



Mid-Term Review of Norway's Humanitarian Policy



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
Fr Nansenspl 4, 0160 Oslo

www.ncg.no

Core Team: Ananda S. Millard (Team Leader), Trude Bang (Team Member).

Quality Assurance: Olav Andreas Hernar.

Mid-Term Review of Norway's Humanitarian Policy



Report, October 17, 2011

Executive Summary

Background

The Norwegian Humanitarian Policy White Paper 40 came into effect in 2009 following the drafting of Norway's Strategy on Humanitarian work (2008) and the Auditor General's Report (2008). The Policy highlights four main goals as central to Norway's work in the humanitarian field. These are:

- Ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance;
- Fund humanitarian efforts on the basis of the international principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence;
- Equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges; and
- Prevent and respond to humanitarian crises and initiate reconstruction in their wake.

In addition, the Policy delineates in detail a number of action points which should be fulfilled during efforts to implement the Policy. Over all the Policy, which is to be in effect until 2013, aims to assist Norway in navigating through the complexities of the Humanitarian field and ensuring that Norway supports relevant efforts in a coherent fashion.

Purpose of the Mid-Term Review and Methodology

This Mid-Term Review was designed to take stock of progress made in the implementation of the Policy. The specific objectives of this mid-term review are three fold:

- Assess the coherence of Norway's actions as a political and financial partner for the period between 2009 to the present in the context of the Humanitarian Policy as stated in the White Paper;
- Assess progress made and the degree of effectiveness in reaching the goals of the Policy; and

- Assess specific progress made in the different priority areas and related action points.

To this end three theoretical frameworks were used. First, *Sticks, Carrots and Sermon*,¹ allowed us to organize and examine varied documentation, interview and survey data in order to see which tools were better used and for what purpose. This analysis also allowed us to determine if tools currently available are used to their full potential. Second, we utilized Results Based Management and Outcome Mapping² where applicable to explore the degree to which Norway has been able to achieve its goals in an effective manner.

Utilizing the aforementioned frameworks the team conducted an extensive review of documents (literature), and interviewed individuals from MFA and numerous partner organizations. In some key cases, individuals who are not direct partners to Norway at this time were interviewed. This was done when it was felt that said individuals were able to contribute to the discourse. In addition, in an effort to gather the experiences, views and perceptions of partners who were not interviewed, an online survey was fielded. The wealth of data gathered through the review process was employed to triangulate data in an effort to increase the degree of both reliability and validity of the findings.

Review Team

This review was conducted by a team of three Nordic Consulting Group consultants; two consultants conducted the review and one focused on the

¹ *Carrots, Sticks, Sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation*, Marie Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C Rist, Evert Vedung (1998, 2010), Transaction Publisher.

² Adopted from *Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A practical Guide*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad.

Outcome Mapping was first developed by International Development Research Centre (IDRC). All necessary resources can be found at <http://www.outcomemapping.ca/projects/index.php>

quality assurance of the final report. The review took place between June and September 2011.

Findings and Conclusions

Overall we found that in some aspects the Policy has been coherently implemented, and progress has been made in relation to the overall goals and the individual action points. These areas include, for example, humanitarian disarmament, gender, protection/IDPs and refugees. Other areas such as inclusion of non-Western donors, assurances of the use of the humanitarian principles and *do no harm* approaches by funded organizations have been less successful.

Ensuring the 'degree' of progress made in relation to any one effort, given the absence of bench-marks and data allowing us to systematically trace outcomes and/or measure outcomes in relation to outputs (i.e., effectiveness), has been a major challenge to this review. Anecdotally, however, respondents often note that efforts made have been efficient, but generally there is no way to substantiate or challenge these claims.

Funding has been destined to initiatives which are in line with the Policy document. Norway has systematically funded and supported with its rhetoric, the issues which are highlighted in the Policy. However, it is not possible to know without extensive further research the degree to which some initiatives actually benefit individuals on the ground.

The review noted that Norway's inability to ensure that projects actually benefit beneficiaries on the ground as much as is possible is also directly tied to Norway's limited staff resources which appear disproportionate to the amount of funding and number of funded initiatives.

Lessons Learned

- *Through dialogue, partners have become more professionalised:* Multiple respondents noted that the increased

dialogue requirements of multi-year framework agreements assisted in professionalizing their work. The dialogue, they noted, forced them to more actively examine their work through the Policy's lens.

- *Inclusion of non-Western Donors:* A new approach to engaging non-Western donors should be found. Norway, it was noted, as a non-EU member could serve as a key conduit to link non-Western donors to the EU forum.
- *Dialogue adds to the ability to implement the Policy:* While many respondents knew the Policy, the degree of their knowledge varied greatly. Respondents who were most aware and able to ensure that their activities were in line with the Policy were those who benefited from direct and continual dialogue with Norway.
- *Efforts where both political and financial engagement are actively used show far more progress than efforts that do not count with a multi-pronged approach:* Examples include Gender, and Humanitarian Disarmament.
- *Multi-Year Framework Agreements:* These efforts are commended as a good way to ensure dialogue, close follow up, and financial security of the recipients. However, evaluations of these processes should be closely examined before expanding their use.

Recommendations

- The Action Points should be consolidated to reduce repetition and should include clear benchmarks so that progress can be more clearly measured.
- More staff should be made available to be able to adequately follow up the implementation of the Policy.
- A mechanism to ensure that adequate competence is available to follow up on programs and projects should be institutionalized. Including, for example, specific training of staff in charge of project follow up, strive to ensure continuity of staff, and more systematically include Humanitarian section staff in project evaluation

presentations, even when not directly involved in the evaluated projects, to increase their general awareness of programmatic challenges.

- A mechanism to ensure that the knowledge and capacity at foreign missions are used and are made available to MFA headquarters should be put in place.
- A mechanism to ensure a smooth transition between humanitarian and development efforts should be put in place. This would require a mechanism to ensure communication between relevant MFA and Norad personnel so that efforts are not dependent on individuals. Dialogue between MFA and partner organizations and research institutions regarding ways to ease the transition between humanitarian and development efforts should also be encouraged.
- A guide to identify key areas of the Policy and how these should be included in contracts and grant letters should be made available to ensure that issues such as gender, *do no harm*, humanitarian principles, etc. are always underscored in grant agreements.
- Reporting requirements should be more stringent regarding core issues. Funding recipients should be required to show proof of the use of humanitarian principles, *do no harm*, discrimination - as they do in relation to fraud (i.e., financial audit), and should implement mechanism to reliably measure outcomes.
- Norway should continue to promote extensive communication with implementing partners, such as is done in relation to multi-year framework agreements. Communication should be improved in relation to non-framework agreement partners so that that they too are better able to plan ahead, and have

clear expectations of Norwegian funding allocations. For example, Norway could make minimum commitments known to agencies that they regularly fund before making a final funding allocation commitment.

- MFA should distribute the White Paper more actively and more widely. This would allow institutions who are not in framework agreements with MFA to be familiar with the Policy and perhaps use it, and its contents, more actively. It would also allow other actors, such as other governments and international organizations, to be better versed in the way Norway works.
- Norway should make partners clearly aware of other resource material that will be able to better inform them of Norwegian views or expected standards. For example, on issues such as: What does Norway mean by gender, *do no harm*, etc.?
- The MFA should consider updating the Policy document in order to ensure that it continues to be seen as an active document.
- MFA should consider re-drafting the document so Programmatic and Diplomatic action points (Table 4) are not intertwined but laid out in a way that enables different groups of actors to have easier access and hence, can more actively use the components of the Policy which are relevant to them.
- The inclusion of issues such as building resilience amongst populations, including solid capacity building efforts and a stronger focus on evidence based decision making (i.e., clear and solid data gathering) should be explored.
- This review could be used as a way to re-enliven the discussion on the Policy and by so doing to reignite the active use of the Policy document.

Acknowledgements

The team would like to thank the MFA and Norad staff both at headquarters and at missions abroad for their time, assistance and openness in responding to our questions. In particular we would like to extend our gratitude to Randi Lotsberg, Kristin Hoem Langsholt, Frøydis Aarbakke, Susan Eckey and Vebjørn Heines for facilitating this review.

We would also like to extend our gratitude to all staff from partner institutions, including various NGOs, UN agencies, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other institutions and government representatives for taking the time to share with us their experiences, knowledge and perceptions regarding the international humanitarian environment, and the role and implementation of Norway's Policy.

The views, perceptions, and experiences from all those interviewed and from survey respondents proved invaluable in the conduct of this review. The findings presented here, however, are the views of the external review team and of its understanding of the data collected. Despite our best efforts to validate and check information, any errors found are our sole responsibility.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	iii
Acknowledgements	vi
List of Acronyms	viii
Chapter 1. Introduction	1
1.1. Background.....	1
1.2. Purpose of the Review and Methodology Used	3
1.3. Limitations on Reliability and Validity.....	5
1.4. The Report Content	6
Chapter 2. Background and Analytical Framework	7
2.1. Does Norway Need a Humanitarian Policy?	7
2.2. Norwegian Humanitarian Work and the Birth of the White Paper	7
2.3. Some General Issues on Presentation.....	9
2.4. <i>Sticks, Carrots and Sermons</i> : Framing the Analyses	10
2.4.1. <i>Sticks</i> : What is available?.....	11
2.4.2. <i>Carrots</i> : What is available?.....	13
2.4.3. <i>Sermons</i> : What is Available?.....	13
2.4.4. The Use of <i>Sticks, Carrots and Sermons</i> : Some General Observations.....	13
2.5. Results Based Management and Outcome Mapping.....	14
Chapter 3. Money and Talk: Is it Coherent?	15
3.1. It's All About the Money: Who Got How Much, to Do What?.....	15
3.2. How do Politics and Ways of Working Affect the Money Questions?	18
Chapter 4. How Far Has Norway Gone? Progress Made and Effectiveness	21
4.1. People in Need.....	21
4.2. Humanitarian Principles	22
4.3. Global Humanitarian Challenges	22
4.4. Humanitarian Crises and Reconstruction	23
4.5. Concluding Remarks	24
Chapter 5. Progress Made and More Attention Required: The Core Areas of the Policy	25
5.1. A Global Humanitarian System.....	25
5.2. Respect for Humanitarian Principles.....	26
5.3. Needs Based Assistance.....	26
5.4. A More Coherent Assistance	28
5.5. Norway as a Good Donor	28
5.6. Humanitarian Disarmament.....	29
5.7. The Protection of Civilians, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.....	30
5.8. Concluding Remarks	30
Chapter 6. Conclusion and Recommendations	32
6.1. General Remarks	32
6.2. Lessons Learned	32
6.3. Recommendations	33
6.2.1. Improving Implementation	33
6.2.2. Expand the Use of the Policy	34
6.2.3. The Longevity of the Policy	34
Bibliography (Works Cited)	35
Annex 1: ToR	38
Annex 2: SWOT	41
Annex 3: List of Key Partners	42
Annex 4: List of Interviewees	43
Annex 5: List of Questionnaire Recipients	45
Annex 6: Annotated Bibliography of Key Resources	48

List of Acronyms

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization-Trust
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
ISU	Implementation Support Unit of the Mine Ban Convention
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NISAT	Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NPA	Norwegian Peoples Aid
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODSG	OCHA Donor Support Group
RBM	Results Based Management
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
TBC	To be confirmed
TMC	Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Centre
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

Chapter 1. Introduction

This first chapter of the Mid-Term Review of Norway’s Humanitarian Policy White Paper 40³ provides some background on Norway’s engagement in the Humanitarian field and outlines the goals of this review. The chapter also delineates the methodology employed, and the limitations and challenges faced during the review process. This chapter ends by introducing the content of the forthcoming chapters.

1.1. Background

Humanitarian assistance is one of Norway’s key areas of work in the international arena. Since 2009, Norway has allocated some 1,303,161,484USD⁴ to humanitarian activities and interventions including the funding of projects, programs, humanitarian funds, and individuals. This funding constitutes a proportionally high per-capita contribution to humanitarian aid. In 2010, Norway ranked 6th in the world as a Humanitarian Aid donor, contributing 3.1% of the total Humanitarian Aid provided globally; yet Norway’s population accounts for only .071% of the total world’s population.⁵ The funds allocated to humanitarian efforts come from the following budget lines, Chapter 163.70 and 163.71⁶, which includes a reserve to cover unforeseen needs. In 2008, the funds allocated to unforeseen needs amounted to 10% of the total budget. By 2009, the proportion of the budget allocated to unforeseen needs increased to 15%. The annual distribution of these funds by different implementing partners or channels is depicted below in Table 2.

Table 1: Funding by Norway Since 2007

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Amount (USD)	439,274,318	505,685,237	462,223,925	525,713,531

Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org

Table 2: Percentile of Funding by Norway to Humanitarian Work Since 2007 Distributed by Channel

	2007	2008	2009	2010
UN Agencies	46.4%	46.8%	39%	45.6%
NGOs	33.2%	32.1%	29.8%	29.6%
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement	12.2%	12.4%	20.9%	14.5%
Private Organizations and Foundations	1.6%	2.2%	4.0%	3.1%
Inter-governmental Organizations	0.6%	0.9%	1.3%	0.8%
Governments	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.3%
Other	5.9%	5.4%	5.0%	6.1%

Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org

As Table 2 shows, Norway has traditionally allocated the majority of its funding to UN agencies, followed by NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Still, it is notable that Norway has traditionally funded a variety of initiatives and partners. The initiatives range from large assistance efforts, to funding the participation of states and/or civil society in international meetings. Within each of the categories noted in Table 2 there are multiple individual funding recipients (i.e., partners).


³ The White Paper is interchangeably also referred to as the Policy. The word “Policy” will be used when referring to White Paper 40. The word “policy” will be used when referring generically to policies or to other policies.

⁴Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data is available at: fts.unocha.org. This figure includes the funding which has thus far been recorded for 2011. The budgetary data utilized in this report is in USD because the data registered by the FTS is in USD. The review team opted to use this source of data throughout the report because the data provided the ability to analyze financial data more amply than if we had relied solely on the budgetary data we accessed directly from the Ministry. In order to be more reliable funds were not converted back into NOK.

⁵ Data on Humanitarian Aid collected by UNOCHA’s FTS. Data on Population http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population. The population data is dated 14 October 2011. Given a relatively stable population growth the use of figures from consecutive years should not distort the general finding on proportion of aid per capita in any way.

⁶ Within Chapter 163 the .70 allocation is dedicated to natural disasters and the .71 allocation to humanitarian assistance.

Figure 1: Distribution of Funding by Year by Key Areas of Funding in USD



Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org⁷

An examination of the distribution of Norwegian funding by year and by subject area (Figure 1) shows that Coordination and Support services and Protection/Human Rights/ Rule of Law have received proportionally the most funding, with Health and Mine Action in the middle range, followed by Food and lastly, Education, non-food items and Water and Sanitation.

The “Norwegian Humanitarian Policy”⁸ which outlines Norway’s strategy for humanitarian interventions was presented in September 2008, and served as the backdrop for White Paper 40 that is under review here. The Policy dictates the role Norway is to play in the humanitarian field from 2009-2013. The underlying political objective of the Policy was to support Norway in establishing itself as a key financial and political partner in the humanitarian field. In this way the Policy was not only to delineate areas of importance, but also to assist Norway in navigating through the main challenges encountered in the humanitarian field. With this in mind, the principal goals of the Policy are to:

- Ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance;
- Fund humanitarian assistance based on the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence;
- Equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges; and
- Prevent and respond to humanitarian crisis and initiate reconstruction in their wake (White Paper 40, p.5).

These goals, together with the recommendations noted in the Auditor General’s Report (2008) (see Box: The Auditor General’s Report),⁹ prompted shifts in the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) operated in the humanitarian field. The White Paper aimed to respond to both the priorities outlined in the Strategy drafted in 2008 and the challenges noted by the Auditor General. The White Paper does three things:

- Provides a bird’s eye view of the humanitarian field;
- Identifies clear priorities for implementation; and

⁷The FTS database is kept by OCHA, but each government provides the data available. This figure equates to funds disbursed, not committed. Hence, there is a considerable drop in 2011 as the funding for the year has not yet been allocated in full. Data for 2011 was updated on October 16th 2011.

⁸The Norwegian Humanitarian Policy from 2008 is hereafter referred to as the Strategy.

⁹Issues mentioned in the Plan of Action that was drafted following the Auditor General’s report are included in this document as they overlap with the White Paper’s action points (see Chapter 5).

- Identifies clear shifts in the administrative apparatus that should enable a more efficient and effective implementation of the noted priorities.

It is important to highlight that many of the changes in how MFA should work, which are highlighted in the White Paper, were first noted in the Auditor General's report. Indeed, changes in the way MFA worked started to occur as a response to the Auditor General's report and were in effect, or underway, before the White Paper was presented to Parliament.

In line with the above, based on our examination of archival documents interviews with both MFA staff and partner organizations, a number of trends in the way the MFA has operated in the years since the publishing of the White Paper are apparent:

- Reduction in the number of contracts;
- Introduction of Multi-Year Framework Agreements;
- Incorporation of key tenets most agreements including gender, *do no harm*, risk analysis, etc.; and
- Increase in demands placed the reporting by some partners.

The Auditor General's Report

The Auditor General's office audited MFA's efforts in the humanitarian field in 2008. Their review stressed the need for, and value of, Norway's work in the field of humanitarian assistance. The report also highlights Norway's prominence as a donor in the international community. In tandem with these findings a number of weaknesses in the way MFA manages its work in the Humanitarian Field were noted. These weaknesses were stressed as it was felt that they threatened Norway's ability to more effectively and efficiently contribute to humanitarian efforts.

Weaknesses Identified

- Slow administrative and financial processing of funding requests.
- Low levels of coordination between short and longer term efforts.
- Low level of involvement of local players.
- Low degree of follow up of projects.
- Funding provided to many individual projects in too many settings.
- Limited predictability of funding due to one year grants.

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In short, it appears the White Paper has led to, or preceded, some changes in the way MFA works in the Humanitarian Aid field. As is visible through the documentation review, and noted by multiple respondents, some of the changes are recommended in the Auditor General's Report and hence, it is hard to identify clear causality for the actual shifts.

1.2. Purpose of the Review and Methodology Used

In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR), the main objectives of this Mid-Term review are three-fold:

- Assess the coherence of Norway's actions as a political and financial partner for the period between 2009 to the present in the context of the Humanitarian Policy as stated in the White Paper;
- Assess progress made, and the degree of effectiveness, in reaching the goals of the Policy; and
- Assess specific progress made in the different priority areas and related action points.

The review has utilised a number of methodological approaches to gather the required data. First, archival data has been collected and analysed. Here the emphasis has been on government documents including priority memos (*Fordelingsnotat* or *Prioriteringsnotat*), annual budgets (*Stortingsproposisjoner*) and budgetary information provided to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service, Embassy action plans (*Virksomhetsplaner*), and speeches: in addition to grant letters with some of the key funding recipients, multi-year framework agreements, minutes from meetings with key partner organisations, e-mail correspondence between MFA and key partners, annual reports, and evaluation documents of projects and programs have also been examined. A full list of documents consulted and used is available in the bibliography to this report.

Second, a series of semi-structured and open interviews were held with staff from MFA that

have been, or are directly involved in, the drafting and/or implementation of the White Paper. Key staff members from partner organisations, international organizations, and other government representatives were also interviewed. All interviews were either conducted in person or by telephone conference, and in a limited number of cases by e-mail. A full list of interview respondents is available in Annex 4. The distribution of interviews between the two consultants was guided by convenience and availability; however, in the case of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, interviews were conducted by Ananda S. Millard as Trude Bang has had a previous institutional relationship with the Norwegian Red Cross. While the current assignment and the previous relationship with the noted institution gave no reason for bias or impropriety, we wanted to ensure that this review, and the perception of this review, was in no way tarnished. The general type of questions asked during the interviews is found in Annex 6¹⁰.

The third data collection mechanism employed was an online survey. This approach was utilised in order to gather data from a number of respondents who would have otherwise been excluded, as time did not allow for interviewing all organizations that have been funded by MFA. The questionnaire that was fielded is found in Annex 6.

The aforementioned data sources were utilized in conjunction in order to enable the triangulation of data.¹¹ All data gathered through interviews and through the surveys remains anonymous, thus no individual respondent is cited in this report. The assurance of anonymity was given in order to enable more candid discussions. However, when more than five respondents of the same category have agreed on any one issue, a general reference has been made as this allows the reader to ground the reading more firmly on a source and simultaneously protects the respondent.

In order to conduct the analysis, this report has relied on a number of theoretical frameworks. First, the concept of *carrots, sticks and sermons*¹² was used as a way to organize the tools available to the MFA in the implementation of the White Paper.

Second, Results Based Management (RBM)¹³ and Outcome Mapping¹⁴ were utilized where applicable throughout the report, but primarily in Chapters 4 and 5. Table 3 illustrates the different frameworks which have been utilized at different stages of this review. Each framework is explained in more detail in Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively.

Table 3: Theoretical Frameworks Employed in this Mid-Term Review

Framework	What is it used for?	How is it helpful?
<i>Carrots, Sticks and Sermons</i>	This is used to organize the tools available to the MFA in its efforts to implement the Policy. Chapters 3, 4 and 5.	It allows us to ensure we examine the utility of all available tools.
Results Based Management and Outcome Mapping	These tools are used throughout the document but most often employed to examine progress made and effectiveness in relation to the general Policy goals, and in relation to specific progress made in specific priority areas (e.g., Chapter 4 and 5).	These tools provide a structure to our examination in order to ensure achievements and effectiveness are part of a concerted and deliberate approach, rather than inadvertent effort.

¹⁰The interview guides were used to highlight areas of interest, but in numerous cases interviews turned toward the respondents' specific area of expertise.

¹¹Triangulation refers to the corroboration of data used by multiple sources (at least 3) through the use of at least two data gathering methods.

¹²Adopted from *Carrots, Sticks, Sermons: Policy Instruments and their Evaluation*, Marie Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C Rist, Evert Vedung (1998, 2010), Transaction Publisher.

¹³Adopted from *Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A Practical Guide*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad.

¹⁴This system was first developed by International Development Research Centre (IDRC). All necessary resources can be found at <http://www.outcomemapping.ca/projects/index.php>

1.3. Limitations on Reliability and Validity


Overall, this document has a high level of both reliability and validity. First, **reliability** is high because we have consistently triangulated data and generally have encountered little contradiction amongst our sources. Indeed, due to the high number of sources employed we have been able to secure corroboration to all statements made herein. Second, **validity** is also high given the aforementioned utilization of triangulation. Furthermore, the warranty of confidentiality is also believed to have aided in securing validity of non-published data (i.e., interviews and survey).

However, a few challenges were encountered. First, some of the key respondents did not return our request for interviews or were unavailable to be interviewed despite numerous requests made by the review team. Second, some UN agencies could not be targeted with the survey because it was not possible to determine who would be best suited to respond to the questions. This means that only information from key UN agencies, as identified by MFA, was gathered through the conduct of interviews.

Third, the online survey response rate was low despite having issued a number of reminders including personal, rather than automated, messages. Notably, a number of organizations that started the survey did not complete it (Figure 2). While there can be many reasons for this, of which some are mentioned below, the lack of respondents has meant less information than wished for from partner organizations. Still, given all other data collected, ample information to enable triangulation of data to support the findings and conclusions mentioned in this report has been gathered.

On close analysis of the survey questionnaire it seems that being asked whether or not the respondent was aware of the Policy served as a way to spook away respondents. The high number of times the questionnaires was viewed by single institutions (i.e., survey sent to 33 institutions and viewed 75 times) suggest that perhaps partners were not well versed with the White Paper or even the general content of Norway's humanitarian policy and did not want to openly express this, or perhaps that the survey was forwarded around within the institution without anyone actually feeling entitled/able to answer it. An examination of partial responses (12 surveys) shows that when asked if they knew about the Norwegian Humanitarian Policy they desisted from continuing to respond to further questions. Undoubtedly, lack of willingness to participate in the review by institutions targeted with the survey can also have been a reason for low response rate. Still, despite the low response rates, some data could be used as corroboration to interview data. Figure 2 below shows the survey response distribution.

Figure 2: Survey Response Rate Distribution (N=33)



Source: Data gathered for this review using Survey Console Automated survey system.

Lastly, the lack of field visits associated with the review limits its ability to accurately convey the experiences in affected countries. As one way to counter this shortcoming, interviews with embassies in Pilot Countries were held. These were instrumental in providing a bird's eye view of the way the Policy affected work at embassies. While for the purposes of this review a desk focused study is regarded as appropriate, this shortcoming is worth highlighting none the less.

1.4. The Report Content

This report is composed of six chapters. The first chapter provided the contextual information and outlined the methodology employed. Chapter 2 provides background information on the White Paper and introduces the analytical frameworks employed for this review. Chapter 3 presents the findings related to Norway's coherence in implementing the Policy (i.e., Objective One of this Mid-Term Review). Chapter 4 presents findings relevant to progress made and effectiveness of efforts conducted in relation to the main goals of the policy (i.e., Objective Two of this Mid-Term Review). Chapter 5 focuses on findings directly relevant to the priority areas and related action points (i.e., Objective Three of this Mid-Term Review). In some cases, issues noted in the White Paper could have been discussed in any of the three chapters on findings (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). However, action points, we found, were far more specific regarding what steps needed to be taken hence, we have chosen to be biased towards the detail which can be provided in Chapter 5 and have hence, limited our discussion of specific issues in Chapter 3 and 4 respectively. The report concludes (Chapter 6) by presenting a series of general findings, lessons learned and recommendations. Lessons learned are noted throughout the report; however, the most prominent are highlighted in Chapter 6. In addition, the report includes seven Annexes. These include the: ToR, SWOT figure outlining the Policy, list of key partners, list of interviewees, list of recipients of the questionnaire, framework for questions asked during the interviews and the questionnaire which was fielded online, and lastly the key reference documents annotated bibliography.

Chapter 2. Background and Analytical Framework

This chapter starts by briefly discussing the need for a policy in the humanitarian field, followed by an outline of White Paper 40. Section Three of this chapter presents some observations on the presentation and content of the policy. Section Four presents the *sticks, carrots, sermons* analytical framework and briefly discusses the role played by each tool. Section Five presents RBM and Output Mapping, the other two analytical frameworks employed during this review. In short, the chapter provides the necessary background to allow for the presentation of findings which is found in Chapters 3-5.

2.1. Does Norway Need a Humanitarian Policy?

While the question of whether a policy is needed or not was not strictly the brief for this review, we felt it was impossible to omit this subject as it was mentioned on occasion by a number of interviewed respondents from both the MFA and partner institutions, and the ideas posed appeared relevant and worthy of note. Therefore, before delving into the White Paper and its implementation, whether or not there should be a Policy on Humanitarian Efforts at all is discussed.

On this topic there are two main camps or schools of thought: One argues that humanitarianism cannot be driven by policy because it should simply respond to a humanitarian need and hence, humanitarian needs and not governmental politics should govern the decisions made. Another school of thought stresses that Norway as a government should have a policy not only because it is a political entity, but also because by having a policy it is able to more soundly and coherently act. While the first argument can be one of merit for institutions that dedicate themselves solely to humanitarian work, the experience of this Policy in relation to Norway and Norwegian actions has shown that for governments a policy can be hugely beneficial. Key respondents from both the MFA and partner organizations stressed that the Policy has assisted in focusing the Norwegian effort and in so doing making the efforts Norway has invested into more successful. Indeed, while multiple respondents highlighted both points of view, none supported the first school of thought at the time of interview.¹⁵ However, it should be noted that this conclusion is biased because those interviewed are either government personnel or currently have some kind of partnership relationship to the Norwegian government. How organizations which have lost their ability to access MFA funds¹⁶ as a result of the Policy feel, has not been measured by this review.

2.2. Norwegian Humanitarian Work and the Birth of the White Paper

There was a consensus amongst all categories of respondents that Norway has a long history as a strong humanitarian actor in the international field. Given its long history, some trends have emerged over the years and given credence to Norway as a key actor in some fields, more than in others. However, the credence that Norway had attained, government respondents noted, has been the result of a process of identification of priorities which was not dependent on a clear policy guideline, but rather a series of factors including: the individuals holding key posts, their interests and what was understood as a pressing priority in the international field at the time; individual merit of applications rather than the focus of the application, also influenced by a first come first serve approach; and the country for where the funding was intended which was influential in relation to focus-countries. In short, a clear political framework, embodied in a single strategy, did not guide the efforts and hence, there was substantial room for individual interpretation. This allowed for a more piecemeal approach to funding which was a costly (both time and funds) enterprise, and disempowered Norway from having the degree of impact that it could have. These factors led to a need for a shift in the way Norway approached humanitarian work. This was also noted in the Auditor General's report. For its part the Strategy (2008), which

¹⁵Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) was noted in the Auditor General's Report (p. 44) as seeing no need for a Humanitarian Strategy, unfortunately MSF did not respond to requests for an interview hence, their current position in relation to the White Paper is not known. See also Auditor General's Report p. 44 for other views on the matter.

¹⁶ It was noted that the more stringent guidelines for what should be funded limited the access of some organizations to Norwegian funds (See Chapter 3).

preceded the White Paper, was noted by the Auditor General as a possible step towards correcting some of the Ministry's shortcomings in terms of the Government's work in the humanitarian field.¹⁷

White Paper 40 starts by providing a situational overview of the humanitarian environment at the time of writing. Generally speaking, this situational review highlights the contextual areas of concern that most affected the humanitarian environment. Mainly:

- The financial crisis and the food crisis;
- Humanitarian principles;
- Humanitarian reform;
- Humanitarian disarmament;
- Gender;
- Children and young people;
- Humanitarian military collaboration;
- Prevention of humanitarian crisis; and
- IDPs and their protection.

Other relevant challenges such as the protection of staff from humanitarian organizations, the need to focus efforts on education as a foundation for progress, the need for beneficiary including approaches and so forth, are also mentioned. From a broader perspective the international backdrop to the drafting of the Policy document included a focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)¹⁸ and their relevant targets and indicators; and Norway was also keenly involved in UN reform efforts including the move towards the Delivery as One approach.¹⁹ Additionally, the Policy should not be seen in isolation as it has links to a number of other Norwegian policies.²⁰

While the general consensus amongst those interviewed was that the Policy identified and prioritized the most relevant humanitarian issues, some aspects were identified as requiring further or more in-depth coverage or inclusion (Figure 3).²¹ Notably, the need to better highlight the issues noted in Figure 3 is not linked to whether or not progress has been made in implementation of the White Paper, or the degree to which Norway has acted coherently in view of their humanitarian efforts.

¹⁷See Auditor General's Report: Introduction and pages 38, 39, 42, 43 and 57.


¹⁸ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

¹⁹Norway has focused considerable attention and funding towards the Delivery as One Pilot effort in Vietnam, a country which is also piloting the Policy. www.norway.org/vn

²⁰ See p. 6. in the White Paper. Specific White papers to the Storting which are highlighted in White Paper 40 as relevant are: Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities: The main features of Norwegian foreign policy (Report No. 15 (2008-2009); Climate, Conflict and Capital (Report No. 13 (2008-2009); Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises (Report No. 9 (2007-2008); Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy (Report No. 10 (2008-2009); On Equal Terms: Women's Rights and Gender Equality in International Development Policy (Report No. 11 (2008-2009).

²¹ For the current listing of priority areas and relevant action points see pages 33 and onwards in the Policy document, particularly page 40.

Figure 3: Topics Requiring More Attention



2.3. Some General Issues on Presentation

The Policy outlines a number of critical issues and identifies some of the most pressing priorities and for this, it should be commended. However, a few issues regarding the document’s presentation are noteworthy as they may negatively impact the use, accessibility and comprehension of the document.

First, the Policy highlights a number of **priority areas** and relevant **action points**.²² For analytical purposes we have categorized these into two distinct groups depending on the type of goal which is sought after, and the degree to which Norway depends on other actors to achieve the desired outcome (Table 4).

Table 4: Priority Area Action Categories

Category	Implementer and Desired Outcome
Programmatic Priorities	These refer to action points which require MFA funded 3 rd party initiatives and/or action points that have implicit outcomes for which successful implementation by an implementing partner are required.
Diplomatic priorities	These refer to action points which guide MFA’s diplomatic efforts and hence, are not directly dependent on the activities by implementing partners.

Since programmatic and diplomatic action points (Table 4) require support from different agents in order to be effective (i.e., direct MFA action or third party intervention by a partner organization), distinguishing these in the report would promote the accessibility to, and possibly the implementation of, action points by partner organizations without the need for direct and close dialogue with MFA. The separation of the action points would highlight the role of partner organizations.

Second, there are four key factors that can contribute to the overlooking, de-prioritization and/or non-implementation of action points. First, a high number of action points (*52 in total*). Second, a focal point within MFA in charge of coordinating the follow up of all action points by all relevant sections, missions and partner institutions is lacking. Third, a number of the action points do not establish clear measurable goals, but rather focus on intent which makes it difficult to measure progress and this in turn can lead to them being overlooked or under implemented. Fourth, some of the action points are somewhat repetitive.

Third, a number of assertions made in the Policy are factually incorrect and by using them Norway becomes complicit in the perpetuation of incorrect data, and validates the utilization of incorrect data. Examples of this include statements such as “The use of rape as a weapon emerged in earnest during the Balkan wars in the 1990s...” (p.27). While it may be correct that the concept of rape as a weapon of war became more openly recognized as a result of the crimes

²²See pages 33-42 in the White Paper.

committed during the war in the Balkans, sadly rape has been utilized as a weapon of war in multiple conflicts far earlier.²³ Similarly, the claim that landmines and cluster munitions kill children and young people in particular (p.28) is also an incorrect statement. It has been amply demonstrated that the common victims of landmines and cluster munitions are directly tied to the type of contamination and the local way of life, and do not generally affect one population group. Of course small children are likelier to sustain more severe injuries than adults given the same weapon due to their size, and males are more susceptible to death than females given same injuries due to physiological responses to blood loss.²⁴

2.4. Sticks, Carrots and Sermons: Framing the Analyses

In order to adequately examine coherence (Chapter progress made (Chapter 4) the attention paid to specific priority areas (Chapter 5), have utilized *the sticks, carrots and sermons* analytical framework (See “*Sticks Carrots and Sermons*”).²⁵ This approach been chosen as it allows the exploration of a large array tools available to the government and its partners implementation of the Policy. The approach also allows the exploration of the and degree of use of different tools.

<i>Sticks Carrots and Sermons</i>	
Sticks refer to ‘orders’ to implement activities by virtue of a hierarchical chain of command. The actors in the system are ‘forced’ to undertake the intended actions to realize the objectives of the policy. Examples could be contracts, guidelines, strategies, framework agreements, legislation, etc.	3), and
Carrots are incentives provided to actors in the system to encourage the design of interventions that are line with the policy. Such incentives could be access to funding or other resources such as staff, in kind assistance, or rewards that yield status and prestige, etc.	we
Sermons refer to cases where the actors in the systems are motivated to act according to the policy by awareness raising and through information. The use of sermons is prompted by the belief that actors in the system will be influenced to change their behaviour by information and knowledge, rather than (or in addition to) through incentives and/or orders (carrots and sticks). Examples could be speeches, statements at international conferences or meetings, evaluations and research efforts.	Box: has of in the utility

Different *sticks, carrots and sermons* govern a number of different relationships in relation to the Policy. These are noted in Figure 4.

²³Izikoğlu and Millard. BICC Brief 43.
²⁴Assertion based on extensive research conducted by Ananda S. Millard, one of the authors of this review, in varied capacities including research projects funded by MFA and related evaluations for MFA (1999-2002, 2010).
²⁵Adopted from *Carrots, Sticks, Sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation*, Marie Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C Rist, Evert Vedung (1998, 2010), Transaction Publisher.

Figure 4: Relationships Governed by Sticks, Carrots and Sermons

Within MFA	Between the MFA and...	Between Norway and...
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Within the Humanitarian Section at the MFA (i.e., determining internal budget and time allocations). • Between Humanitarian Section at MFA and other sections at MFA (i.e., determining priorities at the ministerial level). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Norwegian government missions abroad (i.e., determining priorities in relation to Norway's work in a given country or in the international arena); • Implementing partners (i.e., determining Norway's involvement on a particular issue and the terms of any such involvement). This may also apply to the relationship between Norwegian missions abroad and implementing partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Other governments (i.e., determining Norway's position on a specific subject) • Indirect partners or actors who are furthering the general humanitarian discourse supported by Norway, but where there is no formal engagement between Norway and said actor (i.e., determining possible relationships in future).

2.4.1. Sticks: What is available?

Legally binding instructions, laws and directives are the most common sticks. These however, would require that violation incur legal sanction. This is not the case with the implementation of a policy. The White Paper did not lead to a legislative change per se, and there are no agencies charged with observing its faithful implementation. However, despite it not being legally binding, the White Paper does provide the framework for what is expected of the MFA in relation to humanitarian intervention. In this way the White Paper itself adds weight to the use of sticks even if said sticks have not changed drastically since 2009. Here we review the main sticks available to the government.

Guidelines

MFA has at its disposal the utilization of both the RBM Guidelines²⁶ and Outcome Mapping²⁷ (see Section 2.5) tools to measure progress, and the success of operational activities (e.g., efforts in relation to end beneficiaries). While these systems are available to Norway, the documents reviewed (e.g., grant letters to implementing partners, multi-year framework agreements, contracts, etc.) made no mention of either tool or of their use. This is understandable to some extent as the tools mentioned have been primarily designed for development projects. However, as is demonstrated from our use of these tools in the findings for this review, it is also possible to apply these methods to some humanitarian interventions. Thus, they are mentioned also here as tools available to Norway in terms of implementing the Policy. Moreover, they are pertinent as the Auditor General's report highlights the need for delineating more carefully what the intended Result Chain is for individual projects, and MFA already stressed at that time (e.g., 2008) the low quality of applications/reports.²⁸

Budgets Requests, Priority Memos, Action Plans and Grant Letters

Each year the MFA issues the budget request (*Stortingsproposisjon - Prop. 1 S*) to parliament. When the budget request has been approved by the parliament, priority memos (*fordelingsnotater*) outlining the areas of focus for the year, are developed for each budget chapter. The Humanitarian Section at MFA is responsible for preparing the priority memo for Chapter 163 (post 70 and 71).²⁹

The main instrument at the Embassy level is the Embassy Action Plan (*Virksomhetsplan*) which is sent to the MFA. The action plan includes the main priorities as identified by the Embassy and a relevant budget. The action plan includes all aspects of the Embassies inner workings, as well as the annual report for the previous year. The request for funding from Embassies to MFA now follow a specified template that requires special attention be paid to aspects of the White Paper. The MFA responds to the Embassy Action Plan with the annual appropriation letter (*Tildelingsskriv*) which clearly delineates what the priorities for MFA are, and provides further

²⁶Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A practical Guide, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad.

²⁷<http://www.outcomemapping.ca/projects/index.php>

²⁸Auditor General's Report Section 4.3.1.

²⁹Post 163.70 (natural disasters) and post 163.71 (humanitarian assistance).

direction and possibly amends the Embassy's action plan. In addition, there are grant letters to individual agencies for the conduct of individual projects or programs.

Multi-Year Framework Agreements

The MFA has also at its disposal the ability to put forth multi-year framework agreements with implementing partners. These agreements, unlike grant letters or contracts, have in-built a number of individual orders (sticks) delineating the actions that ought to be taken by the partner agency. Multi-year framework agreements are based on extensive and continual dialogue between the MFA and the management of the partner institution. This dialogue leads to the drafting of the actual agreement and to modification of said agreement based on any risk that may threaten the ability to fulfil the terms of the agreement. As with grant letters or other contracts, reporting on results takes place annually even though there is a longer-term financial commitment on behalf of the government.

Annual reporting demands that benchmarks be achieved or that adequate reasoning for low achievement be provided in order to enable further disbursements of funds. These agreements have been introduced into the working of the Humanitarian Section as a result of the effort to streamline work by the Ministry, improve follow up of programs and projects, and reduce the number of contracts and partners as noted by the Auditor General's report and as highlighted in the White Paper (p.42). The importance of multi-year framework agreements is multi fold: First, it is a new-post-White Paper- stick which is currently being piloted by MFA. Second, it demands closer follow up by MFA of the partner institution. Third, it requires that partner agencies meet the objectives agreed upon on an annual basis to be able to ensure the continued funding. Fourth, it provides partner institutions with more financial security.

At the moment there are nine multi-year framework agreements, with six different organizations. These framework agreements are depicted in Table 5. While the number of agreements is few, it is an important tool as their success or failure will have a direct impact on the way Norway relates to partner organizations in the future.

Table 5: Current Multiyear Framework Agreements

Organisation	Subject	Annual grant in NOK	Timeframe
NRC	NORCAP	69 000 000	2009-2011
NRC	IDPs Africa	86 000 000	2010-2012
The Norwegian Red Cross	Disaster Risk Reduction	34 000 000	2009-2011
The Norwegian Red Cross	Humanitarian Assistance - Afghanistan	40 000 000	2009-2011
NCA	Augusta Victoria Hospital - Palestine	5 000 000	2009-2011
NCA	SGBV in DRC	17 000 000	2010-2012
NPA	Humanitarian Disarmament	95 900 000	2009-2011
OCHA	Support	60 000 000	2009-2011
The Feinstein Institute	Humanitarian Research	3 000 000	2009-2011

Source: "Fordelingsnotat" 2011.

Reporting and Administrative Tools

The Ministry has always had a series of reporting mechanisms in order to ensure that funding allocations were adequately directed and reported upon. In 2009, the Ministry introduced a new system to organize and store information enabling a more efficient storage of reported outcomes. While reporting requirements are not a stick per se, they can lead to clear sanctions (sticks) and hence, they are noted here. The more adequate organization and storage of reports does not, however, reveal anything about the content of the reports and/or how these are used within MFA.

2.4.2. *Carrots: What is available?*

Carrots are incentives utilized to encourage actors to further the Policy's goals. The Norwegian government has been able to activate a number of carrots.

Funding Available

Norwegian funding for Humanitarian interventions is disproportionately high in per capita terms. Here, however, not the amount but the management of said funding is worth highlighting. Norway has at its disposal a great degree of flexibility of funding, which can be a good carrot for organizations in time of crisis as well as in responding to less sudden humanitarian needs.

Staff Positions

Norway has utilized the placing of key staff positions in particular fields as a key way to further their Policy goals. By doing this they both provide more man-power within the agency/institution recipient of the secondment, but also ensure that certain topics are given further attention/coverage.

Recognition of Progress Made

Norway has employed recognition of progress as a way to further the Policy by, for example, granting multi-year framework agreements (see Section 2.4.1) to institutions which have excelled on issues that are highlighted by the Policy. In this way Norway can both provide recognition and further work on the subject of interest. Similarly, Norway has played a key role in making certain institutions gain international recognition, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) by funding their efforts and actively endorsing their work.

2.4.3. *Sermons: What is Available?*

Sermons are activities which try to influence through persuasion; they are intended to support existing implementation mechanisms such as carrots and sticks by expressing and/or reiterating a position through speeches, position statements, research and the like. Sermons are often utilized to build a particular culture or standing rhetoric that serves to create a collective understanding regarding a particular theme.

MFA has had at its disposal a number of avenues to deliver and use sermons. The principal sermon in terms of Norway's work in the humanitarian field is the Policy document itself in so far as it has been able to generate considerable attention and, according to MFA respondents, has been a key source of inspiration. Aside from the Policy itself, the Norwegian government has a number of additional opportunities to divulge the contents and support the implementation of the Policy. Amongst them are the speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as the Minister for Development; in addition to speeches and presentations by secretaries of state as well as presentations, statements and speeches provided by Norwegian diplomats at international meetings and conferences. Lastly, Norway can also rely on funded research, relevant multi-year framework agreements,³⁰ and on evaluations of projects and programs as mechanisms to further disseminate the views expressed in the Policy.

2.4.4. *The Use of Sticks, Carrots and Sermons: Some General Observations*


Generally, we found that the MFA utilizes some tools better than others in ensuring the implementation of the Policy. Norway has at its disposal a number of *sticks, carrots and sermons*; however, these are generally not employed to their full potential. This does not mean that the Policy has not been implemented (see Chapters 3-5), but it does mean that Norway could improve implementation by better utilizing the tools available. Overall, Norway relies primarily on sticks rather than carrots. Generally, sermons are effectively utilized but not so in directly promoting the Policy (see Section 3.2.).

³⁰Multi-year framework agreement on research in the humanitarian field with The Feinstein Institute, Tuft's University.

2.5. Results Based Management and Outcome Mapping

Results Based Management (RBM) and Outcome Mapping are two additional theoretical frameworks used in this report. **RBM guidelines**³¹ are a recognized system utilized for assessing development cooperation projects and programs. The system has been endorsed by Norway making it all the more relevant here. RBM provides a linear outline of the implementation process of any one effort. In so doing, it allows the examination of the degree to which the aim of any one endeavour was clear and adequately managed. This framework is used to more accurately measure Norway's degree of effectiveness in implementing the Policy (see Chapters 4 and 5). The relationship between *outputs* and *outcome* will be examined (Figure 5) in order to determine the effectiveness of efforts undertaken. Changes in *inputs*, *activities* and *outcome* will be examined in order to better establish progress made in relation to the Policy.

Figure 5: The Result Chain³²



A third and last analytical framework that is used as a backdrop to this report is **Outcome Mapping**.³³ Outcome Mapping focuses on *outcomes* that are directly influenced by the program or project (identifying the boundaries of influence). This approach moves away from examining aspects that may or may not have resulted from any one effort. This is a particularly useful tool in both determining levels of success, but also – and more relevant here - for determining if the outcomes identified are relevant to the activities conducted. This framework will be primarily utilized to examine progress made in relation to individual action points tied to priority areas (see Chapter 5), but also elsewhere when relevant.

In the absence of methodologies designed for the examination of effectiveness and clear attributable outcomes in the humanitarian-emergency field, the above frameworks were chosen even though they were designed to analyse development efforts. Evidently the aim of these frameworks makes their application to the emergency setting inadequate in many cases, but their application to some cases adds considerably clout to the discussion. Furthermore, since these tools have been endorsed by Norway they were a better fit for this task than other approaches.

³¹Adopted from *Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A practical Guide*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad.

³²Adopted from *Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A practical Guide*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad, p.10.

³³This system was first developed by IDRC. All necessary resources can be found at <http://www.outcomemapping.ca/projects/index.php>

Chapter 3. Money and Talk: Is it Coherent?

In this chapter we turn our attention to Coherence in order to answer the first of the three objectives of this review: “Assess the coherence of Norway’s actions as a political and financial partner for the period between 2009 to the present in the context of the Humanitarian Policy as stated in the White Paper.” In order to do this we examine the *sticks, carrots and sermons* that Norway has availed itself to implement the White Paper. Interview and survey data are also used to arrive to the findings.

3.1. It’s All About the Money: Who Got How Much, to Do What?

The general consensus derived from the analysis of the data is that the funding was applied in a way that was consistent with the Policy. In keeping with the Policy and with the Auditor General’s findings and recommendations, Norway has implemented a number of measures.

Norway’s funding allocation has fluctuated some since 2007 (Table 1, in Chapter 1), but according to interview data, these shifts appear to have gone largely unnoticed by most MFA and partner agency personnel. A review of the priority memos delineating expenditure for Chapter 163 (post 70 and 71) shows a marked shift starting in 2009. This shift delineates a move from a country focus to an institutional and subject area focus as reflected in the priorities highlighted in the Strategy document (*Norwegian Humanitarian Policy - 2008*), and later echoed in the Policy (*White Paper 40*). Moreover, interview respondents argued that the type of subjects funded has been streamlined in accordance with the Policy document and that this has impacted who gets funding for what. These changes appear to not have impacted the top 10 funding recipients which have consistently remained the same (Table 7) and where the trends in their funding, with one exception – UNHCR in 2009 - have also remained consistent (Figure 6).

Also notable is that funding to the top 10 funding recipients fluctuates from 62-70% of all funding provided by Norway (Table 7). Indeed, the vast majority of funding recipients receive only a very small proportion of the funding available (Figure 7). The distribution of funds shown in Figure 7 for 2010 is mirrored in other years. Moreover, recipients of small funding allocations are less likely to receive close follow up³⁴ and hence, Norway relies primarily on its funding to the top 10 recipients (Table 7) of Norwegian Aid and on framework agreements (Table 5, in Chapter 2) to ensure the implementation of the Policy.³⁵ Indeed, of the 9 current framework agreements 8 are signed with institutions which are in the top 10 list of the funding recipients. In terms of coherence in funding, the lines of work of the top 10 funded institutions are tightly tied to the goals of the Policy.

Table 6: Number of Partners to Norway since 2007

Year	2007	2008	2009	2010
Num. of Partners	157	164	171	178

Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org

Table 7: Top 10 Recipients of Funding by Year in Percentile

Agency	2007	2008	2009	2010
CERF	12.5 %	10.9%	9.2%	12.5%
Norwegian Red Cross	11.9%	11.0%	11.0%	13.3%
NRC	8.9%	10.3%	6.7%	10.2%
OCHA	6.9%	6.0%	N.A.	6.9%
UNHCR	6.6%	11.8%	5.1%	7.5%
NPA	5.2%	6.1%	5.6%	5.2%
NCA	4.7%	2.9%	3.9%	3.9%
CHF	4.7%	4.6%	4.1%	4.6%
UNICEF	4.7%	3.9%	4.0%	4.6%


³⁴Multiple respondents noted that given the limited capacity available, smaller projects are often not followed up closely.

³⁵ While RBM and Outcome Mapping is not often used, the high level of dialogue between MFA and large funding recipients is better able to ensure that the funding contributes to furthering the Policy.

WFP	3.6%	5.0%	2.9%	4.4%
ICRC ³⁶	N.A.	N.A.	9.7%	N.A.
Total Percentage	69.8%	70.8%	62.3%	70%


Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org³⁷

Figure 6: Trends in Funding of Top 10 Recipients 2007-2010



Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org

Figure 7: Count of Funding Recipients by Percentile of Funding Allocated 2010



Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org

A number of administrative measures taken have, according to MFA staff, been able to contribute positively towards a more administratively efficient system. Following the recommendations made in the General Auditor's report which noted the need for increased efficiency, and as a result of the clear action points in the policy, the number of grant letters was reduced by 25%³⁸ after the White Paper came into effect. However, while some respondents from MFA highlighted that the reduction in the number of grant letters has made the MFA far more efficient, the number of partners has grown (Table 6). These findings together suggest that the number of contract agreements per agency has been reduced, but not the number of different institutions requiring attention. This in turn indicates that the overall administrative burden may have not decreased.

Another measure taken to increase efficiency is the early disbursement of funds. In 2010, Norway was able to disburse 40% of its funding in the first quarter of the year, and 79% by the

³⁶Note that Generally funding to the ICRC is provided through the Norwegian Red Cross.

³⁷Note that while some organizations may receive a lower percentage of funding in any given year or indeed, fall off the top 10 list, this does not necessarily mean that their actual funding was reduced.

³⁸ See Fordelingsnotat for 2011.

second quarter of the year.³⁹ In 2011, the goals have been similar to the disbursement accomplishments of 2010. While the ability to disburse funds early is a very positive step, some institutions noted unpredictability in funding as a chief concern. This is an issue that affects areas and institutions that do not enjoy a multi-year framework agreement.⁴⁰ Not only did some organizations voice their concern regarding Norway's unpredictability in terms of knowing how much Norway's commitment would be, some respondents also noted that in some cases post 2009, they have experienced unexplained shifts in funding.

While coherence with the policy in terms of subject areas funded is notable, a number of shortcomings are worthy of mention. First, far too much emphasis is placed on the recipients of most of the funding (top 10). This was evident both by the list of target respondents for this Mid-Term review provided by the MFA, interviews with MFA staff; as well as on the multi-year framework agreements as key mechanisms to implement the Policy. While clearly there are good and evident reasons to focus attention on where the majority of the funds are going, there is a risk that far too little attention is paid to other funding recipients. Clearly, the multi-year framework agreements are useful tools for backing the Policy as they include a closer dialogue between the MFA and the respective partner including, for example, more formal meetings between the senior management of both the Humanitarian Section and the implementing partners; and allow the partner organizations to more effectively focus their work by having a longer term funding security.

Multi-year framework agreements have also placed more responsibility on implementing partners in fulfilling the goals of the White Paper. By doing this Norway has both ensured that partners are more aware of the Policy and more actively involved in the implementation of the Policy. Partner organizations also noted that their level of professionalism increased as a result of the strong dialogue and close cooperation with MFA. Predictability in funding is a key benefit of multi-year framework agreements. The overview gained of such agreements through the conduct of interviews for this review suggested that both the government and implementing partners are content with the arrangement. None the less, multi-year framework agreements are not necessarily a final solution, but rather an approach that is being tested and will in due course be re-examined. There are many factors that can influence the success or failure of multi-year framework agreements, but from the Policy's perspective these agreements appear to have been a step forward.

The formal approach to close dialogue utilized in multi-year framework agreements is also extended, more informally, to the top 10 recipients of funding which do not enjoy multi-year framework agreements. However, such a close cooperation is not possible with all funding recipients. Therefore, grant letters also play a key role in ensuring the implementation of the Policy. To this end, we found that grant letters to implementing partners generally appear to be in line with the Policy. However, the degree to which the grant letters make reference to the White Paper varies greatly. When referring to overarching issues such as "*do no harm, and humanitarian principles*", for example, reference could be used to more forcefully push forward the tenets purported by the Policy. Gender, and to a greater extent, anti-corruption are more systematically noted in grant letters. The inclusion of these two points was repetitively noted by partner agencies interviewed, which highlighted that the inclusion of these issues into grant letters served to stress to them Norway's priorities.

An aspect of concern when examining the implementation of the Policy was the question of personnel capacity, competence and administrative resources (i.e., equipment). While on the one hand Norway can be commended for supporting the implementation of the Policy through the funding for key staff positions (*carrots*) at different organizations, for example MFA is financing a Gender Advisor position within Norwegian Refugee Council, on the other there is

³⁹ Norsk humanitær politikk. Prioriteringer og forslag til fordeling av humanitær bistand i 2011. Post 163.70 og 163.71 (Fordelingsnotat 2011)

⁴⁰It is important to note that multi-year framework agreements govern individual subjects and areas of work within an institution and hence, do not necessarily cover all funding by the MFA to an institution that enjoys a multi-year framework agreement.

clear understaffing in some sectors. It was noted by interview respondents at MFA that at headquarters, staff are in some cases responsible for portfolios that are too large, and do not have the resources needed in order to expedite their work. MFA respondents who noted they did not have the time to ensure that projects by smaller grant recipients achieved the expected outcome confirmed this. Notably in 2010, 124 of the 178 funding recipients received 1% or less of Norway's funding. Additionally, some interviewees noted that MFA staff often lack the necessary knowledge to be able to adequately follow programmatic aspects of funded projects. Likewise, in many embassies the person charged with the humanitarian portfolio does not have the skills needed and/or the time to adequately follow up relevant humanitarian efforts/issues. In Sudan, for example, a country that has consistently received substantial funding,⁴¹ the position dedicated to the humanitarian portfolio is only a 25% person post.⁴² Similarly, at the mission in New York the humanitarian portfolio is to be covered by a 40% person post. The rotation of staff has also hindered progress in some areas due to lack of continuity. An exception to this has been landmine and cluster munitions where some interviewees commented that staff continuity has been enjoyed and has, some argued, greatly benefited the progress made by Norway.

The movement of staff between Norwegian implementing partners and MFA non-diplomatic posts at the MFA (i.e., advisors to the MFA or MFA staff on limited leave from the MFA) was criticized by some respondents who felt that this could translate into staff having conflicting allegiances. However, this can also be a positive side effect of a small community where the very fact that people move from one institution to another may enable staff to acquire different experiences, views and skills.

3.2. How do Politics and Ways of Working Affect the Money Questions?

From a general point of view the politics - statements at large - have supported the Policy. However, herein a few issues need to be highlighted:

First, multiple MFA respondents noted that the Policy simplified their tasks by clearly delineating what should and could be supported or funded. Of course the Policy followed from previous documents and ways of working, so few fundamental changes emerged from the White Paper itself. This latter point was highlighted by multiple respondents. Overall, the review found that funding and requirements are generally in line with the Policy particularly as pertains to the top 10 funded partners (see section 3.1). However, less attention was paid to other funding recipients. Reporting on projects funded sometimes omitted or provided scant detailed information regarding how humanitarian principles, *do no harm concepts*, and gender aspects were implemented. Some interview respondents, and answers provided in the online survey, showed that some partners are unclear about what is meant by the aforementioned concepts and hence, have little idea of how they may go about implementing them. The data suggests that this is particularly the case with small implementing partners.

Second, on efforts to include non-Western donors into the international donor community, Norway was commended for its attempt (financial and diplomatic efforts), but criticized for its approach and generally found to not have made huge progress. Clearly Norway has achieved great success as a key humanitarian donor and as such, its experience is valid. However, some respondents noted that Norwegian "naiveté" was a key culprit in the Norwegian lack of success in its work with non-Western donors. Norway's approach to engaging potential non-Western donors is rooted on the idea of "including" them into the current way of working, and thereby ensuring that non-Western actors approach the humanitarian field in the "right" way, as a number of interview respondents from MFA and partner agencies noted. This approach was questioned at two levels. First, a number of respondents noted that non-Western actors may feel excluded from the start if they feel "required" to adopt the current approach at the expense of

⁴¹Sudan has consistently been amongst the top recipients of humanitarian appeal funding. In 2011 and 2009, Sudan received the largest proportion of funding with 7.4% and 9% of the total allocation respectively. In 2010, Sudan received 6.2% of the funding and ranked second only to Pakistan. Source: FTS data available at web page: fts.unocha.org

⁴²Virksomhetsplan for ambassaden i Khartoum. 2011.

voicing their own experiences and views of humanitarian work. Second, some suggested that the very idea that the current international environment is what we should aspire to might be an incorrect premise. Overall, it was suggested that a far better approach to including non-Western actors would be to enable dialogue and to not pre-emptively decide that non-Western actors must migrate in their thinking to fit into the current paradigm, but rather be open to the possibility that a new and better paradigm may emerge.

On a side but related issue, it was noted that Norway often invested considerable energy devising proposals and concepts to be presented at international meetings (i.e., international law conferences) that were well thought out and which were likely to be operationally successful, but this was done at the expense of ensuring that their proposals were well received by other members of the international community. Clearly, the idea that Norwegian concepts and proposals result from careful analysis was commended; however, the lack of the necessary effort placed in ensuring “buy-in” from other relevant actors was seen as a key drawback for Norway.

Third, the dissemination of the Policy document itself as one way to ensure that it is adequately implemented was also explored. While the Policy was consistently credited by all types of respondents familiar with the document for inspiring work in the Humanitarian Field and serving to highlight Norway’s efforts, the degree to which the Policy document is openly disseminated through general political rhetoric is less evident. A review of multiple speeches and statements noted that while statements made were in line with the Policy, the Policy itself was not mentioned. This may serve to explain why knowledge of the Policy, and particularly of its content, was so limited amongst some respondents. The personnel from the government were clearly well versed with the document, as were staff members from organizations involved in multi-year framework agreements and to a lesser extent the top 10 funding recipients who do not enjoy multi-year framework agreements at this time. Other organizations, however, demonstrated limited knowledge of the document and of its content. According to some MFA respondents, the White Paper was widely disseminated when it was first published. However, interviews with partner organizations and the online survey show that the content is not well known by all the partners who could benefit from a better understanding of the Policy (e.g., partners who can play a key role in implementing aspects of the Policy). It was also noted by respondents from both MFA and a limited number of partner organizations that when the Policy document was first released it served to enliven the discussion and empower the actors within the government. Some MFA respondents noted that at the time it was released, the Policy document was used far more actively than it has been since. However, staff involved in reporting to the Parliament noted that at the very least the document is used for said reporting. This would call for the need to find ways to ensure that the Policy continues to have a solid role in encouraging agents of the state to remain engaged in the humanitarian field.

A fourth aspect requiring attention, particularly in view of the limited in-depth knowledge of the Policy by some actors, is the degree to which Norway has been able to communicate with other actors in the humanitarian field. In general, Norway was commended by interviewed partner agencies for having fruitful on-going dialogues with them. Indeed, Norway was hailed for being easy to communicate with. However, some partners noted that on occasion Norway was not particularly clear about why certain decisions were made (i.e., shifts in funding) or what it required (i.e., reporting on specific issues). This is a puzzling situation given that on the government side the Policy was highlighted as a key tool in determining funding and programmatic priorities. The situation suggests that while things may be clear to the government agents, they may not always be adequately conveyed to implementing partners. Examples of the contradiction in communication ability by Norway include:

- Norway is an *effective communicator* in devising multi-year framework agreements and in ensuring that multi-year framework agreement partners understand their requirements vis-à-vis the implementation of the Policy;

- Norway is an *effective communicator* in underscoring the importance they place on issues such as protection, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Landmines and Cluster Munitions;
- Norway *can improve its communication skills when* explaining the reason for funding fluctuations with standing donor-funding recipients;
- Norway *can improve its communication skills when* delineating what its gender requirements are and how these should be reflected in reports;⁴³
- Norway *can improve its communication skills when* highlighting all relevant aspects of the Policy as part of funding agreements (e.g., grant letters); and
- Norway *can improve its communication skills* in terms of highlighting the White Paper.

⁴³ Some respondents noted that in some cases Norway has invested considerable time with implementing partners to ensure that partners report adequately on specific issues. Oddly despite these efforts, some issues are still unclear to implementing partners.

Chapter 4. How Far Has Norway Gone? Progress Made and Effectiveness

In this chapter we turn our attention to **progress made** and the **degree of effectiveness** in **reaching the goals** of the Policy.⁴⁴ Here too, like in Chapter 3, the findings will be based on the analysis of *carrots, sticks* and *sermons* and how these have been used to support progress in the implementation of the Policy. Additionally, we also turn to RBM and Outcome Mapping in order to explore the degree to which attention has been paid by MFA to the different steps of the result chain (Figure 5 in Chapter 2).

In order to adequately assess the progress Norway has made, each goal of the Policy is discussed separately. The key goals of the Policy are to:

- Ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance;
- Fund humanitarian efforts on the basis of the international principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence;
- Equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges; and
- Prevent and respond to humanitarian crisis and initiate reconstruction in their wake.

4.1. People in Need⁴⁵

The degree to which Norway has successfully ensured, promoted the assurance that, and/or built mechanisms to ensure that, people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance is hard to measure. This difficulty is tied to the lack of clear RBM and adequate outcome mapping for each effort (See Section 2.5). However, if only certain aspects of the result chain (Figure 5 in Chapter 2) are focused upon, Norway's utilizations of *inputs* to fund *activities* which had intended *outputs* and *outcomes* which would effectively support **people in need** is clear. The degree to which the *outcomes* were achieved is harder to measure particularly given the tools or approaches utilized by Norway to reach **people in need** and the underuse of outcome mapping. These tools include Norwegian funding to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and to Consolidated Appeal Processes (CAP). According to multiple respondents, these are important mechanisms to ensure that **people in need** receive assistance. The CERF has been praised and criticised in almost equal measure. While the importance of making funds available for emergencies is undisputed, potential recipients of funding questioned the way the CERF is administered. It was noted that the system to apply for funds is cumbersome, slow and overly bureaucratic. The critique is well known to Norway, but seemingly, in the absence of a better system, they have chosen to support the existing one. While this is understandable, Norway could to take a more leading role to improve the way the funds are being administered. In relation to the CERF, Norway relinquishes its ability to follow up specific initiatives funded because the management of the CERF should ensure that the funding is disbursed adequately.

The CAP process, according to respondents, is a very useful way of making needs known to donor countries. Here, Norway should be commended for consistently meeting their pledges and for focusing not only on key international priorities, but also on the more *forgotten* emergencies and supporting them consistently over the years. For example: Myanmar, Somalia,⁴⁶ Sri Lanka, and Korea (DPRK) to name a few. In relation to the CAP, Norway is able to identify specific projects it wishes to fund and in relation to these is able to ensure that funding is reaching **people in need**. However, it should be noted, as mentioned in Chapter 3, that small funding recipients often do not receive extensive follow up. While end of year (or funding period) reports are submitted, as are financial audits, the MFA often lacks the capacity to adequately ensure, through verifiable means, that the *outcomes* achieved are those intended.

⁴⁴ Second objective of this review, the assessment of "progress made, and the degree of effectiveness, in reaching the goals of the Policy."

⁴⁵The headings in this section follow the subjects noted in the White Paper. In this sense the White Paper itself provides the context to understand each heading.

⁴⁶Currently, Somalia is again on the agenda due to the famine, but Norway has been a consistent donor to the country even when it was not so consistently in the spotlight.

Targeted efforts, such as sponsorship programs to support participation in individual diplomatic efforts such as the Cluster Munitions Convention or the Mine Ban Treaty, appear to have been largely successful in ensuring the participation of effected countries and therein in supporting the voice of affected countries in the diplomatic process. The financial support to participants from affected countries has been generally intended to engage affected countries in the international dialogue. The administration of the sponsorship program seems to be effective (*input, activities and output*). In some cases this was achieved as participants took active part in discussions (output), and have come to be recognized as important players in the international discussion (outcome). In other cases the effectiveness of the effort is harder to gage. Still, given some of the successes noted by respondents, the effort itself can be seen as progress.

Norway's funding for the top 10 funding recipients are believed, by respondents, to lead to the *effective* implementation of the Policy as these are most closely followed up by Norway. In relation to the funding of UN agencies, which accounted for 45.5% of the total funding in 2010, some respondents posed that it was difficult to know how much funding actually reached the **people in need** given the multiple overhead costs by the UN at diverse stages of project/program implementation. Overall, there is a lack of use of verifiable methodologies to ensure the expected outcomes and impact is attained.⁴⁷

4.2. Humanitarian Principles

When it comes to furthering the implementation of **humanitarian principles**, Norway is a proactive actor at the international level (diplomacy), but less so in ensuring that partners implement **humanitarian principles**. MFA's main cooperation partners have institutional mechanisms to ensure their work is governed by humanitarian principles. Some smaller grant recipients, however, treat **humanitarian principles** as an *understood* notion common to all employees. This more relaxed approach is worrisome as it may mean that staff working for said institutions do not actively understand the principles and hence, are unable to enforce them. This was notable in some interview and survey responses where we requested institutions explain what they understood by humanitarian principles, and how these were ensured in the conduct of their operations. This is not an issue which Norway requires stringent reporting on. As pertains to the compromising of humanitarian principles or the humanitarian space, respondents generally noted that they had not faced such a challenge yet, and commended Norway's awareness regarding the challenges faced in humanitarian work today (e.g., the fact that in some cases humanitarian principles are *compromised* by the nature of the environment, rather than by the implementing agency).

4.3. Global Humanitarian Challenges

The degree to which Norway has contributed to equipping the international community to meet future **global humanitarian challenges** is a tall order. Still, Norway's contribution in meeting some **global humanitarian challenges** is visible. The White Paper highlights the following key humanitarian challenges: climate change; protection in complex conflicts; migration; food security, health and education. No respondents noted any additional challenge which they felt had been omitted.

In relation to responding to **global humanitarian challenges**, Norway has contributed to - by being an active member of different donor groups - defining how a donor can be involved in follow up. Examples include Norway's recent leadership in the ICRC Donor Support Group and its current role as chair of the OCHA Donor Support Group. Norway has also paid special attention to environmental issues, particularly through the Pilot Countries (e.g., Vietnam and Cuba) where efforts are being made to find new and innovative solutions to humanitarian challenges (e.g., new initiatives in Vietnam exploring innovative responses to environmental threats) and ways to replicate successful solutions elsewhere (e.g., Initiatives in Cuba to

⁴⁷ This shortcoming was noted in terms of reporting in Moberg, Liv. David Geirdner and Florence Mandelik. Rapid Study on Evaluations, Reviews and Studies of Humanitarian Assistance with Norwegian Funding 2007-2010. Oslo: Scanteam, 2010.

reinforce existing knowledge and practice for coping with environmental threats and exploring mechanism to replicate successes elsewhere). The efforts in Cuba are also examples of non-Western partner engagement.⁴⁸ Norway has also been active (see Chapter 5) in the implementation of a comprehensive approach to responding to the plight of refugees which includes a variety of issues such as food security, health, education, and migration. Norway has also actively supported the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE).⁴⁹

Norway has played a key role in ensuring that positive shifts happen in the humanitarian field in relation to issues such as the inclusion of gender, for example, as part and parcel of all efforts. Indeed, the inclusion of gender⁵⁰ was consistently pointed to as a key change in Norway's approach to funding in recent years. Second, anti-corruption has also been systematically included in all funded agreements. Thirdly, the increasing focus on resilience as a key to humanitarian work is also an area that Norway has made headway in, although, according to some respondents, less markedly so. This perception is countered by some noted efforts, including Norway's support for the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), as well as involvement in the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015⁵¹ which is highlighted in White Paper Number 9.⁵² The multi-year framework agreement with the Norwegian Red Cross on Disaster Risk Reduction (Table 5 in Chapter 2) and efforts made with Pilot Countries, mainly Vietnam and Cuba (Section 5.4) should also be highlighted.

The issue of resilience is a key area because it extends the margins of what constitutes the humanitarian field into what is traditionally understood as development. Multiple respondents noted that being able to more seamlessly link humanitarian and development work is key to improving the way support to vulnerable populations is provided. A number of MFA respondents noted that the ease or difficulty that is encountered by Norway when transitioning a project or program from humanitarian to development aid varied. The two key factors that were highlighted as affecting the transition are the staff involved (i.e., relationship between key individuals, availability of staff) and the institutions involved (i.e., are institutions able/available to execute a transition). Multiple respondents from both MFA and partner organizations stressed that more work in this field is needed, however, they also highlighted that Norway is on the right track and that the rhetoric – *sermons* - consistently highlight the need to link humanitarian and long term development efforts.

4.4. Humanitarian Crises and Reconstruction

Those interviewed noted that Norway was both a timely and willing contributor in time of **crisis**. This is due, at least in part, to Norway's "emergency preparedness reserve." The reserve increased from 10% of the budget in 2008 to 15% in 2010. This reserve allows Norway to be flexible and respond rapidly to unexpected circumstances. In 2010 alone, over 57 Million USD were allocated to the floods in Pakistan, as well as almost 32 Million USD to the Earthquake in Haiti. These are just two examples of a number of emergency funding allocations made that year. In addition, almost half of Norway's total annual contribution to OCHA is un-earmarked funding provided through a multi-year framework agreement. This funding too allows OCHA to more rapidly respond to **crisis** coordination. Norway is, on a consistent basis, one of the top five donors to OCHA.

As pertains to **reconstruction**, Norway also funds extensively in the wake of **crisis** and long term thereafter. The efforts made to find long-term solutions for IDPs and the conduct of both demining and Un-Exploded Ordnance (UXO) removal are two examples of **reconstruction** efforts. Reconstruction efforts following both the Haiti Earthquake and the Pakistani floods have

⁴⁸ Other countries engaged in efforts to prevent the consequences of natural disasters include Bangladesh, China, and Uganda.

⁴⁹ A number of individual initiatives are not listed here, but rather are found in Chapter 5.

⁵⁰ Notably the meaning of "gender" to Norway was not clear to all partners.

⁵¹ World Conference on Disaster Reduction, 18-22 January 2005, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. [Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015](#).

⁵² The issue of resilience and local participation is highlighted in Report No. 9 (2007-2008) to the Storting "Norwegian Policy on the prevention of humanitarian crisis." p.19 as well as the 6 action points found in p.48.

also been funded.⁵³ The degree to which individual projects are effective (i.e., achieving intended *outcomes*) is less clear. However, given the utilization of CAPs which delineate clear projects with goals and objectives; and the emphasis on the use of large agencies which have established systems to design and implement projects there is an increased chance for success. Of course often crisis environments reduce the level of success because risks to outcomes are not clearly identified and responded to.⁵⁴

4.5. Concluding Remarks

Generally, in relation to most key goals of the Policy, clear progress has been made. However, there are some areas where improvement could be sought after. These can be generally underpinned by two commonalities: communication and institutional resources. The first one includes both how implementing partners need to better communicate the progress they make; and how Norway can improve some of its communication in terms of more widely divulging the Policy, hence, being more clear regarding what it means and requires in terms of key concepts presented by the Policy, and being more stringent in its reporting requirements. In turn more stringent reporting requirements must fit neatly into a better system for knowledge management that not only allows MFA staff to better administer information, but which also allows MFA staff to learn from different experiences. At the moment funding provided within multi-year framework agreements is subject to the most stringent reporting mechanism.

UN agencies are generally allowed to submit their standard annual reports, while smaller implementing partners are required to report, but generally are not subjected to clear guidelines that employ either RBM or Outcome Mapping. Some respondents from the MFA agreed that there are a number of areas that require more attention and improvement at the MFA, however, these respondents also stressed the difficulty of changing a system which cannot be allowed a period for reform. This dynamic was equated to 'trying to fix a vehicle while it is moving' by one respondent. Regarding institutional resources, Norway can improve its ability to ensure a more thorough implementation of the Policy if it is able to secure more staff and more competence. The latter particularly pertains to the follow up on some of the operational projects funded by the MFA.

⁵³ In 2011 Norway has thus far allocated over 1.4 Million USD to Haiti and over 2.5 Million USD to Pakistan, these funds are at least in part destined to reconstruction efforts following the crises of 2010.

⁵⁴ Adopted from *Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A practical Guide, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad, p.11.*

Chapter 5. Progress Made and More Attention Required: The Core Areas of the Policy

Here we focus on the third goal of this review, assessing **specific progress made** in the different **priority areas** and related **action points** noted in the Policy. Progress made in each of the seven priority areas identified in the Policy will be examined individually. We will focus specifically on the different issues pointed at in the action points.⁵⁵

5.1. A Global Humanitarian System⁵⁶

Norway's endeavours to work on **new humanitarian alliances** have shown some progress. However, according to respondents, progress is primarily limited to increasing visibility of new humanitarian alliances, with no clear substantive outcomes yet.

Norway's general approach to engaging non-Western actors is noted in Chapter 3. Specific steps taken include, for example, Norway's initiative to invite and finance the participation of 15 non-Western donors to a field visit to the OCHA operation in Haiti scheduled for November 2011. It is hoped this will enable non-Western donors to support OCHA financially and to participate more actively in the OCHA General Assembly by having first-hand knowledge of OCHA. While leading the ICRC Donor Support Group, Norway was actively engaged in arranging meetings that targeted and attempted to engage the BRIC countries. Efforts with China specifically have been difficult, but this is partially a result of China and Norway being starkly different in approach, and also of the strains placed on the relationship following the 2010 Peace Prize Award to Liu Xiaobo, a human rights activist who China considers a dissident. Measuring how much Norway's engagement with the EU has been "intensified" is difficult. Clearly an engagement exists.

As regards Norway's **continued support for the UN and continued humanitarian reform**, it should be highlighted that Norway is a key donor to a number of UN agencies and funds. Indeed amongst Norway's top funding recipients are UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF and WFP, as well as the CERF and the Common Humanitarian Fund. Norway is also a keen responder of the CAP. Norway is currently chairing the OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG), which also shows progress. It was noted that Norway is not particularly critical or demanding of UN agencies in terms of reporting or operations; this, in contrast to some of the demands made by Norway of multi-year framework agreement partners. Some noted that this is because UN agencies have better mechanisms in place to ensure effective operations, but numerous evaluations over the years challenge this to be the case. A key issue here is how much of the funding actually translates into direct assistance, particularly when comparing efforts by UN agencies with those of other organizations which have slimmer structures. Still, by accepting the UN annual reports as opposed to demanding additional reports tailored to Norway's needs, Norway is not adding an administrative burden on the UN, which is commendable as it shows flexibility. Norway could however, take a lead in advocating for an improved reporting system or even offer to support the UN in improving their reporting on tangible impact that different projects/programs have on the ground and their respective cost/benefits.

As pertains to the link between humanitarian and development efforts, some progress has been made but clearly this is a field that requires extensive attention and a more integrated approach at the Ministry level, as well as on how Norway engages with implementing partners. Still, respondents highlighted that Norway has shown progress in how it works with UN agencies, and has been keen to work on projects that move more seamlessly from humanitarian action to development. For example the Transitional Initiatives Solution Project by UNHCR which is funded by the humanitarian and development fund (50/50) - to work in Eastern Sudan. While this project is the only one of its kind, it is important to highlight it as a good step forward. Another good example of progress made is the three-year framework agreement with the

⁵⁵ See pages 33-43 of the Policy Document.

⁵⁶ All the sub-headings employed equate those noted in the Policy document.

Norwegian Red Cross which focuses on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). Efforts to see the work of other agencies as extending from humanitarian to development initiatives were also noted. UNICEF's approach to work is one example of an agency that works in both the humanitarian and development field. Norway has also focused attention on resilience as a preventative measure, and these efforts were seen as positive steps forward.

5.2. Respect for Humanitarian Principles

This core area recognizes that the *humanitarian system is becoming far more complex* and puts forth a number of issues identified as key in implementing the Policy. The first four action points point to Norway voicing a particular view during international engagement. Some respondents stressed that progress in reference to some of these action points is difficult to measure because there is no designated bench mark or achievement required. Noting issues such as the importance of a coherent approach that fosters cooperation and adequate division of roles between humanitarian, civil society and military organizations; as well as promoting the more stringent use of the UN guidelines for military contribution to the humanitarian operations follow up of and support efforts to protect aid workers and consider the consequences of the use of private security for humanitarian aid - is chiefly important. Norway shows a clear view on these issues by highlighting them at international meetings and events. While Norway can be credited with contributing to keep these issues on the agenda, no clear breakthrough has been made post Policy.

The issue of *untraditional humanitarian actors* is noted here also. Like with non-Western donors, Norway has tried to engage in a dialogue; but like with non-Western donors, the approach taken to this dialogue may be excluding rather than including (see Section 3.2).

As pertains to *strengthening international humanitarian law and supporting the Red Cross movement*⁵⁷, much has been achieved. Norway has essentially met all its goals as regards to its relationship and support of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement⁵⁸ including, for example, the chairing of the ICRC Donor Support Group. One aspect which has not strictly materialized has been the increase in direct funding to the ICRC. The bulk of the funding to the ICRC continues to be channelled through the Norwegian Red Cross, through a tripartite agreement signed in 2010.

As pertains to humanitarian law, Norway is a clear proponent and supporter of it. Clear examples include the "Protection of Civilians under IHL" Seminars, one of which was held in Indonesia and a second which is planned for Argentina. More on this specific issue will be discussed below in the section on humanitarian disarmament. Also important is the promotion of the humanitarian principles themselves which could benefit from more clear attention (see Section 4.2).

5.3. Needs Based Assistance

The points noted under needs based assistance cover a myriad of aspects, with a principal focus on gender and child related issues.

Gender, and the integration of gender issues into its work, is one of the areas where Norway has done remarkably well. All pertinent interview respondents highlighted that increased emphasis on reporting on gender has been a key change in the way Norway works. However, less clear was what Norway means by *gender*. Clearly the definition and its implementation varied so while Norway can be commended for enforcing this aspect, Norway's efforts to communicate what it means and hopes to gain from including gender aspects into the programs and projects

⁵⁷The White Paper States Red Cross movement, although it is assumed that the document refers to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. See p.35.

⁵⁸ Norway's support to the Red Cross movement has also led to specific funding to efforts to support persons with disabilities including the ICRC Special Fund for Disabled. In May 2011, Norway hosted a major conference on Emergencies and Persons with Disabilities.

they fund have been less successful. This is surprising since multiple efforts in this field have been made, GenCap⁵⁹ being one of them. Still, however, the progress should be commended.

Progress has also been made in including gender experts in international missions as regards to protection from violence, and from discrimination based on gender as well as from **Sexual Gender Based Violence (SGBV)**. Clearly, protection is a field that has benefited from substantial support from Norway, as has the issue of gender and SGBV. Substantial progress has been made on responding to the SGBV situation, particularly in countries such as Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as well as other cases. However, a couple of related aspects deserve special attention. One aspect that appears to be left outside of current engagement is the question of male victims of SGBV and also the issue of perpetrators as victims. Both of these issues are often ignored in the documentation and in terms of projects funded, but the few studies that have focused on these issues highlight that more attention is required. While the common wisdom is that male victims of SGBV are few, the reality is that little research on the issue has been done and investigative processes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for example, often show that men are reluctant to speak of SGBV and hence, disguise it under the general term of *torture*.⁶⁰ A second aspect that appears omitted is perpetrators as victims. This is a far less palatable subject for clear reasons; however, the experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and more recently Libya, suggests that perpetrators are not always willing participants. These two issues are noted here because Norway has clearly championed the subject and therefore, in a good position to show leadership and break new ground.

In line with the above, Norway has consistently followed up on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; and on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) on Sexual Violence against Civilians in Conflict. In terms of direct actions, Norway has supported a senior advisor on combating sexual violence in the DRC within MONUSCO and supported the implementation of the Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence in the DRC.

Norway has also funded **education**. The Policy includes an action point where education as a deterrent for prostitution and child soldier recruitment is outlined. While Norway's work on education is commendable, its ability to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers is difficult to gauge. The child soldier issue, and recruitment particularly, is complex and varies greatly from one context to another, where by education may be one of many contributing factors. Overall, Norway's work promoting the rights of children and the Paris principles, and as a key partner to UNICEF,⁶¹ should be commended. On the other hand children have not, in recent years, been identified as a key target of aid. Efforts to utilize the full capacity of key national actors (i.e., Save the Children Norway) have not been fully realized. Hence, there are opportunities for both further work with children and for solidifying the link between humanitarian and development projects, as often children issues require both immediate and long-term attention.

One last issue mentioned in this section is the support for **health** efforts, particularly targeting women and children. Here too Norway has funded numerous efforts that aim at improvements in this field. This is clearly visible in Figure 1 (Chapter 1) where the proportional distribution to health efforts is made apparent.

Overall, initiatives funded are in line with the varied action points and Norway's efforts have clearly brought some of the aforementioned issues to the attention of multiple actors (e.g., UN, NGOs and other donors). Yet, the degree of success of each initiative is harder to quantify. How can we know for sure, for example, the impact that an advisor on gender issues can have?

One aspect that is highlighted in the Policy but not in the action points, is attention to **needs based programming and do no harm** principles. Through the interviews and the survey

⁵⁹ IASC Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) Project. <http://www.nrc.no/?aid=9160724>

⁶⁰This was highlighted by an International Criminal Court (ICC) representative at a workshop of Wartime Rape held in Germany in 2010.

⁶¹ UNICEF is on the top 10 recipients of Norwegian funding.

responses it is clear that some implementing partners do not have adequate mechanisms to ensure that their work is needs based, and that it clearly follows a *do no harm* approach (See Chapter 3).

5.4. A More Coherent Assistance

Norway has become increasingly focused on funding efforts which are aimed to build resilience and preparedness. To this end, Norway was commended for its flexibility in funding and for its focus on resilience and preparedness generally. Norway's work in Cuba, a pilot country for the Policy, will be primarily focused on preparedness.⁶² Similarly, the work in Vietnam focuses largely on environmental issues and therein, on building resilience and on identifying new innovative approaches to respond to challenges. This was one of the issues that some operating partners highlighted as a key area of importance in current and future work. Norway has also actively supported the "Adaptation Framework for Agriculture" and these efforts should be commended.

The link between those working on humanitarian issues and those working on development issues at MFA/Norad is not fully established. As pertains to participation of affected parties in humanitarian activities, Norway has made some headway, for example, with viewing climate as a humanitarian issue. However, as is the case with other action points, these are not linked to clear bench-marks to enable the measurement of progress. Respondents generally noted the importance of including climate into the thinking of the humanitarian field, but the degree to which institutions have internalized this as part and parcel of their work appears to be in its infancy.

As is clear from the funding areas (Figure 1 in Chapter 1), Norway has consistently funded both health and education. As pertains to the Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) and its international minimum standards for education in crisis situations and early recovery, Norway is actively working in this area; for example, by supporting discussion on the INEE at a meeting co-hosted by the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and UNESCO in Hanoi in the coming months. Additionally, institutions funded by Norway and working within education, such as NRC, are compliant with INEE standards. Norway is as solid supporter of the sector often contributing substantial un-earmarked funding.⁶³

5.5. Norway as a Good Donor

Norway is generally regarded as a flexible and predictable donor, as it has allocated considerable funds as part of multi-year framework agreements for non-earmarked funds. With OCHA for example, it has entered into a multi-year framework agreement; and contributes substantially to various appeals. Indeed, Norway is a key donor for multiple institutions; therefore, predictability is very important (see Chapter 3).

Regarding the ***further development of the Norwegian model*** and the relevant action points, Norway has made decisive progress in moving from projects to programs, particularly in the context of multi-year framework agreements (see Chapter 3).

Efforts to ensure the smooth working of Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) continue and research is promoted, a key partner thus far has been Tufts University. Norway's initiative to establish a new research program on ***humanitarian policy*** jointly with the Norwegian Research Council is a remarkable step forward that should be commended. The program will cover six thematic areas which are in line with the Policy, and which should bring to the fore new knowledge in key areas of work. This effort should also succeed in opening new discussions and exchanges between research ventures and research institutions not only in Norway, but also in other countries. During the review it was noted that given the magnitude of

⁶²Work in Cuba has been slow and getting started, but the planning thus far suggests that the focus will be preparedness.

⁶³ Un-earmarked funding enables institutions to be more coherent in their programming because they are more freely able to employ the funds to fill gaps.

the call for proposals by the Research Council, the venture would have benefited from more staff support to Pilot countries; for example, to engage local research entities more actively.⁶⁴

The need for **more efficient administration and learning** is also highlighted. To this end, MFA staff noted that progress has been made. With the exception of the last two action points, all action points point to the need for progress. In terms of a RBM, these action points focus solely on *Input and in some cases Activities*. Still, based on the interviews conducted and the documents reviewed, it is clear that the administration and follow up of grants has improved. The extent to which foreign missions are involved has reportedly also increased, even though the degree of involvement still seems to vary from one mission to another. Still, few institutional efforts to change how projects are administered were noted. Rather the focus has been on better archival mechanisms. Despite progress made, input from missions abroad is not sought after systematically (see Section 3.1). It was noted that field visits are extremely useful, but that the availability of funds and time often limits the number of visits that can be made by MFA staff. While it is clearly important that MFA staff are familiar with projects and carry out field missions, it is also important to note that some of the MFA staff have no experience with field operations and hence, visits can prove less useful as staff are ill equipped to evaluate what they see.

Regarding documentation of efforts and utilization of findings, the number of evaluations conducted is commendable. However, the degree to which they are used and followed up varies. This factor can also be a result of lack of manpower at MFA (see Section 3.1). The degree of impact of single evaluations depends both on how well they are distributed and how much time people have to study them. Still, this is an area where Norway does well as many of the evaluations published are of a high standard.

As pertains to zero tolerance for fraud and corruption, Norway has been extremely consistent. This is one aspect which was highlighted in grant letters as a matter of course and is clearly an objective where, while hard to know if it occurs regardless, Norway is taking all possible steps to contravene. As pertains to the requirement for ethical guidelines, the survey found that not all organizations funded by Norway have these guidelines. Lastly, multiple respondents noted that Norway fulfilled the requirements of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles. Many of these principles are noted in the Policy document as well.

5.6. Humanitarian Disarmament

Norway should be commended for the role it has played in **Humanitarian Disarmament**, particularly in relation to landmines and cluster munitions. Norway held the presidency of Convention to Ban Landmines in 2009 until November 2010. In this role, Norway was a protagonist on the discussions on the issue. Norway has supported countries to enable them to meet their convention obligations and has entered into bilateral agreements with affected countries, which were found to be exceptional ways to promote work on the subject. Supports for monitoring and advocacy efforts to ensure the success of the Convention also continue.

Norway has also worked extensively and successfully in making the Cluster Munitions Convention a reality, and in making the document come into force swiftly. Norway played a key role in the first meeting of state parties for the Cluster Munitions Convention (2010), and has since continued to play a leading role on Cluster Munitions issues.

In short, much has been done in terms of landmines and cluster munitions; indeed, the action points have been met. In relation to Armed Violence and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Norway signed the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development in 2006 and followed this by spearheading the Oslo Commitments on Armed Violence in 2010. Norway has supported the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) since its birth in 1997, and in 2009 established a project on humanitarian disarmament which included both SALW and ATT work. Norway has not yet played a central role in the international discussion on small

⁶⁴See http://www.forskningsradet.no/en/Newsarticle/Research_on_humanitarian_policy/1253966241029

arms and armed violence and hence, unlike the landmines and cluster munitions fields, does not hold a strong position of authority in the field. Some respondents argue that Norway has not invested in small arms because the issue is far more complex than landmine and cluster munitions and this means that there are few diplomatic opportunities to gain recognition for achievements made. Other respondents posed that it would be unfair to measure success in the SALW and Armed Violence field as relative to efforts made in the Landmine and Cluster Munitions fields because in the latter, Norway has invested disproportionately in relation to other Donors. Moreover, it cannot be expected that Norway commit the level of effort it has on cluster munitions and landmines to other fields because the resources available do not permit it. Be the reason what it may, Norway is in a good position to make considerable headway in the small arms arena if it so chooses, but this would require a clear policy on how it will handle the issue (e.g., a humanitarian, a development, or a legal question) and a far more intensive follow up than what it has provided to date.

5.7. The Protection of Civilians, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

As pertains to *Protection of Civilians, Refugees and IDPs*, Norway is involved in innovative approaches to integrate refugees and internally displaced people. Some of these efforts are specifically targeted to finding lasting solutions for refugees (see Section 5.1). Additionally, Norway remains engaged in active diplomacy in order to promote protection. Indeed, protection is one of the area's that is better funded from the Norwegian budget (Figure 1). Norway is also involved with UNHCR to support the reinforcement of institutional capacity including funding new protection posts.

Additionally, Norway requests that implementing partners play close attention to conflict sensitivity. The degree to which different actors are able to ensure that their programs and projects are conflict sensitive varies as the necessary data is often not available. In Sudan, where adequate data to measure conflict sensitivity is available, this is not systematically used by UN agencies.⁶⁵ This suggests that the actual implementation of conflict sensitive measures varies.

Lastly, in relation the reform of UN peace keeping Operations Norway has actively employed its diplomatic arm at the Security Council and in relevant debates at the Human Rights Council to support forward looking reform. In these venues Norway has focused on stressing the importance of protecting and improving mechanisms that adequately protect civilians.

5.8. Concluding Remarks

In general, Norway has done very well in implementing the core areas of the Policy. However, it's important to note that the extensive number of action points - some of which can be interpreted as repetitive - and the lack of benchmarks or measurable outputs and outcome makes any assessment of progress a challenge. Indeed, in most cases it is difficult to map outcomes (see Section 2.5). Overall, we can conclude that Norway has made efforts to respond to the action points, but we are unable to say the degree to which each action point has been an effective way of achieving a particular objective. Despite this shortcoming, it is relevant to note that the action points do effectively cover the majority of key areas of the Policy, and this is a positive aspect. They also do serve to give a more clear direction of what Norway expects from its work in the humanitarian field, an aspect which is also positive. Similarly, even though the RMB system has been endorsed by Norway, it is not a required component of reporting - neither is Outcome Mapping nor an alternative system.⁶⁶ Our examination of funding allocations and grant letters enables us to know that the input and the activities funded are in line with the White Paper, and from reporting we are able to know that the output produced was as expected. But we are unable to know if the outcome was indeed the one wished for. The need for these tools is less evident to MFA in cases where a close cooperation exists between the MFA and the

⁶⁵ The Conflict Risk Mapping and Analysis Project, a UNDP Project, compiles and analyses situational data for Sudan.

⁶⁶ The Rapid Desk Study carried out by Scanteam found that while reporting was very good in relation to funding spent and in relation to the MFA, it was less good in relation to beneficiaries. This also suggest the need for a more stringent reporting requirement. See: Moberg, Liv. David Geirdner and Florence Mandelik. Rapid Study on Evaluations, Reviews and Studies of Humanitarian Assistance with Norwegian Funding 2007-2010. Oslo: Scanteam, 2010

funding recipient; however, such close relationships and dialogue do not, if not documented, answer the above noted questions for third parties. Furthermore, a “who does what” framework could be a useful tool to maximize the available skills and capacities at MFA.

Chapter 6. Conclusion and Recommendations

In this chapter we outline the main conclusions, lessons learned, as well the recommendations. Additionally, a SWOT analysis found in Annex 2 provides a pictorial view of the Policy document and of the areas where improvement could be sought after.

6.1. General Remarks

This policy, unlike others, has benefited greatly from two key factors. First, and most importantly, that Norway has for a number of years forged a name for itself as a key humanitarian actor in the international arena. Second, that the government that drafted and accepted the White Paper has remained the same; and therefore, is keen to implement one of its 'own' policies. While the importance of the second factor is debatable, with some arguing that Norway regardless of the government which is in power would remain a key actor in humanitarian work; others note that even if Norway keeps to humanitarian work, the importance of the White Paper may be demoted by a new government and this in turn may affect coherence and progress made in the field generally. It is impossible to know the degree to which the Policy has benefited from a consistent government, however, it is undeniable that it has benefited to some extent.

Generally speaking, Norway should be commended both its stance regarding humanitarian issues and for the achievements made recent years in the field of humanitarian work. Chief amongst these achievements has been the promotion of gender as a issue of concern, its firm stance on anti-corruption, its work in both the field of humanitarian disarmament particularly as pertains to Landmines and Cluster Munitions and in the field of protection.

However, Norway has also faced challenges. Limited staff numbers is a constant challenge in trying to implement a Policy that is so all encompassing. Moreover, the inclusion of action points which cannot, by their very nature, be clearly measured is also a hindrance to evaluating progress.

It must also be highlighted that while the Policy has not been diffused as widely as it could have. Within the Ministry, it was hailed as a source of guidance and inspiration and as a document which was actively used on a day to day basis when it came out and currently, at least when preparing the annual report on activities to Parliament. However, not all possible users have employed it as an active document.

6.2. Lessons Learned

Here the key lessons learned are highlighted:

- *Through dialogue partners have become more professionalised:* Multiple respondents noted that the increased dialogue requirements of multi-year framework agreements assisted in professionalizing their work. The dialogue, they noted, forced them to more

**Key recommendations from the Auditor Generals report:
The follow-up**

Here progress made, as well as areas requiring further attention in relation to some of the key recommendations made by the Auditor General's report - are presented.

- Slow administrative and financial processing of funding requests. To this end, Norway has made clear headway by being able to more rapidly respond to requests and disburse funds.
- As pertains to coordination between short and long term efforts, a number of examples point to efforts in the right direction, but there is still substantial room for improvement.
- In terms of project follow up, headway has been made in relation to Framework agreements. However, as relevant to the large majority of funded agencies, which receive a small proportion of funding, the staff limitations appear to have been a key hindrance to more direct follow up. Tied to this, follow up could also benefit greatly from a more stringent requirement made of implementing partners so that outcomes and impact can be more verifiably measured.
- In terms of predictability of funding, this remains a challenge for many funding recipients, however a move towards more stable funding is being piloted through the use of framework

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actively examine their work through the Policy's lens. Ways to support the professionalization of smaller grant recipients should be sought after. Dialogue could be a good option, but this would require even more staff time which is already in short supply.

- *Multi-Year Framework agreements*: These efforts are commended as a good way to ensure dialogue, close follow up, and financial security of recipients. However, evaluations of these processes should be closely examined before expanding the approach.
- *Inclusion of non-Western Donors*: New approaches to engage non-Western donors should be explored. Norway, it was noted, as a non-EU member could serve as a key conduit to link non-Western donors to the EU forum.
- *Dialogue adds to ability to implement the policy*: While many respondents knew the Policy, the degree of their knowledge varied greatly. Respondents who were most aware and able to ensure that their activities were in line with the Policy were those who benefited from direct and continual dialogue with MFA/Norway.
- *Efforts where both political and financial engagement are actively used show far more progress than efforts that do not count with a multi pronged approach*. Examples include Humanitarian Disarmament, Gender, etc.
- *Inclusion of key issues, such as gender and corruption, into grant letters has been a key mechanism used to ensure that partners are aware of Norwegian priorities and ways of working*. Therefore, this approach could be used to ensure that partners are more aware of - and implement - other overarching issues such as humanitarian principles and *do no harm* concepts.

6.3. Recommendations

This section focuses on recommendations to further strengthen the implementation of the Policy, ensure the Policy is used as much as possible, and secure the longevity of the Policy on Humanitarian Activities.

6.2.1. Improving Implementation

- The Action Points should be consolidated to reduce repetition and should include clear benchmarks so that progress can be more clearly measured.
- A “who does what” framework should be introduced to be able to adequately follow up the implementation of the Policy.
- A mechanism to ensure that adequate competence is available to follow up on programs and projects should be found. Including, for example, specific training to staff in charge of project follow up, striving to ensure continuity of staff, and including humanitarian section staff in project evaluation presentations even when they are not directly involved in the individual project review.
- A mechanism to ensure that the knowledge and capacity at foreign missions is used and are made available to MFA headquarters - should be put in place.
- A mechanism to ensure a smooth transition between humanitarian and development issues should be put in place.
- A mechanism to ensure that key Policy aspects are included in contracts and grant letters should be introduced to ensure that issues such as gender, *do no harm*, humanitarian principles, etc. are always underscored in grant agreements.
- Reporting requirements should be more stringent regarding core issues. Funding recipients should be required to show proof of guidelines regarding their work in relation to humanitarian principles, *do no harm*, discrimination, as they do in relation to fraud (i.e., financial audit).
- Norway should continue to promote extensive communication with implementing partners to enable better planning on behalf of partners, and a better understanding of Norwegian key tenets.

- A more active and substantive engagement by MFA in the utilization of RBM and Outputs Mapping to ensure the effectiveness of funded efforts would be a positive step forward. In general, our data suggests that these tools are not yet fully developed nor exploited.

6.2.2. Expand the Use of the Policy

- MFA should distribute the document more actively and more widely. This would allow a wider audience to be familiar with the Policy and perhaps use it, and its contents, more actively. It would also allow other actors (e.g., governments and international organizations) to be better versed in the way Norway works.
- Norway should make partners clearly aware of other resource material that will be able to better inform them of Norwegian views or expected standards (i.e., what does Norway mean by gender, *do no harm*, etc.).

6.2.3. The Longevity of the Policy

- The MFA should consider updating the Policy document in order to ensure that it continues to be seen as an active document.
- MFA should consider re-drafting the document so that Programmatic and Diplomatic action points (Table 4) are separated to enable different actors to better understand their role in relation to the implementation of the Policy.
- The inclusion of issues such as building resilience amongst populations, including solid capacity building efforts and a stronger focus on evidence based decision making (i.e., clear and solid data gathering), should be explored.
- This review could be used as a way to re-enliven the discussion on the Policy and by so doing to reignite the active use of the Policy document.

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Annex 1: Terms of Reference (T.o.R.)



CONSULTANCY SERVICES FOR A MID-TERM REVIEW OF “NORWEGIAN HUMANITARIAN POLICY”

DATE: 23 MAY 2011

ABOUT THE REVIEW

The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), a directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), hereby invites a selection of qualified suppliers to take part in a competition for a contract to provide consultancy services in connection with a mid-term review of Norwegian Humanitarian Policy (Report no. 40 (White Paper) to the Storting (2008 -2009)).

Background:

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has requested the Norwegian Directorate for Development Cooperation (Norad) to organise a mid-term review of the Report no. 40 (White Paper) to the Storting (2008 -2009).

The White Paper provides a vision for Norway’s role in the humanitarian field. It focuses on humanitarian challenges, robust administration of humanitarian aid, Norwegian humanitarian goals and a plan of action for obtaining these goals. It is based on the strategy for humanitarian policy, “Norwegian Humanitarian Policy” that was presented by the Government in September 2008. The strategy gives a view of Norway’s part in the humanitarian field and presents main priorities for the 5-year period until 2013.

The Government’s **goal** is for Norway to be one of the leading political and financial partners in international humanitarian efforts and to help ensure that the international community is as well equipped as possible to meet future challenges.

The Humanitarian Policy states that Norway in cooperation with others shall:

- ensure that people in need are given the necessary protection and assistance
- fund humanitarian efforts on the basis of the international principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence
- equip the international community to meet future global humanitarian challenges

- prevent and respond to humanitarian crises and initiate reconstruction in their wake.

To achieve these goals Norway will give **priority** to the following areas:

- a global humanitarian system
- respect for humanitarian principles
- humanitarian disarmament
- needs-based assistance
- the protection of civilians, refugees and internally displaced persons
- a more coherent assistance
- Norway as a good donor

A number of specific action points are furthermore identified within each of these priority areas.

Purpose and scope of the mid-term review:

The purpose of the mid-term review is to assess the implementation of the White Paper. This shall be done by assessing the degree to which the Government is moving towards fulfilling the goals and priorities identified in the White Paper.

The review shall specifically assess:

- a) the coherence of Norway's actions as a political and financial partner with the Humanitarian Policy as stated in the White Paper during the period 2009 up to now
- b) progress and the degree of effectiveness in reaching the goal of the policy
- c) progress in the specific priority areas and related action points (listed in Chapter 5 of the White Paper).

Based on the findings and conclusions the review should identify lessons learned and give operational recommendations that are relevant for the continued follow-up of the White Paper. This includes providing recommendations on revision of action points.

Implementation:

The mid-term review shall mainly be carried out as a desk-study combined with interviews of relevant humanitarian actors in Norway and with international actors. The review team is expected to work closely with the Section for Humanitarian Affairs in MFA.

Time frame: The work should be carried out in the period June – October 2011, within the frame of 48 working days at the most.

Travel costs in connection with interviews of international humanitarian actors are not envisaged. Possible costs in connection with presentation of the draft report and/or final report in Oslo shall be covered within the budget for this assignment.

An inception report shall be submitted to Norad and MFA within two weeks of commencement of the assignment.

A draft report shall be sent to Norad within 19 September 2011. MFA and Norad will be given ten working days to provide comments. Within ten working days of receiving comments from MFA and Norad the Final report shall be submitted.

The report should be written in English, include an executive summary with conclusions and recommendations and should not exceed 30 pages.

Requirement of the consultant:

The team of (at least two) consultants are expected to possess the following qualifications:

- experience from similar assignments. The proposed team leader must have team leader experience.
- knowledge of humanitarian principles, policies and practices, humanitarian assistance
- knowledge of the Norwegian humanitarian system
- good writing and oral skills in Norwegian and English (at least one team member should be fluent in Norwegian)

Knowledge of gender policies and programming will be considered favourably.

Reference documents:

One basis for the review will be a report commissioned by Norad mapping and summarizing a selection of existing evaluations, reviews and relevant studies of humanitarian work financed by Norway ("Rapid desk study on Evaluations, Reviews and Studies of Humanitarian Assistance with Norwegian funding 2007 – 2010." - attached)

For Norad,
Oslo 23 May 2011

Bjørg Skotnes
Director
Peace, Gender and Democracy Department

Randi Lotsberg
Senior Adviser

Annex 2: SWOT

The figure below provides a pictorial view of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of Norwegian Humanitarian Policy.

<p style="text-align: center;">Strengths</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Policy served to energize the Humanitarian section in the MFA and validate their efforts. • The Policy is widely used within the Humanitarian section and by relevant staff at missions abroad. • The Policy is well known by key partners (especially by Multi-Year Framework Agreement partners). • The Policy write up included input from some key partners like the ICRC, NRC, NCA, Norwegian Red Cross and Norwegian Save the Children. • MFA is (generally) regarded by partners as a good donor (flexible, close follow up, low reporting requirements, influential and generous). • The Policy identifies relevant priority areas. • Most priority area action points appear to have been met or efforts to meet them have been made (see also lack of performance based management). • Norway has gained international recognition for its work in the field of humanitarian disarmament, particularly in relation to Landmines and Cluster Munitions. • Norway has become a chief promoter of Gender issues and is well recognized for its work on this subject. 	<p style="text-align: center;">Weaknesses</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fewer areas of support. • Requires substantial follow up and the staff available is insufficient. • The inherent high staff turnover leads to lack of continuity in follow up of funded projects/programs and initiatives. • The core areas mix both diplomatic and programmatic efforts making presentation and possibly implementation more cumbersome. • UN reporting does not clearly outline cost break down (i.e., over head, administration, transfer of funds costs). Unclear how much of Norway's funds are getting to actual beneficiaries. • Lack of clear mechanism to ensure clear communication between different MFA sections regarding follow up of the action points in the WP. • Many of the goals of the Policy cannot be measured employing a performance based management tool.
<p style="text-align: center;">Opportunities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Utilize the Policy to promote Norwegian Policy views in the international arena. • Make specific mention of the Policy in <i>sermons</i> so that the Policy document becomes better known. • Norwegian MFA staff can through the dialogue related to Multi-Year Framework Agreements, become better versed on operational issues. • Demand for better reporting and more accurate explanations related to issues such as implementation of humanitarian principles, inclusion of <i>do no harm</i> concept, etc. (i.e., administrative, support, actual beneficiary support). • Build mechanism to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian to development efforts. • Efforts to include non-Western actors can have a more inclusive (i.e., open discussion) approach. • Advocate for better reporting from the UN agencies in terms of direct benefit to end-users. 	<p style="text-align: center;">Threats</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too much reliance on the UN system despite low levels of detail in reporting. This is tied to the inability to know how much funding actually reaches beneficiary groups. • Lack of staff to meet the demands of the Policy. • Lack of competence to adequately follow up operational projects. • Approach to include non-Western donors is too prescriptive and not sufficiently inclusive. • Relationship between MFA and key NGOs in Norway may be too close and thus threaten the integrity of the Policy or the view of the perception of integrity.

Annex 3: List of Key Partners

- Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
- Norwegian Red Cross
- Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
- Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA)
- Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
- The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC)
- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
- The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)
- The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC)
- The Feinstein Institute, Tufts University
- Norwegian Research Council

Annex 4: List of Interviewees

Name	Position	Organisation
*Per Nergaard	Director of International Mine Action Department	NPA
*Steffen Kongstad	Ambassador	Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva
*Thomas Nash	Director (Formerly responsible for CMC)	Article 36
Arman Aardal	Senior Advisor - Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Anne Heidi Kvalsøren	First Secretary	<i>Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations. Formerly in Cuba</i>
Atle Leikvoll	Deputy Secretary General (outgoing)	MFA
Dona Tarpey	Acting Head of Donor Relations and Resource Mobilisation Service	UNHCR
Eivind Aalborg	Head of International department	Norwegian Church Aid
Gunnar Andersen	Head of International department	Save the Children
Haakon Gram-Johannessen	Councillor	Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva
Halvor Sætre	Deputy Director General – Section for Human Rights and Democracy	MFA
Helena Fraser	Chief, Donor Relations Section	OCHA
Hilde Klemetsdal	Head of project for Women, Peace and Security Section for Global Initiatives and Gender Equality	MFA
Hilde Salvesen	Senior Advisor- Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Ingunn Vatne	Senior Advisor- Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Isabella Barras	Head of Unit, External Resources Division	ICRC
Johan Meyer	Senior Advisor	MFA
Kerry Brinkert	Director, ISU	ISU
Laura Cheeseman	Director	Cluster Munition Coalition
Mads Oysen	Humanitarian Affairs Specialist	UNICEF
Magnhild Vasseth	Deputy Head of international department	Norwegian Refugee Council
Mathias Schmale	Under Secretary General, Programme Service	IFRC
Nicholas Marsh	Senior Researcher, NISAT Project	PRIO
Otavio Trindade	First Secretary	Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva

Øystein Lyngroth	Head of Project - Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Ragnhild Dybdahl	Ragnhild Dybdahl, Ph.D.	Royal Norwegian Embassy Hanoi
Robert Smith	Position missing	OCHA
Shoko Arakaki	Chief, Funding Coordination Section	OCHA
Sigvald Hauge	Senior Advisor - Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Sine (Eline) Holen	Associate Donor Relations Officer	UNHCR
Steve Omalley	Chief, CERF	OCHA
Susan Eckey	Former Director - Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA
Sylvie Brigot	Executive Director	ICBL-CMC
Thoralf Stenvold	Minister Councillor	<i>Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations</i>
Leni Stenseth	Head of International department	Norwegian Red Cross
Vebjørn Heines	Deputy Director - Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA

* Denotes interview by email

Annex 5: List of Questionnaire Recipients

The following organizations were sent the questionnaire. When possible the questionnaire was sent to specific individuals. When not it was sent to the main address with a forwarding request.

ADPC
Afghan Aid
Care-Norway
Caritas-Norway
Concern
DDG
FAO
Geneva Call
HALO
Handicap International
IANSA
IBRD
ICBL-CMC
ICRC
IOM
ISU of the MBC
Action on Armed Violence
Landmine Monitor
Landmine Survivor Initiative-Bosnia
MAG-Lebanon
MSF
Noreps
Norges Geotekniske Institutt
NORWAC
Norwegian Church Aid
Norwegian Red Cross
NRC
NUPI
PRIO
Redd Barna
Right to Play
Saferworld
SIPRI
Small Arms Survey
TMC
YME Foundation

Annex 6: Annotated Bibliography of Key Resources

This annotated bibliography presents some key documents⁶⁷ which could be of direct use to MFA staff depending on their area of work or focus when moving forward with the recommendations of the review or documents which complement the findings of the review.

Faure, Sheila Dohoo, Max Glaser and Alice Green. Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review. 19 September 2007.

Although somewhat dated this document delineates in detail the inner workings of the CERF and its shortcomings. This document is a good starting block for any effort that is undertaken to attempt to revise the mechanisms which are currently employed by the CERF. It should be noted that a new evaluation is expected to be published shortly (2011).

Grunewald, Francois And Veronique De Geoffrey. Principle 7 Of The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative: "Request Implementing Humanitarian Organisations To Ensure To The Greatest Possible Extent, Adequate Involvement Of Beneficiaries In The Design, Implementation, Monitoring And Evaluation Of Humanitarian Response". Urgente Rehabilitation Development. July 2008.

One of the areas where the review felt more attention is required is in the implementation of the "do no harm" principle. In order to adequately implement this principle, however, more attention needs to be paid to participation. While including more stringent requirements for implementing partners is one step, it is also important to be aware of what more stringent participation from the affected population means. For these purposes this document is very useful in that it outlines the kind of efforts that are required, at different levels-donors included, in order to ensure effective participation by the beneficiary group.

Harvey, Paul, Abby Stoddard, Adele Harmer and Glyn Taylor. The State of the Humanitarian System: Assessing Performance and Progress: A pilot Study. London: ALNAP, 2010.

This document presents a relatively comprehensive look at the progress that has been made in the field of humanitarian intervention and at the areas that are currently still weak. While the document does not focus on Norway or specifically on organizations/projects funded by Norway, it does provide a clear view of the current weak links such as corruption, and therein the need for solid focus on the issue. The document also point to areas that should require more attention, for example the evaluation of effectiveness. Therefore the document could serve to assist decision making in Norway in so far as pertains to making small shifts in focus or further underlining the need for certain measures.

⁶⁷ These documents were chosen as they have direct relevance to the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the mid-term review. It was agreed that this annex would introduce between 5 and 10 publications only.

Norad

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

Postal address:

P.O. Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 OSLO

Office address:

Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Tel: +47 22 24 20 30

Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

postmottak@norad.no

www.norad.no

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