
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief



Government Funding

The Netherlands



Rie Andersen Marina Buch Kristensen

June 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSI
DEFINITIONS II
INTRODUCTION
METHODOLOGY
DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONSE
OVERALL ALLOCATIONS AND DISBURSEMENTS10
GOOD HUMANITARIAN DONOR SHIP17
DECISION MAKING CRITERIA23
RESPONSE STRATEGY
HUMAN RESOURCES
KEY MESSAGES 25
APPENDIX
Terms of Reference:
References
Tables in original currency 31

Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
DAC	Development Assistance Cooperation
DARA	Development Assistance Research Associates
DGIS	Directorate General for International Cooperation, MFA
DMV	Human Rights and Peace building Department, MFA
DMV/HH	Humanitarian Aid Division, MFA
DMV/VG	Peace building and Good Governance Division, MFA
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IHP	International Humanitarian Partnership
INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, MFA
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NGO	Non Governmental organisation
NRC	Het Netherlandse Rode Kruis
OCHA	Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
SHO	Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties
SPHERE	Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Definitions¹

Pledge:

Pledges are made by donors in response to disasters usually in the form of statements. It is not reported through any international mechanism or validated system – they are a series of individual statements from countries. Pledges can among other be made as a statement in a donor conference, to Parliament or at the press conference.

Commitment:

The key feature of a commitment is that it is (to some extent) binding. Donors use different terms and the status of a commitment may range from money which has been set aside with the intention that it should be spent on X to a legally binding contract to transfer a fixed amount to the recipient on a specified date. It is always a defined amount of money.

Disbursement:

The key feature of a disbursement is that the donor does not have control of the funds anymore. A disbursement can either be a transfer of money/goods from the donor to the recipient, or it can be money which is set aside for the recipient to draw down.

Goods in kind:

Goods which have been purchased in the donor country and that are ready for consumption or use on arrival in the recipient country. Thus defined, aid in kind is classified as tied by definition. Most (but not all) aid in kind consists of either food aid or emergency and distress relief. However, not all food or emergency aid is necessarily in kind. Amounts to be spent in another country for purchases of goods to be shipped from that country are not classified as aid in kind.

Tied aid:

Tied aid is aid that must be spent on good and services either from the donor country or from a specified group of countries. Aid is tied if it specified in a contract or agreement between the donor and the recipient that a specific supplier from the donor country has to be used. Gifts in Kind are always tied.

New money:

New money is funds that are added to an existing budget line. It is not new money if it has been reallocated from other budget lines. It can be new money to the humanitarian budget or new money to the development budget as a whole.

¹ These terms are based on the definitions given by the institute "Development Initiatives_" with regard to "Pledges, Commitments, Disbursements, Gifts-in-Kind and Tied Aid" as agreed by the participants in the TEC Funding Study Coordination meeting in Geneva, 8th September 2005.

Humanitarian assistance:

There is no common definition of what constitutes humanitarian assistance- the growing area of action which aims to respond to and prevent emergencies. For the purpose of this evaluation the term covers what is defined as humanitarian assistance by donors and NGOs in the respective countries. In Denmark "nødhjælp", in the Netherlands "nodule" and, in the Ireland emergency aid. The terms humanitarian assistance, relief and emergency are used interchangeable.

Introduction

Channel Research is pleased to present this Draft Report on **the Dutch Government funding flows**, which is to feed into an overall evaluation of the funding response of the various governments, UN agencies, NGOs and INGOs to the Tsunami emergency and relief. The Funding Study, commissioned by Danida, is on of six thematic evaluations under the auspice of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC). Findings from the thematic evaluations will be presented in an overall TEC Synthesis Study to be published at the end of 2005.

According to the ToR (annex 1) the purpose of the sub-study on Dutch Government Funding is to:

- 1. Document the amount and pattern of pledges made by the Government of the Netherlands in the months following the tsunami. Analyse these pledges commenting on evidence that they represent new funding, or reallocated funding. Seek to comment on the relationship between appeals for assistance from agencies and states on the one hand and the nature of pledges on the other.
- 2. Document for each actual financial commitment made and comment on how these relate to their pledges. Where possible, show to which countries and to which agencies, commitments have been made. Comment on where these commitments correspond to agency and affected-state identified programming
- 3. Commitment mechanisms identify mechanisms used by donors to disburse funds (i.e. traditional methods versus new methods)
- 4. Of these commitments, what has actually been spent? How well has spending in these first months been prioritised and disbursed in a way that demonstrates impartiality?
- 5. Analysis of flow of goods in kind from each major donor state paying particular attention to military assets and pharmaceuticals. Have unsolicited goods been donated? Has military assistance been charged at cost?

The data being subject to evaluation consists of descriptive and financial data on pledges, commitments and disbursements, actions, the projects and the policies, as gathered by the evaluation team in October 2005.

The draft report is presented in a structure common to all the sub-studies commissioned as part of the funding evaluation. This format was agreed to at the TEC Funding Study Coordination meeting, on 8 September 2005 in Geneva. It has been prepared by Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA), the agency responsible for synthesising the findings of the multiple Government studies in preparation for the overall funding study synthesis. Consequently the report at hand does not constitute a traditional stand-alone evaluation report, but is written in a format which facilitates the purpose of synthesising and cross-country comparison.

Besides a general description of the donor country's response, the DARA format includes a focus on: Overall Allocation and Disbursement; adherence to Good Humanitarian Donor ship principles; Decision Making Criteria; Response Strategy and Human Resources. While adhering as strict as possible to the reporting format, the evaluation team has strived to avoid unnecessary repetitions in the report caused by the overlapping nature of these themes.

Methodology

The evaluation team ensured triangulation of findings by applying a variety of data collection methods comprising desk research and analysis of existing material; interviews with key informants in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; as well as interviews and quantitative data collection in the form of a questionnaire sent to organisations and institutions receiving government funding.

In the desk phase the team carried out initial research, and a questionnaire based on the TOR as well as a spreadsheet for the data collection. Data supplied by the donor was supplemented with data found on a number of web sites including the MFA website – such as: policy documents; previous evaluations; press releases; and discussions in parliament. Furthermore, the team approached the recipients of government funding, in order to gather further information and documentation.

The desk research was followed up by interviews with two types of informants:

- Interviews in person, by phone or e-mail, with officials in the donor administration, so as to be able to answer questions about pledges, donor policy, action and reaction with respect to the donor.
- Interviews in person, by phone and e-mail, with selected grant recipients in order to confirm the grants, obtain more financial data and to be able to answer questions specifically related to donor processes including criteria for cooperation.

This report presents the collected data and the subsequent analysis in the DARA report format as agreed by the participants in the TEC Funding Study Coordination meeting in Geneva, 8th September 2005.

Description of the Response

Background

The Dutch government pledged an unprecedented amount of $\notin 240$ million (\$ 303,406,131) within 16 days of the Tsunami disaster in South East Asia. The Tsunami disaster and the response were in many ways unique and this study will seek to determine *how* and *why* the Dutch government acted and reacted with its response.

The first responses came from a preliminary task force that was in function within the Humanitarian Aid Division from the onset of the disaster. In early January a formal Tsunami Task Force was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by the Deputy Director of the Human Rights and Peace building Department². Contact was established with the national NGO fundraising body; SHO and the UN country resident coordinators in Sri Lanka and Indonesia early on in the response. The task force took part in discussions and information meetings on initiatives from civil society, businesses and individuals throughout the response. The humanitarian strategy, as well as the basic principles for reconstruction aid, was set out during these meetings.

The Netherlands had the chairmanship of the EU during the first week of the Tsunami, and therefore the MFA was very actively involved in coordinating funding at EU-level³.

The political involvement during the first week of the response was minimal. However there was a broad agreement in the Dutch Parliament to provide substantial support in order to match the unprecedented public response and the Minister for Development Cooperation announced the pledges on the Jakarta conference on 6^{th} January.

The departments for *Dutch Humanitarian Aid (DMV/HH)* and *Reconstruction Aid for the Tsunami (DMV/VG)* are managed by the *Human Rights and Peace building Department (DMV)* which is a section under the *Directorate General for International Cooperation and the Director General for Political Affairs (DGIS)* within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. DGIS manages the aid programmes. In the mid 90's Dutch foreign policy was realigned with a fuller integration of the geographical desks responsible for aid and other aspects of foreign policy. Within the aid administration the Humanitarian division is separate from the regional desks that are organised on a geographical basis.

The Netherlands does not have an overall strategy paper for humanitarian assistance, but commitment and handling of humanitarian funding through NGOs is guided by three papers: "Grant Policy Framework for Humanitarian Aid 2005" (Dutch MFA, 2005); "Streamlining the awarding of

² The Task Force comprised the Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, staff from the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department; the Asia and Oceania Department; the United Nations and International Financial Institutions Department; the Sustainable Economic Development Department; the Information and Communication Department and the European Integration Department.

³ MFA found coordination a difficult task as Members states were not reporting their individual contributions to the Presidency.


grants to NGOs within the framework of humanitarian funding"⁴ and "Checklist for Organisational Capacity Assessment") (Dutch MFA). The key relief organisations implementing the Dutch humanitarian aid also implement Development aid on behalf of MFA and have framework agreements with the ministry on these programmes.

Humanitarian aid

Two days after the disaster the Netherlands made $\in 1$ million available to the International Red Cross for immediate humanitarian relief and $\in 13$ million and $\in 7$ million to Indonesia and Sri Lanka respectively through UN channels. On the 30th of December the Minister of Development Cooperation announced a raise in humanitarian aid till $\in 27$ million. At the Geneva conference 11th of January the sum was raised from $\in 30$ million to $\in 40$ million.

The lion's share of the humanitarian aid went to Indonesia (60%) followed by a large share to Sri Lanka (29%). Only 8 % was allocated to India and 3% to the region.

Distribution of committed Humanitarian Aid to Countries



Only $\notin 31$ million of the $\notin 40$ million originally pledged in Humanitarian aid will be paid out, as the HMV/HH (Humanitarian Division) in June has found no demand in the Tsunami affected areas for the remainder Humanitarian aid⁵. In April the MFA, having pledged $\notin 200$ million for reconstruction aid, questioned the need for committing the remaining humanitarian pledge. The NGOs were not able to absorb more funding, the initial phase of emergency had passed and a substantial amount of reconstruction aid had already been allocated. A political decision was therefore taken to reallocate the rest of the pledge⁶. The remaining $\notin 9$ million has been reallocated to emergencies in Africa.

^{4 (}Dutch MFA march 2004)

⁵ Pim Kraan, Deputy Head, Humanitarian Aid Division

⁶ Andriessen, Joost , Head of Humanitarian Aid Division

Reconstruction Aid

The Minister for Development Cooperation stated early on that the scale of the disaster demanded long term involvement. Consequently a pledge of \notin 200 million in reconstruction aid over a 5 year period was announced on the Jakarta conference on the 6th of January 2005. The funding was to be channelled through DMV/VG, the Peace building and Good Governance Division within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As with humanitarian assistance the lion's share of the reconstruction aid committed went to Indonesia (75.9%) and Sri Lanka (23.7%). Only 0.4% went to the Maldives.

Reconstruction Aid, distribution on Country ⁷		
Country	Amount committed	%
Indonesia	€91.566.809	75.9%
Sri Lanka	€28.541.533	23.7%
Maldives	€500.000	0.4%
	€120.608.342	100 %

*total pledge €200 million

The €200 million in reconstruction aid for the 5 year period was an unusual pledge as DGIS does not have a policy framework for reconstruction following natural disasters. The amount is substantial considering the fact that a decision in principle was taken in 2001 only to grant reconstruction aid to post-conflict disasters. Since there was no policy framework for natural disaster reconstruction the DMV/VG developed a set of criteria for the allocation of funds.

Dutch corporations expressed serious interest in taking part in implementation of the reconstruction aid and within the already allocated funds for reconstruction aid, 30% has been committed for implementation through private Dutch businesses.

As part of the tsunami response, the Dutch MFA furthermore agreed with the Indonesian and Sri Lankan governments on a one year debt postponement.

Actors and Funding Mechanisms

⁷ Most of the reconstruction funding to Sri Lanka has not been committed yet.

The key implementing partners of the humanitarian assistance in the Dutch tsunami response have been UN-agencies, International Red Cross, Dutch NGOs and the Ministry Of Defence. The total pledge for humanitarian aid was \notin 40 million and within 4 days the funding was made available with \notin 20 million to UN agencies (of which \notin 18.4 was finally committed), \notin 2 million to International Red Cross and finally \notin 5 million to Dutch NGOs through SHO. Later on in the response \notin 4.5 million became available to Dutch and International NGOs.

The distribution of the pledged amount was 60% to the UN, 30% to the NGOs, 7% to the Red Cross and 3% to the Ministry of Defence. Historically humanitarian funding through NGOs (including ICRC) amounts to 30% and UN to 69%⁸. Funding was thus following normal Dutch practice of giving given priority to the UN channel.

The Tsunami Strategy

In its humanitarian tsunami response the Dutch MFA has acted in accordance with its stated principles and has followed the usual Dutch practice of providing a large share of the funding via UN organisations and the Red Cross.

Likewise, the strategy within reconstruction aid also followed Dutch tradition of favouring multilateral solutions, as the Netherlands was one of the initiators of the Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. However, the Netherlands was not in favour of a regional MDTF. They preferred to have the funding earmarked for Sri Lanka and Indonesia, as they were the countries most severely affected; had limited disaster management capabilities; and were already Dutch partner programme countries.

Since the strategy in relation to the tsunami reconstruction differed from normal Dutch practice of only granting reconstruction to post conflict countries, criteria for the reconstruction aid had to be developed for the occasion. The Minister for Development Cooperation gave some broad guidelines: The funding should be coordinated; cover a 5 year period; and be aimed at Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The Tsunami Task force drew up the criteria in more detail, specifying that: the funding should be demand-driven; consistent with the reconstruction plans of the governments concerned; coordinated; not interfere with the local market; be conflict sensitive; tailored to local circumstances; as well as technically, culturally, socially, institutionally and economically relevant and/or useful to the population. The standard development cooperation criteria should furthermore apply to reconstruction aid: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, feasibility, sustainability and gender sensitivity.

It was stated that private Dutch businesses should only be considered as implementing partners of the reconstruction aid in special circumstances. For example if they had specific knowledge and prior experience in the affected sector/area. As such the Minister for Development Cooperation preferred not to tie a specific amount for implementation solely through Dutch private companies.

^{8 &}quot;From Emergency Relief to Rehabilitation, A Evaluation of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance in 2000-2004, TOR 2nd of March 2005, IOB, MFA.

Country	Commitment \$	Disbursement \$	Humanitarian	Reconstruction	In Kind*	Cash	Tied**
India	3.128.967	2.987.149	100%	0%	0,0%	100,0%	0,0%
Indonesia	134.286.198	82.104.027	17%	83%	0,7%	90,9%	8,1%
Maldives	634.276	-	0%	100%	0,0%	100,0%	0,0%
Regional	1.274.809	1.274.809	100%	0%	0,0%	100,0%	0,0%
Sri Lanka	46.981.757	28.157.481	23%	77%	0,0%	78,3%	30,7%
Total	186.306.007	114.523.467					

Overall Allocations and Disbursements⁹

New or reallocated money

The \notin 240 million was reallocated within the annual budget for Development and Humanitarian affairs and taken from contingency, i.e. uncommitted funds. The budget usually allows for raises in the humanitarian budget due to the annual increment in the GNP. The Netherlands allocate 0.8% of GNP annually to Development and Humanitarian Aid.

The total humanitarian aid budget was \notin 130 million at the beginning of 2005. By the end of October 2005 the budget had been raised to \notin 220 million including the raise for the Tsunami response and Pakistan. The additional funds came from the development budget.

In 2004 the level of humanitarian spending of the total development budget in the Netherlands was $4.63\%^{10}$. The same level was allocated in 2005 and will due to the budget increase end at a higher level for 2005.

Implementing actors

Eight commitments have been made from the humanitarian budget to 22 different agencies primarily UN-agencies and NGOs. The commitment to UN representative in Indonesia of €13 million involved

⁹ Donor is MFA only

^{10 &}quot;From Emergency Relief to Rehabilitation, An Evaluation of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance in 2000-2004, TOR 2nd of March 2005, IOB, MFA.

12 different UN-agencies, the commitment to the UN representative Sri Lanka of €7 million involved 7 different UN-agencies and finally the Dutch fundraising body SHO received €5 million for 8 different Dutch Relief NGOs.

Implementation foreseen	cen Actor commitment \$ Country Sector		Sector	Cash \$	In Kind \$	
Ministry of Defence	Ministry of Defence NL	971.711	Indonesia	Coordination	-	971.711
NGO	Cordaid	1.310.837	India	multi-sector	1.310.837	
NGO	Helen Keller International	1.902.829	Indonesia	Health	1.902.829	
NGO	Kerkinactie	1.000.747	Indonesia	Health	1.000.747	
NGO	Novib	725.894	India	multi-sector	725.894	
NGO	Save the Children the Netherlands	774.196	India	multi-sector	774.196	
NGO	Save the Children the Netherlands	885.526	Indonesia	multi-sector	885.526	
NGO	Save the Children the Netherlands	728.333	Sri Lanka	multi-sector	728.333	
NGO	Stichting Vluchteling	577.896	Indonesia	multi-sector	577.896	
NGO	Tear Fund	366.471	India	multi-sector	366.471	
NGO	Terres de Hommes	451.041	Indonesia	multi-sector	451.041	
NGO	Unicef	859.797	Sri Lanka	Education	859.797	
NGO	ZOA Vluchtelingenzorg	1.414.652	Sri Lanka	multi-sector	1.414.652	
IFRC	Red Cross the Netherlands IFRC	1.050.080	Regional	multi-sector	1.050.080	
IFRC	Red Cross the Netherlands IFRC	1.316.934	Indonesia	multi-sector	1.316.934	
IFRC	Red Cross the Netherlands IFRC	1.242.390	Sri Lanka	multi-sector	1.242.390	
UN	IOM	697.704	Indonesia	Shelter	697.704	
UN	OCHA	93.000	Sri Lanka	Coordination	93.000	

Breakdown by Implementing Actor for Relief phase¹¹

 $^{^{11}}$ Donor is MFA only

Implementation foreseen	Actor	Total commitment \$	Country	Sector	Cash \$	In Kind \$
UN	UN-common services	5.118.610	Indonesia	Coordination	5.118.610	
UN	UNDP	1.046.556 Indonesia Shelter		1.046.556		
UN	UNFPA	697.704	Indonesia	Health	697.704	
UN	UNFPA	927.000	Sri Lanka	Health	927.000	
UN	UNHCR	1.046.556	Indonesia	Shelter	1.046.556	
UN	UNHCR	1.854.000	Sri Lanka	Shelter	1.854.000	
UN	UNICEF	697.704	Indonesia	Food	697.704	
UN	UNICEF	697.704	Indonesia	Health	697.704	
UN	UNICEF	2.537.105	Indonesia	Water & sanitation	2.537.105	
UN	UNICEF	443.993	Indonesia	Protection	443.993	
UN	UNICEF	1.854.000	Sri Lanka	Education	1.854.000	
UN	UNJLC	463.000	Sri Lanka	Coordination	463.000	
UN	WFP	1.268.553	Indonesia	Food	1.268.553	
UN	WFP	409.331	Sri Lanka	Coordination	409.331	
UN	WHO	488.393	Indonesia	Health	488.393	
UN	WHO	697.704	Indonesia	Health	697.704	
UN	WHO	1.052.899	Indonesia	Water & sanitation	1.052.899	
UN	WHO	927.000	Sri Lanka	Health	927.000	

Twelve commitments have been made from the reconstruction budget to 9 different agencies. It was allocated to the MDTF, the Asian Development Bank, Governments in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and to private Dutch companies.

Implementation foreseen	Actor	Total commitment \$	Country	Sector	Cash \$
ADB	Asian Development Bank	9.197.006	Sri Lanka	Shelter	11.416.973
Consultant	Ecory Consultants	433.472	Indonesia	Economic	-
Gov to Gov	Ministry of Fisheries SL	6.442.979	Sri Lanka	Economic	8.879.868
Gov to Gov	Ministry of Ports and Aviation SL	926.043	Sri Lanka	Economic	-
Gov to Gov	Ministry of Transport SL	13.513.298	Sri Lanka	Economic	-
Gov to Gov	Sri Lanka Ports Authority	520.107	Sri Lanka	Economic	520.107
Gov to Gov	Witleveen & Bos Consortium	10.402.131	Indonesia	Economic	-
MDTF	World Bank	100.000.000	Indonesia	multi-sector	100.000.000
NGO	Crisis Management Initiative FI	31.844	Indonesia	Coordination	31.844
NGO	Federation of Chambers of Commerce SL	5.454.776	Sri Lanka	Economic	5.454.776
UN	IUCN World Conservation Union	152.226	Sri Lanka	Environment	152.226
UN	UNDP	634.276	Maldives	multi-sector	634.276

Breakdown by Implementing Actor for Reconstruction phase

Military assets and in-kind contributions

Of the humanitarian Aid 2.5 % has been provided in-kind in the shape of the air transport (KDC-10). Furthermore air traffic controllers were deployed. This funding is characterized as direct military assets.

The in-kind contribution of military assets consisted of

1) Transport of NATO donated mobile bridges from Croatia to Aceh, Indonesia. The Netherlands organised the transport and delivery to the Indonesian authorities. In consultation with the Indonesian authorities an exploration team from the Ministry of Defence investigated how the bridges could best be used.

2) Dutch military air traffic controllers were deployed in Medan (Aceh) for several weeks to guide incoming aid flights, and communication equipment was made available to air traffic control stations at several airports in Aceh.

3) Air transport requested by OCHA - a KDC-10 was provided mainly to transport goods for International Red Cross.

Funding for 2) and 3) have not been allocated in the humanitarian budget yet, as it will only be finally accounted for by the end of the financial year. The costs are said to be minor.

Of the humanitarian budget 2.5% was allocated to the transport of mobile bridges. The Ministry of Defence has charged the MFA the full costs (app. \notin 5.000 per hour) of the air transport. The air transport of NATO bridges will be charged against the humanitarian aid budget by the end of 2005. So far \notin 766.000 has been committed to cover this cost.


The role of the Flash Appeal and the FTS

The UN Flash Appeal did play a significant role in the allocation of Dutch funding. 67% of the humanitarian funding was committed on the basis of Flash Appeal to either UN-agencies or the International Red Cross. The Netherlands pledged all it's funding on the basis of the country specific Flash Appeals as they were ready before the regional CAP.

Funds concentrated in a few key agencies

Of the humanitarian budget 30% has been allocated to eleven different NGOs including two international NGOs. All key Dutch humanitarian NGOs received funding either by applying individually to the Ministry or through their membership of the NGO Fundraising body SHO.

The allocation to the UN system was channelled to nine different UN agencies. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred to see the funds concentrated in few key agencies. The distribution among the UN-agencies was handed over to the UN office resident coordinators in Sri Lanka and Indonesia (UNDP). UNDP initially distributed the Dutch funding among a large range of UN-agencies which DMV/HH contested. The final allocation to the nine UN agencies was finally agreed between the DMV/HH and UNDP.



Distribution of committed Humanitarian Aid on Channel

Implementation mechanisms utilized- new partnerships

The normal criteria for selection of NGOs were applied and applications were turned down on the basis of too low quality and no prior presence in the affected area. All NGOs with two exceptions were traditional implementing partner.

DGIS do fund International NGOs as opposed to Dutch NGOs if they have a comparative advantage¹². Of the NGOs funded in the tsunami response two International NGOs were new implementing partners; the Helen Keller institute and the Finnish Crisis Management Group.

The Helen Keller Foundation approached the embassy in Jakarta and quick assessment of the organisation carried out by the embassy before the funds were committed. The same criteria used to select Dutch NGOs were applied.

The inclusion of private Dutch businesses as implementation partners for reconstruction aid posed some problems, as no initial selection criteria were present due to the fact that there was no policy within the MFA for implementing post-disaster reconstruction aid.

¹² International NGOs including the International Red Cross normally receive 25% of the humanitarian budget (Interview- senior staff).

		Committment	Disbursement	
Sector	Country	\$	\$	End Date
Coordination	Indonesia	6.090.321	-	31-08-2006
	Sri			
	Lanka	965.331	965.331	31-12-2005
Coordination Total	Coordination Total		965.331	31-08-2006
	Sri			
Education	Lanka	2.713.797	1.854.000	31-07-2006
Education Total		2.713.797	1.854.000	31-07-2006
Food	Indonesia	1.966.257	16.491.184	30-06-2005
Food Total		1.966.257	16.491.184	30-06-2005
Health	Indonesia	5.485.080	1.522.263	31-01-2007
	Sri			
	Lanka	1.854.000	1.854.000	31-12-2005
Health Total		7.339.080	3.376.263	31-01-2007
multi-sector	India	3.177.397	6.342.763	31-07-2006
	Indonesia	3.231.397	2.515.840	31-07-2006
	Regional	1.050.080	-	31-07-2006
	Sri			
	Lanka	3.385.375	3.082.396	30-06-2006
multi-sector Total	1	10.844.249	11.941.000	31-07-2006
Protection	Indonesia	443.993	-	30-06-2005
Protection Total		443.993	-	30-06-2005
Shelter	Indonesia	2.790.816	-	30-06-2005
	Sri			
	Lanka	1.854.000	1.854.000	31-12-2005
Shelter Total		4.644.816	1.854.000	31-12-2005
Water & santation	Indonesia	3.590.004	-	30-06-2005
Water & santation Total		3.590.004	-	30-06-2005
		38.597.848	36.481.777	31-01-2007

Sector Allocations and Geographic Focus by Donor

Non-traditional areas and sectors

The Helen Keller International, a new implementing partner of the MFA, works in an area of emergency assistance that the Ministry has not funded before namely Supplementation of Micronutrients (SUM). The MFA believed this form of assistance would work well as a supplement to traditional relief assistance¹³.

Delivering reconstruction aid to countries that had suffered from a natural disaster was also a new area for the MFA.

 $_{13}\ {\rm Andriessen},\ {\rm Joost}$, Head of Humanitarian Aid Division

Previous funding in the affected countries

The Netherlands has long-term development ties with some of the hardest-hit countries in the region. In 2004, Indonesia received \in 32 million for education, water projects and good governance programmes. Sri Lanka received \in 8.8 million largely to preserve the environment and support the peace process.

Good Humanitarian Donor ship

Humanitarian principles and objectives

There is no policy paper which outlines the general strategy and principles for Dutch humanitarian assistance. A policy paper is presently being elaborated by DVM-HH. At present the budget remarks and a policy framework paper and a checklist for humanitarian aid channelled through NGOs function as guidelines. In these papers it is spelled out that the basic principles underlying Dutch humanitarian assistance are the humanitarian imperative, impartiality and independence as enshrined in international humanitarian law.

Respecting the international humanitarian principles

The principles of impartiality and independence were guiding the Dutch humanitarian response to the tsunami in the sense that the Netherlands was actively seeking to provide assistance in ways that would not fuel the conflict situations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

The Netherlands have been a strong supporter of Multi Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan in relation to reconstruction aid. Likewise the Netherlands was one of the initiators of MDTF in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In both places a MDTF was seen as a way of respecting the principle of impartiality.

In view of international aid principles, in particular impartiality, the Netherlands does not normally channel its humanitarian assistance through national governments. Exceptions to the rule are only made in the case of natural disasters¹⁴. In the case of the Tsunami the Dutch Government did provide bilateral funding through reconstruction aid to both Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka the MDTF has not materialised and the Dutch Government has provided reconstruction aid directly to the Sri Lankan Government.

There is however a limit to the amount of reconstruction aid that the Netherlands can provide to the Sri Lankan Government without violating the impartiality principle. Especially since delivering aid to regions controlled by the Tamil Tigers has become difficult after a decision to include T.R.O. (Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation) on the EU list of terror organisations is pending.

¹⁴ Grant Policy framework for Humanitarian Aid 2005.

The Dutch response has been careful to take conflict sensitive issues into account. The reconstruction aid has been concentrated in Sri Lanka and Indonesia where the Netherlands already had peace building and good governance projects. The Human Rights and Peace building Division (DMV) handling the reconstruction aid is familiar with the conflict situation in the two countries and is handling the issues with great insight.

Subscription to the RC code of conduct and other standards is listed as a prerogative for Dutch humanitarian funding. The view in the Ministry is that it is difficult to apply standards directly and that the NGOs should be as far as possible be self regulatory. The MFA is however advancing quality control mechanisms and standards also by financing programs such as SPHERE, ALNAP, HAP-I. The MFA hosted an international conference on the RC code of conduct in 2004.

Flexibility and timeliness

From the pledge of \notin 40 million in humanitarian assistance, 8 commitments have been made¹⁵ and \notin 29 million has been disbursed. The Ministry has disbursed 7 out of the 8 commitments within the 6 weeks target.

Regarding reconstruction aid 12 commitments have been made by end of October 2005 and the Ministry has disbursed €64 million.

Allocation of funding is very flexible in the Netherlands. Of the \notin 40 million pledged in humanitarian assistance only \notin 31 million will be actually spent on the Tsunami response. The remaining \notin 9 million have been reallocated to Sudan and Ethiopia.

With regard to the reconstruction aid the Dutch Government has stressed that reconstruction takes a long time which is why the Government has committed funds for a 5 year period. Even if the absorption capacity in Sri Lanka is presently low, the Dutch Government has not so far expressed any intention of reallocating the money. The allocation of the money between Sri Lanka and Indonesia is not fixed and if the money cannot be spent in Sri Lanka it can eventually be spent in Indonesia.

The 30 December 2004 the Dutch Government decided to allocated \notin 20 million to the UN. In an effort to speed up the disbursement process the money was allocated directly to the UN office resident coordinators in Colombo (\notin 7 million) and Jakarta (\notin 13 million) for them to allocate to the appropriate UN-agencies. The standard procedure would have been to make the money available to the UN agencies via their headquarters. Unfortunately UNDP as UN resident coordinator in Jakarta

¹⁵ The commitments to the individual UN-agencies are not counted separately. The Ministry made two commitments to the UN country resident coordinators in respectively Sri Lanka and Indonesia. The responsible resident coordinators then allocated the money to the individual agencies. The commitment to Dutch NGOs channeled through the SHO is likewise counted as one commitment.

was not able to respond in a relevant, swift and effective way¹⁶ and consequently the actual allocation was considerably delayed. However this pilot attempt could serve as an input to the debate on how to improve the timeliness of the UN-system.

Needs based funding

Whether Dutch pledges were supply- or demand driven cannot be answered with a simple yes or no as demand and supply changed over time. An unprecedented amount was however supplied or made available before the exact need or demand was known.

At the time of the donor conference in Geneva the scale of the catastrophe and the reconstruction needs were not fully determined. However the scale was evident, and whatever the precise needs, the Dutch pledge would cover only a fraction.

The pledges were based on estimates on need by the UN system and the NGOs. However the rise in the pledge from \notin 30 to \notin 40 million was decided by the Minister for Development Cooperation and announced at the donor conference in Geneva the 11 January.

At the same donor conference the Dutch government pledged €200 million in reconstruction aid. The timing suggests that this pledge was to some extent a political pledge.

The Netherlands do not conduct its own assessments based on field visits. It is relying on the UNsystem, the NGOs and the media reports, and to a large extent the estimations of need is also based on experience from other disasters.

The Netherlands is traditionally placing emphasis on the importance of the UN coordination efforts and a shared analysis of need among donors. It is a precondition for receiving government funding that an NGO is actively engaged in coordination efforts in the field¹⁷. Control on the engagement of the NGO sector in CHAP processes is controlled both by the embassies and DMV/HH. The DMV/HH acts upon complaints of field coordinators or acts if field visits give the impression a partner in the field does not live up to expectations vis-à-vis coordination and needs assessments/ analysis.

Beneficiary participation

It is difficult to say how much of the humanitarian assistance that has involved participation by final beneficiaries. Of the humanitarian funding 30% was channelled through NGOs and could have involved some kind of beneficiary participation. The Ministry does not have an explicit written requirement¹⁸ of the NGOs to include beneficiary participation. One of the NGOs that received

¹⁶ UNPD distributed the funding between a large number of UN-agencies (including for HIV/AIDS program in the initial emergency phase) and moreover they charged \$100,000 in administration fees, interview Pim Kraan HMV/HH

¹⁷ Grant Policy framework for Humanitarian Aid 2005 (June, 2005)

¹⁸ Grant Policy framework for Humanitarian Aid 2005 (June, 2005)

funding directly from the Ministry explained in its project proposal that it aims to involve the local capacities in the design, implementation and management of the project but that it is difficult with a disaster of this magnitude and where local capacities are limited.¹⁹

With regards to reconstruction aid the Government has placed great emphasis on basing its reconstruction efforts on the plans developed by the Sri Lanka and Indonesian Governments. However the two governments have taken a long time to draw up such plans which moreover turned out quite general and vague.

The Dutch Government has ensured that reconstruction work that has been undertaken by Dutch companies has been formally requested by the two governments.

Disaster preparedness and mitigation

The Netherlands is not operational in its delivery of humanitarian aid and it does not have an emergency agency to draw on. It does not have a disaster preparedness capacity within the Ministry of Development Cooperation (DGIS) in terms of staff resources. In the Evaluation report of the Dutch MFA response to the Tsunami is recommended that DGIS should be able to draw of a team of emergency specialists that could be deployed in the embassy in disasters situations²⁰.

In 1997 the MFA funded 50% of an air carrier Hercules C-130 H 30 with the purpose of being able to draw on the carrier in emergency situations like the tsunami. The costs for the utilisation of the carrier, is deducted depreciations.

The Netherlands do not have a specific budget line for disaster preparedness or mitigation. DGIS do fund some NGO projects that involve local disaster preparedness. But of Dutch humanitarian assistance in the period 2000-2004 only 0.16% had been spent on disaster preparedness.

Linkages to recovery and development

Long-term projects are not funded from the Dutch humanitarian assistance budget. However the Dutch Government has placed great emphasis on its long-term commitment in terms of reconstruction. The Minister has explicitly stated that she shares the view of UN coordinator Jan Egeland that even three years is too short for reconstruction. The minister has therefore committed reconstruction aid from the Netherlands for a period of five years. A position that is very supportive of recovery and long-term development.

¹⁹ Emergency Project Proposal, ZOA (December, 2004)

²⁰ Evaluatierapport Tsunami Crisis (August 2005)

It is outside the scope of this evaluation to determine if the humanitarian aid delivered by the Dutch MFA has been given in a way that establish an actual link to longer term recovery and development in the affected area.

UN Coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate

The coordinating role of the UN and the ICRC/IFRC is a central part of Dutch humanitarian assistance. Dutch humanitarian aid aims to strengthen and develop a common coordinated approach among all actors concerned to ensure that they do not operate alone and without coordination in the affected zone. The Netherlands only finance activities of NGOs which are involved in the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) if there is one.²¹

The Dutch government has also placed emphasis on the coordination roles of UN and the International Red Cross in its Tsunami response. Immediately after the disaster the Netherlands made available $\notin 1$ million to the IFRC and $\notin 20$ million through UN channels of which 1.3% went to coordination efforts.

Effect on other crisis

The \notin 40 million pledged in humanitarian assistance has not been taken from the existing humanitarian budget. The Government decided to raise the humanitarian budget with \notin 40 million already when the assistance was pledged. It is not new money added to the overall development budget but it is new money to the humanitarian budget. The \notin 40 million added to the humanitarian budget have been taken from the development budget; from funds not yet allocated. The \notin 9 million not committed from the Tsunami budget has been reallocated to other humanitarian crises in Africa.

The \notin 200 million in reconstruction aid is not new money to the development budget either. It is allocated from the existing development budget of 0.8% of the Dutch BNP. It is funded by the annual increase in the development budget resulting from the annual increase in the Dutch GNP, and hence constitutes funds not yet allocated. It is new money to the reconstruction budget.

Predictability and flexibility

The key implementing partners in the Dutch Tsunami response have been the UN-agencies and Dutch NGOs. The distribution among them did not differ significantly from distribution in earlier years. Dutch humanitarian assistance has in the period between 2000-2004 been implemented 70% by multilateral organisations²² and 30% by (I) NGOs²³. In relation to the Tsunami funds pledged the distribution was 60% to the UN, 30% to the NGOs and 7% to the International Red Cross and finally 3% to the Ministry of Defence.

²¹ Grant Policy framework for Humanitarian Aid 2005

²² Primarily UN and small amount channelled through NATO, OSCE etc

²³ From Emergency to Rehabilitation- TOR written by IOB

With regard to the reconstruction aid approximately 70% has been committed to foundations that will be managed by the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. The Dutch Government followed the principles of Good Humanitarian Donor ship and channelled a large share of its funding unearmarked to UN-agencies and to multi-donor trust funds.

Of the reconstruction aid 30% has been committed to either the Indonesian or the Sri Lankan government. The Dutch government has however not followed good donor practice in allocating these 30% in tied aid to private Dutch companies²⁴. The Dutch Government was heavily lobbied by Dutch companies seeking funding for projects. The allocation to Dutch companies has placed an additional administrative burden on a division in the MFA already pressed for resources. Procedures had to be invented along the way in order to speed up the process and cater for international tendering rules. It is difficult to see the added value of this new practice especially because a number of these contracts have not yet been concluded.

Appeals and Action Plan

According to the OCHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) the Netherlands has contributed with 0.7 of the grand total of the Tsunami funding. This is the same level as Denmark (0.7) and Sweden (0.6). Of the grand total related to projects in the Flash Appeals the Netherlands has contributed with 2.8%, Denmark with 1.5% and Sweden with 2.0%.

In comparison with like-minded donors the Netherlands has contributed much more to the Flash Appeal. Moreover, outside the Flash Appeal the Netherlands has responded to direct UN requests for projects implemented by the military such as air transport and air traffic controllers.

Response capacity

The investment in an Air cargo carrier is part of a Dutch emergency preparedness strategy.

The Dutch relief and development NGOs do not receive any government funding for internal contingency planning that could strengthen their capacity for response.

The annual provision of untied core funding to the humanitarian UN organizations by the Dutch Government helps to ensure contingency planning by these agencies.

Military humanitarian action

Only 3% of the Dutch humanitarian aid has been channelled through military organisations.

²⁴ The aid is defined as tied since the Dutch company is mentioned as implementing partner in the contracts between the Dutch Government and Indonesian Government.

Evaluation

The MFA has commissioned the sub-studies on Dutch government and NGO funding as part of the overall TEC funding evaluation. It is supporting the TEC with $\notin 100.000$ to the core funding and $\notin 34.000$ to the funding study. An evaluation of the Dutch management of the Tsunami response primarily in relation to Dutch citizens was published in August 2005.

The evaluation team has succeeded in completing the study despite the time constraints thanks to very helpful and forthcoming personnel in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Financial transparency and accountability

The figures are published on the website of the Ministry and have been reported to the UN Financial Tracking System (FTS). However, only the overall figures are published on the website and a full list of commitments has yet to be published.

Decision making criteria

With regard to the humanitarian assistance the Ministry is guided by the *Grant Policy framework for humanitarian aid* which was updated in June 2005. This policy framework includes reference to international humanitarian aid principles. A general policy paper is presently being elaborated. In this respect a range of ministries and NGOs are being consulted.

With regard to reconstruction aid the Ministry do not have stated principles for reconstruction aid to countries following natural catastrophes. The Tsunami Task Force that was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in early January therefore had to draw up the criteria for the selection of projects in the matter of a few weeks.

Response strategy

The response strategy has been to channel as much as possible through the UN and to kick start the private fundraising in the Netherlands by donating €5 million to SHO- an NGO fundraising body. The Dutch Government wanted a swift response to the catastrophe and therefore decided to commit funds directly to the Office of the resident Coordinator in Indonesia and Sri Lanka respectively. UNDP Jakarta was unfortunately not able to respond accordingly and the attempt to be swift backfired, whereas the response was more appropriate in Sri Lanka.

The Dutch MFA is not operational in delivering humanitarian assistance. It does therefore not have a standing disaster response mechanism as such. Specific conflict mapping or risk analysis have not been carried out for the humanitarian response neither in the field nor in headquarters. This has been delegated to the operational bodies funded by the Netherlands.

With regard to reconstruction aid the Dutch Government has pledged €200 million to Sri Lanka and Indonesia. It was decided to concentrate the reconstruction efforts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia as the two countries were most severely affected and as the Netherlands have previous partner programmes in both countries.

The Dutch Government was one of the initiators to setting up MDTF in Sri Lanka and Indonesia and in drawing up common donor objectives. In Indonesia a lion's share of the reconstruction aid has been donated to the MDTF. In Sri Lanka there have been efforts by several donors to set up a MDTF similar to the one in Indonesia so far without success. Both the Indonesian and the Sri Lankan Governments have been asked to provide a detailed strategy with clear priorities for the reconstruction phase. However both governments have so far failed to produce clear strategies. The Dutch Government therefore have had to rely on Government to Government aid with decisions being taken on an ad-hoc basis.

The Ministry has taken the conflict situation in Sri Lanka into account in so far as it is wary of allocating funding only to the Southern regions controlled by the Sri Lankan Government. This strategy could prove difficult now that a decision to include the Tamil Relief Organisation on the EU list of terror organisations is pending. This could lead to less Dutch reconstruction aid being allocated to Sri Lanka.

Human Resources

Existing staff managed the response with fewer resources (due to the Christmas season) in their normal functions. In January a task force was established that involved different departments in the MFA.

Staff leave was postponed and people worked harder and longer hours. It was however a short intense period of a few weeks. Other tasks were not put on hold although the annual negotiations with implementing partners had to be postponed.

The time of the year and the scale of the disaster meant that there was major strain on the department with regard to resources to manage and implement the Tsunami response. The initially available staff was to some extent inexperienced. As staff members returned from their holidays they volunteered to be part of the Tsunami response. They were however requested to stay with their normal tasks as it would be the most effective. All staff members directly involved put all other tasks aside for the first week of the response.

The Ministry does not have the manpower to fund a large number of projects implemented by individual NGOs.²⁵ In order to lessen the burden the Ministry has an arrangement with SHO, to

²⁵ An attempt to lessen the administrative burden has been recently been elaborated (Streamlining the awarding of grants to NGOs within the framework of humanitarian funding, March 2004)

which they donate a single amount which SHO then distributes among the major humanitarian NGOs. However final reporting and accounts are expected to adhere to usual ministerial standards.

With regard to reconstruction aid the responsible department experienced an additional work load. Delivering reconstruction aid following natural disasters was outside their usual scope of work so procedures had to be invented along the way. The department was especially burdened with having to invent new procedures for the bilateral aid that was channelled to Dutch private companies. The evaluation team witnessed the bulky files for these projects which contain correspondence and tender proposals of different sorts back and forth to and from MFA. DMV-VG did not have staff available for this type of reconstruction aid as this type of project handling is normally a very small part of delivering development aid.

Key messages

- The Dutch Government pledged a total amount of €240 million (\$ 303.4 million) to the Tsunami disaster in Asia. The total response was pledged as €40 million (\$ 49.6 million) in humanitarian assistance and €200 million (\$ 253.7 million) in reconstruction aid over a period of 5 years. As per end of October 2005 €30 (\$ 38 million) of the humanitarian assistance and €64 (\$81 million) of the reconstruction aid has been disbursed.
- Dutch humanitarian funding is very flexible. €9 million previously allocated to the Tsunami response, was reallocated to other disaster situations in Africa in June, as the HMV/HH (Humanitarian Division) found no demand in the tsunami affected areas for the unspent funds.
- The pledge by the Minister of Development of €200 million for post-disaster reconstruction aid was unusual as the Netherlands in principle only grant reconstruction aid to post-conflict disasters. The allocation of the reconstruction aid has been somewhat problematic especially in Sri Lanka where the absorption capacity presently is very low due to the conflict situation.
- The Dutch Government has lived up to the principles of Good Humanitarian Donor ship by allocating a large share of its humanitarian funding un-earmarked to multilateral institutions such as the UN-agencies and International Red Cross. The Dutch government however need a way of making the Dutch assistance more visible vis-à-vis the Dutch public. One idea could be that the UN-system announces individual donor contributions systematically.
- Regarding reconstruction aid priority has been given to funding through Multi Donor Trust Funds initiated by the Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation and managed by the World Bank. However reconstruction aid so far committed apart from the MDTF is to some

extent tied to implementation by Dutch companies, which has given rise to administrative difficulties.

Appendix

Terms of Reference:

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief.

Theme 2, Government funding flows

Background

Please read this document after reading the two attached background documents, "The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition: An Introduction" and "Concept Paper for Evaluating The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief"

The Tsunami catastrophe that struck Asia on 26 December 2004 is one of the worst natural disasters in modern history. Although the major impact was felt in India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand, several other countries were affected including Myanmar and Somalia, or touched by the tsunami including Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, Seychelles and Tanzania. More than 170,000 people are thought to have died and thousands more injured. Overall, an estimated 2 million people have been directly or indirectly affected of whom 1.7 million are internally displaced²⁶. Damage and destruction of infrastructure destroyed people's livelihoods, and left many homeless and without adequate water and healthcare facilities.

The world - governments and people – responded with unprecedented generosity in solidarity with the rescue and relief efforts of the affected communities and local and national authorities. More than \$ 6 billion has been pledged for humanitarian emergency relief and reconstruction assistance to Tsunami affected areas. This has been instrumental in reducing or mitigating the consequences of the disaster, and in boosting the current recovery and reconstruction efforts.

This evaluation is part of the overall evaluation by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. It is a thematic evaluation of the funding response by the various governments, UN agencies, NGOs and INGOs. The overall shape of the funding response evaluation is laid out in the Concept Paper annexed to these TORs.

The purpose of this specific evaluation is to:

3. Key state donors (including the EU)

Document the amount and pattern of pledges made by the Government of Denmark in the months following the tsunami. Analyse these pledges commenting on evidence that they represent new

²⁶ Figures for numbers dead and missing taken from Guha-Sapir, Van Panhuis, "*Health Impact of the Tsunami: Indonesia* 2005". Brussels Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, July 2005

funding, or reallocated funding. Seek to comment on the relationship between appeals for assistance from agencies and states on the one hand and the nature of pledges on the other.

Commitments: Document for each actual financial commitment made and comment on how these relate to their pledges. Where possible, show to which countries and to which agencies commitments were been made. Comment on where these commitments correspond to agency and affected-state identified programming

Commitment mechanisms – identify mechanisms used by donors to disburse funds (i.e. traditional methods versus new methods)

Of these commitments, what has actually been spent? How well has spending in these first months been prioritised and disbursed in a way that demonstrates impartiality?

Analysis of flow of goods in kind from each major donor state pays particular attention to military assets and pharmaceuticals. Have unsolicited goods been donated? Has military assistance been charged at cost?

Final report

The author's final report should be presented in a structure common to all the pieces of work being commissioned for this evaluation.

An introduction which describes the nature of the data and subject specifically evaluated.

An overview of the methodology adopted with particular reference to data sources.

A presentation, in narrative, table and graphical form, of the data gathered.

An analysis of the data in the light of the four key issues presented above.

An annex containing cited references

The main report should be presented as a MS Word file in English using British English spelling. Tables and graphs may in addition be presented as MS Excel files.

Authors should note that their report will be compiled and edited into the overall report on the evaluation of flows which in turn is one of a number of key evaluations being conducted.

Timetable

The penultimate draft of the evaluation must be submitted to the evaluation organizers, by email, no later than 7th October.

The organizers will feed comments back to the evaluator in weeks two and three of October.

Final draft material must be presented by email to the organizers by Friday 4th November.

References

Interviews:

Andriessen, Joost H.L.M.	MFA, Head Humanitarian Division
Anten, Louise M.	MFA, Head Peace building and Good Governance Division
Beijnum, Mariska van	MFA, Researcher Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
Gerrmann, Marchel	MFA, Senior Financial Officer
Graauw, Inez de	Save the Children, Senior Information Officer
Hoof, Heidi van den	N(o)vib, Tsunami Information officer
Hoogen, Hans van den	N(o)vib, Co-ordinator Humanitarian Programs
Kouwen, Jetty	MFA, Senior Policy Officer, South-East Asia and Oceania Division
Kraan, Pim	MFA, Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid Division
Leuverink, Inge	Cordaid, Senior Programme Officer Emergencies &
	Rehabilitation Department
Norman, Bonnie	Cordaid, Head Emergencies & Rehabilitation Department
Pulles, Helene	SHO
Sloot, Eric	MFA, Financial Officer
Vermeer, Riné	Save the Children, Financial Programme Manager
Wijbrandi, Jan Bouke	SHO (and N(o)vib), Director Campaign Department

Background documents:

Evaluatierapport Tsunami Crisis", (MFA, August 2005)

From Emergency Relief to Rehabilitation, an Evaluation of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance in 2000-2004, TOR 2nd, (IOB, MFA, March 2005)

Grant Policy Framework for Humanitarian Aid 2005" (MFA, 2005);

Streamlining the awarding of grants to NGOs within the framework of humanitarian funding (MFA, March 2004)

Checklist for Organizational Capacity Assessment, (MFA)

Project files

Press releases and website documents

Tables in original currency

Country	Committm ent €	Disburse ment €	Humanit arian	Reconstr uction	In Kind*	Cash	Tied**	
India	2.517.594	5.000.000	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	
Indonesia	110.205.569	66.200.10 3	17%	83%	1%	91%	8%	
Maldives	500.000	-	0%	100%	0%	100%	0%	
Regional	827.778	-	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%	
Sri Lanka	37.338.401	21.894.69 9	23%	77%	0%	78%	31%	
Total	151.389.342	93.094.80 2						
* Gift In Kind is "Goods which have been purchased in the donor country that are ready for consumption or use on the arrival in the recipient country. Thus defined, aid in kind is classified as tied by definition								
	d is aid that micified group o					e donor c	country or	

Inplementa tion foreseen	Actor	Total Committ ment €		Sector	Cash €	In Kind €
Gov to Gov	Federation of Chambers of Commerce SL	4.300.000	Sri Lanka	Economic	4.300.000	0
Gov to Gov	Ministry of Fisheries SL	5.079.000	Sri Lanka	Economic	5.079.000	0
Gov to Gov	Ministry of Ports and Aviation SL	730.000	Sri Lanka	Economic	-	730.000

Breakdown by Implementing Actor for Relief and Reconstruction phase

Gov to Gov	Ministry of Transport SL	10.652.53 3	Sri Lanka	Economic	-	10.652.53 3
Gov to Gov	Sri Lanka Ports Authority	410.000	Sri Lanka	Economic	410.000	0
Gov to Gov	Witleveen & Bos Consortium	8.200.000	Indonesia	Economic	-	8.200.000
Ministry of Defence	Ministry of Defence NL	766.000	Indonesia	Coordinatio n	-	766.000
NGO	Cordaid	1.033.333	India	multi-sector	1.033.333	0
NGO	Crisis Management Initiative FI	25.103	Indonesia	Coordinatio n	25.103	0
NGO	Ecory Consultants	341.706	Indonesia	Economic	-	341.706
NGO	Helen Kelles International	1.500.000	Indonesia	Health	1.500.000	0
NGO	IUCN World Conservation Union	120.000	Sri Lanka		120.000	0
NGO	Kerkinactie	788.889	Indonesia	Health	788.889	0
NGO	Novib	572.222	India	multi-sector	572.222	0
NGO	NRC	827.778	Regional	multi-sector	827.778	0
NGO	Save the Children the Netherlands	623.150	India	multi-sector	623.150	0
NGO	Save the Children the Netherlands	712.760	Indonesia	multi-sector	712.760	0
NGO	Save the Children the Netherlands	586.235	Sri Lanka	multi-sector	586.235	0
NGO	Stichting Vluchteling	455.556	Indonesia	multi-sector	455.556	0
NGO	Tear Fund	288.889	India	multi-sector	288.889	0
NGO	Terres de Hommes	355.556	Indonesia	multi-sector	355.556	0
NGO	Unicef	677.778	Sri Lanka	Education	677.778	0
NGO	ZOA Vluchtelingenzorg	1.115.170	Sri Lanka	multi-sector	1.115.170	0
RC	Red Cross the		Indonesia	multi-sector		0

	Netherlands IFRC	1.060.000			1.060.000	
RC	Red Cross the Netherlands IFRC	1.000.000	Sri Lanka	multi-sector	1.000.000	0
UN	IOM	550.000	Indonesia	Shelter	550.000	0
UN	OCHA	77.190	Sri Lanka	Coordinatio n	77.190	0
UN	UN-common services	4.035.000	Indonesia	Coordinatio n	4.035.000	0
UN	UNDP	825.000	Indonesia	Shelter	825.000	0
UN	UNDP	500.000	Maldives	multi-sector	500.000	0
UN	UNFPA	550.000	Indonesia	Health	550.000	0
UN	UNFPA	769.410	Sri Lanka	Health	769.410	0
UN	UNHCR	825.000	Indonesia	Shelter	825.000	0
UN	UNHCR	1.538.820	Sri Lanka	Shelter	1.538.820	0
UN	UNICEF	550.000	Indonesia	Food	550.000	0
UN	UNICEF	550.000	Indonesia	Health	550.000	0
UN	UNICEF	2.000.000	Indonesia	Water & santation	2.000.000	0
UN	UNICEF	350.000	Indonesia	Protection	350.000	0
UN	UNICEF	1.538.820	Sri Lanka	Education	1.538.820	0
UN	UNJLC	384.290	Sri Lanka	Coordinatio n	384.290	0
UN	WFP	1.000.000	Indonesia	Food	1.000.000	0
UN	WFP	339.745	Sri Lanka	Coordinatio n	339.745	0
UN	WHO	385.000	Indonesia	Health	385.000	0
UN	WHO	550.000	Indonesia	Health	550.000	0

UN	WHO	830.000	Indonesia	Water & santation	830.000	0
UN	WHO	769.410	Sri Lanka	Health	769.410	0
WB	Asian Development Bank	7.250.000	Sri Lanka	Shelter	7.250.000	0
WB	World Bank	83.000.00 0	Indonesia	multi-sector	83.000.00 0	0

Sector Allocations and Geographic Focus by Donor

Sector	Country	Comittment	Disbursement	End date
Coordination	Indonesia	4.801.000	-	31-08-2006
	Sri Lanka	801.225	801.225	31-12-2005
Coordination Total		5.602.225	801.225	31-08-2006
Education	Sri Lanka	2.216.598	1.538.820	31-07-2006
Education Total		2.216.598	1.538.820	31-07-2006
Food	Indonesia	1.550.000	13.000.000	30-06-2005
Food Total		1.550.000	13.000.000	30-06-2005
Health	Indonesia	4.323.889	1.200.000	31-01-2007
	Sri Lanka	1.538.820	1.538.820	31-12-2005
Health Total		5.862.709	2.738.820	31-01-2007
multi-sector	India	2.517.594	5.000.000	31-07-2006
	Indonesia	2.583.871	2.025.000	31-07-2006
	Regional	827.778		31-07-2006

	Sri Lanka	2.701.405	2.429.853	30-06-2006
multi-sector Total		8.630.648	9.454.853	31-07-2006
Protection	Indonesia	350.000		30-06-2005
Protection Total		350.000		30-06-2005
Shelter	Indonesia	2.200.000		30-06-2005
	Sri Lanka	1.538.820	1.538.820	31-12-2005
Shelter Total		3.738.820	1.538.820	31-12-2005
Water & santation	Indonesia	2.830.000		30-06-2005
Water & santation Total		2.830.000		30-06-2005
Hovedtotal		30.781.000	29.072.538	31-01-2007