



Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

Links between relief,
rehabilitation and development
in the tsunami response

Policy study

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March 2006

**Linking Relief, Recovery, and
Development (LRRD) –
Policy Study**

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A report for SIDA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is a study of agency policies in relation to LRRD and their operationalisation following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 26 2004. It was commissioned by Sida as one of 6 different thematic evaluations organized by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The objective of the study is *‘to find out what ideas and practices regarding LRRD governed operations and roles of the various actors, and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices, and subsequent actions had or may have for the affected population.’* This study focuses on the policy issues, and is complemented by two further country studies on LRRD undertaken by Channel Research.

The methodology followed was phone and personal interviews with a sample of 9 Multilateral agencies, 4 bilateral donors, 10 INGO’s, 3 Government agencies, 5 Local NGO’s and 2 Sri Lankan Research organizations. Personal interviews were held in Canada, Sweden, and the UK, as well as in SL and Indonesia, but in order not to overlap with the country studies the Policy Study Team only met agency and government representatives in Colombo, Aceh, and Jakarta.

Section 2 explores the concept of LRRD showing how thinking in relation to LRRD has moved on from seeing it as a linear ‘continuum’ with distinct phases, to a ‘contiguuum’ in which relief needs co-exist with recovery and development needs. However we argue that the concept is too vague and general to have a real utility, and that the best indicator for the ‘mainstreaming’ of LRRD lies in the actual actions agencies took in relation to the key needs Tsunami survivors faced, especially in relation to shelter and livelihoods, and these issues are reviewed below.

Section 3 then reviews LRRD in the context of the 2004 Tsunami. In relation to the huge amounts of funding that quickly became available, we found Head Office respondents normally saw this level of funding as a positive influence on LRRD, as it increased their ability to allocate funds for reconstruction as well as immediate relief. In contrast field staff reviewing their activities 9 months after the Tsunami, saw some unintended, but negative impacts of so much funding, and often felt under pressure to disburse funds quickly. The Governments of the Tsunami-affected countries are seen as critical in formulating and implementing reconstruction and development policies: agencies interested in LRRD need to be able both to understand, and occasionally to influence, these policies.

Section 4 then reviews agency policies in relation to LRRD. While Head Office respondents were generally positive about their agencies attempts to operationalise LRRD in their response to the Tsunami, a more critical perspective emerged from the field. The concept of LRRD is also increasingly connected to the notion of 'Build Back Better' (BBB). While the intention of BBB is unarguable, the notion is seen as having some potential dangers – including giving excessive weight to risk reduction concerns; exacerbating tensions between beneficiary and adjacent populations, ignoring the important choices that often have to be made about quality and quantity, and raising expectations that a short-term relief or recovery operation should deliver significant structural change in the societies hit by the Tsunami.

The links between LRRD and the various international codes of practice are then reviewed, and the conclusion is that there is a striking degree of 'convergence' between the different initiatives and current thinking in relation to LRRD. [However](#) with so many over-lapping international codes of practice there is a [potential](#) danger of increasing confusion about whether agencies should follow international or local standards.

The relationship between LRRD and accountability –upwards, downwards, and lateral – is explored in section 4.2. While we note increasing pressure on agencies to improve both upwards and ‘downwards’ accountability, there is less discussion of what we call ‘lateral’ accountability – especially the need to coordinate plans with other actors in order to secure the best outcomes.

Section 4.3 reviews whether previous contextual knowledge is helpful or even essential to agencies interested in an LRRD approach. While agreeing with this proposition in general, and supporting the need for post-emergency responses to build local capacity and deliver sustainable benefits, we point out that emergencies do sometimes require agencies to operate even in countries where they have no previous presence or appropriate local partners or other intermediaries.

The general conclusion of this section echoes the initial findings from the Local Capacities Study – that after a major disaster like the Tsunami the capacity of local civil society actors tends to be given a lower priority despite strong evidence that such actors can be crucial in running both relief and recovery activities. The challenge therefore becomes to finding the optimal way of combining international and national capacities to ensure a strong long term response.

Section 4.4. reviews the supporting policies/frameworks, institutional arrangements and ways of working that are likely to be influential in helping or hindering the delivery of an LRRD. Strong gender policies are seen as crucial, but to be effective such policies need to be part of a wider sustainable livelihoods approach. In relation to livelihoods, a popular intervention after the Tsunami has been Cash for Work, but the problem for agencies is knowing when to phase down such interventions in order to ensure they do not have any negative impact on the later recovery process. In addition many projects described as ‘livelihoods’ interventions amounted to no more than large-scale distributions of assets like fishing boats.

In relation to concerns about risk reduction, the report argues that these concerns, though legitimate, have tended to delay and confuse the recovery process, especially with the issue of the coastal ‘buffer zone’ in Sri Lanka. The delays in providing adequate transitional shelter also suggest that the humanitarian sector still lacks realism about the time it takes to meet people’s housing needs after a major natural disaster. This relative lack of attention to the outcomes of reconstruction is underlined by the documented tendency of humanitarian agencies to monitor ‘outputs’ rather than outcomes.

Section 4.5 reviews the impact of different emergency management structures on LRRD. While the inter-departmental working groups set up within major donor agencies in response to the Tsunami usually worked well, there were tensions on the ground between newly-arrived ‘emergencies’ staff and staff with strong local knowledge and more of a development perspective. There was often only coordination at a sectoral level, and focusing on technical issues, discouraging the ‘joined-up thinking’ necessary for LRRD.

Section 4.6 reviews a sample of agencies’ strategies that make reference to LRRD. Most agencies may have undertaken more strategic planning than is publicly recorded, but only a minority were found to have well articulated plans in relation to LRRD. Section 4.7 examines human resource issues. A critical determinant of whether LRRD translates from policy to practice in a major emergency will be whether key staff responsible for managing agency responses understand and are committed to the LRRD approach. But all agencies working in the Tsunami-affected countries experienced very severe recruitment difficulties – both in relation to experienced international staff, and in relation to local staff, and this is seen as a major constraint in the successful implementation of LRRD, both in the Tsunami and future large scale emergencies.

Section 4.7 then considers whether the amount and nature of funding for the Tsunami assisted or constrained agencies from following a LRRD approach. While some agencies argued that the level of public funding available greatly increased their ‘freedom of manoeuvre’, others reported strong pressure to disburse quickly and demonstrate tangible results to the public. High levels of funding led to heightened competition in both for partners and for areas in which to work. All implementing agencies faced the challenge of managing the very high expectations of their donors, which were fuelled in the first few months by high levels of media coverage.

Section 5 then reviews the extent to which government policies in the region created an ‘enabling environment’ for LRRD, since in countries with strong governments, as in the Indian Ocean Region, the policies and practices of local and national governments will be the key determinants of whether outside agencies will be able to be successful in relation to LRRD. Our study concludes that the overall importance of government actors, and their policies, was insufficiently recognized in the strategies of many of the agencies contacted.

We then document some of the key features of the government response in both SL and Indonesia. In SL there have been problems between two different task forces set up for relief and reconstruction, and between different ministries, and uncertainties on such issues as import regulations and the coastal buffer zone. LRRD requires a certain level of clarity about long term objectives and the parameters within which aid organizations are expected to work. We conclude that Government policy and practice were not able to provide a conducive environment for LRRD. The picture in Aceh is seen as rather more positive since the (rather late) establishment of a single government reconstruction agency, the BRR, backed by a Multi-donor Trust Fund. But co-ordination still remains very difficult. From the perspective of LRRD, the major constraint in Aceh does not appear to be a reluctance of agencies to shift from relief to reconstruction. A greater problem is that the implementing agencies, their institutional and private

donors, and Tsunami survivors themselves have tended to underestimate the time that reconstruction would take.

In conclusion the report suggests that at least in relation to a natural disaster the 'contiguuum' model of LRRD needs to be re-thought to allow recovery and 'development' efforts (however defined) to start almost at the same time as relief: this also supports the idea that recovery needs to be co-ordinated from the earliest possible stage.

With regard to the overall LRRD concept, we conclude that the idea has obvious merit and was especially relevant for a fast-onset natural disaster like the Tsunami in which for many survivors relief needs were relatively short-lived, and the recovery process began very soon after the Tsunami was over. But this study finds the concept of LRRD tends to raise more questions than it answers about the role of different actors in the recovery process, and whose definition of 'recovery' or 'development' is followed.

At the policy level there would appear to be two areas where implementing agencies might benefit from further thinking in relation to LRRD. The first is that most large agencies, whether they are INGOs, UN organizations, or Red Cross affiliates, are all part of large global networks with increasingly complex management and communication systems. The report suggests that too much senior staff time is going into 'upwards' accountability functions to meet the needs of these increasingly complex and demanding global organizations and networks, and too little priority is being given by senior managers to play a really constructive part in co-ordination work, which is still seen as a diversion from their 'real' work.

The second conclusion is that while LRRD is always a 'good intention' agencies need to give more thought to the transition out of relief. The sector least well served in this respect is undoubtedly that of shelter, where both local authorities and agencies could have introduced alternatives to tents at an earlier

stage, especially in Aceh. But in general there appear to be growing numbers of unresolved issues about how the humanitarian sector as a whole can work successfully with national governments at all levels, so that the local capacities of both governments and local NGOs are encouraged.

1 INTRODUCTION

This is a study of agency policies in relation to LRRD and their operationalisation following the Indian Ocean Tsunami of December 26 2004. It was commissioned by Sida as one of 6 different thematic evaluations organized by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The objective of the study is *‘to find out what ideas and practices regarding LRRD governed operations and roles of the various actors, and to assess what consequences those ideas, practices, and subsequent actions had or may have for the affected population.’* This study focuses on the policy issues, and is complemented by two further studies undertaken by Channel Research reviewing LRRD after the Tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Methodology

The research team¹ met initially in September 2005 and agreed how it would approach the Policy Study. At that meeting we agreed we needed to contact as many as possible of the agencies which had been involved in the response to the Tsunami, and we agreed we needed to talk to staff involved in formulating or operationalising policies in relation to LRRD. Following the initial meeting we prepared lists of questions for both donor and implementing agencies: later questions for state agencies were also developed. We also prepared an introduction to LRRD which we shared with our respondents, which is quoted in full in section 3.

After the initial meeting in mid-September, an Inception Report was prepared and presented to Sida in early October. Both the report, and the methodology for the study, were revised after this initial meeting. In particular it was agreed that this Study would look rather more at outcomes, and more at the perceptions and policies of the Governments in the two countries worst affected by the Tsunami, than

¹ The team consisted of Hugh Goyder (Team Leader), Jerry Adams, Tania Kaiser, Cowan Coventry, Suzanne Williams & Ian Smillie.

had been envisaged in the initial TOR. The research was then carried out in the subsequent 5 weeks after the Inception Meeting. The sample included the following agencies:

Agencies	Where contacted
1. UN & Multilateral	
UNDG	New York
UNDP	Jakarta, Colombo
World Bank	Aceh
Asia Development Bank	Colombo
WFP	Rome
UNFPA	Aceh
UNHCR	Colombo
OCHA	SL/ Aceh
UNOPS	SL
UN Habitat	Aceh
FAO	Jakarta
ILO	Aceh
2. Bilateral donors	
CIDA, Dept of Foreign Affairs	Canada
DFID	UK
Sida	Sweden, Jakarta
Aus Aid	Australia
JICA	Jakarta

3. International NGOs:	
Action Aid	UK
SC-Alliance member agencies	USA, UK, SL, Indonesia
IFRC	Canada, SL,
ICRC	Aceh
CAFOD	UK
FORUT	Sweden
Oxfam International	UK, Australia, Aceh
CARE	USA, Canada, Aceh, SL
Mercy Corps	Aceh
Christian Aid	SL
Samaritans Purse	Aceh
Tearfund	UK, Aceh/Medan
World Vision	USA, Canada

4. Government Agencies	
BRR – Reconstruction Agency	Aceh
TAFREN - (Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation	Sri Lanka
Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation	Sri Lanka

5. Local NGOs	
Yayasan Ruhun Bambu	Indonesia
Flower Aceh	
SEDEC (Caritas SL)	Sri Lanka
Sarvodaya	
Sewa Lanka	
Tamil Relief Organisation	

6. Academics / Policy Analysts	
Centre for Policy Alternatives	Sri Lanka
Political Scientists, Colombo University	

In summary our sample included 9 Multilateral agencies, 4 bilateral donors, 10 INGO's, 3 Government agencies, 5 Local NGO's and 2 Sri Lankan Research organizations.

However, given the nature of the subject matter it proved difficult to identify people prepared to talk to the study team. LRRD is a broad concept, and the findings in this study must inevitably reflect not just official agency positions, but also the individual views and experiences of those people who agreed to contribute their perspectives to the study. Since it was far easier to collect this kind of information when meeting people 'face to face': the research team was able to collect relatively more information from agencies in the UK, Canada, and Sweden with whom it was possible to arrange face-to-face meetings: it proved far more difficult to collect the same quality of data from phone interviews.

In addition the team visited Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In order not to overlap with the two country studies, these visits were focused on meeting agency and government staff responsible for formulating and

implementing country-level policies in relation to LRRD. These visits did though face the constraint of ‘mission-fatigue’ as three other TEC Missions had passed through the same offices, and asked to see the same people, in the previous 3 weeks, and a number of agencies declined our invitation for meetings or phone interviews on the grounds that they had already ‘covered the same ground’ in recent meetings with other TEC Study Teams.

Finally there was a bias in our sample in that we have not included in it perspectives of the many hundreds of smaller agencies, both international and local, which offered humanitarian assistance to survivors in the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami. We have assumed (and we assume that the country studies will confirm) that such agencies were mainly interested in immediate relief, and did not intervene with any strong initial policies as regards LRRD. However there may well be a growing divide between well established, ‘formal’ NGOs, both local and international, and more spontaneous responses by individuals, churches, professional groups, and other civil society organizations. A supplementary study of this ‘spontaneous humanitarianism’ and its impacts could be a useful supplement both to this, and the other TEC Studies.

2 LRRD AS A CONCEPT AND AGENCIES' UNDERSTANDING OF IT

At the start of the study the research team prepared the following introduction which was shared with the agencies with whom we had contact at the outset of our research. This also draws upon the recent article by Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri (2005).

Thinking about “linking relief, rehabilitation and development” (LRRD) originated with the African food crises of the 1980s. The concept of a continuum – a linear sequence from relief to rehabilitation to development – was discarded early in the discussion, recognizing that different needs and phases of response might co-exist simultaneously. It also became clear that many emergencies were not a temporary disruption to the “normal” process of development, but were instead a symptom of political problems and a lack of development.

As ideas about LRRD evolved to better reflect the complexity of so many humanitarian emergencies, there was a split in thinking about fast-onset natural disasters and protracted complex political emergencies. Where the latter are concerned, the technical response used in natural disasters is rarely fully applicable. Even in natural disasters, however, issues of development and longer-term prevention must be addressed, and in many cases there is a clear coincidence of both natural disaster and complex emergency – for example, crop failures resulting from conflict or bad governance; flooding and landslides resulting from poverty-induced deforestation and erosion. The devastating effects of the tsunami in Aceh and Sri Lanka were exacerbated by endemic poverty, and the response was complicated by political crises that had affected both areas for a generation.

LRRD-based policies and strategies can include attempts to:

- *identify and address the causes of disaster vulnerabilities;*

- *build on local capacities that support rather than displace indigenous attempts to recover;*
- *assess and respond to social, political and economic needs in the recovery phase of an emergency.*

The goal of LRRD thinking is to promote linkages between relief and development assistance in ways that encourage effective and sustainable transition out of crisis, or at least ensuring that as much as possible is done to prevent the future erosion – by natural or political causes – of development investments. However it is recognised that these linkages are problematic and multiple layered, and may not be universally appropriate, and may well vary, for example in response to agencies’ different mandates.

The linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development was seen as a contiguuum with overlapping phases and links (denoted by the arrows) between each phase:




Fig 1 LRRD as a 'Contiguuum'

Issues in clarifying the linkages between the Relief, Recovery/Rehabilitation and Development Phases:

- It is important to recognize that in the context of the Tsunami (as in many other fast impact disaster situations) ‘Development activities’ were happening prior to the event. It is therefore even more essential to build in thinking on how these can be re-started and integrated with Relief, Recovery/Rehabilitation activities
- The length of time of the Relief phase needs to be based on the risk of a recurrence of the original trigger moment/ hazard and the ability of the affected communities to respond to it – mitigation

As the research progressed we became aware of a number of critical issues in applying ‘LRRD’ as a concept for the following reasons.

- It remains a relatively ‘woolly’ concept, difficult to evaluate.
- Where funding in response to a crisis is coming from two different departments of a donor, the issue of ‘links’ between relief and reconstruction or related ‘development’ may be of greater importance than when funding is coming from a donor with a broader definition of ‘humanitarianism’ (e.g. Sida)
- Most individual experts and agencies agree with LRRD as a concept, but such general agreement must not be confused with an explicit and robust policy on LRRD, which is well articulated and understood by all an agency’s staff and partners.²
- While immediate humanitarian needs are obvious and unlikely to be controversial, there are clearly many differing views about reconstruction. Tsunami survivors, aid agencies, and governments are all likely to have very different notions of what constitutes ‘development’.
- In practice it is very difficult to distinguish between ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’ interventions, especially in the case of the Tsunami where reconstruction will take many years.

² This consensus is by no means universal. – see recent paper by Skotte (2005)

- It is tempting to assume that agencies with the most thought-out policies in relation to LRRD may have the strongest impacts on the ground, but it is hard to 'prove'. In both Indonesia and Sri Lanka we found that a key variable was the extent to which agencies were able to deploy staff with the skills and confidence not just to implement their own programmes but also to maintain strong communications with other actors, especially the BRR in Indonesia, local government, UN other NGOs.
- The processes by which relief is distributed, and the extent to which these processes follow international best practice (for example Sphere standards, Red Cross code) are likely to have a greater impact on the speed of recovery than general agency policies in relation to LRRD.
- Our study suggests that 'LRRD' is no more than a very broad conceptual framework. The test is how well it is implemented through strong policies in relation to gender, shelter, and the restoration of livelihoods

3 LRRD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TSUNAMI: POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

For most of the agencies contacted, LRRD was seen to be far more of an issue in complex emergencies like long-running civil wars, when it is often problematic after many years of relief to raise funding to enable recovery to take place and be sustained. Although the linear or sequential approach to LRRD is discredited in the case of complex emergencies, it still does have relevance in the context of the Tsunami. Unlike in complex emergencies it was possible to start reconstruction very soon after the Tsunami, and many interventions (for example UNDP's early Cash for Work programmes in Aceh) both met people's immediate needs for cash and helped clear devastated areas for later reconstruction work.

As argued below, there were differences of opinion between Head Offices and their published strategies on the one hand and the views of field staff about whether the huge funding for the Tsunami response helped or hindered agencies pursue strong LRRD policies. In donor countries there was strong pressure, (as reported to the study team by DFID, CIDA, and Sida) for governments to increase their pledges to match the very high levels of public contributions, and thus there was strong pressure initially for a high level of expenditure on emergency relief. Head Office respondents normally saw this level of funding as a positive influence, as it increased their ability to allocate funds for reconstruction as well as immediate relief. In contrast field staff reviewing their activities [nine](#) months after the Tsunami, saw the negative impacts of so much funding, and they also had to contend with a difficult reality on the ground that the public in donor countries were giving huge amounts of money to INGOs for relief purposes when immediate relief needs had already been effectively met by the Governments of the affected countries, and their military forces, supported by the deployment of international military assets.

All the countries hit by the Tsunami have relatively strong governments, with Central, State or Provincial, District, and Block or Sub-district layers of administration. Many humanitarian agencies have more experience of emergencies in Africa where government structures are normally much weaker. In the Tsunami-affected countries Governmental authorities have a powerful role in formulating and implementing reconstruction and development policies, and agencies interested in LRRD need to be able to understand, and occasionally to influence, these policies. While there were many complaints about delays and inconsistencies in the government response, there was one occasion in Tamil Nadu when the State Government became frustrated at the slow pace of decision making in CARE.(Bhattacharjee 2005).

This had implications for the type of human resources which were most in demand following the Tsunami, especially in Aceh, where there was a severe shortage of people who combined English language skills with sufficient experience at working with local government structures.

4 LRRD IN AGENCY POLICIES

“Knowing what to do is different from knowing how to do it; and knowing ‘how’ is different yet again from being able to implement”.

Jeffrey Pfeffer, Stanford University Business School

‘Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development’ (LRRD) is not a term in common usage among humanitarian and development agencies interviewed, although nearly all agencies expressed recognition of and support for the ideas expressed by the concept. The exception to this norm was the minority of agencies whose mandate restricts them to the relief or initial recovery phase. Our research suggests that the basic concept of LRRD - that recovery and rehabilitation efforts in an emergency seek to support rather than displace local attempts to lay the foundations for a sustainable transition out of crisis - has been widely accepted, but the concept has yet to be mainstreamed into agencies’ humanitarian work.

Thus we found that a study which only reviewed agency policy, in a formal sense, in relation to LRRD would be a restricted and unfruitful exercise. Our central proposition is that the best indicator for the ‘mainstreaming’ of LRRD lies in the actual policies agencies pursued in relation to the key needs Tsunami survivors faced, especially in relation to shelter and livelihoods, and these issues are reviewed below.

However, our research also indicates that while Head Office respondents were generally positive about their agencies attempts to operationalise LRRD in their response to the Tsunami, a more critical perspective emerged from the field. This raises a number of interesting questions about how supporting policies, institutional arrangements, working practices and the local policy environment help or hinder the effective implementation of LRRD. Our research would indicate that the critical success factors

associated with good practice in LRRD are more associated with these ‘exogenous’ factors than with commitments in policy documents to the principles and philosophy associated with the concept.

In the following section we will:

- review the official policy commitments to LRRD of the agencies interviewed along with relevant supporting policies and working practices
- make reference to the Tsunami reconstruction strategies we have been able to review
- identify factors that have helped or hindered the implementation of an LRRD approach in the Tsunami emergency, and
- summarise key learning from this analysis regarding the successful translation of LRRD policy into practice in the case of the Tsunami response.

4.1 Mandates, Policies and Procedures

LRRD, as a term, is not familiar to, and certainly not in common usage in, many of the agencies reviewed. However, all were familiar with the underlying concept. Some had their own terminologies to express a similar concept or philosophy e.g. a ‘one programme approach’ (Oxfam Australia) which integrates advocacy, development and humanitarian work. Most development agencies interviewed claimed a general mandate for LRRD as derived from their primary purpose - for example, the World Bank, Action Aid and others, whose mandate or articles of association make reference to reconstruction, poverty eradication or development. For others, like the Red Cross, it is understood and implicit but their primary mandate is saving lives and preventing further loss of life in the recovery phase.

More specific commitments to LRRD in principle are more likely to be found in official policies on, for example, emergency response or strategic plans. Most agencies subscribe to the general principle that the design of relief and rehabilitation efforts must seek from the outset to provide the foundations for (or at

minimum not undermine) sustainable development. For example, *“We adopt an approach that links emergencies to processes of development.....to ensure emergency aid not only satisfies the immediate needs of those affected by an emergency but also promotes structural changes in the long term that protect the right to live with dignity”* (Action Aid Emergency Strategy.p3)

The concept of LRRD is also increasingly conflated with notions like ‘Build Back Better’ (World Bank, Global Consortium et al), and ‘Reconstruction plus’ (Oxfam GB) which explicitly aim to leave affected people better off than before as a result of intervention. There are at least four controversial elements to these notions. The first is the notion of **risk reduction** – which involves making value judgements about how communities both perceive and respond to different risks: we discuss this issue in more detail below. The second controversial element of ‘Build Back Better’ is that better housing and infrastructure for Tsunami survivors will tend to **exacerbate tensions between beneficiary and adjacent populations**. Many of the agencies interviewed explicitly sought to avoid creating such divisions by targeting ‘tsunami-affected districts’ rather than ‘tsunami-affected people’ , but donors varied considerably in their view of this: FORUT, whose rehabilitation programme in Sri Lanka was funded by Sida and NORAD, found that Sida was prepared to be far more flexible on this targeting issue than NORAD. Paradoxically, the more agencies seek to comply with international standards like Sphere the more such local tensions may be increased. New building standards, for example, in the coastal area of Sri Lanka will not be replicated further inland creating disparities of provision for the directly and indirectly affected populations.

A third issue with ‘BBB’ lies at the more pragmatic level, **with important choices to be made about quality and quantity**, and between relatively ‘rough and ready’ construction solutions which will mean more people are re-housed sooner, as against more long term solutions requiring the acquisition of land and the construction of new villages and towns. We review this issue of shelter below.

The fourth potentially controversial element of the ‘BBB’ notion lies in the commitment to ‘*structural change*’ as expressed in the Action Aid policy document above. While the majority of humanitarian actors would support the need for such change as a long term goal, there are real questions about whether foreign NGOs in particular have a real mandate to push forward such changes as part of a relief and recovery operation, or whether their staff on the ground have the wisdom, experience, and diplomatic skills that would be required to achieve such change without causing new conflicts. A particular difficulty with such approaches lies in the evaluation of impacts, with the risk that a reconstruction programme like that following the Tsunami which may in the end be seen as having a successful outcome in providing the majority of survivors with shelter and assistance with livelihoods, can be judged a failure if it does not transform existing social arrangements. We return to this issue below.

However, a careful examination of official policies sometimes reveals the difference between a *commitment* to and *recognition* of LRRD. For INGOs like ActionAid the policy has become an explicit agency *philosophy*, but in the policies of other agencies there are more distanced references to LRRD: for example, the AusAid Humanitarian Action Policy says only that “*There is growing recognition that.....greater attention is needed to the links between relief, rehabilitation and development*” (2. p8). This level of ‘recognition of LRRD allows for a selective interpretation of principles, as is hinted at in the remark which follows it “*However, humanitarian action differs from development programs*”.

It has to be recognized that LRRD, as a discrete concept, was not on peoples’ minds and lips in the field. While the general principles it implies found broad agreement across a range of aid actors, there was little sense in which it was a concept that had explicitly driven programming. Equally, few of the interviewees indicated that their operational responses had been guided strongly by formal policy frameworks. In some cases, it seemed as if LRRD was still being conceptualized very much as a temporal shift from relief to development rather than anything more complex.

Most agencies subscribed in interviews to the concept of a 'contiguuum' as opposed to a 'continuum' of responses in LRRD - in other words, that thinking and planning about rehabilitation and reconstruction begins immediately after the immediate rescue and recovery phase. This approach was facilitated by the nature of the Tsunami as a rapid onset disaster. Decisions to move from relief to reconstruction were made in most organizations very soon after the emergency reconstruction efforts. Indeed some agencies reported that they had moved too quickly to the reconstruction phase and had to reintroduce emergency responses. There is a consensus in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia (which we hope will be underlined by the country studies) that for many Tsunami survivors the emergency phase has lasted longer than expected due to the scale of the destruction, the large numbers of displaced people in camps, and the difficulties associated with their resettlement - especially the need to resolve land issues. This in turn highlights the importance not just of the local political/policy environment to the successful implementation of LRRD but also of the key importance of local government and civil society organizations in molding that environment (see Section 4.4). Oxfam GB offered an insight into the inappropriateness of a rigidly phased approach to emergency response by suggesting that if we seek to understand the impact of an emergency from the point of view of the individual affected we have to recognize that s/he has multiple needs at the same time.

Codes of Practice

The table below shows some of the different codes of practice to which almost all humanitarian actors now subscribe and the extent to which they are relevant for the concept of LRRD:

Code	Key points relevant for LRRD³
Red Cross	6. Local capacities
Code of Conduct	7. Involving beneficiaries 8. Reducing future vulnerabilities 9. Accountability to beneficiaries
Sphere	Participation standards (representation, transparency, local capacity, long term sustainability)
Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)	8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries 9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development
HAP	All 7 key Principles (Involvement of beneficiaries, etc)

The extent of ‘convergence’ of the different initiatives in relation to LRRD is striking, and all the agencies interviewed have committed themselves to them, though GHD only really applies to the group of donors which agreed to the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship at a meeting in Stockholm in 2003. However, specific measures to encourage or ensure compliance were rarer on the ground. For example, CARE recruited a Humanitarian Accountability Officer in Indonesia to ensure such codes were adhered to by staff. Oxfam Australia trains emergency personnel on Red Cross Code of Conduct and many agencies seek to mainstream Sphere into their programming.

³ numbers refer to the relevant sections of the different documents

Some major donors like CIDA also had systems of accreditation based on their own guidelines to screen, for example, NGOs for matching grants. In the case of CIDA, there were differing views with regard to how rigorously these guidelines were applied. However, this does raise an interesting issue of whether it is feasible or desirable for bilateral donors and UN agencies to try to promote LRRD through the criteria they use to select partners, or the flexibility they allow in the expenditure of their funds.

Respondents in the field, however, pointed out that (as one might expect) local and national government agencies in the areas affected were often unaware of internationally agreed codes of practice for the humanitarian sector. Equally however, these codes have to exist within the context of a wide variety of national legal and institutional arrangements, and if agencies want to have a longer term presence in countries like those affected by the Tsunami they have to learn about, and respect these arrangements. With so many over-lapping international codes of practice agencies on the ground are entitled to a degree of uncertainty or even confusion about whether they should follow international or local standards.

In India the Government of Tamil Nadu in the week following the Tsunami put agencies under considerable pressure to build temporary shelters of an inadequate quality, described in one evaluation as *'not only below Sphere standards but also unfit for any family to live with dignity'*. Agencies felt they had to agree to assist in the construction of these shelters as some had already been allocated to commercial contractors and they did not wish to appear unhelpful to the State Government. This is an example of how hard it is in practice for international standards to survive in the face of an assertive government. It also shows how decisions made in the first days following a disaster can have a major impact on the quality of the subsequent reconstruction effort. (Bhattacharjee et al, 2005).

There was also pressure by local government in Sri Lanka, given the need for rapid construction of houses, to bypass Sphere guidelines on housing. This takes us into the issue of different and even conflicting definitions of what constitutes 'better' in the LRRD paradigm. Some international standards can be more generous than beneficiaries want or expect and there will inevitably be trade offs to be made between quality and quantity in any reconstruction programme.

4.2 LRRD, Rights and Opportunities

Accountability: upwards, downwards, and lateral?

Those agencies explicitly committed to LRRD - for example, ActionAid, World Vision, Oxfam, and Sida - are also committed to a 'rights-based approach' to development and, indeed, humanitarian assistance. This approach stresses the rights of citizens in relation to the duties of accountable public institutions. A rights-based approach can be seen as a logical extension of the 'bottom-up' approach that characterises the approach of many development agencies, particularly international NGOs. Some respondents argued that supporting the claims of rights holders vis-à-vis such duty bearers in a post-emergency situation is an important characteristic of LRRD; that empowering those affected by the Tsunami to assert their rights vis-à-vis government and donor agencies was an effective way of ensuring that relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts met the long-term aspirations of those affected.

Like LRRD, accountability to beneficiaries is often more of an aspiration than an operationalised policy. Oxfam Australia, for example, asserts that humanitarian agencies generally have a poor record of supporting the meaningful participation of affected communities in the emergency response. It claims that that real 'bottom up accountability' requires knowledge of entitlement, availability of credible grievance and redress mechanisms and empowerment to access them. As result, it supported a number of experiments in 'bottom up accountability' in their post-Tsunami programme through the formation of Camp Committees, the formation of an action group called Gender Watch and a network of national and international NGOs called Aid Watch to monitor aid coordination and impact. A key feature of this kind of approach is that intervening agencies make far more effort to provide people with full information about their entitlements: as Channel Research's Indonesia country study notes, accurate information

(rather than unreliable rumors) about what relief and rehabilitation people could expect was a scarce commodity after the Tsunami in both countries.

This focus on ‘bottom up accountability’ is instructive since a number of respondents both at Head Office level and in the two countries complained that increased ‘upward accountability’ - for example, in the form of increased and multiple reporting - represented a major distraction to their efforts. Thus an implementing NGO in the Tsunami-affected countries may have multiple reporting lines not just to its own Head Office, but to bilateral and multilateral donors as well as both the local and international media. This increased reporting and accounting burden was of course one of the inevitable consequences of the unprecedented scale of funding.

One gap in agencies’ current thinking on LRRD in relation to accountability is that there is still no strong sense of ‘lateral accountability’, defined as the requirement to co-ordinate efforts closely with, and feel accountable to, both to government structures and the wider humanitarian sector – even though all the codes of conduct and international standards referred to above emphasise the need for such accountability. For bilateral donors one important indicator of the extent to which their actions are influenced by such a sense of ‘lateral accountability’ is the extent to which they are prepared to support multilateral initiatives like the World Bank’s Multi Donor Trust Fund for the reconstruction of Aceh. For implementing agencies a similar strong indicator of ‘lateral accountability’ is the amount of effort they are prepared to commit to ensuring that their reconstruction work is consistent with government plans.

This sense of ‘accountability’ does not imply that agencies have to do everything that Governments request them. During the reconstruction effort there have been several occasions on which NGOs needed to be cautious about Government requests: examples are the case of temporary shelters in Tamil Nadu, already quoted, and the case of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, quoted below, where the GoSL, for political

reasons, encouraged NGOs to rebuild more houses than had actually been destroyed by the Tsunami. But the idea of ‘lateral accountability’ implies that agencies are fully aware of the national and local political environment, including PRSPs and particular government anti-poverty programmes, and that they are able to use this knowledge in their reconstruction programmes. This links to the importance for LRRD of agencies’ previous ‘presence’ in a country discussed in the following section.

As regards co-ordination, many implementing agencies in both SL and Aceh are in the slightly illogical position of reporting that they are ‘too busy’ to attend co-ordination meetings, but at the same time they complain about the poor quality of co-ordination. This may actually relate to one of the key differences with the Tsunami response which highlights a weakness in thinking about the purposes of coordination which was seen as a coordination at **activity** level and not at the level of **outcomes and impact/purpose**. One reason why agencies attend co-ordination meetings is to ensure that what are normally limited resources are directed into the most needy sectors and areas. A further reason is for agencies to exchange information on a situation so that they can work more effectively. However with such a massive response to the Tsunami agencies had so much money there was less (perceived) need to network. There was also a tremendous pressure on all actors to carry out a large number of activities – many of them beyond their normal capacity. Once organisations felt they had sufficient information to implement their project they did not see coordination meetings as being of the same high priority. We return to these issues below.

LRRD and Rights-based Approaches

One interpretation of LRRD within a rights-based perspective held by Action Aid is that it is an *opportunity-based* rather than a *needs based* approach. From this perspective, the impact of a major emergency can provide a stimulus and open up the opportunity for broader social change – to ‘build back better’ from a rights-based perspective. Although not in any way attributable to international development agencies, the impact of Tsunami, for example, provided additional impetus behind the Aceh peace

process. More specifically ActionAid, for example, sought to promote pro-poor social change at local level by supporting the joint ownership of fishing boats in Tamil Nadu, strengthening civil society in the Maldives, and helping marginal groups in Tamil Nadu and Thailand push for their land rights. This supports our general finding that an agency is far more likely to be able to implement LRRD successfully if it has a prior country presence (whether as an international or national agency) and strong local partners. However, in contexts like that of Aceh and Sri Lanka this socially transformative vision needs to be combined with some careful conflict analysis to reduce the risk that interventions will either worsen pre-existing conflicts – or start new ones.

The way in which a rights-based approach is not only complementary to LRRD but can actively promote it can be illustrated by some public policy work post-Tsunami. Oxfam GB, for example, issued a Briefing Note three weeks after the Tsunami struck calling for:

- all displaced people to have a choice to return home or stay in the camps as long as necessary
- swiftly-funded, poverty-focused reconstruction efforts involving the participation of local people and governments
- immediate rehabilitation efforts during the emergency phase.

LRRD, Country Presence and Partners

Agency responses to the Tsunami were in part influenced by their previous history of the region or systems of country prioritisation. This is hardly surprising, and yet it suggests a more disturbing reality – that the opportunity (or lack of it) to implement an LRRD approach can be determined by the geographical location of the emergency. For example, some of the international NGOs most committed to LRRD e.g. ActionAid, Oxfam Australia only responded to the Tsunami where they had a history of programming and established local partners. This enabled them to take advantage of long-standing relationships and an accumulated understanding of the local context to build local capacity. It is worth

noting also that these agencies were not prominent in the immediate rescue and recovery stage and that they focused their efforts on rehabilitation and reconstruction.

In a parallel sense, some major donors have a system of ‘core’ countries where they prioritise their aid efforts. CIDA, for example, has an implicit policy of long-term bilateral programming in certain core countries. If an emergency occurs in one of these countries, CIDA will actively promote a long-term recovery effort. In non-core countries it would support reconstruction efforts by contributing to the UN and NGOs. The availability of both governmental and non-governmental agencies, therefore, to directly fund or implement an LRRD response to an emergency may well depend on historical commitments to that particular country or region.

An additional problem pointed out by several agencies was that agencies new to a particular area have to rely far more than established agencies on the findings of their own assessments. The TEC’s Needs Assessments Study has already raised some important questions about the validity of the post-Tsunami assessments; from the perspective of LRRD the major issue is that most such assessments tend to focus on ‘victims’ and rarely take sufficient account of **institutional capacity**, an understanding of which is an essential pre-requisite of the LRRD approach. This suggests that at the earliest possible stage following a disaster agencies need to share their learning about the capacities of both governmental and non-governmental actors which will be involved in the recovery process – and if recovery needs are to be addressed at an early stage, this analysis needs to be undertaken at a far earlier stage than is often currently done, if it is done at all.

The fact that most agencies explicitly committed to LRRD seek to **work through partners** wherever possible raises a number of associated issues. The first is the general issue as to the importance of a prior presence and knowledge of the society and culture and availability of local partners as condition of

implementing a LRRD approach. Some agencies put particular emphasis on this condition and will not directly intervene where it is not present. This risks marginalising LRRD as an ‘ideal type’ response when historical and geographical factors conveniently combine to suit the agency. There is no doubt that the likelihood of post-emergency responses building local capacity and delivering sustainable benefits is enhanced by the availability of appropriate local partners or intermediaries. However, if LRRD is to be restricted only to these circumstances it considerably reduces its importance as a strategic response to major emergencies. Natural disasters, for example, tend to occur inconveniently in areas of the world - such as Kashmir or Iran in recent times - where international agencies do not have a strong presence and where the availability of local partners is restricted. In such areas the critical factor in determining the success or otherwise of LRRD will be an agency’s ability to work successfully with Government partners. In such areas the UN Agencies and national Government agencies will usually play a larger role in the reconstruction process.

Secondly, several agencies reported that the unprecedented scale of funding available for the Tsunami had a massive impact on local partners. The influx of so many new agencies, all seeking staff with scarce administrative, technical, and language skills, had a hugely inflationary impact on local labour markets. Some local civil society organizations saw their budgets increase exponentially, stretching their organizational capacity. In the context of an increased sense of public accountability, therefore, a number of international NGOs stressed the need for targeted capacity building of local partners in financial management ; and they also tried to improve their own monitoring and evaluation systems as a result of this heightened sense of accountability to donors. However, a contrasting perspective - for example, from Save the Children - to the same set of challenges was that in the face of such a huge scale of funding their partners quickly became overloaded, and that INGOs like SCF therefore needed to remain operational in the Tsunami areas for a **longer** period to ensure this funding was disbursed effectively. The Local

Capacities Study should be able to clarify whether this has been a common response to the scale of funding raised, and if so, what impact it has had on local capacity.

The general conclusion on this tends to echo initial findings from the Local Capacities Study – that after a major disaster like the Tsunami the capacity of local civil society actors tends to be given a lower priority despite strong evidence that such actors can be crucial in running both relief and recovery activities. The challenge therefore becomes to finding the optimal way of combining international and national capacities to ensure a strong long term response. And it is important to point out that at least in Aceh, INGOs like Mercy Corps, without any previous experience of the country were able to introduce innovative programmes, especially in relation to Cash for Work, which are discussed below.

4.3 Supporting policies and practices for LRRD

Gender

There are a number of supporting policies/frameworks, institutional arrangements and ways of working that are likely to be influential in helping or hindering the delivery of an LRRD approach. For example, in the case of the Tsunami - where the impact of the disaster was markedly disaggregated by gender - the application of a gender analysis, both in the initial assessments and in the planning of interventions, was critical. There is an important distinction here between those agencies which tend only to see women as ‘vulnerable’ and hence in need of greater support, and those which applied a strong gender analysis to all their interventions. It will be interesting to find out from the country studies whether organizations with strong gender policies were seen as being more successful in LRRD than those which have not given such priority to gender issues.

As with the other issues in this study, we found the difficulty has been to assess the extent to which policies have been translated into effective action on the ground. Oxfam emphasized the gender and

livelihood impacts of the Tsunami from a very early stage; and undertook research and advocacy to highlight the specific needs of women. (Oxfam 2005). The Oxfam International Strategy document says that *'all programs will have a clear approach to the impact of the Tsunami on women and their rights, and programs will be evaluated against this'*. But there is less discussion of the difficulties faced by the very large numbers of widowed men, many of them with dependent children. But their gender perspective also links to a very clear commitment, which is shared by a number of agencies to improving rural livelihoods. (Buchanan-Smith & Fabbri 2005) We conclude that a strong gender policy is certainly necessary to help agencies formulate comprehensive policies in relation to LRRD, but that to be effective it needs to be part of a wider sustainable livelihoods approach.

However, as with LRRD more generally, it is important to note that the existence of policies on paper is not enough in itself. Staff need to be trained in the relevant methodologies, particularly staff recruited on a short-term basis, and have the confidence and the support to implement them effectively. The recruitment, selection and training of personnel in an emergency response is likely to be a critical factor in the effectiveness of a LRRD approach (see Section 4.2).

Livelihoods

Buchanan Smith & Fabbri (2005) argue that *'A focus on livelihoods also offers a unifying framework, spanning short term concerns to protect and save livelihoods and long-term concerns about strengthening and reinforcing livelihoods, not least to reduce vulnerability'*.

A key indicator of an agency's success in LRRD lies in its ability to make the shift from the immediate 'protecting' and 'saving' of livelihoods into the phase of strengthening and reinforcing. As was found with the Tsunami, it is not easy to make this transition. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster in Aceh there was an unusual number of initiatives to offer survivors short-term employment in Cash for Work (CFW) activities. UNDP disbursed over \$10 million through CFW and the total number of people

employed in CFW activities is estimated by the World Bank to be over 30,000 people. (World Bank –October 2005). The INGO Mercy Corps was able to start CFW within 12 days of the Tsunami, and by March it had 40 CFW projects employing 8,000 people. But it reported that the very success of CFW in mobilizing people to clean up debris made it harder for businesses to find labour at pre-Tsunami rates and may therefore have had the indirect impact of delaying the recovery of the private sector (ODI/UNDP 2005). The Indonesia Country Study reports further negative impacts of CFW on *Gotong Royong*, the traditional systems for mobilizing voluntary labour.

This experience emphasizes the continuing challenge faced by agencies in knowing when to phase down much-needed relief interventions so that these interventions do not have any negative impact on the later recovery process. Cash-for-Work was very popular, but many agencies found it difficult to reduce CFW once staff and systems were established and people's expectations had been raised. This phasing down process was undoubtedly made more difficult by the fact that all the agencies had large amounts of money to spend, and CFW appeared an excellent way of spending it. But it should be emphasized that food distributions have also been continued for far longer than one would have expected in both Sri Lanka and Aceh given that they are both countries with strong agricultural sectors – and Aceh had an excellent harvest in March.

One way in which agencies can limit the distorting impacts of relief interventions is by supporting pre-existing development programmes. In Aceh the best example of such a programme was the the Kecamatan (or sub-district) Development Programme which has been supported in Indonesia by the World Bank since 1998. This programme has a wide coverage – reaching 221 different sub-districts, and aims to channel resources direct to sub-districts, and through these, to communities. There are a wide variety of measures in place to reduce the risk of corruption. The Bank has been involved in training at the local level to help communities map out land boundaries and identify reconstruction needs.

(ODI/UNDP 2005)

A wider criticism of the response to the Tsunami in both countries from a livelihoods perspective is that agencies focused on restoring people's assets rather than their livelihoods, with much anecdotal evidence about people receiving too many small fishing boats, but not enough larger boats which can go further out to sea. This is said to have resulted in over fishing of in-shore waters. There are examples from both Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu that where even after people had received fishing boats, they still had difficulty in going out to sea as jetties had been damaged and still not repaired, and there was so much debris near the shore.

Risk Reduction

Governments' concerns to reduce the actual or presumed risk of future Tsunamis have made it far more difficult to restore livelihoods in both countries. In Sri Lanka, the Government originally imposed a 'buffer zone' in which no new building was to be allowed of between 100 and 200 metres from the sea. This was relaxed in a few areas at the time of the elections of November 2005, but it has caused, and continues to cause, great uncertainty, with allegations that the GoSL was trying to use the Tsunami to 'clean up' the coast, especially in the tourist areas of the south where many people who depend on the sea for their livelihood do not have any land title. From the perspective of a fisherman who needs to live close to the sea for his livelihood, the risks of future Tsunamis on the scale of the recent one are far less than the risks he faces if his fishing is interrupted and he has to go into debt.

A difficulty here is that there is an inherent tension between trying to restore people's livelihoods as they were, with all the normal risks that most poor people living near the sea face in their daily lives, and notions of 'Build Back Better' (as understood by the Governments of SL and Indonesia and encouraged by some aid donors, notably Clinton's Global Consortium) which imply that reconstruction requires that these traditional risks be reduced. Once again the ideals may be valid, but there is a real danger that

people's livelihoods will suffer in what could be a very long transitional period of great uncertainty in which new settlements are planned, land is purchased, and new housing finally built.

There is also a real danger that too many resources in relation to risk reduction will go into technical early warning mechanisms, which may not be well maintained once the Tsunami becomes a distant memory in the Region. UNDP has argued the need for what it calls '*end-to-end*' early warning systems which put far greater emphasis on community, and institutional, risk reduction mechanisms – especially community preparedness measures (UNDP/BCPR 2005). But this is an area where the different actors need to collaborate far more closely to ensure that consistent messages are provided to communities across the Region facing a risk of further earthquakes or tsunamis.

Shelter issues

The difficulties with respect to providing Tsunami survivors in both Tamil Nadu, Sri Lanka, and Aceh with adequate shelter, in spite of the huge funding available, suggest serious problems in the way in which both national Governments and the humanitarian sector approach LRRD. The technical issues are well known and need not be repeated here, but they would merit a far deeper analysis. Broadly in all the countries affected the governments and some NGOs took immediate decisions to construct 'temporary' shelters, many of them below Sphere standards: there have been particular criticisms of the 'barracks' constructed in Aceh, and the temporary shelters constructed by the Government of Tamil Nadu. In Aceh, the World Bank estimated in October 2005 that 67,500 people were still living in tents '*now rotting with mould*'. New houses are only being built at the rate of 1,000 per month in Aceh, and progress in SL was reported in August to be far slower, with only 251 houses handed over to their new occupants.

In Sri Lanka there have also been some extraordinary discrepancies in the allocation of houses between different districts. In Hambantota in the south, an area with strong political connections to the current

Government in Colombo, more than 5 times the number of houses have been assigned to donors than were destroyed in the Tsunami. In contrast, in the district of Mullaitivu in the north-east of the island, only one third of the number of houses which were destroyed have been assigned. One wonders how aware the different donors are of these figures, what representations have been made to the Government, and what the implications are for future conflicts in Sri Lanka.

The monitoring and evaluation of LRRD policies

Unless policies are monitored effectively they can easily remain simply as general aspirations or good intentions. This seems to be the case with LRRD. Throughout the humanitarian sector the monitoring of impacts remains weak. As Bhattacharjee et al (op. cit. 2005) found in their evaluation of 3 INGOs working in the India and SL:

'Organisations appear to have focused on outputs rather than outcome and impact. Monitoring/reporting formats used by all the agencies concentrated mostly on physical measure of NFRI distributed, Watsan structures completed, etc'.

Since LRRD is ultimately about impacts, this means that even if an agency has a clear policy in relation to LRRD, it is rare for that policy to be rigorously evaluated. The current trend towards 'Real Time' Evaluations in the sector means that while current debates in relation to a relief programme are often well documented, there are proportionately less resources to review the longer term impacts of relief and recovery operations, especially when the sector is as over-stretched as at present with so many different emergencies. It is possible that the further study in relation to LRRD reviewing the impact of reconstruction activities during 2006 may begin to fill this gap.

Agencies serious about LRRD need some indicators to guide them. One internal evaluation workshop held by an INGO in Sri Lanka to reflect on their work since the Tsunami reported that:

‘There were few documented plans and no indicators for when to move from emergency to rehabilitation phase. There is a need to develop good indicators to guide this planning. We need to anticipate natural difficulties in changing approaches according to different phases (Example: the ending of cash for work as the emergency ends may undermine approaches to community mobilisation at the rehabilitation phase)’

4.5 The Impact of Different Management Structures on LRRD

Individual agencies have different kinds of institutional arrangements for managing their emergency responses and development programmes. Traditionally different departments are responsible for emergency response and development, each with quite distinctive cultures. These arrangements continue to predominate. In the case of the UK, for example, both DFID and Oxfam GB have Emergency or Humanitarian Departments that are separate from the country/regional line management structures. However, all agencies interviewed are sensitive to the possible tensions such segregated responsibilities might engender and most sought to take steps to establish cross departmental working in some shape or form in their post-Tsunami response. For instance CIDA established a Tsunami Assistance Coordinating Committee (TACC) which brought together its Humanitarian and Asia Departments; CAFOD established an inter-sectoral team with a very similar purpose. In some cases these arrangements were unique to the Tsunami; in others they are now standard operational procedures. While line management responsibility for the organizational response to the disaster often rested with emergency professionals; others left it to development professionals who usually had previous experience of the area. Emergency professionals were generally responsible for directing the operations of those agencies directly involved in the

immediate relief effort. The Tsunami was also exceptional in that it affected several countries, thus requiring coordination and cooperation between geographic desks and country offices.

From the perspective of the Head Offices these interdepartmental arrangements worked well and encouraged a more collegial approach to the disaster. However, anecdotal reports describe tensions within agencies between imported, expatriate emergency professionals and local development professionals - the latter often feeling professionally disregarded or devalued, particularly in the relief phase of the emergency. The sectoral focus of emergency departments was often reflected by inter-agency coordination meetings taking place only at a sectoral level and assuming quite a technical nature, discouraging the 'joined-up thinking' necessary for LRRD

The need for effective coordination between international and national agencies in major emergencies is rarely stated as an explicit dimension to a LRRD approach but it is nonetheless critical. Many agencies, particularly smaller NGOs, reported that effective coordination on the ground is a necessary condition of LRRD. Conversely, it was also frequently reported that difficulties in coordinating the efforts of multiple actors in the confused circumstances of the aftermath of the Tsunami e.g. in Sri Lanka was a major impediment to international agencies developing speedy but sustainable responses to the disaster. It was also noted, for example by the SC Alliance in Aceh, that coordination when it did happen was not always effective from the point of view of LRRD, with for instance agencies being allocated parts of more than one district rather than being able to focus in depth on one district.

Some agencies also commented that a positive understanding of how the private sector can and must contribute to reconstruction efforts was sometimes lacking in agencies committed to LRRD. While private companies were often active in the earlier stages of the emergency there was a lack of strategic

thinking about how the private sector could be supported to generate employment and provide services, even in sectors in which private companies had been the principal service providers.

4.6 LRRD and Tsunami strategies

It would seem reasonable to expect that those agencies that were committed to LRRD would have developed, as soon as they were able to, some sort of post-Tsunami strategy or planned programme of work. LRRD, after all, implies an early preparedness to design and implement reconstruction or developmental initiatives, if not programmes. Most development agencies involved in responding to the Tsunami disaster would not disagree with the assertion that an aggregate of stand-alone or ad hoc development activities is unlikely to add up to an effective development programme. Sound development requires planning, consultation, planned synergies and good coordination with other actors.

The dearth of post-Tsunami strategies uncovered by our review is, therefore, surprising. Most agencies have been diligent in their post-Tsunami reporting - for example, on their websites - but have been reporting on their activities rather than, for example, objectives. This may well go some way in reassuring individual donors, for example, that their funds are being well spent but is unsatisfactory from an LRRD perspective. We suspect that agencies may have undertaken more strategic planning than we give them credit for, but that the resulting strategy documents are still not in the public domain.

The 'strategies', for example, of some major donors - for example, DFID - consist of a short list of sectors to be funded and partner criteria. While this may be considered adequate for a funding agency, it is less understandable for a implementing agencies managing very substantial post-Tsunami budgets. Several agencies interviewed that are operational in the disaster-affected areas did not seem to have a disaster response strategy; or if they did they could not place it and it was not at the front of their minds. The exceptions were Oxfam, CARE Canada, SC (UK), CAFOD, and Tearfund which all shared their

strategies with us. For instance Tearfund's South Asia Disaster Response Strategy, dated April 2005, sets out in detail an analysis of the:

- *External environment* – including an analysis of impact, need and capacity of local governments
- *Internal environment* – including an analysis of the Tearfund capacity to respond; that of its partners; and the impact on the existing regional programme
- *Response strategy* – including the scope and scale of intervention; implementation methodology; management arrangements; programme approach and risk management.

The Tearfund strategy shows that it had in place a detailed strategic framework in relation to LRRD within 3 months of the Tsunami; SC (UK) also has a strategy, dated April 2005, which sets out their operational strategy, sectoral plans and prospective partners over a three year period. These agencies who applied for external funding for their post-Tsunami programmes might have been more inclined to develop a LRRD strategy as part of their proposal formulation. One example of this nature that the team reviewed was a detailed funding proposal by the Swedish NGO FORUT in Sri Lanka which lays down clear strategies and interventions. From the point of view of LRRD an agency with a planned programme of work - especially if it has a risk management strategy associated with it - has the basis for more effective coordination with other actors, particularly local government agencies. It also provides a more transparent framework for accountability.

A final reflection on the availability or otherwise of LRRD strategic frameworks for the Tsunami disaster refers to the 'epistemological divide' between relief and development, well-known to all in the sector and recently referred to by Dr Hans Skotte. Skotte suggests that those on the relief side of this divide tend to report (if at all) against completed activities, and that this approach mirrors an approach in some humanitarian agencies of 'Do first. Think later'.

Conclusions: Mandates, Policies and Procedures

- Head offices affirm LRRD principles guided Tsunami response but this is not confirmed by respondents in the field
- Agency commitment to LRRD was linked to a ‘rights-based approach’ and supported by commitment to ‘bottom up accountability’ and rights-based advocacy, but no strong sense of ‘lateral accountability’ (to local governments and the wider humanitarian sector)
- Some agencies strongly committed to LRRD worked only where they had a prior history and partner relationships
- Many agencies established cross-departmental task forces to encourage ‘joined-up’ LRRD thinking from outset
- The need for effective inter-agency coordination on the ground is under-stated in policy documents but critical to LRRD
- Few implementing agencies have published detailed post-tsunami strategies addressing LRRD issues

4.7 Human Resource issues

The human factor in LRRD

A critical determinant of whether LRRD translates from policy to practice in a major emergency will be whether key staff responsible for managing agency responses understand and are committed to the LRRD approach. The calibre of management and their ability to follow, for example, best practice guidelines and train and induct new staff is key. A number of respondents commented on the pressures of operating in a

post-emergency environment and, from the point of view of LRRD, the need for mature, experienced personnel who can ‘keep their heads’ and focus on the strategic while responding to the urgent.

However, all major emergencies present major recruitment difficulties for agencies and the Tsunami was no exception. Most international agencies very significantly increased their staffing in the areas affected. World Vision Canada, as an example, reportedly staffed up from zero in Aceh to about 400 staff, including 20-30 expatriates. International agencies deployed a variety of mechanisms to ‘staff up’ - seconding staff from other programmes, recruiting ex-patriate personnel and recruiting staff locally. Most agencies experienced in major emergencies maintain a roster of personnel to draw upon. As in previous emergencies the massive influx of international agencies into the affected areas had a major impact on local civil society. Many agencies spoke of the need to build capacity of partners while on the other hand nearly all agencies competed to recruit competent personnel from local governmental or non-governmental organizations - thus progressively weakening the human resources of civil society organizations when they should be being strengthened. One local NGO described the effect as ‘capacity breaking’ rather than ‘capacity building’. Another NGO in Sri Lanka, SEDEC, described itself as a ‘production factory’ for international agencies in that it was training local staff only for them to move on to better paid jobs, having lost 25 staff members to international NGOs. Those agencies that had no prior programme in country found it particularly difficult to recruit the right staff in the right numbers. In Aceh, for example, where the labour market was limited staff were recruited from other areas of Indonesia like Medan and Java, and these people were also viewed by local people as ‘outsiders.’

The post-Tsunami response, therefore, once again highlighted the major distortions on the local labour markets wreaked by international agencies in search of competent local staff. If the commitment of international agencies to build local government and civil society capacity in post emergency situations is to be credible, some there need to be some constraints - whether through voluntary codes of conduct or

other means - on the 'enticement' of talented local staff by generous salary packages, and there seems to be a sensitive area here, not well documented, on the extent to which agencies are prepared to 'drain' local agencies to find the staff they need.⁴

Expertise vs local knowledge

An issue of some controversy in taking LRRD forward is the relative merit of managing an emergency response 'through the line' or by deploying seasoned emergency professionals. This particularly applies to those agencies that have an international network of local offices. Some agencies e.g. Oxfam Australia, CARE, take a very firm line that the overall response needs to be managed by their staff in situ who have the local knowledge and relationships necessary to LRRD. Emergency professionals support rather than replace local managers, playing a backfilling role with local staff. Other agencies - for example, World Vision - introduced parallel or temporary line management systems to unequivocally 'import' their best expertise to manage their response. Oxfam GB, for example, introduced a 'step aside' policy to replace country level managers in Aceh and Sri Lanka with senior staff from other regions who had the leadership skills and experience to run a large emergency programme. These individuals are on a list kept up to date for rapid deployment in Category 1 emergencies. Oxfam GB senior staff reflected that this enabled them to go to scale quickly and enhance LRRD by bringing wide range of skills and experience to the humanitarian operation. However, the policy was controversial with local staff who felt the managers flown in from Africa or Latin America lacked an understanding and sensitivity to local context e.g. in PRA data collection.

Those agencies involved directly in humanitarian relief clearly have a responsibility to get the best people in situ as quickly as possible in the rescue stage to save lives. However, this stage will normally last a matter of days. The secondment of emergency professionals from other parts of the world has clear

⁴ We presume this issue will be fully covered in the Local Capacities Study.

advantages in terms of decisive, informed action. However, it does raise a question whether such an approach has a conservative bias, leading to a 'repetitive emergency response syndrome' - in other words, introducing strong leadership that draws on past experience rather than engaging with the specificities of context. Many INGO staff referred to the difficulties faced by humanitarian staff arriving from Darfur when faced with the very different cultural and institutional context of Aceh and Sri Lanka.

Support and training in LRRD

Support and training to staff to work collaboratively with colleagues, and sometimes in unfamiliar ways, must be an important support to a LRRD approach. This has two aspects. First, line managers in country programmes need training in LRRD and support to collaborative working with emergency colleagues. A number of agencies interviewed had taken steps in this direction prior to the Tsunami and included disaster preparedness in their training packages. Secondly, training and induction schemes need to be available to assimilate new recruits in a major emergency. From the point of view of LRRD, it is important to recognize that it is almost inevitable that most international agencies will need to recruit new, often comparatively inexperienced staff in major emergencies. Many of these in turn may be technical specialists recruited e.g. through RedR or comparable networks. The quality of support, induction and training they receive will be a critical factor in their effectiveness. Some agencies e.g. Oxfam Australia, had taken pro-active steps to provide training courses in LRRD to their roster of emergency staff. As another example, World Vision supports their Global Response Team, which has emergency personnel on standby in each region, with training in humanitarian competency certified by the University of Melbourne

Key Learning: Human Resources

- The quality of human resources on the ground rather than formal polices are likely to be key in operationalising LRRD.
- There is a need for international protocols on recruitment of staff in major emergencies if capacity building objectives of LRRD are to be fulfilled.
- Two models emerging for managing emergency response - ‘through the line’ using . local offices or by emergency professionals
- Need for pro-active LRRD training strategy for permanent and ‘standby’ staff of major relief and development agencies.

4.7 Funding and Communications

Public funding and LRRD

The Tsunami emergency raised an unprecedented level of funding from public and institutional sources. Of course, the level of funding available was exceptional and provides no immediate guide for future emergencies. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the level of funding raised for the Tsunami disaster had a significant effect on implementing agencies in a number of ways. In light of this, it is appropriate to consider whether the amount and nature of funding contributes to the likelihood of a better LRRD approach.

Most agencies interviewed were of a view that the level of public funding available greatly increased their ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ to develop an emergency programme along LRRD lines. International NGOs, for example, generally agree that the high level of unrestricted funding that they raised from their own supporters encouraged them to ‘take speedy decisions and calculated risks’ (Oxfam GB) Unrestricted

funds also have no deadlines for disbursement which meant that they could be used or earmarked at an early stage for reconstruction activities. A number of international NGOs commented that they used the different sources of funding 'strategically' e.g. their own unrestricted funds for innovation and institutional or restricted funds for 'quick win' emergency responses. However, other agencies claimed that the source of funding had no impact on use of funds.

There is also a countervailing question about whether the high level of public interest in and funding for the Tsunami disaster encouraged greater risk taking. Some agencies reported a sense of pressure to disburse quickly and demonstrate tangible results to the public. All described a heightened sense of public accountability from the outset as the scale of public response became apparent.

Most Head Office respondents agreed that the conditions surrounding disbursement by major donors were generally more flexible due to the obvious impracticality of spending funds within traditional time frames. However, agency staff interviewed in the field nonetheless reported a pressure to disburse funds and demonstrate results quickly.

The heightened sense of independence and 'freedom of manoeuvre' referred to earlier also had a potential down side. A number of respondents cited, for example, the level of funding available to agencies as a disincentive to coordinate. Rather, high levels of funding led to heightened competition in some cases for partners and a sense of urgency for rapid disbursement. A situation where the affected areas were being 'overrun' by hundreds of international agencies keen to disburse funds might also have contributed to 'driving down' standards. Tearfund, for example, cited the difficulty of trying to insist on tighter M&E systems with local Christian partners when other well-funded agencies were impatient to disburse funding with fewer or no such 'conditions'.

Institutional donors and LRRD

Donors varied in the extent to which they were prepared to allow Tsunami funding to be used for reconstruction and development over a longer period.

-The UK's DEC had three 'windows' for expenditure over 6, 12 and 24 months respectively

-DFID: allowed expenditure over 12 months but was flexible

-CIDA: provided matching funding for both relief and development. Activities from emergency window have to be completed within 12 months.

-Sida: Few reported restrictions.

-ECHO: still perceived as the most restrictive donor with respect to using emergency funding for recovery programmes

LRRD, public interest and communications

We have referred to the heightened sense of accountability of many agencies as result of the unprecedented level of public and political interest in the Tsunami emergency. A number of agencies made reference to the need to pro-actively manage their communications proactively from outset. From the point of view of LRRD a number of agencies said that they made a point of trying to manage public expectations from an early stage regarding the length of time required for effective reconstruction. CARE USA for example, made special appeal and doubled their fundraising target for an endowment fund, supported by messages about longer term need. One respondent commented that it was important that the sector as a whole managed public expectations since it would be the sector as a whole rather than individual agencies whose performance would be reviewed by the general public.

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Conclusions: Funding and Communications

- Most agencies report that high level of public funding and increased flexibility re disbursement encouraged greater risk-taking and earlier LRRD programming
- However, higher levels of funding acted as a disincentive to coordinate in the field and heightened competition between agencies e.g. for partners
- Heightened sense of ‘upward accountability’ by agencies in Tsunami emergency due to high level of public and political interest
- Several agencies sought to pro-actively manage public expectations e.g. timescale for an effective response

5 LRRD AND AN ENABLING POLICY ENVIRONMENT

In the case of a major emergency in countries with strong governments, as in the Indian Ocean Region, the policies and practices of local and national governments will be the key determinants of whether outside agencies will be able to be successful in relation to LRRD. Our study team felt that the importance of these government policies was insufficiently recognized in the strategies of many of the agencies contacted.

All outside agencies serious about LRRD need to work in an effectively co-ordinated and well managed policy environment, which they are both aware of, and to which they feel they can contribute on the basis of their experience. However the national Government bodies set up to manage the Tsunami response all had difficulties. The next section reviews some of the ways in which the local policy environment might have helped or hindered LRRD.

The case of Sri Lanka

In the case of Sri Lanka the government established a Centre for National Operations which reported directly to the President in the immediate post tsunami period. The Centre was quickly overwhelmed by the arrival of plane or container loads of relief supplies, some of which went directly to the coast without being registered on their arrival. The government's capacity to co-ordinate at local level was also challenged by the fact that government district officers and offices had also been directly affected by the tsunami in some places.

This Centre was replaced on 3rd Feb when the already existing Presidential taskforces came to the fore. The most important of these were TAFOR (Taskforce on Relief) and TAFREN (Taskforce on Rebuilding the Nation). Both by-passed Parliament and the line ministries by being accountable directly to the

President who appointed a number of high profile allies, including private sector representatives and one of her main political advisors. These task forces had a co-ordinating rather than an implementing role. All financial agreements between donors and the government were still signed by the line ministries.

A number of characteristics of the Sri Lanka Government's response to the disaster did not facilitate an LRRD approach:

- The separation of TAFOR, responsible for coordinating relief operations, and TAFREN, responsible for coordinating reconstruction efforts was probably not helpful to LRRD efforts. TAFREN acknowledged in interview that their own attempts to co-ordinate INGOs had been weak, questioning whether the approach of the Indian government of initially refusing aid and only accepting it later after they had defined their needs might have been better advised.
- The government's slowness to resolve key issues such as the buffer zone seriously delayed attempts to get the long term recovery process underway. This has now become an issue in the election campaigns of the major presidential candidates.
- The lack of a development framework/plan did not encourage greater coordination of international aid and assistance. The government tended to accept external funding unilaterally without reference to broader considerations - for example, accept ADB funding for railways in the absence of a transport strategy. However, TAFREN is now producing district development plans in consultation with Government, international NGOs, local NGOs, and the private sector.
- Responsibility for the North and East was allocated to the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation; for the South it was allocated to the Ministry of Social Services. While this made sense in terms of the familiarity, for example, of the North and East by the former Ministry, the geographical separation of responsibilities possibly complicated the challenge of effective coordination.

- As discussed above in the section on ‘Risk Reduction’ the GoSL’s policy in relation to the coastal ‘buffer zone’ was contentious, and has led to many delays in decision-making at local level.

In summary, the perception of agencies on the ground in Sri Lanka was that the government was unable to provide the leadership and co-ordination needed to support LRRD. The Colombo-based NGO SEDEC, for example, like many UN agencies and NGOs. expressed frustration at how long it took for relief supplies to clear customs. Tamil groups claimed that aid delivery to the North and East was been held up by the relevant line ministry. The initial ineffectiveness of the Centre for National Operations, the separation of responsibilities for coordination between different agencies and Ministries; the absence of developmental frameworks for international agencies to connect to; and the way in which government addressed politically sensitive issues did not lead to a conducive policy environment. LRRD requires a certain level of clarity about long term objectives and the parameters within which aid organizations are expected to work. Government policy and practice therefore failed to provide a conducive environment for LRRD.

The case of Indonesia

Compared to Sri Lanka, the operating environment for LRRD has been somewhat more positive than in Sri Lanka. The Tsunami hit Aceh Province in the north-west part of Sumatra which had been affected by conflict between the Government and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) for nearly thirty years. The province is characterized by poor infrastructure and services with, prior to the Tsunami, few external organizations working there and restricted access for foreigners.

Given the massive influx of aid and relief primarily through NGO’s, the Indonesian Government decided to let NGOs work in Aceh Province. This was a significant change from the situation prior to the Tsunami where there had only been a few international organizations allowed to work in the Region, and even

most UN agencies had been excluded. Further encouragement to the reconstruction process in Aceh has come from [the signing of the Peace Treaty in Helsinki between the Indonesian Government and the GAM which gives limited self government to the province.](#)

[The initial response](#) by the GoI [was for BAKORNAS to head up the government's response to the disaster. However the sheer scale of the Tsunami on the Aceh Region meant that it was overwhelmed and not able to cope.](#) Therefore a new Agency for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (BRR) was [set up in April/May to oversee the reconstruction of Aceh Province.](#) Much of the funding for BRR, including the World Bank's Multi-donor Trust Fund, has been channeled through the Ministry of Finance in Jakarta and as the World Bank itself has admitted, this process has been '*frustratingly slow*'. In addition the BRR is trying, perhaps rather belatedly, to impose some quality control and overall co-ordination on the huge number of reconstruction initiatives: by October 2005 there were estimated to be [438 NGOs](#) working in Aceh, only 180 of which are said to have reported on their activities to the BRR.

The response to the Tsunami in Aceh Province with over 400 NGOs as well as UN and Bilateral organisations working in the Region highlights a critical problem with coordination being seen primarily at the level of **activities** rather than **outcomes and purpose**. In the early stages of the response this was potentially less critical (and there were far fewer players) but the move towards rehabilitation and development requires more detailed discussion and joint planning rather than a selective sharing of information. This kind of joint planning cannot be managed effectively in meetings at which 400 or more participants might attend.

A key issue for successful LRRD in Aceh was therefore how the wide variety of agencies new to Aceh Province can successfully support the organisations, systems and structures which were present prior to the Tsunami. The need for such support is especially acute in Aceh Province which lost an estimated 20%

of its local government staff and was already under resourced before the Tsunami. Agencies such as World Bank and Save the Children Alliance which are trying to work through such local structures accept that they will have to pay extra costs and some delays in implementation in the short term but see that this is the right longer term approach. One way of addressing this problem would be to have a few people representing different groups of Agencies. This would require agencies to cooperate and allocate funds to pay the salary of a senior person who would represent them all.

One lesson [from the Indonesia experience](#) was that too many co-ordination efforts refer to activities, rather than to outcomes; and that effective co-ordination of so many different actors is impossible. In any future disaster reconstruction programme on this scale [there](#) may be a need for [some kind of grouping of agencies so that different perspectives can be represented by a small 'management team](#) with representatives from the different 'groups' of agencies (for example local NGOs, INGOs, Bilateral donors, and the UN.) This kind of approach would potentially provide agencies with an opportunity to contribute towards a more strategic approach to coordination with knowledge and learning being built up in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. It would require staff with long experience of working with government and other agencies, and the people in these positions would need to be on longer term contracts with this role as a central part of their job purpose.


From the perspective of LRRD, the major constraint in Aceh does not appear to be a reluctance of agencies to shift from relief to reconstruction. What is more relevant is that most stakeholders (the agencies themselves, their institutional and private donors, and Tsunami survivors) tended to underestimate the time that reconstruction would take. Thus (as noted in the section on Shelter above) too many people remain in tents, while in spite of the unique absence of any funding constraints, there is still a dire shortage of temporary housing. In direct contradiction of the linear LRRD model, there are still a

large number of IDPs with a continuing need for income support, either in the form of cash or food, which almost one year after the Tsunami donors are unwilling to fund. There also seems to be a mismatch between the community level focus of most NGOs and the priority that needs to be given to overall spatial planning and rebuilding of the infrastructure, especially the reconstruction of the main highway on the west coast.

A further finding from Indonesia is the impact of the response on local capacity. A number of local NGOs reported the negative effects of so many international NGOs being in the region with inflation in salaries, loss of staff and a perception that they were being seen as implementers. The pressure to move fast and 'achieve' in the short term with the subsequent pressures on local organisations to grow and participate has potentially serious consequences for the future sustainability of local groups once funding begins to reduce.

6 CONCLUSIONS

The findings from this study suggest that the representation of LRRD at the start of this paper oversimplifies the reality of the LRRD concept and its operationalisation. The Contiguum model does not take into account that there are often subsequent critical moments which will influence the transition between the different stages. In practice there are often few clear criteria/indicators for when a relief phase will finish, but there are often ‘triggers’ for agencies to make a shift – especially when funds for relief finish. The diagram below shows a more appropriate way of understanding the operationalisation of LRRD:



- All phases are seen to start at the same time, and reconstruction/development needs should be considered from the outset, to the extent that this is practicable. It is also important to note that development activities may well have been happening prior to the event and that the issue is when and how they should be re-started in the changed circumstances. A further argument for linking of all of the phases at the earliest possible moment.

- [The inclusion of subsequent ‘critical moments’ is there to illustrate the need for clear indicators for withdrawal which could be based on](#) changes in funding patterns, or new requirements to [respond](#) – for example the Nias earthquake.
- [Communication and coordination links between the different phases should consist of planning and decision making at the levels of activities and outcomes/ objectives.](#)
- [M&E capacity will need to be incorporated from the start with work on objectives and indicators](#)
- Importance of the context and contextual factors which will impact on the response
- The impact of the relief response on recovery and development: in Indonesia and SL the massive response raises issues about the longer term sustainability of local NGOs and civil society groups.

We conclude that at least in relation to a natural disaster the ‘contiguuum’ model of LRRD needs to be re-thought and that recovery and ‘development’ efforts (however defined) need to start almost at the same time as relief: this also supports the idea that recovery needs to be co-ordinated from the earliest possible stage.

With regard to the overall LRRD concept, we conclude that the idea has obvious merit and was especially relevant for a fast-impact natural disaster like the Tsunami in which for many survivors relief needs were relatively short-lived, and the recovery process began very soon after the Tsunami was over. But this study finds the concept of LRRD tends to raise more questions than it answers about the role of different actors in the recovery process, and whose definition of ‘recovery’ or ‘development’ is followed.

At the policy level there would appear to be two areas where implementing agencies might benefit from further thinking in relation to LRRD. The first is that most large agencies, whether they are INGOs, UN organizations, or Red Cross affiliates, are all part of large global networks with increasingly complex management and communication systems. Since this report, like many others, notes the increasing

difficulty for all agencies in recruiting and retaining senior staff to work in areas like Aceh, the danger is that too much senior staff time is going into 'upwards' accountability functions to meet the needs of these increasingly complex and demanding global organizations and networks. On the other hand these agencies may be able to devote too little senior management time either to understand the local institutional context or to play a really constructive part in co-ordination work, which is still seen as a diversion from their 'real' work.

The second conclusion is that while LRRD is always a 'good intention' agencies need to give more thought to the transition out of relief. This means giving more attention in monitoring to the impact of relief, whether in the form of food, or non-food items, and being prepared to recognise the unintended distortions caused to local labour markets by foreign funding. It also means making realistic provision in all programmes for such a transition. The sector least well served in this respect is undoubtedly that of shelter, where alternatives to tents should have been introduced far earlier, especially in Aceh. But in general there appear to be growing numbers of unresolved issues about how the humanitarian sector as a whole can work successfully with national governments at all levels, so that the local capacities of both governments and local NGOs can be encouraged.

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