



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

Links between relief,
rehabilitation and development
in the tsunami response

Sri Lanka case study

Evaluation of the linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) regarding interventions in connection with the tsunami disaster in December 2004

Sri Lanka Case Study



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This document has been prepared by Channel Research on behalf of Sida as part of the overall TEC Evaluation on LRRD.

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Table of Contents

<u>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</u>	I
<u>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</u>	IX
<u>MAP OF THE REGION</u>	XI
<u>1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION</u>	1
1.1 <u>MANDATE</u>	1
1.2 <u>SPECIFIC ISSUES COVERED BY THE EVALUATION</u>	2
1.3 <u>METHODOLOGY</u>	3
<u>Qualitative Study</u>	3
<u>Quantitative Study</u>	3
1.4 <u>EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION</u>	4
<u>Constraints of the LRRD Qualitative Study in Sri Lanka</u>	5
<u>2 BACKGROUND</u>	6
<u>3 POST TSUNAMI CHRONOLOGY</u>	9
3.1 <u>THE RELIEF PHASE</u>	9
3.2 <u>THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE</u>	10
3.3 <u>LIMITED IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT</u>	12
<u>4 FINDINGS</u>	14
4.1 <u>BASIC NEEDS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS</u>	14
4.2 <u>SHELTER</u>	17
<u>The buffer zone</u>	21
4.3 <u>HUMAN RIGHTS</u>	22
<u>Non-discrimination and targeting</u>	22
<u>Issues related to discrimination based on gender, age, disability</u>	25
<u>Consultation and accountability of implementing agencies</u>	26
<u>Second generation rights</u>	27
4.4 <u>PRESS AND PUBLIC SCRUTINY OF INGOs</u>	28
4.5 <u>LIVELIHOODS AND POVERTY REDUCTION</u>	28
4.6 <u>PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES</u>	34
4.7 <u>PERCEPTIONS OF RISK</u>	35
4.8 <u>CONFLICT RELATED ISSUES</u>	36
4.9 <u>RETURN TO DEVELOPMENT?</u>	37
<u>5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</u>	39
<u>REFERENCES</u>	46
<u>ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE</u>	47
<u>ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS MET</u>	54
<u>ANNEX 3: EVALUATION PROCESS PHASES</u>	57
<u>ANNEX 4: QUALITATIVE RESULTS BY DISTRICT</u>	59
<u>ANNEX 5: SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND QUESTIONNAIRE</u>	84

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

When disaster strikes usually only the least-affected people, their families, neighbours, and local institutions are available to provide immediate relief. This was true when the tsunami swept into coastal Sri Lanka in December 2004. The initiatives and efforts of the survivors themselves, their friends and relatives, and local organisations and communities provided the bulk of the assistance reaching those in need during the first few days. Thanks to the compassion and assistance of those closest to the disaster, the basic needs of the most affected people were largely met. Their role has continued to be of crucial importance during the post-emergency recovery phase, and will remain so during the current transition to rehabilitation, and eventually, development.

Within a very short period, and on an unprecedented scale, the international community mobilised resources to assist those affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. Hundreds of organisations and agencies, supported by millions of individuals, provided financial, material and human resources in a massive effort to address the crisis.

The Sri Lanka Case Study, as one component of the Evaluation of Linking Relief to Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in tsunami interventions, attempts to identify some of the successes and challenges faced by those in need, and to ascertain to what degree the initiatives for relief, rehabilitation and development taken by the population were enhanced or hindered by actions taken by outsiders.

Basic needs and social networks

With very few exceptions, the most basic needs were met within a few days of the tsunami. While the immediate relief effort was effective, however, it was not necessarily efficient. There were multiple instances of inadequate coordination and duplication of efforts.

Social networks¹, primarily based on extended family and business relationships, provided a framework for satisfying basic needs, especially in the phase immediately following the event. These networks have remained important during the recovery process, with the role of the host families worthy of particular mention. Social networks have been put under great pressure by the disaster. Some have collapsed, unable to withstand the loss of members through death or displacement. Others have been modified and even strengthened, and others created, reflecting the resilience of most tsunami survivors and their communities to adapt and adjust to radical changes in all aspects of their lives.

Formal structures, particularly State Welfare Agencies and the Health and Education Ministries, clearly played a role in assisting those affected by the tsunami, in sectors such as health care, food security, drinking water, shelter and education.

The Sri Lanka Case Study identified access to information by the affected people as an ongoing issue of concern. During the relief phase, people needed information immediately on the status and well-being of family and friends. Later, the lack of information and sometimes misinformation on planned or actual services, policies and decisions led to frustration and difficulties in making decisions. This was particularly true of information related to shelter, hindering people from making informed choices regarding e.g. livelihoods and education. In some cases, false disaster alarms caused people additional psychological and emotional trauma due to unnecessary reliving of the events and fear of the unknown.

Shelter

During the transitional phase, shelter became a central issue, from which a number of related concerns emerged. The challenges of coordination were further aggravated as differences in design,

¹ A **social network** is a social structure between actors, mostly individuals or organizations. It indicates the ways in which they are connected through various social familiarities ranging from casual acquaintance to close familial bonds. The term was first coined in 1954 by J. A. Barnes (in: *Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish*, "Human Relations"). Definition from

scheduling and quality of housing increased intra-community tensions. In some cases, housing design choices and location exacerbated the potentially negative impact on livelihood activities. For example, women who needed to earn incomes from home-based industries were thwarted by the small size of temporary dwellings, while families whose livelihoods depended on fishing were located too far from the coast to safely leave their boats unattended.

Progress in providing permanent shelter was particularly slow, with multiple implications for many beneficiaries. Without permanent housing, most people who had lost their homes were simply unable to get on with their lives. By November monsoon rains had once again displaced many Tsunami IDPs living in flimsy transitional shelters. Repeated displacement has multiple negative implications for people's lives and livelihoods, not the least of which is hampering their ability to move on and recover from trauma.

While approximately 55,000 transitional shelter units were built in the first year after the disaster, progress on permanent shelter has been slow. On November 30, 2005, the GoSL coordinating body TAFREN estimated that 2,414 houses out of an estimated need of 55,000 permanent housing units had been built by donor agencies that had signed MOUs with the GoSL to reconstruct houses.

The evaluation team encountered several sites where private sector or small-NGO initiatives had completed new houses. There is a lively debate on-going whether delays in construction by the larger agencies are sufficiently motivated by the improved infrastructure and design these delays are intended to make possible.

The buffer zone concept introduced by the Sri Lankan government was widely supported by tsunami survivors, despite the confusion it created, and the constraints it presented, logistically and financially, for many individuals. At the time of evaluation, the modalities of the buffer zone remained unclear to both tsunami affected populations and decision-makers.

The post Tsunami reconstruction policy with regard to housing for the poor who lost their homes may result in some getting a better house, since most agencies that are rebuilding permanent homes are doing so according to TAFREN standards. However, landless and squatter communities are excluded from the policy of replacing a “house for a house.” In the long run the policy of merely replacing assets (houses or boats), of those who had them with out consideration of landless tsunami survivors may result in a policy that exacerbates economic inequality, with implications for social conflict.

Human rights

While the intensity and quality of support varied between geographic regions, most people felt that systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, politics or religion had not occurred locally. In some cases, people reported that tensions had actually declined during the relief phase.

The evaluation received numerous complaints of inappropriate targeting, including reliance on social status, bribery, and lobbying capacity, amongst others, to determine beneficiaries of goods and services primarily during the post-relief period. Nearly half of respondents to the LRRD quantitative survey felt that the relief and rehabilitation activities had caused conflict. A third of the respondents felt that the activities had also caused increased conflict at district and national levels.

The evaluation team found little, if any evidence that systematic planning to address the needs of special needs groups, such as older adults, and people with disabilities, etc. had taken place. Instead, those interviewed overwhelmingly reported that such needs had been overlooked by most aid agencies.

Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction

Markets recovered soon after the disaster, and at the time of the evaluation, were functioning well in most places. In other words, prices had adapted to changes in supply and demand, and markets had

expanded and contracted according to need. Two examples include a shift away from cash purchasing and the expansion of the construction industry.

Overall, external support for re-establishing livelihoods was poorly designed and in some cases, inappropriately targeted. Most assistance involved asset-replacement, rather than the strengthening of existing jobs and markets, or the development of new sources of incomes. For example, the practice of replacing tools and fixed assets was found to have only marginally positive effects on those who were underemployed before the tsunami. Marginalised groups, including some women, the poor and a number of ethnic and religious minorities who had had limited assets before the disaster were essentially excluded from sufficient support for livelihoods under this strategy. This is a case where inappropriate programme design has hindered people from reestablishing their livelihoods, left them destitute or dependent on relief and may have deepened poverty.

Despite this, a large proportion of affected people moved on with their lives, returned to their former occupations or re-established their businesses, and rebuilt their homes. This phenomenon supported the finding that the prime actors in the recovery process were the people themselves. There were indications, however, that a culture of passivity and aid dependence had developed among many who remain displaced in temporary shelters without sustainable livelihoods, particularly in the conflict affected districts.

Recommendations

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should:

- Recognise and publicise individuals' adaptability, and the initiatives taken and solidarity demonstrated by the local population, both those directly and indirectly affected.
- Examine and identify the characteristics and capacities of existing and emerging social networks, in order to develop greater complementarity between the efforts of various actors.

- Improve coordination. This has been recommended so many times that the time may have come for governments, INGOs and the international community at large to accept that inadequate coordination may be an unavoidable consequence of the decentralised rapid response system for relief. At the same time, the decentralised system has positive characteristics: it mobilises enormous resources, renders systematic discrimination difficult due to the number and multiple loyalties of actors, and increases the resilience of the system. Therefore
- Constructively assess the negative side-effects of decentralised relief programming, and identify possible remedies rather than continuously attempt, and fail, to create strong coordinating mechanisms.
- Develop ways to involve affected people in deliberations regarding efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development. If this is not possible, they should at least communicate the content and conclusions of such discussions to those affected.
- Support the government in establishing a system whereby submission to the authority of an existing coordination body or authority is a prerequisite for permission to remain in-country in the post-relief phase. This would require a clear set of rules, including ways to address the concerns described above. It should also include a systematic follow-up mechanism, preferably with participation of in-country research centres, think tanks, civil society organisation and experts, and crucially, acceptance of sanctions applied in the case of non-conformity. Past attempts to do improve coordination, including the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership need to be taken into account when considering coordination mechanisms.
- Assess their own capability to provide relief, rehabilitation and development assistance, and acknowledge their limitations, developing partnerships with agencies whose capacities are more closely matched with the needs of the beneficiaries at various stages in the recovery process. Depending on the outcomes of this analysis, partnerships could consist, for example, of simple collaboration, of sub-contracting pieces of work, and/or of transferring funds to

entities better suited to the job at hand. The assumption that relief agencies, when endowed with funds exceeding relief needs, are qualified to, and even under an obligation to, develop the capacity to spend in activities beyond their core mandate should be carefully scrutinised.

- Carefully balance the need to access and utilise local skills and expertise with the need to avoid depleting the human resource base of local organisations and authorities.
- Accelerate the construction of permanent shelters. Where needed transitional shelters that will remain people's homes for the interim period, should be upgraded. Relief actors should ensure that affected people for whom they work have sufficient information regarding their future homes to make informed choices about their future.
- All relief and rehabilitation activities have potential impact on the conflict dynamics. There are ways to lessen the negative spin-off effects. All actors should consistently apply such working methods (e.g. the "Do no harm" methodology), to programming.
- Assess and address the differences in needs and capacities related to gender, age or special needs or disabilities.
- Enhance their support to and partnerships with Sri Lankan NGOs and local authorities. Sometimes legitimate concerns about the representativeness of local authorities should not lead international actors to develop parallel and largely unsustainable structures for assistance. They should creatively support local capacity through a wide variety of means, ranging from providing cash, developing staff capacity, lobbying in their favour, sharing information, asking for input on programming design at an early stage and developing clear exit strategies.
- Guarantee beneficiary participation, communication and information management, avoiding token measures such as 'consulting with them' or ensuring their presence at insignificant stages of activities, but rather empowering them through access to the information they need to assess their situation and to make informed choices about their future.


- Improve livelihoods programming, including minimising small-scale, low-value added, local market-focused interventions, in favour of those that aim for sustainable profitability within a global marketplace. Agencies also need to establish more fruitful partnerships with the private sector and beneficiaries.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
DS	Divisional Secretary
ESOMAR	International Code of Marketing and Social Research Practice
FCCISL	Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka
GA	Government agent
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INTRA	International NGP Training and Research Center
ISSC	International Social Science Council
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RC/RC	Red Cross / Red Crescent

Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPSS	Statistical analysis software
TAFREN	Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
UN	United Nations
Unicef	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
WAPOR	World Association for Public Opinion Research
WFP	World Food Programme
WVI	World Vision International

MAP OF THE REGION



_ Indication of site visited by quantitative survey team

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION

1.1 Mandate

Sida commissioned Channel Research to conduct the country case study on Sri Lanka as part of the evaluation of the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development activities (LRRD) in the response to the tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004.

As one of the thematic evaluations under the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), the findings of the LRRD evaluation are to feed into the overall TEC Synthesis Study to be published in the spring of 2006, and provide the basis for a second stage evaluation. This first phase of the LRRD evaluation is comprised of three separate but concurrent studies as described in the model below, with one synthesis study:




Figure 1. This study in relation to the TEC

Channel Research has conducted the Sri Lanka study (shaded in deeper yellow in the table above) in close coordination with the Indonesia country team, the INTRAC study team that is carrying out the Policy Study and with the Sida Advisor, who is responsible for the Synthesis Study. Channel has also coordinated closely with the Danida commissioned study on funding flows.

1.2 Specific Issues Covered by the Evaluation

The evaluation highlights both the benefits and the less positive effects of the humanitarian crisis response. The leading question of the LRRD evaluation was: To what extent has international action hindered or supported local initiatives?

The unifying framework of the evaluation was the effect of the response on the lives of the affected populations – seen from their point of view, and going beyond issues of quantity. The study has focused on local initiative, demand and response, rather than the supply of international goods and services.

While the Government of Sri Lanka's (GoSL) efforts have not been ignored, the evaluation has intentionally avoided concentrating its focus on the country's public administration. Instead, the evaluation has attempted to triangulate the feedback provided from 'beneficiary' interviews with that of local authorities.²

The analytical approach can be divided into three main lines of enquiry and their relation to the core emergency response. The first concerns development and livelihoods, the second human rights, psycho-social issues and social networks, and the third risk management, whether they are conflict risks or natural risks. The evaluation explores the situation pre-tsunami, during the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe, and at the time of the evaluation mission in October 2005.

No attempt has been made to assess reality in terms of the match between the planned and achieved outcomes of various agencies. In addition, no value judgements have been put forward in terms of beneficiary perspectives (i.e. making them more "true" than the agency perspective). What the evaluation has attempted to do is to express beneficiary perceptions as a standard of reference for the LRRD.

² It is our understanding that the UNDP study will review the work of the different levels of the public administration. Linkages to international aid planning will be covered by INTRAC in the LRRD policy study.

1.3 Methodology

Qualitative Study

The four-person evaluation team interviewed tsunami-affected people living in three heavily-affected districts: Ampara (on the East coast with an ethnically mixed population), Galle (on the South-western coast with a mainly Sinhalese population) and Jaffna (in the North with a mainly Tamil population). People were interviewed from all three ethnic groups, including those highly-affected and those slightly-affected; old, middle-aged and young people (children were not interviewed; however, their situation was discussed with parents, grandparents and teachers); those who were well-off, middle-class and destitute; those affected by conflict; males and females, people residing in various kinds of shelter and people with multiple backgrounds in terms of how they earned their livelihoods. Minority groups, such as Muslims in the south, and Christians in the north, were also interviewed.

Findings from the interviews were triangulated with responses from local authorities and with (mainly local) representatives of NGOs, INGOs and agencies. Some follow-up visits and phone interviews were made.

Quantitative Study

The evaluation also made use of a quantitative survey conducted in nine districts and including 915 respondents. The survey questionnaire is attached in Annex 4 together with the selection criteria for respondents³.

³ This questionnaire was administered amongst a total of 915 respondents in the Tsunami affected districts of Jaffna, Galle, Ampara, Hambantota, Matara, Kalutara, Colombo, Gampaha and Puttalam. Area selection was done on the basis of sampling frame as mentioned in the concept paper. A detailed list of affected villages and the IDP camp was obtained in the selected district and 2 to 6 micro locations were randomly selected from that list based on sampling grid. A sample was allocated for each village/camp and the respondent households were selected randomly from the Tsunami affected areas. After the random selection of the household from local authority lists; a routine kish-grid method was used to select the respondent; with listing of living and present members of the household. As most the questions were applicable to the household instead of the individual; a replacement option was given within the same household; provided the respondent was not a minor. The local enumerator teams used were experienced in the field and minimum one team leader was appointed in a team of 5 researchers. For further

It was not possible, as originally hoped, to conduct the quantitative survey prior to carrying out qualitative interviews in the field. The results of the survey are interesting in and of themselves, however, and provide a useful means to assess some of the findings derived from the qualitative interviews. The quantitative survey focused on the following issues:

- impact of the tsunami
- livelihoods, shelter and use of natural resources
- identifying those to whom people turned to address their needs
- what people received, and the degree of consultation in design of relief interventions
- people's perceptions, particularly regarding the equity of distributions and on the impact, if any, of the events on the conflict

1.4 Evaluation implementation

Channel Research's evaluation team consisted of the following members:

- *Björn Ternström*, Team leader and team focal point for issues related to human rights, psycho-social needs and social networks. He has written parts of and edited all of the final report.
- *Ellen Girerd-Barclay*, team focal point for issues related to development and livelihoods. She was the team entry point for UN and multilateral agency contacts. Ellen has written parts of and commented on all of the final report.
- *Darini Rajasingham*, team focal point for issues related to risk, both conflict and natural. She has also worked with Yashwant Deshmukh and his team on parts of the quantitative survey. She has written parts of the final report.
- *Yashwant Deshmuk*, (of Team C-Voter, India) Management of the quantitative survey, and responsible for all aspects of design, operation and coordination with the Sri Lankan counterpart Nishantha Hewavithana.
- *Susanne B. Pedersen*, Junior consultant, general support and backstopping, in particular in data collection and information management.
- *Tony Vaux*, External: Quality Assurance

The evaluation process was divided into four main phases:

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| ▪ Preparation | August/September |
| ▪ Sri Lanka research phase | October |
| ▪ Analysis and drafting | November /December |
| ▪ Finalisation | January/February 2006 |

The phases are described in greater detail in annex 5.

details please see methodology section of annex 5

Constraints of the LRRD Qualitative Study in Sri Lanka:

The LRRD quantitative study had not yet taken place at the time of the field visit and could not be used to guide the selection of respondents or to clarify issues identified by the study, as originally hoped.

The amount of time for field visits was very limited. Fortunately, events were such that numerous interviews were possible with a wide variety of people, including government officials and representatives of NGOs.

The relief operation had nearly ended, but recovery activities had barely begun, at least for those most in need of assistance. For this reason, the LRRD study was somewhat premature. Most information available from authorities and agencies consisted of livelihood development plans and needs assessments, rather than data on concrete actions and results in the area of concern.

The LRRD policy study took place nearly simultaneously with the LRRD country study. This prevented a meaningful exchange of information that might have guided the LRRD field visits, both for verification of policy and for an investigation of results.

2 BACKGROUND

The tsunami was a rapid-onset, little or no warning, highly destructive event with massive loss of life and damage to property. In Sri Lanka, the tidal wave resulted in over 30,000 deaths, the displacement of 860,000 people, and severe destruction along 70 percent of the coast, an area between 200-2000 m wide and over one thousand km long. The extreme speed of the event meant that survival was more a question of luck and physical capabilities rather than wealth or skill. In consequence all categories of people were struck without differentiation based on political affiliation, social status, or religion. Along with family members, the tsunami washed away homes, businesses and belongings.

According to the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Sri Lanka (FCCISL), in addition to the inestimable loss of human life, economic costs of the tsunami were estimated to be US\$1 billion (4.5 percent of GDP), with nearly US\$700 million of private assets destroyed. The fishing industry lost assets of up to US\$97 million while tourism-related industries lost infrastructure and equipment valued at US\$250 million. The housing sector sustained between US\$306 and US\$341 million worth of damage.

Indirect damage, or “output losses” were estimated to reach US\$330 million during 2005 and 2006 (1.5 percent of GDP). In terms of employment, up to three percent of the labour force or about 200,000 people lost their jobs, including 100,000 in fisheries, 27,000 in tourism and related activities, and the remainder in informal sector activities. In April 2005, the tsunami was expected to slow GDP growth by up to one percentage point (from six to five percent), a relatively insignificant impact since the most affected sectors of the economy contributed a combined three percent to GDP. In addition to fishing, and tourist hotels and restaurants, telecommunications and transport were also predicted to be negatively affected by the tsunami damage. The construction sector, however, was expected to grow from an average of 5.5 percent (in recent years) to eight to ten percent over the coming three years.⁴

⁴ Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry of Sri Lanka (FCCISL). [Back to Business](#)

The tsunami struck a nation with limited resources, yet with an experienced and capable health infrastructure. The country was, and is, suffering the consequences of multiyear internal conflict. Meanwhile, public and private sector infrastructure, both human and physical, remained intact beyond the coastal zone. Colombo, the capital, and the western province, which houses the island's growth centre, were spared.

Though the emergency relief phase of the tsunami operation continued beyond three months in some districts, particularly those that are operationally complex such as those held by the LTTE, the numbers and relief needs of beneficiaries declined as the emergency subsided. In some cases, beneficiaries gained access to private support systems, while in others, the rehabilitation efforts were decidedly more advanced and effective (such as districts in the south of the country).

Pockets of beneficiaries remain⁵ dependent on relief supplies however including water provided by the Sri Lanka Water Board and INGOs (particularly those in camps and transitional shelters, or those whose wells and water supply were affected—until the next monsoon rains flush out the water table). Medical teams remain in two hospitals in the conflict-affected districts of Mullaitivu and Batticaloa, and a small number of beneficiaries continue to receive health and hygiene packs. Debris removal crews still worked in some districts, and a few cash for work programmes were on-going at the time of this evaluation.

On the other hand, the majority of the emergency relief programs have been scaled back while certain sectors that are part of long-term recovery such as housing, and livelihoods, are being scaled up.

(National Economic Rehabilitation Programme), Reorganising and Rebuilding of the Tsunami Affected Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Sector and Sustainable Livelihood Activities, Colombo: August 2005

⁵ As of October 2005 when the field work was done.

3 POST TSUNAMI CHRONOLOGY

3.1 The relief phase

While the impact of the tsunami was massive, so was the response, both locally and internationally.

One cannot overestimate the impact of the countless initiatives taken by the affected individuals themselves. The Sri Lankan response involved communities, businesses, local government, local NGOs and many, many individuals. People were rescued, transportation of the wounded and evacuations were organised, and families were reunited. Rubble was cleared and human remains recovered. Funerals, and any number of memorial ceremonies, burials and cremations, were held. Businesses donated their stocks and local families opened their homes. Schools, temples, offices and other buildings were turned into camps for the affected. Individuals donated clothes and money, cooked food and volunteered their services.

The basic needs of the vast majority of affected people were met in the immediate relief phase. Most affected people received assistance primarily from the informal mobilisation of nearby resources and extended family networks, in large part because of the extremely limited geographical zone of the disaster area.

Meanwhile, there were severe logistical difficulties for national and international assessment and assistance in areas dependent on coastal roads. Of note is the fact that it is generally unclear (and irrelevant) to the people interviewed, at which point international relief started coming to their area. On the whole, in this phase, people did not distinguish between local and international NGOs, government and international agencies, nor were they aware of the respective mandates of the various relief providers.

It was clear from the people interviewed that relief efforts were poorly coordinated during this phase. There were numerous instances of duplication, as well as of the distribution of inappropriate goods.

Meanwhile it is noteworthy that there were few complaints of people being left without assistance. Local government services did not have the capacity to manage all the INGOs that arrived. The INGOs, in turn, showed varying degrees of willingness to be part of coordination efforts.

A specific difficulty for local government mentioned was the pressures on senior officials to ensure that formal documentation and procedures be dealt with. With the way the system worked at the time of the relief activities the government agent in for example Ampara was spending several hours a day signing papers that needed to be signed for formal reasons but could have been signed by someone appointed to do so had an appropriate officer been available.

The impact of the conflict on relief activities was reflected primarily in terms of differences in the intensity of activities. The differences could not be justified by variations in the degree of need, and instead were commonly explained by the obvious constraints to geographic access of certain areas.

While the immediate relief needs of the vast majority of people were met within two to three weeks following the tsunami, the government formally closed the relief period 90 days after the event. The hardest hit and most vulnerable people, however, will need continued assistance for some time.

3.2 The transitional phase

Some stakeholders describe the transitional phase as beginning after the formal closing of the relief phase, i.e. on Day 91. For most of the affected people, the transition to recovery began once their personal and family safety was assured and their basic needs met, including the need to identify and attend to their dead. Local governments and many NGOs began discussing shifting activities into the transitional phase in late January to mid-February. These discussions were both internal to specific organisations and inter-organisational in various coordinating fora. Several sources have cited the GoSL decision to re-open schools as a driving force for the transition away from relief. This decision placed significant pressure on the various stakeholders to vacate the schools being used as temporary shelters, in which a large number of people were housed.

The focus of the discussions was clearly on transitional shelter and issues related to the transfer of affected people to longer-term and even permanent housing. The urgent need to construct transitional shelters gave rise to a number of issues including land rights, infrastructure, the buffer zone, drinking water and sanitation facility availability, the selection of beneficiaries, and construction standards.

Coordination Best Practice

An example good practice regarding coordination was reported from Ampara. This was the system with lead agencies responsible for the various technical areas, which took upon themselves to coordinate the other stakeholders active in each field, and reported to OCHA on a by-weekly basis. OCHA could then compile reports and present them to local authorities in an understandable and decision-manageable fashion.

At this stage there were greater efforts to coordinate activities, due to a combination of a decrease in pressure resulting from the fulfilment of basic needs, a changeover of international relief personnel (with more development-oriented staff arriving), and increased government pressure. During this period coordinating structures became more developed both on the part of the government and of the international aid stakeholders. A number of memoranda of understanding were signed at Colombo level, OCHA coordinating units appear in the field, and district level systems for managing the division of labour between agencies and NGOs were established at this time.

As people vacated temporary shelters, either to return to their previous dwellings or to move into transitional shelters, the question of livelihoods moved to the top of the rehabilitation agenda. In this stage serious complaints began to emerge, ranging from inequitable distribution of goods and services, ineffective distribution in terms of duplication, negative gender-related effects on livelihoods, and serious time delays in initiating activities. The causes for problems were varied, resulting in increased intra- and inter-community tensions.

Meanwhile, the private sector rapidly re-established itself. Markets began to function well, implying that prices had adjusted to supply and demand. As life around those affected by the tsunami returned

to normal, obtaining adequate permanent shelter and re-establishing livelihoods became the focus of most efforts to move beyond relief to rehabilitation and development.

3.3 Limited impact on development

Sri Lanka's development has not ceased as a result of the tsunami. Serious as it was, the tsunami is a temporary shock in the history of an ancient civilisation.




Figure 2: The overall development of Sri Lanka (the green arrow) was not significantly impacted by the tsunami, despite its horrific effects for those affected. The phases are not clear-cut in time or necessarily the same for different stakeholders. Development was ongoing before the tsunami, during the relief and rehabilitation and linking can be seen as reintegrating with structures and processes already there.

The LRRD quantitative survey carried out in October 2005 indicated that for some people life had begun to return to normal ten months after the tsunami struck. While immediately after the tsunami, over half (59 percent⁶) had lost their livelihoods, this figure had nearly halved (29 percent) by year's end. Similarly, while half of the respondents (53 percent) indicated that they had experienced severe personal trauma in the immediate aftermath, less than 18 percent remained traumatised by October. More than 20 percent of the respondents indicated their day-to-day life had returned to normal (compared to three percent in the immediate aftermath).

⁶ Percentages taken from the LRRD survey have been rounded.

The revival of parts of the private sector and increased efforts to address livelihoods issues can be described as the first signs of development with a longer term focus. Other indicators include the re-establishment of primary education, the rehabilitation of and in some cases expansion of infrastructure, the development of capacity within local structures – both government and private-sector, and the commencement of planning and strategy discussions.

It is too early, as well as beyond the scope of this country study to enter into a discussion regarding whether this ‘return to pre-tsunami conditions’ constitutes development or not.

4 FINDINGS

4.1 Basic needs and social networks

It is clear that the basic needs, in terms of food, water and some kind of shelter, were rapidly met for the vast majority of the affected people. Those affected by the disaster, and their unaffected family members, neighbours and communities played a major role in making that possible. Numerous accounts were gathered of people organising relief activities - assisting their neighbours, clearing the rubble, recovering bodies and burying or cremating them and building shelters for the living. Social networks, primarily based on the extended family, were and remain very important for the welfare of the survivors. Communities within the tsunami zone were assisted by a massive mobilisation of Sri Lankan society and many respondents paid homage to the spontaneous and generous acts of individuals and groups and organisations during those first critical days.

Affected people undertook a wide range of activities in order to address their own transitional needs. A number of these were practical in nature, ranging from collecting building materials to the day-to-day improvements of living quarters. They also included organisational tasks, such as establishing camps, lobbying for transitional shelter and re-establishing social networks – mainly family-, neighbour-, religious- or business/livelihoods-based. There were also formal tasks that needed attention, such as replacing lost identity cards and other legal documents, registering for assistance, reporting one's losses. Others spent time re-establishing contacts with former employers, suppliers and customers, and looking for work. Many of these tasks are information based and closely linked to social networks.

The international response was also massive. It clearly was not well coordinated, with numerous instances of duplication, some reports of inappropriate distributions and a few cases of people in need being missed. At the macro level there were concerns that the relative ease of access caused organisations and agencies to oversupply the south and southwest in comparison with the east and northeast. The very scale of the response undoubtedly contributed to the fact that so few people were

left out. Complaints about rations referred to quality and type of commodity, not quantity, indicating that physical needs were met. Cultural preferences and minimum standards, however, were sometimes ignored.

In the very early period people were supplied with cooked meals by neighbours, local NGOs, and religious leaders in local temples, churches and mosques. Many people were housed in schools and temples or other communal living quarters, while others stayed with friends and relatives. Following the distribution of kitchen utensils and stoves, a few weeks after the disaster, distributions of dry rations were initiated.

The Government was responsible for meeting people's basic needs as long as they remained in temporary shelters. One government official highlighted the importance of that responsibility, and the implied strain on local authority resources, as a driving force behind the push to get people into transitional shelters. Several respondents also noted that the conceptual link between relief activities and livelihood activities was first introduced into discussions amongst aid providers in connection with decisions about transitional shelter. This was also the stage when serious attention was paid to issues such as water sources and quality, sanitation, infrastructure, and education.

Several interviewees noted that their primary need in the immediate aftermath was not for food, water or shelter, but rather, for information. Of prime importance was the need for news: firstly, about the safety of family, secondly, about friends and neighbours, and thirdly, regarding the extent of the damage done to home and property.

'What do I care about food – before I know that my children are safe?'

'I could not eat a thing before I had found my family.'

Social networks were identified by respondents as being important elements in their ability to cope after the tsunami. The social networks cited were mainly forms of the extended family, while examples of livelihoods-based associations and religious groups were also mentioned. These

networks were very helpful in the initial days as exemplified by the fact that more than 40 percent of those responding identified social networks⁷ as the most important assistance available in vacating the disaster area. Similarly, 59 percent of those responding saw these groups as the most important in rescue work and the subsequent cleanup (52 percent).

Examples of what the social networks were later used for included: information gathering, lobbying, security, joint reconstruction, supplementing diet or income, psychological support, financial support in the form of gifts or loans, etc. In each of these fields, people took initiatives individually and in groups to get things done for their own benefit, as well as that of their families and communities. Host families who opened their homes to provide shelter, food, and many other needs to affected people were an extremely important form of social safety nets.

The evaluation revealed that the social networks of people affected by the tsunami are under great pressure. Some respondents reported that social networks were collapsing (for example, some fishing cooperatives ceased to exist due to the out-migration of a significant proportion of members, or the death of family members who were fishing partners). Others were strengthened, however, as evidenced by respondents expressing surprise and gratitude at the level of support they received from particular networks. It was not been possible to map the changes in social networks any detail, a task that could be an area of focus for the 2006 LRRD evaluation.

The evaluation found that informal social networks tended to complement, rather than replace, support received from formal structures such as local authorities and NGOs. The GoSL, and NGOs or international agencies coordinated by the government, were seen as the most supportive in getting access to medical help (79 percent), food (70 percent), drinking water (66 percent), schooling (52 percent) and finding/building a new house (38).

⁷ Self-help groups, the community at large, family or relatives and religious groups.

We do not have sufficient data to comment on the tsunami's impact on social networks of a political, ethnic or religious nature. To the extent that such networks may be aggressive and excluding, their impact on surrounding populations may have been negative.

4.2 Shelter

Affected people undertook many activities to secure initial temporary shelter. Some chose relocation to schools, temples or other public shelters. Some were taken in by host families, or relatives, and sometimes by people completely unknown to them prior to the tsunami. Some constructed shelters on or near the site of their former homes. According to the LRRD survey, most support for shelter was received from NGOs (25 percent) followed by friends/family (17 percent) and religious groups (15 percent). Only 7 percent stated the government as the main provider of shelter – 29 percent claimed they received least help from the government.

Similarly those who have obtained transitional shelter have chosen differing strategies. The least affected seemed to prefer to repair their own homes and 21 percent of the respondents to the survey are now back in their original housing. Many others remain with host families. While 14 percent describe themselves as in temporary shelter, less than one percent describe themselves as homeless. The rest have obtained access to transitional housing from GoSL, NGO or other sources. The initiative and competence needed to gain such access should not be underestimated. Losses had to be reported, new ID cards obtained for those who had lost them, and in this regard, numerous cases of lobbying, relationship development and social organising were reported. Most people felt that formal procedures had functioned reasonably well (e.g. it was not difficult to get new documents), although in some cases the process had been skewed by those with higher social status and by those capable of paying their way through the system.

Many of the traditional, extended family units have reconstituted as nuclear families, and thus the number of housing units required after the tsunami may be greater than those units registered prior to

the disaster. This change in cohabitation was a rational response to the recommended size of the houses laid down by TAFREN, with gender implications of the standard design, as described in section 4.3 below.

Many relief agencies were endowed with resources far beyond the needs traditionally within their mandate. Several interviewees felt that, the decision to implement activities outside of traditional mandates was based more on the availability of resources than on actual capacity.

A number of aid agencies are involved in constructing permanent houses and community facilities. TAFREN estimated that 70,000 houses were damaged by the tsunami in Sri Lanka. Some of these houses were within the 100 meter buffer zone demarcated by the GoSL. While 55,000 transitional shelter units have been built, progress is slow on permanent housing. In Jaffna district, where 5,000 permanent homes are needed, only one had been completed at the time of the evaluation. An additional 2,000 houses were required by conflict-affected populations, creating an additional burden on those responding to this need. In Galle, of the 5,080 houses needed, only 271 permanent shelters had been built and 87 handed over to beneficiaries as of 18 October 2005. Local authorities in Ampara estimated that 8,415 houses were needed, 339 were under construction and one had been completed. On November 30, 2005, TAFREN estimated that 2,414 houses out of an estimated need of 55,000 permanent housing units had been built by donor agencies that had signed MOUs with the GoSL to reconstruct houses. The November monsoon rains had displaced many Tsunami IDPs living in flimsy transitional shelter. Repeated displacement has multiple negative implications for people's lives and livelihoods, not the least of which is hampering their ability to move on and recover from trauma.

Private individuals, businesses, members of the Sri Lanka diaspora, and members of the international public have built and completed a significant number of permanent houses through a variety of housing projects. The evaluation team visited a housing scheme of the Nelum Pokina where 40 houses had been built by a member of the Sri Lankan diaspora; and the Salzburg Village, where 70

houses have been built with support from the city of Salzburg, Austria, in an area that was once unusable marshland in Galle District. In Ampara, a South African NGO was halfway through completion of 150 units on what used to be forest land. The evaluation team also visited a housing complex where houses built by the Green Movement were near completion, and well above the recommended TAFREN standards for housing (see box).

A comparison: Houses build by the Green Movement in Haathagala

31 families live in the Haathagala (Hambantota District) temporary camp. These families have lived before in Kalametiya. The temporary shelter is being provided by Oxfam. Adjacent to the camp a new housing project is being carried out by a small Sri Lankan NGO called the Green Movement. The Green Movement is building 31 houses for those families who live in the camp. Ninety percent of the construction of the houses is completed by now. Houses are of good quality and design. Each house has about 650 square feet. Green Movement is a network of local NGOs promoting environment issues. They have no prior experience in relief or construction work. However, they have been able to almost complete a housing project with very little resources they have at their disposal.

The post Tsunami reconstruction policy with regard to housing for the poor who lost their homes may result in some getting a better house, since most agencies that are rebuilding permanent homes are doing so according to TAFREN standards. However, landless and squatter communities are excluded from the policy of replacing a “house for a house.” In the long run the policy of merely replacing assets (houses or boats), of those who had them with out consideration of landless tsunami survivors may result in a policy that exacerbates economic inequality, with implications for social conflict.

The Red Cross/Red Crescent (RC/RC) Movement is at present the single largest pledging donor of permanent shelter in the country. It has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of Sri Lanka’s (GoSL) Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN) which is the principle coordination mechanism to build 15,000 permanent homes for those who were displaced by the tsunami and/or living in the 100 m. coastal zone. A few weeks before the evaluation, the IFRC Head of Delegation estimated that the number of houses to be built by the Movement had depreciated

to about 7,500 for various reasons. Reasons cited for delays on permanent housing construction included:

- Many of the lands identified by TAFREN have had legal problems, including unclear land titles where the state had acquired or requisitioned private lands or there was a lack of legal process to regularize and legalize the transfer
- The unsatisfactory condition of some of the land: e.g. presence of squatters, marshland that required filling, clearing and flattening, etc.
- Delays in the issuing and confirmation of beneficiary lists provided by GoSL and in some instances, apparent irregularities in beneficiary selection
- The lengthy consultation process with beneficiaries and the desire of RC/RC personnel to not just build houses, but homes and communities which is a longer term process
- In one or two cases in the north east the lack of land mine clearance certificates for proposed land
- Lack of skilled contractors, masons, and raw materials, particularly in conflict-affected and more remote districts.

Many parcels allocated by GoSL were problematic. Land disputes and the complicated legal process for securing land titles and distribution was the primary reason cited for the failure to start work on permanent housing. Others included the lengthy process of acquiring land from private owners, stringent requirements for surveying and blocking land, and the discovery that the same land had been offered to two or more parties. The areas struck by the tsunami were densely populated and in many affected zones there is an even greater land scarcity than before the disaster.

Other reasons for lack of progress in constructing permanent houses included:

- Over-centralised tender, procurement and hiring processes, and inability to hire consultants and contractors locally and in a timely fashion
- Lack of qualified (wo)manpower, experienced staff and/or skills on the ground in the affected districts
- Lack of qualified and experienced technical personnel
- Tendency to carry out problem-solving solely at the Colombo-level, rather than with authorities at district level. TAFREN and GAs in the district mentioned that rather than come to them, issues were being taken to Colombo to be resolved.
- Lack of experience, strategy and in-country knowledge and knowledge of institutional structures
- ‘Blame game’ between INGOs and GoSL bureaucracy (e.g. TAFREN, GA), and lack of a constructive problem-solving approach
- Failure to start with the smaller lands, building small numbers of houses on available land and proceeding gradually to the larger tracts of land
- Perception that permanent housing is a long-term project, with adequate funds and subsequently no real rush to complete the task

- Many international NGO and agency staff lacked familiarity with local cultural practices, GoSL institutions and institutional culture.

In contrast to the Red Cross and some of the large INGOs – some donors from e.g. the business sector, Sri Lanka diaspora, other donors and small NGOs have already completed housing projects of 50 or more permanent shelters in several districts in the south and east as cited above.

INGOs that signed MOUS, and that got lands and beneficiary lists from the Government of Sri Lanka but delayed or did not build houses are sitting on lands that the GoSL has invested in them by a legal process. To the extent that they are preventing local business, private donors and members of the diaspora with the means and capacity to build permanent housing from doing so, they should be seen as hindering recovery. It was too early to judge whether the qualitative differences between the projects planned by the larger institutions (but not yet implemented) and the projects implemented faster yet at a smaller scale (see examples above) will suffice to motivate the time delay in their completion.

The buffer zone

As a means to manage and to limit future tsunami risk, the GoSL extended a pre-existing buffer zone within which construction was prohibited. The pre-tsunami buffer zone extended 50 m from the high tide water mark, and was generally not enforced. The new buffer zone was 100 m from the high tide mark in the south and southwest of Sri Lanka, and 200 m from high tide mark in the east and north-east. The quantitative survey reported that two thirds of the people (67 percent) strongly or somewhat supported the establishment of the buffer zone.

Meanwhile, the establishment and enforcement of a buffer zone has created a great deal of confusion for the people who formerly lived within it and are now trying to re-establish their homes. During the months that the buffer zone has been in existence there has been a great deal of debate about it. Numerous rumours have circulated regarding whether it would remain, be changed locally or even

abolished completely. At the time of the evaluation some maintained that the buffer zone was still in force although with local exceptions, while others believed that the government had reverted to the rules in force prior to the tsunami. The ongoing confusion regarding the buffer zone is an example of the disparities in managing and disseminating vital information to those most affected by the tsunami. The uncertainty related to the buffer zone may have prevented and/or slowed initiatives to rebuild livelihoods, as people needed to know where they were going to live before they could make solid plans for earning a living.

The buffer zone has had several other important implications for affected people. The price of land outside the buffer zone, yet near the sea, has increased significantly. Correspondingly, the price of land within the buffer zone was significantly depressed, affecting the wealth and well-being of the people with land in that area. Many people no longer desired to live close to the ocean and preferred to relocate further away from the coastline. Others however, preferred to rebuild on their own land in the buffer zone. According to government regulation regarding cash grants to people whose homes had been destroyed and who wished to build their own houses, such funds were only available to people who owned land outside the buffer zone. Because of this ruling, some people who wished to remain on their own land in the buffer zone had instead constructed houses in other locations, simply to access the grants. With the removal of the buffer zone limitation, in principle, they could have received grants to rebuild their homes in the original locations. For those who had begun construction outside the zone when the rule was relaxed, the grants had already been spent.

4.3 Human rights

Non-discrimination and targeting

A consistent opinion expressed by beneficiaries during interviews in Ampara was that tensions were lowered during the relief phase, indicating that the affected people did not perceive that discrimination had taken place. However, in the survey at community level 49 percent stated that the

distribution of relief caused conflict – 42 percent said it did not. There may be geographical differences that were not captured in the qualitative survey.

The evaluation encountered few if any serious concerns about systematic discrimination between ethnic, political, or religious groups at the local level during the relief phase. Concerns were expressed, however, about inter-regional distributions of relief aid, with problems of organisational overload cited in the south, and insufficiencies noted in the east and north-east. The evaluation team was also informed that tsunami survivors tended to demand relief and other handouts while the conflict-affected population were more passive and thus, marginalised. This finding was particularly important in light of the fact that people displaced by war had been living in camps and other shelters for up to 15 years, and may in fact have had greater needs both for material and psychosocial assistance than those affected by the tsunami alone.

Unfortunately, the key questions regarding non-discrimination in the quantitative survey did not distinguish between the relief and rehabilitation phases, and thus offer a rather mixed report. Of the respondents, 64 percent were convinced that the distribution of relief had not increased the gap between rich and poor and 39 percent believed that there had been no discrimination between those affected by the tsunami and those displaced by the conflict. Meanwhile, 42 percent believed that the distribution of relief and reconstruction assistance had been totally unfair. (*Italics added*). A possible explanation for this apparent contradiction would be related to the reported inadequate targeting referred to below.

The massive scale of support made targeting less important for meeting basic needs during the relief phase. During the transitional phase, however, serious concerns were expressed about inadequate targeting. The bulk of these problems appeared to relate to a lack of coordination, follow-up, and even professionalism on the part of aid actors. Interviews regarding skewed distributions revealed that discriminatory practices were not based on ethnicity, but rather on social and financial status,

both of which affected individuals' capacity to bribe and/or lobby for special treatment. The consequences were that some people received a considerably greater number of items and services, while others went entirely without support. In some cases people who received materials were not even able to use them, For example, boats were given to people without fishing skills or experience. The evaluation observed some cases where those in need received nothing at all. A family in one permanent housing scheme had received none of the furniture offered to others in the same scheme because of its "lack of connections with important people." The inappropriate and oftentimes unfair targeting was of particular concern in livelihoods activities, and in the distribution of transitional shelters. The inappropriate and oftentimes unfair targeting was of particular concern in livelihoods activities, and in the distribution of transitional shelters.

The rehabilitation phase required a different sort of beneficiary identification, output monitoring and impact assessment than the relief phase, as will future development phases. Initially, there was a universal need, met by assisting all those who were affected by the tsunami, regardless of their previous or present assets and net worth. In the first few months, those who had the means to provide for themselves moved on, and consequently, the number of people in need declined considerably.

Whereas in the relief phase beneficiaries were treated as anonymous contacts, and became the recipients of mass distributions of goods and services, during the reconstruction phase, they required more attention and goods and services that targeted individual and family, or at least community needs. According to the feedback received, despite ongoing activities to map previous distributions and to identify housing needs, the beneficiaries had not received sufficient attention for economic recovery as the operation progressed.

Proper targeting of support remained a daunting challenge for several reasons, in particular the widespread movement of people and the disintegration of extended families. At the time of the evaluation, most agencies were entirely dependent on GoSL's beneficiary lists, which were prepared

by the Grama Niladhari (leader linked to the local authority) and later endorsed by the Divisional Secretary (DS). Some agencies had received a large number of appeals from people whose names had been omitted from these lists. There was also ample testimony that it was possible for just about anyone to get onto a list – for a price.

Issues related to discrimination based on gender, age, disability

There was ample anecdotal evidence from the interviews that access to support was partly related to presence at distribution points, previous links to government, including military and NGO offices, social status, and others. This indicated that those living outside “normal” family settings such as single women, older adults, people with disabilities, the ill, and children had experienced greater difficulty accessing goods and services.

The relief agencies seemed to have given little attention to gender issues, an assumption underlined by the scarcity of gender-disaggregated data. As could be expected, the relative disregard for gender in assessment, planning and programming had some serious consequences for support to livelihoods and shelter.

Livelihood support to date mainly consisted of material replacement of assets owned prior to the tsunami, for example boats, fishing nets, three wheelers, agricultural tools, etc. The main assets of families before the tsunami were largely owned by men, and therefore those replaced through relief and recovery efforts were primarily for men. Female livelihoods were often home-based industries of an informal nature, such as coir making, paddy processing, weaving, snack preparation and making handicrafts. In order to continue with such activities many women needed funds to replace stocks of raw materials, a suitable workspace, and easy, safe access to markets. Perhaps more importantly, many women required the means to start up new more profitable lines of business. This was especially true if they had become the only providers for their families. The income their previous work generated was often insufficient to cover the family’s needs. Material assets were often

distributed by relief agencies, whereas funds were not easily available through the support mechanisms in place. This may have deepened poverty⁸.

The ability of most women to re-establish home-based activities was at least in part dependent on the existence of sufficient space in the temporary shelter, especially during the rainy season when working outdoors was nearly impossible. The housing standards established in the post-tsunami period did not sufficiently consider this need. As a result, a number of women were deprived of their livelihoods as they simply did not have the space in which exercise them. For women who had relocated to areas far from their previous homes, transportation costs to reach markets and issues of personal safety were raised as obstacles to earning sufficient income.

Consultation and accountability of implementing agencies

Lack of information on the various efforts made by different agencies, and conflicting criteria regarding the entitlements of the affected people to goods and services caused considerable confusion and frustration for many beneficiaries. In some cases, the absence of vital information regarding both livelihoods and housing led people to take inappropriate decisions. In some households, families accepted distributions of goods for which they had no use, because of fear that there would be no further materials provided. Many affected people complained that they had heard of ‘better items’ being distributed elsewhere, but had no means of confirming such rumours. In one area on the south coast, families had accepted permanent housing without kitchens because they had not heard of the minimum standards. Later, the Government of Sri Lanka and OCHA produced flyers outlining these standards, which helped people to understand what to expect. For those already in housing, however, it was too late to rectify the situation.

⁸ The greater the link between peoples’ livelihood strategies and their ethnicity and/or religion, the greater the risk that the asset-replacement policies in livelihood interventions will have an impact on both gender and the relative poverty of specific groups. This has potential implications for the relationship within and between communities.

In addition to receiving very little information, few people interviewed reported that they had been consulted by agencies and/or government departments and asked for their opinions on proposed activities or feedback on services and distributions. Evidence from the quantitative survey indicated that in the opinion of the affected people, beneficiaries were consulted even less during the transitional phase than they were in the relief phase. Averaging the responses for GoSL, NGOs and international agencies, 41 percent of the respondents felt they were not consulted at all in the relief phase, compared to 52 percent ten months later. While a lack of consultation could be excused during the most acute period of the relief phase, there seems no plausible explanation for failing to seek beneficiaries' opinions as the situation stabilised.

A considerable quantity of data was available in NGO and local government offices, although this information was not well managed. This supports, at least in part, accusations of “information extraction” rather than consultation, in describing communication between the agencies and the affected populations.

The presence of many relatively inexperienced NGOs, and the assumption of unfamiliar tasks by major NGOs, rendered consultations with affected people even more vital than in a ‘normal’ disaster situation. People reported that they felt they did not know what was going to happen next. Most decision-making was highly centralised, with even senior managers within the GoSL and agencies in the field referring to Colombo on key issues.

Second generation rights

The evaluation team's observations related to second generation human rights, e.g. the right to health, to education, to development, livelihoods etc., are parallel to those made above concerning basic needs. No signs were found of systematic discrimination based on ethnicity or religion at the local level, but the evaluation team nonetheless had concerns about inter-regional equity due to the evident

geographical differences in support given. Within population groups there were also differences in access to services related to power, wealth and status. As to livelihoods, please see the section below.

4.4 Press and Public Scrutiny of INGOs

There was a vocal critique of INGOs and similar organisations working in Sri Lanka. While this critique is informed by a current of nationalism, it also raises fundamental issues regarding the ethics, politics, and practice of the international humanitarian industry. Key issues regard a perceived lack of appropriate governance mechanisms and of local and national ownership in the design, implementation and monitoring of tsunami recovery and reconstruction programs.

Another issue that generates debate in the media is the large number of international staff operating in Sri Lanka, a country is almost 90 percent literate and has a large pool of under- and unemployed graduates. Many Sri Lankans express concern that a majority of the expatriate workers recruited for duties in the relief phase lack the requisite development expertise and in-country knowledge necessary at the recovery and reconstruction stage. The engagement of in-country reconstruction and development expertise will be vital to ensure that recovery programming considers the needs and capacities of affected people, while the assistance of the international community will more appropriate for developing local capacities to cope with disasters.

The media periodically focuses on the above issues. INGOs will need to adapt to the substance (as distinguished from the politics), of this critique and take appropriate measures in their relief, rehabilitation and development support in order to do the most ‘good’, and at the same time, maintain public trust.

4.5 Livelihoods and Poverty reduction

When addressing development issues, the point of departure for an analysis will be the concept of a arena for sustaining local livelihoods. This arena contains a number of components such as markets,

government and non-government agencies, the institutional environment, social capital and the natural environment. Individuals or households sustain their livelihoods by using and/or interacting with these components.




Figure 3: The Livelihoods Arena

When the tsunami hit, local livelihoods were affected both directly, as people and assets were lost/hurt/damaged, and indirectly, as the characteristics and the dynamics of the components were changed. How was the arena for sustaining local livelihoods changed by the event and the interventions by various actors?

Following the tsunami, it is clear that many individuals/households became more vulnerable. At the same time, many people developed new strengths and skills while dealing with the consequences for themselves and their families. The evaluation encountered some who, ten months after the event, who were still in shock, exhausted in mind and body, and diminished in spirit. However, an even

greater number of people met and interviewed by the evaluation team were proud of their own achievements and those of their community, speaking of how much they had learned and grown. People related their experiences of changing professions or creating new businesses to adapt to new circumstances, of their perceptions of greater depth in their lives, and of wisdom gained.

The private sector rapidly re-established itself, particularly in the south and east, and to a lesser extent in the north and northeast. Generally, markets functioned well relatively soon after the tsunami, implying that prices adjusted to supply and demand, as exemplified by changes in prices for labour, perishable food and land. New markets were also developed. In Ampara, for example, prices of some capital goods had increased, a phenomenon largely explained by a significant increase in the use of credit (i.e. a new market). Similarly, the construction sector had expanded significantly. Many people spoke of seeking new ways to earn their living, such as shifting from fishing to casual labour, or getting jobs with NGOs.

The private sector also made significant contributions to both relief and reconstruction efforts, with obvious effects on linkages between the two. For example micro-finance schemes and grants were linked to banking skills development and training. In other words, grants or loans were linked to people opening an account in a bank and starting to use it. In this way, people not only learning to use the credit system but also established a credit record and developed relationships with bank staff⁹.

People expressed concerned about the effects of the disaster on natural resources noting that their use has changed quite radically. For example surveyed households using

- agricultural land declined from 19 to 9 percent
- fishing waters, from 25 to 17 percent
- irrigation, from 6 percent to just over 3 percent
- natural sources for drinking water declined from 64 to 53 percent.

⁹ Unfortunately these positive examples from micro-finance were at times overshadowed by damage done by sloppily designed NGO microfinance schemes.

Aquaculture was basically eliminated with only 0.1 percent of households using it to a great extent (4.3 percent pre-tsunami) and 3.7 percent using it to some extent (5.5 percent). Anecdotal evidence indicated that fish yields, however, *had not declined*.

Social networks have been discussed above in the context of meeting basic needs. They were also extensively used by the affected people in their efforts to re-establish livelihoods – in the form of employment and businesses.

The evaluation did not succeed in gathering reliable data concerning changes in ‘rules in use’ though the buffer zone and multiple ‘habits’ related to daily life in the transitional camps could be seen as examples of their impact. These areas that also comprise the social norms regulating women’s and older adults’ access to assistance and livelihoods constitute important fields for further study in the 2006 LRRD evaluation.

The greater part of this evaluation dealt with the GoSL, NGOs, agencies and their interventions. Most livelihoods interventions were in the form of asset replacements. In general, a fisherman who had lost a boat could get a new boat from a livelihoods scheme. In addition to the gender implications described above, this form of assistance also had the unfortunate side effect of maintaining the gaps in power and wealth between social and ethnic groups, and between men and women. People with informal livelihoods, for example, were excluded from the post-tsunami livelihood support system, as were most others who had not owned substantial assets. In Ampara, however, a fisherman who had owned three boats and employed ten people received a single boat following the tsunami. As the boat was sub-standard, the man sold it and bought a better one. At the time of the evaluation he only employed three people, and one of his former employees received a boat of his own. For all these people the assistance provided following the disaster led to changes in terms of earning power and wealth.

Simultaneously, the phenomenon of beneficiary opportunism was noted by both researchers and informed members of local NGOs and civil society groups in many districts. Some individuals in tsunami-affected areas had reportedly collected 'three bicycles and five coconut scrapers', while others had received none. While those benefiting in such a superfluous manner may have been a small minority, the concern about unnecessary hand outs and their potentially negative effect on self-motivation was noted by respondents as an issue of concern.

'The handing out of goodies must stop if a culture of aid dependence and opportunism is to be avoided. People are not going to work these days, it is hard to find labour for the fields and fishing because people are going each day to sign up for different items from different donors.' Jaffna, Women's Development Centre.

Beneficiary opportunism was found to be a rational actor response to misdirected relief that may have long term-consequences resulting in the development of a culture of aid-dependency on one hand and opportunism on the other.

Cash-for-work was also widely used as a recovery strategy, whereas food-for-work had been planned but not yet implemented in a small number of areas. In Ampara, the Pottuvil Divisional Secretary (DS) described a system in use within which the various NGOs involved identified what they perceived as priority work, and brought the proposal to the DS, who invariably approved it. There were set rates for cash payments, which at least some local businessmen did not feel were too high for the market.

In Jaffna, according to TAFREN, cash-for-work activities were still in progress while the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was establishing an information system to further identify livelihood needs for targeting purposes. According to TAFREN, the ILO information system was going to be able to provide specific data on livelihood needs and resources available to meet them. Most existing income-generating activities consisted of cash-for-work programmes, aimed at

providing cash to individuals in exchange for unskilled labour (mainly to clean up debris and use rubble to create pathways in tsunami-affected areas.) According to TAFREN, the new master plan, which involved donors, NGOs, banks, and Chambers of Commerce, in addition to the government, was a comprehensive blueprint of proposed activities, individualised for each affected district. The master plan also provided estimates of damage, requirements for the rehabilitation/reconstruction of schools and health facilities, and required water, sanitation, road and railway infrastructure.

The competency and efficiency of relief agencies in Jaffna District to carry out development activities was called into question. One local NGO cited an example of international NGOs placing boat construction orders in Colombo, although the Chamber of Small and Micro-enterprises in Jaffna had already identified six local boat manufacturers. The common practice of distributing goods and equipment to ‘those most affected by the tsunami’ although initially successful in meeting people’s urgent needs, had resulted in a small number of tsunami survivors receiving three or four boats, while others had received none. In many cases, boats were distributed by NGOs without motors, nets or other fishing equipment, and thus lay idle near the recipients’ temporary shelters. Displaced people who were relocated to areas several kilometres from the coast had no means of storing their boats close to the shore, and were afraid to leave them far from their homes. These boats too were not yet in use. Similar stories were told in Ampara.

Members of the evaluation team participated in an October meeting on livelihoods held by TAFREN, the Ministry of Fisheries and the district government in Jaffna, and attended by the representatives of approximately 20 local and international NGOs. Participants of the meeting called upon TAFREN to establish a monitoring system to assess and report on progress in achieving development objectives, accompanied by a form of accountability. Participants also expressed the need for the monitoring system to be ‘independent’ and ‘competent,’ and to report information to government officials, local and international NGOs and beneficiaries. They expressed their concern that beneficiaries of livelihood development activities were insufficiently involved in decision-making. Needs

assessments and subsequent monitoring systems needed to be ‘bottom-up’ and include the voices of those most affected by the activities, in order to ensure that the needs and desires of affected communities were given due consideration. The evaluators noted the conspicuous absence of beneficiaries and/or their representatives at this meeting, however.

For some actors in rehabilitation, the restoration of livelihoods had not been clearly defined. For example, although boats, motors and fishing equipment were vital for the restoration of the fishing industry, other assistance, such as technical advice on marketing, and training in financial management were also needed to improve livelihoods, especially for people affected by decades of conflict. The evaluation team received complaints that within the largely “relief mandates” of many agencies, support to livelihoods consisted merely of distributing materials and equipment to replace those that had been lost during the tsunami. Since the livelihoods master plan had just been completed, it was apparent that many so-called livelihoods activities had indeed been carried out in isolation, without consideration for external factors affecting livelihoods such as markets, infrastructure, labour, and skills.

4.6 Psychological issues

Lacking the time and the qualifications necessary to explore psychological issues, the evaluation team decided that it would not have been ethical to dig deeply into such issues in the qualitative interviews. Meanwhile, it was obvious from the reactions to other questions regarding family size, housing and livelihoods, that many people were still deeply traumatised by the losses they incurred on 26 December 2004.

Some of the respondents cited examples of interventions that had taken place to address psychological needs. The general opinion was that these interventions were not very useful. A teacher, for example, described well-meaning foreigners coming to a school with papers and crayons

allowing the children to draw and inviting them to do sports during school hours. In her opinion, the children's time would have been better spent studying.

Meanwhile, a local NGO that had been involved in psychosocial care of affected children, cited numerous examples of children who, having refused to leave their homes for a long time, re-emerged to play with their friends following visits by "barefoot counsellors." Although informal, as opposed to professional, such basic psycho-social assistance performed by local, trained aides appeared to have been of some benefit.

Repeatedly, beneficiaries emphasized the importance of information. To some, knowledge about the safety of loved ones came before any other need. False information, on the other hand, was found to be extremely negative and distressing to people. Many cited the negative impact of false warnings of new tsunamis, causing people, especially children and those who had lost family members, serious psychological distress when forced to virtually relive their experiences. The rumours and false warnings also appeared to have a detrimental effect on risk prevention, as people started to ignore warnings in general.

4.7 Perceptions of risk

People's perception of risk has changed radically, as expressed in their responses to the question, "What were you worried about pre-tsunami?" and "What are you worried about today?" Not surprisingly, post-tsunami, about 79 percent of those interviewed for the LRRD quantitative survey were worried about natural disasters, compared to only 20 percent pre-tsunami. More people were also concerned about:

- illness (58 percent compared to 42 percent)
- lack of quality water (62 percent compared to 25 percent)
- home/land in the Buffer Zone (69 percent compared to 12 percent)
- declining soil yields (32 percent compared to 5 percent) and
- declining fish yields (54 percent compared to 23 percent)

Apprehension about the prevailing conflict had increased, though quite marginally, while fear of crime had risen from 37 percent to 44 percent today – which is slightly more than right after the tsunami.

As the north-east monsoons set in from October onwards, many affected people also expressed concern about having to remain in flimsy, transitional shelters. The evaluation team observed that most temporary dwellings were made of a combination of materials such as woven mats and thatch, plastic tarpaulins, and concrete foundations. At the time of the evaluation, the grass components were beginning to wear out, and the plastic sheeting was in tatters from the elements. Some beneficiaries noted that the lack of a permanent home and the sense of displacement considerably prolonged their psychological trauma and their ability to re-establish their livelihoods.

4.8 Conflict related issues

The qualitative interviews clearly indicated that people did not perceive that the relief provided was skewed by ethnic, political or other identifiable factors in the relief phase. Quantitative data appeared to confirm this, with 39 percent of respondents attesting to a lack of discrimination between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected, and 64 percent asserting that the rich had not become richer at the expense of the poor. Nevertheless, at community level almost half (49 percent) of the respondents believed that the distribution of relief had caused intra-community disputes while 42 percent said it had not. More than a third believed that the distribution had contributed to conflict at the district and national levels – another third said it had not. The picture becomes much more mixed in the transitional phase when some activities caused serious complaints. Over 42 percent, for example, were convinced that distributions in the relief and reconstruction phase were completely unfair.

Meanwhile, 40 percent said that the experience of the tsunami had made them more sympathetic to the victims of the conflict. Almost half (43 percent) believed that the events had increased the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka (17 percent felt that it had “increased the prospects to a great extent,” 26 percent that the tsunami had “increased them somewhat.”)

People interviewed could cite numerous instances of distributions that they felt were unfair, or inappropriate, but could also cite examples of post-tsunami activities related to distributions that had strengthened both intra- and inter-community relations. For example, many interviewees spoke of practical assistance (joint clean up, transport help from distribution points, caring for each others children, financial assistance, joint cooking etc) given by friends and neighbours and how this had strengthened existing social networks. Some also spoke of surprise at the help they had received across community boundaries. The help mentioned included practical issues as mentioned above, but also “help with security”. It was emphasized that this would be remembered.

4.9 Return to development?

When discussing the link between relief and development it is important to remember that despite its massive human and material cost, the tsunami did not have a significant impact on the national economy. Linking relief and rehabilitation with development can therefore be described as a reintegration or reconnection of projects and programmes that have temporarily been treated as separate. The unresolved political conflict will most likely continue to be the single factor that most seriously hampers Sri Lanka’s efforts to develop.

There are strong feelings about the usefulness and development impact of international staff of varying quality, especially given the number of qualified Sri Lankan graduates in many fields. Meanwhile, many local organisations reported that they were losing an unreasonable number of qualified staff to the richer, and better paying international organisations. In order to avoid depleting local capacities, actors recruiting qualified Sri Lankan staff need to creatively consider how they can support the organisations and authorities from which they are recruiting key people.

At the local, and even the district level, it was not yet possible to discern the impact of the tsunami relief and recovery on long-term development. Given the existence of functioning health and

educational infrastructure, the focus of major aid stakeholders on providing permanent housing and establishing livelihoods is appropriate. Clearly, people have prioritised these two needs and will have great difficulty in moving on before they are fulfilled.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Evidence suggests that the efforts of the affected people, their neighbours, local organisations and communities made up the bulk of the assistance meeting the basic needs of those in need during the first few days. Their role has continued to be of crucial importance during the current transition to rehabilitation, and will most likely continue to be during the upcoming stage of development.

Recommendation 1

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should recognise and publicise individuals' adaptability, the initiatives taken and the solidarity demonstrated by the local population, both those directly and indirectly affected.

Social networks played a large role, especially in the early days of the emergency when they supported rescue and relief activities. Later on they were important for shelter (e.g. the host families) and for re-establishing livelihoods (e.g. financial support, information dissemination, job searching). Family-, community-, business- or religion-based networks have been placed under varying amounts of stress. Some social networks have collapsed as a result of the tsunami and the events of the past year, while others have been strengthened.

Social networks did not replace the formal structures that people turned to for services such as medical assistance, water supply and sanitation, and education. The GoSL and entities coordinated by government at all levels have remained the prime suppliers of such services, with support from the international community.

Recommendation 2

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should examine and identify the characteristics and capacities of existing and emerging social networks, in order to develop greater complementarity between the efforts of various actors.

The international response was also massive and started to have effect after the first few days. The very scale of the response contributed to the fact that few people were missed out. That the relief was effective does not mean it was efficient. There were multiple examples of bad coordination and duplication of efforts.

Recommendation 3

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should improve coordination. This has been recommended so many times that the time may have come for governments, INGOs and the international community at large to accept that inadequate coordination may be an unavoidable consequence of the decentralised rapid response system for relief. At the same time, the decentralised system has positive characteristics: it mobilises enormous resources, renders systematic discrimination difficult due to the number and multiple loyalties of actors, and increases the resilience of the system.

Recommendation 4

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should constructively assess the negative side-effects of decentralised relief programming, and identify possible remedies rather than continuously attempt, and fail, to create strong coordinating mechanisms.

Discussions among operational stakeholders regarding rehabilitation, and the transition from relief to rehabilitation began in late January, relatively soon after the disaster struck. This rapid shift was driven by a perception of declining relief needs, an abundance of resources and pressure from the GoSL to vacate schools that were used as temporary shelters in order to allow schooling to recommence. The focus of these discussions was initially transitional shelter, expanding quickly to encompass permanent housing and livelihoods. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that discussions took place with the affected people themselves.

Recommendation 4

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should develop ways to involve affected people in deliberations regarding efforts to link relief, rehabilitation and development. If this is not possible, they should at least communicate the content and conclusions of such discussions to those affected. While placing an enormous burden on those still trying to deal with relief activities, the early start of these discussions should be commended.

As rehabilitation began, coordination became more systematic and formal mechanisms such as TAFREN began to function. Many relief agencies, however, continued to ‘do their own thing’, while some respected coordination efforts, and others at least kept the relevant coordinating bodies informed of their activities. It should be recognised that there may be legitimate concerns regarding e.g. conflict impact, related to submitting to political coordination in situations where governance is inadequately representative of the entire population. This should not be used to avoid involvement in coordination entirely however.

Recommendation 6

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should support the government in establishing a system whereby submission to the authority of an existing coordination body or authority is a prerequisite for permission to remain in-country in the post-relief phase. This would require a clear set of rules, including ways to address the concerns described above. It should also include a systematic follow-up mechanism, preferably with participation of in-country research centres, think tanks, civil society organisation and experts, and crucially, acceptance of sanctions applied in the case of non-conformity. Past attempts to do improve coordination, including the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership need to be taken into account when considering coordination mechanisms.

Many relief agencies were endowed with resources far beyond the needs traditionally within their mandate. In some cases, the decision to implement activities outside of traditional mandates was based more on the availability of resources than on actual capacity.

Recommendation 7

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should assess their own capability to provide relief, rehabilitation and development assistance, and acknowledge their limitations, developing partnerships with agencies whose capacities are more closely matched with the needs of the beneficiaries at various stages in the recovery process. Depending on the outcomes of this analysis, partnerships could consist of simple collaboration to sub-contracting pieces of work, to transferring funds to entities better suited to the job at hand. The assumption that relief agencies, when endowed with funds exceeding relief needs, are qualified to, and even under an obligation to, develop the capacity to spend in activities beyond their core mandate should be carefully scrutinised.

There are strong feelings about the usefulness and development impact of international staff of varying quality, especially given the number of qualified Sri Lankan graduates in many fields. Meanwhile, many local organisations reported that they were losing an unreasonable number of qualified staff to the richer, and better paying international organisations.

Recommendation 8

Concerned agencies need to carefully balance the need to access and utilise local skills and expertise with the need to avoid depleting the human resource base of local organisations and authorities.

The immediate need for transitional shelter, and later for permanent shelter, remains a prime concern of many affected people. For those without permanent housing, shelter remains the key need. It is deeply intertwined with livelihoods and psychological well-being and represents a decisive factor in

people's ability to move on with their lives. Providing adequate shelter has involved addressing land issues, establishing standards for buildings, infrastructure and services, and managing logistics. Clarifying NGO and agency mandates, coordination, and working within various government restrictions such as the buffer zone have also been constraints to progress in the sector. From the perspective of the affected people, the process has been slow and frustrating.

Recommendation 9

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should accelerate the construction of permanent shelters and where needed, upgrade transitional shelters that will remain people's homes for the interim period. Relief actors should ensure that affected people for whom they work have sufficient information regarding their future homes to make informed choices about their futures.

While the evaluation found no evidence of systematic discrimination in aid distribution at the local level, it is clear that decisions regarding the allocation of assistance to various regions have not been governed by need alone. Variations in accessibility and subsequent logistics issues are often cited as causes for the noted differences in the quantity and quality of assistance between various parts of the country. Ethnic differences between these same regions may indicate the potential for conflict.

Recommendation 10

All relief and rehabilitation activities have potential impact on the conflict dynamics. There are ways to lessen the negative spin-off effects. All actors should consistently apply such working methods (e.g. the "do no harm" methodology), to programming.

The structure, content and procedures for support have discriminated against women, the older adults and people with disabilities. For example, efforts to link relief to livelihoods have focused chiefly on asset replacement. Many of these efforts have been inadequately contextualised and badly targeted. Livelihoods support appears skewed in favour of males, those with higher status and greater lobbying skills, and people willing and able to pay bribes.

Recommendation 11

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should assess and address the differences in needs and capacities related to gender, age or special needs or disabilities.

Communication and coordination between the government, INGOs and agencies appears to have improved over time, but remains highly centralised processes. Local authorities do not have the mandate, the skills or the support to function effectively as rehabilitation coordinators and development agents. External agencies contribute to these inadequacies by bypassing local authorities, poaching qualified staff and not contributing substantially to strengthening these structures.

Recommendation 12

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should enhance their support to and partnerships with Sri Lankan NGOs and local authorities. Sometimes legitimate concerns about the representativeness of local authorities should not lead international actors to develop parallel and largely unsustainable structures for assistance. They should creatively support local capacity through a wide variety of means, ranging from providing cash, developing staff capacity, lobbying in their favour, sharing information, asking for input on programming design at an early stage and developing clear exit strategies.

Meanwhile, the affected people clearly feel left out. Most feel that they have not been consulted and there is a great deal of frustration over the lack of information provided to them. The LRRD quantitative survey clearly indicates that situation has deteriorated over time and this is hindering people from making rational decisions and getting on with their lives.

Recommendation 13

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should guarantee beneficiary participation, and improve communication and information

management, avoiding token measures such as ‘consulting with affected people’ or ensuring their presence at insignificant stages of activities. Instead, they should empower beneficiaries through offering them access to the information they need to assess their situation and to make informed choices about their future.

Many livelihood support interventions are poorly designed and inaccurately targeted.

Recommendation 14

Concerned agencies and organisations involved in the tsunami response should improve livelihoods programming, including minimising small-scale, low value-added, local market-focused interventions, in favour of those that aim for sustainable profitability within a global marketplace. Agencies also need to establish more fruitful partnerships with the private sector and beneficiaries.

A significant proportion of affected people have moved on with their lives, re-established their businesses, and rebuilt their houses. When reflecting upon the linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development, it is important to remember that the prime actors in these processes are the people themselves.

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ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Introduction

This evaluation of the linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) is part of a larger, international evaluation programme of Tsunami disaster support, which is described below. A first, comprehensive report from the overall tsunami disaster evaluation will be published at the end of 2005.

The LRRD evaluation comprises three separate studies, one on policies and plans, one on interventions in Sri Lanka and one on interventions in Indonesia. The evaluation shall be carried out by one policy level team and two separately procured teams in Sri Lanka and Indonesia respectively. The three studies will be summarised in a consolidated report, written by a separate consultant, who also has an advisory function for the LRRD evaluation.

The LRRD evaluation will have two phases, the first phase during Autumn 2005 and a second phase about one year later. The present Terms of Reference (ToR) cover only the first phase.

The ToR below have seven main sections:

- section 1 and 2 provide background and general approach for the evaluation;
- section 3, 4 and 5 describe specific questions for each of the three studies on Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Policies & Plans respectively;
- section 6 summarises the tasks for the LRRD evaluation advisor; and
- section 7 gives the time plan and requirements regarding reporting that are common to all three studies.

1. Background

The Tsunami disaster along the coasts of the Indian Ocean in December 2004 created an unprecedented response by the international donor community, by individuals and NGOs worldwide and by private companies. Massive resources for immediate disaster relief were mobilised very fast and large amounts of money became available for recovery and reconstruction.

The number of organisations involved in the aftermath of the tsunami created problems of overview, coordination, follow-up and reporting to relevant receivers of information. At the initiative of OCHA and ALNAP a number of organisations have formed the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) in order to more effectively and on a joint basis evaluate the tsunami response and the interventions carried out by the various actors.¹⁰

¹⁰ Further information about the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is available at the TEC website: www.alnap.org/tec/index.htm

The TEC evaluation programme will concentrate on six *themes*¹¹. One of these themes is the linkage between immediate relief interventions, rehabilitation or recovery and development efforts, often known as LRRD.

The LRRD concept

The LRRD concept should in principle be applied in the planning and evaluation of all humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It builds on the assumptions that there is both a severe time constraint in the initial (life saving) stage which limits the range of possible activities and a distinction between this initial and the subsequent stages. At a minimum, what is being done at the initial stage should not harm later efforts for recovery or at least possible negative effects should be consciously diminished while still retaining the primary, operational objective of saving lives. If possible, humanitarian efforts should make a contribution to recovery and development processes and reduce the risk of future disasters.

The awareness of the importance of this linkage and how it affects the longer term outcome of interventions is wide-spread but the understanding of the concept of LRRD varies considerably. It is all too easy to see the linkage between immediate relief and rehabilitation or recovery as a simple operational sequence. In practice often the different stages take place in parallel and the linkage can be rather complicated seen from either the intended beneficiaries' point of view or from the perspective of the planner or the implementation agency.

The understanding and explicit or implicit use of the LRRD concept may thus become an important factor for the long term impact of humanitarian relief interventions.

A brief overview of the recent, professional discussion of the LRRD concept is provided in Annex 1¹².

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The *objective* of the evaluation of LRRD in the context of the tsunami disaster is to find out what ideas and practices regarding LRRD governed operations and roles of the various actors, and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices and subsequent actions had or may have for the affected population.

The *scope* of the evaluation is to investigate a limited number of possible linkages between various types of operations in the countries struck by the disaster and assess consequences from those.

¹¹ The TEC evaluation comprises six themes: coordination, local and regional capacity building, needs assessment, funding and fundraising, LRRD, and impact.

¹² Margie Buchanan-Smith and Paola Fabbri: *Linking relief, rehabilitation and development – A preliminary review of the debate*. Draft manuscript, July 2005.

The LRRD evaluation will have two parts. The first will be carried out during the latter half of 2005 in parallel with the other five TEC themes. The second will be made one year later as a follow-up to the first study. These ToR cover only the first part.

The first part of the evaluation will serve two purposes. One is to provide information on the LRRD theme for the “one year after” synthesis report planned for the end of 2005 (see section 7 below). The other is to collect basic information and to establish points of reference, particularly regarding the intended beneficiaries’ views, to be used in second LRRD evaluation phase in 2006.

The LRRD evaluation will complement the other themes in the TEC evaluation in order to present a comprehensive assessment of essential elements of the response to the disaster. Because of the size of the evaluation task and the number of evaluation issues related to the tsunami disaster response, and because of the problems to organise and finance a large evaluation in a short time it was decided by the TEC members to split the evaluation into six themes. They will each constitute a separate evaluation of an issue that is important to investigate and at the same time be part of the overall evaluation of responses to the tsunami disaster by the international community and national and local authorities. A synthesis report from all six themes will be produced at the end of 2005 (see section 7 below).

For the LRRD evaluation it is important to stress the *learning* aspect, which is very much about modes of planning and operation. It is desirable to have conclusions and lessons learned from the tsunami disaster that may be applied to similar situations in the future. Hopefully, studying this theme may also give insights in problems currently emerging in the tsunami countries and operations and an opportunity to identify remedies if considered necessary.

The possibility to report on the results of interventions – the *accountability* aspect – is particularly important in view of the magnitude of the disaster and the massive response it created. This is a main reason for the TEC evaluation programme and the plan to produce a synthesis report before the end of 2005.

Because linkages are the subject for this theme in principle all possible actors and their operations should be included. Also the immediately affected people are actors from the evaluation point of view and their roles both as beneficiaries and as actors – with their own ‘LRRD projects’ – should be given special consideration in the study.

The actions of the national and local governments will be analysed in the evaluation including their domestic, political role. In the context of the tsunami disaster the bilateral and multilateral donors have multiple roles: as conventional development cooperation partners, as humanitarian actors both in the tsunami disaster and previously in connection with the internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as donors to international and possibly local NGOs, and in varying degrees as responsible representatives

for their own citizens hit by the wave or the earthquake. The international NGOs are important actors as well as the local NGOs or community organs, which have mixed roles as implementing agencies, beneficiaries and political lobby groups.

Involvement by the national governments and by local evaluators in the planning and execution of the evaluation will be very important for this theme in order to capture this range of perspectives.

The LRRD evaluation will be limited to Sri Lanka, Indonesia and, possibly in the second stage, to the Maldives. The obvious reason to include the first two countries is both the magnitude of the impact of the disaster and the number and range of actors involved. The reason to later include the Maldives is that the damage incurred was substantial in relation to the size of the country and its vulnerability to natural disasters.

Approach and methods

The evaluation will concentrate on five aspects of linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development:

1. Livelihoods: Were actions taken relevant and effective for preserving and restoring livelihoods in the short and long run? To what extent have local people been consulted and involved in the rebuilding of livelihoods? Beyond the immediate rescue phase, how appropriate have their interventions been in rebuilding and strengthening sustainable livelihoods in the longer term? Were environmental aspects considered?
2. Human rights: To what extent have agencies adopted a rights-based approach in their interventions? How have they supported different population groups (whether socio-economic, according to age and gender, ethnic group or religion) and how have they taken these into account in their design of relief and rehabilitation programmes after the tsunami? How have protection aspects been upheld during the period after the tsunami?
3. Linkage to development and poverty reduction: Were actions explicitly planned or implemented in relation to development plans? Were immediate and medium-term actions taken which limit future options? To what extent have agencies explored and understood underlying patterns of vulnerability when designing their relief and rehabilitation programmes? How has the institutional set-up and organisational culture of agencies promoted or hampered their ability to adopt and integrate both a short-term and long-term perspective in their response to the tsunami?
4. Risk reduction: To what extent are risk management and vulnerability reduction incorporated into rehabilitation plans and strategies? Are those measures commensurate to perceptions of risks and to changes in livelihood conditions?
5. Conflicts: How have the on-going conflicts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka influenced the design of the immediate and medium-term response? How have agencies dealt with the uncertainties these conflicts pose for

development work? Has humanitarian assistance been provided impartially according to need?

The evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as well as appropriateness, coverage and coherence shall be used. The applicability of these criteria may vary between the aspects mentioned above and should be discussed in the inception reports (see section 7 below).

Information shall be collected through interviews and other forms for data gathering from individuals, families and communities belonging to the affected population, from national and local authorities, from local and international NGOs, and from bilateral and international donors. The inception reports shall propose ways to select sources and reasons for such proposals.

The various actors' selection of channels for interventions, including the private sector, for relief and rehabilitation as well as the forms for implementation shall be described and assessed regarding how they affect the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development.

Stakeholders, particularly local communities, shall be involved in the evaluation process when it is possible to do so.

Careful documentation of the field work is needed in order to facilitate follow-up in the second part of the evaluation.

Consultants

The evaluation shall be carried out by one policy level team and two separately procured teams in Sri Lanka and Indonesia respectively. The task for the policy level team is to analyse documents and, if necessary, interview representatives from a selected number of donor and international NGOs at Headquarters on the issues listed above and in section 5. The task for the country teams is to particularly analyse the LRRD issue from the intended beneficiaries' point of view. Specific Terms of Reference for the three teams are given below.

Both the policy level team and the local teams shall produce reports from their specific studies.

3. The Indonesia study

In addition to the aspects mentioned above, special attention in the Indonesia study shall be given to the following issues:

- a) the possible influences from on-going conflict in the country on immediate relief and on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation;

- b) the problem of meeting the immediate housing needs through a large number of temporary dwellings and the construction of permanent dwellings (the Master Plan says 100,00 new houses are needed);
- c) the emergence of the idea of the coastal protection zone and what effects the zone concept may have on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation;
- d) the obvious pressure from the affected population on donors and other actors to deliver support and its effect on plans and implementation;
- e) how the views of the immediately affected population may have been incorporated in the relief and recovery processes;
- f) the interplay between national and local authorities and international aid organisations and its possible effects;
- g) the impact on plans from the fact that the area is one of the major earth-quake prone areas in the world;
- h) the effects on the rehabilitation process the lack of skilled workers (many perished in the disaster) and the effects on the local economy from the relief- and rehabilitation activities.

Consultants for the Indonesia study

The evaluation team in Indonesia shall comprise three or four persons with experience from evaluation of or research on development projects or programmes. The team members shall have documented ability to collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data from fieldwork and to present findings in a comprehensive report. The team shall have excellent knowledge of Indonesia, extensive experience of working in the country and the majority of the team must be fluent in local language(s).

The team shall have very good knowledge about livelihood, environment and human rights issues, and be able to apply solid gender and poverty perspectives to the study. At least one of the team members shall have good knowledge about humanitarian and disaster relief.

One of the members shall be Team Leader and be responsible for the report and for organising the field work. The team shall make all necessary contact with relevant authorities and organisations. The field work shall, whenever possible, be coordinated with other TEC evaluations.

4. Timetable and reporting

The following timetable applies to the first part of the evaluation, which will be carried out during 2005.

Month	Activity
August	Procurement of consultants
September	Inception reports; TEC Workshops; preparatory work in countries included in the evaluation
October	Field work
November	Draft report(s); dissemination of preliminary results
December	Input to the synthesis report; final report
January-February 2006	Dissemination; reparations for the second part of the LRRD evaluation

Prior to the start of the field work each team shall submit a short inception report. The report shall comment on the ToR, propose a detailed plan for the field work and subsequent analysis of data and, if deemed necessary, propose amendments to the original ToR. The date for the respective inception report will be specified in the contract with each team.

The first part of the evaluation will be summarised in a report in English, not longer than 40 pages (excluding annexes), including an executive summary of maximum 1,000 words. Each team shall produce reports from their specific study. A draft of the report must be submitted before 25 November for use in the summary LRRD report and subsequently for TEC key messages report to be written during December 2005. Further details about form and delivery the teams' draft reports will be specified in the contract for each team.

The teams are also required to propose a brief plan for dissemination of preliminary results, with due consideration to involvement of stakeholders.

The second part of the evaluation will take place in the latter half of 2006. Terms of Reference for that part will be formulated during the first quarter of 2006.

ANNEX 2: LIST OF PERSONS MET

NB! Some names have been shared confidentially with Sida in order to protect the respondents.

Name & Contact Details	Organisation and Functions	Sex	Place	Date
Mr H.M. Herath Abeyweera	Ampara District Government Agent	M	Ampara	21.10.2005
Mr A.W.M. Fahim,	District Support Officer, UNDP	M	Ampara	21.10.2005
Mr A Male, mid forties	Village leader, Muslim Settlement	M	Savodaya Puram, Pottuvil	22.10.2005
Ms B Female, late fifties	Widow (from tsunami), Muslim Settlement	F	Savodaya Puram, Pottuvil	22.10.2005
Ms C Female, early forties	Married, owner of bungalows, Sinhalese Neighbourhood	F	Arugam Bay	22.10.2005
Mr D Male, mid-forties	Fisherman and Castrol agent, Sinhalese Neighbourhood	M	Arugam Bay	22.10.2005
Ms E Female, mid-forties - and nephews	Widow (husband died 3 weeks before tsunami), Tamil area	F	Pottuvil	23.10.2005
Ms T. Murugan Female, early thirties - and husband	Teacher, Tamil area	F	Kumari	23.10.2005
Mr F Male, mid thirties	Farmer and fisherman, Muslim Settlement	M	Former conflict area, 10 km inland of Pottuvil	23.10.2005
Female relatives of the above Sister Mother Neighbour	Un-employed, day-workers, Muslim Settlement	F	Former conflict area, 10 km inland of Pottuvil	23.10.2005
Mr G Male early thirties	Office assistant, Sarvodaya Office	M	Pottuvil	24.10.2005
Mr N.M. Noufar	District Secretary, Local government, DS Office	M	Pottuvil	24.10.2005
Mr Clarence Sutharsan	District Manager, World Vision	M	Ampara	24.10.2005
Mr A.W.M. Fahim	District Support Office, UNDP	M	Ampara	24.10.2005
Ms Teija Lehtonen	Country Coordinator, Finnish Red Cross	F	Colombo	26.10.2005
Mr Sunil Dissanayake	Chairman, Sri Lanka Red Cross	M	Ampara	26.10.2005 (telephone)
Ms. Nihar	SEC GALLE Project	F	Galle	
Ms. Savithry		F	Galle	
Ms. Ranjani		F	Galle	

Ms. Hasana		F	Galle, Muslim Community	
Mr. M.H.M Miflal		M	No. 13/4 2 nd Lane Katugoda Galle	
Ms. S. Maralya	Help-O Project, President	F	15/14 CGR Wattle Dewata Kahyoda helpogh@wow.lk 091 – 4300121 091-5450027	
Mr. B.H DaSILVA, Mrs. Premanitha		M	Salzburg village	
Ms. Tikiri Hanadige Premadas		F	445/12 Matara Rd Devata, Galle	
Ms. Asoka (32 years old, married)		F	Galle	
Ms. Ahil Riyanta (38 years old)		F	Gunsekera Housing Project, Galle	
Mr. A Sivaswamy,	Jaffna Government Agency		Jaffna	
Mr. P. Senthilnathanan	Additional District Secretary Jaffna		Jaffna	022 – 222 7900
Members of agencies working in Livelihoods	Meeting on Livelihoods organised by Tafren Colombo and Additional Government Agent – 24 October 2005		Jaffna	
Mrs. Mary Regina Jesu	Ilai Camp	M	Thumpalai East	
			Thumpalai East	
Mr. A.J. Jaya Seelan	GA Assist. Divisional Secretary	M		
Mrs. Robin Arulsulan Mary Flora (25 years old)		F	Manatkadu	
Mr. Thirunavukarasu (56 years old)	Arasady Camp	M	Maradangani Division, Jaffna	
Mr. K. Eesparapatham	Assistant Director, Planning	M	Uduthurai Camp, Marathankerni Division	
Dr. Saroja Sivachandran	Director, Women's Development Organisation	F	Jaffna	
Mr. Saman Jayasekera	District Secretary's Office, Assi, Director Planning	M	Galle District	21.10.2005

Mr. Asoka Jayasekera	Govt. Agent . Galle District	M	Galle	22.10.2005
Mr. M.G Gunesiri	Technical Officer, Galle	M	Galle	
Ms. Director	Director, Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) Galle	F	Galle	22.10.2005
Ms. Esty Sutyoko	UNOCHA/ Galle GA's office	F	Galle	23.10.2005
Ms. Emily	Galle Project	F	Galle	
LTTE Representative	Planning Office, Manalkadu	M	Jaffna District	26.10.2005

Focus Group Discussions were held with Beneficiaries in the following places in the Galle and Jaffna Districts:

Nelum Pokuna, Galle District
Kattugoda, Galle District (Muslim minority community)
Vallahanduwa, Kattupolwatta, Galle District
Siribopura, Galle District
Devata, Galle District
Hikkaduwa, Morakolla Camp, Galle District

Ellai Lane, Tampalai East, Jaffna District
Point Pedro, Jaffna District.
Manalkadu Jaffna District
Arasady Camp, Marudankerni, Jaffna

ANNEX 3: EVALUATION PROCESS PHASES

The evaluation process was divided into four main phases:

- | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| • Preparation | August/September |
| • Sri Lanka research phase | October |
| • Analysis and drafting | November /December |
| • Finalisation | January/February 2006 |

Preparation phase

The preparation phase consisted of a TEC briefing and discussions with the Sida synthesis writer in Geneva (7-9 September 2005) and a briefing in Stockholm (4 October 2005). An **Inception Report** was prepared and presented to Sida and TEC stakeholders, outlining the specifics of the evaluation in September.

Sri Lanka research phase

Field work in Sri Lanka took place from 10-30 October 2005, with qualitative interviews conducted between 17 and 28 October. The team was divided in pairs during some parts of the field work:

October

- | | |
|--------|---|
| 10 | First pilot testing of quantitative questionnaire |
| 13 | Pilot test of second version of questionnaire |
| 17-19 | Arrival Colombo of non-Sri Lankan team members, team meetings, field preparation; visits to TAFREN and the Swedish Embassy. |
| 14 -25 | Translation, printing and preparation of the quantitative survey. |
| 20-25 | Team 1: Ampara – Data collection and interviews: population including IDPs, private sector, government officials, UNDP. |
| 21-23 | Team 2: Galle – Local officials, UN, NGOs, population including IDPs |
| 24-27 | Team 2: Jaffna – Population, IDPs, local NGO officials. |
| 26 -27 | Team 1: Colombo - meetings and telephone interviews and follow-up |
| 28 | Team debrief, including revisiting Swedish Embassy. |
| 29 | Early morning departure for non-Sri Lankan team members |
| 25 -30 | Quantitative survey interviews undertaken |

Despite the umbrella of the TEC, the evaluation experienced some constraints when arranging meetings, and in particular when seeking access to LTTE-controlled areas due to the absence of a local ‘host organisation’.

Analysis and preparation of draft report

The phase following data collection included further analysis of findings from field studies and preparation of the draft report. In order to ensure coordination with the TEC, the team leader prepared a summary of key findings for the Indonesia team leader, who

participated in the 21 November meeting in London. The team leader participated in the meeting in Brussels on 10 December.

Delivery of first draft report: 25 November.
Comments to draft: 15 December

Finalisation

The team leader and core team will integrate comments and corrections, and finalise the evaluation report. A debriefing meeting took place in Sweden in January 2006, involving participants from the other LRRD sub-studies, thereby facilitating the exchange of key findings, lessons learned and recommendations.

Delivery of second draft report: 13 January
Delivery of final report: February.

ANNEX 4: QUALITATIVE RESULTS BY DISTRICT

Galle District

Galle District has a population of approximately 990,000, of whom 14 percent (138,000) were affected by the tsunami. Nearly 26,300 households were displaced, representing 11 percent of all families, with 230,000 people displaced on 26 December 2004. Initially, over a quarter of those affected were housed in 185 welfare centres (69,000 people.) The tsunami claimed 4,331 people's lives, of whom only 1,194 were identified, and over 300 people were injured.

The GoSL's relief and recovery programme consisted of an income recovery grant of Rs. 5,000 per household per month; a grant for kitchen utensils of Rs. 2,500 per household; food coupons valued at Rs. 375 per person/month; a transitional shelter programme; a permanent housing programme; and a livelihood programme.

Livelihood and Development Activities

In Galle District alone, the livelihoods of over 36,000 families, or 16 percent of the total number were negatively affected by the tsunami. Livelihood recovery programmes were to consist of boat and fishing equipment provision, micro-financing, provision of venues for street vendors, provision of bank loans under low interest rates, the provision of tools and equipment, and training programmes.

Several people affected by the tsunami and residing in temporary shelter and permanent houses gave the evaluation team feedback on their situation immediately following the tsunami and at the time of the evaluation, in October 2005. A Muslim community outside of Galle consisted of approximately 25 families. Ms. Nihar, a 38 year old and her family (husband and four children) lost their home and livelihoods in the tsunami. During the first two weeks following the disaster, the family was housed in a school, after which they were provided with a tent. Relief consisted of food provided by the GoSL, and payments of Rs. 5,000. Ms. Nihar's husband had been employed selling cinnamon wood, but had not worked since the tsunami. As a daily wage earner, he had no "job" to return to following the tsunami. In a housing scheme developed and financed by individuals (Sri Lankan citizens in and outside the country). The family was composed of a woman, her husband, and two children. The youngest child had died during the tsunami at 18 months of age. Ms. Nihar's husband was related to a Sri Lankan army official, and had continued employment as a driver in Galle. During the initial period following the tsunami, the family had received two sums of 5,000 Rs. from the government, in addition to additional sums and coupons for food each month. The food and cash coupons had finished at the time of the interview,

Ms. Savrithy, a neighbour had a husband and one infant. She and her family had rented their home prior to the tsunami and were therefore ineligible for permanent housing. Instead, the family had been

provided with tented housing immediately following the tsunami, and were currently living in temporary housing. Both Ms. Savrithy and her husband were day labourers and were willing and able to work; however, Savithry complained that men needed jobs. She and her husband were interested in starting a small business, but there had been no assistance forthcoming. There were three sources of support: UN Habitat for house construction, the Galle Project, and the local Muslim community. However, with the exception of the local mosque's assistance, she felt that much of the money intended for tsunami victims throughout Sri Lanka was 'going into the pockets' of the organisations. She also spoke of land issues, including disputes between political parties.

Another neighbour, Ms. Ranjani had been employed making embroidery flowers and breakfast foods for sale on the roadside. After the tsunami, she was no longer employed due to lack of funds for purchasing materials for the flowers. Ms. Hasana, another female neighbour had been employed making paper bags before the tsunami but had not worked since December 2004.

Mr. Rasik was married with four children, three of whom were in school. By October 2005, he had started to build his house, although before the tsunami, he had lived in a rented house. He and his wife had received grants of Rs. 5,000 twice, in addition to cash and food coupons since February 2005. The government had promised the family 100,000 Rs but only 50,000 had been received in April. The family had been provided with a kerosene stove, and was purchasing kerosene for cooking fuel.

Ms. Sithi Malya had three children. She had received two payments of Rs. 5,000, although she has heard of other families who have received the payment three and even four times.

In a housing project known as "Salzburg Village" 22 families had been relocated, the first of 85 to receive permanent houses.

Mr. BH and Ms. Premanitha da Silva had moved into a two-bedroom house a week before the evaluation visit. Their family had consisted of six people before the tsunami struck; their youngest child of 18 months had been washed away by the wave, leaving one teenage son (19 years old) and two younger school-age children. The eldest child was working part time as a driver of another person's vehicle, while the others attended school. Immediately after the tsunami the family resided in a school; however, as Christians, they explained that they had not received food from the local temple as most other neighbours had. Within a few weeks they have moved to temporary shelter, and begun receiving food and cash through the coupon system.

Although Ms. Premanitha had been a fisherman before the tsunami, the family now earned a living selling cooked chick pea snacks. Ms. Premanitha continued this job, with her husband providing protection while she sold the snacks. His boat was destroyed during the tsunami, and on occasion, he went fishing on another person's boat. Mr. BH

spoke of others who had received boats, but because of “personal issues”, he felt he had not received one. In other words, some people were better placed to receive the boats, whereas he was not a person with influential friends and therefore did not receive a boat or other fishing equipment.

The family received payments of Rs. 5,000 three times, along with government coupons for cash, food and ‘Samurdhi’, a form of government welfare for the very poor. The family had also received some furniture (a plastic chair and table), but not all that had been promised. According to Mr. BH, some people got several pieces of furniture, while others got nothing.

The family had been traumatised after the tsunami and the loss of their youngest child, and were grateful for the opportunity to live ‘far away’ from the sea. The Austrian-funded housing scheme was several kilometres from the coast, a fact that nonetheless appeared to trouble the family in terms of increased difficulty and cost to reach their former workplace. A bus to town took up to 20 minutes, and cost five rupees per person, increasing the cost of purchasing food for the family and for their business. If the family took a three-wheeled taxi to church, the cost was Rs. 150. The family was planning to set up a shop near their new home to sell their snacks to reduce costs and increase income.

According to the managers of the Salzburg project, the housing scheme had been developed by a local NGO, supported by the city of Salzburg, Austria and Kurier Aid, an Austrian relief and development organisation. Obstacles with land, building permits, and building design had been overcome with diligence and persistence on the part of the staff, and considerable time spent ‘developing good relations’ with government partners. The land was granted to the project by the GoSL in May, and an architect had been hired to design the permanent houses. Prior to being allocated with a permanent house, residents of a temporary housing camp (tents) had been interviewed to determine whether they were authentic tsunami victims and to determine both their needs and desires. The resulting houses were well-designed, and adapted to the situation, albeit within the guidelines established by the GoSL. People living in temporary houses were provided with training and later recruited to assist with house-building, in addition to bicycle repair and brick making. As regards brick making, the machines were offered by an NGO.

At the time of the evaluation visit, 22 families had moved into their homes. Septic tanks had been purchased for the remaining houses and were waiting to be buried. Water quality was good, and water was provided by wells to a central overhead water tank for the housing development. The evaluation noted that only a few houses had tiles roofs, while most were covered with asbestos sheeting. According to the managers, the land allocated for the housing development had been particularly swampy and snake-infested, and considerable efforts had been required to stabilise the soil before building began. At least 200 truckloads of soil had been dumped on

the side to build up and dry the land prior to building the houses. As a result, heavy tile roofs were thought to be unsafe because of the risk they posed of causing the houses to sink. In a few cases, tile roofs were used on reinforced concrete basis, but overall, asbestos sheeting was determined to be a safe and reasonable alternative. The roofing sheets had been painted, sealing them and avoiding exposure by residents to asbestos.

In order to complete the work in a timely way, the managers had employed eight different contractors, giving each about ten houses to complete within a six month period. Two contractors had been employed for painting, two for frame construction, and three for roofing.

Ms. Ashoka, 32 years old, and her husband, who was a fisherman, spent the first two days after the tsunami in a Buddhist temple. Afterwards, the couple moved to a relative's house, and later were provided with temporary shelter constructed in a small camp by the government and the JVP, a nationalist political party. In total, 99 people resided in the camp, of whom 32 were children. Ashoka and her husband had resided in the temporary shelter for four months at the time of the evaluation, and with the beginning of the rainy season, the floors were beginning to flood. So far, no other assistance from NGOs had been forthcoming, and the political party had not offered to provide them with permanent housing. The land on which the temporary houses were built had been leased by the JVP for one year. According to Ms. Ashoka, the people who had built the temporary shelters had not been back, and no news had been forthcoming regarding where the community would go once the lease expired.

According to Ms. Ashoka, very few relief agencies had provided support to this community: UNICEF had provided a mat, lamp, soap and sanitary supplies to her family soon after their arrival, and a group of tourists who had returned after the tsunami had rebuilt the school. Of the residents of the 18 temporary houses, five families had rented their homes prior to the tsunami, and were therefore ineligible for permanent housing. As a poor fishing community, none of the residents had owned their own boats prior to the tsunami, and instead had worked on other people's boats.

During the first months in the tents and later in the temporary shelters, both women and men had occasionally worked as day labourers, earning cash, mainly to clean debris along the coastline. This work had ceased some months prior to the evaluation, and no additional support had been given for livelihoods. In Ms. Ashoka's viewpoint, most assistance to fisherman had been given to people who had previously owned boats. As a day labourer, her husband had not fished since before the tsunami, and now that the monsoon has come, he and his neighbours had missed the main fishing season.

According to Ms. Ashoka, a fishing cooperative or 'committee' existed. She explained that most fishermen were asked to join the cooperative, which was a prerequisite to receiving assistance. She felt

that if people joined the cooperative, they were in fact disadvantaged, since assistance was provided on a “priority” basis. In other words, the ‘big shots’ got the boats, motors and nets first, while the others waited their turn. She explained that having an ID card was the key to getting something – those without an ID (and many had lost them in the tsunami or never had one) got nothing.

Women were employed as day labourers, mostly in construction rather than fishing. Women also produced *coir*¹³ before the tsunami, but the industry had stopped since there were no longer the necessary conditions: a space to work, raw materials, and a shelf to store the fibre. No assistance had been offered to the women to restart their coir production or other livelihoods.

Ms. Anil Priyantaya was 38 years old, and married with three children. Her new house, completed in early September and replacing the house that had been washed away by the tsunami, had been built with funds from a private donor, Kushil Gunsekera (the manager of Sri Lanka’s most famous cricket player). Anil lost her parents and her family’s ‘100 metre house’¹⁴ during the tsunami. The new house had two rooms and a living area, but no kitchen, since it had been built before the housing standards had been determined. The housing project aimed to construct 400 houses; so far 150 had been completed and were occupied.

The family had stayed in a temple during the first days after the tsunami, later in a school, and then with friends. While waiting for the house to be built, they had rented accommodation and finally, two months earlier, had moved to their new home. They had received three instalments of Rs. 5,000, and food and cash from coupons every fortnight. UNICEF had provided the local school with books, and the government had provided basic furniture to all families. On the day of the evaluation, cupboards were being distributed to the entire neighbourhood.

Ms. Anil’s brother lost his wife, but both of his young daughters had survived. Before the tsunami struck, he had been employed by the Petroleum Corporation in Galle. He was still working there and planned to move to Galle town and settle there with his daughters in the near future. Like most people who had survived the tsunami, he and his children were still afraid of the ocean, and did not want to live close to it. Over the months there had been several rumours of a tsunami coming, and they had run from their homes on numerous occasions in the middle of the night in fear of another wave. He felt that disaster preparedness would have helped relieve their fears, but there was, as yet, no warning system in place.

The Sewalanka Foundation had also been active in this hard-hit area, providing support to the very poor. For example, 40 houses were being built for those who had been renting houses and had lost

¹³ “Coir” is a handmade coconut fiber rope

¹⁴ House standing within 100 m of the water

everything. Since GoSL policy did not provide a housing alternative for these people, the foundation had specifically targeted them. In addition, ten three-wheeler taxis had been provided to some needy community members. Others who had lost everything had received Rs. 50,000 cash grants to begin businesses, while those who had some capital had received Rs. 5,000 for establishing the means to sell fish. Women had also been provided with sewing machines.

Jaffna District

As a result of the tsunami, 949 people died, 128 children were orphaned, and 1647 people were injured. An additional 390 people were missing. According to the 10 October 2005 situation report¹⁵, of 3,493 boats available prior to the tsunami, nearly 1800 had sustained some damage, 1500 were completely destroyed, and only 195 were unaffected. Nearly 1400 new boats were thus needed to replenish the shipping fleet.

According to Mr. A. Sivaswamy, Assistant Director of the Jaffna District government, a 200m security zone had originally been identified, and all construction banned in the area immediately bordering the ocean. The “buffer zone” had since been reduced to 100m. Both of the largest buffer zones were located on the eastern side of the district. Where state-owned land was available, there were fewer land issues, although physically moving people to new sites, especially those far from the ocean, had been difficult. Where no state land was available, private land had been identified, but the availability of sufficient land was limited, especially in heavily populated areas. Bottlenecks were created because of complex land tenure questions, and a myriad of legal tangles arose regarding the identification and purchase of privately owned land.

The tsunami relief response was been carried out under a Presidential Task Force and thus was considered to be of the highest political importance. At central level, rehabilitation efforts were being carried out under the supervision of Tafren, the main tsunami relief coordinating body, aimed to facilitate work between line ministries, the donor community, NGOs, and civil society for both housing and livelihood restoration. At the time of the evaluation, numerous donors had offered to provide funding and other support for housing and livelihoods development in Jaffna District. Meetings had been held in all of Jaffna’s affected sub-districts to determine housing needs, and the information had been relayed to Colombo where a master plan had been developed in October 2005.

The GoSL had provided grants to people to rebuild homes on their own land, with funding from the World Bank, the Swiss Development Corporation and the Red Cross. The grants consisted of Rs. 200,000 (provided in four instalments) for families whose houses were completely destroyed and Rs. 100,000 (provided in two

¹⁵ Tsunami Information Unit, District Secretariat, Jaffna, Tsunami Tidal Wave 26 12 2005, Jaffna District, Situation Report 10.10.2005, Jaffna: October 2005.

instalments) for those with partially-damaged houses. According to the district government officials, the number of people who had applied for grants was ‘not encouraging.’

Estimates of damage and needs for both housing and livelihoods had been carried out in several phases, and teams had included a technical officer from the government and representatives of both the affected communities and the donors. Village Rehabilitation Committees had been established to coordinate recovery activities at the community level, and to communicate on behalf of the large number of affected people. For landless people (i.e. those renting their homes or living as squatters prior to the tsunami), the immediate solution was to provide temporary shelter. The district government had made efforts to identify land for them, and in some cases, landless families were being provided with permanent housing. Those affected by the conflict were also eligible for some support by on-going programmes to promote the return of peace and security following the cease-fire.

According to Tafren, cash-for-work activities were still in progress while the ILO was establishing an information system to further identify livelihood needs for targeting purposes. According to Tafren, the ILO information system was going to be able to provide specific data on livelihood needs and resources available to meet them. Most existing income-generating activities consisted of cash-for-work programmes, aimed at providing cash to individuals in exchange for unskilled labour (mainly to clean up debris and use rubble to create pathways in tsunami-affected areas.) According to Tafren, the new master plan, which involved donors, NGOs, banks, and Chambers of Commerce, in addition to the government, was a comprehensive blueprint of proposed activities, individualised for each affected district. The master plan also provided estimates of damage, requirements for the rehabilitation/reconstruction of schools and health facilities, and required water, sanitation, road and railway infrastructure.

Despite the availability of adequate funding, and the involvement of a large number of donors and NGOs for the construction of permanent housing and restoration of livelihoods, the Jaffna District government indicated that little progress had been made to date. Difficulties in completing permanent housing included the dearth of building materials such as timber and pipes, in the northeast, and obstacles related to the procurement of materials from the south, and their delivery to isolated and insecure areas. Purchasing cement had been particularly troublesome, due to the high cost of transporting the commodity to rural areas. Coupons covering the cost of cement had been distributed to people for house repairs, but were found to be insufficient to cover the additional costs of loading, off-loading and transporting the cement to building sites. Road infrastructure was inadequate to handle large, heavy delivery trucks, and needed considerable development before deliveries of materials could take place. Skilled labour was in short supply and agencies involved in reconstructions were “lining up in a queue” for construction workers.

Other issues negatively affecting the reconstruction of damaged houses and the construction of new permanent housing included insufficient water availability and the subsequent need to develop new sources, the absence of sanitation facilities, and the lack of infrastructure for supplying electricity, especially in remote areas. In many coastal areas, the water from shallow wells was no longer potable due to high salinity, and deeper wells were required. In new zones, water sources and sanitation facilities were non-existent and considerable work was needed to develop adequate water and sanitation systems for large numbers of resettled people. Permanent house plans included electrical wiring, but few rural areas had sufficient infrastructure to connect these houses to electricity suppliers.

In terms of livelihoods, Tafren managers from the central level claimed that “all issues have been resolved as regards fisheries.” According to the District officials, however, only 250 boats had been distributed, with an additional 1000 boats under construction and slated for completion by December 2005. Some NGOs had distributed low-interest loans for business development. It appeared, however, that there was some confusion regarding the actual role of NGOs and donors in livelihood recovery, in part due to the continuing presence of relief agencies and their involvement in both relief distributions and development-oriented activities. Some local NGO staff complained that relief NGOs were actually blocking development programmes. They expressed concern that as yet no monitoring system was in place to review and report on progress in the field. According to one NGO, “Anyone can walk in with money and set up an activity.”

Criteria for receiving supplies, equipment and cash were not uniform, and fears of increasing dependency on relief agencies were expressed, particularly in the absence of a clear definition of “rehabilitation”, and the lack of guidelines for distributing resources for development initiatives.

The competency and efficiency of relief agencies in Jaffna District to carry out development activities were also called into question. One local NGO cited an example of international NGOs placing boat construction orders in Colombo, when the Chamber of Small and Micro-enterprises in Jaffna had identified six local boat manufacturers. The common practice of distributing goods and equipment to ‘those most affected by the tsunami’ although initially successful in meeting people’s urgent needs, had resulted in a small number of tsunami survivors receiving three or four boats, while others had received none. In many cases, boats were distributed by NGO’s without motors, nets or other fishing equipment, and thus lay idle near the recipients’ temporary shelters. Displaced people who were relocated to areas several kilometres from the coast had no means of storing their boats close to the shore, and were afraid to leave them far from their homes. These boats too were not yet in use.

The evaluation participated in an October meeting on livelihoods held by Tafren, the Ministry of Fisheries and the district government in Jaffna, and attended by the representatives of approximately 20 local and international NGOs. Participants of the meeting called upon Tafren to establish a monitoring system to assess and report on progress in achieving development objectives, accompanied by a form of accountability. Participants also expressed the need for the monitoring system to be 'independent' and 'competent,' and to report information to government officials, local and international NGOs and beneficiaries. They expressed their concern that beneficiaries of livelihood development activities were insufficiently involved in decision-making. Needs assessments and subsequent monitoring systems needed to be 'bottom-up' and include the voices of those most affected by the activities, in order to ensure that the needs and desires of affected communities were given due consideration.

For some actors in rehabilitation, the restoration of livelihoods had not been clearly defined. For example, although boats, motors and fishing equipment were vital for the restoration of the fishing industry, other assistance, such as technical advice on marketing, and training in financial management were also needed to improve livelihoods, especially for people affected by decades of conflict. The evaluation team received complaints that within the largely "relief mandates" of many agencies, support to livelihoods consisted merely of distributing materials and equipment to replace those that had been lost during the tsunami. Since the livelihoods master plan had just been completed, it was apparent that many so-called livelihood activities had indeed been carried out in isolation, without consideration for external factors affecting livelihoods such as markets, infrastructure, labour, and skills.

The evaluation met representatives from a Japanese NGO¹⁶ that had worked in Jaffna district before the tsunami in the areas of small-scale fisheries development. The NGO was continuing its efforts after the emergency to train people in improved fish conservation methods. Instead of drying fish in the traditional way, on the ground, a new system had been introduced, using drying trays to improve the quality of the product and to reduce losses. Business management, marketing and the transportation of products to markets, however, continued to be major issues confronting fishing communities, and requiring training and guidance.

Livelihood Activities

Ms. Mary Regina Jesu, a resident of Thimpalai East had been a resident in a transitional camp prior to moving to temporary shelter. Ms Jesu had moved so many times in the past 19 years, particularly between 1986 and 1997 as a result of the conflict, and most recently, because the tsunami had destroyed her home, she "couldn't remember how many times her family had relocated." A number of NGOs were building permanent houses and Ms. Jesu expected hers

¹⁶ Need Reference from Darini

to be completed by next year. Although owning a house prior to the tsunami was a requirement for receiving a permanent house, Ms. Mary had heard of one NGO that had developed a housing project for landless people who had lived within 50 m. of the ocean.

Ms. Jagadisvary, a 35 year old woman and mother of two had been married in 1998. Her family had been given refuge in a school immediately after the tsunami, where they resided for almost four months. In order to begin classes for school children, the temporary residents had been forced to leave the school in May 2005. For one month, while awaiting the completion of the temporary shelters, she and her family had shared a house with a family whose home had not been damaged. Ms. Jagadisvary's husband, a fisherman, had owned a boat and fished with his brother before the tsunami struck. Although his brother and fishing partner had died in the tsunami, he and several other fishermen had joined the fishing society/association. As part of this group, they were provided with 10 nets and a boat. The ownership of the boat was unclear, but Ms. Jagadisvary's husband and his nephew were permitted to use it occasionally.

In addition to distributions of food and cash, and two grants of Rs. 5,000 from the government, the family had received a small loan from the fishing society. However, it was impossible for the family to pay back the loan, which had become the source of much anxiety for Ms. Jagadisvary. The family had been promised a house by the government, but Ms. Jagadisvary was unsure when it would be ready. She mentioned that she and her husband would have preferred to receive cash and build their house themselves, but this option was not offered to them. She told the evaluation team that no one had consulted the affected families and asked their opinions about the houses being built. She and her family were afraid to return close to the ocean, and felt that the government should build a boundary wall to prevent further destruction in the event of another tsunami.

Ms. Robin Mary Flora, 25 years old, had also been housed in a school, and moved into the temporary housing camp in April 2005. Her husband had gone to the west coast, where he was from originally, to find work while she stayed in the temporary shelter with her brother-in-law and his family. Although she and her husband and his brother's family had been promised new houses, she had no idea when it would be ready. Although Ms. Robin felt that everyone was treated the same, in terms of relief assistance, she admitted that people with influence were able to get more things and to receive them faster than others. For example, the fishing association had prepared a list of families in need of supplies and equipment, including boats, motors and nets. Criteria for receiving assistance as a matter of priority included losing family members, losing one's home, being below the poverty line before the tsunami, and losing a boat and nets. Although these criteria were considered when items were being distributed, she felt that the most important criterion for receiving something was a person's social status in the community. She had heard of cases in other temporary shelter camps

where people who had never had a boat had received a boat, and believed this was a result of social hierarchy rather than need.

In terms of household items, most of the household's few possessions (a plastic table, two plastic chairs, some sleeping mats and pots and dishes) had been provided by the TRRO, although CARE and ICRC had provided a few essential items. In terms of livelihoods, women had not received much help yet, although she had heard of some receiving training in sewing and weaving. A few months prior to the evaluation, sewing machines had been offered to a few women. Families had also been given one bicycle, which was an important item considering the considerable distance of the camp to the nearest town.

Mr. Thirunavukarasu, age 56, his wife and five children resided in the same temporary camp. Two grownup children were working in public transport, while the other three attended a nearby school. The family had been employed exclusively in fishing, but there had been no opportunities to fish during the June – October season. Because fishing opportunities for many fishermen had decreased, he noted that the price of fish had risen locally. However, he and his family did not eat fish unless they caught it themselves so they were not affected by fish market prices.

The family had owned a brick house that had been completely washed away. They now resided in a two bedroom structure made of some cement walls, plastic sheeting and thatched roof panels. It was unlikely that the house would withstand violent winds or rain during the coming rainy season, but the family was hopeful that permanent housing would be available before then. The TRRO had promised the family a permanent house, which was to be built quite some distance from the coast. Although the family realised that lack of access to the ocean would make fishing somewhat difficult, all family members desired to be away from the ocean.

According to Mr. Thirunavukarasu, the relief and development assistance was provided fairly to all residents of the temporary housing camp, and was generally based on need and relative losses. Like most people, he felt that those who had lost family members were most in need of assistance because the support systems they had relied on had disappeared in many cases, and the losses of family members, as opposed to houses or boats, were irreplaceable. He knew of families who had never had boats who had received boats and some who had had boats not receiving one because the supply was finished. Food and cash coupons had been distributed regularly since a few weeks following the tsunami, and were much appreciated, but they were due to expire at the end of October. He said the family was concerned that none would be forthcoming.

Overall, they felt that although assistance for the recovery of livelihoods and housing was available, it was much too slow, and there was too little information. No one knew what would happen next – when the permanent houses would be ready – when assistance

would be available for getting jobs, when Mr. Thirunavukarasu, would be able to go fishing again, etc. The family was very worried that food coupons would end, and there would not be enough money to purchase food.

According to the director of a women's development NGO in Jaffna, the large number of international NGOs and huge sums of aid money for the relief operation had brought confusion and, during the period of rehabilitation and development, fostered considerable aid dependency in the northeast. Coordination between international agencies and local NGOs and associations was practically non-existent, and very few consultations or information-sharing sessions had taken place since December 2004. For example, local NGOs were not provided with information on international agencies' and NGO's plans for tsunami relief and rehabilitation. In the Director's opinion, the entire relief operation appeared to be largely non-transparent. Although partly due to the sheer size of the operation and the high number of actors operating on the ground, the lack of coordination was also due to a considerable degree of resistance to joint planning and implementation. The need for NGOs to claim credit for activities and to justify agency expenditures to donors prevented information sharing and collaborative programming.

The criteria for distributing relief items were often inappropriate, especially when the 'most affected' people were over-targeted with unnecessary goods. At the same time, some needy affected people received relatively little, and were still awaiting assistance to address basic housing and livelihoods concerns. In addition, the Director felt that the choice of items and services provided by international NGOs were often 'supply-driven' and based on donations or expatriate's preconceived notions of local needs rather than on culturally sensitive needs' assessments. As a result, many of the items that were distributed were either inappropriate or unfamiliar to beneficiaries. Several agencies gave the same items to the same people, and even in October 2005, there were warehouses with large quantities of relief items that had not yet been distributed.

Due to the lack of information provided to affected people regarding plans for recovery, and items for distribution, people tended to accept whatever was given. Many did not know if they would receive anything – their main sources of information regarding relief benefits and programmes appeared to be rumour and hearsay.

International NGOs paid much higher salaries than local NGOs, and local staff were leaving local organisations and joining international NGOs to benefit from higher pay scales. Locally, people suspected that a large portion of the donations for tsunami victims actually went to pay the salaries and living expenses of foreign relief workers. Many Sri Lankans were not convinced that expatriate aid was essential, particularly in light of the high level of education in Sri Lanka and the availability of a strong, trained, and competent workforce nationwide.

Ampara District, examples from interviews

One of the districts visited by the team was Ampara. With over 10,000 killed and over 100,000 displaced, this was one of the hardest hit districts. The respondents spoke quite openly with us, including making some pretty forceful accusations. Some of them were also fearful of repercussions for themselves or their family. Out of respect for these security concerns, we have chosen not to mention their names, nor the names of their villages/camps. Meanwhile, in the interest of maintaining proper documentation we have, in an unpublished annex, provided Sida with lists of the proper names and sites linked to the examples of respondents' stories as described below.

Before the Tsunami, Mr X lived in Site 1 with his wife, six children and one grand-child. He owned a bullock cart which he rented out along with a driver he employed. He also owned a few cattle, some chickens and a house worth Rs 8 lakhs. In addition to his income from the cart he grew some paddy, fished a little and did casual labour, mainly for various branches of the defence forces. A Muslim, displaced by the conflict in the 1990's, he saw himself as a person of some status and volunteered with a local NGO as a way to repay to the community that helped him when he arrived. He particularly noted that this included the Sinhala segments of the community.

Mr X's family members were spared but all their material possessions were lost, their land degraded by salt and of their 300 neighbours who lived in village, 118 were lost. Immediately following the Tsunami, the army evacuated many people to camps further away. Those who remained gathered inland on a hill (57 households, 226 people). After a couple of days, the women and children remained there while the men gathered materials from the rubble of the village to build temporary shelters on own and government land (site 2).

A private contractor from New Zealand tried to get them to give up the land so that he could gain land for a tender for housing. Following approaches to local authorities by the villagers he gave up and went elsewhere.

The village approached the military to get assistance getting road access built. An officer brokered a deal between the villagers, a local Sinhalese hotel owner, some foreigners living in the hotel and the military. The villagers identified an appropriate route, the hotel owner supplied bulldozers, the foreigner some cash and the military engineering staff and/or materials.

The people started a nursery school after a week. This school is still running and received some cash support from a local NGO to cover the teacher's salary for the initial month.

NGOs came and gave assistance mainly through the distribution of relief goods. No one went hungry or lacked medical attention in the first few months.

Later several NGOs approached them about transitional shelters. Realaid Lanka (formed by a Sri Lankan commercial real estate agency) supplied the first 57 houses. The houses were transitional but of good quality. They were built by labourers paid by the NGOs, fed by the villagers. The people had not been consulted on design and were unhappy that the construction was not safe against burglars, forcing them to maintain a constant guard, e.g. in situations where they had to attend funerals. The windows of the house were covered by plywood, and the doors had good quality locks, the roof made of palm leaves was where he feared burglars would enter. Interspersed among the transitional houses were huts of a very temporary nature.

There were multiple water tanks throughout the area supplied by IOM, ADRA and Al Corai. A number of wells were being dug but distribution was corrupt as demonstrated by five (5!) wells being dug on a single household's plot of land.

The financial side of the building activities were managed by the brother-in-law of the local maulawi (assistant priest in the mosque) who came into contact with the NGOs as he owned the hotel at which they were staying.

Following the completion of the first 57 houses new people were moving into the area and Hilfswerk Austria were in the process of completing an additional 56. Mr X was extremely angry that Tsunami affected people were being bypassed by others who were bribing the triumvirate of the contractor's supervisor, the contractor's compiler of lists and the Divisional secretariat's compiler of lists (to date 37 households out of the original 57 had received houses). Mr X did not dare protest too loudly about what was going on due to fears for his own and his family's security. In the initial two-month period when the military was in control such things did not take place, they began when control reverted to local authorities.

Mr X claimed that the building of houses resulted in the influx of people who were not tsunami affected. They bribed the NGOs and are now getting houses, boats, etc. Talking about this made Mr X very aggravated. He said that if he would not lose everything he would be ready to shoot them! Then he brought out a new rifle he had bought after losing his army weapon and sat with it for a while during the interview! Mr X claimed that only a little of the aid goes to the tsunami affected – the rest to the people with money. The responsible persons said it was because assistance was earmarked to particular people.

Mr X also said that most of the new houses went to Tamil families, only two to Muslim. He feared to raise the issue as the contractors were Tamil and might have LTTE connections. On the other hand he said he had good friends among the Sinhalese. He helped them before, and they helped him now. In spite of these tensions he said that relations between ethnic groups were almost as before the tsunami.

While Mr X did not feel that there was discrimination between ethnic groups, he believed that relatives of owners of tourist hotels are positively discriminated across all communities.

Mr X said he had no means of income today, but the appearance of himself and his 10 person family indicated that they were well off, which to some extent raises questions about his sincerity in that aspect.

Mrs Y., a relative of Mr X, came from the same village as he did. Prior to the Tsunami, her family owned two houses and she had six children. Her husband was a paddy farmer, working on rented land. She lost her husband and four of her children including her two sons. Immediately after the event they were brought to temporary camps. She is currently surviving on government food stamps, dry rations, and a monthly stipend of 250 Rs. She had also received a one-time grant of 15000 Rs for the funeral expenses. Of her two remaining daughters one, a 25 year-old was mentally retarded. Her grandchildren were a boy of 10 and a girl of five years.

World vision, ADRA, Al Corais are providing for water to the camp. She had received clothes but stated that the food money was not enough. Her relations provide some extras when they can afford it. She is hoping to get transitional shelter in the form of a house. However, the planned building in the area is now completed so this will be difficult to get. This difficulty is even greater as the local contractors expect bribes to allocate her housing.

Currently she makes no cash income, though this would be possible with a small capital input. She believes she could make a living if she could access a sewing machine, (but she did not have on before), some chickens or cattle, or the kitchen utensils necessary to process paddy. Because she did not have any income, no-one would loan her start-up capital. Her daughter could work with mat weaving but this is currently difficult to do given the small size of the shelter that they are living in. The hut the 5 member family live in, is build of primarily local materials with dirt floors, walls of cloth and rattan and palm leave roof. It was build by the community organisation. The whole family lives, sleeps and eats in an area of about 10 m2. She claimed she could only get World Vision house if she had bribe-money for the local contractors.

Mrs P. is a Singhalese woman in her mid-fourties. She was a well-established cabana owner (at site 3) prior to the tsunami. She estimates that she lost buildings and materials to a value of 50 lakhs. She used to have a big house, some cabanas which she rented and she also ran a small shop.

Immediately after the Tsunami she and her family walked 9 miles to safety, gathering at the house of the local health inspector which is located on high ground. Everybody's prime concern at that point was to find out if their families, neighbours and friends were safe. Once that was clarified, the second priority was to know about their house and land. Third priority was knowing about safety. "Food and shelter were unimportant; we needed answers to our questions. I could not eat before I knew what had happened with my family."

Later they were transferred 18 miles to a camp housed in a school where they stayed until the tenth of January. During the first few days they received cooked food from local villagers. After four days they received kitchen utensils, from the Red Cross, and then distribution of dry rations began. They were then transferred to the temple. In both locations they received everything they needed in the form of local donations from people living in the surrounding area, commercial enterprises and local NGOs.

During the first couple months after the event of the military was in control. In this period everyone received what they needed from whatever resources were available, including local shopkeepers distributing stock. Nevertheless, the situation immediately after the event was made worse by looting and stealing. These activities were mainly organised by quote local boys unquote.

Following the repair of the local bridge, the military handed control of the situation back to the civilian authorities. Up to this point there had been neither discrimination nor complaints of bribery. In the post relief period, following the re-establishment of civilian control, assistance came to focus more on transitional shelter and livelihoods. She had herself not benefited from any of the shelter activities. She was concerned that the distribution of assistance for livelihoods, primarily the distribution of boats, had not functioned well with some people receiving several boats some receiving none and little linkage between profession prior to the Tsunami and assistance received. In her opinion shouting, following officials around, and bribery governed who received boats, that were even given to people who did not know how to use them.

In January, she borrowed of five lakhs Rs from business acquaintances with whom she had well-established payment records. With help of these she rebuilt seven cabanas. These were done by the tourist season in July August and although this was a slow season with about 50% less tourists most of which were of the budget kind, she still managed to repay two and a half lakhs by the end of September. The skills that she used to accomplish this were skills she had developed prior to the Tsunami mainly skills related to managing a rental business and cooking. In the reconstruction process she got a lot of help from friends and business acquaintances.

Building material prices went up but she managed to get most things cheaper by cutting out the middlemen. Labour charges rose from 300 Rs per day to 500 Rs per day plus food. Her estimate is that local

prices are approximately 160% of Colombo prices. In her opinion the differential between the prices in the capital and local prices has increased mainly due to the change in the financing picture: prior to the Tsunami most people made cash payments, after the event purchases are made on credit.

Since the tsunami there have been three major warnings of new tsunamis. She no longer felt safe to continue living where she lives and is attempting to purchase land in a safer area beyond the protection zone. Land prices in such areas have gone up significantly rising from two and a half lakhs to six lakhs.

Mr V., who is Singhalese, was a quite successful businessman prior to the Tsunami. He owned three fishing boats, crewed by other fishermen on a profit-sharing basis. The system implied that he as owner had to cover costs and the minimum income even on days without catches or with small catches. If there were profits, 30 percent remained with the owner and the remaining 70 percent were shared equally among the three crew members. Of his former nine crew members three are still with him, one has received his own boat and the other five are crewing with other boats. He also has one employee helping with the store.

He was also the local distributor for Caltex, and several other brands with a focus in the fishing equipment sector. Mr V. had lived in the area for 28 years but had his family in a different part of the country.

He had received a one boat from a local bank. The boat was not the quality that he expected, and he was therefore selling it intending to buy a better one. Furthermore, the government had taken his three motors away for repairs, they had been gone for 8 months, but he had now been informed that he would be getting them back within weeks (as of late October). Overall there were more boats in the village now than before the Tsunami, though many remained in people's houses rather than being used. The going price for a bribery to get a boat ranged from 50 to 75000 Rs. The value of the boat was 300000 Rs and the bribe needed to be paid to the contractor assigned to distribute boats.

Mr V. had rebuilt in this business with help of his wife's family, his own savings, and pawning his wife's jewellery. He had received some roofing materials as assistance to help rebuild his shop.

There was a fishing cooperative before but he was not an active member. After the tsunami it broke down as people left to live in camps etc.

Mrs U still lives at the site where she stayed prior to the tsunami. A widow, who lost her husband a week before the tsunami, she has five children of which four sons. The children are aged 26, 24, 22, 20 and

18. She and her family survives on the products of their vegetable garden, which she sold to wholesale businessmen from Pottuvil. Her house is located approximately 200 m from the beach. The area was flooded by the Tsunami and while the monsoon crop was lost and some salinity remains it was not heavily damaged. Her house was flooded with about one foot of water.

Pre-tsunami in the price of land in this Tamil village was 5 to 7000 Rs per acre it s now risen to about 10000 Rs per acre due to resettlement from affected areas mainly Komari. The land is irrigated from a well. She estimates that her economic situation is slightly worse than that of other villagers. She harvested two vegetable crops and one paddy crop each year. In addition she grows bananas for subsistence purposes, due to salination the growth of the bananas has slowed. Per

Although her home was not damaged seriously by the Tsunami she has received a transitional shelter, ie an additional house for her daughter's family as the household was estimated to be overcrowded. Out of the 25 chickens she used to have, three remain. There are 35 households in the village, none were fully destroyed, but they still received a total of 27 new houses from the IOM. In the initial survey made by the RDS, she did not receive any house, as she was deemed not to be sufficiently tsunami affected. With help of relative she complained and got a house. There are tensions about distribution within the village. It is her nephew who has dealt with the authorities. Close to the village an additional five houses have been built for five households that have moved into the area also by IOM.

There is no formal organisation in the village where social networks are dominated by family and neighbourly relations.

Many NGOs came to help distributing food, clothes, money. She estimates that her life has become better following the Tsunami mainly as two of her sons have got jobs as labour with NGOs active in the area.

Of 27 houses built in the village, only 19 were planned initially. The other eight were built following complaints from the village to the appropriate authorities and the re-visit to the village by a government official. The village collected 500 Rs to pay for his transport costs in order to make possible for him to come to the village to make the new survey. The villagers themselves did not regard this as corruption, merely as a necessary payment in order for the government official to be able to come.

Small children the village are still afraid of new tsunamis.

Mr M.M.Noufal, Divisional Secretary of Pottuvil has been three years in his present position. PRE Tsunami the main part of his work had to do with the documentation and documents of a legal nature, as well as coordinating government activities in the district.

In the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami the Divisional Secretary focused on the situation for the affected people primarily focusing on food and shelter. The government spending limit for a meal for a person was 12 Rs which was insufficient. His office was completely damaged as was his transport and he was on the road moving around in tricycles working with his mobile phone. The relief support received during this initial period came mainly from private individuals and local NGOs. As more and more NGOs moved into the area many bypassed the government structures.

Meanwhile the Divisional Secretary was working with a staff of seven or eight as compared to his pre-sunami level of 30. After about two weeks the remaining members of his staff started to return, having spent the intervening time taking care of their families and immediate personal needs. In the intervening period the Divisional Secretary worked with his existing staff members and the Grama sewaka, i.e. the system of village level government representatives.

The behaviour of the INGO was varied: some bypassed the government completely; some made their plans and came in to get them approved by the Divisional Secretary. In his estimate the relief staff of the INGOs knew what they were doing and had a good understanding of the situation. In this phase he was especially happy about the activities of private individuals and local NGOs. Asked what advice he would give to a colleague in a similar situation he responded that he would emphasise the importance of local authority representatives meeting, in particular the Divisional Secretary and the grama sewakas. In his opinion a lot of duplication occurred and some affected people were missed. Prior to the Tsunami there were no significant inter-community tensions and none appeared in the period immediately after the Tsunami either.

After the initial relief dominated period, work refocused upon the challenge of replacing emergency shelters with transitional shelters. In this phase the INGOs became more present and started constructing transitional shelters. Some of these shelters were built on people's own land some were built on private land as negotiated by the Divisional Secretary and some were built on government land. During this period there was no inflation. However, since then labour costs have gone up from 350Rs to 700Rs and building material prices have also increased.

During the second phase The Divisional Secretary is particularly proud of the fact that so many local individuals and groups came to help. There were complaints that the rice from the WFP was not liked as it was foreign, and that the mix of the food packets was not good e.g. 50 kilos of rice was distributed but only 20 kilos was needed and the price of rice fell. These were, in his opinion, good signs showing that everybody was reached as people could not complain about quality prior to having their basic needs fulfilled. He noted that the government efforts were not addressing the needs of the non-affected poor.

In terms of advice for colleagues concerning the second phase, he again re-emphasised coordination but also mentioned that some of the non-food items distributed were not appropriate giving examples of toothpaste and some other items, that could have been purchased locally.

In his opinion most beneficiaries were rational and did not tell the truth if they believed that lying would result in additional distribution. People changed their profession according to the incoming help: Today a fisherman, tomorrow a farmer – all as part of human nature. As a consequence there had been duplications in the field. It was therefore particularly important to maintain proper records within local authorities, for example distribution list. When asked about which of the NGOs did not coordinate he was reluctant to answer, but he could give examples on the condition that we did not pass these on.

Psychosocial support was not asked for by the affected people. No new NGOs had appeared post-tsunami.

In January discussions started with the government agent regarding the medium-term activities. The focus of these discussions was how to satisfy the transitional shelters needs and medium-term welfare of the affected people. They were also discussions on livelihood interventions.

During this period cash for work was introduced as a way of working. The organisations involved made their own surveys and decided what they wanted to use the method for, presented their suggestions to the Divisional Secretary who would then approve them. He was not aware of whether good priorities had prevailed in this method. Cash for work involved a payment of 400 Rs per day.

He was unhappy that there were no funds for the reconstruction of his office although there was an unreleased budget allocation from earlier years for that purpose. He was also quite concerned by what he described as the government agent's lack of knowledge concerning the local conditions and the consequences that these had. He had been quite vocal in his opposition to some of the activities undertaken and in his own mind, as punishment, had been transferred elsewhere for a period of two months and then relocated back.

Asked what his main challengers for the future were, he responded:
1 main challenge was to reconstruct the office
2 second challenge is to ensure permanent housing for the affected people.

He commented on the buffer zone, noting that it had declined from 400 m to 50 m during the period April to October.

Mr Clarence Sutharsan was the World Vision operations manager/zonal director based in Ampara. In his previous position of

the organisation he had been based in Colombo with a technical responsibility nationwide. World Vision had worked 15 years in the country. Main activities have been sponsorship for children and area development. The organisation was focused on health, education, infrastructure, water and sanitation, and economic assistance mainly in the form of Micro finance. The organisation had been present in Pottuvil for five years. Prior to the tsunami it saw as its main challenge to implement its WATSAN activities while balancing cleared and uncleared areas. This referred to areas under or not under government control. Immediately pre-tsunami he was based in Batticaloa.

In the immediate aftermath he participated in the clearing of debris including human remains. Their immediate understanding of the situation was that Batticaloa was the only place hit by the disaster. World vision had rapid action groups which were mobilised, pre-stocked food in the district was released, and all the organisation's vehicles were sent to use in the clean-up and relief and rescue operation. They also supported the cremation of affected people. But priority was for all wounded. They then established cooking teams to supply cooked meals and moved for evacuated all the affected staff during the first two days.

World vision has a resource centre in near Pottuvil, to which 2000 families came and were looked after in a camp organised by the organisation. World Vision gave priority to families with sponsored children and their neighbours in the new locations where they were found. Out of 2800 sponsored children 45 were lost.

Asked what he was proud of in terms of the organisation's activities in the first phase he cited the activities of the local staff and the structural strength of an organisation that has been active in the area for a number of years. As an example of that structural strength he cited the fact that the maximum budget levels local managers could decide over were released by the national director normally any district manager can take decisions up to Rs 1.5 million and regional manager up to 2.5 million. The national director gave permission to exceed these limits. He also mentioned that staff only trained in flood mitigation rose to the occasion and provided remarkable efforts in this totally different and much more severe disaster situation.

Asked which mistakes were made he said: because we wanted to give everything we failed in some areas. He noted that the activities had not been sufficiently focused and had suffered from WV trying to do too much. This had consequences for example in terms of not meeting SPHERE standards for a water quality nor in the design of the transitional shelters. He was pleased with the existence of the standards, which he could use as a guideline. In Ampara 245 shelters are being brought up to standards.. He regarded the standards as clear and operational and therefore useful for him in the field. He also noted that without the standards the organisation would have settled with people being satisfied (as they were now) but with SPHERE they would even improve..

In his opinion of relief phase coincided with the government's definition i.e. lasted the first 90 days. The first internal discussions regarding the medium-term, within World Vision took place in February. Following the internal discussions contacts were made with other NGOs, primarily international ones, and the government. At this point government found it difficult to coordinate. In terms of resettlement they were not yet ready and did not give support. In terms of land rights thinking on land allocation had not yet fully developed and coordination was not good enough leading to duplications of land allocation. In terms of approval of programmes, this did take place – but the government simply approved anything proposed by any NGO.

In Ampara district world vision has no memorandum of understanding with the government regarding permanent housing. The government has proposed land too far inland where people do not want to move to. World Vision's strategy is therefore to support people who wish to build on their own land. So far they have identified 400 households where this is possible.

The buffer zone has been a problem as people received a Rs 250000 grant from the government to build a new house as long as they built outside the buffer zone. Some people accepted the grant and started building although they did not want to build inland on the land allocated. Today when the buffer zone has been changed and it is possible for them to build on their own land closer to the sea they already spent the grant and therefore have no means to build a new house.

World Vision's development activities are ongoing in 25 villages, 10 of these were affected by the tsunami. In the remainder activities are going on as before. Given the overload for the organisation following the activities initiated due to the tsunami, the country strategy has been revisited and is becoming more focused. The criteria for focusing are more geographical and less sectoral than before.

In his opinion more women and children died. If there are any guilt issues associated with this they cannot talk about.

In the eastern province the conflict continues and recently tension has increased. For him it is particularly difficult that the LTTE has split into several groups. This made operations difficult as he did not know which faction he was talking to when he spoke to a representative of the organisation.

When asked about consequences of lack of local knowledge among foreign experts he cited the example of water and sanitation activities based on cleaning water from a lagoon in which a number of people had died. This water was not drunk by people as they did not believe that the cleansing process was sufficient given the amount of corpses in the lagoon.

He thought that some of the transitional shelters activities may have contributed to increasing tensions as different organisations were using different designs, sometimes causing jealousy. Meanwhile distributions relief goods were equitable and had decreased tension.

He had no knowledge of Realaid Lanka or Hilfswerk Austrias activities, and had therefore not coordinated with them. He acknowledged that over-eager local WV “mobilisers” may have tried to convince people to wait for WV housing in stead of accepting housing from other NGOs.

Mr Fahim is on secondment to the government agent in Ampara as a district support officer contracted by the UNDP. He arrived in the district on the 26th of January 2005. Previously he was managing the disaster relief activities of the Sri Lanka Red Cross Society.

The main challenges for at the district government in the first month work:

1 coordination

120 INGOs were active in the district during the first month – “all wanting to do something quick”. They were not attending coordination meetings. Information management was a problem, a problem made more difficult by the high turnover of international staff, and a mutual lack of language skills

2 capacity of local government

There were three aspects of this lack of capacity. One was the language barrier as the managers of technical departments were not English speakers. Secondly no-one had experience with anything similar in terms of managing a disaster relief operation. Thirdly the material and systemic prerequisites were not in place. For example there was no access to the e-mails, mobile phones, transport, etc.

The UNDP disaster manager, (on secondment to the government agent to coordinate), had access to transport, could make assessments, and was qualified to summarise these in reports - and this significantly improved information management.

OCHA arrived in the district in March with two expatriate and two local employees. At this point in time the will to coordinate, among the INGOs, increased. This is partly due to turnover in staff, with more development oriented people arriving, and partly due to the increase in coordination capacity that the OCHA team represented. Also: as the immediate urge and need to react quickly slowed down, as the basic needs were covered – there was more time to plan and coordinate. The government was still not capable of fulfilling its coordinating role however.

Basically all relief needs were met, though there was duplication. Activities are still not coordinated well. This is partly due to the fact that there are no strict rules for INGO behaviour, causing only 60%

of them to coordinate actively. There is not even a rule that they must report what they are going. Even livelihood activities are not well coordinated.

What has helped the situation significantly is the establishment of a system of lead agencies where a number of the major organisations have taken upon themselves to be lead agency within a particular activity. For example the UNHCR is clearly coordinating transitional shelter activities.

Discussions regarding the transition from the initial relief phase to the medium-term rehabilitation phase were initially a reaction to the government's decision to open the schools. A byproduct of the evacuation of the schools, which was positive from the perspective of local authorities, was that the government was no longer obliged to feed the evacuees once their transitional shelters needs had been fulfilled. Local authorities and NGOs active in the area were then faced with the necessity of solving the shelter issue for the people that were no longer able to live in the schools. When trying to solve transitional shelter issues, the most difficult issue has been the land related issues. This has been more serious in the high population density Northern part of the district as in the southern part as less land is available in the north.

Following the discussions about transitional shelters the next issue to be discussed was the issue of livelihoods. Water and sanitation issues also quickly became a priority.

Government staff worked diligently, and very loyally throughout the period. However, they lacked strategy and people without experience were appointed to coordinating bodies at Colombo level.

Discussions regarding the longer-term have been initiated, primarily in the fields of education, health and infrastructure. In the period April through June memorandums of understanding were signed by stakeholders willing to repair schools and hospitals. The progress in terms of permanent housing is still weak and this is a problem. Some of the delays are due to the land issues. Meanwhile NGO procedures, for example in terms of tendering, are also delaying things. The lateness in the construction of permanent housing has created a need for maintenance of transitional housing.

Conflict related tensions went down in the immediate aftermath. Immediately after the tsunami it was possible to travel even at night. Now tensions are increasing again and some NGOs are contributing to this process for example through skewed hiring practices.

When asked what advice he would give to a colleague in a similar position he responded that

- 1 there should be strict rules for NGO behaviour particular in terms of coordination and reporting.

- 2 additional staff should be assigned to the government agent at district level with the express duties of dealing with all documents

that need to be signed on behalf of local authorities. With the way the system works now the government agent was spending several hours a day signing papers that needed to be signed for formal reasons but could have been signed by someone appointed to do so had an appropriate officer been available.

3 the same should be applied to other levels of government in terms of managing formalities needed.


He also mentioned an example good practice regarding coordination. This was the system with lead agencies responsible for the various technical areas, who took upon themselves to coordinate the other stakeholders active in each field, and reported to OCHA on a by-weekly basis. OCHA could then compile reports and present them to local authorities in an understandable and decision-manageable fashion.

ANNEX 5: SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND QUESTIONNAIRE

The study was conducted in the Tsunami-affected areas using a structured questionnaire, which was designed on Tsunami related issues. The questionnaire was designed in consultancy with the LRRD assignment team leader and the rest of the expert team members.

The questionnaire was fine tuned after the qualitative observations of the team which visited Sri Lanka. As a result; the questionnaire has about 40% common grounds and 60% localized issues and aspects.

The English questionnaire was translated in Tamil and Sinhala. As per the WAPOR/ESOMAR and ISSC quality norms; both the questionnaires were reverse translated in to English by different set of translators to ensure the correctness of the content.



This questionnaire was administered amongst respondents in the Tsunami affected districts on the basis of sampling frame as mentioned in the concept paper. For example; in Sri Lanka the Districts of Jaffna, Galle, Ampara, Hambantota, Matara, Kalutara, Colombo, Gampaha and Puttalam were covered (marked black in the map).

		North Western	Southern	Western	Eastern	Northern	Total
District	Puttalam	30					30
	Hambantota		100				100
	Kalutara			90			90
	Colombo			100			100
	Gampaha			75			75
	Galle		140				140
	Ampara				200		200
	Matara		100				100
	Jaffna					80	80
Total		30	340	265	200	80	915

A detailed list of affected villages and the IDP camp was obtained in the selected district and 2 to 6 micro locations were randomly selected from that list based on sampling grid.

A sample was allocated for each village/camp and the respondent households were selected randomly from the Tsunami affected GN¹⁷s. As mentioned earlier, these GNs were also selected randomly within the Tsunami affected GN list maintained by the GN officer, the officer in charge of the division.

After the selection of the household; a routine kish-grid method was used to select the respondent; with listing of living and present members of the household. In households; where the main wage earner lost his/her life in Tsunami; the previous wage earner's occupation was recorded along with the present wage earner's occupation.

As most the questions were applicable on the status-research of the household instead of the individual; a replacement option was given within the same household; provided the respondent was not a minor.

In order to maintain the quality of the fieldwork and ensure maximum dispersion of the sample within the selected micro location the enumerators were allowed to conduct only a maximum of 10 interviews per day. Within a given macro location, the team leaders were advised to back check 10% respondents from the completed list.

The local teams used were already experienced in the field and minimum one team leader was appointed in a team of 5 researchers. In all about 50 odd

¹⁷ Grama Niladari Division, the smallest administrative unit approximately equal to a village.

researchers and 10 team leaders were in the field capped by the presence of two central observers in each location.

The initial EDP was done in Colombo and New Delhi with 20% back check of data entry. The final data scanning and analysis was done using the SPSS in New Delhi.

There are a number of blank spaces in the various tables. This means that the result is actually zero in that space. The yellow markings are only to highlight the important trends according to our observation. The "net" is there just to explore the data further; to see if it can make more sense. It is significant statistically only if it gives some more variable analysis; otherwise it's insignificant.

LRRD SURVEY OCTOBER 2005
CONDUCTED BY CVoter Foundation-Social Indicator
105, FIFTH LANE, COLOMBO 03, TP: 2370473

SERIAL NO:

HOUSEHOLD NO:

INTERVIEW NUMBER:

DATE OF INTERVIEW:	DD	MM	YY

INTERVIEWER:

NAME OF INTERVIEWER:
I hereby certify that all information provided here is true and accurate and has been obtained from the respondent as instructed.
<div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

INTERVIEWER: ALL STATEMENTS IN BOLD LETTERING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU AND SHOULD NOT BE READ OUT TO THE RESPONDENT.

Good morning /afternoon/ evening. My name is _____ and I represent CVoter Foundation-Social Indicator, a research organisation that conducts independent research on social issues. We are currently conducting a study to gather public perceptions and attitudes on various socio-economic issues. We would appreciate it if you could spend some of your valuable time to answer a few questions for us.

I hereby assure you that your views expressed will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your views will be combined with those of others so that no one will be able to identify who you are or your views on any issue.

SUPERVISOR:

NAME OF SUPERVISOR:
DATE OF BACK-CHECKING:
STATUS 1. VALID 2. INVALID 3. SUSPICIOUS
IF INVALID , STATE REASONS:
IF SUSPICIOUS , STATE REASONS:
<div style="border-bottom: 1px solid black; margin-bottom: 5px;"></div> SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR

- A. Can you please tell me the number of people living in this household who are between the ages of 18 to 65 years?

USE THE KISH GRID TO SELECT YOUR RESPONDENT

TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE	HOUSEHOLD NO									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1
3	3	3	2	2	1	1	3	3	1	2
4	4	1	3	4	3	1	2	2	1	2
5	1	1	5	3	2	2	4	5	4	1
6	6	4	1	5	4	1	2	6	3	5
7	5	2	3	1	7	7	3	2	6	4
8	2	5	4	1	1	3	5	4	8	7
9	3	4	6	7	5	8	1	9	2	5
10	7	10	8	3	2	4	1	6	1	5

- **MARK THE NUMBER OF THE CHOSEN PERSON ON THE GRID**

Can I speak to _____ (the person chosen through the KISH grid) please?

1. Yes
2. No –
 - i. Respondent is not willing to give interview **(MOVE TO NEXT HOUSEHOLD)**
 - ii. Respondent is not available

IF THE CHOSEN RESPONDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE SET AN APPOINTMENT TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW LATER.

Time check – 1	
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DEVELOPMENT

1. What did you lose and to what extent IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TSUNAMI CALAMITY? How would you rate the damage of the following IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TSUNAMI CALAMITY and to what extent?

				RATINGS
1	Loss of family and friends			
2	Loss of property / valuables	1	To a great extent	
3	Livelihood / job	2	To some extent only	
4	Personal trauma / mental health / frightfulness	3	Not at all	
5	Personal physical health / injuries / epidemic	4	Don't know/ Can't say	
6	Education of family members			
7	Local infrastructure in the area			
8	Day to day normal life			
9	I did not suffer any losses			

2. How would you rate the damage AS ON TODAY and to what extent?

				RATINGS
1	Loss of family and friends			
2	Loss of property / valuables	1	To a great extent	
3	Livelihood / job	2	To some extent only	
4	Personal trauma / mental health / frightfulness	3	Not at all	
5	Personal physical health / injuries / epidemic	4	Don't know/ Can't say	
6	Education of family members			
7	Local infrastructure in the area			
8	Day to day normal life			
9	I did not suffer any losses			

3. What was your main livelihood before the tsunami struck? (here we clearly want to know HOW did the household get CASH for day today living) If you were working for someone else, who?

Occupation	
1	Government Service
2	Private Sector Service
3	Small Scale/Self employed
4	Large Scale Business
5	NGO sector
6	Unorganized day labor
7	Housewife
8	Students
9	Unemployed
0	No Response

Part Time / Full Time
 1= Part Time
 2= Full Time

 3= Retired (with pension)
 4= Retired (without pension)
 5= Unpaid/voluntary

Sector	
11	Fisheries and allied workers
12	Tourism and hospitality industry
13	Agricultural sector
14	Construction related Professionals
15	Lawyer and allied profession
16	Technicians and Associate Professional
17	Police and Military
18	Education Sector
19	Health and Hospitals
20	Transportation
21	Communication/Media

22	Elementary Occupations
23	Banking & Finance sector
24	Other Professionals

4. What was your main livelihood immediately after the tsunami struck? (here we clearly want to know HOW did the household get CASH for day today living) If you were working for someone else, who?

Occupation	
1	Government Service
2	Private Sector Service
3	Small Scale/Self employed
4	Large Scale Business
5	NGO sector
6	Unorganized day labor
7	Housewife
8	Students
9	Unemployed
0	No Response

Part Time / Full Time
1= Part Time
2= Full Time

3= Retired (with pension)
4= Retired (without pension)
5= Unpaid/voluntary

Sector	
11	Fisheries and allied workers
12	Tourism and hospitality industry
13	Agricultural sector
14	Construction related Professionals
15	Lawyer and allied profession
16	Technicians and Associate Professional
17	Police and Military
18	Education Sector
19	Health and Hospitals
20	Transportation
21	Communication/Media
22	Elementary Occupations
23	Banking & Finance sector
24	Other Professionals

5. What is your main livelihood RIGHT NOW/ AS ON TODAY ? (here we clearly want to know HOW does the household get CASH for day today living) If you are working for someone else, who?

Occupation	
1	Government Service
2	Private Sector Service
3	Small Scale/Self employed
4	Large Scale Business
5	NGO sector
6	Unorganized day labor
7	Housewife
8	Students
9	Unemployed
0	No Response

Part Time / Full Time
1= Part Time
2= Full Time

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Sector	
11	Fisheries and allied workers
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15	Lawyer and allied profession
16	Technicians and Associate Professional
17	Police and Military
18	Education Sector
19	Health and Hospitals
20	Transportation
21	Communication/Media
22	Elementary Occupations
23	Banking & Finance sector
24	Other Professionals

6. Did your household also get cash by selling any of the following?

1 – To a great extent 2 – Only to some extent 3 – Not at all

	Before the Tsunami	Immediately after the Tsunami	As on Today
Sold fish/prawn/other aquaculture			
Sold agricultural products (rice, vegetables, etc.)			
Sold livestock products (cattle, milk, etc.)			
Sold forest products (fire wood, wild fruits, medicinal plants etc.)			
Sold other grocery /utility items			
Sold handicraft			
Others sold...			

7. Where does your household cash go? Buying any on the following?

1 – To a great extent 2 – To some extent 3 – Given free by government
4- Given free by NGOs 5- Not expenditure at all

	Before the Tsunami	Immediately after the Tsunami	As on Today
Food and related items			
Household goods (soap etc.)			
Clothes/textiles/shoes			
Fuel			
Labour for work			
Raw material for work			
Paid for education			
Medicines and related items			
Paid debts			
Others...			

8. What was your main problem IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TSUNAMI CALAMITY and where did you get the first help and the most help to resolve that problems?

1 – Government 2 – NGOs 3 - International Agencies
4 - Self Help Groups 5 - Community at large 6 - Friends / Relatives
7 - Political parties/representatives 8 – Religious groups 9 - Did not get any help

	From which groups did you get MOST help/support?	From which groups did you get LEAST help/support?
Getting access to medical help		
Getting access to food		
Getting access to safe water		
Getting access to shelter		
Getting away from conflict area		
Getting away from Tsunami area		
Rescuing people		
Cleaning up		
Arranging schooling		
Getting a job		
Finding/building new housing		

Saving/growing/rebuilding business		
Replacing documents lost (for example ID card, Land Title)		
Volunteering		
Any other, please specify		

9. What are your main problems AS ON TODAY and how are you managing to resolve your problems? What did your household spend time doing to deal with the situation during the LAST one month or AS ON TODAY?

1 – Government

2 – NGOs

3 - International Agencies

4 - Self Help Groups

5 - Community at large

6 - Friends / Relatives

7 - Political parties/representatives

8 – Religious groups

9 - Did not get any help

	From which groups did you get MOST help/support?	From which groups did you get LEAST help/support?
Getting access to medical help		
Getting access to food		
Getting access to safe water		
Getting access to shelter		
Getting away from conflict area		
Getting away from Tsunami area		
Rescuing people		
Cleaning up		
Arranging schooling		
Getting a job		
Finding/building new housing		
Saving/growing/rebuilding business		
Replacing documents lost (for example ID card, Land Title)		
Volunteering		
Any other, please specify		

10. Talking about the future of your livelihood; are you getting the help and support you need at the moment? Is it timely or too long a delay?

1. I am getting it right now immediately
2. Its on but only after some delay
3. Only after considerable delay
4. No one is taking about the future livelihood issue

11. Have prices come back to normal now?

				RATINGS
1	Food	1	To a great extent	
2	Medicines	2	To some extent only	
3	Emergency Relief Material	3	Not at all	
4	Housing repair material	4	Prices were always normal	
5	Seeds and fertilisers			
6	Petroleum based fuel/energy			

7	NON-Petroleum based fuel/energy			
8	General labour rates			
9	Household Consumer Goods	5	Don't know/ Can't say	

12. What kinds of natural resources does your household use?

Comment: We wish to know about different natural resources (land, water, forests etc.) that the respondent's household is/was using to make a living. For example if they used forests to collect timber or non-timber forests products (firewood, wild fruits, grass etc.), caught fish, grew rice, had cattle that grazed, cut grass as fodder or roofing material, collected wild fruits, sold timber, etc. It does not matter whether the household was consuming these things directly or if they sold them. We want to know this for the period before the Tsunami, for immediately after the Tsunami, and for today.

1 – To a great extent 2 – Only to some extent 3 – Not at all

	Before the Tsunami, which natural resources did your household use?	Immediately after the Tsunami, which natural resources did your household use?	Today, which natural resource does your household use?
Agricultural land			
Grazing land			
Timber			
Non-timber forest products			
Fishing water			
Water for aquaculture			
Drinking water			
Irrigation			

13. Compared to others in your village or local area, to what extent are your household's basic needs met? Use the following 5 keys

1. Well/with large surplus
2. Well/with surplus
3. Just enough
4. Barely
5. With great difficulty

<i>Compared to others in your village/local area, to what extent were your household's basic needs met before the Tsunami?</i>	
<i>Compared to others in your village/local area, to what extent were your household's basic needs met immediately after the Tsunami?</i>	
<i>Compared to others in your village/local area, to what extent are your household's basic needs met today?</i>	

14. If you have lost your title documentation, how are you proposing to recover your lost property (land)?

1. Copies of records with government offices
2. Affidavits in court
3. Testimony from local officials
4. Support from NGO's
5. Any other, please specify
6. I did not have any property
7. I did not lose my documents

15a What type of housing or shelter does household live in? Use the following key

Type of house			
1	Cadjan House (roof of coconut leaves)		
2	Wooden House	1. Before the Tsunami	
3	Cement or tiled House	2.Right after the Tsunami	
4	Temporary	3.As on Today	
5	Other		
0	No response		

15b What is the ownership type of housing or shelter that your household lives in?

Ownership of house			
1	Back in original home		
2	Community shelter built by government		
3	Community shelter built by community		
4	NGO organized shelter	1. Before the Tsunami	
5	Self constructed dwelling	2.Right after the Tsunami	
6	Rented shelter	3.As on Today	
7	Homeless		
8	Other		
0	No response		

16. IMMEDIATELY after Tsunami, which of the following agencies did talk to you/ consult with you/ took you in confidence; in order to make sure your participation in designing and executing the relief operations?

Did they talk, consult with you while the Tsunami relief operations? Did they take you in confidence for the relief operations?			
1	Government		Option
2	NGOs		
3	International Agencies	1. Yes; to a fairly large extent	
4	Self Help Groups	2. Yes; but only to some extent	
5	Community at large	3. No; we were never consulted	
6	Friends / Relatives	4. Can't say	
7	Political parties / Political representatives		
8	Religious Organizations		

17. AS ON TODAY, which of the following agencies are talking to you/ consult with you/ taking you in confidence; in order to make sure your participation in designing and executing the relief operations?

Did they talked, consulted with you while the Tsunami relief operations? Did they take you in confidence for the relief operations?			
1	Government		Option
2	NGOs		
3	International Agencies	1. Yes; to a fairly large extent	
4	Self Help Groups	2. Yes; but only to some extent	
5	Community at large	3. No; we were never consulted	
6	Friends / Relatives	4. Can't say	
7	Political parties / Political representatives		
8	Religious organizations		

Conflict and disaster risk management

18.1 Can you suggest anything that should be built back in a better way than before, so that instead of going back to the previous ways, some improvements can be made?

1. Earthquake/Tsunami proof housing
2. Better local infrastructure
3. Superior built-in emergency management system
4. Better disaster warning systems
5. Any other, please specify

18.2 What effect, if any, do you think that the Tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts to date have had on the peace process in Sri Lanka? Would you say that it has greatly increased the prospects for a peace agreement, somewhat increased the prospects, somewhat hurt/decreased the prospects, greatly decreased the prospects or had no effect on the prospects for peace?

1. Greatly increased the prospects for a peace agreement
2. Somewhat increased the prospects
3. Somewhat hurt/decreased the prospects
4. Greatly decreased the prospects
5. No effect on the prospects for peace

18.3 How about the effect of the tsunami on your own opinions about the NE conflict. For example has your sympathy for tsunami displaced persons made you more or less sympathetic toward those people who have been displaced by the NE conflict?

1. The effects of the tsunami has made me **more** sympathetic towards those displaced by the conflict
2. The effects of the tsunami has **not affected** my opinions about those displaced by the conflict
3. The effects of the tsunami has made me **less** sympathetic towards those displaced by the conflict

18.4 Overall, how would you describe your life today compared to what it was before the Tsunami?

1. My life today is about the same or even a bit better than before the tsunami
2. My life is worse today, but should be better soon
3. My life is worse today but it is not any worse than most of my neighbors.
4. My life is much worse today and I do not think it will improve any time soon.
5. My life is much worse today and I fear it may get even worse in the future

18.5 There has been a lot of discussion about creating a buffer zone in Tsunami areas where people will not be allowed to rebuild near the ocean. What is your opinion? Do you support or oppose a buffer zone or do you not have an opinion?

1. Strongly support
2. Somewhat support
3. Somewhat oppose
4. Strongly oppose
5. No opinion