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## FINAL REPORT

# Evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building *Resilience* in the LAC Region 02-10/2016

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## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| ACP     | Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States  |
| CDEMA   | Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency   |
| DEVCO   | European Commission's Directorate-General for International cooperation and Development    |
| DFID    | Department for International Development (United Kingdom)                                  |
| DIP     | DIPECHO (in funding allocation abbreviations)  |
| DIPECHO | Disaster Preparedness Program of the European Community Humanitarian Office                |
| DO      | ECHO Desk Officer  |
| DREF    | Disaster Relief Emergency Fund   |
| DRM     | Disaster Risk Management   |
| DRR     | Disaster Risk Reduction  |
| EDF     | European Development Fund (for the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries)               |
| EC      | European Commission  |
| ECHO    | European Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations |
| ECLAC   | Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean                                    |
| EDF     | European Development Fund  |
| EEAS    | European External Action Service   |
| EQ      | Evaluation Question  |
| ERD     | European Report on Development   |
| EU      | European Union   |
| FAO     | Food and Agriculture Organisation  |
| FARC-EP | Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo                          |
| FGD     | Focus Group discussions  |
| FEWS    | Famine Early Warning Systems Network   |
| FO      | ECHO Field Officer   |
| GCCA    | The Global Climate Change Alliance   |
| GEF     | Global Environment Facility  |
| GFDRR   | Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction  |
| HAR     | Humanitarian Aid Regulation  |
| HFA     | Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015)   |
| HIP     | Humanitarian Implementation Plans  |
| HQ      | Headquarters   |
| IGA     | Income Generating Activities   |
| IICA    | Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture                                    |

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| InfoRM | Index for Risk Management  |
| IPPC   | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  |
| ITA    | Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Transformative Agenda  |
| JRC    | Joint Research Centre of the European Commission   |
| KII    | Key Informant Interviews   |
| LAC    | Latin America and Caribbean  |
| LDC    | Least Developed Countries  |
| LRRD   | Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development   |
| MDG    | Millennium Development Goals   |
| NGO    | Non-governmental Organisation  |
| OECD   | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  |
| PAHO   | Pan American Health Organization   |
| PARAQ  | Programme for Reconstruction and Development of Neighbourhoods   |
| PDNA   | Post Disaster Needs Assessment   |
| PS     | Perception Survey  |
| SFDRR  | Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction   |
| SHARE  | Seismic Hazard Harmonization in Europe   |
| SIDS   | Small Island Development States  |
| SLR    | Systematic Literature Review   |
| SPA    | Systematic Portfolio Analysis  |
| SSD    | Small Scale Disaster   |
| ToR    | Terms of Reference   |
| UARIV  | Unidad de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas  |
| UN     | United Nations   |
| UNDP   | United Nations Development Programme   |
| UNEP   | United Nations Environment Programme   |
| UNFCCC | United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  |
| UNGRD  | National Unit for Management of Disaster Risk    Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres |
| UNISDR | United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction   |
| USAID  | United States Agency for International Development   |
| WASH   | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene  |
| WHO    | World Health Organisation  |
| WHS    | World Humanitarian Summit  |

## Abstract

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This evaluation covers DG ECHO-funded initiatives aiming to increase the resilience of communities and countries to future stresses and shocks in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2012 and 2016. Exacerbated by growing urbanization, the region is exposed to natural hazards, political crises and climate change.

ECHO contributions consist of the systematic inclusion of resilience into most of its humanitarian programs as well as the funding of dedicated risk reduction initiatives. ECHO funded a total 258 projects for an amount of 220 million Euros, 60% of this in Haiti and Colombia.

Sustained risk reduction initiatives contributed to the growing commitment of regional and most national authorities to increase resilience. The effectiveness of resilience initiatives at community level depended to a large part on local and national ownership. When lacking, as often the case in Haiti, results were questionable.

The recommendations include: to improve synergy and on-site cooperation between EU and EC development actors and ECHO, to focus efforts on fewer, larger, multi-partner initiatives, to support efforts at multiple scales within a country to assure a systems approach, and to develop a mechanism to objectively measure the impact on beneficiaries of past initiatives once a major stress or disaster occurs



# Executive Summary

## Introduction

The objective of this evaluation is to provide an overall assessment of the 2012-2015 **resilience strategy/approach** in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) of the European Commission's Department for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO).

The region of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) includes 33 states<sup>1</sup>, and consists of three sub-regions, i.e. the Caribbean (16)<sup>2</sup>, Mexico & Central America (7) and South America (10). It has a population of 522 million,<sup>3</sup> of which 130 million<sup>4</sup> remain “chronically poor”.

The LAC region is highly exposed to a wide range of natural hazards such as earthquakes (Haiti and Chile in 2010, Ecuador in 2016), hurricanes (Matthew in Haiti, 2016), floods, landslides, cold waves, volcano eruptions, drought, tsunamis, forest fires, etc. The region is regularly struck by small and medium scale events that undermine the fragile livelihoods of those affected. Hydro-meteorological events resulting from el Niño<sup>5</sup> seem to be already intensified by climate change leading to change in rainfall patterns, amongst others. LAC is also a highly violent region with a mix of criminality, drug trafficking and political unrest.<sup>6</sup> The civil war in Colombia displaced millions and lasted for 50 years<sup>7</sup>.

“*Resilience*” is defined by the European Commission as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from **stresses and shocks** such as drought, violence, conflict or ‘natural’ disaster without compromising long-term development prospects<sup>8</sup>”.

ECHO-funded projects in LAC include a) immediate lifesaving emergency response, b) humanitarian assistance including some short term activities aiming at longer term resilience building: multi-risk awareness, training in health, sanitation, safe housing, resilient agriculture and income generating activities, and c) DIPECHO<sup>9</sup> projects designed exclusively for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)<sup>10</sup>. 258 projects falling under the last two categories were reviewed by this evaluation.

Up to 60% of the total funding (233 Million euros) was allocated to two countries (Haiti and Colombia, with 39% and 21% respectively). NGOs received 52.2% of the funding compared to 32.3% for the UN and 15.4% for the Red Cross.

## Methodology

The evaluation team consisted of three international members and two regional experts.

<sup>1</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama.

<sup>2</sup> + 9 British and French overseas territories (6) and Constituent country of Kingdom of the Netherlands (3).

<sup>3</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/region/LAC>

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.undp.org/mdg-reports\\_LAC\\_collection](http://www.undp.org/mdg-reports_LAC_collection)

<sup>5</sup> a warming of ocean sea surface along the coasts of Ecuador and northern Peru

<sup>6</sup> While the region is home to fewer than 9% of the world's population, it accounts for 33% of the world's homicides.

<sup>7</sup> A referendum just rejected a peace agreement. A revised agreement is being finalized.

<sup>8</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience_en.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Launched in 1996, the Disaster Preparedness ECHO programme (DIPECHO) is the core element of ECHO's DRR global efforts, in which it has thus far invested €325 million worldwide. [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/risk-reduction\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/risk-reduction_en)

<sup>10</sup> Until 2014 those projects were funded under the Disaster Preparedness ECHO program (DIPECHO)

In the desk phase of the evaluation, 89 technical or scientific publications; 32 European Commission financing decisions with their supporting official documentation<sup>11</sup>; and proposals and reports including ECHO monitoring and final appraisal for each of the projects were reviewed.

Six countries were visited: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 399 stakeholders, and focus group discussions were held with 337 beneficiaries in the communities targeted by the projects. 43 projects were reviewed in greater detail during the field visits.<sup>12</sup>

Three topics were used for in-depth case studies:

- 1) Links between ECHO *resilience building* activities<sup>13</sup> and local, national and regional authorities;
- 2) Use of indicators to measure the effectiveness of resilience building efforts, a way forward for ECHO?;
- 3) ECHO activities in relation to Climate Change.

Finally, an **opinion survey** was carried out to obtain a more quantifiable picture of ECHO partners' and stakeholders' perceptions.

## Findings

This evaluation report is structured around the Evaluation Questions (EQ):

### EQ 1. What is the level of RELEVANCE of ECHO actions?

At project level, among the 258 funded projects that included *resilience building* activities, the document review suggested that, in 243 (94%) of them, the immediate needs and vulnerabilities appeared well documented.

At the strategic level, partners could not always identify the mid-term priorities in terms of building up *resilience*; this was likely due to the lack of a *resilience* HIP with a mid-term perspective, and also to the wide range of ECHO projects ranging from innovative community-based “pilot” initiatives to projects supporting regional DRR activities at the highest level.

Survey respondents (N=334) believed that ECHO-funded initiatives adequately addressed the needs for increased capacity and resilience of the most vulnerable. Our observations support this perception.

### EQ 2. What is the level of COHERENCE of ECHO actions?

Coherence with national policies:

Interviews and documents reviewed stressed the strong requirement placed on partners to involve and coordinate with local authorities and, in more recent years, with national authorities on resilience matters.<sup>14</sup> In most countries some form of pre-approval of projects is required by national authorities. Endorsed projects *align with* the government's broad policies and plans, however, not

<sup>11</sup> Known as Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP)

<sup>12</sup> 32 projects, ongoing and/or terminated, were visited on site with interviews with beneficiaries and/or local authorities (10 in the Caribbean, 10 in Central America and 12 in south America. Other projects were reviewed with the local partner. The visits and review included country, subregional and regional projects, some with repeated funding. Among those 30 visited in the field, 9 were led by UN agencies, 18 by NGOs and 5 by Red Cross. Several of those were from consortia mixing different categories of partners (UN and NGOs). UN and Red Cross projects were often multi-country.

<sup>13</sup> As indicated above, it includes all ECHO funded projects contributing in part or whole to building capacity to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from future stresses and shocks. It excludes, among others, humanitarian projects exclusively addressing emergency needs. The determination was made by the evaluators based on a review of the projects documents.

<sup>14</sup> that does not apply to emergency lifesaving activities where humanitarian principles should prevail.

necessarily meaning that they are those that the governments would consider more critical and of higher priority.

Although national authorities met by the team praised ECHO's DRR efforts, they occasionally expressed the need for closer and more direct dialogue at a strategic level and a lead role in the selection of priorities, activities and locations, as is the case with their development partners.<sup>15</sup>

Local municipalities and other authorities also showed a considerable interest and involvement in the DRR related activities. However, their ownership and official commitment / support varied from country to country and within the countries. Success stories at local level in every country are documented in the main document of this evaluation. The level of success depended to a large extent on the approach adopted by the partner (from interventionism “we do it” to persuasion “we want the municipality to do it”). In Haiti, local commitment was limited due in some extent to lack of true decentralization of national resources and authority from the central level to local authorities.

The survey confirmed a strong consensus on the alignment of ECHO activities with local policies and the *participation* of local authorities. However, a larger number of respondents remained uncertain regarding the level of local *ownership*.

At regional level, ECHO supported the main partners with regional mandates: The UN International Strategy for Disaster reduction (UNISDR), UNDP and the International Federation of Red Cross. The cooperation of partners with sub regional disaster reduction agencies was an asset. ECHO contributed to placing resilience among the priorities at regional level. The value of ECHO at the regional level is particularly visible and useful to the extent that ECHO promotes a culture of learning, exchange and solidarity, and especially regarding hazards that respect no administrative borders. Policies, stronger capacities and good practice cultivated in stronger countries are shared with the weaker countries (through exchanges, etc.). There is, however, no one-size-fits-all approach. Providing more direct support to sub-regional organizations and ensuring ownership at national level remain critical.

Coherence with EU Policies:

EU and partners' interlocutors praised the persistent **advocacy by ECHO for resilience on behalf of the most vulnerable**. Considerable progress was noted in the dialogue and information sharing between EU humanitarian actors and EU development actors. The Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF) is a concerted effort of the EU to foster joint analyses and shared solutions between development and humanitarian actors, thus giving way to more developmental assistance. The JHDF has been implemented in Haiti improving the dialogue and information exchange. An effective focal point<sup>16</sup> for ECHO in Bolivia, a country without ECHO staff, was also particularly noteworthy in this regard. Nevertheless, the marked improvement in the cooperation between the different EU actors was still seen as falling short of the desired outcome of jointly planned and complementary mid-term initiatives between ECHO and DEVCO with a common goal, location and targeted beneficiaries.

### EQ 3. What is the EU-ADDED VALUE of ECHO actions?

First and foremost, survey respondents, except for 5%, agree that ECHO addressed needs not met by other actors during the period covered by the evaluation. This is consistent with interviews and visits conducted by the evaluation team. Many interlocutors, however, noted that the golden period when ECHO was the pioneer and main actor in DRR has passed. There is now political

<sup>15</sup> This ECHO modus operandi in Cuba.

<sup>16</sup> ECHO used the focal point system in some countries without ECHO presence. A person inside the EU Delegation is identified and a MoU is prepared to enable that person to complete specific ECHO-related tasks.

commitment and support for the growing DRR institutions established in all LAC countries as well as sub-regions. The International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, the World Financing Institutions and now the EU are placing resilience building as a development priority approach. What is the added value of ECHO in this context?

The findings point towards the following invaluable assets:

- ECHO has a special understanding of intensive risks (disasters), a unique familiarity with the prevalent risks at national or local levels and a knowledge of DRR institutions and policies. Its expertise in preparedness is unmatched in the EU.
- ECHO is perceived as the voice of the most vulnerable, concerned primarily with people rather than economic outcomes. Its knowledge of local grass root needs is based on its linkage with civil societies actors.
- As an emergency responder, ECHO has an unparalleled flexibility and capacity for innovation. This is invaluable to the EU to be able to take opportunity of the post disaster window of opportunity for new initiatives on DRR/resilience.
- As the collective emergency response arm of the EU, ECHO is best placed to ensure that humanitarian response is sensitive to risks and does not harm future perspectives for development (Linking Response, Rehabilitation and Development -LRRD).

These assets place ECHO in a strong, even unique, position to contribute knowledge and offer technical assistance to development programme design.

#### **EQ 4. What is the level of EFFECTIVENESS of ECHO Actions?**

An effective impact means that the target group increases its capacity to adjust to future stresses and shocks. This is difficult to measure in absence of major stress or shock. Measuring outputs (e.g. number of participants in courses) and outcomes (e.g. knowledge gained, attitudes changed...) is a proxy indicator. Many examples of good practice were identified based on measured outputs and subjective anecdotal observations. They suggest a potential impact on the resilience to future shocks but are not proof or evidence based on hard facts. ECHO monitoring of outputs and outcomes indicators was seen as very thorough with onsite visits and advice. However, SMART indicators (outputs/outcomes) as reviewed in the log frames of the projects were of little value to determine the real impact.<sup>17</sup>

Several examples of “good practice” were identified based on features that led the evaluators to the conclusion that, indeed, the assumption of an impact on future *resilience* is reasonable. Factors of success included effective ownership and support by national Risk Reduction institutions and local authorities, active involvement of the private sector (from local builders to manufacturing associations), imaginative approaches in risk awareness of children, increased social cohesion and committees and agricultural projects adapted to local customs and uses.

In Haiti, an impact on improving *resilience* is more difficult to discern. The evaluators’ interlocutors raised questions most consistently on whether a 12-month humanitarian project can be expected to improve *resilience* even at community level in a country where the local authorities have no resources or decision-making power, central governance is very poor, and poverty is extreme. Nevertheless, there were encouraging signs of a sustained positive change of professional attitude towards cross-sectorial cooperation at the local level in the northern department’s health

<sup>17</sup> SMART indicators are Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant with regard to the objective concerned and Timed to be measured within the framework of the operation). By definition, resilience to future stresses/shocks is difficult to measure and especially in the time framework of the operation.

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian\\_aid/fpa/2003/guidelines/logical\\_framework\\_guidelines\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian_aid/fpa/2003/guidelines/logical_framework_guidelines_en.pdf)

sector.<sup>18</sup> Resilience outcomes perceived by the partners as promising were identified in cholera projects and relocation initiatives based on rental cash support. However, these achievements remain dependent on continued international support.

Among the factors of potential success is the application of ECHO's marker for resilience to humanitarian projects, making them sensitive to longer term issues of *resilience*.<sup>19</sup>

The above observations are only suggestive of impact: The occasional occurrence of emergencies / disasters has not been used by partners or ECHO to demonstrate through scientific studies with control groups that their prior efforts had indeed changed the coping capacity of their beneficiaries compared to other communities affected by the same disaster.

### **EQ 5. What was the level of EFFICIENCY of the ECHO actions?**

Positive factors contributing to efficiency include a frequent, but not systematic, multi-hazard approach, strong participation of local NGOs and staff, the increased use of cash, exploring new forms of partnership (such as private sector and industry) and a consortium (multi-partners' projects) approach in project management. Given the broad diversity of services rendered and definition or type of beneficiaries (persons or institutions) comparing cost per person was not meaningful.

The short duration and small size of the projects<sup>20</sup> and a perceived geographic and thematic dispersion of efforts were frequently listed as impediments to the efficient use of resources for broader and more sustainable impacts. In the survey, although this question registered the greatest proportion of undecided (30%) answers, a majority of respondents perceived ECHO's efforts to be cost-effective.

Overall, there was no evidence of significant lack of efficiency in the implementation by partners.

### **EQ 6. What is the level of SUSTAINABILITY of ECHO actions?**

To be effective, the impact on resilience must be sustainable. The capacity to face future stress should outlive the short projects.

There were examples of sustainability and replication that were all highly linked to the extent of ownership and commitment of local and/or national authorities. Factors of success included the active partnership with the private sector in Honduras (Pedro de Sula), the subcontracting of local NGOs with established presence in the communities, (Nicaragua) and addressing extensive risks perceived by the beneficiaries. Some types of activities leading to economic self-improvement have a greater built-in potential for sustainability: An example is the permanent crop improvements introduced by FAO projects in Colombia. The two extremes were Cuba, where projects were designed to be owned and sustained locally, and Haiti, where "sustainability" is hampered by lack of true decentralization of resources and authority to local authorities, emptying the concept of local ownership. As a result, sustainability of most external funded projects in Haiti is primarily conditioned by the continuing availability of external funding and partners.

### **EQ 7. What are potential INDICATORS OF IMPACT across the region?**

*Resilience* (the ability to withstand / adapt to stress) cannot easily be measured by SMART (and binding) indicators used in a six to fifteen month project. UNISDR, the Caribbean Disaster

<sup>18</sup> Contrarily to the Dominican Republic, the commitment and support at national level was lacking in this cross-border initiative.

<sup>19</sup> The marker applied to each project relate to the proper analysis of existing risks, the potential negative impact of the humanitarian project on those risks, the expected positive effect on local capacity and its contribution to support long term strategies.

<sup>20</sup> In 15- month projects, the startup period (identification of beneficiaries, contact with leaders, recruitment of staff and purchase of material) represent a significant proportion.



Emergency Management Agency, the specialized institution of the Central American Integration System for natural disaster prevention, mitigation and response (CEPRENAC) and other partners' efforts to produce global or institutional indicators deserve praise but held little potential for ECHO purposes to evaluate impact in the targeted communities. More relevant are the suggestions to measure the *resilience* of the LAC countries' risk management systems and how well they support the at-risk communities.

The four parameters of the ECHO resilience marker were seen as a valuable tool to measure commitment to resilience among humanitarian and development projects.

## Conclusions

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The main conclusions are as follows:

- There are significant differences of effectiveness between and within sub-regions in terms of impact on local resilience. The more committed the country, the more effective, efficient and sustainable the results. How success stories were replicated or scaled up was often not under the partner's control.
- Where national or provincial commitments were absent, community-based projects were seen as only being able to improve coping capacity for minor stresses and shocks, reducing considerably the cost-effectiveness of the projects.
- Resilience was found to be strengthened through two complementary mechanisms: the inclusion of DRR/resilience activities to humanitarian assistance/recovery projects and the traditional DIPECHO programme with projects specifically dedicated to DRR/ Resilience.<sup>21</sup> DIPECHO achieved a remarkable level of recognition and influence in LAC. The continued use of this brand name is a clear asset in the region.
- The resilience marker placed ECHO, a humanitarian leader, in a favourable position to positively influence the short-term and occasionally counterproductive (see next point below) approaches of humanitarian assistance. This is seen as a solid step forward in terms of strategic thinking in comparison to many other HA actors.
- The humanitarian imperative of independence from national or local institutions is essential for humanitarian principled commitment of neutrality, independence and impartiality but may be counterproductive in resilience initiatives requiring integration into local DRR and development initiatives. Project ownership cannot be limited to the targeted beneficiaries but should include national and local authorities. At a strategic level, authorities in LAC are increasingly reclaiming national ownership.<sup>22</sup> This requires changes in ECHO's relationship at this level in order to ensure sustainability/ownership of the impact on resilience as was achieved by ECHO in its projects in Cuba
- Although the responses to the survey point to moderate agreement that beneficiaries are better aware of risks, and much stronger agreement that, overall, they are more resilient due to ECHO-funded actions, this evaluation was unable to prove objectively and definitively the impact of ECHO's activities on resilience due to a lack of objective comparative studies (counterfactual studies) after the occurrence of stresses and shocks in affected communities<sup>23</sup>. The evaluators merely identified activities (good practices) likely to have contributed to this goal.

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<sup>21</sup> The four markers applied to each project relate to the proper analysis of existing risks, the potential negative impact of the humanitarian project on those risks, the expected positive effect on local capacity and its contribution to support long term strategies.

<sup>22</sup> This may not only happen in LAC.

<sup>23</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact\\_evaluation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_evaluation)

- Information on climate change has not been sufficiently collected or analysed during the period covered by this evaluation. ECHO is nonetheless being steered towards making more directed responses to climate change, which is an increasingly serious threat in the region.
- The evaluators' prior evaluations of DIPECHO across the world had shown a built-in self-isolation of ECHO from other instruments and in particular the EU Delegations in order to “preserve the independence and impartiality of ECHO's humanitarian response”. This was far from being the case in LAC at the time of this evaluation, where dialogue between DEVCO, the Delegation and ECHO has improved considerably; resilience has been an opportunity to strengthen the ties. The JHDF in Haiti is a positive step but need more time to concretize into joint initiatives.

## Recommendations

| Key recommendations   | Operational recommendations   |
|---|---|
| <p>To continue its efforts to include a resilience component in humanitarian assistance projects.</p> <p>To implement joint DEVCO-ECHO resilience projects for highly vulnerable groups in joint priority areas with a recognised potential for sustainable impact.</p>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ To encourage partners to submit projects in consortia to ensure size efficiency, multi-sectorial approach and built-in mechanism for counterfactual analysis in case of major stress occurrence.</li> <li>▪ To better address the stresses and needs as perceived by beneficiaries.</li> <li>▪ DEVCO and EEAS should adapt or adopt the <i>resilience</i> marker for general use in relevant development projects.</li> <li>▪ ECHO should study ways and means to directly support local NGOs in LAC.</li> <li>▪ ECHO should formalize the “ECHO focal point” system in countries without a permanent ECHO presence.</li> <li>▪ To use any suitable occurrence of significant stress and shock to confirm and document the impact.</li> <li>▪ To promote south-south cooperation and closer direct institutional relationships between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, building upon the existing health the ECHO-funded cross-border initiative.</li> </ul> |
| <p>To encourage DEVCO (and other development actors/institutions) to assume the leadership in resilience building. Meanwhile ECHO should support fewer but larger multi-hazard DIPECHO type projects under a management approach distinct from that of humanitarian assistance: 5-Year strategic plan developed jointly with national authorities; multiple funding sources with a preference to projects co-funded by national DRR institutions or the private sector; targeting beneficiaries with a realistic expectation of impact.</p> |   |
| <p>Subject to DEVCO and other development actors/institutions assuming the lead role for Risk Reduction, ECHO should consider refocusing progressively on preparedness for intensive risks (disasters) and people centred disaster management with strong local ownership, an area unlikely to be effectively addressed by development actors.</p>  |   |
| <p>In emerging countries, DIPECHO type projects (not including humanitarian assistance to victims of disasters) should progressively be subject of the priorities and coordination by the National Institution dedicated to Risk Management.</p>  |   |

# 1 The Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

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The objective of this evaluation is to provide an independent overall assessment of the 2012-2015 **resilience strategy/approach** in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) of the European Commission's Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO/ ECHO).

The evaluation covers all ECHO activities (as formalized by the Humanitarian Implementation Plans - HIPs) potentially contributing to an increase in the *resilience* of the targeted beneficiary persons or institutions. The evaluation is not limited to Disaster Preparedness European Community Humanitarian Office (DIPECHO) projects, designed exclusively for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR).<sup>24</sup> The evaluation also includes *resilience* aspects, when present in emergency humanitarian assistance projects.

Being a strategic regional evaluation, this is not a review of individual projects. The recommendations are limited in number, broad, and supported by related operational recommendations. Successful 'de-facto' approaches are also identified – based on good practice – for possible, wider application in the region.

The evaluation and this report are centred on seven issues (six evaluation questions i.e. relevance, coherence, ECHO Added Value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability and the additional issue of *resilience* impact indicators that could be applied to the region as a whole).

The Terms of Reference (ToR) are in Annex 1 and the Evaluation Questions are in Annex 2.

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<sup>24</sup> Launched in 1996, DIPECHO is the core element of ECHO's DRR global efforts.



## 2 Background

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### 2.1 The Latin American and Caribbean Region<sup>25</sup>

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#### 2.1.1 The LAC Region

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In recent years, the LAC region has evolved considerably with some highly positive changes taking place, including periods of sustained economic growth and declines in poverty and inequality. However, these encouraging trends have never been able to take hold across the region systematically. While the LAC region may have experienced impressive economic growth, it is in no position to absorb the \$2 billion US that environmental disasters are estimated to be costing annually.<sup>26</sup> The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that the economic losses from environmental disasters to crops and livestock reached \$11 billion in the LAC region from 2003 and 2013. During this period 37 major environmental disasters affected 19 countries with losses amounting to 3% on average of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>27</sup>

Given these harsh realities, acceptance of the importance of preventing disasters has recently started to creep into the mainstream thinking of decision makers from the LAC region. It is hoped the urgency of the situation will lead to greater dedication in building preventative capabilities in LAC countries. Nine of the world's top 20 countries most exposed to disaster-led economic impacts are in the region but on the other hand a number of Latin American countries (Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba and Mexico) have made preparedness and prevention their priorities -- moving away from a reliance on emergency response.<sup>28</sup> In most countries, ministries heading socioeconomic sectors and public services or departments in charge or involved in Disaster Risk Reduction do not have a strong legal or policy mandate, other human resources or technical capacity to effectively fulfil their respective Disaster Risk Management (DRM) role and responsibilities.

With the region, already naturally prone to disasters, the negative impact of climate change is felt in a variety of ways as it intersects with wide-spread environmental degradation. Deforestation or other phenomena join with erratic and intense rainfall to produce cascading effects and an increase in floods and landslides in many countries. Coastal and low lying areas are increasingly vulnerable to sea-level rise that contributes to flooding, damage to infrastructure and agricultural resources, and threatens human well-being. Saltwater intrusion compromises groundwater resources.<sup>29</sup> The incidence of disease, including cardiovascular, insect, and water-borne varieties is likewise exacerbated.

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<sup>25</sup> Adapted from the ToR

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/10/09/desastres-naturales-america-latina-crecimiento-riesgo> **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5128e.pdf> 55% of losses were caused by floods, 30% by drought, and the rest by hurricanes and strong storms

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/10/09/desastres-naturales-america-latina-crecimiento-riesgo> **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

<sup>29</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/hac2011/files/HAC2011\\_4pager\\_TACRO.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/hac2011/files/HAC2011_4pager_TACRO.pdf) **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

**Table 1: Disasters of natural and technological origin in LAC (2000-2015)<sup>30</sup>**

| Sub Region         | Occurrences | Deaths<br>(No per<br>1000) | Injured<br>(No per<br>1000) | Affected (Millions)<br>(% of total<br>population) | Total<br>population <sup>31</sup><br>(millions) |
|--------------------|-------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|---|---|
| Caribbean          | 283         | 232,720<br>(5.4)           | 591,352<br>(13.6)           | 18.83<br>(43.3%)                                  | 43.5  |
| Central<br>America | 453         | 9,995<br>(0.06)            | 17,059<br>(0.1)             | 2.74<br>(1.4%)                                    | 175.0   |
| South America      | 828         | 20,884<br>(0.05)           | 1,855,728<br>(4.4)          | 77.21<br>(18.3%)                                  | 422.5   |
| Entire LAC         | 1564        | 1000                       | 1000                        | 0   | 641   |

Of considerable concern are the unreported local disasters that are commonplace across the LAC region. According to the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), a 22-year analysis of 16 countries in the LAC region indicated that localized events and an increase in recurrent disasters collectively accounts for 90% of the total number of people impacted by disasters with an equally high percentage as the cause of damage to homes at a cost of 53 billion Dollars U.S.<sup>32</sup> The analysis highlights the growing urban dimension of these unreported disasters.

Hazard exposure and vulnerability vary across space, age, gender, and socioeconomic status, and are increasing exponentially in large cities. The region's population growth and urbanization are expected to intensify challenges.<sup>33</sup> Slowly the region has become highly urbanized with 80% of the population living in cities, and that proportion is expected to grow to 87 percent by 2050.<sup>34</sup>

Poverty rates in many LAC countries remain high. The Human Development Index scores vary greatly in LAC countries, from Chile with the highest value (ranked 41st in the world) to Haiti with the lowest in 2013 (168th).<sup>35</sup> Economic inequality, both among and within countries, relates to access to water, sanitation, and adequate housing, particularly for vulnerable and marginalized groups, including indigenous people, Afro-descendants, children, and women living in poverty.<sup>36</sup>

Severe droughts in places such as South America's Gran Chaco region and the Central American Dry Corridor have become more common and intense. The loss of water resources is expected to increasingly affect cities, hydropower generation, and food security. The menace of water shortages in urban centres such as Tegucigalpa could be especially worrisome where the possibility of interaction with other issues such as poverty, and personal insecurity is very real.

The impact of violence in the region is profound: one in four citizens claims that insecurity is the main problem in their lives, even worse than unemployment or the state of the economy.<sup>37</sup> In addition to the conflict in Colombia,<sup>38</sup> Central and South America and the Caribbean are three of the four sub-regions with the highest homicide rates in the world.<sup>39</sup> While the region is home to

<sup>30</sup> Source ENM DAT, the CRED Database for disasters which fit at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more people dead; 100 or more people affected; declaration of a state of emergency or Call for international assistance. <http://www.emdat.be/> Complex disasters (violence) are not included.

<sup>31</sup> Population data are for 2016. Percentages are only valid for comparison between sub regions.

<http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-subregion/>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.unisdr.org/archive/35664> The report draws on 83,000 historical records from 10,000 local municipalities and the analysis covers four categories: lives lost, people affected, homes destroyed and homes damaged.

<sup>33</sup> <https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2015/10/climate-change-adaptation-population-dynamics-latin-america-caribbean-2/> **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

<sup>34</sup> <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Publications/Files/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf> **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

<sup>35</sup> <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends>

<sup>36</sup> <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/climate-change-adaptation-and-population-dynamics-latin-america-and-the-caribbean>

<sup>37</sup> [http://www.vox.lacea.org/?q=review/reduce\\_crime\\_violence\\_lac](http://www.vox.lacea.org/?q=review/reduce_crime_violence_lac) **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

<sup>38</sup> At the time of writing, the hopes for peace in Colombia have suffered a setback: the peace agreement solemnly signed with the FARC has been rejected by a small majority in a Referendum.

<sup>39</sup> [http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014\\_GLOBAL\\_HOMICIDE\\_BOOK\\_web.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf) **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

fewer than 9% of the world's population, it accounts for 33% of the world's homicides. The annual homicide rate of more than 20 per 100,000 people is more than three times the world average. Criminal organisations have proliferated throughout the region with countries such as Honduras reporting spread into rural areas and small communities. Crime thrives where there is weak institutional presence and capacity, and broad based economic challenges making it common to employ violence.

## 2.2 Definitions

In 2012, the European Union issued a public communication on *resilience* and the next year drafted an "Action Plan". In the European Union, "*resilience*" is defined as "the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from

**stresses and shocks** such as drought, violence, conflict or natural disaster without compromising long-term development prospects<sup>40</sup>".

To clarify the Resilience approach, ECHO developed four questions known as resilience markers. See box on ECHO resilience markers.

The EU Action Plan is building up on the UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) frameworks supported by Hyogo and more recently the Sendai Conferences. The EU paradigm of '*resilience*' clearly addresses natural hazards (the main focus of the DRR initiative) as well as the conflicts and other disaster events. Preparedness, the original focus of much of DG ECHO's DIPECHO portfolio is one set of activities within DRR.

### ECHO RESILIENCE MARKERS

- 1) Does the proposal include an adequate analysis of shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities?
- (2) Is the project risk informed? Does the project include adequate measures to ensure it does not aggravate risks or undermine capacities?
- (3) Does the project include measures to build local capacities (beneficiaries + local institutions)?
- (4) Does the project take opportunities to support long-term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks?

Preparedness includes risk analysis, early warning, evacuation planning, stockpiling and contingency planning, etc.

According to the UNISDR, while *intensive risk* is comprised of the exposure of large concentrations of people and economic activities to intense hazard events, which can lead to potentially catastrophic disaster impacts involving high mortality and asset loss (UNISDR, 2009a), *extensive risk* is mainly a characteristic of rural areas and urban margins where communities are exposed to, and vulnerable to, recurring localized hazards such as floods or drought. Both are covered under the EU resilience initiative.

## 2.3 ECHO Funding in LAC

For the period 2012-2015, 32 financing decisions, with a corresponding Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) were formally approved for a total of 233 million euros. The list is attached in Annex 3. Each decision has its set of geographical targets, beneficiaries, priorities and rules. Budget sources included the European Union small scale Disaster Relief Fund (DRF),<sup>41</sup> the

<sup>40</sup> **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.**

<sup>41</sup> 29 projects of which 5 were allocated to the Red Cross. Amounts are relatively small (200 to 300.000).

European Development Fund (EDF), the EU Children of Peace Fund (CHD)<sup>42</sup> and the Enhanced Response Capacity (ERC).<sup>43</sup>

For each financing decision, proposals were submitted by DG ECHO's implementing partners, approximately half of them being approved. Table 2 shows the distribution of projects submitted to ECHO in LAC countries.

**Table 2: Projects submitted to ECHO in LAC (excludes interregional projects)**

|                 | 2012 |     | 2013 |     | 2014 |     | 2015 |     | TOTAL |     |
|-----------------|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|------|-----|-------|-----|
| Status          | N    | %   | N    | %   | N    | %   | N    | %   | N     | %   |
| Approved        | 99   | 49% | 75   | 49% | 78   | 59% | 52   | 51% | 304   | 52% |
| Refused         | 102  | 51% | 78   | 51% | 54   | 41% | 50   | 49% | 284   | 48% |
| <b>PROPOSED</b> | 201  |     | 153  |     | 132  |     | 102  |     | 588   |     |
|                 | 2012 |     | 2013 |     | 2014 |     | 2015 |     | TOTAL |     |
| IP              | N    | %   | N    | %   | N    | %   | N    | %   | N     | %   |
| NGO             | 62   | 63% | 37   | 49% | 47   | 60% | 25   | 48% | 171   | 56% |
| RC              | 11   | 11% | 14   | 19% | 9    | 12% | 8    | 15% | 42    | 14% |
| UN              | 25   | 25% | 24   | 32% | 22   | 28% | 19   | 37% | 90    | 30% |
| <b>APPROVED</b> | 99   |     | 75   |     | 78   |     | 52   |     | 304   |     |

The priority of ECHO is to address all types of risks and stresses to which the beneficiaries are exposed. As many projects were primarily humanitarian in response to a specific disaster or emergency, this requirement was not always practical. As a result, approved projects were addressing different types of hazards / risks as shown in Table 3. The multi-hazard approach however improved steadily over time: from 28% in 2012 to 37% in 2015. A surge of interest in climatic change was noted in 2015 with a sharp rise in number of projects addressing droughts in 2015.

**Table 3: Type of hazard / threat addressed by ECHO projects**

| THREAT                    | 2012      |     | 2013      |     | 2014      |     | 2015      |     | TOTAL      |     |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|------------|-----|
| <i>Approved Proposals</i> | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   | N          | %   |
| Multi                     | 25        | 28% | 21        | 33% | 24        | 32% | 19        | 37% | 89         | 32% |
| Violence                  | 20        | 22% | 19        | 30% | 29        | 38% | 4         | 8%  | 72         | 26% |
| Geologic                  | 10        | 11% | 9         | 14% | 6         | 8%  | 8         | 15% | 33         | 12% |
| Floods                    | 12        | 13% | 4         | 6%  | 7         | 9%  | 6         | 12% | 29         | 10% |
| Health Threats            | 10        | 11% | 7         | 11% | 7         | 9%  | 4         | 8%  | 28         | 10% |
| Drought                   | 1         | 1%  | 2         | 3%  | 3         | 4%  | 11        | 21% | 17         | 6%  |
| Storm                     | 7         | 8%  |           |     |           |     |           |     | 7          | 2%  |
| EQ                        | 2         | 2%  |           |     |           |     |           |     | 3          | 1%  |
| Heavy Rains               | 2         | 2%  |           |     |           |     |           |     | 2          | 1%  |
| Fire                      |           |     | 1         | 2%  |           |     |           |     | 1          |     |
| Landslide                 |           |     | 1         | 2%  |           |     |           |     | 1          |     |
| <b>Total Approvals</b>    | <b>89</b> |     | <b>64</b> |     | <b>76</b> |     | <b>52</b> |     | <b>282</b> |     |

<sup>42</sup> Four projects in Colombia, 3 of them to UNHCR.

<sup>43</sup> Five projects totaling 8.5 millions

**Table 4: Financial decisions 2012-2015**

| Year  | HIP | Amount (Thousand Euros) |               |
|-------|-----|-------------------------|---------------|
|       |     | TOTAL                   | DIPECHO (%)   |
| 2012  | 9   | 71,980                  | 10,025(13.9%) |
| 2013  | 11  | 60,729                  | 20,543(33.7%) |
| 2014  | 8   | 49,644                  | 11,040(22.2%) |
| 2015  | 4   | 51,204                  | NA            |
| Total | 32  | 233,557                 | -             |

47 out of 304 funded projects did not include activities aiming to directly increase the *resilience* of people or communities. There were either short term projects for immediate lifesaving humanitarian response or in support to public awareness initiative at European or global level.

For the first three years for which a special budget line was assigned for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), 70 DIPECHO projects (out of a total of 257 including resilience activities) were

funded at a cost of 41.6 million Euros. (i.e. 22.8% of the total LAC budget for those three years). Most of the humanitarian assistance projects included *resilience* or capacity building activities.

60% of the resilience funding <sup>44</sup> was allocated to two countries (Haiti and Colombia with 39% and 21% respectively).

**Table 5: Projects amounts in Colombia and Haiti**

Between those two countries, there were also different patterns of funding. Average cost of projects was much higher in Haiti where almost half of the projects (38 out of 80) were above Euros 1 Million while in Colombia the majority of the projects were under 0.5 Million.


NGOs received 52.2% of the funding compared to 32.3% for the UN and 15.4% for the Red Cross. Figure 1 shows the trend over the four-year period. While Red Cross allocation remains stable, a shift from INGOs towards UN or international Organizations has been observed in 2015. <sup>45</sup> In 2014, NGOs received almost twice the amount approved to UN agencies. In 2015, both NGOs and UN agencies received 42% each of the total budget. The type of projects implemented by NGOs tend to be predominantly people oriented (community based) while UN (and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) are usually building the capacity of institutions, in line with the advocacy role of ECHO.

| Amount (Euros) | Colombia |       | Haiti  |       |
|----------------|----------|-------|--------|-------|
|                | Number   | %     | Number | %     |
| < 500,000      | 38       | 55%   | 11     | 13.7% |
| < 1 million    | 28       | 40.6% | 31     | 38.8  |
| > 1 million    | 3        | 4.3%  | 38     | 47.5% |
| total          | 69       | 100%  | 80     | 100%  |

<sup>44</sup> Resilience funding includes humanitarian assistance projects with a resilience approach.

<sup>45</sup> Data are including all projects adopting a resilience approach. The proportion of humanitarian response projects versus DRR / DIPECHO projects may vary from year to year.

**Figure 1: Funding per partner 2012-2015**



## 3 Evaluation Tools and Methodology applied

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### 3.1 Methodology

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The evaluation was carried out in four phases, in accordance with the Terms of Reference:

- The inception phase leading to an inception report and meeting
- The desk review phase leading to a desk phase report and meeting
- The field phase leading to a field report after each visit and one overall field report and meeting
- The synthesis phase leading to the final report draft and a meeting.

In all phases, the activities were organized around the Evaluation Questions (Annex 2).

#### 3.1.1 The Desk phase

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A list of the most relevant documents reviewed is provided in Annex 4. In addition, 32 Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs), each supporting a financing decision, the “Single Forms” and “FichOps” for each of the 588 projects submitted for funding (284 refused and 304 accepted) were analysed.<sup>46</sup> Rejected projects were briefly reviewed for their inclusion of resilience activities and the reasons recorded for their refusal. This Portfolio analysis was critical in providing a strategic overview by country and/or sub region of the decision making process, and in determining the overall relevance, effectiveness and potential sustainability of ECHO funded activities. Review of projects submitted but not accepted permitted to appraise the decision making process of DG ECHO and identify the criteria for selection.

The number of documents was staggering. The decision to review all documents from the projects rather than a sample was further justified by the need to have a complete overview of all ECHO activities in the six countries to be visited (see Table 4 below). The majority of the projects undertaken by ECHO in the region were implemented in these six countries (74% of the total budget for LAC).

Also in the desk phase and based on the HIPs, an Intervention Logic was prepared (see Annex 12).

#### 3.1.2 Meetings and Interviews

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Meetings for individual interviews or focus group discussions were held in Brussels, Madrid<sup>47</sup> and in each of the countries visited by the team. The list of organizations can be found in Annex 5.

The scope of the contacts can be seen in Table 6.

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<sup>46</sup> The Single Form is the unique electronic archive submitted by the Partner and including the initial request, the amendments, the interim and final reports while the FichOps is an ECHO internal file with all observations, comments, initial appraisals, report of monitoring and final decision from Field and Desk staff.

<sup>47</sup> A significant number of projects in Latin America and Haiti are implemented by Spanish based partners with HQ in Madrid.



**Table 6: Interviews and focus groups**

| Place                               | NGO /<br>Red Cross | Individual interviews |             |                 |          |            | Focus<br>Groups |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------|----------|------------|-----------------|
|                                     |                    | UN                    | Authorities | EU              | Other    | Total      |                 |
| <b>Bolivia</b>                      | 43                 | 11                    | 19          | 4               | -        | 77         | 136             |
| <b>Colombia</b>                     | 31                 | 17                    | 12          | 5               | -        | 65         | -               |
| <b>Dominican Republic</b>           | 17                 | 8                     | 21          | 4               | 1        | 51         | 92              |
| <b>Haiti</b>                        | 42                 | 23                    | 14          | 11              | 1        | 91         | -               |
| <b>Honduras</b>                     | 25                 | -                     | 15          | 1               | -        | 41         | 109             |
| <b>Nicaragua</b>                    | 33                 | -                     | 24          | 1 <sup>48</sup> | 1        | 59         | -               |
| <b>Other places (e.g. Brussels)</b> | 5                  | 2                     | -           | 8               | -        | 15         | -               |
| <b>TOTAL</b>                        | <b>196</b>         | <b>61</b>             | <b>105</b>  | <b>34</b>       | <b>3</b> | <b>399</b> | <b>337</b>      |

The interviews were lightly-structured to allow maximum flexibility to adjust the exchange to the particular area of experience or expertise of the interlocutor. The guideline in Annex 6 served as a checklist and aide memoire.

### 3.1.3 Perception Survey

#### **Description**

In addition to the desk review, field visits, personal and phone interviews, the evaluation team developed and administered a **formal on-line survey** to obtain a more quantifiable picture of ECHO partners' and stakeholders' perceptions of ECHO's contribution to *resilience* building in the LAC region. A hard copy was also distributed at meetings and most interviews. More details and the questionnaire can be found in Annex 7.

Through a systematic review of all FichOps (including refused projects), 615 valid email addresses were compiled.

**Responses Received** The team received 334 responses (245 completed and 89 partial ones out of the 615 successfully contacted. The survey achieved a remarkable response rate of 54 %:

Since the results are based on the participant's perceptions, they cannot be considered conclusive by themselves and were complemented with other information.

The profile of respondents was as follows (main answers only) demonstrating a wide array of opinion:

- Respondent organizations: 46% NGO, 22% UN and 7% government and 3% ECHO;
- Work location: 63% were field-based and 23% headquarters;
- Geographical focus: 49% Caribbean, 28% South America, 14% each Central America and LAC region as a whole;

<sup>48</sup> The entire staff of ECHO in Nicaragua was absent from the country at the agreed upon time of the visit.



- Level of work: 57% at national level, 26% at local level;
- Main sector: 44% CBDRR, 38% institutional capacity building, 28% WASH,
- Familiarity with DRR/*resilience*: 54% high, 40% moderate;
- Familiarity with ECHO's funded efforts: 53% high, 38% moderate.

See Annex 7 for greater detail.

### 3.1.4 Field Visits

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The selection of countries to be visited was based on objective criteria and consultation with the Steering Committee established by ECHO to monitor this evaluation.

The following countries were approved: Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua. Each country has unique features: Haiti is considered the most fragile with the largest ECHO support and weakest national institutions; Colombia, a country with relatively strong institutions is second on the list of beneficiaries due to the ongoing violence; Dominican Republic offers a good contrast to Haiti with whom it shares the same island; Bolivia was seen as being valuable for its model of cooperation between EU actors, partners and authorities; Nicaragua, the Headquarters (HQ) of ECHO's regional office, and Honduras being reflective of all countries in Central America with ECHO funded projects.<sup>49</sup>

The itinerary and participating experts for each country visit are in Annex 8.

In each country, interviews took place and selected projects (in total 43) were visited. The selection maintained an overall balance between:

- the nature of the projects (DIPECHO vs humanitarian with added resilience),
- the sectorial objectives,
- the type of partners,
- the project status: ongoing or terminated,
- the geographical coverage: community, national, bi-national or regional, and
- other factors.

Security and access were practical considerations.

## 3.2 In depth Case Studies

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In consultation with the Steering Committee, three topics were approved for more in-depth presentation as case studies:

- 4) Links between ECHO *resilience* activities and local, national and regional authorities;
- 5) Use of *resilience* indicators, a way forward for ECHO;
- 6) ECHO activities and Climate Change.

The case studies are in Annexes 9, 10 and 11. The most important findings and conclusions are also included in the main report.

## 3.3 The limitations and constraints

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- The evaluation is designed to evaluate the effectiveness of ECHO activities over 304 funded projects. Outputs (number of participants in workshops for instance) and outcomes (knowledge

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<sup>49</sup> Inclusion of English Speaking Caribbean countries was considered but judged not practical due to the low level of ECHO activities in any single country and the tight schedule already required for a minimal coverage of the six countries.

and practices gained) were assessed by both ECHO monitoring staff and the evaluators. What matters more, however, is the impact on *resilience* (Is the increased capacity to adjust to future stress / shock proven). This could be estimated or assumed but not objectively measured or observed in the absence of data on the change in response of the beneficiaries to eventual stress or shock occurring after the project/intervention. That requires a counterfactual analysis of what the resilience would have been in the absence of the intervention.<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, once those positive changes observed, the next step would be to analyse the extent in which ECHO actions have contributed to the change (contribution analysis). Although, the field visits identified several occurrences of severe stresses and shocks after the termination of some of the projects, time and strict schedules did not permit the evaluators to apply this more rigorous approach at short notice. As a result, our conclusions on effectiveness are based on solid data on outputs and outcomes but on subjective observations or anecdotes from the partners regarding the impact on the resilience.

- The timing of both the evaluation and the field visits was not the most favourable. Initial interviews in Brussels were postponed due to the terrorist accident occurring close to the ECHO HQ. ECHO field staff was not available in several countries (more particularly in Nicaragua) due to higher commitments and some key partners' staff were absent due to the Ecuador Earthquake.
- *Resilience* is a new approach for many partners and even EU staff. Although, it may have already facilitated understanding and more integrated programming, there was not a shared understanding of what it encompasses. Being a developmental holistic vision, it did not generate the same enthusiasm from humanitarian interlocutors as lifesaving issues do.
- A most common limitation was the short duration of the visits given the diversity and number of projects which reported that a *resilience* component was included. The sampling of 43 projects was affected by the security situation in Colombia<sup>51</sup> and Honduras and the limited accessibility of some interventions in most other places. Addressing the needs of forgotten communities in remote places is a strength of ECHO but not a particularly convenient choice for pilot initiatives requiring high visibility from other stakeholders or scrutiny from evaluators.

These limitations were addressed by increasing the duration of the visits beyond the terms of the contract and specific interviews with interlocutors most familiar with places or projects that could not be visited.

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<sup>50</sup> The most common counterfactual approach is to use a comparison group. The difference in outcomes (i.e. adjustment to an actual stress and shock) between the beneficiaries of the intervention (the treatment group) and the comparison group, is a single measure of impact. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/37671602.pdf>

<sup>51</sup> In Colombia, a general strike organized at the time of the field visit led to the preventive evacuation of the partners' staff and cancellation of some on-site projects visits. Interviews were carried out without visit to the beneficiaries.

## 4 Findings respective to the EQs

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### 4.1 EQ.1: What is the level of RELEVANCE of ECHO actions?

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This Evaluation Question is multifaceted and complex. It includes the relevance of individual DRR/*Resilience* projects (DIPECHO) and of the often-modest add-on of a *resilience* component or approach to humanitarian (mostly recovery type) assistance projects. All activities aiming to increase the capacity of the beneficiaries to better adjust to future crises, were considered as resilience activities: training, risk awareness, civil society organization of committees, infrastructure, building back better, etc.

A set of relevant projects does not necessarily constitute a relevant strategy; a comprehensive vision is necessary. The introduction of the resilience markers in the project submission and review process illustrates the approach adopted by ECHO.<sup>52</sup> The markers consists of four simple core questions (See box in section 2.2). It has a welcome emphasis on a No-Harm approach in humanitarian assistance.

A multi-hazard approach is usually best but single hazard or sector approaches also have their strengths and advantages.

Other key issues of relevance include the selection of the most at risk (communities and groups within the communities), the involvement of beneficiaries and authorities in determining vulnerabilities and needs and a multi-hazard approach.

The potential for *resilience*, as supported by the *Resilience* Marker (question 2)<sup>53</sup>, must be based on a holistic risk analysis, one that does not focus on a single hazard without justified reason.

In this report, we will first address the issue of relevance at project level and then the overall strategic relevance at country or regional level (HIPs).

#### 4.1.1 Project relevance

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The country relevance of EU-funded actions aiming to foster *resilience* can be assessed by a review of the levels of risk reported by the InfoRM<sup>54</sup>.

Findings from the portfolio analysis indicate that ECHO seriously considers the quality of the needs assessment before approving a project. Out of the 284 proposals refused by ECHO, 193 were turned down because of a poor needs assessment or a lack of relevance.

Among the 258 approved projects including some *resilience* building activities, the review of the documents (FichOps and Single Forms) suggested that in 243 (94%) the immediate needs and vulnerabilities appeared well documented.


Furthermore, there was almost no disagreement among the perception survey respondents (N=334) that ECHO-funded actions in the region were relevant to the needs of the most vulnerable. See Figure 2.

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<sup>52</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/resilience\\_marker\\_guidance\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/resilience_marker_guidance_en.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> Is the project risk informed? Does the project include adequate measures to ensure it does not aggravate risks or undermine capacities?

<sup>54</sup> Information for Risk Management (InfoRM) results 2016: <http://www.inform-index.org/Results/Global> It should be noted that INFORM is a collaboration of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Team for Preparedness and *Resilience* and the European Commission (Joint Research Centre and DG ECHO).

**Figure 2: Perception Survey, Relevance to Needs**

The interviews and field visits to *ECHO* projects confirmed that partners knew the communities well where they worked on a sustained basis. This familiarity with the communities, its leaders and vulnerabilities is an asset valued by ECHO staff, NGOs and local partners. In most community-based projects visited by the evaluators, partner and community dialogue was ongoing and strong. When beneficiaries were asked what their perceived vulnerabilities were and how well the project was addressing them, the reply was positive. It was however occasionally difficult for beneficiaries to single out the mid-term *resilience* benefits from other short-term humanitarian services received.

Most partners appreciated the importance and relevance of adding *resilience*-building activities to their humanitarian assistance projects. Add-on activities included, for instance, building the capacity of departmental health services in response to cholera, or organizing Income Generating Activities (IGA) in the relocation projects for residents from post-earthquake camps in Haiti; including hygiene education and capacity building for the maintenance of the water facilities in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) activities, or complementing emergency food assistance with capacity building<sup>55</sup>. Practically all projects included risk awareness and community organisation (committees) as far as possible given the short duration of the non DIPECHO projects (up to 12 months). Only a couple of humanitarian interlocutors questioned the usefulness of the *resilience* markers and the relevance of ECHO's *resilience* approach.<sup>56</sup>

*DIPECHO* projects addressed well identified needs in consultation with local authorities and beneficiaries. Only one exception was noted: in a project preparing coastal communities in the Dominican Republic for tsunamis, the local committees either spontaneously, or once probed about their priorities, recognised that they had adopted a multi-hazard approach and included, on their own initiative and without the partner's support, stresses and shocks of actual concern to them and in the opinion of the evaluators of greater relevance. Their activities included dengue and Zika, school security, chemical accidents, floods and landslides under the umbrella of tsunami preparedness. Other *DIPECHO* projects, mostly United Nations (UN) or Red Cross, addressed broader issues and had institutions as beneficiaries. The needs assessment was generally comprehensive with more first-hand (rather than quoted) data.

In brief, the need for *resilience*-building support is so comprehensive that it was possible to justify almost every project easily with assessment data.

Whether the projects targeted “the most vulnerable” is another matter. Given the dynamic nature of vulnerability and risk, and the need for detailed and accurate data for measuring, National DRM organizations, NGO and local partners are still using geographical exposition criteria or selected static data (such as poverty indexes, frequent impacts, or IDH) in the definition of the “most vulnerable” or “most exposed”. Other aspects, such as seasonal changes or the impact of social and DRM projects in the baseline are usually not considered. Humanitarian partners also often first propose geographical areas with which they are familiar and from this point select those

<sup>55</sup> irrigation work coupled with agricultural training, livelihood protection as well as investing on improving information systems, allowing Early Warning and needs based decision making

<sup>56</sup> “We run the risk of wasting resources on a concept”. Others tended to believe that “*resilience* was not possible for the first twelve months following a major disaster such as an earthquake”. The use of the *resilience* markers generally did clarify the issue by placing the focus on risk-informed humanitarian assistance, no harm first and building back better.

communities and/or groups that are locally the most vulnerable. Whether they are “*the most vulnerable*” nationwide cannot be established.

Especially vulnerable groups (women, handicapped, the aged...) were either a cross cutting priority in most projects or the topic of specific projects (e.g. relocation in Haiti). Integrating a partner specialised in assistance to women, the aged or the handicapped into a consortium, was seen as an asset to cover those particular groups. The concept of targeting the most vulnerable groups within vulnerable communities instead of just the most vulnerable communities appeared to be more realistic when targeting priorities using short term financial instruments.

A multi-hazard scope (as far as *resilience* activities are concerned) is encouraged by ECHO. The focus is on all types of “*stresses and shocks*”, an expression not always understood by interlocutors interviewed for the evaluation. According to the portfolio analysis, multi-hazard projects increased proportionally from 28% in 2012 to 37% in 2015. The balance is somewhat shifting from intensive to extensive threats<sup>57</sup> and from, rural communities to urban settings. This is in line with global policies and recommendations. Projects addressing a single hazard (stress or shock) or sector were regularly approved for funding (the most common hazards were violence, geological threats, floods and health threats) showing a diversity and flexibility in the ECHO humanitarian strategy. Investment in anti-violence interventions seems to have increased regularly from 2012-14, with a sudden drop in 2015. The opposite is true for drought: in 2015, 11 projects were addressing this single risk.

The visits of single hazard or sector projects have led to several observations:

- In the case of cholera in Haiti, resilience activities in these single hazard humanitarian response projects included capacity building of the competent sectors (health and WASH) while improving their cross sectorial coordination with the Civil Protection and reaching out to all stakeholders.
- Change in agricultural practices, in food security projects (resulting from hydrological stresses or violence as in Colombia) often aimed to improve the resilience capacity of beneficiaries to all economic and climatic stresses (seeds banks, improved resistant and fast growing seeds). They were complemented particularly in Haiti and Colombia with Income Generating Activities (IGA),<sup>58</sup> multi risk awareness and the organization of local committees, etc...

## Good practices

Selecting Partners based on their familiarity with and continuing presence on site.

Dedicating the first few months of a project to further fine tuning the risk analysis and activities in consultation with beneficiaries as was done in recent projects in Haiti

Addressing also common day to day (extensive) stresses. Relevance is / should be in the eyes of the beneficiaries! Priority on multi risk approach but flexibility leading to approval of single risk (for instance cholera response) initiatives shifting the focus on encouraging the sector towards cross sectorial integration.

Proposing projects as a consortium, with each member providing one relevant component. It encourages larger and more comprehensive projects likely to provide a greater impact.

<sup>57</sup> Extensive risk is used to describe the risk associated with low-severity, high-frequency events, mainly but not exclusively associated with highly localized hazards. Intensive risk is used to describe the risk associated to high-severity, mid to low-frequency events, mainly associated with major hazards. UNISDR Global Assessment Report 2015.

<sup>58</sup> The Income Generation activities of the International Committee of Red cross in Colombia was particularly well adapted to local urban conditions.



- Perception of relevance at community level was usually linked to the projects addressing extensive risks of relevance to beneficiaries. When limited by design to rare and unfamiliar hazards (tsunami for instance), inventive communities found a way to make them more relevant.
- Strict criteria for the selection of beneficiaries in Colombia (victims of violence displaced within less than six months) did occasionally lead to situations perceived as counterproductive where a few beneficiaries were receiving ECHO assistance in a settlement where many displaced families equally vulnerable and needed were no more eligible. This criterion contrasts with ECHO's willingness to provide multi-year assistance for displaced people after the earthquake in Haiti.

#### 4.1.2 HIPs Relevance

How well do the HIPs and needs assessments fit together? The review of the HIPs showed a solid needs assessment reflecting the reputation of ECHO as the humanitarian actor generally best informed. This reputation has been largely acknowledged by other stakeholders or UN agencies.<sup>59</sup> However, the information provided to ECHO by partners present in the field cannot offset the lack of comprehensive official data (in Haiti: *“serious questioning on the quality of the information collected that translates into a recurrently weak analysis, hampering a thorough identification of the needs and a strategic targeting.”*<sup>60</sup>)

In general, the needs assessment is comprehensive and the priorities identified were broad enough to fit most partners' perceived priorities. HIP priorities being generally humanitarian (not primarily *resilience*-oriented), they should be independent and need not always coincide with those of the Government. Single hazard HIPs were occasionally questioned: For instance, drought is not recognised as a priority in Nicaragua (and its relative impact is often questioned by stakeholders in Haiti). Data were not available to the evaluators to determine the technical appropriateness of this matter.

The “lack of partners' meaningful participation” in the formulation of the HIPs or more precisely the final selection of priorities was also a frequently raised issue. The traditional consultative process led by ECHO involving national authorities and partners to prepare a “Country Document” stating the needs and priorities for DRR and *resilience* has faltered in several countries. In Haiti, the need to “save lives” in crises and emergencies is perceived by interlocutors as marginalising the *resilience* agenda.<sup>61</sup> In Colombia, Nicaragua and Bolivia the national authorities asserted their leadership in establishing a national diagnosis and setting priorities.

The most important observation is that most HIPs are emergency driven. Indeed, they are humanitarian plans supporting financing decisions responding to the latest emergency situation. This is productive neither for *resilience* nor for DRR actions that require continuity and midterm vision. The last DIPECHO HIPs were issued in 2013 for the Caribbean and South America and in 2014 for Central America. Now there is an HIP integrating humanitarian and DRR/DIPECHO. Interviewees from agencies with a developmental approach had a mixed review of the relevance of this change. The main observation was that while integrating *resilience* into short-term humanitarian plans was a significant progress, a stable longer-term vision or plan needed for *resilience* building (DIPECHO type projects) was lost.

NGO partners expressed the concern that recently the HIPs have become more selective (drought and el Niño) at the cost of a sustained multi-hazard approach which is essential for *resilience*. In Bolivia, the perception was that HIPs led to a focus on floods that did not prepare for (and may have

<sup>59</sup> In Colombia, the familiarity with the field situation was reported as the main factor for ECHO's role as leader of the humanitarian donors group. This knowledge is also a valuable asset for all EU instruments.

<sup>60</sup> Haiti HIP 2014

<sup>61</sup> As indicated by ECHO office in Haiti. “it is a question of priority”, ie Humanitarian versus risk reduction and *resilience*

distracted from taking into account) the subsequent drought. Partners suggested that HIPs should therefore remain flexible without attributing one HIP to a single slow onset shock/stress. Other regional actors perceive the HIPs as becoming vaguer, “catch-all”, therefore making them less straightforward for partners to understand the specific strategy of ECHO, or where to position themselves within it.

In general, interlocutors praised technically the process of ECHO formulating a country strategy and a HIP but felt little ownership in spite of meetings and consultations taking place.

Participants in the South America DIPECHO meeting (Asuncion, 6-7 June 2016) felt that the discussions did not add much clarity or an updated vision at a time when resources are decreasing and national authorities are seeking a greater role and ownership starting from the formulation of DRR priorities in many LAC countries.

## 4.2 EQ.2: What is the level of COHERENCE of ECHO actions

How ECHO activities were coherent from year to year in the period 2012-2015 was addressed under the EQ1.

### How do ECHO-funded activities support national policies on DRR and resilience?

In this region, all governments have endorsed global policies or adopted their own on DRR and climate change. Institutions, however weak in some places, do exist for the management of risk and the promotion of *resilience*. *Resilience* seems to be treated, and rightly so, more as a development priority rather than a part of humanitarian assistance.

The links of ECHO activities with national and local authorities is addressed in greater detail and depth in a special case study (Annex 9).

Interviews and documents reviewed unambiguously stressed the strong requirement placed by ECHO on partners to involve and coordinate with local authorities and, in more recent years, with national authorities. In most countries, some form of pre-approval of the projects is required from the national authorities. This procedure can be a simple step as in the Dominican Republic or an elaborate joint planning as in Cuba, Bolivia or Colombia. According to interviewees, the process is conducive to greater ownership and potential for expansion but may require up to six months. The interlocutor can be a line technical ministry, the DRR Agency (Civil Protection in Haiti) and/or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the countries visited, selecting the proposed activities and beneficiaries for a given project was done by ECHO partners. This means that the projects are individually endorsed as *complying with* the government's broad policies and plans, not that they are those the government would consider more critical and of higher priority. In Colombia, the convergence between partners and the National Unit for Management of Disaster Risk (UNGRD) went one step further. UNGRD praised in particular five ECHO partners for their close consultation with UNGRD in the early formulation of their project and has co-funded some of their projects. In a meeting with UNGRD, the suggestion was raised for joint field monitoring and sharing of non-confidential sections of the partners' final report to ECHO. This ownership is not limited to DRR institutions. Technical ministries such as the ministry Agriculture is an active partner (and funding source) with FAO in the widely-praised food security projects in Colombia. There was a similar positive finding regarding ownership by the Ministry of health of Dominican Republic of the Health initiative at the border with Haiti.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>62</sup> Both partners, the Food and Agriculture organization (FAO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) are development agencies with a mandate to support and guide national institutions in improving respectively food security and health. They are accountable to national counterparts, not directly to the beneficiaries.


Urging the partners to coordinate their projects with, and seek clearance from, national authorities does not mean that ECHO similarly discusses, agrees with or coordinates its *resilience*-specific approach or strategy with national (or regional) institutions. Although national authorities met by the team praised ECHO DRR efforts, a desire for closer and direct dialogue was expressed, similar to that which they conduct with their development partners. Further details are provided in Annex 9.

During the field visits to each of the six countries, numerous opportunities for contact with local authorities were organized by ECHO partners. Local municipalities and other authorities showed a considerable interest and involvement in the DRR related activities. Their ownership and official commitment / support varied:

- In Haiti, a lack of integration has occasionally been cited as a problem in the review of project files and ECHO monitoring reports. However, the projects visited and interviews showed a significant effort to involve local authorities. The result has been mixed and cannot compare to those achieved in similar projects in the neighbouring country. For instance, in a cross border project, the close involvement of the health authorities and emergency medical staff in Haiti is at best encouraging<sup>63</sup> while on the Dominican Republic side of the project, the local and national health authorities assumed full ownership and planned to replicate and expand the activities.
- In the autonomous Caribbean Regions of Nicaragua, municipalities were urged (they reportedly complied) to support staff and assign a DRR budget. This effort was facilitated by local NGOs (subcontracted by ECHO European Partners): the statement “We are not delivering services; we want to support the municipality to do it” illustrates the capacity building approach of those local indigenous NGOs. Municipalities such as Santa Fe along the northern coast of Honduras have also dedicated a modest budgetary line to DRR.
- In Honduras, a particularly fruitful partnership between San Pedro Sula authorities and the private sector is discussed later.
- In Colombia, two recently created institutions (UNGRD mentioned above) and the Unidad de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV) are progressively setting up and strengthening offices in every municipality. Cooperation and coordination of ECHO partners with those local offices was good and open. However, directly building the capacity of those offices was not in the activities of the projects we visited.

In Bolivia, involvement and visible ownership was systematic and multi-scale. National, municipal, decentralized authorities (Gobierno Autónomo, Comité de Operaciones de Emergencia--COE, and alcaldes) and even the indigenous authorities were actively engaged in activities. They witnessed and spoke eloquently about why the DRR and resilience-type activities were important components of their respective programmes. In the Perception Survey there was wide agreement that ECHO-funded efforts align with national priorities (N=334) (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Perception Survey, Alignment to national priorities**




<sup>63</sup> Local ownership and support from technical counterparts was very convincing at personal level but did not turn into institutional commitment, often by lack of resources or political influence.



While government entity participation in ECHO actions was nearly unanimous, visible ownership was much less forthcoming leaving a lot of respondents “undecided” (N=334) (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4: Perception Survey, Government participation and ownership**



**In summary, the findings suggest a close cooperation between individual partners and the authorities. This partner relationship is not matched at strategic level with a direct relationship between ECHO and national authorities as is the case for most development international stakeholders.**

### How well do ECHO-funded efforts align with the wider policy and practice landscape within the EU?

Internal coherence is a priority for the EU. The adoption of the Council conclusions on the EU Approach to *resilience* commits all EU instruments as well as the Member States. Among the main development actors in the European Commission is the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), responsible for designing European international cooperation and development policy and delivering aid throughout the world.<sup>64</sup> DEVCO is the main interlocutor within the EC for integrating resilience into development.

EU and partners' interlocutors praised the persistent **advocacy by ECHO for *resilience* on behalf of the most vulnerable** and recognized its influence on shaping the landscape. There were however some who felt that proactive advocacy (lobbying) for *resilience* outside the humanitarian community was weak. Few interlocutors went so far as to state that their own policy and commitment to *resilience* is a direct result of ECHO advocacy. Some implementing partners report that their own lobbying has also positively influenced ECHO. In addition to DIPECHO advocacy, many factors (global or national) have contributed to shaping the emerging culture of *resilience* in LAC. Among those factors: one can highlight the increasing recognition of the longer-term developmental cost of disasters (both economic and social), the intensive global advocacy through first the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990-1999) and the World Conference in Yokohama (1994) setting targets and goals for national/regional commitment and monitoring. In the last 15 years, DIPECHO initiative was integral part of a broader effort with the launching of the UNISDR and the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> World Conferences in Kobe and Sendai respectively. Many other actors such as the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and PAHO<sup>65</sup> had also a strong influence in shaping this regional risk reduction culture. The DIPECHO initiative in the period covered by the evaluation was critical in involving the communities and the civil society in this otherwise top down process.

A recent and promising example of concrete advocacy is the contribution of ECHO to the planning of the European Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia. ECHO's participation aimed to ensure a smooth transition from humanitarian response to recovery after peace. A document adapting the *resilience* markers to the context of the Trust Fund is actively promoted by ECHO. As the signature of the

<sup>64</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/general\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/general_en)

<sup>65</sup> With funding from OFDA, DFID, Canada and ECHO)

Peace agreement with the FARC was imminent but had not yet taken place during our visit, information on the procedures of the Trust Fund was not available.<sup>66</sup>

Advocacy for *resilience* and actually aligning or joining efforts with EU development actors are different issues. The evaluators' prior evaluations of DIPECHO across the world had shown a built-in self-isolation of ECHO from other instruments and in particular the Delegation in order to "preserve the independence and impartiality of ECHO's humanitarian response". This was far from being the case in LAC at the time of this evaluation. All parties agreed: dialogue is open, data are shared and with increasing frequency, key *resilience*-related financial decisions are made with a varying level of prior consultation between DEVCO and ECHO.

Enquiries made on possible ongoing joint, complementary or coordinated initiatives co-implemented by DEVCO and ECHO to promote *resilience* were relatively unsuccessful but probably also premature in view of the long process for launching development projects. There are however a few collaborative and encouraging ventures, in the aftermath of disasters:

- After the 2013 Christmas floods in the Eastern Caribbean islands: ECHO channelled humanitarian contributions through the Small Scale Response Instrument and DREF instruments for the most immediate needs; this emergency operation has been complemented by DFID funds (same partner, same Single Form); at the same time as the Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction -GFDRR<sup>67</sup> made available funds for two Rapid Damage and Loss Assessments (DaLA), that led to the mobilization by the EU of EUR 12,675 million for reconstruction under the Bridging Facility of the 10th and 11th European Development Fund (EDF).
- EDF funds in 2010 contributed to ECHO humanitarian response after the impact of Hurricane Tomas in Saint Vincent and Grenadines and Saint Lucia and in 2012 after Hurricane Sandy in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.
- The recent joint training ECHO-DEVCO-EU Member States on resilience proved to be not only an interesting tool to have a coordinated approach, but also to facilitate these synergies. "There is a commitment to do it on a 2-year basis in the Caribbean to assess our progress towards resilience" (ECHO Staff).

There were also several interesting examples of partially coordinated and parallel initiatives in Haiti, the most challenging country in LAC for both humanitarian and development communities<sup>68</sup>.

- To improve and formalize this cooperation, the EC launched a Joint Humanitarian Development Framework (JHDF). This framework aims to promote joint and

## Good Practices

Adoption of a clear policy and mechanism (e.g. the JDHF) for increased dialogue, consultation and joint action between EU development and humanitarian actors.

Agreed upon concrete goals and targets (where, for whom, by whom, when) for cooperation / complementarity for resilience building. A good practice but also a key indicator of success.

Active participation at country level of Member States in the process.

Joint workshop between DEVCO and ECHO in Bolivia.

<sup>66</sup> At the time of finalizing the report, the Accord has been signed but narrowly rejected by a national referendum.

<sup>67</sup> EU made substantial contributions to the Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR)

<sup>68</sup> Haiti is the poorest country in LAC (the only Least Developed Country in the region) and the most vulnerable to natural and manmade crises. kim

complementary actions between the EC and European External Action Service (EEAS) and within the EC between ECHO and DEVCO and other stakeholders. The process has recently started and is promising. DFID is an active player in JHDF through exchange of information, plans and ongoing consultation. It was the only national EU program participating in our meeting in the delegation.

- ECHO and DEVCO addressed the issue of relocation of residents in the temporary settlements with different approaches, timing and budget. On one side, ECHO funded a significant number of projects based on rental subsidies, IGA, WASH, Health and other services. On the other side, the Delegation launched the Programme for Reconstruction and Development of Neighbourhoods (PARAQ), a longer and better funded initiative to reconstruct and renovate some neighbourhoods in the affected Capital<sup>69</sup>. Coherence between the two initiatives was achieved through informal dialogue and mutual understanding between the key EU actors and the presence of some of the same partners in both initiatives.

In South America, progress was also reported. Bolivia, a country without a permanent presence of ECHO staff, is nevertheless much closer to this achievement. In Oruro after the floods, an intervention from DEVCO was followed by ECHO for the same communities. The forthcoming initiative of a DG DEVCO-ECHO joint workshop in Bolivia (Santa Cruz) is a contribution to the goal of jointly designed initiatives.

In all countries, partners occasionally received funding from both DEVCO and ECHO. Activities and targets were not often the same but both contributions were integrated smoothly into the strategic plan of the respective partner. In Nicaragua, local indigenous NGOs, which are credited for most of the *resilience* work on the Caribbean coast, are not eligible for **direct** support by ECHO for their DRR activities (but can be integrated as implementing partners) reported having received occasional direct funding from the Delegation.


One standing issue delaying joint DEVCO-ECHO initiatives, as explained by ECHO in Haiti, is the approach to the selection of communities and beneficiaries for *resilience* activities. ECHO is wholly dedicated to targeting the most vulnerable while development actors will also consider the potential (although not a guarantee) for success (i.e. impact) as an important criterion. In addition, development programmes are negotiated with Governments, a lengthy and unpredictable process but providing a sense of national ownership that is important for replication, expansion and sustainability. ECHO approach while appropriate for interventions mostly humanitarian in nature appeared counterproductive for projects primarily addressing long term resilience of beneficiaries.

At regional level, ECHO supported the main partners with regional mandates: The UN International Strategy for Disaster reduction (UNISDR), UNDP and the International Federation of Red Cross. The cooperation of partners with sub regional disaster reduction agencies was an asset. ECHO contributed to placing resilience among the priorities at regional level. The value of ECHO at the regional level is particularly visible and useful to the extent that ECHO promotes a culture of learning, exchange and solidarity, and especially regarding hazards that respect no administrative border. Policies, stronger capacities and good practice cultivated in stronger countries are shared with the weaker countries (through exchanges, etc.). There is, however, no one-size-fits all. Providing more direct support to sub-regional organizations and ensuring ownership at national level remain critical.

Although a large set of respondents did not have enough information to form an opinion, more than 60% of respondents (N=334) believe that the ECHO-funded actions are aligned with European priorities.

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<sup>69</sup> 55,800,000 Euros from the EU, 10,500,000 from AFD and 8,000,000 from NGO's and Red Cross (ECHO partners)

**Figure 5: Perception Survey, Alignment with European Priorities**

### How do ECHO-funded activities support the priorities identified by other key actors?

Other key stakeholders are usually part of the Humanitarian Country Team, a UN-led coordination/consultation mechanism. Outside this mechanism, often co funded by ECHO, informal meetings with other donors also take place. One isolated sign of duplication was reported with Non-EU donors (a training project duplicated by USAID in Honduras – lack of information exchange?).

In brief, ECHO is seen to support national priorities in Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras and the Dominican Republic. There are some more nuanced opinions in Nicaragua. In Haiti, the international community has traditionally set the national priorities as they deem fit.

The main factor seems to be the level and quality of the national commitment to resilience/DRR as perceived by the international community and ECHO. ECHO seems to be too risk adverse in trusting the judgment of national authorities in a development like initiative such as promotion of resilience.

Dialogue within the EU has improved considerably but still falls short of resulting in coordinated initiatives jointly targeting the same communities with DEVCO and ECHO projects.

Advocacy for *resilience* efforts targeting the most vulnerable is generally praised. Over the years, DIPECHO has become recognized as an independent voice for communities, DRR and LRRD.

What is, under this new context, the added value of ECHO within the EU? The question was regularly asked in our interviews and the answers were validated during our visits to projects. The most frequently mentioned unique assets or added-value are as follows:


- ECHO has a special understanding of intensive risks (disasters) and a definite mandate to reduce their future impact on the vulnerable communities that it provides emergency assistance to. The use of resilience markers is encouraging humanitarian partners to consider the long-term implications and consequences of their immediate response (Do no harm and Build Back Better). Interlocutors see a critical role for ECHO in Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) in countries recovering from a major stress or shock.
- ECHO has a vested interest in minimizing the need for future humanitarian assistance.<sup>70</sup> It will be the first one to observe the adequacy and effectiveness of the EU efforts.
- Development agencies tended to focus on the underlying developmental causes. ECHO with its close relation and familiarity with Disaster Management and Risk Reduction national institutions is THE EU instrument for preparedness within the broader scope of DRR and resilience building. The respective roles of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Development Program are illustrative in this regard. Although preparedness and risk reduction are responsibilities of UNDP, OCHA as the response coordinator continue to offer a significant contribution.

<sup>70</sup> Climate change scenarios and demographic trends suggest a marked increase in future risk. Reducing in absolute terms the impact of risks (number of dead and affected population) and the need for humanitarian assistance would require a massive effort not seen as realistic in the short term.

- ECHO persistent focus on communities and local authorities and civil society participation was an asset to contribute to a proper balance of EU resilience initiatives between the strengthening of national institutions and economic development and the more direct impact on the most vulnerable people.
- ECHO hands on approach (“ECHO is the only donor coming to remote communities where we are working, asking questions and giving us good practical advice”), its field presence and monitoring capacity and its network of partners extending from grass roots small actors up to large INGOs or UN agencies are recognized as highly valuable assets to DEVCO and other EU stakeholders.
- The innovative capacity of ECHO was also mentioned. ECHO relatively light structure, its operational agility and administrative flexibility permitted to launch pilot initiatives and to be often one step ahead of others.

On the other side, development oriented partners and stakeholders tended to see ECHO’s exclusive focus of its resilience projects “on the most vulnerable”, independently of the potential for impact, as a handicap in developing efficient pilot initiatives, promoting them or advocating cost effective *resilience* to major development actors.

**Figure 6: Perception Survey, Added Value**



One decade ago, DIPECHO was the only programme advocating and funding DRR. National governments are progressively assuming responsibility and asserting their leadership, sometimes with mixed results. Several countries now have a DRR budget far exceeding ECHO’s and in some cases all external DRR/ *resilience* contributions.

ECHO is no longer the main funding source for DRR and *resilience* in LAC and needs to rethink its role and capitalize on its unique strengths and identity. Pioneering a field, promoting its ownership and succeeding, is a challenge. ECHO has maintained serious assets ensuring its place in resilience building by contributing knowledge and offering technical assistance to development programme design.

#### 4.4 EQ.4: What is the level of EFFECTIVENESS of ECHO actions?

This issue is twofold:

1. To identify the impact of ECHO funded projects on *resilience* to any type of stress, shock or disaster with the understanding that *resilience* is a residual effect or ultimate condition once the project is terminated. The Systematic Portfolio Analysis (SPA) tried to address this question for projects fully dedicated to DRR/ *resilience* building. However, most projects were primarily humanitarian with an integrated *resilience* as one of the proposed results (e.g. relocation projects in Haiti with more resistant housing and IGAs, most of the Build Back Better -BBB- recovery activities, WASH, Cholera etc....). See examples below.
2. To evaluate the overall effectiveness of ECHO’s strategy and approach. This is not the sum of the *resilience* effectiveness of ECHO funded activities. It includes the advocacy and promotion of *resilience* within the EU and the international community. Changing attitudes are as critical at regional level as they are at community level, if not more so.



*Resilience*, as indicated in section 5.1, is the capacity to adjust to future stress and shocks. It is not something objectively measurable when a project has just finished. The only truly objective measure is through *counterfactual studies* using a comparison group after the occurrence of shocks and stresses (see limitations and constraints under 4.3).<sup>71</sup> In the absence of this confirmation, good practices, promoted for instance in the EU *Resilience Compendium*<sup>72</sup> or identified in this evaluation, are based on professional judgment or anecdotal experience and assumptions, not on evidence and hard facts.

In terms of coordination, capacity building and *resilience*, what matters most is the process and the impact on the future attitude of people, communities and institutions under stress, an outcome which is not guaranteed in even the best designed and implemented projects. SMART indicators as reviewed in the logframes of the Single Forms were of little value for this purpose. Designed to be manageable for the partner (easily implementable under adverse conditions) and quantifiable for ECHO, they measure outputs under the control of the Partner. Most interesting were the occasional observations by ECHO's field staff in the FichOps concluding that expected results were technically met<sup>73</sup> but expressing doubts concerning the impact on the *resilience* of the project.

Based on the review of the projects, interviews with ECHO, Partners and stakeholders, some examples of best practices are offered based on factors that lead the evaluators to believe that indeed the assumption of an impact on future *resilience* may be reasonable.

### Systematic Portfolio Analysis (SPA)

The appreciation of ECHO staff on the performance of the projects they monitored gives an overview of the perceived effectiveness. With a few exceptions, effectiveness refers to the overall projects. For those involving a humanitarian response with a limited *resilience* content, separate effectiveness scoring was generally not available from the review of files. It can reasonably be assumed that a project deemed by the ECHO Field Officer (FO) and Desk Officer (DO) as generally very effective is also considered effective in terms of its *resilience* content (unless otherwise noted).

Based on the delivery of the expected results<sup>74</sup> (i.e. meeting the indicators on outputs and outcomes), it is a good overall proxy indicator of performance. Particularly interesting, is the improvement over time in the evaluation period (from 70% fully effective in 2012 to 87% in 2015).

**Table 7: Overall effectiveness of ECHO funded projects**

| EQ3: EFFECTIVENESS        | 2012      |     | 2013      |     | 2014      |     | 2015      |     | TOTAL     |     |
|---------------------------|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|
| <i>Approved Proposals</i> | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   |
| 0: Not Effective          | 1         | 5%  |           | 0%  |           | 0%  |           | 0%  | 1         | 1%  |
| 1: Partially Effective    | 5         | 25% | 8         | 30% | 3         | 23% | 2         | 13% | 18        | 24% |
| 2: Fully Effective        | 14        | 70% | 19        | 70% | 10        | 77% | 13        | 87% | 56        | 75% |
| <b>Grand Total</b>        | <b>20</b> |     | <b>27</b> |     | <b>13</b> |     | <b>15</b> |     | <b>75</b> |     |

<sup>71</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dcdndep/37671602.pdf>

<sup>72</sup> European Commission, 2016. *EU Resilience Compendium: Saving Lives and Livelihoods*.  
[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/eu\\_resilience\\_compendium\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/eu_resilience_compendium_en.pdf)

<sup>73</sup> I.e. the goods were distributed, the meetings or workshops were held with the promised number of participants and committees constituted and met.

<sup>74</sup> In humanitarian assistance projects with added *resilience* content, only the results relating to *resilience* (training, preparedness, awareness, etc.) were reviewed.



## Field visits

In each country visited, some “best practices” were noted. Being context sensitive, they are not necessarily easily replicable.

### Bolivia:

- ECHO-funded projects focused on the municipalities of La Paz and El Alto appear to have been particularly effective in strengthening preparedness and DRR awareness among schools and urban populations. This was done through a creative and thorough media campaign, and by developing animated characters (i.e., a zebra) and then staging live actors in public areas dressed as zebras to disseminate and promote safe-cities messages.
- Setting an entire watershed (as opposed to administrative boundaries) as the site of a wide-scale multiple partner *resilience* project is a significant step towards thinking holistically, as required to build true *resilience* in a given region.
- Community *resilience* is known to be strongly supported through social cohesion. The ECHO-funded efforts which were visited, demonstrated ways to foster social cohesion such as through the public distribution, in cascade, of harvested short-cycle seeds from each of the three “first generation” demonstrative farmers to three additional farming families.
- Respect for and inclusion of support to indigenous authorities (in Bolivia CIMPTA and CIPTA) is also thought to be an effective technique to foster further *resilience* building, as it starts with local knowledge and cultures.

### Good Practices

- Requiring a commitment from local authorities (staff, budget according to context) and co-funding from national authorities (when possible).
- Use (and contracting) of local partners and NGOs.
- Mobilize, motivate the private sector.
- *Resilience* sensitive approach in humanitarian response (the four *resilience* markers is added value)
- Focus mostly on perceived needs and priorities rather than on “what we know is best for them”.
- Consortium or multi sectorial efforts (critical mass).
- Transfer decision power and restore dignity to beneficiaries (cash with few constraints).
- Truly cross border cooperation (south to south)

### Colombia

- ICRC Support to income generation is not based on the partner’s preconceived ideas of standard skills for income generation but on the study of the market, agreement with (and subsidies to) local businesses and training for the jobs actually required in the local urban economy. 67 % of the trainees retained their employment with a salary and social benefits once ICRC subsidies ended. More important perhaps are the conclusions of an evaluation in 2015 that the participants developed self-confidence, leadership and are planning new life projects for their family. Dignity as noted in the conclusions of the world humanitarian summit is a condition for *resilience*.
- Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) agricultural projects to increase *resilience* to climatic disasters have been funded for the entire period covered by the evaluation. They are praised (and funded) both by ECHO and the national authorities. Their effectiveness results from direct benefits in seasonal stresses and shocks through the introduction of new seeds, planting techniques, seed banks etc. adapted to each local micro-culture and its food preferences. Crops with rapid yield that are drought and flood resistant, did not replace but complemented the traditional cultures (“We have a different model for each community”). The impact of el Nino in 2015 was reportedly less severe in the communities benefitting from ECHO funded projects and in Putumayo, production was sufficient in project

communities to provide food to nearby urban areas affected by a one-month strike.<sup>75</sup> The FAO's reported success is in part due to the mix of humanitarian and long term development objectives and approaches. We observed that development agencies are often more determined and successful in promoting *resilience*.

- Too many projects targeting recent IDPs, however, still use a donation approach (bags of groceries....) with limited long-term benefits. The use of cash, an approach fostering dignity and autonomy, is likely to have a greater impact on resilience building in the case of a dynamic economy as found in Colombia. Some donated items such as water filters and mosquito nets will have a lasting impact on reducing vulnerability to future health problems. This direct provision of material assistance is a most valuable humanitarian emergency response activity with a somewhat modest contribution to household resilience capacity building. Some examples of beneficiaries who were able to use this assistance to start an income generating activity were provided.
- Colombia established mechanisms for cash assistance (subsidies) to registered victims of the violence. Several ECHO funded projects provided legal and administrative orientation and assistance to the IDPs on their eligibility and procedures to avail itself of this assistance. In a country with a social safety net, awareness of entitlements and support through the application and registration process are improving the resilience of the beneficiaries. In this context, temporary in kind donations are effective gap filling measures provided they are maintained until the official assistance is taking place. This was not always the case with an arbitrarily short duration.

How much of the Government of Colombia's strong legislative and policy commitment to the management of risks and the assistance to victims of violence is due to the advocacy by ECHO is impossible to determine. However, interlocutors agreed that the trademark of DIPECHO has indeed played a role.

## Cuba

ECHO evaluation reports at the closure of the projects clearly document the expected positive *resilience* impact of the projects, underlining the critical importance of the partners' prior knowledge of local communities and their close integration with government priorities. Those reports are overwhelmingly positive on the impact that the recovery / building back better projects are having on *resilience*. It illustrates, as in the case of Colombia, that commitment of the national authorities is perhaps the determining factor of the effectiveness of resilience building activities of ECHO funded initiatives. The process for approval of those projects in Cuba is reportedly one of the most time-consuming (several ministries) but it is a small cost for a full ownership by the national authorities. In terms of building resilience, ECHO investment in pilot initiatives in Cuba has been effective.

## Dominican Republic

The visit to the projects has provided interesting lessons.

- Six months after the end of a training project, 28 private individual home builders/entrepreneurs met with the evaluation team on a Saturday. The level of their commitment to safe building practices in their small businesses was remarkable in spite of the occasional reluctance of their clients to absorb the additional costs for safe housing.

<sup>75</sup> The partner did not carry a formal comparative (counterfactual) analysis to confirm objectively those anecdotal observations. This point is addressed later.

- In another instance, the active participation of the highest municipal authorities at the emergency committee meeting was an expression of real personal commitment to DRR /*resilience*.
- In another locality, the beneficiaries praised the partner for improving the security of their cattle through evacuation routes and animal shelters. The project was effective in that it successfully addressed the main concern of the beneficiaries!
- The effectiveness of the preparedness for tsunami was very doubtful: Interlocutors (civil protection and municipal authorities) could not explain how and when the population was supposed to evacuate toward higher grounds given the very short warning time in the Caribbean. On the other hand, the 17 students (11 women) of the Master course on safe building practices run by the same project highly appreciated its value. The Autonomous University of Santo Domingo housing the course is considering including it in its own curriculum.

## Haiti

In Haiti, effectiveness in terms of *resilience* is more problematic. It is the country where our interlocutors raised questions most consistently on whether a 12-month humanitarian project can be expected to improve *resilience* even at community level. They stressed that this is particularly critical in a country where the local authorities have no resource or decision-making power, central governance is poor (a euphemism) and poverty extreme. The dependency of *resilience*-building on the local context (or commitment) is best illustrated by the Haiti-Dominican Republic border project to strengthen emergency health services (see Text Box).

### Haiti – Dominican Republic Cross-Border Health Project

**In Haiti**, we noted the genuine enthusiasm of departmental emergency physicians for the ongoing cooperation between hospitals, civil protection and police on all incidents / accidents. This positive attitude has to be placed in the national context of a medical strike closing down hospitals and health centres. Progress in the ambulance dispatch Centre and the Department of Health were notable although modest. The national authorities, in our contacts, did not express a particular support or commitment for this departmental activity.

**In the Dominican Republic**, a less vulnerable country, changes were faster and plans to replicate in other provinces were presented by high level officials travelling from the capital to meet us.

Methods and support from the implementing partner (the Pan American Health Organisation) are similar in both countries. This two speed process and contrast in impact illustrated the low level of achievements in the *resilience* building of ECHO (and other donor) funded projects in a country where national authorities are not sufficiently motivated, supportive and actively involved.

**The contrast potentially has negative effects.** The Dominican Republic side expected rapid improvements in the spontaneous flow of medically undocumented Haitian patients seeking care across the border. These expectations of an orderly referral system as a result of a first phase of a project are premature. The DR side capacity to deliver medical assistance for all the patients (national or Haitian) will be enhanced which is a positive result, as well as a first step in addressing this cross border problematic. Further cooperation between countries should be supported to ensure implementation of binational protocol. Given the current global trend towards intolerance to immigrants, binding together the health facilities on both sides of the border into a south-south cooperation may become critical. PAHO, the ECHO partner is providing technical support directly to both institutions, not facilitating south-south cooperation, personal links and therefore empathy between the authorities of the respective hospitals. Enabling (and funding) technical and material support between a given Dominican hospital and a twinned Haitian facility should be the priority in a second phase of the project.

## Cholera Projects

There are disagreeing opinions regarding the residual *resilience* impact left by the cholera control programmes in Haiti. Those projects, primarily humanitarian assistance (response to the epidemic surge), were secondarily aiming to strengthen the capacity of the health services with an early exit strategy once the national Ministry of Health would be in a position to assume its role. This has not happened. However, many of the partners (PAHO, UN, NGOs, Red Cross) stressed the Ministry of Health's acceptance and "ownership" of the mechanisms developed by those projects: a good surveillance system, the mobile community response teams, the building of cholera treatment centres and the training of the departments among others. The Ministry of Health showed some pride and sense of ownership in Port Au Prince. However, all agreed that those mechanisms need continuing international assistance (funds and staff) to function. In Haiti, "*Resilience*" remains utterly dependent on assistance from the international community

## Projects for Relocation of IDPs

Identifying longer term housing solutions for earthquake affected population living in camps had become a pressing priority several years after the impact of the earthquake. Several projects for the relocation of IDPs were funded with a concern for improving the *resilience* of the beneficiaries in their new location. The activities included Rental Subsidy Cash Grants (RSCG), repair / improvement of yellow houses (from IDP or owners agreeing to rent),<sup>76</sup> IGA, WASH, health access, and other services or DRR measures. Large players are Goal, Concern, and IOM. Doubts about the outcomes of some projects (as opposed to outputs) and their sustainability were raised in the documents reviewed.

Field visits found that the projects were effective in providing an alternative to resident in temporary camps. How resilient beneficiaries have become is a more complicated issue. Three independent evaluations commissioned to study this impact, reached rather distinct and invariably nuanced conclusions.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Houses classified yellow are damaged by the earthquake but are reparable.

<sup>77</sup> GOAL Haiti (2015): Évaluation Finale du projet « Tounen Lakay » phase II

Large-N Analysis Inc. (2014) Second external evaluation of the rental support cash grant applied to return and relocation programs in Haiti. The Wolf Group (2013). External evaluation of the Rental Support Cash Grant Approach Applied to Return and Relocation Programs in Haiti.

## Effectiveness of the relocation projects (Rental cash support)

The main findings of the three external evaluations are as follows:

- According to Wolf Group (2013) “the results are extremely promising: one year on, no grantees have returned to camps and 100% have autonomously found an accommodation solution.” “The survey results suggest that up to 25% of grantees remain in the same rental accommodation for a second year. Those that choose to change their rental solution are continuing to exercise their free choice to find accommodation solutions that reflect their financial means and personal priorities. Of the 75% that moved, 49% reported being unable to pay the rent, while 26% attributed their move to problems with the landlord.” Those findings call for comment: The rental subsidy for one year is given to the rental owner! Not surprising that all found an accommodation solution. That 75% are “exercising their free choice” to leave after the end of the subsidy is less than “extremely promising”.
- The survey contracted by 10 partners to Large-N Analysis Inc. (2014) is based on a larger sample and lead to more positive findings: “Of those individuals who had completed their rental subsidy, 49% of respondents moved to a new rental accommodation, whereas the remaining 51% stayed in the rental accommodation after the completion of their one-year rental subsidy term. Just over 20% of respondents reported moving owing to the price of their rental, and 15% reported moving because of problems with the landlord. 5.5% reported moving because of security concerns”.
- Goal evaluation (2015) is more pointed: “The majority of beneficiaries and community leaders expressed their satisfaction on the improvement of the economic, security and health situation of the beneficiaries...In the longer term, the grant recipients are less positive about their future ability to continue to pay rent once the grant period is complete (75% of grantees with a small trade income said they may not to continue to pay)”. In addition, “community leaders have dismissed as inadequate resources and coaching on the risk management component and disasters. They believe that it has not produced the desired effects “

Regarding relocation effectiveness, the findings suggest that the initiative has been effective in providing safe housing alternatives to part of the beneficiaries. ECHO and other actors should be credited for their efforts to submit their achievements to scientific scrutiny. The divergence of results of the studies for a measurable an objective outcome (safe housing) also illustrates how difficult it will be to measure “the capacity to adjust or resilience”, a soft but important result.

The above examples illustrate that in a country like Haiti, criteria and expectations for effective *resilience* must be dramatically lowered to make them realistic. It is only possible to go so far when governance, accountability and genuine concern are lacking at national level. This is especially true when building *resilience* (a long term goal) is expected to bear results in projects of 12-18-month duration.

There will be important lessons to be learned from the persisting vulnerability of the Haitian cities and communities as demonstrated by the impact of Hurricane Matthew at the time of finalizing this report.<sup>78</sup> Building resilience and reducing the need for future humanitarian assistance may not be a credible objective for ECHO in countries where and when underlying causes of vulnerability are not effectively addressed.

<sup>78</sup> Damage assessment is still going on but news reports mention 90% of destruction in the south.



### In Honduras:

- In Santa Fe and Juliapa, beneficiaries recognized that they are better organized today due to the project. There is a community organizational structure that did not exist before and that can be used to achieve other developmental objectives. This is a common and intangible impact mentioned or observed in community based projects.
- The joint local authorities – private sector initiative in San Pedro Sula has been very effective in mobilizing the community and the private sector, in identifying risks and improving *resilience*. It expanded much further than the original modest objective.
- As in Bolivia, the watershed approach, rather a traditional community focus, has been credited for the effectiveness of projects aiming for *resilience* building.

### In Nicaragua:

- Small co-funding of local projects by municipalities in the autonomous Caribbean regions is, in our opinion, an example of success in changing attitudes and building capacity in rural areas. This has been possible thanks to the lead participation of local Caribbean NGOs and a priority being placed on getting things done BY the local authorities instead of merely getting them done.
- Similar examples are available in urban areas. ECHO funded a DIPECHO project in 2012 for DRR / *resilience* in District II of the Capital. After the completion of the project, an earthquake shocked the capital (April 2014) giving a chance to formally demonstrate by counterfactual analysis the effectiveness and impact of the investment. Testimonies were collected by the Partner (Spanish / Nicaraguan Red Cross) suggesting an improved response to the emergency. Unfortunately, the testimonies are anecdotal and guided by the interviewer. They are mostly useful for public relations purposes. Another occasion to more rigorously prove (rather than suggest) an impact has been lost.

Altogether, there are many stories suggesting improved awareness, preparedness that may lead to future *resilience*. The extent of success depends on the country (and local) commitment.

## 4.5 EQ.5: What was the level of EFFICIENCY of the ECHO actions?

The Systematic Portfolio Analysis of the documents of projects with resilience content did not permit an objective comparison in terms of efficiency per beneficiary. The number and type (institutions or persons) of those beneficiaries varied extensively between activities and projects. The effectiveness achieved for each result and the resilience benefit actually received by the “beneficiaries” was not available from the analysis of the project documents.

The visits and interviews, however, suggest some strengths and shortcomings.

- The appointment of an ECHO focal point<sup>79</sup> in the Delegations, especially when ECHO has no permanent staff (Bolivia) is seen as a very effective and efficient approach to advocating and promoting *resilience*. While this is apparently done in every country of that profile, it seems that there is no formal mechanism for it, no MoU, not even a semi-formal agreement of what proportion of time would be dedicated to ECHO nor a systematic mention of the task in the respective job descriptions. Success of the mechanisms also largely depends on the profile and personality of the focal point.
- Other positive measures to increase efficiency (and impact) are ECHO’s effort to promote the use of cash when possible. It is indeed a strong and often better tool for increasing

<sup>79</sup> In some countries without a permanent ECHO staff presence, a person inside the EU Delegation is identified and a MoU is prepared to enable that person to complete specific ECHO-related tasks.



*resilience* and dignity.<sup>80</sup> ECHO has organised several workshops and issued guidelines on the use of cash. Some partners have adopted this approach while others seemed unwilling to trust the judgment of their beneficiaries.

- Under the consortium approach encouraged by ECHO, several partners with distinct sectorial interests, type of beneficiaries or geographic areas of influence, join forces to present one single and larger project to ECHO. It is felt by many and by the evaluators as an efficient and cost saving approach to getting issues further promoted, especially at a time when resources for LAC are decreasing. It has been particularly efficient when targeting special groups (the handicapped, women, etc.) within a general project e.g. relocation of IDPs in Haiti. This is beyond the value consortia bring in terms of joint problem statements and multi-disciplinary components that are typically more holistic and far-reaching in terms of potential for *resilience*.
- The progressive decrease in partners' international staff and above all the participation of local NGOs (Caribbean coast of Nicaragua, Colombia, Dominican Republic...) has reduced the costs and increased effectiveness. Additional gains would result from ECHO adapting its procedures to directly fund those local NGOs *resilience* activities as is the case with DG DEVCO and some EU actors. A reduction in the need for and presence of international NGOs, as was observed in Honduras, should be seen as a positive sign.
- Community-based *resilience*, addressing all the extensive risks (stresses and shocks) perceived by communities (and not only by the partner) appeared more likely to be implemented with greater ease and a lower cost than those exclusively focused on one rare and unfamiliar but potentially catastrophic event (such as tsunamis).

Commitment from local and national authorities is essential for effectiveness. Without it, there is little resilience impact and resources are not used efficiently. There is a so called “window of opportunity” after disasters to introduce DRR and resilience measures.

Interlocutors pointed to some factors reducing occasionally ECHO's efficient use of resources:

- The short duration of ECHO funded projects is increasing costs and decreasing the likelihood of an impact. Time is achieving more *resilience* than money.
- A broad dispersion or a sprinkling of resources without a clear focus. At project level, the dispersed efforts in the Beni & Mamore Basin in Bolivia with 75 communities hardly accessible and supposed to receive a broad range of services, is one example. In a “simple” emergency such as cholera, the diversity of projects and partners without a lead agency being acknowledged by ECHO is another example.<sup>81</sup> Larger initiatives may be more efficient and easier to evaluate and monitor.
- Coherence over time is also more efficient. The shift in Haiti from *resilience* building commitments to response to drought in 2015, was seen as counterproductive by the partners encouraged to curtail their *resilience* activities for an emergency drought situation. Whether this concerned only funds to be returned to the ECHO activities could not be confirmed.
- Other examples of less cost-effective approaches mentioned above are the reportedly strict criteria for the selection of new IDPs as beneficiaries in Colombia<sup>82</sup>. The result there was assistance delivered at a high cost for only three families in a temporary settlement when all IDP families were equally vulnerable. This is an atypical and exceptional case as usually ECHO is very flexible to human needs.

<sup>80</sup> Several interlocutors mentioned that “There is no true resilience without dignity”.


<sup>81</sup> There was some controversy in discussion with ECHO field staff on whether cholera is endemic in Haiti. By all standards and global definitions, cholera is indeed endemic in the country. It does not mean that it could not be eradicated with a massive investment in WASH, health care and poverty reduction.

<sup>82</sup> Criteria included a recent displacement, excluding needed IDPs settled for some time.

- Finally, the amount of efforts invested in the design and monitoring of SMART indicators to monitor outputs internally and externally, appears inefficient in the context of *resilience*, an outcome requiring flexibility and balanced subjective assessment over a much longer time frame.

In general, even though this question registered the greatest proportion of undecided (30%), a majority of respondents perceive that efforts are cost-effective (N=334, see Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Perception Survey, Cost-effectiveness**



#### 4.6 EQ.6: What is the level of SUSTAINABILITY of ECHO actions?

The sustainability of the impact cannot be separated from the effectiveness. *Resilience* is the capacity to cope with future stresses and shocks. The effectiveness of a *resilience* activity presupposes that the impact will last (be sustained) until the next shock or stress.

The sustainability of the activities themselves, including the expansion or replication of projects, is an issue to be reviewed under this Evaluation Question. The sustainability of DIPECHO pilot projects depends largely if not exclusively on the sense of ownership, resources and commitment of the local or national authorities.

There are examples of replication. A visit in San Gregorio de Nigua in the Dominican Republic started with a meeting with the Vice-alcaldeza. She mentioned that risk reduction and preparedness remained priorities for the local government, given the multi-hazard profile of their jurisdiction (floods, landslides, seismic activity). Work has focused on the reinforcement of the capacities of the most vulnerable communities, and local committees created and trained during the project (terminated) are still very active. Moreover, eight communities, not included in the funded beneficiaries, have reportedly replicated the experience. This requires commitment and a sense of ownership but not significant resources or budget.

A classic example of sustainability is the ECHO programme in Cuba.<sup>83</sup> If national authorities or ECHO see no long-term potential, a project is unlikely to be approved. As mentioned above, the DRR authorities in Cuba do not merely “authorize” an international project but are part of the planning process ensuring that the proposed activities and beneficiaries are those most appropriate from their point of view. This is making ECHO pilot initiatives more likely to be effective and sustainable. The length of the vetting process, reportedly up to 6 months, is a significant cost considering the up to 2Year duration of ECHO DRR financial decisions but it is worth the added benefit of a project with good potential of sustainability above and beyond the HIP life cycle.

Some types of activities leading to economic self-improvement have a built-in potential for sustainability. Although we could not ascertain it in the field, reasonable and believable information was collected that agricultural yield improvements under difficult climatic conditions, successful income generating activities, critical water systems maintenance, home water filters and mosquito nets, and other activities of direct and demonstrated benefit, had a strong potential for sustainability.

<sup>83</sup> As indicated, time constraints did not permit a visit to Cuba. However, the core evaluators were familiar with the humanitarian and DRR activities in this country.

**Table 8: Perceived overall sustainability of ECHO funded projects in LAC (SPA)**

| EQ6: SUSTAINABILITY      | 2012      |     | 2013      |     | 2014      |     | 2015      |     | TOTAL      |     |
|--------------------------|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|------------|-----|
| Approved Proposals       | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   | N         | %   | N          | %   |
| 0: Not Sustainable       | 8         | 10% | 11        | 17% | 12        | 23% | 2         | 11% | 33         | 15% |
| 1: Partially Sustainable | 53        | 65% | 33        | 51% | 26        | 50% | 8         | 44% | 120        | 56% |
| 2: Fully Sustainable     | 20        | 25% | 20        | 31% | 10        | 19% | 7         | 39% | 57         | 26% |
| NA                       |           |     | 1         | 2%  | 4         | 8%  | 1         | 6%  | 6          | 3%  |
| <b>Grand Total</b>       | <b>81</b> |     | <b>65</b> |     | <b>52</b> |     | <b>18</b> |     | <b>216</b> |     |

The SPA shows that ECHO takes sustainability very seriously both in the reasons for refusal of projects and the FO's monitoring visits and appraisal of reports. The sustainability of the impact on *resilience* to stresses/shocks was commented upon and appraised by ECHO field staff in a consistent manner in Cuba projects documentation

One project with potential for replication is the Pedro Sula (Honduras) initiative by the private sector (See Text Box).

### **Private Sector Engagement in Honduras: a factor of sustainability**

An ECHO funded project was implemented in the San Pedro Sula Valley, an urban area vulnerable to flooding, violence and drugs. The area represents 25% of the national population and produces approximately 63% of the national GDP. The purpose of the project was to establish effective relationships in support of collaborative strategies for risk management between the Manufacturing Association, the Private Sector and national authorities (responsible for the Honduras' Risk Management Policy). Three specific goals were:

- Promote the use of official regulatory guidelines and methodologies to involve the private sector in risk management;
- To apply the national policy through practical mechanisms for emergency response within factory operations;
- To encourage the private sector to join with local and municipal emergency committees to improve emergency response capabilities in communities where company workers live.

A total of 826 "brigadistas" have been trained to act in cases of emergency within a factory setting and in their respective communities. In addition to the certified brigadistas, 1,298 employees representing 70 companies have been trained. The Association also trained community level DRR committees in other areas: first aid, prevention and control of fires, emergency management with dangerous materials, cardiac resuscitation, mental health and self-esteem, and confined space rescues. They use GPS to map the vulnerability of employee neighbourhoods, because "what happens to workers or their families outside work affects the company." The community committees contributed to the control of vector-borne diseases in local communities. Another activity included developing better housing for employees. While the original goal of 900 homes

They were many other findings of outcomes with sustainable potential:


- the consideration by the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo to privately replicate the engineer course initiated by the UNDP;
- The success and spread of the Safe hospital and Schools initiatives,
- The high expectations of a local committee in the Dominican Republic whose key members were recently elected to important local posts;
- Nationwide mainstreaming of DRR in the curricula and school gardens in Bolivia.

- In the same country, the adoption of the tool box by DRR authorities
- Assumed ownership of the DRR approach promoted by FAO in agriculture in Colombia
- And, as reported by ECHO staff, the adoption of a code of construction in Ecuador

An important finding is the low potential for sustainability in Haiti. The dependency on international assistance (humanitarian or other), the lack of effective decentralization and demonstrated political commitment are worrisome. When projects did demonstrate sustainability, this was most often due to the permanent presence of the implementing partner, usually a development oriented actor, committed to following up on the initial impact. It is an issue faced by the international community at large and one that cannot be addressed effectively by ECHO or EU alone.<sup>84</sup>

Regarding the two issues, replication potential or reality is perceived by a greater proportion of respondents than actual sustainability (N=334,). Both concepts were supported by more than half the respondents, (Figure 8).

**Figure 8: Perception Survey, Sustainability and Replication**



## 4.7 Impact indicators of regional value?

A major finding from the SPA is the scarcity of outcome indicators covering *resilience* in project logical frameworks. Most of the indicators in the single form are output indicators and do not provide evidence that the activity has indeed contributed to reducing vulnerabilities (especially those “soft” ones on training, awareness and capacity building). *Resilience* (the ability to withstand / adapt to stress) cannot easily be measured by SMART (and binding) indicators in a six to fifteen-month project. This is addressed in the respective case study (Annex 10).

The field visits only confirmed this observation. The partners held strictly accountable by ECHO, inevitably choose targets and indicators of outputs that they feel comfortable they can achieve under adverse circumstances.

UNISDR efforts are unlikely to contribute to the identification of indicators applicable to ECHO's work in the region. Unfortunately, the SENDAI monitoring system is not due to be released before the end of 2016. Based on UNISDR's presentation in Paraguay, the indicators of this Monitoring System appear very similar to the indicators developed by ECLAC and used in the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), an initiative co funded by the European Union! They involve macro-level indicators registered at the level of the country and partner international institutions.

The efforts of partners (NGOs, Red Cross and donors) in developing measuring tools are of limited regional interest to ECHO. Among them, the evaluators repeatedly came across the Goal tool kit, the IFRC Framework (6 characteristics of a resilient community, guidance underway) and many other partner-inspired instruments that attempt to measure *resilience* at community level. These are

<sup>84</sup> The humanitarian position expressed by ECHO staff that “we must do it because nobody is doing it” should not be applied to resilience building. National institutional ownership is essential and may be discouraged by international actors too willing to substitute and offer services.

valuable at micro-level when context-specific but should not convey to anyone that the measurement of impact is any more tangible than its definition.

Given the move of ECHO to increasingly “look through systems” (multiple levels, national advocacy, local authorities, etc.) to assist communities, measuring *resilience* impact at only one level is not appropriate. As ECHO improves its package of services to the community, the impact has to reflect progress at multiple levels, not only community level.

## 5 Conclusions

One of the most consistent findings is that partners and stakeholders were unable to identify what is or should be done differently to shift from Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) to building *resilience*. Essentially, they consider the two sets of activities as identical. There is a consensus that DRR is a term too technical, slanted to one sector (natural disasters), with negative connotations and difficult to promote as opposed to “*resilience*”, an approach found to be more people oriented and now widely accepted, even if not necessarily understood. In relation to the following conclusions, we use DRR/*resilience*.

### 5.1 Overall conclusions

The conclusions are organized around several topics:

- The sensitivity of *resilience* to local context
- The humanitarian approach
- The strategic factors
- The operational factors
- Overall relevance and coherence
- Sustained effectiveness (impact)

#### Sensitivity of *resilience* to local context:

- The delivery of medical care, food or water is influenced by the local context. The outcome or impact of the services once delivered is not.
- In LAC, there are significant differences between and within sub-regions: In the Caribbean, Haiti will continue to pose a singular challenge quite distinct from the situation in the Dominican Republic and in all the English speaking Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) which are highly vulnerable in their own way.<sup>85</sup> In Central America and South America, the countries, all in the lower middle income group, are increasingly assuming their responsibilities and affirming their leadership in the management of risk and *resilience* building. They still need ECHO and EU support, but under different modalities and terms. The same project and technical outputs may have strikingly different outcomes in terms of resilience as is the case for instance in Cuba and Haiti. Technical concepts and activities do not differ much between the two countries but the link and relationship with authorities do. The same applies to the project implemented by PAHO on both sides of the Haitian-Dominican Republic border. The results and buy in are distinct. The improvements in resilience are likely to be greater in Dominican Republic although probably more efforts and funds have been invested in Haiti. The suggestion is for ECHO to invest on the Dominican side as the direct source or channel of support to the Haitian medical counterparts instead of having the UN partner providing support directly and evenly to both sides. The desire or even demand of the national partners to play the lead role has inherent risks but those risks can be overmatched by the potential benefits of ECHO ceding ownership and some decision making.
- The countries are not expected to become less vulnerable. On the contrary, the urbanization, the increasing gap between poor and rich, and the uncertainties of climate change are only a few of the key factors suggesting the increasing vulnerability of part of the population.

<sup>85</sup> No English speaking Caribbean country was included in our approved itinerary.



- Community level *resilience* to daily and mild stresses and shocks may be achieved locally. Disasters, **by definition**, are situations exceeding the local coping capacity. Increasing local *resilience* to disasters absolutely requires support from provincial or national level institutions. This support is what is most lacking in Haiti making it unlikely that neither the massive investment by ECHO and others, nor raising the issue (see further down) of strictly applying the humanitarian target criterion of “the most vulnerable groups” to *resilience* building will have any significant impact.

### The Humanitarian Approach:

- Saving lives is the prime and immediate objective of emergency humanitarian assistance (HA) and justifies the independence and flexibility granted to ECHO and other actors. *Resilience* building is in the grey zone between development (that saves lives also) and HA. An impact on *resilience* cannot be achieved in a few months but can lay foundations for and/or contribute to it. The findings in Haiti and Cuba suggest that the contribution to *resilience* is strongly dependent on truly committed counterparts at all levels. In their absence, the effectiveness and continuity will be minimal.
- “Nobody else is doing it” is an argument advanced by some interlocutors for justifying their comprehensive approach. However, this is no longer a valid and useful argument for addressing *resilience* needs in the Region. Often, it is a counter-incentive leading other, and particularly national authorities, to neglect doing their share. Covering the whole range of activities required to comply with the very broad definition of *resilience* adopted by the EU Council is not within the best interest of ECHO in LAC.
- Humanitarian response requires independence from national political considerations and operational autonomy. By contrast, local and national political commitment and ownership are essential for *resilience* building.

### The operational factors: ECHO has two different mechanisms for building *resilience* in LAC.

- 1. The traditional DIPECHO program with projects exclusively dedicated to DRR/*Resilience* has achieved a remarkable level of recognition and influence. It is a recognized and respected brand name. Until 2014, a dedicated budget line (DIP) and HIP was dedicated to DIPECHO. However, the dedicated budget line with its separate financing decisions and HIPs was discontinued in 2015. The DIPECHO/DRR activities did not stop but were integrated into one single HIP. This is perceived by DRR dedicated partners (especially in Haiti) and the evaluators as a strategic loss in LAC. It did occasionally make developmental activities of ECHO subject to fluctuating humanitarian priorities dictated by the occurrence of new emergencies or the refocusing of humanitarian priorities on specific threats (drought in Haiti). Integration of *resilience* into mainstream humanitarian response activities is a valuable concern and this integration is in the process of resolution with the introduction of the *resilience* markers. Integrating DIPECHO projects with short term humanitarian priorities may be counterproductive.<sup>86</sup> It is preferable to link their planning with other EU development processes with ECHO adopting a similar planning calendar.
- 2. The recent approach to add a *resilience* perspective or component to HA projects through compliance with the four *Resilience* Markers is an excellent effort. The result is to make the response more risk sensitive and compatible with the last sentence in the EU *resilience* definition “*without compromising long-term development prospects*” (See definitions in section 2.2). The positive contribution to building local *resilience* will be, by definition, modest and in some countries negligible, due to the overwhelming humanitarian focus and the limited time and budget. The main and critical benefit will be minimizing response

<sup>86</sup> By nature, response projects are usually single hazard.

initiatives insensitive to local context and harmful to long term development prospects.<sup>87</sup> As well stated by an ECHO staff, it is a matter of “do no harm” first.

- Both approaches are necessary and complementary. Neither one can replace the other. However, one single management approach for both approaches is neither possible nor desirable. The duration of the fully dedicated DRR/*Resilience* projects, the profile of the partners, the level of expectations and the type of indicators must be flexible and adapted to deliver the most effective, efficient and sustainable impact.
- The short duration of projects (humanitarian, 12 months or DIPECHO, up to 18-20 months<sup>88</sup>) is only sufficient for technical outputs (training on WASH, health or maintenance of facilities) or preparedness activities, but is a constraint to achieving an impact on the inner capacity of people, communities, local institutions and stakeholders to adjust to severe stress especially resulting from climate change.

### Overall relevance and coherence

- **At strategic level**, there is a widely held perception that the resilience approach of ECHO lacks coherence geographically and from year to year. It was difficult to find a clear and consistent focus on a strategy (HIPs) dictated by fluctuating humanitarian circumstances. HA needs to be flexible and to adapt to the latest emergency situation. *Resilience* building, on the other hand, needs stability and mid-term focus (and funding). Annual Humanitarian Implementation Plans are not adapted to *resilience* imperatives and, as was seen occasionally, interrupt activities of development minded partners who are more concerned with the long term. Introducing in a resilience project, a “crisis modifier”<sup>89</sup> is one positive thing, reallocating resources of an approved multi hazard resilience project because of a new humanitarian focus on a risk outside the beneficiary communities is another issue.
- The dialogue between DEVCO, the Delegation and ECHO has improved considerably; *resilience* has been an opportunity to strengthen the ties. But it was too early to expect visible specific jointly planned actions or activities designed to complement each other. There are many reasons for the lack of decisive progress to date: cultural and administrative. But one seems more important according to the conversations in Haiti: The selection of the most vulnerable targets regardless of their location and potential for achieving some sustained level of *resilience* coupled with the accepted need to demonstrate rapid and measurable results (SMART indicators). In DRR projects, it should not be “*vulnerability versus potentiality*” but high vulnerability with high potentiality as recommended by the EC in its policy document COM(2011)<sup>90</sup>: “*The EU must seek to target its resources where they are needed most to address poverty reduction and where they could have greatest impact*”. The fact that ECHO applies strictly humanitarian criteria to *resilience* efforts, results in an investment in Haiti *resilience* with comparatively little tangible to show for the effort and money or in other countries “pilot projects” in remote places and therefore more costly, impaired visibility or replicability due to the cost per beneficiary.

<sup>87</sup> Many examples have been provided in the health response to Haiti earthquake: <http://new.paho.org/disasters/dmdocuments/HealthResponseHaitiEarthq.pdf>

<sup>88</sup> In other regions, the evaluators noted an informal understanding between ECHO and its partners that DIPECHO projects could be renewed for up to 3 financing cycles, subject of course to availability of funding and satisfactory performance. In LAC, no such arrangement was noted.


<sup>89</sup> First introduced in 2013 in Ethiopia, the Crisis modifier is asking the partner to address the question: in case an acute and significant crisis occurs in the cluster during the implementation of the project, how will the action be adapted?

<sup>90</sup> [http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/intra\\_acp\\_mobility/funding/2012/documents/agenda\\_for\\_change\\_en.pdf](http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/intra_acp_mobility/funding/2012/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf)

## Sustained effectiveness (Impact)

This evaluation was unable to prove objectively and definitively the impact of ECHO activities on *resilience* (understood not as outcomes but as the demonstrated capacity to adjust to new shocks) because partners and ECHO had no mechanism for comparative studies with control groups in case of severe shock affected former beneficiaries.<sup>91</sup> We were able to identify **projects and activities** (good practices) likely (or believed) to have an impact on the future capacity to adjust to forthcoming stresses. This is based on (reasonable and widely held) assumptions, not on hard facts. There is however a wide consensus that ECHO activities had an impact: the perceptions of 334 respondents to the survey, point to moderate agreement that beneficiaries are better aware of risks, and much stronger opinion that overall, they are more resilient due to ECHO-funded actions. See Figure 9.

**Figure 9: Perception Survey, Impact**



While the greatest enabling factors for this success were perceived by the respondents to be synergy with partners, needs assessment, relevance and coherence, the most limiting factors beyond funding volumes were government ownership, measurability, timeliness of actions and replicability.

- In the region, stresses and shocks occur frequently in areas where ECHO *resilience*-focused projects have been completed. No provision was made by ECHO or the partners to independently study whether populations having benefitted from those projects have adjusted and coped better than those not targeted by the projects. Until this type of rigorous counterfactual study is regularly carried out, there is no authoritative way to identify what works and what does not. The first issue is not the question of attribution of an impact to specific initiatives – a problem common in many developmental projects - but a confirmation of whether there is an impact on future capacity as is widely “assumed”. If there is one, then and only then is an attribution analysis feasible.
- DRR/*Resilience* is or should be a development activity. Advocacy for DRR/*Resilience* within and outside EU is a strength of ECHO. There are signs that this message (i.e., the importance of the *resilience* marker questions) is being received, if not always adequately acted upon, by national governments in LAC and the EU. There are encouraging signs of replication / expansion by stakeholders. The private sector has shown great potential if properly motivated and guided. Beneficiaries and local authorities themselves can show sustained commitment and dedication once they realize the short-term benefits for the most common stresses and shocks of special concern to them. When placed in a power position, communities or authorities in the region show that they react positively to projects that address the needs they perceive.

At strategic level, what is the future of DIPECHO type projects in LAC? First, the DIPECHO brand name has gained strong recognition and it should not be lost. It is also victim of its own success as other stakeholders better equipped or funded to promote DRR are increasingly taking on a greater leadership role. In LAC, ECHO should join other donors in accepting prior consultation with and coordination by the DRR national institution. Projects should not only be selected because

<sup>91</sup> This could not be organized in a visit of 30+ projects in one month.

they target a vulnerable group and have an interested and willing partner. Criteria such as co-funding by national or local institutions and potential for replication or follow up by DEVCO or other development actors should be given progressively much more weight. Initiatives aiming to be innovative or pilots should also be selected for their visibility<sup>92</sup> and potentiality as well as reflect the expression of interest by major stakeholders.

In practice, ECHO does not adopt a pragmatic “triage” approach in selecting its DRR projects. There are too many needed highly vulnerable communities and too many gaps (“nobody is doing it”). This situation is similar to the one faced by the health sector during mass casualties where the triage principle aims to use scarce resources to do the most for the greatest number. Tragic but hopeless cases requiring much attention with limited survival potential are ignored under the accepted compromise of the triage. The same triage approach regarding community based DIPECHO type projects could be considered. It is difficult to see why this approach commonly adopted for development projects could raise moral or ethical issue for DRR/ resilience initiatives. Potential for success should be a key factor in decision for purely DRR projects. Although, this approach was often regarded as contrary to ECHO humanitarian principles, its adoption for ECHO development like activities deserves serious consideration.

Maintaining the administrative identity of DIPECHO as a programme, but under separate HQ management from the emergency humanitarian assistance activities,<sup>93</sup> may make the necessary distinction between HA (short term, independent and impartial, not subject to political influence) and DRR/ *resilience* (progressively subject to government policies and priorities and hopefully with longer term HIPs and projects) more acceptable locally. The region may be a good testing ground for those approaches.

At a later stage, DIPECHO may find that its role will be limited to LRRD: preparing the ground for, complementing and linking HA to the development initiatives of the EU and refocusing on preparedness, an activity which no EU institution is likely to claim as its own.

## 5.2 Summary of the Conclusions of the Case Studies

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The complete findings and conclusions are available in Annexes 9 to 11.

### 5.2.1 Links with Regional, National and Local Authorities

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ECHO consistently insists on the importance of coordination and links with **local** authorities. Only recently, the guidelines to partners have included the coordination with **national** institutions and the compliance of submitted projects with the national policies and strategies.

Each partner coordinating individual projects with the national DRR/*Resilience* authority is a positive step but no substitute to ECHO presenting and discussing/negotiating the overall DRR/*resilience* strategy. This step is overdue in the most advanced LAC countries. ECHO's challenge is to accept national leadership and coordination for development-like initiatives (DRR, capacity building, and *resilience*) while maintaining the principle of independence and impartiality for emergency humanitarian response.

In most countries, the decentralization of national DRR structures is weak and local authorities have limited decision-making powers and resources. The worst situation is in Haiti.

Factors of success are many. In particular, these include:

- The involvement of local NGOs with cultural roots in the target communities

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<sup>92</sup> Effective commercial show rooms are not hidden away of the prospective customers.

<sup>93</sup> ECHO Civil Protection may be a possible host. This avenue has not been explored in this evaluation.

- The priority being placed not on doing things or delivering services to beneficiaries but on ensuring that they are done/delivered **by** the local authorities with the commitment of staff and resources
- An emerging local culture of *resilience* and risk reduction --something DIPECHO has undoubtedly contributed to building in the LAC region.

### 5.2.2 Use of Resilience Indicators, a way forward

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Measuring actual *resilience* at the traditional community-level has not been successful so far and attempting to build this measurement into all projects may not be a useful investment for ECHO in the LAC region.

A more feasible and more interesting option for ECHO may be to measure the *resilience* of the LAC countries' risk management systems and how able they are to sustainably support the target communities. If not acceptable, the corollary of this is to develop simple qualitative indicators that measure the connections target communities have within (i.e., social cohesion) and throughout (i.e., links to governance and policies) their respective systems and their ability to navigate in/throughout those systems.

The *Resilience* Marker presents strong added value for ECHO. A more systematic promotion and use of the marker and making it a requirement more frequently may contribute to resilience more visibly across the portfolio. After more than 40 years of humanitarian work, even short-term (6-month) emergency response projects have, at the very least, the moral imperative of “doing no harm” (Answering at least RM-Question 2 makes sure that implementing partners find the required time to confirm they will do no harm to existing dynamics, capacities and processes). This is a critically important step towards building *resilience* and is not to be minimized in the search for ways to measure impacts.

#### *Proposed ideal real-time counterfactual measuring of resilience impacts*

Ultimately, the most effective and reliable method for ECHO will be to conduct, periodically, a counterfactual assessment to evaluate the attitude and bouncing back capacity of communities recently affected by a significant stress, selecting some of those which have benefitted from ECHO's *resilience* support compared to others who have not been beneficiaries. If the money and effort invested are effective, a difference should be observable.

A counterfactual study will require:

- A budget identified and set aside for such a measure at the start of a HIP period (for example);
- After a major stress/shock occurs, mobilization of a field survey team at the latest six months after the impact;
- Use of a mixed-method assessment (quantitative household surveys and qualitative focus groups/key informant interviews) that would collect primary data among communities, households and/or institutions on a stratified sample of affected groups having benefitted or not from DRR/resilience activities.

Scenarios reflecting some of these ideas are further developed in Annex 10.



### 5.2.3 Climate change

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The Global Climate Risk Index (2015) reports that some of the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change are found in the LAC region.<sup>94</sup> While responding to droughts and other extreme circumstances that climate change can cause, may not deviate much from the emergency situations ECHO and its partner are used to, it is realistic to expect an increase in the volume, severity, and complexity of such events due to climate change. Over three hundred ECHO project files for the LAC region were reviewed with close to a 100 mentioning climate change in some form or another, sometimes only in passing but in many cases citing it as a root cause in creating a hazard or multiple hazards.

One of the first conclusions of this evaluation was the recognition that climate change is capable of increasingly exacerbating poverty and environmental degradation, making ECHO's work more difficult and increasing *resilience* more challenging.

Information on climate change, however, has not been sufficiently collected or analysed during the period covered by this evaluation. Nor is there much analysis to be found in individual project documents. ECHO is nonetheless being steered towards making more directed responses to climate change. This is being felt at policy level through recent declarations at the Humanitarian Summit covering climate change.

ECHO and its partners could propose a package of activities and project planning activities that focus on carrying out short-term interventions aimed at reducing risks associated with disasters while contributing to preparing longer-term development activities. This would allow ECHO and its partners to remain largely within their programming comfort zone.

There is a strong level of political engagement within the region to address the problem. There is also the possibility of leveraging additional resources, considering climate change financing through sources such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and building new forms of partnerships that can assist in reducing vulnerability and building *resilience*.

In the end, climate change is an opportunity or potential platform for ECHO to explore the combining of humanitarian assistance with development programming. Ongoing discussions between DEVCO's Climate Change Unit for the Americas and ECHO are a good sign.

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<sup>94</sup> <https://germanwatch.org/en/download/10333.pdf>



## 6 Recommendations

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### 6.1 Strategic recommendations

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1. ECHO should differentiate its approach according to the primary objective of the funded projects: humanitarian response or DIPECHO/DRR initiatives.
  - a. For those primarily humanitarian response projects, ECHO should continue enabling a *resilience* approach by increasing compliance to the four *resilience* markers and inclusion in the HIPs. Priority should remain focused on the most at risk, vulnerable groups.
  - b. For projects improving resilience as main objective, especially those intended as pilot initiatives, ECHO should give more weight to the decision on the potential for sustained and affordable improvement of resilience, the ownership and commitment of national authorities possibly through co-funding in addition to the level of vulnerability of the beneficiaries.
2. In the short term, ECHO and DEVCO should place a high priority and urgency on designing and implementing jointly planned initiatives for building the capacity of highly vulnerable groups and supporting relevant institutions and organisations with a recognised potential for sustainable impacts. Beneficiaries, sites and goals should be common among the two entities. Budgets, duration, activities, relative timing and implementing partners can be distinct but complementary towards the common goal and objectives.
3. ECHO should continue to strongly advocate for DEVCO to progressively assume leadership within the EU for mainstreaming integrated risk sensitivity in development programmes and sectoral line ministries and supporting the capacity building of national or regional institutions in LAC.

Pending DEVCO effectively assuming this role, ECHO should continue funding projects fully dedicated to DRR/*Resilience* building in LAC (under the well-known DIPECHO brand). The approach to and management of those dedicated projects should be distinct from those applicable to humanitarian assistance projects:

- a. Determine five-year objectives, priorities and strategic resilience plans discussed and jointly planned with and approved by national or regional authorities when possible;
  - b. Focus on fewer but larger multi-hazard projects including ones that seek to address climate change;
  - c. As a good humanitarian donor, assure flexible possibilities for funding over several Financing Decisions with a preference to projects co-funded by national DRR institutions or the private sector;
  - d. Reducing primarily the intensive risks while systematically adding at community level the extensive risks of importance to the beneficiaries.
  - e. Include a built-in provision for counterfactual analysis in case of stresses and shocks after the termination of the projects.
4. In the longer-term, once DEVCO has effectively assumed a proactive leadership in advocating and implementing capacity building for resilience, ECHO should re-centre its

priorities on preparedness for intensive risks and community based disaster management in coordination with DEVCO and other stakeholders.

5. In emerging countries, ECHO support to DRR/resilience and DIPECHO type projects (not including humanitarian assistance to persons affected by disasters) should progressively be formulated with and subject to the coordination by the National Institution dedicated to Risk Management. As a step towards this goal, ECHO should systematically invite national counterparts to join in its field monitoring visits and share the progress reports from partners.

## 6.2 Operational recommendations in LAC

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- a) ECHO should plan promptly for a scientifically objective comparative analysis of the response and recovery capacity of communities having benefitted or not from DRR/Resilience projects in the areas affected by the Hurricane Matthew in Haiti and the earthquake in Ecuador. This counterfactual analysis should include as control group similar affected communities that did not benefit from (ECHO-funded or not) resilience projects. The objective should be to ensure that confirmed outputs and outcomes had actually contributed to a greater capacity.
- b) ECHO should continue encouraging partners to submit projects in consortia to increase the coverage and sectorial scope and to provide special assistance to vulnerable groups.
- c) Partners should specifically and systematically address the stresses and needs as perceived by beneficiaries in order to foster ownership and sustainability.
- d) DEVCO and EEAS should adapt or adopt the four *resilience* markers developed by ECHO for all development activities, including for projects to be funded by the EU Trust fund for Peace in Colombia.
- e) ECHO should study ways and means to directly support local NGOs to increasing effective *resilience* building in some communities.
- f) ECHO should formalize the “ECHO focal point” system in countries without a permanent ECHO presence and should explore ways to incentivize the development of visible synergies between the two entities (i.e., as manifest in joint risk analyses and shared project sites, etc.).
- g) ECHO and its partners in LAC should use any suitable occurrence of significant stress and shock in communities which benefitted from ECHO funded *resilience* activities to demonstrate through scientific means (control group /counterfactual approach) which, if any, of the activities has made a significant difference in the coping capacity and recovery of those beneficiaries.
- h) ECHO and its partners should build upon the existing health cross-border project in Haiti and the Dominican Republic to promote direct south-south cooperation and closer direct institutional relationships between health and medical facilities of both sides of the border. In a second phase, assistance to Haitian facilities should be provided with ECHO funding and PAHO technical supervision through the Dominican hospitals through an arrangement of twinned medical facilities.

## Annex 1: Terms of Reference

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**EUROPEAN COMMISSION**

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION - ECHO

ECHO A - Strategy, Policy and International Co-operation

**A/3 - Policy and Implementation Frameworks**

ANNEX I

**Terms of Reference for the**

**Evaluation of DG ECHO's actions on building Resilience**

**in the LAC Region (2012 – 2015)**

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## 1. DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES

The **legal base** for Humanitarian Aid is provided by Article 214<sup>1</sup> of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR; No. 1257/96)<sup>2</sup>. The objectives of EU humanitarian assistance are outlined in these documents, and could – for evaluation purposes – be paraphrased as follows: *From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the most vulnerable people affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.*

The humanitarian aid budget is mainly implemented through annual funding decisions<sup>3</sup> adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on the HAR. A funding decision is taken for humanitarian operations in each country/region at the time of establishing the budget, or for each unforeseen intervention as needed. The funding decision specifies the amount, the objectives, maximum amounts to be financed by objective, potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. Since 2011 the funding decisions are referred to as '**Humanitarian Implementation Plans**' (HIP).

The **Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles**<sup>4</sup> aim at enhancing the coherence and effectiveness of donor action, as well as their accountability to beneficiaries.

**Protection**<sup>5</sup> is embedded in the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Directorate's (ECHO's) mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid<sup>6</sup>. In the context of humanitarian crises, protection aims at enhancing physical and psychological security for people under threat. It implies respect of the *do-no-harm principle*, ensuring that assistance does not have unintended negative consequences to the affected population. The Funding Guidelines for Humanitarian Protection activities define the framework in which ECHO may support protection activities, including the type of partners and the kind of activities it may finance. ECHO supports non-structural activities aimed at reducing the risk, and mitigating the impact of human-generated violence, coercion, deprivation and abuse of vulnerable individuals or groups in the context of humanitarian crises.

Building **resilience**<sup>7</sup> is a medium to long-term effort that needs to be firmly embedded in national policies and planning. Working with vulnerable populations to build their resilience contributes to alleviate human suffering and is also a fundamental part of poverty reduction. In countries facing recurrent crises, strengthening resilience is a central aim of EU external assistance. The resilience-related actions of humanitarian and development assistance should be jointly programmed in order to ensure maximum complementarity. The Action Plan for Resilience<sup>8</sup> in Crisis Prone Countries lays further foundations for more effective EU

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1 <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-3-cooperation-with-third-countries-and-humanitarian-aid/chapter-3-humanitarian-aid/502-article-214.html>

2 [Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid](#)

3 <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/en/funding-evaluations/funding-decisions-hips>

4 [Good Humanitarian Donorship](#)

5 [Humanitarian Protection Funding Guidelines](#)

6 [The European Consensus On Humanitarian Aid](#)

7 [The EU Approach to Resilience: learning from food security crises](#)

8 [Action Plan for Resilience in Crisis Prone Countries 2013-2020](#)

collaborative action, bringing together humanitarian interventions and development cooperation endeavour to reduce humanitarian needs and bring more equitable development gains.

In the frame of **Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)**<sup>9</sup> systematic efforts are undertaken to improve preparedness for adverse events. This involves analyses and management of causal factors of disasters in terms of reducing exposure to hazards, decreasing people vulnerability, wise management of land and the environment. DRR aims at strengthening resilience to shocks triggered by natural hazards. It also supports climate change adaptation. Humanitarian action should be based on risk assessments and focus on risk reduction while keeping a people-centred approach with special attention given to gender equality and inclusion of vulnerable groups. DG ECHO's DRR/DIPECHO initiatives often take the shape of community-based demonstration projects ('seed money'), aiming at handing over successful results to other actors (governments, development bodies) for replication and scaling-up in a subsequent phase. Thus, DG ECHO must ensure vertical and horizontal linkages to relevant actors that are mandated and capable of exploiting those results, which for ECHO requires measures in terms of both technical and political **advocacy**.

The poorest people carry the greatest exposure to the consequences of disasters such as **food insecurity and under-nutrition**. Insufficient food production or an inability of vulnerable people to purchase enough nutritious food leads to malnutrition and under-nutrition. Moreover, dramatic interruptions in food consumption heighten risks of morbidity and mortality. Addressing under-nutrition<sup>10</sup> requires a multi-sectoral approach and a joint humanitarian and development framework. Humanitarian food assistance<sup>11</sup> aims to ensure the consumption of sufficient, safe and nutritious food in anticipation of, during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. Each year, the European Commission allocates well over EUR 100 million to humanitarian assistance actions that are explicitly associated with specific nutrition objectives. The allocation to nutrition interventions in the Commission Humanitarian assistance has doubled between 2008 and 2011.

## 2. CONTEXT

The region of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) includes 33 states<sup>12</sup>, and consists of three sub-regions, i.e. the **Caribbean(16)**<sup>13</sup>, **Mexico & Central America(7)** and **South America(10)**. It has a population of 522 million<sup>14</sup>, and is one of the most unequal regions in the world in terms of economics, infrastructure, access to education, health, water and electricity<sup>15</sup>. Moreover, weak law enforcement institutions, a vibrant organized narcotics trade, a culture of violence and the region's chaotic urbanization makes the Latin America the world's most violent region<sup>16</sup>, with a homicide rate per capita of 23.4 per 100,000 people, i.e. nearly double the rate in Africa. However, the situation is improving: It was the only region in the world<sup>17</sup> that managed to reduce income inequality during the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention\\_preparedness/DRR\\_thematic\\_policy\\_doc.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/prevention_preparedness/DRR_thematic_policy_doc.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [Staff Working Document on Undernutrition in Emergencies](#)

<sup>11</sup> [Communication on Humanitarian Food Assistance](#)

<sup>12</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama.

<sup>13</sup> + 9 British and French overseas territories (6) and Constituent country of Kingdom of the Netherlands (3).

<sup>14</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/region/LAC>

<sup>15</sup> <http://web.worldbank.org>

<sup>16</sup> [http:// The Wall Street Journal](http://TheWallStreetJournal)

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/lac/overview>



century. In the past decade, Latin America managed to lift more than 70 million people out of poverty while expanding the middle class by more than 50%. Better-quality education, infrastructure, security and healthcare services have become part of the core demands of LAC's rising middle class. While addressing these newfound expectations, the region still has to face the challenge: 130 million people<sup>18</sup> remain "chronically poor".

The LAC has made significant progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), however, the recent global crisis may put obstacles to achieving them all by 2015, as intended.

The LAC region is **highly exposed to a wide range of natural hazards** such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, landslides, cold waves, volcano eruptions, drought, tsunamis, forest fires, etc. The region is regularly struck by small and medium scale events that affect the population and, due to their frequency, undermine the fragile livelihoods of those affected. In addition, hydro-meteorological events seem to be already intensified by climate change (main threats associated with rising sea level, increasing intensity of floods, changes in rainfall patterns, amongst others).

El Niño can be described as a warming of ocean sea surface along the coasts of Ecuador and northern Peru (appearing usually around Christmas)<sup>19</sup>, related also to changes in atmospheric pressure – lower than normal over the eastern tropical pacific, and higher over Indonesia and northern Australia<sup>20</sup>.

Experts already predict a strong El Niño episode, likely to last into spring 2016, and that is already compared to the 1997-98 episode (the worst recorded) which generate massive floods and extreme droughts affecting over 27 million people in Central and South Americas. The disruption of normal climate patterns are actually observed through a drought impacting mainly Central America, the Caribbean region, and the northern part of south America, to date more than 6 millions of people are severely affected by the drought<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> [http://www.undp.org/mdg-reports/LAC\\_collection](http://www.undp.org/mdg-reports/LAC_collection)

<sup>19</sup> The phenomenon El Niño should not be confused with the El Niño ocean current, which each year around Christmas brings warmer seawater to the coasts of Ecuador and Peru, to return to the coast of Mexico around April.

<sup>20</sup> *El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)* is a scientific term that describes the fluctuations in temperature between the ocean and atmosphere in the east-central Equatorial Pacific <http://www2.ucar.edu/news/backgrounders/el-nino-la-nina-ens>

<sup>21</sup> A strong El Niño gave an extra kick to an already warming planet and will come on top of consequences of the Climate Change.

### 3. ECHO RESPONSE

In recent years the LAC region has been covered by HIPs that focus on:

- Disaster Preparedness; Targeted DRR actions (incl. DIPECHO<sup>22</sup>, and drought preparedness).
- Emergency response with integrated DRR actions and;
- Resilience specific actions.

ECHO's main objective is to respond to the acute humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable and exposed people while increasing their **resilience** in line with the EU resilience policy.

Furthermore, ECHO support aims at contributing to longer term strategies in the region, by carrying out awareness and advocacy actions to **promote the replication and scaling-up** of successful community DRR projects.

So far, different approaches have been applied in the region to achieve these goals, taking account of contextual factors. At this moment there is a need to take stock of the achievements made, identify the most successful approaches and reflect on a more coherent strategy for the region, supported by a common set of impact indicators.

#### ECHO funding

Over the evaluation period ECHO response has been particularly focused on, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay.

The following financial allocations have been made during the evaluation period:

- **2015 Financial decision:**

|                                       |                         |                   |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Caribbean, Central America and Mexico | ECHO/-CM/BUD/2015/91000 | <b>20,939,000</b> |
| South America                         | ECHO/-SM/BUD/2015/91000 | <b>23,500,000</b> |
| Central America                       | ECHO/-CM/BUD/2015/01000 | <b>4,000,000</b>  |

- **2014 Financial decision:**

|                           |                         |                   |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Colombia                  | ECHO/COL/BUD/2014/91000 | <b>13,029,000</b> |
| Haiti                     | ECHO/HTI/BUD/2014/91000 | <b>18,500,000</b> |
| Haiti                     | ECHO/HTI/EDF/2014/01000 | <b>5,000,000</b>  |
| DIPECHO Central America - | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2014/93000 | <b>11,040,377</b> |
| Mexico                    | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2014/91000 | <b>500,000</b>    |
| Colombia                  | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2013/01000 | <b>500,000</b>    |

- **2013 Financial decision:**

|          |                         |                   |
|----------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Mexico   | ECHO/-CM/BUD/2013/9100  | <b>2,000,000</b>  |
| Colombia | ECHO/COL/BUD/2013/91000 | <b>13,000,000</b> |
| Colombia | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2013/01000 | <b>500,000</b>    |
| Haiti    | ECHO/HTI/BUD/2013/91000 | <b>15,000,000</b> |

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<sup>22</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/dipecho/drr\\_evolution\\_challenges\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/dipecho/drr_evolution_challenges_en.pdf)

|   |                         |                   |
|---|-------------------------|-------------------|
| DIPECHO Caribbean   | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2013/94000 | <b>8,500,000</b>  |
| DIPECHO South America   | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2013/93000 | <b>12,055,130</b> |
| Resilience –<br>Building resilience in drought-<br>affected communities<br>in Central and South America<br>Jamaica & Dom Rep – Del. Proc. | ECHO/-AM/BUD/2013/91000 | <b>4,000,000</b>  |
|   | ECHO/-CR/EDF/2013/01000 | <b>1,500,000</b>  |

• **2012 Financial decision:**

|                         |                         |                   |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| Colombia                | ECHO/COL/BUD/2012/91000 | <b>13,000,000</b> |
| Colombia                | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2012/01000 | <b>400,000</b>    |
| Haiti                   | ECHO/HTI/BUD/2012/91000 | <b>34,250,000</b> |
| Guatemala               | ECHO/GTM/BUD/2012/01000 | <b>2,000,000</b>  |
| DIPECHO Central America | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2012/94000 | <b>10,025,000</b> |
| South America           | ECHO/-SM/BUD/2012/91000 | <b>5,000,000</b>  |
| Cuba H Sandy response   | ECHO/CUB/BUD/2012/91000 | <b>4,000,000</b>  |

#### **4. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

##### **4.1. PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE**

Based on Regulation (EC) 1257/96 and the EU Financial Regulation, the purpose of this Request for Services is to have an independent **overall evaluation** of the ECHO actions in Latin America (Caribbean, South America and Central America **2012 – 2015**).

Specifically, the evaluation should provide:

- A comprehensive, retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's strategy/approach (as formalised by the Humanitarian Implementation Plans) in LAC, covering the evaluation issues of **relevance, coherence, EU Added Value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**;
- A maximum of **5 prospective, strategic recommendations** – based on the retrospective evaluation and the related research – for a future ECHO strategy in the region. These strategic recommendations could possibly be supported by further, related, operational recommendations. Successful ‘de-facto’ models/approaches should be identified – based on good practice – for possible, wider application in the region.

The main users of the evaluation report include *inter alia* ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level, national and regional stakeholders, the participating implementing partners, and other humanitarian and development donors and agencies.

##### **4.2. EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented in the following. The questions to be addressed by the Evaluator consist of two sets: 1) General questions; and 2) Thematic questions, that partly overlap with the general questions. On the basis of the responses to the questions under both sets, the Evaluator should provide general statements on the evaluation issues as listed under sub-section 4.1 above.

1. **General, generic questions:** These are based on the mandatory evaluation issues as specified under sub-section 4.1. These questions should be tailored to the specific sub-regional contexts by the Evaluator, and finally discussed and agreed with the Steering Group in the inception phase:
  - a. What was the **Relevance** of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. quality of needs assessments, involvement of target populations in terms of participation of local authorities or local organized groups (producers, women), fit between HIPs and needs assessments, fit between projects funded and HIPs;
  - b. What was the **Coherence** of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. alignment with relevant ECHO and other Commission policies, drawing on lessons learned and good practice;
  - c. What was the **EU Added Value** of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. how ECHO has drawn on its specific role and mandate to create a specific added value, which could/would not be achieved by other actors;
  - d. What was the **Effectiveness** of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. how successfully ECHO has implemented its strategy in the region, in terms of achieving required outputs and outcomes and contributing to change;
  - e. What was the **Efficiency** of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. use of resources, management and monitoring processes;
  - f. What was the **Sustainability** of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period? Issues to consider are e.g. contribution to LRRD and Resilience, and institutional impacts on DRM/DRR authorities in the beneficiary countries.
2. **Thematic questions addressing specific information needs:** These questions could, as appropriate, be fitted into the structure of the general questions above.
  - a. To what extent has the ECHO actions identified and targeted the most vulnerable people affected by crises in the region?
  - b. To what extent have the different approaches implemented in the LAC region been successful in terms of contributing to strengthening resilience? What examples of good practice that can be identified for replication in a country, a region, or in other sub-regions?
  - c. To what extent have ECHO's advocacy and communication measures of successful approaches been effective in terms of ensuring uptake of project

results (i.e. replication and scaling-up of successful approaches)? Is there an ‘advocacy gap’? How could ECHO improve in this respect?

#### 4.3. OTHER TASKS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT

The Contractor should, mainly on the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions:

- Identify the **main lessons learnt** and best practices (taking into account context-related factors) in ECHO’s response to natural disasters and food insecurity in the region. What has worked or not, and what were the critical success factors? How can the identification and documentation of good practices be further improved?
- Identify/define/propose appropriate **impact indicators** to be applied for the whole region.
- Identify main gaps and progress made on DP/DRR in beneficiary countries.
- At a general level, identify the main factors **limiting the success of the projects** funded in the countries over the period covered by the evaluation. *COMMENT: This relates to an audit recommendation; Success-limiting factors should be identified in order to develop indicators for focused monitoring, with the overall purpose of strengthening the monitoring system.*
- Reconstruct the **intervention logic** for the ECHO-funded actions in the region;
- Provide a statement about the **validity of the evaluation results**, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.;
- Make a proposal for the **dissemination** of the evaluation results;
- Provide an **abstract** of the evaluation of no more than 200 words.

#### 5. METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT PHASES

In their offer, the bidders must describe in methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the other tasks.

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant and feasible.

The evaluation team should undertake **field visits** to the three sub-regions, i.e.: Central America, South America and Caribbean Region. The specific countries of the visits should be discussed and agreed in the Inception Phase.

#### Deliverables

Within the framework of the present evaluation, the contractors will produce the following deliverables, in accordance with the schedule defined in this chapter:

1. Inception Report
2. Desk Report
3. Field Report
4. Final Report + one annexe per country

## Meetings

It is expected that the contractor participate in four meetings in Brussels with the evaluation Steering Group, as specified below. For these meetings **minutes should be drafted by the contractor**, to be agreed among the participants.

### 5.1. INCEPTION PHASE

The inception phase starts from the moment the contract is signed. During the inception phase the evaluation team will analyse the intervention logic on the basis of official documents and propose the evaluation questions and judgment criteria. The team then will specify the indicators, and develop the final definition of the methodology and the schedule for the field visits. The definitive subjects of three case studies will be approved. It is possible that during Inception phase new information needs are communicated in addition to evaluation questions presented in section 4.2.

#### Kick off meeting

A kick-off meeting will be convened as soon as possible after the signature of the contract. The consultants will present their understanding of the Terms of Reference. The evaluation questions, either from the ToR or proposed by the evaluation team will be discussed as well as an indicative methodological design. Access to informants and to documents, as well as foreseeable difficulties will be considered.

#### Inception report

The Inception Report will be produced after the kick-off meeting and will contain, at a minimum, the following elements:

- a finalised evaluation framework covering all evaluation questions, including additional possible information needs addressed;
- an intervention logic;
- a description of the methodology for data collection and analysis, including the chain of reasoning for responding to the evaluation questions, and indicating limitations;
- draft questionnaires and interview guides; and
- a final detailed work plan and timetable.

#### Inception meeting

One week after the submission of the Inception report the evaluation team will present its overall approach in the Inception Meeting which will take place in Brussels at DG ECHO headquarters with the relevant Commission staff. The Inception report will be discussed and the evaluation team will have the possibility to ask for additional information and/or clarification on the requirements of the ToR, as well as to obtain relevant security instructions and possibly technical support relative to the execution of the tasks. The Inception Report will



be revised if needed according to the mutually agreed amendments and approved by the Commission.

## **5.2. DESK PHASE**

The **Desk Phase** comprises:

- a first analysis of available data in relation to the evaluation questions; partial answers to the evaluation questions will be provided
- limitations of the evaluation methods used will be pointed out, biases and risks, as well as problems to be solved
- meetings with Commission staff, other donors, organisations and partners, as appropriate;
- a final approach and schedule for the field missions.

The **Desk Report** will include:

- A short description of the data collection work implemented, including the meetings, reviews and interviews conducted;
- The first elements of answers to the evaluation questions when available;
- The initial assumptions concerning the evaluation questions, to be tested during the Field Phase, on the basis of the preliminary analysis carried out during the desk phase;
- Progress of data gathering; a conclusion on the quality of data collected so far, and whether remedial actions will be required in the next phase to close information gaps; identification of data to be collected in the field; an outline for the field visit including a preliminary schedule and list of partners, stakeholders and projects to be visited, explaining criteria used for choosing the sample of projects;
- Methodological tools to be used in the field phase, describing how data should be cross-checked, including any possible limitations;
- A discussion of possible issues identified during the Desk Phase that had not been previously discussed with the Commission. The Commission will consider these issues and decide on whether they merit further consideration in the light of the evaluation.

## Desk meeting

One week after a desk report is received a meeting will be organized in Brussels to present the desk report and discuss it with the Steering Committee. A video conference with the field office could be envisaged. The evaluator will duly consider all comments from the Steering Committee, as a condition for approval. In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argued reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted.

### 5.3. FIELD PHASE

Following the formal approval of the Desk Report, the evaluation team shall undertake the field visits, which will be discussed in detail and agreed with the Commission during the inception phase.

The travel and accommodation arrangements, the organisation of meetings, and the securing of visas will remain the sole responsibility of the contractor.

If, during the Field Phase, any significant change from the agreed methodology or scheduled work plan is considered necessary, this will be explained to and agreed with DG ECHO Evaluation Sector, in consultation with the steering group.

At **the end of the mission** the consultants should meet with the Delegation, DG ECHO's experts and DG ECHO's partners for discussion of observations arising from the evaluation. The evaluation team is required to share their findings with the NGOs/IOs concerned to allow them to comment upon. The purpose is to promote dialogue, mutual learning and ownership and to build capacity of the Commission's partners.

At the end of each field trip the team leader should ensure that a **Field Report** is drawn up and transmitted to DG ECHO Evaluation Sector. The Field Report will describe briefly the data collection activities implemented, with special mentioning of those of a participatory nature (including in annex the list of sites and persons visited, minutes from the focus groups if organized, the minutes of the workshop and any other relevant technical documents); a brief description of the situation found; as well as any relevant items identified during the field visit, which could have an influence in the methodology or the conclusions of the evaluation. *N.B.: the Field Report is not an evaluation as such, and should not include overall conclusions and recommendations, neither a collection of project evaluations. It is a working document to report on the fieldwork and identify any particular issues to be tackled during the synthesis phase (e.g. remedial actions related to the methodological approach, etc.).*

A meeting will be organized in Brussels to present the Field Report and discuss it with the Steering Committee. A video conference with the field office may be organised. The evaluator will duly consider all comments from the Steering Committee, as a condition for approval. In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argued reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator may be called for another meeting in Brussels to further discuss the subject of disagreement. The expenses for such a meeting will be covered by the existing budget of the Specific Contract.

### 5.4. SYNTHESIS PHASE

The Draft Final Report should deliver the results of all tasks covered by these Terms of Reference, and must be clear enough for any potential reader to understand.

As a reminder, even if the evaluation will assess individual projects, conclusions and recommendations must be drafted with a view to the overall evaluation of the Commission's intervention in the area concerned, and will be based on the overall information collected during the evaluation process.

The structure of the report should follow a broad classification into three parts:

- **Executive Summary:** It sets out, in no more than 5 pages, a summary of the evaluation's main conclusions and the main evidence supporting.
- **Main body:** The main report must be limited to 50 pages and present, in full, the results of the analyses and conclusions arising from the evaluation. It must also contain a description of the subject evaluated, the context of the evaluation, and the methodology used; and
- **Annexes:** These must collate the technical details of the evaluation, and must include the Terms of Reference, questionnaire templates, interview guides, any additional tables or graphics, and references and a full quotation of all sources.

### **Draft Report Meeting**

A **meeting** will be organised in Brussels after the submission of the first draft final report. The evaluator will make a PowerPoint presentation to the Steering Committee on the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The date for the meeting will be agreed between the Steering Committee and the evaluator. The Steering Committee will provide comments to the draft final report. The comments should be taken into account in the final report.

While finalising the report and its annexes, the evaluators will always highlight changes (using track changes) and modifications introduced as resulting from the meeting and the comments received from DG ECHO Evaluation Sector.

In case of disagreement, the evaluator will provide an argued reply explaining why a certain comment cannot be accepted. In case of substantial disagreements, the evaluator may be called for another meeting in Brussels to further discuss the subject of disagreement. The expenses for such a meeting will be covered by the existing budget of the Specific Contract.

### ***Final Report***

On the basis of the comments made by the Steering Committee, the evaluator shall make appropriate amendments, insofar as these do not interfere with the independence of the evaluator in respect of the conclusions they have reached and the recommendations made. The Executive Summary should be translated into French and Spanish by a professional translator, once it has been approved by the Steering Committee.

The Final Report should be accompanied by a PowerPoint presentation in electronic form, covering the main conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. The evaluator may be requested to present the evaluation results once in Brussels to DG ECHO's staff and / or stakeholders.

For a further detailed description of the format required for the Final Report (incl. EU Bookshop requirements), see Annex.

## **5.5. DISSEMINATION AND FOLLOW-UP PHASE**

The evaluation report is an important working tool for DG ECHO, and once finalised it will be published in the public domain on the Internet. Its use is intended for DG ECHO's operational and policy staff, EU Member States and citizens, and other international and national actors. This evaluation report is also a legal obligation and as such will be transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council.

Following the approval of the Final Report, DG ECHO will proceed with the dissemination and follow-up of the results of the evaluation.

## **6. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION**

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of the evaluation, in consultation with the Unit(s) responsible for the evaluation subject. The DG ECHO Evaluation Sector, and in particular the internal manager assigned to the evaluation, should therefore always be kept informed and consulted by the evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.

The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts.

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will provide general assistance to and feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation.

## **7. EVALUATION TEAM**

This evaluation will be carried out by a team with solid experience in the humanitarian field and in the evaluation of humanitarian aid. Specifically, the team must provide expertise in DRR and DRM, and fluency in Spanish, English and French.

## **8. AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT**

The maximum budget allocated to this study is **220 000 €**.

## 9. TIMETABLE

The duration of the contract is **9 months**.

The evaluation will start on **1 February 2016** and the evaluation tasks should be finalised within 8 months. Considering El Niño, the field visits must be carried out during the period of **May-June**.

In the offer, the bidder shall provide an indicative schedule based on the following table:

| <b>Indicative timing</b> | <b>Report</b>          | <b>Meeting</b>             |
|--------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|
| T+1 week                 |                        | Kick-off                   |
| T+4 weeks                | Draft Inception Report |                            |
| T+5 weeks                |                        | Inception meeting          |
| T+11 weeks               | Draft Desk Report      |                            |
| T+12 weeks               |                        | Desk Report meeting        |
| T+19 weeks               | Draft Field Report     |                            |
| T+21 weeks               |                        | Field Report meeting       |
| T+26 weeks               | Draft Final Report     |                            |
| T+29 weeks               |                        | Draft Final Report meeting |
| T+ 32 weeks              | Final Report           |                            |

## 10. CONTENT OF THE OFFER

The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include:

1. The tender submission form (annex D to the model specific contract);
2. A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being in a situation of exclusion (annex F to the model specific contract)

The technical part of the bidder's offer should be presented in a maximum of **30 pages**, and must include:

1. A description of the overall understanding of the Terms of Reference, the evaluation questions and the tasks covered by the contract;
2. The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases;
3. A description of the distribution of tasks and roles in the team;

4. A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis).
5. The CVs of each of the experts proposed.

The financial part of the offer must include the proposed total budget in Euros, taking due account of the maximum amount for this evaluation as provided above. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided.

## 11. AWARD

The contract will be awarded to the tender offering the best value for money on the basis of the following criteria:

### Quality criteria

| N°           | Qualitative Award criteria   | Weighting (max. points) |
|--------------|--|-------------------------|
| 1.           | Understanding of the terms of reference and the aim of the services to be provided | 10                      |
| 2.           | Methodology for structuring, data collection and analysis                          | 40                      |
| 3.           | Organization of tasks and team, timetable  | 10                      |
| 4.           | Appropriateness of the team on the basis of the expertise proposed                 | 40                      |
| <b>Total</b> |  | <b>100</b>              |

Only those tenders with a mark higher than 50% of the maximum number of points for each quality criteria, and higher than 70% for the overall maximum number of points, will be considered for the award of the contract.

### Price

For the purpose of the financial evaluation of the offers, the Commission will use the lump sum price as submitted in the financial offer of the tenderer.

### Award of the contract

The contract will be awarded to the tender achieving the highest score obtained by applying the following formula:

|                    |   |  |   |   |
|--------------------|---|--|---|---|
| Score for tender X | = | $\frac{\text{Cheapest price}}{\text{Price of tender X}}$ | * | total quality score (out of 100) for all criteria of tender X |
|--------------------|---|--|---|---|



## ANNEX: THE FINAL REPORT

By commissioning an independent evaluation and/or review DG ECHO expects to obtain an objective, critical, easy to read and transparent analysis of its interventions. This analysis should contain the information needed by the Commission for management, policy-making and accountability. It should also include operational, realistic recommendations at operational and/or strategic level. Above all, the report should be a document that can function as a learning tool. Therefore, while writing it, the evaluators should always bear in mind why the report is done, for whom, and how the results will be used.

To each evaluation question quoted in the report the consultant will provide an evidence-based, reasoned answer. Conclusions<sup>23</sup> will be provided pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the evaluated intervention, with special attention paid to the intended and unintended results. Furthermore, the report is a working tool of value to DG ECHO only as long as it is feasible and pragmatic, keeping in mind DG ECHO's mandate constraints and it clearly reflects the evaluator's independent view. DG ECHO's concern is to respect this independence.

The evaluation methods should be clearly outlined in the report and their appropriateness, focus and users should be explained pointing out strengths and weaknesses of the methods. The report should briefly outline the nature (e.g. external or mixed) and composition of the team (e.g. sectoral expertise, local knowledge, gender balance) and its appropriateness for the evaluation. It should also briefly outline the evaluators' biases and/or constraints that might have affected the evaluation and how these have been counteracted (past experiences, background, etc.).

The report shall be written in a straightforward manner in English with an Executive Summary at the beginning of the document. Final editing shall be provided by the contractor. The report should be in the font Times Roman 12, have single line spacing and be justified.

The final report should contain an Executive Summary of maximum **5 pages** and technical and/or other annexes as necessary.

This format should be strictly adhered to:

- *Cover page* (a template is provided at the end of this annex)
  - title of the evaluation report;
  - date of the evaluation;
  - name of the contracted company;
  - disclaimer in the sense that "The opinions expressed in this document represent the views of the authors, which are not necessarily shared by the European Commission."
- *Table of contents*
- *List of Abbreviations and Acronyms*
- *Executive Summary*

A clearly drafted, up to-the-point and free-standing **Executive Summary** is an essential element. It should focus on the key purpose of the evaluation, outline the

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<sup>23</sup>A conclusion draws on data collection and analyses undertaken, through a transparent chain of arguments. (OECD Glossary of Key terms in Evaluation and results based management)

main points of the analysis, and contain a **matrix** made of two columns clearly indicating the main conclusions and specific recommendations. Cross-references should be made to the corresponding page or paragraph numbers in the main text. The Executive Summary will be published also on DG ECHO website. The evaluation team should take this into account when drafting this part of the report.

- *Main body of the report*

The report should include at least a description of

- the purpose and scope of the evaluation;
- the conduct of the evaluation, including of the methodology used;
- the limitations and challenges occurred during the process;
- the evidence found;
- the analysis carried out;
- the conclusions drawn in the form of reasoned answers to each of the evaluation questions provided in the ToR. The questions must be quoted fully in the report, followed by an evidence-based answer. Conclusions should be fully substantiated, and derive in a logical manner from the data collection and analysis carried out during the evaluation process;
- the recommendations for the future. Recommendations should be clearly linked to the findings and based on conclusions. They should be as realistic, operational and pragmatic as possible; they should take careful account of the circumstances currently prevailing in the context of the implementation of the humanitarian activities, DG ECHO's mandate and of the resources available to implement it both locally and at the Commission level. Recommendations should be prioritised, directed at specific users and where appropriate include an indicative timeframe.

All possible **confidential information** shall be presented in a **separate annex**.

While finalising the report and its annexes, the evaluators will always highlight changes (using track changes) and modifications introduced as resulting from the meeting and the comments received from DG ECHO Evaluation Sector.

The final report should be sent also by email in three separate documents in PDF format each containing: the Executive Summary, the Report without its annexes (also removed from the table of contents) and the Report with its annexes.

## **TEMPLATE FOR THE TITLE PAGE**

NAME AND LOGO OF THE CONSULTING COMPANY

(OPTIONAL INSERTION OF PICTURE/DRAWING/MAP)

TITLE OF THE EVALUATION REPORT;  
DATE OF THE EVALUATION;

FINAL

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## Annex 2: Evaluation Questions

### EQ.1 on Relevance

#### **What is the level of RELEVANCE of ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period?**

Issues include

- the quality of needs assessments in the region and period provide a basis for identifying the most vulnerable persons, households and communities and for proposing or selecting for funding the activities best directed to the reduction of their vulnerability to shocks, stresses and disasters taking into account known best practices.
- the initial involvement of target populations in terms of participation of authorities or local organized groups (producers, women) in determining their vulnerabilities and needs,
- how well the HIPs and needs assessments fit together,
- how well the projects submitted / funded and HIPs fit together.

The thematic questions on targeting most vulnerable groups and the multi-hazard approach are also included.

### EQ.2 on Coherence

#### **What is the level of COHERENCE of ECHO actions in the region and sub-regions during the evaluation period?**

The set of ECHO action plans (HIPs) provided the framework within which the internal coherence within ECHO was analysed.

Several sub-questions are included in this section as per ToR:

- How well ECHO is advocating for resilience of the most vulnerable being a priority across the development effort?
- How well do ECHO-funded efforts align with the wider policy and practice landscape within the EU?
- How well are the best practices of those ECHO-funded projects presented to other key stakeholders
- How ECHO-funded activities are supporting the priorities identified by other key actors and supporting national policies on DRR and resilience (LRRD)?

### EQ.3 on Added Value

#### **What is the level of EU-ADDED VALUE of ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period?**

The emphasis in the question is on ECHO actions and their share in the added value.

Issues are e.g. how ECHO has drawn on its role and mandate to create specific added value, which could / would not be achieved by other actors or instruments.

## EQ.4 on Effectiveness

### What is the level of EFFECTIVENESS of ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period?

This is the most important EQ. Did ECHO Partners make a difference for the beneficiaries in terms of increased *resilience*?

Several sub-questions are included:

- What are the main lessons learned (e.g., in ECHO's response to disasters, including food insecurity) and examples of good resilience building practice to lead to replication?
- What has / has not worked, and what are the critical success factors?
- What are the main factors limiting the success of the projects funded in the countries over the period covered by the evaluation?
- Is there an 'advocacy gap'? How could ECHO improve in this respect?

This section (and EQ) includes several of the « tasks » listed in the ToRs:

- Task 1: Identify the main lessons learned and best practices
- Task 3: Identify main gaps and progress made on Disaster Preparedness/DRR in beneficiary countries.
- Task 4: At a general level, identify the main factors limiting the success of the projects funded in the countries over the period covered by the evaluation.

## EQ.5 on Efficiency

### What was the level of EFFICIENCY of the ECHO actions in the region during the evaluation period?

The efficiency and in particular the cost per benefit (cost/value) is an important characteristic of any pilot project. It will influence if not determine its potential for duplication and sustainability.

Issues include the use of resources, and the management and monitoring processes;

## EQ.6 on Sustainability

### What is the level of SUSTAINABILITY of ECHO actions implemented during the evaluation period?

This question addressed whether the ECHO *resilience* effort do leave a permanent trace or foot print locally as well the replication or scaling up of some of the projects, if and when appropriate. Issues include contribution to LRRD and *Resilience*, ownership by national authorities in the beneficiary countries, and willingness of development actors (including EU) to replicate or expand on ECHO projects. Additional long-lasting (self-sustainable) impact such as triggering increased risk awareness at community or institutional level, fostering links and cooperation between actors and stakeholders will also be identified

## Impact indicators

An important sub-question in the ToR is: **What are the appropriate IMPACT indicators of the funded efforts that can be applied to the region as a whole?**

It is the last issue in the Findings and Conclusions. It is presented more extensively and in greater depth as the topic of one of the case studies in annex 10.

## Annex 3: Financing decisions and HIPs

The following financial allocations have been made during the evaluation period:

| 2015                                  |                         |            |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------|
| Caribbean, Central America and Mexico | ECHO/-CM/BUD/2015/91000 | 20,939,000 |
| South America                         | ECHO/-SM/BUD/2015/91000 | 23,500,000 |
| Central America                       | ECHO/-CM/BUD/2015/01000 | 4,000,000  |
| Small scale Humanitarian Response     | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2015/91000 | 2,797,000  |
| 2014                                  |                         |            |
| Colombia                              | ECHO/COL/BUD/2014/91000 | 13,029,000 |
| Haiti                                 | ECHO/HTI/BUD/2014/91000 | 18,500,000 |
| Haiti                                 | ECHO/HTI/EDF/2014/01000 | 5,000,000  |
| DIPECHO Central America               | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2014/93000 | 11,040,377 |
| Mexico                                | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2014/91000 | 500,000    |
| Colombia                              | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2013/01000 | 500,000    |
| Small scale Humanitarian Response     | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2014/91000 | 524.951    |
|                                       | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2014/92000 | 1,250,000  |
| 2013                                  |                         |            |
| Mexico                                | ECHO/-CM/BUD/2013/9100  | 2,000,000  |
| Colombia                              | ECHO/COL/BUD/2013/91000 | 13,000,000 |
| Colombia                              | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2013/01000 | 500,000    |
| Haiti                                 | ECHO/HTI/BUD/2013/91000 | 15,000,000 |
| DIPECHO Caribbean                     | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2013/94000 | 8,500,000  |
| DIPECHO South America                 | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2013/93000 | 12,055,130 |
| <i>Resilience</i> (Drought)–          | ECHO/-AM/BUD/2013/91000 | 4,000,000  |
| Jamaica & Dom Rep – Del. Proc.        | ECHO/-CR/EDF/2013/01000 | 1,500,000  |
| Colombia (and other countries)        | ECHO/ERC/BUD/2013/91008 | 1,500,000  |
| Small Scale Humanitarian Response     | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2013/92000 | 1,793,000  |
|                                       | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2013/91000 | 701.663,00 |

| 2012                                |                         |            |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|------------|
| Colombia                            | ECHO/COL/BUD/2012/91000 | 13,000,000 |
| Colombia                            | ECHO/CHD/BUD/2012/01000 | 400,000    |
| Haiti                               | ECHO/HTI/BUD/2012/91000 | 34,250,000 |
| Guatemala                           | ECHO/GTM/BUD/2012/01000 | 2,000,000  |
| DIPECHO Central America             | ECHO/DIP/BUD/2012/94000 | 10,025,000 |
| South America                       | ECHO/-SM/BUD/2012/91000 | 5,000,000  |
| Cuba H Sandy response               | ECHO/CUB/BUD/2012/91000 | 4,000,000  |
| Haiti Cholera Epidemic              | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2012/93000 | 657,275    |
| Small scale Humanitarian Assistance | ECHO/DRF/BUD/2012/92000 | 1,695,695  |

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## Annex 5: List of organisations met

---

| Organisations outside the field countries visited |              |
|---|--------------|
| Place of meeting                                  | Organisation |
| Brussels  | DG DEVCO     |
| Brussels  | DG ECHO      |
| Madrid  | MDM-ES       |
| Madrid  | ACH-ES       |
| Madrid  | Cruz Roja-ES |
| Asuncion  | UNDP/Quito   |
| Panama  | IFRC         |
| Asunción  | UNDP/Panama  |
| Asunción  | DEVCO        |

| BOLIVIA              |                                       |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|
| GAM Bolívar          | Ayuda en Accion                       |
| Fund.                | GAM Bolívar                           |
| SumajHuasi           | CRS                                   |
| Plan Internacional   | DUE                                   |
| ACH                  | CARE                                  |
| FAO                  | Fund. SumajHuasi                      |
| Christian Aid        | GAM Challapata                        |
| PNUD                 | GAM Huari                             |
| Emapais              | Municipio Autónomo Originario Chipaya |
| COOPI                | U.E. Illimani                         |
| Sol. Practicas       | Ministerio de Educación               |
| OIM/IOM              | GAD Oruro                             |
| VIDECI               | WVI                                   |
| UNICEF               | ECHO Quito                            |
| Junta Vecinal FEJUVE | WV/Bolivia                            |
| FUNDEPCO             | OXFAM                                 |
| GAM La Paz           | ECHO Bogota                           |
| GAM Toledo           | ACF                                   |
| GVC                  | Handicap International                |
| Save the Children    | WV                                    |

| Focus Groups Bolivia |                                       |             |   |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|---|
| 33 persons           | Iximas Simulation                     | 20 May 2016 | UGR, GAM, Mayor Office, Advisors, ect.                                |
| 4 persons            | CIMTA/CIPTA                           | 20 may 2016 | Tumupasa  |
| 19 persons           | San Jose visit                        | 21 May 2016 | Farmers, teachers, School kids, etc.                                  |
| 3 persons            | Villa Alcira visit                    | 21 May 2016 | Farmers   |
| 18 persons           | GAM Challapata                        | 20 May 2016 | GAM, UGR, Consejo Municipal, TV Municipal, Defensor comunitario, etc. |
| 7 persons            | GAM Huari                             | 20 May 2016 | GAM, UGR, Consejo Municipal   |
| 18 persons           | Municipio Indígena Originario Chipaya | 21 May 2016 | Concejal y autoridades originarias (Hilacatas y Mama Talla)           |
| 18 persons           | GAM Toledo                            | 21 May 2016 | GAM, UGR, Consejo Municipal, comunarios                               |
| 16 persons           | GAM Bolívar                           | 22 May 2016 | GAM, UGR, Concejales, promotor, etc.                                  |

| Colombia  |                    |
|---|--------------------|
| ACNUR   | LWF                |
| Alcaldía Arauca                                     | LWF                |
| Alcaldía Buenaventura                               | OCHA               |
| Alianza por la Solidaridad                          | PAHO/WHO           |
| Alliance for Solidarity                             | PMA                |
| Caritas-DE  | RC-DE              |
| Centro Regional de atención y Reparación a Víctimas | Save the Children  |
| CICR  | Swedish Emb.       |
| CIRC  | UARIV              |
| CISP  | UARIV - SPAE       |
| CONASUDE  | UARIV- Cooper. Int |
| Cruz Roja Colombiana                                | UARIV-DGSH         |
| Defensoría del Pueblo                               | UNDP               |
| DUE   | UNGRD              |
| ECHO  | UNGRD              |
| FAO   | UNISDR             |
| ICRC  | WFP                |

| Focus groups Colombia                                       |  |                      |
|---|--|----------------------|
| Iximas Simulation<br>UGR, GAM, Mayor Office, Advisors, ect. |  |                      |
| 5 Beneficiaries in Arauca persons                           | Assistance to IDPs<br>ArsauAruaquitaarauquyuitaCIMTA/CIPTA | Arauca & Arauquita   |
| 7 volunteers  | Colombian Red Cross  | Buenaventura         |
| 3 Beneficiaries   | Economic opportuny project                                 | Buenaventura         |
| 1 beneficiary   | Programa de Fortalecimiento de Unidades de Producción      | Buenaventura         |
| 8 committee members   | Local Committee  | barrio El Progreso   |
| 6 IDPs victims of violence                                  | programa de asistencia psicosocial y legal                 | Buenaventura         |
| 7 Leaders and members                                       | Comité Veredal   | San Pedro / Río Naya |

| Dominican Republic   |   |
|--|---|
| Alcaldia/Palenque  | IDAC Palenque                                       |
| ALSSA Palenque   | IDDE  |
| Ayuntamiento de Palenque                                       | INAPA Palenque                                      |
| Ayuntamiento, SGN  | Junta Vecinos ,SGN                                  |
| Bomberos Palenque  | OIM   |
| CM-PMR: Comité Municipal de Prevención, mitigación y respuesta | OPS/ OMS  |
| CNE – Defensa Civil  | OXFAM   |
| CR - ES  | PLAN Int.   |
| Cruz Roja Azua   | PNUD  |
| Cruz Roja Palenque   | Red Hum   |
| Defensa Civil Palenque   | SGN (San Gregorio de Nigua, San Cristobal)          |
| Defensa Civil, SGN   | SNS   |
| DUE  | SNS   |
| ECHO   | SNS (SERVICIO NACIONAL DE SALUD)                    |
| FAO  | SRSCO (SERVICIO REGIONAL DE SALUD CIBAO OCCIDENTAL) |
| Hospital Palenque  | SRSCO/  |
| Hospital, San Gregorio de Nigua (SGN)                          | World Vision  |
| HRMM   |   |

| Focus Groups Dominican Republic                        |   |              |                    |
|--|---|--------------|--------------------|
| Name   | Place   | Participants | Women              |
| Red Comunitaria y Grupo PASSA (OXFAM-PLAN)             | El Rosario (Azua)                                     | 6            | 6                  |
| Federacion de campesinos (OXFAM-PLAN)                  | Azua  | 9            | 3                  |
| Red comunitaria (OXFAM-PLAN)                           | La Bombita (Azua)                                     | 6            | 5                  |
| Red comunitaria(OXFAM-PLAN)                            | Palmar de Ocoa  | 5            | 3                  |
| CM-PMR (PNUD)  | San Gregorio de Nigua                                 | 5            | 2 (Vice-Alacadeza) |
| CM-PMR (PNUD)  | Palenque  | 16           | 3                  |
| Alumnos del Diplomado de construcción sismo resistente | San Cristobal (universidad autónoma de Santo Domingo) | 17           | 11                 |
| Alumnos curso de maestro constructores                 | San Cristobal   | 28           | 2                  |

| Haiti                                    |                  |
|--|------------------|
| ACF                                      | HRMM             |
| ACF                                      | IFRC             |
| ACTED                                    | IOM              |
| Action Aid                               | MDM              |
| ASB                                      | MDM Espagne      |
| Bureau de la Coopération Suisse en Haiti | MSPP             |
| CAN                                      | MSPP /North      |
| CAN                                      | MSPP/ Cap        |
| CESVI                                    | MSPP/Cap Haitien |
| CNSA                                     | Nutrition/MSPP   |
| Concern                                  | OPS/ DOR         |
| COOPI                                    | OPS/OMS          |
| CR allemande                             | Oxfam            |
| CR Espagne                               | PNUD             |
| CR francaise                             | SI               |
| DINEPA/DRU                               | SJM              |
| DINEPA/DRU                               | SJM/SFW          |
| DINEPA/UNICEF                            | SNS / Dom. Rep.  |
| DPC/NE                                   | SRSCO/ Dom. Rep. |
| DUE                                      | UK/DFID          |
| ECHO                                     | UNDP             |
| FAO                                      | UNICEF           |
| FICR                                     | USAID/OFDA       |
| Goal                                     | WHO/PAHO         |
| GVC Italie                               | WHO/PAHO         |
| Helpage                                  |                  |



| Honduras                             |
|--------------------------------------|
| PRIDE Manufacturing                  |
| Delegación Union Europea             |
| Oficina Municipal de la Mujer        |
| CODEM Comayagua                      |
| Hospital Santa Teresa                |
| CRH Concejo 8                        |
| CRH Oficina Nacional                 |
| Dickies de Honduras                  |
| COPECO                               |
| Centro de Desarrollo Humano          |
| Asociación Hondureña de Maquiladores |
| Centro Penal Comayagua               |
| Comisión de Acción Social Menonita   |
| CASM/TROCAIRE                        |
| CASM/Choloma                         |
| CODEM Santa Fe                       |
| Trocaire                             |
| GOAL                                 |
| SAG                                  |
| CRH                                  |
| Cuerpo de Bomberos                   |
| Salud Pública                        |
| Municipalidad Santa Fe               |
| CASM                                 |
| Alcaldía de San Sebastian            |
| CODEM San Sebastian                  |
| CODEM Villa San Antonio              |
| Gobernación Política                 |
| Red de Jóvenes                       |

| Focus groups Honduras                         |                |                  |
|---|----------------|------------------|
| Place   | # PARTICIPANTS | Partner / Agency |
| <b>SANTA FE</b>                               | 08             | CASM/DCA         |
| <b>JUTIAPA</b>                                | 21             | CDH/DCA          |
| <b>ASOCIACIÓN DE MAQUILADORES DE HONDURAS</b> | 07             | CASM/TROCAIRE    |
| <b>DICKIES</b>                                | 09             | CASM/TROCAIRE    |
| <b>PRIDE MANUFACTURING</b>                    | 24             | CASM/TROCAIRE    |
| <b>COPECO REGION IV</b>                       | 02             | CRH              |
| <b>CRUZ ROJA HONDUREÑA CONSEJO</b>            | 06             | CRH              |
| <b>SOCIEDAD CIVIL DE COMAYAGUA</b>            | 32             | CRH              |

| Nicaragua                 |
|---------------------------|
| Alcaldía/ Fátima          |
| AMC                       |
| D.C GRACCS                |
| Carolina C. Sur           |
| CAPS                      |
| CRN                       |
| Alcaldía UMGIR-Bluefields |
| Bilwi / Miskita           |
| Mined                     |
| GVC                       |
| Bombero                   |
| CORPRED-GRACCS            |
| Cruz Roja Nicaragüense    |
| OXFAM                     |
| Bilwi / Miskita           |
| FADCANIC                  |
| MIFAN                     |
| ECHO                      |
| Alcaldía de Managua       |
| UM-FIR                    |
| Alcaldía Bilwi            |
| Bilwi                     |
| CR- ES                    |
| F.S.L.N                   |
| PLAN                      |
| PLAN Internacional        |
| ENACAL                    |
| Particip                  |
| MIRSA/ Bluefields         |
| Alcaldía                  |
| UM-GIR-AMC                |
| CAPS                      |

## Annex 6: Interview guide

The objective of this Interview Guide is to facilitate the semi-structured interviews with stakeholders. The Interview Guide is meant to assist in a process that will lead to findings, conclusions, and recommendations that can be properly substantiated.

It is designed to be a flexible tool allowing for the examination of topics and issues in a systematic manner without an overly prescriptive approach. Flexibility is essential so that interviews can be adjusted to the knowledge, role and expected contribution of each type of interlocutor.

In using the Interview Guide, the evaluation team will make reference to the six main evaluation questions for this mandate. The Interview Guide is meant to make certain that the evaluation team is in a position to ensure that the conclusions and findings related to the main evaluation questions are supported by information that is properly triangulated through multiple information sources.

There are both general evaluation issues or enquiries and specific ones, more attuned to the experience of the interviewee (ECHO staff, country level partners, national institutions, European Union instruments and other donor organisations).

### Evaluation Issues to be covered in all Interviews

#### Understanding of Risks

- Type of Risks and integration of climate and environmental considerations
- Prioritization of Risks from the point of view of the interviewee
- Level of vulnerability across the geographic areas of concern, trends
- Sources of data in assessments
- Justification / rationale for the targeting of specific beneficiaries (prioritization?)
- Local Infrastructure and institutional capabilities related to managing/mitigating risks

#### Perceptions on strengths and weaknesses of ECHO programmes

- Effectiveness for the beneficiaries
- Efficiency and cost as issues for replication
- Coherence between ECHO activities and other initiatives
- Relative strengths of ECHO compared to other donors (added value) from the interlocutor agency's point of view

#### Gender

- How gender issues are currently being addressed through ECHO programming
- Success and difficulties encountered by all aspects of ECHO programming related to gender
- Best practices in reducing gender-related vulnerability.

#### Sources of information

- References, documents, evaluation of potential interest
- Other contacts critical for this evaluation
- Most successful impact indicator of *resilience*
- Most representative project?

### Evaluation issues specific to interviewees' role

#### ECHO staff

- Strength and weaknesses of ECHO programming (both in countries visited and generally in the region)
- Coherence of ECHO activities with priorities or policies established in other ECHO units

- Extent and results of dialogue with other EC instruments / delegations: success stories?
- Programming challenges and mechanism of a selection of partners and proposals
- Findings on the respective effectiveness of projects: best practices and difficulties
- Best practices for sustainability and scaling up of the ECHO activity (cost efficiency)
- Effectiveness of partnerships with national institutions (national laws and policies)
- Level of priority expressed by National Institutions for ECHO supported programming

### Other European Union Instruments / Delegations

- Other EU programming in *resilience* (Alignment of ECHO-funded efforts to wider policy landscape inside EU, shared assessment and priorities, overlap?)
- Specific added value of ECHO interventions to *resilience*
- Mutual participation in the selection of priorities and projects
- Support to same partners or activities
- Examples of synergies, current and future between ECHO and other EU interventions (missed opportunities?)

### Partner Organisations

- Mandate of partner (humanitarian / development / mixed, experience and duration in country...)
- Partnership with ECHO (strengths and weaknesses, length...),
- Current and projected ECHO-related programming priorities for the country visited and the region (familiarity and application of the HIP)
- ECHO Procedures and approach in comparison with other international donors (selection, approval and administrative / technical management of projects)
- Sustainability of the partner's ECHO-funded activities (what is needed to make ECHO programming more sustainable and cost efficient); Non ECHO best practices
- Areas for further partnerships / synergies with ECHO

### Other Donor Organisations

- Mechanism of international coordination in DRR, *resilience*
- Partnership with ECHO (positive and negative considerations, importance to the donor?)
- Mutual participation in the selection of respective priorities and projects
- Shared assessment
- Shared concerns / perceptions regarding the strengths and weaknesses of national institutions
- Shared challenges and opportunities to programme in country and/or within the region (NGOs capabilities, community readiness, communications and public awareness capabilities)
- Willingness to fund replication or expansion of ECHO projects and factors in that decision-making

### National Institutions

- Alignment with national policies and procedures
- Consultation by ECHO or its partners before setting priorities and selecting projects
- Support received from ECHO or its partners (for example, contributing to enhancing capacity building efforts in support of institutional capabilities or programming activities)
- Value added of ECHO to national institutions in comparison with other donor organisations, the role played by ECHO which others donors do not necessarily fulfil
- Effectiveness and efficiency of ECHO's programming (compared with other donors?)
- Interest in replication or expanding ECHO projects (sustainability)
- Issues or concerns related to ECHO Programming
- Suggested priorities for future programming by or with ECHO

## Annex 7: Perception Survey

### **Description**

In addition to the desk review, field visits, personal and phone interviews, the evaluation team developed and administered a **formal on-line survey** in order to obtain a more quantifiable picture of ECHO partners' and stakeholders' perceptions on ECHO's contribution to *resilience* building in the LAC region as well as to identify enabling and limiting factors and lessons learned. This tool allowed for the collection of a great volume of qualitative and quantitative information from the partners on several of the indicators proposed to measure and validate different aspects of the evaluation questions. Additionally, it facilitated the collection of comments from the partners on their main issues of concern, proposed improvements, issues to be discussed, and provision of ideas.

### **Surveying System Design and Configuration**

A survey was developed and implemented with multiple formats: 1.) utilising the specialized software product SurveyGizmo, a well-known and widely used online surveying system and 2.) hard-copy distributed at meetings and interviews. In order to reach the maximum number of partners and to get the maximum number of responses from them, the survey system was carefully designed to ensure that it was accessible and easily used by everyone, even with little computer knowledge; from any computer even those with slow internet connections, or low screen resolutions; and that it was always available and working properly during the data collection stage. The proposed questionnaire was developed and available in English, French and Spanish.

### **Target Population for the Survey**

For the distribution of the survey, all relevant partner interlocutors' and focal points' (field and HQ) email addresses had to be gathered. In the absence of a centralized or regional database of addresses, securing these was time consuming. Through a systematic review of all FichOps (including refused projects), a list of 697 relevant email addresses was compiled.

Considering that the percentage of users who respond to this type of survey is usually very low, and also that the cost for implementing an online-survey does not increase with the number of participants –as would be the case with a survey implemented through personal interviews – it was decided that no sampling of the target population was needed and that the email invitation to participate on the survey could be sent to the complete list of email addresses available.

An email campaign was initiated, inviting the 697 contacts to participate in the perception survey. Subsequent reminders were sent.

**Table 9: Emails correctly delivered to possible survey participants**

| Contacts Lists                           |            |
|--|------------|
| Total number of contacts                 | 697        |
| Email bounces <sup>95</sup>              | - 82       |
| <b>Total emails correctly delivered:</b> | <b>615</b> |

<sup>95</sup> Email bounce is an email that has been returned by the recipient's mail server as permanently undeliverable (caused by invalid addresses, e.g. doesn't exist, changed address, etc.).

## **Responses Received**

As a result of the surveying activity the team was able to collect a great amount of information from a total of 334 responses (245 completed and 89 partial ones). Besides the responses to all the closed questions, a great number of comments and suggestions to the different aspects of the survey in which the users were given the chance to write 'free-texts' in response to open questions was collected. In summary, the survey achieved a remarkable response rate of 54 %:

**Table 10: Survey's response rate**

| <b>Response Rate</b>                        |               |
|---|---------------|
| Total emails correctly delivered to readers | 615           |
| Survey responses received                   | 334           |
| <b>Response Rate:</b>                       | <b>54,31%</b> |

It is important to clarify that the survey did not ask questions about conclusive facts or numbers but rather about the respondent's perceptions on the topics being evaluated. Since the results are based on the participant's perceptions, they cannot be considered conclusive by themselves and should be complemented with other information. Perceptions may vary from one region to another and are strongly influenced by personal experience and cultural background.

The proposed questionnaire was developed and available in English, Spanish and French.


## **Graphic Design:**

The graphics and layout of the online survey system were designed keeping in mind the same important aspects as explained for the questionnaires: simplicity and usability, making the survey very easy to use and straight-forward for the participants.


Sample screen shots of the welcome page and some of the questions' pages of the survey are shown below:

**Figure 10: Sample screen shot of the welcome page of the survey**

Select another language



## Evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building Resilience in the LAC Region



**HUMANITARIAN AID AND CIVIL PROTECTION**

**Questionnaire to selected recipients**

This survey is part of an independent evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building Resilience in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) Region.

DG ECHO has commissioned this evaluation to the company Particip GmbH. The specific purpose of this questionnaire is to collect your perceptions on ECHO's contribution to resilience building in the LAC region (in the period 2012 - 2015).

Thank you for your time and frank answers. Please respond to the questions of perception providing a **rapid instinctive reaction from a personal - not official organisational - point of view** (multiple responses from the same entity are encouraged).

If you have further questions regarding this evaluation in general, or have any comments or technical problems in relation to the online survey, your contact persons are:  
Barbara Christ, Project Manager - Phone +49 761 79074-0, [barbara.christ@particip.de](mailto:barbara.christ@particip.de)  
Lezlie Morinière, Senior Evaluator, [lezlie@email.arizona.edu](mailto:lezlie@email.arizona.edu)

**With our most sincere thanks in advance for your co-operation,**  
*The Particip Evaluation Team*


Next

0%



**Figure 11: Sample screen shots of the questions' pages of the survey**

Save and continue later
Select another language



## Evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building Resilience in the LAC Region

8. Please score the following statements with respect to ECHO-funded efforts you are familiar with in the LAC region:

|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| ECHO funded efforts meet the needs of the most vulnerable                                       | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts make beneficiaries better aware of the risks  | -- Please Select -- |
| Government entities have participated in the efforts  | -- Please Select -- |
| Government entities demonstrate ownership of the efforts  | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts align with national priorities or policies  | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts align with European priorities or policies  | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts add value by meeting needs not met by other actors                                  | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts are cost-effective  | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts have been replicated/scaled up, or have potential to do so                          | -- Please Select -- |
| The efforts are sustainable after termination of ECHO funding                                   | -- Please Select -- |
| Altogether, ECHO funded activities make the beneficiaries more resilient to stresses and shocks | -- Please Select -- |

9. Please provide an example or an explanation for each of your most extreme scores above:

Back
Next

40%

Save and continue later

Select another language



## Evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building Resilience in the LAC Region

10. Which of the following FACTORS have been the most important to **enable** or **limit** the success of ECHO-funded LAC efforts in resilience?


|   | Enable                | Limit                 | Not so important/applicable |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Synergy with partners                             | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Design and Needs Assessment                       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Government ownership                              | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Link to EU policy                                 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Level of funding                                  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Leadership/Management                             | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Measurability and M&E of impact                   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Relevance   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Coherence   | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Added Value                                       | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Effectiveness                                     | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Efficiency  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Replicability                                     | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Sustainability                                    | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| Timeliness  | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |
| <input type="text" value="Enter another option"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/>       |

Back

Next

60%

[Save and continue later](#)  
[Select another language](#)



## Evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building Resilience in the LAC Region

11. Please provide examples demonstrating how linkage with local / national and regional authorities has contributed to sustainability, replication and/or scaling up.

12. What single "resilience" indicator do you feel best reflects the impact of the funded efforts you are familiar with? To what extent have you tracked this?

13. To what extent have ECHO resilience activities addressed future stresses and shocks from climate change? Please provide examples.

[Back](#)[Submit](#)

80%

A sample of the initial email invitation to participate is shown below:

**Figure 12: Sample of the initial email invitation to participate in the survey**

Dear Madam or Sir,

we are contacting you in relation to the "**Evaluation of DG ECHO's Actions on Building *Resilience* in the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region**". DG ECHO has commissioned the implementation of this evaluation to our company Participip.

With this email we would like to invite you to participate in a quick survey. Your perceptions on ECHO's contribution to *resilience* building in the LAC region are important to this evaluation. Completing this survey won't take you more than 10 minutes.

To access the survey, please click on the blue link below this message. The survey can be completed in English or Spanish. After clicking the link you will be able to choose your preferred language, with the button on the very top of each page.

Should you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact us.

Thank you for your time and cooperation!

THE EVALUATION TEAM

[Please click here to take the survey / Por favor, pulse aqui para acceder al cuestionario](#)

\*\*\*\*\* ESPAÑOL \*\*\*\*\*

Estimada señora o señor,

le contactamos en relación a la "**Evaluación de los esfuerzos de DG ECHO para el reforzamiento de resiliencia en la región de América Latina y el Caribe (ALC)**". DG ECHO ha contratado a nuestra empresa Participip GmbH para llevar a cabo esta evaluación.

Con este mensaje nos gustaría invitarle a participar en una encuesta rápida. Su percepción sobre la contribución de ECHO al reforzamiento de resiliencia en la región de ALC es muy importante para esta evaluación. Completar este cuestionario no le va a llevar más que 10 minutos de su tiempo.

Para acceder al cuestionario, por favor pulse el enlace azul que se encuentra mas arriba, entre el mensaje en Inglés y Español. El cuestionario existe en dos idiomas, Español e Inglés. Después de pulsar el enlace usted puede elegir su idioma preferido, usando los botones en la parte de arriba de cada página del cuestionario.

Si tiene alguna pregunta, por favor no dude en ponerse en contacto con nosotros.

Muchas gracias por su cooperación!

EL EQUIPO DE EVALUACION

### **Target Population for the Survey**

For the distribution of the survey, all relevant partner interlocutors' and focal points' (field and HQ) email addresses had to be gathered. In the absence of a centralized or regional database of addresses, securing these was time consuming. Through a systematic review of all FichOps (including refused projects), a list of 697 relevant email addresses was compiled.

Considering that the percentage of users who respond to this type of survey is usually very low, and also that the cost for implementing an online-survey does not increase with the number of participants –as would be the case with a survey implemented through personal interviews – it was

decided that no sampling of the target population was needed and that the email invitation to participate on the survey could be sent to the complete list of email addresses available.

An email campaign was initiated, inviting the 697 contacts to participate in the perception survey and subsequent reminders were sent.

**Table 11: Emails correctly delivered to possible survey participants**

| Contacts Lists                           |            |
|--|------------|
| Total number of contacts                 | 697        |
| Email bounces <sup>96</sup>              | - 82       |
| <b>Total emails correctly delivered:</b> | <b>615</b> |

## **Responses Received**

As a result of the surveying activity the team was able to collect a great amount of information from a total of 334 responses (245 completed and 89 partial ones).

Besides the responses to all the closed questions, a great number of comments and suggestions to the different aspects of the survey in which the users were given the chance to write 'free-texts' in response to open questions was collected.

In summary, the survey achieved a remarkable response rate of 54 %:


**Table 12: Survey's response rate**

| Response Rate                               |               |
|---|---------------|
| Total emails correctly delivered to readers | 615           |
| Survey responses received                   | 334           |
| <b>Response Rate:</b>                       | <b>54,31%</b> |

It is important to clarify that the survey did not ask questions about conclusive facts or numbers but rather about the respondent's perceptions on the topics being evaluated. Being the results based on the participant's perception they cannot be considered conclusive by themselves and should be complemented with other information, since the perception of different people may vary from one region to another and may be strongly influenced by personal experience and cultural background.


## **Results**

### **1. Respondent's organisation:**




<sup>96</sup> Email bounce is an email that has been returned by the recipient's mail server as permanently undeliverable (caused by invalid addresses, e.g. doesn't exist, changed address, etc.).


## 2. Respondents' position base:




## 3. Respondents' geographical focus of work:




## 4. Respondents' level of work:




## 5. Respondents' main sector of work:



## 6. Respondents' level of familiarity with DRR or resilience programming:




## 7. Respondents' level of familiarity with ECHO-funded efforts:





## 8. Respondents' scoring of statements:



## Annex 8: Itinerary of visit in the countries

| Month                     | MAY 2016 |        |       |       |       |       |       |       |                |         |         |         |         |
|---------------------------|----------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Day                       | 9        | 10     | 11    | 12    | 13    | 14    | 15    | 16    | 17             | 18      | 19      | 20      | 21      |
|                           |          | Tues   | Wed   | Thu   | Fri   | Sat   | Sun   | Mon   | Tue            | Wed     | Thu     | Fri     | Sat     |
| Claude de Ville           | Travel   | Haiti  | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti Workshop | Travel  | DOR     | DOR     | DOR     |
| Lezlie Moriniere          |          | Travel | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti | Haiti Workshop | Travel  | Bolivia | Bolivia | Bolivia |
| Dean Pallen               |          |        |       |       |       |       |       |       |                |         |         |         |         |
| Luis Rolando Durán Vargas |          |        |       |       |       |       |       |       | Travel         | DOR     | DOR     | DOR     | DOR     |
| Linda Zilbert Zoto        |          |        |       |       |       |       |       |       | Travel         | Bolivia | Bolivia | Bolivia | Bolivia |

| Month                     |            |           |           |           |           |          |          |          |          |          | JUNE 2016 |          |                   |        |
|---------------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|-------------------|--------|
| Day                       | 22         | 23        | 24        | 25        | 26        | 27       | 28       | 29       | 30       | 31       | 1         | 2        | 3                 | 4      |
|                           | Sun        | Mon       | Tue       | Wed       | Thu       | Fri      | Sat      | Sun      | Mon      | Tue      | Wed       | Thu      | Fri               | Sat    |
| Claude de Ville           | Travel Nic | Nicaragua | Nicaragua | Nicaragua | Travel    | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia  | Colombia | Colombia workshop | Travel |
| Lezlie Moriniere          | Bolivia    | Bolivia   | Travel    |           |           |          |          |          |          |          |           |          | Travel            | Travel |
| Dean Pallen               |            |           |           |           |           |          |          | Travel   | Honduras | Honduras | Honduras  | Honduras | Honduras workshop | Travel |
| Luis Rolando Durán Vargas | Travel     | Nicaragua | Nicaragua | Nicaragua | Nicaragua | Travel   |          |          |          |          |           |          |                   |        |
| Linda Zilbert Zoto        | Bolivia    | Bolivia   | Travel    | Colombia  | Colombia  | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia | Colombia  | Colombia | Colombia workshop | Travel |

| Month                            |          |          |          |                               |                               |        |
|----------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------|
| Day                              | 5        | 6        | 7        | 8                             | 9                             | 10     |
|                                  | Sun      | Mon      | Tue      | Wed                           | Thu                           | Fri    |
| <b>Claude de Ville</b>           | Paraguay | Paraguay | Paraguay | Paraguay/<br>Meeting<br>SENDI | Paraguay/<br>Meeting<br>SENDI | Travel |
| <b>Lezlie Moriniere</b>          | Paraguay | Paraguay | Paraguay | Travel                        |                               |        |
| <b>Dean Pallen</b>               | Paraguay | Paraguay | Paraguay | Travel                        |                               |        |
| <b>Luis Rolando Durán Vargas</b> |          |          |          |                               |                               |        |
| <b>Linda Zilbert Zoto</b>        |          |          |          |                               |                               |        |

## Annex 9: Links between ECHO and regional, national and local authorities

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### Introduction:

This case study reviews the information available regarding the link between ECHO resilience building activities and local, national, regional institutions. The study covers all ECHO projects in Latin America and the Caribbean for the period 2012-2015. It is based on the review of publications and documents, interviews with actors and stakeholders and direct observations from the visits to six countries (Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras and Nicaragua).

*Resilience* is defined by the EU as “the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region, to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt to and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects”.<sup>97</sup>

### Global approaches to *resilience*

ECHO activities are taking place within a broader global framework, working towards Disaster Risk reduction (DRR) and *resilience*.

Five priority areas to build the *resilience* of nations and communities were identified in the early stages of the global drive towards disaster risk reduction (DRR) formalized in the Hyogo Framework for Action- HFA (2005-2015). These priorities were still applicable for the period covered by the evaluation.

The first priority area of the HFA was to “*Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation*” illustrating the critical role of formal institutions in reaching the goal of *resilience*:

- At country level, the “*States should endeavour to undertake the following tasks at the national and local levels, with a strong sense of ownership and in collaboration with civil society and other stakeholders.*” The tasks range from coordination of all DRR activities, to risk assessments, legislation, monitoring and reporting.
- At regional level, Institutions are expected to “*promote regional programmes, including programmes for technical cooperation, capacity development, the development of methodologies and standards for hazard and vulnerability monitoring and assessment, the sharing of information and effective mobilization of resources*”.
- At International and financial organisations level, focus should be placed on “*assist disaster-prone developing countries to set up national strategies and plans of action and programmes for disaster risk reduction and to develop their institutional and technical capacities in the field of disaster risk reduction*”

The successor Sendai Framework (2015-2030) expands the scope to include the risk of small, frequent hazards referred to as “intensive”. In its guiding principles, the Chart reinforces further the prime role of the national institutions:<sup>98</sup>

- “The primary responsibility of States to prevent and reduce disaster risk”
- “The full engagement of all states institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels”

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<sup>97</sup> EU council. Doc 9325/13. Council Conclusions on the EU Approach to *Resilience*. 28 May 2013.

<sup>98</sup> [http://www.unisdr.org/files/44983\\_sendaimrameworkchart.pdf](http://www.unisdr.org/files/44983_sendaimrameworkchart.pdf) last accessed 21 June 2016.

- “Support from developed countries and partners to developing countries to be tailored according to needs and priorities as identified by them”.

Those plans of action underline the fact that that *resilience* building is not a short term emergency action, it is a mid to long term commitment that should be at the forefront of both humanitarian and development agendas. Ultimately, *resilience* is a capacity building undertaking linked to poverty reduction.

To complement those benchmarks on DRR, a World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) was held in May 2016.<sup>99</sup>

The WHS made the dignity of beneficiaries the highest priority:

- Affected communities, their organisations and their communities should be recognized as the primary agents of their preparedness, response and recovery. First responders should be better supported, and all humanitarian actors, both national and international, should complement<sup>100</sup> local coping and protection strategies wherever possible.
- People affected by crises should be enabled to exercise greater voice and choice in humanitarian action, including through better two-way communication and feedback mechanisms, the increased use of cash-based assistance, where feasible, and concrete measures to increase accountability to affected people.

New forms of international partnership with the authorities, that are of particular relevance to ECHO Modus Operandi, were proposed:

- Local and national leadership and responsibility for crisis management should be reinforced wherever possible, backed by stronger regional cooperation and supported by global institutions. The implementation of such a shift should be aided by analysing the local operational capacities, reviewing current roles and cooperation arrangements, and creating more inclusive decision-making arrangements founded on the principles of partnership.
- Governments and humanitarian actors should develop new partnerships to leverage the capabilities of other sectors, by, for example, building pre-crisis agreements with the private sector and dedicated initiatives to scale-up civil contingency expertise for domestic, regional and international deployment, with particular focus on South-South cooperation.
- Direct funding of local organisations should be expanded and the level of direct finance to affected governments through risk financing or budget support should be increased.

In brief, there is an increasing emphasis on national/local ownership/leadership and a supportive, shared decision-making role by external actors in the actions proposed to the participating States by the WHS.

How is this applying to EU and ECHO *resilience* actions?

## EU policies and approaches

The European Union has been involved in the process to set-up the two global Frameworks and strongly supports the respective plans of action.

The Council of the European Union in its landmark conclusions on the EU approach to *Resilience* (2013) repeatedly stresses the role and the importance of the participation of local authorities in achieving *resilience* to stress and shocks. This focus on local authorities is further amplified in the

<sup>99</sup> Synthesis of the Consultation Process for the World Humanitarian Summit. <http://synthesisreport.worldhumanitarianissummit.org/>

<sup>100</sup> Highlight (underline) by the author

EU communication on the local authorities' role in producing more effective development outcomes.<sup>101</sup>

In 2016, the EU actively contributed to the WHS process and formally committed the Member States and institutions to 100 actions.<sup>102</sup> Among those actions relevant to national or local links, the following EU version can be highlighted compared to the proposed WHS wording.

| WHS proposed core commitment   | EU individual commitments  |
|--|--|
| Reinforce, Do Not Replace: to support and invest in local, national and regional <u>leadership</u> , capacity strengthening and response systems, avoiding duplicative international mechanisms wherever possible. | 53.The EU commits to strengthen national and local capacity to prevent and respond to crises and to support the development of local and national disaster risk reduction <u>strategies</u> , with the active engagement of civil society, through EU development assistance in vulnerable countries, in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), by 2020. |
| Commit to reinforce national and local <u>leadership</u> and capacities in managing disaster and climate-related risks through strengthened preparedness and predictable response and recovery arrangements.       | 62.The EU commits to support the development of local and national disaster risk reduction <u>strategies</u> , with active engagement of the civil society, through the EU development assistance in at least 20 most vulnerable countries, mainly Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) until 2020  |
| Regional action for global challenges  | 98.The EU will support greater collaboration <u>between</u> regional organisations.  |

Although the WHS commitments adopted by the EU also apply at national level, the EU does not mention the term of leadership or avoidance of duplication (issues particularly acute in humanitarian assistance). EU commitments focus on development rather than humanitarian assistance. The EU being a regional organisation, can action #98 be interpreted as a commitment to increase EU support to the relevant regional organisations?

The priority that was set out in EU-wide strategic documents issued during the period covered by the evaluation (2012-2015), is clearly on strengthening local authorities. Building capacity and coordinating with national institutions is not mentioned specifically and as far as development assistance is concerned, it may be implicit as the central authorities are the official counterpart and either the channel or recipient for almost all the EU development assistance. ECHO, due to its humanitarian mandate and need for independence and impartiality, is a glaring exception as it cannot directly channel resources to a national government or civil society institution.

How ECHO and its humanitarian partners in the countries are actually linking with local, national and regional institutions in its *resilience* building activities - a long term development-like undertaking - will be reviewed in this case study. This also specifically relates to one of the value-added characteristics of *resilience* building at community level - namely that of better connecting communities to the full system in which they are set. *Resilience* is unlikely to be strengthened if only one level is nurtured in isolation of the other levels.

<sup>101</sup> Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: empowering local authorities in partner countries for enhanced governance and more effective development outcomes. COM(2013) 280 final

<sup>102</sup> The EU commitments for the World Humanitarian Summit [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit/eu-commitments\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit/eu-commitments_en)

## ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs)

ECHO Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) are the end result of a consultative process involving partners and national/international stakeholders in the targeted countries. The HIPs differ in nature (humanitarian assistance, ERC, DIPECHO...), geographical area and over time. The DIPECHO HIPs and budget lines have been discontinued in 2015, reportedly for the sake of “flexibility”. Excerpts from selected HIPs will illustrate the geographical diversity, change over time and the challenges faced when attempting to interlink ECHO *resilience* activities with national policies and authorities in some countries. Below are quotations from selected HIPs.

### 1. The HIPs dedicated exclusively to DRR/*resilience* activities (DIPECHO):

These DIPECHO HIPs stress the importance of coordination with national and local authorities, while recognizing the weakness of those institutions when it comes to implementation:

In 2012

- All actions must be aligned with national and/or regional DRR/Disaster Management legal, policy and planning frameworks and must contribute to their implementation and consolidation. (central America – CAM).
- the program will aim at developing linkages with local, national and regional authorities, for integration of best practices in government development plans (CAM).

In 2013, the commitment is more specific:

- Boost the real institutionalization of the different structures of the National System, under the leadership of the competent authorities incorporating risk management into strategic and institutional planning processes.
- All actions must be aligned with national and/or regional DRR/disaster management legal, policy and planning frameworks and contribute to their implementation and consolidation. Authorities in the Caribbean are increasingly aware of the importance of DRR and as such, many have laws, procedures, studies, mechanisms in place.
- The next DIPECHO Action Plan for the Caribbean should continue to promote close coordination and initiatives (contribution to country DRR strategy, exchange of tools, experiences) with the respective National Disaster Management Organisations (including national Red Crosses), and regional bodies, such as the Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA)

In 2014, the only DIPECHO HIP (Central America only) documented progress:

- Governments and partners, through the support of DG ECHO, have driven an extensive consultation process in October/November 2013, involving over 400 DRR experts representing DRR partners, relevant national and local authorities, scientific community, other European Commission services and local and international organisations. Four national consultative meetings as well as one regional seminar have been held and these, together with the results of the Consultative Forum on the Risk Management Regional Policy for Central America (PCGIR) of June 2013, [were] the basis to prepare the ground for the 2014-2015 DIPECHO Action Plan in Central America.
- The value of DIPECHO is “Complementing and supporting efforts of national authorities and processes at local, national and regional levels.”

## 2. Special HIP Building *resilience* in drought-affected communities in Central and South America 2013

Very detailed guidance on linkages is provided:

- need to reinforce the capacities and knowledge of local and national authorities to deal with droughts, reinforcing their role in increasing *resilience* but also in their capacity to manage information (early warning) and respond to emergencies
- Ensuring that relevant institutions take ownership
- Capacity building of state and non-state actors on the tools and strategies developed.
- Support coordination mechanisms (at national and regional levels)
- Proposed linkages between national and relevant regional initiatives should be clearly stated in the proposals.

## 3. Humanitarian assistance (non-DIPECHO) HIPs (2012-2014)

In these HIPs, *resilience* is only one added component. The main focus is on the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

In Colombia HIPs, the focus is on humanitarian assistance to populations internally displaced by violence (with an added *resilience* focus):

- promotion of good coordination will be sought with local and national bodies (2012-2014)
- In 2012, this sentence was completed with “as a step towards exit/handover strategies and to avoid substitution of government activities” (This part was omitted in subsequent HIPs).

Haiti presents a more complex challenge as reflected in the HIPs:<sup>103</sup>

- In 2012: the integration of the issue of Cholera into the Ministry of Health’s policies was a goal: “The reinforcement of the capacities of local actors, mainly the departmental health directorate, will be pursued, with the aim of embedding the majority of the international cholera response activities in the national health system”.
- In 2013: “the capacity of the government has not increased sufficiently in terms of disaster management and response and there is no clear transition strategy to reinforce the government capacity on disaster management”.
- In 2014, the ECHO Cholera strategy is limited to a focus on life-saving activities through the provision of adequate treatment, safe water, and hygiene promotion and on reinforcing local capacities.... Proven effective solutions are yet to be used in a more systematic manner to prevent or at least to reduce the impact of recurrent shocks.

Cuba is more of a success story: the country has one of the best disaster preparedness systems in the region. It scored 1 on the ECHO Global Humanitarian Needs Assessment index. All recovery projects have a solid *resilience* dimension. The 2012 HIP stated clearly:

- The capacities of state actors in Cuba are sound and strong, especially in the field of DRR and emergency response. Coordination between DG ECHO partners and state authorities, in particular with MINCEX2 and Civil Defence, will be necessary, as will the support of national and local institutions in order to guarantee the effectiveness and efficiency of the response phase, and, consequently, the required sustainability of the operations.

<sup>103</sup> In April 2013, the **Political Champions for Disaster Resilience** initiative was launched in Haiti. Its lack of success is attributed to the lack of prior involvement (ownership) of Haitian highest authorities who perceived it as an imposed international initiative



#### 4. Regional 2015 HIPs:

These HIPs are comprehensive and include former DIPECHO activities.

In the Caribbean:

- Synergies will actively be sought with the national framework for *resilience*, which is expected to provide overall orientation for humanitarian and development interventions.

Haiti, covered in the Caribbean HIP, remains an LRRD challenge:

- The Ministry of Health [in Haiti] is now promoting its rapid response team to cope with any outbreak in rural areas. However, limited logistical capacities and coordination between institutions (mainly Ministry of Health and Dinepa)<sup>104</sup> hinder a more effective response by national authorities.
- The launch of a thematic table on DRR in March 2014 reflects the commitment of the government to play its role and demonstrate leadership in coordination. Coordination, and in particular strategic coordination aiming at identifying synergies and maximizing impact, remains a major challenge in Haiti despite the multiplication of coordination fora (clusters, sectoral/thematic tables etc.).<sup>105</sup>

In Central America:

- It is also very important to more systematically link the national and regional Disaster Risk Management institutions such as CEPREDENAC's members (Central America) in the process so that the approach of this [ECHO] programme is more integral.
- in terms of preparation, [national] capacities remain weak and limited, mainly due to a lack of political will, lack of resources and know how.
- “ECHO supports the **Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Transformative Agenda (ITA)** and encourages partners to demonstrate their commitment to implementing its objectives, to take part in coordination mechanisms (e.g. Humanitarian Country Team/Clusters) and to allocate resources to foster the ITA roll-out.”<sup>106</sup>

In South America, the HIP targets the national level, recognizing the issue of decentralization while re-stating ECHO support to the parallel ITA mechanisms:

- There is increasing awareness of the importance of DRR in the region, with new policies as well as DRR laws and regulations being developed in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay.
- ECHO will advocate sustainable solutions to the greatest extent possible, promoting disaster risk reduction (DRR) and *resilience* building with national and local authorities as well as with EU Delegations and other development actors.
- Disaster preparedness, disaster risk reduction and *resilience* activities will focus on rural, urban and peri-urban communities in disaster prone areas and on institutions involved in disaster risk reduction/disaster risk management (DRM) both at National and Local levels, with the focus depending on the degree of decentralization of each country, and not only focusing on Response Institutions, but also supporting efforts of other sector ministries and institutions forming part of the National System, which have DRM priorities and responsibilities.
- In most of the countries where DRM is being decentralised to municipalities and sub-national institutions, institutional capacities need to be strengthened at these levels

<sup>104</sup> DINEPA is the Water Authority in Haiti

<sup>105</sup> Despite or because of? It can be argued that the multiplication of parallel external coordination mechanisms is counterproductive in terms of building national capacity

<sup>106</sup> National authorities have a limited role and therefore a mixed view of those global mechanisms.

## 5. Other HIPs

DREF<sup>107</sup> HIPs are mostly dedicated to small scale disasters. There is no mention of modalities to link with national authorities. Small scale disasters may not require national involvement.

2014 and 2015 ERC<sup>108</sup> HIPs address the seven areas of global needs presented in the ERC Guidelines<sup>109</sup> - including DRR, EW, local capacity building. No mention is made of national coordination mechanisms. The HIP focus is on global humanitarian governance (Global Clusters, communities of practice). In practice, the fund has been used to fund UNISDR projects, directly supporting the national DRR authorities.

In brief, the process of HIPs formulation is involving national authorities but in a consultative (participant) capacity in the needs assessment rather than as the lead or co-owner agency.

The HIPs themselves show sustained commitment to local capacity building with scant references to national ownership and coordination, except in the most recent HIPs. Cuba, the best prepared country, being an exception.

## Findings at project level

A multifaceted picture of the actual link or coordination with the authorities, and its strengths and weaknesses was achieved through the following:

- Review of the project documents (FichOps, Single forms),
- interviews with EC staff, national or local authorities, partners and stakeholders, and
- visits to projects in the six countries.

Factors for success stories or challenges will be discussed for selected countries.

### 1. Cuba

This country was not visited. Findings are from a detailed review of project documents and interviews.

Twelve projects were implemented or approved during the evaluation period. Seven for early recovery with Building Back Better after the hurricane Sandy and 5 (of which 3 in 2015) for *resilience* building (DIPECHO). All projects, according to review by ECHO Field and Desk officers, had a “good to excellent” coordination with national and local authorities (from Civil defence to Foreign Affairs). This was seen as a major factor in the perceived success in terms of sustainability.

Credit for this close linkage with authorities is in great part due to national authorities taking charge (ownership). All projects need formal approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in addition to the relevant line sectorial ministries. this needed a good deal of time from the design phase to implementation (up to six months for DIPECHO type projects).

### 2. Bolivia

The national, municipal and local authorities and systems in Bolivia appear well advanced, taking control of DRR and even using the term “*resilience*”. At national level, the Vice-Ministry of Civil Defence (VIDECI) was interviewed and demonstrated strong ownership and autonomous guidance,

<sup>107</sup> Worldwide response to/preparedness for small-scale disasters via the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)

<sup>108</sup> ERC :Enhanced Response Capacity Funding

<sup>109</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/grants/Enhanced\\_Response\\_Capacity\\_guidelines\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/grants/Enhanced_Response_Capacity_guidelines_en.pdf)

especially of national and decentralized preparedness systems (e.g., Unidad Gestion de Riesgos - UGR- of the Autonomous Government of the various Departments visited). Each of the projects visited outside La Paz was also systematically included and showed signs of guiding and sustaining the systems put in place. These actions show great promise for preparedness actions, probably due to years of sustained DIPECHO efforts, but not necessarily yet for *resilience* building. One unique type of support to national structures, was the focus on indigenous authorities in Bolivia (i.e., Consejo Indígena del Pueblo Tacana / Consejo Indígena des Mujeres Tacana). Informants suggest that the remarkable progress in Bolivia on building national capacity may also be due to the strong level of decentralization, uncommon to other countries in the LAC region.

### 3. Colombia

While violence is the main priority for ECHO emergency humanitarian assistance, conflict is far from the only major risk in a country exposed to severe climatic and geological hazards.

A large country with significant technical and human resources, Colombia has also considerably strengthened its national institutions, attending to victims of violence or reducing other risks.

1. **The Unit for Attention and Reparation for Victims (UARIV)** is an institution created in January 2012 in order to comply with the Law of Victims and Land Restitution (Law 1448) approved in 2011.
2. **The System for Management of Disaster Risk**, also established in 2012 (Law 1523), is coordinated by the “Unidad Nacional para la Gestion de los Riesgos de Desastre (UNGRD)”.

Both institutions or Units actively establish and strengthen offices at municipality level.

In all projects (visited or reviewed on file), cooperation and support with provincial or municipal authorities is a stated requirement and an actual priority. The cooperation varies from mere coordination / consultation to active channelling and working through those local authorities. Humanitarian projects for IDPs indirectly strengthen local UARIV offices by referring and assisting victims in their applications for services and subsidies. DIPECHO type projects are closely coordinated at local level.

At national level, the burden of coordinating with and submitting projects for approval by UNGRD is on the partners. National authorities (UNGRD) interviewed, expressed particular appreciation of the quality of dialogue with some partners,<sup>110</sup> dialogue leading in some cases to co-funding by the UNGRD of projects (to be) submitted to ECHO. As they said, “before ECHO products were lost, now we participate in the production and replication”.

A particular source of pride was the substitution of the ECHO lead “Country Document” with a UNGRD publication on priorities and areas of interventions.<sup>111</sup> A good example of progressive ownership.

Although UNGRD is highly appreciative of the *resilience* and DRR achievements of ECHO, the interlocutors are aspiring to an arrangement under which donors are strategically coordinated by the national institution.

<sup>110</sup> UNGRD praised particularly: SCF, Red Cross from Germany, Helpage, LWF and FAO for their close cooperation.

<sup>111</sup> UNGRD Colombia (2014). Documento de priorización de líneas estratégicas y zonas de intervención en gestión del riesgo de desastres en COLOMBIA

None of the ECHO funded country projects are designed primarily to strengthen UNGRD at local or national level.<sup>112</sup> The focus is merely on coordination “with”.

#### 4. Central America

Central American countries are part of the Middle Income group of countries according to World Bank classification. Nicaragua and Honduras, countries visited during this evaluation, are part of the Lower Middle Income group. As a result, they are at a lesser priority for development cooperation funding but nevertheless present areas of acute poverty that are at high risk of disaster.

Both have longstanding Disaster management organisations, with a perceived emphasis on response/ preparedness actions, even if both countries have approved and are implementing comprehensive DRR and *resilience* policies.

**In Nicaragua**, the SINAPRED (like other government institutions) is increasingly affirming its authority. The definition of priorities in terms of more exposed and vulnerable communities is led by National Institutions and the “country document” is considered out-dated and not necessary anymore for the formulation of the HIP. Contrarily in Colombia, this document has not been replaced yet by a government-led identification of DRR/*Resilience* priorities and strategies. Emphasis is more on simulation exercises and pre-disaster drills.

Again, it is up to partners alone to coordinate with national and local authorities and to secure approval for their proposed activities. Noteworthy is the comment of some partners regarding on the one hand the lack of clarity in the official requirements or procedures and on the other, the perceived greater trust of the Government in joint (consortium based) projects.

SINAPRED<sup>113</sup> leaders could not be interviewed and their points of view on the level of coordination with ECHO or its partners is unknown.<sup>114</sup>

At local level, urban (Managua) or rural (Caribbean Autonomous Regions South and North<sup>115</sup>), the coordination with and indeed support to authorities is effective. One major factor is the major (albeit indirect) implementing role of local partners (Nicaraguan Red Cross, long established local NGOs) and the presence of the ECHO international partners in the territory, before and after the projects. A key objective (rather than side benefit of the project) was the adoption of municipal “ordenanzas” on risk reduction, protection and livelihoods and the formal allocation of a municipal budget line for DRR/ *resilience*.

A meeting was held by a team member with local authorities in the North Caribbean Autonomous Region. Representatives of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Environment, Regional government, universities, the Network of Communicators, as well as the Municipal Department of Water, Hygiene and Sanitation, and the fire service, were present. From the beginning of the meeting, it was noteworthy that many of the participants had followed some type of training in the context of the projects.

In Managua (hit by an earthquake recently), ECHO funded work (Red Cross) has focused on the reinforcement of capacities of the most vulnerable communities. A rapid visit to the Municipal Emergency Operation Centtr (EOC) showed how the system is permanently working, with

<sup>112</sup> Projects of Participating Red Cross Societies are closely coordinated by the Colombian Red Cross and aim in part to build its capacity. However, the Red Cross is not regarded as a national authority but as a civil society institution under this study

<sup>113</sup> Sistema Nacional para la Prevención, Mitigación y Atención de Desastres (Nicaragua)

<sup>114</sup> The process of requesting a formal interview is lengthy and reportedly unpredictable.

<sup>115</sup> The specificities and complexity of the autonomous regions (RACS/RACN) lead to a combination of the local authority (Municipality), regional authority (traditional authorities) and central government

telecommunications and special attention to the hotspots. Building and permanent operations are financed through the Municipality's budget. Replication is reported in progress in other communities.

### **In Honduras:**

The country finds itself dealing with a number of stresses and shocks caused by environmental degradation, violence and overall insecurity. A highly mixed range of capabilities of national and local institutions exists but they all have a strong commitment to building resiliency, with differing interpretations of what this means and with some not necessarily using the term. ECHO and a number of implementing partners have no presence in the capital with at least one key one closing its office in the country.

The National Law on the National risk management system (Sistema Nacional de Gestión de Riesgos -SINAGER) has a tremendous reach that, according to multiple interviewees, is a result of a consistent effort by multiple donors working with COPECO, the body responsible for ensuring adherence to and the application of SINAGER. It was not uncommon, for example, to meet with a beneficiary in a small coastal community, who could recite passages from the Act. The law identifies priority thematic and geographic interventions.

The majority of the 27 ECHO funded projects with *resilience* content were usually those focused on community level actions with a multiple-level focus.<sup>116</sup>

- Two communities were visited by team members along the Caribbean coast where DRR projects were implemented, in Santa Fe and Jutipa, with the local and municipal emergency committees, the Unidad Municipal de Ambiente (UMA) and the Municipal Governments. The Santa Fe municipality, which is regarded as being very pro-active by Honduras standards, now dedicates a small amount of money from its budget each year to DRR-related activities.
- In San Pedro Sula, a project aimed to establish collaborative strategies for risk management between the Private Sector, and the national authorities responsible for the SINAGER and in particular to encourage the private sector to join with local emergency committees and municipal emergency committees to improve emergency response capabilities in communities where company workers live.

In summary, there is an effective coordination and leadership by national authorities. ECHO projects seem to balance support to national policies with community - oriented activities.

## **5. Dominican Republic**

In Dominican Republic, ECHO, its partners and Civil Defence authorities expressed satisfaction with the level of cooperation/coordination at central level. Projects are validated by Civil Defence (carta de no-objection) before their submission to ECHO and are designed to comply with a broad set of national priorities.

The formulation of a Country Document by ECHO with stakeholders remains a tool endorsed by national authorities.

As in other countries, ECHO's priority is on cooperation with the local authorities. The local authorities are actively participating in all *resilience* and DIPECHO activities. The Focus Group

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<sup>116</sup> Nine of the approved projects were considered to be addressing multiple hazards. Six approved projects were designed to purely address the issues of violence or insecurity. Four focused strictly on drought response.



Discussions (FGD) in projects visited by the team were held at the Municipality (Alcaldia) office. Ownership was variable and depended on personalities. In one place, local authorities were enthusiastically endorsing ECHO projects' achievements and "expanding" their scope to address risks and priorities of greater concern to them (Zika, Dengue, drought, landslides, chemical contamination, safe schools...).<sup>117</sup> Although some of those projects were terminated in 2013/2014, local ownership by authorities was still visible.

An interesting potential linkage with local authorities was seen in Palmas de Ocoa where the local DRR committee was celebrating the recent election of three of their volunteers/members to top posts in the Alcaldia (municipality). Significant forthcoming commitment (and contribution) to *resilience* and DRR was expected from these local leaders!

In summary, good to excellent coordination with local authorities at project level leading to buy-in or full ownership in most cases. At national level, ECHO's lead role with the formulation of a Country document is accepted, not challenged, by the national authorities who maintain the right to screen and potentially object to specific projects.

## 6. Haiti

Haiti is the most vulnerable of the LAC countries. Since the 2010 earthquake, Haiti has been affected by tropical storms, floods, drought, without counting the repeated cholera outbreaks. The only least developed country of the region, it is a major recipient of international and ECHO humanitarian funding. The number of humanitarian actors, their scope of activities and their independent sources of funding are presenting considerable challenges to coordination by national institutions.

Those national institutions cannot match the funding, human resources and technical skills available to the international actors, be it in health, WASH, food security or general DRR. There is a severe lack of effective decentralization. Departmental offices and institutions do exist, but they are mostly unfunded and with limited operational capacity or autonomy.

Significant funding is allocated by international organisations to "support" national institutions such as the Direction of Civil Protection (DPC). In visits and interviews, we could observe the lack of national ownership: local DPC managers complained that the experts funded by the international community grant their allegiance and loyalty to the sponsoring institution that set their work plan. In meetings, those experts are presenting themselves as if they are from the IO covering their salary and not the national institution they are serving.

There is no effective overall or sectorial national mechanism for the screening and pre-approval of projects (*resilience* or others).<sup>118</sup>

On the other side, it is historically true that the national institutions have a long track record of inappropriate use of resources, ineffective management and often unresponsiveness to the needs and concerns of the beneficiaries.

It is in this context that ECHO and partners' coordination with authorities must be reviewed.

ECHO's strategic coordination with the authorities at national level is limited and difficult due the prevalent climate of mistrust but total dependency of national institutions vis à vis the international actors or humanitarian coordination mechanisms. As is the case in other countries, ECHO

<sup>117</sup> One the projects visited was narrowly designed for Tsunami/earthquakes only. A risk worth raising public awareness but alone insufficient to justify the local commitment and investment in meetings, training and committees in the view of the local authorities.

<sup>118</sup> In 2009, the US Peace Institute provocatively used the phrase: "Haiti, A Republic of NGOs?" <http://www.usip.org/events/haiti-republic-ngos>

encourages partners to engage the national institutions but reports and interviews suggest a limited success, for instance, the Ministry of Health remains both too weak technically and financially, and too unprepared to assume operational responsibility to respond to a seasonal surge of cholera cases. For cross-sectorial ECHO funded projects, the lack of established dialogue between the sectoral line ministries and DRR agencies, is an additional obstacle. ECHO should be credited by placing priorities in formenting this cooperation and dialogue among national participants. During our visit, the health participants, among others, did mention spontaneously this new cooperation outside the traditional borders of the hospital , as a major residual benefit of the terminated project.

At project level, observations are quite diverse among the 93 projects approved during the evaluation period.<sup>119</sup>

In a food security project implemented by OXFAM in Anse Rouge (Artibonite), the presence of at least two state actors was reported. They were not available at the time of the visit. Linkage was with community leaders.

Participants at a focus group who convened on the relocation of IDPs from temporary camps in Port au Prince, credited the authorities for providing a standardized methodology on standardized relocation benefits and noted that it was not adopted by some ECHO-funded relocation partners who provided additional benefits and services.

Interviews with the DPC departmental office in the North East showed limited knowledge of the concept of *resilience* and no particular involvement in ECHO funded projects (“The funds of those projects do not remain in the department”).

The health cross border (Haiti-Dominican Republic) project to strengthen emergency health services is particularly illustrative of the singular challenge in involving authorities in Haiti. The primary mandate of the partner (PAHO/WHO) is to build the capacity of the health authorities and work only through this channel.

- Interviews with Haitian health officials were conducted in a background of a three week old medical strike (hospitals closed). The health directors of the North and North East Departments in Haiti showed a keen interest and genuine commitment but were relatively powerless to move their own institutions due to a heavily centralized (and poorly committed) health system: lack of funding and administrative decision-making at local level. On the positive side, the interlocutors uninvited remarks on the perceived benefits of having broken the long isolation of the medical sector through now ongoing dialogue and collaboration between the hospital, civil protection, police and fire departments are encouraging.
- In a similar visit across the border in the Dominican Republic, high level officials from the Ministry of Health in Santo Domingo travelled to meet the evaluator and present their ambitious plans to replicate and build upon the pilot activities funded by ECHO!

If it is imperative for humanitarian actors to maintain their independence and impartiality in the delivery of emergency assistance to the most vulnerable. *Resilience* activities would benefit from strong leadership at national level. The evaluators have no magic solution to this decades-old problem

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<sup>119</sup> Seven projects were visited in the field

## Conclusions

ECHO consistently insists on the importance of coordination and links with local authorities. More recently, the guidelines to partners have included the coordination with national institutions and the compliance of submitted projects with the national policies and strategies. This is particularly clear and opportune for DIPECHO (DRR) type projects and recovery projects including Building Back Better (BBB) and capacity building for *resilience*.

The burden of coordinating individual projects with national DRR institutions is on the partners. Overall, the latter are doing an excellent job of consulting and coordinating with the national DRR agency provided, it has the will, resources and technical capacity to exercise this leadership. This is not the case in Haiti.

Coordinating projects with the national DRR/*Resilience* authority one by one is a positive step but falls short of presenting and discussing/negotiating the overall DRR/*resilience* strategy by ECHO. This step is overdue in the most advanced countries such as Cuba and Colombia, countries not dependent on external assistance and with a strong technical and managerial capacity. The challenge is to accept national leadership and coordination for development-like initiatives (DRR, capacity building, *resilience*) while maintaining the principle of independence and impartiality for emergency humanitarian response. In practice, those are countries where emergency assistance would be delivered without the formal approval of the authorities.

Should this not be acceptable, ECHO would best leave DRR and *resilience* to other EC instruments better equipped to coordinate their assistance through formal government channels.

ECHO is well known for its community approaches. It is a remarkable strength and asset. However, community based *resilience* has its limits. Larger emergencies and disasters are by definition exceeding the capacity of the affected communities and require provincial or national support. Encouraged by ECHO, partners have made significant achievements in involving local (municipal or departmental) authorities and offices and building their capacity and commitment. In most countries, decentralization of national DRR structures is weak and local authorities have limited decision-making powers and resources. The worst situation is of course in Haiti.

Factors of local success are many. In particular, these include:

- The involvement of local NGOs with cultural roots in the target communities
- The priority placed not on doing things or delivering services to beneficiaries but on ensuring that they are done/delivered **by** the local authorities with the commitment of staff and resources (a real management risk given the quantified and rigid nature of the SMART indicators required for the logframe; *resilience* and smart indicators are almost incompatible!)
- An emerging administrative culture of *resilience* and risk reduction. Something DIPECHO has undoubtedly contributed to build in LAC.

Little has been said on regional links. Unfortunately, this evaluation could not meet with the Caribbean institution (CDEMA based in Barbados) or CEPREDENAC now presided over and managed by the Nicaraguan authorities. They could be extremely valuable allies for ECHO as both parties share the same ultimate objectives. However, the beneficiaries of the regional agencies are the national DRR institutions, while ECHO opts for a direct and independent service to the individuals and communities. How long this will be sustainable in economically emerging countries anxious to assert their responsibilities remains to be seen.



## Annex 10: Use of *resilience* indicators, a way forward

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### Introduction

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Measuring *resilience* impacts is as challenging as defining *resilience* (see discussion on definitions in main evaluation report). Some critics claim *resilience* is in fact immeasurable and that measurement should more efficiently apply a systematic focus on technical outcomes and their sustainability. Other recent studies<sup>120</sup> have articulated multiple good reasons to monitor *resilience*, such as:

- Communication and accountability: to all stakeholders, community to donor;
- Programmatic guidance: to allow the reorientation of program investments according to achievements and gaps;
- Advocacy: as an evidence base to facilitate ECHO-promoted scale up and mobilization of additional funds; and
- Visibility: to showcase the added value of ECHO-focused efforts in promotion of *resilience*.

Dozens of donors and civil society entities in the LAC region and beyond have come up with very different ways to measure *resilience* at various scales and using diverse definitions. The only thing that appears to be consensus is that *resilience* measurement is more art than science. Every challenge encountered in defining the term (outcome/impact/or state of being? single/multiple scales/which? same/different from DRR? Resilient to what/everything?) resurfaces even more vehemently when trying to measure it.

Burdened with these challenges, this thematic case study humbly examines current thinking on *resilience* measurement, globally and specificities in the LAC region. Based on findings, this Case Study proposes various options for ECHO to enhance or harmonize *resilience* measurement. This research aims to contribute to the EC *Resilience in Practice* (2015) call for "evidence...to be built before making substantial changes" to current practice.<sup>121</sup> Well featured in that document, examples of *resilience* building are not the focus of this case study.

The Case Study is organized as follows: overview of state-of-the-art *resilience* measurement at global level (ECHO and beyond); specificities of *resilience* measurement in LAC; and lastly, as conclusion, scenarios and ideas on possible steps to strengthen *resilience* measurement practice across the ECHO portfolio.

### State-of-the-art global measurement of *resilience*

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#### Inside ECHO: *Resilience* Markers

As of January 2015, ECHO officers have been evaluating submitted proposals for funding using the *Resilience* Marker (RM). The RM features four questions that aim to ensure that every ECHO-funded project systematically considers risks and vulnerabilities in the design, builds local capacity and seizes opportunities to reduce humanitarian need in the long term:

1. Does the proposal include an adequate analysis of shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities?
2. Is the project risk informed? Does the project include adequate measures to ensure it does not aggravate risks or undermine capacities?
3. Does the project include measures to build local capacities (beneficiaries and local institutions)?
4. Does the project take opportunities to support long term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks?

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<sup>120</sup> Groupe URD, 2014. Community *Resilience* Performance Measurement Methodology and Standard Indicators, Final report.

<sup>121</sup> European Commission, 2015. *Resilience in Practice: Saving lives and improving livelihoods*.

Through this commendable, simple and efficient effort, the European Union appears to be one of the only donor organisations to date to monitor application of *resilience* principles for each potential individual project. The RM received positive feedback<sup>122</sup> and questions on whether it should be accompanied by a new funding mechanism to address the underlying causes of vulnerability.

Not only does the RM promote building a foundation for *resilience* within each potential project, but it does so by directly engaging implementing partners (IP) in this reflection and self-assessment (later repeated by ECHO officers and noted in the Ficheops / Single Forms). Although LAC discussions highlighted the resistance and difficulty that many IPs have in completing this requirement, the tool itself has justifiably demanded all actors to critically assess the proposed actions to the ultimate good of the communities targeted, as well as a much greater chance of building resilient communities.

Discussions with both ECHO staff and IPs across the region confirm that the RM is in fact a useful tool to guide discussions between donor and implementer and, whenever possible, to apply a “systems approach”<sup>123, 124, 125</sup> in the design of projects. Such an approach is justified because the impact of a future shock – the risk – is dependent on how society’s systems are set up to respond to shocks and change. Minor tweaks in the tool and its use are proposed in conclusions, below.

### Inside ECHO: *Resilience* impacts

Despite its clear contributions to promoting building *resilience*, the *Resilience* Markers were not conceived to be a measure of *resilience* impacts. ECHO’s impact in building *resilience* can eventually be measured in at least three ways, described in Table 1: actual *resilience* of targeted entities or communities, successful contribution to *resilience* through funded efforts and attribution to ECHO.

**Table 13: 3 faces of potential *resilience* measurement in ECHO**

| 3 faces of <i>resilience</i> measurement  | Details and comments  |
|---|---|
| <b>1: Actual <i>resilience</i>:</b> <i>are the targeted entities and/or communities more resilient after the funded intervention than they were before?</i>   | Many ECHO-funded entities have developed community-specific measures and measurement systems to track actual <i>resilience</i> . Examples in the LAC region are IFRC and GOAL.                  |
| <b>2: Contribution:</b> <i>Did ECHO partners accomplish the objectives identified to support resilience building?</i>   | Linked to approved logframes for projects that clearly support <i>resilience</i> building (i.e. received full 2 points in the <i>Resilience</i> Marker “meeting all criteria”)                  |
| <b>3: Attribution:</b> measuring ECHO’s <b>impact on <i>resilience</i></b> entails asking the question: <i>How much of the measured impact on resilience is the result of ECHO’s contributions, versus other factors?</i> | Attribution is extremely hard to measure in a globalizing world and ideally requires a carefully planned study including pre/post measurement and a control group (often considered unethical). |

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> A systems approach insists that no entity is an “island”. It places an entity (i.e. community) on a larger scale that includes elements beyond its daily control such as: ecosystems (rather than community boundaries), economic systems (market flows in and out of the community) and politic / governance systems (that are mandated to provide services and structures to that target). This approach is a hallmark of *resilience* building and is strongly promoted by OECD, IFRC, and others.

<sup>124</sup> OECD (2014) Guidelines for *resilience* systems analysis, OECD Publishing.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf>

<sup>125</sup> Min. of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2010. Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development. Beyond Logframe; Using Systems Concepts in Evaluation. Editor: N. Fujita.

**Measures of actual *resilience***, supported by a growing body of evidence and thought, are rarely conclusive and convincing; they are most often proxies for *resilience* potential and would need to be repeated before and after an ECHO-funded effort is implemented. Most of these focus on the traditional micro/community level; a few of these are described below.

- **Goal**<sup>126</sup> used ECHO funding in Central America (Guatemala and Honduras) to develop a toolkit that guides discussions with communities to produce a baseline classification of *resilience*. Inspired by Twig's work<sup>127</sup> and applied in Haiti, it employs 30 questions grouped into five thematic areas of *resilience* characteristics:
  1. Governance,
  2. Risk Assessment,
  3. Knowledge and Education,
  4. Risk Management and Vulnerability Reduction,
  5. Disaster Preparedness and Response.
  - i) Analysts ("survey technicians") visiting the community triangulate findings from a series of qualitative discussions (focus group discussions and interviews with key informants) to score each question on the survey from 1, minimal *resilience* to 5, high *resilience*. The scores are tallied and the community classified using the same scale. While entirely qualitative in approach, each question has a means of validation and the results are quantifiable. The full assessment can be completed in a half day. Although the toolkit focuses on micro/community level, the governance and risk management components clearly explore connections with the greater system in which the community is positioned and with infrastructure and social services.
- **IFRC:** Discussions with IFRC/Panama on their regional efforts with ECHO to build *resilience*. The evaluation team was reminded of the intensive work ongoing entitled "One billion coalition" which was born in the Red Cross/Red Crescent network at a global Community *Resilience* Forum held in Cali, Colombia in 2014. Since, the movement has been working on a *Resilience* Guidance document to help implement the Framework for Community *Resilience* (FCR<sup>128</sup>). The guidance will support National Societies as they help communities build *resilience* from within, using three building blocks (risk informed/holistic, demand-driven/people-centered, connecting to prevent risk) and ten characteristics of a resilient community, specifically that it:
  - Is knowledgeable
  - Is healthy
  - Can meet its basic shelter needs
  - Can meet its basic food needs
  - Can meet its basic water needs
  - Is socially cohesive and feels secure
  - Has economic opportunities
  - Has well-maintained and accessible infrastructure and services
  - Can manage its natural assets
  - Is connected and supported by appropriate policy.

<sup>126</sup> Goal, 2014. Toolkit for measuring community disaster *resilience*. Guidance Manual, revision 1.

[https://www.goalglobal.org/images/5101\\_HN\\_OP\\_006\\_11\\_Resilience\\_Toolkit\\_English\\_B02.pdf](https://www.goalglobal.org/images/5101_HN_OP_006_11_Resilience_Toolkit_English_B02.pdf)

<sup>127</sup> Twigg, John. Characteristics of a Disaster-Resilient Community. Guidance note Version 2, England, 2009.

<sup>128</sup> Framework for Community *Resilience*, 2014. <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Documents/Secretariat/201501/1284000-Framework%20for%20Community%20Resilience-EN-LR.pdf>

Although not finalized yet, the guidance will guide communities to come up with indicators for each characteristic, collect data as a baseline and repeat the process (especially after prioritized interventions were organized) to determine/monitor *resilience* impacts.

- j) While IFRC has focused on micro-*resilience* (community/household level), they prioritize the need to examine over the long term how to embed community *resilience* building processes in municipal and national policies. They strongly support a strong focus on processes than on what they all “real impact” (number of lives saved).

Measures of *resilience* impacts as “**contributive**” can be derived from the project-based log-frames submitted and reported on by IPs in their singleforms. However, the quality of impact indicators featured in logframes is at best aspirational; most logframes are considered successful when they are able to measure outputs. Key informants during the evaluation did highlight that ECHO has given greater attention since 2015 to get more SMART indicators facilitating a better monitoring of the investment portfolio. However, in most cases, comments found regarding logframes were little more than that for example “indicators were SMART and sources of verification were adequate”.

A few examples follow from the evaluation’s Portfolio Analysis to demonstrate the level of indicators that can be gleaned from the project logframes whose scores on the RM, when available, were adequate. The following are not all considered “impact” indicators, and are, at best is proxy of questionable value:

1. 80% of targeted families reached, at the end of the project, at least 70% of the production level they had achieved before the floods;
2. 2 sub-national governments and at least 5 local governments will have incorporated DRM into their plans, policies and institutional standards;
3. In coordination with local authorities, improved *resilience* to drought in 12 communities was achieved through strengthening community-based organizations, promoting effective participation of women and men.

The first example above is an interesting way to capture the essence of *resilience* –the ability to bounce back after a disaster event. This example requires a reliable baseline (documents unclear on whether it was reliably measured) and demonstrate that *resilience* is relative. While reaching 100% of one’s former production levels would be proof of true *resilience*, it is likely that those who would attain 70% at the end of the project may be better off than those having attained only 50%. Indeed, measuring agricultural *resilience* may be a more straightforward exercise.

Example 2 above stresses that *resilience* outcomes (here, not impacts) may be closely linked to having good plans, policies standards. While this fact is not questioned by the team, is the community *resilience* impact to be measured by the existence of those plans or the application of them? Perhaps this measure relates more to the *resilience* of risk management entities in achieving their mandates --an equally strong measure of impact on communities?

In example 3, aspects of social cohesion are highlighted, possibly intended here as characteristics of a resilient community. While the statement may be unsubstantiated – unproven--, the reader is reminded that social cohesion is a key feature in the lists of themes and profiles inventoried by numerous NGOs, including the two described above. Importantly, social cohesion is not threat-specific; contrary to many experts, *resilience* describes the quality of being able to bounce back from any threat. If one is resilient, the scale (magnitude of the shock) is more important than the nature of the threat (flood versus war versus ebola). **Social cohesion is thought to hold an important key to understanding *resilience*, and is likely to capture economic *resilience* at a community level** (the only way to measure household-level *resilience* within a community is to organize a quantitative household survey, which is rarely if ever conducted by ECHO-projects).

Again, this would be a proxy indicator of *resilience* potential and not a measure of impact in any sense.

**Attribution** of *resilience* impacts has to date not been visibly attempted. A feasible measure of actual and attributive *resilience*, however, is proposed in Conclusions section.

It became clear from key informant interviews that, due to the challenges of finding reliable quantifiable indicators of *resilience* impacts comparable across contexts, ECHO/LAC region staff were already moving towards qualitative anecdotal inventories of *resilience* impacts. One such inventory was being considered as a “*Resilience Calendar*” (i.e., 12 true-to-life stories of *resilience*). Such an effort should be lauded.

## Beyond ECHO

ECHO can also learn from the indicators of *resilience* impact as developed by partners. Examples below are drawn from United Nations in general, Sendai Framework and OECD.

### *United Nations*

In February 2015, output Indicators for the UN System on Disaster Risk Reduction for *Resilience*<sup>129</sup> were developed and approved by the UN High Level Committee on Programmes Senior Managers Group on Disaster Risk Reduction for *Resilience* (HLCP/SMG). Although these indicators were developed to monitor UN organizations at macro-level they can also be contextualized to monitor national entities supported by ECHO, or even ECHO's partners:

- 1.1 DRR integrated into climate change, environment, development and recovery plans;
- 1.2 Entities have capacity to carry out their functions on DRR;
- 2.1 Disaster risk reduction for *resilience* is integrated in institutional policies and strategies;
- 2.2 Organizations have monitored and reported progress in integrating DRR as part of strategic plans, programmes, and multi-year results frameworks;
- 2.4 Risk-based approach is extended to disaster relief and recovery programmes;
- 2.5 Preparedness for effective support to nations and communities' emergency response and recovery efforts is enhanced;
- 3.1 The development agenda reflects the risk of disasters and the need to build *resilience*.

### *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SF-DRR) 2015-30*

The Hyogo Framework for Action implemented the “HFA Monitor” as an on-line, self-assessment reporting tool and contributed in part to the UNISDR-boasted “single largest repository of the worldwide state of play in DRR”, monitoring *resilience*-related indicators. HFA and their newest updates under ‘Sendai’ (to be finalized in 2016) are still macro-level (usually national-level) indicators. While HFA Monitor indicators were reportedly input focused, at least four of the seven Sendai targets underway are outcome focused<sup>130</sup>, “reducing existing risks and also preventing new risks and strengthening *resilience*”. They include:

- Number of deaths, missing persons and persons affected by disaster per 100,000 people;
- Direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP);
- Direct disaster economic loss in relation to global GDP, including damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services;
- Number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction strategies;
- Proportion of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies in line with the SFA.

<sup>129</sup> UNISDR (2015). Indicators for Measuring the Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction in UN programming  
[http://www.unisdr.org/files/47063\\_indicatorsformeasuringtheintegratio.pdf](http://www.unisdr.org/files/47063_indicatorsformeasuringtheintegratio.pdf)

<sup>130</sup> “Monitoring progress in disaster risk reduction in the Sendai Framework for Action 2015-2030 and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda”, PPT by UNISDR/Andrew Maskrey, at the Asunción Conference, Paraguay, June 9, 2016



While these indicators may not be directly related to *resilience* impacts, they are closely linked to ECHO's humanitarian mandate and could eventually be considered to reflect institutional *resilience* in ECHO portfolio. The *World Humanitarian Summit's* core commitments under Core Responsibility Four of the Agenda for Humanity to Natural Hazard and Climate Change include a commitment to *accelerate the reduction of disaster and climate-related risks* through the coherent implementation of the SFDRR 2015-2030, etc. and another commitment to *reinforce national and local leadership and capacities* in managing disaster and climate-related risks. It also features a commitment to *increase investment in building community resilience as a critical first line of response*, with the full and effective participation of women. Also, all of the commitments under “Changing People's Lives: From Delivering Aid to Ending Need”'s “*Transcend Humanitarian-Development Divides: work together, toward collective outcomes that ensure humanitarian needs are met...*”, are pertinent to ECHO's *resilience* building efforts.

### OECD

A recent example from OECD<sup>131</sup> highlights a use of the systems approach (see discussion above) to guide discussions on building *resilience* at the macro-level through facilitation of a participatory workshop attended by risk experts, systems experts and decision makers. The OECD portal<sup>132</sup> contains a How-To-Guide for field practitioners, a Facilitators Guide and a PPT slide deck. The workshop spans two days and is organised into five modules. By the end of the workshop, participants will be able to describe concepts linked to *resilience* such as risks, shocks, stresses, vulnerabilities and capacities, share a vision of current and future risks and their impact on the targeted system and develop a joint roadmap to boost the system's *resilience*. In the case of an adaptation of this useful approach to the ECHO universe, the key decision makers would include the national or even decentralized authorities in risk management or civil protection.

### *Specificities of resilience measurement in LAC*

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Measuring *resilience* in the LAC region has encountered more challenges, perhaps, than parallel movements in the Horn of Africa, etc. This specificity is likely linked to the level of development of the region, the scale of urbanization and globalization and the huge sustained focus of DIPECHO for generations that has built a solid culture of risk management within national and decentralized institutions. These are all characteristics that will likely make *resilience* measurement in LAC quite different from that in Africa.

Furthermore, although measuring *resilience* must reflect ECHO's main focus area (people oriented projects and communities), the term “community” is changing across the LAC region. No longer limited to the quintessential rural village, the term can now refer to mobile communities (IDPs), urban communities, professional communities (local businesses, merchants, farmers, women engaged in artisanal crafts) and others. The measurement of *resilience* impacts will need to stay flexible to capture progress in a diverse and ever-changing array of communities.

While much of global *resilience* measurement discussions (especially in Africa) has centered on community-level *resilience*, the LAC region appears primed to consider measuring the *resilience* of risk management institutions in the achievement of their mandates (i.e., to support communities in reducing risk). This focus on institutions or even the *resilience* of key institutions should not be considered “beyond the ECHO mandate”, but rather be welcomed as an opportunity and a good practice when relevant (i.e. when countries have reached this level).

More and more often, ECHO-funded efforts in the LAC region recognize the role the wider ‘system’ plays in those communities. Holistic system-wide thinking is, in fact, the real essence of

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<sup>131</sup> OECD (2014) Guidelines for *resilience* systems analysis, OECD Publishing.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/Resilience%20Systems%20Analysis%20FINAL.pdf>

<sup>132</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dac/risk-resilience.htm>

“*resilience*”. There is clear recognition of ECHO agents and partners in the LAC region that *resilience*, by definition, cannot be effectively promoted at one scale in isolation of other scales. Even through the *Resilience* Marker, ECHO recognizes the need to invest in *resilience* building at multiple levels: national, municipal, local and community. More specifically, promoting the *resilience* of a given community (ECHO’s traditional mandate) relies on linking that community to other systems (ecologic, economic, political, etc.). Measurement at the community level alone, therefore, may prove to be an inefficient indication of (i.e. may not capture until much later) real progress being made. Measures that track the successful connecting of communities to services and entities responsible for their welfare should be considered as one element in the panoply of *resilience* impacts to be featured in ECHO programming.

Based on the above discussion, there is a growing list of examples of foci on other types of communities and other supporting, levels, see Table 2, that need to be featured in any *resilience* impact measurement. This should not be seen as a detriment to ECHO programming, but rather a healthy embracing of a systems approach --one that offers greater potential for ultimate *resilience* impacts.

**Table 14: Measuring *resilience* impacts will need to go beyond the traditional rural/agricultural ECHO “Community”**

| Sub-Region                 | Examples of ECHO-funded efforts aiming to strengthen <i>resilience</i> at levels beyond the simple rural “community”   |
|----------------------------|--|
| Central America and Mexico | Honduras: Private sector, communities employed by the Haitian Manufacturing Association of San Pedro Sula in collaboration with Mennonite Social Action Committee and the Asociación Nacional de Organismos no Gubernamentales (ASONOG) of Honduras<br>“Sociedad Civil, Empresa Privada y Gobierno unidos para reducir el riesgo urbano en Honduras” |
| Caribbean                  | Haiti: IDPs departing camps and living in appropriate housing one year after leaving the camp;<br>Haiti: Dfid-led Guidelines for municipalities on Urban Risk Analysis;<br>Dominican Republic with private sector and urban risks;   |
| South America              | Colombia: IDPs and children requiring protection<br>Bolivia: municipalities (LaPaz and El Alto); VIDECI/national risk management entities  |

### *Conclusions: Scenarios and potential steps to strengthen resilience measurement practice*

While there are masses of literature and actors exploring ways to measure community *resilience* and despite ECHO’s traditional focus on community, measuring actual *resilience* at the traditional community-level is not a useful investment for ECHO in the LAC region for many reasons:

1. Humanitarian mandates are not best suited to *resilience* outcomes or impacts;
2. Length of projects —ECHO projects are too short and *resilience* building takes years not months;
3. Desire to scale up rapidly —scale up of successful community efforts is more straightforward from an institutional level vantage point, than from the community level;
4. Evolving definitions of “community” —the term ‘community’ in the LAC region is rapidly evolving to feature more urban, mobile, private sector and even institutional characteristics;

5. Growing recognition of the need to connect communities and provide a strong enabling environment for *resilience* building. The market for that enabling environment in the LAC region is clearly cornered by the ever-strengthening national and decentralized governments mandated to manage risk. Measuring a blossoming enabling environment will capture impacts earlier and more meaningful in many cases than measuring community-level *resilience*.

It will be much more interesting for ECHO to harness the energy of the systems approach, by aiming to measure the *resilience* of the LAC countries' risk management systems and how well they support the target communities. If not acceptable, the corollary to this is to develop simple indicators that measure the connections target communities have within (i.e., social cohesion) and throughout (i.e., links to governance and policies) their respective systems and their ability to navigate in/throughout those systems.

It will be useful to promote the *Resilience Marker* process and even more systematically and requiring it more frequently. After 40+ years of humanitarian work, even short-term (6-month) emergency response projects have, at the very least, the moral imperative of “doing no harm” (Answering at least RM-Question 2 makes sure that implementing partners find the required time to confirm they will do no harm to existing dynamics, capacities and processes). This is a critically important step towards building *resilience* and is not to be minimized in the search for ways to measure impacts. Some minor tweaks that could be made to the RM process are featured in Table 3 to align it more fully with current risk management terminology.

**Table 15: Minor changes proposed to Resilience Marker terminology**

| Current question in RM   | Proposed adaptations (changes in <b>bold</b> )   |
|--|--|
| 1. Does the proposal include an adequate analysis of shocks, stresses and vulnerabilities?   | 1. Does the proposal include an adequate <b>risk</b> analysis ( <b>multiple</b> shocks / stresses, vulnerabilities <b>and capacities</b> )?  |
| 2. Is the project risk informed? Does the project include adequate measures to ensure it does not aggravate risks or undermine capacities? | 2. Do the risk analysis and the actions proposed explore / include adequate measures to ensure it “ <b>does no harm</b> ” to existing systems, dynamics or relationships?                      |
| 3. Does the project include measures to build local capacities (beneficiaries and local institutions)?                                     | <i>No change proposed</i>  |
| 4. Does the project take opportunities to support long term strategies to reduce humanitarian needs, underlying vulnerability and risks?   | 4. Does the project take opportunities to support longer term strategies, <b>connecting local level actors to appropriate entities beyond in order to reduce humanitarian needs and risks?</b> |

*Proposed ideal real-time counterfactual measure of resilience impacts*

The best measure of actual and attributive *resilience* is proposed in the main report. In such an endeavour to measure real *resilience* of a community (or country):

- A budget would be identified and set aside for such a measure at the start of a HIP period (for example);
- As soon as a major event occurs in a country and region in which ECHO has funded projects (e.g. Ecuador earthquake), ECHO would organize an in-house or contracted team to prepare to go to the site in real time or latest six months after a response operation;



- The team would design a mixed-method assessment (quantitative household surveys and qualitative focus groups/key informant interviews) that would collect primary data among communities, households and/or institutions.
- Sampling would start with a list of areas/households reportedly affected by the emergency.
  - The list of affected would be compared to a list of direct beneficiaries of ECHO-funded efforts prior to the emergency and a subset of affected former beneficiaries (households and institutions) would be selected.
  - A control group of entities who were similarly affected but whom had not been direct beneficiaries prior would also be studied using identical process. This control group, if deemed ethical, is the only way that attribution to ECHO could be estimated within reason.
  - For both groups, households would be stratified by level of impact (ex: distance from quake, or river) of the current emergency event.
- Pre-event baseline data would need to be thoroughly compiled from project archives of all IPs and partners involved. If these are not available, questions below would have to be adapted to try to compensate for their lack.
- Questions could include the following:
  - For households: what were your livelihood strategies and respective levels of success prior to the event? ; how do they compare to strategies/levels you are now able to employ?; to what extent has the event triggered permanent changes (negative or positive) in your daily life?
  - For institutions: what actions were you trained to perform in light of an imminent disaster event; which were you able to employ and how successfully? How successfully do you feel you prepared communities for this event? What could have been done better?

### Scenarios

Finally, moving forward on *resilience* impact measurement depends largely on future high-level ECHO decisions in regards to their institutional role in promoting *resilience*. Many of those interviewed for this evaluation claim that humanitarian actors should not be held to build (or measure) *resilience*, but should only be strictly responsible for actively “doing no harm”. ECHO stands at a crossroads now in which they can decide to:

- be faithful to their humanitarian mandate (one of the few donors who specializes in the humanitarian sector without also becoming a development actor) giving *resilience* appropriate importance from that singular perspective, or
- play the bridging role of actively linking humanitarian action to development action because they are the only entity that will/can (at least temporarily) or
- actively embrace *resilience* by evolving into a dual-mandated institution (both humanitarian and development).

Some of these ideas are further developed in Table 4 below, with very light mention of indicators of *resilience* impact that could be explored.

**Table 16: *Resilience* measurement by scenario**

| <b>Assumptions</b>  | <b>Indicator(s) to explore</b>   |
|---|--|
| <b>Scenario 1: MODEST</b><br><i>ECHO as major humanitarian actor agrees to remain a relatively modest actor in resilience building. ECHO is satisfied to lay a good foundation or enabling environment.</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Systematize use of the <i>Resilience</i> Marker and track scores to register gradual increases in average (scores averaged over sub-regions and regions);</li> <li>• Identify indicators for and track connections between communities and their inherent systems;</li> <li>• Identify and explore indicators to measure ECHO investment in enabling environments;</li> <li>• Promote use of qualitative anecdotal measures of <i>resilience</i> impacts.</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Scenario 2: MICRO/More ambitious</b><br><i>Despite its short-term life-saving humanitarian mandate, ECHO can positively influence community-level resilience in 20 or fewer months</i>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use IP proposed measures of community <i>resilience</i> such as GOAL or IFRC's;</li> <li>• Consider tracking numbers of communities that “graduate out of ECHO”—those that do not require second or third projects (same community/IP/effort funded in by subsequent HIPs).</li> </ul>  |
| <b>Scenario 3: MACRO to MICRO/Most ambitious</b><br>Lead humanitarian actors in a true composite measure of humanitarian action   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scenarios 1 and 2 plus...</li> <li>• Actively track institutional <i>resilience</i> and indicators to measure ECHO investment in enabling environments;</li> <li>• More resilient nations and communities means fewer deaths due to recognized disaster and emergency events. Counting trends in deaths is a proxy for counting lives saved (see Sendai/UNISDR discussion above);</li> <li>• Working with national institutions to track trends per period per type/scale of event is a measure of <i>resilience</i> of entire countries;</li> <li>• Challenges are many including: which disaster events, declared / undeclared, extensive / intensive?</li> </ul> |
| <b>Regardless of Scenario</b>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Invest in the proposed ideal real-time measure of <i>resilience</i> impacts described above</li> </ul>  |

## Annex 11: Climate Change

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### 1.0 Background

An increased level of climatic instability has settled in across the LAC region. In fact, according to German Watch, five of the most impacted countries by climate change for the 1994 to 2013 period were found in the LAC region with four of them; Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic the focus of field studies for this evaluation.<sup>133</sup> Other countries such as Bolivia and the SIDS of the Caribbean are also considered to be among the countries most negatively impacted by climate change but experiencing the impact in very different ways.

Climate change interacts with degraded environmental conditions and the unfavourable social and economic conditions that contribute to poverty that pervade many parts of the LAC region to create a highly complex and worrisome dynamic. Declines in crop yields brought on by drought and excessive rains, diminishing water resources, an increasing number of extreme climate related events such as hurricanes, and the outbreak of vector-borne diseases are among the more harmful impacts of climate change occurring in poor and problematic areas of the LAC region. These circumstances are obliging development and humanitarian agencies and National governments across the LAC region to seriously consider how best to address climate change. To this end, ECHO is no different. However, the extent of the impact of climate change on ECHO's activity has not been well understood let alone addressed systematically.

### 2.0 Climate Change Case Study Objective and Outline

This climate change case study is intended to provide ECHO with perspective on how the Department, moving forward, could possibly integrate climate change related considerations into its programming. The case study is a result of insights garnered through the evaluation of ECHO's LAC programme and additional information gathered through research and previous field work in the LAC region on climate change related assignments.

As per the original case study outline a somewhat stronger emphasis is placed on reviewing the situation in Central America that is perhaps the area in the LAC region most impacted by climate change. As well, the case study is designed to be as much an exploratory document as an evaluation exercise. The reason for this is that it was not possible to assess in a systematic manner the relationship between climate change and ECHO programming.

This case study attempts to create a general understanding of what ECHO and its partners have been facing in relation to climate change and what more could be done. It also attempts to present a strong understanding of the current context in which ECHO and its partners are contenting with climate change. Specifically the case study:

- Reviews the extent to which ECHO and its implementing partners have been recognising circumstances created by climate change and carrying out actions with a climate-change focus that lead to greater resiliency.
- Identifies gaps in programming and capacity of ECHO and its partners that impede implementing more constructive responses to climate change that could lead to enhanced resiliency.

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<sup>133</sup> <https://germanwatch.org/en/download/10333.pdf>

### 3.0 LAC Regional Climate Change Analysis

It is not easy to generalise about such a large and diverse geographic area in a relation to a problem, climate change, that itself is difficult to correlate with the problems it is believed to be having. Nonetheless, there is clearly a problem and it very much relates to the mandate of ECHO. While responding to droughts and other extreme circumstances caused by climate change may not deviate much from the emergency situations ECHO and its partner are used to, there is however the spectre of an increase in their volume, severity, and complexity as a result of climate change. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), flooding is the main cause of disasters in Central and South America, while hurricanes mostly affect Mexico and the Caribbean. Mudslides and landslides are more frequent in South America. Biological Pest epidemics are most common in Central and South America and there is a link to all to climate change.<sup>134</sup>

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), towards the end of the last century Central America and South America began to be impacted by “unusual extreme weather events” that contributed greatly to further vulnerability and to subsequent climatic events.<sup>135</sup> The IPCC has reported that for Central America and South America a changing climate has led to changes in the “frequency, intensity, spatial extent or duration of weather and climate extremes”, and this has translated into increasingly more unmanageable situations where existing capacity and resources are not able to respond to extreme events and more slowly unfolding circumstances such as droughts. This turbulence has been occurring in a global context of successive decades of recorded warmer temperatures, which is believed to be the main cause of the increasing instability.

Throughout the LAC region but especially so in poorer countries there has been a lack of capacity to produce, monitor and share in a practical manner climate and hydrological information that would be a starting point in better understanding in practical terms precisely what is taking place.<sup>136</sup> While there is agreement that events are occurring more frequently, are more severe, and their timing is less predictable, and this is attributable to climate variability, there is still a ways to go before events are accurately attributed to climate change.<sup>137</sup> What is also a problem is location. Specific information in terms of what is taking place in local areas is badly required as it is felt that that climate change can have a range of impacts that are not being properly accounted for.<sup>138</sup>

For the SIDs of the Caribbean region sea level rise is a key concern especially in low-lying coastal areas. The challenges faced by SIDs risked to be one of the more dramatic aspect to climate change. According to the IPCC, the impacts of climate change will affect SIDs in terms of livelihoods, coastal settlements, infrastructure, ecosystems and economic stability.<sup>139</sup> The IPCC already sees climate change impacting the future of SIDs. Beyond the increase in disruptive events, climate change will threaten the very existence of SIDs by undermining the economic and social fabrics of the islands. In this scenario international cooperation is vital to avert some of the more pessimistic outcomes that some climate change models envisage for the Caribbean such as wide-spread flooding.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Source: Handbook for Disaster Assessment - ECLAC <http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones>

<sup>135</sup> [http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/resources/htmlpdf/WGIIAR5-Chap27\\_FINAL/](http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/resources/htmlpdf/WGIIAR5-Chap27_FINAL/)

<sup>136</sup> Magrin, G.O., J.A. Marengo, J.-P. Boulanger, M.S. Buckeridge, E. Castellanos, G. Poveda, F.R. Scarano, and S. Vicuña, 2014: Central and South America. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part B: Regional Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Barros, V.R., C.B. Field, D.J. Dokken, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1499-1566.

<sup>137</sup> [https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX\\_Full\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf)

<sup>138</sup> <https://www.unisdr.org/archive/35664>

<sup>139</sup> [http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN\\_IPCC\\_Whats\\_in\\_it\\_for\\_SIDS.pdf](http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN_IPCC_Whats_in_it_for_SIDS.pdf)

<sup>140</sup> [http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN\\_IPCC\\_Whats\\_in\\_it\\_for\\_SIDS.pdf](http://cdkn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/CDKN_IPCC_Whats_in_it_for_SIDS.pdf)

The Central American region is grappling with a broad range of climate change related challenges that overall are shared by other areas of the LAC region. What is different is the convergence of so many different climate related challenges. It is one of the reasons why Central American countries are considered to be the most negatively impacted by climate change. There are coastal areas in Central America for example along the Caribbean Sea that face the same challenges Caribbean SIDS are in terms of sea level rise. There are many trans-boundary climate related issues such as those found in Central America's Dry Corridor, a key programming priority area for ECHO and other development agencies such as the FAO.

In the Dry Corridor extremely poor households across large areas of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador have been experiencing a rapid deterioration in their food security.<sup>141</sup> A recent report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a service run by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) foresees the need for a response in the Dry Corridor on the scale of Hurricane Mitch considered to be one if not the worst disaster to strike the sub-region.<sup>142</sup>

#### 4.0 Evaluation Findings Related to Climate Change

One of the first conclusions drawn from the field work in Central America was as difficult as it is to comprehend the impact of climate change, the interconnection between poverty, climate change and general environmental degradation is far more complex and will increasingly shape ECHO's mandate.

During the Desk Phase for this evaluation a review of ECHO LAC project documents was conducted. Of the roughly 300 project files that were reviewed close to a 100 made mention of climate change in some form or another. Climate change might have been simply mentioned in passing or cited as the cause in creating a hazard or multiple hazards. The information on climate change is not analysed at a macro level through for example a climate change marker like is done for resiliency. Nor is there much analysis on climate change in individual project documents that could contribute to ongoing learning. In the reports where reference is made to climate change, there is no evidence of the use of scientific data to connect climate change to the hazards being experienced in programming areas. The need to have more precise or scientific information on what is taking place with climate change in specific locations was raised by ECHO project stakeholders in Honduras with the Red Cross and in coastal communities. However, the reality is the science is not to the point where this is generally possible although there are increasing experiences in this regard (see section 6). ECHO project partners and beneficiaries are very lucid that the problem of climate change is very real. It is being experienced in a very direct way. They know it is happening but they may not completely understand why or can articulate their understanding in a formal manner. It takes very little prompting for the issue to be discussed with some passion as problems caused by climate change are identified. Some of the impacts of climate change as reported by ECHO project implementers and beneficiaries include increased heat or temperature, diminished rain, unpredictable rain patterns and more frequent and intense rain storms and extreme events.

The desire of beneficiaries to have better information on climate change is matched by their desire to have more and better information in other areas such as good scientific data on matters such as water levels and forest coverage in ECHO programming areas.

The issue of unpredictability was often brought up. It is possible for locations to go from drought conditions one year to intense flooding the next year. These types of scenarios of extreme changes in the challenges being faced are requiring more multifaceted approaches both from the standpoint

<sup>141</sup> <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/crisis/dry-corridor/en/>

<sup>142</sup> <http://news.trust.org/item/20140814170615-rsqpx/?source=spotlight>

of risk reduction and development orientated actions. Climate related volatility is part of a larger problematic that communities in ECHO programming areas are facing in terms of a general rise in threats that are being faced. A community can be contenting with the threat of multiple hazards brought on by general environmental degradation or climate change or a host of other considerations. For example in Honduras, it was common to see a ECHO DRR focused project effectively implemented but the overall circumstances in the programming area have evolved to a point where communities may be facing multiple threats from deforestation, flooding, drought and food scarcity nullifying the utility of the DRR action. One municipality that was visited along the north coast of Honduras was dealing with a range of problems inland but also had a host of other problems associated with its coastline that ECHO was trying to address through its local partner including sea level rise. In such scenarios it is possible for ECHO programming to be successfully implemented with a sound rationale for its implementation but ultimately undermined by other factors.

A convergence of the issues of violence and climate change is a real possibility in countries such as Honduras and Guatemala where both problems are very extensive. The Honduran Red Cross suggested that this is an increasingly plausible scenario. While most of the concern related to climate change currently surrounds circumstances in rural and coastal areas, there is growing risk of urban centres becoming a concern. In large centres such as Tegucigalpa water scarcity is becoming an issue that is being complicated by climate change. There are numerous communities in the Tegucigalpa area that are poor and contenting with violence and crime and at the same time are slowly losing their sources of water. As noted earlier cross border issues related to climate could grow. There is the Dry Corridor of Central America but there are also other hot spots such as the Artibonito water Basin shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic that had been a ECHO programming area and where deforestation, poor water management and climate change could have terrible implications for an area with enormous economic potential. The Artibonite is already dealing with Haitian migration into the Dominican Republic and this has been a source of tension between the two countries. There is a risk that the Artibonite region that has the promise of becoming a place of prosperity could evolve into something unstable leading to increased vulnerability.

National emergency response agencies in Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay are among those reporting during this evaluation that their work is being complicated by climate change. Research on national emergency response and climate change in support of the evaluation was very limited but certainly merits further consideration by ECHO to fully understand the perspective on this matter of the national bodies that are considered to be ECHO's main partner at a country level.

## **5.0 European Development Assistance and Humanitarian Assistance Context**

### **5.1 EUROCLIMA**

The main vehicle for delivering climate change related development assistance to the LAC region for the EU has been EUROCLIMA that was first conceptualised in 2009 with an official launch in April 2010. The first programming period for EUROCLIMA was from 2010 until 2013. A second period was initially agreed to for 2013 to 2015 but was ultimately extended to 2016. EUROCLIMA's objective has been to facilitate the integration of climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies and measures into Latin American public development policies and plans. The implementing partners have been the ECLAC, the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (JRC), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO). Caribbean countries have been targeted through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) programme that also covers Africa and the Pacific regions and over 80



countries.<sup>143</sup> The total contribution of the European Union for EUROCLIMA's first phase was €5.000.000 and for the second phase €11.450.000. The Unit for Regional Programmes Latin American and Caribbean of DG DEVCO has been responsible for the management of EUROCLIMA. Technical Assistance supports the European Commission with the coordination and visibility of the Programme, and works together with UNEP and ECLAC in the implementation of Components 1 (EU-Latin American policy dialogue on climate change) and 2 (Adaptation and mitigation “no-regrets” measures).

EUROCLIMA was evaluated in 2015. The evaluation report was favourable in terms of the results achieved by the programme. The report also highlights the degree to which the context in Latin America had evolved in relation to climate change.<sup>144</sup> According to the report the need for further climate change actions should remain a priority for EU-LAC regional cooperation for the foreseeable future.<sup>145</sup> The report highlighted how at the time of EUROCLIMA's commencement the problem of climate change was yet to have been completely comprehended by LAC countries. Since then the gravity of the situation has come into stronger focus for LAC decision makers. This evolving attitude certainly should be a consideration for ECHO.

EUROCLIMA+ is scheduled to be launched in 2017 covering 18 countries including Cuba. Agreement has been reached to programme in five sectors including renewable energy/energy efficiency and sustainable food production, resource efficiency in an urban environment, forests, biodiversity and ecosystems, and DRR and Management. A tentative budget of €40 million has been proposed.

## 5.2 EU Commitments to the World Humanitarian Summit

<https://www.worldhumanitariansummit.org/> World Humanitarian Summit was recently held in the early part of 2016. The key objective of the summit was to establish a framework for humanitarian action to tackle anticipated humanitarian crisis. The three main objectives of the summit were:

1. Reaffirm our commitment to humanity and humanitarian principles.
2. Initiate actions and commitments which enable countries and communities to prepare for and respond to crises and be more resilient to shocks.
3. Share best practices which help save lives around the world, placing affected people at the centre of humanitarian action and alleviating suffering.<sup>146</sup>

One of the main commitments, arising from the Summit related to natural disasters and climate change: ***Managing Risks and Crises Differently:***

Core commitment 1: Commit to accelerate the reduction of disaster and climate-related risks through the coherent implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development<sup>147</sup> and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change<sup>148</sup>, as well as other relevant strategies and programs of action, including the SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action (SAMOA) Pathway.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>143</sup> <http://www.gcca.eu/> like EUROCLIMA the GCCA has established a GCCA+ programme

<sup>144</sup> Barnini, Massimo, Canessa Roberto, Lundsgaard, Torben (2015) Evaluación de EUROCLIMA (2010-2014) Informe Final Marzo 2015. *Misión realizada por cuenta de la Comisión Europea*

<sup>145</sup> Barnini, Massimo, Canessa Roberto, Lundsgaard, Torben (2015) Evaluación de EUROCLIMA (2010-2014) Informe Final Marzo 2015. *Misión realizada por cuenta de la Comisión Europea*

<sup>146</sup> <https://icvanetwork.org/world-humanitarian-summit-0>

<sup>147</sup> <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication>

<sup>148</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris/index_en.htm)

<sup>149</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit/eu-commitments\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit/eu-commitments_en)



The EU has committed to promoting synergies and enhancing coherence between risk management and climate change adaptation in its work to implement the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and in particular in its efforts to contribute to the global goal for adaptation to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen *resilience* and reduce vulnerability to climate change and to support the work of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) "Warsaw International Mechanism to address loss and damage due to climate change". The EU commits to strengthen coherence between climate change adaptation strategies and risk management plans at national level in third countries, including through the support provided by measures such as the GCCA+ that has also been extended.<sup>150</sup>

## 6.0 Conclusions on Climate Change and ECHO

For a number of reasons ECHO is seeing itself guided towards more directed responses to climate change. There are the recent declarations at the Humanitarian Summit covering climate related policy to consider. But more importantly at a practical or field level, it is becoming very difficult to not to proactively address the problem as this will increasingly be the desire of beneficiaries. The question is how can ECHO best move forward and contribute to addressing climate change.

ECHO and its partners would appear to have a number of attributes that would be useful in support of interventions to address climate change. Indeed, there is consensus in the climate change community that responses to climate change must be multi-dimensional and that is certainly the finding from the fieldwork for the ECHO LAC evaluation. Circumstances faced by communities across the region often involve multiple threats that cannot be properly addressed by humanitarian interventions with limited scope, time frames and resources. Even still the types of interventions that ECHO often supports related to DRR have an undeniable appeal. In coastal and rural communities for example, there are needs related to reducing vulnerability that require a range of short and long-term measures. Preventing and/or preparing for emergency circumstances is of importance in adapting to climate change.

What is also of importance is how the ECHO activity is delivered. The ability to partner with organisations with ground-level experience in matters such as DRR like ECHO's current partners have is advantageous. The focus on community level participation and understanding ground level perceptions could be one of ECHO's contributions to broader interventions. While staying in a community over a number of years is currently not part of ECHO's strategies, ECHO partners can demonstrate good capabilities related to participatory practices in support of DRR activity that could also facilitate longer-term interventions in support of climate change adaptation. ECHO partners could propose a package of activities and project planning activities that focus on carrying out short-term interventions aimed at reducing risks associated with disasters while contributing to preparing longer-term development activities. This is simply one suggestion. There could be other services that ECHO and its partners could deliver in relation to climate change actions. Focussing on what ECHO and its partners currently do well would ensure a comfort zone. It should also be noted that there is already a notable overlap in the tools that are used in support of DRR activity and the climate change field. A good example of this would be risk mapping where the practice is used widely in both fields.

From that basic package of services and tools that ECHO and its partners could provide the objective would be to develop other activities that directly address climate change while providing benefits that are closely aligned to the package that ECHO and its partners deliver. Some obvious activities would be focussed on improving local water management practices and climate sensitive agricultural production. ECHO would nevertheless seek to learn from these related activities.

<sup>150</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit/eu-commitments\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/european-and-international-cooperation/world-humanitarian-summit/eu-commitments_en)

The ability to assist in putting in place longer-term DRR focussed infrastructure such as emergency shelters, establishing evacuation routes and contributing to overall disaster preparedness will be increasingly valued in an era of climate change. However these types of interventions should be increasingly implemented in different programming approaches especially ones that emphasize other developmental objectives. The issue of climate change offers this possibility. As noted there is a strong level of political engagement within the region to address the problem. There is also the possibility of leveraging additional resources. One only has to consider climate financing through sources such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Climate orientated programming should also provide the opportunity to build new forms of partnerships aimed at building *resilience*.


If ECHO does choose to explore how it can more pro-actively address climate change this will or should have organisational implications. Climate change presents a mainstreaming challenge to all organisations, development and humanitarian. ECHO has not really started down this path. Mainstreaming involves integrating climate change considerations into policy, programming and day to day operations. Mainstreaming requires clear organisational objectives and internal mechanisms to ensure that climate change objectives are achievable. Mainstreaming can start with small matters such as how project documents track information on climate change and how this information feeds back into programming decisions. As noted, this evaluation process identified how the term climate change is already being used in a wide variety of ways in project documents. This is neither good nor bad but the problematic associated with climate change is such that a structure is required to deal with the issue properly.

One of the issues that this case study identified has been an information gap on climate change. It was instructive to see how ECHO beneficiaries in highly vulnerable programming areas are categorical in their perception that climate change has to be addressed and better information is part of the solution. ECHO and its partners' ability to articulate these types of perceptions can provide an important complement to more scientific approaches as they continue to improve. A next wave in climate science that is still not yet functional is the downscaling of climate modelling. Downscaling will allow for the building of more precise climate scenarios for specific geographic areas. The potential pertinence of this to the work of ECHO and its partners is considerable. In summary, the overall issue of climate knowledge/climate science can be better employed and ECHO and its partners may have a role to play in this regard. Project beneficiaries and project partners require better information and technical data on matters such as the status of water resources, forest and vegetation coverage, and coastal erosion. In climate focused projects this type of information is often generated and it is hoped that in certain circumstances that ECHO project beneficiaries would gain access to this type of information through new partnerships and alternative programming arrangements that a focus on climate change might bring.

In the end, climate change can be seen as an opening for ECHO to explore the combining of humanitarian assistance with development programming. That there have already been discussions between DEVCO's Climate Change Unit for the Americas and ECHO is seen as a good sign.

## Annex 12: Intervention logic

Figure 13: Intervention logic



## Annex 13: Résumé analytique

### Introduction

Le présent document vise à fournir une évaluation globale de l'**approche et stratégie de résilience** 2012-2015 pour la région Amérique latine et Caraïbes (ALC) de la direction générale de l'aide humanitaire et de la protection civile de la Commission européenne (DG ECHO).

La région Amérique latine et Caraïbes comprend 33 États<sup>1</sup> et est constituée de trois sous-régions – les Caraïbes (16 pays)<sup>2</sup>, le Mexique et l'Amérique centrale (7 pays) et l'Amérique du Sud (10 pays). Elle compte 522 millions d'habitants,<sup>3</sup> dont 130 millions<sup>4</sup> restent confrontés à la « pauvreté chronique ».

La région ALC est exposée à un risque élevé de catastrophes naturelles des plus diverses : séismes (Haïti et Chili en 2010, Équateur en 2016), ouragans (Matthew en Haïti, 2016), inondations, glissements de terrain, vagues de froid, éruptions volcaniques, sécheresses, tsunamis, incendies de forêt, etc. La région est aussi régulièrement touchée par des événements climatiques de petite et moyenne ampleur qui fragilisent encore davantage les moyens d'existence des populations affectées. Les événements hydrométéorologiques provoqués par *el Niño*<sup>5</sup> semblent déjà s'être intensifiés suite au changement climatique, au point de modifier la répartition des précipitations, entre autres. La région ALC connaît par ailleurs de graves violences, sous la forme de criminalité, de trafic de stupéfiants et de troubles politiques.<sup>6</sup> Pendant 50 ans, la Colombie a en particulier été le théâtre d'une guerre civile qui a déplacé des millions d'habitants<sup>7</sup>.

La Commission européenne définit la «*résilience*» comme « la capacité d'une personne physique, d'un ménage, d'une communauté, d'un pays ou d'une région à résister, à s'adapter et à récupérer rapidement à la suite de **crises et de chocs**, tels que des sécheresses, des violences, des conflits ou des catastrophes naturelles sans compromettre les perspectives de développement à long terme<sup>8</sup> ».

Les projets financés par ECHO dans la région ALC incluent a) une réponse d'urgence immédiate destinée à sauver des vies, b) une aide humanitaire intégrant quelques activités à court terme visant à renforcer durablement la résilience : sensibilisation multirisque, formation à la santé, assainissement, logement sûr, agriculture résiliente et activités génératrices de revenus, et c) projets DIPECHO<sup>9</sup> exclusivement axés sur la réduction des risques de catastrophes (RRC)<sup>10</sup>. La présente évaluation portait sur 258 projets relevant de ces deux dernières catégories.

Jusqu'à 60 % du financement total (233 millions d'euros) ont été affectés à deux pays (Haïti et Colombie, respectivement 39 % et 21 %). Les ONG ont bénéficié de 52,2 % du financement, contre 32,3 % pour l'ONU et 15,4 % pour la Croix-Rouge.

<sup>1</sup> Antigua-et-Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbade, Belize, Cuba, Dominique, Grenade, Guyana, Haïti, Jamaïque, République dominicaine, Sainte-Lucie, Saint-Kitts-et-Nevis, Saint-Vincent-et-les-Grenadines, Suriname, Trinité-et-Tobago, Argentine, Bolivie, Brésil, Chili, Colombie, Équateur, Paraguay, Pérou, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexique, Nicaragua, Panama.

<sup>2</sup> + 9 territoires britanniques et français d'outre-mer (6 pays) et les territoires constituant le Royaume des Pays-Bas (3 pays).

<sup>3</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/region/LAC>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.undp.org/mdg-reports>, LAC collection

<sup>5</sup> Réchauffement de la surface des océans le long des côtes de l'Équateur et du Pérou

<sup>6</sup> Alors qu'elle abrite moins de 9 % de la population mondiale, la région enregistre 33 % des homicides perpétrés dans le monde.

<sup>7</sup> Un accord de paix vient d'être rejeté par référendum. Un nouvel accord est en voie de finalisation.

<sup>8</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience_en.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Lancé en 1996, le programme de préparation aux catastrophes d'ECHO (*Disaster Preparedness ECHO*, DIPECHO) est au cœur des efforts de RRC d'ECHO, qui y a affecté à ce jour 325 millions d'euros à travers le monde.

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/risk-reduction\\_fr](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/risk-reduction_fr)

<sup>10</sup> Jusqu'en 2014, ces projets ont été financés au titre du programme de préparation aux catastrophes d'ECHO (DIPECHO)



## Méthodologie

L'équipe d'évaluation se composait de trois collaborateurs internationaux et de deux experts régionaux.

Au cours de la phase documentaire de l'évaluation, 89 publications techniques ou scientifiques ; 32 décisions de financement de la Commission européenne et leurs documents justificatifs officiels<sup>11</sup> ; ainsi que des propositions et rapports, concernant notamment le suivi et l'évaluation d'ECHO pour chacun des projets, ont été examinés.

Des visites ont été effectuées dans six pays : Bolivie, Colombie, Haïti, Honduras, Nicaragua et République dominicaine. Des entretiens semi-dirigés ont été menés auprès de 399 parties prenantes et 377 bénéficiaires des communautés ciblées par les projets ont participé à des discussions de groupe. Quarante-trois projets ont fait l'objet d'un examen plus approfondi lors des visites de terrain.<sup>12</sup>

Trois thèmes ont été sélectionnés en vue de la préparation d'études de cas approfondies :

- 7) Liens entre les activités d'ECHO de *renforcement de la résilience*<sup>13</sup> et les autorités locales, nationales et régionales ;
- 8) Utilisation d'indicateurs pour mesurer l'efficacité des efforts de renforcement de la résilience, une voie à suivre selon la DG ECHO ;
- 9) Les activités d'ECHO en rapport avec le changement climatique.

Enfin, un **sondage d'opinion** a été réalisé afin d'évaluer de manière plus quantitative les perceptions des partenaires et des acteurs des projets d'ECHO.

## Résultats de l'évaluation

Ce rapport d'évaluation est structuré autour des Questions d'évaluation (QE) :

### QE 1. Quel est le degré de PERTINENCE des actions d'ECHO ?

En ce qui concerne les projets, il ressort de l'analyse des documents que 243 (94 %) des 258 projets financés qui ont inclus des activités de renforcement de la *résilience* ont bien documenté les vulnérabilités et les besoins immédiats.

Au niveau stratégique, les partenaires n'ont pas toujours pu identifier les priorités à moyen terme de renforcement de la *résilience* ; cela s'explique probablement par l'absence d'un HIP « résilience » doté d'une perspective à moyen terme et par le large éventail de projets ECHO allant d'initiatives « pilotes » innovantes à base communautaire à des projets de soutien aux activités régionales de RRC au plus haut niveau.

Les répondants (N=334) ont estimé que les initiatives financées par ECHO répondaient correctement aux besoins de renforcement des capacités et de la résilience des populations les plus vulnérables, un point de vue étayé par nos propres observations.

<sup>11</sup> Connus sous le nom de Plans de mise en œuvre humanitaire (*Humanitarian Implementation Plans*, HIP)

<sup>12</sup> Trente-deux projets, en cours et/ou achevés, ont fait l'objet d'une visite sur site incluant des entretiens avec des bénéficiaires et/ou des autorités locales (10 dans les Caraïbes, 10 en Amérique centrale et 12 en Amérique du Sud). D'autres projets ont été examinés avec le partenaire local. Les visites et l'examen ont porté sur des projets nationaux, sous-régionaux et régionaux, certains ayant été financés à plusieurs reprises. Parmi les 30 projets ayant fait l'objet d'une visite de terrain, 9 étaient dirigés par des agences de l'ONU, 18 par des ONG et 5 par la Croix-Rouge. Plusieurs avaient pour chef de file des consortiums associant différentes catégories de partenaires (ONU et ONG). Les projets de l'ONU et de la Croix-Rouge couvraient souvent plusieurs pays.

<sup>13</sup> Comme indiqué ci-dessus, il s'agit de tous les projets financés par ECHO qui contribuent, en tout ou en partie, au renforcement de la capacité à résister, s'adapter et récupérer rapidement à la suite de crises et de chocs. Sont entre autres exclus les projets humanitaires uniquement axés sur la réponse aux besoins urgents. La distinction a été opérée par les évaluateurs sur la base d'un examen des documents des projets.

## QE 2. Quel est le degré de COHÉRENCE des actions d'ECHO?

Cohérence avec les politiques nationales :

Les entretiens et les documents examinés ont mis en avant l'obligation imposée aux partenaires de travailler en coordination avec les autorités locales, et, plus récemment, avec les autorités nationales sur les questions de résilience.<sup>14</sup> Dans la plupart des pays, les autorités nationales exigent l'une ou l'autre forme de pré-approbation des projets. Les projets approuvés *s'alignent* sur les politiques et les programmes généraux du gouvernement, ce qui ne signifie pas forcément qu'ils seront considérés les plus essentiels ou les plus prioritaires par les gouvernements.

Bien que les autorités nationales rencontrées par l'équipe aient salué les efforts d'ECHO en matière de RRC, elles ont aussi parfois ressenti la nécessité d'un dialogue plus étroit et plus direct au niveau stratégique et le besoin de jouer un rôle majeur dans la sélection des priorités, activités et sites, comme c'est le cas avec leurs partenaires de développement.<sup>15</sup>

Les municipalités locales et autres autorités ont également manifesté un intérêt considérable pour les activités de RRC et y ont largement participé. Toutefois, leur niveau d'appropriation et d'engagement/soutien officiel a différé d'un pays à l'autre et au sein même des pays. Le rapport principal de l'évaluation documente, pour chaque pays, des *success stories* au niveau local. Le degré de réussite a été influencé dans une large mesure par l'approche adoptée par le partenaire (de l'approche interventionniste « nous allons le faire » à l'approche persuasive « nous voulons que la municipalité le fasse »). En Haïti, l'engagement local a été quelque peu limité par l'absence de réelle décentralisation des ressources nationales et de délégation de compétences du niveau central aux autorités locales.

L'étude a confirmé un réel consensus concernant l'alignement des activités d'ECHO sur les politiques locales et la *participation* des autorités locales. Toutefois, un grand nombre de répondants restaient dans l'incertitude concernant le degré d'*appropriation* locale.

Au niveau régional, ECHO a soutenu les principaux partenaires avec des mandats régionaux : la Stratégie internationale de prévention des catastrophes des Nations Unies (SIPC), le PNUD et la Fédération de la Croix-Rouge. La coopération des partenaires avec des agences sous-régionales de réduction des risques de catastrophes a été un atout. ECHO y a apporté sa contribution en faisant de la résilience une des priorités au niveau régional. L'importance et l'utilité du rôle d'ECHO au niveau régional est particulièrement visible dans la mesure où la DG encourage une culture d'apprentissage, d'échange et de solidarité, notamment en ce qui concerne les risques qui se jouent des frontières administratives. Les politiques, le renforcement des capacités et les bonnes pratiques développés dans les pays les plus forts sont partagés avec les plus faibles (par le biais d'échanges, etc.). Il n'existe toutefois pas d'approche universelle. Apporter un soutien plus direct aux organisations sous-régionales et promouvoir l'appropriation au niveau national reste essentiel.

Cohérence avec les politiques européennes :

Les interlocuteurs de l'UE et des partenaires ont salué **les inlassables efforts de plaidoyer d'ECHO en faveur de la résilience pour le compte des plus vulnérables**. Des progrès considérables ont été enregistrés en ce qui concerne le dialogue et l'échange d'informations entre les acteurs humanitaires et de développement de l'UE. Le Cadre conjoint Humanitaire-Développement (*Joint Humanitarian Development Framework*, JHDF) représente un effort concerté de l'UE en vue d'encourager les analyses communes et le partage de solutions entre les acteurs humanitaires et du développement, l'objectif étant d'accroître l'aide au développement. Le JHDF a été mis en œuvre en Haïti afin d'améliorer le dialogue et l'échange d'informations. À cet

<sup>14</sup> Ne s'applique pas aux activités d'urgence destinées à sauver des vies pour lesquelles les principes humanitaires doivent prévaloir.

<sup>15</sup> Mode opératoire d'ECHO à Cuba.

égard, il convient de mentionner tout particulièrement l'existence d'un point focal<sup>16</sup> ECHO en Bolivie, un pays ne bénéficiant pas de personnel ECHO. Cependant, l'amélioration marquée de la coopération entre les différents acteurs européens semble ne pas avoir permis de réaliser l'objectif escompté : le lancement d'initiatives à moyen terme, complémentaires et planifiées conjointement, associant ECHO et la DEVCO autour d'un objectif, d'un site et des bénéficiaires communs.

### QE 3. Quelle est la VALEUR AJOUTÉE POUR L'UE des actions d'ECHO ?

On retiendra surtout et avant tout que tous les répondants, à l'exception de 5 % d'entre eux, s'accordent pour affirmer qu'au cours de la période faisant l'objet de l'évaluation, ECHO a répondu à des besoins négligés par d'autres acteurs. Ce résultat est conforme aux données issues des entretiens et des visites réalisés par l'équipe d'évaluation. Cependant, de nombreux acteurs ont indiqué que « l'âge d'or » d'ECHO, qui fut un temps le pionnier et le principal acteur de la RRC, est révolu. L'on observe à présent un engagement politique et un soutien en faveur du nombre croissant d'agences de RRC établies dans tous les pays de la région ALC et dans les sous-régions. La Stratégie internationale de prévention des risques de catastrophes, les Institutions financières internationales et à présent, l'UE, font actuellement du renforcement de la résilience une approche prioritaire en matière de développement. Mais quelle est alors la valeur ajoutée d'ECHO dans ce contexte ?

Les résultats mettent en avant de précieux atouts, les voici :

- ECHO comprend particulièrement bien les risques intensifs (catastrophes), possède une excellente connaissance des risques existant au niveau national ou local ainsi qu'une bonne connaissance des institutions et des politiques de RRC. Son expertise dans la préparation aux urgences est inégalée dans l'UE.
- ECHO est perçue comme le défenseur des plus vulnérables, elle s'intéresse bien plus aux personnes qu'aux résultats économiques. Sa connaissance des besoins de la base au niveau local repose sur ses liens avec les acteurs de la société civile.
- En tant qu'acteur de réponse aux urgences, ECHO se distingue par une flexibilité et une capacité d'innovation inégalées. Sa capacité à exploiter toute opportunité dans une situation post-catastrophe pour lancer de nouvelles initiatives de RRC/renforcement de la résilience est un atout très précieux pour l'UE.
- En tant que bras de réponse collective aux urgences de l'UE, ECHO est la mieux placée pour veiller à ce que la réponse humanitaire tienne compte des risques et ne compromette pas les perspectives futures de développement (Lien entre la réponse humanitaire, la réhabilitation et le développement (*Linking Response, Rehabilitation and Development, LRRD*)).

Grâce à ces atouts, ECHO est bien placée, voire la mieux placée, pour mettre ses connaissances et son assistance technique au service de la conception de programmes de développement.

### QE 4. Quel est le degré d'EFFICACITÉ des actions d'ECHO ?

Un impact est qualifié de réel lorsque le groupe cible voit s'améliorer sa capacité à s'adapter aux crises et chocs futurs. Cet impact est difficile à évaluer en l'absence de crise ou de choc majeur. La mesure des produits (par ex. nombre de participants aux cours) et des résultats (par ex. connaissances acquises, attitudes modifiées....) est un indicateur substitutif. De nombreux exemples de bonnes pratiques ont été identifiés sur la base des produits mesurés et d'observations anecdotiques subjectives. Ceux-ci suggèrent un impact potentiel sur la résilience aux chocs futurs

<sup>16</sup> Dans certains pays, ECHO a utilisé le système de points focaux sans être présent. Dans ce cas, un membre de la Délégation de l'UE est identifié et un protocole d'accord est préparé afin que cette personne soit habilitée à effectuer des tâches spécifiques en rapport avec ECHO.



mais ne constituent pas une preuve documentée par des faits avérés. Le suivi des indicateurs de produits et de résultats d'ECHO a été jugé très complet, avec des visites et des conseils sur site. Toutefois, les indicateurs SMART (produits/résultats), tels qu'examinés dans les cadres logiques des projets ont été de peu d'utilité pour déterminer l'impact réel des interventions.<sup>17</sup>

Plusieurs exemples de « bonnes pratiques » ont été identifiés sur la base de caractéristiques qui ont amené les évaluateurs à conclure que l'on peut raisonnablement supposer qu'elles aient un impact sur la *résilience* future. Parmi les facteurs de succès, il faut retenir une appropriation réelle par les institutions de réduction des risques et les autorités locales ainsi que leur soutien, une participation active du secteur privé (des constructeurs locaux aux associations de constructeurs), des approches imaginatives de sensibilisation des enfants aux risques, un renforcement de la cohésion sociale et des comités et des projets agricoles adaptés aux us et coutumes locaux.

En Haïti, l'impact des projets sur l'amélioration de la *résilience* est plus difficile à identifier. Les répondants ont surtout posé la question de savoir si l'on peut s'attendre à ce qu'un projet humanitaire d'une durée de 12 mois puisse améliorer la *résilience*, ne serait-ce qu'au niveau communautaire, dans un pays où les autorités locales n'ont ni ressources ni compétences décisionnelles, où la gouvernance centrale est très faible et la pauvreté extrême. Des signes encourageants ont toutefois indiqué un changement positif durable des attitudes, plus professionnelles, avec un passage vers la coopération intersectorielle au niveau local dans le secteur de la santé du département du Nord.<sup>18</sup> Des résultats en termes de résilience perçus comme prometteurs par les partenaires ont été identifiés dans des projets choléra et des initiatives de réinstallation basées sur un soutien de type prêt de liquidités. Ces résultats continuent toutefois à dépendre de la poursuite du soutien international.

Parmi les facteurs potentiels de réussite, il y a lieu de retenir l'application du marqueur de résilience ECHO aux projets humanitaires, qui sont ainsi sensibilisés aux aspects à plus long terme de la *résilience*.<sup>19</sup>

Les observations ci-dessus ne font que suggérer un impact : ni les partenaires ni ECHO n'ont utilisé la survenue occasionnelle d'urgences/de catastrophes pour démontrer, à l'aide d'études scientifiques avec des groupes de contrôle, que leurs efforts antérieurs avaient effectivement amélioré la capacité d'adaptation de leurs bénéficiaires par rapport à celle d'autres communautés touchées par la même catastrophe.

## QE 5. Quel est le degré d'EFFICACITE des actions d'ECHO?

Les facteurs positifs contribuant à l'efficacité des actions incluent souvent, mais pas systématiquement, une gestion de projet caractérisée par la mise en œuvre d'une approche multirisque, une forte participation des ONG et personnel local, l'utilisation accrue de liquidités, la recherche de nouvelles formes de partenariat (par exemple entre le secteur privé et l'industrie) et une approche de consortium (projets multipartenaires). Vu la grande diversité de services offerts et la définition ou le type de bénéficiaires (personnes ou institutions), la comparaison du coût/bénéficiaire n'a pas été utile.

<sup>17</sup> Les indicateurs SMART sont spécifiques, mesurables, atteignables, réalistes par rapport à l'objectif concerné et limités dans le temps pour être mesurés pendant la durée de l'intervention). Par définition, la résilience aux crises/chocs futurs et difficilement mesurable, en particulier dans le cadre temporel de l'intervention.

[http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian\\_aid/fpa/2003/guidelines/logical\\_framework\\_guidelines\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/partners/humanitarian_aid/fpa/2003/guidelines/logical_framework_guidelines_en.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> Contrairement à la République dominicaine, l'engagement et le soutien à l'échelon national en Haïti n'était pas présents dans cette initiative transfrontalière.

<sup>19</sup> Le marqueur appliqué à chaque projet formule des questions concernant l'analyse appropriée des risques existants, l'impact négatif potentiel du projet humanitaire sur ces risques, l'impact positif attendu sur les capacités locales et sa contribution au soutien aux stratégies à long terme.

La courte durée et la petite taille des projets<sup>20</sup> ainsi que la dispersion géographique et thématique des efforts perçues par les répondants ont souvent été citées comme autant d'obstacles à une utilisation efficace des ressources pour un impact à plus grande échelle et plus durable. Dans cette enquête, bien que cette question ait enregistré le pourcentage de répondants indécis le plus élevé (30 %), une majorité d'entre eux a estimé que les efforts d'ECHO affichaient un bon rapport coût-efficacité.

Dans l'ensemble, rien n'a permis de conclure à un important manque d'efficacité de la mise en œuvre assurée par les partenaires.

#### **QE 6. Quel est le degré de DURABILITÉ des actions d'ECHO ?**

Pour être efficace, l'impact sur la résilience doit être durable. La capacité à affronter les crises futures doit en effet être garantie au-delà de la brève durée de vie des projets.

Des exemples de durabilité et de réplcation, tous étroitement liés au degré d'appropriation et d'engagement des autorités locales et/ou nationales ont été mis en évidence. Parmi les facteurs de réussite, retenons un partenariat actif avec le secteur privé – ((Pedro de Sula - Honduras), la sous-traitance à des ONG locales bien présentes au sein des communautés (Nicaragua) et les interventions contre des risques importants perçus par les bénéficiaires. Certains types d'activités aboutissant à une auto-amélioration économique présentent un potentiel élevé de durabilité, c'est le cas par exemple des améliorations des cultures permanentes introduites par des projets de la FAO en Colombie. Les deux extrêmes se retrouvent à Cuba, où des projets ont été conçus en vue d'une appropriation locale durable et à Haïti, où la « durabilité » s'est heurtée à l'absence de réelle décentralisation des ressources et de délégation des compétences aux autorités locales, ce qui vide de son sens le concept d'appropriation au niveau local. Dès lors, la durabilité de la plupart des projets financés par des fonds externes en Haïti dépend avant tout de la poursuite du financement et de la présence de partenaires extérieurs.

#### **QE 7. Quels sont les INDICATEURS D'IMPACT potentiels dans la région ?**

La *résilience* (capacité à résister/s'adapter aux crises) ne se mesure pas facilement au moyen des indicateurs SMART (et contraignants) utilisés dans un projet d'une durée de six à quinze mois. Les efforts de l'ONU/SIPC, de l'Agence caribéenne de gestion d'urgence des catastrophes, de l'institution spécialisée du Système d'intégration de l'Amérique centrale pour la prévention, l'atténuation et la réponse aux catastrophes naturelles (*Central American Integration System for natural disaster prevention, mitigation and response*, CEPREDENAC) et d'autres partenaires en vue de la production d'indicateurs internationaux ou institutionnels sont certes louables mais ne servent guère l'objectif d'ECHO d'évaluation de l'impact dans les communautés ciblées. Plus pertinentes sont les suggestions de mesurer la résilience des systèmes de gestion du risque des pays ALC et la façon dont ils parviennent à aider les communautés à risque.

Les quatre paramètres du marqueur de résilience ECHO ont été considérés comme un précieux outil pour la mesure de l'engagement à promouvoir la résilience au sein des projets humanitaires et de développement.

## **Conclusions**

Les principales conclusions sont les suivantes :

- Il existe d'importantes différences d'efficacité, entre les sous-régions et au sein de celles-ci en termes d'impact sur la résilience locale. Plus l'engagement est solide dans le pays, plus

<sup>20</sup>Dans les projets d'une durée de 15 mois, la période de démarrage (identification des bénéficiaires, contacts avec les dirigeants, recrutement du personnel et achat de matériel) représente un pourcentage significatif.

les résultats seront efficaces et durables. Les partenaires ne maîtrisaient souvent pas la façon dont les *success stories* étaient reproduites ou généralisées.

- Selon les répondants, les projets à base communautaire ne bénéficiant pas d'un engagement à l'échelon national ou provincial peuvent uniquement améliorer la capacité d'adaptation face à des crises et chocs mineurs, d'où un rapport coût-efficacité extrêmement limité pour ces projets.
- Deux mécanismes complémentaires améliorant la résilience ont été mis en avant : l'inclusion d'activités de RRC/résilience dans les projets d'assistance humanitaire/réhabilitation et le programme traditionnel de DIPECHO qui inclut des projets spécialement dédiés à la RRC/résilience.<sup>21</sup> DIPECHO a atteint un niveau remarquable de reconnaissance et d'influence dans les pays de la région ALC. La poursuite de l'utilisation de ce label est un réel atout pour la région.
- L'utilisation du marqueur de résilience a permis à ECHO, acteur humanitaire de premier plan, d'influencer positivement les approches à court terme parfois contre-productives (voir point suivant ci-dessous) dans le domaine de l'aide humanitaire. Il s'agit là d'un réel progrès en termes de réflexion stratégique comparé à beaucoup d'autres acteurs d'aide humanitaire.
- L'impératif humanitaire d'indépendance vis-à-vis des institutions nationales ou locales est essentiel pour l'engagement humanitaire de principe envers la neutralité, l'indépendance et l'impartialité. Il pourrait toutefois se révéler contre-productif dans les initiatives de renforcement de la résilience qui doivent être intégrées dans des initiatives locales de RRC et de développement. L'appropriation des projets ne peut être limitée aux bénéficiaires ciblés mais doit inclure les autorités nationales et locales. Au niveau stratégique, les autorités des pays de la région ALC exigent de plus en plus l'appropriation nationale.<sup>22</sup> Cela exige des changements dans les relations d'ECHO à ce niveau pour garantir la durabilité/appropriation de l'impact de la résilience comme ce fut le cas pour les projets menés à bien par ECHO à Cuba.
- Même si les réponses à l'enquête, dans une grande majorité, montrent que les bénéficiaires sont mieux conscients des risques et qu'elles indiquent surtout que, dans l'ensemble, ils font preuve de davantage de résilience grâce aux actions financées par ECHO, cette évaluation n'a pu prouver objectivement et définitivement l'impact des activités d'ECHO sur la résilience en raison de l'absence d'études comparatives objectives (études contrefactuelles) après la survenue de crises et de chocs dans les communautés touchées<sup>23</sup>. Les évaluateurs ont seulement identifié des activités (bonnes pratiques) susceptibles d'avoir contribué à cet objectif.
- Trop peu de données sur le changement climatique ont été recueillies ou analysées pendant la période couverte par cette évaluation. ECHO n'en conserve pas moins l'objectif d'apporter des réponses plus ciblées au changement climatique qui constitue une menace de plus en plus sérieuse pour la région.
- Les précédentes évaluations de DIPECHO à travers le monde avaient mis en avant une certaine isolation d'ECHO par rapport à d'autres instruments et en particulier aux Délégations de l'UE afin de « préserver l'indépendance et l'impartialité de la réponse humanitaire d'ECHO ». C'était loin d'être le cas dans les pays d'ALC au moment de l'évaluation, où le dialogue entre la DEVCO, la Délégation et ECHO s'est considérablement

<sup>21</sup> Les quatre marqueurs appliqués à chaque projet concerne l'analyse correcte des risques existants, l'impact négatif potentiel du projet humanitaire sur ces risques, l'impact positif attendu sur les capacités locales et la contribution du projet aux stratégies à long terme.

<sup>22</sup> Cela peut être le cas ailleurs que dans les pays d'ALC.

<sup>23</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact\\_evaluation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impact_evaluation)

amélioré ; la résilience a été une occasion de renforcer les liens. Le JHDF en Haïti a été une étape positive mais il faudra plus de temps pour le concrétiser en initiatives conjointes.

## Recommandations

| Recommandations clés  | Recommandations opérationnelles   |
|---|---|
| <p>Poursuivre ses efforts pour inclure un volet « résilience » dans les projets d'aide humanitaire.</p> <p>Mettre en œuvre de projets de résilience conjoints DEVCO-ECHO dont l'impact durable potentiel est reconnu en faveur des groupes extrêmement vulnérables dans des domaines prioritaires communs.</p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Encourager les partenaires à soumettre des projets en consortium pour garantir l'efficacité en termes de taille, l'approche multisectorielle et l'existence d'un mécanisme intégré d'analyse contrefactuelle en cas de survenue d'une crise majeure.</li> <li>▪ Mieux prendre en compte les crises et les besoins tels qu'ils sont perçus par les bénéficiaires.</li> <li>▪ La DEVCO et le SEAE devraient adapter ou adopter le marqueur de <i>résilience</i> pour que son utilisation se généralise aux projets de développement pertinents</li> <li>▪ ECHO doit se pencher sur les méthodes et moyens de soutenir directement les ONG locales dans les pays de la région ALC.</li> <li>▪ ECHO devrait officialiser le système « points focaux ECHO » dans les pays ne disposant pas d'une présence ECHO permanente.</li> <li>▪ Utiliser toute survenue de crise ou choc important pour confirmer et documenter l'impact.</li> <li>▪ Promouvoir la coopération sud-sud et des relations institutionnelles directes plus étroites entre Haïti et la République dominicaine, en s'appuyant sur la solidité existante de l'initiative transfrontalière financée par ECHO.</li> </ul> |
| <p>Encourager la DEVCO (et d'autres acteurs/institutions de développement) à assumer un rôle de leadership dans le renforcement de la résilience. Entre-temps, ECHO devrait soutenir un nombre plus restreint de projets multirisques à plus grande échelle de type DIPECHO en suivant une approche de gestion distincte de celle de l'aide humanitaire : un plan stratégique quinquennal développé conjointement avec les autorités nationales ; des sources de financement multiples, la préférence étant donnée à des projets cofinancés par des institutions de RRC nationales ou par le secteur privé ; un ciblage des bénéficiaires avec un espoir réaliste d'impact.</p> |   |
| <p>Pour autant que la DEVCO et d'autres acteurs/institutions de développement assument leur rôle de leadership dans la réduction du risque, ECHO devrait envisager de se réorienter progressivement vers la préparation aux risques intensifs (catastrophes) et la gestion des catastrophes centrée sur les personnes, avec une forte appropriation locale, un domaine probablement pris en charge peu efficacement par les acteurs du développement.</p>   |   |
| <p>Dans les pays émergents, les projets de type DIPECHO (n'incluant pas l'aide humanitaire aux victimes de catastrophes) devraient progressivement se soumettre aux priorités et à la coordination de l'institution nationale dédiée à la gestion des risques.</p>  |   |

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