



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

Links between relief,
rehabilitation and development
in the tsunami response

Indonesia case study

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition



March 2006

Evaluation of the Linkage of Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) Regarding Interventions in Connection with the Tsunami Disaster in December 2004

Indonesia Case Study



Mr Emery Brusset (team leader)
Dr Wartini Pramana
Ms Anne Davies
Mr Yashwant Deshmukh
Ms Susanne B. Pedersen
In cooperation with Team C Voter, Mr Robin Davies, Mr Tony Vaux

21 March 2006

This document has been prepared by Channel Research on behalf of Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit as a deliverable for the first phase of the LRRD TEC Evaluation.

Please address all correspondence to:

Ms Susanne B. Pedersen,
E-mail: Pedersen@channelresearch.com
Tel: +32 2 633 6529
Fax: +32 2 633 3092

channelresearch

19 Rue de l'Église St. Etienne 1380 Ohain Belgium
Tel +32 2 633 65 29 Fax +32 2 633 30 92
www.channelresearch.com info@channelresearch.com
VAT No 864 560 703

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report was commissioned by Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit to find out the consequences of the links in their objectives (or the absence of such links) that various actors have made between their relief and development operations, as part of their response after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2005.

These links are commonly known as the Links between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, or 'LRRD'. The aim of the study was to examine the extent to which LRRD takes place on the ground, captured through the perspectives of the people of Aceh¹. As stated in the mandate of the evaluation, "the immediately affected people are actors from the evaluation point of view and their roles both as beneficiaries and as actors – with their own 'LRRD projects' – should be given special consideration in the study."

The theoretical notion of linkages between different forms of aid is a remote concept for most people, with little bearing on how they see their needs being met in practice. The evaluation consequently reviews performance from their point of view, that is, of the 'gaps' (needs not met) and 'rifts' (in the fabric of society, where harmful effects arise from poor linkages) of the combined action of emergency aid, governance support (in particular human rights), development aid, and conflict resolution, in the tsunami-affected areas of Aceh.

The evaluation focuses not only on the impact of Swedish assistance but covers all actors, international and national, who responded to the disaster. It is complemented by a literature review, the 'LRRD' Policy study which focuses on agency planning, and the related LRRD case study in Sri Lanka, within the overall framework of the five thematic evaluations under the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). A Synthesis Report summarises the conclusions in these documents and some other relevant material.

The analytical framework of the evaluation uses three categories based on the main questions found in the terms of reference: economic issues (food, work, shelter and infrastructure), social (human

¹ The Indonesian nomenclature for Aceh Province is Nangroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD). This report will use the two terms interchangeably.

rights, social capital), and crisis related (natural disaster risk and conflict risk). This evaluation has situated livelihoods in the economic sphere.

Two data gathering methods were used: the first, qualitative, was based on semi-structured interviews in a targeted sampling of communities along the coastlines. This framed the design of the quantitative survey applied to 1,000 respondents selected through random sampling.

Findings on Economic Issues

1. At the time of the evaluation, the response to the massive earthquake and tidal wave devastation in Aceh and Nias was in transition. The main features of this transition are as follows:

- The population, those who lost family members, houses, belongings and livelihoods, as well as those who were not affected but saw their lives affected in myriad ways, are broadening their horizons and making new plans.
- Some people remain vulnerable and require sustained assistance while others are taking their own initiatives to rebuild their lives.
- The government and aid agencies are shifting their efforts to reconstruction and development, although relief aid is still being provided to those in need.

2. Although the recovery period has taken time to move into high gear, there are many reasons for proceeding slowly, perhaps the most important being to *get it right*. The Government of Indonesia, leading the process, will ultimately be judged by its own people less for slowness and caution than on the quality and sustainability of final outcomes, as demonstrated by an absence of ‘gaps’ or ‘rifts’ in the fabric of society and state.

3. In nearly all cases, international and national agencies helped rather than hindered early initiatives in responding to the tsunami disaster, providing structure, form and most importantly, funding, to the necessary relief. It overcame the problem of meeting the immediate housing needs through the initial provision of tents and – after a slow start – the construction of permanent dwellings.

4. Food aid was useful, but led rapidly to self-targeting, in other words food aid was used by the most destitute, those who did not have access to other resources. As much of the food production capacity in Aceh² was not affected, the evaluation raises doubts as to whether more food aid is needed. Considering the sufficient levels of production issues of entitlement and distribution instead become pertinent in determining food security.
5. Our survey shows that nearly two thirds of those who suffered in the tsunami have regained their livelihoods as small-scale traders, casual labourers or self-employed in agriculture and fishing. There is evidence of some success of cash for work initiatives (although coverage sometimes leaves to be desired, as in Lhokseumawe), because they contribute to increased economic activity and purchasing power.
6. As time goes by, however, the record of aid is becoming less clear. Forty percent of respondents affected by the tsunami say that they still have not received assistance for permanent housing. Delays caused by the imperative to 'get it right' (search for timber, planning delays) in the reconstruction of permanent housing, the initial decision of many aid agencies not to build temporary housing and individual preference of some people to remain on their land rather than move into temporary accommodation meant that, at the time of the evaluation, a great number of people whose houses were destroyed were still living in tents.
7. Apart from the prolonged misery of those still living in tents, people express in the questionnaires a perception that day to day life is as hard today as it was just after the tsunami, but certainly not worse, and for different reasons. Whether this perception is attributable to a belief in the uneven distribution of aid or to other factors is not clear.
8. At the time of the evaluation, property and work had become the top concerns of those most affected by the tsunami, bypassing bereavement as the earlier major preoccupation. As the economy grows on the basis of new opportunities, some groups are being left behind – among these female headed households and people who did not have a profession to return to, and received no assistance in the form of replacement assets (eg. permanent housing). The public social support system is not

² Aceh normally produces a food surplus for sale to other parts of Indonesia. {Goyder, 2005 ; ICASERD, 2005.

equipped to deal with this, and the responsibility falls on relief agencies and on the solidarity of neighbours, with a potential risk of perpetuating dependence. This could lead to a rift within and between communities in the future, which could be avoided by closer targeting of rehabilitation assistance to those in need..

9. People are generally aware of inflation, though they do not mention it spontaneously as a significant inhibiting factor in rebuilding their lives. Individual and group respondents attribute it more to the rise in fuel prices than the impact of the international presence. As usual, inflation acts as a regressive tax on the poor and further reduces their options.

10. Successful linkage between relief and development depends to a large extent on the existence of a district level planning/regulatory/arbitration body, reconciling information and claims between the population and aid actors, and allocating resources to strengthening institutions. The testimony of the population and of the agencies is that this intermediary presence is weak or absent in Aceh, posing a challenge to the re-launching of sustainable development. Even in key public sectors such as education the population expects less from the government than the international agencies. This is clearly one significant gap in the international effort, which has not been able to generate this mid-level planning. The evaluation did not evaluate the extent to which this has been attempted.

Findings on Social Issues

11. As yet there is no evidence of a rift in the social fabric as a result of the uneven distribution of assistance. Village solidarity is strong: If someone in need did not receive assistance, others pooled their assistance to share with the aggrieved party. More cases were heard of community self-help than jealousy or resentment within communities. Even in cases where other communities received more assistance, the little resentment there was, directed itself towards the implementing agencies rather than towards the respective community (even if in some cases hostility was expressed toward incoming populations). Sixty five percent of the respondents did not feel that there had been an increase in the gap between rich and poor as a result of the tsunami, while twenty percent perceived that this had been the case.

12. The strong sense of solidarity in Acehnese communities has not been fully capitalised in aid assistance. Cash for Work has created a mechanism for the population to generate income but it could undermine the sense of solidarity if it is not well designed to promote both paid work and volunteerism in the community.

13. A widening disconnect runs between the local leaders and the population, communities and NGOs, as well as between the government and the communities. Whereas in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami emergency assistance was provided by other Indonesians: neighbours, the Government and the Army, people's perceptions have veered towards a distrust of their leaders and belief that most assistance is being provided by international agencies.

14. The allocation of assistance, from the agencies to families, is hierarchical and codified. In some cases it is described by individuals in interviews as unfair, but there is no system of redress. The international agencies, largely due to their structural makeup, have not been able to get around to labour-intensive monitoring and follow-up, and tend to work with the administration and village leaders rather than in consultation with all stakeholders.

15. The information gap is very real and reflected in people's frustration at not knowing what is going on. There has evidently been a strong and consistent flow of information from the population, but not back toward the population – a feature that has been observed in other emergencies³. People lack information about reconstruction plans in their area. A large space is open to rumour and misinformation, and a growing distrust of foreign "NGOs" (which effectively covers every aid organisation that does not wear a uniform). This leads to the popular perception that the aid community and the public administration are inward looking and not sufficiently responsive to people's perceived needs.

16. NGO 'broken promises' were a recurrent theme in interviews. Some of these are evidently owing to a lack of information feeding downwards to communities, but others are most certainly due to the

³ *World Disasters Report 2005*, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

practice in highly mediatic emergencies of NGOs ‘staking out’ an area or community for reconstruction, then lacking the funds or capacity to follow through their intentions⁴.

17. Evidence from interviews and the survey on attention to vulnerable groups is conflicting. While in some instances there are agencies catering to the needs of the elderly, or handicapped, which were not present before the tsunami, in other cases there is an inability to penetrate beyond traditional screens of face saving, shame and social bias. Cultural sensitivity is not as complete as it should be to address intelligently the more hidden aspects of suffering in the society. This translates to unmet needs of people unable to express them, and of agencies unable or unwilling to dig deeper to find them.

18. The aid agencies have sought to obtain inputs from women, which is highly relevant, as the status and conditions of women in Aceh vary greatly across the region. In tsunami-affected areas women’s traditional roles have been changed mainly because those who lost male family members have been forced to cope on their own.

19. Evidence shows that the manner of gender consultation is in many cases not good. It takes place often through community meetings, whereas meetings in tents, barrack rooms and in the home are more conducive for seeking women’s views.

19. The aid agencies’ delay in promoting the livelihoods of women, irrespective of their marital status, increases women’s vulnerability to poverty as it prevents them from coping well with shocks in their life (for example unemployment, domestic violence, sickness or loss of male breadwinner in a household).

Findings on Risk Related Issues (Conflict and Disaster)

21. A wider dimension has been added to the tsunami recovery operation in Aceh with the implementation of the peace agreement⁵ between the government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka - GAM), ending over thirty years of conflict. The peace process is important because it links the emergency response to the possibility for development throughout the Province

⁴ idem

and allows the processes to move forward, whereas before, stalemate had been reached. The generous amount of funding dedicated to the tsunami recovery effort can be considered as an investment towards cementing the peace.

22. The tsunami was a triggering factor, rather than a cause, for the peace process. There are indications that contacts had been initiated before the disaster struck. The conflict peaked just after the international presence was felt and the peace effort got under way, and at the time of writing the latter's success was clearly linked to the rapid deployment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, agreed after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in Helsinki.

23. "Hikmah" is a Bahasa Indonesia expression denoting that in a catastrophe one can gain something good⁶. This expression is now frequently used in Aceh. The disaster shook people to their core (many said they thought the end of the world had come), but at the same time shook them out of the habits and despondency that war and poverty had created. Many drew from this a greater aspiration to peace, or closer family relations, or personal strength.

24. Most people in Aceh had never been in contact with aid agencies prior to the tsunami. Many people felt international exposure to be a *hikmah* of the tsunami. This allowed the humanitarian space in the affected areas to open up remarkably easily.

25. The main constraint posed by the conflict for aid agencies was their inability – due to Government prohibition – to enter areas in Aceh beyond those directly affected by the tsunami. This restriction on humanitarian space meant that the agencies could not assess whether or not other people in the province needed humanitarian assistance. Yet in order to operate in those areas obviously in need, they were obliged to respect the Government edict. The rules were clear, and people abided by them. However security risks for aid personnel could – and did – arise, as the conflict was active until at least May 2005.

26. Due to the earlier Government-imposed restrictions, the conflict-affected populations, particularly those in remote areas, are perceived by some respondents not to be getting material

⁵ Signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005.

⁶ *Hikmah* in Bahasa Indonesia means wisdom or philosophy. For example: *Jangan terlalu sedih. Ambillah hikmah kejadian ini*. 'Do not be too sad. Take what happened as a lesson'. *Hikmah* is related to Illahi, or Divine Wisdom.

assistance. This is creating a gap between the disaster victims and the conflict victims which, if not addressed, may have the potential of creating another conflict within conflict; between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. Interestingly, the survey indicates that this discrimination is not perceived to be politically biased.

27. Since the peace accord in August 2005, the parties to the conflict have reduced the practice of extorting money and goods from the population. There is every reason to expect that the money saved, as well as the additional revenue likely to accrue from the resumption of productive activity, possible due to people’s sense of increased security, will be re-directed to paying for goods on the market and thus returning to the mainstream economy. On the other hand there could be social tensions if the perpetrators of extortion are not provided with an alternative – legitimate – means of income.

28. The ‘peace dividend’ also brings the possibility of allowing local government to re-establish provincial and local taxation systems. Fair and functioning systems might in turn provide extra impetus to the macro economy and increase provision of government services across the province.

29. On the question of what should now be improved, almost 80% of the response indicated a need for earthquake/tsunami proof housing and better disaster warning systems. In some of the communities visited there now exist emergency warning systems such as teaching appropriate response behaviour to children in schools, use of the mosque as a clarion call to evacuate and move to higher ground etc. In Calang people said they had been advised by the mosque to move to higher ground immediately after the earthquake of 11 October 2005. In other areas respondents were not aware of any such initiatives.

Overall Evaluation Conclusions

- Despite the effect of the tsunami on macro-level indicators in Aceh, the economy is adapting itself reasonably well. Other factors stemming from the country-wide situation are having a greater effect, in particular, government policies on reducing fuel price subsidies.

- The rapid recovery in many respects shows that people's individual livelihoods strategies work while their relationships with aid agencies do not. This points to a need for the aid agencies to address these weaknesses.
- Beneficiary assessments of international aid reflect a gap in terms of economic expectations. These expectations mainly take the form of asset-replacement in the short-term. Respondents/beneficiaries and some aid agencies were generally more concerned with the speed of delivery of assistance, rather than taking the necessary time to *get it right*. The desire for fast results is a normal reaction, witnessed after most disasters and conflicts (eg. in the Balkans). It may be tempting to rebuild homes as fast as possible, but – despite the obvious drawback of prolonging people's stay in temporary accommodation – most aid actors recognize that coordinated planning for sustainable communities and sound economic recovery should take priority – and are taking the necessary time to do it.
- By assisting only tsunami-affected populations and not those affected by the conflict who have suffered chronic deprivations for many years, relief and recovery operations may be compromising long-term stability. This is especially important because the abundance of funds does not require selectivity. Yet the tsunami acted as a catalyst for the incipient peace process. The international effort fuelled the contacts and encouraged the process. The conflict resolution efforts of ASEAN and the EU are still entering public consciousness.
- The main gap between relief and development aims is defined by the population in terms of information flows, of redress mechanisms, and of linkages between NGO planning and long-term development. This 'missing link' is directly tied to the absence of a district level of dynamic administration with which the agencies and the population can work to reconcile issues and plan forward.

Recommendations

- Needs based planning, based on Humanitarian Codes of Conduct, must take into account all populations which demonstrate need (from disaster or conflict), notwithstanding the reason of the need (conflict or disaster), particularly at those times when security allows attention to war affected groups.
- It is vital to establish a public information feed-back loop system that reaches all population groups early on in disaster areas, to ensure that the population understands the nature of the relief, rehabilitation and recovery efforts, enabling them to influence their situation.
- Weakened by the disaster from both personal and institutional losses, it is clear that local government in Aceh will require a comprehensive upgrading of skills and a more professional understanding of delivering public services. There must be reinforcement, from an early stage by aid agencies, of meso-level government institutions (that is, at the District level) to consult and act as an information bridge with the population and aid actors, identify key obstacles in the design of long term solutions, and communicate these to foreign actors, the state, and the population. This could pull together community level initiatives and link them to provincial and national ones.


These and other recommendations are further elaborated at the end of the main body of the study.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRR	The Tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency
BRIMOB	National Police Mobile Brigades. Elite police force specializing in public order
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DINSOS	The Provincial Social Welfare Department
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
ERTR	Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery
ESOMAR	International Code of Marketing and Social Research Practice
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. Free Aceh Movement
GDI	Global Development Index
GDM	Gender Empowerment Measure
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GID	Gender in development approach
GoI	Government of Indonesia
HDI	Human Development Index
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre, Sumatra
ICASERD	Indonesian Center for Agro Socio Economic Research and Development.
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent

ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGO	International Non Governmental Organization
INTRAC	International NGP Training and Research Center
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
ISSC	International Social Science Council
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Muspika	Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan. Council of Heads of Sub-District.
NAD	Nangroe Aceh Darussalam
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ORC	Office of the Recovery Coordination
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia. Indonesia Red Cross
Posko	Pos Komando or Command Post, local coordination and support centres.
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPSS	Statistical analysis software
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TLC	Temporary Living Centre
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian National Army
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNIMS	United Nations Information Management Service for Sumatra
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAW	Violence Against Women
WAPOR	World Association for Public Opinion Research

WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Programme
WID	Women in development



The names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

ReliefWeb Map Centre - 11 May 2005

The red square markers indicate locations visited by the survey team

1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION

1.1 Mandate Given to the Evaluation

This report was commissioned by Sida's Department for Evaluation and Internal Audit to examine the consequences of the linking (or its absence) that various actors have made between relief, rehabilitation and development operations (LRRD), as part of their response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2005. The aim of the study was to examine the extent to which LRRD take place on the ground, captured through the perspectives of the population of Aceh.

LRRD is generally considered to be a vague concept and it is difficult to arrive at a universally-agreed definition. One way of explaining it is: 'integrating short-term perspectives and meeting immediate needs, with longer-term perspectives in support of the development process'⁷. This follows from an earlier line of reasoning that: 'Better 'development' can reduce the need for emergency relief; better 'relief' can contribute to development; and better 'rehabilitation' can ease the transition between the two'⁸. In the Terms of Reference for the evaluation LRRD is described in the following manner:

'At a minimum, what is being done at the initial stage should not harm later efforts for recovery, or at least possible negative effects should be consciously diminished, while still retaining the primary, operational objective of saving lives. If possible, humanitarian efforts should make a contribution to recovery and development processes and reduce the risk of future disasters'.

Coverage is not restricted to the impact of Swedish assistance but includes all international and national actors. The analytical framework of the evaluation uses three categories based on the main questions found in the terms of reference: economic issues (livelihoods, economic growth and poverty reduction), social (human rights, social capital), and crisis related (natural disaster risk and conflict risk).

⁷ Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005.

⁸ Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1994.

The aim is to provide an empirical assessment of the way in which aid took account of the distinctive requirements of long term response assistance in the early stages, and if later recovery build on efforts in the relief phase.

In NAD, the evaluation finds that LRRD is progressing along lines that closely resemble what policy analysts have dubbed the ‘continuum’ model of successive waves of emergency and development aid, albeit with overlapping phases and at different paces among different groups of the population. This is described in the jargon as a ‘contiguum’:

Progression from Relief through Recovery and Rehabilitation to Development in Aceh

January 2005December 2015

Relief Phase: 2 yrs.

Recovery Phase: 5 yrs.

Development Phase: 7-10 yrs.

The overlapping arrows show how in Aceh LRRD resembles an uneven contiguum in its movement towards development, seen arbitrarily in a ten year timeframe. In any given community it may be possible to witness simultaneously families who are able to maximise their resources and increase their livelihoods potential as well as families who remain extremely poor and vulnerable, firmly entrenched in the relief phase.

The notion of LRRD is extremely hard for the beneficiary populations and non-aid stakeholders to grasp. As we have chosen their point of view, the LRRD concept is often treated implicitly in our findings. The study reviews the effects of the interplay of emergency aid, governance (especially with regard to human rights), recovery and development aid, and conflict resolution in the tsunami-affected areas of Aceh.

This study is complemented by the ‘LRRD’ Policy study which focuses on agency planning, and the related LRRD study in Sri Lanka, within the overall framework of the five thematic evaluations under the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). It was designed to provide information to the LRRD Synthesis Study, written subsequently. It was agreed

during discussions prior to the field work that the two country studies would concentrate on the perspectives of the population (with the exception of the foreign corporate actors who would also be interviewed here), while the Policy Study concentrated on the policy aims and programming processes of the aid actors.

This first Indonesia country study, conducted at a very early stage of the LRRD process, is to form baseline for a second phase of the evaluation planned for late 2006 when aid delivery is more advanced.

The LRRD evaluation supplements that of other thematic studies under the TEC such as the UNDP Commissioned study on building local capacities, and the Danida commissioned study on funding flows.

1.2 Approach Selected

Two data gathering methods form the basis for the study: the first qualitative and based on semi-structured interviews, based on a targeted sampling of communities along the coastlines, which led to the second, designed as a quantitative survey applied to 1,000 respondents randomly selected along the coastline of Aceh.

The evaluation sought both the beneficial and the negative influences to be found in the fabric of crisis response until today. This includes links with longer term structural efforts in the fields of governance, development aid, corporate investment, diplomacy and security.


In consultation with the other LRRD teams, the leading question which was originally selected is:

What are the rifts and gaps that have been generated by the articulation of relief, rehabilitation and development activities?

It was intended that the unifying framework of the evaluation be the effect of the response on the lives of the affected populations – seen from their point of view, and expressed in

their own words during the interviews. These observations from the population were checked⁹ as much as possible with statements from aid agencies, including the Indonesian Government coordination body, BRR and other national and international institutional actors.

A figure of the “cobweb” structure of the possible linkages between the multiple actors and their operations is presented below:



The main focus of the assessment was to learn about the population’s experience of the operations of this “cobweb”. The many studies being carried out within the TEC framework, focusing on different themes and at different levels of analysis, opened up a unique opportunity for us to focus on the opinions and attitudes expressed by people – individuals and groups - living in the tsunami-affected areas.

This methodology yielded limited information on one count: the surveys and interviews did not allow us to disaggregate the different influences on local outcomes. It was difficult to relate a change in the situation to foreign assistance, and even more difficult to attribute this in turn to the absence of linkages between forms of assistance.

⁹ ie. verification of the facts from other sources to support findings and conclusions.

There was also an unavoidable disconnect between the conceptual framework put forward in the evaluative questions (LRRD is based on agency programming issues) and the population's view of how their needs were being addressed.

We have attempted to address this limitation by focusing the evaluative analysis instead on the very areas identified by the population in the qualitative interviews and confirmed subsequently in the quantitative interviews, where they were found to be recurrent in the different locations and population groups visited.

These problems have been categorised in the analytical phase as gaps and rifts.

- What is often presented as the gap issue is in fact an amalgam of an absence of aid whose cause is situated “upstream” (if resources can be considered a stream). In many cases we find these have been more aptly reviewed in the other studies commissioned by Sida:
- The rifts refer to the way in which the fabric of society risks being torn by tensions created through unfair or unbalanced distribution of humanitarian aid – unfair, that is, in people's perceptions.

An example of this is the way in which aid was provided to people displaced by the disaster, but not to the even higher numbers of host families with whom the great majority of the displaced had found refuge. In some areas where access to large numbers of people in distress was relatively easy, a great many humanitarian agencies competed to be the ‘first in’ to distribute aid¹⁰. The people in these areas (eg. Banda Aceh and neighbouring communities) were able to gain access relatively easily to large quantities of aid, whereas those in areas that were cut off and where access was harder to gain, were at first left without any aid at all.

Later, when ‘discovered’ (for example in Calang), aid was slow to arrive, mainly for logistical reasons. ‘Rifts’ may also be occurring slowly but inexorably as the ‘cash for work’ programmes became more important to people than ‘Friday clean-up’ or ‘gotong royong’ - voluntary work traditionally undertaken by people for their communities. The

¹⁰ *World Disasters Report 2005*, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Ch. 4

fabric of society risks being torn by some of these interventions which have the effect of whittling away at traditional practices. It is worth noting that resentment was found by the team to be directed at the international aid effort in general rather than towards beneficiaries who were lucky enough to get more aid.

1.3 Data Collection Methodology

We examine what the population saw as valuable or otherwise to their long term plans and their capacity to adapt, and then complement their responses with our own assessments – based on our reading of the situation – as to what could be done to increase the positive aspects (elimination of needs, strengthening of local initiatives), and decrease the negative ones (gaps and rifts). The outline of our research is based on the evaluation questions as they are presented in the terms of reference.

Qualitative Research

The qualitative component of the evaluation team was comprised of:

- *Emery Brusset* (French), who led the team, is an evaluator specialised in post-crisis programmes and impact assessments.
- *Dr Wartini Pramana* (Indonesian) has worked extensively on social organisation issues.
- *Anne Davies* (British) is an evaluator with expertise in aid programming in contexts of conflict, displacement and disaster.
- *Yashwant Deshmukh* (Indian) is an opinion survey expert with a track record of successful assignments in conflicts and disasters.
- *Susanne Pedersen* (Danish) is an evaluator with prior experience in Indonesia, and a strong track record of management of evaluation teams in complex environments.

They were supported by a resource team of two international consultants (a macro-economist, Mr Robin Davies; and a report quality assurance person, Mr Tony Vaux), plus an Acehnese team consisting of a logistician, Ms. Irene Sariat, two interpreters, and two drivers.

The team visited various tsunami-affected populations in villages, tents, barracks, temporary housing and permanent homes. Interviews were arranged to take advantage of

the circumstances of the moment, and questions posed were framed to elicit a narrative structured by respondents themselves.

Care was taken to always move and operate independently of the aid agencies, with our own translators, and using Indonesian consultants for the interpretation of statements made. In all logistics and accommodation, the team remained autonomous from the operational agencies, with the sole exception of UN helicopter transportation to and from Calang, where the team also stayed in the UNDP compound.

The team divided into two groups: One travelling along the coast in a south-westerly direction, in the districts and sub-districts of Banda Aceh, Calang, Lamno, Lhoong, Lhohk Nghha – the other travelling in an easterly direction to Lhokseumawe. This division was in order to cover as extensive an area as possible in the space of two weeks.

These sites were chosen for the following reasons:

- Areas most damaged by the tsunami, adjacent to less affected areas, affording a comparison of the impact of the disaster;
- High population densities, giving a representative overview of diverse people's concerns;
- Representative sample of both tsunami-affected and conflict-affected populations;
- Desire to assess some areas not covered by other TEC teams;

Quantitative Research

The quantitative component of the quantitative survey was carried out by Team C Voter, under the leadership of Mrs Aditi Prasad and Mr Yashwant Deshmukh. Team C Voter is an Indian polling company which was able to call on, train and follow a team of fifty local surveyors throughout the assessment.

The survey was conducted in the tsunami-affected areas using a structured questionnaire, designed on the basis of the questions in the Terms of Reference. The questionnaire was designed towards the end of the qualitative research. A similar survey was conducted as

part of the Sri Lanka country study and the Indonesia and Sri Lanka questionnaires have about 40% common grounds and 60% localized issues and aspects.

The original English questionnaire was translated into Acehnese, even though it included key local concepts such as “hikmah”. As per the WAPOR/ESOMAR and ISSC quality norms, the questionnaire was then re-translated into English by different sets of translators to ensure the correctness of the content.

This questionnaire was administered to respondents in the tsunami- affected districts. A detailed list of affected villages and IDP camps was obtained by the team in the selected districts, and 2 to 6 micro locations were randomly selected from that list based on a sampling grid. The total number of respondents was 1,227 and the response rate was about 72%.

The number of completed interviews and coded samples covered is as follows:

District	Frequency
Aceh timur	42
Langsa	29
Aceh Utara	102
Lhokseumawe	49
Bireun	91
Pidie	116
Aceh Besar	200
Banda Aceh	232
Aceh Jaya	122
Aceh barat	183
Aceh Selatan	25
Aceh Barat Daya	36
Total	1227

The map on page xii indicates the geographic location of the sample groups locations visited by the survey team, in the form of three red dots. A sample was allocated for each village/camp and the respondent households were selected randomly from the tsunami-affected villages. These villages were also selected randomly within the tsunami affected villages list maintained by the village officer, the officer in charge of the division. After the

selection of the household; a routine kish-grid method was used to select the respondent, with listing of living and present members of the household.

In households where the main wage earner lost his/her life in the tsunami the previous wage earner's occupation was recorded along with the present wage earner's occupation. As most the questions were applicable on the status of the household instead of the individual, a replacement option was given within the same household; provided the respondent was not a minor.

In order to maintain the quality of the fieldwork and ensure maximum dispersion of the sample within the selected micro location, the enumerators were allowed to conduct only a maximum of 10 interviews per day. Within a given macro location, the team leaders were advised to check 10% of respondents from the completed list.

The surveyors were all local and already experienced in the field. A minimum of one team leader was appointed in a team of 5 researchers. In all about 50 odd researchers and 10 team leaders were in the field in each country, capped by the presence of two central observers in each location. The initial analysis was done in Jakarta with 20% check of data entry. The final data scanning and analysis was done using SPSS in New Delhi.

Details of the evaluation chronology are contained in Annex 2.

Limitations of the methodology

The team was conscious of the difficulty of establishing a relation of trust with outsiders, and different measures were taken for this. The senior team member of Indonesian nationality worked alone to obtain certain aspects of information, while other (foreign) team members worked directly with Acehnese consultants, and the quantitative survey combined Indian and Acehnese personnel. This combination of biases and levels of access to information was intended to compensate for the fact that the team could not recruit experienced Acehnese consultants.

Logistics and time constraints did not allow for visits at different points in time (longitudinal study), or to sample locations presenting salient features, such as the island of Nias, which suffered additional damage in the 28 March 2005 earthquake, or to other offshore areas that had been affected by the tsunami and – for the same reasons – had received little assistance coverage. The issues selected in the Terms of Reference were very broad, to the detriment of depth in certain areas, for a total of 106 person days for 7 persons. In particular the peace process, an important element of the international effort, could not be analysed in depth due to the remoteness of this process to the population.

By focusing on people's views it was difficult to enter into discussions on the quantitative impact of aid beyond perceptions. For example, it would have been germane to this study to examine the effects of housing reconstruction on potential deforestation in the province due to the immense timber needs, or assess the wisdom of re-building the coastal road linking Banda Aceh with Meulaboh, when parts of it were so close to the water's edge that a mere high tide would wash it away again.

People's thinking did not stretch to considering how meeting their needs might have a negative impact on the environment or on sustainable development. What they knew was how their communities could be reconstructed and the coast road rebuilt. The 'people-focused' methodology thus proved a constraint to obtain empirical data on these important issues.

People interviewed included heads of household (male and female), beneficiaries of humanitarian aid and non-beneficiaries, village heads (keuchicks), district heads (bupatis), traders in markets, owners of small stores and roadside kiosks, large international industries (Lafarge and Exxon Mobil - Aruna Oil Field) and other members of the general population not related to any particular category. Some people were interviewed individually and others in groups. Invariably the team found that an interview with one individual or family in their homes would end up being a group affair as neighbours joined in the discussion.

In both the quantitative and qualitative surveys, the teams also interviewed people in several conflict-affected communities in order to gain a comparative insight as to how people perceived their economic and social situation. We found that after time had been taken to build some trust, most people could talk about their conflict experiences, and provided personal analyses of whether or not the peace would work this time, the pitfalls involved, and how it affected their livelihoods.

Findings were complemented with views from some national and international bodies, UN agencies and NGOs in the districts, in Banda Aceh and in Jakarta. Follow-up visits and phone interviews were made where necessary to obtain additional details. However the actual agency programming was not included, as this was done through the Policy Study. This limited the ability of the team to interpret some of the orientations followed by aid.

1.4 Key Facts on Aceh

The evaluation presents here some information necessary to understand the general lines of the analysis. Technical background information can be gained from other sources, and is not repeated here.

Situation pre-tsunami

Aceh is not only one of the poorest of Indonesia's provinces but also one that was suffering from a declining economy prior to the tsunami. The insecurity arising from thirty years of fighting between GAM and the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Indonesian national army) was the principal cause, as well as declining natural resources - for example Exxon Mobil estimates that there are no unexplored reserves in the Arun Liquefied Natural Gas field, and that its concession will produce on a significant level only for six more years, while current production is only 10% of the peak production.

The sporadic fighting not only harmed freedom of movement (such as access to fields by farmers) but also, more crucially, was the prime factor in the rapid tail-off in both domestic and foreign investment. The net result was a highly fragile economy where corruption was rife, together with commensurately high levels of unemployment in the depressed formal sector, while over three-quarters of the population eked out a living in the informal economy. Around one-third lived below the poverty line. Compounding the whole problem was the large number of people either displaced by the conflict (quantitative evidence here is highly unreliable¹¹) or those whose normal lives were disrupted.

Situation post-tsunami:

A few macro-economic statistics illustrate the socio-economic impact of the December 26th disaster¹².

- of a population of circa 4 million, 221,000 died from the tsunami and the March 28th earthquake in the island of Nias, or remain unaccounted for;
- estimates suggest that a minimum of 700,000 people were adversely impacted by the Tsunami. Of this total around 600,000 persons (300,000 fishermen, 170,000 small businessmen and 130,000 farmers) are reckoned to have totally lost their livelihoods;
- in global terms, 97% of Aceh Province's GDP was heavily disrupted;
- physical damage and loss replacement cost from the tsunami valued at € 3.800 billion (US\$ 4.451 billion) of which 71%, or €2.700 billion (US\$ 3.168 billion), was accounted for by the private sector alone (fishing, small enterprises, farming and housing).

Displacement must be added to the woes of the people of Aceh, in addition to war and poverty. The official Government figures¹³ mentioned 555,000 displaced by the tsunami, of which:

- 65,228 in Temporary Living Centres (TLCs¹⁴)
- 153,477 in tents
- 253,880 living with host families

¹¹ See for background "Evaluation of Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, 1999-2004", Channel Research, on behalf of Sida.

¹² Sources: national statistics, UNDP, World Bank - 2005

¹³ 14 June 2005.

¹⁴ They are still defined as barracks by the people of Aceh. *Barak* in Bahasa Indonesia is defined as quarantine quarters.

This contrasts with the 2002 peak conflict related displacement figure of 2.5 million, and the figure of 600,000 in 2004¹⁵, for the whole country.

The conflict in NAD

The long-running conflict in Aceh (over 30 years) had reached a peak by the time of the tsunami, despite earlier ceasefires and peace initiatives. A unilateral ceasefire was offered by GAM shortly after the disaster, to which government forces responded by not launching large operations. However up to March incidents were still reported in Pidie, Bireun, Aceh Utara (North Aceh), Aceh Timur (East Aceh), and Aceh Selatan (South Aceh). Human rights abuses reached their pre-tsunami level again during the second quarter of 2005. A concerted international peace effort, culminating in the signature of a Memorandum of Understanding between the parties to the conflict on 15 August 2005, finally brought about changes in armed group behaviour.

The European Union, together with contributing countries from ASEAN, as well as with Norway and Switzerland, deployed a monitoring mission in Aceh designed to monitor the implementation of various aspects of the MoU. The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) became operational on 15 September 2005, date at which the decommissioning of GAM armaments and the relocation of non-organic military and police forces began.

The civil emergency status had been extended in November 2004 for another six months. It was only in May 2005, almost six months after the tsunami, that the status was reduced to civil order. The current improvement in the security situation suggests that the province is at a turning point. The prime focus of the government is on managing this transition, using as much as possible the resources unleashed by the emergency response to prepare for a better future.

¹⁵ “Evaluation of Assistance to IDPs in Indonesia, 2004”, Channel Research for Sida.

2 LIVELIHOODS AND COPING MECHANISMS

2.1 The Population's Priorities

To learn how the aid effort interfaced with people's needs, a common line of questioning was pursued in our interviews that can be summarised as follows:

What were/are your main livelihood needs: immediately after the tsunami, some months after the tsunami and now? What improvements to your life would you like to bring about? What improvements to the community where you live would you like to see in the future?

Respondents in both rural and urban areas were unanimous in their hierarchy of needs, making little distinction between time frames. The two most important needs were expressed as shelter and work, interchangeable as priorities one and two.

This was invariably expressed as: to get back my land and rebuild my house; to build a house; to move from here (usually the TLC barracks) back to my land; to move back to the site of my former village with the community. People who had not owned property pre-tsunami also expressed the desire for their own piece of land and a house, the emphasis in all cases being *ownership*.


Work needs were expressed as: to retrieve my land and restore it for cultivation as before; to go back to fishing; to set up a stall (kiosk); to repay my debts and enlarge my business; to get the same kind of land that I had before and to cultivate it (in the case of those whose land had been irretrievably lost to the sea). The emphasis here was predominantly on *individual enterprise*. There was a strong need to move toward recovery, and all efforts in this direction were relevant.

People did not mention the need for food in the early days after the disaster. When asked about this they said that it was not an issue, they were too shocked and traumatised to think of any particular survival tactic. Only later on when they were able to think more clearly did they formulate the above overriding priorities, which have remained constant.

For persons interviewed along the west coast no one spontaneously linked an improvement of their livelihoods situation with peace – or the economic potential it could bring to the province – but when asked, they expressed the hope (rather than conviction) that it would help. In some cases they were specific about how much more rice they would be able to grow (due to improved access to fields), how much more freely they would be able to transport it to markets, and how much less fear they would feel about travelling without being ‘taxed’ at checkpoints manned by both sides of the conflict. This would indicate a strong connectedness between conflict resolution efforts and rehabilitation.

In Lhokseumawe and Banda Aceh on the other hand respondents were much more emphatic about the new opportunities created by the disappearance of the informal taxes imposed by the warring parties on the population. We will return to this in the section concerning the conflict and impact on the economy.

**Hierarchy of needs,
as expressed sequentially by tsunami-affected populations,
and entities involved in addressing them**



The hierarchy of needs pyramid illustrates how those respondents most affected by the tsunami viewed their changing priorities in the immediate aftermath of the disaster, on the path to recovery and in the longer term. The boxes on either side depict the evaluators' understanding of where those priorities are situated in the LRRD 'continuum' timeframe model and the agencies that either did or are expected to intervene in those timeframes. The model is not intended to portray how the different phases are occurring in reality, but what they represent according to respondents' expression of priorities. Property reconstruction was expressed in some cases as a more important priority than casual employment etc. and in other cases, full employment was a greater priority – thus it is shown here as falling in the middle.

An estimated 20%¹⁶ of the tsunami-affected population was estimated in May 2005 to figure in the bottom two strata of this diagram and will remain in need of basic existential requirements for at least another year. The majority of the population interviewed was situated at the time of the study between levels two and four, whereas only a few had achieved, or were close to achieving the goals of the higher strata.

In general, people expressed their needs in modest terms, desiring mainly to return to the *status quo ante*. Yet, when put another way, asking what they thought their children would aspire to, the answers were different. These ranged from the modest: setting up of a larger store, having a bigger boat, to the more ambitious: entering professions such as teaching, medicine and the ubiquitous 'office'- some also expressed hope for growing tourism in the region.

These observations confirm that people see their needs as a series of day-to-day requirements that are tied closely to their social and traditional structures and culture. All respondents, whether directly or indirectly affected by the tsunami, wanted to get back to 'normal' as soon as possible, while recognising that this may take time.

¹⁶ FAO/WFP food supply and demand assessment for Aceh province and Nias Island, Special Report produced in May 2005.

Community, village, sub-district and district officials interviewed were still in a state of tsunami-induced disarray and showed an inability – almost an apparent apathy - to plan for the future or say what they thought was needed. They pointed out that they themselves had sustained personal and institutional losses and that it would take time to replenish the institutional talent pool.

2.2 Food Aid and Food Security

Since food aid and food security are considered by aid agencies as being paramount to people's survival, as well as to their longer-term self-sufficiency, and considered furthermore as indicators of successful humanitarian interventions, these aspects were examined in the evaluation. One of the measures of assessing the extent to which recovery is taking hold is to gauge people's ability to provide for their own nutritional needs and to modify food aid programming accordingly. It is also relevant to examine the impact of food aid on local economies since rises or declines in price can affect people's livelihoods in different ways and may merit a reassessment of policy. The evaluation asked people their views on the extent to which food aid had affected their livelihoods and conducted research in local markets to determine its impact on prices.

Food aid, according to most respondents, was highly appreciated in the early phase of the emergency even though it was slow to arrive and did not immediately reach all intended beneficiaries, due mainly to logistical difficulties¹⁷. People interviewed related how, in the first few days after the tsunami those who had not lost everything survived on stocks purchased in a burst of panic buying. Traders in the market described how people bought up every item available in the market within 24 hours and individuals confirmed that within that timeframe there was nothing left in the market to buy.

¹⁷ According to the 'FAO/WFP food supply and demand assessment for Aceh province and Nias Island', Special Report produced in May 2005.

Where families lacked certain essential items, members of the community shared out what they had with others who had lost everything. People in areas adjacent to the tsunami-struck communities realised the enormity of the disaster when survivors started straggling into their villages completely naked. This brought home to them the extent of their desperate need for help. The delay in food did not create a large scale gap.

When food aid started arriving, people could not or did not distinguish whether it came from the GoI (DINSOS stocks¹⁸) or WFP, or NGOs. People in nearby villages not affected by the tsunami likewise shared some of their surplus stocks with the stricken population.

Food prices rose after the tsunami between 50 – 200%, according to people interviewed, including market traders (this largely tallies with the BRR/WB October 2005 findings). The survey compared prices of selected food items (rice, coconut oil, eggs, sugar, vegetables and fruit) pre-tsunami, immediately after the tsunami and now. Respondents were unanimous in their views that prices remain high today because of the global rise in fuel prices, not because a scarcity of goods.

Even the price of rice – a commodity in plentiful supply due to its distribution as food aid – has risen from Rp. 5,000 per bamboo (approximate 1.5 Kg) to Rp. 7-8,000 today (more in October 2005, due to Ramadan demand). The overall rate of inflation is, according to the poorer respondents, already having a negative impact on their budgetary planning and the hope was often expressed that prices would go down after Ramadan.

¹⁸ The Provincial Social Welfare Department (DINSOS) was able to respond at an early stage: it had stocks already in place from its role in providing assistance to those affected by conflict.

We were not able to assess in any meaningful way the effect of food aid on market prices¹⁹, as current inflation has various causes, such as the fasting at the time of the assessment, and fuel prices have skewed commodity prices across the board throughout Indonesia. Similarly we were not able to find reliable evidence from other sources.

Studies carried out by ICASERD²⁰, WFP²¹ and the BRR/World Bank²² show that, despite the province of NAD being a surplus producer of rice and fish both prior to the tsunami and after it, food aid will continue to be needed in 2006, or at least until major infrastructure and housing projects are complete. This is more as a result of the unevenness of food distribution among the population than a lack of local food production: while nearly everyone displaced by the tsunami needed food aid in the immediate aftermath, some have regained economic activities which have led them to food self-sufficiency while others, who have not enjoyed income-generating opportunities and remain extremely poor, continue to need it.

As all three studies recognize – and with which our own study concurs - food aid will need to be more closely targeted in the future to avoid it becoming a brake on production and trading opportunities while helping those still in need to meet their nutritional needs. So far there has been little negative impact of food aid on the general economy, no “rift”, according to these studies and to the market research carried out by the evaluation in locations visited. But if food aid levels are not adjusted downwards in tandem with finely-tuned targeting as soon as possible, the important relief mechanism that food aid represents could come to represent instead a jeopardy to recovery efforts.

¹⁹ Even though food aid may lead to a decline in trade, due to the inelasticity of demand in the short term and the inelasticity of supply because of food aid (distortion - subsidy) that decreases market sensitivity to price changes.

²⁰ “Food and Labor Market Analysis and Monitoring System in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD) Province”. Final Report. Indonesian Center for Agro Socio Economic Research and Development (ICASERD) Indonesian Agricultural and Development Ministry of Agriculture, July 2005.

²¹ FAO/WFP food assessment, op cit.

²² *Rebuilding a better Aceh and Nias – Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort*, joint

A joint report by the Indonesian Center for Agro Socio Economic Research and Development (ICASERD) and Indonesian Ministry of Agriculture noted in July 2005 the likelihood that continued relief/assistance, including food, would be needed until major infrastructure and housing projects are complete (conclusions that are echoed in WFP and BRR/World Bank reports). It is estimated that rice production in 2005 will reach only 85 percent of the production level of 2004. The decline, however, will not make the province a rice-deficit region as it still has a surplus production. Only Aceh Jaya and Banda Aceh will experience a deficit in 2005.

The coastal community of Aceh has traditionally relied heavily on fishery as their source of income (livelihood), regularly producing a fish surplus that was traded with other regions in Indonesia. Although fish production declined after the tsunami, ICASERD reports that the province still has a surplus fish production. Despite the destruction of some 11,000 fishing vessels in the tsunami, as well as loss and damage of brackish water ponds, there is still a significant functioning fishing fleet in parts of the province that were less affected.

These findings point to the fact that, despite a post-tsunami surplus production in rice and fish, the continuation of food aid in 2006 that is recommended by ICASERD (albeit with reduced rations) is testimony to food security being more a question of distribution and entitlement than one of production levels. These findings were borne out in interviews with individual beneficiaries of food aid (all IDPs), some of whom said they no longer needed it but were still receiving it, and others who had no other means of procuring food and manifestly still needed it. Similarly, the province-wide fish surplus does not take into account the loss of former livelihood activities of those fishermen whose fishing boats and equipment were destroyed in the tsunami, and along with them, their traditional means of income.

The majority of people interviewed appeared to have attained a good level of self-sufficiency in procuring their own food – attested to by the presence of unused stocks of canned fish in their households. On the other hand, pockets of extreme poverty and vulnerability were found, consisting of predominantly female-headed households living in tents, whose survival continued to depend on food rations. These population groups are to be found on the margins of nearly every community and constitute the most vulnerable of the population. They have been unable to join or retain cash-for-work schemes since they cannot leave their young children untended, and have therefore been unable to earn any income to supplement their aid handouts. This population group belongs to the universal category which rarely benefits from macro-economic structural poverty reduction programmes, and seems to call for a continuation of relief programmes.

Higher on people's priorities than immediate food aid is longer-term food security. Even entitlement to food aid is no longer considered a bonus since its over-abundance means that it fetches little value in the market place. The coastal areas affected by the tsunami were predominantly exploited for agriculture and fishing (70% of coastal employment). The income-generating activities of an estimated 330,000 working people, or 123,000 households were lost or severely impaired, equating to just below 16% of the provincial workforce engaged in farming and fishing. This translates to 50 percent of marine fishing and 41% of brackish water aquaculture while 'many' (an unspecified number) of farmers have lost two consecutive paddy seasons²³.

Nearly all of the population, with the exception of the most vulnerable groups, including the landless, is engaged in clearing their land in preparation for the next paddy season through cash for work schemes, or reverting to fishing activities with new boats provided by international aid. This would indicate that assistance delivered so far has

had a beneficial impact in several ways: it has enhanced people's ability to earn enough to cover their basic needs, allowed them to engage in productive activities that will lead to a recovery of the land and their own livelihoods and, in their own words, acted as a healing process to overcome the trauma of their losses. By these measures, international assistance has been appropriate and relevant to people's needs. Its composition has enabled them to move beyond the relief phase into a recovery phase.

The great majority of those interviewed, whether in temporary living centres (TLCs), tents, host families or makeshift shelters, hope to be able to plant rice in the September 2006 season and be self-sufficient by then. Some, however, have irrevocably lost land to the sea in low-lying areas. Currently, food aid rations make up the gap in food self-sufficiency but people said they would be much less dependent on them once their fields were back to part or full production and once access to markets had improved for both farmers and fishermen.

People in non-tsunami affected areas, but living in adjacent areas, have been able to continue with food production as normal. Mostly affected by the destruction of infrastructure such as market places, roads, and bridges, their main hope is to see an early reconstruction of these in able to resume market access.

At the time of the evaluation, infrastructure repairs were slow and ad hoc. Judging from people's comments, delays in reconstruction meant that micro and macro economic recovery was being curtailed. Along the West Coast at least there was a reason for this: according to people interviewed, the Government had made an agreement with four international donors to construct a new coastal road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh. This was to be a major undertaking and only some sections of the road were finished. The existing coastal road was supposed to be repaired by the Government (through

²³ Idem.

financial allocations to the districts), but funds either did not materialise or were insufficient to carry out the full range of repairs necessary.

Thus, in some areas, local residents did their best to make stop-gap repairs that rendered parts of the road and some bridges just about usable – though extremely risky. Inevitably the low level of funding for the repair of this major artery raised questions about corruption, though as far as the evaluation could ascertain, nothing was proved. Thus, the study confirmed that it is not only food production that contributes to people's assessment of food security, but also the importance of market access, which depends on a good combination of governance and rapid rehabilitation. This was not in evidence, and represents a potential gap.

Signs of rice harvesting abounded during the evaluation mission's field study, and the team learned that some people were able to mitigate their livelihoods losses because they owned, or were lent by friends and family, land further inland that they were able to cultivate. These findings tally with the FAO/WFP assessment report carried out in May 2005, which stated:

- Many farmers are planning October 2005 production (now in progress);
- Some fishermen have gone back to fishing, albeit on a smaller scale, sharing boats and nets;
- Fresh informal credit is being provided to paddy farmers expecting to resume production in 2005.

General Livelihoods

Adaptation

The emerging definition of livelihoods to which the Terms of Reference appear to refer concerns how people use their skills and assets to survive. We have used a narrower concept of livelihoods that is understood to cover (in European terms) work, employment, income-generation activity, source of revenue, occupation, job, trade, profession, career. This definition is more in line with what the humanitarian community defines for programming purposes as ‘livelihoods’.

Survival, resilience, creativity, determination

Yudi is a 21 year old fisherman who shares a small tent only 20 metres from the sea in Kota Banda Aceh with two other young fishermen. Only he and his mother survived the tsunami, three other members of his family perished and their entire belongings were lost, including their property. They had no legal title to their property (system of *adat*). In the first few days after the disaster Yudi went to live with relatives in the interior but after a month he decided to return with his friends to their former community. They started collecting tsunami debris by diving for scrap metal, which they sold, and fished from the shore to supplement their WFP rations (evidence of which was everywhere in the tent). After a further month they had saved enough money to buy a boat. Yudi was also able to use his savings, which he had at a local bank. The bank had a photocopy of his records and the village leader helped him with a letter of identification. His cousin did the same and he believes that many other people had taken similar precautions. The new boat cost Rp. 13 million – an increase from Rp. 9 m. pre-tsunami. - and solar power provides about one quarter of its fuel requirements. The group found that people at first did not want to eat fish so their earnings were meagre. The scrap metal they dive for brings in Rp. 1,000/kg, which – due to the still rich pickings – allows the men a sufficient income to cover their needs. Working with the scrap iron has inspired Yudi to learn a related skill namely blacksmithing, and he is saving up for enrolment in a programme. His second priority is a generator set. A house is third.

Indicators we used to verify the importance of livelihoods to the population were:

1. Their ranking in priority of needs,
2. The amount of time people spent pursuing them, or planning for them relative to other needs.

As stated earlier, livelihoods are interchangeable with shelter as priorities one and two on their hierarchy of needs. Interviews with individuals and groups of people showed

that the greater percentage of their time is taken in planning and working towards restoring them.

Many of those who are re-starting food production activities have benefited from various schemes such as cash-for-work, provision of boats and other fishing equipment, provision of seeds and tools, as well as small-scale credit from private lenders and national and international efforts to repair essential infrastructure. Such schemes, when inputs are appropriate and follow from consultation with beneficiaries, represent the outcome of policies, by national authorities and international agencies alike, which can be considered LRRD good practice.

In some cases though, people have not been so lucky with appropriate inputs. For example, in Calang a group discussion with members of Panglima Laot, a fishermen's association from Aceh Jaya Regency, revealed a litany of errors with regard to the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship and sound programme practices: donors had wished to provide boats to offset those lost by the fishermen in the tsunami but had failed to consult with the fishermen as to the type of boats they needed. This led to the wrong model or size of boat being delivered, boats that were not functional due to being delivered with the wrong kind of engines, and finally a complete halt to the delivery of boats due to the issue of illegal logging.

Some fishermen were lucky enough to receive functional boats of the right size before the ban was imposed and reported catches of excellent quality and quantity. This caused resentment among those who received the inappropriate boats. Asked if they would consider taking up a different means to earn a living, all replied that they were too old to learn a new trade, that they only knew how to fish and that was what they wished to do.

Inappropriate inputs such as in this example not only raise expectations and cause disappointment but can also cause tensions within a community. As LRRD bad practice,

it could hardly be worse. Not only did the donors or their agents not consult with beneficiaries prior to offering important capital assets, they did not adequately consider the potential environmental consequences of their intended actions. Furthermore, beneficiaries of one programme can lose out altogether if the programme is unsuccessful because other agencies who might have assisted them would have chosen instead other beneficiaries.

Private Initiative

The Acehnese are often engaged in more than one income-generating activity. It is not unusual to find a fisherman with a small plot of land whose wife runs a street store or kiosk while doubling as a tailor. This is less from choice than the imperative of bringing in sufficient income for the family needs. That many individuals and families are becoming once again multi-source income earners is indicative of gradual recovery.

Formal discussions between communities and donors or government authorities were reported to be infrequent and in some cases – particularly among the most vulnerable tented groups – non-existent. The team found that people living in TLC barracks were the most empowered to voice their livelihood activities and preferences. Their physical configuration and community groupings make them easier for NGOs and government authorities to visit than people scattered on individual plots.

Those we interviewed were mostly fishermen, farmers and small traders in urban and rural settings. They had lost all physical assets and with them, their former livelihoods. Many had benefited from – and some were still enrolled in – cash for work projects and with the money earned had been able to purchase items with which to re-start their former activities or, where this was not possible, initiate new ones. Housed in temporary housing or tents they were clearing their land on which to rebuild their houses, or fields, or going to sea in groups, sharing boats, to resume fishing. There was predominantly a

climate of resilience and coping with life while waiting to resume previous activities full-time.

Government subsistence allowance (*jadup*) to IDPs, including those in host families, in the form of Rp. 30,000 per household per day, has, like the cash for work programme, been a huge boost to the economy of many families and the most popular form of relief aid. However, there appear to be serious disruptions in its distribution. Many people asked the team if they knew when the next *jadup* would be paid because they had only received a one-off payment covering a two-month period (some only one). The team could find no one in the government who could provide a satisfactory explanation as to why the *jadup* had not been paid, which raises suspicions of corruption²⁴.

Many projects with external financing have employed small-scale grants as a means of enhancing the economy at both macro and micro levels, significantly raising people's income-generating potential. This strategy, as much as cash for work programmes, has allowed people to revert to – or approach as closely as possible – their former livelihoods. Thanks to micro grants such as sewing machines, coffee-grinding tools, nylon for fishing nets, etc. people were able to quickly set up a small enterprise soon after the tsunami destroyed their previous livelihoods. It is easy to see how these inputs represent the seeds of developmental expansion into coffee shops, tailoring, industrial agriculture and fish processing.

However, we find supply-side determinism on the part of the providers as initiatives do not emanate from consultations with individuals to assess their needs. For example, we observed the standard 'female' package of a sewing kit, baking materials etc., which may not be suitable in cases where the women lack outlets for their produce.

²⁴ The ICASERD report *op cit* refers to similar inconsistencies in *jadup* distribution.

More than one local NGO noted that produce from female IDP beneficiaries of micro-finance schemes can only be sold at sub-market prices because of the lack of prevailing purchasing power in the community. Providing women with such packages is also a symptom of gender pre-determinism. Careful consultation with the actual beneficiaries would be likely to indicate that many are better-suited to receive training in certain skills that would then determine the nature of the input they would best benefit from receiving.

Cash for work programmes have been enormously appreciated by beneficiaries for two main reasons: the cash earned has enabled a dignified withdrawal from aid handouts and the work undertaken has proved therapeutic in helping people to overcome their losses. A third important benefit is that the rapid injection of cash into the economy (UNDP's cash for work project alone has injected US\$ 10 million over a period of six months) has boosted money supply, which has led to increased economic activity. For individuals, this translates into increased purchasing power. For the province, it has helped to slow its pre-tsunami economic decline.

The logic behind UNDP's decision to implement cash for work projects under its Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery (ERTR) programme was that no house rebuilding or field cultivation could commence until property ownership was proved, land was cleared and demarcated, fences built and the soil processed. In essence, any initiative towards longer-term development would remain stalled until these first steps were taken. It made sense to take people off *jadup* dependency and put them to work in clearing their land while developing plans for full-scale, comprehensive urban and rural waste management appropriate for the whole province - an investment for the future. UNDP estimates that the two-year funding for humanitarian activities will allow development agencies the necessary breathing space to plan properly for the long term.

However, concerns are raised from the local civil society that cash for work programmes could erode the traditional volunteerism in the community and promote the mentality of “social loafer”, or weaken the community bonds in which figures of authority are undermined by a family based distribution.

Beneficiaries are reluctant to let go of the security cushion that the cash for work programme represents to them. Future programme monitoring should ensure that as many people as possible can revert to full-time employment in the reconstruction phase. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) about 200,000 workers will be needed for reconstruction efforts alone in 2006, be it in housing, local public infrastructure or major provincial infrastructure²⁵ and this will doubtless provide not only income security for a while but also new skills.

Small Private Enterprise

In the multi-layered private sector, livelihoods are being restored often without any assistance from national authorities or international donors. Market stalls and shops in many parts of Banda Aceh were looted in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami leaving their owners, already in debt with wholesalers, without assets or collateral. Shop owners interviewed said they had managed to renegotiate their debt with former suppliers who had even provided them with additional supplies and a more generous repayment schedule. Apparently suppliers were just as concerned at losing their traditional outlets, which led them to share short-term losses with their retail partners.

The common practice of consignment trading systems between suppliers and retailers²⁶ allows tsunami survivors to start or to rebuild a business, if the survivor is known as

²⁵ ILO report, October 2005, op.cit.

²⁶ In the locations where the team conducted the interviews, ‘consignment’ trading system is widely practiced. According to this system, suppliers will provide retailers with goods to sell but the title of ownerships of the good remains with the suppliers. Retailers will pay suppliers based on the goods that are sold and return

trustworthy by the supplier. Thus it is the survivors' good social capital, especially trust and connection to suppliers or those with capital, that become a survivor's social safety net. Many suppliers are based in Medan and transport links to move goods have been quickly restored. The overall impression gained from interviews with people engaged in these activities is one of resilience, creativity and the value of traditional networks.

Two multinational industries operating prior to the disaster were analysed by the team, both to learn the economic impact of the tsunami on their business, and what they had done – or were intending to do – to help their employees and the communities in which they operated to recover.

At the higher end of the industrial spectrum, both Exxon Mobil and Lafarge (oil and gas, and cement industries respectively) are active in the relief and recovery effort. The reasons are twofold: both enterprises aim to continue their lucrative activities and exercise a degree of social responsibility. By building goodwill among the population, they hope to be able to enhance their social licence to operate.

Large Private Enterprise

Exxon Mobil in Lhokseumawe was less affected by the tsunami than it was by the years of conflict. The company brings oil to the well-heads, and to the Liquefied Natural Gas cargos. The profits of sale are split with the government. The evaluation was given a figure of US\$100 million per month to the government. For a few years now the company has been carrying out a Community Partnership Programme, based on community projects, with an increasing emphasis on ownership. The programme has been spending some US\$180,000 since 2004. When the tsunami struck the company lost only three employees, who were on holiday in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. The facilities were not affected as they were either located on Block B (some 20 km inland)

unsold goods. Therefore, retailers do not require a big capital to start or rebuild

or offshore, where the rigs have been built to rise with water levels and waves. The company estimates that 100 persons were killed who were immediate employee dependents. Exxon immediately fielded the heavy machinery at its disposal, mainly bulldozers and water trucks, estimated to be equivalent to US\$120,000 per month. The total contribution the company made to the tsunami response in Aceh, in cash, in kind and personnel, it estimates to be US\$11 million. The government invited them to act as they did not have the resources themselves. This contrasts with the effect of the conflict on the company, where in 2001 it registered attacks on 100 personnel minibus transports, contractors were killed, grenades were thrown into the compound, and a plane was shot at.

The Lafarge cement factory in Lok Ngha was responsible for 20% of the total cement production in Indonesia before the disaster. The plant was 80% destroyed by a direct hit from the tsunami. 137 of its 450 workforce died and the production of 1.3 million tons of cement per year was lost at a stroke. Yet, being a multinational company, Lafarge has been able to assist its remaining staff either with early retirement packages, or placing them in employment schemes with NGOs operating in the area, or helping them with inputs to rebuild their houses, as well as keeping on a skeleton staff at the factory. It has also pledged to finance the building of 500 houses, a school and a mosque in Lok Ngha. Aiming at modernising the Aceh plant and restoring it to productive capacity by 2007 at a cost of \$ 90 million, it manages to maintain sales of cement, which it imports from Lafarge factories in Malaysia, in order not to lose its client base. Lafarge may also be benefiting significantly from the tsunami reconstruction phase, though no information could be obtained on this. As a major employer in the area its restoration to full functioning will cushion the economic impact of the tsunami in the longer term and contribute to community cohesiveness.

their businesses.

In the case of Exxon Mobil its emergency assistance to the province is also commendable and could yet be rewarded by the peace process resulting in a positive impact on its future activities. As well, the fact that both of these large companies have decided to not only contribute to relief and recovery after the tsunami but also to remain in business has the potential to attract other foreign investment to the province – especially given the promising outlook for peace and stability.

2.3 Shelter and community infrastructure

In the words of the BRR, shelter reconstruction was chaotic at the beginning but is gaining coherence. There are various estimates of housing reconstruction needs: according to BRR, an estimated 76,000 houses need to be reconstructed in Aceh and a further 20,000 in Nias. Higher estimates point to a need for 110,000²⁷. Taking an average unit cost of \$ 4,500, total cost would come to US\$ 500 million, though the BRR/World Bank estimates that \$ 762 million will be needed, of which \$ 702 million has been mobilized to date²⁸. So far about 10,000 permanent housing structures have been built by different national and international agencies and another 20,000 are in progress. BRR plans for 30,000 houses to be completed by the end of 2005, though there is some scepticism as to whether this can be achieved²⁹.

The team encountered a certain stoicism and sense of realism among families, especially those in barracks who understand that it will take time for their homes and communities to be rebuilt. Others, especially those in tents and makeshift shelters are extremely frustrated.

²⁷ *Homes remain elusive for Acehnese on Idul Fitri*, Jakarta Post, 31 October 2005. The exact figure is 110,986 (source: BRR) versus another figure of 82,252 (source: Shelter Working Group (Source: ORC / BRR Tsunami Recovery Report as at Dec 8th). These figures raise concern about lack of agreement on estimates.

²⁸ BRR/WB report op.cit, p. 73

²⁹ Jakarta Post article op.cit.

Confused messages (though it is unclear if these came from the Government or from construction aid agencies) led them to understand that they would not get a permanent house if they moved into a temporary one, so it was better to stay in a tent and be first in line for a permanent house. They did not trust subsequent government and NGO assurances to the contrary, that moving into a temporary house or TLC would not jeopardise their right to a permanent house. BRR is intensifying its public information efforts with village-to-village information campaigns and radio call-in shows to reverse this perception and to disseminate accurate information.

The population appears equally uninformed as to who will assist them to rebuild their homes or other community infrastructure. When questioned, the response seemed to be the NGO name that first came to mind. Those participating in self-help projects were unanimously pleased with the results (projects visited were PCI and Mamamia, a local partner of Caritas Germany and Austria, in Lhoong). However the same beneficiaries knew nothing about plans to install water, sewerage, electricity or other services. Nor were they aware of the cost of their new house.

Tents

In the case of Aceh and Nias, the enormity of the damage wreaked by the tremors and the tsunami, in most cases simply wiping out existing communities and houses, meant that tents were the only rapid response shelter mechanism possible. In the early aftermath of the tsunami, they were instrumental in safeguarding the immediate welfare of the affected population.

The fact that people still lived in tents ten months after the tsunami, in spite of the unprecedented amounts of funding, has been a source of comment in the Indonesian press³⁰ and a source of concern of the international community, according to at least two agencies interviewed on the subject. Although the delay in reconstructing permanent

housing has its roots in the debate on unsustainable logging and the early delay in Government plans for reconstruction, agencies were only just, at the time of the evaluation, starting to recognize that temporary housing could have been planned and constructed earlier, or even kept as a contingency plan³¹. The quantitative survey reveals that fifty four percent of the affected population (defined here as the communities along the sea front) lives in tents, and twenty percent in barracks. The BRR/World Bank report.³², quoting a September 2005 United Nations report on Temporary Shelter in Aceh and Nias, states that, overall, fifteen percent of the displaced population lives in tents (67,504 individuals) and sixty five percent (293,740 individuals) with host families or extended family members³³

Temporary shelter

The point of temporary housing in the context of Aceh and Nias is that (a) it is a necessary measure to take people out of the deteriorating and unsanitary tents, and (b) there is sufficient emergency funding to erect it without drawing on the necessary funds to rebuild permanent housing.

The evaluation found that families have gradually come to accept the temporary living centres (TLC's), finding them preferable to living in rapidly deteriorating tents. Former residential (administrative) communities have also been assisted to move into them, to retain their sense of togetherness and social network. Today most of the barracks are occupied and, although conditions are not optimum, improvements have gradually been made. However, water and sanitation remain a real problem in many of these sites.

³⁰ Jakarta Post article, op.cit.

³¹ IOM, IFRC

³² BRR/World Bank Report, op.cit.

³³ A study conducted by the NGO consortium CARDI in December 2005 shows that the number of people living in host families has declined considerably since earlier studies and is now estimated at a maximum of 50,000. The report attests to the difficulties in identifying people in this category since often, people living with families do not consider themselves to be displaced and others have left their hosts

The success of the initiative requires ensuring that the temporary structures do not become the slums of tomorrow by finding adequate land on which to construct them, ensuring access to water sources and disposing of solid waste. This is dependent on a minimum level of urban planning, whose absence will represent a gap between relief and development.

Permanent housing

All beneficiaries of housing projects interviewed, whether fully installed in their reconstructed houses or working on their construction professed to be satisfied with their new asset. Only one respondent did not approve of having a latrine inside the house, claiming this to be unhealthy (rural Acehnese houses traditionally have outhouses on the property). For others, permanent housing is still a distant dream and there is resentment at the perceived lack of equality in targeting.

Uncertainty, resentment, suspicion, mistrust

Ali, 23, shares a tent with friends along the shoreline and has very definite ideas as to his hierarchy of needs. Already earning a meagre living by diving for scrap metal and fishing, he wants his house rebuilt on land where he used to live, right here on the site of the tent. He resents the coming and going of NGOs who have not even stopped to ask what the community may need. Only World Vision donated food (from WFP). He is aware of government and NGO reconstruction programmes and does not understand why he and other community members on the same site – a kind of jetty some 20 metres from the sea – are not receiving help. He knows the Government has retracted its former zoning laws and stated that people can live wherever they want to. What Ali and many others in a similar situation have not been told or realised is that neither the Government nor NGOs have any intention of reconstructing people's former homes on sites considered to be unsafe, such as this close to the shoreline.

One major obstacle is the issue of land title, a pre-requisite for agencies to commence rebuilding. This is often not available for many Acehnese, mainly because they did not possess legal title prior to the tsunami. Another is the use of certain construction materials and methods. For example, some agencies offer only self-help schemes,

without de-registering with the community.

providing the materials but leaving the construction work to the owner. Others use contractors to rebuild the whole village – either local building firms or companies from outside Aceh (a source of contention for local businesses), and some a combination of both according to individual capabilities. This has led to a certain degree of discontent for some beneficiaries.

Discussions over minimum construction standards, materials permitted, quality assurance and the task of restoring land title are, according to those interviewed, the main reasons for a slow start to the construction of permanent housing. Wood is the traditional housing material used in Aceh but the requirements for rebuilding houses – along with that required to rebuild fishing boats – represent three times the amount of timber that Indonesia can sustainably provide, according to UN Habitat. Thus it has been necessary to consider alternative materials, such as bricks and fibre cement.

There are three main considerations that communities encounter with respect to shelter activities:

1. The paramount need mentioned by the aid agencies to ensure participatory approaches with regard to community site planning and housing components. Yet people lack information about reconstruction plans in their area, and generally lack understanding of how to relate to the NGOs.
2. The presentation of land title, or at least sufficient proof that the beneficiary is entitled to the land his house will be built on to avoid later ownership claims; this is an enormous challenge in light of the lost land records in the tsunami and the fact that many people did not own land in the first place. Permanent communities cannot be built back without this preliminary prerequisite, and in traditional rural communities, there is little notion of land titling; neighbours vouched for each other who lived where “from this banana tree to the river is Pak X’s land”. Some fifty one percent of the respondents to the quantitative questionnaire explained that they had to go and seek the land titles from the authorities.
3. Integration of housing plans with overall community infrastructure plans (water, drainage, sewerage, electrical systems, schools, health posts, religious structures, streets, markets, etc.)

Only if these requirements are respected is there a chance of long-term linkages to relief. Yet the beneficiaries did not have the possibility, or the capacity, to obtain any results in these areas. They were unclear about the identity of those who would take on these considerations. Forty nine percent of the respondents to the quantitative survey said that they had been visited by NGOs asking what they needed and that they had heard assistance would come, then apparently never to return. Seventy percent felt they were not well informed about the organisation or its procedures. Thirty five percent felt the NGOs, when found and contacted, listened but did nothing, while twenty six percent felt they listened and did something. However fifty two percent report that they felt the NGOs had come out of genuine concern, while thirty five percent felt they could not say what the purpose was.

This disconnect with large scale planning is not the result of disinterest or hostility. Some communities understand that they will have to be moved due to the subsidence of land, which is now either submerged or too unsafe to rebuild. The majority of villagers expressed resignation with temporary shelter, understanding the need for proper planning, and the time this is likely to take. Acehnese tradition and general principles of humanitarian action indicate the advisability of ensuring that system-wide decisions are taken jointly with communities, to ensure that families adhere to plans adopted by common agreement.

There is reportedly a low level of attendance at coordination fora where essential information is shared and where discussion can take place on targeting and avoiding gaps and overlap. The result is that in many areas visited by the team, an NGO has 'staked out' its area of operation but has not started work there. This problem is a sensitive one to address, and one which the population is not equipped to deal with. They have simply no ability to communicate with absentee organisations.

The construction industry as a whole is expected by those interviewed to bring them many benefits in the form of training schemes (for such skills as engineering, carpentry, joinery, brick laying, plumbing, electrical work, etc.) and subsequent employment. There are hopes that cash for work schemes will be phased out and construction employment phased in seamlessly, and indeed, many of these activities are already underway. BRR/WB estimates that some US\$ 18 million was injected into the economy from cash for work payments and provided employment to an estimated 29,000 – 35,000 people.

Most people interviewed were eagerly looking forward to participating in the rebuilding of their communities and hoped specifically they would be involved in rebuilding their own houses. This has been taken into account since most housing schemes have planned for elements of self-help along with contractual work to help people who are unable to perform the necessary work themselves. Lacking however is information on how and when this will happen. People seem only vaguely aware that the cash for work schemes are destined to end shortly or that training schemes for reconstruction, in which they can be enrolled, are planned. Information does not seem to penetrate through the filter of the Keuchik.

This denotes the absence of an intermediary level of joined up programming with the population, which extends into the recovery phase. It is also reflected in the physical reconstruction sector, where mid-level institutions seem not to be functioning. As pointed out by the BRR and World Bank report, prospects are good for small-scale, individual reconstruction and for large-scale infrastructure rehabilitation, but there is a ‘gap at the meso-level infrastructure needs, such as district-level roads, protective dykes, sewerage and water-supply systems’³⁴. If these important considerations are not addressed the housing projects will not be sustainable in the longer term.

³⁴ BRR/World Bank report, op.cit.

3 HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL ISSUES

3.1 Introduction

As recognised by Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005)³⁵: “Working with and strengthening local organisation is entirely consistent with, indeed is central, to a rights-based approach to humanitarian action.” Findings relevant to the concepts of building local capacity and participatory approaches are presented together under the headings of community-based approach and a rights-based approach.

Likewise, issues concerning vulnerable groups also coincide with the concept of protection of vulnerable groups in the context of social capital and gender issues.

In this report, there are two levels of analysis of social capital:

- (a) Social capital of the tsunami survivors is examined on evidence gathered under four salient themes, namely: (i) solidarity; (ii) protection of vulnerable groups, (iii) community governance; and (iv) collective action.
- (b) Implementing agencies³⁶ are one of the most critical institutional networks for tsunami survivors and key providers of resources in the relief, rehabilitation and development phases, analysed in terms of accountability and community-based approach.

3.2 Solidarity

Among the tsunami survivors in Aceh, the village emerged as a significant psychological boundary, reflected in respondents’ voluntary reference to establishing social bonds with their fellow villagers. It is worth noting that tsunami survivors, who are also conflict survivors, had on some occasions been internally displaced as a whole village, and maintained the same village structure in their displaced location post-tsunami. The extent of this practice was not studied quantitatively here, but consistent patterns were observed. This also occurred for those in precarious shelter (e.g., tents, or barracks), for example in terms of appointment of Pak Keuchik, or village heads.

³⁵ Idem

³⁶ Implementing agencies here refer to all parties who have direct contact with tsunami survivors in providing them with basic assistance, including government agencies, local and international NGOs, and private sector philanthropic initiatives.

The team found consistent evidence of active solidarity between family members, friends/acquaintances, former or current business contacts and host community with the tsunami survivors. When implementing agencies failed to address beneficiaries' needs for various reasons and in different degrees, these social networks were identified in qualitative interviews by respondents as reliable providers of aid

Community providers offered shelter, sharing of wells when some villagers' own wells were not functioning, or supplying pipe-borne water to IDPs in the barracks when supplies were terminated by the local government; exchanging undesired assistance items (e.g., food rations), and lending monetary or non-monetary capital to re-establish livelihoods. Sixty five percent of the respondents did not feel that there had been an increase in the gap between rich and poor as a result of the tsunami, while twenty percent perceived that this had been the case.

Respondents said that even though they had family members who lived in a different village, they preferred to stay together with their fellow villagers. The common explanation was that tsunami survivors could understand each other better without having to explicitly verbalize the experience. Women and men voiced the same sentiment. Even the common courtesy of not imposing on family members' hospitality for a long period of time is another factor reinforcing social bonding among villagers.

In brief, the experience of the tsunami was – and continues to be - a shared defining experience, a social bond for villagers. In turn, the strong social bonding is a potential for mobilizing tsunami survivors to carry out collective action for relief, rehabilitation and development activities.

Aid governance

Decision-making related to reconstruction plans and humanitarian assistance, is by and large, done by a small group of people in a village. There is little evidence of obtaining

justice from the leading group when respondents feel that their rights have been violated or insufficiently recognized, and this came over as a traditional power axis replicated in every administrative structure throughout Aceh.

In the case of rebuilding housing, the most common aid delivery procedure for agencies other than government is to contact the Camat or head of sub-district, who would go through discussions with the head of village, the implementing agency and other members of Muspika (Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan). Muspika is a government agency, which consists of Head of sub-district, head of police, and head of armed forces at sub-district level.

Decisions about the size, type of materials, and design of the house are made by implementing agencies under guidance from BRR and proposed to a head of sub district and a village leader. An agreement is made between the implementing agency and the Regent. After decisions are made at the policy level, the heads of households are invited by the head of village to a public meeting to explain the decision and discuss implementation issues. At this point, beneficiaries have little influence to change the decisions made at the higher level, and are consulted only on practical implementation issues.

When the implementing agencies did not keep to the agreement (67% of those interviewed claimed that they had heard that assistance was coming, or had been asked what they needed, but received nothing), the lack of trust in agencies in general was identified as a problem. An example of this was the long government 'bureaucratic' process with no positive outcome that prevented the people of Kuala village, Lamno sub-district, from doing something when a written agreement with an international NGO (Red Cross China) to provide housing did not start as scheduled, with no explanation of the status of its implementation. Eight percent of those interviewed in the

quantitative survey claimed that the NGOs thus broke their promise, and fewer than ten percent claimed they could get assistance from the government.

Generally people strikingly lack information about reconstruction plans in their area. There is a large space left to rumour and misinformation, and a high distrust of foreign “NGOs” (which effectively covers every aid organisation that does not wear a uniform), and these organisations have difficulty finding their marks in the society. Forty nine percent of the respondents said that they had been visited by NGOs asking what they needed and that they had heard assistance would come, then apparently never to return. Seventy percent felt they were not well informed about the organisation or its procedures. Thirty five percent felt the NGOs, when found and contacted, listened but did nothing, while twenty six percent felt they listened and did something. However fifty two percent report that they felt the NGOs had come out of genuine concern, while thirty five percent felt they could not say what the purpose was.

The redistribution process is highly codified, and does not present many alternatives to the NGOs and implementing agencies. In relation to the reception and distribution of other forms of assistance, beneficiaries commonly refer to ‘Keuchik’ or head of village as the person in-charge. The village head could also appoint villagers to coordinate distribution of assistance as part of the Posko (Pos Komando or Command Post or local coordination and support centres) committee. These people could be teachers, religious leaders, civil servants or villagers.

The ‘keuchik’ or head of Posko would distribute assistance according to different criteria (by household or room in barrack), depending on the number of supplies. At sub-district level, such as Calang, reception and distribution of some assistance is the responsibility of respective sectoral government agencies (e.g., Dinas Kesehatan or sub-district Health Office).

Villagers often expressed dissatisfaction with the distribution of assistance. One respondent commented that 75 per cent of aid distribution in his village was fair. Other respondents alleged that elites were taking a bigger proportion of aid compared to the rest of the villagers (Calang and Lamno). Government officials were often seen as ‘corrupt’ because of the occasional disappearance of aid (e.g., generators and children’s school books in Calang), failure in the distribution of assistance promised by the Government (e.g., jadup, hardship allowance for civil servants) and sale of assistance items in the local market (WFP food rations in Lamno).

There appears to be no effective mechanism to rectify the situation. Some respondents mentioned that they had confronted the ‘Pak Keuchik’ to no avail. The majority tolerated the situation, which they admitted led to distortions. The aid agencies were not able to intervene at this level.

The importance of information

An important consideration that may yet compromise development plans is the widening disconnect between the agencies and the population due to the lack of information and understanding on the part of the latter. The need to consult people about their needs and aspirations and to provide them with clear and unambiguous messages on what can be done, what cannot be done, when it will start and how they can participate, is paramount. Yet, ten months after the disaster, we encountered everywhere confusion, misinformation, lack of information and inflated expectations. These are bound to result in disappointment, resentment and possibly conflict.

For instance, visits to shelter construction sites revealed that in most cases those responsible for building houses – let alone beneficiaries – could not say who would be responsible for restoring essential infrastructure such as drainage, sewerage and water systems, nor schools, health clinics or other related community works. Respondents to the quantitative survey mention NGOs and international agencies. This is not to imply

such works are not taking place, but there is a narrow vision among workers in various projects that seems to preclude their awareness about other activities being planned at the same site.

Inquiring further as to the lack of information on the part of beneficiaries, it was discovered that while NGOs involve, consult and inform community leaders (Keuchik's) with regards to needs and plans, they assume that the latter will pass the messages along to the families they are responsible for. This is apparently not always the case: four Keuchik's interviewed by the team said they did not feel the need to inform their communities, because (a) people are not interested and (b) do not need to know. Thirty one percent of those surveyed said that NGOs came to talk to the keuchiks, while only twenty two percent held a community meeting.

All people are concerned about was the kind of assistance they would receive and when. They appeared to be quite convinced that information only needs to be shared with them, and that they could be entrusted to know best what their communities needed.

To the question of why such a high number of NGOs broke their promise to assist, twenty percent of the respondents to the survey said there was a misunderstanding with the people. Twenty nine percent felt the aid procedures were not understood, while forty one percent felt they had been given the wrong information about the NGO.

Correcting this situation would require a greater investment in time than is currently being made by the aid agencies to organise community gatherings, hold question and answer sessions, undertake random door-to-door interviews, all with repeat visits after certain intervals.

3.3 Protection and Human Rights issues

Protection of vulnerable groups of population.

In Aceh, solidarity among villagers also applies to solidarity with disadvantaged groups of the population. In spite of community solidarity, a reliable protection mechanism is absent beyond that of individual goodwill. In the post-tsunami phase, even an under-age orphan is considered as one household in the distribution of assistance. They normally live with their relatives who represent them in public meetings and manage their portion of humanitarian assistance. Prior to the tsunami, most respondents in the village did not see under-age orphans as a critical issue in their villages. The major concern after the tsunami is the need for a reliable protection mechanism for under-age orphans who live with their guardians to ensure protection of their rights from any form of abuse.

There does not seem to be a strict age restriction on participation in the public meetings. One respondent from Kreung Tenong village, Lamno sub-district, a high-school student orphan knowledgeable about assistance to his village, attends meetings on behalf of his older siblings, even though he is unable to participate in a meaningful way. Suggestions from young persons in the public meeting are less likely to be well received as meetings are supposed to be for adults.

Some respondents in qualitative interviews claimed that orphans are at risk of being sold, particularly because of the proximity to Medan, which is perceived as a departure point for smuggling children out of Indonesia for illegal adoption, forced labour, or work in the sex industry. In addition, Aceh is also close to known 'markets' for human trafficking such as Batam island. Such perceptions reflect a significant issue, even if there is no observed evidence. IOM, who has investigated the issue, tends to believe that this is actually happening.

Even though no interviews with disabled persons were conducted during this study, a staff member of a local NGO commented on the lack of attention given to disabled

people prior to the tsunami. Subsequently an international NGO came and helped the physically disabled. During the field visit, we found that those with psychological problems are looked after by the community but that there is no systematic effort to identify and help them.

Elderly respondents, both male and female mentioned that their basic needs such as reading glasses are not met. The livelihoods program is not tailored to their needs. An older widow mentioned she had difficulties in participating in public meetings and in those economic activities available because she had no glasses and suffered from rheumatism. Her sewing and cooking skills could earn her a living from home, but she has no access to equipment or the market. These cases indicate that elderly and sick people are likely to constitute long-term social cases whose special needs will, for the foreseeable future, require extra efforts from implementing agencies to identify and address.

There is no reliable community-based monitoring system in Aceh to ensure rights protection for vulnerable populations in the community where they live. Cultural values such as saving face by not revealing shame, maintaining dignity, and a sense of 'taboo' in interfering with others' family problems are among constraints presented to the NGOs to effectively deal with human rights abuse against vulnerable population in a domestic, should it occur.

Few organisations have engaged in the community-based protection of vulnerable populations. World Vision has started a community-based protection system in July 2005 by appointing one woman and one man to be in charge of monitoring and dealing with all forms of abuse against women and children in each community. The Government also prohibited adoption of the tsunami orphans as a preventive measure to human trafficking.

Some internally displaced persons and tsunami survivors had previously been victims of conflict-related displacement. In Kreung Sabee, for example, the tsunami-related IDPs are originally farmers from Panggong village, a remote village in Lamno sub-district. As part of government's effort to eliminate GAM members, they were forced to leave their village in 2003, without even being allowed the time necessary to pack their belongings.

They were taken by the TNI to coastal villages where they were fed, clothed and sheltered by Dinas Social for two years before the tsunami hit. They now find themselves displaced to their current location. Prior to the tsunami, communities tended to exclude victims of the conflict from social interaction, or those involved with the conflict. Interestingly 60 percent of the respondents consulted in the survey claim that the tsunami has made them more sympathetic to the plight of these people.

Few had returned to their village but they could not start working on their farms again since they lacked equipment and other materials. Even their houses were in ruins. They believe that their special needs as IDPs have been overlooked by the aid agencies and they showed a high level of dependency on the food rations, including canned sardines, which other tsunami survivors refused to eat. Their lack of social capital and survival or livelihood skills in the coastal areas to which they have been moved is likely to place them among the most vulnerable groups or the poorest of the poor for the foreseeable future.

In contrast, migrant small traders, who came to Calang in search of better economic opportunities and/or lower competition, did not perceive themselves as being vulnerable to discriminatory treatment by aid agencies or the host population. Some of them are direct tsunami survivors and others are indirectly affected ones. They receive some humanitarian assistance, especially food rations, but built their own small shops/houses on the land leased from the host population. Some 60 percent of the respondents in the

total sample claim that they did not receive any assistance to rebuild their savings and business, while fourteen percent received some from international agencies just after the tsunami.

Interestingly, interviews with the host populations showed mixed reactions about the economic migrants. The positive views include (a) the migrants could replace those who died³⁷, and subsequently the presence of more people could lessen the trauma (i.e., the silence reminds people of the immediate aftermath the tsunami); and (b) they could help local economic development. Others believed that social jealousy and friction could occur if a wider gap were to open between the economic development of the migrants compared to the host population. Thirty one percent felt there would be no conflict, just jealousy, while only seven percent predicted conflict, however.

Collective action

There have been mixed findings on the impact of Cash for Work on the traditional practices of volunteerism. Gotong-royong, an Indonesian term for a collective action, which is a common mechanism to maintain public facilities, has also been part of tradition in Aceh villages, such as ‘Friday Clean-Up’.

Post-tsunami, many – notably community leaders – have expressed concern that the cash for work program could erode this value to the point that people would only participate in maintaining public facilities if they get paid. Beneficiaries pointed out that the difference between the former ‘gotong-royong’ activity and cash for work program lies in the duration of the activities. ‘Friday Clean-Up’ is one day weekly whereas cash for work activities could take weeks. They would still be willing to be

³⁷ It should be noted that the *desa* (village) level law legislated at the national level (UU No 22, 1999) stipulates that a *desa* can be combined with another or divided, etc. by the provincial government and DPRD. The consequence is that an artificial community with no previous social capital can be created.

part of collective action if the duration is short. Unemployed respondents said that if they had other source of income, they would be willing to engage in ‘gotong-royong’.

Local NGOs and some Keuchiks also alleged that cash for work could change the mentality of Acehnese and encourage them to become ‘social loafers’ or free-riders for being able to get paid, irrespective of the amount of work they engage in. Interviews with beneficiaries suggest that the coordinator of cash for work is responsible for disciplining workers. At times, when they managed to reach the goal earlier than originally scheduled, they received the amount of money as agreed according to the original schedule. Social loafing does happen in this, as in any teamwork.

Unfortunately, management strategies such as assigning community members to agree on monitoring systems and sanctions against the social loafers, as well as establishing tasks division and reward systems, which promote both individual and collective accountability, are not considered in the cash for work programmes.

A recent UNDP report³⁸ documents collective action practices in building physical infrastructure such as bridges, paths or roads and public buildings with community based resources prior to the tsunami when there was no public funding for it. Similarly, anecdotal evidence of villagers’ initiative to use their resources to rebuild their lives themselves after being disillusioned by prolonged delays in obtaining housing assistance and ineffective livelihood program is also found. In Kuala village, Lamno, displaced villagers have tentatively planned to return to their village after Ramadan in order to start working on their lands. While the initiative seems commendable, the decision may not be sensible as the village is still partly flooded.

³⁸ UNDP- Civil Society Capacity Building Report, 28 October 2005.

Accountability of implementing agencies

The often insufficient level of feedback or information activities from the NGOs may have contributed to the feeling of disappointment and resentment among the beneficiaries. Thirty seven percent of the respondents say that they found the solution on their own, while twenty three percent went to the community leaders' meeting to ask for mediation. In general, they did not take initiative to contact the NGOs themselves for follow up, as they did not know how to find the often Jakarta or overseas-based organisations, and furthermore, did not believe it would do any good. Twenty percent report being passed on from one person to another (although twenty six percent say the NGO, when contacted, listened and did something).

It is quite common that beneficiaries perceive humanitarian assistance as donation/charity and therefore they have no sense of entitlement or any understanding of their rights in respect to the assistance. Fifty two percent of respondents feel that the NGOs came out of genuine concern. In order to address the issue of 'unfulfilled promises', especially with respect to housing, BRR has decided to appoint an ombudsman to mediate areas of conflict between implementing agencies and beneficiaries.

Beneficiaries interviewed privately tended to attribute disappointment related to the submission of proposals to NGOs, to the lack of transparency in the decision-making process by the NGOs, to nepotistic practices; and to the inaccurate selection of assistance recipients. In the survey, the results we obtained tend to be more positive, a large minority saying the NGO was misunderstood.

Irrespective of the root cause of the 'broken promises', images of implementing agencies as well as relationships between beneficiaries and implementing agencies could be put in jeopardy. It is worth observing that some of these problems could be substantially ameliorated through better information practices.

Adoption of community-based approach and rights-based approach

The inadequate application of participatory approaches, at the policy and programme levels in the reconstruction of Aceh has been well-documented³⁹. During the immediate relief phase where the situation demanded urgent responses to a massive number of people, it may not always be feasible to carry out comprehensive public consultation.

However over the medium term operations there has not been strong evidence of the development of effective monitoring and feedback mechanisms, in order to compensate for the lack of early consultation. Hence, the complaint mechanism, as well as internal monitoring and evaluation system, which were weak at the beginning of the tsunami response⁴⁰, clearly remain a significant issue to be addressed almost one year after the tsunami.

Respondents mentioned meetings with the staff of NGOs in the field as a means of giving feedback. Overall, they did not perceive that the feedback made any difference as they were given no explanation as to why their suggestions were not accepted. Although it may not be realistic to provide responses and explanations to all suggestions, it would facilitate programme effectiveness if critical issues were discussed with beneficiaries, as reflected in agency claims to good governance.

Field consultations show that in some cases programme implementation is delayed or the output not used by beneficiaries because of failure to include their perspectives. At Janguet village, indoor toilets are not used because they are believed to be unhygienic in small houses. The beneficiaries are not used to close proximity between the toilet and the kitchen and bedroom.

³⁹ UNDP- Civil Society Capacity Building Report, 28 October 2005.

⁴⁰ Final Report: Real Time Evaluation of Medair's 'Tsunami Emergency Response'
Lee, Andrew CK MedAir 30/06/2005. Multi-agency evaluation of tsunami
response: Thailand and Indonesia by Reed, Sheila; Mashni, Ayman;
Sasmitawidjaja, Virza; Care and World Vision 01/09/2005

The Mamamia housing project has attempted to involve beneficiaries by allowing beneficiaries to build their own houses with building materials and labour costs provided by the NGO, except for the timber. However, the beneficiaries' request for an advance based as opposed to the existing reimbursement system was not responded to, and hence the poorer beneficiaries lacked means to complete the rebuilding of their houses.

An observer commented that implementing agencies only listen to beneficiaries when there have been many criticisms against their activities or major problems. Hence, implementing agencies tend to adopt curative rather than preventive approaches. Advocates to beneficiaries, whether they are individuals or groups, have played quite important roles in ensuring that the needs and interests of their beneficiaries are addressed by respective agencies (e.g., a child's rights activist in Calang, volunteers in Lamno who obtained new tents for IDPs).

It should be recognised, however, that these advocates are not technical experts even in their particular areas of interest; therefore, they would also need capacity strengthening and/or access to technical experts in order to provide informed choice to their beneficiaries.

The lack of access to information as a basic element of community empowerment has also been reported in previous assessments⁴¹. Consistent with findings in other report mentioned above⁴², the village heads do not receive sufficient information on aid, reconstruction plans etc.

Field consultations also suggest that information customarily held by the village head is not necessarily fully shared with other villagers. The villagers interviewed commonly had some information about aid or rehabilitation plans but always referred to the

⁴¹ UNDP – Where is My House, 5 September 2005.

⁴² *Idem*.

‘Keuchick’ for full information. Word of mouth is the main medium of information sharing with varying degrees of accuracy. People’s sources of information are neighbours, friends and acquaintances.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that women’s ability to establish informal social networks (e.g., friendships with neighbours and other villagers, service providers, traders in the market) influences their access to information as they are not confined to their houses. This finding highlights the importance of understanding informal network as a source of information for women other than male members of the family.

Women are treated to the same level of entitlements as prior to the tsunami, while there is only a small increase in female or child headed households (eleven and nine percent have witnessed it respectively). Eighty nine percent of the respondents did not feel that women would have difficulty claiming land registered under their husband’s name, while 19% of respondents claimed they had lost their spouse in the tsunami. However interviews indicate that the manner of consultation is in many cases not optimal. It takes place often through community meetings, whereas meetings in tents, barrack rooms and in the home are more conducive for seeking women’s views.

Miscommunication between an implementing agency and its beneficiaries could lead to conflict, as per an incident in Janguet Village. On 17 October 2005, a staff member of Islamic Relief Service was attacked by some villagers over a misunderstanding of the schedule of payment of cash for work. Because of unclear information provided to the community about changes in the schedule of payment, the ‘Keuchik’ of the village was also alleged to have been involved in the embezzlement of the money. The incident relates to the community’s perception of the lack of accountability in the village governance. At the time of data collection, the court trial of the case has just begun, thus an accurate account of the incident was not available. Some agencies, such as UNDP and BRR will shortly launch measures to improve population’s access to

information concerning reconstruction of Aceh through such media as newsletters as well as distribution of information boards in tsunami affected communities.

Evidence from respondents suggests that there has generally been a lack of capacity building to strengthen governance at the village level. As mentioned earlier, village heads play a significant role in bridging NGOs and villagers. In response to the massive impact of the tsunami, they do not always have the necessary capacity to maintain social cohesion and solidarity (e.g., transparency, non-discriminatory treatment, and public trust) or to mobilize villagers to carry out collective action to fill the gaps of inadequate public services. Moreover, many “keuchiks” also have to deal with their personal losses and survivals. Some ‘keuchiks’ reported that they have not received their salaries from the government since the tsunami.

In the case of Aceh where the public services were weak even before the tsunami, laying the foundations for sustainable development during the relief phase also requires strengthening community participation. There has been little evidence of initiatives to strengthen community-based management of public facilities and services, especially in the sector of water and sanitation. Traditions and previous practices such as ‘gotong royong’, social cohesion and solidarity, could be better exploited⁴³.

Health

Respondents reported that school-aged children managed to resume their studies one to three months after the tsunami even when classes took place in tents. Health services were also accessible within a short period of time. In fact, some respondents commented that the quality of services has improved and is cheaper or even free of charge compared to pre-tsunami.

⁴³ Satu Kahkonen (2002). Does Social Capital Matter in the Delivery of Water and Sanitation? In Christiaan Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer (Eds), *Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: a A Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners*. The World Bank: Washington, D.C.

Public health services in Indonesia are supposed to be free of charge, according to the government's policy, but in practice clients pay for the services. International aid, in this context, has helped reconstruction of these health centres, but the sustainability of the services can only be ensured if there is a well-planned handover to the government. Unfortunately, there was no good evidence of full recovery of the health sector during the field visit, but in one former-conflict area, a health centre that had to be shut down during the conflict was able to resume operations thanks to international NGO rehabilitation assistance.

Access to water varies from home water delivery (by Oxfam), digging one's own well, sharing wells with neighbours and obtaining clean water from the nearby hills. There is no consistent impact of the distance of access to clear water on women's household burden. Some women reported having to walk to get it themselves; to pay a rickshaw-man to get the water; and others received help from their husbands or brothers. Sanitation is accessible but almost all of them are in poor condition due to lack of maintenance. Overall, as noted in other assessment documents⁴⁴, the tsunami relief response has been limited to providing immediate basic needs of the population without sufficient consideration to integrating medium and long-term perspectives of the services provided.

A respondent working with school-aged children reported a decline in behavioural problems among children from immediately after the tsunami to now. Some respondents or their children, however, are still trying to cope with the traumatic experience. Similarly, others remain struggling to come to terms with the loss of family members as evidenced in the overt expression of sadness during the interviews, especially among women respondents. Praying has been reported as a way of coping with the loss and the traumatic experience by men and women. As mentioned earlier,

⁴⁴ UNDP- Civil Society Capacity Building Report, 28 October 2005.

both men and women intuitively stayed with their fellow tsunami survivors as a way of giving psychological support to one another.

Primary and secondary information indicate that a trauma-counselling programme has been offered by several aid organizations from an early stage of the emergency phase in the forms of individual, group and community-based counselling, vocational and play therapies, respectively for adults and children, in different parts of Aceh. However, geographic coverage of this programme is uneven. Respondents in Calang reported the absence of such programmes. In spite of these programmes, respondents have a limited understanding of the psychological process in experiencing loss and other traumatic experiences related to the tsunami.

Similarly, they reported inappropriate responses to their suffering by people who did not experience the loss of family members. These findings show that in spite of the need for information about bereavement processes by a large number of tsunami survivors, there has been a lack of culturally-appropriate mass-education through traditional channels of communication (e.g., network of ulama) about the psychological aspects of bereavement, psychological trauma, how others deal with grieving persons, and information about available services. Understanding of these issues could potentially empower the grieving persons to know whether what they feel is normal or not, and where to find services if they need it. Likewise, others could offer more appropriate responses to them.

Ultimately, the extent to which beneficiaries have dealt well with the impact of the tsunami can be found in their responses on perceived 'hikmah' or wisdom gained from experiencing the tsunami. Interviewees reported that they felt: (a) closer to God or more religious; (b) more patient and accepting things in life, etc.

3.4 Gender impact

Gender issues focus on (a) number of widows versus widowers, (b) variability in gender relations and women's status across Aceh, (c) adoption of women in development (WID) versus gender in development (GID) approaches, (d) participation of women in public consultation, and (e) protection against violence against women (VAW).

Number of widows versus widowers

The number of widowers is reported to have increased dramatically in comparison to the increase in the number of widows. In general, beneficiaries commented that younger widows have remarried or would do so soon, while older widows usually remain being single (see the section on protection of vulnerable population).

Widowers with adequate financial resources would easily find a new wife as they could afford the 'mahar' or bride dowry, which at least would cost Rp 5 millions worth of gold jewellery. They mostly prefer younger women. If there is an unbalanced ratio between adult males and adult females, the potential problem of early marriage among women warrants further study. In both cases of widows and widowers with young children, child care becomes a major concern, especially for those who lost their extended family members. Among few agencies dealing with this issue, is World Vision.

Variability in women's status and gender relations

Secondary information⁴⁵, field consultations with beneficiaries and local experts, and observation suggest the importance of not making a generalization on gender issues in Aceh, and being particularly cautious with portrayal of the status and conditions of women in Aceh by the foreign media (particularly regarding issues of submission).

⁴⁵ ILO (undated). Panel discussion: Rebuilding Women's Lives in the Aftermath of Disaster. Up-date on gender issues in Aceh, Indonesia.

Policy and programme designers seek to obtain inputs from women, which is highly relevant as the status and conditions of women in Aceh vary greatly across the region. For instance, in some places coffee shops are a gathering place for men whereas women who frequent coffee shop will run the risk of being harassed. This is seen as a source of gender differentiated information collection by the agencies. Yet curiously this fact was not reflected in the experience of our female respondents.

ILO's quick assessment found that men and women from different parts of Aceh showed different attitudes about what is considered as appropriate jobs for women. In addition, those who work in the post-conflict areas should be careful not to return women to their traditional roles. In these areas, women have been functioning as breadwinners and peace-keeping agents, when the men fled the village for their own survival.

In "pre" and "post-tsunami", irrespective of the Indonesian family law which only recognizes men as a heads of households⁴⁶ and Shariah Law, which stipulates representations of women in public life by their male family members, respondents reported that widows could become heads of households. Interviews with widows of different ages suggest that there is more willingness to take part in public meetings among younger widows.

In spite of the opportunity to be part of public meeting for women, it has been widely recognised, including by Kuntoro, Head of BRR, that women have not been fully involved in the rebuilding of Aceh⁴⁷.

⁴⁶ The Marriage Law 1975 Marriage and Family Law stipulates that position of wife are equal to those of the husband, both in family and society. However, the husband is the head of the household and the wife is the caretaker and responsible for the household. The State Guidelines in 1989 describe Indonesian woman's contribution to the state as (a) loyal supporter of the husband; (b) producer and educator of future generations, (c) caretaker of the household, and (d) additional economic provider for the family.

⁴⁷ An interview with Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, Head of BRR, published in Ceureumén, dated 15 October 2005, entitled 'Perempuan Belum Terlibat Penuh dalam

According to the survey, respondents did not think that women in Aceh would be discriminated against in claiming their land. The manual for land registration in tsunami-affected areas in the provinces of NAD and North Sumatra, published by the government, assures equal rights of men and women to claim and register lands. It states the rights of widows and daughters to inherit lands according to Shariah Law and of those under-aged to register land under their own names with the help of their guardian.

Gender discrimination in the property heritage depends on which laws are used to settle the issue. Based on the Shariah Law, sons are entitled to 2/3 of the parent's heritage and daughters are only 1/3. If a community follows the traditional law or adat, it is the women who will inherit the parents' property.

In field consultations, widow respondents did not express land rights as an issue. In fact, there were indications of community solidarity to help widows to rebuild their houses and the Keuchik's efforts to prioritize rebuilding of widows' houses.

Pre-tsunami, few NGOs had access to micro-finance or micro-credit programmes aimed at providing livelihoods for women, including female survivors of the conflict (e.g., Centre for Community Development and Education, Flower Aceh). Other NGOs, who started to operate after the tsunami, did not mainstream gender perspectives into their livelihoods programmes in the relief phase (e.g., no provision of child care services to facilitate participation of women with young children).

Women's livelihoods projects took place at a later stage. In other words, women in development approach (WID)⁴⁸ is the one that is largely adopted by NGOs rather than

Rekonstruksi' (Women have not been fully involved in the reconstruction).

⁴⁸ Women in Development approach first came to prominence in the early 1970's as an approach to include women in development. Different policy responses and interventions focused on women as a separate group resulting in women's concerns being "added on" and peripheral to mainstream development efforts. WID policies and interventions have in the main concentrated on women's productive

the gender in development (GID)⁴⁹ approach. Moreover, this WID approach did not start from the beginning of the emergency phase.

The delay in promoting economic independence for women, irrespective of their marital status, increases women's vulnerability to poverty as it prevents them from coping well with any shocks in their life (e.g., unemployment, sickness or loss of male breadwinner in a household, domestic violence).

For orphans, especially a female orphan, the lack of access to employment increases their risk of becoming victims of human trafficking. As mentioned in the section on protection of vulnerable population, the micro-credit programmes for women also tend to exclude women with no previous employment experience or skills as a means of reducing the institution's financial risk. Therefore, failure to mainstream vulnerability approaches in the relief phase perpetuates marginalization of the poorest of the poor in long-term development.

Violence against Women

There is no strong indication of a significant increase in domestic violence incidents and other forms of violence against women since the tsunami. This finding should be treated with caution because the issue of domestic violence remains taboo, which makes the severity of the problem difficult to assess.

work. The failure to make an explicit link with their reproductive work often adds to women's workload. Focusing on women in isolation means that unequal gender relations in various social and economic settings remain unaddressed [UNDP (2001). Gender in Development Programme: Learning and Info Pack].

⁴⁹ Gender in Development (GID) perspective emerged in the late 1980's as an alternative to the prevailing Women in Development or WID approach. Unlike WID, which focused on women only, and called for their integration into development as producers and workers, GID focuses on the interdependence of men and women in society and on the unequal relations of power between them. The GID approach aims for a development process that transforms gender relations in order to enable women to participate on an equal basis with men in determining their common future [UNDP (2001). Gender in Development Programme: Learning and Info Pack].

A respondent commented that the tsunami led to a feeling of sadness from the loss of family members and consequently did not increase the rate of violence. This is as opposed to emergencies caused by conflict, which often causes a sense of frustration of being treated unjustly and promotes a culture of violence, which spills over to violence and conflicts in households.

It is noteworthy that prior to the peace agreement, the presence of armed forces inside the camps did not only not provide protection but actually increased the vulnerability of women to violence and threatened their security. Local NGOs also express concerns about potential increase in sexual harassment towards women. As presented earlier in the section of protection of vulnerable population, World Vision has started a protection programme for women and children.

4 CONFLICT AND DISASTER RISK

4.1 Conflict Affected Areas

The interior of Aceh province has traditionally – for at least the past five decades - been less prosperous than the coastal areas, partially due to the conflict but also due to of physical access difficulties. Some of the conflict-affected areas were indirectly affected by the tsunami, compounding existing problems of freedom of movement, due to damaged infrastructure, and hence access to markets, as well as through reduced purchasing power of tsunami-affected populations.

People interviewed in conflict-affected villages close to the coastal areas (Lamno, Jurig near Kreung Sabe, Calang, Lhokseumawe) responded in overwhelmingly positive terms to the signing of the peace accords and attest to profiting already from an early peace dividend. This includes:

- Safer access to their fields, in due course increasing cultivation and profits;
- A marked decrease in the level of harassment, including decreased levels of extortion from both the GAM and TNI, and physical abuse from the TNI directed at people suspected of harbouring and assisting rebels;
- A relaxation of the rule regarding public gatherings (previously it was prohibited to hold gatherings of more than three people in public locations) leading to the re-opening of coffee shops;
- A decrease in the number of GAM and TNI checkpoints at which extortion regularly took place;
- A lightening of the general atmosphere conducive to a more relaxed social interaction and, flowing from this, the possibility of engaging in a greater number of business transactions.

In other areas, people expressed only cautious optimism regarding these factors.

Despite efforts of the team to gauge the monetary value of the peace dividend, people were able to give only broad estimates ranging from 10 to 20 percent of their income that they would no longer have to forfeit to the conflicting parties. If an estimated 2 million people inhabit the conflict-affected areas, half of whom could be considered to be actively employed, a very rough estimate of the overall monetary value of the peace

dividend would be \$136 million annually⁵⁰. Of course, once people begin to increase production and trade, the dividend will be immeasurably greater.

Although there was no evidence from the field survey to support this view, the evaluators – as well as other work that has been carried out on this issue⁵¹ – believe that initial optimism may cause a ‘rift’ in the social fabric and give rise to social tensions if improvements to people’s longer-term livelihoods do not become tangible, or if the disparities between tsunami reconstruction beneficiaries and those not benefiting are not addressed. This has for example been observed in conflicts around the world, such as in Kashmir or in Burundi.

People living in those areas most affected by the conflict overwhelmingly stated their satisfaction at being able to once more access their fields for cultivation, thanks to the reduction of hostilities as a result of the peace accords. When asked if they resented the degree of assistance being provided to tsunami-affected populations, the response was that they harboured no resentment, understood that those populations had lost everything, and therefore deserved more assistance and expressed relief that it had not affected them.

However, some point to a growing resentment among populations in more isolated areas who have not received any aid and whose livelihoods have been adversely affected, not only directly by the conflict⁵² but indirectly by the tsunami through the loss of infrastructure to bring their goods to market, and the reduced purchasing power of the tsunami-affected population.

⁵⁰ Using an estimated formula of 1 million people earning \$ 1.5/day, over 365 days, that is an annual gross income of \$ 547,500,000. Estimating an average annual loss of 25% to extortion, the figure of \$136 m is arrived at, representing the amount that would no longer have to be paid to the extortionists.

⁵¹ Aceh Reconstruction in a Conflict Environment, Adam Burke and Afnan, September 2005

⁵² “Aceh: Reconstruction in a Conflict Environment; views from civil society, donors and NGOs”, by Adam Burke and Afnan, August 2005.

4.2 Conflict as an Obstruction to Relief

During the years of conflict there was limited humanitarian access to Aceh, and hence little relief flowing in. Even specialised agencies, such as ICRC, were allowed only a very limited and controlled presence in the province: just two delegates were allowed at any point in time.

The conflict situation in Aceh initially hampered relief to tsunami-affected people in as much as it imposed restrictions on movements, limiting travel possibilities and involving heavy coordination with the government and the military and also informal consultations and discussions with the GAM. In June – July 2005, two international NGO workers were shot at (though not killed) by the armed forces.

Local Acehnese population, as well as NGO representatives interviewed, alleged that while at one level the military adjusted reasonably well to the new situation on the ground, their presence nevertheless slowed down the relief response to the tsunami. Governmental agreement to travel into areas outside those immediately affected by the tsunami necessitated military escorts and lengthy bureaucratic procedures, which meant that most agencies decided to implement relief activities in geographical areas that did not entail these constraints. Humanitarian space was thus effectively compromised.

All international agencies are aware that the Indonesian authorities are still very sensitive to conflict issues and the opening up of conflict areas to needs assessments and other international activity is only proceeding slowly. In terms of UN security parlance, these areas are still under phase IV, meaning that they are only accessible with heightened security measures.

However, now that security is no longer a major constraint to humanitarian access, Humanitarian Codes of Conduct should now be given priority and access to conflict-affected communities by international aid agencies opened up. This requires careful negotiation with the GoI. There is sufficient evidence that these communities and individuals have similar, if not greater needs and vulnerabilities than those affected by the tsunami, and that these are not being met. The principle on non-discrimination is one of the cornerstones of international human rights law and is also a basic tenet in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

Continued discrimination between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected communities regarding the degree and content of international assistance could ignite or exacerbate inter-community tensions and complicate the peace process – for which international agencies would be partly to blame. Any such complication could have a negative impact on recovery efforts in the whole province, setting back the opportunity for development for all.

Comprehensive coverage would allow agencies to map the different contexts of vulnerable communities and individuals, assess their degree of vulnerability, determine their needs, and complement official efforts to assist them, as an example of good LRRD practice.

4.3 Peace Dividends

The international presence in Aceh has gradually broadened and created opportunities to both rebuild Aceh and Nias and cement the peace. There is a clear symbiotic relationship between these goals: a durable peace needs sustainable development while development needs peace in order to reach its full potential. At a more immediate level internationalisation by humanitarian assistance reinforces internationalisation of the peace agreement, and *vice versa*.

Early on there were very real questions from the point of view of agencies as to how long they would be allowed to operate. The subsequent peace talks opened the way for a wider geographic effort, especially from May 2005, to improve livelihoods throughout the province and offer an opportunity for the tsunami response to reach its full potential.

Already prior to the tsunami an estimated 30% of the population lived below the poverty line compared to 17% as the national average⁵³. The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates underemployment at nearly 30% of the workforce in October 2005, 63% of which is under 30 years old⁵⁴. To prevent inequalities, opportunities must open up to the population outside the tsunami-affected areas and embrace everyone living in the province.

In the heavily conflict-afflicted areas – villages around Lhokseumawe, Biruen, Pidie, people noted that illegal extortion of goods and cash by both sides to the conflict has decreased significantly since the peace agreement. The more relaxed atmosphere allows them to move around with less fear of being accosted and robbed, with the attendant result that they are more confident about going out to cultivate their fields and conduct business transactions. Checkpoints manned by the TNI or BRIMOB are less evident and while people still give the soldiers donations, they do so more as a voluntary - or precautionary - action than out of necessity.

Before the tsunami, public health and education were the sectors most severely affected by the conflict because virtually no professionals wanted to venture to Aceh due to the inherent insecurity. With the peace process in place, this trend can hopefully be reversed and equal attention can be paid to services and infrastructure prerequisites in the conflict affected areas.

⁵³ FAO/WFP assessment, May 2005.

⁵⁴ *Aceh Reconstruction: A Strategy for Gainful Employment*, ILO, October 2005.

The conflict has also negatively affected the overall investment climate in Aceh. Most goods in Aceh are brought in from Medan, but illegal fees that traders and businessmen pay for transporting these goods within Aceh are significant, affecting the price of the products. Attention should focus on reducing the cost of trade, improving safety and restoring the legal system – something that the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has recognized and is seeking to promote.

4.4 Risk Mitigation

An Action contre la Faim newsletter reports in July 2005 that 85-90% of the displaced have returned to their areas of origin, including areas at risk⁵⁵. This was confirmed by the evaluation through observation during site visits. These are located within many of the areas decreed by the government to become buffer zones, in other words not suitable for human habitat. Surprisingly, the field survey showed that a majority of respondents (62%) supported the concept of buffer zones in coastal areas, even the 55% who previously lived in them.

Over half the respondents said they intended to return to buffer zone areas, though 33% would only do so because they had no choice, while 30% indicated that they did not wish to. Nearly 70% admitted that they feared the implications of returning to high-risk zones. One quarter of the people who reported to have earlier lived in buffer zones, have already moved to non-buffer zones.

With regard to current fears, the survey focused on four areas of concern to people in the region, such as lack of quality water, the threat of natural disaster, decreasing fish yields and land/homes in the buffer zone. While over one third of the respondents said they were worried about lack of quality water, more than half the respondents feared another tsunami and a high number was also worried about fish yields going down,

⁵⁵ “Food Security Surveillance Newsletter N°1”, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Action Contre

affecting their basic food and livelihoods. Before the tsunami, such fears were almost negligible.

While one quarter of the respondents claimed that they were asking the government and NGO's for assistance to alleviate the risk of being affected by a new disaster, nearly one half the respondents are doing practically nothing about the situation, obviously hoping for some external intervention to sort out their troubles.

The qualitative study did not conduct an in-depth analysis of how the population perceived that they might be assisted to 'build back better'⁵⁶. Interviews with individuals and groups discussed how they might improve their livelihoods, but as stated earlier in this report, their main concern was to get back to the previous way of life before the tsunami, which was the benchmark they understood best. People were questioned, however, on their views regarding the appropriateness of rebuilding houses, communities or other infrastructure in areas that are obviously at risk from natural disasters: sea erosion, earthquakes, high tides or tsunamis. Responses were mixed. Some people had experienced such trauma that they were adamant about wanting to move to a safer area than where they had previously lived. Others were equally adamant about wanting to rebuild their dwellings on the same plot, irrespective of the risks inherent in doing so.

More technical issues such as the implications of mangrove or shrimp farm development along the coast, the potential environmental risks of using large fishing vessels with ultra-modern equipment to increase fishing yields, 'ice ports' to store increased yields, etc., or the merits and detractions of increasing forestry reserves, were not discussed in the interviews. Since people were unable to express what they would

la Faim.

⁵⁶ Phrase coined by the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, former US President Bill Clinton, during his visit to Aceh in June 2005

like to 'build back better' regarding their own situation, it was unlikely that they would possess sufficient technical know-how to offer views on these developmental issues.

Some, but not all respondents, gave their views on how better disaster preparedness and mitigation could be built into their communities in the future. A few hoped that their houses could be rebuilt in such a way as to better withstand earthquakes, which are experienced frequently and sometimes violently in Aceh. They were aware that such features were included in the plans for housing reconstruction and believed they were necessary, though something of a luxury that they had not previously contemplated building in themselves. Others approved of recent measures being implemented in some communities to warn of impending disaster, such as tannoy announcements from mosques, and of mainstreaming the teaching of how to react in a disaster in schools. Still others believed that tsunamis were such a rare occurrence that it would be no use to prepare for another one as it would not be likely to happen again for many years. They maintained that, if fishing was their main occupation, it was a necessary risk to live as close as possible to the sea - a risk they thought they had no choice but to take.

This raises questions as to how sustainable development can be promoted in some areas if people do not want to change their income-generating habits, such as fishing, and choose to live with risk. Attempts to encourage people to change or modify these activities, such as switching from marine fishing to brack-water fishing or aquaculture, for example, might have negative environmental effects if too many people decided to engage in them. Building harbours for fishing boats, allowing people to live further back from the shore, might promote the proliferation of fishing, as well as promoting an increase in the size of boats to get bigger catches – which in turn may have negative environmental effects.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The last decade has witnessed intense discussion in circles of academia, policy as well as practice concerning the linkages between emergency, reconstruction and development. Originally, the issue of linkage was represented as a continuum from relief via rehabilitation to development. Although it is clear in Aceh that it has been realised that such a continuum does not exist, the issue of linkage between the different domains remain relevant. The evaluation finds that in Aceh the links are very real. Problems occurring in this field are here loosely referred to as “the gap-issue” or the “rifts issue”. As is seen in the present evaluation, there is not a single gap, nor rift, although the potential for ‘rifts’ has been underlined. There are rather issues that require fine-tuning rather than major changes.

Although the recovery effort has taken time to begin to deliver, there are many reasons for proceeding slowly, perhaps the most important being to *get it right*. The Government of Indonesia is in the lead throughout the process and, although it got off to a slow start in the recovery planning stages, will ultimately be judged – both by its main constituency, the population, and by international assessment - less for its slowness and caution than on the quality and sustainability of final outcomes. At the moment, however, people are frustrated by the slowness of recovery and impute the delays to both the authorities and to international agencies.

Yet the tsunami response to date has not fully adopted approaches that would facilitate the link between the relief, rehabilitation and development. In spite of the strong evidence of positive features of social capital (e.g., solidarity, collective action) in Aceh, these resources have not been fully capitalized on in reconstruction.

According to civil society and community leaders there is a risk that mentalities are changing to dependency, especially in the areas that are overly served by many

agencies. Beneficiaries may well be earning a small income from micro-finance schemes but are using the profits on, for example, a rice cooker or other consumables rather than savings towards a house or village school, because 'IOM will build it' or 'UNICEF will provide the materials'.

Likewise, there has not yet been sufficient effort to strengthen weak aspects of good community governance or the management of public facilities and services. When the price of fuel increases, most other commodities follow. Inflation of rents creates discrepancies of wealth in the population: the rich get richer on the backs of internationals. This boosts further inflation, which constitutes a regressive tax on the poor. The gap raises tensions within the population and this is predicted to worsen in the short run. But there is also a secondary economy growing among people who have less.

Similarly, the economic opportunity presented by the internationals has caused migration of small traders with capital from other areas to fill in the gap in the directly-affected tsunami areas, where the host population lost its ability to raise capital. Tensions between migrant traders and the host population may increase if a significant gap of wealth is allowed to develop between them.

Another important potential source of conflict that must not be ignored stems from the fact that while the directly affected population groups receive massive amounts of assistance, more indirectly affected groups – most importantly those affected or displaced by the conflict – do not have the same access to rehabilitation and recovery assistance, irrespective of their comparable needs. Although there is little evidence to suggest it is happening, disaffected parties to the peace agreement could be considered likely to capture the subject of inequalities down the line for their own agendas.

People lack information about plans for reconstruction in their area, about who is helping them and what will be done; consequently there are myths and rumours,

misinformation and gaps in information that are leading to frustration and anger on the ground. If this situation persists, there will be a risk of civil unrest as well as growing animosity towards foreigners and the Government. Such attitudes could be again exploited by detractors of the peace process and ultimately threaten its successful outcome.

There is a lack of a rights-based approach or people-centred principle in programming, in spite of individual efforts by some agencies. Monitoring and feedback mechanisms are not effective in compensating inadequate beneficiary consultation. The inadequate information flows to beneficiaries, the perceptions of 'broken promises', and the lack of effective mechanisms to resolve the real 'broken promises', point to a governance issue.

However, agencies with specific mandates on specific vulnerable groups address their needs with various degrees of success, especially the elderly, people with physical or mental disabilities, and those with weak employment experience and skills.

The tsunami and the subsequent peace agreement have brought many significant changes into gender relations in Aceh. There have been new opportunities, such as recognition of the lack of women's inputs in the reconstruction of Aceh. Other gender issues such as domestic violence, and the protection of female orphans' rights, are evolving.

People's perspectives are mostly focused on short-term asset-replacement and less on longer-term prospects for wider opportunities. There is some evidence that respondents/beneficiaries and some aid agencies were generally more concerned with the speed of delivery of assistance, rather than the need for long-term effects of assistance. While recovery aid – both local initiatives and international assistance - has anticipated beneficiary priorities on shelter and livelihoods, beneficiaries are unhappy

about the slow pace of assistance and frustrated that they cannot take their own initiatives before knowing when that assistance might materialise.

Yet not all is negative. This is exemplified by the extent to which a key word is used today in Aceh: “Hikmah” is a Bahasa Indonesia expression denoting that in a catastrophe one can gain something good⁵⁷. This expression is now often mentioned. The disaster shook people to their core (many said they thought the end of the world had come), but at the same time shook them out of the habits and despondency that war and poverty had created. Many drew from this a greater aspiration to peace, or closer family relations, or personal strength. Eighty percent feel that peace is a consequence of the tsunami, sixty percent that it gave them personal strength, and eighty one percent that it gave them closeness to God.

People in Aceh are accustomed to living with risk, especially the frequency and violence of earthquakes. Living in the province is a tacit acceptance of risk-taking, but risks can be mitigated by using earthquake-resistant construction techniques and materials, and by inculcating certain behavioural patterns in the population that will help them react appropriately and save lives.

‘Building back better’ will need careful consideration to avoid engaging in development activities that may be harmful to the environment and prove ultimately unsustainable. People will need technical expertise to help them choose alternative income-generating activities that reduce both their own, as well as environmental risks. The current focus on Aceh and the availability of resources provide a good – perhaps unique – opportunity to engage all stakeholders in consultations to bring about sustainable development.

⁵⁷ *Hikmah* in Bahasa Indonesia means wisdom or philosophy. For example: *Jangan terlalu sedih. Ambillah hikmah kejadian ini.* ‘Do not be too sad. Take what happened as a lesson’. *Hikmah* is related to Illahi, or Divine Wisdom.

One of the most important challenges will be to resist the temptation to move ahead too fast before undertaking low-key, possibly time-consuming but necessary studies as to the kind of development best suited to human and environmental needs. These must ultimately balance economic and ecological sustainability with the retention of time-honoured traditions that form the backbone of this close-knit and creative ‘civil’ society.

Recommendations

1. Needs based planning, based on Humanitarian Codes of Conduct, must take into account all populations that demonstrate vulnerability from disaster or conflict, notwithstanding the reason of the need. There is sufficient evidence that conflict-affected communities and individuals in Aceh have similar, if not greater needs and vulnerabilities than those affected by the tsunami, and that these are not being met. The principle on non-discrimination is one of the cornerstones of international human rights law and is also a basic tenet in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Continued discrimination between tsunami-affected and conflict-affected communities regarding the degree and content of international assistance could ignite or exacerbate inter-community tensions and complicate the peace process – for which international agencies would be partly to blame. Any such complication could have a negative impact on recovery efforts in the whole province, setting back the opportunity for development for all. It is therefore recommended that the international community keep up pressure on the GoI to allow humanitarian access to *all* conflict-affected populations in the province, irrespective of their locations, and to create the security conditions necessary for such access. Comprehensive coverage would allow agencies to map the different contexts of vulnerable communities and individuals, assess their degree of vulnerability, determine their needs, and complement official efforts to assist them, as an example of good LRRD practice.

2. By the same logic, international attention should also be given equally to other disaster-affected populations in Indonesia who may be in similar or worse situations of vulnerability than the people of Aceh, and, in the spirit of non-discrimination, support Government efforts to assist them as well.

3. A lesson may be learnt for future disasters from the collective failure to ensure sufficient flows of information both to and from the population concerning plans to assist them. It is recommended that appropriate public information systems be established early on in disaster areas, using traditional methods to ensure the widest possible coverage, to ensure that the population understands the nature of the relief, rehabilitation and recovery efforts; enabling them to understand and influence their situation. It is also recommended to spend more time on listening to beneficiaries, not just their leaders, to learn more about their needs, preferences and problems. BRR's plan to set up communal listening posts and complaint boxes may help considerably. Greater use of the radio could be made to disseminate information and to encourage listener feedback in remote areas.

4. There must be reinforcement, from an early stage by aid agencies, of meso-level government institutions (that is, at the District level) to consult and act as an information bridge with the population and aid actors, identify key obstacles in the design of long term solutions, and communicate these to foreign actors, the state, and the population. This could pull together community level initiatives and link them to provincial and national ones.

5. A lesson learning exercise should be carried out concerning the effectiveness of the international conflict resolution role, and of AMM and its links to

the aid effort. This should also include a review of the systems that allowed for a timely deployment, and of the impact on public perception of their work.

6. A public rating of NGOs operating in a given area should be developed, which would include an appraisal of the ability to inform the population on overall design, timing or reasons for non-delivery.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Introduction

This evaluation of the linkage of relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) is part of a larger, international evaluation programme of Tsunami disaster support, which is described below. A first, comprehensive report from the overall tsunami disaster evaluation will be published at the end of 2005.

The LRRD evaluation comprises three separate studies, one on policies and plans, one on interventions in Sri Lanka and one on interventions in Indonesia. The evaluation shall be carried out by one policy level team and two separately procured teams in Sri Lanka and Indonesia respectively. The three studies will be summarised in a consolidated report, written by a separate consultant, who also has an advisory function for the LRRD evaluation.

The LRRD evaluation will have two phases, the first phase during Autumn 2005 and a second phase about one year later. The present Terms of Reference (ToR) cover only the first phase.

The ToR below have seven main sections:

- section 1 and 2 provide background and general approach for the evaluation;
- section 3, 4 and 5 describe specific questions for each of the three studies on Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Policies & Plans respectively;
- section 6 summarises the tasks for the LRRD evaluation advisor; and
- section 7 gives the time plan and requirements regarding reporting that are common to all three studies.

1. Background

The Tsunami disaster along the coasts of the Indian Ocean in December 2004 created an unprecedented response by the international donor community, by individuals and NGOs worldwide and by private companies. Massive resources for immediate disaster relief were mobilised very fast and large amounts of money became available for recovery and reconstruction.

The number of organisations involved in the aftermath of the tsunami created problems of overview, coordination, follow-up and reporting to relevant receivers of information. At the initiative of OCHA and ALNAP a number of organisations have formed the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) in order to more effectively and on a joint basis evaluate the tsunami response and the interventions carried out by the various actors.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Further information about the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is available at the TEC website: www.alnap.org/tec/index.htm

The TEC evaluation programme will concentrate on six *themes*⁵⁹. One of these themes is the linkage between immediate relief interventions, rehabilitation or recovery and development efforts, often known as LRRD.

The LRRD concept

The LRRD concept should in principle be applied in the planning and evaluation of all humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It builds on the assumptions that there is both a severe time constraint in the initial (life saving) stage which limits the range of possible activities and a distinction between this initial and the subsequent stages. At a minimum, what is being done at the initial stage should not harm later efforts for recovery or at least possible negative effects should be consciously diminished while still retaining the primary, operational objective of saving lives. If possible, humanitarian efforts should make a contribution to recovery and development processes and reduce the risk of future disasters.

The awareness of the importance of this linkage and how it affects the longer term outcome of interventions is wide-spread but the understanding of the concept of LRRD varies considerably. It is all too easy to see the linkage between immediate relief and rehabilitation or recovery as a simple operational sequence. In practice often the different stages take place in parallel and the linkage can be rather complicated seen from either the intended beneficiaries' point of view or from the perspective of the planner or the implementation agency.

The understanding and explicit or implicit use of the LRRD concept may thus become an important factor for the long term impact of humanitarian relief interventions.

A brief overview of the recent, professional discussion of the LRRD concept is provided in Annex 1⁶⁰.

2. Purpose and scope of the evaluation

The *objective* of the evaluation of LRRD in the context of the tsunami disaster is to find out what ideas and practices regarding LRRD governed operations and roles of the various actors, and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices and subsequent actions had or may have for the affected population.

The *scope* of the evaluation is to investigate a limited number of possible linkages between various types of operations in the countries struck by the disaster and assess consequences from those.

⁵⁹ The TEC evaluation comprises six themes: coordination, local and regional capacity building, needs assessment, funding and fundraising, LRRD, and impact.

⁶⁰ Margie Buchanan-Smith and Paola Fabbri: *Linking relief, rehabilitation and development – A preliminary review of the debate*. Draft manuscript, July 2005.

The LRRD evaluation will have two parts. The first will be carried out during the latter half of 2005 in parallel with the other five TEC themes. The second will be made one year later as a follow-up to the first study. These ToR cover only the first part.

The first part of the evaluation will serve two purposes. One is to provide information on the LRRD theme for the “one year after” synthesis report planned for the end of 2005 (see section 7 below). The other is to collect basic information and to establish points of reference, particularly regarding the intended beneficiaries’ views, to be used in second LRRD evaluation phase in 2006.

The LRRD evaluation will complement the other themes in the TEC evaluation in order to present a comprehensive assessment of essential elements of the response to the disaster. Because of the size of the evaluation task and the number of evaluation issues related to the tsunami disaster response, and because of the problems to organise and finance a large evaluation in a short time it was decided by the TEC members to split the evaluation into six themes. They will each constitute a separate evaluation of an issue that is important to investigate and at the same time be part of the overall evaluation of responses to the tsunami disaster by the international community and national and local authorities. A synthesis report from all six themes will be produced at the end of 2005 (see section 7 below).

For the LRRD evaluation it is important to stress the *learning* aspect, which is very much about modes of planning and operation. It is desirable to have conclusions and lessons learned from the tsunami disaster that may be applied to similar situations in the future. Hopefully, studying this theme may also give insights in problems currently emerging in the tsunami countries and operations and an opportunity to identify remedies if considered necessary.

The possibility to report on the results of interventions – the *accountability* aspect – is particularly important in view of the magnitude of the disaster and the massive response it created. This is a main reason for the TEC evaluation programme and the plan to produce a synthesis report before the end of 2005.

Because linkages are the subject for this theme in principle all possible actors and their operations should be included. Also the immediately affected people are actors from the evaluation point of view and their roles both as beneficiaries and as actors – with their own ‘LRRD projects’ – should be given special consideration in the study.

The actions of the national and local governments will be analysed in the evaluation including their domestic, political role. In the context of the tsunami disaster the bilateral and multilateral donors have multiple roles: as conventional development cooperation partners, as humanitarian actors both in the tsunami disaster and previously in connection with the internal conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as donors to international and possibly local NGOs, and in varying degrees as responsible representatives for their own citizens hit by the wave or the earthquake. The international

NGOs are important actors as well as the local NGOs or community organs, which have mixed roles as implementing agencies, beneficiaries and political lobby groups.

Involvement by the national governments and by local evaluators in the planning and execution of the evaluation will be very important for this theme in order to capture this range of perspectives.

The LRRD evaluation will be limited to Sri Lanka, Indonesia and, possibly in the second stage, to the Maldives. The obvious reason to include the first two countries is both the magnitude of the impact of the disaster and the number and range of actors involved. The reason to later include the Maldives is that the damage incurred was substantial in relation to the size of the country and its vulnerability to natural disasters.

Approach and methods

The evaluation will concentrate on five aspects of linkages between relief, rehabilitation and development:

1. Livelihoods: Were actions taken relevant and effective for preserving and restoring livelihoods in the short and long run? To what extent have local people been consulted and involved in the rebuilding of livelihoods? Beyond the immediate rescue phase, how appropriate have their interventions been in rebuilding and strengthening sustainable livelihoods in the longer term? Were environmental aspects considered?
2. Human rights: To what extent have agencies adopted a rights-based approach in their interventions? How have they supported different population groups (whether socio-economic, according to age and gender, ethnic group or religion) and how have they taken these into account in their design of relief and rehabilitation programmes after the tsunami? How have protection aspects been upheld during the period after the tsunami?
3. Linkage to development and poverty reduction: Were actions explicitly planned or implemented in relation to development plans? Were immediate and medium-term actions taken which limit future options? To what extent have agencies explored and understood underlying patterns of vulnerability when designing their relief and rehabilitation programmes? How has the institutional set-up and organisational culture of agencies promoted or hampered their ability to adopt and integrate both a short-term and long-term perspective in their response to the tsunami?
4. Risk reduction: To what extent are risk management and vulnerability reduction incorporated into rehabilitation plans and strategies? Are those measures commensurate to perceptions of risks and to changes in livelihood conditions?
5. Conflicts: How have the on-going conflicts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka influenced the design of the immediate and medium-term response? How have agencies dealt with the uncertainties these conflicts pose for

development work? Has humanitarian assistance been provided impartially according to need?

The evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact as well as appropriateness, coverage and coherence shall be used. The applicability of these criteria may vary between the aspects mentioned above and should be discussed in the inception reports (see section 7 below).

Information shall be collected through interviews and other forms for data gathering from individuals, families and communities belonging to the affected population, from national and local authorities, from local and international NGOs, and from bilateral and international donors. The inception reports shall propose ways to select sources and reasons for such proposals.

The various actors' selection of channels for interventions, including the private sector, for relief and rehabilitation as well as the forms for implementation shall be described and assessed regarding how they affect the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development.

Stakeholders, particularly local communities, shall be involved in the evaluation process when it is possible to do so.

Careful documentation of the field work is needed in order to facilitate follow-up in the second part of the evaluation.

Consultants

The evaluation shall be carried out by one policy level team and two separately procured teams in Sri Lanka and Indonesia respectively. The task for the policy level team is to analyse documents and, if necessary, interview representatives from a selected number of donor and international NGOs at Headquarters on the issues listed above and in section 5. The task for the country teams is to particularly analyse the LRRD issue from the intended beneficiaries' point of view. Specific Terms of Reference for the three teams are given below.

Both the policy level team and the local teams shall produce reports from their specific studies.

3. The Indonesia study

In addition to the aspects mentioned above, special attention in the Indonesia study shall be given to the following issues:

- a) the possible influences from on-going conflict in the country on immediate relief and on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation;

- b) the problem of meeting the immediate housing needs through a large number of temporary dwellings and the construction of permanent dwellings (the Master Plan says 100,00 new houses are needed);
- c) the emergence of the idea of the coastal protection zone and what effects the zone concept may have on subsequent rehabilitation plans and their implementation;
- d) the obvious pressure from the affected population on donors and other actors to deliver support and its effect on plans and implementation;
- e) how the views of the immediately affected population may have been incorporated in the relief and recovery processes;
- f) the interplay between national and local authorities and international aid organisations and its possible effects;
- g) the impact on plans from the fact that the area is one of the major earth-quake prone areas in the world;
- h) the effects on the rehabilitation process the lack of skilled workers (many perished in the disaster) and the effects on the local economy from the relief- and rehabilitation activities.

Consultants for the Indonesia study

The evaluation team in Indonesia shall comprise three or four persons with experience from evaluation of or research on development projects or programmes. The team members shall have documented ability to collect and analyse qualitative and quantitative data from fieldwork and to present findings in a comprehensive report. The team shall have excellent knowledge of Indonesia, extensive experience of working in the country and the majority of the team must be fluent in local language(s).

The team shall have very good knowledge about livelihood, environment and human rights issues, and be able to apply solid gender and poverty perspectives to the study. At least one of the team members shall have good knowledge about humanitarian and disaster relief.

One of the members shall be Team Leader and be responsible for the report and for organising the field work. The team shall make all necessary contact with relevant authorities and organisations. The field work shall, whenever possible, be coordinated with other TEC evaluations.

4. Timetable and reporting

The following timetable applies to the first part of the evaluation, which will be carried out during 2005.

Month	Activity
August	Procurement of consultants
September	Inception reports; TEC Workshops; preparatory work in countries included in the evaluation
October	Field work
November	Draft report(s); dissemination of preliminary results
December	Input to the synthesis report; final report
January-February 2006	Dissemination; reparations for the second part of the LRRD evaluation

Prior to the start of the field work each team shall submit a short inception report. The report shall comment on the ToR, propose a detailed plan for the field work and subsequent analysis of data and, if deemed necessary, propose amendments to the original ToR. The date for the respective inception report will be specified in the contract with each team.

The first part of the evaluation will be summarised in a report in English, not longer than 40 pages (excluding annexes), including an executive summary of maximum 1,000 words. Each team shall produce reports from their specific study. A draft of the report must be submitted before 25 November for use in the summary LRRD report and subsequently for TEC key messages report to be written during December 2005. Further details about form and delivery the teams' draft reports will be specified in the contract for each team.

The teams are also required to propose a brief plan for dissemination of preliminary results, with due consideration to involvement of stakeholders.

The second part of the evaluation will take place in the latter half of 2006. Terms of Reference for that part will be formulated during the first quarter of 2006.

6 ANNEX 2: PHASES OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation process was divided into four main phases:

Preparation phase

- TEC briefing in Geneva (7-9 September),
- Coordination meeting in Oxford with the LRRD Policy Team (12-13 September),
- Meeting with the background concept researcher Margie Buchanan-Smith,
- Final briefing in Stockholm (4 October).

An **Inception Report** was prepared and presented to the client (Sida) and TEC stakeholders on 22 September, outlining the approach.

Indonesia research phase

The team conducted field work in Indonesia from 7-21 October, while the quantitative research extended till 25 November.

8 th -9 th	Arrival in Jakarta – team meetings, field preparation and briefing at the Swedish Embassy.
10 th -11 th	Banda Aceh – Data collection and interviews: UN agencies, NGOs, government officials, local population including IDPs, private sector.
12 th -14 th	Team 1: Calang – Local officials, UN, NGOs, population including IDPS
12 th -15 th	Team 2: Lhokseumawe
16 th	Banda Aceh – UN agencies, NGOs, local officials, private sector. Elaboration of preliminary findings
17 th -18 th	Team 1: Lamno - Population, IDPs, local NGOs, local officials.
19 th -21 st	Jakarta – Country Heads of UN agencies, INGOs; Bakornas, ASEAN, the Red Cross Movement (ICRC and IFRC). Debriefing at Swedish Embassy

The visits took place during the period of Ramadan. This was not avoidable given the reporting timeframe. However, the evaluation team did not experience any significant difficulties in accessing informants.

Analysis and preparation of draft report

- Meeting in London on 21-22 November
- Meeting in Brussels on 10 December.
- Delivery of first draft report: 25th November. The quantitative data will only be available and inserted on 6 December
- Comments to draft: 15th December

Hand-Over

- Delivery of second draft report: 13th January
- Delivery of final report: March.

7 ANNEX 3: LIST OF PERSONS MET

Name	Organisation and Functions	I/ G*	Sex	Place	Date
Dian Rosdiana	John Hopkins University Program, Communication and Advocacy Specialist.	I	F	Jakarta	5/10/05
Frederik Frisell	Embassy of Sweden, Jakarta	I	M	Jakarta	10/10/05
Tabrani Yunis	Director, Center for Community Development and Education. He lost his wife and all his children.	I	M	Banda Aceh (BA)	10/10/05
Teungku Raden Sulaiman	Database program officer, Fatahayat, women section of Nadhatul Ulama, a national religious based organisation	G	M	BA	11/10/05
Teungku Loli	Finance officer, Fatahayat	G	F	BA	11/10/05
Abriati Yusuf	Director, Fatahayat	G	F	BA	11/10/05
Rinaldi	Former fisherman now diving to collect metals from the sea, 30 years old, single, living in a tent on former government's warehouse in his village. He lost most family members and a fiancée.	I	M	BA	11/10/05
Jerry Adams	INTRAC – LRRD Policy study team	I	M	BA	11/10/05
Yudi Ali	Fishermen aged 21 and 23, living in tents	G	M	Kota Banda Aceh	11/10/05
Irawati Hapsari	UNDP Programme Officer	G	F	BA	11/10/05
Said Fauzan Baabud	UNDP Programme Officer		M		
Simon Field	Team Leader, Emergency Response and Transitional Recovery		M		
Ir Zulflan Ahmad	Bupati, Kabupaten Aceh Jaya	I	M	Calang	12/10/05
Yusnani	Housewife, 28 years old. She lost one of her two children.	I	F	Calang	12/10/05
Asman	Did odd job pre-tsunami, now owns a small coffee shop at home, 50 years old, widower, living in a house built by himself on his own land. He lost all his family members.	G	M	Calang	12/10/05
Bakhtiar	Former logistic officer of a large fisherman boat, 39 years old, widower, living in a house donated by Java Post on his own land.	G	M	Calang	12/10/05
Arsyad	Former farmer and now unemployed, 43 years old, widower, living in a house donated by Java Post on his own land.	G	M	Calang	12/10/05
Syamsudin	Shop owner, sold noodles before. Did not lose immediate family. Originally from Lahmno, went there for a short time after the tsunami.	I	M	Calang	12/10/05
Maria Valencia	Medical doctor, MDM, Spain	I	F	Calang	12/10/05

Deddy Afidick	Exxon Mobil	I	M	Lhokseumawe	12/10/05
Wahyuddin Albra	Universitas Malikussaleh, Faculty of Economics	I	M	Lhokseumawe	13/10/05
Glory Islamic	Save the Children	I	F	Lhokseumawe	13/10/05
Mohd. Hatta Buntar	Aceh Monitoring Mission, Deputy team leader	I	M	Lhokseumawe	14/10/05
Aymeric Durandy	Aceh Monitoring Mission, Field Monitor	I	M	Lhokseumawe	14/10/05
Dina Astita	Teacher, married, 34 years old, an activist for education and orphans. She lost all her three children.	I	F	Calang	13/10/05 and e-mail 09/11/05
Nasir	Shop owner 4 family members worked 6 months for CfW to earn money to rebuild shop on father's brother's land. (21 yrs.).	G	M	Calang	13/10/05
Darmasiah	Family member to Nasir (40 yrs)		F	Calang	13/10/05
Misa Nurhayati	Neighbour to Nasir The women became very emotional when explaining about the indignity of receiving old, inappropriate clothing as part of the early relief		F		
Group in Shop	Kepala desa/Kecik, male, 55) Budiman Abbas, male, 58, farmer Talib, male, 73, farmer Mai Yuli, male, 38, farmer Mohamedinaj, male, 45, farmer Wani, female, 22, housewife Suba, female, 24, housewife	G	mix	Jurig village, Calang District	13/10/05
Alinawati	Midwife, married, 33 years old, living in a conflict area and indirectly tsunami-affected area.	I	F	Jurig Village	13/10/05
Adnan	Former paddy farmer. Claimed that the market system had broken down. Says safety has improved (42 yrs.)	G	M	Jurig Village	13/10/05
Afrizal	Carpenter during early reconstruction phase, now works as farmer during the season. Agrees safety has improved. (30 yrs.)	G	M	Jurig Village	13/10/05
Idawati	Housewife. Farms rice for own consumption. Has taken course in sewing. Would like sewing machine instead of food aid – which they accept, but neither need nor like. Feel much safer after Tsunami. (21 yrs, 1 child)	G	F	Jurig Village	13/10/05
Upiyati	Housewife, mother to Idawti. (50 yrs.)	G	F	Jurig Village	13/10/05
Masnah	Former farmer, IDP from Panggong Village, a conflict area, 27 years old, married with three children.	G	F	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05
Syarifah	Former farmer, IDP from Panggong Village, a conflict area, 76 years old, a grandmother of Masnah.	G	F	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05

Idris	Former farmer, IDP from Panggong Village, a conflict area, 46 years old, Masnah's father.	G	M	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05
Hindun	Former conflict IDP from Panggong. Aid dropped by helicopter after 1 month. For 6 months living in small shack build from debris. Still has husband. Still owns land waiting for reconstruction (27 yrs.)	G	F	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05
Syalliah	Widow (30 yrs) Has daughter. Relies on NGOs and food aid for support. Wants to become farmer or have shop.	G	F	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05
Mariana	Widow (38 yrs.) Is supported by 17 yr old son who also goes to school.	G	F	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05
Mr Abbas	Kecik (Community Head), representative of Panggong villagers, conflict area	G	F	Kreung Sabee	13/10/05
Salmi	Widow, 35	I	F	Kreung Sabe tent settlement	13/10/05
Muchlis	Project Officer of Livelihood Program, Cardi-IRC	I	M	Calang	13/10/05
Fithriadi Feisal	Project Manager, Cardi-IRC	I	M	Calang	13/10/05
11 representatives of Panglima Laot from 11 villages	Meeting at Cardi-IRC, main interviewees: Ibrahim from Patih Village, Jumaidi from Aceh Jaya district. All the 10 men are widowers, but one who is recently married.	G		Calang	13/10/05
President	Satkorlak	I	M	Llhokseumawe	13/10/05
Boat Builder	Save the Children Beneficiary	G	M	Llhokseumawe	13/10/05
Families	Four families and one orphan, fishing village	G	M/F	Llhokseumawe	13/10/05
Syed Yasir Ahmad Gomar Prateek	OXFAM, Chalang	G	M	Calang	13/10/05
Seli	Migrant small trader from South Aceh, selling groceries, married with 2 children under 5.	I	F	Calang	14/10/05
Putri	Migrant small trader from Labuan Haji Village, selling groceries, married with 2 children under 5.	I	F	Calang	14/10/05
Musmalawi	Migrant small trader from Lagen, selling gold jewelleryes, married with 2 children.	I	M	Calang	14/10/05
Nasir	Migrant small trader from Meulaboh, selling clothes, single.	I	M	Calang	14/10/05
Idris	Small trader, selling pots and pans and renting lands to other small traders, originally from Calang	I	M	Calang	14/10/05
Hashiati	Small trader from Meulaboh, 25 years old, married with two children under 5, a tsunami victim.	I	F	Calang	14/10/05

Muzakir	Former a small restaurant owner, now own a construction materials small shop, married and his nuclear family members are intact.	I	M	Sentosa Village	14/10/05
Mustafa	Leader of barrack. Still has wife and two children. Lost brother, mother, sister in law. All in barracks for 8 months, orig. from Panton Makmur. Farmer and small shop before, now jobless, land is sanded. (33 yrs)	I	M	Walubi Barracks, C.2. Daya Baro	14/10/05
Womens Group 6 persons	Women working for cash for work for Islamic Relief. All were self employed traders before. Has arranged system of private toilets in barracks are worried about communal toilets in planned semi-permanent housing	G	F	Walubi Barracks, C.4. Daya Baro	14/05/05
Magdalena	Had copy-shop before, husband is jr. high school teacher	G	F	Walubi Barracks, Daya Baro	14/05/05
Fatima	Farmer, husband trader	G	F	Walubi Barracks, Daya Baro	14/05/05
Rosmawati	Had small shop, husband is a wood cutter	G	F	Walubi Barracks, Daya Baro	14/05/05
Ali	Head of village or Pak Keuchik, in office 1 week, shifts every 2 nd month. Original from Leepung directly on the shore. 5 children all survived. (53 yrs.)	I	M	Lambaro Barrack, BA	14/10/05
Junaidi	Deputy Keuchik	I	M	Lambaro Barrack, BA	14/10/05
Market Survey	Twelve market stalls and small shops visited	G	Mix	BA	14/10/05
Stall holder, Market BA	Shopowner from Sigli, house destroyed but still has land. Had market stall in Kuede before it was destroyed, did not get the stall back when the market place reopened.	I	M	BA	15/10/05
Stall holder, Market BA	Stall holder in same area as before. House destroyed, land still under water.	I	M	BA	15/10/05
Irwan	Director, Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia	I, G	M	BA	15/10/05
Fahmi	Staff of Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia	G	M	BA	15/10/05
Erwin	Staff of Flowers, women's NGO	G	M	BA	15/10/05
Hadi	Staff of Flowers, women's NGO	G	M	BA	15/10/05
Pak Keuchick	He was in and out of the interview because of his busy schedule.	G	M	Kuala Village/ Lamno	15/10/05
Tengku Harun	Former farmer, now unemployed, 40 years old, widower	G	M	Kuala Village/ Lamno	17/10/05

Abdul Wahab	Former farmer, now unemployed, 50 years old, widower	I, G	M	Kuala Village/ Lamno	17/10/05
Nurul Ima	Widow, 50 years old. She lost her husband and now lives with her children.	I	F	Kuala Village	17/10/05
Hayatun Nufus	Widow, 28 years old. She lost her husband and children.	G	F	Janguet Village	17/10/05
Teungku Helfani	Widower, no children, 30 years old.	G	M	Janguet Village	17/10/05
Teungku Zulkifli	Widower but recently married, no children, 30 years old.	G	M	Janguet Village	17/10/05
Hamdin	Unemployed, 23 years old, single.	G	M	Kreung Tenong/KT Village	17/10/05
Intan	Widow, lost husband and 2 children, 25 years old.	I,G	M	KT	17/10/05
Mawardi	A high school student, 16 years old, lost his parents and now live with his siblings.	G	M	KT	17/10/05
Solihin	21 years old	G	M	KT	17/10/05
Muzakir	Administration/Finance Staff of Fatahayat, NU, UNFPA-funded project	G	M	Lamno sub-district	17/10/05
Zalfata	Counsellor of Fatahayat, NU, UNFPA-funded project	G	M	Lamno sub-district	17/10/05
Safriadi	Volunteer of Ratna Sarungpaet Post Command from Jakarta, 22 years old	G	M	Lhoong	17/10/05
Muksan	Volunteer of Ratna Sarungpaet Post Command, from Jakarta, 31 years old	G	M	Lhoong	17/10/05
Bakhtiar	30 years old, tsunami survivor who lives in a tent.	G	M	Lhoong	17/10/05
Host family	Grandmother, 72, hostess. Maria, female, 20; Rica, female, 14, four children – Family IDPs	G	F	Lamno	17/10/05
Umarr,	Male, 29, teacher	I	M	Lamno	17/10/05
Rahimi	Male, mullah	I	M	Lamno	17/10/05
Group of men	Saribuddin, male, Kecik of Ceunamprong village – representative of fishermen Hasim, male, Kecik of Kareung Ateuh village – representative of farmers Kecik (male) of Kende Unga village	G	M	Lamno	17/10/05
Fish stalls	4 traders in market	G	M	Lamno	17/10/05
Ensalet and Jobaira	Ensalet, male, 60 and wife Jobaria, 55, plus grandson	G	Mix	Udong Seudung (Lamno)	17/10/05
Group	Rubia, female, 23 Mohammed, male, 26	G	Mix	Kreung Teunong (Lamno)	17/10/05

	5 Community families				
Mr. and Mrs. Uddin	Host Family	G	M	Lamno	17/10/05
Yusuf and Rahman	Yusuf, male, 76 Rahman, male, 61	G	M	Kundin village (Lhoong)	18/10/05
Jupri	Small trader, selling groceries, 35 years old	G	M	Lamno	18/10/05
Muslim	Small trader, selling groceries, 35 years old	G	M	Lamno	18/10/05
Jauhari	Owner of pharmaceutical shop who lost properties during the tsunami.	G	M	Lamno	18/10/05
Beti	Staff of telecommunication small shop, 27 years old	G	F	Lamno	18/10/05
Ashari	Driver of MSF-Belgium, married with 3 children, home owner	I	M	Lamno	18/10/05
Teungku Mawardi	Home-owner	I	M	Lhoong	18/10/05
Masrawati Sinaga	Gender Officer of World Vision Indonesia	I	F	BA	19/10/05
Yulia Immajati	PhD candidate, who did her research on women and conflict in Aceh prior to tsunami	I	F	Canberra (phone interview)	3/11/05
Rina Meutia	National Liaison Officer, United Nations Information Management Service for Sumatra (UNIMS)	I	F	email	9/11/05
Faizal Rizal	Program Officer, UNDP, Calang	I	M	email	1/11/05

* I = Individual Interview; G = Group Interview

8 ANNEX 4: QUESTIONNAIRE

LRRD SURVEY OCTOBER 2005
CONDUCTED BY CVoter Foundation-Social Indicator
105, FIFTH LANE, COLOMBO 03, TP: 2370473

SERIAL NO:				HOUSEHOLD NO:		
INTERVIEW NUMBER:						
DATE OF INTERVIEW:		DD	MM	YY		

INTERVIEWER:

NAME OF INTERVIEWER:
I here by certify that all information provided here is true and accurate and has been obtained from the respondent as instructed. <div style="border-top: 1px solid black; margin-top: 10px; width: 200px;"></div> SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWER

INTERVIEWER: ALL STATEMENTS IN BOLD LETTERING ARE INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOU AND SHOULD NOT BE READ OUT TO THE RESPONDENT.

Good morning /afternoon/ evening. My name is _____ and I represent CVoter Foundation-Social Indicator, a research organisation that conducts independent research on social issues. We are currently conducting a study to gather public perceptions and attitudes on various socio-economic issues. We would appreciate it if you could spend some of your valuable time to answer a few questions for us.

I hereby assure you that your views expressed will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your views will be combined with those of others so that no one will be able to identify who you are or your views on any issue.

SUPERVISOR:

NAME OF SUPERVISOR:	
DATE OF BACK-CHECKING:	
STATUS	1. VALID 2. INVALID 3. SUSPICIOUS
IF INVALID , STATE REASONS:	
IF SUSPICIOUS , STATE REASONS:	
<div style="border-top: 1px solid black; margin-top: 10px; width: 200px;"></div> SIGNATURE OF SUPERVISOR	

KISH GRID

- A. Can you please tell me the number of people living in this household who are between the ages of 18 to 65 years?

USE THE KISH GRID TO SELECT YOUR RESPONDENT

TOTAL NUMBER OF PEOPLE	HOUSEHOLD NO									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1
3	3	3	2	2	1	1	3	3	1	2
4	4	1	3	4	3	1	2	2	1	2
5	1	1	5	3	2	2	4	5	4	1
6	6	4	1	5	4	1	2	6	3	5
7	5	2	3	1	7	7	3	2	6	4
8	2	5	4	1	1	3	5	4	8	7
9	3	4	6	7	5	8	1	9	2	5
10	7	10	8	3	2	4	1	6	1	5

- **MARK THE NUMBER OF THE CHOSEN PERSON ON THE GRID**

Can I speak to _____ (the person chosen through the KISH grid) please?

1. Yes
2. No –
 - i. Respondent is not willing to give interview (**MOVE TO NEXT HOUSEHOLD**)
 - ii. Respondent is not available

IF THE CHOSEN RESPONDENT IS NOT AVAILABLE SET AN APPOINTMENT TO CONDUCT THE INTERVIEW LATER.

Time check – 1

Livelihoods, Poverty and Development

1. What did you lose and to what extent IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TSUNAMI CALAMITY? How would you rate the damage of the following IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TSUNAMI CALAMITY and to what extent?

				RATINGS
1	Loss of family and friends			
2	Loss of property / valuables	1	To a great extent	
3	Livelihood / job	2	To some extent only	
4	Personal trauma / mental health / frightfulness	3	Not at all	
5	Personal physical health / injuries / epidemic	4	Don't know/ Can't say	
6	Education of family members			
7	Local infrastructure in the area			
8	Day to day normal life			

2. TO WHAT EXTENT HAVE YOU RECUPERATED ANY OF THE FOLLOWING?

				RATINGS
1	Loss of family and friends			
2	Loss of property / valuables	1	To a great extent	
3	Livelihood / job	2	To some extent only	
4	Personal trauma / mental health / frightfulness	3	Not at all	
5	Personal physical health / injuries / epidemic	4	Don't know/ Can't say	
6	Education of family members			
7	Local infrastructure in the area			
8	Day to day normal life			

3. WHAT IS THE HIKMAH FROM the TSUNAMI?

Peace
 Assistance
 Returned to your village (for IDPs)
 Closer family / community relations
 Economic opportunity
 International exposure
 Personal strength
 Closeness to God
 Others, please specify

- 4a. What was your main livelihood before the tsunami struck? (Here we clearly want to know HOW did the household get CASH for day today living) If you were working for someone else, who?

Occupation	
1	Government Service
2	Private Sector Service
3	Small Scale/Self employed
4	Large Scale Business

Sector	
11	Fisheries and allied workers
12	Tourism and hospitality industry
13	Agricultural sector
14	Construction related Professionals

5	NGO sector
6	Unorganized day labor
7	Housewife
8	Students
9	Unemployed
0	No Response

15	Lawyer and allied profession
16	Technicians and Associate Professional
17	Police and Military
18	Education Sector
19	Health and Hospitals
20	Transportation
21	Communication/Media
22	Elementary Occupations
23	Banking & Finance sector
24	Other Professionals

4b. What was your main livelihood immediately after the tsunami struck? (Here we clearly want to know HOW did the household get CASH for day today living) If you were working for someone else, who?

Occupation	
1	Government Service
2	Private Sector Service
3	Small Scale/Self employed
4	Large Scale Business
5	NGO sector
6	Unorganized day labor
7	Housewife
8	Students
9	Unemployed
0	No Response

Sector	
11	Fisheries and allied workers
12	Tourism and hospitality industry
13	Agricultural sector
14	Construction related Professionals
15	Lawyer and allied profession
16	Technicians and Associate Professional
17	Police and Military
18	Education Sector
19	Health and Hospitals
20	Transportation
21	Communication/Media
22	Elementary Occupations
23	Banking & Finance sector
24	Other Professionals

4c. What is your main livelihood RIGHT NOW/ AS OF TODAY? (here we clearly want to know HOW does the household get CASH for day today living) If you are working for someone else, who?

Occupation	
1	Government Service
2	Private Sector Service
3	Small Scale/Self employed
4	Large Scale Business
5	NGO sector
6	Unorganized day labor
7	Housewife
8	Students
9	Unemployed
0	No Response

Sector	
11	Fisheries and allied workers
12	Tourism and hospitality industry
13	Agricultural sector
14	Construction related Professionals
15	Lawyer and allied profession
16	Technicians and Associate Professional
17	Police and Military
18	Education Sector
19	Health and Hospitals
20	Transportation
21	Communication/Media
22	Elementary Occupations
23	Banking & Finance sector

5. After the Tsunami, did your household also get money by:

1 – To a great extent 2 – Only to some extent 3 – Not at all

Sold jewellery/ other family assets
 Sold metal/ wood/ other Tsunami debris
 Sold livestock products (cattle, milk, etc.)
 Sold forest products (fire wood, wild fruits, medicinal plants etc.)
 Sold other grocery /utility items
 Sold handicraft
 Others sold...

6a. What was your main problem IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE TSUNAMI CALAMITY and where did you get the first help and the most help to resolve that problems?

1 – Government	2 – NGOs	3 - International Agencies
4 - Community Groups	5 - Community members	6 - Friends / Relatives
7 – TNI/ GAM	8 – Religious groups	9 - Did not get any help

From which groups did you
get MOST help/support?

From which groups did you
get LEAST help/support?

Getting access to medical help
 Getting access to food
 Getting access to safe water
 Getting access to shelter
 Getting adequate sanitation
 Getting away from Tsunami area
 Rescuing people/ family members
 Cleaning up
 Arranging schooling
 Getting a job
 Finding/building new housing
 Saving/growing/rebuilding business
 Replacing documents lost (for example ID card, Land Title)
 Any other, please specify

6b. What are your main problems AS OF TODAY and how are you managing to resolve your problems? What did your household spend time doing to deal with the situation during the LAST one month or AS OF TODAY?

1 – Government	2 – NGOs	3 - International Agencies
4 - Community Groups	5 - Community members	6 - Friends / Relatives
7 – TNI/ GAM	8 – Religious groups	9 - Did not get any help

From which groups did you
get MOST help/support?

From which groups did you
get LEAST help/support?

Getting access to medical help
 Getting access to food
 Getting access to safe water

Getting access to shelter
 Getting adequate sanitation
 Getting away from Tsunami area
 Rescuing people/ family members
 Cleaning up
 Arranging schooling
 Getting a job
 Finding/building new housing
 Saving/growing/rebuilding business
 Replacing documents lost (for
 example ID card, Land Title)
 Any other, please specify

7. Talking about the future of your livelihood; are you getting the help and support you need at the moment? Is it timely or too long a delay?

1. I am getting it right now immediately
2. It is taking place but only after some delay
3. Only after considerable delay
4. No one is talking about the future livelihood issue

8. Have prices gone up/ come down, today?

				RATINGS
1	Food	1	Gone up to a great extent	
2	Medicines	2	Gone down to a great extent	
3	Household goods	3	Gone up to some extent	
4	Housing repair material	4	Gone down to some extent	
5	Seeds and fertilisers	5	Remained the same	
6	Petroleum based fuel/energy	6	Don't know/ Can't say	
7	NON-Petroleum based fuel/energy			
8	General labour rates			
9	Household Consumer Goods			

9. If you have lost your title documentation, how are you proposing to recover your lost property (land)?

1. Copies of records with government offices
2. Affidavits in court
3. Testimony from local officials
4. Support from NGO's
5. Any other, please specify
6. I did not have any property
7. I did not lose my documents

10. What kind of housing or shelter does household live in? Use the following keys

1. Tent
2. Barracks
3. Makeshift individual housing
4. Host family
5. Back in original home
6. Rented
7. Homeless
8. Other

Before the Tsunami, what kind of housing did your household live in?
Immediately after the Tsunami, what kind of housing or shelter did your household live in?
Today, what kind of housing or shelter does your household live in?

11a. Can you suggest anything that should be built back in a better way than before, so that instead of going back to the previous ways, some improvements can be made?

1. Earthquake/Tsunami proof housing
2. Better local infrastructure
3. Superior built-in emergency management system
4. Better/ Different livelihood
5. Better disaster warning systems
6. Any other, please specify

11b. Has any of the above been done?

1. Earthquake/Tsunami proof housing
2. Better local infrastructure
3. Superior built-in emergency management system
4. Better/ Different livelihood
5. Better disaster warning systems
6. Any other, please specify

Conflict & Disaster Mitigation

12a. Was there a group of people from elsewhere who benefited unfairly more than your own from the economic opportunities?

1. Yes and it could lead to conflict
2. Yes, but there will be no conflict, only jealousy
3. Yes, but it helps with the economy
4. No, this is not true at all
5. Can't say

12b. Were there more assistance for the Tsunami survivors than people who suffered from the conflict between TNI and GAM?

1. Yes, Tsunami survivors are getting much more help
2. Yes, but conflict suffering people are also getting some help
3. The conflict suffering people are getting much more help than tsunami survivors
4. No, there is no discrimination between Tsunami / conflict victims
5. Can't say

13a. We understand that there has been a practice of asking people to pay country tax or safety funding for GAM, for example, or TNI, and so on. Is this:

1. Still going on today
2. Stopped before the tsunami
3. Stopped in January just after the tsunami
4. Stopped in August when the MoU was signed

13b. If this has stopped (if not please tick last option), is it possible for you to:

1. Buy more food?
2. Pay for the reconstruction?
3. Invest in a business or trade?
4. Just cover the basic needs
5. This money is still being paid to the authorities

14a. The Government has been discussing about creating a buffer zone in Tsunami areas where people will not get assistance if they rebuild near the ocean. What is your opinion?

1. Strongly support the buffer zone
2. Somewhat support the buffer zone
3. Somewhat oppose the buffer zone
4. Strongly oppose the buffer zone
5. No opinion on the buffer zone

14b. Did you live in the area that now falls into the buffer zone?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know/ Not sure

Before the Tsunami, did you live in the buffer zone?	Immediately after the Tsunami, did you live in the buffer zone?	Today, do you live in the buffer zone?
---	--	---

15a. Which of the following future threats or risks to your household are you worried about?

1 – To a great extent 2 – To some extent 3 – Not at all

	Before the Tsunami,	Immediately after the Tsunami,	Today
Illness			
Prevailing conflict			
Lack of/ or bad quality water			
Crime			
Land/home in Buffer Zone			
Soil yields going down			
Natural disasters			
Fish yields going down			
Other, please specify			

15b. What are you doing about it?

1. Nothing
2. Taking action on my own
3. Agreeing measures with the community
4. Asking the Government for assistance
5. Asking the NGOs for assistance

Human rights, social capital, psycho-social rehabilitation

16. How did your village (or association or barrack or community) get assistance?

1. You went to look for it with many others?
2. You went to look for it on your own?
3. The Government arranged it?
4. The NGO showed up?
5. Do not know?

17. Is it important that NGOs come to consult you, before assistance comes into your village?

1. Not needed
2. Would be nice
3. Very important
4. Would be very rude if they did not

18. Did the NGOs come to talk to you about their assistance?

1. No idea
2. Talked to Pak Kechik
3. Talked to a friend or acquaintance of the NGO
4. Invited a few people
5. Held a community public meeting (Musyawarah)
6. Talked to the Government
7. Talked to the Ulama
8. Just showed up without warning

19. How fairly has assistance been distributed among all the community?

1. Fair to a large extent
2. A little fairly
3. Totally unfairly
4. Undecided
5. Don't Know

20. Are there more men than women survivors now in your community?

1. Yes a lot
2. A little more
3. The same as before
4. Undecided
5. Don't Know

21. Are the women assisted as much as the men in your community?

1. A lot more
2. A little more
3. The same
4. Less
5. Much less
6. Don't Know

22a. What was the reason for the broken promises (if any) between the NGOs and the population?

1. Miscommunication
2. NGOs have made a written or verbal agreement and broke it
3. NGOs spoke to the wrong people
4. Mistaken rumour
5. No Answer

22b. What did you do about this broken promise? (tick more than one if you want)

1. Looked for the NGO
2. There was a community leaders' meeting to mediate
3. Complained to the Government
4. Spoke to other NGO people
5. Found the solution on your own
6. Any other (please specify)

22c. If you managed to contact the NGOs about broken promises, what was their reaction? Contact can mean putting a suggestion into a box provided by the NGO, or going to see them, calling them on the phone, going to their offices

1. They listened to you and did something
2. They listened to you and did nothing
3. They avoided you
4. You were passed from one person to the other
5. They treated you disrespectfully

23. What according to you has been the reason for NGOs to come here?

1. Genuine concern
2. Come for their own livelihoods
3. Pressure from their own community or country
4. Hidden agenda
5. Cannot say

DEMOGRAPHICS:

Sex: 1. Male 2. Female

D2. Age: How old are you?

D3 What approximately was the monthly income of your family from all sources before the tsunami?

1. Less than or equal to Rs. 100,000/-
2. Rs. 100,000 – Rs. 200,000
3. Rs. 200,001 – Rs. 300,000
4. Rs. 300,001 – Rs. 400,000
5. Rs. 400,001 – Rs. 500,000
6. Rs. 500,001 – Rs. 1,000,000
7. Rs. 1,000,001 – Rs. 1,500,000
8. Rs. 1,500,001 – Rs. 2,000,000
9. Rs. 2,000,001 – Rs. 2,500,000
10. More than 2,500,000-
11. No response

D4. Could you please tell me your educational qualifications? (SINGLE CODE ONLY)

1. Cannot read and write	8. Doctoral Degree
2. Literate but no formal education	9. University Drop out
3. Up to Class 6 (elementary school)	10. Vocationally trained
4. Up to Class 9 (secondary school)	11. Technically trained
5. Up to Class 12 (High School)	12. Professional
6. Bachelors degree	
7. Masters Degree	

D5. Which of the following groups in Indonesia best describes you?

1. Muslim
2. Christian
3. Hindu
4. Buddhist
5. Others (Specify) _____

D6. Will you vote during the elections next year?

1. Yes, certainly
2. Yes, but not very certain
3. Not at all
4. Can't say

1. RESPONDENT'S NAME:		
2. ADDRESS:		3. TEL NO:
4. PROVINCE	5. DISTRICT:	6. DS:
GN Code:	1. Rural 2. Urban	
GB:		

Thank you very much for your time.

Comments of the interviewer