

INTERIM GUIDANCE NOTE

Measuring and managing for results in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations

The purpose of this Note is to disseminate good practices on measuring and managing for results in fragile and conflict-affected states and situations (FCAS). It provides guidance for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at both the country programme and project levels. The intended audience is country office managers and advisers at DFID and other donor agencies. This note is intended to be useful for DFID country offices in their Operational Planning following the Bilateral Aid Review, in the context of the Spending Review commitment to spend 30% of ODA in fragile states. It is also intended to inform the development of new business cases.

This Note deals with those aspects of results management that are specific to FCAS (which make up most of DFID's country programmes), and supplements general DFID guidance on the subject (for example, [logframe guidance](#)).

Measuring results in FCAS encompasses all the usual challenges of measuring development results, but often in circumstances where programming, measurement and attribution are significantly more difficult, alongside the challenges of measuring our impact on conflict and fragility.

This Note is intended as guidance, not prescription, setting out options that can be adapted to the needs of country offices. This is an evolving area, so this should be seen as a first set of ideas on a difficult subject. It will be updated regularly on the basis of lessons learnt and new innovations. We would therefore welcome your feedback and ideas.

This Note is a joint product between the [Fragility and Development Team](#) and the [Aid Effectiveness and Value for Money Department](#). It was prepared following a stocktake of DFID practice across six country programmes (Afghanistan, Burma, DRC, Nepal, Somalia and Yemen)¹ and has benefited from the experience and insight of those programmes. It has also benefited from valuable inputs from the Conflict Policy Team.

¹ Cox, M & Thornton, N (2010), '[Managing results in conflict-affected and fragile states: a stock-take of lessons, experience and practice](#)'.

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Summary / Signposts

Introduction

Measuring and managing results well is essential to ensure we are effectively addressing poverty, conflict and fragility, and therefore spending funds well, in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), which are now most of our bilateral programmes. The experience of some country offices is already showing that if we focus time, effort and resources on results in FCAS, we can monitor our engagement well, learn lessons, and build a robust evidence base on what works, what doesn't and why.

Experience shows that delivering both short and long term results is critical. It is critical to deliver some results quickly on the ground to build confidence of the population. At the same time, real transformation takes a long time. Evidence shows that it takes 15-30 years for a country's institutional performance to improve from the level of a fragile state like Haiti to the level of a functioning state like Ghana².

We need to measure the impact of our whole country engagement – including all individual projects - on conflict and fragility. We know that 'development as usual' doesn't work in FCAS. We need programming that addresses the causes and effects of conflict and fragility directly, both through governance and conflict-focused programmes and through service delivery, wealth creation and other programmes that are explicitly designed to support peacebuilding and state-building.

We need to find ways to overcome the challenges of measuring results across our programmes in difficult contexts – dealing with incomplete or unreliable data, security concerns and logistical difficulties, political sensitivities and volatile and unpredictable environments.

And we need to monitor to ensure we are avoiding doing any inadvertent harm through our interventions – for example, ensuring that humanitarian or service delivery programmes do not undermine longer term objectives for strengthening state-society relations, or that any intervention does not exacerbate existing patterns of exclusion.

Techniques for measuring and managing results in FCAS are not fundamentally different to those we use in peaceful and stable countries, but may need to be employed more intensively, adapted and combined with innovative approaches.

Linking results to risk and VFM

In FCAS we have to work with risks that we cannot mitigate. Overall risks to achieving objectives and avoiding doing inadvertent harm are higher. If we are too risk averse, we are unlikely to be effective, because transformative and innovative programmes are often high risk. Results management therefore needs to be closely integrated with risk management, ensuring a balance of risk across the portfolio. On-going monitoring of high level indicators is critical to assess risks across the whole programme **[Section 1.2]**.

A range of tools are available for monitoring risk at country level including risk registers and scenario planning **[Section 2.3]**, and examples from Yemen, Nepal and DRC show different ways of approaching this **[Boxes 7, 8 and 9]**.

² WDR 2011 forthcoming

Value for Money considerations in FCAS need to take account of the difficult context, namely through:

- Considering risk and return
- Deriving appropriate comparators as unit costs are likely to be higher
- Factoring in the benefits of wider impacts of interventions (such as the contribution of a sector programme to security, institution building or stronger state-society relations)

[Section 1.3]

Results at country level

A ‘theory of change’ narrative needs to set out what is needed for the country to achieve a transformation from conflict and fragility to peace, security and development, and how DFID’s interventions will support this. This should be based on evidence and analysis, and needs to be adapted over time as necessary in response to changes in circumstances or new analysis and understanding. **The peacebuilding and state-building framework should then be used to frame the overall country strategy and objectives** and to prioritise between interventions **[Section 2.1]**. Examples from Somalia and Burma show how this can be done effectively in very different contexts **[Box 3]**.

Indicators need to be selected to monitor the contribution of the country programme to addressing conflict and fragility through these objectives. They should be incorporated logically into results chains that link overall country level objectives to project level objectives. Data for country level monitoring should combine regular development data - appropriately disaggregated to identify conflict significant factors – with data from specific sources and indices on aspects of peacebuilding and state-building (such as Uppsala Conflict Data or the State Fragility Index) **[Section 2.2]**. Innovative data sources can also be useful, such as the Ushahidi platform which mapped 2008 post-election violence in Kenya through crowd-sourcing **[Box 5]**.

While we are usually monitoring positive and negative developments, in some cases a steady state may be a good result (such as a country not reverting to conflict). Clear and precise country level objectives, built on an evidence-based theory of change, are particularly critical for DFID, HMG and/or partners to demonstrate our contribution to this.

Results at project level

M&E needs to be designed and carried out so as to support, and not distort, programming that will help FCAS achieve the long-term transformation from conflict and fragility to sustainable peace and development. Again, it is critical to be very clear about what we are doing and why.

Robust M&E at project level requires investment in systems [Section 3.1]. This includes setting up organisational structures, such as dedicated teams, and allocating sufficient staff time and resources. DRC and Nepal provide examples of different approaches **[Box 10]**. Extra effort should be focused on monitoring key issues that are hard to measure, but which are critical, such as political processes and institutional reform, as compared to, for example, health and education which are usually more straightforward to measure.

Ensuring effective monitoring of programmes implemented by partners is key. This can be addressed, for example, by engaging a different partner for the monitoring role, or

defining a hands-on oversight role by staff [Section 3.1]. Examples from Somalia and South Sudan illustrate different approaches [Box 11].

The project cycle

We need to monitor impact on conflict and fragility in all sectors throughout the project cycle. A step by step guide is provided which combines specific suggestions for projects in FCAS with some general guidance. Key points include:

- **Setting clear objectives:** All projects in FCAS should include objectives to reduce conflict and fragility as well as specific results directly related to the sector [3.2.1]. DFID Somalia's approach to the health sector provides a good example [Box 12]
- **Reviewing existing research and evidence.** Country offices should draw on experience from other fragile states. If there is a lack of evidence and the programme is innovative it may be necessary to start small, pilot and then decide whether to scale-up [3.2.2]
- **Finding available data and identifying gaps.** We need to measure what is important, not what is easy to measure. In many fragile states where there is a lack of information we will need to invest in data. [3.2.3]
- **Defining indicators.** To measure the impact of any project on conflict and fragility, indicators need to reflect peacebuilding and state-building objectives alongside sector objectives. [3.2.4]
- **Establishing baselines** As there is often a lack of good data in FCAS, project/programme design may need to start with data collection to establish robust baselines. [3.2.3]. The DRC Media for Democracy and Accountability Project gives a good example of an innovative approach to setting a baseline [Box 14]
- **Setting realistic targets and working with realistic timeframes.** In FCAS, it tends to take longer to design projects, get them operational and observe results – for reasons of capacity, logistics, politics and/or insecurity. We need to recognise this and be upfront about it, setting realistic targets and milestones, and avoid setting up programmes to fail. [3.2.6]
- **Contribution and attribution.** In FCAS it may not always be possible to demonstrate attribution at output level, for example, joint donor programmes working across a range of complex areas. In such cases it is critical to be clear why not and robust in demonstrating contribution. [3.2.8]
- **Combining different approaches and innovating [3.2.9].** Country offices are encouraged to use innovative approaches particularly when it is hard to define a linear input-output based results chain. Outcome Mapping is one possible approach [Box 17]
- **Impact evaluations with control groups.** Given that conflict and fragility are inevitably affected by factors beyond our control, these offer a methodology that can help us work out 'what happened?' and 'why?', acknowledging the complexity and multiple influences that will affect progress towards peace-building and state-building objectives [3.2.10].
- **Planning for evaluation and ex-post evaluation.** In FCAS, many projects will have outcome and/or impact level targets that cannot be assessed within the lifetime of the project so we should plan for ex-post evaluation (for example, 5 years after project closure), to ensure that we gain a full understanding and record of successes, shortcomings and any inadvertent impacts. [3.2.11]

- **Using results to improve performance.** This is particularly critically in FCAS to manage and provide the evidence for much of our programming, given its high risk and innovative nature [3.2.12].

Getting the data you need

Data collection often presents serious challenges in FCAS, where national statistical data may be unavailable or unreliable, and security and logistical constraints may limit direct access to certain areas. [Section 3.3]

Experience shows that reliable data can be obtained even in difficult environments. There are a number of useful principles to keep in mind, on which guidance is provided:

- **Use official data sources where possible [3.3.1]**
- **Work with local partners [3.3.2]**
- **Work with the private sector [3.3.3]**
- **Work with the military [3.3.4]**
- **Invest in data [3.3.5]**
- **Involve beneficiaries in monitoring [3.3.6]**
- **Use opinion polls [3.3.7]**
- **Use perception surveys, but with care [3.3.8]**
- **Triangulate [3.3.9]**
- **Innovate [3.3.10]**

It is important to collect and use data with political sensitivity. Data can be very powerful and we must take care not to exacerbate or create tensions or conflict or put particular groups at risk through insensitive handling of data.

Monitoring to ensure we avoid doing inadvertent harm

All interventions into FCAS are potentially harmful. Our interventions may for example, bolster a failing government, strengthen the hand of a minister or faction within a government or undermine state-society relations. We should understand these impacts and seek to support positive trends, monitoring programme delivery to ensure we minimise inadvertent harm [Section 3.4].

1. Introduction

1.1 What is distinctive about results in FCAS?

Measuring and managing results well is essential to ensure we are effectively addressing poverty, conflict and fragility, and therefore spending funds well, in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS), which are now most of our bilateral programmes. The experience of some country offices is already showing that if we focus time, effort and resources on results in FCAS, we can monitor our engagement well, learn lessons, and build a robust evidence base on what works, what doesn't and why.

Experience shows that delivering both short and long term results is critical. In fragile, and particularly post-conflict or deteriorating states, it is critical to deliver some results quickly on the ground to build confidence of the population. At the same time, real transformation takes a long time. Countries do not exit from conflict and fragility in a single leap and it takes many steps and transitions to make progress. During the twentieth century, even the fastest performing countries took 15-30 years to bring their institutional performance from the level of a fragile state like Haiti to the level of a functioning state like Ghana³. Rapid transformation cannot be expected in the 2-5 year planning cycles typical of national governments and international agencies and we therefore need to include realistic milestones in our planning and monitoring.

When we talk about measuring results in FCAS, we refer to three closely related challenges:

- **Measuring our impact on conflict and fragility:** We know that a portfolio of standard development activities is not sufficient in FCAS: we need programming that directly addresses the causes and effects of conflict and fragility⁴. This involves governance and conflict-focused interventions, and service delivery, wealth creation and other programmes that are designed explicitly to address conflict and fragility, with peacebuilding and state-building objectives. This means we need to measure the impact of our whole engagement in a country (or sub-national region), including all individual projects, on conflict and fragility.

This means monitoring variables (for example, security, legitimacy, institutional change) that are inherently challenging to measure but which are critical elements of transformative programming⁵. This also means recognising in our results management that we are dealing with long term change and finding ways to measure milestones or intermediate stages to monitor progress.

- **Measuring results in difficult contexts:** All the usual challenges of measuring development results across our country programme also apply in FCAS. In addition, FCAS are more likely to suffer from incomplete and unreliable national data. Insecurity and poor access may limit access to areas where results are expected, and we may need to protect staff, partners and beneficiaries from security threats.

At the same time, volatile and often unpredictable contexts may call for a higher degree of flexibility across the country programme and in the modalities and

³ WDR 2011 forthcoming

⁴ DFID (2010), '[Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper](#)'

⁵ See for example, Natsios, A (2010), '[The clash of the country-bureaucracy and development](#)', Centre for Global Development

timeframes of individual projects. Much of our work in FCAS is politically sensitive and this can also affect how we approach measuring results.

- **Do No Harm:** We need to monitor to ensure that we are guarding against the risk of doing inadvertent harm through our interventions – for example ensuring that approaches to humanitarian assistance and service delivery do not undermine medium- to long-term objectives for building peaceful states and societies, or ensuring that any intervention does not inadvertently bolster a political faction or exacerbate existing patterns of exclusion⁶.

These challenges do not necessarily imply separate activities. Many tools and approaches outlined in this paper will serve more than one of these objectives. But we should keep all three objectives in mind when managing for and measuring results in FCAS.

This Note addresses the challenges of measuring and managing for results at the country level (**section 2**) and at the project level (**section 3**). The two levels should be logically and clearly integrated and many of the principles and guidance set out in the following sections apply at both levels.

1.2 Integrating results and risk management⁷

FCAS present inherently risky environments for development assistance. However the risks of failing to engage in these contexts are also high. As recent work by the OECD-DAC has shown, if we are too risk averse, we will compromise our ability to deliver results⁸. We need to find ways to engage that can deliver both short term results on the ground, and potentially transformative longer term results, but which do not cause harm or come at too high a cost.

An appetite for higher risk programming needs to be accompanied by a robust approach to risk management. For innovative projects in particular, this may call for starting small and then scaling up. The risk that we need to manage is the risk of negative outcomes. There are two key aspects to this risk, (i) factors that DFID will be able to partially influence and (ii) factors that are beyond DFID's active control. Broader contextual factors are often the type of factors that we are unable to mitigate – and that we need to work with.

Two main types of risk that relate to results in FCAS are:

- the risk of non-achievement or underachievement of objectives;
- the risk of doing inadvertent harm.

Operationally, these are closely related to two further types of risk:

- security risks to staff, implementing partners and beneficiaries;
- other risks such as fiduciary and reputational risks.

In the past, the usual practice was to assess risk upfront, include mitigating actions in the project design and hope for the best. But risk management should be a continuous part of project management, providing us with a means of operating in a volatile environment and making adjustments to activities, modalities and partnerships in a timely way. The DAC recommends that donors should set more realistic objectives and success criteria in programmes, work with partners to agree on realistic frameworks for measuring results in

⁶ OECD-DAC (2007), '[Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#)'

⁷ This section will be updated to reflect the outcome of upcoming Management Board discussions on risk.

⁸ OECD-DAC (2011) 'Aid risks in fragile and transitional contexts'

difficult environments, including methods based on demonstrable reduction of known risk factors, and invest in a higher level of M&E than in other environments⁹.

As in other contexts, we need to measure results and risks at both country programme level and for individual projects. These two processes should be joined up and mutually reinforcing. Monitoring at country level enables us to track changes in the operating environment and assess the implications of these for each individual project (see **section 2.2** below).

A range of tools and techniques for managing risk are available, including risk registers and scenario planning. These are set out in more detail in **section 2.3** below.

1.3 Linking results to value for money¹⁰

The Appraisal section in the new Business Case is the main vehicle for addressing VFM. For all Business Cases, the Appraisal section is intended to ensure that the proposed intervention is designed in the best way to optimise value for money. Staff are required to set out expected benefits, resource costs, and risks/challenges of the intervention, as well as an assessment of design and quality, a summary VFM statement comparing benefits to costs, and a sensitivity analysis. It is intended that in time the use of identified VFM metrics will contribute to VFM analysis, however these are still in development at this stage.

In summary, analysis of VFM requires us to work through the programming options in a structured way, choosing those that offer the best balance of return, risk and economy. When making a VFM case, staff should consider:

- precisely what the country programme or the individual project is trying to achieve (objective) and why (in line with the theory or theories of change (see **section 2.1**) that inform the Country Business Plan);
- what is the baseline;
- the contribution of the activity to corporate and Operational Plan objectives;
- the cost of not intervening (or another relevant counterfactual);
- the development results expected and, based on this expectation, analysis of the likelihood of over or underachievement against this; this should be related to likely over or underachievement and appraisal of the inherent risk involved in the project;
- the economy (cost of inputs), efficiency (rate of conversion of inputs into outputs) and cost-effectiveness (overall rate of return);
- whether it will leverage other activities (for example; provision of security would enable greater economic activity to take place)
- the availability and cost of alternative options for achieving those results.

There are some important points to note about applying VFM analysis in FCAS:

- **Risk:** VFM analysis needs to incorporate both risk and return. Many of our innovative interventions in FCAS are simultaneously high risk and high return. For example, programmes to support fragile peace or state-building processes can be strategically very significant, but subject to political forces beyond our control. Some operations, like humanitarian assistance, have a high prospect of successful delivery even in difficult environments, but have a less transformative impact.

⁹ OECD-DAC (2011) 'Aid risks in fragile and transitional contexts'

¹⁰ Techniques for measuring VFM are still under development and further guidance will be issued by the Aid Effectiveness and Value for Money Department when available.

VFM metrics should not create incentives to focus solely on low risk activities, but help us assess the alternatives and find an appropriate balance. This is best done on a portfolio basis and an Operational Plan in a fragile state should include a balance of higher risk activities with strategic impact and activities we are confident of delivering. It may be helpful to look at the VFM result more broadly – what are the implications of not doing something innovative for the country programme (and perhaps even regionally).

- **Unit costs** are often higher in fragile states due to difficult operating environments, security and logistics costs; unit costs may also vary significantly within one fragile state due to conflict, political issues and other factors. They may vary substantially between large and small projects. It may be difficult to be entirely certain about their reliability. In VFM assessments it is therefore important to use judgement in deriving appropriate comparators and to explain and justify robustly the data being used.
- **Wider impacts (externalities):** programmes and projects in FCAS should be designed to have wider positive impacts than their immediate objectives, for example through contributing to security, institution building, reducing conflict or supporting stronger state-society relations by addressing inequality of access to services, according to country-level analysis and peacebuilding and state-building objectives. Factoring this into VFM analysis could include for example, calculations of the estimated cost to the country of violence and conflict. These higher level impacts should also be included in qualitative VFM assessments.

2. Measuring and managing for results at country level

This section provides guidance on results and risk management at the country level.

Note that much of this section is also applicable at a sub-national regional level where our engagement is substantial and where significant regional issues should be a focus of our monitoring.

2.1 Set explicit goals on addressing conflict and fragility

- **Analyse the context and draw on evidence** (**Box 1** lists some of the many analytical tools available) to inform planning processes. Commission analysis jointly with FCO, MOD and/or national or international partners where possible. Shorter pieces can be commissioned as updates or in response to changes. (See **Box 2** on Nepal).
- **Set out a clear narrative on how the country programme will contribute to reducing conflict and fragility:** what is needed for the country to achieve the transformation from conflict and fragility to peace, security and development (the ‘theory of change’) and how will DFID’s interventions will support this transformation? (See the example of Somalia in **Box 3**) The ‘theory of change’ needs to be adapted over time as necessary in response to changes in circumstances or new analysis and understanding: we are unlikely to be able to know with complete confidence at the outset how cause and effect will work, and politics will play out, in a particular context.

- **Use the peacebuilding and state-building (PBSB) framework (see diagram below) to frame the overall strategy and objectives and to identify and prioritise interventions.** Poverty reduction is our overarching objective, but international experience has shown that ‘development as usual’ is not effective in FCAS unless preceded or accompanied by specific measures to address conflict and fragility (see **Box 3** on Somalia and Burma)

Box 1. Tools for analysing conflict and fragility

The primary tools for country analysis are in widespread use across DFID, and each have their associated guidance:

- **Country Governance Analysis:** a mandatory tool used to assess the state of institutions against a normative standard (the Capacity-Accountability-Responsiveness framework), prepared with a historical perspective to capture the trajectory of change;¹¹
- **Political economy analysis:** a flexible investigative tool into the nature of the political settlement, the interplay between formal and informal institutions and the interaction between economic and political power;¹²
- **Strategic Conflict Assessments:** used to assess drivers of conflict at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels, covering political and socio-economic grievances, natural resource disputes, political culture and conflict resolution mechanisms. SCAs provide a means of assessing the interaction between our interventions and conflict dynamics;¹³
- **Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis:** used to assess patterns of horizontal or group-based inequality that may feed conflict, and which development assistance may inadvertently reinforce.¹⁴

Other tools include:

- the **Countries at Risk of Instability (CRI) Framework**, a tool developed for cross-Whitehall analysis that draws together political, social and economic analysis from restricted and open sources, and is designed to facilitate comparative analysis of risk levels between countries or across regions;¹⁵
- the **Critical Path method**, which is an analytical process focused on immediate planning needs, designed to expose the steps or processes required to achieve stability;
- **Conflict Audits** are used to assess whether country programmes are addressing the causes of conflict and being delivered in a conflict-sensitive manner. Contact the **Conflict Policy Team in CHASE** for further information.

For further guidance, see the DFID Briefing Paper [‘Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations – Briefing Paper A: Analysing Conflict and Fragility’](#)

Box 2. Strategic Peace Assessment in Nepal

Nepal’s 2008 Strategic Peace Assessment was commissioned to identify opportunities and risks around the peace process. It identified possible triggers of renewed conflict, including:

- the collapse of the coalition government;
- increases in identity-based tensions;
- unsatisfactory resolution of the future of the Maoist/Nepali armies;
- lack of progress in the federalism debate;
- failure of the Constituent Assembly to address the interests of excluded groups;
- failure to deliver a peace dividend, including to the poor and excluded;

¹¹ DFID, “Country Governance Analysis How To Note”, April 2010.

¹² DFID, “Political Economy Analysis How To Note”, July 2009.

¹³ DFID, “Conducting conflict assessments: guidance notes”, January 2002.


¹⁴ DFID, “Gender and Social Exclusion Analysis How To Note”, March 2009.

¹⁵ Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, “Investing in Prevention: An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response”, 2005.

- land reform policies and attempts at land redistribution;
- unfulfilled popular expectations.

Since then, Nepal has followed a strategy of commissioning small pieces of research to keep itself regularly updated on a rapidly evolving situation.

Diagram: DFID's approach to peacebuilding and state-building



Box 3. Addressing conflict and fragility through peacebuilding and state-building in country strategies – Somalia and Burma

DFID's Bilateral Aid Review for **Somalia** sets out an overarching strategy to address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility. The central objective of reinforcing local areas of development, peaceful local governance, and economic opportunities marks a shift towards a **greater investment in building longer term stability from the community-level up**, promoting local agreement and helping diminish the appeal of extremist groups. DFID will help:

1. **Address the humanitarian effects of the conflict:** by meeting the needs of some of the 2.7m Somalis (36% of population) now in need of humanitarian assistance;
2. **Consolidate local areas of stability:** by helping local communities to engage in peacebuilding and governance, creating jobs, improving access to women's and children's health and reproductive care;
3. **Promote more legitimate government:** by helping the central and Somaliland governments to be credible alternatives to militia-led governance, able to build on local governance and reconciliation.

This strategy is based on extensive analysis by the UK government which showed that

there is no military or political solution to Somalia's instability that can be imposed by central government or by the international community. A national-level peace process and government are necessary, which draw on and support, rather than threaten, local arrangements for stability and governance. Lasting stability – and undermining the appeal and power of extremist and other militia groups – must come by building on local areas of stability and peaceful governance.

In **Burma**, the UK is committed to an EU Common Decision not to provide direct support to central government. The PBSB framework has influenced the design of activities in two ways. First, MDG-related programmes are designed in ways that build, rather than undermine, local capacity, through shadow alignment with national strategies and efforts to support the role of local civil society. At the same time, DFID has designed activities that address critical weaknesses in state/society and centre/periphery relations. Through its civil society and service delivery work, the programme tries to maximise opportunities for local communities and community-based organisations to participate in the decision-making processes that directly affect their lives, and to work together more effectively. By strengthening the capacity of non-government actors, the programme seeks to prepare the ground for a more responsive political settlement in the future.

2.2 Identify appropriate data sources & select indicators of conflict and fragility

It is important that measurement is considered at an early stage, in order to develop a strategy to monitor and evaluate the performance of the planned country engagement as a whole. Monitoring against high level indicators is also important to monitor changes in the operating environment to manage risk.

2.2.1 Identifying data sources

The range of possible data sources should be considered, in order to identify and list clearly those most appropriate for monitoring progress. Wherever possible and appropriate, international data sources should be used, for the purposes of comparability. Where no appropriate data source exists, the office should consider what is needed to ensure country level conflict and fragility objectives can be monitored and evaluated.

- Sources may include internationally compiled indices (see **Box 4**), national government and non-governmental data, as well as other more innovative sources (see **Box 5**).
- In particular, the MDG database from the [UN Statistics Division](#) (UNSD) is a principal source of data on development. The World Bank's [World Development Indicators](#) (WDI) are more numerous (for example, covering general indicators such as population, or trade as a percentage of GDP). Where the data on these sites are different, UNSD data should be used. Country data needs to be carefully explained. **Box 4** lists a range of possible sources of data that may be specifically useful for monitoring trends in addressing conflict and fragility.
- Disaggregating existing development indicators (for example around provision of basic services) in different ways can also be useful for monitoring trends in fragility and conflict – for example, to monitor regional, ethnic or other forms of exclusion.

- If necessary, commission other sources, for example, opinion polls, focus groups and/or the views of a selected board of experts. See **section 3.3** below for more guidance on obtaining data.

Box 4. Some international and regional sources of data for monitoring conflict and fragility at country level (with hyperlinks)

See box 7. for some examples of how these can be used.

[Afrobarometer](#) – perception survey data from several African states.

[Bertelsmann Transformation Index](#) – indicators on political legitimacy, democratic transitions etc.

[Corruption Perceptions Index](#) – Transparency International’s global perception survey of corruption

[Failed States Index](#) – includes indicators on social, political and economic pressures, and state legitimacy

[Freedom in the World](#) - comparative assessment of global political rights and civil liberties

[Gallup World Poll](#) – perception surveys from a range of countries on political and social issues

[Ibrahim Index of African Governance](#) – includes indicators on Safety and Rule of Law; Participation and Human Rights; Sustainable Economic Opportunity; and Human Development

[Minorities at Risk](#) - monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups

[Open Budget Index](#) - measures budget transparency and accountability

[State Fragility Index](#) - includes measures of state effectiveness and legitimacy

[UN Statistics Division](#) – wide range of data including MDG’s, economic, social, and environmental indicators

[Uppsala Conflict Data](#) – rigorous data on numbers of conflict deaths

[World Bank/IMF DSA](#) - debt sustainability assessments for low-income countries, aiming to guide borrowing decisions

[World Development Indicators](#) – over 400 indicators on many aspects of development, many of which could be disaggregated for conflict and fragility monitoring purposes.

Box 5. Innovative data sources – Ushahidi

Ushahidi (‘testimony’ in Swahili) is an NGO-run web platform originally developed to map the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya by ‘crowd sourcing’. It allows data to be gathered direct from the public via SMS, email or the web, and put onto maps and timelines. Allowing data entry by the public at large has the potential to distort the picture through bias, but also enables the quick gathering of data from a broad base of people. The platform has since been used to track violent crime in Atlanta, USA, to monitor elections in Mexico, and to map the Haiti earthquake. Such innovative approaches to data collection can be a useful complement to more traditional approaches, providing quick, flexible information.

For more information, visit <http://www.usshahidi.com>

2.2.2 Selecting indicators

- **Select appropriate indicators to monitor the *contribution* of the country programme to addressing conflict and fragility** (according to the country level objectives identified, see **section 2.1** above). Remember that the selection of indicators will be informed by the data available but should not be dictated by it: we need to measure what is important not what is easy to measure.
- Ensure these are incorporated logically into **results chains that link overall country level objectives to project level objectives**. There should be a clear line of sight between country and project level objectives and outcomes, with consistent indicators. This also allows us to use project monitoring results to report outcomes at country level.
- While we are often monitoring positive and negative developments, **in some cases a steady state may be a good result** (for example, a country not reverting to conflict).

Precise country level objectives, built on an evidence-based theory of change, are particularly critical for DFID, HMG and/or partners to demonstrate *contribution* to this.

Annex A illustrates some of the categories of indicators that can be used to illustrate different objectives in relation to fragility and conflict at country level. Many of these may also be suitable for use at programme level (see **section 3.2** below). The selection of appropriate indicators in a particular context will depend on the key dynamics of conflict and fragility identified through in-country analysis. **Box 6** shows the indicators used by DFID at country level in DRC.

Box 6. Country level indicators to monitor conflict and fragility in DRC

This box sets out some examples of indicators that are used in DRC both to measure progress on peacebuilding and state-building goals in the Country Business Plan and to monitor changes in the external operating environment.

- Reducing conflict and improving security (activities of armed groups; numbers of displaced people and voluntary returns; command and control arrangements for defence forces; implementation of peace agreements; regional security and border incidents);
- Improving respect for human rights (reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence; reports from UN and reputable human rights NGOs on justice and human rights);
- Reducing corruption (transparency of natural resource revenues; WB 'Doing Business' survey; expected vs. actual government revenue from natural resources; compliance by executive with control institution recommendations);
- Respect for democracy and the political settlement (functioning of national and provincial parliaments; % of women in elected positions; media freedom);
- Providing basic services (primary roads developed and maintained; primary enrolment; primary health care; access to clean water; budget allocations and spending for education and health);
- Effectiveness of public financial management (integrity of budget; budget execution data; reduced leakage of public funds; % increase in budget revenues from natural resources and other sources).

The monitoring uses a combination of qualitative information from external sources (for example, news media, press statements by NGOs), any available quantitative data (for example, business climate surveys indicating perceptions of corruption) and subjective assessments by DFID staff of political and institutional developments.

2.3 Monitoring risk

2.3.1 Risk registers

A risk register or matrix is a tool for monitoring risk levels in volatile situations and ensuring an effective management response. Risks can be identified jointly with the FCO and where applicable, the MOD. For each identified risk, a risk register will:

- classify risk levels according to an agreed rating system (for example, a traffic light system), and possibly also record trend lines;
- set out indicators and/or trigger events;
- identify possible consequences for the country programme and their severity;
- set out mitigating strategies, where possible;
- set out contingency plans to follow if the risks eventuate;

- assign responsibility for monitoring and follow-up to particular staff members or HMG partners.

This data should be updated regularly, with the frequency of monitoring determined by the level of volatility in the operating environment. In Yemen, for example, the UK government carries out monitoring on a quarterly basis: see **Box 7**.

Box 7. Yemen Country Risk Monitoring Matrix

DFID Yemen has developed a Risk Monitoring Matrix, setting out risks and associated indicators for each of the countries. The matrix is used to monitor the balance of risk and programme performance across the country and regional portfolio, and identify where corrective actions are needed.

Examples of risks and associated indicators include:

- food price rises threaten poverty reduction gains and create tensions (wheat prices; food CPI; exchange rate);
- macro-economic environment deteriorates (oil price; oil revenue; inflation);
- human rights situation deteriorates (OHCHR and HRW reports);
- governance environment deteriorates (CPIA score; corruption perceptions; progress towards elections);
- war, tribal tensions and terrorism threaten stability and human security (no. of displaced persons; levels of protest; embassy and partner analysis and reporting).

For each risk, the matrix includes an assessment of the current status mapped on a quarterly basis, with a short assessment of the trend. Each risk is linked to the Corporate Risk Register, and assigned a lead staff member. In the past, the matrix included mitigation actions, but this was discontinued as at this level the risks are not susceptible to mitigation by the programme.

Risk monitoring must be accompanied by an active management response. Where a heightened risk to successful project delivery or to the security of staff, partners or beneficiaries is identified, there should be a structured process of working through the implications for each activity affected (see **Box 8**)

Box 8. Nepal Risk Management Office – an example of an approach to risk management

In Nepal, DFID established a Risk Management Office, jointly with GTZ. This Office undertakes continuous monitoring of security risks in conflict-affected areas, to provide implementing partners with the confidence to operate in a difficult environment. Key activities include:

- Establishing and supporting systems and procedures for managing security risks, including contingency planning, emergency response and crisis management, reporting and information flows;
- Providing training for staff and partners on staying safe in conflict zones, basic first aid and dealing with difficult security situations;
- Providing advice and intelligence on the operational environment to staff, partners and consultants, including daily travel advice and how to deal with the government and Maoist security forces;
- Training partners on conflict-sensitive approaches to development and how to comply with the 'Do No Harm' principle.

2.3.2 Scenario planning

One tool for ensuring an effective management response is scenario planning. This can help country offices think through in advance how to respond to different eventualities. This in turn requires them to be explicit about their risk appetite – that is, what levels and types of risk they are prepared to tolerate before deeming an activity non-viable.

The usual practice is to identify four possible trajectories for the conflict or PBSB process, usually with associated triggers (events likely to bring them about) or indicators (evidence that they are occurring). To root the analysis, it is important to develop credible scenarios with carefully thought-out impacts. The advantage of undertaking a scenario analysis is that it allows you to calibrate the likely impact of a particular event on the aggregate risk. **Box 9** gives examples of scenarios used by two DFID country offices.

There should be periodic assessments as to which scenario currently applies, and the scenarios themselves need to be revisited periodically. Whenever a change in scenario is identified, it should serve as a prompt for country offices to analyse the implications for the programme.

Detailed guidance on scenario planning is available in: Government Office for Science (2009), 'Scenario Planning Guidance Note'. [[link](#)]

Box 9. Examples of scenarios used by DFID

DFID Nepal uses a combination of country-level scenarios developed jointly with HMG partners. Four scenarios are identified, and an analysis is made of likely consequences in the political, economic and social spheres:

1. No capacity – No legitimacy (state collapse) – a worst-case scenario involving an unravelling of the peace process and breakdown in central government;
2. Low capacity – No legitimacy (fragile state) – resulting from a political stalemate with accompanying protests and disorder;
3. Some capacity – Some legitimacy (steady progress) – reasonable progress on the peace process, with the coalition government able to manage the most pressing issues;
4. Increasing capacity – legitimacy (a New Nepal) – political consensus leading to actions to strengthen state capacity, with aid provided through government systems.

DFID DRC monitors changes in the country context, and assesses which of the following four scenarios from the Country Plan applies:

1. Return to widespread violence/armed conflict;
2. Use of state resources to preserve power with little benefit to ordinary people (government shows very little commitment to reform, but manages to buy off/include the main constituencies, therefore avoiding a return to war – at least temporarily);
3. Improvements in some aspects of governance, with serious ongoing problems in other areas (but a positive overall trend) and some progress on social sector service delivery and economic growth.
4. Stronger commitment to reform and poverty reduction (such as a combination of progress on core governance issues such as security sector reform and public finance and a real commitment to delivering basic services to poor people and broad-based economic growth).

The quarterly monitoring in DRC is done jointly with the FCO and MOD, using a combination of qualitative information from external sources (for example, news media, press statements by NGOs), any available quantitative data (for example, business climate surveys indicating perceptions of corruption), and subjective assessments by DFID staff of political and institutional developments

3. Measuring and managing for results at project level

FCAS present a range of distinct and difficult challenges for M and E, demanding an approach that is both appropriate and robust for a difficult operating environment. Tools and approaches for managing results at project level need to be employed in a more innovative and intensive way, with a higher level of effort and often expenditure, than in other contexts.

3.1 Invest in managing for results

To ensure effective project level M&E, make sure that:

- **sufficient staff time is allocated to results:** for example, DFID Afghanistan has 3 Full Time Equivalent Staff working on results (and see **Box 10** on arrangements in Nepal and DRC). Improving our capacity in this area will in most instances imply greater staff time focused on results, including setting up and quality assuring M&E processes. In view of constraints on admin budgets, this may pose a dilemma for some offices. This can be addressed in part through ensuring a wide range of staff have improved skills so that focusing on results and M&E becomes core to how we approach our day to day work, rather than a specialist add-on. Other solutions may involve including specific responsibilities in programme-funded posts.
- **organisational structures support robust M&E** and results management (see **Box 10**);
- **a sufficient proportion (but not too much) of the project budget is reserved for M&E:** the DAC suggests up to 10% of resources in difficult environments;
- **M&E is designed and carried out so as to support, and not distort, programming** that will help FCAS achieve the long-term transformation from conflict and fragility to sustainable peace and development. Again, it is critical to be very clear about what we are doing and why;
- **monitoring arrangements are integral to the design of the project**, and not created as an afterthought;
- **baseline research is conducted as early as possible** (and within the first 6 months) of project implementation;
- **extra effort is focused on monitoring objectives that are inherently harder to measure**, such as support to political processes, support to institutional reform, as opposed to, for example, health and education outputs and outcomes that are usually more straightforward to measure;
- **the results of project M&E are actively disseminated** across the country team and corporately, to inform adjustments to ongoing programmes and future programme design, and for collective lesson-learning (but be careful of political sensitivities);

Box 10. Organisational structures to support results management

DFID Nepal has created a Results and Value For Money Task Team, in addition to its dedicated Results Adviser. The team includes the Economic, Social Development, Governance and Results Advisers, who provide up to 35% of their time, for a total resource of 1.6 Full Time Equivalent staff. The team leads on both the external (influencing) and internal results agendas, including promoting standard results and value for money indicators, leading on cross-cutting elements of new programme design and building the knowledge base of the country team. Financial resources are available for investments in the national statistical and planning systems, analytical inputs into the

national policy process and the commissioning of independent evaluations. Results information and other resources are posted on TeamSite, ensuring that lessons learned from impact evaluations are disseminated across the country team.

DFID DRC has dedicated one Full Time Equivalent staff to results, increased M&E capacity in programme teams and allocates approximately 10% of programme budgets to M&E. The Results Team is central to DFID-DRC's results system. It integrates two functions: managing development results, which relates to the content of programmes, and managing for development results, which relates to systems and organisational management. All new programmes have to be 'passed' by the results team, which gives it the authority to ensure that sound M&E frameworks and plans are in place from the start. During programme design phases, a member of the Results Team joins lead advisers to discuss M&E plans with partners. The team also has a role in ensuring on-going programme quality through review processes. The team therefore provides a QA function for all programmes.

- **And, ensure oversight or operational monitoring of implementing partners**

DFID has often trusted implementing partners with the delivery of multi-annual programmes with only light reporting and oversight requirements. This is usually not adequate in FCAS, where delivering complex interventions generally involves a high level of flexibility, with elements of trial and error. This calls for quality, real-time information on the delivery of activities and early results, and a robust management response to ensure that lessons are learned and corrections made.

Partner M&E systems are often notably weaker in FCAS, and reporting is sometimes optimistic. Implementing partners can become activity-focused and lose sight of the strategic issues. This calls for closer engagement with implementing partners, to support, facilitate and oversee operations. It may also be appropriate to engage a different partner for the monitoring role, to provide an independent source of data, with the agreement of the implementing partner. Results can be used to challenge the implementing partner and flag when changes are required. This also requires a hands-on oversight role by DFID staff (or joint donor committee, where appropriate). This should be specified at the outset in the project management arrangements.

Box 11. Monitoring with partners – examples from South Sudan and Somalia

In **South Sudan**, the Basic Services Fund (a challenge fund which provides grants to NGOs for education, health and watsan projects, through a secretariat run by a management agent) has a three-fold monitoring system:

1. NGOs submit quarterly progress reports to the monitoring officer assigned to them at the secretariat who scrutinises them
2. Secretariat monitoring officers visit each NGO at least 3 times during each 18 month grant period, visiting as many activities as possible, to assess progress and make recommendations. Their field visit reports are cross-checked with the quarterly reports
3. NGOs do not receive any funds in advance, and their monthly invoices are an important monitoring tool. Monitoring officers scrutinise the invoices against the quarterly reports and field visit reports and if invoiced expenditure does not tally with these, payment is withheld and further verification is carried out.

In **Somalia**, the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery is funded by DFID and other donors and delivered by the UN. DFID staff and consultants have little or no access to the areas where the programme is being implemented and the UN system itself works mainly remotely or via local partners. Several different monitoring approaches have been combined to overcome these constraints.

The programme funds local development initiatives through a participatory planning process. Financial and 'contract' monitoring is done by project staff on a monthly basis, with dispersal of funds for community initiatives tracked through a dedicated financial and information management system. Disbursements are conditional on delivery of the outputs linked to the previous disbursement, and require joint sign-off by UN staff, local government officials (engineers in the case of construction projects) and community representatives. Contractors are required to produce photographs of construction sites in their monthly reports. Implementation data is aggregated on a central data base by the programme management team, against logframe indicators. Where the data reveals a problem with implementation, the management team seeks clarification from implementing partners or takes action to ensure that timetables and budgets are respected. This aggregated data is also used for progress reports to quarterly donor Steering Committee meetings.

3.2 A guide to measuring results in relation to conflict and fragility *in all sectors throughout the project cycle*

This section combines specific suggestions for projects and programmes in FCAS with some key points of general guidance.

3.2.1 Setting clear objectives


The first stage in developing a logical results chain is to be extremely clear about what a project or programme is aiming to achieve, with a clear line of sight to country level objectives. In FCAS, **all projects should include, at appropriate levels in the results chain, objectives to reduce conflict and fragility as well as results directly related specifically to the project itself** (see **Box 12**). For instance, as well as objectives on girls completing school, an education programme might include objectives related to increased social cohesion. Similarly, a wealth creation programme might need to include objectives on reducing youth grievances related to unemployment¹⁶. It is important to be aware of political sensibilities when setting these out.

As in all contexts, after identifying the overall objectives of a project, the results chain and logframe design should focus on the results that are expected to be achieved through the project. Project outputs should reflect what we directly hope to achieve, with the higher level outcomes and impact being defined through a clear theory of change. These steps are key to good logframe design, and critical to future evaluations of the effectiveness of the intervention in delivering results at different levels.

For general guidance on results chains, refer to the DFID Briefing on [The Results Chain](#). See also **Annex B** for some useful tips.

The Results Chain:

¹⁶ Annex C of DFID (2010) '[Building peaceful states and societies](#)' sets out some extra examples of how sector programmes can contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives.



Box 12. Addressing conflict and fragility through service delivery interventions

In the health sector in **Somalia**, DFID is planning to continue to work with NGOs and UN agencies through the following activities, aiming to:

1. Scale-up access to, and use of, RMNH services:

- Increase demand for, and access to, family planning; focus on adolescent girls
- Increase skilled health personnel in emergency obstetric care facilities, through expanded training by NHS volunteers.
- Increase access to Skilled Birth Attendants, FP, and fistula treatment through a voucher scheme.
- Increase utilisation of the EPHS (including malaria diagnosis and treatment) through NGOs, communities.
- Strengthen RMNH evidence base and monitoring frameworks using new measurement tools

2. Improve stability and accountability by:

- strengthening community roles in local governance structures (for example, community health committees), and empower women to have choice in reproductive health
- applying lessons from fragile states (for example, credit and savings, women health workers)

3. Improve overall donor results, by working with others (i.e. Sida, UN agencies) and exploring the possibility of a joint donor Basic Services Fund

In the **Nepal** programme, education and health interventions have a clear state-building focus. The country team is investigating ways in which service delivery can help to build state legitimacy, including commissioning political economy analysis in the health sector to inform the design of a health SWAp. Ensuring that services reach strategic areas and address social exclusion will be key issues in the design.

3.2.2 Reviewing existing research and evidence

Research and evaluation evidence supporting the assumptions that underpin the proposed intervention should be drawn together and summarised. It will be necessary to draw on evidence, as far as it is available, on what works in terms of programming in this sector, in this country. It is also important to draw on experience of good practice from other fragile states. If there is a lack of evidence and the programme is innovative, it may be necessary to start small, pilot and build an evidence base, before deciding whether to scale-up. This stage will inform the objectives and the theory of change of the intervention, and therefore also the results chain.

3.2.3 Finding available data and identifying gaps

The next stage is to find out what data is already available to monitor performance, before clearly setting out the monitoring and evaluation strategy to be adopted throughout the life of

the project. Remember that **we need to measure what is important, not what is easy to measure: selecting indicators will be related to data availability but should not be dictated by it.** Section 3.3 sets out how suggestions on how to get hold of the data you need in difficult contexts. In many fragile contexts it is likely that there will be a lack of data and we will need to invest in information as part of our programming (see **section 3.3.3**).

This stage should as usual involve consideration of data publication frequency, in order to consider how and when progress will be monitored and also to ascertain whether enough data will be available to assess overall project performance and the relevant assumptions.

It will be important to use both **qualitative and quantitative data**. Many objectives related to addressing conflict and fragility are best monitored through changes in beliefs, perceptions, knowledge and attitudes, usually measured through surveys, opinion polls or focus groups. Data on perceptions also need to be treated with some care (see **sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7** below on using surveys and triangulation).

3.2.4 Defining indicators

To measure the impact of any programme on addressing conflict and fragility, **indicators need to reflect peacebuilding and state-building objectives alongside sector objectives**. For example, if an education project seeks (among other things) to improve the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of a marginalised group, then it should measure not just increases in service provision, enrolment rates and educational attainment, but also changes in attitudes towards the state among the target population.

Monitoring results in FCAS involves finding ways to measure intangibles like state legitimacy, confidence levels, trust in institutions, social cohesion and so on. Indicators that proxy these outcomes need to be carefully tailored to the political, social and cultural context. One way to do this (if the context allows) is by involving the intended beneficiaries in indicator selection through a participatory design process. They may be able to identify simple measures of progress that would not be apparent to outsiders. Qualitative methods are also likely to be critical to ensure monitoring captures a full and accurate picture.

Box 13 below provides some useful sources of sample indicators on conflict and fragility to be used at project/programme level alongside sector indicators as appropriate (and some of those suggested in **Annex A** may also be useful at this level). **Note that these should all be used and adapted carefully.** **Annex B** gives some examples of indicators used in DFID programmes.

Staff should make sure they are up to speed on what makes a good indicator. **Annex B** provides some useful tips and Annex 4 of the DFID Guidance on Using [Logframes](#) provides useful guidance on this.

Box 13. Sources of sample conflict and fragility related indicators for use at project level

Conflict, Security and Justice:

Scheye, E and Chigas, D (2009) '[Development of a Basket of Conflict, Security and Justice Indicators](#)'. This also includes indicators useful for measuring progress towards some key **statebuilding** objectives

Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2010). '[Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators](#)'

Governance and conflict: [DFID is currently testing indicators in this area and this will be updated to reflect this].

Voice and accountability: Social Development Direct, '[Measuring change and results in voice and accountability work](#)', DFID Working Paper 34.

Peacebuilding: Social Impact (2006), "[Fragile states and peacebuilding programs: practical tools for improving program performance and results](#)"

The NGO Search for Common Ground has developed a database of programme level indicators in use across their own work. These are available online at [to update]

Rule of law: Vera Institute of Justice (2008), "[Developing indicators to measure the rule of law: a global approach](#)"

3.2.5 Establishing baselines

Having identified available data sources and defined indicators, it is then necessary to consider suitable baselines that will be used to assess progress throughout implementation of the project. It will be important to consider which indicators have baseline information, and which existing sources of data can be used. As there is often a lack of good data in FCAS, project/programme design may need to start with data collection to establish baselines.

Box 14. Setting the baseline for a DRC media project

The Media for Democracy and Accountability Project in DRC (jointly funded with the French) is a highly innovative approach to building democracy through media. An independent baseline study was commissioned during the inception phase. It assessed the current state of the media sector, including estimated audience sizes, the perception and needs of media managers and the quality of content.

Among the techniques used was to convene a panel of media professionals and analysts in several locations around the country, and ask them to rate the status of a number of issues (for example, press freedom, fairness of licensing laws, plurality of news sources, respect for ethical rules etc.). They also carried out an analysis of content from a representative sample of media outlets, and commissioned additional studies on issues such as the professionalism of journalists. This has led to an innovative monitoring mechanism involving panels of five media professionals and analysts in five locations (rural and urban) convened periodically to assess progress and trends.

3.2.6 Setting realistic targets and working with realistic timeframes

While it is critical in many fragile, and particularly in post-conflict, contexts, to deliver some results quickly, it is also important to recognise that lasting change takes time. Evidence shows that transformative institutional reform takes 15-30 years¹⁷, well beyond our short country planning and project cycle timeframes. In practical terms, we need to be upfront about this and set realistic targets and milestones. Opinion polls can be very useful in taking readings on whether change is moving in the right direction.

¹⁷ [WDR 2011](#) forthcoming

It is also important to factor into planning processes and results frameworks that it often takes longer in FCAS than in other contexts to design projects, get them operational and observe results – due to issues relating to capacity, logistics, politics and/or insecurity.

3.2.7 Disaggregating data

As always, most indicators should be disaggregated by sex. In addition, if horizontal inequality¹⁸ within the target population (for example, by ethnic group, religion or caste) is a potential source of fragility or driver of conflict, then disaggregating data accordingly may provide important information on conflict dynamics. It may also be important to disaggregate data by age, disability, geography, etc as appropriate. If political sensitivities make it inappropriate to collect this data directly, it may be possible to use proxies for group membership (for example, place of residence) but with care.

3.2.8 Contribution and attribution

As always, it is necessary to state which results will be attributable to DFID and to which DFID action is making a contribution. DFID guidance is that contribution is acceptable at outcome level, while we should aim to be able to demonstrate attribution at output level. In FCAS this may not always be possible - this might be difficult, for instance, on a joint donor accountability programme where we work across a range of areas such as parliament, media and political party strengthening with different partnerships on each output. Where it is not possible to demonstrate attribution at output level, it is critical to be clear why not and robust in demonstrating contribution.

3.2.9 Combining different approaches and innovating

Country offices are encouraged to be innovative in their approaches to measuring results in FCAS and to draw on methods not frequently used by DFID to help them. This may be particularly useful for measuring results that are intangible or hard to measure, and where it is harder than usual to define a linear input-output based results chain. **Box 15** below gives a brief introduction to Outcome Mapping, which offers another way to capture results that are less easily monitored in the logframe format.

Box 15. Outcome mapping

Outcome Mapping is an approach to planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning that has been developed by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) as a way of grappling with the complexities of development and the challenges of attribution. It is particularly suitable for programmes where outcomes are unpredictable and not subject to control. It is an approach that might be of particular interest to those seeking to understand what works and why in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Outcome Mapping is a participatory methodology that emphasises iterative learning. The methodology involves asking what outcomes the programme or project hopes to see in terms of changes in the behaviour and relationships of those involved in the project, designing the intervention with those desired outcomes firmly in mind, and coming up with ways of measuring –

¹⁸ The concept of 'horizontal inequalities' refers to inequalities between groups defined by identity, such as ethnicity, religion, caste or region. Depending on context, such groups may initially try to mobilise peacefully, such as through the electoral system, or with demonstrations or strikes. However, if this has no effect or is put down violently, groups may turn to violence in frustration at their powerlessness. For further information see the [CRISE website](#).

quantitatively or qualitatively – the desired outcomes. Elements of the Outcome Mapping methodology can be creatively combined with more traditional approaches to monitoring and evaluation.

The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), an international network focused on conflict prevention, has switched to use Outcome Mapping. This is because it allows them to capture the *contribution* of their work to behavioural changes that can prevent conflict, rather than struggling to capture the often intangible results of conflict prevention work in a logframe. For example, much of their work in conflict affected countries focuses on dialogue between conflict parties – Outcome Mapping has enabled them to capture the often unpredicted improvements in behaviour of these parties (and wider social groups) that result. One of GPPAC's donors – the Dutch MFA – has now adopted a 'tailor-made monitoring' system that allows reporting using Outcome Mapping.

At a more local level, an organisation called Dagomba International has made use of outcome mapping in a programme that aims at social transformation in Liberia, through building community, fostering peace and reconciliation. Outcome Mapping is being used in that programme in order to improve understanding of the extent to which the programme has contributed to changes in behaviour, relationships and outcomes.

Further information about Outcome Mapping can be found through the [Outcome Mapping Learning Community](#) and at the [International Development Research Centre](#). The Liberia example is written up and available [here](#).

3.2.10 Impact evaluation with control groups

Conflict and fragility are inevitably affected by factors beyond our control. Any progress towards PBSB objectives is likely to be a result of multiple influences, and cannot be attributed solely to any single intervention. Impact evaluations use theory-based approaches to assess whether our activities have made a plausible contribution to progress. As the OECD-DAC advises, Such methods acknowledge the complexity and interdependent nature of events in the real world and ask not, 'did x cause y?' but rather, 'what happened?' and 'why?'¹⁹

In impact evaluations, ideally, surveys are administered to a representative sample of the target community and to a control group of non-beneficiaries. The control group should display similar general characteristics, but be sufficiently removed to avoid 'spill-over' effects from the intervention. In conflict zones, changing security conditions between baseline research and project completion may mean that control groups are no longer accessible. An alternative group with similar characteristics may have to be substituted. If access to the beneficiary population is constrained, it may be necessary to substitute a different methodology, such as bringing representatives of the target population out of the insecure area for focus groups. A certain level of compromise – 'good enough' monitoring – is sometimes unavoidable. We should, however, be aware of any resulting limitations to the data and take them into account when analysing and communicating the results.²⁰

Randomised Controlled Trials

Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are considered by many as a gold standard to obtain an unbiased estimate of impact and establish a causal relationship between the intervention and the outcome or outcomes. In international development RCTs are becoming more

¹⁹ [OECD DAC \(1999\) 'Guidance for evaluating humanitarian assistance in complex emergencies', pp. 12-3.](#)
²⁰ [Bamberger, Michael \(2005\), 'Designing quality impact evaluations under budget, time and data constraints', World Bank](#)

common to assess project effectiveness in fields as diverse as public health, education, microfinance, agriculture and, more recently, democratisation and governance²¹.

RCTs have been and are being conducted in fragile states, including in conflict-affected states. Some of these have specifically looked at conflict-mitigating impacts such as building cohesion and improving relations between ethnic groups (see **Box 16**)²².

Further information on how these are conducted is provided in Annex D.

Box 16: RCT Evaluation of Community-driven Reconstruction and Social Cohesion in Liberia

Jointly funded by DFID and IRC, Fearon et al (2009)**Error! Bookmark not defined.** used a randomized field experiment to evaluate the impact of a Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programme in northern Liberia from 2006-2008. The programme area had been particularly affected by the violence of the preceding 15 years. The evaluation tested the hypothesis that exposure to the programme would enhance the ability of communities to act collectively for mutual gain. To test this hypothesis, IRC agreed randomly to assign communities to a treatment group (42 units) that received the CDR programme and a control group (41 units) that did not. The implementation of the programme was tracked over the following 18 months, at the end of which surveys were conducted alongside public goods games, to observe whether the CDR treatment communities behaved differently from the control communities. In the public goods games, communities stood to earn a cash grant, the size of which depended on how much cash game participants (individuals from randomly selected households) decided to keep for themselves. The study found that in communities exposed to the CDR programme, the share of available cash earned by the community was 6.5 per cent greater than in the control communities. The experiment concluded that villagers exposed to CDR exhibited higher levels of social cooperation, suggesting that changes in community cohesion can happen over a relatively short period of time and that post-conflict development aid can have a measurable impact on social cohesion.

An IRC paper summarising lessons from the organisation's experience with RCT evaluations identified the difficulty of accessing reliable data as a key challenge in the Liberia evaluation.²⁷ One of the most basic requirements for random assignment is that there exist accurate data on the units of the given sample frame, whether the units are individuals, villages, communities, health clinics or schools. Accurate population data is needed to use to identify the full universe of communities from which to do the random selection. This was no easy feat in Liberia, where the March 2008 census was the first since 1984 and valid population data is a scarce resource

3.2.11 Planning for evaluation and ex-post evaluation

We need to consider any evaluation to be carried out within the project cycle, clarifying the purpose of this any evaluation, who the key users will be and set out the expected date(s) for the evaluation. We should also clearly lay out the key evaluation questions and outline the planned evaluation methodology, explaining how the evaluation approach fits with the

²¹ Moehler, Devra C (2010) 'Democracy, Governance and Randomized Development Assistance' *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 2010 628: 30

²² Andrew Beath et al. (2010) 'Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase II of Afghanistan's National Solidarity Programme (NSP): Estimates of Interim Impacts from First Follow-up Survey' (This is also long, but there is a summary of findings from p.i to viii); Fearon, James, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2009. 'Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion after Civil War: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-conflict Liberia'. *American Economic Review* 99 (2): 287–91; Casey, Katherine Whiteside, Rachel Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. 2009. 'Does community driven development improve collective action in post-war Sierra Leone?' Poverty Action Lab Projects.; Paluck, Elizabeth Levy. 2009. 'Reducing intergroup prejudice and conflict using the media: A field experiment in Rwanda.' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 96 (3): 574-87; Paluck, Elizabeth Levy. 2008. Is it better not to talk? A field experiment on talk radio and ethnic relations in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.' Working paper, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.

existing evidence base to support the intervention and consider whether the baseline data and monitoring plan will provide the relevant data to answer the evaluation questions.

In FCAS, many projects will have outcome and/or impact level targets that cannot be assessed within the lifetime of the project: *'The weaker or more fragile a state, the longer the time lag will be in showing program results, and allowances much be made for this lag in evaluations'*²³. At the design stage it is therefore important to consider not only the end of project evaluation but also to plan for ex-post evaluation (for example, 5 years after project closure), to ensure that we gain a full understanding and record of successes, shortcomings and any inadvertent impacts (see **Box 17** below). This is critical to build the evidence base on what works and what doesn't, and why.

Any plans for this would need to be linked to impact evaluation plans (**section 3.2.10**), but we suggest this longer term monitoring should not be limited to only those programmes that have an impact evaluation.

Box 17. Capturing long-term results in Kenya

DFID Kenya provided funding in 2008 to the Kenya National Commission for Human Rights Commission and the Waki Commission (Inquiry into the Post Election Violence) to investigate and document crimes committed during the Kenyan 2007/8 post election violence. These commissions completed two reports detailing the crimes committed and people who may have been involved. In the time since project completion, these two reports have become critical in the International Criminal Court's work on Kenya. It is possible that they may also have an impact on impunity in Kenya, but even that may take longer.

As these higher level results occurred after project completion, they weren't captured on the PCR. DFID Kenya is looking into quick ways to capture the longer term results of this support, for example by questing a short memo that captures the journey from the first support to the human rights commission report, which heavily fed into the Waki report, both of which are now feeding into the ICC work.

DFID is now encouraging ex-post evaluations, for example, 5 years after project completion, to examine the full impact of interventions and is exploring the possibility of embedding this as standard DFID practice is being considered through the new approach to project scoring which will be introduced later in 2011.

3.2.12 Using results to improve performance

It is essential to have systems in place respond to the results of M&E through changes in ongoing programmes and new programme design. It is important to understand what didn't work, and why not, as well as successes. This is to ensure effective programming and value for money, and is particularly critically in FCAS to manage and provide the evidence for much of our programming, given its high risk and innovative nature.

3.3 Getting the data you need

Data collection often presents serious challenges in FCAS, where national statistical data may be unavailable or unreliable, and security and logistical constraints may limit direct access to certain areas. Safety is of course a paramount concern, and donors owe a duty of care to staff, contractors and beneficiaries.

²³ Natsios, A (2010) [The clash of the country-bureaucracy and development](#), CGD, p71

It is also critical to collect and use data with political sensitivity. Data can be very powerful and we must take care not to exacerbate or create tensions or conflict or put particular groups at risk through insensitive handling of data.

Experience suggests that reliable data can be obtained even in difficult environments. There are a number of useful principles to keep in mind, which are set out below.

3.3.1 Use official data sources where possible

Make use of official data sources as much as possible (and invest in their development whenever appropriate), but supplement them as necessary with other sources. When setting up additional monitoring arrangements, we should ensure that the data is as useful as possible to national stakeholders and other partners. This means using national data categories and formats wherever possible, and sharing data with national institutions at appropriate points in their planning and budgeting cycle. An HIV programme in Zimbabwe offers an interesting example of this kind of ‘shadow alignment’ in monitoring (**Box 18**).

Box 18. Shadow alignment with the Zimbabwe HIV/AIDS Monitoring System

In Zimbabwe, where direct assistance to government is limited, DFID has sought out ways to engage constructively with public institutions in areas where a credible technical dialogue is possible. The Expanded Support Programme for HIV and AIDS (ESP) is a pooled funding mechanism for HIV/AIDS, implemented by UN agencies and NGOs. The first challenge was to establish an effective working relationship with the national authorities. One strategy for building this relationship was to develop a joint M&E process. Donors and government have agreed to an annual independent review, which provides the ESP Working Group and the government with an independent assessment of policy consistency, coordination, budgeting and management across the sector, creating a basis for dialogue. Regular monitoring of ESP is done through the national HIV and AIDS M&E system, with additional support from UNAIDS to improve data quality.

This aligned approach has limitations in terms of the accuracy of monitoring. The first annual review found a range of problems with the national M&E system, including missing baselines and weak compliance with data requirements by national authorities. In the short term, this makes it more difficult for donors to track the overall achievements of the ESP. Nonetheless, the programme has the flexibility to identify and gradually address these weaknesses over its lifespan. The aligned approach is helping to build mutual understanding and cooperation between the national authorities and donors, creating the basis for a more programmatic engagement in the sector.

3.3.2 Work with local partners

Work with local partners (companies and NGOs) especially but not only where it is hard for donors and others to operate in the target area. Where appropriate **invest in their capacity**. Even in a collapsed state like Somalia, there are tertiary institutions offering relevant qualifications in monitoring methods and a range of companies competing for business.

3.3.3. Work with the private sector

It is important to consider working with local and international private sector actors in the area of M&E. Local firms can provide a useful entry point to networks and share country knowledge. Larger international companies often use considerable resources for risk

monitoring and management and might be able to provide data that is not available elsewhere.

3.3.4 Work with the military

[to be completed]

3.3.5 Invest in data and data systems

In FCAS it is likely to be more necessary than elsewhere for us to invest in data. This may include reviewing the robustness of existing data, commissioning new data collection, and supporting national or other bodies in collecting good data, and simultaneously building their capacity.

Country offices should consider making investments in building up the pool of data, both for its own purposes and as a contribution to wider development efforts (see **Box 19**). This may include support for national statistical institutions and their survey programmes. Non-government channels may also be used, but it is important to ensure mechanisms are in place to share the data among stakeholders.

Box 19. Investing in information in Afghanistan

After three decades of conflict, quality data is sorely lacking in Afghanistan, and is urgently required for stabilisation and development efforts. DFID has initiated several investments to improve the pool of quantitative data available for informing strategies and measuring progress, including:

- A joint programme with the World Bank and the EU to support the Central Statistics Organisation (CSO) and improve the quality and availability of official data. This has included updating the Afghanistan National Statistics Plan, and prioritising surveys.
- A new monitoring programme with the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Helmand, designed to generate information on outputs, outcomes and impact of DFID and PRT programmes against the Helmand Plan. This includes establishing baselines and creating a GIS-linked database. The database has a user-friendly web interface for querying data, graphs and maps, and can be used to generate progress reports on the Helmand Plan, thematic issues or any other user-defined requirement.
- DFID has carried out a thorough investigation into the reliability of the most frequently used data on social, economic and governance progress in Afghanistan, using a detailed examination of methodologies, internal validity tests on micro-data and triangulation with other sources. Given the paucity of documentation and the difficulty of access to micro-data, the exercise involved developing relationships of trust with data providers to secure their support. Findings confirm that data is least reliable in insecure areas and where fewer resources are available. There are particular concerns over opinion polls, where differences in local and Western concepts call for very cautious interpretation of results. Nonetheless, the investigation revealed that reliable information is available despite the difficult environment, and that even where the accuracy of data is in question it may still be useful for broad purposes such as tracking trends over time.

3.3.6 Involve beneficiaries in monitoring

If designed sensitively, this can be both good practice from a participation perspective and a practical way of collecting data. Beneficiaries have an interest in seeing projects successfully delivered – one way to do this is through committees to monitor outputs and outcomes. Providing monitoring committees with digital cameras and mobile phones can be a low cost way of obtaining additional data to verify the reports of implementing partners.

Box 20. The Social Fund for Development (SFD) in Yemen

The SFD has well established mechanisms for both operational and impact monitoring. It begins each local intervention by collecting detailed data on the district, which informs the preparation of a district plan through a participatory process. Community representatives and local CSOs assume responsibility for M&E of the plans. The plan is widely publicised through local newsletters and at the District Office, to boost transparency and encourage the community to hold its representatives to account.

3.3.7 Use opinion polls

Opinion polls can be a useful means of gauging public perceptions of progress towards objectives that may be difficult to measure (such as state legitimacy) and where it may take a long time to see tangible change but where we need to be able to monitor if the direction of travel is perceived to be in the right direction.

3.3.8 Use perception surveys, but with care

Monitoring progress towards PBSB objectives will often come down to measuring changes in community knowledge, attitudes or perceptions. For this reason, perception and other types of survey are usually an integral part of the monitoring process. However, conducting good quality surveys in FCAS is notoriously difficult. **Box 21** summarises some of the common pitfalls and how to avoid them.

Box 21. Surveys: common pitfalls and possible solutions

- **Political and security constraints:** Surveys may raise politically sensitive questions, and often cannot be conducted without the consent of local authorities. This should be taken into account in questions selection. In conflict-affected communities, care should be taken to avoid asking questions that may increase tension ('do no harm'). We also have an obligation not to place questioners/enumerators in positions of danger. In insecure environments, a risk assessment should be conducted.
- **Cultural and linguistic problems:** Survey instruments with inappropriate cultural assumptions and/or poor translation can produce meaningless results. Suitably qualified professionals working with local partners familiar with the cultural context should be engaged to develop survey instruments. Where surveys are drafted in English and translated, a useful precaution is to have them re-translated back into English by a second translator, to pick up translation errors. Survey instruments should also be piloted in the area in which they will be used. In traditional Islamic communities, achieving a gender balance among respondents may be very difficult. In Afghanistan, for example, surveying women entails engaging female enumerators who must be accompanied by male relatives, raising the cost of the exercise.
- **Management challenges:** Poorly managed surveys are prone to receiving fraudulent returns, particular in insecure environments where access is limited. Implementing partners should be selected with care, based on demonstrated ability to deliver. There are statistical techniques (internal validity tests) for identifying obvious cases of fraud. Data entry should record the identity of enumerators. Significantly different results between enumerators can indicate a problem. Questioners can also be given GPS units and asked to record the coordinates at each survey site. This is useful both for oversight purposes

- and for analysis, as the location of villages may be difficult to identify on maps.
- **Qualitative vs. quantitative questions:** In conflict-affected environments, public opinion may be volatile and surveys can pick up transient influences. To provide a more accurate picture, there should be a balance of qualitative and quantitative questions. For example, to gauge security levels in the community, it is appropriate to ask for both general perceptions of security and the actual number of incidents of crime or violence experienced by the respondent's household in, for example, the past month or year. Questions on trust in institutions should be balanced with questions on utilisation of services, and so on.

To counteract methodological shortcomings, surveys are often combined with other approaches, such as focus groups, which offer an opportunity to explore results with the target population in a more open-ended way, providing qualitative data that can be very useful in interpreting survey results and other analysis such as conflict assessments (at national or local level). These should usually be commissioned during the baseline research, and then repeated at project completion. As research-based studies produced by experts, using key informant interviews and other techniques, they allow a more nuanced investigation of the levels and drivers of conflict, including exogenous influences on the target population not anticipated in the project design.

3.3.9 Triangulate

Particularly where data is unreliable, it is important to triangulate across multiple sources to produce data that is good enough for practical management purposes. For example, if official statistics on school enrolment are suspect, it may be possible to cross-check them through site visits to a sample of schools and data from household surveys. It may be that official statistics will be found to be accurate in some respects and biased in others, enabling us to make some use of the data.


3.3.10 Innovate

Many other tools and approaches are possible. In DFID's Media for Democracy and Accountability Project in DRC, for example, one of the monitoring tools is a panel of media professionals and analysts in five locations around the country who convene periodically to assess progress and trends over the life of the project (see **Box 16** above). Further examples of innovative approaches, developed to deal with logistical and security constraints respectively, are outlined in **Boxes 22 and 23** below.

Box 22. Using mobile phone technology to monitor the Healthy Village Sanitation programme in DRC

The DFID-funded Healthy Village sanitation programme, implemented by UNICEF, is testing the use of mobile phone technology for monitoring. There is a lack of data at all levels, due largely to constraints associated with major logistical challenges across very large areas. The system aims to collect and validate real-time programme data for monitoring and planning, using text messaging and the internet. The system is easy to use and cost-effective. It uses a pre-formatted SIM card (developed with the mobile phone provider) which allows operators to capture and transmit data in the expected format, reducing the risk of error.

The first tests, carried out with programme partners from Ministry of Health, have confirmed the feasibility of the method. Larger scale tests are now taking place in the provinces of Bas Congo and Kinshasa. If successful, the scheme will be extended to all provinces in late 2010 and early 2011. The following diagram shows how the data is collected and transmitted:



Box 23. Monitoring water and sanitation projects in Iraq

DFID supported a major water programme to construct three water towers and storage reservoirs in Al-Hayaniyah, one of the poorest districts of Basra, to provide water supply to 250,000 people. DFID staff were unable to visit the site of the project for safety reasons. Two engineering consultancy companies were used to monitor the local contractors, using site visits, aerial photography and reports from local engineers to monitor progress. DFID has also worked in close partnership with the Government Water Directorate which provided engineers to oversee construction and site testing.

3.4 Monitoring to ensure we avoid doing inadvertent harm

All interventions into FCAS are potentially harmful. Our interventions may bolster a failing government, strengthen the hand of a minister or faction within a government, bring down a government, increase or decrease conflict between different communities or undermine state-society relations. We should understand these impacts and seek to support positive trends, monitoring programme delivery to ensure we minimise any inadvertent harm. Annex C of the DFID Practice Paper [Building peaceful states and societies](#) also sets out some examples of how to 'do no harm' in specific sector programmes.

This is a key issue for project design, and monitoring during implementation is also essential, because we may not have got the design right and/or other factors may change, particularly in volatile political environments or contexts affected by violent conflict.

Data disaggregation in monitoring can help detect inadvertent harm – for example, the risk of our activities reinforcing existing patterns of inequality and exclusion.

Monitoring to ensure on-going conflict sensitivity is critical. But minimising harm is broader. **Box 24** sets out some examples of key issues to consider monitoring.

Box 24. Monitoring 'Do No Harm': examples of what to monitor

What impact is the programme having on the:

- combination of consultation, coercion and persuasion that characterises state-society relations
- ways in which state-society relations are mediated – including the relative position and power of political parties, clans, traditional networks and others
- balance of power between groups competing for control of the state
- inclusion or exclusion of particular elites or social groups in decision-making structures of

the state

- relative importance of the formal and informal rules that govern how the state and society work
- capacity of the state to respond to society
- capacity of society to put demands on the state
- extent of co-operation or polarisation between state and society
- legitimacy of the state among elites
- legitimacy of the state among diverse social groups
- relative importance of competing sources of legitimacy
- the level and expression of expectations on the state – putting enough or too much pressure on the state to deliver
- creation of capacity in state organisations
- creation of parallel structures outside the state
- promotion of state or non-state structures as sites of decision-making on public sector goods.

[OECD-DAC \(2010\) 'Do No Harm: international support for state-building'](#)

Annex A: Sample indicators for monitoring trends on conflict and fragility at country level

Note that this table contains examples, intended to help generate ideas and should not be considered a prescriptive or comprehensive list. Indicators used should always reflect analysis of the context and capture context specific features (for example, indicators capturing the opium trade in Helmand or the drugs trade in West Africa).

High-level objective	Possible indicators	Possible data sources
Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> # deaths from armed conflict # displaced as % of population # violent clashes reported intentional homicide per 100,000 % demobilised ex-combatants maintaining an independent livelihood after 1 year AND/OR jobs created/training provided for members of groups involved in conflict AND/OR % of jobs/training for women and minorities Growth rates of primary incomes of marginalised groups Restoration of freedom of movement (e.g. traffic along particular routes) % minority groups and women in political or public office Existing development indicators (for example, service provision, literacy, maternal and child health, household income) disaggregated by religion, ethnic group, region, caste, gender etc. as relevant. # land rights disputes successfully resolved % constitutional changes suggested in peace agreement actually implemented Inequality measures % reduction in perceptions that conflict is likely 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Uppsala Conflict Data project (updated annually) UNHCR data Media monitoring Official data, where available, UNODC data. Programme/survey Official data, programme data Official data, programme data Official data, Minorities at Risk (updated 3-yearly) Existing development data, including MDG indicators Official data, programme monitoring Monitoring of legislation Gini coefficient Opinion polls
Support progress towards an inclusive political settlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Level of factional/exclusive language used by elites Inclusion of minority groups in political settlement % of minority group members/population of marginalised areas voting in elections Interaction amongst hostile groups, e.g. % targeted groups who say they would meet socially with members of 'opposing' groups. Level of civil and political rights among minority groups % population confident in honesty of elections/political process Constitution amended to increase inclusiveness of political settlement % increase in perception that political 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Failed States Index – measures elite factionalisation (updated annually) State Fragility Index (updated annually) Official statistics, survey data. Programme/Survey Data, Afrobarometer in some countries. Freedom in the World (updated annually) Survey data, e.g. Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer where available Monitoring of legislation Opinion polls

	settlement is inclusive	
Build or restore core state functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Effective state control of territory, e.g. # major internal security incidents • # instances of security services acting outside of civilian oversight • % population who perceive improving security situation, disaggregated as appropriate • % improvement in population with confidence in the police • Criminal conviction rate (% of prosecutions) • % population who regard the justice system as fair and effective • Effective financial and macro-economic management • GDP per capita • Tax collection as a % of GDP, disaggregated by region. • % of revenue from natural resources included in budget • % of public sector workers receiving regular salaries • % increase in perception that government is effective 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official data, media monitoring • Failed States Index (includes measures of impunity etc.) • Survey data, Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer, Opinion polls • Opinion polls • Official data, UNODC. • Survey data, Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer, Opinion polls • PEFA, CPIA scores • World Bank • Official statistics • Official statistics • Official statistics, survey data • Opinion polls
Support response to public expectations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing indicators for basic service provision, disaggregated by religion, ethnic group, region, caste, gender etc. as relevant. • % of citizens who believe public institutions serve their interests • # jobs created, training places provided, # individuals in new jobs (disaggregated by sex, age and other social group as relevant) • % improvement in perceptions of access to finance; number of loans given (disaggregated) • Growth rates of primary incomes of marginalised groups • Improvement in perception of corruption • Legitimacy of government. E.g. % increase in perception that government is legitimate and serving the population • % increase in budget transparency • Rehabilitation or extension of infrastructure, e.g irrigation, electricity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing development data, including MDG indicators • Survey data e.g. Gallup World Poll, Afrobarometer, Opinion polls • Official statistics, programme data • Survey data, Programme data • Household survey data • Corruption Perceptions Index • Opinion polls. Also delegitimisation score in Bertelsmann Transformation Index (updated biannually), Failed States Index. • Open Budget Index • Local data

Annex B: Examples of fragility and conflict-related project level indicators from DFID programmes

A **DRC Community-Driven Reconstruction Programme (Tuungane)** is designed to stabilise and strengthen conflict-affected communities through inclusive community-based planning and management processes. The project takes a learning approach, with a strong emphasis on monitoring. Columbia University has been engaged to conduct baseline and end-of-project household surveys. Some of the outputs and indicators include:

- newly established community governance systems demonstrate democratic decision making (% of community members who believe that the local committee is representative of the population, who feel free to express themselves in committee meetings, and who participated in elections to local committees);
- improved understanding of and demand for democratic decision making (% of community members who believe that the public should decide on the allocation of public funds, or question the actions of national political leaders);
- increased influence of women in community planning and development (% of community members who believe that women are eligible to become president of village committees; % of women elected onto village committees; % of women who have raised an issue with the village chief in the past 6 months).

A **programme in Burma to promote local democratic change (Pyoe Pin)** is using an issue-based approach to engage community-based organisations and CSO coalitions in decision making on local government. Measuring advocacy work by beneficiary organisations (especially from a very low base) is proving a challenge. The programme has identified quantitative indicators such as:

- number of policy issues that supported CSO coalitions are working on;
- number of beneficiary organisations that have developed strategies to influence policy and debate;
- number of networks and coalitions able to identify way in which they are managing conflict more effectively.

However, the country team notes that qualitative assessments may ultimately be more meaningful, even if difficult to summarise in logframe format.

DFID Nepal's Enabling State Programme is using a range of indicators to measure the emergence of a more responsive and inclusive state, including:

- % increase in pro-poor allocation in the national budget;
- % increase in representation of excluded group in legislative body, civil service (1st class and above in 7 key ministries) and political parties (6 big parties);
- # of Constituent Assembly members who benefited from the program;
- # of women-related policies promulgated, reviewed and tabled through pressure by Inter Party Women's Alliance;
- % of voters registered reflects the actual eligible voters (disaggregated by geographic area);
- # of cases filed challenging the fairness/legitimacy of election;
- structure of federal state agreed;
- fiduciary risk rating in PEFA action plan;
- # of cases filed and investigated by national level anti corruption body;
- % poor and marginalized citizens reporting against corruption;
- # of debate issues raised by media through the program;
- Rank on the worldwide press freedom index;
- # of disputes resolved by programme supported informal mechanisms (disaggregated);
- # of cases referred by formal justice system to programme supported informal mechanisms
- % representation of excluded group in civil service (1st class and above in 7 key ministries);
- membership of excluded groups (against national statistics) in national/district level political parties (6 largest political parties) disaggregated by gender and ethnicity.

Annex C: General tips on indicators, baselines, milestones, targets & sources²⁴

- Indicators should directly relate to the output and outcome being monitored. In turn, baselines, milestones and targets should directly relate to the indicator.
- Indicators should only capture what is to be measured. Indicators shouldn't contain target statements.
- Indicators should be clearly defined and you can make use of footnotes or comments to add a fuller definition. For example, to define what it means for a working group to be 'effective' or what an 'enabling environment' would look like.
- Indicators should be disaggregated by sex where relevant.
- Remember that if an indicator is included then you must be able to monitor it. If you cannot find monitoring data then you should consider monitoring a proxy measure. There should be no missing information – if an indicator is included it must have associated baseline data, milestones and targets.
- Make use of footnotes or comments boxes to highlight the use of proxy indicators/ data issues or other relevant concerns about the indicators.
- It is good practice to include milestones as well as end targets in a results framework. Different fonts or colours can be used to separate out the milestone from the progress data recorded alongside it.
- DFID is generally felt to be optimistic in its target setting for programmes and as a result they do not always achieve the level of results they are expected to. We all need to get better at setting realistic targets so it is important to consider whether the targets are attainable (but not too easy). In many cases, our results are driven by Government milestones and targets but footnotes or comment boxes could be used to note whether DFID feels these are too optimistic and what a more realistic (or minimum acceptable level) might be.
- Target dates should reflect the end of the relevant programme, even if beyond the end of the current country plan. Different programmes may have different numbers of milestones and targets.
- It is good practice to record the sources of indicators (e.g. in footnotes or an Annex) and will be helpful to offices in carrying out future reviews, particularly when there is staff turnover.

²⁴ Compiled by Africa Division Statistics Advisers

Annex D: Further information on randomised controlled trials

(See also section 3.2.10 above)

Methodology: A population is assembled for which the intervention is appropriate and two or more groups are formed through random allocation. Units (individuals or clusters such as schools, villages etc) are randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions so that every unit has the same ex ante probability of receiving the treatment. One or more groups is exposed to an intervention (treatment or experimental groups), while the other group or groups receives alternative treatment or no treatment (comparison or control group). The effects of the intervention are observed by comparing the outcomes of both groups. Other methods, such as before and after observational studies, may over-estimate the benefits of interventions because they cannot control for known and unknown variables²⁵.

Some cautions: Not all development academics and practitioners accept the gold-standard claims of RCTs across all disciplines²⁶. RCTs have to be managed carefully to ensure that different rates of attrition in, or contamination between, the treatment and control groups do not threaten the validity of the trial. An IRC report reviewing its experiences with RCTs identified finding qualified and experienced evaluators to conduct RCTs as a challenge.²⁷ Properly conducted RCTs can give an accurate answer on the impact of a programme in the particular setting in which it has been evaluated (high internal validity), but may not be able to answer questions about scaling up to other settings, unless a systematic set of RCTs have been conducted on a given programme in a number of different locations.²⁸ RCTs use qualitative research and social and economic theory, to answer the 'why' questions about their findings.

Ethical issues and options: A commonly encountered misgiving about RCTs that is particularly relevant to fragile states concerns the ethical and political sensitivity of withholding treatment from control groups. However, if the lottery system is transparent, random allocation of an intervention may not be inherently less ethical than other means of deciding where an intervention takes place. As one report notes, 'whenever funds are limited or programs need to be expanded in phases, only a portion of potential beneficiaries can be reached at any time. Choosing who initially participates by lottery is no less ethical (and perhaps even more so) than many other approaches.'²⁹

One option in addressing ethical and political concerns is to use innovations in RCT design such as the 'stepped wedge design'.³⁰ In this design an intervention is rolled out to the trial individuals or groups sequentially over a number of time periods. The time point at which the participants receive the intervention is randomly allocated and data is collected from treatment and control groups at each point where a new group (step) receives the

²⁵ David J. Torgerson and Carole J. Torgerson (2008) *Designing Randomised Trials in Health, Education and the Social Sciences: An Introduction* Palgrave Macmillan

²⁶ Angus Deaton 'Randomization in the Tropics'

www.princeton.edu/~deaton/.../Instruments_of_Development.pdf; Short ODI paper 'The gold standard is not a silver bullet for evaluation' <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/details.asp?id=2811&title=impact-evaluation>; ILAC Working Paper 13. Randomised Control Trials for the Impact Evaluation of Development Initiatives: A Statistician's Point of View, by Carlos Barahona <http://www.cgiar-ilac.org/content/working-papers>

²⁷ Nelson, Jodie Lee (nd) *Are we ready for RCTs?* (IRC)

²⁸ Frans Leeuw and Jos Vaessen (2009) *Impact Evaluation and Development: NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation*, The Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation, p xv

²⁹ Evaluation Gap Working Group Report (2006), *When Will We Ever Learn: Improving Lives through Impact Evaluation*. Center for Global Development. p. 23.

³⁰ Brown, C & Lilford R (2006) The stepped wedge trial design: a systematic review. *BMC Medical Research Methodology* 2006 6:54

intervention. By the end of the trial, all participants will have received the intervention. This design is considered appropriate where there are ethical and/or political concerns over withholding the intervention from some participants – where there is a prior belief that the intervention will do more good than harm. It may also allow for rigorous evaluation of nation-wide or region-wide public policy interventions that could be implemented in phases. However, this design requires extensive data collection, there is no unified approach to the design and the analysis of data is more complex.

Annex E: Useful resources

- DFID [Results Network](#) Insight pages (and link to **Results Action Plan**)
- DFID [Logframe Guidance](#)
- DFID [Logframes and Standard Indicators](#) Insight pages
- DFID [Evaluation](#) Insight pages
- DFID [Impact Evaluation](#) Insight pages

DFID Practice Paper [Building Peaceful States and Societies](#)

DFID Summary Note [Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations](#)

DFID Briefing Papers on Working Effectively in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations:

-  [Briefing Paper A – Analysing Conflict and Fragility](#)
-  [Briefing Paper B – Do No Harm](#)
-  [Briefing Paper C – Links between Politics, Security and Development](#)
-  [Briefing Paper D – Promoting non-discrimination](#)
-  [Briefing Paper E – Aligning with Local Priorities](#)
-  [Briefing Paper F – Practical Coordination Mechanisms](#)
-  [Briefing Paper G – Act Fast but Stay Engaged](#)
-  [Briefing Paper H – Risk Management](#)
-  [Briefing Paper I – Monitoring and Evaluation](#)

OECD-DAC '[Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations](#)'

DFID [How To Note on Measuring and Using Results in Security and Justice Programmes](#)

DFID **How To Note on M&E of Employment Promotion Interventions in FCAS** [*Growth and Investment Department, forthcoming*]

DFID **How to Note on the Production of Information for Policy Making in Countries Emerging from Conflict**

DFID [How to Note: A Practical Guide to Assessing and Monitoring Human Rights in Country Programmes](#)

DFID **How To Note on Measuring Influencing**

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