

Humanitarian Coalition Philippines Typhoon Appeal – *PART B: LITERATURE REVIEW*



October 2, 2015

SvN rePlan

SvN rePlan

SvN, rePlan
110 Adelaide Street East
Toronto, ON
M5C 1K9

www.svn-ap.com

Contact: Jason Petrunia, jpetrunia@svn-ap.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	1
LIST OF ACRONYMS	1
PART B: LITERATURE REVIEW	3
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
2.0 OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW	8
3.0 LIMITATIONS OF THE REVIEW	9
4.0 OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF, AND RESPONSE TO, TYPHOON HAIYAN	9
4.1 Impact	9
4.2 Response	10
4.3 Response Timelines – First Response to Early Recovery	10
5.0 LITERATURE REVIEW	11
5.1 Cross Cutting Issues Impacting Urban Interventions	11
5.2 Livelihoods Programming and Urban Contexts	17
5.3 WASH Programming and Urban Contexts	19
5.4 Shelter Programming and Urban Contexts	21
6.0 CONCLUSIONS OF THIS REVIEW	29

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Discussion Paper and Literature Review was produced by the **SvN** and **rePlan** team of Jason Petrunia, Aaron Budd, Robyn Barron and Ruth McCormack. This work could not have been possible without the cooperation of the Humanitarian Coalition and its members; Care, Oxfam Canada, Oxfam Quebec, Plan and Save the Children.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ASDW	A Single Drop for Safe Water
CFW	Cash for Work
CRRP	Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan
DFATD	Department of Foreign Affairs Trade and Development
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DFID RRF	Department for International Development Rapid Response Facility
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DZ	Dwell Zone
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERL	Early Recovery & Livelihoods (Cluster)
FSAC	Food Security & Agriculture Cluster
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GFSC	Global Food Security Cluster
GPH	Government of Philippines
HC	Humanitarian Coalition
HRC	Humanitarian Response Consortium
HRN	Humanitarian Response Network
HumEx	Humanitarian Expertise
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
LGU	Local Government Unit
NBZ	No Build Zone
NDZ	Non-Dwell Zone
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPARR	Office for the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
UCG	Unconditional Cash Grants
UN	United Nations
VAW	Violence Against Women
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

PART B: LITERATURE REVIEW

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Objectives

This literature review has been developed with the objective of identifying and outlining some of the key best practices, common challenges and lessons learned from urban Shelter, WASH, and Livelihoods interventions undertaken in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. Documentation for this review is drawn from materials provided directly by Humanitarian Coalition (HC) member organizations, and those available in the public domain.

Limitations

Given that the subject matter of this review is concerned with urban interventions, it has become clear over the course of the review that there is a relative paucity of urban-specific learning and references within the materials available. For example, many of the evaluations and project reports cover programming that was undertaken in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas simultaneously, but make very little explicit reference to urban specific work. The authors extrapolated two types of information from the documents reviewed in order to identify key learnings and best practices relevant for urban programming:¹

- 1) Lessons learned and/or best practices identified by humanitarian agencies themselves and/or government/local partners as key for effective urban programming;
- 2) Key Issues with the capacity to negatively or positively affect the effectiveness of urban interventions if not properly addressed – either for the beneficiary population or for surrounding areas.²

Impact

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines on November 8th 2013, affecting over 14 million people. Over 6,000 people were killed, and more than 4.1 million people were displaced, with homes, livelihoods and infrastructure destroyed or damaged on a vast scale. Total losses were estimated at up to US\$2 billion, affecting major urban centres as well as rural areas – including Tacloban City and its population of over 200,000. Over 1.4 million houses were damaged, with around 50% of these being totally destroyed. Displacement was not only linked to damaged housing, but also to community social structures that had been significantly changed as a result of high mortality and migration patterns following the typhoon.

Response and Transition to Recovery

There is general recognition (e.g. IASC, HumEx, DEC/HC, UNICEF) that the transition from relief to recovery was less successful overall, encountering challenges in terms of responding and adapting to changing needs and coordinating assistance. However, despite the magnitude of the disaster, pre-existing levels of poverty and difficulties transitioning to the recovery phase, *“the response to Typhoon Haiyan took place in an environment of significant resilience and rapid self-recovery among affected communities.”*

¹ In those cases where the reporting and analysis reviewed addresses all of urban, peri-urban and rural contexts.

² Based on the authors’ experience as humanitarian workers, urban planners, livelihoods and shelter experts (in urban settings)

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

Literature Review Findings

Findings focused on cross cutting issues for urban interventions, shelter, wash and livelihoods. Main findings include:

1. Cross Cutting Issues Impacting Urban Interventions

Current Gaps in Urban Specific Understanding & Experience

There was relatively little urban-specific learning identified in the literature, this may reflect difficulties or capacity gaps amongst implementing agencies in terms of experience and understanding of working in urban environments.

Challenges in the Transition from Response to Recovery

The literature noted a number of challenges in making this transition, including a need for greater flexibility and adaptability so that responses can better respond to populations' fast-changing needs – for example, by integrating early recovery support into emergency packages from the outset. This was identified as a key element in addressing the challenges affecting response and recovery, particularly in urban areas where communities were more geographically diffuse even if space was more densely populated.

Coordination with Local Government and Local Partners

Although national NGOs were among the first responders, overall there was limited engagement with national NGOs and civil-society. Where they were in place, pre-existing partnerships did play an important role in enabling member organisations to initiate joint approaches, including in fostering LGU leadership. This highlighted the importance of doing more to develop relationships with local and municipal partners in order to extend impacts extend well beyond the life of the emergency and support recovery in on longer term change – for example, in responses supporting municipal water supplies.

Beneficiary Targeting, Participation and Community-Based Approaches

The GFSC noted that targeting was one of the biggest gaps for urban programming as existing social protection systems were not sufficient to reach all vulnerable households. This can be addressed in the future by adapting targeting methodologies so that they draw on a wider range of municipal service and population information to develop the urban analysis and targeting criteria. Suggestions were also made with regards to geographical targeting, ie. neighbourhood and surrounding areas.

Emergency to Early Recovery – The Need for Integrated Programming and Donor Flexibility

The benefits of integrated programming in urban areas, particularly with regards to shelter, livelihoods and WASH (sanitation provision), as well as from response to recovery, were repeatedly noted in the literature (e.g. Shelter Cluster). Given the interrelated and interdependent nature of services and recovery rates, flexibility in funding would allow service providers to use funds for non-traditional humanitarian activities that can improve first phase response and its transition into early recovery across affected urban areas surrounding regions.

2. Livelihoods Programming and Urban Contexts

Challenges in Designing Urban Livelihoods Programs

Difficulties in identifying and classifying urban livelihoods, reliance on external factors such as a supply of imported goods, and the high diversity of urban livelihoods available and/or required of people, contributed to challenges in determining appropriate interventions.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

Challenges in Timing, Transition and Sustainable Solutions

Overall the transition to early and longer-term recovery of livelihoods was slow and underfunded. There were recommendations for earlier and more tailored approaches to livelihoods restoration and, in urban areas, a focus for developing solutions for non-agricultural contexts was also recommended. Linking livelihoods programs with local social protection mechanisms and municipal services is a potential area of opportunity for improving urban-specific livelihoods interventions

Cash Programming

An estimated 40% of the response to Haiyan was delivered through cash transfers, making it one of the largest cash-based humanitarian responses ever. In urban areas the use of cash and vouchers was considered to be particularly effective. **Unconditional cash grants** were used at scale by some agencies from an early stage, however reports recommended better strategic planning and coordination of unconditional cash in the early relief phase for food and shelter. **Cash for Work** was used to successfully contribute to meeting immediate needs and restoring infrastructure, however, reports noted that long-term use of CFW was not appropriate, especially in urban areas. In urban areas, recovery is tied to local economic opportunities as much as access to supplies, materials and services. Some reports noted that a good practice is to accompany cash support with support to municipalities engineering and/or technical guidance.

3. WASH Programming and Urban Contexts

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

A number of agencies worked with Metropolitan Water Departments to restore municipal water supplies within a week of the disaster, an intervention that has been widely noted for its effectiveness in rapidly enabling safe water access at scale for urban centres. Sanitation provision was not as successful with a continuing need to address medium to long-term capacity for sewage management. Reports indicated that providing additional support to municipal authorities and service providers responsible for sewage management would be a best practice for future urban-based relief and recovery responses.

Relief to Recovery

The Haiyan response was seen as an opportunity to improve on the pre-Haiyan situation, and ambitions went beyond humanitarian needs to address pre-existing sanitation and healthcare issues. It was also recommended that, in urban areas, it is important to ensure that WASH committees are linked to municipal water services and governance systems.

Debris Clearance & Waste Management – Environmental & Health Risks

As debris and poorly maintained dumpsites posed environmental and health risks, technical support was provided to LGUs. It was recommended that there be continued support provided to address the need for capacity-building in waste management in the medium to long-term given the elevated risks this poses for densely populated areas.

4. Shelter Programming and Urban Contexts

Environmental Impacts and Reconstruction in Urban Areas

The level of reconstruction required after a disaster on the scale of Haiyan inevitably places stresses on natural resources, particularly around urban areas with large populations and high concentrations of damage. Reports recommended developing regional master plans that consider growth, water, energy, and waste systems as

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

tools of reconstruction to ensure humanitarian responses leave positive impacts in surrounding areas, rather than accidentally creating harm.

Relocation and Resettlement

The importance of livelihoods in relocation planning was repeatedly cited as one of the most critical factors in relocation activities. Identifying sufficient land to house requires significant investment and planning to ensure that adequate services are in place, connected to existing urban plans, and structured so they contribute to future urban growth instead of adding to sprawl or informal settlements. Reports also noted that resettlement processes should be inclusive and include effective land use planning to reduce the risk of future displacement or evictions.

No Build/No Dwelling Zones

The issue of whether households could legally rebuild on land they occupied before the typhoon caused confusion for agencies and for families living in these areas, many of whom were informal settlers³, and has been a central question in planning shelter and settlement assistance. This meant that flexible programmatic approaches were required, based around longer-term solutions where possible, as it was not clear when resettlement may occur.

Land Rights & Secure Tenure

Haiyan increased the number of households without formal tenure arrangements and the commitment to build back better requires measures to provide land tenure security as part of relocation and resettlement efforts and recovery programs. Reports recommended that housing, land and property rights and solutions should feature prominently in strategic and operational planning from the outset, particularly in densely populated urban areas with a variety of tenure and planning regimes. This could be done by using staged approaches for formalizing resettlement sites and/or managing incremental growth in urban areas.

Coping Strategies and Self-Recovery

Shelter kits for self-recovery were considered a welcome advance on the transitional shelter approach however needs assessments reported that some regions were more prone to negative coping strategies, including the accrual of debt, than others. The Shelter Cluster noted that if self-recovery *“was achieved through an increase in household debt, particularly if this is high-interest, then this could affect resilience to future shocks in the longer term”*.

Technical Assistance & Building Back Better

Monitoring showed that household self-build efforts were usually “building back worse” with potentially dangerous dwellings being rebuilt. Beyond the satisfaction levels of the assisted population, the reality is that the outcome of the shelter assistance that has reached households has not led to minimum levels of safety or adequacy for much of the population. The most appropriate role for the humanitarian community is in the provision of technical assistance rather than direct materials, supplies or services.

Conclusions of the Review

Key lessons and best practices learned from Haiyan response and recovery interventions include:

³ IFRC; UN-Habitat; UNHCR. (2014). *Shelter Projects 2013-2014*. Retrieved from http://sheltercasestudies.org/shelterprojects2013-2014/Shelterprojects_2013-14_Lowres_WEB.pdf

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

- The potential positive effects of using regional and/or area based approaches for program design and implementation in higher density urban areas;
- The benefits of partnering with local and municipal partners in designing and implementing response frameworks;
- The need to connect immediate interventions with larger regional and local urban planning frameworks;
- The effectiveness of integrated livelihoods, WASH and Shelter approaches (that cross sectoral lines) that provide for affected populations' immediate needs while also connecting to longer term municipal services, urban growth plans, and economic and DRR initiatives;
- The importance of tenure security, appropriate municipal service systems and modified, developmental approaches to livelihoods as the cornerstones of integrated, holistic urban responses; and
- The need for donor and program flexibility so as to effectively transition between emergency and recovery support and/or between first phase response and support activities (ie. those activities essential for ensuring humanitarian responses – such as water provision – are built into municipal systems).

2.0 OBJECTIVES OF THE REVIEW

This literature review has been developed with the objective of identifying and outlining **some of the key best practices, common challenges and lessons learned from urban Shelter, WASH, and Livelihoods interventions undertaken in response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines**. Documentation for this review has been drawn from materials provided directly by Humanitarian Coalition (HC) member organizations, and those available in the public domain (accessed through online searches), including evaluations, reviews, project reports, briefing notes, monitoring reports and technical guidance materials⁴ (see Annex 1 for a full list of the documents reviewed).

The findings of this literature review will form the basis for a companion Policy Discussion Paper for the HC, member agencies, Canadian donors and humanitarian actors. The discussion paper aims to provide recommendations for:⁵

- Supporting Canada-based agencies in implementing “best practice” urban WASH, Shelter and Livelihoods interventions with a view towards transition and reconstruction;
- Aiding Canadian donors to better support effective, efficient urban humanitarian WASH, Shelter and Livelihoods interventions.

3.0 LIMITATIONS OF THE REVIEW

As noted above, the materials for this review are restricted to those documents provided by HC members, and other relevant documents available in the public domain. The authors are aware that there is likely a significant amount of relevant information that is either not publically available, or has not been shared by HC members and that, therefore, falls outside of the scope of this review and the accompanying discussion paper.

With regards to the materials shared by HC members, some agencies provided more substantial, detailed and/or relevant documentation, while others provided less. This has led the review to draw on learnings from certain agencies more than others – potentially limiting its applicability to some of the HC members. Where possible, the authors attempted to complement missing information through some of the relevant, publicly available documents.

While it would have been useful to conduct key informant interviews as part of the review process, timing and the resource limitations for this review led the HC and the authors to agree that interviews were outside the scope of work for this consultancy. Resource constraints also meant the SOW for this review was limited to a small sub set of documents available, namely: **evaluations and learning documents** related to **Shelter, Livelihoods and WASH** interventions in **urban areas** and part of the **Haiyan response**. Any documents that did not respond to all four criteria were excluded from the review.

It is important to note that gender, GBV and Protection (including disability) are largely missing from this Literature Review. Though there is substantial documentation regarding gender, GBV and Protection issues in the Haiyan response in general, the authors were largely unable to identify any information relevant for the scope of literature cited in the SOW regarding how these topics were addressed as part of **urban specific**

⁴ As per the TORs for this assignment.

⁵ These objectives were shifted from the original objectives in the TOR. The changes were made in consultation with the HC to better reflect the lessons learned and findings from the accompanying literature review.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

interventions (as opposed to being a component of general good practice); ie. with regards to land and housing rights, livelihoods, mobility or access to services, targeting, etc. **in urban areas**. While the authors' experiences as humanitarian and urban specialists lead them to believe that gender, GBV and protection are key elements of urban responses – and that they were likely considered and included by agencies' in ways specific to the urban context – the lack of literature available to the authors detailing what this looked like in urban areas mean that these topics are highly limited and/or absent from this review. The authors hope that additional documents addressing these topics can be provided and/or included in future iterations of urban related literature reviews.

The search for documentation uncovered more in relation to shelter and livelihoods as compared to WASH, which is reflected in the balance of the content in the review. This is due in part to the notable repository of Haiyan documents available from the Shelter Cluster, but may also be attributable to the fact that shelter and livelihoods were a more significant feature of the response in terms of scale, challenges and priorities/needs.

Given that the subject matter of this review is concerned with urban interventions, it has become clear over the course of the review that **there is a relative paucity of urban-specific learning and references within the materials available**. For example, many of the evaluations and project reports cover programming that was undertaken in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas simultaneously, but make very little explicit reference to urban specific work. Though this makes it difficult to identify which specific findings agencies viewed as particularly relevant for their urban interventions, the authors extrapolated two types of information from the documents reviewed in order to identify key learnings and best practices relevant for urban programming:⁶

- 1) Lessons learned and/or best practices identified by humanitarian agencies themselves and/or government/local partners as key for effective urban programming;
- 2) Key Issues with the capacity to negatively or positively affect the effectiveness of urban interventions if not properly addressed – either for the beneficiary population or for surrounding areas.⁷

4.0 OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF, AND RESPONSE TO, TYPHOON HAIYAN

4.1 Impact

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the Philippines on November 8th 2013, affecting over 14 million people. Over 6,000 people were killed, and more than 4.1 million people were displaced, with homes, livelihoods and infrastructure were destroyed or damaged on a vast scale. Total losses were estimated at up to US\$2 billion, affecting major urban centres as well as rural areas – including Tacloban City and its population of over 200,000.⁸ Over 1.4 million houses were damaged, with around 50% of these being totally destroyed. Displacement was not only linked to damaged housing, but also to community social structures that had been significantly changed as a result of high mortality and migration patterns following the typhoon.⁹

According to assessments,¹⁰ prior to the disaster over half of the affected population had been living in dwellings that offered little protection from climate hazards. In the period after the typhoon, many displaced people ended up living in emergency bunkhouses (managed by the government), tented camps, or with host

⁶ In those cases where the reporting and analysis reviewed addresses all of urban, peri-urban and rural contexts.

⁷ Based on the authors' experience as humanitarian workers, urban planners, livelihoods and shelter experts (in urban settings)

⁸ OCHA. (2014, June). *Philippines - Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda: Environmental Assessment Final Report and Recommendations*.

⁹ OCHA; UNEP. (2014). *Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) Philippines, Environmental Situational Overview*.

¹⁰ REACH; ARC. (2014, April). *Groundtruthing Open Streetmap Building Damage Assessment - Haiyan Typhoon: Final Assessment Report*.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

families. However, the majority opted to remain on-site of their damaged or destroyed homes, living in self-constructed temporary shelters. The areas most affected by Haiyan were largely those with higher poverty incidence rates than the national average (approximately four out of ten families in most affected provinces were living below the poverty line), resulting in social and economic vulnerability. Many had no savings and lost all or most of their assets. Post-Haiyan assessments indicated severe damage to many level 2 and 3 municipal water supplies and community wells, along with extensive damage to household and communal level sanitation facilities. Drinking water costs also increased post-Haiyan in many affected areas, particularly for those without a connection to municipal water supplies. Shelter and livelihoods (ie. access to income, including sustainable recovery of pre-typhoon livelihoods and development of alternatives) were consistently identified by the affected population as the two main priority needs overall, in addition to basic needs of food and water.

4.2 Response

On November 11th 2013 the Government of the Philippines (GPH) announced a State of Calamity in all affected provinces; the following day the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) formally activated an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) system-wide level 3 (L3) emergency response to the typhoon. The huge humanitarian response to the disaster drew in the support and contributions of multiple actors, including the GPH, international and national NGOs, charitable foundations, UN agencies, the private sector, Filipino and broader Asian civil society, and the Filipino diaspora. The role of 'non-traditional' actors in the response was significant. For example, remittances from the diaspora increased by \$600 million in the three months following the typhoon, while charitable foundations working directly with the government and communities also made notable contributions.

The IASC Strategic Response Plan (SRP) was launched on December 10th 2013 with the overall goal that communities and local governments recovered from the disaster, built back safer and avoided relapses, while strengthening resilience. The SRP aimed to complement the GPH's strategic plan for recovery – 'Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda' (RAY), with a total budget of US\$8.17 billion. The GPH also announced the creation of the Office for the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR). On July 4th 2014, the government declared the humanitarian phase over and that coordination of the further response would be under OPARR's structures rather than through humanitarian clusters. The RAY was merged into the newly finalised Comprehensive Rehabilitation and Recovery Plan (CRRP). As the humanitarian phase came to an official end, 5,400 households remained living in tents, evacuation centres and bunkhouses. In addition, a million people were still living in 'unsafe' zones, and an estimated 95,000 households were considered vulnerable to future shocks due to the quality of their shelter or location.

4.3 Response Timelines – First Response to Early Recovery

The immediate response to the typhoon was generally seen as timely and effective in meeting emergency needs at scale (e.g. IASC Evaluation, HumEx, joint DEC/HC Haiyan Review, individual agency RTEs) and prioritizing support based on key risks such as communicable disease outbreaks, food insecurity, lack of clean water, emergency shelter and protection.¹¹ There were issues with coverage, with relief operations largely starting in urban areas and then spreading slowly into adjoining districts and beyond. Many of the more remote rural communities relied on local charitable initiatives initially, and received no outside assistance for the first few weeks.¹²

¹¹ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

¹² Chughtai, S. (2013). *Typhoon Haiyan: The Response so Far and Vital Lessons for the Philippines' Recovery*. OXFAM briefing note, December 7, 2013.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

Multiple factors contributed to create highly favourable conditions for an effective initial disaster response, including: the Philippines being a lower middle-income country with a vibrant local economy; relatively good health and education indicators; an experienced national disaster management system; the absence of notable conflict in the affected areas; large-scale public sympathy and donations at the international, diaspora and national level; and good links to major donors; and resilience of the affected communities (e.g. DEC¹³).

There is general recognition (e.g. IASC, HumEx, DEC/HC, UNICEF) that the transition from relief to recovery was less successful overall, encountering challenges in terms of responding and adapting to changing needs and coordinating assistance.¹⁴ However, despite the magnitude of the disaster, pre-existing levels of poverty and difficulties transitioning to the recovery phase, *“the response to Typhoon Haiyan took place in an environment of significant resilience and rapid self-recovery among affected communities”*.¹⁵ Within days, many people had returned home and were attempting to rebuild with at least makeshift shelters, and seeking to resume livelihood activities, though often using high cost credit.¹⁶ With the pace of recovery being faster than anticipated, agency staff *“often cited their need to ‘keep up’ and, to remain relevant, to be flexible in their actions”*.¹⁷ For example, CARE’s evaluation of their shelter program noted that after their technical advisors recognized that people were quickly starting to reconstruct, they adjusted the response strategy to focus on early recovery.

5.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

5.1 Cross Cutting Issues Impacting Urban Interventions

A. Current Gaps in Urban Specific Understanding & Experience

As noted in the limitations section of this review, there was relatively little urban-specific learning identified in the literature, this may reflect difficulties or capacity gaps amongst implementing agencies in terms of experience and understanding of working in urban environments. For example, in the Global Food Security Cluster’s (GFSC) report *Lessons Learned from the Urban Response* (one of the few urban-specific documents found), the authors noted that UN and NGO staff reported a *“massive gap on what urban means in terms of relief and recovery contexts,”* (pg.2) and that in general there was not much specific attention to what a response in an urban setting needed or implied. This was largely in reference to food security and livelihoods programming, and possibly having more general applicability. World Vision’s RTE also reported that emergency staff had not felt confident regarding how to work in urban areas, with this as *“a general area of weakness among INGOs which have traditionally focused on rural contexts”*. Noting that 77% of Filipinos are projected to live in cities by 2030, the same report remarked on the increasing importance of developing capacities for urban emergency response programming.

¹³ Highlighted in several reports.

¹⁴ Humanitarian Coalition; Disasters Emergency Committee. (2014, April). Typhoon Haiyan Response Review. Retrieved from http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/dec_hc_haiyan_response_review_may_2014.pdf.

¹⁵ Humanitarian Practice Network. (2015, January). The Typhoon Haiyan response. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63>.

¹⁶ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

¹⁷ Humanitarian Coalition; Disasters Emergency Committee. (2014, April). Typhoon Haiyan Response Review. Retrieved from http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/dec_hc_haiyan_response_review_may_2014.pdf.

B. Challenges in the Transition from Response to Recovery

A need for greater adaptability and flexibility

The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation summarized that “*while blanket, standard responses to food, water, health and shelter needs were appropriate and effective in the immediate phase of the response, it became apparent that there was a need for more tailored responses that go beyond enabling households to meet immediate basic needs but also to restore livelihoods quickly*”.¹⁸ The DEC/HC report also emphasised this point, recommending that responses were specifically designed so as to be flexible and adaptable to affected populations’ fast-changing needs – for example, by integrating early recovery support into emergency packages from the outset.

Long term challenges affecting response and recovery

Although some of the key cross-cutting challenges, including land rights, tenure issues and supply chain bottlenecks were identified and widely recognised at an early stage, strategies to address these took much longer to develop.¹⁹ This created implementation delays with regards to longer-term recovery activities and affected actors’ capacity to keep pace with beneficiaries’ rapidly changing contexts and concomitant needs. The need to support effective and sustainable livelihoods recovery was also recognized at an early stage in the response; however, the challenges and related delays came in identifying, developing and rolling out programs appropriate to affected populations’ contexts, especially in urban areas where communities were more geographically diffuse, even if space was more densely populated.

Structure, Coordination and Organizational Capacity

At the structural and coordination levels a number of factors seem to have contributed to challenges with the transition process. For example, the international humanitarian community and the government appear to have had different understandings of, and planning timeframes for, relief and recovery activities. There was also “*a conceptual tension between the host government's sovereignty and leadership of disaster response in its own country, and the international humanitarian community's principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence*”.²⁰ In reviewing the response at the one-year stage, OCHA representatives commented that establishing a transition framework would have helped build momentum and increased coherence, recommending that “*investment in and planning for transition must begin at the earliest possible stage*” of future responses, requiring more thinking and dedication of resources at the global level. Challenges in the transition process also highlighted again the systemic disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches and the need to address this,²¹ especially at the local level.

C. Coordination with Local Government and Local Partners

Coordinating with local government

Long-standing relationships meant that coordination with the government was strong. Government-led humanitarian clusters led and oversaw coordination for the response, with the support of international actors. Despite being heavily affected itself, the government provided an enabling environment for responders and

¹⁸ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Carden, D., Clements, A.J. (2015, January). Coordinating the response to Typhoon Haiyan. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/coordinating-the-response-to-typhoon-haiyan>

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

some Local Government Units (LGUs) hosted humanitarian agencies throughout the response.²² Over the course of the response LGUs played a more prominent role in the coordination of activities within municipalities, although with varying degrees of leadership and engagement across different LGUs. It has been suggested that in future responses LGUs should be supported to take a more leading role in the coordination of activities at the municipal level from the outset. This includes issues such as gender budgeting and gender-sensitive planning for hosting relocated families.²³

Response approaches that built on national systems to contribute to the strengthening of local disaster response mechanisms showed benefits particularly at the local level and in denser urban environments. It was noted however that more attention is required for strengthening national and local systems beyond workshops and training.²⁴ UNICEF's RTE reported the benefits for influencing and complementary programming achieved through working with government at the central and municipal levels in the WASH sector. In order to improve preparedness for future responses, it was also recommended to consider pre-crisis joint response agreements with the government at national and provincial levels, and investment in technical assistance at these and LGU levels to improve project and aid management, DRR, and strengthen accountability and local engagement and ownership.²⁵

Working with local civil society

Although national NGOs were among the first responders, overall it was found that there was limited engagement with national NGOs and civil-society at both national and, to a lesser extent, at local levels, and that *"there was little if any evidence of the international response contributing to the strengthening of national civil society and its role in disaster management"*.²⁶ With some positive exceptions, the cluster system in the Philippines largely failed to involve local civil society,²⁷ a point that was also noted in the Operational Peer Review and other evaluations. The disconnection of the private sector and non-Western NGOs from the mainstream response was a real gap, with international actors often being unaware of locally available capacity.²⁸ As one author noted, including local groups in the clusters in the initial response would have resulted in information about needs and completed distributions by local groups being submitted earlier. This in turn would have greatly increased coverage and improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the response.²⁹

Where they were in place, pre-existing partnerships did play an important role in enabling member organizations to initiate joint approaches. For example, Oxfam was able to immediately link up with their national partner (ASDW) with the Humanitarian Response Consortium to undertake a joint needs assessment in the Tacloban area and begin response activities within a few days. Drawing on Oxfam's logistical experience and financial resources and ASDW's knowledge of the Philippines water sector and Tacloban, the agencies

²² Ibid.

²³ OXFAM. (2014, July 24). Report on Protecting Women & Girls - Typhoon Haiyan Lessons Learned.

²⁴ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response. New York: UN-OCHA.

²⁵ Darcy, J., Leonardi, E., Robitaille, P., Monzanal, M., & Gandin, J. (2014, July). Real-Time Evaluation of Unicef's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. New York: UNICEF.

²⁶ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response. New York: UN-OCHA.

²⁷ Tipper, J. (2015, January). Engaging with clusters: empowering and learning from local organizations. Humanitarian Exchange(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/engaging-with-clusters-empowering-and-learning-from-local-organisations>

²⁸ OXFAM. (2014, July 24). Report on Protecting Women & Girls - Typhoon Haiyan Lessons Learned.

²⁹ Humanitarian Practice Network. (2015, January). The Typhoon Haiyan response. Humanitarian Exchange(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63>.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

identified the Leyte Metropolitan Water District as a partner, and were able to put in the necessary resources to enable municipal staff to get back to work and re-establish services in the affected areas.³⁰

Partnerships

Actors highlighted the importance of doing more to develop relationships with local and municipal partners, in order to extend impacts well beyond the life of the emergency and support recovery in on longer term change.³¹ CARE provides an example of this where its pre-established partnerships allowed them to quickly set up ways of working with local partners. Under these agreements, CARE took responsibility for facilitation of linkages, technical assistance, procurement and logistics support, partner development and support for gender-responsive monitoring and evaluation, among other things while partners took responsibility for coordination with barangay (village) and municipal levels of government; community identification and mobilization; targeting and beneficiary selection; distribution and implementation of activities.³² Oxfam points to the requirement for donors to directly fund national capacity and coordination development, and provide timely funding directly to national organisations, both government and non-government, to enable partners to respond at greater scale, maximizing the impact that these relationships and divisions of labour can have. Protection actors further suggested that international NGOs, should take on more of a role to connect local civil society organizations with the international community's coordination structures and international protection/GBV actors through actions as simple as accompanying local partners to cluster meetings, all the way up to providing consistent training on coordination.³³

D. Beneficiary Targeting, Participation and Community-Based Approaches

The IASC evaluation reported that communities wanted more consistent and transparent beneficiary targeting systems to be used by all implementing agencies, having been dissatisfied with the differing systems used. However, at the individual agency level, including HC members, successes and good practices in beneficiary selection were reported where participatory and community-based approaches were used. For example, Save the Children noted that involvement of communities in beneficiary selection was key to avoiding inclusion errors. CARE's shelter program (which was undertaken in rural areas) found that selection processes, which included the transparent verification of beneficiary lists by the whole community through a public forum, contributed to greater overall satisfaction amongst community members than less open methods. World Vision³⁴ collected community feedback through SMS, which communities reported as leading to improved targeting, greater community ownership, and increased trust levels.³⁵ These practices are especially important in urban environments where people's communities are often geographically diffuse, requiring selection and feedback processes that cut across a wide typology of physical and social spaces.

Beneficiary Targeting in Dense Urban Areas

The GFSC noted that targeting was one of the biggest gaps for urban programming as existing social protection systems were not sufficient to reach all vulnerable households, and a tendency because of time constraints to use information from municipalities that was not always correct. It was also suggested that, given the

³⁰ Street, A. (2015, January). Humanitarian partnerships: reality lags behind the rhetoric. Humanitarian Exchange(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/humanitarian-partnerships-reality-lags-behind-the-rhetoric>

³¹ Fitzpatrick, D., & Compton, C. (2014). Beyond Safe Land: Why Security of Land Tenure is Crucial for the Philippines' post-Haiyan Recovery. OXFAM joint agency briefing paper, August 2014.

³² Rand, J. (2014). Aspirations and Realities: Partner approaches to emergency response within the context of lighter footprints - Based on a case study of CARE's partnered response to Typhoon Haiyan.

³³ OXFAM. (2014, July 24). Report on Protecting Women & Girls - Typhoon Haiyan Lessons Learned.

³⁴ As well as other agencies.

³⁵ World Vision International. (2014, August). Typhoon Haiyan Response 6-Month Report. Retrieved from <http://www.worldvision.org/sites/default/files/Typhoon-Haiyan-6-Month-Report.pdf>

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

complexity of urban livelihoods, there is an argument for self-targeting mechanisms, due to difficulties with other targeting mechanisms that are very data-dependent where data is insufficient or incorrect. This can be addressed in the future by adapting targeting methodologies for urban areas so that they draw on a wider range of municipal service and population information to develop the urban analysis and targeting criteria including (but not limited to): population density, cadastral, pre-existing levels of services and material usage consistent with income levels (as a proxy for vulnerability) – defined by both the municipality and by neighbourhood groups or virtual communities.

Suggestions were also made with regards to geographical targeting, with the use of a micro-level approach based on the smallest geographical unit considered essential for targeting purposes (GFSC) ie. neighbourhood, area, etc. Strong coordination on targeting was also reported as critical in urban areas due to multiple (geographically) small administrative units, and the diversity of income levels within these. Many of the documents reviewed called for the use of a neighbourhood, or area, based approach rather than a sectoral approach in future responses as a way of more effectively addressing the complex, integrated nature of people's needs in dense urban environments. CRS's urban shelter and settlements recovery program in Tacloban adopted an approach which placed neighbourhoods at the centre of the project, and aimed to be fully inclusive by putting decision-making power in the hands of the households themselves. Despite real challenges, particularly in meeting the needs of the most vulnerable, this approach proved successful in finding solutions to complex situations.³⁶ Some agencies also set-up community committees to identify needs, and assist in targeting in Tacloban to help design specific programs for urban areas (GFSC).

E. Emergency to Early Recovery – The Need for Integrated Programming and Donor Flexibility

Integrated Programming

The benefits of integrated programming in urban areas, particularly with regards to shelter, livelihoods and WASH (sanitation provision), were repeatedly noted in the literature (e.g. Shelter Cluster). Urban populations are connected to multiple, integrated and interdependent service systems, affecting their capacity to recover post disaster both positively and negatively. Issues such as land ownership, drainage, waste management, transportation, local supply systems and local markets, quality and quantity of housing stock and population density (and how social protection issues such as gender inequality, racial or ethnic discrimination, inclusion, etc. affect people's access to goods and services) are all interrelated. Lack of response in one area has the potential to significantly affecting coping capacity or resilience in others.

For example, CARE concluded that providing targeted shelter support combined with longer-term support for livelihoods *“was consistently highlighted as something which would allow affected people to recover”*, and *“where this progression does not exist, there was considerably less confidence about a holistic recovery; with more concerns about debt and less confidence in completing the houses”*.³⁷ Building support from food, to shelter, to livelihoods based on needs also helped support good community relations.³⁸ The links between livelihoods and shelter self-recovery rates were also posited as a possible explanation for the relatively more rapid rate of shelter self-recovery in regions where livelihoods were recovering faster, including those without a large coconut production sector.³⁹ In terms of sanitation and shelter, to encourage an integrated

³⁶ Catholic Relief Services Philippines (2015, January). Urban shelter and settlement recovery: a “menu of options” for households. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/urban-shelter-and-settlement-recovery-a-menu-of-options-for-households>

³⁷ CARE. (2015, January 15). *CARE Canada Typhoon Haiyan Final Report*.

³⁸ Solvang, I., & Lan Chun Yang, E. (2014, April). *CARE & Partners 2013 Typhoon Haiyan Emergency Response After Action Review Report*.

³⁹ Shelter Cluster. (2014). Analysis of Shelter Recovery. Retrieved from <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Final%20Analysis%20of%20Shelter%20Recovery.pdf>

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

humanitarian approach aiming to improve household living conditions and decrease public health risks, it was recommended by both the Shelter and WASH clusters that household WASH interventions, and specifically household latrine repair and rehabilitation, be paired with shelter interventions. For agencies that were undertaking one or the other type of intervention, there were recommendations to look into working with partner organisations to provide a quality package of shelter and sanitation.⁴⁰

Donor Flexibility

The relative speed with which it became feasible and appropriate to implement early recovery activities in the response also highlighted the advantages, and vice versa, of having access to flexible funding which allows programs to be integrated and/or adapted. As reported by CARE in their Shelter Recovery Project Evaluation, “donor flexibility enabling adjustments in programming to accommodate shifts from emergency shelter to a shelter self-recovery approach...was important”. Where funding committed to emergency shelter could not be changed (e.g. DFID RRF funds, DFATD in-kind emergency kits), distributions of emergency shelter materials went on longer than strictly necessary and prevented reallocation to self-recovery kits.⁴¹ It was also reported by Habitat that early in the response, one donor required them to reduce the cost of assistance they were providing per household for self-recovery kits in order to align its costs with agencies providing emergency shelter. This reduced the intended impact of the intervention by reducing the quantity of materials received by each household.⁴² Given the interrelated and interdependent nature of services and recovery rates, not only in urban centres, but in the regions they affect, flexibility in funding would allow service providers to use funds for non-traditional humanitarian activities that can improve first phase response and its transition into early recovery across the region.

F. Gender and Protection

As previously noted, though there is a plethora of literature detailing different approaches and issues related to gender, GBV and protection, the authors did not find many documents detailing lessons learned or good practices with specific implications for urban interventions in particular. Some general lessons learned and good practices that should also apply to urban areas included agencies’ focus on assuring sex and age disaggregated data collection and gender-sensitive program design. Though the “MIRA I did not disaggregate data by sex and age, making it impossible to differentiate the protection needs of women & girls from men & boys (at this time)” (Report on Protecting Women and Girls, pg.3) this was adjusted for the MIRA II and in several agency specific interventions (i.e CARE, Oxfam, Plan and Save the Children all note completing gender-sensitive assessments in their program reports). This led to several agencies actively implementing information campaigns geared towards women’s protection and/or reducing GBV (Oxfam, Plan⁴³) and ensuring gender-sensitive distribution and participation mechanisms. Several agencies also pointed to including gender-specific activities within their responses, including: vulnerability targeting that led to a strong presence of vulnerable women, female headed households, and people with disabilities on beneficiary lists (CARE); proactive recruitment of women community mobilizers and marginalized people (including women and people with disabilities) in non-traditional livelihoods activities such as carpentry (CARE, Oxfam); information campaigns targeting both women and men, allowing women to participate in managing build back safer activities (CARE);

⁴⁰ Duncalf, J. (2013, December). A Real Time Evaluation of ACF International's Response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in the Philippines.

⁴¹ Maynard, V., Barritt, P. (2015, January). Supporting shelter self-recovery: field experience following Typhoon Haiyan. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/supporting-shelter-self-recovery-field-experience-following-typhoon-haiyan>

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Plan International. (2015, January). *Emergency WASH & Shelter Assistance to Typhoon Haiyan-Affected Communities in Leyte, Philippines - Final Report*.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

targeted research into and support for addressing GBV and gender discrimination (Plan⁴⁴, Oxfam); support to essential government services such as women and child friendly spaces (Plan),⁴⁵ gender budgeting, and the establishment of a VAW desk in barangays to address GBV (Oxfam).

5.2 Livelihoods Programming and Urban Contexts

A. Challenges in Designing Urban Livelihoods Programs

The GFSC's paper on lessons learned in the Haiyan response summarised a number of the challenges that staff working in the livelihoods sector encountered with regards to urban programming. These included difficulties in identifying and classifying urban livelihoods because of the diversity of livelihoods in the urban context (including the tendency to earn an income from multiple livelihood sources) and reliance on external factors such as a supply of imported goods (as compared to rural areas where there is more of a reliance on farming, local agriculture and other locally available goods). These factors, and the high diversity of urban livelihoods available and/or required of people, contributed to challenges in determining appropriate interventions. Several months after the typhoon hit there was still a dearth of urban-specific livelihoods assessments, although some agencies were planning to conduct them. It was also noted that the high unemployment rate in Tacloban, which existed prior the typhoon, made it important to rethink regular emergency livelihoods approaches so they could both meet immediate needs and address this longer term challenge. The paper included the recommendation to adjust thinking on livelihoods recovery to a chronic and developmental model, including linking with governmental social protection programmes, and engaging with civil society organisations. Urban communities themselves were reported to have recommended earlier support to livelihoods training, and support for micro-enterprises.

B. Challenges in Timing, Transition and Sustainable Solutions

Overall the transition to early and longer-term recovery of livelihoods, and critically the development of programs to support more sustainable livelihoods, including non-agricultural livelihoods, was slow and underfunded. There were recommendations for earlier and more tailored approaches to livelihoods restoration,⁴⁶ while RTEs and other reviews undertaken after the initial response phase frequently emphasized the need to develop effective livelihoods strategies, including considerations of resilience and alternative livelihoods (e.g. World Vision RTE). Reflecting on some of the challenges encountered in livelihoods support, the IASC evaluation recommended building livelihoods capacity in the international response system to more effectively and rapidly link emergency activities to the early restoration of livelihoods. Highlighting some of the particular issues faced in urban areas, a focus for developing solutions for non-agricultural contexts was also recommended. There was a notable absence of literature examining ways that humanitarian actors could use livelihoods programs to improve or support municipal and/or services, infrastructure and systems. Linking livelihoods programs with local social protection mechanisms and municipal services is a potential area of opportunity for improving urban-specific livelihoods interventions.

⁴⁴ Plan International. (2015, January). Emergency WASH & Shelter Assistance to Typhoon Haiyan-Affected Communities in Leyte, Philippines - Final Report.

⁴⁵ Plan International. (2015, January). Emergency WASH & Shelter Assistance to Typhoon Haiyan-Affected Communities in Leyte, Philippines - Final Report.

⁴⁶ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response. New York: UN-OCHA.

C. Cash Programming

An estimated 40% of the response to Haiyan was delivered through cash transfers, making it one of the largest cash-based humanitarian responses ever.⁴⁷ In urban areas the use of cash and vouchers was considered to be particularly effective as markets recovered quickly, and during feedback urban communities recommended greater use of cash transfers as compared to the distribution of commodities (GFSC).

Unconditional cash grants

Unconditional Cash Grants (UCG) were used at scale by some agencies from an early stage - for example, Oxfam provided blanket UCGs in target municipalities in Eastern Samar in recognition of immediate needs and of the time further assessments would take to complete. IFRC also delivered unconditional cash support for first time in a humanitarian response - reaching 57,000 families - which an RTE found to have been successful and relatively rapid. As per feedback collected by the DEC, beneficiaries appreciated the freedom of choice provided by UCGs, and largely spent the money on basic items such as food and shelter materials. The DEC/HC report also recommended that cash programming should be scaled up as a means of supporting quicker early recovery. A comparative study undertaken by Mercy Corps during the response looking at differences in utilisation of single lump-sum cash transfers as compared to three payments of the same amount, found that *“recovery programs that seek to promote investments in productive assets should strongly consider delivering cash transfers in the form of a lump sum.”*⁴⁸

Implementing agencies highlighted the poor communication regarding cash-based interventions between the Food Security & Agriculture (FSAC), Early Recovery & Livelihoods (ERL), and Shelter Clusters as contributing to duplications in terms of geographical coverage, inconsistencies in the value of cash transfers, and misunderstandings in terms of the intended use of cash. Better strategic planning and coordination between the FSAC and Shelter Clusters on the provision of unconditional cash (which was used in large part for food and shelter material purchases) in the early relief phase could have helped in ensuring food and shelter needs were met, including in urban areas (GFSC).

Cash for Work

Cash for Work was used extensively in the response in both urban and rural areas. This successfully contributed to addressing immediate needs (through cash payments) and restoring public and private infrastructure and enabling access to affected areas through the clear-up of debris. However, some CFW programmes (not managed by HC members) undertook more cosmetic and less useful work, resulting in clear recommendations that CFW *“must always be meaningful and productive”*.⁴⁹ The DEC/HC review also noted that some DEC/HC members included initiatives that would almost certainly have usually been undertaken without pay (e.g. clearing mangroves or clearing dams), resulting in instances where communities delayed starting work to wait for CFW assessments. There were also concerns that CFW contributed to wage distortion and diverted public and private sector workers from resuming their normal jobs; this was due in large part to the fact that the GPH set CFW rates at 100% of the official minimum wage, which was often more than actual market rates.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Humanitarian Practice Network. (2015, January). The Typhoon Haiyan response. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63>.

⁴⁸ Mercy Corps. (May 2015). *Beyond Meeting Immediate Needs: The Impact of Electronic Cash Transfer Approaches on Disaster Recovery and Financial Inclusion*. Pg. 3

⁴⁹ Humanitarian Coalition; Disasters Emergency Committee. (2014, April). Typhoon Haiyan Response Review. Retrieved from http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/dec_hc_haiyan_response_review_may_2014.pdf.

⁵⁰ Brown, A. (2015, January). Are cash transfers the ‘new normal’ in the Philippines? Challenges and opportunities from Typhoon Haiyan. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange->

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

One evaluation of the larger response concluded that the long-term use of CFW is not appropriate and does not contribute to sustainable livelihoods,⁵¹ whilst Oxfam's RTE also encouraged programming to quickly move away from large-scale CFW to activities supporting livelihoods recovery. The IASC evaluation also reported that *"communities repeatedly highlighted their need for more and earlier support to help them move from dependency on emergency employment to more sustainable livelihood and shelter solutions"*, underlining the sense that though CFW was relevant in the immediate response phase, it would have been more effective to direct those funds towards sustainable livelihoods recovery earlier. Where cash for work is relevant, some reports note that good practice in urban environments suggests that organizations work in partnership with the local, municipal agencies responsible for the particular work being remunerated, e.g. the municipal waste, water, sanitation departments.

Cash and Shelter

Cash assistance was used extensively in shelter programming, constituting around one fifth of the support in this sector.⁵² This often constituted of a combination of cash and materials, which according to at least one review is a more effective approach than cash only, dependent on context and markets e.g. availability of quality materials.⁵³ There were, however, also indications that the use of cash transfers may have sped up shelter recovery early on, with beneficiaries in one location stating that they would have preferred to receive cash to enable them to start repairing or rebuilding their homes as soon as the markets were open, rather than waiting for distributions of materials.⁵⁴ Oxfam used mobile stores for shelter materials as part of a cash-based intervention whereas CARE provided conditional cash grants in combination with materials, based on the recognition *"that levels of damage, needs and capacities varied between households"*, with cash grants *"allowing households to purchase materials or hire skilled labour, depending on their specific needs"*.⁵⁵ Monitoring showed that some beneficiaries used at least part of the grant to purchase food or meet other urgent costs, which in those cases had some effect on the technical quality and speed of shelter construction.

In urban areas where recovery is intimately tied to local economic opportunities as much as access to supplies, materials and services, some reports noted that a good practice is to accompany cash support with engineering and/or technical guidance (to ensure the "build back" really is "better") and that implementing agencies should coordinate with municipalities to: source local materials and facilitate procurement from local businesses, facilitate linkages and agreements with local building and planning departments, and support community planning/inclusion activities.

[magazine/issue-63/are-cash-transfers-the-new-normal-in-the-philippines-challenges-and-opportunities-from-typhoon-haiyan](#)

⁵¹ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

⁵² Humanitarian Practice Network. (2015, January). The Typhoon Haiyan response. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63>.

⁵³ Chamberlain, P. (2015, April). Mid-Term Review: BRC/PRC Typhoon Haiyan - Iloilo Recovery Programme.

⁵⁴ Humanitarian Coalition; Disasters Emergency Committee. (2014, April). Typhoon Haiyan Response Review. Retrieved from http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/dec_hc_haiyan_response_review_may_2014.pdf.

⁵⁵ Maynard, V., Barritt, P. (2015, January). Supporting shelter self-recovery: field experience following Typhoon Haiyan. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/supporting-shelter-self-recovery-field-experience-following-typhoon-haiyan>

5.3 WASH Programming and Urban Contexts

A. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

The speed, coverage and impact of WASH activities in the initial weeks of the response was generally better in urban centres than it was in more remote and rural areas - for example, the RTE of UNICEF's response noted that WASH interventions outside of urban and displaced centres were slow. Furthermore, data from the WASH Cluster monitoring assessment showed - for example, that 24% of the affected population within 50 kilometres of the cyclone path received water treatment products in rural areas, as compared to 42% in urban areas, indicating a relatively higher concentration of support in urban areas.

The fact that there were no outbreaks of any communicable diseases despite the high-risk environments arising from congestion, displacement and infrastructure damage – especially in dense urban environments – has been attributed to a large extent to the effectiveness of the response.⁵⁶ This entailed targeting priority areas, including urban locations and displaced centres, with a focus on re-establishing clean water supplies, water treatment, basic sanitation, surveillance and immunization for vulnerable groups.⁵⁷

Water

In Tacloban a number of agencies (Oxfam, UNICEF, A Single Drop of Safe Water) worked with the Leyte Metropolitan Water Department to restore the municipal water supply for around 200,000 people within a week of the disaster, an intervention that has been widely noted for its effectiveness in rapidly enabling safe water access at scale for an urban centre. The speed of this work was facilitated by pre-existing partnerships between an international and national NGO, and an established relationship between the national partner and the water department. Several months into the response it was noted that numerous NGOs had supported urban water access provision, including supporting Local Government Units (LGUs) to rehabilitate municipal water systems.⁵⁸ However, it was also reported that across the affected areas many people were spending significant amounts on purchasing potable water,⁵⁹ primarily those without a municipal water connection who were paying 5 PHP per 20 litres of water on average, as compared to 10 PHP per 1000 litres for those with a municipal connection.⁶⁰ Some reports noted that this could have been addressed through additional activities to continue extending the municipal water supply to those without water connections prior to the typhoon.

Sanitation and Hygiene

Sanitation provision was not as successful, at least in the initial response, being considered “slow and not always appropriate”.⁶¹ Sanitation coverage post-Haiyan was also poor, at just 8% despite efforts made by humanitarian agencies.⁶² At the overcrowded evacuation centres, sanitation facilities were generally overwhelmed, and many were also affected by inadequate drainage and waste management.⁶³ In urban

⁵⁶ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

⁵⁷ Darcy, J., Leonardi, E., Robitaille, P., Monzanal, M., & Gandin, J. (2014, July). *Real-Time Evaluation of Unicef's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines*. New York: UNICEF.

⁵⁸ Humanitarian Coalition; Disasters Emergency Committee. (2014, April). *Typhoon Haiyan Response Review*. Retrieved from http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/dec_hc_haiyan_response_review_-_may_2014.pdf.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Save the Children. (2014, March). *Save the Children DEC Disaster Response Program Phase 2 Plan*.

⁶¹ Darcy, J., Leonardi, E., Robitaille, P., Monzanal, M., & Gandin, J. (2014, July). *Real-Time Evaluation of Unicef's Humanitarian Response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines*. New York: UNICEF.

⁶² Save the Children. (2014, March). *Save the Children DEC Disaster Response Program Phase 2 Plan*.

⁶³ Chughtai, S. (2013). *Typhoon Haiyan: The Response so Far and Vital Lessons for the Philippines' Recovery*. OXFAM briefing note, December 7, 2013.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

displaced areas with inadequate sanitation facilities, some women interviewed during the early response period reported they were defecating into plastic bags; without any collection points, they had no option but to dump the bags wherever they could.⁶⁴ Temporary desludging facilities were established in some urban areas (e.g. Tacloban, Palo) for the handling of emergency sewage, which were eventually handed over to the municipalities. However, there remained a need to address medium to long-term capacity for sewage management, which was low in the affected areas pre-Haiyan.⁶⁵ Some reports indicated that providing additional support to municipal authorities and service providers responsible for sewage management would be a best practice for future urban-based relief and recovery responses.

Relief to Recovery

Although there was a rapid shift from emergency response to early recovery measures, with an emphasis on community-based sanitation approaches and rehabilitation of healthcare services, as with many other sectors, WASH early recovery targets were behind schedule. However, the Haiyan response was seen as an opportunity to improve on the pre-Haiyan situation, and ambitions went beyond humanitarian needs to address pre-existing sanitation and healthcare issues.⁶⁶ The WASH Cluster noted however that better technical and management capacity, and involvement of local and national counterparts, was going to be required for those agencies planning mid or long term WASH programs. This included developing technical and managerial guidelines for new or rehabilitated WASH infrastructure that integrates DRR and 'build back safer' considerations. It was also recommended that WASH committees at barangay level be created or empowered to improve the sustainability of WASH facilities through a strong, decentralized WASH management approach⁶⁷ and, in urban areas, ensuring those committees were linked to municipal water services and governance systems.

B. Debris Clearance & Waste Management – Environmental & Health Risks

Haiyan created huge amounts of debris that needed to be cleared, much of which was deposited at municipal dumpsites. Environmental assessments noted that in general there was a lack of sites to handle the debris and temporary dumpsites risked becoming permanent.⁶⁸ As debris and poorly maintained dumpsites posed environmental and health risks, especially in the rainy season, technical support was provided through a waste management team to build capacity on this subject in LGUs. Work was also undertaken to make technical improvements at key municipal dumpsites and landfills for Tacloban and Ormoc Cities. It was recommended that there be continued support provided to address the need for capacity-building in waste management in the medium to long-term given the elevated risks this poses for densely populated areas.⁶⁹ It was also noted in the same report that the decentralization on key waste management issues to the municipal level can

⁶⁴ Duncalf, J. (2013, December). A Real Time Evaluation of ACF International's Response to Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda in the Philippines.

⁶⁵ OCHA. (2014, June). *Philippines - Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda: Environmental Assessment Final Report and Recommendations*. Retrieved from <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/EFA%20Environmental%20Assessment%20June%202014.pdf>

⁶⁶ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

⁶⁷ Philippines Shelter Cluster; WASH Cluster;. (2014, April). *Shelter & WASH Response Monitoring - Typhoon Haiyan: Final Report*. Retrieved from https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/PHL_Haiyan_Shelter-WASH_Response_Monitoring_Assessment_Final_Report_FINAL_22Apr2014.pdf

⁶⁸ OCHA. (2014, June). *Philippines - Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda: Environmental Assessment Final Report and Recommendations*. Retrieved from <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/EFA%20Environmental%20Assessment%20June%202014.pdf>

⁶⁹ OCHA. (2014, June). *Philippines - Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda: Environmental Assessment Final Report and Recommendations*. Retrieved from <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/EFA%20Environmental%20Assessment%20June%202014.pdf>

complicate implementation of major investments in large-scale waste management systems, which may require collaboration and cooperation across LGUs and different municipal departments.

5.4 Shelter Programming and Urban Contexts

The overall aim for the Shelter Cluster was to promote self-recovery solutions and ultimately owner-driven reconstruction practices. Though this approach resulted predominately in the provision of shelter repair kits in the first year, a variety of recovery intervention types were proposed: the supply of materials for roofing and framing, salvaging lumber and debris for re-use, training of skilled and unskilled labour, awareness-raising in safer building practices, technical assistance, and cash-based programs.⁷⁰

Key challenges for shelter interventions

Many humanitarian actors experienced challenges in accessing quality building materials in the aftermath of the typhoon, particularly good quality CGI sheeting and lumber. Other key challenges facing the shelter sector included: lack of clarity regarding permanent relocation solutions for IDPs; shifting government policy regarding support to people living in the coastal zone deemed unsafe by the government; problems of land tenure, services and livelihood opportunities at numerous “transitional” settlements; low funding (e.g. the Shelter Cluster was only 43% funded), and; shifting Government policy on its own shelter programs.⁷¹ Despite the speed with which many affected people started to reconstruct their homes, monitoring by the Shelter Cluster several months after the typhoon found that the process of recovery to durable housing had been slow “and seems to have all but plateaued in urban areas and those provinces hardest hit...; makeshift shelters being the norm” (pg.35).

A. Environmental Impacts and Reconstruction in Urban Areas

The level of reconstruction required after a disaster on the scale of Haiyan inevitably places stresses on natural resources, and managing demand for materials such as wood and sand (for concrete preparation) was an important concern in recovery and rehabilitation. This is particularly the case around urban areas such as Tacloban, with large populations and high concentrations of damage. For example, the Shelter Cluster highlighted during the response that large quantities of beach sand were being quarried for construction purposes from coastal municipalities south of Tacloban, increasing the vulnerability of those areas to coastal erosion and related risks. The salt content in beach sand also made it a poor quality choice for construction from a technical perspective. An environmental assessment report of Haiyan-affected areas recommended that efforts be made to find sustainable solutions, including sourcing environmentally sustainable materials, and recycling where possible. The report also recommended the development of regional master plans for reconstruction focused on localization of dwellings and identifying the quantities of materials required, and where these could be responsibly sourced.⁷² It is essential to consider the impact of both disaster and recovery actions (especially when it is self-recovery led) on the larger area surrounding affected urban centres, given the high degree of connectivity and dependence that urban residents and service systems have with relation to the area’s surrounding environment. Regional master plans that consider growth, water, energy, and waste

⁷⁰ IFRC; UN-Habitat; UNHCR. (2014). *Shelter Projects 2013-2014*. Retrieved from http://sheltercasestudies.org/shelterprojects2013-2014/Shelterprojects_2013-14_Lowres_WEB.pdf

⁷¹ Hanley, T., Binás, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

⁷² OCHA. (2014, June). *Philippines - Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda: Environmental Assessment Final Report and Recommendations*. Retrieved from <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/EFA%20Environmental%20Assessment%20June%202014.pdf>

systems will help ensure that humanitarian responses leave positive impacts in surrounding areas rather than accidentally creating harm.

B. Relocation and Resettlement

In Tacloban City the government eventually opted for a main relocation site approximately 15 kilometres north of the centre, in a largely undeveloped area, along with other smaller-scale relocation projects in the coastal barangays. However, the sites selected were considered too far away by the majority of affected households, and many are finding it difficult to create new livelihoods or maintain their previous livelihoods in the proposed relocation areas.⁷³ The importance of livelihoods in relocation planning was repeatedly cited as one of the most critical factors in the process. According to one survey, 49% of people stated livelihoods were the most important criterion in site selection.⁷⁴ The IASC evaluation also highlighted that the “*lack of sustainable livelihood options is a key obstacle to the relocation of families in displacement centres*”. Overall the conclusion was that without effective livelihoods opportunities in the relocation areas, people would either remain there and become poorer, or leave, and potentially return to areas designated as unsafe, neither of which outcomes could be considered as ‘building back better’⁷⁵ and all of which could be mitigated through effective regional urban planning and design processes.

Challenges were also encountered with regards to access to a safe water supply in the proposed permanent relocation sites for Tacloban, due to conflict between the provincial and city governments, and delays in agreeing to the extension of the water system.⁷⁶ It has been reported that the LGUs, who are responsible for implementing relocation, do not have the financial, technical or human resource capacity to address the multiple potential challenges of large-scale relocation programs e.g. limited land availability, lengthy and expensive land acquisition processes, housing, and compensation issues.⁷⁷ Major protection issues were raised in at least some of the transitional shelters and relocation sites, including GBV, poor access to safe water and sanitation, and no electrical connection, along with the lack of sustainable livelihoods. This was despite extensive work by some agencies to improve conditions in these temporary relocation sites.⁷⁸ Though LGUs in affected areas continue to pursue durable solutions for those displaced by Haiyan, some reports estimate that over 200,000 families (up to 1 million individuals) continue to live in areas deemed ‘unsafe’ across Haiyan-affected regions. Identifying sufficient land to house these communities has proven difficult, and requires significant investment and planning to ensure that adequate services are in place, connected to existing urban plans and services, and structured so that they accompany and contribute to future urban growth (through regional urban planning that accounts for existing relocation sites) instead of adding to potential urban sprawl or informal, unserved and unsafe urban settlements.

Surveys conducted with those potentially subject to relocation showed that they often had received little or no communication or active consultation on the issue from the authorities.⁷⁹ In this context the point was raised that resettlement processes should be inclusive and include effective land use planning to reduce the risk of future displacement or evictions; something that can be achieved “*by facilitating their participation in*

⁷³ Humanitarian Practice Network. (2015, January). The Typhoon Haiyan response. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63>

⁷⁴ Baudot, C. (2014). The Right Move?: Ensuring durable relocation after Typhoon Haiyan. OXFAM briefing paper, April 30, 2014.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ OXFAM. (2015, March). *Project Closure Reports - Tacloban Programme (Protection)*.

⁷⁷ Baudot, C. (2014). The Right Move?: Ensuring durable relocation after Typhoon Haiyan. OXFAM briefing paper, April 30, 2014.

⁷⁸ OXFAM. (2015, March). *Project Closure Reports - Tacloban Programme (Protection)*.

⁷⁹ Fitzpatrick, D., & Compton, C. (2014). Beyond Safe Land: Why Security of Land Tenure is Crucial for the Philippines' post-Haiyan Recovery. OXFAM joint agency briefing paper, August 2014, p 12.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

*identifying suitable areas for settlements that are based on safety considerations as well as development and infrastructure needs*⁸⁰ especially in densely populated urban areas and surrounding sites.

“As large scale relocations are likely to be an ongoing feature of post-disaster rehabilitation programs in the Philippines, there is a need to establish the necessary national legislative framework to ensure that such relocations support the voluntary and informed movement of community members to safe sites that enable access to basic services, livelihood opportunities and social networks. A rights-based and gender-sensitive approach that is community-led is critical to realizing sustainable relocation”⁸¹ (Oxfam, *Beyond safe land*, pg. 12). For example, Oxfam worked with government agencies to ensure that both men and women affected by the typhoon were able to register for assistance, and that the concerns of both men and women were taken into account in processes such as relocation and resettlement.⁸²

Further to that, previous emergencies have shown that “a rights-based and gender-sensitive approach that is community-led is critical to realizing sustainable relocation” (Oxfam, *Beyond safe land*, pg. 12).⁸³ To that end, lessons from both Haiyan and other disasters show that:

- 1) Land tenure security requires collection of gender disaggregated data early, “particularly so as to identify the numbers of widows and female-headed households and
- 2) Local resistance to inheritance of land rights by women should also be anticipated, and managed by (1) information and awareness rights programs, and (2) access to justice mechanisms that allow women to take claims beyond the family and community levels.”⁸⁴ (Oxfam, *Beyond safe land*, pg. 20-21).

In the Philippines, the Department of Social Welfare’s information collection system – through Disaster Assistance and Family Access Cards – specifically requested information regarding the sex of the head of household, allowing for some gender-disaggregated data regarding land tenure to be available. This is critical for supporting more gender-equitable land tenure measures.

No Build/No Dwelling Zones

Shortly after the disaster, the GPH announced a ‘No Build Zone’ (NBZ) within 40 metres of the coastline across the affected area, leaving 200,000 families facing permanent relocation and prohibiting those in the NBZ from repairing or rebuilding. In March 2014 a change in policy was announced to allow for livelihoods and commerce in coastal zones. The new guidance tasked LGUs with establishing “safe zones”, “unsafe zones” and “no-dwelling zones” through the use of hazard risk mapping. Areas that are needed for livelihoods activities, but are considered “unsafe zones”, would be categorized as “no-dwelling zones”, meaning that no residential structures can be built there.⁸⁵ In many cases local authorities would not allow any longer-term shelter or livelihoods assistance to be provided in these restricted areas as they fear it would encourage people to remain in dangerous locations. However, many of the most vulnerable families – and those most affected by Haiyan –

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid, p 12.

⁸² OXFAM. (2015, February). *Oxfam Canada HC Haiyan Final Report*.

⁸³ Fitzpatrick, D., & Compton, C. (2014). *Beyond Safe Land: Why Security of Land Tenure is Crucial for the Philippines' post-Haiyan Recovery*. OXFAM joint agency briefing paper, August 2014, p 12.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p 20-21.

⁸⁵ Philippines Shelter Cluster; WASH Cluster;. (2014, April). *Shelter & WASH Response Monitoring - Typhoon Haiyan: Final Report*. Retrieved from https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/PHL_Haiyan_Shelter-WASH_Response_Monitoring_Assessment_Final_Report_FINAL_22Apr2014.pdf

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

have few alternatives, and so continue to reside within the restricted zones, leaving them potentially even more vulnerable.⁸⁶

The issue of whether households could legally rebuild on land they occupied before the typhoon caused confusion for agencies and for families living in these areas, many of whom were informal settlers⁸⁷, and has been a central question in planning shelter and settlement assistance. Many households initially remained in danger areas and delayed thinking about their future in the short to medium-term based on confusion about the possibility of eviction, and the likelihood of being offered a permanent relocation site by the government.⁸⁸ Some donors would not permit agencies to provide self-recovery shelter assistance to households in the purported NBZs, despite urgent needs, which contributed to conflict between those living inside and outside of the NBZs.⁸⁹ There was also ongoing uncertainty around the GPH's resettlement plans, for which identifying suitable land was taking time. All of which meant that flexible programmatic approaches were required, based around longer-term solutions where possible as it was not clear when resettlement may occur. Examples include: i) Habitat's agreements with LGUs to be able to provide self-recovery assistance to families living in NBZs;⁹⁰ ii) World Vision's plans to provide shelter assistance in urban areas by negotiating agreements with landowners on a case by case basis in order to prevent further displacement and iii) CRS's twin-track approach in Tacloban City providing a 'menu of options for assistance' catering to households in the 'Dwell Zone' (DZ) and Non-Dwell Zone (NDZ).

In the case of CRS, an agreement was reached with the City authorities to use a main coastal road to define the boundary. With the NDZ designated as a high risk area, the local government would only permit emergency shelter assistance there; as such the CRS project worked with neighbourhoods to define support options that would allow families to relocate within Tacloban, whilst staying as close as possible to their place of origin. These options were: 'Rent to own' land subsidy - financial support to move to a safe location where families can potentially own land, together with a full shelter and latrine package; Land rental subsidy - financial support to rent a plot of land in a safe location, together with a full shelter and latrine package; Apartment rental subsidy - financial support to rent an apartment or house in a safe location, and; Host family subsidy - financial support to live with a family member or friend in a safe location. It was found that the most effective approach was to place responsibility with each household to find a piece of land, apartment or host family to which they would be happy to relocate; previous efforts by CRS to work directly with the Mayor's Office and local landowners had proved largely unsuccessful.⁹¹

Land Rights & Secure Tenure

Land rights and tenure security are long-standing issues in the Philippines. Monitoring by the Shelter Cluster showed that Haiyan had increased the number of households without formal tenure arrangements, something

⁸⁶ Shelter Cluster. (2014). Analysis of Shelter Recovery. Retrieved from <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Final%20Analysis%20of%20Shelter%20Recovery.pdf>

⁸⁷ IFRC; UN-Habitat; UNHCR. (2014). *Shelter Projects 2013-2014*. Retrieved from http://sheltercasestudies.org/shelterprojects2013-2014/Shelterprojects_2013-14_Lowres_WEB.pdf

⁸⁸ Humanitarian Practice Network. (2015, January). The Typhoon Haiyan response. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63>

⁸⁹ IFRC; UN-Habitat; UNHCR. (2014). *Shelter Projects 2013-2014*. Retrieved from http://sheltercasestudies.org/shelterprojects2013-2014/Shelterprojects_2013-14_Lowres_WEB.pdf

⁹⁰ IFRC; UN-Habitat; UNHCR. (2014). *Shelter Projects 2013-2014*. Retrieved from http://sheltercasestudies.org/shelterprojects2013-2014/Shelterprojects_2013-14_Lowres_WEB.pdf

⁹¹ Catholic Relief Services Philippines (2015, January). Urban shelter and settlement recovery: a "menu of options" for households. *Humanitarian Exchange*(63). Retrieved from <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/urban-shelter-and-settlement-recovery-a-menu-of-options-for-households>

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

attributed to families moving out of previously formal tenure into informal tenure situations as reconstruction continued and homes or sites were abandoned. The same report also found that rates of informal tenure were higher in 'no-build zones' (56%) as compared to non-no-build zones' (43%), due to more informal settlements being located in these areas. Many people potentially subject to relocation expressed the expectation that it would provide them with tenure security, and/or that they did not want to be relocated without such guarantees.⁹²

Oxfam highlights in their briefing paper on this issue, "*security of land tenure is essential to re-establish shelter and livelihoods and to reduce the risks of chronic poverty*", and that the "*government's commitment to build back better after Typhoon Haiyan requires more than building safe houses. It also demands measures to provide land tenure security for poor and vulnerable people as part of relocation and resettlement efforts, and as part of livelihoods recovery programs*". They go on to note that tenure insecurity creates cycles of vulnerability to disasters, with displaced people without secure tenure being more likely to return to unsafe land, or fall into poverty where eviction, or the threat of eviction, prevents livelihoods restoration.⁹³

Despite this, IASC recognised that, "*insufficient attention was accorded at the outset to land and property rights – which have emerged as one of the main obstacles to both protection and durable solutions for a significant population*".⁹⁴ With this in mind it was recommended that housing, land and property rights and solutions should feature prominently in strategic and operational planning from the outset, including fielding legal and technical expertise, and giving it due attention in terms of policy and advocacy work. Furthermore, it should be factored into preparedness planning to "*consider how a response will cope with property and land issues for at least transitional measures to meet humanitarian needs*".⁹⁵ This is particularly important in densely populated urban areas with a variety of tenure and planning regimes. The Oxfam briefing paper also recommends that the government's shelter assistance guidelines be revised to provide guarantees of ownership or long-term occupancy of land to informal settlers and lessees in order to ensure their eligibility for permanent shelter assistance (from which they might otherwise be excluded). It is suggested that the guarantees could be based on housing programs for the poor. This can be done using staged approaches that formalize resettlement sites as well as through ownership schemes depending on local context and needs, with phased approaches being particularly appropriate as a measure to manage incremental growth in urban areas as well as support relocation efforts.

A best practice example of NGO-government partnerships for providing shelter solutions despite beneficiaries' tenure situation is the Islamic Relief program in Cebu. Islamic Relief formed solid partnerships with the Provincial Government of Cebu and with at least two LGUs in Bantayan. Where they developed two distinct approaches to shelter construction for identified households, the first to build in relocation sites were those are deemed to be appropriate by the community. In these areas the government secured access and committed resources to support required infrastructure such as sanitation, water and roads and land titles were arranged to be given to the relocated. The second was to build on existing locations of identified households. For tenants, a tri-partite agreement was developed with legal counsel to set expectations and a legal framework to protect beneficiaries. This was signed by beneficiaries, the landowner and the LGU, securing a minimum of 10 years tenancy for beneficiaries.⁹⁶

⁹² Baudot, C. (2014). The Right Move?: Ensuring durable relocation after Typhoon Haiyan. OXFAM briefing paper, April 30, 2014.

⁹³ Fitzpatrick, D., & Compton, C. (2014). Beyond Safe Land: Why Security of Land Tenure is Crucial for the Philippines' post-Haiyan Recovery. OXFAM joint agency briefing paper, August 2014.

⁹⁴ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Humanitarian Coalition; Disasters Emergency Committee. (2014, April). Typhoon Haiyan Response Review. Retrieved from http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/dec_hc_haiyan_response_review_may_2014.pdf

C. Coping Strategies and Self-Recovery

Shelter kits and self-recovery

The DEC's review of the Haiyan response reported that it was a *"notable point in comparison to other recent large disasters...that transitional shelter has not been a term often cited"*, with shelter kits for self-recovery considered to be a welcome advance on the transitional shelter approach; where done well the shelter kits provided adhered to developmental principles of a strong core from which to build. One DRR expert working in Cebu supported the shift to shelter kit provision, describing transitional shelter as a 'waste of money'.

The Shelter Cluster reported that 70% of the overall shelter recovery response consisted of repairs and retrofits through shelter recovery kits and associated support. However, it is highlighted that given the underlying poverty levels and impacts on livelihoods, this approach was *"only likely to be a suitable solution for those people whose homes were partially destroyed, as beneficiaries have shown a low ability to top up assistance provided using their own resources"*. At the same time, agencies had (for obvious reasons) tended to focus beneficiary selection on the most vulnerable, and included the extent of destruction of the house as criteria. However, many of the documents reflecting on the self-recovery shelter kit approach have highlighted the fact that where these are targeted to the most vulnerable, a complete package of support must be provided to the household to complete construction work as *"by definition, such people do not have the means to complete an unfinished shelter"*.⁹⁷ This includes additional materials, technical assistance and/or capacity, financial support and (particularly in urban areas) connections to municipal infrastructure and services. Where the necessary support to complete construction was not provided; groups such as the single, elderly and the mentally disabled were found to be *"still living in very poor and undignified circumstances"* after the shelter kits were received.⁹⁸

Debts and the cost of self-recovery

Needs assessments after the typhoon reported that some regions were more prone to negative coping strategies, including the accrual of debt, than others; these regions also tended to have higher rates of self-recovery (although there were likely multiple factors influencing this). One agency working in Region VI reported that over half of the assessed households in the municipalities in which they were working had borrowed money after Haiyan, mostly to rebuild their homes. Overall the Shelter Cluster notes that if self-recovery *"was achieved through an increase in household debt, particularly if this is high-interest, then this could affect resilience to future shocks in the longer term"*.⁹⁹ Some implementing agencies also raised this issue, highlighting concerns for households who were excluded from shelter interventions as they had already rebuilt their homes through taking high interest loans, but where then facing critical vulnerability issues as they were unable to repay the loans. As in rural and peri-urban areas, this can have detrimental effects on urban populations' coping capacities, especially in those cases where populations have to spend additional money to connect to municipal services, on transportation and commutes to work and/or face higher costs of daily living than in non urban areas. Though none of the literature reviewed cited specific gendered impacts of this increased debt load on urban populations, it is possible to assume that in households where there are gender inequalities in education, access to income and/or in decision making and control of resources, increased debts for self-recovery were likely offset by a decrease in family resources being provided to women and girl-children or other marginalized groups (ie. by pulling girls out of school to save money, by limiting transportation costs, and therefore movement, unless needed, etc.). To help address this the Shelter Cluster recommended that

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ CARE. (2015, March). CARE Philippines Typhoon Haiyan Shelter Recovery Programme Evaluation.

⁹⁹ Shelter Cluster. (2014). Analysis of Shelter Recovery. Retrieved from <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Final%20Analysis%20of%20Shelter%20Recovery.pdf>

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

more be done to better define capacity for self-recovery, and complement this through data gathered on the use of negative coping strategies.

D. Technical Assistance & Building Back Better

Build back better

The recovery-oriented targets of the shelter sector have much lower levels of success, with only 24% of the target number of households demonstrating safety features; 61% of households have a dwelling considered as adequate; and only 27% of the target number of households have a durable roofing solution. Overall, less than 50% of IDPs have a sustainable return or relocation site. Monitoring by cluster partners in the first three months observed that household self-build efforts were usually “building back worse” with potentially dangerous dwellings being rebuilt.¹⁰⁰ Beyond the satisfaction levels of the assisted population, the reality is that the outcome of the shelter assistance that has reached households has not led to minimum levels of safety or adequacy for much of the population. 76% of dwellings were objectively classified as still being very unsafe or fairly unsafe, while 39% were objectively classified as being very inadequate or inadequate. As households prepare for relocation, it will be important that existing vulnerabilities are accounted for and that agencies work with households to build back safer and change existing conceptions of what constitutes a safe or adequate dwelling, where necessary.¹⁰¹

The Shelter Cluster provided guidance on minimum safety and adequacy features, which were also used for assessments. Safety features included minimum standards on site, shape, foundation, tie-down, bracing, strong joints and roofing, while adequacy standards considered space, durability, drainage, ventilation, ceiling height, privacy, security and accessibility. Moreover communication planning and support should also be provided to DSWD at the municipal level so as to ensure build back safer messages are incorporated in the delivery of its Emergency Shelter Assistance and National Community Driven Programmes.¹⁰²

Technical Assistance

The Shelter Cluster summarized as follows regarding the role of technical assistance in terms of BBB: *“In a largely repair and retrofit based response, technical assistance has the capacity to influence not only the vulnerability of Yolanda affected households to future shocks, but also to increase disaster risk reduction knowledge across non-affected households. Further work needs to be done to ensure the provision of technical guidance around recovery activities, in particular for repairs and retrofit, from the very early outset of a shelter response”*.¹⁰³ The Shelter Cluster found that a great deal of scope still exists for technical assistance in order to increase the prevalence of good building safety features. The Cluster also recommended that, where government assistance will be primarily provided through cash or voucher based approaches, the most appropriate role for the humanitarian community was in the provision of technical assistance rather than direct materials, supplies or services.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Hanley, T., Binas, R., Murray, J., & Tribunalo, B. (2014, October). *IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*. New York: UN-OCHA.

¹⁰¹ Philippines Shelter Cluster. (2014, September). *Shelter Sector Response Monitoring - Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines, 2013 Final Report: Monitoring Assessment 2*. Retrieved from <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/shelter-sector-response-monitoring-typhoon-haiyan-philippines-2013-final-report>

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Shelter Cluster. (2014). *Analysis of Shelter Recovery*. Retrieved from <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Final%20Analysis%20of%20Shelter%20Recovery.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Part B: Literature Review

Based on Lessons Learned from Urban Shelter, WASH and Livelihoods Interventions in Response to Typhoon Haiyan

Some good practice examples include: i) CARE, which was operating primarily in rural areas and through partner organizations, instituted a model of ‘roving teams’ to provide technical assistance and assist beneficiaries in building back safer. Roving teams were made up of carpenters and mobilizers identified from the target communities; team members were provided with training in the relevant building techniques; ii) Oxfam, who provided on the job technical training to women carpenters used the provision of shelter technical assistance to simultaneously develop address gender inequalities by providing women with skills and knowledge to do carpentry activities – raising self-esteem and providing a source of livelihood.¹⁰⁵

6.0 CONCLUSIONS OF THIS REVIEW

Overall, there is a dearth of information regarding urban-specific learning in the materials available regarding livelihoods, WASH and shelter responses to Typhoon Haiyan. Despite this, the authors have been able to identify some key lessons learned and best practices from Haiyan response and recovery interventions that are applicable to, and/or essential for, urban interventions in both the Philippines and in future humanitarian interventions. These key lessons and good practices include:

- The potential positive effects of using regional and/or area based approaches for program design and implementation in higher density urban areas;
- The benefits of partnering with local and municipal partners in designing and implementing response frameworks;
- The need to connect immediate interventions with larger regional and local urban planning frameworks;
- The effectiveness of integrated livelihoods, WASH and Shelter approaches (that cross sectoral lines) that provide for affected populations’ immediate needs while also connecting to longer term municipal services, urban growth plans, and economic and DRR initiatives;
- The importance of tenure security, appropriate municipal service systems and modified, developmental approaches to livelihoods as the cornerstones of integrated, holistic urban responses; and
- The need for donor and program flexibility so as to effectively transition between emergency and recovery support and/or between first phase response and support activities (ie. those activities essential for ensuring humanitarian responses – such as water provision – are built into municipal systems).

¹⁰⁵ OXFAM. (2015, March). *Project Closure Reports - Tacloban Programme (EFSVL, Gender, Protection, Shelter, WASH)*.