Independent Review of the Central Emergency Response (CERF) Fund in Pakistan

Andy Featherstone
May 2013

Acknowledgements

Cover Photograph

A woman repairs her house in which was destroyed by the monsoon floods of September 2012. With CERF funds the local NGO, Support to Deprived People (SDP) distributed IOM-procured shelter kits to those whose houses had been destroyed in villages across Shikarpur district in Sindh Province. 3-months after the distribution, villagers remain reliant on the tarpaulins for shelter which for many has been the only assistance they have received (photo credit: Andy Featherstone).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

1. While some hard fought development gains have been made over the years, more recently Pakistan has been plagued by natural disasters with the National Disaster Management Authority's (NDMA) 2012 Disaster Risk Management Needs Report citing landslides, earthquakes, hill torrents, monsoons, flooding and cyclones as key hazards.[1] Military action and associated IDP movements in north-western Pakistan have served to exacerbate the vulnerability of communities to natural disaster in addition to requiring significant levels of humanitarian assistance.

2. Between 2006 and 12-May 2013 Pakistan received $154 million from CERF making it the 5th largest recipient and the third largest recipient of funding from the Rapid Response (RR) funding window. The value of CERF to overall humanitarian funding in Pakistan (captured on the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] Financial Tracking System) has been significant with a peak in 2008 where it accounted for over 15% of total humanitarian funding. Since that time it has regularly accounted for between 6% and 8% of total funding. Pakistan submitted 3 successful CERF applications in 2012 with total approved funding of $36.7m.

Scope of the review and methodology

3. The main purpose of the review is to assess the value-added of CERF funding towards the humanitarian response in Pakistan during 2012. A major aim of the country reviews is to provide the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) with an appropriate level of assurance around the achievement of key performance benchmarks and planned results for the CERF mechanism as outlined in the 2010 Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF). [2] The review includes recommendations aimed at improving operational aspects of the CERF and also identifies relevant policy issues which need to be addressed at a global level (see annex 4 for the full ToR).

4. The review was undertaken over a period of 3-weeks including 11-days spent in Pakistan during which Interviews were conducted with key stakeholders at the federal, provincial and sub-provincial level which included staff from UNOCHA, Senior UN and Non-governmental organisation (NGO) staff, donors, cluster coordinators and government representatives (a full list of participants is provided in annex 1). Country-level discussions were supplemented by interviews with members of the CERF Secretariat.

5. The analytical approach was deliberately kept rapid and light (an overview of the methodology is provided in annex 3). The field work in Pakistan was accompanied by a literature review of country-specific and general CERF documents in addition to recent evaluations.

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[1] NDMA (2012) Disaster Risk Management Needs Report (internet). Available at
http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Publications_One_UN_DRM/DRM_Needs_Report.pdf
[2] The PAF is available at http://www.unocha.org/cerf/reportsevaluations/evaluations/country-reviews

CERF processes

6. The CERF has delivered mixed results against process indicators, generally performing well on timeliness, but less so for inclusiveness and transparency. While the 2012 Under-funded Emergency (UFE) application was considered as good practice and benefitted from a strong process, allocation from the RR window, while being timely, appear to have omitted some humanitarian partners, particularly NGOs, from decision-making processes which their presence may have helped bring greater objectivity to.

Prioritisation

7. **The prioritisation process for the CERF RR funding requires stronger leadership.**
    RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC and HCT
    It is incumbent on the RC/HC to ensure that RR funding meets the most essential needs. In order to achieve this it is recommended that when the HRT and ICCM fail to adequately prioritise and/or when the process becomes divisive, the RC/HC supported by the HCT should play a stronger leadership role in determining and communicating priorities relevant to the context.

8. **The CERF life-saving criteria should be more restrictively interpreted and additional detail should be given to guide discussions on eligibility.**
    RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: CERF Secretariat
    The CERF life-saving criteria are the subject of considerable debate and controversy particularly in relation to the Rapid Response window. The balance of opinion in Pakistan is that discussions on prioritisation would benefit from a more restrictive interpretation of the criteria which focuses on a smaller number of sectors and that more detailed criteria would assist in decision-making about the eligibility of projects for CERF-funding.

Streamlined review, allocation and distribution

9. **A country-level flow chart of the prioritisation, review and allocation process should be prepared for the CERF RR and UFE window**
    RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: OCHA Pakistan on behalf of the RC/HC
    Given the opacity of parts of the prioritisation, review and allocation process in Pakistan, the frequency with which the process changes and the importance of a timely submission to meet life-savings needs, there would be considerable benefit if the process was presented in a flow chart for both UFE and RR windows. This would increase transparency while facilitating inclusivity. If humanitarian stakeholders are clearer about the process then they will be more likely to participate meaningfully in it.

10. **A flow chart of the prioritisation, review and allocation process should be included in the global guidance for the CERF RR and UFE window**
    RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: CERF Secretariat
    The inclusion of a flow diagram as part of the global guidance for both the RR and UFE windows would go a long way to managing expectations, promoting understanding and facilitating greater participation in the process.

11. **A half-day after-action review and reflection exercise should be conducted after the next CERF allocation**
    RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
    Given the value of the CERF for timely response in Pakistan, a half-day after-action review which included the participation of the whole of the HCT and benefitted from independent facilitation could offer scope for lessons to be learned and practice to be strengthened.

CERF results

12. There can be little doubt of the value which the humanitarian community attaches to the CERF in Pakistan. Considered as the fund of first response, the CERF has been successful in providing timely and much-needed assistance for a variety of humanitarian crises across both the UFE and RR windows. In addition to meeting needs, results suggest that the fund has also assisted in leveraging donor funding for what are often considered to be hard-to-fund humanitarian responses. It is more difficult to gauge the contribution made by the CERF to strengthening humanitarian coordination; on the face of it the CERF can certainly make a positive contribution, however, in the event that negotiations over fund allocations become protracted, this contribution can be significantly diminished if not reversed largely due to structural problems with accountabilities within and between members of the HCT. While the CERF doubtless delivered some strong results across a range of sectors, the process and format which guides reporting does only a modest job of capturing these and should be strengthened.

Quality and accountability

13. **An online project management system should be developed by the CERF Secretariat**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: CERF Secretariat
To increase the efficiency of the reporting process, to strengthen the link between articulation of objectives, monitoring of results and aggregation and communication of impact, the CERF Secretariat should consider developing an online project management system for the CERF. A system which could track project objectives, provide basic monitoring against standardised and gender mainstreamed indicators and present results against these would offer significant process efficiencies to country-based and Secretariat staff and may also offer time efficiencies.

14. **A thematic/sectoral evaluation of CERF results should be conducted to complement the RC/HC annual report and PAF reviews**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC with support from OCHA Pakistan
Given the weaknesses of the RC/HC annual report in articulating the impact of the CERF, there should also be scope for complementing it with evaluation. While accountability for CERF-funded projects rests with the implementing UN agency, an additional evaluation which focused on sector or thematic achievements would go some way to overcoming the fractured nature of the reporting process and better demonstrate the added value that the fund has, particularly to a country like Pakistan which often struggles to raise funds in a timely manner.[3] In saying this it is important to bear in mind the challenges of evaluating humanitarian interventions, of attributing changes to a single funding source and the practical constraints such as access and security. For these reasons an evaluation should not be considered a panacea but it could go some way to strengthening an assessment of results.

The CERF, Emergency Response Fund (ERF) and a future of pooled funding in Pakistan

15. The current relationship between the ERF and CERF can best be described as coexistence rather than complementary; both fund similar work and while there are some examples of coordination of resources, they tend to be the exception rather than the norm. Given OCHA's management of both funds and of concerns raised in the review about the governance of CERF and its inclusiveness, a second set of recommendations that seek to build on the relative strengths of each of the pooled funds are proposed as a contribution to a discussion on the future of pooled funding in Pakistan. While the recommendations have been tailored for the specific context in Pakistan it is important to note that they are

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[3] The evaluation would be distinct from a PAF review which focuses on CERF processes and overall results. Instead it should focus on a priority sector such as WASH or shelter or on a theme such as gender equality or accountability to affected populations.

consistent with feedback from previous reviews and evaluations and as such build on existing evidence.[4]

16. **Pooled funds in Pakistan could be supported by a single team.**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
While the CERF has no dedicated country-level staff but takes considerable OCHA resources to manage and coordinate, the ERF has a dedicated team in place. Ensuring that the preparation of ERF and CERF requests is handled by a common team would increase the likelihood that both funds are used in a complementary manner by avoiding duplication and by aligning analysis, consultations and prioritization. It would also permit resource efficiencies to be realized by OCHA.

17. **Similar processes could be used to identify needs and priorities for both CERF and the ERF**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
A comparable approach to the identification of needs and priorities for CERF as for the ERF would lead to a more coherent prioritization and allocation of funds. This would also increase the transparency and inclusiveness of the CERF prioritization would allow greater NGO involvement and ensure that sectors/clusters are playing a lead role in identifying needs and priorities for all funding streams. Knowing that CERF currently offers a faster allocation and disbursement process than ERF it will be essential that a balance is made between inclusiveness and transparency.

18. **Consideration should be given to vetting CERF proposals through ERF governance and review structures**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
The governance and review structures for the ERF are more rigorous and inclusive than those of the CERF and would add an important element of peer review to the CERF process as well as helping to foster a more coherent and coordinated oversight of all pooled fund allocations in Pakistan. It would also present an opportunity to increase involvement of non-UN actors in the CERF process. The note on inclusivity and timeliness for the recommendation above also applies here.

19. **The use of the ERF monitoring and evaluation capacity could be used to complement existing UN agency efforts**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
While monitoring of CERF results is the responsibility of the respective UN agency, this could be supplemented by joint monitoring and evaluation efforts for CERF and ERF. The ERF has a dedicated monitoring and evaluation team which could be used to complement existing agency efforts and strengthen communications on the achievement of the CERF in Pakistan. Joint evaluations would present more coherent and compelling evidence of the impact of pooled funding against anticipated results and gender marker commitments and could potentially fill a gap in CERF reporting.

Complementarity between CERF and the RAPID Fund
20. **Information-sharing and coordination between CERF and RAPID should be strengthened**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC with support from OCHA Pakistan
While information-sharing between the ERF and RAPID is now routinely undertaken which has resulted in a level of complementarity between the two pooled fund, this has not been the case with the CERF. Greater complementarity may be achieved if OCHA Pakistan engaged with RAPID at the prioritisation stage with a view to exploring how best to coordinate the use of pooled funds.

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[4] The recommendations are in line with the draft guidance prepared by the CERF secretariat on complementarity between CERF and country based pooled funds. See CERF and Country-based Pooled Funds: Stock-Taking, April 2013, CERF Secretariat

Table of Contents

Acronyms

CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DFID	Department for International Development
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FDMA	FATA Disaster Management Authority
FSL	Food Security & Livelihoods
HC/RC	Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HDI	Human Development Index
HRT	Humanitarian Regional Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCM	Inter-Cluster Coordination Meetings
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Implementing partners
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MIRA	Multi-sector Initial Rapid Assessment
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority
NDMC	National Disaster Management Commission
NFI	Non-food Items
NHN	National Humanitarian Network
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOC	No Objection Certificate
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
PAF	Performance and Accountability Framework
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority
PHF	Pakistan Humanitarian Forum
PlaCES	Protective Learning and Community Engagement Services
PoP	Principles of Partnership
RAPID	Responding to Pakistan's Internally Displaced
RR	Rapid Response
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
TLC	Temporary Learning Centre
UFE	Under-funded Emergencies
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organisation
WFP	World Food Programme

Humanitarian Snapshot: Pakistan - Complex Emergency and 2012 Floods (1 March - 4 April 2013)

OCHA

Legend

KP and FATA
- IDP Camp
- Areas of Return/Displacement
- Hosting Areas
- Area of Displacement
- Inaccessible Areas

Flood Affected (2012)
- Flood Affected Areas
- Notified by Government as calamity hit area

Afghan Refugees
- Locations of Refugees

8.7 million
Total People Affected

4.8 million people affected in 2012 monsoon floods
978,000 people estimated displaced people due to insecurity
1.3 million people returned to FATA
1.64 million Afghan refugees

1 Jalozai
2 New Durrani
3 Togh Sarai

Khyber Agency: Displacement from Maidan area of Tirah Valley

		Source: FDMA
Children	19,787	
Female	13,980	
Male	9,160	

Total individuals newly displaced: 42,927

KP and FATA Number of In-Camp and Off-Camp IDPs

In Camp   Off Camp   Source: UNHCR

D.I. Khan	135,728	76,030
Hangu	5,821	
Hangu	4,402	
Kohat	125,244	
Kurram	12,438	
Kurram	33,422	
Nowshera	57,771	
Peshawar	320,406	
Tank	62,764	

757,996 Total IDPs
681,966

2012 Floods: Gaps and Unmet Needs (6 months on)

Food Security: At least 166,470 families need agricultural inputs; 246,844 families need cash assistance. 113,712 families need livestock fodder/feed.

Health: At least 1 million people require primary health services with health education.

Nutrition: Over 400,000 children under five and pregnant and lactating women need urgent nutritional support.

WASH: More than 415,000 people still require WASH services.

Shelter: About 12,000 households need tents; 109,300 households need tarpaulin sheets; 174,600 households need blankets; 326,350 households need mats/bedding; and 315,300 kitchen sets are also needed.

Education: At least 1,549 temporary learning centres are required for 159,206 children; 3,148 schools need to be renovated for 436,754 children.

Protection: About 93,000 elderly and persons with disabilities; 764,000 children under 14; and 24,000 women with no male/community support need protection assistance.
Source: Clusters

Since mid-March, about 43,000 people have been displaced from Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency, FATA, due to an escalation of hostilities between rival armed groups. Humanitarian partners are providing assistance to 163,102 registered displaced families with an estimated population of 978,000 people in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA due to a complex emergency that has affected the region since 2008.

There are also 1.64 million Afghan refugees receiving humanitarian assistance, and more than 1.3 million people who have returned to FATA since 2009, who require humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian partners have provided assistance to 1.7 million of the 4.8 million people affected by the 2012 monsoon floods, but critical needs remain unmet in the hardest-hit areas of Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh provinces.

Disclaimer: The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu & Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.

Creation date: 28 February 2013, Map doc name: PAK591_Pakistan_Humanitarian_Snapshot_v6_A4_20130228, for feedback: khanm@un.org
Source: IDP and Afghan Refugee figures: UNHCR, Flood Affected: IOM, .

Attribution: Map provided courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

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1. The Scope of the review & methodology

1.1 The scope of the review

21. The main purpose of the review is to assess the value-added of CERF funding towards the humanitarian response in Pakistan during 2012.

22. A major aim of the country reviews is to provide the ERC with an appropriate level of assurance around the achievement of key performance benchmarks and planned results for the CERF mechanism as outlined in the 2010 Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF).[5] The review also includes recommendations aimed at improving operational aspects of the CERF and identifies relevant policy issues which need to be addressed at a global level (see annex 4 for the full ToR).

1.2 Methodology

23. Key components of the methodology included a rapid desk review and field visits by the consultant to humanitarian hubs in Peshawar in KP province and Sukkur in Sindh province. The Sukkur trip included a brief trip to the 2012 flood-affected areas where CERF RR projects are still ongoing (the review itinerary is reproduced in annex 2). Interviews with key stakeholders were held at the federal, provincial and sub-provincial level and included OCHA staff, Senior UN and NGO staff, donors, cluster coordinators and government representatives (a full list of participants is provided in annex 1). The analytical approach was deliberately kept rapid and light (an overview of the methodology is provided in annex 3). The field work in Pakistan was accompanied by a literature review of general CERF documents and guidance note and recent evaluations (which included other PAF reviews, the 5-year evaluation including evaluation of the Pakistan CERF - a list of documents is provided in annex 3).

24. Recognizing that CERF funds are often co-mingled with other donor funds by agencies and that the in-depth assessment of beneficiary-level impact is formally the charge of recipient agencies, the review was guided by the ToR in not attempting to link beneficiary-level changes to CERF activity, except where recipient agencies were able to provide this data. The review mechanism did not seek to provide comprehensive coverage linked to detailed narratives and contextual analysis around how and why results were being achieved; rather it focused on providing an assurance around issues of the Fund's operational impact. The Pakistan field work was undertaken between 16th April and 26th April 2013.

2. Humanitarian Response and Financing in Pakistan

2.1 Pakistan humanitarian profile

25   While some hard fought development gains have been made over the years, in recent years Pakistan has been plagued by natural disasters with National Disaster Management Authority's (NDMA) 2012 Disaster Risk Management Needs Report citing landslides,

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[5] The PAF is available at http://www.unocha.org/cerf/reportsevaluations/evaluations/country-reviews

earthquakes, hill torrents, monsoons, flooding and cyclones as key hazards.[6] Ranked 146th out of 187 countries in the 2012 Human Development Index (HDI) and in the top 15 countries of Maplecroft's influential natural disasters risk index[7], the need for concerted efforts to reduce disaster risk linked to timely and effective humanitarian response are important priorities for all humanitarian actors. Military action and associated IDP movements in north-western Pakistan have served to exacerbate the vulnerability of communities to natural disaster in addition to requiring significant levels of humanitarian assistance.

Figure 1: Overview of the CERF[8]

The CERF was created on 12 December 2005 and launched in March 2006. It expanded the previous Central Emergency Revolving Fund (created in December 1991) by adding a grant component to the existing loan component. The purpose of the expanded CERF is to ensure the rapid and coordinated response of UN agencies to emergencies, with the following objectives:

- To promote early action and response to reduce loss of life
- To enhance response to time-critical requirements based on demonstrative needs and
- To strengthen the core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crises.

The CERF includes two components: a loan facility of up to $30 million and a grant facility with a target of $450 million. Funding from the grant facility is split into two windows – rapid response window and under-funded emergencies window. Only UN funds, programmes and specialized agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are eligible to apply for funding under the grant facility of the CERF. The ERC is the fund manager and in addition also plays a role in advocacy and fund-raising for the CERF. As one element of the financing pillar of the humanitarian reform agenda, the CERF would be expected to contribute to other pillars, including the development of effective partnerships between UN and non-UN humanitarian actors.

2.2 Humanitarian coordination in Pakistan

26　　Presiding over the international humanitarian endeavour in Pakistan is the RC/HC who leads the Humanitarian Country Team HCT which comprises UN agencies and international and national NGO representatives (a member of the National Humanitarian Network and the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum), with participation from the International Federation of the Red Crescent and International Committee of the Red Cross and the Cluster coordinators in an observer role.

27　　Pakistan was one of the first countries to adopt the cluster system after the Kashmir earthquake in 2005 and they have been in existence for much of the time since then and are particularly active during emergency responses at national, regional and often even district level. OCHA supports inter-cluster coordination. It chairs or co-chairs relevant inter-cluster coordination meetings (ICCMs) that take place regularly, and as determined by the scale of the humanitarian response. At the national level, the ICCM is co-chaired with the NDMA during responses to natural disasters. At the provincial level, the inter-cluster coordination forum is the Humanitarian Regional Team (HRT) in Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP),

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[6] NDMA (2012) Disaster Risk Management Needs Report (internet). Available at http://www.ndma.gov.pk/Publications_One_UN_DRM/DRM_Needs_Report.pdf
[7] http://maplecroft.com/about/news/nha_2013.html
[8] Updated version of Dohoo Faure S & Glaser M (2007) *Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review, final report*, 19 September 2007 (internet). Available at https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/CERF_review_final_+_appendices.pdf

composed of provincial heads of agencies and provincial cluster coordinators, and chaired by OCHA; and the ICCMs in Hyderabad, Sindh, and Quetta, Balochistan, co-chaired by OCHA and the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA).

28   In addition to sectoral coordination, other coordination forums include the UN Country Team (UNCT) comprising the UN agencies, the Pakistan Humanitarian Forum (PHF) composed of over 50 mainly international NGOs and the National Humanitarian Network (NHN) being a consortium of more than 180 national NGOs.

2.3 The role of the government

29   The institutional and policy arrangements for disaster response and management in Pakistan were put in place with the creation of the National Disaster Management Ordinance in 2006. Under the Ordinance the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) was established under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister as the highest policy making body in the field of disaster management. As an executive and operational arm of the NDMC, the NDMA coordinates and monitors implementation of national policies and strategies on disaster management.

30   Beneath the NDMA there is a devolved and de-centralized mechanism for disaster management which came into being in 2010 and comprises Provincial Disaster Management Commissions (PDMCs) and Authorities (PDMAs) which have been replicated at district level across the country by District Disaster Management Authorities (DDMAs). The National Disaster risk Management Framework has been formulated to guide disaster risk management.

31   In 2008, the FATA Disaster Management Authority (FDMA) was established to lead disaster risk mitigation, response and early recovery, under the guidance of the FATA Disaster Management Commission. The FATA PDMA has also developed significant experience and capacity to support responses to natural and man-made disasters.

2.4 Humanitarian donor profile

32   The frequency with which disasters have affected Pakistan is reflected in the high levels of humanitarian funding since the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir. Since this catastrophe other disasters have followed, but it was the floods in 2010 that witnessed an unprecedented level of need across Pakistan and necessitated huge funding requirements, with the total contribution rising above $3 billion (accounting for 25% of global humanitarian aid funding).[9] With further significant flooding in 2011 and 2012 and with the conflict in KP and FATA affecting ever greater numbers of people, humanitarian funding has remained at a significant level accounting for 4.6% of total global humanitarian funding in 2012, making Pakistan the 6th largest recipient in the world.[10] The long-standing military action and associated IDP movements in north-western Pakistan have served to exacerbate the vulnerability of communities to natural disaster in addition to requiring significant levels of humanitarian assistance.

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[9] Global Humanitarian Assistance (2012) *GHA Report 2012*, Development Initiatives (internet). Available at http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/GHA_Report_2012-Websingle.pdf
[10] ibid

Figure 2: Total humanitarian funding and top 5 donor contributors[11]

Rank by $ contribution	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1st	United Kingdom	Saudi Arabia	United States	United States	United States	United States
2nd	Private[12]	Netherlands	United Arab Emirates	Private	European Commission	European Commission
3rd	Netherlands	CERF	European Commission	Japan	CERF	CERF
4th	Sweden	Italy	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
5th	United States	European Commission	Japan	European Commission	Carry-over from 2010	Norway
TOTAL funding	78,648,535	66,754,845	784,032,664	3,166,374,211	482,696,408	458,012,592

Pooled Funds: The Emergency Response Fund

33   The ERF is the RC/HC's mechanism to release rapid and flexible funds in response to an emergency and can also be used in situations of underfunding of acute needs in priority sectors. In Pakistan, since 2010 the ERF has disbursed $37.4 million for 144 projects that are estimated to have benefited more than 4.5 million people in Pakistan. The projects, carried out by implementing partners, most often national NGOs have provided food, water, sanitation, health care, shelter, education, nutrition, protection, community restoration, agriculture and livestock. The ERF is seen by many as having provided urgently required funding to bridge humanitarian gaps in the country.

Pooled Funds: The CERF

34   CERF funding has enabled agencies in Pakistan to provide life-saving assistance and fill gaps in humanitarian responses to natural disasters and the complex emergency in KP and FATA. Since 2006, Pakistan has received $154 million from CERF making it the 5th largest recipient (see figure 3 below) and the third largest recipient of funding from the RR funding window (as of May 2013). The value of CERF to overall humanitarian funding in Pakistan (captured on the OCHA FTS) has been significant with a peak in 2008 where it accounted for over 15% of total humanitarian funding. Since that time it has regularly accounted for between 6% and 8% of total funding (7.4% in 2007, 6.7% in 2011 and 8.0% in 2012). This is illustrated in figure 2 which shows CERF's position in the top 3 donors to Pakistan on 3 occasions in the last 5-years (2008, 2011 and 2012).

Pooled Funds: RAPID Fund

35   Responding to Pakistan's Displaced (RAPID) is a funding mechanism established in September 2009 under a cooperative agreement between Concern Worldwide and the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of U.S Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). It targets funding for national and international NGOs to provide assistance to IDPs and disaster-affected populations. Since 2009, the RAPID fund has worked with 71 national and international NGOs across Pakistan and has funded 125 projects, providing assistance to over 2.8 million people.[13] Grants of between $5,000 and $300,000 are awarded on the basis of needs declared by OCHA and NDMA across 7 priority sectors

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[11] UN OCHA CERF data, available at http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/allocations-country/2006-2013-country
[12] 'Private' refers to contributions from individuals and organisations
[13] RAPID Fund update, March 2013, Concern Worldwide

Figure 3: Top 10 CERF recipient countries, 2006 – 2013 (as of May 2013)[14]

	Country	Funds By Window		Funds Allocated US$	Percentage of Total
		RR	UFE		
1	Congo, The Democratic Republic of the	56,868,294	169,880,774	226,749,068	7.74 %
2	Republic of the Sudan	145,181,509	36,916,572	182,098,081	6.21 %
3	Ethiopia	62,789,740	100,873,000	163,662,740	5.59 %
4	Somalia	131,494,049	25,989,086	157,483,135	5.37 %
5	Pakistan	122,956,478	31,401,248	154,357,726	5.27 %
6	Kenya	94,732,225	34,422,493	129,154,719	4.41 %
7	Niger	80,358,461	24,464,483	104,822,944	3.58 %
8	Chad	51,210,329	50,514,157	101,724,486	3.47 %
9	Afghanistan	51,351,161	46,363,474	97,714,635	3.33 %
10	Haiti	67,505,956	23,206,922	90,712,878	3.10 %

Figure 4: ERF and CERF funding to Pakistan, 2006 – May 2013[15]

Note: The size of the total 2010 humanitarian funding in Pakistan means it is not possible adequately represent on the chart

[14] UN OCHA CERF data, available at http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/allocations-country/2006-2013-country (accessed 12/05/2013)
[15] UN OCHA FTS data, available at http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.aspx?page=emerg-emergencyCountryDetails&cc=pak

(and multi-sector programmes). The RAPID Fund benefits from an internal monitoring capacity in each of its areas of operation[16] and engages in targeted capacity building of implementing agencies.

2.5 An overviews of the 2012 CERF prioritization and allocation processes in Pakistan

36   Pakistan submitted 3 CERF applications in 2012; it was selected by the ERC for the first round of the UFE window and 2 further applications were made for RR funding, each of which received a positive response.

Allocation 1: CERF Rapid Response to conflict in KP and FATA

37   From January to March 2012, the CERF RR allocation was used to address the most immediate and critical needs of more than 16,000 newly displaced families from Khyber Agency to the neighbouring districts of KP, particularly in Peshawar, Nowshera and Charsadda, both in camp settings (Jalozai Camp) and in off-camp hosting arrangements. The influx of IDPs was double the estimated number of displaced by the end of 2011 and required additional measures to address the situation.

38   OCHA called a meeting of the Humanitarian Regional Team (HRT[17] /ICCM) in Peshawar to guide the CERF process. The HRT prioritized the humanitarian activities based on information on the conditions of the new arrivals in Jalozai Camp. The CERF funding application was jointly reviewed and endorsed by the HRT on 8 March 2012, just one week after initial information on displacements was provided by the authorities and while significant numbers of IDPs were arriving and already being registered at Jalozai Camp. The application then received approval from the HCT and the RC/HC submitted the request. In response a CERF allocation of $11,970,485 was made to 6 UN agencies.

Allocation 2: CERF Under-Funded Emergency response (round 1) to conflict in KP and FATA

39   Pakistan was selected by the ERC for inclusion in the first round of the 2012 UFE window and a recommendation was made in December 2011 to allocate $15 million to support ongoing life-saving activities. The UFE prioritization process and drafting of proposals was underway when the new displacements prompted the RR submission. As a result of the underfunding, crisis-affected persons in KP/FATA received limited support, particularly the most vulnerable groups. For the majority of clusters, resource mobilization was a significant problem due to limited resources and "*the diversion of funding to support the floods response of 2010 and 2011*".[18] In early 2012, shortly after the expiry of the Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan, only an estimated 50 per cent ($332,179,558) of the requested $661,180, 978 was funded.[19]

40   The HRT then outlined the CERF process, including allocations and prioritization according to CERF life-saving criteria, defined timelines, and organized roles and responsibilities. Available data was used to analyse gaps to then feed into prioritising the use of resources. The HRT agreed CERF should cover the priority short-term needs of commonly identified vulnerable groups. Two components of the Humanitarian Operations Plan (HOP) were identified as eligible for CERF funding: support to IDPs/host communities during displacement and support to IDPs as they returned to areas of origin. However, due to funding gaps, further targeting and prioritization was required. As a result of a funding analysis, the HRT agreed resources should be used to bridge funding gaps until the end of May. Agreed activities

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[16] RAPID has funded projects in 36 districts in KP, Sindh, FATA, Punjab and Balochistan
[17] Members of the Humanitarian Regional Team include: heads of UN agencies at sub-office level, cluster coordinator; representatives of NGO and ICRC as an observer.
[18] Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report 2012 on the Use of CERF Funds, Pakistan, pp.34
[19] ibid

included maintaining established IDP camp services; meeting the priority need for food and clean drinking water in host communities; and supporting IDPs whose areas of origin were declared safe by providing assistance for principled, return.

41   The HCT received recommendations from the HRT in Peshawar in relation to the needs, prioritization strategy, gaps and response plan as per CERF criteria, for review. The HCT members reviewed the documents and discussed the approach at an HCT meeting. Project Proposals were submitted to OCHA for review against agreed criteria based on the needs, priorities and strategy outlined in the chapeau of the submission. They were then submitted by the RC/HC to the CERF Secretariat on 22 February 2012. The CERF provided $14,845,730 in underfunded grants to 6 UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Pakistan. The grants targeted affected populations in KP and FATA.

Allocation 3: CERF Rapid Response to floods in Sindh and Punjab

42   Towards the end of the year, in September 2012, flash floods and hill torrents, triggered by heavy monsoon rains experienced in Pakistan, caused widespread loss of life, livelihoods, and infrastructure. According to the NDMA, the 2012 floods affected 4.8 million people in 14,159 villages, damaged 636,438 houses, affected 1.2 million acres of crops and killed 12,121 head of cattle. Local authorities established 484 relief camps (i.e. relief/evacuation centres, largely schools and other public buildings) that hosted up to 314,408 people affected by the floods.

43   The HCT requested the HC to inquire about the possibility of requesting CERF support to respond to the floods. The RC/HC tasked OCHA to follow up on this request. Following consultations, the ICCM defined the CERF response priorities and suitable funding allocations based on the findings of the Multi-sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA). This defined response priorities which were then recommended to the HCT by the ICCM, which approved the recommendations. The priorities then guided the development of the CERF grant proposal.

44   In response, a CERF allocation of US$9.9 million was made to help UN agencies and humanitarian partners provide water, food, shelter and health care to those affected by the floods.

3. CERF processes

3.1 Inclusive country prioritisations

45   The prioritisation process for each of the three 2012 CERF applications was handled differently with the common denominator being the role of the HCT in empowering a coordinating body, either the ICCM in the case of the Sindh floods or the HRT for KP/FATA displacement to take responsibility for proposing sectoral priorities to HCT.   The RR allocation in KP/FATA used initial assessment data (including from PDMA) where it existed while the HOP was used for the UFE allocation to KP/FATA conflict. For the floods, the MIRA was used to provide a context for the decision-making process.

Prioritisation process for the Rapid Response funding window

46   Feedback for the two RR allocations in Pakistan was mixed underlining the challenges in trying to reach consensus on a common approach in a complex and often under-funded environment such as Pakistan. While initial discussions with the CERF Secretariat raised a

concern that allocations may have been spread too thinly between agencies and sectors, opinion in Pakistan was divided on what constituted good practice.

> "In Pakistan it is important to provide a coherent response, particularly given the high levels of poverty and the general lack of funding" Head of UN Agency and HCT member

> "All clusters except community restoration are eligible to apply for CERF funds according to the CERF lifesaving criteria. All clusters at the time of allocation want to have a share no matter how small it is", UN staff member, Islamabad

47   The minority view was that the breadth of the needs linked to a perceived chronic lack of funding necessitated an approach which sought both to save lives and protect livelihoods in order to mitigate the depletion of assets which had the potential to create a secondary crisis. Conversely to this, a far larger group of interviewees felt that the inability to prioritise life-saving assistance represented a failure to take difficult decisions and that the limited resources necessitated that prioritisation be strengthened in the future.

48   While there was a general view expressed that the breadth of the CERF Life Saving Criteria was unhelpful and that a narrower definition would assist in weeding out ineligible projects, the more significant problem is an inability to rigorously prioritise needs at the country-level. This suggests the need for stronger leadership by the HCT, the body tasked with supporting the HC to *'determine priority sectors/clusters and/or geographic areas or beneficiary groups…for inclusion in the CERF request'.*[20]

49   While the HRT and/or the ICCM are best placed to agree priorities, when this is not achieved to the extent required, HCT which must show greater leadership in guiding and if necessary, challenging the failure to rigorously prioritise. Several HCT members who were interviewed felt that part of the problem was an inability of some of the group members to de-link agency and sector responsibilities from their broader HCT role and as a consequence it was difficult to have an objective discussion about prioritisation. Given this concern, it is unfortunate that the NGO members of HCT who were best placed to play an objective role felt the most detached from the process (objective in the sense that their organisations do not directly receive CERF funds). Addressing the lack of active NGO participation in decision-making may go some way to strengthening the perceived impartiality of the process as well as strengthening the inclusiveness of the process.

50   With prioritisation in mind, the current process for the proposed RR CERF application for displaced communities in the Tirah Valley will provide an interesting test case. In order to achieve impact from the proposed $3.8 million CERF allocation, it will be important for clearly-defined priorities to be made rather than allocating funding across the different sectors; cluster and agency 'hats' will need to be removed if funds are to be targeted towards priority needs.

Transparency and inclusiveness of the prioritisation process
51   While the process of determining priorities for CERF RR allocations was considered challenging, it was also considered a relatively closed process with NGO (both international and national) and government stakeholders often playing little or no part in the process.

52   There has been a historical schism within the humanitarian community and parts of the Pakistan government which has been manifest in a failure to agree humanitarian priorities or

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[20] UNOCHA (2010) *CERF Rapid Response Window: Procedures and Criteria*, 23rd September 2011

to prepare and launch a consolidated appeal to guide humanitarian response. At the national-level, responsibility for response to natural and man-made disasters has also been split between different institutions which has made it impossible to identify a single interlocutor to participate in such exercises.

Figure 5: CERF-funded temporary learning space and PLaCES in district Jacobabad

Essa Machi temporary learning centre (TLC) in district Jacobabad, Sindh. Funded by UNICEF through their RR CERF allocation, the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum opened the centre after the village school was inundated by the monsoon floods in September 2012. Protective Learning and Community Engagement Services (PLaCES provide a multi-functional centre and outreach service for women and children affected by the floods in addition to offering a broad range of services which cut across clusters including psychosocial support, child-protection and adult literacy (photo credit: Andy Featherstone).

While the findings of the review bring into question the rigour with which the prioritization process was undertaken, there is little doubt about the impact of both of UNICEF's projects on flood-affected communities in Sindh Province with the TLC offering impressive results in terms of quality of education, enrollment and retention and the UNICEF PLaCES making a contribution not only to women's welfare and psychosocial support needs but also going some way to strengthening knowledge and changing attitudes on issues of child protection, women's literacy and violence against women.

53   In contrast with the government's participation in humanitarian coordination structures, there are both national and international NGO representatives on the HCT and NGOs are also represented at different levels within the clusters (including as co-leads for several of the clusters). Despite being represented in key decision-making forums, their participation in the prioritisation process was minimal and limited to a small number of the clusters who took a consultative approach to the process.

54   As a consequence of a perceived lack of participation in the prioritisation process there was broad consensus from non-UN stakeholders of the need to ensure greater transparency to address the lack of understanding about how the process works in practice. Interviews with the CERF Secretariat underlined the importance of prioritisation discussions with the onus placed on ICCM and HRT to ensure that discussions went beyond UN cluster staff to include representation from the broader membership. The recommendation applies also at the HCT-level where NGOs felt they were insufficiently involved to participate meaningfully in the process. The recommendation here is to endorse the use of the IASC's Principles of

Partnership[21] in all aspects of the CERF processes as a contribution to strengthening partnership in Pakistan more broadly.

Prioritisation process for the Under-Funded Emergencies window

55 In terms of prioritisation there was a general view that the UFE window should be approached differently to the RR window with a funding and gap analysis playing a more significant role in determining priorities for the latter which was discussed within the HRT which included the participation of NGO representatives and input from the PDMA and FDMA. In this regard, the process of working up the priorities for the KP/FATA UFE allocation was considered to be good practice and received broad endorsement although the inclusiveness of the process played a part in reducing the timeliness (see figure 6 below for a description of the process and figure 8 for a comparative analysis of the time taken for the 2011 and 2012 CERF prioritisation, submission and allocation processes).

Figure 6: Good practice in prioritising the first round UFE allocation in Pakistan[22]

An allocation of $15 million was allocated to the KP/FATA IDP crisis in the first round of the UFE window which had been underfunded relative to the response to the floods in 2010 and 2011.

The head of the UNOCHA Peshawar sub-office coordinated the process for which it was agreed that priorities would be discussed rather than funding. The HRT had recently completed an update of needs and identified two main beneficiary groups – IDPs in camps and IDPs in host communities. It was decided that the priority would be to keep IDP camps open unless there was a specific unmet need identified for off-camp IDPs.

The WASH Cluster was the only one that had undertaken a needs assessment in host communities which identified that the off-camp IDPs were severely affected by the degradation of WASH facilities. The other need for off-camp displaced persons was in the livelihoods sector; the IDPs were herders and had brought their flocks with them. The animals were dying of disease or the IDPs were selling them to meet immediate needs. Therefore, there was a concern that the IDPs would have lost all their assets by the time they returned.

Following the HRT discussion, Cluster leads were tasked to examine the key services required in the camps, to calculate the cost per month for each service and compare this against the amount of funding that was currently available for the sector. The total funding needs vs. fund available were then assessed against the total CERF funding available and different permutations of time vs. support to sectors were calculated.

The discussion deliberately avoided focus on agencies and instead kept as its reference point services and priorities for the IDPs. Once HRT had received the analysis of what was possible and made a decision on how to allocate the funding, the discussion was moved to Cluster lead agencies in order to determine the total allocation per agency.

The complementary use of the RR and UFE windows

56 Another success worthy of mention is the use of the different CERF windows to complement each other. Shortly after the RC/HC was informed of the successful application for the first round of the UFE window for the IDP response in KP/FATA,[23] there was a fresh displacement

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[21] Endorsed by the Global Humanitarian Platform in 2006, the Principles of Partnership (PoP) articulate a set of commitments to guide the relationship between different humanitarian partners. The CERF life-saving criteria refer to the PoP as a template for interactions between UN agencies, clusters and NGOs

[22] This extract is taken from a transcripts of a face-to-face interview between Rosemary Willey-Al'Sanah and Tasneem Mowjee as a contribution to the review

[23] UNOCHA reports show that on 31 December 2010 only 50% of the requested $661,180,978 had been funded and there were concerns that funding may be diverted to the floods response in Sindh and Balochistan

of 16,000 families from the conflict-affected areas of Khyber Agency as a consequence of military operations against non-state armed actors. In acknowledgement of the need for a rapid response to the new displacement, an application to the RR window was made in March 2012. Interviews with cluster staff and IPs (implementing partners) in Peshawar, a review of the project proposals for the two allocations and details from the RC/HC annual report show a clear separation was maintained between the two responses and in this respect the Pakistan HCT should be commended in its appropriate use of the CERF.

3.2 Streamlined review, allocation and distribution

57   Once priorities had been endorsed by the HCT, the task of translating these into agency allocations was undertaken jointly by the agencies themselves with OCHA playing a facilitating role where this was required. Even when there was a proposed allocation to work to, interviews suggested that it was at times difficult for agencies to reach agreement on relative priorities and to split the allocation between them. In 3 of the last 5 CERF applications, the HCT (or a subset of it, including the RC/HC) has had to get involved in "brokering ratios" between agencies).

58   There was some debate about whether the role of clusters should be restricted to identifying priorities and strategies or whether it should include project review. Cluster involvement in identifying projects was mixed, with the Peshawar HRT tending to take a more consultative approach. For some clusters, and particularly in Islamabad, UN agencies often met only with their implementing partners. While this ensured the timeliness of the process, it did mean that clusters were often omitted from the project development process.

59   Where there was a single UN agency represented in a cluster, progress in moving from prioritisation to proposal was swift; where there were two or more UN agencies, delays were sometimes experienced as funding was negotiated in what could become quite protracted exchanges. With the discussions involving only a small subset of the cluster, often limited to peer agencies and lacking an objective means to determine intra-cluster priorities, there was criticism from both within the UN system and from NGO partners about this aspect of the process.

60   Proposal writing and submission followed rapidly after funding allocations had been agreed and by this stage of the process, many of the UN agencies already had a fairly clear plan of action in mind, the only challenge coming in the event of a request from the CERF Secretariat to reduce the budget. Rather than go through an additional prioritisation process, across-the-board budget percentage reductions tended to be favoured as a means of re-calculating budgets in a timely and non-confrontational way.

61   Peshawar-based IPs spoke of their limited knowledge of the process and of their dissatisfaction with their lack of involvement, at times knowing little or nothing about projects until they were requested to implement them.[24] While there was general agreement that the projects were well-targeted, there was also a sense of disempowerment as a result of the perceived opacity of the process. The lack of an inclusive project development process sometimes led to challenges in implementing projects due to the short timeframes. In this respect, the findings of this review are little changed from the findings of the Pakistan country submission for the 5-year evaluation;

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[24] A meeting was held in Peshawar to contribute to the review in which 14 local/national/international NGOs participated

> 'NGOs have the feeling that they have little say in CERF processes. They complained about the process at the time of the 2010 RR allocation made in response to the IDP crisis. In their view the CERF processes for the response to the floods lacked transparency.' CERF 5-year Evaluation, Pakistan Country Study, Channel Research

62   Coordination between Provincial humanitarian coordination structures and National-level structures was considered problematic at times and on several occasions UN agency staff in Islamabad raised concerns about decisions that had been made in Peshawar having to be undone as they didn't adequately take account of organisational capacity and resourcing realities, although it is important to add that promoting appropriate decision-making as close to the area of impact as possible should be considered good practice.

The importance of more clearly outlining process

63   Given the perceived opacity of parts of the process, the frequency with which the process conducted at country-level changes and the importance of a timely submission to meet urgent humanitarian needs, there would be much to be gained from presenting the process of prioritisation, allocation, submission and review in a flow chart for both the UFE and RR windows. This would offer the benefit of ensuring transparency while also offering a more inclusive process.[25] If humanitarian stakeholders are clearer about the process then they are more likely to participate meaningfully in it.

64   At CERF Secretariat level it is recommended that a flow-chart or short one-page set of bullet points outlining the steps in the process are provided in the global guidance procedures and criteria for both the UFE and RR window. At a country level it is recommended that the global guidance is contextualised to make it relevant to the structures in Pakistan. The objective of this should be to promote accountability, transparency and inclusiveness.

Learning from experience through an after action review

65   Given the different processes that have been used to identify and allocate CERF funds in Pakistan which have each had successes and challenges, there has been a significant missed opportunity to learn from the experiences. Despite an after action review template and accompanying set of guidelines having recently been developed by the CERF Secretariat, the opportunity to trial the methodology has not yet been taken.

66   While there was guarded interest in uptake of the methodology from some participants of the review, the guidelines do little to permit challenging issues of governance, inclusion and transparency to be objectively discussed and addressed. Some participants felt that if the status quo was to be challenged and changed, rather than undertake the exercise as a 2-hour internal HCT exercise, it would require at least a half-day and should be facilitated by someone outside of the process who could be considered impartial and who was not directly involved in the process. Given the importance of CERF funds in Pakistan, a half-day reflection on one or more CERF processes each year would seem a wise investment.

4. CERF results

4.1 Timely response

67   There was consensus within the humanitarian community and donors that in 2012 the CERF was amongst the quickest funding to arrive after a crisis and consequently most considered it the 'go-to' fund for humanitarian response in Pakistan. While a small number of UN

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[25] The flow chart should include the engagement of key cross-cutting advisors such as for gender

agencies spoke of their use of internal funds in advance of CERF funding, many relied entirely on the CERF. Discussions with donors highlighted the value of the CERF application process as a trigger to commence their own internal discussions about funding, suggesting a significant reliance on CERF.[26]

Figure 7: Funding trends in response to the 2012 floods[27]

68   Donor representatives considered the use of CERF funds as seed money to initiate response as playing an important role in agencies being able to strengthen their own understanding of humanitarian needs and in so doing put them in a stronger position to submit compelling funding requests. In this respect CERF has been extremely successful in establishing itself as the funding stream of choice for emergency response.

69   An analysis of the timing of donor funds in response to the 2012 floods provides an endorsement of the timeliness of CERF funds at a scale that permits a proportionate scale-up in response. OCHA FTS data shows that the $9.9m allocation which arrived in mid-October wasn't equalled by other donors until a month later (see figure 7 above). While the absence of a humanitarian appeal makes it very difficult to track the data for the responses in KP/FATA it is likely that donor funding would follow a similar pattern.

70   While the speed and reach of the CERF funds is commendable, it is also a potential concern. With the CERF application considered by donors as a trigger for their own internal discussions and with Pakistan benefitting from 3 relatively generous allocations in 2012 which permitted the kick-starting of humanitarian operations to scale, there is a possibility that the CERF could become a victim of its own success. The challenge will come when a CERF application is rejected or when only a small allocation is made. In this respect, the 2013 Tirah valley[28] CERF request will provide an interesting example, both because of the time it

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[26] Many of the donors who participated in the review provide generous annual grants to the CERF and in this way are making a contribution to the early CER-funded response.

[27] Source: OCHA FTS

[28] Since mid-March, 48,169 people have been displaced from the Maidan area in the Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency, FATA, due to an escalation of hostilities between rival armed groups and the Government's security

has taken to obtain adequate data to work up a concept note (estimated to be between 3-4-weeks due to the inaccessibility of the IDPs and as a consequence, paucity of information agencies had about their needs) but also because of the small amount that was requested (approximately $3.8m). Given the precarious situation of the IDPs, the lack of an immediate humanitarian response and the limited size of the CERF allocation, it will be even more important for a far stricter prioritisation process to be undertaken as will the timely release of supplementary funding from donors.

71　　While there is a danger in donors considering a CERF application as a touchstone or precursor to their own funding discussions, there is significant anecdotal evidence of the successes of CERF assisting in leveraging donor funds. While comprehensive data is not available, the 2012 RC/HC Annual Report on the use of CERF funds in Pakistan contains significant evidence in support of the assertion; for the UFE allocation of $15 million, the education, nutrition, child protection and health sectors all reported additional funding from donors including the Danish Embassy, ECHO, Australia, USAID and Norway. While the KP/FATA RR allocation provides scant details of additional resources leveraged by the initial CERF contribution, the monsoon floods RR allocation provides a more positive picture of the value of the CERF in kick-stating humanitarian response, identifying funding from the Polish government, USAID and DANIDA.

72　　While there was an overwhelmingly positive response from all the stakeholders to the question of timeliness, a comparison of the fund in 2012 against past performance provides a more nuanced picture (see figure 8 below). Importantly the RR window performed extremely well with very little time taken to move from first to final submission (only a quarter of the time it took in 2011). The 2012 UFE process understandably took longer than the 2012 RR submission (a lower prioritisation is placed on timeliness for the UFE window) but of greater concern is that it also took considerably longer than the 2011 UFE process.[29]

73　　Discussions with humanitarian stakeholders in Pakistan and a review of the data show that the steps in the CERF process that have the greatest bearing on timeliness are preparation, application revision and final submission. It is these steps that account for the significant variation in performance between UFE and RR windows in 2011 and 2012 and also speak to one of the most important tensions for a CERF process – that of timeliness versus inclusiveness. While the 2012 UFE process was considered inclusive, it was also more time-consuming, taking 2-weeks (although this may also have been due to the CERF application being made in tandem with the development of the Humanitarian Operations Plan and may also have been affected by the KP/FATA UFE and RR applications being prepared simultaneously).

74　　The average time for submissions to be drafted and finalised for the 2012 RRs in KP/FATA and Sindh was just 6-days although feedback from humanitarian partners, particularly NGOs (represented in both the HCT and clusters) suggested that they did not participate in the process. It is difficult to provide an unequivocal recommendation on balancing timeliness and inclusiveness because both are important for different reasons, but having a clearly written and communicated process would certainly provide the greatest likelihood of ensuring that the process is broadly inclusive as well as being timely.

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operations against armed non-state actors. Humanitarian partners are seeking an additional $3.5 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to address the basic needs of the IDPs. More funding will be needed from other donors to sustain assistance to the displaced families (Source: Pakistan – Khyber Agency Displacements. Situation report No. 5, 26 April 2013)

[29] The comparison was made using data in the Pakistan Country Study for the CERF 5-year evaluation

Figure 8: Average CERF timings in calendar days from submission to disbursement for Pakistan[30]

	2006-10	2011 UFE	2011 RR	2012 RR	2012 UFE
■ First to final submission	10	5	19	6	14
■ Final submission to approval	3	2	3	3	4
■ Approval - LOU	8	4	4	4	2
■ LOU - disbursement	5	4	4	5	5

The timeliness of sub-granting from UN Agency CERF recipients to IPs

75   Data is routinely collected for the timeliness of sub-granting and at a global level has been subject of considerable scrutiny. Analyses undertaken by the CERF Secretariat of sub-grants made between 2009 and 2011 show a significant improvement on the average number of working days from CERF disbursement to first instalment received by IP for RR allocations but little change in the time taken for UFE sub-grants to be made with an average for the two CERF funding windows of 50.5-days. A review of the data presented in the 2012 Pakistan RC/HC annual report suggests an average processing time across the three Pakistan CERF grants of 50.1 days (see figure 9 below).

76   While in the context of humanitarian need this is a significant delay, it is important to note that the impact of this delay in terms of operations was partially mitigated by sub-grantees starting their funded activities prior to the first instalment being made which reduced the time-lag to just over 16-days. When asked about the timeliness of grant transfers, IPs in Peshawar struggled to provide accurate information but suggested the process took weeks rather than months. This suggests that efforts made locally by UN agencies to reduce sub-grating delays may be bearing fruit. Strategies that have been adopted include using pre-existing partnerships (WFP), preparing contingency Partnership Cooperation Agreements (UNICEF) and preparing contingency plans which identify partner response capacities (IOM). It is important to say that there was a general view taken by partners that the time lag had been reduced through the adoption of these measures.

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[30] Source: 2011 - 2012 - CERF database; 2006-10 - Spaark M & Ur Rehmen A (2011) *5-year evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund: Pakistan Country Study,* Channel Research

Figure 9: Timeliness of Pakistan CERF sub-grants[31] in 2012 and global CERF sub-grants, 2009 - 2011[32]

CERF Grant	Total number of sub-grants to Gov, NGO, NNGO[33]	Average # days from disbursement to first instalment to IP[34]	Average # days from disbursement to start of funded activities by IP
RR KP/FATA	79	50.1	16.2

YEAR	Total number of CERF projects	Total number of sub-grants reported	Average number of working days from CERF disbursement to first instalment forwarded to implementing partner		
			RR	UFE	All
2009	466	171	50.4	62.8	51.4
2010	468	121	53.9	70.4	59.2
2011	472	600	41.2	62.3	50.5

4.2 Life-saving actions at critical moments

77   While the extent to which the CERF adequately prioritises life-saving activities was the subject of considerable debate, the subjective nature of what is considered life-saving does not allow an easy analysis of this. There is however, considerable evidence to suggest the 2012 CERF allocations met essential humanitarian needs for both natural and man-made disasters in Pakistan.

78   From a review of the allocations by cluster (see table 10 below), the clusters that received the majority of allocations are those most associated with the provision of life-saving assistance and services, being WASH, shelter and food, alongside multi-sector assistance which accounts for priority assistance to camp-based populations. For each of the 3 CERF allocations, funding to these three sectors accounted for between 68 – 80% of the total. Of note is the increase with time of the protection cluster which was also considered an essential part of a timely humanitarian response.

79   Agency interviews on the impact of CERF-funded assistance provided an endorsement of the contribution of the RR window to meeting time-critical needs. At the time of the IDP influx, agencies were already under-funded and as a consequence the humanitarian community was poorly placed to scale-up the existing response to meet the new needs. Of note are the extension of food distribution to meet the needs of the new influx, the provision of water and sanitation services to IDPS and support provided to meet the specific protection needs of vulnerable sections of the community.

80   For the floods response, the CERF was the first major funding contribution to the initial response underlining its value in meeting critical needs. Food rations, shelter/NFI kits and provision of water and sanitation for those displaced were amongst some of the most urgent needs addressed by the fund.

81   While the UFE window is not always associated with meeting quite the same criticality of need as the RR window, in the context of a significant break in funding, CERF played a key

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[31] 2012 Pakistan RC/HC Annual Report.
[32] Survey of UN Agency Sub-Granting procedures to implementing partners under CERF grants, CERF Secretariat, May 2012
[33] The data is taken from annex 1 of the 2012 RC/HC annual CERF report for Pakistan. Please note that for a small number of grants the data was incomplete and hence omitted from the analysis
[34] Data is used only where an exact date is indicated for the disbursement to a government, NGO or NNGO implementing partner as indicated in annex 1 of the RC/HC annual CERF report 2012

role in permitting the humanitarian community to continue meeting basic needs while resources were mobilised to fill the post-CERF gap.

Figure 10: Total 2012 CERF allocation by cluster

4.3 Quality and accountability

Agency monitoring

82   UN Agencies/IOM are accountable to their individual Executive Boards and for implementation of their own mandates and their use of CERF resources is integrated within these existing reporting and accountability structures. As such, the review did not seek to assess the results achieved by the agencies; rather the focus was placed on assuring that the monitoring systems that the agencies deployed were sufficiently rigorous to report on what the funding had achieved.

83   While different agencies each have their own approach to monitoring, there are certain commonalities that are shared between them; the first line of monitoring involves agencies own staff linked to a bespoke performance monitoring tool which produces regular reports against expected outputs. Each of the UN agencies had a system in place to perform these core functions. In areas that were considered insecure and/or inaccessible to their staff, most agencies then complemented this system with a third party monitoring mechanism for both general (quantitative aggregation of outputs) and technical (adherence to technical quality standards) monitoring. For this, local NGO or research organisations not involved directly in implementation were contracted to make regular visits to IPs to collect data and elicit feedback from those receiving assistance. This data is written up and presented to the UN agency to supplement its own monitoring data and to verify data contained in IPs progress reports. Based on the successful implementation of this model, at least one agency (IOM) has extended the use of the third party monitoring mechanism to its natural disaster responses in order to ensure adequate coverage of fast-moving and geographically dispersed programmes.

Figure 11: WFP's approach to monitoring and evaluation

WFP monitoring and evaluation mechanisms reflect a corporate Results-Based Management framework: using a logical framework approach to monitor activities and their efficiency and effectiveness in achieving results. This involves monitoring the distribution process and following-up with recipient communities post-distribution through focus group discussions and other stakeholder consultations.

In Pakistan, where the security situation permits, WFP undertakes monitoring directly to ensure maximum accountability. Monitoring undertaken by a contracted third party is used in areas where direct UN access is limited. Cooperating Partners provide information on the number of beneficiaries reached and the amount of food distributed, which is verified by WFP. WFP maintains coordination and oversight of all monitoring processes by providing corporate monitoring and reporting tools to partners, and cross-verifying information supplied via other sources.

A quarterly monitoring exercise is undertaken in randomly-sampled locations, and results analysed in order to identify strengths and weaknesses of a programme and make informed management decisions to improve effectiveness and efficiency.

These monitoring and evaluation processes collect a range of data used to determine the outcomes generated by a particular intervention, and are supplemented by more detailed impact studies typically outsourced to a third party research institution on an annual basis and supervised by WFP's dedicated Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping function.

RC/HC Annual reporting

84   Despite the existence of strong processes of monitoring, the extent to which the annual reporting process provides assurance that the desired results were achieved is less convincing. A new reporting process was implemented in 2012 and feedback from agencies, OCHA and cluster coordinators were generally negative. Criticisms focused on issues concerned with (i) the report format, (ii) the report process, and partly as a consequence of this, agency responses were often of a low quality.

85 *Report format*
   ▪ A number of agencies reported challenges in reporting specific results against CERF funds due to them being part of a much larger programme which received funding from multiple donors. In this case, the agency tended to extrapolate results from the broader programme and provide detail where this was possible which tended to lead to a very formulaic agency response.
   ▪ At least one agency (WFP) raised a concern that the RC/HC annual report format differed from its standard reporting template and as a consequence it took considerable time to re-format results for each of the CERF allocations it received in 2012.
   ▪ Apart from disaggregated beneficiary data, the majority of the project results were reported in narrative form and as such results could not be easily extracted to permit the aggregation of consolidated results by CERF allocation or by country.

86.   *Report process*
   ▪ Agency staff and cluster coordinators spoke of there being too little time between the arrival of the new report format (21st January) and the submission date (15th March) which didn't allow for discussion between the contributors to the report or for training to be provided to staff tasked with filling it out the which resulted in a lack of clarity about how to fill in the report.
   ▪ The request for supplementary information for the 2 2011 CERF allocations against the new reporting format as part of the 2012 RC/HC annual report process made for a very heavy

reporting process as well as stretching agency knowledge. A number of agencies expressed concern that as a result of staff turnover it was difficult to accurately answer questions on the 2011 responses.

- The need to prepare a separate report for each of the 3 allocations separately is understandable but writing all 3 reports at a single point in time did lead to significant repetition across a number of the sections such as lessons learned and for individual agency projects.
- The submission of shared parts of the report such as lessons learned on an agency-by-agency or cluster-by cluster basis has led to the document being fractured and at times contradictory. Had time allowed, a process of working up the strategic parts of the report by HCT as a whole would have been beneficial both in terms of quality of output but it would have also allowed greater discussion about progress towards learning lessons which could have strengthened practice in the future.
- Compiling and consolidating the report was time-consuming and required significant communication back-and-forth between OCHA, cluster coordinators and the CERF-funded agencies which was time-consuming and inefficient.

Figure 12: CERF-funded shelter kits providing much-needed assistance to villagers in Shikarpur district

In January 2013 the national NGO Support to Deprived People distributed IOM-procured shelter kits and Non-food items (NFIs) to people whose houses had been destroyed in Shikarpur district. Community discussions revealed that while the items arrived in the village several months after the flood (distributions initially targeted other areas), the items were considered to be timely (particularly the blankets which arrived during the cold weather), of good quality and met an essential unmet need. The CERF-funded assistance was the only relief items that have been distributed in the 2 villages visited during the field trip and there continues to be significant needs despite the floods having initially affected the area 7-months ago.

87. *Agency response issues*
- While the inclusion of a specific section in the report on the IASC Gender Marker is positive, the responses received were disappointing. While there is no requirement for the Marker to be used for CERF, it is considered good practice and across the 40 projects which formed the 3 CERF allocations, the 2a code was used on 18/40 projects, 2b was given to 4/40 projects and a Mark of 1 was given to 6 projects. Despite the promise of strong results against gender equality, with over half of the projects either having the potential to contribute significantly to gender equality or with a principal purpose to advance gender equality, the lack in most cases of an accompanying narrative in the section on gender or in the body of the project report is disappointing and represents a missed opportunity.

- The understandable use by agencies of standard answers for certain questions (for example, M&E) resulted in significant repetition throughout the report.

88. Overall there was a lack of clarity within Pakistan about the objective of the report and its target audience which resulted in frustration. While it contained a wealth of data, the report is likely too long for donors, interviews with which highlighted the importance of brevity, and the significant repetition throughout the document makes it difficult to easily digest.

89. To increase the efficiency of the process, to strengthen the link between the articulation of objectives, monitoring of results and aggregation and communication of impact an online project management system would offer considerable benefits. A system which could focus on objectives, provide basic monitoring against standardised indicators and present results against these would offer significant benefits to country-based staff and would specifically;

- Strengthen the results-orientation of the approach.
- Permit the use of standardised indicators linked to specific actions.
- Allow agencies accountable for projects to enter monitoring data and report on results in real time rather than according to an annual cycle which often provides a poor fit with implementation timeframes.
- Significantly reduce the administrative burden currently placed on OCHA.

90. An online project management system would also benefit the CERF Secretariat in the following ways;

- It would allow an analysis of agency monitoring data in real time rather than on annual basis.
- It would be better able to aggregate and communicate the achievements of the CERF in a given country in a given year or globally as a whole.
- It could generate annual reports on CERF achievements with minimal needs for transaction costs between the CERF secretariat and countries.

91. Given the weaknesses of the RC/HC annual report in articulating the impact of the CERF, it is also recommended that it should be supplemented with an evaluation. While accountability for CERF-funded projects rests with the implementing UN agency, such an approach would go some way to overcoming the fractured nature of annual reporting and better demonstrate the added value that the fund has, particularly to a country like Pakistan which often struggles to raise funds in a timely manner. An evaluation of the sector achievements of a CERF allocation could potentially fill gaps which the RC/HC annual report omits such as issues of progressing gender equality or delivering beneficiary accountability aspirations.[35] While a process such as this should not be considered a panacea due to challenges associated with attribution and practical constraints such as security and access, an annual evaluative exercise could fill in some important gaps in evidence and provide a more compelling narrative for the important role that the fund plays.

4.4 Support to humanitarian coordination and leadership

Strengthening humanitarian coordination

92. The contribution of the CERF to strengthening humanitarian coordination was an issue that elicited a range of opinions. Many felt that the participation of HRT and ICCM in the CERF

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[35] While a PAF review looks at the CERF process and overall results, the proposed evaluation would look at achievements at a sector or thematic level.

prioritisation process naturally strengthened humanitarian coordination with the linking of funding and coordination acting as a catalyst to bring different stakeholders to the coordination table; others considered that coordination systems were so well established in Pakistan that CERF made a negligible contribution; and the view voiced by some of those involved in negotiating CERF allocations was that the sometimes divisive nature of these discussions actually made for discord between UN agencies and weakened trust within HCT and clusters as a result.

93.   The above said, there is little doubt that the participation of the ICCM in Islamabad and HRT in Peshawar in identifying humanitarian priorities for the CERF and proposing these to the HCT can and often does strengthen their role and it is these two forums which have likely benefited most from the delegation of responsibilities with the caveat that this is sometimes compromised when the process was unclear. The CERF does less to strengthen HCT and because many of the clusters play only a marginal role in CERF processes, it is difficult to speak of them benefitting from it.

94.   While assessing the contribution of the CERF to strengthening coordination is a complex question, what can be said is that on the 3 occasions in 2012 that CERF funding was requested, the process of prioritisation, allocation and implementation assisted the humanitarian community in focusing in on a common problem, identifying gaps in coverage and key humanitarian needs and in working together to determine and deliver timely solutions. While the process was at times bumpy, the end results that of timely assistance delivered to people who required it urgently should be considered a success of humanitarian coordination.

95.   Beyond the coordination of humanitarian agencies, perhaps the greater and less visible contribution made by CERF to strengthening coordination is in providing a foundation for donor agencies to supplement CERF funds by making a commitment to providing assistance in the short- and medium-term. While the evidence presented in the RC/HC annual report is anecdotal, donors confirmed that as a tool to galvanise interest and action, the CERF was broadly effective. Given the difficulties which humanitarian agencies have faced in fundraising to provide vital assistance, the impact of the CERF on raising funds for critical needs should be considered as no small achievement.

Partnership and effective division of labour

96.   There is little evidence to suggest that the CERF has strengthened partnerships between UN agencies and NGOs or governments at the national level in Pakistan. While the initial ire of NGOs in 2006 at not being eligible for CERF funds appears to have abated in recent years, the lack of NGO engagement in Pakistan may also be indicative of a withdrawal of NGOs from strategic CERF processes rather than an acceptance of the status quo. At the same time, efforts by the UN agencies in Islamabad to elicit NGO involvement appear to have been at best, modest.

97.   At Provincial-level NGOs participate in CERF processes and projects as members of HRT (albeit in the minority) and as implementing partners. During a meeting of 14 CERF IPs in Peshawar, comprising international, national and local organisations, participants spoke of having limited influence in the prioritisation process through their participation in some of the clusters but reported that their most significant involvement was only when CERF funds had been allocated and expressed concern at what they considered to be a de-linking of proposal preparation and implementation. The percentage of the total 2012 Pakistan CERF

allocation that was sub-granted to NGOs was 14.1% (see figure 13 below);[36] Of this amount, it is noteworthy that the greatest proportion of CERF sub-granting was made to national NGOs (72.5% for the RR window and 51.7% for the UFE window). This is hardly surprising given the more prominent role played by national organisations in humanitarian response in Pakistan in recent years but is doubtless also a result the flight of international organisations from parts of the country considered too insecure or too inaccessible.

98. It is difficult to say whether this represents an effective division of labour or not as no yardstick exists to determine what a proportionate allocation should be but the way the relationship between UN agencies and IPs was described suggests it was more akin to contracting than it was to partnership as articulated in the Inter Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) PoP.

Figure 13: Total 2012 CERF allocation by implementation modality[37]

Partner Type	RR	Percentage	UFE	Percentage	Grand Total	Percentage
GOV	$343,504	12.3%	$723,080	26.3%	$1,066,584	19.2%
INGO	$426,710	15.2%	$605,939	22.0%	$1,032,649	18.6%
NNGO	$2,031,853	72.5%	$1,424,401	51.7%	$3,456,254	62.2%
Grand Total	$2,802,067	100.0%	$2,753,420	100.0%	$5,555,487	100.0%

99. The complexity of the government's relationship with the international humanitarian community and the fractured nature of the NDMA's responsibilities for natural disasters and not for conflict-related displacement have tended to militate against their involvement in national-level CERF processes. At a Provincial level, however, government agencies are more engaged in the range of humanitarian coordination and response and as such play a more prominent role as evidenced in the UFE allocation to KP/FATA where 26.3% of the

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[36] the IP sub-grants referred to in the analysis is as reported by recipient agencies in the RC/HC CERF report
[37] The data is taken from annex 1 of the 2012 RC/HC annual CERF report for Pakistan. The analysis was conducted by the CERF Secretariat.

allocation was sub-granted to government agencies. The PDMA and FDMA in Peshawar were outspoken on the importance of strengthening the prioritisation process and the necessity for them to play a more prominent role in it.

Empowering humanitarian leadership

100.   The RC/HC felt that the contribution made by the CERF in 2012 of $36.7m made an important contribution to strengthening his leadership role. While this is a relatively small amount of the total humanitarian funding to Pakistan, that the process bought the humanitarian community together was viewed positively.

101.   On the face of it this certainly appears to be the case, however, in the event that the CERF prioritisation process becomes protracted, several HCT members commented that the perceived benefits can be diminished if not reversed. The dysfunctional accountabilities between humanitarian actors, particularly those represented in HCT and the RC/HC can make it extremely difficult to resolve disagreements and in this regard puts the RC/HC in a very sensitive position (he is accountable for the process of leading and coordinating humanitarian action, but not for the results as he has no authority over the agencies responsible for service delivery).

102.   While these flaws in accountabilities are not the fault of the CERF, by using the RC/HC as the final arbiter of CERF allocations, it potentially exposes the gaps in accountabilities, particularly when negotiations over allocations falter. Several UN agency staff spoke to this issue raising a concern that when there was a lack of agreement on how to allocate CERF funding, this structural accountability deficit complicated the task of finding a resolution.[38] For this reason, some considered that the CERF had in the past weakened the position of the RC/HC and humanitarian leadership more generally.

5. Complementarity between the pooled funds in Pakistan

5.1 *Complementarity between the ERF and CERF*

103.   The most obvious complementarity between ERF and CERF is the focus of each on facilitating response for different parts of the humanitarian community; while CERF is targeted towards UN agencies (albeit with NGOs as implementing partners), ERF funds are intended predominantly for facilitating NGO (international, national and local) responses. Both are managed by the RC/HC with significant support from OCHA and so in this sense, the ERF and CERF provide a valuable response tool to mobilise the diversity of the humanitarian community.

104.   Beyond this, interviews revealed very few examples of complementarity between the two funds. While the larger UN agencies tended to dismiss the ERF as awarding smaller grants and being less timely than the CERF, several of the smaller UN agencies were better able to find value in it, providing examples of joint-funded work with ERF-funded NGOs distributing CERF-funded heath kits and ERF-funded NGOs distributing CERF-funded food supplies; but these examples appear to be the exceptions rather than the norm and the majority of interviews tended to focus on the peculiarities of each rather than their complementarities.

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[38] This structural accountability gap is defined in the 2010 CERF PAF document as follows: 'Recipient agency accountability to the RC/HC at the field level is not formalized, nor is it formally recognized by agencies consulted at field level as having a significant influence on the direction of their programming.'

105.   The relatively modest size of the Pakistan ERF was an issue that was raised on a number of occasions, with the CERF contribution in Pakistan being significantly larger than the ERF (up to 10 times larger in the years since the 2010 flood response when both funds were much larger and the gap between the two was far smaller).[39] In terms of the comparative timeliness of the 2 pooled funds, CERF projects that are implemented directly by the receiving UN Agency take half as long to process than for the ERF, but where CERF funds are sub-granted the delays experienced in transferring funds means that the ERF process can be more timely.

5.2 Complementarity between UN-managed funds and the RAPID fund

106.   With a focus on supporting national and international NGO response in Pakistan, there are significant similarities and complementarities between the RAPID Fund and the ERF which benefits from good collaboration between the respective teams. For interventions in KP/FATA, data has been shared about partner funding applications to ensure that essential services have been covered and also to avoid duplication. Interviews with RAPID fund staff revealed only limited knowledge of CERF activities and no examples were forthcoming of complementarity between the two funds. While the humanitarian priorities outlined in the HOP serve as a guide for all three pooled funds, the lack of stronger coordination between RAPID and CERF seems a missed opportunity given the significance of their combined funds and the potential for them to proactively complement each other.

5.3 A comparison of ERF and CERF in Pakistan: Towards a future of pooled funding?

107.   While the ERF and CERF perform the same basic function, that of directing pooled funds towards humanitarian priorities there are some important differences in how each is governed and managed which is material to a discussion about the complementarity of the funds and offers some choices which could shape the future of pooled funding in Pakistan. While the timeliness, scale and achievements of the CERF in Pakistan are impressive, there is the potential for the CERF to learn from the ERF on issues of governance, prioritization and monitoring (see figure 14 below). Moreover, a common approach to these issues would significantly strengthen CERF processes in addition to offering considerable efficiencies to both the ERF and CERF.

Greater than the sum of the parts: strengthening the complementarity of pooled funding in Pakistan

108.   The strengths and weaknesses of the 2 UN pooled funds are surprisingly complementary; the CERF provides comparatively large amounts of funding to UN agencies for humanitarian response in a timely manner, but the governance structure has weaknesses and the process of prioritization is considered by some to lack transparency. Conversely, the ERF has a good track record of delivering smaller projects through NGO partners and benefits from a process of prioritization and allocation which is more inclusive and transparent than the CERF but is often less timely.

109.   Given Pakistan's vulnerability to crises and bearing in mind concerns about a lack of humanitarian funds, pooled funding plays an essential role in facilitating timely response. However, while there is an argument to maintain both pooled funds given their distinctive added value there is also a compelling argument for the RC/HC and OCHA supported by the HCT (on behalf of CERF) and the ERF Advisory Board to explore the potential for best practice to be replicated across both funds and for potential efficiencies to be explored. Key

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[39] In 2010, the CERF and ERF were $51.8m and $36.6m respectively; in 2011 and 2012 the gap between the two was far larger being $32.4m and $2m respectively in 2011 and $36.7m and $5.6m respectively in 2012 (Source: OCHA FTS)

recommendations extracted from previous reviews by the CERF Secretariat include the following;[40]

Figure 14: Lessons to be learned? ERF governance and approaches to prioritization and monitoring

<u>Governance</u>
For the ERF, the RC/HC is responsible for funding decisions and for ensuring adequate strategic and programmatic oversight and the appropriateness of funded activities. An Advisory Board composed of representatives from national NGO, international NGO, three representatives from the UN humanitarian agencies/IOM, and three contributing donors is mandated to advise the HC on strategic and policy issues related to the ERF. A Review Board from the clusters assists the HC in the review of ERF proposals against set priorities and the overall humanitarian response framework. Cluster/sectoral working groups are responsible for the technical review based on identified needs, timeliness, cost effectiveness, and comparative implementation strategies and the capacity of the partners.

<u>Prioritisation</u>
To be eligible for ERF funding, all project proposals have to be consulted with and endorsed by the respective cluster/sectoral working group. These are responsible for the technical review based on identified needs, timeliness, cost effectiveness, and comparative implementation strategies and the capacity of the partners and clusters have established standardised processes to deliver timely review and feedback.

<u>Monitoring</u>
With the support of OCHA field sub-office/presence, the ERF Unit and the cluster/sectoral working group, as part of their broader mandate[41], will jointly monitor and evaluate the activities funded by the ERF as a basis for assessing the project. Review Board and Advisory Board members may also join the visit. This will be undertaken in consultation with the recipient organisation. If resources do not allow field participation, the cluster/sectoral working group will advise on monitoring methodologies.

- UN pooled funding in Pakistan could be handled by a single team. While the CERF has no dedicated country-level staff yet takes considerable OCHA resources to manage and coordinate, the ERF has a dedicated team in place. Ensuring that the preparation of the CERF requests is handled by a common set of staff would increase the likelihood that both funds are used in a complementary manner by avoiding duplication and by aligning analysis, consultations and prioritization. It would also permit significant staff and time efficiencies to be realized by OCHA.
- Similar processes could be used to identify needs and priorities for both CERF and the ERF; a comparable approach to the identification of needs and priorities for CERF as for the ERF would lead to a more coherent prioritization and allocation of funds. This would also increase the transparency and inclusiveness of the CERF prioritization would allow greater NGO involvement and ensure that sectors/clusters are playing a lead role in identifying needs and priorities for all funding streams. Knowing that the CERF delivers more timely assistance than the ERF it will be essential that a balance is made between inclusiveness and transparency. In saying this, and in acknowledgement of the smaller size of the ERF and the comparatively modest size of its allocations, the ERF could play a balancing role to that of the CERF, focusing on secondary or complementary sectors to that of the CERF.

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[40] These recommendations are in line with the draft guidance prepared by the CERF secretariat on complementarity between CERF and country based pooled funds. See CERF and Country-based Pooled Funds: Stock-Taking, April 2013, CERF Secretariat
[41] Generic ToR for sector/cluster lead at the country level in IASC Guidance Note on Using the Cluster Approach to Strengthen Humanitarian Response, 24 November 2006

- Consideration should be given to vetting CERF proposals through ERF governance and review structures as this would add rigour and an important element of peer review to the CERF process and it could help foster a more coherent and coordinated oversight of all pooled fund allocations in Pakistan (see figure 14 above). The ERF also has a clearly defined gender mainstreaming toolkit which the CERF could benefit from. This would present an opportunity to increase involvement of non-UN actors in the CERF process. The note on inclusivity and timeliness above also applies here.
- While monitoring of CERF results is the responsibility of the respective UN agency, joint evaluation efforts could be deployed for CERF and ERF. The ERF has a dedicated monitoring and evaluation capacity which could be used to complement existing agency efforts and strengthen communications on the achievement of the CERF in Pakistan. Joint evaluations would present more coherent and compelling evidence of the impact of pooled funding and could potentially fill a gap in CERF reporting.

110.   Taking into account the general concern raised by review participants that it is becoming increasingly difficult to fundraise for humanitarian response in Pakistan and given the similarities in the mandate of the CERF, ERF and RAPID fund there would be much to be gained from strengthening information-sharing and communication between the three funds generally and particularly in the initial stages of a CERF application. While information-sharing between the ERF and RAPID is now routinely undertaken, greater complementarity may be achieved if OCHA Pakistan engaged with RAPID at the prioritisation stage with a view to exploring how best to coordinate the use of pooled funds.

6. Conclusion: Value Added of the CERF to the humanitarian endeavour in Pakistan

111.   There can be little doubt of the value which the humanitarian community attaches to the CERF in Pakistan. Considered as the fund of first response, the CERF has been successful in providing timely and much-needed assistance for a variety of humanitarian crises across both the UFE and RR windows. In addition to meeting needs, results suggest that the fund has also assisted in leveraging donor funding for what are often considered to be hard-to-fund humanitarian responses.

112.   Where the CERF has performed less well is in the transparency and inclusiveness of its decision-making processes with humanitarian partners often omitted from decision-making processes which their presence could have helped bring greater objectivity to. For this reason and because of the need for peer agencies to take difficult decisions over resource allocation, the extent to which the CERF has strengthened humanitarian coordination and leadership is difficult to judge. While the CERF doubtless delivers some strong results across a range of sectors, the process and format which guides reporting does a poor job of capturing these and should be strengthened.

113.   While the recommendations made to strengthen CERF processes and results will make an important contribution to the fund in the future, there are a second set of recommendations which speak to the strategic use of pooled funds in Pakistan more broadly and which, if implemented, could go a long way to promoting a more coherent and efficient response to sudden onset and under-funded emergencies in Pakistan.

6.1 Prioritisation

114.   **The prioritisation process for the CERF RR funding requires stronger leadership.**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC and HCT
It is incumbent on the RC/HC to ensure that RR funding meets the most essential needs. In order to achieve this it is recommended that when the HRT and ICCM fail to adequately prioritise and/or when

the process becomes divisive, the RC/HC supported by the HCT should play a stronger leadership role in determining and communicating priorities relevant to the context.

115. **The CERF life-saving criteria should be more restrictively interpreted and additional detail should be given to guide discussions on eligibility.**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: CERF Secretariat
The CERF life-saving criteria are the subject of considerable debate and controversy particularly in relation to the Rapid Response window. The balance of opinion in Pakistan is that discussions on prioritisation would benefit from a more restrictive interpretation of the criteria which focuses on a smaller number of sectors and that more detailed criteria would assist in decision-making about the eligibility of projects for CERF-funding.

6.2 Streamlined review, allocation and distribution

116. **A country-level flow chart of the prioritisation, review and allocation process should be prepared for the CERF RR and UFE window**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: OCHA Pakistan on behalf of the RC/HC
Given the opacity of parts of the prioritisation, review and allocation process in Pakistan, the frequency with which the process changes and the importance of a timely submission to meet life-savings needs, there would be considerable benefit if the process was presented in a flow chart for both UFE and RR windows. This would increase transparency while facilitating inclusivity. If humanitarian stakeholders are clearer about the process then they will be more likely to participate meaningfully in it.

117. **A flow chart of the prioritisation, review and allocation process should be included in the global guidance for the CERF RR and UFE window**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: CERF Secretariat
The inclusion of a flow diagram as part of the global guidance for both the RR and UFE windows would go a long way to managing expectations, promoting understanding and facilitating greater participation in the process.

118. **A half-day after-action review and reflection exercise should be conducted after the next CERF allocation**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
Given the value of the CERF for timely response in Pakistan, a half-day after-action review which included the participation of the whole of the HCT and benefitted from independent facilitation could offer scope for lessons to be learned and practice to be strengthened.

6.3 Quality and accountability

119. **An online project management system should be developed by the CERF Secretariat**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: CERF Secretariat
To increase the efficiency of the reporting process, to strengthen the link between articulation of objectives, monitoring of results and aggregation and communication of impact, the CERF Secretariat should consider developing an online project management system for the CERF. A system which could track project objectives, provide basic monitoring against standardised and gender mainstreamed indicators and present results against these would offer significant process efficiencies to country-based and Secretariat staff and may also offer time efficiencies.

120. **A thematic/sectoral evaluation of CERF results should be conducted to complement the RC/HC annual report and PAF reviews**
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC with support from OCHA Pakistan
Given the weaknesses of the RC/HC annual report in articulating the impact of the CERF, there should also be scope for complementing it with evaluation. While accountability for CERF-funded projects rests with the implementing UN agency, an additional evaluation which focused on sector or thematic achievements would go some way to overcoming the fractured nature of the reporting process and better demonstrate the added value that the fund has, particularly to a country like Pakistan which

often struggles to raise funds in a timely manner.[42] In saying this it is important to bear in mind the challenges of evaluating humanitarian interventions, of attributing changes to a single funding source and the practical constraints such as access and security. For these reasons an evaluation should not be considered a panacea but it could go some way to strengthening an assessment of results.

6.4 Complementarity between the CERF and ERF

121.   The current relationship between the ERF and CERF can best be described as coexistence rather than complementarity; both fund similar work and while there are some examples of coordination of resources, they tend to be the exception rather than the norm. Given OCHA's management of both funds and concerns raised in the review about the governance of CERF and its inclusiveness, a second set of recommendations that seek to build on the relative strengths of each of the funds are proposed as a contribution to a discussion on the future of pooled funding in Pakistan. While each of the recommendations has been tailored for the specific context in Pakistan it is important to note that they have been consolidated from previous reviews by the CERF Secretariat and as such build on existing evidence.[43]

123.   **Pooled funds in Pakistan could be supported by a single team.**
        RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
        While the CERF has no dedicated country-level staff but takes considerable OCHA resources to manage and coordinate, the ERF has a dedicated team in place. Ensuring that the preparation of ERF and CERF requests is handled by a common team would increase the likelihood that both funds are used in a complementary manner by avoiding duplication and by aligning analysis, consultations and prioritization. It would also permit resource efficiencies to be realized by OCHA.

124.   **Similar processes could be used to identify needs and priorities for both CERF and the ERF**
        RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
        A comparable approach to the identification of needs and priorities for CERF as for the ERF would lead to a more coherent prioritization and allocation of funds. This would also increase the transparency and inclusiveness of the CERF prioritization would allow greater NGO involvement and ensure that sectors/clusters are playing a lead role in identifying needs and priorities for all funding streams. Knowing that CERF currently offers a faster allocation and disbursement process than ERF it will be essential that a balance is made between inclusiveness and transparency

125.   **Consideration should be given to vetting CERF proposals through ERF governance and review structures**
        RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
        The governance and review structures for the ERF are more rigorous and inclusive than those of the CERF and would add an important element of peer review to the CERF process as well as helping to foster a more coherent and coordinated oversight of all pooled fund allocations in Pakistan. It would also present an opportunity to increase involvement of non-UN actors in the CERF process. The note on inclusivity and timeliness for the recommendation above also applies here.

126.   **The use of the ERF monitoring and evaluation capacity could be used to complement existing UN agency efforts**
        RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC
        While monitoring of CERF results is the responsibility of the respective UN agency, this could be supplemented by joint monitoring and evaluation efforts for CERF and ERF. The ERF has a dedicated

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[42] The evaluation would be distinct from a PAF review which focuses on CERF processes and overall results. Instead it should focus on a priority sector such as WASH or shelter or on a theme such as gender equality or accountability to affected populations.

[43] The recommendations are in line with the draft guidance prepared by the CERF secretariat on complementarity between CERF and country based pooled funds. See CERF and Country-based Pooled Funds: Stock-Taking, April 2013, CERF Secretariat

monitoring and evaluation team which could be used to complement existing agency efforts and strengthen communications on the achievement of the CERF in Pakistan. Joint evaluations would present more coherent and compelling evidence of the impact of pooled funding against anticipated results and gender marker commitments and could potentially fill a gap in CERF reporting.

6.5 Complementarity between CERF and the RAPID Fund

127. **Information-sharing and coordination between CERF and RAPID should be strengthened**

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION: RC/HC with support from OCHA Pakistan

While information-sharing between the ERF and RAPID is now routinely undertaken which has resulted in a level of complementarity between the two pooled fund, this has not been the case with the CERF. Greater complementarity may be achieved if OCHA Pakistan engaged with RAPID at the prioritisation stage with a view to exploring how best to coordinate the use of pooled funds.

Annex 1: Review participants

Unless indicated otherwise, participants are based in Islamabad. Many of the meetings were held as agency, team or sector focus group discussions.

CERF Secretariat staff (5)
David Hartstone, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, CERF Performance and Monitoring Unit
Karen Smith, Programme Officer, Rapid Response Grants
Shelley Cheatham, Underfunded Emergencies Lead
Victoria Sun, Programme Officer, CERF
Samir Mahmoud, Programme Officer, CERF

UNOCHA Pakistan staff (14)
Lynn Hastings, Head of Office
Annette Hearns, Head of Coordination
Sallee Gregory, Deputy Head of Office
Fatima Iqbal, Humanitarian Affairs officer
Daniel Teng'o, Public Information and Reporting
Hadia Nusrat, Gender Equality Advisor
Syed Hammad Raza, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, UNOCHA (SUKKUR)
Michael Juma, Head of Sub-office (PESHAWAR)
Tom Otunga, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (PESHAWAR)
Waheed Anwar, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (PESHAWAR)
Haseeb Saeed, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (PESHAWAR)
Shaista Ataullah, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (PESHAWAR)
Abdul Jabbar, Humanitarian Affairs Officer (PESHAWAR)
Rosemary Willey-Al'Sanah, (formerly) Head of Peshawar Sub-office (YEMEN)

UNOCHA ERF staff (1)
Laksmita Noviera, ERF Manager, UNOCHA

RAPID staff (1)
Shahid Mahmood, Programme Manager, RAPID fund, Concern Worldwide

UN/IOM Agency staff (26)
Drene Terana Sariffodeen, External Relations Officer, UNHCR

Ammarah Mubarak, Emergency Manager, IOM
Munazza Hadi, National Officer, Programme, UNHCR
Karen Allen, Deputy Representative, UNICEF (HCT)
Massouma Qazillbash, Emergency officer, UNICEF
Musarrat Youssuf, Research and Evaluation Officer, UNICEF
Alhaji Bah, Chief of Field Operations, UNICEF
Dr. Nashima Mahmood, Health Officer, UNICEF
Syed, Saeed Qadri, Nutrition Officer, UNICEF
Shandana Aurangzeb, Reports Specialist, UNICEF
Jorge Martinez, Emergency Coordinator, WHO
Tauqueer Ahmad Abbasi, Project Officer Basic Services, UN Habitat
Habib Mughal, Manager for Housing and DRR, UN Habitat
Neill Wright, Representative, UNHCR (HCT)
Timo Pakkala, Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator (HCT)
Yu Yu, Deputy Representative, UNPF (HCT)
Jedda Constantine, Reports Officer, WFP
Tonseef Ahmed, M&E Officer, WFP
Danyal Bacha, Pipeline Officer, WFP
Rizwan Bajwa, Programme Officer, WFP,
Jean-Luc Siblot, WFP Representative, Pakistan (HCT)
Dr. Ghani Ur Rahman, National Livestock Officer, FAO
Banaras Khan, Crops Specialist, FAO
Syed Abdul Razak, Operations Manager, DPRU, FAO
Deepak Bajracharya, CFO, UNICEF (PESHAWAR)
Rameez Hussain, IOM (PESHAWAR)
Muhammed Farhad, UNICEF (PESHAWAR)
Khalid Khan, FAO (PESHAWAR)

Donor Agency Representatives (8)
Isami Takada, First Secretary, Deputy Head Economic and Development, Japan Official Development Assistance

Jason Tulk, First Secretary, Development, CIDA
Gilles Angles, Cooperation Attache, Embassy of France in Pakistan
Dilani Perera, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Sweden
Joseph Tritschler, Senior Program Officer, OFDA
Katharina Lauer, Senior Humanitarian Advisor, OFDA
Abigail Perry, Department for International Development (by email)
David Sevcik, ECHO Head of Office, Pakistan

Cluster Coordination staff (17)
Elisabetta Brumat, Protection Cluster, UNHCR
Dr. Jorge Martinez, Health Cluster, WHO
Asiya Chaudhury, WASH Cluster/WASH specialist, UNICEF
M. Shafiq, Health Cluster, WHO
Fawad Khan, Health Cluster, WHO
Masooma Haider, Food Security Cluster, FAO
Amina Saoudi, Shelter cluster, IOM
Nasar Ali, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF (SUKKUR)
Saleem ur Rahman, Education officer, UNICEF (SUKKUR)
Valerie Svobodova, Protection Cluster Co-lead, IRC (PESHAWAR)
Asif Mahmood, WASH Cluster Support, UNICEF (PESHAWAR)
Zahir Shah, Food Security Cluster Coordinator, WFP (PESHAWAR)
Sikander Azam, IMO Shelter Cluster, UNHCR (PESHAWAR)
Tesfay Gebregziabher, CCCM Cluster Coordinator, UNHCR (PESHAWAR)
Dr Sardar Hayat Khan, Health Cluster Coordinator, WHO (PESHAWAR)
Khalid Khan, Food Security Cluster Coordinator, FAO (PESHAWAR)
Lubna Tajik, GBV Sub-cluster, PCO UNFPA (PESHAWAR)

NGO/implementing partner staff (27)
Mubashir Ahmed, Director of Programmes, Concern Worldwide (HCT)
Claire Whiting, PHF Country Coordinator (HCT)
Nargis Khan, PHF Policy and Communications Coordinator

Andy Buchanan. Country Director, ACTED (HCT)
Antonia Pannell, IDP Vulnerability Assessment & Profiling, IRC
Dr. Saman Yazdani Khan, Centre for Health & Population Studies (representing NHN)
Naseer Memon, SPO National Centre (representing NHN - HCT)
NRSP project staff (SUKKUR)
Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum project staff (SUKKUR)
Irfan Ali, National Operations Officer, IOM (SUKKUR)
Support to Deprived People project staff (SUKKUR)
Roshni Helpline field staff (SUKKUR)
Mohammed Khan, Chief Executive, CERD (PESHAWAR)
Dr. Zuman Ali, MERLIN (PESHAWAR)
Shujant, CESVI (PESHAWAR)
Dr. Hamida, Project manager, CAMP (PESHAWAR)
Taimoor, Project manager, BPDO (PESHAWAR)
Mohammed Khater, Protection Coordinator, IRC (PESHAWAR)
Ann Emerson, CYPD Coordinator, IRC (PESHAWAR)
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Abdul Wakeel, Executive Director, SSD (PESHAWAR)
Amjad Ali, Project Coordinator, CERD (PESHAWAR)
Sahibzada Shoaib, Chief Executive, SEED (PESHAWAR)
Javed Akhtar, Chief Executive Officer, SWWS (PESHAWAR)
Dr. Niamat Ali, Team Leader, CDO (PESHAWAR)

Government representatives (6)
Muhammad Idrees Mahsud, Director, NDMA
Brig. Sajid Naeem, Member (operations), NDMA
Mrs. Ammara Aamer Khattak, Director Relief Operations, PDMA (PESHAWAR)
Mr. Arshad Khan, DG FDMA (PESHAWAR)

Mr. Khalid Ilyas, Director Relief/Operations, FDMA (PESHAWAR)

Fiaz Muhammed, PDMA (PESHAWAR)

Annex 2: Itinerary

Date	Location	Meetings
16 April	Islamabad	Focus: The RC/HC and OCHA OCHA, Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator, CERF team, Gender Equality Advisor, ICCM
17 April	Islamabad	Focus: CERF recipient agencies UNHCR, IOM, UNICEF, WHO
18 April	Islamabad	Focus: Donor agencies Japan, CIDA, France, Sweden, OFDA, DFID
19 April	Islamabad	Focus: HCT and CERF recipient agencies HCT meeting, UNFPA, UN Habitat
20 April	Sukkur	Focus: Sindh flood response Jacobabad project visit, UNICEF (Child Protection and Education), implementing partners - PFF, NRSP and ROSHNI
21 April	Sukkur	Focus: Sindh floods response Shikapur project visit, IOM (shelter/Non-Food Items), implementing partner – SDP
22 April	Islamabad	Focus: CERF recipient agencies and RAPID fund Concern RAPID Fund, FAO, WFP
23 April		Focus: Government National Disaster Management Authority
24 April	Islamabad	Focus: Clusters and national/international NGOs Pakistan Humanitarian Forum, National Humanitarian Network, implementing partners, Food security/protection/shelter/WASH/Health clusters
25 April	Peshawar	Focus: KP/FATA displacement UN OCHA sub-office, cluster coordinators and UN Agency staff, implementing partners, Provincial Disaster Management Authority, FATA Disaster Management Authority
26 April	Islamabad	Focus: ERF Secretariat, ECHO and wrap-up ERF, ECHO, UN OCHA Head of Office

<u>**Annex 3: Methodology**</u>

Approach and methods

A mixed methods approach was adopted for the review with a focus on qualitative discussions with key informants and focus group discussions across each of the key stakeholder groups. Prior to the review, a literature review was conducted of documents made available by the CERF Secretariat and the OCHA Country Office including country-specific information and more general CERF-related guidance, learning and recommendations. A field trip to Sukkur which included project-level visits in addition to discussions with agency field staff allowed key issues to be explored and provided a snapshot of progress against 2 ongoing CERF RR flood projects. A trip to Peshawar offered an opportunity to triangulate findings and issues raised in Islamabad with Provincial/field realities. Undertaking the trip at a late stage of the process assisted in shaping recommendations for the review. A comparative analysis of the contribution made between the CERF and ERF and other bilateral humanitarian funding sources was conducted alongside a timeline of CERF contributions to the flood response in 2011 and 2012 to provide insights into the timeliness of the funding.

PAF Indicators and interview questions

The ToR, CERF PAF[44] and guidance from the CERF Secretariat informed the interview questions which focused on both process and results.

Core questions that were used consistently throughout the review are as follows;[45]

Inclusive country prioritisation (process)
- What process was used for prioritisation at the intra-cluster level and inter-cluster level
- Did funding allocations adequately reflect sector funding needs as outlined by the Clusters?
- Who was involved (who wasn't involved)? How were the decisions communicated?
- How was the funding split between organization type? Do you consider this to reflect a 'fair division of labour'?

Streamlined review, allocation & distribution (process)
- When did agencies apply for funds, when were funds received and when did they implement programmes?
- How did the speed of disbursements of CERF funds compare with the performance elsewhere?
- Are sufficient quality control mechanisms in place for approval of projects & fund disbursement?
- <u>What justification is there for the large number of grant recipients (for the Oct 2012 Floods allocation)? How do you balance a desire for a coherent response with the need to prioritise saving lives?</u>
- <u>Would an in-country CERF After Action Review after the implementation of each CERF "package" have improved joint reflection and learning on the CERF process and led to a higher quality RC/HC report and an easier reporting process.</u>

Reporting (process)
- <u>How did the process for the 2012 RC/HC report proceed? Were relevant stakeholders consulted during preparation? Were the report and its content discussed in the HCT or in other fora?</u>
- <u>How was the new reporting format and guidance perceived?</u>

Monitoring of results (process/results)
- Did beneficiary organisations understand the reporting requirements? Did they meet them satisfactorily?
- How do we know that results were achieved? Were sufficient quality control mechanisms in place across all beneficiary agencies for monitoring, reporting and review (were CERF reporting commitments met)?

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[44] The CERF PAF is available at http://www.unocha.org/cerf/reportsevaluations/evaluations/country-reviews
[45] Questions that have been underlined were proposed by the CERF Secretariat during briefing discussions and in background documents submitted to the consultant.

- How do agencies monitor the FATA/KP operations? To what extent has quality assurance requirements been met?
- To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by the CERF attain their stated objective(s)? To what extent do the individual project activities produce the expected results? How do you know?
- In what ways are agencies accountable to project participants? Do you consider this adequate? How could it be strengthened?

Timely response (results)
- Was the CERF timely for UFE, RR? How do you know?
- How many NCE were requested and for what reasons?
- Was the CERF successful in kick-starting humanitarian response?
- How successful were the CERF funds in leveraging additional donor contributions (UFE & RR)?
- Was the March UFE allocation successful in filling the 3-month gap? Was donor funding forthcoming afterwards? Given the UFE and RR allocations were made at similar times, was there adequate absorption capacity to make timely use of these? Was the use of the two funding streams complimentary?

Life-saving activities (results)
- Was the CERF successful in meeting life-saving needs? How do you know?
- To what extent were relevant gaps identified and successfully filled at critical moments?

Support to humanitarian reform (results)
- Did the CERF contribute to strengthening the coordination mechanisms?
- Did the CERF empower the Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator in Pakistan?

ERF/CERF complementarity
- Do you consider the CERF to compliment the ERF? In what ways?
- How could pooled funding in Pakistan be strengthened?

Documents Reviewed

FATA & KP conflict & Monsoon, 2012
- Humanitarian operations Plan 2012, revised
- List of all humanitarian pledges for response to KP/FATA conflict, UNOCHA FTS
- Draft Chapeau for HCT (draft 5)
- List of RR UFE extensions
- Monsoon Humanitarian Operations Plan, 2012, UNOCHA

CERF Funding analysis, 2006-2012
- 2007 – 2012 humanitarian funding to Pakistan, 2012, UNOCHA FTS
- CERF Pledges and Contributions, UNOCHA FTS
- 2007 – 2012 contributions to the UN CERF, UNOCHA FTS

General CERF documentation
- CERF UFE Procedures and Criteria, 18 March 2010
- CERF Guidance, Rapid Response, 2011

- Monsoon 2012 Floods Donor Briefing, 2 Sep 2012, UNOCHA
- Pakistan Timeliness and Data
- CERF report 2012, Pakistan, HC signed off
- MIRA Report, Pakistan Floods, September 2012
- Tirah Valley IDP Influx, 15 April 2013, UNHCR
- UNHCR Pakistan Operational Update, October – December 2012
- DRAFT RR Application Concept Note ver3 (24 Oct 2012)
- Final Life-Saving Criteria, 26 Jan 2010
- PAF, August 2010
- UN agency sub-granting of CERF funds to IPs, CERF Secretariat, May 2012
- Application of the CERF Life-Saving Criteria, An Update, CERF Secretariat, September 2011
- CERF and Country-based Pooled Funds: Stock-Taking, April 2013, CERF Secretariat
- Survey of UN Agency Sub-Granting procedures to implementing partners

under CERF grants, CERF Secretariat, May 2012

ERF documents
- ERF profile January 29 2012

Pakistan RR Projects and extension, 2012/13
- CERF concept note, 240313 Final
- Approval letters for October and March submission
- No cost extension documents
- Project proposals for October and March applications

Pakistan UFE Round 1, 2012
- Prioritisation strategy and associated documents
- Project Proposals for UFE application
- Draft and final submission
- Approval letter and routing slip
- No cost extension documents
- CERF 2012 First Underfunded round – overview of decisions

Pakistan background documents
- CERF Underfunded second round 2011 prioritisation strategy
- Pakistan Humanitarian Response plan: Prioritisation statement, 2010
- Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan: Prioritisation statement, 2009
- Prioritisation strategy for the allocation of the $10 million through the CERF Under-funded window

5-year Evaluation
- CERF 5-year evaluation report
- CERF 5-year Pakistan country report

PAF Reviews
- Djibouti CERF PAF review, 2012
- Ethiopia CERF PAF review, 2012
- Kenya CERF PAF review, 2012
- Philippines CERF PAF review, 2012
- Somalia CERF PAF review, 2012

RAPID Fund
- RAPID fund update, March 2013
- RAPID fund presentation, August 2012

Gender Marker
- Annex 3 Monitoring Gender and the Gender Marker in Projects
- Gender Marker Codes, one-pager

Annex 4: Terms of reference

INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE VALUE ADDED OF THE CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (CERF) IN PAKISTAN

Terms of Reference

1. Background to the CERF and Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF)

It is widely recognized that the key strengths of the CERF lie in its ability to respond quickly and in the relatively high degree of flexibility it affords users compared with other sources of humanitarian funding. Member States and private donors require appropriate assurances that the considerable funds involved are managed appropriately and meaningful results are being achieved. The ERC function is charged with a formal fiduciary responsibility over the proper use of CERF funds, and relies upon the CERF Secretariat to assist with the proper discharge of these responsibilities. In this context, the development of a PAF for the CERF is regarded as an effective tool.

Paragraph 19 of General Assembly Resolution 60/124 calls for "the establishment of an appropriate reporting and accountability mechanism to ensure that the funds allocated through the Fund are used in the most efficient, effective and transparent manner possible." Consequently, the CERF Advisory Group at its meeting on 12 October 2006 called for the development of a Performance and Accountability Framework (PAF). In addition, the 2008 CERF Two-year Evaluation gave as Key Recommendation 4: "The multiple lines of accountability for CERF need to be clarified, in consultation with the UN Controller and the operational agencies, to specify the roles of each actor." In response, the CERF Secretariat worked on developing a PAF, a first draft was circulated in 2009 and a PAF adopted in 2010.

The CERF PAF proposes, among other things, the introduction of independent reviews to be conducted annually within a sample of three to five countries as determined by the ERC. The CERF Advisory Group supported the inclusion of such an independent country-level mechanism. Following a pilot review conducted in Kenya in early 2010, the CERF AG met on 1 July and endorsed the PAF. Since then, the CERF secretariat has aimed to conduct between three and five country-level reviews per year[46].

2. Scope and Purpose

The main purpose of the present country-level reviews will be to assess the value-added of CERF funding towards the humanitarian response in Pakistan during 2012.

A major aim of the review will be to provide the ERC with an appropriate level of assurance around the achievement of key performance benchmarks and planned results for the CERF mechanism. The review will also include recommendations aimed at improving operational aspects of the CERF and may also identify relevant policy issues which need to be addressed at a global level.

3. Key issues

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[46] A full list of reviews conducted to date and final reports are available online at http://unocha.org/cerf/reportsevaluations/evaluations/country-reviews/performance-and-accountability-framework

The critical overriding question on which assurance is sought by the ERC is: **Have CERF operations in the country successfully added value to the broader humanitarian endeavor?**

Using the PAF indicator sets, assurances will be sought around the following specific broad areas of concern to the ERC:

1. *CERF processes are achieving key management benchmarks in that::*
- CERF submissions are based on an inclusive planning process and adhere to established quality criteria.
- Transparent systems are in place for correct allocation, efficient flow and use of CERF by agencies.
- Adequate monitoring and evaluation systems are in place at the agency level for measuring and reporting on results.

2. *There are reasonable grounds to believe that CERF operations favour the following results:*
- CERF consolidates humanitarian reform by empowering the RC/HC and enhancing the quality of coordination within the cluster approach and across clusters.
- CERF facilitates adequate coverage, eliminates gaps and facilitates an effective division of labour among humanitarian (especially smaller) actors.
- CERF contributes to a more timely response to needs.
- CERF favors the delivery of relevant life-saving actions at critical moments.

The review will also assess the extent of harmonization between the CERF and the Pakistan Emergency Response Fund (ERF).

4.　　　Review Methodology

During the PAF development process, UN agencies emphasized that the formal assessment of agency performance vis-a-vis CERF-funded activities remains the prerogative of recipient agencies via their own internal oversight procedures (internal performance reporting, audit and evaluation etc.). The review approach will therefore be designed in a manner which avoids duplication with such procedures and meets only the immediate assurance needs of the ERC in relation to the PAF.

Recognizing that CERF funds are often co-mingled with other donor funds by agencies and that the in-depth assessment of beneficiary-level impact is formally the charge of recipient agencies, the review will not attempt to link beneficiary-level changes to CERF activity, except where recipient agencies already have this data. The review mechanism will not seek to provide comprehensive coverage linked to detailed narratives and contextual analysis around how and why results are being achieved. Rather it will focus instead on providing an assurance around issues of the Fund's operational impact.

Key components of the methodology will include a rapid desk review and field visits by the consultant to Pakistan including interviews with key stakeholders. Visits to one or more regional coordination hubs can be envisaged if these play a substantive role in CERF processes. The analytical approach will be deliberately kept rapid and light.

Prior to leaving Pakistan, the Consultant will leave with the RC/HC a short analytical report consisting of a series of short observations and recommendations in relation to the key assurance issues identified above. The RC/HC, together with the HCT, will subsequently be requested to provide a "management response" to the recommendations contained in the report.

<u>Desk review:</u> A quantitative analysis will be conducted on the data, reports and files available at the HQ and Country level. These include:

- Funding data, including funding from sources other than the CERF (e.g. OCHA's Financial Tracking System);
- Timelines on sums requested, allocated from CERF database;
- CERF country-level reports on context, needs, status of implementation, activities, results and lessons learned;
- CERF meeting minutes at HQ and country-level and notifications of application decisions;
- CERF Project files at HQ and country-level.

<u>Semi-structured interviews</u> at country level will include: RC/HC, Cluster leads, Heads of Agencies, I/NGO partner implementing CERF projects and those without access to CERF funds, host government, donors. Interviews will also take place with selected CERF Secretariat staff to get further background and perspective. UN Agencies and IOM will be asked to provide relevant documents and indicate interview partners to facilitate the review.

<u>Select project site visits:</u> These may be included as appropriate and time permitting to help provide some limited anecdotal information regarding the use of funding at the affected population level and can provide a field-level snapshot and some direct contact with affected populations.

<u>In-Country briefings</u> will be used as learning opportunities to discuss and validate the findings, explore possible recommendations and further refine the analytical approaches.

5.   Proposed Consultants

It is anticipated that one consultant will be required to prepare the reviews for the countries of the Sahel. The consultant will be independent and he/she has not been previously involved with any aspects of the country-level operations being reviewed. He/she should have the following skills:

- Expertise in UN humanitarian reform & financing and knowledge of the CAP and Flash Appeal process;
- Expertise and extensive experience in humanitarian evaluation;
- Expertise in analyzing financial data in tandem with other types of information;
- Expertise in project management and implementation;
- Knowledge, including field experience with a broad range of humanitarian actors, such as UN agencies, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, local government disaster response structures and systems, and NGOs;
- Fluency in written and spoken English,
- Familiarity with natural and man-made disaster settings.

6.   Management and Support

The review will be managed by the CERF Secretariat, who will identify country-level focal points to support the review mission. Their responsibilities will include:

- Provide necessary administrative, coordination and logistical support to the consultants;
- Facilitate the consultants' access to specific information or expertise necessary to perform the assessment;
- Monitor and assess the quality of the review and its process;
- Ensure sufficient engagement by UNCT on initial findings prior to dissemination;
- When appropriate, recommend approval of final report;
- Disseminate final report; and
- Facilitate management response to the final report and subsequent follow up.

7.   Deliverables

The main output will be one concise report in English to the ERC, through the CERF Secretariat, of no more than 25 pages (excluding appendices) in an electronic version plus an Executive Summary (up to two pages). The report will be structured in the form of short observations and conclusions around the different assurance concerns linked to the PAF. The reports will include, as appropriate, a set of specific, well targeted and action-oriented recommendations whose purpose should be to improve the performance of the CERF within the country or raising any policy issues. The annexes will include a brief description of the methods used and the tests performed and a list of persons interviewed.