



HUMANITARIAN PARTNERSHIPS

EASTERN & SOUTHERN AFRICA (ESA)

UNOCHA WORKSHOP – THE TRANSCRIPT
14-15 JUNE 2012, STELLENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA



Participants and residents of 'Never Never' informal settlement in Cape Town study an aerial photograph of the settlement during a community risk assessment course, conducted by DiMP – an example of local capacity building that underpins the Periperi U initiative in Africa''

BEECHWOOD
INTERNATIONAL

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WORKSHOP OVERVIEW

On 14-15 June, in Stellenbosch, South Africa, OCHA's Policy Development and Studies Branch and its Regional Office for Southern Africa (ROSA), in conjunction with Stellenbosch University, convened a two-day workshop that brought together over 40 individuals from 11 countries,¹ primarily from eastern and southern Africa (ESA). Delegates included academic institutions from the PeriPeri University disaster risk reduction (DRR) partnership², regional organizations (SADC), National and religious NGOs and Red Cross Societies, as well as regional representatives of IFRC, WFP, UNICEF, IOM and USAID.

The participants brought a diverse range of experience and expertise in the fields of disaster risk reduction and humanitarian response. The discussion focused on improving the effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in light of the current and changing nature of humanitarian emergencies and response in the region.

In order to maximise opportunities for individuals to interact with others from different backgrounds and experiences, brief presentations were combined in each of the sessions with facilitated small groups to stimulate and guide dialogue. As the discussion proceeded, people captured questions, comments and ideas anonymously, using a system of wirelessly connected netbooks called the *TEAMWIN Collaborator*. Each bullet point in the main body of this document is a direct input from participants, edited only for spelling. The facilitators helped to categorise the inputs into common themes in real time.

AGENDA

Welcome: Mr Ignacio Leon, OCHA

Session 1: Humanitarian challenges in the region and how we can adapt

- Dr Rui da Maia, Technical University of Mozambique
- Mr Misikir Tilahun, Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA)

Session 2: Decision-making at regional, national and sub-national levels

- Ms Helen Altshul, African Development Solutions (Adeso)

Session 3: Links to communities and non-traditional partners

- Facilitated discussion

Session 4: Preparedness, resilience, and the longer-term

- Mr Xavier Agostinho Chavana, Government of Mozambique

Session 5: Partnerships and way forward

- Mr Ignacio Leon, OCHA
- Facilitated discussion

Facilitation: Mr Rahul Chandran and Mr Daniel Gilman (OCHA); Dr Edwina Thompson (Beechwood)

¹ Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Kenya, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, as well as Algeria and Ghana.

² PeriPeri U is a platform for university partnership to reduce disaster risks in Africa. It stands for 'Partners Enhancing Resilience to People Exposed to Risks' – with a special focus on advancing university action on risk and vulnerability reduction in Africa.
<http://riskreductionafrica.org/en/rra-ddr-per/rra-whatisperiperi>

HIGHLIGHTS

OCHA came to the workshop in “listening” mode to identify the key themes and priorities of different groups in the region. The word cloud below identifies how frequently some concepts were raised by delegates through the transcript. A number of key priorities also emerged from both the verbal and transcribed discussions.



Word cloud from transcript of the workshop identifying key concepts

Investing in community knowledge and capacities

Given the key role of local communities as primary responders, the flow of information to and from the community level was seen as a crucial element of early warning, needs assessment and accountability. Participants identified a need for humanitarian actors to find ways to work better at the community level and help improve local capacity for disaster response and prevention.

Understanding local contexts was also seen as a pre-requisite for international actors, who were encouraged to ensure that they had sufficient local knowledge before attempting any intervention - ‘if you don’t know, don’t go’. Indeed, many participants suggested that there were widespread opportunities for international actors to learn from local models and modalities of assistance.

Participants stressed that there were numerous lessons that regions, countries and communities in Africa could learn from each other and that there was a need for international engagement and support for regional knowledge-sharing platforms to allow this. The [Peri-Peri University initiative](#) was cited as one such example of South-South cooperation.

Strengthening engagement with governments

Although the community level was seen as key, it was also emphasised that recognising the critical role of government at all levels remained an essential aspect of effective response. It was repeatedly emphasised that international actors had to avoid bypassing governments when engaging with affected populations. In light of a government’s ability to develop both policies to avert future risks and vulnerability and the legal framework to support humanitarian action, participants underlined that humanitarians must find better ways to engage authorities before a crisis occurs.

Strengthening engagement with the private sector

Humanitarian actors were called upon to nuance their understanding of the role of the private sector, going beyond a view of businesses as simple sources of finance. Instead, private actors should be embraced as a rich source of ideas, answers and many kinds of resources, as well as critical stakeholders that can benefit from faster recovery and improved mitigation measures. The challenge for humanitarians was to engage the private sector more proactively, identifying opportunities for collaboration before a crisis, so that the role of businesses included planning and preparedness and not just response.

Participants identified opportunities to leverage the private sector for investment in capacity development for humanitarian action at the local level, but that also required that humanitarian and development actors help the development of a vibrant private sector at the local level. Indeed, just as community action was paramount in humanitarian response, so the role of local businesses was as important as the burgeoning impact of international corporations in humanitarian activities.

More support for resilience and DRR

Participants expressed concern that humanitarian programming could encourage dependency and lead to a 'humanitarian trap'. They emphasized the importance of building the capacities of local communities to help themselves. This related to the question of how to build resilience and reduce vulnerabilities, with participants emphasizing that there was work to do in mapping existing patterns and capacities at the community level. This would allow lessons to be shared with other communities at similar levels of development and infrastructure.

Participants also stressed that there was a need to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the causes of suffering, including through more detailed post-disaster forensic analysis. Only through better understanding what happened and why in a specific instance, will it be possible to address problems efficiently.

SESSION SUMMARIES

1. Humanitarian challenges in the region and how we can adapt

Dr Rui da Maia (Technical University of Mozambique) and Mr Misikir Tilahun (Africa Humanitarian Action) presented an overview of key regional challenges, which was followed by a discussion among participants about priorities and challenges for humanitarian action in the region. Dr da Maia presented a multidimensional map of the continent which served as a tool to identify trends in humanitarian need, as well as humanitarian 'hotspots' that should be priorities for intervention. The tool highlights structural issues which drive vulnerability and participants expressed a wish that it be shared further, for example with the African Union (AU).

Regional early warning systems were cited as particularly valuable, given that emergencies in one region often affected other areas. The presenters pointed to SADC's Southern Africa Region Climate Outlook Forum (SARCOF) system, a seasonal climate prediction tool for agriculture in southern Africa, as one such initiative already in-progress. In response to the map of humanitarian 'hotspots' presented by Dr. da Maia, it was noted that countries - especially those with institutional deficits - could find themselves in a 'humanitarian trap', where humanitarian action created a dependency on interventions while leaving societies unable to support themselves without aid.

Mr Tilahun presented on key regional challenges, which in the East African context he identified as (i) lack of independent resources; (ii) a shrinking humanitarian space and (iii) operational challenges (including a lack of skilled workers and high costs of materials). He also introduced AHA's own programming in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia.

Respondents called for programming which included resilience and DRR as part of a humanitarian-development continuum, given that droughts in the Horn of Africa were regular, predictable events. Participants also stressed the importance of knowledge, both in terms of local understanding (e.g. the effect of humanitarian response on local economies) and effective dissemination of information.

With strengthened partnerships in mind, there was emphasis on the distinctive roles of key groups, including donors, the media, governments, NGOs, the UN and the private sector and how these actors could better collaborate. The need for more effective South-South partnerships was emphasized, along with a forum to share valuable lessons.

The session concluded with participants sharing an overview of the specific local challenges faced in participants' own countries. Common themes included the importance of good governance and for platforms for civil society to mobilize, undertake initiatives and advocate.

2. Decision-making at regional, national and sub-national levels

Ms Altshul addressed the humanitarian system's failure quickly to respond to early warning signs in the 2011 Somalia famine. She explained the various flaws in the system which served as obstacles to the use of cash transfers at-scale. Aversion to use of cash was found not to have been driven by a lack of evidence, but rather by a deficit of leadership and discomfort with risk. Ms Altshul argued that partnerships between INGOs had been instrumental to a more successful response and that a consortium approach encouraged learning and quality. At the systemic level, a greater openness towards innovation is required to combat a 'conformity' which stymies effective new developments such as the use of cash transfers at-scale.

Delegates reflected on 'good' decisions that have been made in specific responses. Examples cited included social protection mechanisms ('safety nets'); effective early warning systems and DRR programming as an aspect of all activities – including vulnerability capacity assessments. The pro-active involvement of governments in terms of policy formulation, leadership and coordination was a recurring theme, but was considered only part of the solution; equally important was the notion that 'good decisions flow from assessments that involve communities to eliminate top-down solutions'.

In contrast, reflecting on 'bad' decisions, participants identified responses suffering from deficits of good governance, particularly where vested interests were involved. A 'downward cascade' of decision-making from the international to the local level was held responsible for decisions that were insufficiently informed by local context. Therefore, more consistent information flows to and from communities were required to improve the quality of humanitarian decision-making. A general lack of accountability was seen as an obstacle to timely incorporation of 'lessons learned' through past failures.

Improvements suggested to the current system of decision-making included enhanced partnerships, not least with the business community; support for research into vulnerability and DRR issues and creating knowledge sharing platforms, particularly between local communities. With regard to humanitarian decision-making, 'culture', one participant argued, 'is man-made. It can be changed through education'.

3. Links to communities and non-traditional partners

Participants explored how the humanitarian system could link better to communities, both in order to improve understanding of their needs and to ensure that humanitarian actors are truly accountable. They also considered how to create stronger linkages with non-traditional partners who 'understand' different contexts. One finding was that existing community methods of resilience should be further investigated to see what practices could be effectively replicated. Preparedness in was key - structures needed to be identified before an emergency so that agencies on the ground had appropriate baseline knowledge. Furthermore, by committing to long-term engagement, agencies could strengthen their accountability while simultaneously accruing essential contextual knowledge.

Participants stressed that collaborating with existing organisational structures was an important way of gathering information, but informal structures should also be used in a complementary fashion. Accordingly, participants called for an expansive understanding of 'communities' and stressed that to avoid exclusion (for example of minorities, women and children), humanitarian actors should ensure the representativeness of their interlocutors. Concrete measures to enhance responsiveness to communities were also proposed, such as the use of suggestion boxes in public places.

In the context of accountability, participants voiced a need for transparency. At present, there was a lack of clarity over who the humanitarian community was accountable to. For participants, it was not clear where the buck stopped within the UN system, nor was there enough 'lateral accountability', i.e. information sharing between NGOs, international agencies and governments. As indicated above, thorough knowledge was deemed a *sine qua non* of any intervention: 'if you don't know, don't go'.

4. Preparedness, resilience and the longer-term

At the start of the session, Mr Xavier Agostinho Chavana (Government of Mozambique) shared with participants the experience of Mozambique in the wake of the 2000 floods. A cyclone warning system (CWS) and Inter-district Operational Flood Warning System (SIDPABB) were set up in Buzi. The latter consists of three essential components: (i) measurement; (ii) central data analysis; (iii) community action. A centerpiece of the system was Local Committees that were made up of 15-18 volunteers, led by the community leader. The system had bolstered disaster preparedness and was being expanded to other areas at risk of flooding.

Mr Chavana then presented on the institutional environment in Mozambique, detailing the impact of disasters in the country, before charting the evolution of flood management systems. This includes the gradual establishment of regional water authorities across the country and the creation of a disaster management authority with a corresponding legal framework. The role of local communities is a crucial component in the system and CSOs are closely involved in consultations on contingency planning. In closing, Mr Chavana argued that humanitarian programming should receive less priority in order to reduce dependence and that instead, development interventions should be emphasized in order to reduce vulnerability.

In the ensuing discussion, there was emphasis on the importance of communication between disaster management authorities across borders, as well as the optimal balance between an effective government-managed system and an appropriate degree of consultation.

'Building back better' to avoid repeating cycles of similar responses was also a topic of discussion, with an emphasis on mainstreaming DRR into (development) programming, improving early warning systems, conducting more effective needs assessments (incorporating both rapid assessment for immediate response and a more comprehensive sector-based assessment) and investing in human capacity.

5. Partnerships and the way forward

In the concluding session, Mr Ignacio Leon (OCHA) reiterated the principles of humanitarian partnership expounded by the Global Humanitarian Platform (2008): equality, transparency, complementarity and results-orientation. He proposed a 'new humanitarian partnership' comprised of three pillars: 1) mutual acknowledgement of capacities, expertise and gaps; 2) knowledge transfer; 3) common objectives and results.

The elements of effective partnerships were debated among delegates who stressed that even if equality was not attainable in its literal sense, improved results would be seen if partners were to respect each other, share their skills and expertise, and work towards common objectives. Participants detailed a shared vision (below) to move from a humanitarian system too often plagued by asymmetrical power relationships, political agendas, short-termism and fragmentation to one characterized by shared goals, effective engagement of affected communities, and enhanced local, national and regional capacities.

Humanitarian Partnership Mission Statement

A Partnership based on our shared goals of:

- *Involving beneficiaries, and holding ourselves accountable to them;*
- *Building a fully inclusive humanitarian system;*
- *Leveraging local knowledge and capacities;*
- *Learning and innovating in how to be better prepared and better responders;*

...and commitment to:

- *Taking forward the discussion on accountability within our individual organizations;*
- *Investing in local and regional knowledge and skills.*

NEXT STEPS

Partners made a range of individual commitments to enhance partnerships towards strengthening humanitarian response in their countries and to work more closely with OCHA in the future. These included³ to:

- Advocate for increasing our interaction with Universities and looking into possible partnerships aiming at developing mitigation related studies of mutual interest (IOM)
- Continue carrying out investigation on topics of interest to communities' development and disseminate the results in a 'digestible' way to the consumer/s (communities, NGOs, Government...) (Mozambique)
- Continue to advocate for new policies on DRM towards Government with the community of NGO working on DRR thematic (Madagascar)
- Continue to assist in the strengthening of African Academic Networks, and bring developmental issues such as disaster risk reduction and humanitarian assistance to the fore front of our agendas (South Africa)
- Continue to strengthen our capacity to train and generate knowledge in the area of disaster risk reduction (based of priorities) and sustainable development (Ethiopia)
- Disseminate the primary issues and the main 'Heres', 'Theres' and some of the suggested 'Solutions' to the UNICEF network in all 21 country programs in Eastern and Southern Africa in the context of how UNICEF can be a better partner in supporting Humanitarian Action including DRR. Advocate for a more relevant approach to regional inter-agency humanitarian cooperation led by OCHA (UNICEF)
- Engage with my Government in an interface meeting to follow up on humanitarian needs mainly by advocating for approval of the DRM policy and finalisation of the Climate Change policy (Malawi)
- Increase professionalism of national NGOs to allow them to adhere to international standards of humanitarian relief work and improve their technical skills in DRR issues, especially in the areas of risk surveying as well as in the use of techniques of Conservation Farming for food production in semiarid zones (Mozambique)
- Report to top management for more advocacies for the strengthening of the coordination and the partnership involving key stakeholders through the legal framework, taking in account the countries' experiences, expertise of the DRR team and lessons learnt from this kind of fora (SADC)
- Work closely with humanitarian organisations such as ActionAid and Red Cross in the research process for ensuring that the researches are responsive to the actual needs of the communities pertinent to enhancing their resilience to disasters (Tanzania)

Delegates specifically requested OCHA to support further work on:

- Influencing national and regional governmental policies on DRR and humanitarian space;
- Investing in knowledge creation and dissemination around DRR rather than solely focusing on response;
- Supporting linkages between relevant international organizations and universities, private sector and other 'non-traditional' partners.

Delegates proposed to hold a follow-up workshop next year to continue developing partnerships and ideas in the region, and follow up on the individual commitments made at the conference.

³ A full list of individual commitments is on page 42.

WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES

OCHA'S PERSPECTIVE

To address **challenges** to humanitarian response in the region, and to identify possible areas for **enhanced partnership**. OCHA is in **'listening' mode**; engaging with humility, learning about partner experiences, and playing its part in building a truly inclusive system.

The OCHA Humanitarian Policy Conference held in Dec 2011 identified a need to enhance cooperation with NGOs, think tanks and other groups involved in humanitarian work. As a follow up, OCHA is convening a series of humanitarian policy workshops to listen to and learn from national and regional actors as to their priorities and challenges. These discussions will inform and drive a humanitarian policy agenda.

A two-day workshop will bring together 40 individuals from national academic institutions, civil society groups, governments, and regional organizations who have relevant humanitarian and development field experience to discuss how to the effectiveness of humanitarian partnerships in light of the current and changing nature of humanitarian emergencies and response in ESA.

It is hoped that the workshop will help to support the emergence of a broader, cooperative network among participating organizations and inform OCHA's 2012 humanitarian policy conference to be held in Dec 12.

PARTICIPANT AIMS

Individuals listed what they would celebrate achieving by the end of this workshop.

Action

- Africa is closer to sorting out its own humanitarian challenges
- Something concrete and practical - we 'did' something here, rather than just 'talked' and 'socialized'
- Mapped a pathway that will improve the situation, rather than simply follow aid trends
- More ways to increase resilience of people
- More ways to deliver efficiently to the people at the receiving end

Share and learn

- Address questions like: what constitutes a humanitarian emergency? At what point does foreign aid come in? Is there a threshold and how is that defined?
- Creating a platform for lessons learnt in humanitarian trends and policy making (if there is such an existing network, build on what they have created)
- Learn the operations of humanitarian work and see how to link it up with the outputs of research produced in academia and community work, capacity building
- Move from humanitarian and increasing resilience - and learn from the past
- Share the experience on flood management and see how that matches the expectations of the audience
- Share the very good experience from disaster management in Mozambique; involvement of the community and role of partners (Government, civil society, academia, private sector, NGOs and UN agencies)
- To share the best practices at local level in the topic of disaster risk reduction and disaster risk management in general, and learn about advocacy strategies at the regional level

Community first, politics second

- Bring needs of the community to our consideration of different types of intervention
- Establish ways to depoliticize humanitarian interventions
- Overcome the challenge that starts with the UN itself - multiple agencies not listening to each other

Network and partner

- Consensus on the benefits of unity in diversity, bringing together multiple types of actors
- Deepened understanding of partnership with scientists and how to address risk
- Involvement of all relevant players in identifying solutions
- So much is being done by different actors but in an isolated way. Should agree how to coordinate and capture the work of all these actors within one mechanism
- To better know the network of institutional expertise for future collaboration
- To create a strong foundation for 'new' partnerships with the full range of actors involved in humanitarian response and DRR - including regional, local, academic and other partners
- To meet other colleagues within the humanitarian framework and jointly identify better ways of addressing humanitarian actions through improved partnership and coordination
- To meet partners and define how to strengthen working relations
- To understand opportunities in the region and ensure better harnessing of existing skills
- To understand role of partners in addressing global challenges
- To understand what 'humanitarian partnership' *really* means and how it actually plays out in the field amongst the various stakeholders of humanitarian action and the people whom they serve

Paradigm shift and advocacy


- Better communication with donors about the dangers of *waiting* to respond to emergencies
- Business as usual does not work for humanitarian action. Need to integrate with development issues such as climate change
- Closer to persuading donors that we need to understand that responding before emergencies is important
- Dismantled stereotypes of UN and NGOs as "enemies"
- Humanitarian environment is always changing. Need to start "thinking of the unthinkable"
- People have a chance/opportunity to adapt. Move away from *humanitarian*
- The relationship between development, response and DRR
- We would like to see a clear link between Disaster Risk Reduction and humanitarian assistance

Other

- Do not overwork the term 'climate change'
- Even in scientific world not magic solution
- To learn more about OCHA, its interventions, failures and successes, best practices and share this with students while expanding networks on human development issues

HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES: REGION

Two presenters provided an overview of key regional challenges, then participants discussed and categorised their perceived priorities and challenges to humanitarian action in the region.



Dr Rui da Maia, Hotspots of humanitarian needs in Africa

- Academia: if we assess structural issues, we can ID hotspots.
Response: Yes, I think that we *must* display ID Hotspots in a separate thematic map.
- Any clear evidence that is climate change or climate variability?
Response: Ref climate change, the evidence is contradicted. For e.g., in Zanzibar and coastal areas of Tanzania, there is a noticeable shrinking of the level of the sea although general theory reeferes to rising sea levels. Meanwhile, research work by Dr Simon (UK) indicates that rising sea level in the City of Lagos, Nigeria could 'soon' affect probably the livelihood of some 10-17m people living along the river. Ref climate variability, this relates mostly to rain profile in arid or semi-arid zones. For e.g., in southern Africa, agricultural rains are expected during the period 8-16 November, each year. Last crop season (2011) had agricultural rains only in December, which is very late for maize farming at the household level. You will get an immediate crop failure of 50% if you plant maize after December.
- Are your products, i.e. maps, available on-line?

Response: Not yet. There is a plan to have them on a cloud app after September 2012. Collaboration is needed in terms of literature review in different humanitarian sources to validate maps before proceeding.

- Has there been any attempt to come up with a regional early warning system, since emergencies from one area/country often affects other areas/countries?

Response: Yes. There are working initiatives: the SARCOF system is a seasonal climate prediction tool for agriculture in southern Africa (<http://www.sadc.int/english/current-affairs/news/sarcof-15-announcement>). USAID is also sponsoring a network and technology for early warning for countries sharing the Zambezi River.

- Has this tool been shared with the AU? Response: No
- Hoping that this model can also capture the East African Migration corridor through Nairobi/Darsalaam to the West e.g. USA, and to the East e.g. Durban etc.

Response: Yes thank you please send us bibliographic information to support.

- I think this is a very good and useful tool that should be further developed. The graphic presentation of issues of different nature will be useful to the policy makers, humanitarian actors and technocrats alike in Africa and the International community. Well done.
- If you look to the Map of Africa, you will see that most conflicts depend on bad distribution of national resources
- It would be good to break it down into regions within the African continent, in order to focus on the issues per region
- Population movements also occurring outwards, i.e. vis Somalia to Yemen, Saudi Arabia, etc
- Presentation of this kind of information on a more thematic basis would probably offer more practical value for advocacy purposes
- Should the crisis hotspots be handled by countries or internationally?

Response: Regional crisis hotspots should be handled internationally. Country-specific hotspots should be handled regionally first.

- People in the regions with humanitarian needs in the map should learn from their behavior and avoid the same situation in the future.

Response: These countries find themselves in a sort of 'humanitarian trap'. Since most humanitarian hotspots are landlocked and lack formal institutions, their situation will worsen with time unless humanitarian actors deal with it and help lift them out of the trap.

General questions or comments

- How can humanitarian interventions assist in cases where emergencies are related to governance issues more than natural environment/disasters?
- How do we bring a common understanding of the needs of all the countries?
- Humanitarian issues need to be seen in the longer term and not just the response to a crisis
- In order to solve a problem you have to understand it. Higher Education institutions have the resources to investigate and research into the causes e.g. social, political, natural. Then need to disseminate their conclusions
- I have heard nothing about global geopolitics and humanitarian crisis?
- Those in need learn how to manipulate the system because the UN intervenes in a specific way
- UN should be away from politics as we see that humanitarian has taken a place of intervention
- We should stop thinking that salvation will come from the West. African governments and people need to find the solutions from within
- What is new? Drought, corruption etc are commonplace. How can we address the issues?
- Does humanitarian action constitute a profession?
- We have to rethink the strategies used by humanitarians. All humans are the same - nobody is more human than the next man or woman
- There is the feeling that we do not have the resources to respond, but the mentality needs to change so that we can pool whatever is available without depending on the international community's support

Misikir Tilahun, Key challenges in Eastern Africa

Lack of independent resources, which limits:

- > Institutional growth and capacity;
- > Ability to scale up existing interventions during emergencies;
- > Ability to dispatch rapid response teams to new areas;
- > Ability to bring contributions to projects when entering into new partnership agreements – creates a tone of dependency rather than equality (contractor vs. partner);
- > Efficiency in programme implementation

A shrinking “humanitarian space”

- > Physical access that aid agencies have to affected populations;
- > The extent to which agencies are able to adhere to the core principles of humanitarian action;
- > Security conditions – i.e., the nature of the ‘operating environment’ that agencies work in;
- > The ability of affected populations to reach needed lifesaving assistance and protection.

Operational challenges

- > High prices of materials;
- > Unavailability of local markets (lack of variety/quality in supplies);
- > Lack of adequate drug and laboratory supplies;
- > Unavailability of skilled workers;
- > Rough access roads;
- > Weather – protracted dry or rainy seasons

Context/Lessons

- Would you say that Somalia is in a 'league of its own' in the region, in terms of the difficulties to access populations, insecurity, social complexities, political interests (e.g. piracy) conflicting with humanitarian imperative?
- The situation in Somalia; is it really more complex than other conflict-affected areas or is it because there is more information on the challenges prevailing there than there is in other parts like Darfur, Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic? Just thinking aloud
- What are big lessons you have gleaned from humanitarian action in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia?
- Corruption is the primary cause of humanitarian issues. There is not system of justice for appeals, e.g. Swiss banks holding corrupt funds, private companies triggering wars in the DRC
- Drawing from the presentations, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa, all problems are recurring which suggests limited interest or lack of will to learn from mistakes to avoid history repeating itself
- Ensure that we learn from how we have been operating over the past decades, or whether we have been dictated by political imperatives/influence. What is the experience of the UN/OCHA?
- For many countries that lived through crisis and OCHA or NGOs did not intervene have learned better
- I believe we should be humanitarian enough to give the time and chance to the humans to learn from errors and do better in the future
- In Horn of Africa, droughts are not an emergency - they are regular, predictable events. Programming needs to include disaster risk reduction, resilience etc as part of development continuum, not separate humanitarian response from other types of programs
- Knowledge is the key to successful humanitarian action. HEIs must carry out investigation and disseminate knowledge on humanitarian aspects to be addressed by stakeholders (governments, NGOs, CBO, local NGOs, civil society, etc)
- Main cause of humanitarian issues is the unequal distribution of resources
- Must look at the causes and context, not just broad-brush trends that are similar across the Continent
- Must understand the local economy - humanitarians often unknowingly distort the economy by supplying free seeds, or other products available locally
- Role of researchers is to do more analytical work, consider structural root causes so that these can be addressed. This is the role of academics. this analysis should be shared
- We all learn from our errors and thus human must be given the chance to learn to adapt by themselves

Funding/Donors

- Are donors the tax-payers? Or the ambassadors/agencies? How do we engage with the tax-payers or the societies directly rather than government interests?
- Challenge of distinction of affected populations e.g. refugees or IDPs and their vulnerabilities compared to host populations, and how humanitarian organizations can assist
- Donors should be able to fund long term interventions not just short term emergency relief. Funds are not available for development but as soon as there is a disaster the funds are magically available.
- Funding partners - there is need to recognize who they are accountable to, communities affected need to be factored in
- How can we find better access to resources from within Africa to reduce reliance on International actors? What are the possibilities for a gradual scaling up?
- It is not really about the resources but it is more about the willingness of government and people to do something
- Lack of trust between donors and government may be the reason why they do not fund development work
- One of the biggest challenges is the lack of resources, often the private sector has better access to these resources in order to strengthen humanitarian efforts
- Other than UN and other large organizations what are your other sources of funding? What is the size of your workforce?
- Pressure of funding channels and lack of independent resources - does this mean you can't really meet the needs your organization identifies? Have you had success in persuading donors to refocus?
- Should there be mandatory percentages of donor grants – even emergency grants – that should be directed to capacity building and evaluation? Would communities and/or policy-makers accept that less money for emergency response today means more effective response next year?
- The donors should change their understanding of humanitarian help by helping people before disasters.
- We need to communicate between various stakeholders better, including affected communities regarding how to address the problems including financial situations
- Who are we really accountable to? Those affected, or those providing resources?

Media

- "CNN factor" - donors only respond when issues are high-profile and public in the news
- Crises are created through the media
- Efforts should be made for media to follow a crisis from the start to its aftermath
- Humanitarian action has become so media driven: nobody intervened when there were warnings of drought in Somalia, only when CNN arrived. This shows that humanitarian is a profession. Media is about conflict, bad events, there is a negative bias in the media
- Media can also create a sense of "better than those affected"

Access

- UN system also faces shrinking humanitarian space as it advances 'One UN' and emphasis to 'National Execution' in situations where Government does not fulfill its commitments viz GA 46/182 – placing the welfare of populations affected by emergencies as clear government responsibility framed within Humanitarian Principles

Advocacy

- Does international advocacy help create humanitarian space in your countries?
- How well linked do you feel to international advocacy actors?
- How can non-state actors play a stronger role in convincing governments to *really* prioritise the needs of the population and to learn from one another (more South-South cooperation)?

NGO role

- Educating people is not the role of humanitarian agencies
- We should also consider how to integrate local knowledge into humanitarian practices
- NGO participation is undermining community scale response and responsibility. External interventions create dependency
- NGOs participate in responding to problems but they are not involved in determining how to solve them or prevent them

Govt role

- Centrality of Gov't. Differences in Gov't approaches to humanitarian assistance - need to understand different governments' attitudes to development
- Domains of key challenges - independent resources, shrinking space and operational challenges= hence the question is who should be responsible for handling humanitarian challenges? strengthen government roles and how do the current actors cope
- Government should take primary responsibility and liaise with other governments on issues related to humanitarian assistance within the African continent and create a platform for sharing information
- Governments also need to be more receptive and the right people with the right attitudes and personalities need to be strategically placed in order to create and enabling environments
- Governments are not open enough, they need to create and enabling environment in order to learn and understand
- How does we create platform where we are able to engage with governments at a national level in order to derive solutions?
- I would like to know where is the government's responsibility in all these humanitarian situations
- If we fill gaps for the state, that may lead to a dependence, which could to also maintain a potentially unsustainable status quo
- There is a great variation of receptivity amongst various countries in Africa; this can often present a huge problem when implementing humanitarian efforts or Disaster Risk Reduction projects - the success of such efforts often depends on the receptivity of a government
- We need strategies that communicate to Government in a non-threatening way - e.g. empowerment, engagement, consultation. We can't just go straight to the local level without consideration of how the Government will view this
- Too much rhetoric when talking of engagement at local level or community level. How to ensure linkages with other levels of government?
- What is the responsibility of governments in all these situations?
- Who is your Government partner in Ethiopia?

Private sector

- If we engage the private sector there should be something in it for them
- There must first be a well-developed private sector. Not the case in all countries
- Often think humanitarian is just "donations" could also be timely service delivery - but without creating dependence, e.g. private companies assisted in xeno crisis in SA in 2008; private sector assisted in transporting people from SA to Mozambique
- Big business is behind crises in some areas - e.g. DRC. So sometimes connected to the problem, rather than the solution
- Business is a business - their core business is to make money
- Business is willing to be humanitarians but are not waiting to be humanitarians
- Businesses are interested in long term strategies in handling humanitarian issues; what makes for a smart, effective and sustainable business is key
- Businesses are not there just waiting for a humanitarian crisis to respond to; they have their core business and that is to run the business; they just don't have money ready; they allocate it
- Businesses have millions of dollars which are undeclared as to which organizations they have been donated to; they are taking advantage of a blind government and therefore declarations of profits
- Even the local shopkeeper is a business; while she can help people, she cannot be a charitable organization, she has to run her business for profit just like the big companies

- Governments do not regulate the involvement of private sector as the will to help is there
- Mobile phone company managed funds, accepted in kind, gave to churches. All were involved. CBOs, local traditional authorities
- Not possible to make private sectors involvement a government policy issue; there is no budgetary line item available in businesses. The decision of fund allocation when needed for humanitarian assistance rests with the CEO and top management
- Private companies may be a problem fueling the crisis. For example, the case of DRC and mining companies
- Private sector gets involved in the response but not in the planning; they are limited by their profit motive
- What is needed is the key engagement strategy between the private sector and governments

Partnership

- How can convert the 'contractor' relationship to a 'partnership'?
- Most national NGOs face the same key challenges in their daily work. It is time to build partnership strategically to influence the political level about this kind of non-hazard crisis caused essentially by lack of governance. Did AHA promote this kind of partnership at the national level and have you the capacity to work on advocacy?
- National level scale partnerships more useful than international intervention
- Issues should be tackled in a global way not on a country by country basis
- South-South relationships needs to be strengthened

Coordination

- There is no coordination in humanitarian aid; it is just thrown there

Sustainability

- Is humanitarian intervention helping these populations cope in the future with the same situations?
- There has been a creation of dependency on humanitarian efforts, there should be more long term solutions put in place within African countries to reduce such dependency and allow them to rely on their own contingency plans
- In some parts locals' culture is living from humanitarian assistance. People taking advantage> pvt sector can make money and support
- Sometimes humanitarian crises is "maintained" by NGOs and UN

HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES: COUNTRY

Participants reflected on key humanitarian issues confronting the country contexts they represent.

Ethiopia

- Civil society is controlled by the Government - what do we do about that?
- Use of mobile phones - government was uncomfortable because opposition was using SMS to communicate
- Trans-boundary nature of disasters requires united efforts. How to coordinate between two countries?
- In Ethiopia, the government has in some cases rightly acknowledged that NGOs need to be accountable to communities, not preoccupied with short term response, but looking more widely and holistically at vulnerability and appropriate disaster risk management
- The Ethiopia example is based on a strong administrative structure from the central to regional, to *woreda* (district) to *kebele* (sub-district), etc

Ghana

- In Ghana, extended family networks support those in need. Learn to build on strengths of cultural norms. Even those in poverty are willing to share. It is about family system, not NGOs
- There is a lot of activity amongst civil society but how do we engage them in order for them to play more of a role in humanitarian efforts? The government agencies are more engaged in these efforts

Kenya

- Some regions are chronically dependent on food aid e.g. Turkana which has been receiving aid every season for over 50 years
- The 'Kenya for Kenyans' initiative highlighted the inefficiency of government in addressing predictable disasters. Why should individuals pay when they are already supposedly paying through taxes yet those are being squandered and not used for the purpose they are intended?
- Cyclical floods - all the same actors come and respond. So the Government decided to build dykes and claimed the problem was solved. In December 2011, the dykes broke, and the same problems occurred - internal displacement, etc. The local people were asked what went wrong: they responded that solutions are usually developed with outside engineers etc without the traditional knowledge and input of the local people
- Humanitarian response should take advantage of the Social Cooperate action that is available in Private sector
- Private sector positive story in Kenya: in severe drought, mobile company mobilized to respond to the drought. SMME and individuals targeted
- Responses by faith-based organisations in Kenya during the 2008-09 drought
- Tapping into the expansive middle income population in Kenya has been used to mobilise resources for the humanitarian action

Madagascar

- Madagascar is highly vulnerable to disasters with high poverty prevailing, poor ranking on HDI, cyclical political crises. NGOs very active. But lack of resources is a serious constraint. Communities are not really active participants due to prevailing 'top down' thinking/approach. Funding tends to be tied, proscribed and thus less adaptive to local conditions. It is also driven by donor interest that is more short-term based. So there seems to be a systems problem in how these recurrent challenges are being addressed. A lack of leadership is an overriding constraint. Coordination seems compartmentalized – government on the one hand, UN and clusters another, and then the various NGOs. NGOs are preoccupied with securing resources; lack of longer term funding leads to a project-based emphasis. This also works against the challenge of genuine community level participation
- So effective leadership is needed to address this; focusing to longer-term approaches
- This requires a knowledge base informed by the reality of recurrent hazards enabling more of an evidence-based approach
- But it must have good governance to work

- Good governance in this respect enables leadership, acting on behalf of the most vulnerable, advancing standards for efficiency and accountability
- Key challenge at the local level is to understand people's own problems; they need more direct support rather than it being channelled through NGOs. They want to continue to run their business - they have other priorities that the humanitarians may not be very aware of

Malawi

- In Malawi there is often a lack of access to roads
- We often have to rely on the military during relief efforts
- More collaboration needs to be created and maintained in order to make these relief efforts easier
- Civil society NGOs have a shared platform - feeds back into government policy
- Over the past five years, Government has committed to collect general aid management information and has developed an information system that tracks the aid flow into the country – the Aid Management Platform (AMP). The system tracks aid providers as well as government's progress in meeting aid effectiveness targets, is fully accessible to the civil society, providers of aid and government agencies, and there are plans to roll it out to parliamentarians. The system tracks information on aid disbursement by sectors and thematic function, for both off and on budget flows, and is updated quarterly. How does this capture best practices in humanitarian assistance, beyond just macro-economic planning? Could we learn from the M&E model?

Mozambique

- Main challenge in Mozambique is movement of people since the country is used as a corridor by migrants going to South Africa. More public health problems, malaria, cholera and diseases such as polio that had been eradicated are now re-emerging. Challenge of lack of immunization and sanitation challenges. Some of the migrants come from countries where there is no immunisation. Human resources and funding limited for preparedness and response. A number of NGOs that worked at community level left during the war. Role of private sector in humanitarian work and general disaster preparedness not well developed. More investment in mineral resources, but little benefit to local communities and no collaboration in humanitarian activities. Problem of coordination to strengthen partnership. Lot of rhetoric on partnership issues but limited implementation. Academic institutions now train teachers in secondary schools and other practitioners in disaster management to ensure information is disseminated at school level.

South Africa

- Election year/politics drastically influences your ability to respond
- Engaging private sector to transport people during the xenophobia outbreak in South Africa and then get payment later =building trust with private sector for service delivery. This ensures they make the money and they respond to humanitarian needs at the same time
- Local community engagement is problematic in SA. Too many politically-motivated local gate keepers guarding access to scarce local resources and shaping any developmental interventions.
- Over-dependence on NGOs at the expense of community engagement/initiative
- One of the major problems in handling crises is that the information about the anticipated problems cannot be recognized head of time so that humanitarian assistances can be arranged ahead of time. Therefore, to be effective in humanitarian assistance building capacity of forecasting is crucial. Research organizations and universities should help a lot at least in forecasting problems.
- Local informal communities in Cape Town often not interested in reducing flood risk for example as they live deliberately in flood-prone areas in order to shift up the priority housing list for state-provided housing. Provision of housing is seen by local poor 'shack-dwellers' as the panacea for all ills associated with poverty

Tanzania

- The private sector has played a major role in the response to humanitarian assistance
- Floods in Tanzania - the Govt identified a new area, about 50km from the city center, providing basic services, and app. 5,000 people re-located from prone affected area to the new location

Uganda

- In Uganda disasters are related to civil conflict. Regional representation in governance is the major cause
- In Uganda there are many conflicts caused by uneven distribution of resources
- It is common practice than non-government entities only come in to respond to problems and challenges but do little to suggest and propose sustainable solutions to the causes of both human and naturally induced disasters. This needs to change.
- The "patron - client" relationship that dominates politics and governance is increasing the vulnerability of developing countries. The bigger powers are still interested in resource exploitation for their own benefits not primarily improving living standards on poorer nations.
- There are problems with the aid agencies because in areas such as Karamoja where the humanitarian need is intense, even the national Ugandan staff do not feel motivated to respond because some see them as 'second class citizens'. But international staff do not have access to the area
- Humanitarians are quick to go away - they only come in when there is a problem, then leave. Need more commitment from the international community so that local resilience is built to 'prepare', rather than just 'respond'

General discussion

- Local education interventions about trends such as climate adaptation/changes
- Identification of beneficiary households - most needy.
- WFP often works through communities who identify their own beneficiaries for food distribution or for school support
- Example: Inner city tribal community - strong organisation, established their own funding base. They had inherent social capital, were able to leverage internal resources, and external to complement those. This was the key to success
- Other areas have had flight - women-centric - men who are left are considered 'failures' one a 'slum of hope' - the other a 'slum of despair'. Need for strong local community capacity and autonomy to help absorb outside resources



DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS RESPONSE

After listening to the lessons from the 2011 famine in Somalia, participants examined the impact of good and bad decisions on crisis response at regional, national and sub-national levels. The session also concentrated on the collection and use of information from national or regional academic institutions and local actors for decision-making.

Ms Helen Altshul, Lessons from 2011 famine in Somalia

- Most of us think that we have the solutions. We have to understand that solutions are within the communities themselves. Our role is just to help them to make their own solutions real
- Exactly - and if this involves cash transfers through their own channels, why not?
- What can explain the delay for the response? UN agencies as well government were aware of the crisis
- Yes, it's hard to comprehend
- Despite the early warning indicators why was there indecision on that part of humanitarian actors, governments, donors to act? What could have been done?
- The Somalia famine qualifies as the 'humanitarian shame' of 2011 on the humanitarian and international community
- How long do you think this humanitarian situation will last in Somalia??
- Yes, there has been introspection, but sadly signs that a repeat will occur. We risk confronting the same situation



- Four words: Coordination, Partnership, Development and Innovation to be clarified in the Somalia crisis
- Why is humanitarian action focused more on emergency aid, and not getting more involved in a way to prevent crisis?
- How do we get good 'talent' to stay, so they are liberated to innovate?
- We should also consider the international level, as this is often where decisions are made
- You have mentioned more than six times the word 'international' as for INGOs and other, do you think that at a certain stage all decisions are taken at the international level involving international criteria?
- Where is all the money that was donated?
- What difference does this really make? Cash transfer or food aid surely both create dependency? Why do you think cash transfer is a better option? Answer:
 - Cash transfers do not distort markets
 - Easy to use
 - Avoids big logistical constraints
 - Cash vouchers that WFP uses will now constitute up to 30 per cent of the programme. Skills training and on-the-job resilience building must accompany this for sustainability purposes

- Need to seek grants for livelihoods and agricultural support - money is not currently there for such interventions that encourage *prevention* rather than crisis response
- The challenge is to embrace an intervention like cash transfers in light of future crises - it should not become just another band-aid
- Apply with evidence and in the country context
- It seems that we as humanitarian actors encourage and support monetary solution in emergency aid. But have we sufficient insight about the economic or financial mechanism at those countries and communities we want to help?
- The use of cash in safety net is effective as shown in South Africa cash transfer systems
- Cash is feasible only if food is available in local markets otherwise can be difficult, even so cash is important to encourage food production in very fertile areas
- Cash transfer systems will need sort of local banks to keep it or most of cash will be used immediately to buy food?
- Madagascar western part gets good rains and there is no need for food aid but it is happening and hurting local markets
- Usually donors are not willing to provide aid in the form of cash which can encourage local production and productivity efforts. It would be very much helpful to have aid in the form of cash than grain which can discourage local markets and farmers
- It seems that some circles are looking for emergency situations and sometimes unfortunately increase the situation to a certain level in which the community, the local, the region and even the national levels are surpassed and cannot manage the situation themselves. Thus the humanitarian professional 'experts' take over in the management and sometimes even get involved in politics of the country
- Famine and poverty are man-made situations due to the lack of social justice, corruption, important natural resources, lack of equal and just distribution of the national resources, and the problem is governance in these countries
- Livestock issues, time has come for destocking, but this will take time. Should support communities to convert stock into cash as coping mechanism for drought management
- Re processing cattle pre famine, cattle is extremely important to communities. By the time people are prepared to process it is too late. The attachment that pastoralists have is incredible. A sociological issue. This example highlights the need for academic research
- Good government mechanisms are necessary. Kenya example: livelihood is based on stock, how to access right kind of forecast information to take decision about selling their asset; needs for precise forecasting and forms to communicate the communities
- Forecasting is imperfect science and there are decision-making risks
- Governments should give a safety blanket on this
- Angola does not have decentralized contingency planning or early warning systems, especially where it counts at the local level
- Donors stop funding early warning systems, so each NGO take initiative to do it off their own initiative
- Governments are reluctant to accept assessments till is too late
- In election years nobody wants bad news
- Donors take time to respond to crises
- People use Somalia's example to justify delays in providing food aid
- Ethiopia, the reality is unreliable, information is not gathered in proper way to permit actions
- Ethiopia has a very robust emergency food reserve
- Unicef will work for early declarations based in thresholds to avoid severe results and people dying
- Data and information is needed. Somalia good early warning systems. Angola has a profound lack of data and information
- Challenge to gather all good practices know, develop standards and disseminate them toward weaker African countries
- 20 DRR approach can promote systems the enable sustainability. Capacity of regional administration to bring good practices and convert in policy framework is not there. This should be promoted
- Gaps: Role of SADC, in developing a centralized information system for flood monitoring, there is no information in Angola for example on floods in the south region to allow a systematic approach

- No key indicators are available at SADC to allow a coordinated approach to flood management especially in cross country intervention, each country as got its own way of computing floods
- Meteorologists are there but the role or hydrologists is sometimes not known. Meteo information is not simplified enough to allow quick actions by stakeholders
- SADC programs are funded by donors and no HR is available for follow up. DRR strategy have be done 2001-2005 but no commitment or implementation
- DRR operational personnel at SADC do not know what is the regional plan. Not looking at bigger picture
- Budget allocation is a serious issue
- Response should address advocacy and dissemination of good practices at national level and connecting at community levels, those responsible for policy

Reflect on, and capture, some 'good' decisions that have been made in support of specific responses.

- Availability of contingency plans where Governments exist
- Botswana: Government provides compensation to livestock farmers once their disease outbreak to control the spread and restock later
- Coordination and communication flow. Forum to share info and experience. Well-defined coordination mechanism
- Ethiopia: Key involvement of government - social safety net programmes for chronic conditions and emergency or contingency funds by Government.
- Ethiopia: 2011 drought, not as bad as Somalia because government took control early on
- Functional early warning system - govt, NGO, community. Have a platform for dissemination to different decision makers donors, NGOs, community
- Ghana: there is a Social Protection Policy called (LEAP) Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty, and a National school feeding program which is home-grown. It has really reduced poverty. We have seen the success of the social policy's, the National Health Insurance Policy of 2004 and 2006 is working very well within Ghana. There is also a National Disaster Management Organization which stocks food and medical supplies. There has been a discussion on whether we can get these resources based on needs, so there we are doing local assessments based on needs
- Governments' role is critical in terms of policy formulation to avert future risks and vulnerability, preparedness action including legal framework to support humanitarian space
- In-built DRR in activities in all programmes
- Kenya: Linking farmers to the market, there has been a training system for a group of HIV-affected widowers in which they are taught to farm to store, sell, and then become contractors to WFP where they have sold food to us. This is a great example of empowering women
- Malawi: Addressing food security issues from within with government subsidies, the budget has been increased for this. There is a new initiative where they are using the local wetlands for sustainability
- Market linkages
- Policies and education to encourage behaviour change among vulnerability communities and perception of risks
- Pre-identified risk profiles, vulnerability capacity assessments
- Some governments have decided to delegate Disaster related issues to organizations and they really support them both politically and financially; an example of this is the Kenya Red Cross
- Sometimes all you need is a river diversion, these are often interventions which can prevent further floods later on but they are not being explored
- USAID has introduced a "crisis modifier" into funding proposals. This is an additional amount that is earmarked but not granted to the implementing agency until certain "triggers" are reached. The agency suggests the triggers and indicators to measure them. Then when the evidence shows that a situation is developing into a crisis/emergency, this crisis modifier funding is released for immediate use, giving the agency a bridge while they work on more detailed response proposals.
- We should focus on the immediate needs of people during disasters
- After bad decisions come the good decisions, relative to the initial bad decision, which the good decisions seek to resolve

“Good decisions flow from assessments that involve the communities to eliminate top-down solutions”

Reflect on, and capture, some 'bad' decisions that have been made in support of specific responses. Also identify any 'gaps' or challenges in local/national/regional information sharing.

- At what point is it decided whether a situation is a crisis? It is all political. Often first decision comes from the international level, which convinces the national level and cascades down. Donors work with politicians - they are the same, or strongly linked
- What do you do if the government denies that a situation is an emergency yet agencies have identified that there are urgent needs? UN cannot declare an emergency if that conflicts with a national government position
- Humanitarianism is largely driven by political interest; thus, politicians and humanitarians have conflicting interests
- Decision should be system-based - when a certain level of malnutrition is reached, the response should be automatic, not based on political concerns
- Too much power vested in a few individuals/agencies when it comes to decision making, other voices are not heard
- What is the real space for decision-making? In Somalia the terrorist legislation limits the ability to give \$ to Islamic orgs... the space for decision-making at the regional/national level is limited by the international
- Delayed declaration of a disaster or crisis in many countries is also a common problem
- Different needs are perceived in different ways - in Libya each group a different perception made on different set of interests - opposition/Government/ international community/local communities
- Fragmented - not quite binding on others - failure to identify the common good
- Government decisions/actions without community and humanitarian actors involvement/consultation
- How do we get local Gov't empowered to respond... how do we get validation from the next level? Build consensus across different levels so that decisions don't contradict each other
- In Malawi often when there is a disaster, camps are set up in order for people to find refuge, but people leave the camps in order to go back home even though it may not be declared safe yet. We need to better understand why this is the case
- Insufficient collaboration between agencies, due to competition over resources
- Lack of accountability for bad decisions? E.g. took a year to respond to Somalia famine. Who was held accountable for this delay?
- Lack of preparedness for the unpredictable spikes
- Libya intervention: you cannot kill people for humanitarian reasons, or embargo a country that effectively destroys livelihoods
- Linking humanitarian aid with politics (e.g. elections benefits)
- Need for interaction and accountability to move up from lower level
- Often there are early warning systems but there is no one managing they often get neglected or ignored
- One of the mistakes that many countries make are not having sufficient local contractors in order to maintain job creation
- Partnership lack - distribution is in parallel by private sector, NGOs, internationals, governments... question of leadership and getting people around the same table
- The concept of humanitarian action is worthily put in opposition of development action. Development means also preparation, prevention, and mitigation and it is the same way of working in a humanitarian objective
- The use of wrong figures by Government is also problem, there are times when government is not aware of certain situation which occur on the ground, therefore the lack of knowledge on the ground is of great concern
- There is not enough strengthening of communities in order for them to sustain themselves

“Bad decisions are based on vested interests - mostly political and governance issues - especially at national level. Power systems and structures are very important in decision-making. Who has the resources, political power that will determine decisions and which will be implemented in the end?”

“Problems of information flows - wrong information leads to bad decisions. Need to see the information assessment and decisions as a package a single loop. Sometimes communities have more space to provide info and less to take decisions...”

Suggest some improvements to the current decision-making systems and processes.

- Agencies need to collaborate, bringing their separate skills and experience together to solve a problem jointly
- As a humanitarian, I need to reach out to non-humanitarian actors e.g. researchers, private sector
- Assist the core government to make the right decision at crucial moments
- Be careful about the advice coming forth. The quality will mitigate failure in decision-making
- Bring involvement of stakeholders at each level
- Bring together community based organizations with regional government to agree on good practice (evidence-based) for more sustainable DRR approaches
- Build network of partners (academics, private sector) for joint planning
- Communication with communities through sensitizations to address community perceptions and actions (e.g. animals dying during drought; explain why they could be slaughtered/sold before)
- Communities can take decisions if they are well-guided from above
- Coordination, partnership, development and innovation (in a proper framework)
- Create a best proposal "think out of the box" prize event to create thematic, innovative proposals
- Create a scheduled cycle of think tank meetings involving government and civil society. Each meeting will have a set topic and participants will be expected to bring examples of best and worst practices to the discussion before time. At the end of each meeting there should be an action plan
- Culture is manmade; it can be changed through education. Long-term investment in education in a persistent way creates social change. Changing the future through higher education that starts now
- Decisions should be to a large extent automated - e.g. when a level of malnutrition is reached, response should be automatic, and the response should be developed beforehand
- Develop an M&E system for humanitarian response, to learn and improve
- Develop better methods of feeding information from community level up to organizational level in terms of early warning.
- Disseminate applied research results in relation to problem of risk communication and dissemination
- Documentation of best crises management efforts in the country and make available to policy makers for better future decisions
- Don't accept everything: be strategic about what you accept as a government
- Engage stakeholders to come to a joint agreed position
- Engage with stakeholders at a local level in order to get their input on how to improve humanitarian efforts
- Engagement with communities at local, provincial, national and international levels of partnerships. Ensure flow of information back and forth, accountability. Strengthen coordination of interventions. Promote community ownership of programmes/interventions
- Establishing an Early warning system for flood hazards of the Fogera Plain
- Getting involved at an earlier stage and facilitate the sharing of information. Example: management of cholera - sent to the field to the community and identified key stakeholders and got them to share information related to cholera response
- Higher education in societies is key
- I will strive to bring the voices, concerns and needs of the communities I serve to national and international humanitarian policy debates. They do not usually get the opportunity to sit at the table. It is part of my duty to bring their views to the dialogue

“Carry out research on DRR issues and publish the results in a ‘digestible’ way so that they can be used by the stakeholders to their advantage.”

“Consult the business community through their forums to establish the interventions they can offer.”

“Create linkages between local communities and governance structures/role players to enable actioning of participatory findings.”

“Identify the right champions in your country and listen to their advice.”

- Identify sector-based thresholds for early response linked to agreed early warning indicators that address management, coordination, fund raising, advocacy and dissemination
- If you interact with them at the local level of Government in order to better understand the local contexts...
- Integrate DRR and emergency issues into indigenous knowledge through training, research and community outreach services
- Need to match implementation with decision-making authority and capacity
- Make information available through research, short courses, training and research
- One way to fill gaps in decision-making: expert joint monitoring/assessment mission as the right mechanism to enable good decision-making whether there is crisis or not and what interventions are needed including the definition of the time and scale for the proposed interventions
- Produce and disseminate independently verified evidence of successful approaches to feed into advocacy and policy influencing efforts
- Share the key challenge concerning partnership in humanitarian action with the national NGOs to obtain their knowledge and to document their results at the national level
- Social change takes time. Strategic planning for eventual social change is the key
- Take advantage of different levels - communities are not legal bodies, but have strongest local knowledge. If you want to take a decision in the SADC region you need consensus from those countries. Understand different mechanisms for decisions at different levels
- Teach students so that they can tell their parents
- The concrete actions must be classified in tangible and intangibles. In our case, as academic representatives, we will be able to come up with intangible actions. This is due to the fact that tangible actions are those who are directly related to the change of the real people that we are committed to serve. In fact, the tangible actions will be seen as the result of the effect of the intangibles actions, which correspond to the deliverable products with direct impact in changing the life of people will be made available by different humanitarian actors in the form of direct response to the needs of affected people
- The interventions to consider all aspects - multi-dimensional issues
- There is not enough local replication before we roll out an idea. Test successful models beyond their original context to ensure good replicability at local, national and continental level
- To develop more closed partnership at every level, with all sector for tackling the problems
- To do lobbying for the humanitarian issues
- To put in action the local capacity and the indigenous knowledge in order to face local humanitarian challenges
- Understand what the limits and scope for decision-making are - communities and different levels need to have clear frameworks within which they make their decision - what are the realities and resources available in reality?
- We see decision-making as if it should be done out there by somebody. Instead, the communities need to be empowered enough to be in a position to make the right decisions in a timely manner in order to trigger action
- Widen communication and involve more key stakeholders

“Look at the implementation system... sometimes people take decisions but they are never actioned appropriately”

“Shared information and situational analysis creates the correct framework for decision-making - avoiding asymmetry of information”

LINKS TO COMMUNITIES & NON-TRADITIONAL PARTNERS

Participants explored how the humanitarian system can link better to communities, both in order to improve the understanding of their needs, and to ensure that they are truly accountable. They also considered how to create stronger linkages with non-traditional partners who 'understand' the context. Examples that demonstrate the importance of 'listening' to local voices for better needs assessment and accountability were captured, along with ideas for how to adapt over the long-term.

CONTEXT & NEED

- In one drought stricken area in Kenya, a humanitarian organisation brought seeds which were meant to be planted for food, but what they forgot was that people were hungry 'now', instead of providing them with food now and then providing them with seeds for sustainability. So instead of planting the seeds, many of the people washed the seeds, boiled it and then ate it. Many people died due to the consumption of these seeds - lesson learnt: Humanitarian efforts need to be thought out carefully before they are put into action
- Identify existing community methods of resilience that can be adopted or improved to mitigate risks
- Do we need to build links to the community and other non-traditional partners *before* a disaster, or just during a rapid onset disaster situation?
- Pre-disaster should be the point of engagement to assess hazards and risks
- Building relationships with communities before disaster
- Somali refugees in Ethiopian camps flagged some problems with the shelter they were provided during the emergency phase. UNHCR, NGOs and the relevant government agency met with refugee committees and leaders to identify their concerns, take recommendations and improve the condition of shelters based on this input
- Open discussions with all people and their representatives e.g. community leaders, women, girls, boys
- Community members involved in deciding who should be targeted for assistance (e.g. through wealth ranking) using jointly determined criteria
- Committee at community level must include true representation of all sectors and interests e.g. women, youth, elderly, disabled
- Some communities do not have structures, people just operate as individuals. Also some groups may be excluded e.g. women
- Engaging communities to know what is the need
- Engage communities and disseminate community perspectives
- Working with risk-prone communities/gatherings of individuals
- Community risk assessment is a way of engaging a risk-prone community before it becomes disaster-affected. There are well known applicable participatory engagement methods of doing this. Example: weathering the storm - Community Risk Assessment allows communities to identify their problems
- Need to listen to all stakeholders, minority groups, bring all people on the agenda, women, children and community leaders. Anthropological surveys to identify points of entry to the community
- Have a profile of the disaster-prone areas. List the areas prone and engage them. What should be in the profile?
- When doing needs assessments, we must identify key stakeholders based on religion, ethnicity, traditional organisations and other social organisations
- Responding to the beneficiary at different levels
- Identify community structures that exist on the ground that can be used in describing needs, they can also be an entry point into the community. Initially consult chiefs/leaders to get information about the existing informal and formal structures and their functionality
- Community targeting, at least using community leaders, knowledgeable people

“Structures need to be identified before an emergency situation occurs. Agencies on the ground need to have a good baseline picture, not just try to find out in a crisis”

“Cross scale communication, both vertical and horizontal. How? Regular dialogue and meetings - face to face contact is critical. Innovative techniques such as scenario planning to integrate community perspectives into planning processes.”

- Getting information from all sources – for example Media. Use Radio to have open conversations with community
- How to empower community to identify their needs? Community needs to be organised
- Have a system for community members to communicate with agencies e.g. using mobile phones
- Strong government structure (forums) must be put in place through which the voices different groups can be aired
- Need for strong local structures. Also consider informal community based structures outside government which can provide information on community issues
- Get a general view of the whole community on what the needs are
- Organised community general meetings
- The use of independent media like the TVs, Radio
- Giving affected communities responsibilities, and making authorities responsible - e.g. sit down and share the division of work and get commitment. Then action
- Researchers can engage with community to bring information on community using innovation and new technology
- Available tools for decision-making through research
- Create thought out scenarios of what would be the consequences of disasters and provide options of mitigation that would be considered in the event of a disaster
- Information may be available at national level to tell you what the existing leadership and governance structures are at the local level. You must get that information from somebody before going in to the community.
- Acknowledgement of long term commitment to the problem at hand promotes accountability. Meet regularly face to face and communicate. Knowing your community during good and bad times
- Listening is collecting data from all stakeholders for reliable risk identification
- Collaborate with the existing government organization's structure
- Within South Africa, there has been a situation where an informal settlement was illegally set up in a residential area. Conflict within this area increased and the residents within the area were up in arms. The local government was called in and decided to bring in a mediator who specializes in conflict resolution. This mediator liaised with the people in the informal settlements, with the residents in the area, with drug dealers who were operating within the informal settlement and he asked them exactly how it would be possible to bring peace within the area. Many suggestions were made and many more stakeholders were involved, finally a resolution was made and peace once was once again restored. (Mediators often have a key role to play in conflict resolution)
- Use consultative process to engage with communities to address problems.
- Sometimes we should ask communities what contributions they can make
- Transparent sharing of information e.g. about resources available and dissemination of feedback of research
- Mozambique e.g. local steering committee made up of church leaders, village leaders etc involved in humanitarian action. These can be sources of information on issues that affect community. Can also use suggestion boxes for community members to highlight issues that affect them.
- The success of the needs assessment is dependent not only on the structure, methodology, approach, etc. However, at the operative level, one must ensure that the beneficiaries are able to communicate their concerns to the persons performing the needs assessment. Many times the assessment is being performed by someone who do not know the community context, history, language, customs. The mediator would need to be aware of the history, context and be proficient in the language/customs in order to be able to ask what people need, whether these problems are due to the immediate crisis or a result of previous development issues, etc.
- Use of suggestion boxes placed in public buildings to collect views of the people
- Red Cross works through local volunteers who are part of the community and understand the values and needs so they can highlight community needs

“Engage with government structures and use informal structures to complement these. That way you are operating within the law and remain relevant to local people.”

“It is important the way you listen to communities, as one can create expectations which can lead to frustration.”

- To listen to communities better - key stakeholders should have a sense of valuing the views of the affected communities. They should be considered to have indigenous knowledge that can help solve the problems

ACCOUNTABILITY

- Businesses are accountable to both shareholders and communities that employees come out of by ensuring the right policies are in place - business continuity
- Transparency of who is the humanitarian community accountable to? Communicating with governments and relevant stakeholders
- Acquiring feedback from affected communities on relevance and impact of response measures - consultation with affected peoples
- Monitoring of measures implemented
- In Somalia emergency response, there was a complaints mechanism so that anybody wishing to find out more about the distribution (e.g. why certain villages/individuals were receiving aid, or the amount of cash given) could raise those issues and get a response. So the process was very transparent.
- Community monitoring mechanisms need to be in place, so that the impacts of interventions are measured using jointly agreed indicators
- In order to be accountable, research findings should be made available to development and research partners with a view toward finding solutions
- Communities are expecting development outputs from research ventures and this should be taken into account
- Data collection on key indicators, analysis and then dissemination of the results - both good and bad
- Many agencies only report positive impacts and not unintended negative impacts (if any) of their work.
- Identify credible community members and work with them to initiate social changes
- Develop indicators to measure change
- Develop appropriate education models
- Don't forget information sharing and accountability on a lateral level - between governments and international agencies and other NGOs
- Only intervene in areas where you have experience/presence on the ground. Agencies sometimes jump in due to money being available in an emergency but without having any prior knowledge of the local context.
- If you don't have the knowledge then don't intervene! IF YOU DON'T KNOW - DON'T GO!
- Monitoring and evaluation systems
- Lobby governments to include indigenous communities in every planning process, not just in emergencies
- Communities should sometimes be held accountable, and find ways to help and empower themselves (for e.g. a school was built in a low-income area for students, however the school was not being used and only when relief workers made visits would students run into it). Certain conditions and milestones therefore need to be put into play and if these are not met, communities should be held accountable. We also need to understand why these milestones, conditions and compliance were not met and prioritise the problem in order to increase cooperation through communication and effective coordination
- It's our obligation to speak around future risks, listen and combine it with available data from other sources and combine with future forecasting with risk profiles. Seasonal exposures and future risks. Communication about likely risk scenarios based on sciences on future risks drivers. E.g. lack of education at a higher level, lack of family planning at the local level may be risks for a future risk and it's our obligation to raise that now and bring it to the fore
- Does your framework for engagement with stakeholders change per country etc.? Is it appropriate to have a generic MOU?
- It is the job of researchers to assess the future risks and advise accordingly

“Disaster management committees - village, sub-ward, ward, district, regional and national levels - for post-event analysis.”

“The UN system should be more accountable - with whom does the buck stop? The RC? Is the RC empowered?”

- Agencies need to be transparent about their funding - amount, how it is being spent, etc
- Going towards higher education population is needed for longer-term development
- From a practitioner point of view, sustainable methods and solutions need to be reached for true accountability rather than short term solutions
- From an ethical point of view, should one take action for the immediate problem that can be fixed at the moment or should one consider the longer term sustainable developmental programs that will last much longer?
- Donors have a separate humanitarian and developmental funding system, which makes it difficult to respond to longer term structural issues that could humanitarian issues
- Often the warning was there, but nothing happens until the emergency occurs. For example Katrina.
- Examples of understanding needs or accountability; Scientist monitoring Hurricane Katrina for long enough and the warning was in place, but the huge exposed population was left out exposed for too long until it was too late because of a lack of respect for populations of the low level. Improper government procedures and priorities
- Often the underclass that is not listened to. It is not about resources - the more important issue government commitment
- We must prioritize the community's needs according to *them*, not according to what aid agencies think are the priorities
- Humanitarian action should be neutral, impartial. But this may not always be possible
- Accountability and attention that existed at local level: example from South Africa; the responders listen to community needs but are resource constraints. There's need for shelter and local communities may be able to provide posts for re-building the shelter. Accountability is both to the community and the government responses
- Cape Town: had very destructive urban fires. Accountability is to the community and local government structures. For example, Shebeen position showed to be an indicator, which came from community engagement. Now seeing a reduction in fire damage. Better control of risk factors
- What is the role of OCHA in coordinating all the players in the humanitarian world?
- Apply same standards to local staff of international agencies/NGOs so that they are incentivised to serve the true humanitarian needs, while feeling protected
- The main drivers of urban fires in Cape Town is the development of Shebeens (local drinking dens/joints). Long term accountable government program would be to control the development of Shebeens and electrification of the establishments. There's some response towards this driven by research findings from scientists. There's reduction of the risk as shown by reduced fire events
- There should be key indicators to measure individual performance to ensure effective accountability
- Accountability should be through openness, transparency - e.g. information should be published through open access systems like a public website. This can be information on finances, tenders etc
- Sense of urgency - act as soon as the information or knowledge is available, rather than when a disaster happens
- Accountability of researchers who see an event coming to urgently warn and demand action... accountability to provide strong bolstered research to support their claim
- Communication with communities should take place at all times to ensure that there is an iterative and innovative discussion. If you have this, you have accountability - which is a two way street
- How are the organisations working in humanitarian response accountable to each other? Are they communicating with each other?
- Accountability both within communities - mutual accountability as well as between levels - all discussions need to be iterative
- Need for transparency in order for partners to understand where your accountability lies.
- Cape Town: had very destructive urban fires. Accountability is to the community and local government structures. For example, Shebeen position showed to be an indicator, which came from community engagement. Now seeing a reduction in fire damage. Better control of risk factors

“Those who control resources should come together with beneficiaries and discuss all issues from planning, implementation and evaluation - part of transparency.”

Discuss and capture how you can change your crisis response programming to "build back better" and avoid having to repeat the same type of response.

- A disaster response that allows one to establish relationships with communities to build early warning disaster response systems
- A forensic Investigation of disasters is necessary to learn the lessons of what and why it happened
- Address development issues to reduce exposure and vulnerability. Ensure mainstreaming DRR into development intervention
- Address poverty which seem to be the driver of many risks
- After immediate response it is important to undertake risk assessment
- An effective approach to needs assessment will enable a better strategy to BBB. Such will capture critical information that can inform actions that will enable not only immediate response but aspects of recovery. This can be done by 1) doing the rapid assessment for immediate response that is followed up by 2) a more comprehensive, possibly sector-based assessment
- Collaborate with partners. Apply appropriate technology to build back better. Use evidence methods to better build
- Community structures and all key people trained in disaster management (teachers, nurses) and they become vehicles to disseminate disaster information at various levels
- Construction of more disaster resistant structures in flood plains and earthquake prone areas.
- Drought - look at alternative natural resources besides agriculture to build back after droughts. E.g. use natural fruits for liquor, spices production etc, then sell to buy agricultural products. Building sustainable drought resilience
- Each emergency is investigated and reflected upon and experiences used for future planning
- Early Warning System that was implemented in Mozambique is an excellent model for "building back better"; there have been a lot less lives lost after its implementation
- Enforcement of laws and regulations for disaster reduction
- Engage the community on re-settlement plans
- Ensure that resilience building is implemented after the disaster has occurred. Providing immediate assistance should be done, but training people to sustain themselves is key so that people are more equipped once they encounter another disaster again.
- Follow-up on correcting mistakes
- From the lessons learned we will build better from structural and non-structural point of view.
- Harness local resources and involve local communities right from the time of need assessment and through to preparedness and in the aftermath of recovery phase
- Harness local resources by identifying and working with them including human resources and materials
- Increased community awareness and early warning system that results in early action. Community empowerment to take early action e.g. moving to safe havens when floods are about to occur
- Integrate "build back" activities with wider sustainable development approaches. This includes improved communication, use of better technology, greener technology, institutional reform, community participation and involvement in planning and decision-making
- Investment in action-oriented research
- Investment in long term disaster risk reduction strategies like proper settlement planning
- Learn from the PAST to build back better
- Living with floods e.g. building structures that may not be totally submerged-stilts houses
- Mainstreaming disaster issues in the training and academic programmes
- Need to develop and update risk maps and analysis
- One common mistake to correct in time is the un-coordinated evacuation of people at the onset of a crisis - there should be more government commitment to the evacuation of the population during disasters. Use the aid that is given during such disasters wisely in order to "build back better" after the disaster has occurred and strengthen prevention efforts in order to find permanent solutions.
- Other aspects include factoring human capacity development, and interventions that have a longer-term impact – i.e. beyond mobile medical services to establishment of government supported health services. To be effective a capacity for advocacy and influencing policy making is vital – for example, ensuring access to ARVs, etc

- People need to be educated and be made aware of the prevention efforts that need to be done once a disaster has occurred, this education needs to contribute to behaviour change people
- Research and innovation e.g. new crop varieties to withstand drought
- Resettlement and relocation of disaster victims where possible especially for landslides and flood victims
- Resettling people from flood zones coupled with early warning information
- Risk analysis and vulnerability projections and context analysis in the settings
- Risk mapping and analysis – Comprehensive risk assessment and vulnerability, Development of Country Disaster Plan, Analysis of the gaps, Response to the gaps
- SADC to use the experience from one or two member states to build a comprehensive framework for disaster management response
- Strong government leadership in implementation of plans and regulations
- Undertake improved physical planning interventions to guide human settlement and land use.



PREPAREDNESS, RESILIENCE & THE LONGER TERM

Participants heard from a Government representative about the disaster management techniques in one country, and discussed how to use crises as an opportunity not only to prepare in the future, but also to “build back better” the situation of vulnerable communities.

Mr Xavier Agostinho Chavana, Floods management in Mozambique & the Buzi warning system

- Are the Local Committees for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) volunteers or paid? Answer: The work is done on a voluntary basis by 15-18 members.
- How is the forecasting capacity of the flood EWS in Mozambique? Before an hour, a day, a week, etc. Answer: 24-72 hours depending on the information.
- Who owned the EWS and how is it structured? Is there an accountability mechanism?
- Do you think the same type of crisis is not at risk of being repeated because of negligence?
- How is the EWS sustainable, in terms of organizational structure, resource, forecasting capacity?
- "The perfect is the enemy of good enough." A caveat that we need to be careful with approaches like vulnerability risk mapping as it is premised on high natural hazard environments and the means to undertake an essential risk profiling in such communities. Where such high risk environments can be identified and the means exist to conduct, consolidate and as need be disseminate the outcomes, this is very good. However, this will not take the place for basic rapid assessment methodologies (that need to be strengthened to include a primary degree of community dialogue to both frame a quantitative response and validate the community context). Don't mix DRR with Emergency Response.
- A related recommendation, IASC agencies (UN, international NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, etc) should, using the cluster framework, identify and agree on pragmatic 'validation' actions in the early phase of an emergency response – framed by community consultation and dialogue – that can inform needed adjustments to ensure the greatest possible impact (and efficiency) of the response
- You have presented what happened but for a reliable preparedness you should have presented also why it happened, which will improve our learning of the lessons
- Is there coordination between this project and the Zambezi River Basin Initiative through WMO/IFRC?
- What are the lessons you have learned from this disaster in terms of prevention, mitigation, response and recovery?
- History has shown us that donor-driven and donor-funded EWSs are not sustainable
- I believe what you presented is an extreme event and if it occurs again, do you think it will not cause the same or more consequences?
- Was it ever considered to permanently relocate people to "safer" places?
- How is poverty contributing to building resilience of people staying across the river to shift to other safe places?
- What is the compliance of the communities after the warnings have been given so far?
- If you know that floods will occur, how is the logistical support organized and how efficient is it?

Mr Xavier Agostinho Chavana, Role of recent institutional reforms

- What is the source of the data and estimates on the impact of the previous events?
- What diseases are concerned in the epidemics?
- What plague did you have? Bubonic?
- Reduction in deaths/destruction due to floods since 2000 is interesting, but to say that this is due to the measure taken since then you would need to show the figures from earlier years e.g. 1990s
- Was the magnitude of the floods before 2000 similar to the ones after 2000?
- With all the rivers and tributaries crisscrossing the country, do you still have arid and semi-arid areas?
- Do you have community contingency plans or simulation is based on national contingency plans?
- What is the role of INGC in disaster risk reduction?
- Who funds all this? The Government of Mozambique?
- The structure is more government-centred. To what extent do the people have trust in Government?

- You seem to say that only the government can decide that is okay but the government does not have all the expertise. It can consult sometimes so that it can take the good decisions
- Are people prepared to move to resettlements or they are forced?
- The place where people have been moved from, is it cordoned off and put to other use by the government to prevent people from moving back there?
- Are there regional-level non-governmental initiatives that should be leveraged in the face of such problems (e.g. the Red Cross "Zambezi initiative")?
- CPLP platform - moving towards the creation of a cross-boundary link, which should benefit the region
- Should SADC play a more active role in trans-boundary management of such issues? The SADC forecasting centre demonstrates the political will to engage with these issues; could a focused effort build on this to provide a larger regional role for SADC? What are the limits on a regional role?
- Are there plans for the Government of Mozambique to take its disaster management experience to its role as Chair of SADC? What is the right regional way of sharing experiences? Suggestion: ensure the disaster management centres are talking to each other, bringing their respective experience to the table



PARTNERSHIPS & WAY FORWARD

This session captured the reasons for moving towards a new humanitarian partnership, articulated a vision for the future, and the obstacles we can expect to arise. Finally, participants brainstormed ways to build stronger partnerships that deliver better response, and committed to actions going forward.

Mr Ignacio Leon's comments on 'A New Humanitarian Partnership'

Partnership has been a key element of the history of humans ever since they became social animals with mutual interests. Over time, this relationship became legalized to ensure that one individual was not taken advantage of by others. Therefore the origin of partnership as we know it today had a personal and formal nature. It was the *societates publicanorum*, which arose in Rome Empire in the third century BC, that had the earliest form of legal limited partnership. This was followed by the Islamic Law, the Quirad and Muraba institutions developed during the Islamic medieval period. The most modern form of partnership is the result of the Napoleonic Code (1807) which helped European nations include partnership in their legislation.

Most recently the partnership term has been used and abused in any kind of social relationship between and among individuals, governments, associations or organizations in different areas including Humanitarian. The Global Humanitarian Platform, a dialogue forum between UN and non-UN humanitarian organizations co-chaired by the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), has also echoed the importance of partnership. In 2008 they identified the following principles of humanitarian partnership:

Equality Transparency Complementarity Results-Orientation

In 'a new humanitarian partnership' we need more than a simple collaboration between humanitarian actors. Humanitarian partnership is an obligation and a commitment of those who can alleviate, reduce or avoid the suffering of people who are at risk or are affected by crises (natural or man-made).

This new partnership should be based on **three pillars**:

1. Mutual acknowledgment of the capacities, expertise and gaps. We should take the maximum advantage of partnership; not doing this will have a negative impact in the partnership potential. A clear example is "the use" of the academic sector. We request them to conduct an evaluation or a study but we don't link and explore enough this partnership with other academic areas that this sector could have an advantageous position vis-à-vis other partners. This is why it is important to call other actors who did not participate in this workshop but who are key in this new partnership. The question is: is our current coordination structure including all the key actors who can have a positive impact on people?

2. Knowledge transfer. This is very easy to say but very difficult to implement. A real transfer of knowledge could impact our own institutional relevance as others will have the same capacities and expertise as us. Some of you are professors and you see how new students arrive to class once you have transferred your "knowledge". However transfer of knowledge will improve equality among us and the result will be an improvement in the efficiency of the humanitarian actions.

3. Common objectives and results. The first one is easy as we have the same objective, which is to protect people; however we need to focus in the last one: results. The results are easy as well if we focus our work on people, on people who are like you and me, who enjoy and suffer like you and me.

We need to call for 'a new humanitarian partnership' that builds trust among those who can have a positive impact on the people. To do so we need to be innovative and get away from preconceptions. A tri-sectorial partnership – public, private and civil society is a must. If we cannot achieve it, history will pass 'the bill' to us and then it will be very late for those that are more vulnerable.

Questions, comments, or ideas on partnership.

- All partners must profit from the partnership – they must be better off with it than without it
- Cross-sector partnership is not a new idea; however, there is still insufficient emphasis on how to implement partnerships practically
- Donors are not always partners; sometimes they are just a funding conduit
- Humanitarian organisations are not responding to the needs of the community but they are accountable to the politics of the donor organization/country and the objectives that they bring behind them
- Humanitarian organisations don't hear about the changing world and the likely danger of climate change; does OCHA need to work business as usual 'EMERGENCY' like a fire fighter? We depart here
- Partnership = equality
- Partnership = playing respective roles towards an agreed outcome; it is not about competition or striving for equality per se, it is about reaching targets that benefit a certain constituency. It requires vision, maturity and genuine commitment
- Partnership does not necessarily mean equality; partners can bring in different skills, experience, resources, but there must be a common goal and understanding of the roles of the different actors within a partnership
- Partnership requires humility
- Partnerships are good but never equal; they are commonly the 'patron-client' partnerships, and the patron always gets a fairer deal
- Partnerships seem to have ulterior approach with commercialisation opportunities for some partners and not all parties are able to benefit
- Partnerships take time and are inherently organic and evolutionary; Periperi U is a successful consortium because it has been allowed to develop slowly and of itself – this is a good model
- Practice proved that humanitarian organizations are not purely humanitarian – this makes humanitarian actions vulnerable to politics and malpractice
- Projects and partnerships should not be taken to be same thing – these days we are interested in partnerships, which are very long term, and projects within partnerships, which begin and end and still the partnership remains
- University could by transferring common knowledge to all the stakeholders to change their behaviour
- Write a code of conduct and ethics for humanitarian actors



HERE

'The Push': What makes it untenable to stay where we are?

Lack of progress

- Humanitarian aid is growing and growing and that should be reduced progressively and progressively – increase the resilience of people, this is why we like to change

Asymmetrical power relationships

- Asymmetrical power relationship: in our world today, partnership is mainly one-way cooperation from rich towards the poor where partnership should bring common interest to the parties involved
- Currently there is asymmetry in power relationships, resources
- Partnership is based mainly on money. The group that has the money has the power and controls the relationship. The mindset has to change
- Academic institutions are taken to be cheap labour. Information is collected supposedly to be used for humanitarian purposes but then they are used for commercial purposes

Political and donor agendas

- Tell politicians to make difference between humanitarian assistance for people in need and to solve some political problems in the name of humanitarian reasons – this is confusing
- Donor community and external agencies tend to be patronizing of local institutions i.e. govt, universities and civil society. He who pays the piper calls the tune
- Donor considers the partnership as a contractual business between the 'haves' and 'have nots' – just to implement what the donors are planning to achieve

Short-termism

- Community exit after short term interventions and responses leaves communities not prepared to be left on their own
- Current partnerships are too short; 2 to 3 years cannot be considered a partnership; it is a cooperation
- Short-term relationships are leaving the community worse off

Competition/trust

- Lack of trust amongst the stakeholders
- Competition between stakeholders
- Competition for resources, staff
- Competition is used to justify not doing enough by saying this is 'what they can we can do', this is where we are funded
- Competition should not be necessary, players in the field of humanitarian work should have the interest of the beneficiary communities in mind
- Too much competition

Lack of knowledge sharing

- In current partnerships stakeholders want to keep all the intellectual property for themselves
- Inadequate sharing of studies and findings of academia – wealth of studies but dearth of exchange
- Need to move from individual interests. The 'there' should be premised on who is going to benefit from the partnership? Is it government, beneficiaries or private sector?
- UN and NGOs: lack of info about who does what where; the relevant expertise of all humanitarian actors for analysing the gaps and look into new partnerships based on the needs of affected populations.

Fragmented, lack of focus

- Too many fora, too little focus, more need to consolidate
- Don't know how to integrate the different actors, how to give beneficiaries a voice

- Assumptions that people working in the humanitarian sector are automatically good partnership brokers; but that is a skill which needs to be developed. There should be training to help people negotiate and manage partnerships effectively
- Overreliance on external consultants

Too centralised/inflexible

- Traditional structure of humanitarian work has remained as UN affairs (top level actors). The crucial thing is to find a way that other players closer to the community can be involved to play more activate roles. Other actors' point of view should be taken into consideration. PPU is one of the other actors. We need to have an incorporation of other traditional non-actors
- Too centralised, top heavy structure
- We are 'suppliers' of humanitarian assistance. We build partnerships around that with ourselves at the centre. There are lots of other actors e.g. Governments, private sector that we are not incorporating properly
- Organisations still work in silos
- Rigid systems based on history and inflexible mandates. Traditional players still dominate the humanitarian terrain

Lack of broader engagement

- Weak partnership amongst government, academia, civil society and international NGOs
- Local NGO and private sector are sidelined and they are not able to meet the set standards over time. Governments should invest more in professionalisation of local private/NGO sector. What is happening in the capacity development field? Who is being capacity built?
- Partnerships with regional organizations that are not empowered, and this empowerment must come from within – the international community cannot build it for them. They must commit, otherwise it is not an equal partnership. But how to help then?
- Private sector is not adequately involved



THERE

'The Pull': What might a clear and compelling shared vision look like through the eyes of the key stakeholder groups?

Long term view

- This is a long-term journey – coordinates can be 10-20 years out
- Partnership should be a long-term relationship
- Partnerships have to be a forever thing; that's why university are always there; also communities are there forever. Partnerships should then be forever and in the course of time you can have cooperations and collaborations. Partnerships should be like marriage; you would not go into it if you know it is going to last a few weeks, months or years

Shared goals/strategic focus

- Eradicate poverty and bring education into every home
- Common goal that everyone works towards
- NGO/Community: guided by the 3 pillars of humanitarian partnership (ref Ignacio)
- Re-emphasised relief and concentrate on increasing disaster risk reduction for the long term
- Sector that addresses the capacity gaps

Beneficiaries effectively engaged

- How can the role of the beneficiary be improved? Make them a stakeholder through accountability, involvement, evaluation
- In each partner office, each individual should have a link to a specific group of beneficiaries. To follow them from beginning to end. People should not be detached because of their role. Everybody needs to feel a direct link to the beneficiary. Charity starts at home.
- Involvement of beneficiaries in identifying problems and solutions. Not talking on behalf of beneficiaries
- Beneficiary is at the centre of the partnership
- DRR activities are cascaded to the lower levels of community involvement e.g. Mozambique examples
- Empathy with beneficiaries – ability to think about how you would like to be treated if you were the beneficiary
- There is nothing *about* community *without* community
- 'Nothing about them without them'. You cannot develop people – they develop themselves

Broad partnership

- Partnership which includes humanitarian organisations e.g. OCHA; implementing organisations for e.g. Civil society, government, academics and NGOs and the communities where, from the very beginning of a disaster, each stakeholder will have a specific role to play, from the immediate relief provided by humanitarian organisations, to the building of resiliency through implementing organisations and the cooperation and involvement of the community in helping to sustain what has been learnt, not only for the short term, but for the long term
- Optimal contribution to the different actors with appropriate response. The main player here is government. Government can benefit from the most effective model of partnerships drawing from risk assessment, proper response, building on recovery. There's a notion of competition that should not be let to overlook what partnerships are. Every organisation should play their role effectively. This working together helps governments to achieve the common goal.
- Mechanisms where all players are involved in relevant partnerships
- Enough space to extend current partnership to non-traditional partners in order to strengthen synergies
- Fair and functioning dialogue platforms at country level which are more inclusive to all the stakeholders such as Government, UN/Donor agencies, Civil Society and Academia
- Formulation for engagement – bringing in non-traditional actors. Better set-up arrangements to engage the non-traditional actors
- More inputs from gender based organisations

Effective partnership

- Open, trusting set of partnerships where there are mutual benefits for all involved
- A true system of accountability. If the response is late, and there were obvious warning signs, who gets fired?
- Somebody is fired if people die unnecessarily
- Greater transparency, and improvement in the way we plan to respond to the distribution of resources; there must be a joint appeal that's based on a common understanding among all partners
- Adequate communication two-way channels among diverse partners
- Don't assume that partnership is *always* necessary to achieve objectives. Partnerships are time consuming and complicated, the parties should only enter into them when absolutely necessary to meet their objectives and achieve the desired impacts
- Predictable transparent funding mechanisms for all organisation based on capacity in order to create a stable foundation for all key role players
- Partners are sharing resources, skills, competencies and ideas that are relevant to humanitarian assistance in order to strengthen one another
- Partnerships in humanitarian assistance made clear; today the definition is confusing
- Equal numbers of men and women working in the humanitarian sector, including in positions of authority. No women here from UN OCHA, which claims to live by gender equality
- Real partnerships between interested parties to go from Site A to Site B
- Protocol of engagement of each actor in a national platform is one of the ways of working
- Simplified way of working. Ideally there should be less initiatives in the world

Local/national/regional capacity

- Capacity of local national NGO and private sector able to meet the minimum standards required
- More reliance on local capacity or regional groupings to implement humanitarian/development programs rather than external consultants
- More scope and funds are being given to locally based NGOs so that they are creating their own network/partnership

Government role more central/effective

- Government benefits most from effective partnership – to take leadership at all levels
- Government to play a central role in arbitration to make partnership work and improve accountability
- Governments are now more unwilling to declare disasters. The international community needs to find ways of engaging governments reluctant to publicly acknowledge disasters in such a way that face is saved and those in need are assisted. Donors need also be briefed on these changing attitudes, as they often must wait for a declaration.
- Governments should play a more noticeable and true role in taking the lead to meet the demands
- Clarity on who is responsible for declaring emergency
- Redefined roles opposite govt
- Redefined role of NGO and UN agencies vis-a-vis govt

Academia/universities a useful resource

- Academic to any other organization; can offer education (formal curriculum), training (short courses) and research
- Academic to any other partnership should be based on shared common interest
- Academic/Govt: a powerful system of critical thinking
- Academic/Govt; UN; Community: there is a lot expected out of the academia in terms of research, training, teaching, etc but this expectation should be supported with relevant and concrete enabling environment in form of infrastructure, architecture, logistics, remunerations, etc. It should be mutually supportive
- Academic/Others: sufficient relevant capacity in terms of human resources to ensure continuity and implementation of programmes
- Academic/UN & NGO: student exchange, providing insight into existing problems, training, critical thinking

- Academic; applied research, best practices, definition of relationships between communities and humanitarian organizations.
- Academic; research in nutritional standards to determine whether communities are resilient enough to withstand impending drought, if not the nutritional status should be improved and be kept optimum at all times
- Academic; research on water and sanitation during normal times and times of crises should be optimal but emergencies should be foreseen and planned for; communicable disease control during emergencies
- Efficient partnership with scientists; the partnership is built on clear interest of the parties interested
- Needs-based and mutual understanding relationships where a community/NGO/government, etc have a need for training and they approach the university for training which universities carry out effectively
- Short courses provided by universities to humanitarian organisations based on needs
- NGO/University: working mechanism to rationalise i.e. in a scientific and methodological way the lessons learned, best and good practices on the ground, in order to scale-up this experiences
- Scientists work with their teams and thus need funded partnership
- Key elements of academic endeavour are research, teaching and training, and community outreach. Any collaboration or partnership needs to facilitate these objectives. Thus, commissioned research can add value, our research can inform cutting edge training programmes that are appropriate, empirically grounded but must allowed to be undertaken within already tight academic schedules. Our student's need internships experience, and research support
- Universities have the lead role in tackling issues of community interests and no longer lag behind a bit
- University can bring new knowledge and behavior to civil society and to humanitarians
- Strong partnership with the private sector and the academic sector when dealing with relief efforts for e.g. if a humanitarian organisation would like to distribute food into an area, a needs assessment on exactly what food should be distributed should be done by researchers in order to make sure the correct in intervention is being done
- Academic to NGO and government; training/teaching and capacity building, generating evidence based research and providing services to communities e.g. consultancies
- Academic/community – ongoing training programs short, long term, consultancies, service delivery
- Growing relations with academics and mutual relations with humanitarian players

Private sector engaged/contributing

- How to engage the private sector – provision of commodities. They should be involved in the planning process, such as planning for transport of food stuff, supply. They should not be sidelined. Making the supply chain more effective rather than sourcing commodities that are available locally from elsewhere.
- Opportunity – private sector is interested in working with others. Although private sector obviously needs to make profits, governments can give them tax breaks and other incentives. This leads to good practice in poverty reduction, jobs, etc
- Private sector and national NGO don't fit in terms of standard for providing service because the standards are developed to give advantage to overseas suppliers. So we need to adjust the standards or bring the private sector up to those required standards in order to involve them appropriately
- Private sector players are involved in these meetings
- Harness the ingenuity of the private sector. They are governed by unforgiving market forces they are of necessity efficient
- Social insurance policy which is a shared responsibility among various partners which is able to protect the country's resources if disaster occurs

Professionalism/training

- Professional system that has built on work being invested by academic and other training institutions
- Improved professional competencies of humanitarian workers through training in areas of greatest needs e.g. by academic institutions.
- Training is now focusing on clearer professional DRR issues, which is what PERIPERIU is taking a lead in doing. This is giving in well trained professionals to build local capacities
- More efficient regulation of the work of international humanitarians
- Culture of humans is manmade; this culture can be changed only by education and training

Draft a clear and compelling shared vision statement

A Partnership based on our shared goals of:

- Involving beneficiaries, and holding ourselves accountable to them
- Building a fully inclusive humanitarian system
- Leveraging local knowledge and capacities
- Learning and innovating in how to be better prepared and better responders

...and commitment to:

- Taking forward the discussion on accountability within our individual organisations
- Investing in *local* and *regional* knowledge and skills



WALLS

Brainstorm and categorise the issues, obstacles and challenges we must overcome together to realise our shared vision

Clarity of purpose, goals, ways of working

- Assumption that everybody understands the same thing by the term 'partnership'
- Goal of the partnership ill-defined for university scientists
- Rules and objectives in a partnerships need to be stated clearly in order to make the coordination of activities run effectively
- Who are the beneficiaries of this partnership? Clarifying this helps to formulate the partnership in a rationalised manner. Beneficiaries should be the main determinant of the type of the partnership
- Donor "push" for partnerships (e.g. in order to access funding) as opposed to "pull" factor of partnership being the best way of achieving humanitarian objectives
- Results often published in in-digestible forms
- Knowledge needs to be user friendly in order for all role players to understand and to adapt
- Remove under cover people working and acting in the name of humanitarian activities

Fragmentation

- Closer you get to the field, the less cohesion of organisations and limited observance of principles of partnership
- Humanitarian in this world is growing forever and this cannot be sustainable because vulnerability is increasing. To avoid this wall, universities should participate to reduce vulnerabilities by sharing lessons and collaborating as through Periperi U
- Implementation in the actual field work deviates from the GHP's 4 principles of partnership because circumstances are so different in real field experiences
- Lack of trust between humanitarian actors
- People work in silos – finance/administration/implementation, etc
- Universities not taking initiatives to link with humanitarian organisations to provide critical thinking
- We're doing too much with too little >> Disagree – we are doing too little with too much
- There is no sharing of information; we do not need to re-invent anything we just need to know what each other is doing through communication >> Disagree – coordination in the field is good, at HQ level is where the problems lie

Competing interests

- Never a free interest in partnership
- Today the donors to humanitarian affairs are based on their interest in terms of taxes, advertisements, old stocks
- Lack of ethics and conduct of some humanitarian actors
- Confusion about suspected 'other' role of humanitarians – providing information to governments for political purposes
- Many countries refuse today humanitarian assistance for their people because some humanitarian actors do not stick to their mandate in helping and are engaged in other political reasons
- Very often it is POLITICS that constitutes the main wall facing the humanitarian community
- Blurred boundaries between political and humanitarian imperatives
- Humanitarian actors compete very often in assisting victims

Knowledge sharing/learning

- Lack of links between communities and research structures for learning
- Weak dissemination structures for evidence from research
- No system-wide M&E or learning platforms/knowledge-sharing
- No systematic cycle of knowledge sharing between think tanks and civil-society/governments/INGOs and UN

- Not enough formal testing of ideas
- Many agencies only report positive impacts and not unintended negative impacts
- No links to community established before disasters – prevention
- Lack of pathways to feed information from community level up to organizational level, particularly for early warning
- University knows how to transfer the knowledge and thus prepare the communities
- DRR is known as it is approach for a behaviour
- Changing culture and behaviour by teaching people to have a new vision of the world
- University can bring new knowledge for humans

Funding/resourcing

- Funding is not consistent – being able to do the job better is limited by the lack of funding
- Resources for DRR always a problem
- Funding for DRR is limited and donors seem to put response to disaster more than to DRR activities
- For scientists, funding could be a strong wall
- Funding is the fundamental tool for partnership for university and humanitarian actors
- Lack of research funding for university students and lack of internship placements in organizations

Short termism

- 3-5 year research time scale
- Generational change requires different approach to timescale
- Short term can be applied to communities where the threat is certain in the short time

Roles/responsibilities

- Govt leadership is essential to guide and maintain such as coordination among the actors acting in humanitarian area
- Clarity on who is responsible for declaring emergency – government should but sometimes they don't want to for political reasons; NGOs can raise the alarm but can't act unless the rest of the humanitarian community acknowledges that there is an emergency

Inclusion/attitude

- Donor/UN – Government – patronisation tendencies by donors (partnerships are imbalanced)
- Unwillingness to open up to the outside as some governments are still operating closed societies

Skills gap/talent

- Lack of skills amongst humanitarian actors for effective partnership working
- NGOs find it difficult to attract the kind of people with academic credentials and organizational authority to impact partnerships at that level.
- University can help to prevent the walls and drive from A to B by the direct way possible
- By research and experience University will reduce humanitarian assistance by transferring knowledge to civil society and donors and humanitarian groups

NEXT ACTIONS

What can I commit to do next to play my part in overcoming these 'walls'?

Benedict (Tanzania)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Share with this group the outcomes of my research focused on local problems
Benedita Tech University of Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue carrying out investigation on topics of interest to communities' development and disseminate the results in a 'digestible' way to the consumer/s (communities, NGOs, Government...)
Bob UNICEF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disseminate the primary issues and the main 'Heres', 'Theres' and some of the suggested 'Solutions' to the UNICEF network in all 21 country programs in Eastern and Southern Africa in the context of how UNICEF can be a better partner in supporting Humanitarian Action including DRR. Advocate for a more relevant approach to regional inter-agency humanitarian cooperation led by OCHA.
Bogdan IOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Share the outcomes of the workshop with the IOM colleagues within the East and Southern Africa Region as well as HQ who will attend the IOM Migration Crisis Management Training scheduled in Pretoria in last week of June this year. Encourage the colleagues based in country offices to develop partnerships with other humanitarian actors taking into account the actual needs of beneficiaries and the gaps identified through the 'who does what where' approach. Advocate for increasing our interaction with Universities and looking into possible partnerships aiming at developing mitigation related studies of mutual interest.
Carsterns CDC (Malawi)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage with my Government in an interface meeting to follow up on humanitarian needs mainly by advocating for approval of the DRM policy and finalisation of the Climate Change policy.
Chernelle Lambert Stellenbosch University	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to assist in the strengthening of African Academic Networks, and bring developmental issues such as disaster risk reduction and humanitarian assistance to the fore front of our agendas.
Chris Makerere University SPH undertakings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Train professionals in DRR. Run short courses in management of public health emergencies. Research in DRR/emergencies. Networking and in DRR capacity building efforts.
Diana Moi University (Kenya)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to offer short courses to interested parties. Push for the introduction of formal MSc courses into the university. Continue to do research that I'm already doing and make myself available to organizations such as Red Cross to carry out commissioned research as long as we make an agreement about the dissemination of the results such that they are available to policy makers and also fulfil university requirements of publication.
Djillali Benouar (Algeria)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transfer the knowledge about earthquake engineering, engineering seismology and earthquake risk reduction (i.e. how to build to resist earthquakes and behave in seismic active zones) – in the framework of the activities of my Research Laboratory 'Built Environment' at the university of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene (USTHB) in Algeria.
Enyew Bahir Dar University (Ethiopia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continue to strengthen our capacity to train and generate knowledge in the area of disaster risk reduction (based of priorities) and sustainable development. Disseminate the knowledge to the needy beneficiaries. Build capacities of communities and practitioners through tailor-made short courses to respond to crises such as drought, flood and other crises. Any organisation to support such efforts is highly welcome to be our partner.
Estelle NGO SAF-FJKM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Share the key points in this meeting to the DRR community members (who implement pilot DIPECHO projects). Start to discuss with university to systemize research on key themes in DRM area. Continue to advocate for new policies on DRM towards govt with the community of NGO working on DRR thematics.

Fanja Malagasy Red Cross	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue/add more effort to integrate communities in all actions they concern. • Share some best practices and lessons learned from what we do with communities to all participants of this workshop.
Gabriel Kassenga Ardhi University	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Work closely with humanitarian organisations such as ActionAid and Red Cross in the research process for ensuring that the researches are responsive to the actual needs of the communities pertinent to enhancing their resilience to disasters. • Work in close partnership with the organisations, from defining the research problem to synthesising results, drawing conclusions and giving recommendations for effective delivery of humanitarian services in the event of disaster.
Helen Adeso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Share some papers that we have written/published on the Somalia emergency with OCHA to circulate to the rest of the participants. • Connect to other participants on LinkedIn. • Participate in future workshops and network with UN agencies in Nairobi e.g. WFP.
Jacob Songsore Ghana University	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertake more policy research and the training of the next generation of researchers who are more sensitive to DRR and humanitarian work and incorporate the OCHA resources into my Peri Peri U knowledge resource base.
James Kisia Kenya Red Cross	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involve Nairobi University more in our work especially in creating learning sites for the two organisations.
Jihan WFP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follow up acquaintances made at this workshop and elect/try that at least TWO tangible partnerships are created, in my region or beyond. • Continuously look for opportunities of synergy and formal/informal information sharing with private sector/academia/non state actors. • Share the latest activities of interest to this newly established network. A few of these include the Africa Risk Capacity, the PRX2 – a recent regional emergency preparedness simulation exercise we undertook in Johannesburg, etc. • Share the latest lessons learned of emergency response operations recently undertaken.
Jorge Pondaca UDM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consult with NGOs to assess their needs in terms of scientific and technical skills. • Assess community needs and suggestions about how to solve their humanitarian needs.
Kuda OCHA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase my interaction with non-traditional partners such as researchers and DRM experts to better understand the interface of humanitarian actions with DRR and ER. • Organize more information sharing and discussion forums and even training events for humanitarian actors.
Michael Murphree African Centre for Disaster Studies (ACDS), North West University	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ACDS is committed to providing innovative, academic and applied knowledge generation with an emphasis on DRR. We have produced "creative commons" knowledge products and provide training and capacity development in all aspects of DM and DRR. We are committed to fostering cross scale and inter institutional communication and understanding, to this end we are facilitating and hosting the inauguration of the Southern African Society for Disaster Reduction (SASDiR) which is open to all persons with an interest in DRR. This will be launched at the 10th Anniversary conference of the ACDS (October 9 - 12 2012) (www.acds.co.za). We would like to see OCHA playing an important role in accessing resources to develop and support local institutions, research, communication and capacity development. We see OCHA as a critical link between institutions like our own and other regional and global institutions particularly those within the UN system.
Misikir AHA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bring the voices of 'MY' communities to international humanitarian debates (as the focal person for humanitarian policy and advocacy in AHA). These include the voices of my communities whom I serve, my colleagues on the field and the voices of sister NGOs from elsewhere in my region. I will take these voices to UNHCR's Annual Consultation with NGOs; introduce them in the UNHCR's Structured Dialogue for enhanced partnerships; raise them at the African Union's Coordinating Committee for the Assistance of Refugees forum; and advocate for

	them at the Inter-Agency Standing Committee meetings to which I am invited to attend from time to time.
Osman (Ghana)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Network with local govt, community groups and other stakeholders to build community capacities to reduce flood risks in Ghana.
Pam (Uganda)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do my work better to ensure communities are resilient and better prepared against disaster risks (but I will need resources and more productive partnerships that are based on mutual cooperation). • Dedicate some time to train public and communities on DRR/management.
Peninah Moi University (Kenya)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Avail myself for community service, training and offer expertise to government, Ocha, National and International NGO and other practitioners with an aim to enrich DRR activities in the country and the region. • Seek further opportunities to engage staff and students at the School of Public Health in being more available to expand our existing community health and nutrition involvement with communities the university is currently working with.
Periperi University of Tana	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to enlarge our partnership with other willing stakeholders, especially with OCHA, to contribute improving the humanitarian activities impacts to beneficiaries.
Raul OCHA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue dialogue with everyone in this room. • Hold a series of regional meetings to listen and learn from the truly diverse humanitarian communities. • Do everything I can to ensure that PEOPLE (aka beneficiaries) are at the centre of everything we do.
Rui Technical University of Mozambique	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase professionalism of national NGOs to allow them to adhere to international standards of humanitarian relief work and improve their technical skills in DRR issues, especially in the areas of risk surveying as well as in the use of techniques of Conservation Farming for food production in semiarid zones.
SADC/Jean Claude Kazadi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Report to top management for more advocacies for the strengthening of the coordination and the partnership involving key stakeholders through the legal framework, taking in account the countries' experiences, expertise of the DRR team and lessons learnt from this kind of fora.
Stanley IFRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue networking and discussing issues raised here with everybody I met. Promote networking and work thru existing regional and national forums to share experiences, lesson learnt and expertise through our Red Cross networks in SADC.
Tarekegn Yehuala/Bahir Dar University	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make NGO projects a case study for the MSc. students' papers. • Assess the training needs of humanitarian organisations and NGOs and based on the need organize trainings. • Organise workshops for exchange of best practices between GOs and NGOs.
TJIPO GBCHHealth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue focused dialogue with the meeting attendees which will include invitations to attend our regional and in-country meetings. • Explore a continued dialogue with OCHA for their collaborative and active participation in our GBCHHealth October regional SSA malaria meeting , titled 'The Road to Malaria Elimination – Investment and Beyond'.
Trish	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to undertake commissioned research as well as training programmes for various spheres of government and to expand these areas of collaboration.
Xavier Chavana/ Dulce Chilundo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue to provide inputs on DDR to the SADC region: exchange of good practices, experience and information on DDR and climate change.
All of us	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Be proactive – go and look for people and create opportunities for partnering
Anon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote the sharing of ideas with other people and sharing of experiences with other Humanitarian actors. I do believe that this is the strategic best way forward to mitigate the current situations as a result of fragmentation

SUPPORT REQUIRED

Tell us what you need from OCHA to help you realise better partnerships.

Influence/advocacy

- Influence national and regional governmental policies on DRR and humanitarian space – UN is better placed to do this than individual organizations present here
- Strive harder to split the double hats of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) and ensure that there is an empowered HC in place who can boldly advocate on behalf of ALL humanitarian actors

Knowledge creation/dissemination

- Invest very much in advancing knowledge creation and dissemination pertaining to DRR rather than focus much of your resources on responses
- Provide opportunities for sharing output of this forum with other regions e.g. West Africa, Asia

Education/training

- Investment in education and training is necessary to universities for research and teaching in humanitarian affairs
- OCHA seems to have a lot of money for coordinating humanitarian assistance; it should invest some of this money in education by funding ongoing and new educational programs
- This meeting is a good indicator that the OCHA is keen on listening to the higher education institutions in Africa – keep this up as it is important to hear the perspectives of knowledge producers as we also work with communities on daily basis and have a good feel of the situation on the ground with communities

Linkages/collaboration


- Provide linkages with relevant international organisations at the local/regional levels to the universities presented in this meeting so that the universities can start to talk to other practitioners on the ground, since OCHA may know where other practitioners are located and what they are doing which the university may not now
- More consultations that will lead to a project for networking and building community capacities for reducing flood risks in Ghana
- Strive to ensure that there are experienced NGO people on its HC pool roster to call upon to lead specific emergencies if/when they occur

Suggestions for the possible continuation of this forum.

- Africa Centre for Disaster Studies 10 year anniversary in October – launching Southern Africa Society for Risk Reduction; open forum to include all practitioners, academics to provide the innovative communication we referred to earlier
- Regional Anti-Malaria meeting in October – gateway to private sector actors in the region so that the humanitarian contribution is not an 'afterthought'
- Periperi U – constitutes an important think tank for Africa in terms of DRR – continue this connection
- Periperi U – should be involved in all discussions and eventually for DRR activities in Africa
- Provide the basis for thinking of change in humanitarian affairs
- Provide the basis for agreeing on change; need to involve more organizations and include private sector
- Involve members in further consultations/initiatives/activities and discussions on the continent, in order to continue sharing and benefiting from evidence-based research activities and innovative DRR research outputs ongoing in different institutions

ANNEX: FEEDBACK

Participants provided anonymous feedback through both surveys and open-ended questions.



Note: 'Acceptable' is a good strong result

What did you like about this workshop?

Productivity and scope

- Brought important issues surrounding 'humanitarian partnerships'
- Considerable amount discussed in short period of time and fairly clear outcomes. Well done!
- Good general discussion about listening and understanding the role of higher education in humanitarian affairs
- Opportunity to interact with other stakeholders working on risk reduction and humanitarian action
- Outcome in terms of content will be a lot and great – well appreciated
- Productivity of the workshop
- Really enjoyed some of the presentations from various organisations. I learned a lot that I can use in my lectures to students about what the realities are out there in the humanitarian world
- Strategic thinking
- Very informative
- Well organised as regional platform of sharing regional ideas and the corresponding promising best practices in a consistent and academic manner

Engagement and interaction

- Energy level was very high
- Engaging dialogue
- First time I saw EVERYBODY contributing equally
- High level interaction through professional facilitation and democratic discussion
- I will now more closely collaborate/coordinate with my colleagues who are in the humanitarian field to better serve the communities
- Interaction with people with vast knowledge and experience in emergency and disaster risk reduction
- Interactive
- Interactive nature of the workshop. You have managed to make everybody contribute. This is excellent
- Interactivity
- My perspectives and practices will change after this workshop – I will emphasise more elaborate partnership in my efforts

- Sharing experiences with others
- Very interactive exercise which has contributed to build trust and partnership
- Way people have been invited to participate actively
- Wonderful to have honest and open dialogue

Participants

- Broad level of expertise among participants
- Brought together a diverse group of people and that it was overwhelmingly participants from Africa with minimal 'international' participation
- Extremely good to have met so many different actors. Opened a world of opportunities
- Meet other actors on Disaster and to learn from them
- Meeting a lot of new people who are involved in humanitarian work
- Meeting a lot of people representing different organisations and having different views which can assist in the way we do things
- Opportunity for academics to express their opinion with practitioners

Facilitation

- Facilitation methods
- Rahul is an excellent facilitator provoking thought and pushing people to think outside the box
- Facilitation was excellent
- Facilitators were well organised and giving clear and precise direction on what had to be done
- Facilitators were the best ever
- Way it is facilitated

Methodology

- Focus on linking to the objectives throughout and capturing the inputs 'on the fly' has been commendable
- Format was totally unexpected and quite new to me; I rather like it. It is very intensive and requires a fresh mind and not a tired one
- How it was structured going from overviews of our respective region(s) and working down to individual commitments at the participant level
- Idea of a short presentation before breaking into group work
- Innovative approach to the conduct of workshop
- Intimate discussion through small 'work tables'
- Layout of the workshop allowed real time iteration and discussion and teasing out issues
- Methodology and the way it is conducted – the facilitation and the technology
- Methodology was very good – it enabled participants to freely give their opinions and views without any inhibitions
- Manner in which knowledge and information was produced
- Structure and innovative approach
- Very clear about the goals to be achieved

Technology

- Appreciate the working group (collaborative TIC system used)
- Effectiveness of the methodology used to gather opinions
- Enjoyed the innovative technology used to gather everyone's thoughts and comments
- How everybody was able to forward his/her idea unlimitedly
- Innovative technology
- Interesting way of capturing things as they go through the people's thoughts
- More interactive method based on ITC
- Using private sector tools to help us with our humanitarian challenges
- Very useful way to make sense of our work

What would you do differently and better next time?

Nothing

- Format is conducive for dialogue so no need to change it
- If the proceedings are to be distributed to all participants I would change nothing
- None
- Nothing
- Nothing – all good
- Topic is universally important so it should remain the same

Participants

- More actors – community representative and private sector can enrich the outcomes of the next workshop
- More diversity – make sure the right people are in the room
- More NGOs and fewer academics (maybe just one or two people to represent PeriPeri U not everybody)
- More partners for planning and response
- More people from the private sector may have been beneficial to see things from their perspective
- More private sector and government to observe or participate
- More women participants – only 13 out of 42 in the room (including facilitator)
- Perhaps broaden the group to include other key actors such as government

Introductions

- Allow time for introductions at the start of the workshop – not everybody was wearing a name tag so people who did participate in the PeriPeri U workshop were disadvantaged
- Introductions would have been good in the beginning to help us all be at ease with each other and know who's in the room. There was an assumption that the participants knew each other and that the facilitators also knew all the participants which was not an accurate assumption. It borders on taking people for granted!! This kind of intense thinking is worth compensating for next time

Clarifying objectives/setting expectations

- Have proper introduction and lay out the expectations that the organizers have in mind. What really did OCHA want to achieve from this meeting? It would have been important to also explain to the participants what the information collected here would be used? Draft policy? Program change? It's not clear if OCHA would like a CONCRETE partnership with the universities in Africa in knowledge generation or training in any other form?
- I was never clear about the objectives of this workshop. This needed to be better articulated. I am already involved in many collaborations and partnerships and committed to the communities in which I work and to the students whose awareness to human issues I am awakening so it was unclear to me why I should need to change or 'improve' my practice or commit to something new without some kind of mutual benefit
- More clear objective of the forum

Planning and preparation

- Agenda changed from the original one sent
- Don't change the agenda at the last minute
- Difficult question and broad issues I think you did very well. Next step maybe we can ask think institutions to suggest a structure?
- Provide more background information to the participants on the specific themes/concepts
- Supportive document before the kind of forum will be appreciate next time
- Tighter organization and coordination with partners in planning. Broader consultations ahead of time to address and devise the agenda

Format

- Filter out important ideas in each and every exercise so that we can also learn better from others
- More discussion about each session regarding the discussion and thoughts put down on the computer
- More exchanges and interactions with all the participants not necessarily those around my table
- More plenary discussions – technology was good for capturing people's thoughts and comments but there was little opportunity for debate
- More 'plenary' type discussion? Still not sure what OCHA will use this for and how?
- More smaller conversations
- More time for reflection and then create group discussion
- More time to presentations such that participants gather more views that would be used in their discussions
- Present fewer issues to give people time to go more deeply in discussions
- Sharing and exchange with more participants

Facilitation

- Main facilitator more open to other 'different' or maybe 'opposite' ideas and views of the participants
- In certain cases it seemed sometimes forceful the way we were coaxed to give answers – there should be room for creativity in a somewhat unstructured way

Technology


- Number of laptops are few

Time

- A bit more time
- Allocation of time for more sharing of the existent ideas and promising best regional practices
- Issues discussed could not be discussed in exhausted within one and half days
- Programme was too tight and demanding with a little room for breathing


Logistics

- Allow more space for circulation
- Better food
- Hard alcohol
- Information about admin arrangements




UNOCHA Regional Workshop on Humanitarian Partnership Eastern and Southern Africa
 Misikir Tilahun
 Head of Programmes
 14-15 June 2012

African...



spirit **concept** **composition**


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Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA)

- A non-governmental organisation based in Ethiopia that provides lifesaving programmes and services for displaced communities across Africa.
- AHA's programmes are divided into 6 categories that address the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs):
 - ✓ Capacity Development
 - ✓ Health Care
 - ✓ HIV/AIDS
 - ✓ Gender Based Violence
 - ✓ Relief & Recovery
 - ✓ Humanitarian Policy & Advocacy
- Since 1994, AHA has extended its services to 17 countries; its main services in East Africa are based in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan.


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Ethiopia

- Support to displaced communities from Eritrea and Somalia seeking refuge in Ethiopia's *Asajiyta, Berhale, Adi Harush, Bokolomayo, Malkadida* and *Kobe* refugee camps.
- These services reach over 70,000 Somali and Eritrean refugees.
- Through partnerships with the Government of Ethiopia, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other NGOs, AHA has been able to support refugees by providing shelter, water and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, and non-formal education services.


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Somalia

- Since September 2011, AHA's projects in Mogadishu have been conducted in partnership with a Somali national NGO and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia.
- The projects, which reach over 450,000 IDPs, provide:
 - Water, sanitation and hygiene interventions, and
 - Nutrition/health support for mothers and children under the age of five.


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Sudan

- AHA's two main sites of operation are in Darfur and Blue Nile State.
- In these sites, AHA provides services that deal with relief and recovery, capacity development, and healthcare for over 700,000 IDPs and returnees.
- Interventions in Sudan are carried out in partnerships with various agencies of the Government of Sudan, UNHCR, WFP, FAO and international and national NGOs.


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Key Challenges


- Lack of independent resources, which limits:
 - Institutional growth and capacity;
 - Ability to scale up existing interventions during emergencies;
 - Ability to dispatch rapid response teams to new areas;
 - Ability to bring contributions to projects when entering into new partnership agreements – creates a tone of dependency rather than equality (contractor vs. partner);
 - Efficiency in programme implementation

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Key Challenges (Cont'd.)

- A shrinking “humanitarian space”
 - Physical access that aid agencies have to affected populations;
 - The extent to which agencies are able to adhere to the core principles of humanitarian action;
 - Security conditions – i.e., the nature of the ‘operating environment’ that agencies work in;
 - The ability of affected populations to reach needed lifesaving assistance and protection.




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Key Challenges (Cont'd.)


- Operational challenges
 - High prices of materials;
 - Unavailability of local markets (lack of variety/quality in supplies);
 - Lack of adequate drug and laboratory supplies;
 - Unavailability of skilled workers;
 - Rough access roads;
 - Weather – protracted dry or rainy seasons



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THANK YOU!



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Lessons from the 2011 famine in Somalia: key issues & challenges in humanitarian response

Presentation by Helen Altshul, Regional Program Director, Adeso
OCHA REGIONAL WORKSHOP ON HUMANITARIAN PARTNERSHIP
EASTERN & SOUTHERN AFRICA
JUNE 14-15, STELLENBOSCH, SOUTH AFRICA

OVERVIEW OF THE 2011 FAMINE IN SOMALIA

- ❑ Most dire humanitarian situation in the world
- ❑ Mass exodus of people
- ❑ High level of malnutrition
- ❑ Approx 750,000 people at risk of starvation
- ❑ 6 regions affected by the famine, later downgraded to 3
- ❑ Famine amidst insecurity from militia groups
- ❑ Lack of access & monitoring challenges
- ❑ Confusing counter-terrorism legislation

EARLY WARNING SIGNS

- Immense potential for cash transfers to provide humanitarian relief at scale
- Many early warning signs of a looming food crisis – by February 2011 clear that major food crisis was looming
- **BUT** took months for humanitarian community to employ cash transfers as alternative to food aid



EARLY WARNING SIGNS

- Large-scale food aid was not feasible
- Advocacy efforts for adoption of cash at scale were initiated in March 2011 & yet the large-scale use of cash only from August 2011 onwards (took famine declaration)
- Famine declared on 20th July – HCT endorsed principles of cash programming on July 25th
- Vast majority of cash responses implemented from September 2011 onwards



POTENTIAL RISKS WITH CASH

- **Market elasticity & potential inflationary effects** – no evidence of previous inflationary effects, FSNAU & FEWSNET reports supported use of cash in South central Somalia
- **Risk of aid diversion** – but existing cash transfer system through Hawalas
- **Risks in ability to monitor** – previous experience showed M&E possible
- **Risks in targeting** (overcoming power structures) – proven methodology existed

FLAWS IN THE SYSTEM

- **Fear of mistakes:** despite evidence, major reluctance of humanitarian community to use cash at scale early on.
- **Risk aversion:** Defending the decision to use cash overshadowed well-established track record in meeting relief needs effectively.
- **Remote management:** almost no international staff in Somalia – desensitization
- **Trust deficit:** barriers between local & international organizations

SOUTH CENTRAL SOMALIA CASH CONSORTIUM

- 2011–2012 Globally, Somalia had the largest cash transfer program implemented by NGOs
- As per Inter Cluster Cash Coordination, \$88 million transferred in different forms of cash (Aug 11 – May 12)
- Cash Consortium transferred \$25 million in unconditional grants (Sep 2011 to April 2012)
- Cash Consortium is planning to implement phase II (May – Oct 2012)
- Preliminary analysis shows positive impacts

M&E System

- Traditional M&E possible in the region
- Cash Consortium – common M&E framework adopted by 5 other INGOs (9 agencies total)
- 3 levels: process, market, impact
- Tools: monthly & quarterly PDMs, weekly market price monitoring, complaints mechanism
- ODI independently analyzes & reports on M&E data & cross references with FSNAU & FEWS-NET
- Independent field monitors
- Triangulation

LESSONS LEARNED



- Partnerships between INGOs was key to success
- Coordination with other players helped spread the intervention

LESSONS LEARNED

- Somalia experience illustrates that many of the barriers to use cash at scale & to respond early & effectively to crisis are not based on lack of evidence, but on lack of leadership in the face of risk aversion.

LESSONS LEARNED



LESSONS LEARNED

- Proper training for all field staff in beneficiary selection/targeting & the logistics of distribution is essential to the success of the intervention.
- A consortium approach is highly encouraged because it breeds combined learning, a common M&E system, compliance to donors & promotes technical quality all of which were key to the success of the intervention

CONCLUSION

- When lives are endangered, the humanitarian community needs to act quickly & effectively.
- The current system breeds a sense of conformity: everyone is nervous, & those who are innovative tend to get frustrated – so they either leave or assimilate or are the lone voice in a big room.
- Humanitarian reform needs to look at how we ensure that few personalities do not drive change, action & innovation, but that instead the system as a whole is open & receptive & willing to act in that manner.

THANK YOU

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Republic of Mozambique

**MOZAMBIQUE FLOOD MANAGEMENT
THE BUZI WARNING SYSTEM**

Stellenbosh, 15.6.12

Dulce Chilundo
dfchilundo@gmail.com


15/06/12 Annex

Background

Mozambique

- Location:** Southern Africa eastern coast (10 ° 27 'e 26 ° 52' south and 30 ° 12 'e 40 ° 51' east)
- Surface:** 799.380 km² and 2.700 km of coast line
- Population:** 20,5 million (47,7% Man and 52,3% Woman);
 - 68,5% of population is rural;
 - 31,5% urban;


Official Language: PORTUGUESE




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MAIN THREATS


Cyclones




Floods



Droughts




Earthquakes



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
Disaster: Rate of Occurrence



Event	Records
Floods	913
Drought	757
Epidemic	622
Conflict: Humans-Wild life	454
Forest fire	368
Pest	363
Rain	189
Storm-Wind	183
Cyclone	174
Storm	140
Total	4158

- Over the last 30 years Mozambique experienced around 25 events types
- The table shows the top 10 over the last 10 years.

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


Nine transboundary rivers

Floods

15/06/12 Annex

MAJOR FLOODS



Year	River Basin	Death	Affected
1985	Pungue, umbeluzi, Maputo, Incomati, Zambeze		
1997	Motomoli, Licungo, Lurio		
1998	Govuro	23	70.000
1999	Umbeluzi, Incomati, Limpopo, Pungue, Zambeze, Lugela		400.000
2000	Limpopo, Incomati, Umbeluzi, Save, Buzi	699	4.500.000
2001	Pungue, Zambeze, Chire, Licungo	113	553.000
2006	Zambeze		
2007	Zambeze, Buzi	0	181.000
2008/09	Zambeze, Pungue, Buzi, Save, Lucungo, Messalo	9	102.000
2010-2011	Zambezi, Limpopo, Incomati	13	121.000
2011	Incomati, Limpopo		

FLOODS: 1980 / 2012

15/06/12 Annex

EARLY WARNING FLOODING SYSTEM

After the devastating floods caused by the tropical **cyclone Eline** in February 2000, Mozambique decided to implement a disaster risk management (DRM) structure for monitoring *floods, cyclone, droughts* and other events. For instance, the *cyclone warning system (CWS)* and an *Inter-District Operational Flood Warning System (SIDPABB)*, are well established, functioning and known at community level in Mozambique

The flood warning system consists of three components:

- *Measurements* (water level every 6 hours along the stations of the main rivers)
- *Data analysis at the forecasting centre*
- *Local DRM committees prepared to take actions*

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INTERDISTRICTAL FLOODING WARNING SYSTEM - SIDPABB

PRODER
Programa de Desenvolvimento Rural Gestão de Risco de Calamidades (GRC)
Disaster Risk Management (DRM)

Sistema Interdistrital de Aviso Prévio da Bacia do Rio Buzi (SIDPABB)

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THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE SIDPABB

First component – Consist of components operated in various stations for observation/monitoring of weather parameters: temperature, precipitation, water flow and levels along the rivers stations

Second Component – The center of data analysis installed in Buzi that makes the forecast and disseminates the information within the **district** as well as to the regional center and the national level. Action starts if there is a **warning of danger** coming down stream. The communities start working

Third Component- The local government make decisions and disseminate the information and messages via **radios, Local Committees for Disaster Risk Management, and megaphones**. Evacuation is prepared to happen two days in advance to flooding.

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INTERDISTRICTAL FLOODING WARNING SYSTEM - SIDPABB

- The work is done in voluntary basis;
- The Local Committee is made of 15 to 18 members of the community and is lead by the community leader;
- The Local Committee receives a Kit of instruments/equipment to be used for disaster response: vests, megaphone, identification cards;
- *Each member plays a role and it can be interchanged*

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Members of the Local Committee i) reading the scale; ii) sending flood warning to communities via radio

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WHO MANAGES THE SIDPABB

Training of the Local Committees for Disaster Risk Management

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Main Achievements

1. The methodology used in Búzi SIDPABB has proven to be efficient and meeting all disaster preparedness and response standards.

2. Buzi experience is under expansion to other districts at high risk of flooding:

- Caia and Chemba districts along the Zambeze river
- Govuro district along Save river.

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Annex

OBRIGADO!

MERCY!

THANK YOU!

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Annex

MANAGING FLOODS IN MOZAMBIQUE : THE ROLE OF RECENT INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS





XAVIER AGOSTINHO CHAVANA
Ministry of Planning and Development
Mozambique




Presentation to OCHA's Regional Consultation,
 Stellenbosch, June 2012

PRESENTATION OUTLINE

1. **IMPACTS OF NATURAL DISASTERS IN MOZAMBIQUE: 2000-2009**
 - A quick look at the 2000 floods
2. **FLOOD MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: PAST AND PRESENT**
 - Water governance
 - Institutional arrangements
3. **FLOOD RESPONSE AND THE ROLE OF LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS**
 - From regional forecast to local action
4. **HUMANITARIAN AID VERSUS DEVELOPMENT**
 - The place of resettlement programs

2





Thank you