gaps in the capacity of national systems to take on their coordination responsibilities, mechanisms to trigger scaling down of international personnel, and information resources and mechanisms to brief surge personnel on national response systems and capacities.</p>	<b>Critical</b>	<b>EDGs and HCT</b>	<b>Medium term, and short-term in the Philippines</b>
<p><b>5. Transition</b> Transition needs to be considered in responses from the outset. Develop measures including practical global guidance to support HCTs on a) how to ensure transition is considered and addressed from the beginning of a response, particularly in L3 emergencies, and b) how to manage transition as a collective HCT and in cooperation with government. Include consideration of how to manage issues such as potential tensions between national government's sovereignty in disaster management, and the international community's (and governments') principles of</p>	<b>Important</b>	<b>IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC Team</b>	<b>Medium term</b>

<sup>3</sup> Recommendations are categorized as Critical (top urgent priority), Important (high priority), or Learning Opportunity.



humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.			
<p><b>6. Preparedness and the private sector</b></p> <p>As part of Philippines preparedness process, set up agreements with private sector actors to ensure that systems are in place before the next emergency for a more coherent and linked-up response, including agreements to facilitate cash transfer programming, the establishment of a basis for partnerships between clusters and private sector partners, and support for supply chains for the most commonly-needed relief and early recovery supplies.</p>	<b>Important</b>	<b>HCT</b>	<b>Short-term</b>
<p><b>7. Housing, land and property</b></p> <p>In large-scale, sudden-onset natural disasters, place a higher strategic and operational priority on working with national authorities, to anticipate and resolve property rights and land issues that could stall early recovery and stand in the way of durable solutions. Housing, land and property rights and solutions should figure prominently in the SRP, and HLP legal and technical expertise should be fielded early to support the HCT. As part of preparedness planning at country level, consider how a response will cope with property and land issues for at least transitional measures to meet humanitarian needs.</p>	<b>Important</b>	<b>EDGs, Global Protection and Shelter clusters</b>	<b>Medium term</b>
<p><b>8. HPC and planning in large-scale sudden onset emergencies</b></p> <p>Review HPC guidance to further differentiate between the planning and reporting processes of protracted emergencies vs sudden onset large scale disasters. In sudden onset emergencies (especially natural disasters) modify the pathway for the HPC assessment and planning tools with (a) a lighter, more analytical SRP at around the 20-day mark (following a preliminary response plan in line with the current HPC guidance), followed by (b) a suite of (connected) cluster response plans at the 60-day mark, based on (c) operationally-oriented needs assessments conducted in the 15-45 day period.</p>	<b>Important</b>	<b>IASC Working group and OCHA HPC team</b>	<b>Short-term</b>
<p><b>9. HPC and needs assessments</b></p> <p>Redesign assessment processes to ensure they support operational planning. In a sudden onset emergency, after an initial “scale and scope” assessment (preferably conducted in conjunction with the national government) such as the MIRA, needs assessments should be conducted collectively and on a cluster basis, with a clear view to informing operational planning.</p>	<b>Critical</b>	<b>IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC team</b>	<b>Short-term</b>
<p><b>10. HPC and empowered leadership</b></p> <p>Further develop the guidance on empowered leadership to reflect the respective authorities and responsibilities of IASC members, Emergency Directors, the HC, and sub-national managers in an L3 emergency. Be clear if the mandate of surge capacity is to support and not replace the HC/HCT, and if the concept of empowered leadership extends below the national level.</p>	<b>Important</b>	<b>IASC Working Group</b>	<b>Short-term</b>

## Acronyms


AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
AAR	After Action Review
BFAR	Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CRRP	Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTP	Cash Transfer Programmes
DHC	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
DSWD	Department for Social Welfare and Development
EDG	Emergency Directors Group
EQ	Evaluation Question
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERL	Early Recovery and Livelihoods
FSAC	Food Security and Agriculture
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GPH	Government of Philippines
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Project
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle
IAHE	Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
L3	Level 3

LGU	Local Government Unit
MIRA	Multi-Cluster/Sector Integrated Rapid Assessment
MSWD	Municipal Social Welfare and Development
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NFO	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
OPR	Operational Peer Review
PCA	Philippine Coconut Authority
PDRRMC	Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
PMR	Periodic Monitoring Report
PRP	Preliminary Response Plan
QA	Quality Assurance
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda
RC	Resident Coordinator
SoP	Standard Operating Procedures
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
TA	Transformative Agenda


## **Acknowledgements**

The IAHE team would like to thank the communities and all those who gave their time to share their experiences with the evaluation team in interviews and discussions. We appreciated people's openness, patience with the questioning, and generosity throughout. The team is also grateful for the professional and good-natured support provided by the OCHA teams in New York, Manila, Tacloban, Guiuan and Iloilo, who provided considerable practical and logistical support in advance, during and after the evaluation visits, and ensured the smooth running of the evaluation process.

# Map of the path of Typhoon Haiyan and of the Affected Population



## IAHE consultations in Region VI, VII, VIII



# 1. Introduction to the evaluation

## 1.1 Background and purpose of the evaluation

Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) made landfall on the Central Visayas regions of the Philippines on 8 November 2013. While the wind speeds were unprecedented and highly damaging, most destructive of all for some areas was the storm surge which followed. Over 6,000 people were killed and some 4 million were left homeless, in an area that already suffered high levels of poverty. Responding to the offer from the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC), the Government of the Philippines (GPH) formally accepted international assistance through Presidential Proclamation No 682 on 11 November 2013. On 12 November 2013, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) activated an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide level 3 (L3) emergency response to the typhoon.<sup>4</sup>

An Inter-agency humanitarian evaluation (IAHE) is mandatory for all declared L3 system-wide emergencies. The objectives of the IAHE are:

- to provide an independent assessment of the extent to which the collective objectives set in the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) to respond to the needs of affected people have been met
- to assess the extent to which response mechanisms, including the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) and other key pillars of the Transformative Agenda (TA) have successfully supported the response, and recommend improvement-oriented actions.

The evaluation considers the overall inter-agency response within the scope of HCT coordination. It does not evaluate the government response or that of other agencies. It is not intended to replace agency or sector-specific evaluations, but rather aims to add value by a focus on the collective results and learning from the overall inter-agency response. The primary audience of the evaluation is the Humanitarian Coordinator and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). It also aims to contribute to the evidence base for decision-making and judgments about future humanitarian action, policy development and reform by the IASC Principals, IASC Working Group, Emergency Directors and other international and national stakeholders.

The evaluation addresses the following four questions:

1. Were the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?<sup>5</sup>
2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?
3. Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?
4. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?

---

<sup>4</sup> Five criteria are used by the IASC Principals to determine whether a level 3, system wide response is required: namely scale, urgency, complexity, combined national and international capacity to respond, and reputational risk.

<sup>5</sup> During the inception phase of the evaluation the IAHE guidelines were adapted to ask "To what extent are SRP objectives appropriate and relevant to meet humanitarian needs, and have systems been established to measure their achievement? To what extent are the results articulated in the Strategic Response Plan achieved, and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by the disaster?" This broader question is addressed through the evaluation in EQ1 and EQ4.

## 1.2 Country Context

The Philippines is a lower middle income country with a human development index ranking of 117 out of 187.<sup>6</sup> The typhoon's impact was concentrated on some of the poorest provinces in the country, average household income in the severely affected provinces being only 75 percent of the national average (2012 data). Over 50 percent of household incomes in the affected provinces were largely dependent on agriculture and remittances.<sup>7</sup> While the Philippines regularly experiences typhoons, those regions most strongly hit by Haiyan had not experienced disasters with any regularity and, rarely if ever, had experienced the kind of storm surge that affected Guiuan and Tacloban in Region VIII.

As one of the most hazard prone countries in the world, the Philippines has dedicated significant resources to strengthening response capacity and disaster management mechanisms. In 2007, the Philippines National Disaster Coordinating Council (since replaced by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council: NDRRMC) established a sectoral cluster system for preparing and responding to disasters in the Philippines. In 2010, the Republic Act 10121 was passed which set out the national disaster risk reduction and management framework. The act defines the roles and responsibilities of government departments at different levels.

At the time of Haiyan, the government and international community were already responding to a number of emergencies in the Philippines, including the Bohol province earthquake in central Philippines, which struck on 15 October 2013. Support was also being provided to the displaced population in Zamboanga City and Basilan, caused by conflict in September 2013.

## 1.3 Emergence Response and Strategic Response Plan

### The wider response

The Government provided substantial relief assistance to families in the nine affected regions. President Aquino declared a State of Calamity on 11 November 2013, covering all Haiyan-affected provinces. The government's strategic plan to guide the recovery and reconstruction was laid out in the document 'Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda' (RAY) published on 16 December 2013. The total RAY budget was for US\$ 8.17 billion, with US\$ 2.83 billion identified as critical immediate needs or short-term interventions, i.e. for first twelve months (2014). In December, the government announced the creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR). On 4 July 2014, the government declared the humanitarian phase over and that coordination of the further response would be under OPARR's structures rather than through humanitarian clusters. The RAY at this point was folded into the newly finalised Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP).

Other actors made significant contributions to the response. The private sector played a considerable role, but there is no overall figure available for its contribution. It included national private sector groups such as the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF), Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR), which all

---

<sup>6</sup> [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr\\_theme/country-notes/PHL.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PHL.pdf) access 2 Oct 2014

<sup>7</sup> Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda (RAY), Government of the Philippines, 2013, p4.

play active roles in disaster response, coordinating members' support and supporting emergency preparedness, alongside small scale, local businesses directly providing charitable donations in their local community. Charitable foundations working directly with local government and communities also played an important role, for example one agency alone, the Taiwan-based Tzu Chi Foundation, announced that it provided assistance worth \$12 million in the first two weeks of the response, and has contributed significant further assistance since then including cash assistance, medical, non-food item supplies.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the diaspora played possibly the most direct and important role for many affected communities. In a year-on-year comparison, remittances to the Philippines rose by \$600 million in the first three months following Haiyan<sup>9</sup>. Finally, Filipino civil society consisting of both national NGOs and local civil society organisations played an important role, notably faith-based organisations and other national networks.

### **Humanitarian Country Team inter-agency response**

From a total of nine regions hit by the typhoon, the Government identified a priority corridor covering 171 municipalities in 14 provinces and four regions, and these were the focus of the inter-agency response. Within four days of Haiyan's landfall, the HCT produced the Haiyan Action Plan (Flash Appeal or Preliminary Response Plan). A major response was mounted by the international community including the deployment of 462 surge staff within three weeks. The Strategic Response Plan was launched on 10 December 2013, and designed to complement the government's RAY plan. The overall goal of the Strategic Response Plan was that communities and local governments recovered from the disaster, built back safer and avoided relapses, while strengthening resilience. The SRP is organised around five inter-sectoral objectives. The total budget for the SRP was US\$ 788 million. The SRP was intended to be a 12-month plan, but largely in response to the Government of the Philippines' announcement of the end of the humanitarian phase of the Haiyan response the HCT took a decision to close the SRP on 31 August 2014. By the time of its closure, \$468 million had been received against the plan, making it 60.2% covered.<sup>10</sup>

## **1.4 The report**

The report is laid out as follows. Section two includes a summary of the methodology (with a more detailed methodology in Annex 3). The subsequent four sections address each evaluation question in turn. The report concludes with overall assessment, conclusions and recommendations.

---

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.tzuchi.org.ph/newsite/TC\\_Phils\\_Yolanda\\_Efforts\\_Summary/index.html](http://www.tzuchi.org.ph/newsite/TC_Phils_Yolanda_Efforts_Summary/index.html);  
<http://www.roc-taiwan.org/PH/ct.asp?xItem=515190&ctNode=4695&mp=272>

<sup>9</sup> Source: Central Bank of the Philippines: <http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/keystat/ofw.htm> This is a comparison of Nov 2012-Jan 2013 remittances with Nov 2013-Jan 2014 remittances.

<sup>10</sup> FTS accessed 2 Oct 2014. Annex 8.9 has details of funding by cluster.

## 2. Methodology

An inception phase in June/July 2014 included a country visit by the IAHE team leader and OCHA's Chief, Evaluation. The inception phase consultations played an important role in identifying the areas of focus for the evaluation. The evaluation is designed around the four questions detailed in the terms of reference, and an evaluation matrix developed by the IAHE team with sub-questions and criteria for assessment (Annex 4).

Following the inception process, a survey team visited 19 communities in Region VI to gather preliminary data on the response (Annex 8.6 and 8.7). An online survey was sent to all current and former members of the HCT and cluster coordinators to gather feedback on Humanitarian Programme Cycle processes and HCT performance (Annex 6.5). Initial key stakeholder interviews also took place. In addition, a document review was undertaken including review of available agency evaluations, reviews and surveys for data relevant to the IAHE evaluation matrix (Annex 10-bibliography).

The final and main field visit, by the full four-person IAHE team, took place in the Philippines from 21 August to 10 September 2013 and involved:

- 18 systematic community consultations across Regions VI, VII and VIII using qualitative methods to assess relevance, timelines and effectiveness of assistance (Annex 8.8). An additional nine communities took part in project visits, interviews and group discussions (IAHE itinerary Annex 5).
- Key informant interviews (KII) with humanitarian agency staff, donors and government officials from a range of involved departments and structures, including disaster risk reduction and management councils at national, regional and local levels (full list in Annex 7).
- Facilitated and structured focus group discussions with national NGOs, humanitarian agency staff and government representatives at national and regional levels (full list in Annex 7).
- Over 210 people participated in key informant interviews and group discussions from government departments, NGOs, humanitarian agencies and donors.
- Three feedback and validation workshops in Tacloban and Manila for humanitarian agency staff, government representatives, the HCT and IAHE in-country advisory group (96 participants in total).

Community consultations have included men, women, older people, youth, children and people with disabilities. Communities visited included coastal, inland, highland, rural and urban locations. Data was analysed against the criteria laid out in the evaluation matrix.

**Quality assurance (QA)** processes included the use of standard templates for data collection, triangulation of data findings through the use of a mixed range of methods without reliance on any one data source for findings, and internal and external peer review. In addition, the team adhered to an ethical approach in evaluation methods.<sup>11</sup> Important QA roles were fulfilled by a country evaluation advisory group<sup>12</sup> and an inter-agency Evaluation Management Group.<sup>13</sup> The three

---

<sup>11</sup> Adapted from DFID Ethics and Principles for Research and Evaluation, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Members are USAID, Canada, Japan, and Australia, OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, UNDP, National and International NGOs (PINGON), Plan, UNCSAC, Representatives from the Philippines government (DSWD)

<sup>13</sup> Members are UNICEF, WFP, FAO, OCHA



feedback and validation workshops held in Manila and Tacloban at the end of the fieldwork were an important opportunity for the team to check and refine emerging findings.

**Picture: IAHE community consultation**



### **Constraints**

The evaluation faced a number of constraints. These included:

- A lack of available data for some SRP objectives particularly in relation to outcomes. In addition, changes in indicators and targets over the course of the response challenged evaluation assessments.
- The inter-agency response itself only contributes to the strategic response objectives, but these are not objectives that are held or reported on by any other organisation, making it difficult to weigh the contribution of the inter-agency response vis-a-vis the wider response. In addition, stakeholders, including communities, do not always differentiate between the different sources of assistance.
- The evaluation took place in month ten of the response. This had advantages in terms of being a time when it was possible to see more clearly some of the results of the overall response, phases of implementation and how the response had evolved. It meant that respondents provided a more reflective perspective on some of the issues that were important in the early months and maybe lost some of the detail of the early phases. Timing of IAHEs is something being considered by the IAHE steering committee.
- A cluster performance monitoring exercise was already under way through an independent process at the time of the IAHE. This parallel process excluded the possibility of the IAHE undertaking another cluster survey as originally planned due to "survey fatigue", however not all clusters completed the independent process so there are gaps in that data. Monitoring data of some clusters was shared with the IAHE (education, shelter, nutrition).
- Although all communities in the Region VI survey had received some assistance, low levels of certain types of assistance limited the extent of the statistical analysis that was possible.
- The response rate to the IAHE HCT online survey was sufficient only to provide guidance for areas to probe in more depth during field work, rather than providing statistically significant data.
- Accessing staff who were active in the early phase of the response and who had left was time consuming and difficult. Nonetheless, the team secured sufficient interviews with personnel involved in the early stages of the response and reviewed available exit reports, enabling the team to gain a good picture of the initial phase as well as the overall response.



### **Evaluation Management**

The evaluation is managed by OCHA's Evaluation Unit and the Philippines IAHE Management Group led by OCHA, and comprised of WFP, FAO and UNICEF on behalf of the IAHE Steering Group. This is the first IAHE conducted by the IAHE Steering Group, and it constitutes an opportunity to test out the IAHE guidelines and the IAHE process more broadly. In addition, an in-country Advisory Group<sup>14</sup> was formed to represent in-country stakeholders.

---

<sup>14</sup> Members are USAID, Canada, Japan, and Australia, OCHA, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, ILO, UNDP, National and International NGOs (PINGON), Plan, UNCSAC, Representatives from the Philippines government (DSWD)

### 3. Results: Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by disaster?

*The inter-agency Haiyan response contributed through relevant and timely actions to emergency needs being met. Immediate assistance was appropriately prioritised with key risks such as communicable disease outbreaks, food insecurity, lack of clean water, emergency shelter and protection addressed. Consideration of how best to support people's self-recovery and other early recovery measures have been slower and achieved a lower rate of success so far, partly because of the need to tailor approaches according to geographical area and population group, but also because of resource constraints and unclear institutional jurisdictions. The sustainability of the significant results of the emergency response depends now on the effectiveness of the recovery phase, notably in the restoration of livelihoods, shelter and physical reconstruction of facilities particularly schools and health centres.*

The IAHE considered the first evaluation question concerning results by reviewing the response's effectiveness, relevance and timeliness.<sup>15</sup> This section is structured by:

- Analysis of each objective and its progress to date<sup>16</sup>
- Relevance of the response
- Timeliness of the response
- Key lessons and issues

All outcome and output data available in September 2014 is attached in Annex 8.1<sup>17</sup>

#### 3.1 Strategic Response Objective One

**SRO1: Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build for food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services.**

**Outcome: Percentage of target population with a minimum household food consumption score >42**

**Outcome: Level of rice, maize, vegetable production compared to a normal year in affected areas**

**Outcome: Prevalence of global acute malnutrition in girls and boys 6-59 months**

##### *The approach*

The immediate response to meet food needs in the first days was overwhelmingly local, with communities sharing available food amongst themselves until the first external supplies arrived from local government. It took 4-5 days for the first supplies from outside to arrive - which included high

<sup>15</sup> This focus was agreed in the inception phase.

<sup>16</sup> While this report comments on all objectives in a general sense, it was agreed, at the inception phase, that the team would look more closely at the results of the five clusters that make up the vast majority of expenditures: food security and agriculture, shelter, early recovery and livelihoods, protection and WASH. Constraints including changing targets and lack of data availability on outcomes and targets are detailed in the methodology section.

<sup>17</sup> Outcome and output data was provided by OCHA, and was being collected for the third and final periodic monitoring report. OCHA validates data with the agencies and clusters supplying it.

energy biscuits and specialized nutrition products for vulnerable children and mothers - and ten days or more before the international food pipeline was fully established 'at scale' and reaching communities. Once up and running, there was good cooperation between the inter-agency response and government distributions, including in efforts to reach more remote inland and island areas. The military assets proved vital for surveillance, food drops and gaining access to remote areas.

One distinctive feature of the food security response was the scale of cash transfers. As early as November, cash transfers were being set up in Western Visayas where market conditions supported this approach. By April, all major inter-agency food distributions ended and WFP closed its food pipeline. The government continued targeted food distributions until July, and carried out assessments to target further distributions. A second distinctive feature was the early focus upon supplying certified seed and related agricultural inputs, so that farmers could maintain their usual production cycle and meet regional food needs through normal market supply from April 2014 onwards.

### ***The results***

The inter-agency food security response targeted 3 million people out of an estimated affected population of 5.6 million. The latest data indicates the response successfully achieved its targets. The percentage of households with a minimum household food consumption level greater than 42 was 92.7%, up from 68% in December 2013<sup>18</sup>. The prevalence of acute malnutrition is 4.1% in regions VI, VII and VIII - deemed globally acceptable. IAHE interviews with the Department of Agriculture also indicated that some crop yields in the affected areas are up as a result of timely planting and increased use of fertilisers. There was no indicator developed or tracked to see if the approaches that were used successfully stimulated markets. MIRA 2 observed the re-emergence of markets at the six week point, but there is no evidence to attribute this to the response.

In terms of outputs, blanket supplementary feeding targets were surpassed, but nutrition cluster targets for counselling on breast-feeding and infant/young child feeding only reached half the planned numbers, due partly to lack of capacity in government services and local partners. Targets for supplementary feeding for severe and moderately malnourished children were also not reached. However, this was in part due to initial over-estimation of the prevalence of severe malnutrition, based on outdated baseline data from government sources. Additional positive results of the humanitarian response included the establishment of a more robust nutrition surveillance system, and more reliable data on the prevalence of moderate and severe malnutrition.

**Key finding: Food security cluster partners contributed to meeting immediate food needs and avoiding nutritional deterioration. The role of the community and local government in meeting food needs in the first few days highlights the importance of preparedness measures. The cluster adoption of a mixed response combining cash and food was appropriate. The sustainability of these positive food security findings is now largely dependent on how effectively livelihoods are restored. Given the high rates of poverty in the Visayas before Haiyan, any success is vulnerable to future shocks.**

---

<sup>18</sup> The food consumption indicator is a proxy for household food security and is a measure of dietary diversity, food frequency and relative nutritional importance of the food consumed.

### 3.2 Strategic Response Objective Two

**SRO 2: Families with destroyed or damaged homes, including the displaced population, attain protective and sustainable shelter solutions.**

**Outcome: Number of households that sustained house damage that are currently living in safe, habitable emergency shelter**

**Outcome: Number of households that sustained house damage from the typhoon that are currently living in safe, habitable dwelling**

**Outcome: Percentage of population living in displacement sites with improved shelter, living conditions and displacement management**

#### *The approach*

In the first week, the vast majority of immediate shelter needs were met by family and friends. An estimated 3.8 million displaced people stayed with family and friends, while 384 evacuation centres provided temporary shelter for over 100,000 people. The speed with which people affected by the typhoon returned home and started to rebuild their homes or at least a make-shift shelter was notable.

The inter-agency response is limited to the provision of emergency and transitional shelter, while the government has responsibility for permanent housing solutions (limited to IDPs in displacement centres whose homes were destroyed and in unsafe areas). At the same time, the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster provided support for camp management and improvement of living conditions in evacuation centres, tent cities and bunkhouses. No shelter support was offered to families living with other families.

The initial focus of the shelter strategy was on support to self-recovery, primarily by supplementing emergency tarpaulin distributions with more durable roofing solutions in the form of 'shelter self-recovery' (SSR) kits.<sup>19</sup> A second element of the strategy was support to transitional shelter in temporary settlement sites. As well as the direct provision of assistance, shelter cluster activities included information campaigns promoting safe-building measures, the establishment of common standards for self-building and agency interventions, monitoring of the shelter situation through regular, systematic assessments, and advocacy on behalf of displaced populations who continue to remain vulnerable.

#### *The results*

The SRP targeted 300,000 households for emergency assistance, 500,000 for housing self-recovery, as well as aiming to ensure that 100% of people in displacement sites have adequate shelter and basic services.

In terms of outputs, the inter-agency response surpassed its targets in the emergency phase with distributions of tarpaulins and tents (though this was with a reduced level of assistance than that planned i.e. one tarpaulin rather than two, so in effect this is on track with the original target); with the reach of information campaigns; and with the allocation of shelter kits. All displacement sites were fully staffed and gaps in service have been effectively monitored and followed up.

---

<sup>19</sup> CGI (corrugated galvanized iron) sheets, nails, tools, hurricane straps, timber



The recovery-oriented targets of the shelter sector have much lower levels of success, with only 24% of the target number of households demonstrating safety features;<sup>20</sup> 61% of households have a dwelling considered as adequate;<sup>21</sup> and only 27% of the target number of households have a durable roofing solution. Overall, less than 50% of IDPs have a sustainable return or relocation site. Monitoring by cluster partners in the first three months observed that household self-build efforts were usually “building back worse” with potentially dangerous dwellings being rebuilt. Monitoring data showed that, by August 2014, over two-thirds of the population still believed they could not cope in meeting their shelter needs without external assistance.

**Picture: Makeshift shelter used by a family for weeks after the typhoon**



At the time of the IAHE, 5,083 individuals remain in tents or evacuation centres and 19,702 individuals in transitional shelters (bunkhouses) making a total of 24,785 (5,441 households). There is also concern for 95,000 households living in unsafe or makeshift shelter though the extent to which this is caused by Haiyan cannot be assessed, many were in poor quality shelter before the typhoon<sup>22</sup>. While everyone is optimistic that the IDPs in tents and evacuation centres will have a transitional shelter by the end of November, the bunkhouse populations will likely remain there for some time, possibly one or two years, pending the construction by the government of “permanent shelter” making a total of 5,441 households (24,785 individuals) a remaining humanitarian need. It is important to note that at the time of the IAHE field visits the government had not yet started its own emergency shelter programme at scale. With insufficient resources to meet all the needs, the cluster has constantly wrestled with finding the balance between quality and coverage, in the absence of a government programme to address the needs.

---

<sup>20</sup> Safe being defined as percentage of households exhibiting one or more observed construction features that will reduce the risk of catastrophic failure (wind, storm surge, seismic) - shelter cluster definition.

<sup>21</sup> Percentage of households exhibiting one or more design features that promote privacy (partitions) and security for the family (lockable door) - shelter cluster definition.

<sup>22</sup> Report from the Philippines HCT: Analysis of Remaining Humanitarian Needs from Typhoon Haiyan as of 31 August 2014 (14 October 2014).

Consistent with the Accountability to Affected Population (AAP) community feedback,<sup>23</sup> the IAHE region VI survey and community consultations found low levels of satisfaction among evaluation participants regarding shelter assistance.

Key challenges facing the shelter cluster included:

- a) Lack of high quality materials to support self-building approaches that met safety standards.
- b) Lack of clarity regarding permanent relocation solutions for IDPs.
- c) Shifting government policy regarding support to people living in the coastal zone deemed unsafe by the government.
- d) Problems of land tenure, services and livelihood opportunities at numerous “transitional” settlements, typically semi-durable low-cost housing developments built with humanitarian funding on land that has been borrowed or leased for a limited period, and from which the IDPs could be evicted at a future time.
- e) Funding for the shelter cluster has been low, with only 43% of its budget covered. However, the presence of over 30 shelter actors operating outside of the SRP suggests that considerable funds are being invested in shelter through different channels.
- f) Shifting Government policy on its own shelter programmes.

Despite these many challenges, the inter-agency response on shelter has several **key success stories**:

- Advocacy on bunkhouses helped improve conditions for IDPs, particularly in terms of space allocation and WASH facilities.
- Advocacy on the “unsafe” zone policy helped to clarify ambiguities and unblocked services to some highly vulnerable populations.
- Key information tools were developed, to support best practices in construction and repairs by agencies and self-recovery efforts. With wide-reaching communication campaigns, these reached most affected populations - though results in the REACH survey of the safety of housing suggest there is significantly more to do to support their application.
- The Shelter cluster contracted a third party, REACH, to conduct periodic assessments which coincided to match the PMR cycle, and as a result the Shelter cluster was able to provide very solid data on the quality of construction and on the evolving character of shelter needs, even in the absence of a clear count of the scope of the needs.

---

<sup>23</sup> OCHA set up a system to collect feedback from communities on the response (see 3.6.2).



**Key findings:** The inter-agency response was effective in meeting the emergency shelter needs of a significant portion of the affected population. It has supported the affected population to attain better shelter solutions, particularly through management of displacement centres, provision of services and advocacy for good conditions and rights of IDPs including in displacement centres and relocation sites. A focus on self-build was an appropriate response in a country where self-recovery rates by households are rapid.

Shelter needs remain for both IDPs and people who have returned to their places of origin in wholly inadequate shelter. 5400 households remain in tents, evacuation centres and transitional shelter (bunkhouses). An estimated 95,000 households remain vulnerable to future shocks, particularly this typhoon season, due to the poor quality of their shelter or location - though many of these 95,000 are likely to have been in poor quality shelter before Haiyan. An unknown number of families are living temporarily with other families and are not supported by the shelter cluster.

### 3.3 Strategic Response Objective Three

**SRO 3: Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries.**

**Outcome: Percentage reduction of affected people in vulnerable employment (Includes own-account workers and contributing family workers as defined by ICSE)**

**Outcome: Percentage of affected women and men in rural areas who have regained pre-typhoon livelihoods (farming/fisheries)**

#### *The approach*

The main components of the inter-agency livelihoods strategy are threefold: (a) emergency employment; (b) skills training; and (c) focussed training and material support to farmers and fisher-folk, including inter-cropping, seeds and tools, and distribution of fishing boats and equipment. The vast majority of the livelihood strategy implementation to date, particularly for non-agricultural livelihoods, has been through emergency employment.

After three months, following the OPR recommendation, the early recovery and livelihoods strategy was revisited. Inter-agency discussions held jointly with the government correctly analysed some areas for closer attention, including: identifying priority groups; potential risks of oversupply of skills which planned training programmes would provide;<sup>24</sup> and the importance of a focus on activities that dovetail the early recovery response with more sustainable economic development plans and the UNDAF. This analysis has taken quite some time to translate into action, with skills development activities only beginning at scale very recently.

In relation to agricultural livelihoods, a longer term strategy for the recovery of agricultural livelihoods is now well under way, led by the two relevant government units under the Ministry of

<sup>24</sup> Exacerbated by a lack of data on labour markets since Haiyan

Agriculture - Philippines Coconut Authority (PCA) and Bureau for Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR). Farmers face particular challenges, due to continued problems of debris and the time for tree crops to reach harvest, particularly coconut crops that take 5-8 years. Support to restocking livestock and non-rice crops has been slower to be provided, and while considerable numbers were assisted with rice seed in the first phase of distributions, needs for inputs continued well into 2014. The fisheries strategy has not been without its challenges either, notably in targeting boat and gear distributions accurately. A thorough assessment led by BFAR is helping to address this issue. Partners agree that the full results of current and ongoing inputs to agricultural livelihoods will not be seen until 2015.

Coordination challenges have affected the development and implementation of the livelihoods strategy. Two separate clusters, early recovery and livelihoods (ERL), were brought together into one cluster in the response. Responsibility for agricultural livelihoods has not always been clear with overlap in interventions from the ERL and food security and agriculture (FSAC) clusters. Added to this, the ERL cluster has achieved low levels of funding, with only 33% coverage at the time of the closure of the SRP. It is not clear what are the targets and anticipated results of early recovery in relation to sustainable livelihoods within the timeframe of the SRP, beyond the provision of emergency employment.

In addition, delays in implementation of the government livelihoods strategy have made linkage to this difficult. The GPH approach to livelihoods as outlined in the RAY describes measures to restart agriculture, provide short-term employment including emergency employment, skills training, preparation for self-employment and to "re-energise enterprise" as a key to promote employment. In January 2014 the livelihoods cluster was established under the government rehabilitation and recovery coordination structure OPARR, which began work to further elaborate its livelihoods strategy. However, the pace of implementation of this has been slow.

### ***The results***

Unfortunately, the IAHE was not able to find complete outcome level data for livelihoods. Data showed there were some reductions in the vulnerable employment figures as shown by the Labour Force Survey, but data was only available for Central and Western Visayas, not eastern Visayas (Region VIII), however attribution of this change to the inter-agency response is not possible. Furthermore, only 26% of rural livelihood assets are identified as restored, against a target of 77%. The fact that livestock restocking and non-rice crops lagged behind rice seed distributions is likely to have contributed to this. That said, the emergency employment data shows very high levels of people employed during the response, and that this contributed to reaching targets for rehabilitation of public infrastructure, such as drainage canals, roads and public spaces. The MIRA 1 suggested that emergency employment could provide people with the means to buy materials to rebuild their homes, livelihoods and support the local economy, but post-distribution monitoring, agency reviews and IAHE interviews and community consultations consistently found that while cash-for-work interventions successfully enabled people to meet their basic needs, but rarely were adequate to enable the rebuilding of shelter and livelihoods. The evidence suggests that cash for assets, and those cash transfer programmes (CTPs) which included elements of training such as carpentry, have been more successful in supporting people to regain livelihoods. However, overall, the IAHE found that people were also experiencing higher levels of debt, having struggled to rebuild their own shelters and livelihoods.

**Picture: Sari sari store re-opened by female owner three days after Typhoon Haiyan, using high interest credit to re-stock and repair**



The IAHE found that, since the early stage of the response, there had been consistent calls from people to move from a reliance on emergency employment to support for more sustainable and customised solutions, including access to credit, support for micro-enterprise and skills development. Indeed, the sustained nature and level of cash for work schemes has had some negative impact on labour markets, with some employers reporting a lack of available labour for certain agricultural tasks earlier this year and increases in daily wages. The extent of these distortions is unclear and seemed to be levelling out by the end of the SRP period.

Support to fisher-folk has been complex, with so many donations of boats from independent donors that the Bureau for Fisheries asked for these to be stopped in January 2014. At the same time, there was inadequate distribution of fishing nets and other equipment. As a result, the IAHE community member interviews heard that income from fishing (without the gear) was only at 20% its pre-Haiyan levels. Overall, evidence from IAHE focus group discussions and community consultations suggests livelihoods have recovered to between 15-50% of pre-Haiyan levels. This is in line with other data available from agencies' own monitoring, but to confirm these estimates would require much greater investigation.

While the IAHE heard from across communities of their continuing need for sustainable livelihoods, there are gender differences. Higher levels of debt have been found among women borrowing both for household expenses and to restart livelihoods. IAHE consultations confirmed AAP findings that women and also older people reported a continued need for more tailored livelihood support than has so far been available.

**Picture: Fishing household at work in Region VI**



**Key success stories:** the Typhoon Haiyan response emphasised adherence to international labour standards, and ensured a regional minimum wage to worker beneficiaries, as well as personal protective and safety equipment, social protection and health benefits to reduce vulnerability among workers. It is too early to say if this will have lasting effect but it provided an opportunity to increase workers' and agencies' awareness of labour rights.

**Key finding:** Emergency employment was successful in enabling households to meet their immediate needs. Some early interventions to support rural livelihoods were also timely and well-coordinated with government departments, notably the replanting of rice and support to fisheries. There was a need for more customised approaches earlier, particularly for non-agricultural livelihoods and also coconut farmers, and in particular for a move away from cash for work towards approaches leading to sustainable livelihoods. Affected people report high levels of debt.

### **3.4 Strategic Response Objective Four**

**SRO 4: Prevent increases in mortality and morbidity and the outbreak of communicable diseases through immediate access to basic water, sanitation, hygiene and health services.**

**Outcome: Percentage of displaced women, men and children of all ages, with access to basic WASH services to maintain public health**

**Outcome: Percentage of the population that is functioning poorly and is likely to be in need of services, including those with severe or extreme difficulties in functioning in different aspects of day to day life**

## ***The approach***

The inter-agency response included the rapid re-establishment of municipal and community water supplies, emergency sanitation services in displacement centres, communicable disease surveillance, and the re-establishment of treatment and health services, including reproductive health care and immunisation. There was a huge response from foreign medical teams which provided significant support but also placed heavy coordination demands on the Department of Health. Over 150 teams in total responded to Haiyan. Key challenges in the emergency phase were the lack of electricity, particularly for maintaining the cold chain, and problems of access. Particular support provided by the international response to emergency water supplies included the provision of water bladders, trucking operations, a large number of different types of water treatment units, generator sets, repairs of transmission and distribution pipes, distribution of water kits and water harvesting support.

The response went beyond meeting humanitarian needs caused by Haiyan: the WASH strategy used the opportunity to reinforce national policy to prevent pre-existing sanitation and health risks caused by open defecation, and the health cluster adopted ambitious targets for mental health services which went beyond pre-existing health service provision.

## ***Results***

The most significant result that the inter-agency response contributed to was the lack of any major outbreak of any epidemic or disease despite the high risk context. While attribution cannot be determined, the extensive damage to water supplies and health services, the large numbers of IDPs in remote areas and also concentrated in urban areas and evacuation centres, all combined to make the outbreak of communicable diseases a high risk following Haiyan. The range of measures taken by the cluster partners was highly appropriate to contribute to efforts to address these risks.

There is no current data available for the outcomes identified in the SRP. Initial targets were for 3 million people to have access to WASH facilities and 100% of affected population to have access to basic health services.<sup>25</sup> While there has been considerable progress - 61% of municipalities in affected areas had functioning health facilities by April (up from 49% at the end of January) - this figure is still well under target.<sup>26</sup> No update on this figure was available to the IAHE.

Significant successes include:

- The re-establishment of the Tacloban town water supply in the first few days. In the first month, water services in 21 municipalities were restored, serving 600,000 people through the 24 main water service providers.
- The rapid distribution of hygiene kits (over 100k) and water kits (65K) within the first month.
- The rapid provision of healthcare for people in the affected areas, especially providing support for women's reproductive healthcare including obstetric and neo-natal care, trauma care, mental health and psychosocial support, chronic conditions and infectious diseases.
- The establishment, by February, of functioning health facilities at pre-typhoon levels in 49% of municipalities.

---

<sup>25</sup> Defined as at least 5 health centres per 10,000 people - later revised to 2.89

<sup>26</sup> Equating to 1.78 facilities per 10,000 people, well below the original target of 5 (which itself was revised to 2.89)

- The rapid gearing up and strengthening of the Philippines emergency communicable disease and epidemic surveillance systems, including training and equipment for staff.
- Coordination of over 150 foreign medical teams.

Unplanned, longer-term results include a national level debate on an expanded primary health care package for all Filipinos across the country, independent of income level. In addition, the government is looking into a national mental health care programme building on the experience in Haiyan. Finally, the Department of Health now has improved information on the health facilities across the affected regions, and stronger skills in mapping these.

However, challenges remain: there are concerns regarding WASH facilities at bunkhouse sites (originally designed only for six months and which are likely now to be occupied for much longer) and in the “No Build Zones” in coastal areas; and the rate of restoring health facilities has been slower than planned. It is clear that, after initial emergency response mechanisms were put in place, the rehabilitation of services for the long-term has seen a slower rate of progress.

**Key finding:** The activities to prevent outbreaks of disease were successfully implemented, targeting priority areas for intervention such as municipal water supplies, immediate treatment, surveillance and immunisation. Different healthcare needs of women and children were addressed. Pre-positioning of goods was effective. There was a rapid shift from emergency response to early recovery measures, with an emphasis on community-based sanitation approaches and rehabilitation of healthcare services.

Emergency response targets were effectively reached but progress against recovery targets has been slower. Concerns remain for sanitation conditions in bunkhouses. At the same time the response has provided an opportunity to achieve progress in relation to pre-existing challenges, for instance in sanitation and mental health care services.

### 3.5 Strategic Response Objective Five

**SRO 5: Affected people quickly regain access to community and local government services, including basic education and a strengthened protective environment.**

**Outcome: % of affected people who express that they feel secure**

**Outcome: % of girls and boys with access to adequate primary and secondary education**

#### *The approach*

Key components of the strategy to address the education objective included working closely with the Government on classroom reconstruction, teacher training and back-to-school campaigns. This was complemented in the protection domain by the conversion of child-friendly spaces into daycare and temporary learning spaces, after the initial needs for psychosocial assessment and family reunification were met.

The protection cluster partners provided protection training for key service providers, including the police and DSWD. A key intervention was support for the locating or re-issuing of key documentation vital for access to benefits and school enrolments. A cross-sectoral approach was taken by

protection cluster field teams, for instance in Samar they prioritised difficult to reach areas and provided feedback on a range of concerns to operational agencies. Practical assistance was provided through the provision of solar lighting. Agencies also focused on strengthening child protection mechanisms and protection from trafficking and gender-based violence, through the strengthening of referral systems and measures such as the establishment of women friendly spaces and counselling and advisory services.

### ***The results***

With regard to protection, no data was available to the IAHE to show progress at the outcome level, though the protection needs assessment in May shows a slight *increase* in reports of feelings of insecurity since MIRA 2. Women, older people and families living with other families were identified as the groups most at risk. The assessment found far higher reports of protection problems among displaced people than other affected people. Recent feedback through AAP mechanisms shows that communities still express feelings of vulnerability, especially with the beginning of the typhoon season and ongoing shelter and livelihood needs.

Output monitoring shows excellent progress in most areas particularly in: provision of training on protection guidelines; child protection and gender based violence services; protection monitoring visits; and ten of the targeted fifteen municipalities have functional gender-based violence (GBV) referral mechanisms. On the education side, after initial high levels of re-enrolment, the rehabilitation of classroom and learning spaces, and the provision of learning materials, there are lower rates of success for children's participation in structured activities, and training for teachers on emergency-related subjects. Though classes resumed immediately, protection issues were raised for both IDPs and students. Some schools were still occupied by IDPs even when classes resumed, resulting in tensions between the IDPs and the students.

In terms of identification of risks, the IAHE found that protection risks were well identified and pursued for displaced populations, in particular documentation issues, and risks relating to relocation, no-build zones and bunkhouses. The cluster has flagged the importance of resolving land tenure for IDPs moving to transitional settlement sites and/or back to unsafe zones, and has been very active in the inter-cluster working group taking forward advocacy in this area. However, solutions to these do not seem to be in sight yet. Earlier attention to property and land rights would have been beneficial.

The focus was appropriately directed to more remote areas and displacement centres (evacuation centres, bunkhouses, tent cities) at higher risk and vulnerability. There is the potential that insufficient attention was accorded to families living temporarily with other families. In protection needs assessments, the elderly were considered to be at higher risk than children, but there is little evidence of elderly-focussed needs assessment or programming.



**Key findings:** There was good early identification of some key issues and risks. Good progress in the provision of temporary learning spaces and materials has helped rebuild sense of "normal life" for children. Strong protection measures were put in place correctly identifying key risks particularly for women and children but possibly overlooking the elderly and people living with other families. In some instances, measures have gone beyond returning services to pre-Haiyan levels, for example in relation to GBV referral pathways. There is slow progress in the government's permanent rebuilding of schools, which may put the temporary facilities under strain. Key outstanding protection concerns centre on the 5,400 households still displaced with no clear relocation plans.

### **3.6 Relevance**

#### **3.6.1 Relation to needs**

While most clusters did initial rapid assessments which often focused on the extent of damage, deeper assessment and planning rapidly moved to agency- and project-specific processes, resulting in a lack of overall comprehensive needs assessment of the sort needed to set baselines and to inform the more precise location of needs. A baseline study for WASH was carried out only in April 2014, and for Protection in June 2014. Shelter, food security and livelihoods had no comprehensive door-to-door needs assessments (Annex 8.2 holds more information on the needs assessment processes undertaken for each objective). Despite the generally weak link between assessment and planning, the IAHE found that the SRP objectives, strategy and activities on the whole were relevant to the needs of the population affected by Haiyan, although insufficient emphasis was placed on planning, advocacy and funding for livelihoods and shelter.

IAHE community consultations found that, on the whole, communities considered the type and content of assistance for emergency response to have been appropriate. The IAHE survey found that women and disabled people were more critical of the assistance in terms of its timeliness and the extent to which it had helped them cope with and recover from the disaster. Communities in urban areas recommended greater use of cash rather than commodities, and earlier support to livelihood training and support for micro-enterprise. Communities repeatedly highlighted their need for more and earlier support to help them move from dependency on emergency employment to more sustainable livelihood and shelter solutions. Thus, while the objectives were relevant, some elements of the strategy - in particular its pace of implementation - did not meet community expectations.

#### **3.6.2 Accountability to Affected Populations**

A significant feature of the Haiyan response was the attention to Accountability to Affected Populations and Communication with Communities (CwC), two related processes intended to enable community participation in the design and monitoring of assistance in order to increase its relevance and effectiveness, as well as accountability. Communication needs and preferred communication channels were assessed as part of the MIRA1, and this supported optimization of communication strategies. CwC and AAP were boosted in this response by the EDGs' adoption of an AAP Plan of Activities, and by the deployment of successive OCHA CwC and AAP advisors to the field and pre-existing in-country CwC capacity. The IAHE found high levels of attention to accountability among




agencies, with multiple communication channels, including community committees, listening exercises, hotlines, monitoring processes, complaints boxes, specific outreach projects such as radio programmes providing information, and also opportunities for questions and answers from communities to agencies through radio or text. The consultation processes took gender differences and other community dynamics into account, and set up means for men, women, older people and children to input separately.

**Picture: Feedback mechanisms set up by agencies**



Somewhat late in the response, systematic OCHA-coordinated community feedback processes were initiated, and these provided non-agency specific mechanisms to gather community feedback on conditions and assistance, which was then analysed and fed back to the relevant agencies, clusters and, if necessary, the HCT for further action and follow-up. The IAHE found evidence that this feedback did influence the activities of agencies and clusters, although this consequence was not usually transmitted back to the originating communities - so the affected populations themselves could not see the whole feedback loop at work. The AAP/CwC feedback loop is shown below.

**Figure 1. Community feedback loop**



The IAHE identified three key areas for improvement in AAP:

**a) Start and scale up earlier** - the response would have benefitted from the establishment of a response-wide, community-level feedback mechanisms at an earlier point, which would have enabled more community participation in the design of response and early recovery programmes.

**b) Feedback to communities** - the communities consistently reported to the IAHE that they got no response to their complaints. The inter-agency response did make good use of the After-Action Reviews coordinated by OCHA to share community feedback with government officials.

**c) Clarify the relationship between Communication with Communities and AAP** - CWC and AAP started with overlapping mandates and parallel structures in the Haiyan response, but in the end they combined to work together in a more integrated way. The IAHE found there is sufficient common ground for the two areas to be brought together for greater effect. This would be particularly important in a less well-resourced response, where the same people often combine both functions together with monitoring and evaluation.<sup>27</sup>

### **3.6.3 Beneficiary targeting**

The most frequent complaint heard by the IAHE in community consultations related to beneficiary targeting. After blanket distributions of initial food assistance and NFIs, the IAHE found that agencies (including those which operated outside the inter-agency response) used a range of methods including:

- a) Poverty approach - using government data based on who was already part of the government social protection programme (the 4Ps or Pantawid Pamilya Pilipino Program)
- b) Poor and newly-vulnerable approach - using government 4Ps data and supplementing this with agency's own assessments of "new vulnerable"
- c) Poor and needs approach - using lists drawn up by barangay captains
- d) Validated needs approach - using agency's own criteria for beneficiaries and identifying them often with community or barangay council involvement
- e) Community priorities approach - engaging communities in targeting e.g. through comment on initial beneficiary lists. This approach was seen more frequently in later assistance
- f) Prior relationship approach – there were some instances where programmes targeted specific stakeholders, for example affected employees of a company or of an organization; members of a local saving institution for small loans; or members of a religious community.

Communities were generally unhappy with any type of targeting, arguing that they were all victims and therefore all needed assistance, and additionally that it was not traditional to exclude people in the community from assistance. In particular, community dissatisfaction was strongest about agencies' use of different approaches to selection, noting that it was not always clear what criteria were being used and that there was a lack of community participation in defining the criteria. Many people were critical of certain criteria, seeing them as too blunt (for example, assistance for multi-child families where other families with fewer children were known also to have great need). At the same time, both local government and communities also pointed to the politicisation and perceived abuse of assistance by some barangay officials, and thereby confirmed the value of independent

---

<sup>27</sup> The CwC and AAP working group sees a close inter-relationship between CwC as a mechanism to mainstream AAP, and that AAP strengthens CwC's efforts to empower affected communities. The working group advocates for the mainstreaming and merging of AAP and CwC at the operational level for future emergency responses.

assessment. Despite efforts for more harmonised approaches to targeting, such as the inter-agency guidance produced on this (though not until February 2014), there was a strong overall message from communities on the need for more consistency and transparency in targeting approaches.

#### **3.6.4 Differentiation of needs**

A key factor influencing the relevance and effectiveness of assistance is the extent to which it can take account of the different needs of the affected population. Response measures to address this included the provision of gender advisors, AAP processes and protection mechanisms, all of which highlighted the needs of particularly vulnerable groups. There were also significant initiatives to highlight the perspectives of particular communities, notably, children's voices were heard through an assessment by an inter-agency group on children's perspectives.<sup>28</sup> Because MIRA 1 was designed to quickly capture barangay-level information rather than data at household- or individual-level, it did not collect sex- and age-disaggregated data. MIRA 2 took more account of gender, and included men and women. More gender-disaggregated data earlier would have been valuable, given that there can be differential impact of a disaster on different groups, and this is an important factor to inform the design of responses.

Nevertheless, OCHA's analysis of the application of the gender marker showed that over half of the projects reviewed had the intention to contribute significantly to gender equality, and that the different needs of boys and girls, men and women had been analysed and integrated into programme design. Some interventions, such as reproductive healthcare services and other measures to address gender-based violence, focussed on women's needs. The IAHE could not validate this, but on the whole it seems that many agency assessments and programme designs used gender-analysis.

The IAHE findings from the survey and community consultations were consistent with the findings of the AAP consultations and other monitoring process. Key findings were:

- a) Vulnerable groups were given some priority in the distribution of assistance. But, with some exceptions, there was limited evidence of programmes being designed to meet the particular needs of vulnerable groups, particularly older people and people with disabilities.
- b) Assessment processes and early consultation processes were limited in gathering the perspectives and needs of particular vulnerable groups. Communities reported that consultations focused more on identifying beneficiaries and whether people met programmes' selection criteria.
- c) Monitoring processes, AAP and IAHE interviews and focus group discussions found there was a need for more tailored approaches to livelihoods, including those of women and older people. Research found women were more likely to be in debt and were more likely to be working in the informal economy.

---

<sup>28</sup> After Yolanda: What Children Think, Need and Recommend by Save the Children, Plan, UNICEF, World Vision, December 2013

**Key findings:**

**The range of approaches used by agencies to identify beneficiaries caused confusion and high levels of community dissatisfaction.**

**There was a lack of systematic approaches to identify and differentiate between different groups' needs at the initial stage of the response. Later, individual agencies built in processes to consult with communities and prioritised assistance to vulnerable groups - but even then there was little evidence of tailoring assistance to meet specific groups' needs.**

### **3.7 Timeliness of responses**

For the vast majority of communities, the first hours and days of the response were local, with communities and then local government providing immediate assistance. Initial inter-agency emergency assistance started arriving on Day 4, and at scale on Day 11 - supported by agency pre-deployments and later the surge capacity. The timeliness of the overall response was greatly facilitated by the deployment of national military assets in the hardest hit areas. The pre-deployment of the UNDAC Team and subsequent deployment of additional UNDAC Members with UN-CMCoord expertise added significant value in liaising with both national and foreign military forces to support humanitarian priorities. The speedy re-establishment of telecommunications for the humanitarian sector was a key contribution to which the GPH, international agencies and private sector all contributed - building on useful preparedness measures and contacts made earlier in 2013.

The IAHE community survey found that initial assistance was timely: 12 out of 19 barangays surveyed received assistance within one week of Haiyan, with more inland barangays reporting less timely responses. This first response was usually the government provision of food. However, subsequent IAHE community consultations across 18 communities in Regions VI, VII and VIII found communities more critical, particularly of the pace of assistance after the initial food distributions. Initial assistance had reached these communities somewhere between 2-14 days following landfall of Haiyan, usually food assistance provided by LGU/MSWD. Generally, in terms of timeliness, and linking closely with communities' views on the overall assistance received, communities were more positive about emergency assistance than early recovery support. IDPs who had been in evacuation centres and were now in bunkhouses and tent cities were generally more positive about the timeliness of assistance. This community feedback is consistent with the IAHE analysis of progress against the SRP objectives and targets, which found that emergency response targets had higher rates of success than early recovery targets. The two particular areas of concern highlighted by communities, women and men, and supported by SRP monitoring data, are the slow progress in early recovery of livelihoods beyond emergency employment, and attainment of more durable shelter solutions both within the community and in terms of knowing whether and where relocation will take place.

**Key finding:** Emergency assistance was timely, aided by the pre-deployments including those of UNDAC and military assets. Communities were more critical of the pace of the provision of assistance for recovery.

### 3.8 Key lessons and issues

**3.8.1 Critical importance of in-country preparedness:** Demonstrated by the important role that early warning systems, directed evacuation, pre-positioning of food, and community self-help with shared food and shelter all played in saving lives.

**3.8.2 Current vulnerability of the response achievements:** To external shocks, such as the current typhoon season, due to: the low state of repair of evacuation centres; depletion of people's coping mechanisms, particularly as a result of unsafe shelter and un-restored livelihoods; and uncertainty regarding the timing of components of the government's longer term recovery programmes.

**3.8.3 Inter-relationship of objectives:** Analysis of the SRP's results makes evident that re-establishing sustainable livelihoods is key for the sustainability of other results, particularly food security and shelter for those who have partially self-recovered.

**3.8.4 Build in speed and flexibility in early recovery response:** The IAHE highlights the need for the inter-agency response to be nimble and able to adapt and customise its responses from an early stage. While blanket, standard responses to food, water, health and shelter needs were appropriate and effective in the immediate phase of the response, more customised approaches quickly became important.

Picture: IAHE community consultation – developing the timeline and discussion on assistance



#### **4. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?**

*The international community's engagement with national and local systems was complex and evolved significantly over time. The magnitude of the disaster and the initial strength of the international response were factors that contributed to an early divergence between international and local planning and coordination processes. The international response and surge mechanisms in particular did not adapt sufficiently to play a complementary role in a middle income country with strong disaster management capacity. However, strong leadership, practical measure such as co-location, former institutional working relationships and a focus on implementation helped bring the national and international systems back together for some very successful cooperation in implementation. Importantly, different planning timeframes and a lack of clarity around linkages between emergency relief and early recovery contributed to difficulties in the coordination and management of transition. The IAHE found limited evidence of effective engagement between the international response and national and local civil society.*

The IAHE focused on five aspects of the international response: (a) needs assessment and planning, (b) coordination and implementation, (c) strengthening of national systems, (d) the challenge of transition, and (e) engagement with national civil society.

##### **4.1 Needs assessment and planning**

The Government and HCT had a good working relationship, having cooperated in a number of recent disaster responses. The establishment, in 2011, of the Technical Working Group, bringing together the key coordination mechanism of the government - the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) - with the HCT, provided a forum to discuss and improve effective coordination on issues related to international humanitarian assistance.<sup>29</sup>

In advance of Haiyan, the Government and HCT worked closely, meeting on 6 November 2013 as part of the preparedness process (preparedness measures are also covered in section 6.1). In the initial days after the disaster struck, there was frequent contact and good operational coordination between the national government and international actors in Tacloban, but when international surge teams and supplies started to arrive at scale, the planning processes of the international community and GPH began to diverge. The Haiyan Action Plan (Flash Appeal or Preliminary Response Plan) produced by 12 November was based on initial government data and interviews with key informants. The first MIRA was conducted without significant Government involvement,<sup>30</sup> and soon afterwards the Strategic Response Plan was developed, approved and released, also without significant Government involvement, although the HCT and HC did encourage liaison by the international co-leads of clusters with their national counterparts - given that Filipino government

---

<sup>29</sup> NDRRMC Member 05 S 2011: members from NDRRMC - OCD, DOST, DOH, DSWD, DILG, AFP, PNP; from HCT - OCHA, UNICEF, OXFAM, IFRC, WFP, IOM.

<sup>30</sup> The Government was invited, but declined to participate, taking the position that the existing approximate needs assessment was sufficient, and that their energy needed to focus upon immediate service delivery. They did participate as informants in key informant interviews.



planning took place at sector level. The SRP was validated with Government cluster leads and line Ministries to ensure that the Government had no objections to its direction.

Reasons for limited Government involvement in the key early planning phases of the international response included: (a) a Government priority on service delivery, (b) the externally-oriented character of the international assessment and planning instruments, (c) the way HPC tools were mostly prepared by surge personnel who were experts in their respective domains but did not have well-established relationships with the national coordination machinery, and (d) the Government was working on its own plan known as Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda, launched on 16 December 2013.

While the international community was working on the HAP, the MIRA and the SRP, the government was undertaking its own planning process, with more of a medium-term emphasis on early recovery. Local government units were instructed to provide initial damage and needs assessments which produced municipal and regional plans by 25th November. These local plans provided the basis for the Government's strategic plan, RAY, which is broken into three separate components. The first two of these

(critical immediate needs, and short-term interventions) loosely correlate with the timespan of the SRP although the scope of the RAY is more at the recovery end of the relief to recovery spectrum.

The separate planning processes continued with the international community conducting MIRA 2 in December, whilst the national Government conducted a PDNA in early 2014, in association with its international development partners, leading to the Government's revised Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan in September 2014.

#### The main components of RAY

US\$ 0.78 billion - critical, immediate needs

US\$ 2.05 billion - short-term interventions (2014)

US\$ 5.34 billion - medium term needs

Total US\$ 8.17 billion

**Key finding: Government data informed the early phases of the international response, but then the international community and the government followed largely separate paths of assessment and planning, each with different emphasis on parts of the relief-recovery spectrum. There is little ownership of the SRP by the GPH, though its contents largely complement the direction of the Government's RAY.**

## 4.2 Coordination and implementation of the international response

The coordination picture across the response has many regional, sectoral and temporal variations. While it is difficult to generalise across the whole response, some clear findings emerge.

### 4.2.1 The cluster system(s)

Both the international community and the Government used the cluster system as their main vehicle for coordination. However, there were differences in the cluster system as established in the Philippines with that which has evolved in the global system. (For full details see Annex 8.3). There were some adaptations made to the cluster system in the Philippines e.g. by incorporating the livelihoods cluster which does not feature in the global cluster system though this proved problematic in finding a coherent approach to livelihood support across agencies and clusters. The

cluster system rolled out in the Haiyan response placed considerable strain on government departments, notably on DSWD, which was expected to assume leadership of five clusters while also serving as the primary delivery channel for GPH relief. While this large and dual role was one taken on by DSWD in earlier disasters, the scale of the Haiyan disaster and response created a huge strain for one department.

The cluster system in the Philippines has a government lead and international agency co-lead(s) but the respective roles and responsibilities of each are largely undefined. The IAHE found that, at the initial stage, government officials – particularly at the provincial and municipal levels - were very appreciative of international technical expertise and management support to coordinate the scaled-up international assistance. However, this then quickly developed to national structures and systems feeling overwhelmed by international staff, most of whom were new to the country and had not established relationships with their counterparts. While some clusters, such as health, agriculture and education, maintained their national government leadership role with international agencies in support, for most clusters in the initial part of the international response, it was the international cluster co-leads who effectively ran their clusters – especially in the hubs where national capacity was most stretched.


**Finding: there is a relatively good alignment between the national and the international cluster systems. Roles and responsibilities in co-leadership were not clearly defined, nor were they adjusted to the scale of the disaster and response.**

#### **4.2.2 Coordination mechanisms**

There were a number of fora to bring together the international and national responses including: the inter-cluster coordination mechanism led by OCD initially from November 2013 and then DSWD from February 2014; the OPARR-DSWD-HCT series of meetings from January to June 2014; and regionally based inter-agency meetings. However, the IAHE found that parallel processes for coordination were present from the early stage of the response, for instance inter-cluster meetings were held in Manila, Tacloban and Guiuan only for those international agencies involved in the international response. Similarly, the government, at different levels, held their own coordination and inter-sectoral meetings. These separate processes each had their own constituencies and their own logics, but the IAHE found that over time they became too disparate, especially in Region VIII. This divergent trend is illustrated in the figure below.



Figure 2. Government and Inter-agency assessment and planning processes and timelines<sup>31</sup>



A number of factors drove divergence:

- a) the strength of both the scale of the emergency and the international response overwhelmed already stretched government resources
- b) there was limited understanding of each other's systems, particularly among the incoming surge staff (of national system and capacities) and among Government officials (of international systems). While the government system was well understood by government officials at the national level, the cluster system had not been operationalised in these regions before so there was variable understanding of the government system across municipalities, and even less knowledge of the international system at regional level. At the same time, the incoming surge personnel had very limited knowledge of the national disaster response mechanisms and capacity. This lack of knowledge of national systems, combined with a sense of urgency to move ahead with their operations, was often perceived by national counterparts as arrogance and disrespect. Knowledge of national systems that was held in the Manila-based offices of international agencies was not always drawn on by the surge staff in the field
- c) for sound operational reasons international coordination structures were set up in locations near the affected areas, even though these did not always coincide with the government's centres of authority e.g. in Guiuan rather than Borongan in Eastern Samar; Roxas rather than Iloilo for Region VI

<sup>31</sup> The figure illustrates the processes with the main events, actors and processes undertaken by the government and inter-agency response in assessment and planning which are described more fully in the text above.

- d) there was a lack of clarity regarding who was the decision-maker in some settings causing confusion. For instance, the NDRRMC, in effect, relocated to Tacloban in the early stages of the response, overriding the regional, provincial and city structures
- e) perceptions of politicisation of government priority-setting and complexities of local politics notably in Region VIII led some international actors to “go it alone”
- f) the absence of provincial and regional contingency plans limited the national authorities’ ability to direct international assistance
- g) the independence of the humanitarian community was important to maintain, but also an irritant. For example, the HCT created tensions with its advocacy for improved standards of bunkhouse accommodation, for a clear no-build zone policy and for respect of the rights of people awaiting relocation

#### **4.2.3 Regional and sectoral variations**

Despite the pressures of Haiyan, the IAHE also found numerous examples of successful cooperation, and noted the eventual re-convergence of the national and international coordination systems. This pattern varied between regions and sectors. For example, in region VI, early close coordination was co-led by the Provincial Governor and RDRRMC, with OCHA and the Canadian military contingent in support. The Roxas experience became a model structure for national-international cooperation, as well as civil-military coordination. Politically, Region VIII and particularly Tacloban is far more complex than Regions VI and VII, which hampered a set-up similar to those in Cebu and Roxas.

#### **Co-operation in Cebu, Region VII**


In Region VII, the international response was much more clearly located within and under government structures from an early point. The Governor established the Task Force Paglig–on mandated to plan, implement, and monitor rehabilitation programs, projects and activities in the areas of Cebu Province affected by Super Typhoon Yolanda. The Task Force rapidly brought the agencies into a common framework beginning with an 11 December 2013 workshop with UN agencies, INGOs, local NGOs, Government Agencies and Local Government Units, to develop “The Cebu Province Rehabilitation and Recovery Program”. Clusters were established, many with clear leadership by government departments, and strong links were drawn between all clusters and the government’s regional plan.

The IAHE identified key factors enabling closer international-national cooperation:

- leadership by key figures
- practical measures like co-location
- staying out of the limelight: the smaller the scale of the response, and therefore the more limited global attention to regions VI and VII, seemed to provide a more conducive environment for close cooperation and coordination
- less disrupted provincial and regional government structures and personnel, in places where there was less severe typhoon damage.

The IAHE also examined how clusters evolved over time, and identified additional key factors. First, pre-existing cooperation and relationships helped. Coordination was noticeably smoother in sectors where cooperation had a strong track record e.g. in health, agriculture, and education. Secondly, national staff in the international organisations and structures played important roles, due in large part to their knowledge of the national systems. It is noticeable that international-national cooperation improved as the proportion of positions filled by national staff increased, which started to occur after the de-activation of the L3 status as shown in Figure 3 below. And lastly, practical coordination and the creation of customised structures to suit the area and sector helped: for example WASH established a system of municipal-level focal points with representatives from the LGU and an INGO to take responsibility for coordination of activities within that municipality.

Figure 3. Comparison of numbers of international and national staff in response (UNDSS)



**Key findings:** the pressure to diverge is strong. The magnitude of the demands on government services and strength of the international response led to the establishment of separate coordination processes, particularly in areas of intense response activity. While separate processes may have enabled timeliness and met operational priorities for early response, it would have been preferable for there to be more effort to keep parallel mechanisms in tandem, and to bring them together under government leadership as soon as circumstances allowed.

### 4.3 Factors which strengthened national systems

Despite some divergences in planning processes and coordination mechanisms, in *implementation* the response was characterised by close cooperation between international actors and Government at many levels. Some of the best examples of strengthening of national systems were when activities were implemented in partnership. These include:

- a) **Use of national systems, standards and protocols** – for example in adherence to minimum wage standards and labour laws, ensuring that seeds met Department of Agriculture

certification standards, and the use of national health standards (which match SPHERE standards). Investment in and use of national health and nutrition surveillance systems have also served to strengthen them. Using the Government's 4P program as the basis for targeting poor households is another example.

**b) Building on local systems-** There are a number of cases where interventions, in seeking to build sustainability, have given new life to dormant government systems. For example, in some locations the GBV and women-friendly services have catalysed local women to access local government gender and development funds for their longer term support. And in general, the overall response has energized the government's disaster risk reduction and management system, which had a variable pattern of performance. This includes organisations working with Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Councils at different levels right down to the community level. Gaps in structural competencies have also been revealed: for example, in Region VI, revised guidelines are being finalised to deal with international assistance more efficiently.

**c) Investment in national systems** - the latter stages of the international response have seen increasing attention to capacity-building, particularly, but not exclusively, at the municipal level. However, the IAHE also found LGUs weary with the requests for staff to be involved in training and workshops - suggesting the need for more creative approaches to capacity-building. There have been steps to learn lessons and prepare better across government structures, for example OCHA is developing a civil-military coordination training package with the government. Likewise, WFP is working with DSWD to develop facilities which will reduce bottlenecks in food distribution and other challenges experienced in the Haiyan response. Investments include a two year project to establish a network of government disaster response centres equipped for efficient food pack distribution, and improved planning systems that can make quicker decisions between assistance options, i.e. food vs cash choices.

The international response has allocated funds to support government structures e.g. UNICEF support for additional social workers working within DSWD, and USAID/UNDP support for OPARR. However, some of the attempts to build capacity have been blocked by bureaucratic restrictions and inefficiencies: for instance, donations of vehicles have been blocked in some cases, and there are government restrictions on staff numbers stemming from earlier rationalisation processes.

**d) Joint learning** - the After Action Reviews facilitated by OCHA in Regions VI and VIII provided valuable opportunities for the government to hear feedback collected through the AAP/CWC system on the response, and to reflect on its own performance. They concluded with commitments and plans for improved preparedness for future crises, and in some regions government offices are considering adoption of AAP/CWC systems.


There is a note of caution highlighted by the LGUs. AAR reports confirmed reports heard by the IAHE that the scale of the response to Haiyan would cause LGUs problems in future responses, when there would not be the same level of resources to respond, for example with food, cash support and quality of shelter. The concern was that international assistance has created expectations that national authorities could not meet in future.

**Key finding:** Some inter-agency approaches, particularly those building on national systems, contributed to the strengthening of national and local disaster response mechanisms. Attention to these increased after the immediate, emergency response phase, and benefits are particularly evident at local levels. More attention is needed for the strengthening of national and local systems beyond workshops and training.

#### 4.4 The transition from emergency response to recovery

The IAHE found that coordination over the transition to recovery phase was complicated by different understandings by national authorities and the international community of the terms “emergency response” and “early recovery”, and of the boundaries between them.

Figure 4. Emergency response and recovery linkages



The graphic above shows that GPH legislation<sup>32</sup> clearly defines three phases of response, with, most importantly, disaster response ending at the moment that immediate life-saving threats are stabilised. The Filipino perspective has a very short “disaster response” phase and recognizes a fast evolution towards recovery. For the GPH, the scope of humanitarian action ends when the extraordinary displacement and disruption caused by the disaster are ended. There is no concept of early recovery in the Filipino system.

For the international community, while the intention is to consider early recovery from the beginning of the response the IAHE found the focus of activities tended to be on emergency response activities for much of the first three-six months. The international humanitarian response includes early recovery activities so was planned to extend to November 2014 with its associated coordination systems. This approach extends into what the Philippine system describes as recovery, and early recovery.

The SRP was initially designed to be a 12 month plan. The Government's RAY has now been subsumed into the Comprehensive Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, which covers both the early

<sup>32</sup> Republic Act 101211

portion of the response and extends forward to 2017. The SRP and the CRRP focus on different ends of the relief to recovery spectrum, although there is an area of overlap in the middle, and that is precisely the transition zone that has caused some discomfort to both the national and international actors, with national actors feeling a strong sense of sovereignty, and international actors feeling a sense of responsibility towards the affected population, and particularly to the vulnerable core for whom solutions have not yet been identified and made available. Broadly-speaking, some of the frustration expressed by the national government comes from their perception that the international community involvement extended too far beyond the emergency response, and that they were continuing to operate in “emergency mode” and with a largely separate planning and coordination system.

To some extent, the Haiyan response is victim of its own success: the immediate response was effective, the move to begin self-recovery was quick and national systems were capable. But the IAHE found there was a lack of guidance and tools for transition and exit. Somewhat symptomatic of this is that the L3 emergency was de-activated after three months (the first time this has ever happened), but apart from demobilising the surge teams it was not at all clear to people on the ground what this meant for programming – and so programming and its associated coordination machinery pretty much continued unchanged until the Government precipitated closure.

The turning point came with the Government announcement on 4 July 2014 of the end of the humanitarian phase and that OPARR was to become the coordinating body for the next phase of recovery. Most organisations are managing the practical implications of this change, though there are challenges for areas such as shelter and protection that do not fit easily in the new system.

There remains a deeper conceptual tension between the host government's sovereignty and leadership of disaster response in its own country, and the international humanitarian community's principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. This was made more complicated by the absence of a full assessment of the remaining humanitarian needs and the hasty way in which the SRP was ended.

**Key findings: there is a lack of agreed procedures and guidance for HCTs to steer the transition process and evolution of the international-national relationships from humanitarian to recovery phases, particularly in places where there is a strong, competent government experienced in disaster response management.**

#### **4.5 International response engagement with national civil society**

A number of efforts were made by international agencies to engage with national civil society. A national NGO umbrella body - the UN Civil Society Assembly - is a member of the HCT. There were early attempts to deliberately reach out to national NGOs (NNGOs): an OCHA-financed national NGO liaison officer position was operational for some time, and special briefing sessions were convened for NNGOs by OCHA. OCHA raised the issue in inter-agency meetings at regional levels a number of times, where agencies agreed on the need to engage more with national NGOs and local civil society, but struggled to work out a strategy to take it further. OCHA proposed the creation of an Emergency Response Fund with an NNGO focus (as exist in 20 other countries), but donors were not interested.

A complicating factor was the limited capacity of local CSOs. Some international humanitarian agencies with pre-existing NNGO programmes and relationships have continued working with them

throughout the Haiyan period, and there are examples of the Haiyan response being used by them as a vehicle to strengthen local capacities in disaster management. A few national NGOs were able to fully participate in the cluster system but, on the whole, the IAHE heard that there has only been increased participation of national and local NGOs in clusters and working groups recently, with the decrease of international organisations and staff.

Overall, the IAHE heard that often NNGOs felt that they were not trusted (especially financially) by INGOs or UN agencies. Some NNGOs felt the international relationships were “extractive” and not true partnerships. They also struggled with the high turnover of expatriate staff, which meant that durable relationships could not be established. Generally speaking, Filipino NGOs operated separately from the International NGOs and from the HCT system. There was little evidence of new relationships or capacity being built in the humanitarian field, a situation that was well-described by the title of a report written by a consortium of International NGOs: “Missed Again.”<sup>33</sup>

**Key finding: there was limited engagement with national NGOs and civil-society at both national and, to a lesser extent, at local levels. There is little if any evidence so far of the international response contributing to the strengthening of national civil society and its role in disaster management.**

#### 4.6 Key lessons and issues

- There is a need for more flexibility in the international system to modify and fit with national disaster response systems
- At times, when the scale of crisis puts a national disaster response system under intense pressure, some parallel structures maybe needed for a limited period. But there also need to be mechanisms to ensure both national and international systems stay closely in tandem and re-merge as soon as possible
- There is a need for international responders to learn more about national systems before they arrive in country, as well as for the key actors at all levels in the national system to better understand the international response mechanisms
- Transition places particular demands on international-national coordination and was further challenged by differences in understanding of key concepts and phases of emergency response or relief, early recovery and recovery
- In a situation where capable national staff are available, maximise their capacity sooner to reduce the need for international surge personnel less familiar with the context.
- There is a need to consider, in preparedness plans, how to build civil society capacity for disaster preparedness, and its links with national and international responses

---

<sup>33</sup> Featherstone, A. (2014) Missed again: Making space for partnership in Typhoon Haiyan response.

## 5. Coordination: Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?

*Coordination mechanisms were well funded and rapidly established, and the cluster system functioned as planned. While there is some unevenness in the geographical distribution of the response in relation to needs, the IAHE found no evidence of serious, sustained gaps. Cross-cutting issues provide opportunities for more joined up inter-cluster approaches. Cash-based approaches present considerable opportunities but also coordination challenges to ensure positive impacts at individual, household, community and local economy levels, particularly when there are simultaneous CTPS in different sectors addressing different, but inter-linked objectives.*

The IAHE addressed the third evaluation question concerning coordination by considering the:

- coverage of the response
- lessons from the coordination of cross cutting issues<sup>34</sup>
- collective management and leadership of the HCT in relation to transition and collective challenges affecting response effectiveness.

The previous section considered how the international response worked with the government and national civil society. This section is concerned primarily with coordination within the inter-agency response.

### 5.1 Coverage

#### 5.1.1 Geographical coverage

The Haiyan response was a challenge to coordinate: activities took place in three regions (and five main coordination hubs) with a large range of active responders including government, private sector and charitable foundations. The IAHE estimates that at least 84% of the total response did not flow through the inter-agency coordinated systems.<sup>35</sup>

In the case of food assistance, the blanket coverage ensured that assistance reached all affected areas, although community consultations and interviews revealed that some areas waited much

---

<sup>34</sup> In the inception phase, it was agreed that cash, gender and AAP were the cross-cutting issues the IAHE would consider. Some comment is also given here to civil-military and private sector engagement. AAP and gender are dealt with more fully in Section Three. Environment was not an issue focused on in this IAHE.

<sup>35</sup> We approximate the total response at \$2.882 billion. At least \$1.25 billion was allocated for special Yolanda recovery programmes by the Government in the last budget amendment of 2013 and the first budget period of 2014 (as with all these estimated contributions, not all of this was disbursed in the 10 months under review); \$468m reported in FTS as contributions against the SRP (not to Government or to the Red Cross); \$350m reported by the Government of Philippines as received from private donors to the Government of the Philippines; \$336m raised by all the agencies of the Red Cross including ICRC; \$297m reported in FTS as provided to non-SRP partners that are not Red Cross or National Government; \$76m from the Canadian "matching fund" above and beyond their immediate contributions recorded in FTS; \$60m from members of the US Chamber of Commerce; and \$45m to MSF. This very approximate scan does not include funds provided by Filipino Line Ministries or LGUs, donations from the Filipino private sector (which were conspicuous throughout the affected region), costs of the national and international military assets, Haiyan-related remittances (nationally year-on-year remittances rose \$600m in the November-January period), or concessional early recovery loans of at least \$500m provided by Japan and the Multilateral Development Banks.



longer to receive assistance, particularly areas which were more remote or not initially identified as severely damaged. IAHE analysis of all inter-agency activities compared to need,<sup>36</sup> found there was a concentration of activity around coordination hubs and, in Region VI, in coastal areas. Interviews confirmed there were imbalances and that it was difficult to shift agency plans to address these. Agencies told the IAHE they were locked into their plans early on, that they were reluctant to request changes from donors (concerned that a request for a major change would reduce donor confidence in their needs assessment and planning), and also reluctant to target areas which were more difficult to access, for example where there are insurgents in Region VI, because time-consuming liaison would prevent them meeting tight time schedules. A lesson here is for donors to make it clear that programming adjustments are acceptable in the interest of effectiveness and results. However, overall there is no evidence of major sustained geographic gaps.

### **5.1.2 Performance of the cluster system**

Coordination was well-funded with 89% of the SRP coordination budget covered and coordination architecture rapidly established. Most clusters were well-resourced, especially in the initial surge, with national cluster coordinators, information management officers, as well as a number of regional and sub-regional coordination staff. On the whole, those clusters with dedicated cluster coordinators (not double-hatting as agency leads) were more effective, as were those clusters that had pre-established relationships with government counterparts.

One of the main coordination challenges facing most clusters was that the very magnitude and visibility of the disaster attracted high level and sustained attention from the heads of Agencies, nearly all of whom visited the field at least once, and who allocated some of their most senior staff as surge personnel. While, on the one hand, this high level of attention provided the benefits of more resources, the disadvantage was that agency staff in the field were pressed to meet agency demands for profile and performance, and in some cases these vertical agency allegiances prevailed at the expense of horizontal cluster relations. In some sectors, the pressure to report up along Agency lines using Agency templates and metrics also inhibited the collection of cluster-level reporting data using cluster metrics.

### **5.1.3 Tools to support coordination**

The key tool used by clusters to address gaps and avoid duplication was the 3W/4Ws mapping. The IAHE found that agencies considered this a useful tool, particularly on arrival and when designing their programmes. However it was limited, as it only mapped activities to the municipality level and not to barangay level (which would have been time absorbing and challenging given the lack of data on boundaries). But it is at barangay level where the IAHE heard from communities, agencies and local authorities that there was duplication, particularly in the emergency phase when large-scale distributions of food and non-food items were under way. It was not possible to assess the scale of this duplication, nor the extent to which this was due to organisations operating outside of the cluster system. A second significant drawback of the coordination mechanisms was that agencies found them to be time-consuming in their demands for information and for participation in frequent – sometimes overlapping coordination meetings. That being said, there is no doubt that coordination processes managed by staff experienced in coordination improved connectedness and coverage, and enhanced results.

---

<sup>36</sup> Using data on extent of damage and pre-existing poverty See Annex 8.4.

Cluster-wide assessment is another tool to support coordination. All clusters did some initial, rapid assessments in the first weeks of the response, but many were focused on damage rather than needs. Beside the MIRA, UNOCHA made available a prioritization tool to all the clusters in early December. It included primary data on damage, needs and vulnerability at the municipal level.<sup>37</sup> The IAHE found that in terms of assessment, agency and project-specific assessments soon prevailed, using different methodologies and not producing data that can be aggregated. As a result, in most clusters there was little reliable, standardised, primary data on the extent and more precise location of needs and vulnerability. Other than shelter, which contracted out a monitoring process to REACH and which also considered areas of WASH, only in March-April did most clusters begin more detailed sector-wide assessments and baselines studies, with WASH and protection carrying out detailed assessments at this point. But, by this time, planning was complete and there was limited opportunity to change course in light of new evidence.

#### 5.1.4 Quality of coverage

In terms of consistency and quality of assistance, clusters worked to establish and promulgate standards, guided by SPHERE and with country-specific detail for instance in the case of shelter. Agencies and cluster coordinators reported that it was difficult to ensure agency adherence to common standards and approaches given that they have only powers of persuasion, peer pressure and encouragement as leverage. Most effective were those standards which were pre-agreed before Haiyan and harmonised between the international and national systems, for example in health, or when national standards were adopted, such as in the quality of seeds for distribution.

**Key finding: the IAHE found no evidence of serious geographical gaps. There was some concentration of assistance around coordination hubs and signs that the response was slow to adapt to new information on gaps. Coordination mechanisms including data provision for information products were viewed as heavy. The cluster system worked well, although cluster discipline sometimes found itself challenged by agency allegiances. The coordination system struggled to fulfil its role in the presence of so many non-participating organisations.**

## 5.2 Cross cutting issues

### 5.2.1 Cash

The scale of cash-transfer programming in the Haiyan response was unprecedented in humanitarian response. At least 45 agencies working towards the SRP objectives are known to have used cash based responses, and four agencies alone provided \$34 million to 1.4 million Haiyan-affected people. There is no information that comprehensively captures the total distribution within, nor the substantial cash distributions outside, the SRP. Early phase unconditional cash transfers tended to be replaced by conditional cash transfers, usually cash for work or other emergency employment.

A number of factors contributed to the relevance of cash-based responses in the Philippines: (a) the remittance economy meant everyone was accustomed to cash transfers, (b) the system of Financial Service Providers (FSPs) is highly developed, and (c) there is a pre-existing 5-year old GPH cash transfer program including a poverty targeting mechanism (4Ps) supported by the World Bank.

---

<sup>37</sup> Banini, B and Chatainger P. (2014) , Composite Measure for Local Disaster Impact- Lessons from Typhoon Yolanda Philippines. A note for ACAP. [http://www.acaps.org/img/documents/c-140527\\_compositemeasures\\_philippines.pdf](http://www.acaps.org/img/documents/c-140527_compositemeasures_philippines.pdf) . This includes a review of four prioritisation matrices the authors identified as produced by agencies in the response.

The experience of the Philippines illustrates the potential effectiveness of CTPs as a flexible means to support people's self-recovery, as demonstrated by post-distribution monitoring, which shows very diverse expenditure patterns that cannot be easily replicated by in-kind assistance. This gives more power to individuals to manage their own recovery. However, cash transfers for emergency employment (cash for work) tended to be sufficient to meet only immediate household needs, and the appropriate level of cash transfer to support recovery further (without distorting markets) remains an area for further investigation.

The presence of a CTP advisor was found to have been extremely useful in promoting more coordinated approaches to cash across clusters and agencies. However, it is also clear that there is much more to be done to ensure that simultaneous use of cash in various clusters provides maximum impact at household, community and local economy levels.

The extensive use of cash would benefit from much greater research and analysis than was possible in this IAHE. Some areas for further investigation and development include:

- **Identifying the collective impact of CTPs on household recovery** - projects tend to track expenditure patterns and achievement of their own objectives e.g. food security, shelter. However, given that expenditure patterns are diverse, a broader review of cash's impact on the recovery of (a) households, (b) communities, and (c) local economies would be beneficial. This could include impact on labour markets as well, which the IAHE heard had been distorted, though it was not clear to what extent. Stronger monitoring of these dimensions would be valuable in future responses.
- **Linking the meeting of immediate needs to more sustainable livelihoods** - cash is (rightly) used as a modality to achieve different objectives in relation to the SRP, in this case particularly for food security and livelihoods. However while these are inter-related, more research is needed into how support for food security can be shifted to support for more sustainable livelihoods, i.e. beyond emergency employment.
- **Standardisation of monitoring** - aggregating results in the Haiyan response is challenged by the lack of comparability of data - as different agencies report on different units of account (household, family, individual). Standard monitoring systems are needed.
- **Quality standards** - there are no existing quality standards (e.g. within SPHERE) to guide CTP. Groups such as CaLP are working on good practice guides. Further work on this would be beneficial.
- **Dealing with debit and credit** - the Philippines illustrates how quickly people may begin to self-recover but often this is through borrowing money at very high interest rates. The IAHE heard repeatedly of people struggling to cope with their debt. Discussions began in Haiyan about how to respond to this through humanitarian assistance (for example allowing people to apply a new conditional transfer for shelter against debt previously incurred for shelter needs), but much more work needs to be done to consider (a) how assistance can be used to extend credit to people to support their recovery, and (b) levelling the playing field by allowing conditional transfers provided later in the response to be used to pay off loans that were taken for recovery purposes earlier in the response.

- **Linkages with existing social protection mechanisms** - WFP quickly adapted to GPH's 4Ps system and, instead of setting up a parallel system, simply topped up the existing GPH 4Ps allocations. Similarly, UNDP and ILO payments were executed by the LGU treasurer's office. But not everyone did this. There is more to learn regarding how to link effectively with existing social protection mechanisms.
- **The experience of modalities** such as cash highlight the need for very close - ideally integrated planning, implementation and monitoring, to ensure the response contributes to positive results for affected people. This should be explored further.

**Key finding: The scale of the use of cash in the response was unprecedented. It demonstrates the significant contribution CTP can make to a response and recovery, but also many coordination challenges in its use. Further work is needed to develop consistent approaches to CTPs and to understand better how to use CTPs in a harmonised way across clusters for positive response and recovery results.**

### 5.2.2 Private sector coordination

The private sector was a significant player in the Haiyan response.<sup>38</sup> For the first time, OCHA deployed a private sector adviser who provided early briefs for the private sector on their potential role in different stages of the response (produced 19 November). The extent to which private sector actors linked to clusters seems to have varied, and to have been highest in the early stages of the response. The experience of Haiyan highlights a number of issues that could be best addressed through preparedness measures. These include the need to (a) increase awareness in the private sector of humanitarian principles and standards; (b) build mutual understanding in the humanitarian sector and private sector of ways of working together and potential partnership approaches; and (c) the potential of cooperation with the private sector to anticipate and address supply chain problems, as well as to support pre-positioning of key commodities.

---

<sup>38</sup> The term covers a wide spectrum of actors from multi-national companies and their charitable foundations; financial service providers and telecommunications companies which were partners in cash-based responses and communication activities; national private sector groups such as the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation (PDRF), Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP) and Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR) which all play active roles in disaster response, coordinating members' support and also have roles in emergency preparedness, as well as small-scale local businesses directly providing charitable donations in their local community. The PDRF runs its own clusters for shelter, WISH (water, infrastructure, sanitation and health), livelihoods, education and environment. While there is no comprehensive assessment of the private sector contribution to the response it was significant, forming for instance the second largest donor for WFP. The US Chamber of Commerce "Corporate Aid Tracker" indicates that the private sector contributed US\$ 58.9 million towards the response. OPARR anticipates the private sector will play a significant role in the reconstruction and recovery plans.

**Key finding: the private sector played a significant role in the Haiyan response. The presence of an advisor helped facilitate links and understanding between the private sector and humanitarian communities, though there is much work to do to take this further. Key preparedness measures can enable more effective cooperation between the private sector and humanitarian communities in response and recovery, and more work is needed in this area particularly in conducive contexts like the Philippines.**

### **5.2.3 Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination**

Civil-military cooperation played a major role in the emergency stage of the Haiyan response particularly in initial logistics and securing access to remote locations. The GPH welcomed the deployment of foreign military assets from 22 States in the first two months of response. Earlier reviews of coordination found a key success factor was pre-existing professional relationships formed in training, previous deployments and simulations ( Full summary of the review in Annex 8.10). The experience in Region VI of co-location in Roxas City has been universally commended as good practice. In line with the recommendations that came out of the Haiyan UN-CMCoord After Action Review (AAR) jointly organised by OCD and OCHA, OCHA has started work with OCD to develop a tailored Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) training course that specifically caters to humanitarian, civil and military actors in-country. It is envisioned that the training course will be incorporated into the NDRRMC's training program.

**Key finding. Effective humanitarian civil-military coordination made a significant contribution to the speed and effectiveness of the early stages of the response. Key to effective humanitarian-military interaction were investments in preparedness activities which included joint training, simulations and exercises that built professional relationships, mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities, and trust.**

### **5.2.4 Technical advisors**

The Haiyan response saw an unprecedented number of technical advisors dealing with cross-cutting issues: in cash, environment, gender, private sector relations, communication with communities, accountability to affected populations, civil-military relations as well as the inter-cluster coordination function. Over time, these evolved into a team within inter-cluster coordination. The potential of these thematic advisers to consider needs, experiences of assistance and the response across clusters was unique, as they were able to engage with individuals, households and communities as a whole rather than through a sectoral lens. The advisors were mainly recruited externally and were part of international surge mechanisms, but as time went on, they shifted over to increased use of national expertise. Given the cultural dimensions of many of the cross-cutting themes where local knowledge and understanding is vital, the presence of established national capacity in the Philippines will be of great benefit to the efficiency and effectiveness of future responses.

Consistent lessons for effective cross-cutting assistance heard by the IAHE were:

- for technical advice to be very practical and close to the operations (not based in Manila)

- to be clear from the outset about what they can practically contribute to operations and be careful not to draw energy away from operational capacity (for example by minimising demands for time, information and data)
- to coordinate with each other for closer cooperation, evolving into a team as they did over time, within the domain of inter-cluster coordination

**Key finding: cross-cutting approaches enabled the needs, experiences and perspectives of affected populations to be considered as a whole, i.e. beyond a specific sector. New coordination mechanisms are needed to build on this possibility, without placing further demands on already - stretched operational capacity.**

### 5.3 Collective management and leadership

#### 5.3.1 Transition

HCT transition planning began in February, in clusters and at regional level, following a recommendation of the OPR. However, this focussed more on transition of the coordination machinery at regional and cluster levels - the number of organisations and scale of activities to coordinate - rather than on transition of the content of programming taking into consideration the extent to which humanitarian needs had been met or SRP objectives reached. Plans were updated in June. No overall transition plan was produced which mapped out the HCT's transition to the UNCT, nor was there a "remaining needs" assessment by cluster or sector, and a formal agreement with the relevant government agencies of their readiness to take over until later in the year following the closure of the SRP. The IAHE found that agencies had no clear, collectively understood and owned transition plan to guide the evolution of their work under the twelve month plan. Such a plan might have helped in dealing with the complex situation outlined in the previous chapter of the report as the response shifted from emergency response to recovery.

**Key finding: transition planning began in February at a sectoral and regional level which rightly allowed for the different needs and paces of transition in each cluster and region but was not brought together into a collective plan. Transition planning focused more on coordination structures and less on adjusting the response to meet the rapidly changing needs of the affected population. There could have been a more strongly collective HCT-led approach to transition planning, which would have supported organisations to adapt better to a rapidly changing context, both in terms of needs as people self-recovered and in terms of government capacity as new structures were established.**

#### 5.3.2 Dealing with obstacles to effective response implementation

Bunkhouses and land - including relocation to new permanent settlement areas - are major issues which have challenged the implementation of the Haiyan response and cut across clusters, including shelter, livelihoods, protection and WASH, and which required a coherent response from all agencies. Land issues relate mainly to changing government policy on the 40 metre no-build zone, later redefined as an unsafe zone.

Picture: Notice of No-build zone, Region VIII



The HCT did take an advocacy position on the bunkhouse question, which contributed to improvements in the quality of living conditions there. In relation to the unsafe zone, over time and partially in response to advocacy from the HCT based on sound advice developed by an inter-agency working group considering the rights of citizens and legality of the approach, the government has shifted to an approach based on hazard mapping (not yet complete) and local government discretion. These land issues were identified in the SRP and in fact existed and were well known in the Philippines well before Haiyan. The 40 metre no-build policy is a long-standing issue in Filipino disasters, and there is a history before Haiyan of attempts to enforce the zone rule as well as attempts to relocate coastal populations that have often failed because of their involuntary character and the absence of livelihood opportunities in relocation sites. While the HCT advocacy eventually had some positive effect, and the advice produced by HCT was appreciated by agencies working in the field, the decision-making process was slow. The IAHE found that housing, land and property issues should have been given much more HCT policy and advocacy attention early on, and that this would have benefited from a stronger policy push by the HCT.

**Key finding: land was correctly identified as a critical issue at the beginning of the response, however, the HCT was slow to agree on a way to address it. In the end, the HCT did provide this leadership and this had a positive impact on the overall response for affected people.**

#### 5.4 Key Lessons and Issues

- Coordination processes and tools were helpful in guiding agencies to avoid duplication, but were resource-intensive and struggled to deal with the range of organisations working in the Philippines outside of the coordination mechanisms.

- In very high-visibility emergencies, agencies need to maintain cluster discipline within a collective response, and not divert their attention to advancing agency goals.
- Cash provides a key means to support a more integrated approach to support households and communities in emergency response and early recovery but presents coordination challenges.
- HCT leadership in dealing with tough, cross-cutting issues was assisted by the provision of solid, technical advice.
- Successful coordination with other sectors, notably the private sector and the military, is enhanced by effective preparedness measures to build understanding and trust.



## 6. To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?

*The components of the HPC were applied rigorously. Under exceptionally tight timeframes, outputs were produced on time, and of high quality. However, many tools were not widely used for the purposes for which they were intended, and most interlocutors questioned whether the significant effort and opportunity cost invested in them were justified. The SRP, in particular, seems to be ill-suited to the realities and needs of a sudden onset natural disaster.*

The HPC sets out a logical sequence starting with needs assessment, leading to identification of strategic priorities and an overall results framework, from which cluster plans are derived, then projects are developed, and finally costed (Figure 5). In the Haiyan case, some of these steps were truncated (see Annex 8.5 for details of the first six weeks' timeline).

### 6.1 Preparedness

At the time of the Haiyan response, the Protocol on the Common Framework for Preparedness and the Emergency Response Preparedness guidance were both in draft but had not been released. Nevertheless, key members of the HCT were aware of them, and the IASC Sub-Working Group on Preparedness seized the opportunity of the Haiyan response to assess preparedness in Haiyan, with a view to informing the finalisation of the guidance.

In comparison with most situations of sudden onset natural disaster, the Philippines was very well-prepared. The HCT and Government had worked together on a number of simulations and on two ongoing emergency responses (Zamboanga and Bohol earthquake) in the weeks preceding Haiyan, and had benefited from After Action Reviews after Typhoon Bopha. Meteorological early warning systems worked well, and regional communications were strong so that quality regional resources could be pulled in at short notice and pre-deployed to the field. Unsurprisingly, the IASC assessment was that the immediate preparedness was very good, as well as the overall interagency coordination of the initial response. Some areas for improvement were noted however, including an apparent underestimation of the risks and scale of storm surge (most deaths occurred due to storm surge in Tacloban, where local evacuation to safe havens was incomplete when the storm struck), and the need to restock emergency relief supplies as soon as they are depleted (especially if a high-risk weather season is approaching). The main recommendation for the global level was that the “no regrets” policy should be modified to include a more complete package of initial assistance, beyond the rapid mobilisation of key staff. The IAHE was not able to observe these factors directly (although new preparedness work was taking place during the mission in anticipation of future events in provinces that seemed to be underprepared), but has no doubt that preparedness measures combined with the experience of the international and national field teams were important factors in the successful initial response.

### 6.2 The Assessment Tools

The two main assessment tools deployed in Haiyan were a Multi-cluster/sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA -finalized 29 November 2013) intended to capture the scope of needs at community level, and a second MIRA (finalized 20 December) designed to get a more qualitative sense of impacts at household level. In addition, several agencies conducted their own initial needs

assessments. More thorough cluster-based needs assessments were conducted in March-May in some sectors.

MIRA 1 was generally considered to be useful by the international community, including donors, although some actors felt it was too driven by UN agency agendas. It provided data at the provincial level that for the most part confirmed the aggregate planning assumptions that clusters were already using. It provided reassurance to donors and to field actors that the response was aligned with needs, but there was little evidence that MIRA 1 was used by clusters or donors to make targeting or allocation decisions. MIRA 2 was generally felt to have told agencies what they already knew. There was no evidence of the MIRA 2 having shaped action.

**Key finding: due largely to the time pressures of the planning document timetable, assessments were conducted at too general a level, and too late, to usefully inform operational planning.**

### 6.3 The Planning tools

A 6-month, \$301 million, Haiyan Action Plan (Flash Appeal or Preliminary Response Plan) was produced 4 days after the Typhoon made landfall<sup>39</sup>. The IAHE considered the quality of the HAP to be very high. It was used to frame initial planning by the HCT, its six month timeframe was appropriate, the identified financial needs were realistic (generally equivalent to the total amounts of funding raised against the SRP by mid-2014), and the document was widely used by donors to shape their initial pledging.<sup>40</sup>

The Strategic Response Plan was produced 30 days after the Typhoon. It was generally informed, or at least validated, by MIRA 1, but did not benefit from a Humanitarian Needs Overview of the depth that is envisaged in the HPC and in the SRP guidance, which clearly and correctly states that “strategy development follows needs analysis.”<sup>41</sup> Specifically, there was insufficient time to consult in depth with the national government or with the operational hubs, or to consult with communities. Instead, clusters were pressed into developing cluster plans in a week, based upon incomplete data, and the cluster plans became the basis upon which the Strategic Plan was constructed. While understandable, given the circumstances (and the final product is remarkably coherent), the SRP and cluster plans were developed simultaneously, after initial projects had been developed (at the HAP stage), and before cluster needs assessments.


---

<sup>39</sup> Given that the needs in sudden-onset sudden onset, large-scale “natural” disasters are very similar and differ mainly in quantity, it was suggested that the HAP could have been produced even more quickly if there were (a) a globally standard pre-drafted text for sudden onset natural disasters into which an HCT simply has to plug the situation narrative, the contextualized priorities, and the specific variables regarding the affected population and the cluster targets, and (b) if budgetary estimates were based on beneficiary/unit costs (“activity-based costing”), rather than preliminary project proposals.

<sup>40</sup> Somewhat overlooked in the HPC guidance, and considered highly valuable for planners and donors alike in the few days before and after a sudden onset disaster, are the daily Situation Reports. In Haiyan, a Situation Analysis was reportedly drafted by the HCT but not released, as it duplicated information already in the Situation Reports

<sup>41</sup> SRP Guidance 2015

Figure 5. Humanitarian Programme Cycle <sup>42</sup>



<sup>42</sup> <http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/programme-cycle>

With regard to cluster planning, beyond the summaries provided in the SRP, there were few cluster response plans that integrated needs assessment with agency activities and reporting into a coherent cluster-based management framework, and which thereby formed the bridge between the SRP and agency projects. Opinions were divided as to whether operational planning should be done on a cluster or a sub-regional geographic basis, but most interlocutors felt that (a) operational planning at a level below the SRP was a missing link in the response, and (b) that greater investment at that level, ideally following operationally-oriented needs assessment, would have been more worthwhile than the effort spent on developing the SRP.

**Key Finding: it was not possible to follow the HPC planning sequence. The SRP became less of a planning document, and more of a synthesis that brought together, in a single coherent framework, elements of preliminary assessment, cluster planning and agency programming intentions.**

The Strategic Response Plan was appreciated and widely used as a reference by donors, but was not used to determine resource allocation to clusters, agencies or projects. 60% of all funding allocated by donors against the Haiyan appeal was already allocated before the SRP was issued.<sup>43 44</sup>

The SRP's purpose is "to support country-based decision makers". It is a management tool which articulates a shared vision of how to respond to the expressed and assessed needs.<sup>45</sup> The Strategic Response Plan covered a twelve-month period and envisaged supporting recovery through to "sustainability", "self-sufficiency", "restoration" and "strengthened environment,"<sup>46</sup> although many actors argued at the time of drafting that it should have been a six-month document with emphasis on relief and the early end of the recovery spectrum. This tension between an emergency and a recovery focus is evident within the document; it carried through into the construction of the results framework, and into the relationship between the international community and the national government. Perhaps as a result of this uncertainty, the SRP was not fully "owned" by the HCT, and there were examples of HCT members favouring their agency interests over the collective interest of the humanitarian response.

In the absence of a clear and agreed plan for scaling back from L3 status and for shifting programming more firmly into early recovery, there was some confusion as to whether the SRP should be revised at the six month mark (as recommended in the HPC guidance at the time),<sup>47</sup> and there was a lag of several months (depending on the cluster and location) between the recognition of the need to change direction, and actual programming changes. Contributing factors to this were the inflexibility of surge personnel (many working in a three month frame to a pre-established pattern of emergency response), and the reluctance of some agencies to return to their donors and seek agreement for emergency funds to be redirected to early recovery.

In the end, while the pace of recovery took international actors by surprise, many elements of the SRP and of the results framework were overtaken by events. Following a declaration by the

---

<sup>43</sup> FTS, extracted 17 September 2014

<sup>44</sup> Agency websites and press releases

<sup>45</sup> SRP Guidance 2015

<sup>46</sup> SRP strategic objectives

<sup>47</sup> The HCT made the decision, correctly in the view of the evaluation team, that revision of the SRP at the six-month mark would have entailed significant effort for little benefit, and that the re-focussing which had taken place should be reflected in the successive PMRs

Government that the humanitarian phase was over, the decision was taken to end the SRP effective 31 August 2014. While the SRP did explicitly expect recovery to gain momentum over time, the actual speed of recovery was considerably underestimated - despite ample experience from previous typhoon responses in the Philippines. Two factors might have contributed to this oversight: firstly, the fact that the SRP was drafted by a dedicated team of surge experts from outside the Philippines, and, secondly, the momentum of the international fund-raising machinery that was still successfully raising unprecedented resources from the public. While tools can assist in dealing with operational choices, it is important to note that any set of tools need judgement in their application, and that effective operational decision-making by experienced staff remains the key to effectiveness.

**Key finding: in a sudden-onset emergency in a middle-income country with significant experience and capacity for managing sudden onset large-scale disasters, the SRP should (a) have a short timeframe, and (b) anticipate how the strategy and the related coordination machinery would transition to early recovery and local ownership. It needs to be flexible.**

Figure 6. A possible revised HPC planning cycle for a large-scale sudden-onset disaster

Document/ Product	Main audience/purpose of the revised products	New Timeframe	Existing Timeframe
Situation analysis	All agencies and donors: approximate scope and scale of needs	Day 2	Day 2
Strategic Statement	All agencies	n/a	Day 3
Preliminary Response Plan	All agencies and donors (trigger for initial donor funding allocations/broad planning parameters)	Day 4	Days 5-7
SRP	Shorter, more strategic than current template, sets broad objectives and outcome-level results based on small set of tested global indicators, no outputs, cluster plans or projects, updated costing using per capita unit costs not projects	Day 20	Day 30
MIRA/needs assessment	Detailed assessment oriented to support cluster/area planning	45 days (at end of one-month collective assessment process)	Day 14
Cluster work plans/ area operational plans (depending on the context)	Specific cluster or area work plans with true baselines, full results frameworks at output and activity levels, with SMART indicators and targets based on the detailed needs assessments	60 days	Not required, covered by cluster annexes to current SRP sometimes complemented by cluster plans
PMR 1	Initially reporting only outputs and changes in the overall situation	90 days	90 days
OPR	As now	90 days	90 days
PMR 2	True outcome results reported, and additional reporting columns for adjustments to targets in light of current funding expectations, includes analysis of changes in overall situation	180 days	180 days

## 6.4 The Response Monitoring and Results Measurement tools

Under the challenging circumstances outlined earlier, the SRP settled on five, well-considered strategic objectives, each with a set of indicators and targets but many of which were difficult to measure, and the baselines were a mix of pre-emergency and post-emergency figures. The indicators and targets were substantially revised in each PMR. By the second PMR covering February-April (and released in July), the results framework was complete. Unfortunately (from a results reporting viewpoint) the transition to early recovery was well under way just as PMR 2 was finalized, and, because many operations were wound up, clusters combined and hubs closed, there was a critical gap in the coordination and reporting system, resulting in little outcome-level data being available for the third and final PMR. The consequence of this is that, as the SRP is closing, there is a wealth of output data, and almost no outcome-level information against which to assess overall programme performance.

The measurement of results in Haiyan was further complicated by six factors: (a) the evolution of indicators and targets over time meant that the goalposts were constantly moving; (b) due to the early wind-up of activities, reporting became so inconsistent that the levels of data aggregation evolved over time, from municipal to provincial to regional over the three PMRs; (c) some agencies had dual reporting frameworks: agency reporting (aligned with the agency/country programme and with agency/global reporting) and cluster reporting - and when pressed the agency reporting was given preference; (d) PMRs did not account for the respective underfunding of activities – although it was suggested by the country team that an additional column could be added to the reporting matrix to reflect resource-adjusted targets; (e) some clusters reported results of non-SRP partners;<sup>48</sup> and, (f) the results framework was not adjusted when the understandable decision was made to shorten the SRP by three months.

**Key finding: despite the response occurring in a data-rich and well-resourced response to a sudden onset disaster, with adequate government data systems, and despite a substantial effort on the part of clusters to meet the expectations of improved humanitarian response monitoring, it was not, in the end, possible to develop robust outcome indicators at the outset, nor was it possible to meaningfully measure outcome-level change before the humanitarian machinery started to dismantle. A simpler system would have been more appropriate.**

**Key finding: rather than requiring a revision of the SRP at a pre-determined point in time, regular monitoring and adjustment is critical and advised by PMR guidance. The PMRs, as well as being a tool to report progress - which they do well (if produced on time) - should be used by the HCT as the basis for periodic inclusive reviews that consider (a) performance to date, (b) the evolution in the humanitarian context, and (c) funding trends. After each PMR, an HCT management response could have the effect of a mid-course correction to the SRP.**

## 6.5 The Evaluation tools

The Operational Peer Review was timely and well-executed, identifying, at the 60-day mark, most of the major issues of coordination and transition to early recovery that were encountered by the IAHE

<sup>48</sup> This is important if the PMR is regarded as a planning tool, especially in a situation like Haiyan, where the SRP only accounts for at most 16% of the total response, but misleading if it is seen as a reporting tool. The same tool might better serve both purposes if the on-SRP and off-SRP results data is differentiated in the reporting matrix.

team six months later. It contained two sets of recommendations: one for global level action and addressed to the IASC principals, the Emergency Director's Group and Global Cluster Coordinators; and another addressed specifically to the HC/HCT. The HC/HCT took prompt and appropriate action on all of the recommendations that were not superseded by events; the global recommendations seem to have been considered at a later point.

**Finding: the OPR is a valuable addition to the HPC, and its peer character and recommendations strengthened both its relevance and the quality of HCT response.**

## **6.6 The impact of L3 status**

Haiyan was the first large-scale sudden onset disaster since the L3 protocols of the Transformative Agenda were developed, the first time that an L3 emergency has been deactivated, and the first time that a Strategic Response Plan has been shortened by three months from the original planned period. The view expressed by many observers in the Philippines is that the L3 status created its own momentum: an international surge that to some extent overwhelmed national systems and side lined at least some of the incumbent HCT, followed by a sudden and somewhat disorderly closure and transition.

### **6.6.1 Inter-agency rapid response mechanism (IARRM) and the surge**

Haiyan was a disaster where the international system delivered an astonishing amount of support in a very short time-frame, helping to stabilize a vulnerable situation quickly by responding to emergency humanitarian needs. Some of the key success factors underlying the rapidity and scale of response included the mobilization of a Philippines-experienced UNDAC team to Manila before the Typhoon struck, the ability of in-country humanitarian teams (international and national) to redeploy from two existing emergencies in Mindanao and Bohol (though these along with other intense emergencies of the past two years had also absorbed much existing international response capacity), rapid mobilization of international military assets, immediate allocation of \$25 million from CERF, the direct involvement of the Emergency Relief Coordinator on two field visits in the earliest days of the response, and the fielding of 462 international surge-capacity staff within three weeks. The swift response was also built on preconditions for success that included local preparedness, HCT readiness, national response capacity, easy access, and both global and local public interest.

However, the immediate surge could have been better. With regard to the surge personnel, the IAHE consistently heard that many were insufficiently knowledgeable about the existing Filipino emergency response system, and, in many instances, insensitive to local culture, in particular to local political culture. The net effect of the surge was to deliver an effective response, but one that side lined many in-country staff, failed to adequately join up with national systems, and ended up creating parallel structures built upon a global model that was not well-suited to the national-led, middle-income country context of the Philippines. It would have been more efficient if it had truly adapted to the context. This may well have involved down-scaling and "nationalising" the surge capacity earlier. In the end, the L3 surge response did not follow one of its own guiding principles of

“taking into consideration the context of the response ... including the existing capacity on the ground.”<sup>49</sup>

Areas where the in-country team had difficulty in meeting the needs, and where specific surge capacity skills could be envisaged in an emergency with a similar profile, are (a) civil-military liaison – this could have been deployed along with the UNDAC, (b) a senior liaison officer devoted entirely to maintaining communications and relations between the national authorities and international agencies, and (c) a senior liaison officer to coordinate, brief, accompany and support the constant stream of senior visitors (agency heads, foreign ministers, heads of state).

**Key finding: The IARRM was effective in delivering a rapid response at scale but did not adapt adequately to the country context.**

### 6.6.2 Empowered Leadership

The concept of empowered leadership is still evolving, and in the Haiyan situation it does not seem to have been understood or accepted in the same way by all the key actors. The concept paper on Empowered Leadership (revised in March 2014, after the main Haiyan response was over), places considerable emphasis on the HC: it summarises the duties and responsibilities of the HC in relation to the HCT and the HPC, and the main new “power” component seems to be the authority of the HC to “take decisions on behalf of the HCT in circumstances where there is no consensus”. In recent HPC discussions, it has been suggested that the concept should extend to the HCT being able to use their contextual knowledge to determine the appropriate nature and timing of HPC components. In both cases, the implication is that the exercise of empowered leadership is local. It does not consider that in a major L3 emergency, according to the IASC’s own L3 protocols on System-Wide Activation, the main decisions on whether and how to activate the L3 response are made outside the country, by the ERC in conjunction with the Emergency Directors and the IASC, after consultation with the HC.

What was widely reported in the Haiyan response is that the importance of this emergency, combined with a broadly-shared desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Transformative Agenda and the L3 protocols, attracted the highest levels of interest in the HQs of UN and other agencies, and also resulted in the mobilization to the field of a number of D1 and D2 deployed personnel. The consequence of this is that the attention of the in-country teams of some agencies, in Manila and in the regional hubs to which senior staff were also deployed, was reportedly often focussed upwards along the line of the respective agency management hierarchies, at the expense of horizontal attention across the clusters and collective response, or a ‘downwards’ focus on operations. This in turn encouraged agency-centric behaviour.

Thus it seems that the HC and HCT at times were placed in an uncomfortable situation with regard to leadership. On the one hand, the HC and HCT were encouraged to make decisions according to the empowered leadership model, but on the other hand some of the very same HCT members were being disempowered, to the extent that they were receiving constant attention and direction from their agency heads (who were in some cases making country-level management decisions while visiting the country).

---

<sup>49</sup> IARRM reference document



**Finding: in a highly visible and significant sudden-onset emergency, the pressure from HQs can distract HCT members from a collective *modus operandi* and pull them instead in the direction of agency allegiances.**

In the midst of this, the HC was provided with some, but insufficient, support. The fielding of an experienced Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC), as envisaged by the L3 protocols, was delayed. Delays were due, in part, to difficulties in securing agreement regarding who should be appointed the DHC. In the end, the DHC function was carried out by three different people for between two and six weeks at a time, with consequent interruptions in approach and continuity. There was limited support directly for the HC's own office.

At its core, the principle of empowered leadership seems to imply that, in time of crisis when decisions need to be quick and evidence-based, those managers who are most aware of the context and closest to operations should have greater authority. This could apply at the sub-national level (heads of sub-offices, cluster co-leads) as well as at the national level.

## 7. Conclusions and recommendations

### 7.1 Overall assessment

The key evaluation criteria agreed at the inception phase were relevance, effectiveness and efficiency (in terms of timeliness – value for money was not included in the scope). Other evaluation criteria are referenced in this concluding section where there is evidence.

Taken together with the responses of other major actors, including government, the private sector and the diaspora, which form the major part of the response, the inter-agency emergency response was timely and effective in meeting immediate humanitarian needs, across a wide geographic area and initially in very difficult conditions. Government and HCT readiness, the pre-deployment of UNDAC and other agencies' personnel as well as effective civil-military coordination all contributed significantly. However, the extent to which the inter-agency response contributed to overall results is difficult to assess in the absence of full data on assistance outside of the inter-agency coordinated system (and beyond the scope of this IAHE).

The inter-agency response was slower to adapt to the circumstances of early recovery, a process begun by the Filipino people within days of Haiyan. Some individual agencies did respond, in many cases developing plans beyond the timeframe of the SRP on the basis of both needs and resources available. However, the overall inter-agency and cluster approaches missed opportunities to enhance early recovery by not adapting quickly enough. The transition to early recovery was complicated by the fact that sectors and regions recovered at different paces. In addition, uncertainty regarding the government's capacity and timetable to begin large-scale recovery programmes made it more difficult to link the inter-agency response to longer-term recovery.

When the SRP ended on 31 August 2014, humanitarian needs remain for 5,400 households (24,785 individuals) displaced by Haiyan, and who were still living in tents, evacuation centres or bunkhouses. 95,000 households remain particularly vulnerable to extreme weather because of the poor quality of shelter -- though their shelter conditions may pre-date Haiyan

#### **Factors contributing to results and performance**

A number of characteristics of the Philippines created highly favourable conditions for an effective disaster response. These include its lower middle-income country status, relatively good health and education indicators, a vibrant local economy, an established and experienced national disaster management system and a government which accepts its responsibility to protect the rights of citizens. Furthermore, in the affected area there was an absence of significant civil conflict. Key external factors included large-scale public sympathy, media coverage, significant diaspora support, long-standing links with important aid donors, and the absence of a high profile "competing" disaster at that time. The combination of these underlying contextual factors contributed to its overall relatively high level of funding and to the effectiveness of the early response.

### Assessment of the inter-agency response by SRP objective

SRP Objective	IAHE assessment <sup>50</sup>	Comment on the inter-agency response
<p>1. Typhoon-affected people meet their immediate food needs, avoid nutritional deterioration and build food security in ways that are sustained through stimulation of markets and production, and access to life-saving community-based nutrition services.</p>	<p>High</p>	<p>There is clear evidence that people have met their food needs and avoided nutritional deterioration. The mixed response of cash and food was appropriate and followed a differentiated approach according to market conditions. Early support to restart agricultural production notably in rice was an important contribution. Current progress is vulnerable to future shocks if livelihoods are not restored to pre-Haiyan levels quickly.</p>
<p>2. Families with destroyed or damaged homes, including the displaced population, attain protective and sustainable shelter solutions.</p>	<p>Medium-Low</p>	<p>The response addressed emergency shelter needs, and has improved the quality of shelter for people in transitional housing. The focus on self-recovery was appropriate, but more attention was needed to the supply of quality materials, and to measures to ensure that the well-crafted shelter cluster messages on safer building techniques translated into safer shelter. Overall, the response was underfunded and fell short of its targets.</p>
<p>3. Women and men whose livelihoods or employment have been lost or severely impaired regain self-sufficiency, primarily with the restoration of local economies, agriculture and fisheries.</p>	<p>Medium-Low</p>	<p>The response addressed immediate needs through extensive emergency employment programmes which enabled people to meet urgent household needs and also contributed to restoring basic infrastructure and access. But long-term use of such programmes is not appropriate and does not contribute to sustainable livelihoods. The development of programmes to support more sustainable, non-agricultural livelihoods beyond emergency employment has been slow and under-funded. Direct support for farming and fishing helped a portion of the</p>

<sup>50</sup> Ratings are based on the IAHE team's judgement taking into account IAHE findings on inter-agency response effectiveness, relevance and timeliness. Ratings go in order of High/high-medium/medium/medium-low/low.

		affected population begin to resume their livelihoods though numbers are below target. A lack of sustainable livelihood options is a key obstacle to the relocation of families in displacement centres.
4. Prevent increases in mortality and morbidity and the outbreak of communicable diseases through immediate access to basic water, sanitation, hygiene, and health services.	Medium	The response addressed emergency health and sanitation needs, successfully contributing to the prevention of outbreaks of any communicable diseases despite the high risk environments. Early recovery targets are behind schedule, although ambitions go beyond humanitarian needs to address pre-existing sanitation and healthcare issues.
5. Affected people quickly regain access to community and local government services, including basic education and a strengthened protective environment.	High-Medium	The initial education response was effective at getting girls and boys back to school in temporary learning spaces two months after Haiyan, but consolidation with teacher training and government-led permanent construction has since lagged. The initial protection focus on resolving lost documentation as well as Child Protection and GBV was appropriate, but insufficient attention was accorded at the outset to land and property rights – which have emerged as one of the main obstacles to both protection and durable solutions for a significant population.

## 7.2 Conclusions and recommendations regarding the four evaluation questions

### 7.2.1 Were the results articulated in the SRP achieved and what were both the positive and potentially negative outcomes for people affected by disaster?

The inter-agency response effectively contributed to emergency needs being met through a timely and relevant response. Earlier and more tailored approaches to support recovery and particularly to restore livelihoods would have been beneficial to meet early recovery targets. The use of different approaches for beneficiary targeting by agencies caused community confusion and dissatisfaction. Innovations, notably in scaled-up cash based approaches and engagement with communities through accountability

and communication mechanisms were largely effective. The priority remaining humanitarian needs are the 5,400 households still displaced by Haiyan.

Recommendation	Priority <sup>51</sup>	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>1. Remaining humanitarian needs</b> In coordination with the government, maintain an overview of the remaining humanitarian needs, with a particular focus on the 5,400 households in tents and displacement centres, and be ready to offer assistance if needed.</p>	Critical	HCT	Immediate
<p><b>2. Cash transfer</b> Set up a practice-oriented research project to learn from the large scale use of cash-transfer programme approaches in the Haiyan response. Include consideration of a) the results of CTPs for communities and local economies; b) benefits and challenges of different modalities; c) areas where standards would add value and d) consistent monitoring approaches to support inter-cluster approaches that benefit households and communities as a whole.</p>	Learning opportunity	IASC Working Group	Short-term
<p><b>3. Restoring livelihoods</b> Build up livelihoods capacity in the international response system e.g. through a roster of livelihoods experts, to more effectively and rapidly link emergency activities to the early restoration of livelihoods. Focus on transfer from emergency employment to sustainable livelihoods, and on solutions for non-agricultural contexts. Develop a range of flexible assessment and programme instruments.</p>	Important	EDGs	Medium-term

**7.2.2. How well did the international response engage with and strengthen national and local systems, structures and actors for disaster response?**

At the preparedness stage and in the immediate days following the typhoon the international community engaged well with Government disaster response and risk reduction systems. However, the overall magnitude of the disaster and the strength of the inter-agency response overwhelmed some government units and, as a result, the international and national coordination mechanisms diverged along separate paths for quite some time. While there are many examples of excellent cooperation, and government officials at all levels appreciated both the assistance and the extra technical and coordinating capacity provided by the international community, there was also a strong sense that some international surge staff did not understand national systems or capacity. While inter-agency operational priorities drove the response, its structures and processes were not adjusted sufficiently nor early enough to take account of the international community’s complementary role in this middle income country with an established, albeit stretched, government disaster management system.

<sup>51</sup> Recommendations are categorized as Critical (top urgent priority), Important (high priority), or Learning Opportunity.

**Recommendations**

Recommendation	Priority	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>4. Preparedness for major emergencies (L3)</b>            In middle-income countries which are highly vulnerable to sudden onset disasters and have strong national capacity in disaster management, international actors should prepare together with the government for major disasters and a possible L3 response. Use detailed scenario planning to work through how the international response needs to adapt in order to play its complementary role in these contexts. Start with and document the Filipino scenario planning and in it clarify, among other factors: the roles of international personnel e.g. as cluster co-leads; gaps in the capacity of national systems to take on their coordination responsibilities; mechanisms to trigger scaling down of international personnel; and information resources and mechanisms to brief surge personnel on national response systems and capacities.</p>	Critical	EDGs and HCT	Medium term, and short-term in the Philippines

**7.2.3 Was the assistance well-coordinated, successfully avoiding duplication and filling gaps? What contextual factors help explain results or the lack thereof?**

The IAHE found no significant sustained geographical gaps though the inter-agency response was slow to adapt to new information due in part to perceptions of funding inflexibility. The cluster system worked well for those participating in it but struggled in the presence of so many non-participating organisations. Lighter coordination mechanisms and technical advice tailored to the local operational priorities were more effective.

Four features of the Haiyan response highlight the value of inter-cluster coordination beyond the conventional cluster system: the extensive use of cash by several clusters, the dynamic needs of communities moving rapidly into early recovery, the success of AAP/CWC mechanisms at gathering community-wide (rather than sector or agency-specific) feedback, and the multiple challenges (access to services, livelihoods, protection) faced by families without a shelter solution. Land issues were correctly identified as critical at the beginning of the response, and HCT advocacy had a positive impact on the overall response for affected people. However, the HCT was slow to agree on how to address these admittedly difficult issues.

Importantly, differences between the international and national planning timeframes, and different views on the boundaries and linkages between emergency relief, early recovery and recovery, together contributed to a difficult process of transition from relief to recovery programming. In this, the international system’s limited range of programming modalities to flexibly support early recovery are a shortcoming. Transition includes change in (a) the nature of affected people's needs (emergency to early recovery); (b) the type of programme approaches to meet changing needs (humanitarian to recovery to development); (c) structures and systems for coordination of assistance (HCT to UNCT, closure of clusters). There is a lack of guidance to support HCTs to manage processes of transition.

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Priority</b>	<b>Who</b>	<b>Timeframe</b>
<p><b>5. Transition</b></p> <p>Transition needs to be considered in responses from the outset. Develop measures including practical global guidance to support HCTs on a) how to ensure transition is considered and addressed from the beginning of a response, particularly in L3 emergencies, and b) how to manage transition as a collective HCT and in cooperation with government. Include consideration of how to manage issues such as potential tensions between national government's sovereignty in disaster management, and the international community's (and governments') principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.</p>	Important	IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC Team	Medium term
<p><b>6. Preparedness and the private sector</b></p> <p>As part of the Philippine preparedness process, set up agreements with private sector actors to ensure that systems are in place before the next emergency for a more coherent and linked-up response, including agreements to facilitate cash transfer programming, the establishment of a basis for partnerships between clusters and private sector partners, and support for supply chains for the most commonly-needed relief and early recovery supplies.</p>	Important	HCT	Short-term
<p><b>7. Housing, land and property</b></p> <p>In large-scale, sudden-onset natural disasters, place a higher strategic and operational priority on working with national authorities, to anticipate and resolve property rights and land issues that could stall early recovery and stand in the way of durable solutions. Housing, land and property rights and solutions should figure prominently in the SRP, and HLP legal and technical expertise should be fielded early to support the HCT. As part of preparedness planning at country level, consider how a response will cope with property and land issues for at least transitional measures to meet humanitarian needs.</p>	Important	EDGs, Global Protection and Shelter clusters	Medium term

#### **7.2.4 To what extent were IASC core humanitarian programming principles and guidance applied?**

The components of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) were applied rigorously, and in many cases newly-developed tools were applied for the first time. Under exceptionally tight timeframes they were produced on time, and outputs were high quality. However, interlocutors questioned their suitability to the realities of a large-scale sudden onset disaster, and whether the significant effort and opportunity cost invested in them, particularly in the SRP, were justified. The HPC outlines a logical sequence for the response from needs assessment to strategic frameworks, operational plans and costed projects. In the Haiyan case, some of these steps were truncated and some tools were developed in isolation. In particular, assessment and planning documents were not causally connected and the SRP was issued before the results framework was fixed, contributing to the challenge of reporting the results.

Adaptations are needed to make them more suitable for large-scale sudden onset disasters. The L3 status significantly supported the rapid scaling-up and resourcing of the response. Greater attention to adapting to local conditions and collective approaches would have further strengthened the response.

Recommendation	Priority	Who	Timeframe
<p><b>8. HPC and planning in large-scale sudden onset emergencies</b>            Review HPC guidance to further differentiate between the planning and reporting processes of protracted emergencies vs sudden onset large scale disasters. In sudden onset emergencies (especially natural disasters) modify the pathway for the HPC assessment and planning tools with (a) a lighter, more analytical SRP at around the 20-day mark (following a preliminary response plan in line with the current HPC guidance), followed by (b) a suite of (connected) cluster response plans at the 60-day mark, based on (c) operationally-oriented needs assessments conducted in the 15-45 day period.</p>	Important	IASC Working group and OCHA HPC team	Short-term
<p><b>9. HPC and needs assessments</b>            Redesign assessment processes to ensure they support operational planning. In a sudden onset emergency, after an initial “scale and scope” assessment (preferably conducted in conjunction with the national government) such as the MIRA, needs assessments should be conducted collectively and on a cluster basis, with a clear view to informing operational planning.</p>	Critical	IASC Working Group and OCHA HPC team	Short-term
<p><b>10. HPC and empowered leadership</b>            Further develop the guidance on empowered leadership to reflect the respective authorities and responsibilities of IASC members, Emergency Directors, the HC, and sub-national managers in an L3 emergency. Be clear if the mandate of surge capacity is to support and not replace the HC/HCT, and if the concept of empowered leadership extends below the national level.</p>	Important	IASC Working Group	Short-term



## List of Annexes

Annex 1	Matrix - summary evaluation findings and recommendations
Annex 2	IAHE terms of reference
Annex 3	Detailed methodological note
Annex 4	Evaluation matrix
Annex 5	IAHE itinerary
Annex 6	Evaluation tools
Annex 7	List of persons interviewed
Annex 8	Qualitative and quantitative analysis
Annex 9	List of acronyms
Annex 10	Bibliography