OPERATIONALIZING THE HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACE NEXUS

# LESSONS FROM COLOMBIA, MALI, NIGERIA, SOMALIA AND TURKEY

**IOM** UN MIGRATION

Cover photo: Fathuma in front of the general store she opened with the help of IOM in Burao, Somaliland, Somalia. © International Organization for Migration / 2017

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International Organization for Migration (IOM)

# OPERATIONALIZING THE HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACE NEXUS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM COLOMBIA, MALI, NIGERIA, SOMALIA AND TURKEY

Prepared for IOM by Liam Perret, Consultant

# FOREWORD

With 41.3 million people estimated to be living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2018, this was the highest figure ever recorded. There were 28 million new displacements associated with disasters and conflict recorded in 2018 alone.[1] With displacement related to conflict and violence becoming increasingly protracted, and with persistent funding gaps, there has been acute recognition that humanitarian tools alone are not enough to solve displacement.

Along with other partners in the international community at the World Humanitarian Summit in September 2016, IOM therefore endorsed the commitment to a New Way of Working (NWOW) that meets people's immediate humanitarian needs, while at the same time reducing risk and vulnerability, through more effective collaboration across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDPN). IOM's engagement in this triple nexus is supported by its broad mandate and decades of operational experience across the spectrum of the HDPN. In fact, IOM's endorsement of the NWOW is in line with, and builds on, IOM Council Resolution No. 1243, whereby its Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) was adopted. This resolution acknowledges the need to address the medium- to long-term consequences of migration crises for individuals and States, including through more comprehensive solutions to displacements in emergency and post-crisis situations. Furthermore, the MCOF promotes stronger linkages between IOM's sectors of assistance in the humanitarian, peace and security, and development areas and supports programming geared towards laying the foundations for durable solutions, lasting peace and sustainable development.

The present report is part of an effort to inform IOM's engagement with other partners and promote more effective operationalization of the HDPN. It explores enablers and barriers to operationalizing the HDPN based on IOM's experiences in Colombia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey. The report finds that willingness and ability are at the centre of a conducive environment for effective humanitarian, development and peace collaboration. For example, peace agreements, inclusive legal frameworks, national development plans that take the effect of crisis into consideration provide a basis for humanitarian, development and peace actors to come together under a shared vision. Similarly, effective coordination structures and shared analysis at, and between, national and subnational levels as well as amongst multilateral actors are key for effective delivery on those visions.

Noting that most protracted crises are characterized by high risk, instability and unpredictability, they can be difficult environments for traditional development programming. In line with the OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus, the report points to the value of programming that contribute to conditions that are more suitable for development efforts, much in line with IOM's MCOF.

IOM supports programming geared towards laying the foundation for durable solutions, lasting peace and sustainable development primarily through our transition and recovery programming as well as transitional justice programming amounting to approximately USD 500 million out of which almost half is multi-year programming.

Still, as highlighted in the report, programming in the transition and recovery space often falls between humanitarian and development funding structures. To deliver on the promise of the Grand Bargain, more attention will be needed to ensure there is no missing-middle between traditional humanitarian and traditional development programming and financing thereof.

Mohammed Abdiker

Director, Department of Operations and Emergencies, IOM

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# ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| CRESTA/A | Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority / Accountability |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| DOCO | United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office |
| DSRSG | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| GIZ | Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) |
| EU | European Union |
| FARC – EP | Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo |
| HC/RC | Humanitarian Coordinator/ Resident Coordinator |
| HCT | Humanitarian Country Team |
| HD(P)N | Humanitarian Development (Peace) Nexus |
| HRP | Humanitarian Response Plan |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| ICCG | Inter-Cluster Coordination Group |
| IHL | International Humanitarian Law |
| IHRL | International Human Rights Law |
| IDP | Internally displaced person(s) |
| IOM | International Organization for Migration |
| LGA | Local Government Areas |
| MCRP | Multi-Crisis Response Project for the North East |
| MINUSMA | United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission |
| MoPIED | Ministry of Planning and Investment and Economic Development |
| PCNI | Presidential Committee for the North East Initiative (Nigeria) |

| | |
|---|---|
| PfM | Public Financial Management Systems |
| PWG | Pillar Working Group (National Development Plan, Somalia) |
| OCHA | United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| RRF | Resilience and Recovery Framework |
| RRR | Ministry for Recovery, Reconstruction and Resettlement (Borno State, Nigeria) |
| RCO | Resident Coordinator's Office |
| ReDSS | Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat |
| SDRF | Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility |
| SEMA | State Emergency Management Agency |
| SDGs | Sustainable Development Goals |
| SMS | Short Message Service |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary General |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCT | United Nations Country Team |
| UNDAF | United Nations Development Assistance Framework |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNSDPF | United Nations Sustainable Development Partnership Framework |
| UNSF | United Nations Strategic Framework (Somalia) |
| UNSOM | United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia |
| UTP | Under Temporary Protection |
| TCC | Troop Contributing Country |
| 4W | Who is doing What Where |

# KEY MESSAGES

### *National laws to address protracted crises*

Governments could consider adopting dedicated laws to deal with protracted humanitarian crises and allocate the resources necessary to sustainably address the needs of affected populations. Development actors could build and support States' capacities to develop legal frameworks, that address crisis issues, and implement them.[2]

### *Work jointly towards exit strategy from onset*

Humanitarian, development and peace (HDP) resources could be used to alleviate the needs of the population and in parallel to rebuild/strengthen State institutions at all levels. The State should at minimum be able to consult the needs of the affected populations, coordinate and regulate aid delivery, collect taxes and deliver services. Public co-funding (in-kind or cash) could be normalized for all development and peace interventions. Unless the State is party to the conflict, violating International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and/or International Human Rights Law (IHRL), aid projects' outputs could be credited to the State to support its legitimacy.[3]

### *Standardize data and consolidate analysis*

While crisis affected States' institutional capacities need to be strengthened, the UN system needs to enable the collection and analysis of data between agencies to standardize data collection and analysis methods,[4] e.g. through legal and policy frameworks enabling such practices. Quantitative and qualitative analyses could be centralized at country level in partner(s) most capable of delivering highest quality analysis and ensure it is shared with all aid agencies committed to the humanitarian development peace nexus (hereinafter HDPN actors).

### *Joint analysis, planning and coordination*

To get a common understanding of a crisis and develop joint responses, HDPN actors require integrated analysis products: standard Who, does What, Where and When (4W) matrices for HDPN actors; HDP Aid Flow Mapping;[5] Humanitarian Needs Overviews coupled with Development/Peacebuilding Overviews; and Collective Outcomes monitoring. Collective Outcomes could be developed by governments, donors, HDPN actors and affected communities. They could be monitored through context analyses and public opinion polls in addition to project monitoring. Integrated analysis and information management units could be placed in Resident Coordinator's Offices (RCOs). To develop contextualized programmes, analytical capacities need to be coupled to national and local (UNCT/HCT) coordination teams.

### *Use flexible and pooled funding to incentivize HDPN*

Donors could avoid gaps between humanitarian and development funding streams, including through supporting transition and recovery programming and providing flexible multi-year funding and by aligning aid strategies at country level and pooling resources to end protracted crises. Multi-Partner Trust Funds with funding windows that have different levels of risk could fund projects based on integrated HDPN analyses, using performance linked disbursements, to incentivize HDPN synergies through area-based programming and vertical strengthening of institutional capacity.[6]

### *Risk management capacity to 'Do No Harm'*

RCOs could have risk management units to mitigate aid diversion and conduct stress tests of programme strategies and assist projects to be conflict sensitive and manage application of humanitarian principles and the pursuit of political objectives.[7]

### *Political reconciliation to enable community recovery and re-establishment/strengthening a legitimate and functioning State*

Mediation and reconciliation rather than military efforts could spearhead efforts to gain access and re-establish State presence, capacity and legitimacy. HDPN interventions should at minimum not undermine these processes and at best support them and their outcomes.[8]

# 1. INTRODUCTION TO HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACE NEXUS

The need for comprehensive responses to protracted crises is clear given the increase in climate related disasters, the increase in conflict related humanitarian needs (80% of all appeals), and the record high number of 68.5 million displaced worldwide in 2017.[9] Since 2015, active conflicts are becoming more internationalized, lasting longer, being more violent and more difficult to solve.[10] These crises are generating a higher volume of humanitarian appeals that are increasingly underfunded.

Against this background, the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit acknowledged that humanitarian tools alone are insufficient to resolve protracted crises. Consequently, there was a call for improved collaboration across the humanitarian–development nexus and a "New Way of Working" (NWOW) to reduce needs, risk, and vulnerability. This included a commitment to work over multiple years, based on comparative advantages, towards collective outcomes and, wherever feasible, reinforcing the capacities and resilience at national and local levels. That same year, the twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace in the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly emphasized the significance of insecurity as a driver of vulnerability.[11] They also called on the development, peace and security, and human rights pillars to work in an integrated fashion to prioritize prevention, address root causes of conflict and support institutions for sustainable peace and development. This has come to be known as the Humanitarian–Development–Peace nexus (HDPN) or the triple nexus.

In protracted crises, the discrepancies between, on the one hand, humanitarian principles, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and on the other hand, the diverging political objectives of State and non-state actors as well as other international stakeholders, generate tensions that make a coordinated and comprehensive response from the HDPN actors difficult at best. This dilemma generates a challenge for the HDPN, in particular the ambition to articulate and work towards collective outcomes through joint approaches, as there is a risk that this could politicize humanitarian action in a manner that undermines the humanitarian principles. HDPN actors are not responsible for solving the political crises that fuel protracted crises,[12] which remains the responsibility of State actors, but they can contribute to make conditions more conducive to their resolution.[13]

Until now, there are varied interpretations of the meaning of HDPN and limited guidance on how to operationalize it. There are two main interpretations of the nexus: 'distinct but complementary' versus 'merged but principled'. The first emphasizes the need to safeguard humanitarian principles, acknowledges the comparative advantages of humanitarian and development action and seeks complementarity between the two in a context specific manner. In contrast, the second emphasizes that humanitarian action should support the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), sees the distinction between humanitarian and development assistance as an obstacle to effective crisis response, and therefore seeks to breakdown the silos between the two and says that contexts should dictate when humanitarian principles should be upheld and when not.[14]

This research advocates that not everything in protracted crisis operating environments needs to be linked to the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. There is a need to distinguish between the different objectives, work streams, and tools that agencies have at their disposal. The guiding principle for the HDPN should be to work from the needs of populations in protracted crises to find solutions that go beyond humanitarian responses by gradually bringing an end to the crisis and setting the affected populations on a path to development. With due respect for the existing aid architecture, principles and laws, a NWOW requires a commitment to do things differently. Much of this report and its recommendations is premised on this necessary change.

In failed or fragile states, the humanitarian principles, IHL and IHRL should be used as frameworks for engaging with Government, holding it to account, and building its capacity to fulfil its duties and responsibilities. In the long run, sustainability will rely on a legitimate government being able to oversee, regulate and deliver services, thus working around it could jeopardize this long-term goal. In conflict contexts, stabilization programmes are designed to deliver services where governments fail or remain highly constrained. The transition from humanitarian to development to peace contexts does not happen in a linear manner. There is therefore a need for combining and applying the humanitarian, development and peace instruments in protracted crises simultaneously. An understanding of subnational dynamics is necessary to best tailor planning, coordination, programming and monitoring tools.

In light of the ongoing United Nations reforms and given the inherent risks to operationalize the HDPN, from September to December 2018, IOM has undertaken case studies in five countries to understand how to operationalize the HD(P) nexus more effectively at country level. IOM is uniquely placed to contribute to the operationalization of the NWOW. Its structure and work has transcended the HDPN[15] for decades by delivering across the spectrum from humanitarian protection and assistance, to transition and stabilization initiatives to development and peacebuilding programming.

This study has been conducted jointly by a long time IOM staff, Ms Ginette Kidd, and a United Nations Coordination consultant, Mr Liam Perret. Five countries (Colombia, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia and Turkey) were selected due to the protracted displacement crises they are each dealing with, the different capacities of their States to respond to the crises, and the different international community footprints in country. Mali, Nigeria and Somalia are also nexus pilot countries for the United Nations Joint Steering Committee on Humanitarian Development Collaboration.

The policy research has resulted in two separate reports: an internal report with recommendations for IOM and the present one with recommendations for partners in protracted crises including host governments, donors, and HDPN actors. The objective of this report is to contribute to develop practical guidance on the operationalization of the HDPN approach. As such it can contribute to, e.g., efforts of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to provide guidance on the HDPN, the operationalization of the OECD *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace–Nexus*[16] and other such efforts. The research used a combination of primary (key informant interviews and project site visits) and secondary (desk review) data to formulate observations, analyses and recommendations. This study is not intended as a scientific endeavor but serves to share anecdotal findings based on a broad spectrum of key informant interviews. While efforts were made to interview all relevant stakeholders, the short nature of the country visits and lack of availability of some internal and external stakeholders is a limitation.

This report first looks at whether the operating environment in the five countries of the case study has been conducive to operationalize the HDPN. Lessons learnt from the operating environment are disaggregated in sections on national policies and legal frameworks, donor policies and financial instruments, and multilateral frameworks. Then, the report looks at whether aid responses to the five protracted crises analysed have been consistent with a nexus approach.[17] Lessons learnt from the aid responses are disaggregated into leadership, analysis, coordination, funding, programming, monitoring and evaluation, and enabling functions sections (planning having been covered under the operating environment part). Hereafter, from the lessons learnt in the five countries, the report analyses specific challenges for humanitarian, development and peace actors to operationalize the nexus approach in crisis contexts. On which basis, a model to inform strategic planning and decision-making to operationalize a nexus approach is suggested. Finally, strategic and operational recommendations are made to host governments, donors, and HDPN actors.

## 2. LESSONS LEARNT FROM COUNTRY-LEVEL IMPLEMENTATION

### 2.1 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

In the following section, lessons learnt from **Colombia**, **Mali**, **Nigeria**, **Somalia** and **Turkey** on barriers and enabling factors to the operationalization of the HDPN are disaggregated in subsections on national policies and legal frameworks, donor policies and financial instruments, and multilateral frameworks. Key enablers are highlighted in each subheading.

#### 2.1.1 National policies and legal frameworks

*National Laws to Sustainably Address Structural Causes and Consequences of Protracted Crises*

This study acknowledges that foremost it is the long-term cultural and political processes that a country goes through which influence the government's framing of a crisis that will in turn influence the setting of political priorities and principles that will guide its humanitarian, peace and development responses to that crisis. For example, in **Colombia**, the reframing of the crisis between 2010 and 2018, from a war on drugs to addressing root causes of the civil war, enabled the political changes that yielded both the Victims and Land Restitution (law 1448, referred to as Victims Law) and ultimately the Havana Peace Agreement.

Governments should work to generate and then seize the political opportunities, for adopting dedicated laws to deal with protracted humanitarian crises in order to allocate the resources necessary to deal with the needs of the affected populations in a sustainable way. For instance, the law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection passed by the Turkish Parliament was key to enable the creation of the Directorate General for Migration Management, to set up a strong interministerial coordination structure, and for the Government of **Turkey** to allocate USD 30 billion of its national budget to respond to the needs of the 3.5 million Syrians Under Temporary Protection (UTP) living on its territory.[18] In **Colombia**, in 2011, the government passed the Victims Law to promote national reconciliation, restoration of rights, assistance to and protection of the victims of the conflict, and reparations through means of restoration, compensation and rehabilitation.[19] The law also set up a Unit for Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation (Victims Unit).[20]

Conversely, in **Nigeria**, the absence of legislation to address the North East crisis and the resulting IDP movements is a structural problem in the sense that political will is diffused and resources not prioritized. In **Somalia**, the absence of legislation is due to a lack of progress on reconciliation which results in the political space not being inclusive enough yet and marginalized groups continuing to use violence or aligning with violent extremist groups as a means of protection. Those groups that are included in the state-building process continue to oppose each other thereby blocking constitutional reforms and the passing of key laws.

The importance of legal frameworks as a means to sustainably address crises was identified by IOM **Colombia**'s long-term approach to build institutional capacity of the Government of **Colombia** on IDP and conflict victims' rights prior to passing of law 1448. This shows that development actors can have an impact on policies that address underlying causes of a conflict and contribute to its resolution. The close technical collaboration developed by IOM enabled it to engage the Government of Colombia in its policy making process, build the capacity of its institutions to implement the law, and thus help IDPs have access to services and justice.

*Peace agreements enable conflicts to end and root causes of the conflict to be addressed*

Comprehensive peace agreements are important factors enabling States to transition out of conflict and affected populations to gradually reduce their reliance of humanitarian aid as they gradually regain access to public services and to livelihoods. The Peace Agreement ("Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera") signed between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP offers a comprehensive set of solutions, ranging from rural development to an international implementation verification mechanism, that contribute to addressing the root causes of the conflict.[21] So far, the Government of Colombia has been successful in keeping the peace process momentum going thanks to continued political will, the establishment of a legal framework and an institutional architecture for the implementation of the Peace Agreement,[22] and a strategy for rapid response to build peace in municipalities worst affected by the conflict.[23] The greatest challenge once a peace agreement is signed is its implementation. This requires continued political will to allocate resources and to address the root causes of the conflict. In **Colombia**, the provisions of the Havana Peace Agreement have been inscribed in the constitution which prevents the government rolling back on the implementation. In contrast, in **Mali** the implementation of the agreement has been stalled since its signature in 2015 suggesting a need for a stronger political commitment from the Government. In both cases, the agreements risk to be undone due to the continued conflict in parts of the country with non-state armed groups that remain outside the peace process. Having a peace agreement in place is an enabling factor to implement a comprehensive HDPN approach to resolve a crisis as it is an indicator of political will to address root causes of the conflict. HDPN actors operating in a pre/post peace agreement context, need to monitor the peace process in order not to undermine and hopefully support the political dialogue and deliver peace dividends in order implement the provisions of the agreement and prevent a slide back to conflict.

*Clear strategic frameworks and coordination mechanisms allow for comprehensive responses*

Horizontal interministerial and vertical intra-governmental coordination is key to enable a whole of government approach response to protracted crises. **Colombia** is a good example where the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation oversees all actions related to the National Development Plan while the Presidency's High Counsel for Peace is in charge of all actions related to the implementation of the Peace Agreement. In **Turkey**, the Presidency's Strategy and Budget Office leads strategic coordination while the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM)[24] is managing the operational coordination of assistance provided to Syrians UTP on the ground. On the contrary, in **Nigeria**, the absence of a strong national legal framework to deal with IDPs, overlapping government plans (Buhari Plan and the Economic Recovery and Growth Plan), and shortcomings in interministerial and vertical government coordination have made it difficult for the Government of **Nigeria** to effectively combine its civilian and military resources to stabilize the North East of the country and allow IDPs to return to their homes and livelihoods. The challenges in interministerial and inter-agency coordination found at Abuja level are equally strong at State level in **Nigeria**. This constrains coordination and planning efforts to move toward a nexus approach. The figure below illustrates the complex governance relations for recovery efforts in Borno State:



The lesson from **Nigeria** was for donors, the United Nations and aid agencies to engage with the State level government in Borno to develop a Return Strategy and Policy Framework to avoid forced returns and promote durable solutions. Subsequently, the European Union (EU) developed an integrated funding package for Borno State to support this approach.

### 2.1.2 Donor policies and financial instruments

*Coherent donor policies help end protracted crises*

Converging donor foreign policies help crisis affected countries devise more effective political processes as well as policy and programme response strategies to regain normalcy. In **Colombia** for instance all the main donors supported the Peace Agreement and have kept pressure on the government not to roll back on its provisions. In **Somalia** though, diverging interests, beyond immediate HDPN objectives, from international donors (trade/anti-piracy, antiterrorism, countering irregular migration, Gulf Countries crisis) and regional Troop Contributing Countries all provide contradicting incentives for opportunistic opposing political factions to pursue their own interests.[25] In contrast to the multitude of external actors' interests in **Somalia**, in the case of **Mali**, France, provides an example of a bilateral donor, with an influential role, which acts across the spectrum of the HDPN and has applied a more coherent Whole of Government Approach for some years. The French Government deploys multi-disciplinary assessment teams to areas of interest, to collect data from a range of information sources. While planning is not undertaken in concert, a shared assessment and analysis of local situations promotes more complementary interventions. The French Government's endeavor to fire-wall humanitarian interventions to avoid humanitarian targeting based on counter-terrorism or other security-related priorities. A conflict sensitive approach is applied across interventions.

### 2.1.3 Multilateral frameworks

*Separate yet complementary humanitarian, peace and development frameworks, which include recovery and stabilization, are conducive to an HDPN approach*

None of the cases studied had a fully-fledged HDPN strategy with collective outcomes backed up by an operational framework. Still, having separate yet complementary Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) and United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) were seen as conducive to the operationalization of the HDPN. Integrated analysis, information management and coordination systems at national and regional level are needed to ensure they come together at the ground level though.  In **Colombia**, the UNDAF and HRP are distinct but support complementarity with the former addressing peacebuilding and development needs including those of conflict victims and providing sustainable solutions for populations to be resilient to climate shocks and to develop livelihoods. While the HRP, through its Early Recovery Cluster, works in the three most affected areas/regions to provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance to victims of conflict and help transition to peace through livelihood, income generation, reconciliation and access to services interventions.[26] Humanitarian, development and peace actors in **Colombia** recognize the importance of working together in areas where the State's ability to deliver services is constrained to help strengthen its presence and rebuild the confidence of the population in State institutions.

# MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORKS

1. SHORT TERM



**EMERGENCY RESPONSES**

**Objectives**
Respond temporarily
to immediate needs.

**Example of activities**
Distribution of WASH kits,
construction of water points
in the camps.

OVERLAP

OVERLAP

Back to need if deterioration

Back to need if deterioration

**DEVELOPMENT RESPONSES**

**Objectives**
Move forward, improve
the situation

**Example of activities**
Construction of new
water points,
strengthening the
capacity of
the actors

**STABILIZATION RESPONSES**

**Objectives**
Restore the state
preceding the crisis

**Example of activities**
Rehabilitation
of water points,
support for
resilience.

OVERLAP

3. LONG TERM

2. MIDDLE TERM

*Source: Nexus Approach adapted from Mali HRP 2018.*

In **Mali**, the "Plan Cadre intégré des Nations Unies pour l'aide au développement au Mali (2015–2019)" (UNDAF) takes the fragility of the Malian context into account, reflecting the need to consolidate peace and, noting the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA)'s mandate which includes support for humanitarian aid, the UNDAF also embeds some humanitarian-relevant indicators. However, humanitarian action itself is considered outside the scope of the UNDAF (reflected in the annual HRP), as are the military actions of MINUSMA which do between humanitarian actors and Malian authorities and development actors to better articulate priorities to address the causes of risks and vulnerabilities.

The Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) in **Mali** also includes a humanitarian-development nexus map, with security as a key criterion, and the HRP includes a Nexus approach graphic (above), in recognition of the need to better coordinate humanitarian and development programming to address vulnerability and build the resilience of populations at risk or affected by crises. The HRP also highlights the need for stabilization efforts and notes that "…security stability is essential to not only access vulnerable populations, but also to give them the opportunity to rebuild their homes and to redevelop their livelihoods. The inclusion of peace actors, including peacekeeping, is therefore important to improve the actions of partners engaged in the Nexus". [27] While a Nexus Task Force has also been established, there is apparent lack of consensus among its members as to the inclusion of peace actors in these deliberations. One humanitarian donor explained: "If ethically undertaken, humanitarian and development programmes do contribute to peace objectives, but they do not necessary need to be explicitly joined". [28] This lack of consensus amongst the Nexus Task Force members, illustrates the challenges of operationalizing a nexus approach and how in practice to move beyond humanitarian assistance in an insecure context. The unease centered mainly on the inclusion of hard elements of peace (cf. programme observation on p.16 and recommendation on p.28) but in this case extended to exclude the "soft elements" of peace as well which makes it challenging for recovery, stabilization and peacebuilding actors to then meaningfully engage in developing a comprehensive exit strategy in line with to a nexus approach. There are plans to move to a multi-year HRP with the next UNDAF cycle.

In **Somalia**, the United Nations system has a United Nations Strategic Framework, an HRP but also a Comprehensive Approach to Security and a more recently a Recovery Resilience Framework, thus highlighting the need for bridging humanitarian and development frameworks. Each of these frameworks are supported by mostly separate coordination structures with parallel meetings. The result, at the Mogadishu level, is that some staff have to take part in more than 30 meetings per week where similar issues are discussed in slightly different configurations with the same group of people.[29] This diffuses accountability and effective decision-making. There has been a recognition that there are too many Mogadishu level meetings and not enough at the State level. Lessons are leading to a change in coordination architecture by merging working groups that overlap and pooling of resources between the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and United Nations Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM) (e.g. the UNSOM regional heads of office role will include UNCT/HCT coordination) within the United Nations in an effort to have more senior capacity at subnational level.[30]



| NDP 2017–2019 | | | Development coordination architecture: SDRF, UNCT, PWG, ... | | |
| NDP 2017–2020 | | | | | |
| | | | RRF 2019–2020 | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | Collecitve Outcomes 2019–2022 | |
| HRP 2017 | HRP 2018 | HRP 2019 | | | |
| | | | Humanitarian coordination architecture: HCT, ICCG, Cluster, ... | | |
| 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 |

*Source: Somalia HRP 2019.*

In **Nigeria**, in response to the Governments Economic Recovery and Growth Plan, the United Nations developed its Sustainable Development Partnership Framework (UNSDPF) for the 2018–2022 period. The plan has made strides to integrate humanitarian, development and peace work under an integrated framework, yet the complex all-encompassing framework is proving difficult to implement. The coordination structure is equally ambitious with pillar working groups and thematic working groups at the Abuja level and geographic coordination groups led by agencies at the subnational level. Any complex plan will require time to operationalize but there is a real risk of the "perfect being the enemy of the good" in this case.[31]



*UNSDPF Results Framework Overview. Nigeria UNSDPF 2018–2022.*

*Frameworks combining humanitarian and recovery are conducive to better coordination*

Joint frameworks bringing humanitarian and development actors together help to improve joint planning and programming on the ground. The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) coordination architecture in **Turkey** has helped humanitarian and development agencies achieve greater coherence in the way they fundraise, plan, coordinate and deliver assistance to the Syrians Under Temporary Protection towards collectively agreed outcomes. Putting the Government in the driver's seat for analysis and planning exercises leads to greater national ownership and better interministerial coordination. In **Somalia**, the 2018 Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF) planning process has been hailed as a success. It built on the Disaster Impact Needs Assessment analysis in 2017 which put the Federal Government of Somalia in the driver's seat from the onset. While the RRF is yet to be publicly launched, the Federal Government of Somalia is presenting it as the operational strategy for the resilience pillar of the National Development Plan.

## 2.2 AID RESPONSES

In the following section, lessons learnt on whether aid responses to the five protracted crises analysed have been consistent with a nexus approach.[32] Lessons learnt from the aid responses are disaggregated into subsections on leadership, analysis, coordination, funding, programming, monitoring and evaluation, and enabling functions sections (planning having been covered under the above operating environment section).

### 2.2.1 Leadership

In protracted crises settings, HDPN actors need leaders with political acumen to overcome the centrifugal tendencies imparted by competing international, regional, national and local political actors; with multidisciplinary backgrounds in order to connect the dots between humanitarian, development and peace resources; that are capable of building common ground to find pragmatic solutions across mandates and donors' requirements; and that can inspire their teams to implement their visions.

Humanitarian, development and peace aid leaders' forums at the country level have been found to be useful to align their strategies to collective outcomes. These should only be used to have a coherent strategy and share information and not decide on aid allocations. They should be different than the forums involving government where aid allocations and priorities are set.

As a good example of this, in 2015, the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) in **Colombia** recognized that the context was changing from a conflict setting to a setting where humanitarian concerns would decrease in the aftermath of the signing of the Peace Agreement. The RC/HC took proactive steps to put in place a transition plan linking humanitarian operations to longer term recovery, peacebuilding and development activities. He succeeded in operationalizing it by: 1) creating a clear vision for humanitarian and development cooperation; 2) establishing a coordination mechanism system that connects humanitarian and development planning and operations; and 3) backing the coordination infrastructure with an inclusive information management and analysis system.[33]

### 2.2.2 Analysis

The research repeatedly suggested that, in order to bring evidence to action, HDPN actors need to build integrated analysis tools and link these to a common information management system. While HDPN actors should improve their own collective analysis capacities and in parallel build those of the host government as part of the longer-term exit strategy, in crisis/fragile contexts the risk of data manipulation and politicization by the government is still too great – particularly if it is a party to the conflict. Therefore, both efforts should be pursued in parallel but not mixed until the State can fulfill its duties and responsibilities under IHL/IHRL.

*Building government capacity*

Strong national statistical analysis capacity enables HDPN actors to have robust data for programming. **Colombia** and **Turkey** have national statistical agencies which produce reliable national censuses and socioeconomic analyses of their national populations. The challenge is for displaced populations to be integrated in national statistical databases. In **Colombia**, IOM has built the capacity of National Administrative Department of Statistics ("Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas") to develop the "Red Nacional de Información" database about the victims of the conflict. It provides an up to date count of the number of victims, missing persons and victims who benefited from justice and reparations.

*Building integrated and localized analysis tools for HDPN actors*

In order to coordinate humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions that respond to life saving assistance needs, address SDG priorities, and try to reduce conflict and build peace, several complementary information products are needed: 1) linking humanitarian needs analyses with context and conflict analyses to understand the root causes of the protracted crises and how these are interlinked; 2) a 4W mapping (who, does what, where, when) of humanitarian, development and peace actors to identify synergies and avoid duplication; 3) an aid flow mapping that would include development and peacebuilding aid to know what resources are spent where

and for what purpose; 4) the monitoring of collective outcomes; and 5) Civilian-military coordination with humanitarian and development actors.

In **Nigeria**, the November 2018 Humanitarian Situation Report[34] is based on the integration of multiple datasets including security incidents via the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), population displacement via a Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), food security via the "Cadre Harmonisé", and sector data from the sectoral humanitarian coordination clusters which gives a more complete operational picture for agencies to plan their humanitarian and recovery work.

In **Colombia**, the Unit of Management and Analysis of Information (UMAIC) provides an information management capacity that serves humanitarian issues as well as peacebuilding and development ones. Built on the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) structure, the UMAIC was tasked to develop new stabilization products, and diagnostics such as the Peacebuilding Overview (PBO), using the HNO model, and with a focus on NWOW. The PBO takes the points of the Peace Agreement as a reference to determine the categories of analysis and help identify territories that show the greatest needs in terms of peacebuilding. The PBOs are done in parallel to the HNOs.[35] While UMAIC and its products are the most advanced form of integrated analysis seen in this study, it currently faces challenges that bear valuable lessons for any replication attempts. The United Nations Political Assistance Mission to Colombia and development agencies found it challenging to reach a consensus on what indicators should be measured under the PBO, which in turn made it complex for OCHA to adapt its existing information products to these new variables. More so, while bilateral donors saw the relevance of the UMAIC products they could not easily 'sell' them to their capitals because these products did not neatly fit into a humanitarian, development or peacebuilding 'funding box'.[36] Humanitarian assessments / actors are pre-disposed to focus on numeric needs – demographic, wash, shelter, health, whereas peacebuilding indicators are more area based (conflict drivers, spoilers, boundaries, access to resources). Reconciling these two different approaches to context and needs analysis is a significant challenge that will require a shift in organizational culture within agencies and in the inter-agency coordination functions.



*Grupo de Paz del Sistema de Naciones Unidas. "Análisis de Construcción de Paz (Peacebuilding Overview)", UNOCHA, 2018.*

*\*This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.*

*Statistical analysis using ordered logistic regression, controlling for distance to closest major city (regional/district capital), population, security events clustered by region, and intensity/density of past security events. « CRESTA/A Operational Context Analysis ». Altai Consulting for UN-PBF, 2018.*

*\*This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.*

In **Somalia**, with funding from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), the RC's office (RCO) piloted a multisectoral analysis product combining humanitarian, development and peace data to inform the operationalization of the Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority / Accountability (CRESTA/A) strategy. The tool analysed all publicly available datasets to find correlations that could be used for further field level analysis in order to better prioritize interventions through area-based approaches. An example of a gap analysis for Education Services in **Somalia** shows that at the national level, satisfaction with education services tends to decrease significantly beyond 10km away from the nearest education facility. Extrapolating this finding allows to identify potential gaps in education service delivery for priority interventions. The Ministry of Planning and Investment and Economic Development (MoPIED) in **Somalia** in collaboration with the World Bank and the United Nations, has been mapping aid flows for the past three years. The mapping and disaggregation of humanitarian and development aid in **Somalia** is an essential tool for helping the Federal Government of Somalia, donors, and implementing partners better plan and prioritize resources based on needs and to ensure a proportional geographical distribution of funding.[37]

## 2.2.3 Coordination

*National coordination complemented by decentralized coordination and decision-making*

In order to improve the coordination between humanitarian, development and, where/when relevant and appropriate, peacebuilding actors, joint coordination bodies need to exist at national and local levels.

In **Nigeria** and **Mali**, respectively, a nexus working group and a nexus task force were established. These have had limited membership and limited success as they were primarily driven from the capital level and did not include all key actors.[38] On behalf of UNCT/HCTs, nexus task forces could be the forums for strategic discussions to formulate collective outcomes but also to follow up on their implementation at subnational level. In some contexts, rather than creating an additional working group, existing coordination structures at national level (e.g. in the United Nations system, the Programme Management Teams at country level) can take on the task of discussing HDPN issues. Discussions at national level could be informed by Local Coordination Teams (LCTs).

**Presencia Equipos Locales de Coordinación (ELC)  2018**

*Local Coordination Teams in Colombia*

*"The Humanitarian–Development–Peacebuilding Nexus In Colombia". Inter-agency Standing Committee, 2018.*

*\*This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.*

In **Colombia**, the UNCT and HCT have joint meetings and are linked to 12 LCTs in the regions. The LCTs are supported and guided from the leadership of the operation in the capital but are not *directed* by them.[39]

For the joint analysis to lead to better programming on the ground, analytical capacities need to be deployed to the subnational level and coupled with local coordination teams. Like the analysis, these LCTs need to mix humanitarian, development and, where relevant and appropriate, peacebuilding actors. The United Nations in **Nigeria** and **Somalia** are heading in the same direction as **Colombia** as they aim to replicate UNCT/HCT coordination bodies backed by integrated analysis capacity at the local level.

*Linking Planning and Programming with Coordination and Funding Instruments*

In **Mali**, MINUSMA's Stabilization and Recovery Section is integrated within the RCO and facilitates cohesion between MINUSMA components, United Nations agencies and other technical and financial partners in order to support inclusive dialogue, State authority restauration and return of basic social services among communities most affected by the conflict, particularly in northern **Mali**. The Stabilization and Recovery Section's work is organized around the three pillars: 1) Support to joint strategic programming; 2) Management of financing mechanisms for peace and security in **Mali** (including (i) the Quick Impact Projects, (ii) the Trust Fund for peace and security in **Mali** and (iii) the United Nations' PBF); and 3) Support to the Government of **Mali** for the Coordination of United Nations and non-United Nations stabilization partners. A pilot project, the "integrated approach", was conceived as an initiative between UNDP, OCHA and MINUSMA's Stabilization and Recovery Section aiming to support early recovery in areas where the security allows. While a mapping exercise to identify potential areas of joint intervention was undertaken, the initiative seems to have stalled which is a missed opportunity for bringing in humanitarian actors and funding to strengthen area-based nexus programming approaches. The **Somalia** RCO has also set up a CRESTA/A unit since 2016. While the DSRSG/RC/HC had envisioned it to play an enabling role for humanitarian, development and UNSOM teams to work together on Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability, the team has primarily remained focused on its stabilization support role.[40]

### 2.2.4 Funding

*Catalytic Pooled Funds*

Pooled funding mechanisms can be used to incentivize catalytic programming linking humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts on the ground through area-based programming.

In **Mali**, recognizing that stabilizing the region and preventing violent radicalization requires the creation of conditions for economic development, the Sahel Alliance was established by the EU, France, Germany, UNDP, the African Development Bank and the World Bank in 2017, to assist with regional stabilization and the accelerated development of the G5 Sahel countries. Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom have since also joined. Projects target six priority areas: education and youth employment; agriculture, rural development and food security; energy and climate; governance; decentralization and basic services; and internal security, with particular attention to vulnerable and fragile zones. In

February 2018, the Alliance announced the implementation of over 500 projects by 2022, with global funding of EUR 7.5 billion.

In **Colombia**, the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) for Post Conflict was instrumental in maintaining investments to support institutional reforms at capital level to keep the political momentum going. The fund helped to rebuild trust in local authorities when these showed political willingness and were involved in the implementation of projects. However, there was limited impact at community level due to the fund's relatively small budget and lack of further government involvement and investment. In addition, insufficient communication to the population failed to position the United Nations' efforts as part of a broader government strategy.[41]

In **Somalia,** the PBF has been a key enabler for the United Nations to do more joined up programming linking recovery, stabilization, local governance and peacebuilding. Since 2015, it invested close to USD 40 million in programmes that seek to improve governance by enabling local authorities and communities to rebuild trust around the delivery of services, resolution of local conflicts, and provision of employment opportunities to Somalis. The risk-taking and catalytic nature of the fund enabled innovative durable solutions, and stabilization and development programming to increasingly work in concentrated geographic areas where only humanitarian agencies had worked previously. In addition to the catalytic funding provided by the UN PBF, the UN set up the country-based UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund for Somalia in 2015. In line with the New Deal principles, the MPTF aimed to provide the means for donors to provide unearmarked, multi-annual and flexible funding towards the implementation of the Peace and State building Goals as defined in the New Deal Compact for Somalia (2014–2016). In practice donors continued to earmark, more or less softly, their funding allocations. While the MPTF yielded greater transparency and coherence in donor contributions to the UN, bilateral funding still continued to be allocated by donors which affected oversight and coordination efforts with the Federal Government of Somalia. The MPTF funding decisions were governed by the SDRF. The UN MPTF also created a National Window to channel funding directly through Somali government systems in order to help build and test them.

In **Nigeria**, the EU designed the Borno Support Package in 2017 blending humanitarian and development funding to improve the resilience of the conflict affected populations.[42] The EU funding package combines short term humanitarian aid with long term development support instruments (European Commission Humanitarian Aid – ECHO, EU Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa – EUTF).[43] The EU Delegation in Abuja pooled its humanitarian, development and stabilization/peacebuilding specialists in a geographic working group to design the funding package for Borno State. The EU Delegation in **Nigeria** promoted area-based approaches through a combination of political negotiation with State and local authorities and a capacity, willingness and ability assessment of local partners.[44]

In 2018, under the EUTF, the EU Delegation in Nairobi has developed a holistic programming package of EUR 83 million – the Inclusive Economic Development programme.[45] The programme combines political, security, operational and financial resources through programming concentrated in four geographic areas (Juba River Corridor; Shabelle River Corridor; Central-North Corridor; Somaliland Corridor) in order to extend state authority and services, promote local reconciliation and peacebuilding as well as create inclusive economic opportunities, and protect the most vulnerable.

## 2.2.5 Programming

The following programming examples highlight ways in which the comparative advantages of humanitarian, development and peace actors can be capitalized on to work towards collective outcomes bearing in mind the complementary characteristics of each partner and the need to keep some elements distinct.

### Emergency Social Safety Nets

Humanitarian and development responses have been linked in **Turkey** through the setting up of an Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) programme for 1.52 million refugees under a joint programme between World Food Programme (WFP), the Turkish Red Crescent and the Ministry of Family with funding from ECHO.[46] In addition, UNICEF has set up a Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) top up for vulnerable families to promote school enrolment. Over 266,000 children attending school and their families received support through the CCTE programme based on attendance rates. Social protection in crisis contexts is a good example of an integrated yet principled nexus approach.

### Separate humanitarian delivery from hard peace elements

Humanitarian actors have raised concerns over military actors delivering Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as these are using similar humanitarian outputs but with a security and political strategy behind it. In **Mali**, MINUSMA undertakes "humanitarian-like" interventions in the form of QIPs, which were reported to be highly undesirable to humanitarian actors who see this as a blurring of the lines. The blurring of lines poses a real risk that can result not only in humanitarian access being jeopardized and their perceived neutrality being compromised, but also the lives of humanitarian agency personnel and those of the affected populations they seek to help being threatened. In **Nigeria**, the military has been in charge of IDP camps in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. The military has been running the camps, delivering humanitarian aid and controlling the access of aid agencies to these camps. Humanitarian actors have advocated for the management of the camps to be handed over to civilian administrations in order to avoid IDP sites being targeted by Boko Haram.[47] In **Somalia**, Stabilization actors have realized that simply delivering QIPs projects without linking them to local governance efforts did not increase the stability of the target locations.[48]

### Multidimensional Community Driven Response to Promote Stability and Durable Solutions

The Midnimo (unity) project in **Somalia**, led by the Federal Government of Somalia, South West and Jubbaland States' Ministries of Interior, and jointly implemented by IOM, UN-Habitat and UNDP, has linked a community-based planning approach to a multidimensional community driven response to displacement and instability. Once the communities and local authorities have established community action plans (CAP), these are publicly shared with local authorities who then use them to coordinate the actions of other humanitarian and development actors. In IOM, the Midnimo programme has gradually built synergies with other stabilization and health programmes (e.g. mobile clinics, provision of medical supplies to maternal health and child clinics, etc.). These three programmes are now increasingly adopting an ad hoc area-based approach across IOM's health, durable solutions and stabilization interventions. These programmes all use the same principle of putting the Government counterparts at the forefront to ensure that it is credited for the outputs delivered. Midnimo is also being used as a means to deliver upon the outcomes of political reconciliation processes by building on them and helping conflict parties deliver peace dividends to their constituents. This approach is tested with UNSOM mediation support in Balcad and Galkayo. The Midnimo programme was designed as part of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan for **Somalia** 2016–19. Another programme, the Daldhis (Build Your Country) sought to extend the Joint Programmes on Local Governance (JPLG), Youth Employment and Rule of Law in the same geographical areas as Midnimo. The JPLG has been instrumental in rebuilding local institutions and legal frameworks in Somaliland and Puntland over the past ten years, which has resulted in municipalities being able to increasingly complement humanitarian and development assistance with locally raised tax revenues to finance service delivery. The JPLG has not only strengthened local institutions, but also shown that (re)building a local tax base is a durable way to raise revenue for local authorities and solve chronic deficiencies in public service provision in towns like Hargeisa, Burao and Berbera while also improving their accountability to their citizens. Public co-funding is a key element to end aid dependency.[49]

*Multisector multi-donor approach for rapid results*

Funded by the Alliance Sahel in **Mali**, the Konna Recovery and Economic Stabilization initiative[50] is combining port-related infrastructure reconstruction to accelerate economic activity and facilitate trade with: creating and developing jobs directly linked to fishing, agriculture and breeding; re-establishing and increasing basic services (drinking water and electricity); and the creation of minimum social safety nets (see graph below). Local authorities will also be supported via civic engagement. The Government of **Mali** indicated that a success with Konna could allow similar rapid results approaches with important mid-size economic infrastructure in other areas of Central and Northern **Mali**.



*Coupling context monitoring to Pooled Fund Mechanism*

The **Somalia** Resilience Program (SomReP), a consortium of seven INGOs (Action Against Hunger, ADRA, CARE, COOPI, DRC, Oxfam, and World Vision), formed in response to the 2011 famine in **Somalia**. The consortium developed a system based on Early Warning Committees that have been trained to monitor indicators and develop contingency plans in their own communities for rapid onset (floods, conflict) and slow onset (drought, climate change) disasters. By linking the community level monitoring of indicators to regional early warnings from Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) /Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) through radio and SMS, the consortium members have been able to analyse information and take decisions much quicker. SomReP, has coupled its Early Warning System context monitoring system with a pooled funding mechanism for Early Action.[51]

*Use the political capital of short-term project outputs for longer term outcomes*

Use the trust generated by the delivery of humanitarian and development projects results to advance bottlenecks for the State to take over service delivery (political capital). In **Turkey**, the provision of boats to the coastguard enabled IOM to engage local authorities to support protection and development programmes to migrants (e.g. mental health and psychosocial support and referrals to hospitals).

### 2.2.6 Monitoring and evaluation

*Delink outcome monitoring from project implementation*

In order to track progress, monitoring needs to include collective outcome indicators and should ideally be complemented by context indicators, based on regular context analysis and perception surveys. Such monitoring should preferably be de-linked from project monitoring which is often output based due to the need of implementing partners to show successful delivery. The current reliance on aggregated output level indicators fulfils accountability needs of donors but not of host governments and affected people. Output level results monitoring does not offer any insight on actual progress out of protracted situations. In **Somalia**, the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) has been working with the RCO to develop a set of outcome level indicators (based on the IASC durable solutions framework) across the humanitarian-development-peace spectrum to establish a common basis for monitoring progress in solving the protracted displacement crisis. It has for this purpose also partnered with the Somali MoPIED, the NGO Africa Voices, the World Bank's High Frequency Survey team and Altai Consulting to develop a context monitoring tool coupled with public opinion surveys using radio shows and SMS surveys in order to have an objective means of measuring those same collective indicators.

### 2.2.7 Enabling functions

For HDPN actors to be able to deliver assistance in areas where the State is not willing or able to be present, humanitarian, development and peace agencies rely on key logistical, security, and risk mitigation functions often delivered by the United Nations system. In **Nigeria** for instance, IOM is enabling access by HDPN actors to Minimum Operating Safety Standards compliant humanitarian hubs that provide office space and accommodation facilities in the North East.  The United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), is also a key part of the system to enable the United Nations, NGO and donor staff to access communities in hard to reach and unstable areas. In **Somalia**, UNDSS has historically been proactive in carrying out field security assessments and providing field security officers and vehicles (i.e. air and ground assets) to this effect. Whereas, the research indicated that in **Nigeria**, the security provision and civil–military coordination mechanisms were more conservative and less conducive for aid agencies to reach populations in need. In **Somalia**, **Nigeria**, and **Mali**, United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) was a key provider of air transport for humanitarian goods and humanitarian–development–peace personnel. In **Somalia**, the Risk Management Unit has been providing services to mitigate the risk of aid diversion (contractor and partner assessments), capacity-building for Government institutions to increase the Use of Country Systems, and stress tests for strategies (Durable Solutions Initiative) to help the HCT and UNCT take calculated risks in their decisions. Too often these enabling services are underfunded and therefore limited in the support they can provide to humanitarian–development and peace operations on the ground.[52]

# 3. IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACE EFFORTS IN PROTRACTED/CONFLICT SETTINGS

Based on lessons learnt from the operating environment and aid responses, the following section analyses the specific challenges for humanitarian, development and peace actors to operationalize the nexus approach in protracted crisis contexts.



**COMPLEX PROTRACTED CRISIS SCENARIO**

In complex protracted crisis scenarios, humanitarian, development and peace aspects of the crisis occur in a parallel, non-linear fashion and influence each other (as illustrated in the graphic above). A difficulty for HDPN actors to deliver assistance and implement projects in such contexts is that the limited set of issues anyone of them can address through a project or even a portfolio of programmes will not have an impact in solving the protracted crisis over a short time frame. This case study has shown that moving out of a complex protracted crisis requires concerted, long-term, and comprehensive efforts on all three dimensions of a crisis. Yet, as outlined below, humanitarian actors face challenges to engage too closely with development and peacebuilding efforts that could jeopardize the humanitarian principles. Whilst all actors can contribute to conditions that are more conducive to resolve of a conflict, it is thus imperative that the responsibility for this remains in the hands of political actors.

Unsurprisingly, the case studies have revealed differences between the capacities of fragile low-income countries and those of stable middle-income countries to respond to large scale displacement related humanitarian crises. The existence of legal and policy frameworks, peace agreements, clear national development plans and coherent coordination structures reflect a more conducive operating environment to operationalize a nexus approach.

On the one end of the spectrum (of cases considered for this study): **Somalia**, a low-income country emerging from 25 years of civil war, which despite continued presence of African Union troops since 2006, full scale international donor reengagement since 2012, the presence of a United Nations Political Mission since 2014, and steady levels of humanitarian funding since 2011 is still extremely vulnerable to natural and manmade shocks and at risk of relapsing into conflict. While the government has managed over the past two years to develop a National Development Plan, Resilience and Recovery Framework as well as several other national strategies to address the main drivers of

instability, the capacity of State institutions, particularly at the local level, remain very weak, and unable to ensure security and safety of its citizens let alone provide basic humanitarian assistance to those in need. The country will therefore continue to rely on humanitarian aid and development assistance for the foreseeable future. In this context, stabilization, early recovery, resilience and durable solutions programming has increased since the 2011 famine. Meanwhile, development actors are still largely unable to operate in areas that are not under AMISOM control in the new Federal Member States.

On the other end of the spectrum (of cases considered for this study): **Turkey**, an upper-middle income country with strong institutions has been dealing with the arrival of 3.5 million Syrians Under Temporary Protection (and other migrants) on its territory due to the Syrian conflict. Thanks to its well-developed institutions and national financial resources, the Turkish Government has been able to adopt legal and policy frameworks within two years of the onset of the crisis, set up new, tailored and functioning institutions within four years, as well as provide most of the humanitarian assistance to the Syrian population on its territory from the onset.

However, looking at the other upper middle-income country case in this study, **Colombia**, it took over 50 years for the Government to pass a law addressing the rights of conflict affected victims and to reach a comprehensive peace agreement.

Thus, even in the best-case scenarios it can take several years for a State to develop adequate legal and institutional frameworks to respond to the structural causes of a large-scale protracted humanitarian crisis and even longer for these to have operational effect. This delay is prolonged substantially in the absence of a consensus amongst political elites and when the roots of the crisis are linked to long standing domestic political, social and economic issues.

In the meantime, donors traditionally fund humanitarian and development assistance through short (e.g. 12 months for HRPs) and medium-term frameworks (e.g. 3 or 4 years for an UNDAF) in support of National Development Plans or regional plans targeting localized crises. These plans are usually at outcome level, often have unrealistic targets for their intended implementation timeframe, and do not consistently link with subnational plans at the local level. The disconnect between local, regional and national level plans as well as between humanitarian and development plans in protracted crisis settings is an obstacle for humanitarian, development and peace HDPN actors to engage with national authorities on a realistic, sustainable and time bound exit strategies. Hence, as shown in the model for strategic planning and decision-making (in the following section), the HDPN actors need to engage lower levels of government / interim authorities in order to agree on realistic and localized priorities that can be attained within the planning timeframe of a National Development Plan cycle. This effort to disaggregate national level targets and plan based on as accurate as possible data is a logical way to make incremental progress toward a scenario in which affected populations are more self-reliant and can rely on local government institutions to provide them with basic services, and access to justice, rule of law.

In contexts where the State has retreated, and/or its institutions are weakened at the local level and are no longer able to deliver basic services, humanitarian and development HDPN actors step in. In addition, in conflict affected contexts, the ability of humanitarian and development actors to deliver assistance is often constrained. Thanks to IHL and IHRL, humanitarian actors have a framework to negotiate access to populations in need. The desk review and case studies considered in this report confirmed that humanitarian principles were increasingly being infringed upon by State and non-State armed actors and that humanitarian actors needed continued efforts from the RC/HC and/or donors to remind host governments of their obligations to maintain operational space and to respect the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors.[53]

Humanitarian actors also increasingly acknowledge, as seen in the **Colombia**, **Nigeria**, **Somalia** and **Mali** HRPs, that they need to do more to ensure their interventions contribute to build the resilience of affected populations and contribute to making conditions more conducive for development actors to engage earlier on in fragile contexts.[54] Humanitarian actors often have to make careful and informed choices in order to uphold the humanitarian principles in complex crises. There is an emerging realization that in some cases this may entail trade-offs between humanitarian principles, e.g. by giving priority to the principle of humanity and access over neutrality, impartiality and operational independence.[55]

In relation to Collective Outcomes, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) recommendation on the HDPN calls for a people centred approach in which humanitarian action, while remaining needs-based, neutral, and impartial, should strive to do no harm, be

conflict sensitive and contribute where appropriate to conditions that are suitable for taking up development efforts.[56] Development actors often rely on more stable and predictable environments to engage (e.g. after a cease fire or peace agreement, when the rule of law is re-established, and national legal frameworks are in place). Similarly, private sector investments needed for large scale employment is often hard to attract in protracted crises. The commitments made at the WHS and captured in the Sustaining Peace resolutions, show that HDPN actors cannot rely solely on continuous cycles of humanitarian aid delivery. Member States and aid organizations have agreed that HDPN actors need to work on more sustainable interventions for services and infrastructure and making unstable contexts more conducive for development efforts to take place, scaled up, and for gains not to be reversed.

To fill the space between humanitarian and development, peacebuilding and recovery interventions are badly needed and gradually being funded by donors. These need to be significantly upscaled early on in crisis and strategically linked to Humanitarian and Development interventions. Though, as shown in the case of the MPTF for Post Conflict in **Colombia**, peacebuilding and recovery interventions cannot singlehandedly yield the shift the context needed. The evaluation of this MPTF found that the projects it funded were highly relevant and appreciated by its beneficiaries. However, the lack of government investment to scale up the projects and their scope was limiting their intended impact of re-establishing a functioning and legitimate state presence.

Similarly, failing to build on the limited, yet promising results of peacebuilding and recovery interventions can \stifle government led development efforts as well as efforts to develop the local economy and attract the private sector. IOM **Colombia**'s Migration and Rural Development programme is an interesting attempt to address this problem. The programme has developed strategic partnerships with national and local government authorities, United Nations agencies and the private sector to attract investments in conflict affected rural areas where State institutions have been absent, namely the 170 Priority Economic Development Territories identified during the peace process. A new agricultural development model has been proposed to reinvigorate value chains that require significant labour (e.g. coffee) as an alternative employer the narcotics industry (i.e. coca leaf production). IOM seeks to leverage its long-term presence in rural areas, work on land rights linked to the victims' law 1448, links with communities as well as relations with the government, to identify opportunities and provide incentives for the private sector to invest in rural areas that were formally inaccessible due to conflict and develop high quality agricultural value chains for export.

Further examples of peacebuilding and recovery programming from IOM in **Colombia** (in partnership with UNFPA and the Unit for Attention to Victims and Integral Reparations), showed the positive outcome that a project providing reparations and psychosocial support to conflict affected populations can have. The project generated a positive perception of the State that was seen as an effective promoter of social cohesion by investing in rebuilding the social fabric of the local community. In **Turkey**, IOM's technical contributions to the development of the Government's harmonization policy and support to the Ministry of Labour, combined with direct humanitarian assistance, livelihoods assistance to support the establishment and expansion of small businesses and access the labour market and support to community and Municipal centres to enable access to training and services are mutually reinforcing. They are addressing needs and vulnerabilities while creating an enabling environment for self-reliance and local integration.

The transition from peacebuilding and recovery programming into development programming is highly context specific. The legitimacy of the State institutions is a good reference point though. Elections, depending on their quality, usually mark an evolution from working around the State to working through the State – because elections offer some guarantee of institutions being representative of the people's interests thus making development interventions more prominent. The danger of building institutions and doing development interventions at scale in post-conflict contexts where reconciliation and peace processes have not yielded representative political institutions presents the risk of development actors reinforcing an exclusive political system and social exclusion that marginalized groups could challenge again through violent means.

In sum, the success of peacebuilding and recovery interventions should be measured in part by determining the cost effectiveness of service provision and in part whether they have prevented the situation from deteriorating or made the environment more conducive for development actors to operate and the State to re-establish or strengthen its presence, capacity and legitimacy.

# 4. CRITICAL STEPS FOR THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS TO OPERATIONALIZE THE HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACE NEXUS

Building on the analysis in the previous section and adding to the IASC "Typology of Response Scenarios in Protracted Settings" (which can be considered at Steps 3 and 4 below),[57] the following section proposes a model for strategic planning and decision-making to operationalize a nexus approach in a protracted crisis context.

The support by international HDPN actors to solve a protracted crisis in countries where States are unable and/or unwilling to meet the needs of the populations living in their territory serves the promise of the 2030 Agenda and Commitment to Action to leave no one behind. Not doing so exposes HDPN actors to political instrumentalization and could result in aid resources being used to pursue objectives that are contradictory to humanitarian principles (particularly of neutrality, impartiality, and independence) and that do not contribute to the sustainable resolution of the crisis.[58] Furthermore, in order for such gains to be sustainable, they ultimately rely on a functioning and legitimate State back up running as soon as possible. The following decision tree aims to help aid leaders responding to a protracted crisis to plan their interventions, so they can contribute to a sustainable resolution of the crisis:

Step 1:    HDPN actors should perform a first analysis of the context, the political system and its inclusiveness, the prevalence of civic and political rights and compare them to the development indicators, and humanitarian needs in the country. This should determine whether the Government is willing to represent the people's interests and to meet their needs in a comprehensive manner.[59]

Step 2:    If the answer is yes that the Government is willing, HDPN actors should work with the State to develop clear strategies in support of national and local development (and where relevant and appropriate peace) priorities. If no, in a country in conflict where the State institutions are no longer in control of the entire territory and are party to the conflict, aid organizations could need to find alternative ways to articulate the best way to help people of crisis affected country.[60]

Step 3:    Where there is no consensus amongst and concerted efforts from the national authorities to meet the needs of the people residing in their territory, then aid organizations should seek to engage at the subnational level for find the next most representative political forum (e.g. State Parliament) to identify priorities to end the crisis. If the State level is not conducive, aid organizations should repeat the exercise until they can find an inclusive political forum(s) to engage with and determine collective priorities to end the protracted crisis (e.g. district council, municipal council, etc.). Aid organizations should also determine whether there is a consensus amongst international donors about the best way to end the protracted crisis and if they can be engaged in the planning process whilst maintaining the humanitarian principles, as this will increase the likelihood of their ownership of the plan and subsequent allocation of funding towards its outcomes.

Step 4:    In parallel to this process of engagement with national/subnational institutions and political forum(s), aid organizations should analyse the context and needs of the population and identify means for responding to them. Aid organizations should also aim to build a consensus from the bottom up on how to address the crisis. Community stabilization and local governance programmes can help address this.

Step 5:    On the basis of a shared analysis of needs and response means, HDPN actors should determine gaps and comparative advantages of each partner to respond based on operational ability. Once programming options have been identified, they should be analysed for their conflict sensitivity, analysed for risks, and those should be discussed in an integrated inter-agency setting (at minimum a joint UNCT/HCT and at best including civil society actors and the private sector where relevant).

Step 6:    An internal strategic plan should be established between HDPN actors to reflect the collective outcomes agreed as the optimal ways to meet needs and contribute to the crisis's resolution. Efforts to find a common ground with national and subnational authorities on pursuing these collective outcomes should be constant as should efforts to rebuild institutional capacity to deliver services and be accountable to the affected population.

# IS A COUNTRY CONTEXT FAVOURABLE
# FOR APPLYING AN H/D/P NEXUS APPROACH?
## WHAT TO DO IF NOT?

Priorities of leadership in Country X

Interest of the people in Country X

What is the optimal process to guarantee needs of population when government does not want/is incapable?

**1**

Are these two aligned?

**2**

Yes

No

Do the international actors agree on the long term vision for country X?

Do the national leadership agree on vision for improving lives of their population?

Do the community leadership agree on vision for improving lives of their population?

**3** Identify political willingness to reduce population needs

Make a public strategic plan linking HDPN resources with the Government priorities (eg. UNDAF/HRP/RRF).

**4** Identify means to reduce population needs

Make an internal strategic plan with IC actors linking HDPN resources to do no harm and develop capacities and political will to do good.

Needs of the population

Climate/Environment

Political economy

Actor mapping/interests

Assess Partner Capacity

HDPN Programmes

Coordination

Funding

**6**

Risk Analysis

Scenarios or options

Determine ability, gaps and comparative advantages

**5**

# 5. RECOMMENDATIONS

## 5.1 STRATEGIC

*Recommendation for Host Governments to Adopt National laws to Address Protracted Crises*

Governments could adopt laws dedicated to dealing with protracted humanitarian crises to allocate the resources necessary to sustainably respond to the needs of affected populations. Development actors could build States' capacities to develop legal frameworks and strengthen institutions that address crisis issues such as re-establishing local authorities, the provision of basic services, the rule of law and the judiciary. To rebuild social contracts between States and their citizens, donors and HDPN actors could ensure that the State is given credit for all programme interventions unless the State is a party to the conflict, violating IHL and/or IHRL.

*Recommendations to Promote a Common Vision and Multi-Year Programming and Associated Funding*

In cases where a State is unwilling to meet the needs of its people, the international community could conduct integrated strategic humanitarian-development and peace planning exercises with common needs analysis, scenario planning, and risk analysis scenarios and programming options. This exercise could involve heads of agencies, DSRSGs, SRSGs and ambassadors/heads of cooperation at country level. This should lead to a common strategy[61] with aligned humanitarian, development and peace aid resources to support it as appropriate. This would promote coherence of aid instruments on the ground and the political will of governments to address the economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security needs of their people.[62]

Integrated financial tracking system at country level to determine where aid flows go, who receives them, and what they are used for should be established, including the subnational level. Donors could consider adopting funding mechanisms (pooled funds under the same governance structure but with multiple windows – United Nations, NGOs, Government) at the country level bridging humanitarian–development–peace spectrum. These funding windows could have different levels of risk tolerance in order to incentivize innovative area-based approaches to deliver programmes in unsafe and unregulated spaces. Transition and stabilization programming is key to increase the conduciveness of operating contexts for development interventions to take place Efforts are therefore needed to ensure such programming does not fall in a gap between traditional humanitarian and development funding streams. The MPTFs could fund common analytical products for HDPN actors to work from towards collective outcomes.[63]

*Recommendations for Leadership*

At the country level, host governments and donors could support and empower RC/HCs through appropriate funding and political support to coordinate HDPN efforts.[64] In protracted crises HDPN actor leaders (e.g. DSRSG/RC/HC as well as Country Directors) should have multi-disciplinary backgrounds that allow for a comprehensive analysis of protracted crises, an understanding of the possibilities and limitations of development assistance as well as evaluate the risks of compromising the principles of humanitarian action; a strong political acumen to navigate and negotiate competing donor, national, regional and local government interests; and ability to muster the collective creativity of their peers and teams to work toward collective outcomes.

Leaders should articulate a simple, practical and commonly agreed vision that reflects the views and inputs of HCT and UNCT members and clearly identifies what is required to 'make it work' i.e. coordinating humanitarian and development plans and programmes that are distinct but are mutually reinforcing.

*Recommendations to Safeguard Humanitarian Principles and Humanitarian Space*

Donors and governments could avoid associating an HDPN approach with collective outcomes to hard peace elements such as military peacekeeping elements linked to counter insurgency or counter terrorism or military mission support to regional forces and instead focus on community recovery and extension of state authority and accountability through privileging soft peace elements.

*Recommendations to Establish National and Local Integrated HDPN Analysis and Coordination in RCOs*

National and subnational coordination mechanisms bridging the HDPN (e.g. UNCT/HCT and Peace Operation if present) could be established and linked with integrated analysis units (e.g. humanitarian, development and political) housed in RCOs, and staffed with senior political, development and humanitarian analysts and officers. These integrated information management and analysis units could pull together relevant analysis produced by a range of government, NGO, United Nations, International Financial Institutions, academic, and private sector entities at country level.

## 5.2 OPERATIONAL

*Recommendation to Standardize Data and Strengthen Analysis*

Donors and HDPN actors could establish legal and policy frameworks for OECD DAC Donors and the United Nations system to standardize data collection analysis and sharing methods. At the country level, analysis capacity could be centralized based on comparative advantages and products shared with all HDPN actors considering reputational and operational risks. The shared analysis in the United Nations system should be used as basis for developing collective outcomes and HDPN policy and programmes strategies.[65]

*Recommendation for Strategic Planning and Monitoring*

United Nations Strategic Plans at the country level should have collective outcome indicators to monitor across the humanitarian, development and peace interventions and through complementary context monitoring tools. Context monitoring could be done at country level and monitored on a quarterly basis. Thresholds for early warning could be defined and linked to United Nations pooled funds established to respond to natural or manmade crises. Exit strategies need to be pegged to governance indicators and built to link up humanitarian, development and peacebuilding interventions.

*Recommendation to Clarify Policy Coordination and Technical Guidance on HDPN*

There is a need to clarify roles and responsibilities around the HDPN in the United Nations system to know who sets policy guidelines and is designated for providing technical guidance to United Nations presences in country. Currently United Nations agencies are turning variably to the IASC, OCHA and/or UNDP depending on personal connections.

*Recommendation to Use Flexible and Pooled Funding Mechanisms to Incentivize HDPN Approaches*

MPTFs and other pooled funding mechanisms should look at adopting a HDPN criteria or creating dedicated HDPN funding windows, particularly at the country level, to incentivize catalytic programming through area-based approaches. Donors could also seek to avoid gaps between humanitarian and development funding streams, including through transition and recovery and flexible multi-year funding and by aligning aid strategies at country level and pooling resources to end protracted crises. This requires donor representations at country level to have sufficient decision-making power to combine the different funding instruments based on integrated HDPN analyses.

*Recommendations for Donors to Fund Common Enabling Services*

In protracted crisis settings, donors could fund the common enabling support functions required for humanitarian, development and peace actors to access affected populations throughout the area of intervention. They could incentivize HDPN actors to pool administration, support and back office functions to the extent possible. At minimum, donors could use multi-partner trust funds to fund logistical support for accommodation and office infrastructures, air transportation, and safety and security services. They could also consider funding Risk.

# ANNEX 1: SUMMARY OF GOOD HUMANITARIAN–DEVELOPMENT–PEACE NEXUS PRACTICES

| Category | HDPN Good Practices | Risk of not applying them |
|---|---|---|
| Analysis | 1. Regular multisectoral, joint humanitarian, development, conflict, and political-economy analyses<br>2. Decentralized common analysis capacity at subnational level<br>3. 4W mapping for HDPN<br>4. Fund flow monitoring for humanitarian, development and peace resources<br>5. Risk analysis of strategies and programmes options | a. Fragmented problem analysis / response strategies<br>b. No local targets, endless planning, no delivery<br>c. Duplication and prevents short/long term synergies<br>d. Funds do not match needs / political strategy<br>e. Aid resources risk reinforcing status quo |
| Planning | 6. Strengthen national legal and policy frameworks at all levels to unable State resources to be mobilized and allocated to crisis response<br>7. Common framework for International Community and link all plans<br>8. Develop Area Based Plans based on government led community consultations | f. Weak government accountability and capacity to deliver<br>g. Many plans reduce effectiveness + diversion risk<br>h. Exclusive and unrealistic national plans = conflict |
| Programming | 9. Aim for legitimate government at front of HDPN service delivery<br>10. Improve Institutional capacity at all levels to analyse, plan for and respond to the needs emerging from crisis<br>11. Community based early warning systems linked to pooled funding | i. No sustainability, transfer of trust, social contract<br>j. Without Institutional capacity-building no durable solutions.<br>k. Programming not responding to context changes |
| Coordination | 12. Decentralized and empowered subnational coordination<br>13. Link HDPN coordination structures at local level<br>14. Use HDPN funding pragmatically through people centered approach | l. Untimely decisions that do not reflect context needs<br>m. Overlap, duplication and blurred lines between HDPN<br>n. No sustainability and continued dependence on aid |
| Leadership | 15. Multidisciplinary leaders, consensus builders, judged on outcomes<br>16. Donor and aid partner forums to align collective outcomes and interventions strategies | o. Mandates, funding, interests not reconciled = incoherent strategy<br>p. Lack of common vision = siloed work and status quo not challenged. |
| Funding | 17. New Deal based governance structures with UN/donors/governments/CSOs<br>18. MPTF for HDPN synergies, risk-taking, enabling functions and joint analysis.<br>19. Use of country systems<br>20. National co-funding at all levels | q. No ownership from government, external priorities<br>r. Funding does not meet comprehensive needs<br>s. Institutions are weak, unaccountable and illegitimate<br>t. Generates culture of dependency |
| Monitoring and evaluation | 21. Have unified outcome frameworks at country level across HDPN<br>22. Use context analysis tools to monitor outcomes<br>23. Use perception surveys to monitor outcomes<br>24. Separate outcome monitoring from programme implementation | u. Plans not accountable to ending crisis objectives<br>v. Aggregation of output indicators not reality<br>w. Population feedback / aspirations ignored<br>x. Attribution more important than ending crisis |

| COLOMBIA | | |
|---|---|---|
| Protracted context | Barriers/Disincentive | Enablers/Incentives |
| <ul><li>High middle-income country, with high income inequality (50.8 Gini in 2016)</li><li>50-year civil war</li><li>5.1 million Colombians and 1.9 Venezuelans in need of humanitarian assistance.</li><li>8 million IDPs</li><li>8.4 million victims of conflict</li><li>Pending agrarian reform (77.6% of land owned by 13.7% of population)</li><li>Narcotics trafficking</li><li>Non-State Armed Groups control part of territory</li></ul> | <ul><li>Lack of State administration presence in rural areas</li><li>National Department of Statistics does not yet account for IDPs</li><li>Non-State Armed Groups outside peace process – ELN negotiation halted.</li><li>Absence of infrastructure, persisting insecurity, absence of civil servants in conflict affected zones.</li><li>Narcotics trafficking feeds political economy of conflict</li><li>Zero sum game between Peace/Development/Migration crises due to fiscal deficit</li><li>Migrant pressure on job market, services and infrastructure increases social tensions</li></ul> | <ul><li>Donors all support peace agreement / unified engagement strategy</li><li>Good interministerial coordination on peace and development</li><li>Comprehensive migration policy</li><li>Strong National Statistical Department</li><li>Strong academic institutions / CSOs to play critical friend role to Government of Colombia</li><li>Havana Peace Agreement addresses root causes of conflict</li><li>Peace Agreement in constitution and Transitional Justice Institutions</li><li>Victims and Land Restitution Law (1448) address restauration, compensation, rehabilitation.</li><li>Political vision of President Santos enabled legal and policy changes</li><li>Territorial strategy for rapid response to conflict worst affected municipalities.</li><li>Vision of RC/HC for transition</li><li>UMAIC / Local Coordination Teams</li><li>UN Trust Fund for Post Conflict</li><li>Early Recovery Cluster</li><li>Visibility of aid projects accredit Government of Colombia</li></ul> |

| MALI | | |
|---|---|---|
| Protracted context | Barriers/Disincentive | Enablers/Incentives |
| <ul><li>Tuareg rebellion and Islamist insurgency in centre / north since 2012</li><li>Radicalization of marginalized groups seeking a voice</li><li>Prolonged state of emergency</li><li>Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation signed in 2012</li><li>182nd on HDI</li><li>Migration, drug trafficking, people smuggling political economy</li><li>Unequal access to and sharing of public and natural resources</li><li>Youth unemployment</li><li>Proliferation of arms</li><li>Social tensions</li><li>Traditional rural livelihoods negatively impacted by climate change</li><li>69,000 refugees; 80,000 IDPs</li><li>4.1 million people in need</li></ul> | <ul><li>Mali government not proactive to solve political crisis since 2015 Peace Agreement signing</li><li>No IDP law yet</li><li>No policy on humanitarian action yet</li><li>Armed groups outside peace agreement</li><li>French / Chadian intervention and MINUSMA re-established pre-crisis status quo</li><li>HDPN actors targeted in 194 security incidents. Peacekeepers killed.</li><li>Access sometimes requires MINUSMA/ Military escorts</li><li>Nexus task force not inclusive</li><li>Absence of infrastructure, persisting insecurity, absence of civil servants in conflict affected zones.</li><li>MINUSMA humanitarian-like QIPS blur lines.</li></ul> | <ul><li>Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation</li><li>Pact for Peace Government of Mali / UN to reinvigorate peace process</li><li>G5 Sahel Regional Security Alliance</li><li>Dedicated Ministry of Social Cohesion, Peace and National Reconciliation</li><li>Programme of accelerated development for Northern Mali</li><li>Integrated French humanitarian, development and peace cooperation</li><li>UNDAF and HRP are complementary</li><li>IOM support to Government run DTM</li><li>Stabilization and Recovery unit in RCO coordinates and funds projects in hard to reach areas to re-establish state and access to services.</li><li>Sahel Alliance – funds comprehensive projects: infrastructure, employment, services, institutional capacity, etc.</li><li>WFP seconded Nexus Adviser to Nexus Task Force</li></ul> |

| NIGERIA | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Protracted context | Barriers/Disincentive | Enablers/Incentives |
| <ul><li>Boko Haram (BH) conflict started in 2009</li><li>Underinvestment / underdevelopment in Northern Nigeria</li><li>Collapse of Lake Chad Region economy</li><li>Trade routes disrupted</li><li>Poor education, poor access to services</li><li>Youth radicalization</li><li>1.9 million IDPs in Nigeria</li><li>27,000 killed</li><li>Security focused response to BH</li><li>10.2 million in need of humanitarian assistance</li><li>Low middle income country</li><li>Oil rich country but unequal distribution of resources</li><li>Leaders have 'lost human feelings' for affected population[66]</li></ul> | <ul><li>Military controlling access / garrison towns</li><li>Military doing counter insurgency and humanitarian aid</li><li>Government of Nigeria forced 'voluntary returns' of IDPs</li><li>Too many overlapping Government Plans for NE crisis (Buhari Plan; Economic Recovery and Growth Plan)</li><li>Restrictive legislation for (I)NGOs makes them unable to support long term responses to crisis and play critical friend role to Government of Nigeria</li><li>Weak interministerial and vertical government coordination in response to crisis</li><li>Nexus working group not inclusive</li><li>Lack of IFI / UN coordination on crisis response</li><li>Absence of infrastructure, persisting insecurity, absence of civil servants in conflict affected zones.</li><li>No political dialogue with Armed Groups</li></ul> | <ul><li>UNSDPF / HRP complementary</li><li>EU Borno Support Package</li><li>Visionary Deputy HC supports nexus</li><li>Humanitarian Hubs in NE Nigeria provide access to HDPN actors</li><li>Donor partnership with Borno State on the Borno Return Strategy and Policy Framework</li></ul> |

| SOMALIA | | |
|---|---|---|
| Protracted context | Barriers/Disincentive | Enablers/Incentives |
| <ul><li>27 years of civil war</li><li>4.2 million in need / 2.6 million IDPs[67]</li><li>State disintegrated from 1991–2012</li><li>Top down state-building process since</li><li>Islamist insurgency since 2006</li><li>Multiple contending international and regional power agendas (CT/Piracy/TCC interests)</li><li>Government limited to 'city-states' isolated from rest of country</li><li>State not present and unable to meet most population's needs</li><li>Political tensions and poor center-periphery relations</li><li>Political economy of war well entrenched</li><li>Traditional rural livelihoods negatively impacted by Climate Change</li><li>Urban economies not strong enough to provide jobs for all</li><li>Insecurity and absence of rule of law</li><li>Radicalization of marginalized groups seeking a voice and protection</li></ul> | <ul><li>Corruption, lack of access, aid diversion</li><li>Competing international actors' agendas</li><li>Reconciliation process not completed and blocking political reforms</li><li>Absence of forum for donors and HDPN actors to align intervention strategy across the nexus</li><li>Absence of HDPN forum in UN system</li><li>Too many overlapping strategic frameworks and coordination structures – endless planning, little delivery</li><li>Absence of infrastructure, persisting insecurity, absence of civil servants in conflict affected zones</li><li>No political dialogue with Armed Groups</li></ul> | <ul><li>CRESTA/A approach to stabilization and durable solutions</li><li>Collective outcomes</li><li>Durable Solutions work ReDSS/RCO/WB</li><li>RCO and RMU enabling coordination, planning and risk mitigation on nexus</li><li>Resilience and Recovery Framework</li><li>Drought Operation Coordination Centres linking analysis, coordination, planning</li><li>SDRF aid architecture increases government ownership of D and P interventions</li><li>UN PBF catalytic support for projects bridging the HDPN</li><li>EU Inclusive Economic Development Programme linking H/D/P in area based</li><li>Visionary DSRSG RC/HC</li><li>Proactive UNDSS enables HDPN actors access</li><li>Midnimo project</li><li>Reconciliation instead of military lead to stabilization and early recovery</li><li>SoMREP Early Warning/Early Action</li><li>JPLG – bottom up state-building</li></ul> |

| TURKEY | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Protracted context | Barriers/Disincentive | Enablers/Incentives |
| <ul><li>Years of Syrian war</li><li>3.5 million Syrians Under Temporary Protection (UTP)</li><li>1.5 million Syrians UTP benefit from Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN)</li><li>Generation of Syrians born in Turkey</li><li>Macroeconomic conjecture not good</li><li>Significant portion of Turks also in informal economy</li><li>Social cohesion fragilized</li><li>Return contingent on political solution in the Syrian Arab Republic</li><li>No political solution in sight</li></ul> | <ul><li>Not signed its 1967 Protocol and it applies a geographical limitation for asylum claimants from outside of Europe</li><li>Shift from the de jure open-door policy towards a strictly managed border policy</li><li>Not enough job creation for absorbing Syrians under temporary protection</li><li>Migrant pressure on job market, services and infrastructure increases social tensions</li></ul> | <ul><li>Political willingness to use own resources to respond to needs of Syrian UTP led to USD 35 billion Government of Turkey allocation</li><li>Law 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection</li><li>Sub-regulations providing access to health, education and legal access to the labour market</li><li>Directorate General for Migration Management</li><li>Law 6735 on international labour force that established a qualified labour migrant scheme</li><li>3RP coordination and planning structure</li><li>National Action Plan on harmonization of Syrians UTP</li><li>EU–Turkey Deal allocation of 6 billion euros enabled burden sharing and setting up of several programs including (ESSN) and Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE)</li><li>Willingness of other donors to continue the burden sharing</li></ul> |

# ENDNOTES

1 IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019

[2] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation IV.5.

[3] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation IV.1.d

[4] For instance by adding development and peace specific recommendations to the "IASC Guidelines for Common Operational Datasets in Disaster Preparedness and Response, 2010": https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/common_operational_datasets.pdf; AND/OR by building on initiatives such as the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS) which is a joint initiative from Statistics Norway, Eurostat, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to improve the statistics on refugees and internally displaced persons: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/expert-group-on-refugee-statistics/background

[5] Building on the OCHA Financial Tracking Service and other Aid Information Management Systems (AIMS).

[6] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation V.1

[7] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation IV.3.

[8] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation IV.1.a

[9] UNHCR Global Trend Study. 2018. www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017/

[10] PRIO. 2017. "Trends in Armed Conflict, 1946-2016". http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/a7992888-34fc-44e6-8176-2fcb3aada995/pdf

[11] The twin resolutions on Sustaining Peace (General Assembly Resolution 70/262 and Security Council Resolution 2282) define sustaining peace as "encompassing activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict".

[12] 'Five actions to move humanitarians closer to the 2030 Agenda', UN OCHA, 23 December 2017, available at: https://medium.com/humanitarian-dispatches/five-actions-to-move-humanitarians-closer-to-the-2030-agenda-9937f426ef6a. As David Miliband put it: "I am deeply alarmed by the crisis of diplomacy. At this year's General Assembly, where was the all-night session to end the conflict in Yemen? It takes politicians to stop the killings…The reason 65 million people are fleeing for their lives is a crisis of diplomacy."

[13] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation III.3.a

[14] *Unblurring Boundaries': Opportunities for Clarity in the Humanitarian-Development Nexus Discourse*. Geoffrey Pinnock. 2018.

[15] IOM is increasingly referring to the triple Nexus in recognition of the mutually reinforcing nature of humanitarian, development and peace aspects of its work.

[16] "Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity". OECD DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019

[17] "Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity". OECD DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian-Development—Peace Nexus: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019

[18] Reuters. June 2018. Syrian refugees in spotlight in Turkey's election in June. www.reuters.com/article/us-Turkey-election-syrians/syrian-refugees-in-spotlight-in-Turkeys-election-in-june-idUSKCN1J023X

[19] Breaking the Impasse, annex I, Country case studies – Colombia.

[20] KII Bogota, November 2018.

[21] Six points of the Havana Peace Agreement: 1) Integral rural development; 2) political participation (of the FARC); 3) End of the armed conflict (security guarantees and reincorporation of the FARC); 4) Solution for the problem of illegal drugs; 5) victims of the conflict; 6) implementation and verification.

[22] Namely the *Jurisdiccion Especial para la Paz* (Special Jurisdiction for Peace), *Unidad de Busqueda para la Personas Desaparacidas* (Investigation Unit for Missing Persons), and the *Comision de la Verdad Colombia* (Truth Commission).

[23] UMAIC. Peacebuilding Overview 2018.

[24] As early as 2008, the Government of Turkey had already initiated plans to establish a Migration Management Agency. Turkey: Law No. 6458 of 2013 on Foreigners and International Protection. http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/files/LAW_ENG_UNOFFICAL.docx

[25] Fritz Schaap. 2017. "The Business off fear in boomtown Mogadishu". Der Spiegel: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-business-and-violence-driving-the-boom-in-mogadishu-a-1174243.html; Transparency International. 2016. "Collective Resolution to Enhance Accountability and Transparency in Emergencies – Southern Somalia Report"; Tobias Hagmann. 2016. "Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia". Rift Valley Institute.

[26] "The work axis in the prioritized zones is framed in protection and early recovery, which implicitly includes issues of livelihoods, income generation, coexistence and reconciliation, and access to services (Food security and Nutrition, Education in emergencies and Health)." HRP 2018. OCHA Colombia.

[27] HRP 2018. OCHA Mali.

[28] KII Bamako, November 2018.

[29] KII Mogadishu, December 2018.

[30] KII Mogadishu, December 2018.

[31] KII Abuja, November 2018.

[32] "*Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity*". OECD DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian–development–peace nexus: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019

[33] IASC. Nexus in Colombia. Case Study. October 2018.

[34] OCHA. November 2018. Humanitarian Situation Report: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/27122018_nga_ocha_humanitarian_situation_update.pdf

[35] *Source*: UMAIC 2018.

[36] KII, Bogota, November 2018.

[37] Somalia Aid Flows. 2018. Page consulted on 22/01/2019: https://www.Somaliaaidflows.so/

[38] KIIs Abuja and Bamako, November 2018.

[39] IASC. Nexus in Colombia. Case Study. October 2018.

[40] KII, Mogadishu, December 2018.

[41] Colombia UNMPTF for Post Conflict mid-term evaluation. November 2018. (David Huey, Ana Maria Restrepo, Nadia Albis, Eva Maria Rodriguez, Lida Patricia Rodriguez Ballesteros. Noviembre 2018. Evaluacion Independiente de Medio Término Fondo Multidonante de Naciones Unidas para el Posconflicto. Lidapatty International Consulting S.A.S).

[42] EC. June 2017. Press Release. Source consulted on 2018/12/06: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1645_en.htm

[43] EU Press Release. July 2017. "EU announces €143 million support package for the crisis in North East Nigeria" http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1645_en.htm

[44] KII, Abuja, November 2018.

[45] https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/t05-eutf-hoa-so-57_iled_0.pdf

[46] Turkish Red Cresent Fact Sheet. January 2019: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/KIZILAYKART%20CTP%20Factsheet%206.pdf

[47] KII, Maiduguri, November 2018.

[48] KII, Mogadishu, December 2018.

[49] KII, Nairobi, November 2018.

[50] See: https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/projects/konna-recovery-and-economic-stabilization/

[51] KII Nairobi, December 2018 & Stephen McDowell. 2015. Redefining Early Warning Early Action.

[52] KIIs Abuja and Mogadishu, November 2018.

[53] KIIs Abuja, Maiduguri, Mogadishu, and Bamako. November and December 2018.

[54] KIIs Maiduguri, Nairobi and Mogadishu.  November and December 2018.

[55] WFP 2018. " Evaluation of WFP Policies on Humanitarian Principles and Access in Humanitarian Contexts": https://www.gppi.net/2018/07/04/evaluation-of-wfp-policies-on-humanitarian-principles-and-access-in-humanitarian-contexts

[56] "*Nexus approach refers to the aim of strengthening collaboration, coherence and complementarity*". OECD DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian–development–peace nexus: https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019

[57] IASC. Humanitarian Development Nexus Task Team.2018. "Towards a Typology of Response Scenarios in Protracted Settings".

[58] Tobias Hagmann. 2016. "Stabilization, Extraversion and Political Settlements in Somalia". Rift Valley Institute.

[59] The needs of the people should be understood in a comprehensive manner, Including economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security needs. This goes in line with General Assembly resolution 66/290, which clarifies that human security provides "people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people." This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation IV.2.

[60] In adherence with the principles of the United Nations Charter: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/un-charter-full-text/

[61] Understood as a strategy towards commonly identified outcomes which serve the interest of the people of the crisis affected country/region. Humanitarian principles do not preclude engaging with States or in political strategy discussions, they provide a normative framework to do so.

[62] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation III.3.e.

[63] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation V.1 and 2.

[64] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation III.2.a.

[65] This is in line with the "OECD DAC Recommendation on the HDPN", recommendation III.1.a.

[66] KII Maiduguri, November 2018.

[67] HRP 2019. OCHA.