


## Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief



# Local Response

## Indonesia

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**Tsunami Evaluation Coalition:  
The International Community’s Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief  
– Local Response Study -**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADB:	Asian Development Bank
ADPC:	Asian Disaster Preparedness Center
ALNAP:	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BAKORNAS:	National Coordination Body (Badan Kordinasi Nasional)
BAPPENAS:	National Development Planning Agency
BRR:	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias
CMG:	Core Management Group
IDP:	Internally Displaced Person
INGO:	International Non-governmental Organization
LNGO:	Local Non-governmental Organization
MDTF:	Multi-donor Trust Fund
NAD:	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
NGO:	Non-governmental Organization
PLN:	National Electricity Agency
OCHA:	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
PDAM:	Provincial Water Supply Company
RAN:	Recovery Aceh Nias Database
SATKORLAK:	Implementation Coordination Committee (Satuan Kordinasi Pelaksana)
SATLAK:	Implementation Committee (Satuan Pelaksana)
TEC:	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TLC:	Temporary Living Centers
UN-HABITAT:	United Nations Human Settlements Program
Unies:	United Nations Information Management System
WB:	World Bank
WHO:	World Health Organization

**Tsunami Evaluation Coalition:  
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**Executive Summary**

The tsunami catastrophe that struck Asia on December 26, 2004, is one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. It affected many countries around the Indian Ocean but the major impact was felt in India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. More than 250,000 people have died and thousands were injured. Overall, an estimated 1.5 to 5 million people have been directly or indirectly affected. Damage and destruction of infrastructure has destroyed people's livelihoods, and left many homeless and without adequate water and healthcare facilities. The generous assistance pledged has been instrumental in reducing or mitigating the consequences of the disaster, and in boosting the current recovery and reconstruction efforts.

This "Local Response Study" is part of the overall evaluation by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). It is a thematic evaluation of the funding response and the flow of funds by the various governments, local, national and international NGOs, the public sector and the communities themselves. The study tried to measure in quantitative and qualitative terms the financial flows and the quality of the implementation of the funds, taking into consideration the views and the concerns of the organizations, public, private, NGOs and the affected communities.

The response in general has been overwhelming in terms of funds pledged and number of organizations involved in the reconstruction efforts. The number of organizations involved has decreased from the initial relief to the current reconstruction phase because the mandate of some organizations is only for relief operations, and others are not prepared for a long-term commitment. But it is precisely the coordination of this large number of organizations that is compromising the effectiveness and efficiency of the response. The BRR, which is the office in charge their coordination, is itself overwhelmed with this work.

In terms of effectiveness of the response it is still too early to judge, but some aspects are not looking too successful. It is very evident that the issue of housing is being addressed without consideration of village and city development. Spatial development plans for the city and the villages (which could be the guiding tool for the integration of districts, sub-districts and village level development) are still under preparation. This has served as an excuse for some organizations not to comply with basic urban planning principles and to ignore integration of housing and infrastructure.

Among its most important lessons learned is that governments have to be prepared in advance for disasters by putting in place adequate resources to develop appropriate policies and mechanisms to reduce risks, to prevent them or to effectively deal with them when they arise.

The development of the Recovery Aceh Nias (RAN) Database to strengthen the performance of BRR in tracking activities of each organization involved in recovery matched against identified needs is a welcome development. Through this, BRR and the involved organizations will have access to a solid information base that can support the overall reconstruction process to measure progress, identify gaps, address implementation problems and improve planning of interventions.

Gathering information from all organizations, the RAN will be able to provide comprehensive data on the flow of funds mobilized to respond to the tsunami.

While the armed confrontation threatened to be a serious obstacle for relief and reconstruction at the beginning, the ongoing peace process, if successfully implemented, will provide a much wider framework for organizations to contribute not only to the reconstruction but also to a more sustainable and democratic development of the province. The incorporation of the former separatist fighters into mainstream life will offer an additional opportunity for reconstruction and rehabilitation, but it also seems to be an additional challenge. It is critical for international organizations to work together and to be aware of the importance of the role of the local government, local NGOs and individuals in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. To involve all actors constructively is a shared responsibility.

**Tsunami Evaluation Coalition:  
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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

The tsunami catastrophe that struck Asia on December 26, 2004, is one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. Although the major impact was felt in India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand, several other countries were affected (including Myanmar and Somalia) or touched by the tsunami (including Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, Seychelles and Tanzania). More than 250,000 people have died and thousands were injured. Overall, an estimated 1.5 to 5 million people have been directly or indirectly affected. Damage and destruction of infrastructure has destroyed people's livelihoods and left many homeless and without adequate water and healthcare facilities.

The world—governments and people—responded with unprecedented solidarity and generosity, supporting rescue and relief efforts in the affected communities by local and national authorities. The generous assistance pledged has been instrumental in reducing or mitigating the consequences of the disaster, and in boosting the current recovery and reconstruction efforts.

## **2. CONTEXT**

Early in January 2005, in recognition of the added value joint evaluations bring to the humanitarian sector, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) together with the ALNAP Secretariat began to discuss how best to coordinate evaluations of tsunami response. The intention was twofold:

1. To promote a sector-wide approach to evaluations of the tsunami response in order to optimize sector-wide learning.
2. To develop, test and validate products for future timely establishment of evaluation coordination mechanisms (coalition) that could facilitate such an approach.

As a follow-up, an interagency and donor meeting was convened in Geneva on February 23, 2005, to discuss how best to develop this approach. At that meeting participants agreed to create an 'evaluation coalition' (subsequently named the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, or TEC), guided by a Core Management Group (CMG).

This "Local Response Study" is part of the overall evaluation by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. It is a thematic evaluation of the funding response by the various governments, local and national NGOs, the public sector and the communities themselves. The purpose of the study is:

- a) to provide an overview of the total volume of funding of the response by the various actors, and to sample the flow of donations of goods, in kind or cash, for relief and reconstruction,
- b) to assess the appropriateness of allocation of funds in relation to the actual relief and reconstruction needs and in relation to other emergencies,
- c) to contribute to a better understanding of public responses to emergencies, and
- d) to provide a basis for follow-up studies after two and four years.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The study tried to measure in quantitative and qualitative terms the financial flows and the quality of the implementation of the funds, taking into consideration the views and the concerns of the organizations involved—government, public and private organizations, NGOs and the affected communities. This evaluation study was carried out in a period of five weeks, of which four weeks were dedicated to collecting anecdotal information backed by quantitative data at the local level from the actors involved in the relief operations and reconstruction efforts. This included representatives from organizations from the public and private sectors, NGOs and the affected communities. Information and perceptions from the affected communities were collected through interviews in 20 selected villages located in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar and Pidie Districts. The field work was carried out by the Forum LSM Aceh, a local NGO based in Banda Aceh. The interviews were carried out by four teams of three interviewers each. Each team was responsible for data collection in five communities/villages. Data was gathered through various methods that included, at a minimum, an interview with a community leader, focus group discussions with a group of men and a group of women and collection of information from the village files. In some of the villages, representatives of organizations involved also provided their views. The findings, more qualitative than quantitative, are the basis for the analysis of the local response of organizations assisting these communities to get back to normal life.

Districts / Villages included in the Study			
Banda Aceh District	Aceh Besar District		Pidie District
Ulee Iheu	Gampoeng Baro	Alue Riyeung	Pantee Teungah
Tibang	Lamteungoh	Lamreh	Kuala Pidie
Gampong Jawa	Kajhu	Meunasah Keude	Jeumeurang
Keudah	Cot Gue	Brandeh	Lampoih Krueng
Lambaro	Lampineung	Deudap	Ileleuebeu

The results are expected to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the funding flows to and from tsunami-affected communities in aspects related to the source, use and distribution of funds received, the participation of the community in determining the use of funds from external sources and own-source resources for self-help efforts. The evaluation covers a ten-month period from December 2004 to October 2005.

### 4. FINDINGS

This chapter of the study provides the description and analysis of the impacts of the tsunami in Aceh, based on the findings on the twenty affected villages included in the study. It provides an overview of the organizations involved, the type of assistance and the degree of participation of the affected communities in the decisions pertaining to the design of the projects and the use of funds. Description and analysis are done separately for the initial emergency and relief phase and for the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase.

#### 4.1 Part I: Community/Village Profile: Tsunami Impact on the Community

##### 4.1.1 Population

In terms of loss of lives, the tsunami of December 26, 2004, was devastating. In the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD)<sup>1</sup> alone the number of casualties reached 128,515 while the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was estimated at 513,278<sup>2</sup>. The extent of

<sup>1</sup> This study excluded the island of Nias and North Sumatra Province.

<sup>2</sup> Unies – HIC May 6, 2005.

loss of lives is reflected in the results obtained through the field survey. From 15 of the 20 locations included in this study, data shows that the population decreased by 61% from 41,236 to 16,221 inhabitants. In five of these locations the loss of lives was tremendous, reaching as much as 91% in Meunasah Keude, 86% in Keudah, 78% in Kajhu, and 68% of the population in Gampoeng Jawa. In six of 12 locations, both women and men were affected. In most of the villages where fishing was the main economic activity, men were the majority of victims. Children and elderly comprise the next most affected group.

#### **4.1.2 Built and Natural Environment**

##### **Shelter**

The destruction of shelter as a result of the tsunami was massive. In NAD Province 173,67,3.01 ha, or 34.8% of total settlement areas, were completely destroyed. The destroyed houses comprised 116,880 units or the equivalent of 57% of residential areas<sup>3</sup>. Data from 16 villages included in the study shows that from a total of 6,002 housing units before the tsunami, 86% (5,001) were destroyed. In Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar, some villages were completely destroyed without a single structure left standing. In the villages included in the study, destruction of 100% of housing units was reported in five of the locations (Ulee Iheu, Gampoeng Baro, Kajhu, Lampineung, Menausa Keude), and more than 95% of units were destroyed in two others (Gampoen Jawa, Alue Riyeung). Data on renters from ten locations show that although renters are a minority, they account for a considerable portion (618 or 16%) of families of the total in these locations.

##### **Services, Community Facilities and Infrastructure**

Community facilities and infrastructure were destroyed and heavily damaged by the tsunami, disrupting the regular provision of basic services such as water, electricity, education and healthcare. In NAD, 66% of the health facilities and 46% of school buildings were destroyed. In addition, 43% of religious buildings were destroyed and 13.5% sustained major damage<sup>4</sup>. Data from the areas surveyed shows the total destruction of 13 mosques, 12 community halls, six village offices, five nursery schools, 13 primary schools, five secondary schools, nine health centers, four community sports places and one slaughterhouse.

As a consequence of the earthquake and tsunami 38% of provincial highways and 27.5% of arterial roads suffered total damage, while 14% and 45.5% respectively sustained major damage. In addition, 2,267 bridges representing 66.5% of the total number were completely destroyed<sup>5</sup>. In the infrastructure sector, water drainages, roads, and one bridge were also completely or partially destroyed in the villages included in the study. It was often mentioned that the destruction of roads and bridges was a factor that contributed to slow start-up of relief activities. Because of the damages sustained in the transport and communication systems, reaching out to isolated communities was a serious challenge in the first weeks and months of the relief effort.

##### **Environment**

In terms of environmental impacts, the most critical issue is related to the contamination of soil and water sources. Most of the tsunami-affected communities relied on bore wells for

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<sup>3</sup> Director General of Human Settlement, Ministry of Public Works, page 1, no date.

<sup>4</sup> Directorate General of Human Settlements, page 1, no date.

<sup>5</sup> Directorate General of Human Settlements, page 1, no date.



their supply of water; those that received it through the municipal service also saw their service disrupted because of the collapse of the system. In the NAD province, 83% of the aqueduct system suffered complete damage and an additional 6% suffered major damage. In Aceh Besar District 18% of the villages had access to piped water while 41% had access through wells. In Banda Aceh 46% had access to piped water and 41% were serviced by wells, and in Pidie 80% of the villages used piped water<sup>6</sup>.

Pools of stagnant water, which are becoming breeding grounds for mosquitoes, still exist in some parts of the villages where residents have started to return. Respondents, especially those living in barracks, reported an increase in mosquitoes and flies. Except for palms, most other trees, bushes and plants were washed away by the waves. Due to the contamination of the soil it will take some time and effort before new plants and trees can grow again. In Tibang village a mangrove-planting project is under way while in various others the cash-for-food programs have been used for village cleaning and for re-greening purposes. Cleaning activities are very important in order to prevent unhealthy environmental conditions that can negatively affect an already vulnerable population.

#### 4.1.3 Livelihood

Extensive damage to crops, irrigation systems and fishery infrastructure was mentioned in almost all the surveyed villages. As is the case in the rest of the province, livelihoods have been destroyed and families have been stripped of the few assets they possessed. Trade and business suffered considerably. The assessment estimates that in NAD province, 75% (1,416 units of markets/kiosks) were completely destroyed and 7.7% suffered major damage<sup>7</sup>. For various reasons, total damages to the livelihoods of affected families were difficult to assess and the list of productive activities mentioned included a wide variety including salt processing, fishing, animal husbandry, agriculture, factories and shops. Street vendors and traders lost their assets and laborers their work places.

##### **The Agony of Losses: A Case Among Thousands**

Bapak Jamal is a fisherman in Lamteunogoh Village in Aceh Besar District. As a consequence of the earthquake and tsunami he lost his wife and four children. He also lost his house, which was permanent, and all his possessions—one car, one boat, two cows and a shop as well as Rp. 5 million in goods. On top of this loss, he has a psychological trauma that only started to heal after he got a boat and started fishing again. Although he feels better, there are important moments like the Muslim festival of Ramadan when all memories are going to come back.

Source: Pak Jamal, Lamteunogoh Village.

Stories like Bapak Jamal's and worse can be heard by the thousands in Aceh and its surroundings. This is why it is crucial to develop and put in motion the mechanisms to provide access to credit for income generation activities in a more substantial way. Aside from the

<sup>6</sup> Directorate General of Human Settlements, page 1, no date.

<sup>7</sup> Directorate General of Human Settlements, page 1, no date.

cash-for-work programs and supply of boats, it was only in four of the 20 villages of the study that activities to generate and improve income were reported.

#### **4.1.4 Government Structure**

The emergency and relief operations in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam were managed through a structure created directly under the President of Indonesia. A national coordination body (Bakornas: Badan Koordinasi Nasional) at the national level, implementation coordination committee (Satkorlak: Satuan Kordinasi Pelaksana) at the provincial level and an implementation committee (Satlak: Satuan Pelaksana) at the district level managed civil and military assistance and contributions.

In NAD province, 1,412 units of government buildings or the equivalent of 75% of the total government premises were completely destroyed, while 7.2% of them sustained major damage<sup>8</sup>. In addition to loss of lives of government officials from all levels of the municipal structure, offices collapsed and files and data were destroyed and lost. This situation disrupted the government network for coordination of assistance, especially during the weeks immediately after the tsunami struck.

During this initial period the government utilized a Coordinating Committee under the national Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), which was in charge of coordination of the organizations providing assistance until the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR) was formed to take care of the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

The local government structure comprises the city or district administration headed by the mayor (Walikota or regent/Bupati in rural areas), followed by the sub-district (Kecamatan) headed by the Camat, then the village head (Keucik) and, finally, the hamlet/neighborhood headed by the Kepala Lorong.

During this ten-month phase, assistance came directly from the organizations to the affected communities. The sub-district and neighborhood authorities were the most active entities as they were closest to the people. From the government side, the social and health ministries as well as the public works ministry were the most active agencies, particularly in the distribution of food, clothes, provision of healthcare and restoration of basic infrastructure.

#### **4.2 Part II: Response: Emergency and Relief Phase**

This section provides a brief description of the resources, in-kind or cash, received by the affected families during the emergency and relief period. This period has been defined as the six months following the tsunami, which comprises the months between December 26, 2004, and June 2005.

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
<sup>8</sup> Directorate General of Human Settlements, page 1, no date.

#### 4.2.1 Resources Received in Response to the Tsunami

The amount received in response to the tsunami and earthquake in the region—especially in Indonesia—was of unprecedented proportions. The international community pledged US\$ 7.3 billion of which approximately US\$ 3.5 is actually available so far.

The following graphic illustrates the estimation of total money in US dollars pledged by the various sources of funds, for both relief and reconstruction purposes. It also shows the flow of funds through the different on-budget and off-budget channels for approval and implementation.

Resources committed and received by the various parties organized according to sectors are very difficult to identify. Most private sector donations, which are known to be very significant, were directed through local and international NGOs and for this reason are difficult to trace. For various reasons financial information is considered as sensitive and the majority of organizations consulted, both local and international, did not like the idea of sharing this information. The same was also observed in the case of local government. When the team visited Satkorlak, the agency that managed the data for civil and military assistance during the emergency phase, it was denied access to these data.



Source: BRR

Important sources of local contributions, which are mobilized and rarely recognized, are those resources provided as cash or in-kind by the affected families themselves. These are represented by the voluntary work of cleaning the neighborhoods; assistance in the registration process of survivors, casualties and disappeared persons; labor for repair work for community buildings like mosques, community halls, and schools; and others. Some respondents expressed that they mobilized their family and own resources to rebuild their houses or to start small businesses. Those who had savings made use of them in order to provide for their daily needs. All of these contributions are very significant and important, but at this moment it is very difficult to quantify them and to assess their value.

Other important local resources mobilized during the emergency phase and also very seldom recognized are those resulting from the mobilization of the army. The army was active in the restoration of the transportation and communication system by building bridges and repairing roads, recovering bodies and conducting other important activities whose in-kind value is difficult to assess. Moreover, access to this kind of information is restricted.

### **Cash Compensation**

In terms of compensation, the policy of the government of Indonesia was to provide cash compensation of Rp. 3,000 (approximately US\$ 0.32<sup>9</sup>) per day to every affected person for a period of six months. Compensation payments started in March 2005. Reports from the villages showed that in three of them people received the cash compensation for four months and in nine locations it was received only three times. By now they should have received it for the six months promised by the government. According to local sources, the delay in the distribution of cash compensation is due to the fact that the national government disbursed only the funds sufficient for one month. Taking into account the desperate situation of the people, local governments provided the compensation cash for two months out of their own resources in order to cover the deficit. Local governments are still waiting for the national government to comply with its commitment to the people.

One time cash compensation was given also by local NGOs and private sources. In Alue Riyeung a local NGO provided Rp. 50,000 (US\$ 5.27) per person and the same amount in Lambreh and Deudap villages. Also in Lamreh village a private person provided Rp. 90,000 (US\$ 9.48) per family. In Tibang an INGO provided Rp. 1,263,000 (US\$ 133) per family and in Meunasah Keude each widow received a donation of Rp. 500,000 (US\$ 52).

The situation for most of the people is quite desperate because according to them the compensation, apart from being late, is also insufficient to sustain a life of dignity. Those who had savings have used them up either to cover everyday needs or to start small businesses.

### **Goods and Projects Received vs. Goods and Projects Requested**

According to this survey, food, water, medicine, hygiene kits and clothes were the most widely distributed items. Water quantity was not enough in one location and its quality was of medium standard in one location; there were complaints about its strong smell of chemicals. In general, the food quantity was enough; however, its quality was questioned in Cot Gue and its quantity in Lampineung and Gampoeng Jawa. Other goods received were prayer items, generators, cooking utensils, mats, mattresses, blankets, cushions and hygiene kits. Clothes were considered of medium quality in Lamponih Krueng and Kuala Pidie, and healthcare was ranked low in Lamponih Krueng, Ileeleubeu and Kuala Pidie. Healthcare was provided in most of the villages and in the same three villages this service was also considered of medium quality.

In terms of temporary shelter, tents and barracks were the most common solution offered. The respondents' feeling is that as a temporary solution they were fine, but not for the long term. Some affected families have been living in them for ten months already, and they complain that they are too small, too crowded and that the hygiene conditions and the supply of services are very poor. There is no privacy and now that the rainy season has begun some barracks and tents have leaks. Furthermore, conditions in the surroundings are unhealthy. Of the communities surveyed, six are still living in barracks, four already returned to the previous location and one stayed in the place where they used to live throughout the disaster. In some cases people spend the night in the barracks and the day in their former villages.

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<sup>9</sup> Oct. 2005 US\$ 1 = Rp. 9,500



Cash-for-food programs by various international and local organizations were introduced during the relief period in order to assist with debris removal and cleaning efforts, and to alleviate the economic situation of the people. This program was implemented in 13 of 19 communities that participated in the survey. It offers one to two months of work for a salary between Rp. 35,000 and Rp. 45,000 per day. Some organizations expressed their concern about this type of program because according to them it is undermining the voluntary work, which is much needed during participatory reconstruction. These organizations argue that, in many instances, people do not want to work voluntarily in the housing programs because they are not paid, and in this type of project, community involvement and participation are seen as the essence of sustainability. In their view, the cash-for-food programs are eroding the voluntary spirit (gotong royong) that is very much part of the culture of the local people. On the other hand, people expressed satisfaction with the cash-for-work program and in some cases complained that they were too short.

### **Who Offered This Support?<sup>10</sup>**

Emergency and relief services were provided by hundreds of organizations. International organizations were the most active and well prepared to respond to the situation. National, provincial and local governments were not prepared for the emergency. Assistance during this period to the 18 communities that participated in the survey was provided by 30 international NGOs and UN agencies, four local NGOs, three political parties and eight private individuals and businesses. Respondents mentioned as government resources two district heads, the Health Department, the Public Works Department, the Provincial Water Supply Company (PDAM) and the National Electricity Agency (PLN). This list may not be complete because in some instances the people remember what they received but not always the name of the organization that assisted them.

### **Involvement of Affected Families in Prioritization of Needs**

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<sup>10</sup> The following is the list of organizations mentioned by the respondents in the interviews as providing assistance to them in the villages included in the study during the relief phase. They are presented in alphabetical order: Al-Amin, Al-Marhamah, Alisey, ARC, Care, Cardi, Concern, Forum LSM Aceh, Golkar Political Party, Gollberg Malaysia, CRC, Habitat for Humanity, Health Department, Helen Keller, Indovision, IRD, Indofood, Islamic Relief, Lintas Batas, medical team from the Philippines, Mercy Corps, Metro TV, Merlin, Mobil Oil, Muslim Aid, Norlink, North West, Obor Berkat Indonesia, Oxfam, PDAM, Pertamina, PKK Political Party, PKS Political Party, Plan International, PLN, Pugar, Save the Children, Social Development Department, Soroptimis, Thomas Family, Unicef, Up-Link, USAID, Walhi, Waskita Karya, WHO, World Vision, Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia, YBI, and YEU, as well as various unidentified organizations from France, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Involvement of the affected families in the assessment of the needs was reported by ten of the communities and partial involvement by three. In two locations participation in the assessment of needs was not considered important. According to the survey, in order to assess community needs and priorities, organizations held community meetings, but more for matters of estimation of quantities than for discussions of priorities. Respondents mentioned that organizations had a 'menu' to offer and that the people had just to accept it. In some communities it was also mentioned that at the time of the emergency they had absolutely nothing, and so everything that came, planned or not, with or without participation, was very much welcome. Only in one instance it was mentioned that the community did not receive what they needed, and in another case people mentioned that not all assistance received was actually needed.

#### **LESSON 1**

When the system of assistance is not effective, affected people need to and will find their own ways to fend for themselves.

During the first few months after the tsunami, coordination and planning between organizations was not very effective. There were various organizations providing the same items, in the same locations, and in the end some of the families received excess of some items of assistance. It was reported in two cases that whenever they received something in excess they would go and sell the goods in the market and with this money they would buy those things that they really needed.

### ***4.3 Part III: Response: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Phase***

This section describes and analyzes the assistance provided to affected families and communities, based on interviews in the 20 communities included in this study, interviews with representatives of organizations involved in the reconstruction efforts and documents published by recognized sources. The period of rehabilitation and reconstruction has been defined as the time beginning six months after the tsunami, which means from the month of July 2005 onwards.

#### **4.3.1 Mid-term and Long-term Support Offered**

Most mid- and long-term support being offered is related to housing, water and sanitation, healthcare, education, and programs to generate or improve income.

##### **Housing and Community Infrastructure**

Affected families expressed that housing is of the highest priority. For them, housing is the basic element from which to start the reconstruction of their lives. In September 2005 it was estimated that in Aceh Province there were 1,240,000 internally displaced people of whom 64,000 were living in barracks, 60,000 in tents and an estimated 290,000 were living with host families<sup>11</sup>.

Estimates show that construction of new houses could bring relief to 30,000 to 60,000 families by the end of 2005. This should therefore reduce the number of families living in tents and

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<sup>11</sup> UN-HABITAT, Sept. 15, 2005.

temporary living centers<sup>12</sup>. For those families who lost their homes, the government policy set a standard for a 36-square meter house costing a minimum of Rp. 42 million<sup>13</sup>. Without setting a maximum cost limit it has been left to organizations to determine the amount they see fit to expend for their houses. Thus, currently the houses which are being built range from Rp. 28 to 48 million. On the one hand, this has created disappointment among those who received houses of lower value, and on the other hand, it has created a preference by affected groups towards those organizations that are building, or promising to build, more expensive houses.



There are hundreds of organizations involved, both local and international, but non-governmental organizations provide almost all the housing. The majority of these NGOs have very big budgets, so big that it is said that in total NGOs have far more funds than what is being pumped through government channels.

Various multilateral organizations like the World Bank through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and UN-HABITAT have also started preparation of housing solutions; however, only UN-HABITAT has succeeded in actually building housing units. ADB- and MDTF-funded housing projects are still struggling with bureaucratic procedures. In the villages surveyed there are 14 organizations providing housing, only two of them of local character. The number of houses being provided by these organizations ranges between 15 and 300 houses.

### Available Resources for Housing Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in Aceh and Nias

Donor	Pledged (\$ '000)	Available (\$ '000)	Housing Units Planned	Comments
IOM	25,000	25,000	11,000 new units	Ongoing
Caritas			10,000 new units	Ongoing
Red Cross			20,000 new units	Ongoing
Habitat for Humanity			10,000 new units	Ongoing
World Vision			17,000 new units	Budget reduced to 7,000 units
ADB	72,000	72,000	11,000 new units 5,000 repairs	Delayed
MDTF (World Bank)	85,000	(85,000)	20,000	Delayed
UN-HABITAT	25,000	15,000 ?	6,000 – 10,000 new units	
KfW	36,000 (Euros 30 m)	36,000 (Euros 30 m)	15,000 new units	Need to revise budget to realistic price levels
Other international and domestic NGOs			40,000	Ongoing, very scattered; Not all commitments will materialize
<b>Subtotal of pledges:</b>			160,000 new units 5,000 repairs	Amount of units pledged looks like over-committed, but actually may fall short due to price increases or budget cuts
<b>Total requirements:</b>			100,000 new units 50,000 repairs	Latest estimates of BRR.

Source: estimates by author, on basis of various reports and verbal information

Note: ADB: Asian Development Bank; IOM: International Organization for Migration; MDTF: Multi-Donor Trust Fund; NGOs: nongovernmental organizations.

<sup>12</sup> UN-HABITAT, Sept. 15, 2005.

<sup>13</sup> The minimum cost started at Rp. 28 million, but because of rising prices of building materials, it was increased to Rp. 42 million.

Although BRR is making efforts to improve the coordination of organizations and their contributions, in the shelter sector there is still plenty to be done. There is still a lack of communication among organizations working in the same or neighboring villages where there is absolutely no urban integration among the projects. It looks like every project is a world unto itself. In Lamreh there are three organizations providing houses. One organization is building 200 permanent housing units, and the other two are building 15 and 30 transitional solutions respectively. The same is the case in Lamteunogoh where there are also three organizations providing 146, 20 and 20 units respectively. In principle, there should be space for both big and small organizations, but the size of their contribution should not be an excuse for the lack of coordination. In some cases, as in Lambreh, some families are receiving houses from more than one organization.

## LESSON 2

Uncoordinated efforts and overlapping assistance give unscrupulous people the chance to abuse the system.

Shelter for renters is an often overlooked, but important and urgent matter. The BRR has estimated that out of the approximately 600,000 families who lost their homes during the tsunami, 90,000 were renting their place of residence, but some organizations consider this an over-estimation. A more accurate assessment of the number of former renters is supposed to come up shortly. So far there are no significant solutions being provided for renters. The reason is that government policy for the solution of housing for renters is still under discussion, and organizations need to wait until the guidelines and policy are clear and officially endorsed, especially those concerning access to land. In a few cases, villagers have provided community land for renters through land consolidation or donation of empty communal land. This approach would be more difficult in more crowded urban areas where there is no government or empty public land available.

Despite the discussions and efforts to develop appropriate policy and mechanisms to solve the problem of renters, the fact remains that organizations prefer to work with communities that have either no renters or have resolved the issue of land. Therefore, vulnerable families such as the renters still have to wait for a solution.

The response for housing so far has been very slow and the main reasons mentioned for that include (i) slow definition of policies and mechanisms by BRR and the provincial and local governments, especially those in relation to compensation, land and city planning; (ii) organizations did not have the capacity and/or were not prepared to respond to the magnitude of the demand; and (iii) shortage of skilled labor and building materials, especially of certified wood. The BRR has also pointed to the Ministry of Finance for delaying critical enabling regulations that would allow reconstruction work to proceed. The Ministry of Finance has been particularly slow in allocation of a counterpart budget for multilateral funded projects, which are going to be implemented through official channels known as 'on-budget'.

While the response has been slow so far, it is also evident that the pace is picking up as organizations, especially the big ones, are managing to put in place their logistics and infrastructure in order to start a more massive type of response. The government is also



initiating programs like the Urban Poverty Project (P2KP), a five-year housing and social development provision, and the Aceh-Nias Settlements Support Program (ANSSP). Through the ANSSP, around 1,000 permanent houses will be completed by the end of 2005 and, of the total 6,100 planned, as many as 1,200 will be under construction<sup>14</sup>.

Reconstruction of community infrastructure is underway with a priority on the health, education, and water and sanitation sectors. In the education sector in Aceh, more than 100 schools have been completed to date while construction of 31 schools by two organizations is in process. The rehabilitation of the education sector also includes training of teachers. After they are trained they are allocated to schools that have lost teachers. They are provided with a salary for six months and a settlement package. In the health sector the reconstruction involves the provision of health centers and clinic rehabilitation at district, sub-district and village levels as well as the provision of basic health training to strengthen the capacity of local professionals. In the villages included in the study, organizations have built, or are in the process of building, five mosques, five health centers, one nursery school, five primary schools, two secondary schools and four community halls.

### **Livelihood**

Respondents have complained about the lack of projects and programs for the economic improvement of affected families. It is common to see men sitting idle, waiting for access to credit or funds to start an income generation activity. As one person said, “We do not want more charity, what we need is work.” In the villages surveyed there are six organizations involved in programs for the provision of direct credit or revolving funds. Other programs include four skills training programs, cash for work in 14 villages and direct assistance in-kind, such as the provision of tools, boats, seeds, motorized pedicabs (becaks), etc. A fish processing hall and seven factory units for brick production have also been provided.



<sup>14</sup> UNHCR, October 1-15, 2005.

The response has been characterized by slow support for income generation and improvement. The majority of these small initiatives do not yet show significant impacts in overall economic recovery. Cash for work programs are only short-term solutions, but what is needed now are longer-term programs. Government and organizations need to move from cash for work programs to more sustainable livelihood programs, and provide access to financial resources to a large portion of the affected population.

#### 4.3.2 Organizations Involved<sup>15</sup>

The organizations involved in reconstruction projects with the communities in this study comprise 25 international organizations, four local organizations, two charity organizations, two political parties and four national organizations. As mentioned before, 14 of these are involved in providing housing. In relation to government institutions, respondents also mentioned the National Land Agency (BPN), which is doing land registration work, and social development departments and the Health Department, which are working together with international organization for the provision of education and health services and infrastructure. BRR was mentioned as providing assistance for the construction of one mosque.

Insufficient coordination and interaction among organizations working in the same villages or in the same sector contributes to overlapping and inefficient use of resources. Overlaps and lack of coordination, like the cases mentioned in the section on the provision of housing (Part 4.3.1), can also be encountered in other sectors. In the fishery sector the concern is that organizations are planning to replace more boats than were lost or damaged as a result of the tsunami, risking depletion of the already-stressed fish stocks, and leaving the affected rural communities in a worse state than before<sup>16</sup>. Organizations need to work together to coordinate, follow up and review their plans in order to be efficient and effective in providing assistance. Sectoral meetings which are held weekly (or less frequently for some reasons) have not been able to establish sufficient communication and coordination among all relevant organizations. Interaction with BRR itself has been insufficient and marred by BRR's overload of work.

#### LESSON 3

Lack of communication, coordination and interaction among organizations can have unexpected negative impacts in the very communities they are hoping to assist.

#### 4.3.3 Community Participation

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<sup>15</sup> The following is a list of organizations mentioned by the respondents in the interviews as providing assistance during the reconstruction phase. They are presented in alphabetical order: Al-Marhamah, Alisei, Allianz, BRR, Care, Concern, CRC, FAO Norway, Forum LSM Aceh, GTZ, Habitat for Humanity, Health Department, Hivos, IRD, Islamic Relief, JRS, LSM Aceh, Mercy Corps, Merlin, Muslim Aid, Norlink, Oxfam, Obor Berkat Indonesia, PCI, PKK Political Party, PKPU Political Party, Plan, Save the Children, Social Development Department, Soroptimis, TDH, Unicef, USAID, Up-Link, World Vision, Yayasan Rumpun Bambu Indonesia, Yayasan Kreasi and YEU.

<sup>16</sup> UNHCR, October 1-15, 2005.

The use of a participatory planning process is part of the government policy for housing reconstruction. Communities need to be involved in the identification of needs, definition of priorities and design of projects. According to the study, in most villages communities are being informed and consulted on the delivery of houses or the services which are being offered by each organization, but the extent to which affected families can influence the decisions being made is limited. Their perception is that they receive what is being offered because it is free, and because it is free they do not need or find it appropriate to voice complaints.

#### **LESSON 4**

Affected families have insufficient awareness of their right to question the quality of assistance, providing room for some organizations to ignore or downplay their needs and preferences.

According to the study, some degree of involvement on the part of the communities in the planning of activities of the various organizations was reported. In two of these cases it was stated that the communities were fully involved in the decisions concerning assistance (housing), but in four cases they were not fully involved. In two cases respondents stated that they were not involved in any planning but that the organizations came with their projects ready for implementation. In one village (Paie Ileubeu) people reported that one NGO came and erected a board with the name of the NGO announcing the implementation of a housing project. This was done without consulting the community, as was evident from the fact that people do not know which sort of houses the organization is going to build.

Although the communities expressed that participation of affected people in the planning and decision-making process is necessary, some people stated that the participatory planning process is too time-consuming. They feel they have waited enough and are ready to receive houses, services, infrastructure and other assistance. On the other hand, most organizations still see participation and involvement in planning and implementation as an important way to create a sense of belonging and sustainability.

#### **4.3.4 Coordination and Management of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation**

To manage the rehabilitation and reconstruction activities, the Indonesian Government created the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh and Nias (BRR) in April 2005. This agency has a four-year mandate to oversee the implementation of reconstruction and rehabilitation projects in the earthquake- and tsunami-affected areas. It is based in Banda Aceh, the capital of the NAD province, with branches in Nias and Jakarta.

To date the BRR has approved 540 concept notes of reconstruction and rehabilitation with a total value of US \$2.3 billion<sup>17</sup>. The BRR is the only agency that provided the study with information on the flow of funds from government, local and international organizations which are registered with the agency.

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<sup>17</sup> UNHCR, October 1-15, 2005.

In order to speed up the implementation process, projects are being implemented with marginal involvement of sectoral offices at the city level. Various organizations, both local and international, showed that they have sought approval from the local government (mayor or regent) through the signing of a MoU. After this they presented a concept note for project approval to BRR, and then proceeded to implement their projects directly at the district and sub-district level. The most intensive coordination and interaction with provincial and local government departments was mentioned in the case of health and education projects.

It is at the village level that heads and leaders are more closely interacting with the affected communities to gather information and to join efforts to access assistance. In the locations where there are barracks or temporary living centers they have appointed a barrack coordinator and in some villages, including two in the study, they have formed a Housing Reconstruction Committee (KERAP), which operates with funds provided by the Urban Poverty Project (P2KP).

#### **4.3.5 Roles and Responsibilities: Community Perceptions**

Community perceptions of the efficiency of the responses are mixed. In five of the villages people feel that during the emergency phase it was mainly the international organizations that responded to their needs. On the other hand, in five other villages people think that government was relatively efficient. In two villages people think that the local government began a slow response three months after the tsunami struck, and that apart from the cash compensation, did not have much to offer. The perception in 11 villages is that the local government started improving its performance during the reconstruction phase. It was noticed that more village heads were active in various initiatives and that some government departments were working with INGOs. The BRR was mentioned on only one occasion, but as a bureaucratic organization.

The common perception regarding access to vital information about services and support during the emergency and relief phases is that such information did not exist, and if it did exist, there was no access to it. The general feeling is that people only waited for assistance or asked for assistance from those who approached them. This perception has since changed and for the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase the perception is currently that there is information but dissemination channels need to be improved.

For affected families, access to financial support, working capital and credit is critical. Their perception is that during the emergency phase they received cash compensation and cash for work assistance, but it was not enough. During the reconstruction phase they think that there are more NGOs, local and international, providing access to credit for small businesses through revolving funds and skills training, but that more of such programs and better access to them are necessary.

Despite the problems described and reports about unfulfilled promises by some organizations, it is very much a surprise that the perception in almost all the communities included in the study is one of satisfaction with the rehabilitation and reconstruction process.

## 5. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

### 5.1 Gender

Reconstruction efforts in general have not sufficiently capitalized on the potential of women. It is true that some programs, like the cash for food program and other community-based initiatives, encourage a gender-friendly approach and that some organizations have a gender-sensitive policy for contacting their personnel. Other organizations have specific programs oriented to support women's empowerment, but the scope of these efforts is not sufficient. The findings of a case study conducted by UNFPA to identify women's issues in Aceh included among some interesting findings that "... violence against women is a crucial issue in Aceh that needs to be addressed. However, many feel that the various types of such violence, especially sexual harassment, are too sensitive to be discussed in public, and that most respondents are also of the opinion that the implementation of the Shariah law ignores women's interests."<sup>18</sup>

Rebuilding efforts in Aceh could go beyond sensitization and training for labor-intensive and low-return employment. Women should be supported and trained to occupy positions of responsibility in local and provincial institutions, in all levels of government and in the private sector. The reconstruction and democratization process provides an opportunity for organizations to support more significant changes in the position and role of women in society.

#### LESSON 5

Reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts are not sufficiently addressing the potential and concerns of vulnerable groups such as women, renters, widows, the elderly, the handicapped and others.

### 5.2 Transparency

The BRR is committed to fighting corruption and to setting an example of integrity from within its own office. The director and vice-director of the BRR signed an integrity pact, and wealth declaration forms were distributed to and filled out by the BRR director and deputy directors. BRR staff are not allowed to receive money or parcels in addition to their salary and when received this has to be recorded officially.

In its efforts to bring transparency to all levels, BRR has established an Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) to prevent and investigate corruption in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias. This Unit is also expected to build local capacity for detecting, investigating and preventing corruption and to ensure long-term good governance.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Although it was intended that the results of this study include a balance of quantitative and qualitative data on local financial assistance in response to the tsunami, the reality is that it proved to be very difficult. It has been widely publicized that an unprecedented amount of funds were mobilized throughout the world for the earthquake and tsunami relief and reconstruction efforts, but to actually follow the flow of these funds is not simple for many reasons. Almost all organizations shared the notion that records of financial flows should be made available, but when asked by the study team to provide this data, they were not prepared share it. Qualitative data, on the other hand, was less complicated to gather.

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<sup>18</sup> UNHCR, October 1-15, 2005.

Not many countries or organizations in the world could have been prepared for a catastrophe of this magnitude. Nevertheless, the initial response from the government took very long to materialize due to a lack of preparedness and to the high number of casualties and destruction that government personnel and institutions suffered. It is neither an easy task for the government nor for organizations to channel assistance on such a massive scale. But despite problems faced initially by international and local organizations, the overall perception is positive towards the performance of international organizations. However, there are some valid complaints from the group of respondents.

#### **LESSON 6**

The most important lesson is that governments have to be prepared in advance for disasters, putting in place adequate resources to develop appropriate policies and mechanisms to reduce risks, to prevent them or to effectively deal with them when they occur.

The response in general has been overwhelming in terms of funds pledged and number of organizations involved in the reconstruction efforts. The number of organizations involved has decreased from the initial relief to the current reconstruction phase because the mandate of some organizations is exclusively for relief operations; others are not prepared for a long-term commitment. But it is precisely the coordination of this large number of organizations that is compromising the effectiveness and efficiency of the response. The BRR, which is the office in charge their coordination, is itself overwhelmed with this work.

In terms of effectiveness of the response it is still too early to judge, but some aspects do not look very successful. It is evident that the issue of housing is being addressed without attention to village and city development. Spatial development plans for cities and villages, which could be a guiding tool for the integration of district, sub-district and village level development, are still under preparation. This has served as an excuse for some organizations not to comply with basic urban planning principles and to ignore integration of housing and infrastructure.

The development of the Recovery Aceh Nias (RAN) Database, which strengthens the performance of BRR in tracking activities of the organizations involved in recovery matched with identified needs, is a welcome development. In this way, BRR and relief organizations will have access to a solid information base that can support the overall reconstruction process in terms of measuring progress, identifying gaps, addressing implementation problems and improving intervention planning. Gathering information from all organizations, the RAN will be able to provide comprehensive data on the flow of funds mobilized for tsunami response.

While the armed confrontation threatened to be a serious obstacle for relief and reconstruction at the beginning, the ongoing peace process, if successfully implemented, will provide a much wider framework for organizations to contribute not only to the reconstruction, but also to more sustainable and democratic development in the province. The incorporation of former separatist fighters into mainstream life will offer an additional opportunity for reconstruction and rehabilitation, but it also seems to be an additional challenge. It is critical for international organizations to work together and be aware of the importance of the role of the local government, local NGOs and individuals in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process. Involving all actors constructively is a shared responsibility.

## **7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE EVALUATIONS**

- Undertake efforts to remedy the lost sense of emergency and urgency in order to speed up reconstruction and rehabilitation interventions.
- Improve the coordination of aid efforts by government, NGOs, bilaterals, multilaterals and the private sector, and invite these actors to introduce their progress reports and documentary materials into the public domain.
- Strengthen supervision of implementation and reporting mechanisms.
- Build up sectoral and area-focused databases in the RAN Database system.
- For the sake of transparency, undertake long-term sequential review studies that can provide participating organizations and the public with an overview of the progress of reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.

## 8. ANNEX 1:

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## 9. ANNEX 2:

### LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

- Bruno Derkon, UN-Habitat Advisor
- Pak. Mohamad, Employment Promotion Center, ILO
- Nena Soeprapto, Consultant Diakomie
- Lorena Berne, Planete Urgence
- Sandrine, Planete Urgence
- Community Leader from Cot Gue
- Ibu Linda and her husband, Community Leader
- Ian Hamilton, Program Manager UN-Habitat
- Pak. Djoko Sasono, Spacila Planning BRR
- Pak Tommy, Information System BRR
- Nail Taylor, Information System BRR
- James de Rave, Private Sector
- Emilia Sitompul, Habitat for Humanity
- Gunawan Sudyono, Center Manager, Habitat for Humanity
- Fadlullah Wilmot, Director, Muslim Aid
- David Murphy, Catholic Relief Services
- Dina Setiawati, Catholic Relief Services
- Director, Islamic Relief
- Architect, Islamic Relief
- Visit to the Press Center
- Visit to Satkorlak Office
- Visit to Social Department Office
- Visit to Ocha Office
- Visit to BRR Office, Jakarta
- Visit to Bappenas Office, Jakarta
- Affected families of the 20 communities included in the study
- Lily Kausoum, Director Soroptimus

The Information Team requested information from the following organizations:

BRR	ADB
Concern	Planete Urgence
Aus Aid	Islamic Relief
CRS	Muslim Aid
Yayasan Gajah Sumatera	Aus Care
The Military Office	Habitat for Humanity
Social Development Department	Triangle
Satkorlak	GTZ
Care	Atlas
Dompot Dhuafa Republika	Chamber of Commerce
Panglima Laot	Bekornas

## 10. ANNEX 3:

### INTERVIEW PROTOCOL & QUESTIONNAIRE

#### 1. Interview Protocol

The Interview Protocol for the four country assessments was developed to support the approach ADPC has adopted to understand the nature of the funding flows to and from tsunami-affected communities in order to build a bottom-up set of anecdotal community assessments. Information includes the source, use and distribution of funds received; the participation of the community in determining the use of funds from external sources; and their own resources for self-help efforts. The Protocol will stipulate the information to be gathered through focus groups and individual interviews; the format for recording and presentation; and methods of interviewing selected communities and families affected by the tsunami. The Protocol will cover the following areas:

- A. Tsunami Impact on the Community
- B. Response
- C. Reconstruction
- D. Roles and Responsibilities

#### I. Impacts of Tsunami on Affected Communities: Profiles

- A. Population before and after the tsunami
- B. Affected population groups – women, widows, children, men, elderly, handicapped, etc.
- C. Community configuration
- D. Shelter damages
- E. Infrastructure and basic services
- F. Livelihood
- G. Governance structure (geuchik/mukim/camat)
- H. Perceived hazards
- I. Prior risk management plans
- J. Community annotated map of impacts and other important information
- K. Environmental impacts

#### II. Response (0 to 6 months)

1. Resources received in response to the tsunami
  - a. Compensation for lives lost from national and local governments or others
  - b. Goods received vs. goods requested
    1. clothes
    2. food
    3. equipment
    4. health services/medicines
  - c. Shelter – temporary or otherwise
  - d. Programs such as Food for Work, others
2. Who offered this support?
  - a. National government
  - b. Local government
  - c. NGO/INGO
  - d. Private sector
  - e. Own resources

- f. UN/international organization/bilateral donor
  - g. Other
3. What was promised?
  4. What was delivered?
  5. How were priorities established for needs?
  6. Did the offers respond to your priorities?
  7. NGO activities in the community and perceptions of needs
  8. Local government activities in the community and perception of needs

### **III. Recovery/Reconstruction (after 6 months)**

1. What mid-term/long-term support was offered to you for reconstruction?
  - a. Livelihoods
  - b. Shelter
  - c. Food for work
  - d. Cash for work
  - e. School reconstruction
  - f. Infrastructure reconstruction
    - i. water
    - ii. solid waste
    - iii. roads
    - iv. markets
    - v. health facilities
    - vi. others
  - g. Others
2. What was the process of consultation with the community to determine the provision and use of funds?
3. What resources were pledged?
4. What resources were received?
5. What influence did the community have on fund allocation?

### **IV. Roles and Responsibilities**

Community perceptions of:

- A. Response efficiency
- B. Access to vital information regarding services and support
- C. Access to financial support
- D. Mid- to long-term assistance

## QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SURVEY IN AFFECTED COMMUNITIES

**Note:** Pertanyaan khusus yang kita harap menjawab dan menganalisa dengan hasil wawancara ini adalah:

- ❖ Berapa/jumlah/nilai assistensi, dan berupa apa, datang ke wilayah yang termasuk penelitian ini dari:
  - Lembaga / organisasi pemerintah local dan nasional?
  - LSM local?
  - LSM internasional?
  - Organisasi atau lembaga swasta?
  - Lain-lain?

*Lebih bagus perkiraan/estimasi tentative ini dibuat bersama masyarakat setempat.*
- ❖ Jenis organisasi yang aktif di wilayah, efektivitas dan kualitas assistensi/dorongan yang diberikan. Informasi ini dari segi kualitatif, dan kuantitatif jika bisa.
- ❖ Peran serta LSM local dan KBM (CBOs) dan bagaimana kinerja mereka jika di banding dengan kinerja dari LSM internasional.
- ❖ Estimasi tentative nilai total dari kegiatan gotong royong dan sumber yang dimobilisasi oleh masyarakat sendiri. Jenis apa? Berupa apa?
- ❖ Apakah masyarakat di wilayah diberi kesempatan untuk ambil keputusan tentang:
  - alokasi dana projek,
  - penggunaan dana tersebut.

### PERTANYAAN / QUESTIONS

#### I. BAGIAN I: PROFIL WILAYAH DESA /COMMUNITY PROFILE

1. **Jumlah penduduk sebelum dan sesudah tsunami** / Population before and after the tsunami
2. **Jumlah korban berbagai Kelompok** / Affected population groups
  - a. Wanita / Women
  - b. Anak / Children
  - c. Pria / Men
  - d. Janda/duda / Widow/widower
  - e. Orang tua / Elderly
  - f. Handicapped
  - g. Lain / Other
3. **Konfigurasi Wilayah (kualitatif)**  
Deskripsi wilayah (situasi geografi)  
*(dekat dengan pantai, kawasan pesisir, pertanian, pasar, keadaan alam dan sebagainya jenis mata pencarian mayoritas dan informasi khusus lainnya)*
4. **Jumlah kerusakan rumah** / Shelter damages
  - a. Jumlah units sebelum Tsunami / Total units before
  - b. Jumlah units yang **Rusak Total** / Total units totally destroyed
  - c. Jumlah units **Rusak Berat** (perlu banyak reperasi) / Units partially destroyed (need a lot of repairs)
  - d. Jumlah units **Rusak Ringan** (perlu sedikit reperasi) / Units slightly damaged (only need small repairs)
5. **Prasarana dan sarana (pelayanan) dasar** / Infrastructure and basic services  
Jumlah **Sebelum** dan jumlah **Sesudah** bencana (*sebelum ada rekonstruksi*)

Jenis	Jumlah sebelum Total before	Jumlah Sesudah Total after	Komentar/observasi
Sekolah, taman anak2 / Schools			
SD			
SMP			
Madrasah			
Mesjid / Mosques			
Balai masyarakat / Community halls			
Pusat kesehatan / ..... / Health posts			
Saluran irigasi / Irrigation channels			
Jalan2 / Roads			
Saluran air hujan / Water drainages			
Air minum / Water supply			
Pelayanan listrik / Electricity supply			
Pelayanan telepon / Telephone service			
Lain / Other			

## 6. Livelihood

a. Jumlah sumber mata pencaharian sebelum dan sesudah Tsunami/ Existing businesses before and after

Jenis bisnis / Type of business	Jumlah sebelum Total before	Jumlah sesudah Total after	Observasi/komentar
Pekerjaan / Employment			
Pedagan K5			
Warung / corner shop			
Perkebunan buah dan sayur / fruit and vegetable plantations			
Toko jualan / shop			
Toko pengolahan / processing shop (food processing, preparation, etc.)			
Pabrik / factory (wood furniture, windows, doors, etc.)			
PNS			
Kantor / office			
Nelayan /fisherman			
Tani / farmer			
Lainnya			

b. Coba buat assessment dari total kerugian masyarakat dengan kehilangan mata pencarian. / If possible make a financial assessment of the losses.

-  
-

c. Wawancara dengan satu orang setempat di setiap komunitas dan minta dia untuk menceritakan tentang kerugian dari keluarganya. Ini untuk ilustrasi kerugian satu keluarga dan sampai di mana terkena tsunami dari segi:

- orang meninggal, atau luka parah,
- pekerjaan, bisnis, kesempatan kerja,
- kerugian material,
- mengganti rencana2 kehidupan dan membangun kemajuan keluarga,
- bagaimana pengaruh psikologi, dan
- Sumber2 yg sudah diinvestasi dari mereka sendiri.

Interview with one person of the community to find out the story of how her/his family was affected in terms of lives, businesses, job opportunities of its members, material losses, changes in plans they had which will affect the progress of the family, physiological burdens, resources they have mobilized themselves and resources from organizations. (Family saga - close relatives).

7. **Struktur Pemerintahan (saat ini)** / Governance structure
- a. **Pemerintah (geuchik/mukim/kecamatan)** / Official  
*Activitas khusus (seperti untuk Penanganan pengungsi, bantuan kemanusiaan, rehabilitasi, rekontruksi dan lain-lain)* / Main tasks
8. **Yang mana organisasi/individu yg bekerja dengan masyarakat di lokasi ini dan apa pekerjaannya** Which organizations are working with the community and what do they do?
- a. **Pemerintah** / Government  
b. **Non pemerintah / LSM nasional dan LSM internasional**  
c. **Swasta** / Private sector  
d. **Lembaga Amal** (Charity organization)  
e. **Lain** / Others

Organisasi/Individu / Organization	Jenis organisasi /Type	Aktivitas / Activities	Nilai pertolongan sampai sekarang	Komentar / Comments

9. **Pandangan terhadap hal-hal negative (bahaya)** / Perceived hazards
- a. **Di lokasi sementara** / In the temporary location
- b. **Di lokasi yg. akan dipindah** / In the proposed location Ya \_\_\_\_\_ Tdk. \_\_\_\_\_
10. **Apakah wilayah/penduduk sudah punya persiapan bila terjadi bencana di tempat yg tinggal sekarang dan di tempat yang akan ditempati akan datang? Ya \_\_\_\_\_ Tdk. \_\_\_\_\_**  
 \_\_\_\_\_ / Do you have an emergency plan now?
- a. **Apakah ibu/bpk tahu Apa isinya rencana itu? Ya \_\_\_\_\_ Tdk. \_\_\_\_\_** / What does it consist of?
- b. **Dari mana ada inisiatif untuk buat rencana tersebut? (Pemerinta, Ngo, masyarakat sendiri)**
11. **Coba buat peta dengan kelompok masyarakat yang menggambarkan informasi lain untuk mendukung informasi yang sudah didapat. (Jika sudah ada peta todak perlu di buat)** / Mapping of impacts and other information by the community.
12. **Dampak terhadap lingkungan hidup** / Environmental impacts
- a. **Kontaminasi tanah** / Soil contamination  
b. **Kontaminasi air minum** / Water contamination  
c. **Kenaikan populasi nyamuk, tikus dan binatang dan lainnya yg berbahaya untuk kesehatan** / Increase of mosquitoes, rodents or other animals  
d. **Lain** / Others

**II. BAGIAN II: KEADAAN DARURAT Dan MASA PANIK/ (Dec. sampai Jun) /**  
EMERGENCY AND RELIEF (Dec. to June)

**13. Apakah anda dan semua anggota keluarga dapat uang JADUP?** / Did you and the members of your family receive compensation?

<b>Pihak</b>	<b>Berapa?</b> / How much?	<b>Observasi / komentar</b>
Dari pemerintah? / From government?		
Dari pihak lain? / From others?		
Tidak dapat / Did not receive		
Assuransi sendiri / Own insurance		

**14. Menentukan prioritas** / Establishing the priorities

- a. Apakah waktu keadaan darurat, anda dan orang di komunitas di sini dilibatkan dalam process untuk menentukan prioritas keperluan? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
Were you and your neighbors asked what were your priority needs at that time?
- b. Bagaimana proses untuk menentukan prioritas? What was the process to establish the priorities at that moment?  
*Rapat dengan masyarakat? / Meetings with the community (berapa orang yang hadir? / With how many people? Berapa kali rapat untuk menentukan prioritas?)/ If yes, how many?*

<b>Descripsi Proses</b>	<b>Observasi / Komentar</b>
Tahap Keadaan Darurat (Dec. sampai Maret)	
Tahap Keadaan Darurat (April sampai Juni)	

c. Menurut ibu/bpk, proses itu untuk menentukan prioritas diperlukan waktu itu atau tidak?

d. Apakah yang diberi justru yang Ibu/Bapak perlukan waktu itu? / Is what you were given what you needed the most?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

**15. Apa saja yang dijanjikan dan apa saja yang diterima** / Items Promised vs. Items Received

a. Jika mereka dilibatkan dalam process untuk menentukan prioritas, isi Tabel 1: Permintaan Masyarakat Sebagai Prioritas dan Table 2: Yang Diterima oleh Masyarakat / IF THEY WERE ASKED to participate in the decision making to establish the priorities, proceed first to fill in both Tables.

b. Jika mereka tidak dilibatkan, hanya isi Tabel 2: Yang Diterima Masyarakat. /IF THEY WERE NOT ASKED, proceed to fill in ONLY the Table for Items Requested

**Tabel -1. Permintaan bantuan yg. diprioritaskan Masyarakat - Tahap Keadaan Darurat / Pertolongan**

Permintaan kepada organisasi yg mana	Jenis organisasi	Jenis bantuan dari organisasi	Diberi atau Tidak?	Jumlah / Quantity			Kualitas / Quality			Apakah tepat waktu/Was it on time?	Komentar / Comments
				Cukup untuk yg diperlukan	Tidak cukup	Bagus	Sedang	Tdk bagus	Ya		
		Air minum/Water									
		Pakaian/Clothes									
		Makanan/Food									
		Obat/Medicine									
		Pelayanan kesehatan/Health services									
		Physiological counseling									
		Dana/Cash									
		Listrik/generator									
		Rumah*/Shelter*									
		Food for work									
		Cash for work									
		Lain/Others									

Pemerinta Pusat  
Pemerinta daerah  
LSM / ILSM / NGO/ING  
Swasta / Private Sector  
Sumber sendiri  
UN/Int. Organisation/Bilateral  
Lain?

\* Rumah sementara, semi-permanen, atau permanen / Temporary, semi-permanent, permanent?  
Apakah ada komentar lain? / Any other comment?



**Tabel – 2. Yang di diterima masyarakat (tampa process menentukan prioritas) - Tahap keadaan Darurat**

Dari organisasi yg mana	Pertolongan / Asistensi yg diterima (dana atau barang) / Emergency and Relief Phase - Items Received		Kualitas / Quality				Was it on time?		Komentar / Comments	
	Jenis organisasi	Jenis assistensi dari organisasi	Jumlah / Quantity	Cukup utk yg diperlukan	Tidak cukup	Bagus	Sedang	Tdk bagus		Ya
		Air minum/Water								
		Pakaian/Clothes								
		Makanan/Food								
		Obat/Medicine								
		Pelayanan kesehatan								
		Physiological counseling								
		Dana/Cash								
		Listrik/Generator								
		Rumah*/Shelter*								
		Food for work								
		Cash for work								
		Lain/Others								

\* Rumah sementara, semi-permanen, permanen? / Temporary, semi-permanent, permanent?  
 Apakah ada komentar lain? / Any other explanation or comment:

Pemerintah Pusat Pemerintah daerah LSM / ILSM / NGO/ING Swasta / Private Sector Sumber sendiri UN/Int. Organization/Bilateral Lain?
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16. **Apakah waktu keadaan darurat itu, orang dari organisasi/yang memberi bantuan, punya persepsi sama dengan masyarakat tentang keperluan prioritas? (*jelaskan*)** / Did organizations have the same perception of needs as the community?

17. **Apakah waktu keadaan darurat, orang dari organisasi atau lembaga pemerintah punya persepsi sama dengan persepsi masyarakat tentang keperluan prioritas? (*jelaskan*)** / Did the government have the same perception of needs as the community?

**III. TAHAP III: REABILITASI DAN RECONSTRUKSI (sesudah 6 bulan dari juli sampai sekarang)** / RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION (after 6 months, period from July until today)

18. **Apa bantuan/dorongan jangka menengah dan jangka panjang sudah dijanjikan kepada anda/ masyarakat di sini dan dari siapa? (*Isi Table 3*)** What mid-term/long-term support was offered to you for reconstruction of your home and your life?

Tahap Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi – Assistensi jangka menengah dan jangka panjang yg dijanjikan / id-term and long-term support offered to you for reconstruction of your habitat and your life							
Berapa Rp. Nilai Rp.?	Dari organisasi yg mana?	Jenis organisasi	Jenis yg dijanjikan	Kuantitas / Quantity	Dalam proses / In process		Mengapa? Jelaskan
					Proses berjalan sesuai dengan waktu dijanjikan	Proses tdk sesuai dengan waktu yg ditentukan	
			Rumah / perumahan				
			Pekerjaan				
			Pinjaman usaha				
			Pembinaan ketrampilan				
			Pelayanan kesehatan				
			Dana / Cash				
			Pinjaman keperluan sehari-hari				
			Food for work				
			Cash for work				
			Prasarana dan sarana				
			- air minum /water				
			- solid waste				
			- sanitasi				
			- jalan / roads				
			- mushola				
			- Madrasah				
			- sekolah / school				
			- pusat kesehatan				
			- taman anak2				
			- Balai masyarakat				
			- Bangunan special untuk keamanan				
			- Jalur darurat/escape routes				
			- lain / Others				

**19. Menentukan prioritas tahap rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi / Establishing the priorities**

- a. Apakah pada tahap rehabilitasi, anda dan orang di komunitas di sini dilibatkan dalam process untuk menentukan prioritas keperluan? Ya \_\_\_\_\_ Tdk. \_\_\_\_\_  
Were you and your neighbours asked what were your priority needs at that time?
- b. Organisasi apa saja yang melibatkan masyarakat dalam process menentukan prioritas?
- c. Apakah masyarakat dapat mempengaruhi proses untuk alokasi bantuan dana/barang yang ditawarkan oleh organisasi?
- d. Apakah organisasi2 itu beritahu masyarakat berapa dana ada untuk program/projek? Dan bagaimana pendapat masyarakat untuk investasi dana itu? / Did the organizations tell you how many funds/resources they had and ask you how the community would like/need to spend them?
- e. Organisasi apa saja yang kasi tahu dan organisasi yang tidak?
- e. Bagaimana proses untuk menentukan prioritas? What was the process to establish priorities at that moment?
- Rapat dengan masyarakat? / Meetings with the community?
  - berapa yang hadir? / With how many people?
  - Berapa kali rapat untuk menentukan prioritas? / If yes, how many meetings?
  - Menurut ibu/bpk proses itu untuk menentukan prioritas diperlukan waktu itu atau tidak?
  - Kalau tidak ada proses pelibatan masyarakat, apakah bantuan itu hanya datang tanpa diminta ?/ Things just came without asking?
- f. Apakah yang diberi justru yang Anda perlukan waktu itu? / Is what you were given what you needed the most?  
Ya \_\_\_\_\_ Tdk. \_\_\_\_\_
- g. Apa saja yang diperlukan yang sudah di terima? Dan belum diterima?

**IV. Part IV: PERAN DAN TANGGUNG JAWAB / ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

**20. Persepsi dari orang/kelompok / Community perception of:**

	Waktu tahap keadaan darurat (Jan-Juni 2005)	Tahap rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi? (Juli-sekarang)	Komentar
Bagaimana efektifitas peran dari organisasi/pemerintah/ How efficient was/is the response from organizations and government?			
Bagaimana dengan Akses terhadap informasi bantuan dan dukungan / How accessible was/is information regarding services and support?			
Bagaimana akses terhadap dukungan modal / How accessible was/is the financial support?			

**21. Apa pendapat anda tentang semua bantuan yg ditawarkan/dijanjiikan oleh semua institusi2/organisasi2 yang terlibat di daerah ini?**

What do the affected persons think about what is being offered by all these parties/organizations?

a. Apakah menurut mereka semua projek2 ini akan direalisasikan? Do they think that it is going to happen or not?

Ya \_\_\_\_\_ Tdk \_\_\_\_\_

b. Mengapa? / Why?

c. Apakah bpk/ibu senang dengan proses asistensi untuk rehabilitasi dan rekonstruksi? / Are they happy or not with the way things are going?

d. Mengapa? / Why?