


Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)

The International Community's Funding of the Tsunami Emergency and Relief



Government Funding

Australia

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Australian Government
AusAID

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I. Introduction

Provide a general description of the donor country's response, the actors involved and the funding mechanisms employed. (i.e. whether several agencies are involved and if military assets have been deployed, etc.).

In the first 36 hours following the disaster:

- An emergency task force of senior officials was established in Canberra (at 6 pm on Sunday December 26th) to coordinate Australia's response;
- The AusAssist Plan, a standing AusAID disaster response plan, was activated on December 27, 2004;
- Essential supplies from the AusAID emergency store were sent to Indonesia on four RAAF C-130 Hercules, departing on December 27-29;
- The flights also took two AusAID funded medical teams to conduct health assessments and provide primary treatment;
- AusAID funded the immediate deployment of four participants in United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) teams to Thailand and Indonesia;
- AusAID staff from posts in affected countries were dispatched to disaster areas to assess the impact of the tsunami; and
- Additional staff from Canberra was sent to Indonesia, Thailand and Sri Lanka to support the posts.

On December 27, 2004, an initial contribution of A\$10 million, which was directed through international relief agencies such as the Red Cross and UN humanitarian agencies, was announced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. On December 29th and 31st, additional contributions of \$25 million each were made.

The Australian Government committed a total of \$21.5 million to the UN Flash Appeal. These funds were allocated to assist with the UN's vital role in providing relief and coordinating international humanitarian action.

Australia's assistance to Indonesia during the emergency phase was directed mostly to Indonesia (Banda Aceh, with some small-scale assistance going to the northwest coast and the outlying islands of Nias, Batu, Banyak and Simeulue). The support focused predominantly on health, water and sanitation, but extended to re-establishing schools and protecting the most vulnerable children. The assistance also played a key role in providing the logistics necessary to support the humanitarian relief operation. By the end of January, Australia had delivered an estimated 1036 tonnes of humanitarian aid to tsunami victims in Aceh and North Sumatra provinces. That aid included food, water, medical supplies and shelter equipment.

More than \$25 million of the Australian Government aid funds were provided for emergency relief in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, India and Thailand, focusing on the urgent need for food, shelter, water and sanitation, as well as public health, education and the environment.

Throughout the emergency phase, AusAID worked closely with the Australian Defense Forces, Emergency Management Australia and the Department of Health and Aging, which provided critical assistance in deploying emergency medical teams and medical supplies, including

vaccinations. A large number of offers of assistance were received from federal, state and local governments. Offers of personnel to participate in the immediate response teams (including seven medical teams), water, medical supplies and transport were accepted and activated appropriately.

Australia also provided support to non-governmental organizations that have a proven track record of working in emergency contexts and reaching affected communities with well-targeted direct relief. This maximized the speed and efficiency of the relief effort and ensured the widest distribution of essential supplies. Australian NGOs received over \$12 million to provide services, supplies and support in tsunami-affected countries.

A further \$1 million was provided as part of the Special Indian Ocean Rim Disaster Fund to smaller NGOs that have accreditation with AusAID and already had programs in tsunami-affected areas. The agencies were funded to carry out important emergency relief and rehabilitation work, including emergency shelter, clothing and food, as well as to provide medical supplies and trauma counselling to affected communities in Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia.

In January, the Australian and Indonesian Governments agreed to form an Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development. The Australian Government will contribute A\$1 billion over 5 years to this partnership, in addition to Australia's existing development cooperation program.

In the longer term, an additional \$8 million was pledged to assist Sri Lanka. This was directed through MDBs to assist with reconstruction efforts.

Comment on the level of importance of humanitarian spending in donor state aid.

Supply OECD DAC data on percentage of funding which donor usually devotes to humanitarian aid. (i.e. whether it is above or below the 7% average).

The overarching goal of Australia's Humanitarian Action Policy is:

To protect lives, alleviate suffering, maintain human dignity and assist recovery from conflict, natural and other disasters, through effective response, prevention, preparedness and risk reduction.

In line with the geographic focus of the broader development cooperation program, Australia's humanitarian action remains primarily focused on the *Asia-Pacific region*. However, recognizing our international partnerships and responsibilities, Australia will continue to respond to emergencies in other parts of the world. In doing so, our response will be guided by the scale of the disaster or crisis, our ongoing responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region, the response by other donors and our capacity to assist and make an effective contribution.

AusAID's funding for humanitarian aid¹ has ranged from 9.9% to 11.5% for the years 2002 to 2004.

*Present an overview on **how** donor(s) acted and reacted with their funding in this emergency and **why**.*

See above. In accordance with standard emergency procedure, an Inter Departmental Task Force was established once the disaster became known. The initial concerns were not only for the local inhabitants, but also for the large number of Australian tourists and expatriates who

¹ CRS Codes 7010 - 72030

were known to be in some of the affected areas. The overall Australian response was therefore multi-faceted.

The AusAssist Plan, a standing AusAID disaster response plan, was activated on December 27, 2004. Australian Defense Forces and other assets that could be rapidly mobilized were dispatched to Indonesia and Thailand to assess, and then provide initial assistance to, the worst affected region.

The initial financial response (A\$10 million) was modest while the situation was assessed, but was greatly expanded (A\$25 million x2, and later the commitment of A\$1 billion) when the extent of the disaster, particularly in the province of Aceh in Indonesia, was determined.

The greatest contribution was made to assist Australia's second largest aid recipient and near neighbor, which had suffered the most extensive loss of life and devastation. Substantial assistance was also provided to assist Sri Lanka, which had also suffered extensively. In Thailand, arguably the main Australian assistance was the provision of Australian Federal Police to assist in disaster victim identification.

The A\$1 billion allocation over 5 years to the AIPRD demonstrated Australia's long-term commitment to Indonesia's reconstruction and development efforts, both in and beyond tsunami-affected areas.

The Australian public demonstrated their concern for the affected countries in our immediate region by donating A\$330 million to Australian NGOs.

Comment on possible limitations encountered in the evaluation and account for particularities.

II. Overall Allocation and Disbursement

- Mapping the volume and distribution

See accompanying Excel file (see page 23).

Have committed funds increased overall spending? (i.e. were new funds allocated or was the emergency relief funding reallocated from other budget lines?)

AusAID

The first A\$10 million committed to disaster relief came from the existing funding for Humanitarian, Emergency and Refugee Programs in the 2004-05 financial year. The next A\$50 million was additional funding, as was the A\$1 billion allocated to the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD).

The additional A\$8 million allocated to assistance in Sri Lanka (through the ADB and World Bank) later in the year was made from within existing resources.

It is not clear whether or not other Australian players (e.g. ADF) carried costs within their existing allocations, or received any supplementary funding. However, Defense Force capacity existed not only to assist the immediate response and cleanup of the original tsunami, but also to respond rapidly with assistance to the victims of the later earthquake (centred on Nias Island).

If other budget lines were affected, which?

No other budget lines were affected. Each year AusAID has an allocation for emergency and humanitarian funding which was used to cover some of the costs of the intervention. As noted

above, additional funding was provided by the Government to cover commitments which might have exceeded this.

What was the immediate impact on other planned interventions?

At the time of the tsunami there were no major Australian aid activities in Aceh. However, the focus on the response to the tsunami reduced the capacity to undertake other activities in Indonesia as planned.

Was all funding provided in the form of grants and untied aid?

All support for UN organizations, MDBs, domestic and international NGOs were grants. Contracted services followed standard Australian Government purchasing guidelines.

Breakdown by implementing actor for relief phase

See accompanying Excel file.

- *What role, if any, did the Flash Appeal and the FTS play in terms of the donor funding?*

See above, and answers to later questions.

- *Has there been a concentration of funds in a few organizations/institutions or have funds been distributed more widely? (How does this compare with percentages of allocations committed in other disasters?)*

Allocations are distributed according to those organizations which are seen to be able to make the most appropriate response in the timeliest manner. For example \$11 million was provided to WFP for the provision of food and logistics, and support was provided to IOM due to its expertise in managing large numbers of IDPs.

- *Did funds flow to private companies for implementation purposes?*

Minor amounts flowed to private companies for the provision of specific goods and services

- *Were military assets employed?*

Yes. The Australian Defense Force was able to provide the earliest Australian assistance. The ADF summarizes its assistance in 'Operation Sumatra Assist' as:

- 1200 tonnes of humanitarian aid distributed by air;
- 70 aero-medical evacuations;
- 2530 people transported by air;
- 3700 medical treatments (in the Army Field Hospital);
- 4.7 million liters of clean water produced;
- 9000 cubic meters of debris cleared; and
- 1700 large drains cleared and 6 large fishing boats salvaged².

Expenditure on the military assets employed are included in the Indonesia expenditure for 'Other Government Departments' in the attached spreadsheets.

² At www.defence.gov.au/optsunamiassist/default.htm

- *Were any donations in kind? If so, what type of goods were provided?*

Details of this assistance are not readily available. However, it is recorded that free goods and services from the Australian corporate and private sector were valued at over \$10 million.

This included services of medical teams and provision of some ambulances.

- *What implementation mechanisms were foreseen and utilized? Have different partnerships developed?*

See above.

Sector Allocations and Geographic Focus by Donor and Budget

- ◆ Data is provided for humanitarian aid;
- ◆ To the sectors defined by OCHA, “logistics” has been added to account for military assets, transportation and emergency teams, etc.

See accompanying Excel file.

Have donor institutions funded non-traditional areas and sectors?

No, with the possible exception of support for IOM, which is not normally a major player in disaster assistance in Australia’s region.

Information should be provided on whether the donor regularly funds humanitarian aid interventions in the countries that were affected by the tsunami and whether efforts in disaster preparedness and mitigation have been engaged in the past.

AusAID regularly funds humanitarian interventions in the countries in its region, including those assisted on this occasion

Efforts in disaster mitigation and preparedness are discussed later in this report.

III. Good Humanitarian Donorship

Provide an assessment of donor funding policy on the basis of Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice.

Response: Australian Government funding policy conformed to Humanitarian Donorship Principles and Good Practice. The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) is the Australian Government’s lead humanitarian and development assistance agency. AusAID was responsible for the management of the vast majority of Australian Government funding provided in response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami. AusAID is guided by its *Humanitarian Action Policy January 2005* published in late 2004. This policy is expressly founded on the “international goals and principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship”. AusAID provided advice informed by these principles to the GoA Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force established to oversee and coordinate the Australian Government’s response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami. AusAID conducts a regular dialogue with Australian NGOs on the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship. Australia has been reviewed (favorably) by the DAC against GHD.

An assessment of Australian Government funding policy is detailed in the response to the following questions posed by the TEC.

1. Humanitarian principles and objectives

*Was funding guided by principles of **humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence**? Was funding directed towards easing human suffering and provided in a way that did not favor one of the sides in conflict?*

Response: Yes. As defined in Humanitarian Action Policy, Australia's humanitarian action is guided by the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. The overriding concern of the Australian Government in responding to the Indian Ocean Tsunami was to effectively and efficiently address humanitarian needs. Australian Government assistance was impartial - Australia's response was implemented without discrimination between or within affected populations (no group was favored for anything other than humanitarian reasons).

Australia was strongly interested in assisting Indonesia, being an immediate neighbor, and Australia had a greater capacity to respond in Indonesia given the large development cooperation program and our experience responding to emergencies in Indonesia (Bali and Jakarta Embassy bombing). Additionally, Australia's focus on Indonesia reflected a sensible division of labor between donors - other donors provided considerable assistance with the UK agreeing to be lead donor for Sri Lanka, for example. But the overriding reality is that Indonesia was the worst affected county and required considerable assistance. This was the primary factor guiding funding.

The bulk of Australian Government assistance, excluding the considerable in-kind and technical assistance provided by the Australian Defense Force and various government agencies/departments, was provided through UN agencies, international organizations and NGOs, which are independent. Australian Government funding was untied (other than by country or region and by relevant sectors).

See also Part IV, Decision-making Criteria.

*How were **international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights** considered in both the strategy and funding of donors in response to the tsunami?*

Response: Respect for IHL, refugee law and human rights were implicit in the Australian Government's response. Australia is a signatory to the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols which impose obligations on the Australian Government. IHL, refugee law and human rights are reflected in various policy documents including the aforementioned *Humanitarian Action Policy January 2005* and in *AusAID's Peace, Conflict and Development Policy 2002*. AusAID engages in IHL and human rights awareness-raising with Australian NGO and Australian Defense Force partners through a structured dialogue. As noted, the bulk of Australian Government funding was provided through UN agencies, international organizations and NGOs, which are presumed to respect IHL, refugee law and human rights. Protection issues were considered in funding decisions - ICRC, IOM, and UNICEF programs were supported. A key component of the Australian Government's response was to support displaced people and provide protection to vulnerable groups, such as children.

In the case of Indonesia, the Australian Defense Forces, and through them, AusAID, worked closely with the TNI. The Australian Government assessment is that the TNI discharged its humanitarian role effectively. The presence and advocacy of humanitarian actors in Aceh had a positive influence on TNI activities and priorities.

What efforts have been engaged in promoting the use of IASC guidelines, RC Code of Conduct and IDP Guiding Principles?

Response: Use of the IASC guidelines, RC Code of Conduct and IDP Guiding Principles was not expressly promoted by the Australian Government during the course of the response, however the Australian Government provides ongoing financial support for training UN country teams in IDP Guiding Principles and as a member of the High Level Working Group, Australia supports and advocates IASC guidelines.

Did the donor uphold the principles of humanitarian aid in responding to the tsunami disaster? Was funding explicitly and exclusively channeled only to those institutions that claim to adhere to this code of conduct and aspire to Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response? (Related to needs-based funding and choice of independent implementing channels, etc.).

Response: In the context of a whole-of-government response, one of AusAID's roles is to ensure that any political imperatives that may arise are countered with principles of humanitarian aid. All humanitarian funding channeled through Australian NGOs, was in accordance with humanitarian principles in so far as all NGOs accredited with AusAID must be compliant with the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) Code of Conduct which includes adherence to humanitarian principles - ACFID investigates alleged breaches of the Code. The ACFID Code of Conduct makes reference to the RC Code of Conduct and the Sphere Minimum Standards in Disaster Response and all NGOs funded have endorsed the RC Code of Conduct and the Sphere Minimum Standards.

2. Flexibility and timeliness

*How **flexible and timely** was funding? Can intended funding be reallocated to another crisis? What mechanisms does the donor have to mobilize funds?*

(see criteria for flexible and timely funding)

- *Support to Central Emergency Revolving Fund CERF,*
- *Time span between pledge and disbursement (maximum 6 week target suggested by June 2005 HRR)*

Response: Australian Government funding was flexible and timely. Funding was announced rapidly and funds were transferred quickly. An initial A\$10 million was committed within 24 hours, drawing on AusAID's emergency response funds. A Media Release from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of December 27, 2004 stated: 'Much of this assistance is likely to be directed through international relief agencies such as the Red Cross and UN humanitarian agencies'. Two additional contributions, each of A\$25 million, were announced on December 29 and 31, 2004, respectively (the media releases can be found on the AusAID website). The recipients of the total A\$60 million are noted in the tables in section II. In the case of the vast majority of UN and NGO funding the time span between pledge and disbursement was well below the maximum six weeks target suggested by the 2005 Humanitarian Response Review.

On January 5, 2005, an additional A\$1 billion was committed for reconstruction and development with the formation of the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD). The \$1 billion five-year partnership supports Indonesia's reconstruction and development efforts, both in and beyond tsunami-affected areas (see Prime Minister's Media Release of January 5, 2005). In June 2005 an additional A\$8 million was committed to Sri Lanka for reconstruction from within AusAID's budget.

In terms of flexibility, there was no earmarking other than by country and the humanitarian sector specified by the requesting agency. AusAID was flexible with NGOs – broadly stated proposals were accepted; they were able to obtain extensions of time and narrow/expand countries in which they provided assistance. Australia’s contributions to UN agencies were dynamic and flexible to allow for the changing needs in humanitarian crises.

Funds could not be reallocated to another crisis. Unless an appeal is fully funded AusAID is unable to redirect funds upon the request of the relevant agency. AusAID does not have a formal reallocation mechanism.

AusAID has not to date supported the CERF but this is under consideration.

3. Needs-based funding

*To what extent did tsunami funding follow a **needs-oriented approach** and allocate funding on the basis of needs assessments? What criteria were followed? Was there a shared analysis of needs?*

- *How were needs assessed?*
- *What sources of information were available? (local governments, in-country donor staff, humanitarian professionals dispatched, Embassy personnel, media, etc.)*
- *What role did appeals play (Flash appeals, Governments, UN, NGOs)?*

Response: Australian Government representatives in the countries concerned began approaching host governments for information on what they needed on December 26, 2004. At the same time contact was initiated with UN agencies. On December 28, 2004 AusAID convened a telephone conference with Australian NGOs to help coordinate relief efforts. AusAID officers and consultants were sent to the field in the first week of the response to conduct rapid needs assessments, and where opportune, join other assessment missions (host government, UN).

The initial commitments were made on the basis of the information received in the first few days, i.e. before formal needs assessments could be conducted. OCHA prepared a Flash appeal to which the Australian Government contributed, but decisions had to be made before receipt of the UN appeal. Inevitably decisions were based on imperfect information, but Australia had to respond on the basis of apparent needs and gaps.

Information from Aceh, in particular, was poor initially and access was difficult. The precise needs for Aceh still remained somewhat confused by December 31st, although the scale of the disaster was more apparent and there could be little doubt that there would be a very substantial need for medical assistance, food, water and sanitation and shelter and for the victims in the worst affected areas.

Australian NGO proposals (capacity statements) were based on their own information, country expertise and emergency experience. Proposals were adapted following discussions with AusAID officers to complement the focus of the Australian Government’s response and fill response gaps that had been identified.

AusAID made assessments in early January, including the conduct of a health needs assessment mission to Banda Aceh starting January 9th. Representatives attended regular coordination meetings where needs and gaps were discussed. OCHA SitReps were marginally useful in providing updates of the situation and identifying remaining gaps.

4. Beneficiary participation

*Was funding directed in a manner that supported **beneficiary participation**? Provide criteria for forms of funding that favor beneficiary participation.*

Response: This is implicit for the most part. As a donor Australia expects funded agencies and organizations to involve beneficiaries in accordance with generally accepted standards (including the process standards specified in Sphere). On occasion AusAID discussed beneficiary participation with funded agencies, e.g. with IOM in relation to a funded shelter program in Aceh. Australia worked closely with local authorities and respected their own capacities. Direct Australian assistance was provided with a very strong emphasis on engagement with and support for the activities of government authorities in Aceh (e.g. Health Office, Education Office) with a view to ensuring an optimal match with the needs of beneficiaries. Some funding was provided to local NGOs with a community focus.

5. Disaster preparedness and mitigation

*What efforts if any have been undertaken in **disaster risk reduction, mitigation, preparedness**? Including efforts engaged prior to the disaster and tsunami funding committed for this purpose: amount and percentage. Does the donor have a specific budget line for this purpose?*

Response: Australia supports a holistic and integrated approach to disaster risk management within the context of sustainable development in the Asia-Pacific region. Australian support is provided at several levels:

- *national and community level* - through various bilateral programs to improve the capacity of National Disaster Management Offices and develop community-based initiatives and AusAID's Cooperation Agreements for Emergency Response with five Australian NGOs (Australian Red Cross, CARE Australia, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, World Vision and Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia and the Pacific) to develop their emergency response capacity and foster indigenous disaster mitigation and preparedness in the Asia Pacific region.
- *regional level* - through support to South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC), the Australian Red Cross (ARC) and Pacific regional projects promoting community-based disaster management, providing sea level and climate monitoring and prediction, cyclone warning and weather services and research on the economic impact of natural disasters on development in the Pacific.
- *global level* - through support to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. Australia's 2004/2005 contributions to OCHA include A\$250,000 for the position of OCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor (Asia) and the Regional Support Office in Bangkok and A\$150,000 for the position of OCHA Regional Disaster Response Advisor (Pacific) in Suva.

Prior to the tsunami, Australia was funding limited disaster preparedness activities in Indonesia (PMI and WHO re: pandemics). Under AIPRD, \$10 million was committed in March 2005 to extend Australia's support for disaster preparedness activities in Indonesia.

Australian Government representatives attended the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction meeting in Kobe on January 17-18, 2005 and the Australian Government has signed the Hyogo Framework. AusAID is implementing a disaster preparedness program in Indonesia with BAPENAS.

AusAID has no specific budget line for disaster risk reduction, mitigation and preparedness although it is referred to in the Humanitarian Action Policy and incorporated in Country Programs.

6. Linkages to recovery and development

*What measures have been undertaken to provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are **supportive of recovery and long-term development**? List support measures (coordination with development departments, % of social budget foreseen in reconstruction phase)*

Response: From the outset, Australian aid to Indonesia was provided with longer-term engagement in mind. Key sectors in the relief period, and into the rehabilitation and reconstruction period, have included health, education, and restoring communities/local governance. As noted above, to the extent feasible, this assistance has been identified and planned in close conjunction with local government authorities. Specific support measures included:

- An adviser was placed with BAPPENAS to assist with the development of the Masterplan for the Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, and later with the BRR to advise its head, Dr Kuntoro.
- Sectoral advisers were placed alongside key counterparts in the general hospital, health and education offices, etc, to aid them in their work to restore essential services.
- A further group of advisers was placed in BRR advising BRR Deputies in their key sectoral responsibilities.
- Australia met many of the initial costs of the BRR, including media and public relations, travel, office set-up, etc.

There was no substantial gap between the relief phase and the rehabilitation/reconstruction phase, with Australian-funded activities continuing at the general hospital in Banda Aceh, and in the health, education, and local governance sectors throughout. Assistance during this period has included a mix of technical advice, key supplies, and rehabilitation/reconstruction of key facilities. The transition to long-term contractors commenced in September 2005.

7. UN Coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate

*To what extent and how has the donor supported **OCHA's and other key humanitarian UN agency coordinating and ICRC/IFRC specific roles** in the tsunami disaster? How has the flow of funds been coordinated internationally and nationally?*

- *Provide the level of funding provided for UN coordination and ICRC/IFRC mandate.*
- *Describe what measures if any are undertaken by the donor to promote that organizations and other actors funded respect UN and RC roles.*

Response: From the outset the Australian Government recognized the importance of coordination and the overriding need for host government leadership. Determining how

Australian Government field personnel could work with government and international agencies was an immediate priority. UN coordination during the relief phase in Indonesia, where Australia was most directly involved, was initially patchy and cause for concern, but strengthened over time. These weaknesses in the initial weeks caused AusAID to rely more on informal coordination channels.

The Australian Government funded:

- the initial IFRC appeal (A\$5 million)
- OCHA in its coordination role (A\$1 million in Indonesia)
- the ICRC (two tranches of A\$625,000 for Indonesia)
- WFP as key food aid agency (A\$7 million in Indonesia including funds for UNJLC, \$3.2 million in Sri Lanka and \$800,000 in Maldives for food and logistical support)

AusAID staff regularly attended OCHA coordination meetings in the various capitals and in the field.

8. Effect on other crises

*How and with what resources has the response to the tsunami been funded? Have funds that were intended for other crises been diverted? Has the generous response to the **Tsunami affected funding of other emergencies** in 2005?*

Response: Of the A\$60 million committed by December 31, 2004, A\$50 million was new money i.e. only \$10 million was drawn from AusAID's emergency budget. The A\$1 billion Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development program is additional to the aid budget. See Portfolio Supplementary Additional Estimates Appropriation (Tsunami Financial Assistance) Bill 2004-05 and Appropriation (Tsunami Financial Assistance and Australia-Indonesia Partnership) Bill 2004-05. The additional A\$8 million provided to Sri Lanka in June for reconstruction was, however, drawn from AusAID's budget (Media Release of June 3, 2005 refers to this).

Funds intended for other crises were not diverted.

9. Predictability and flexibility

*Has the donor engaged efforts to ensure **predictability and flexibility in funding to support key humanitarian organizations**?*

- *Which agencies have been funded? Are they regarded as key and what have been the selection criteria?*
- *How flexible and predictable have funding mechanisms proved? ⇒Definition of **key (agency competence), flexibility and predictability**.*
- *Could key organizations rely on donor for funding?*

Response: When AusAID made grants to humanitarian agencies and organizations for relief activities no undertakings were made about providing further funds, although additional funds were later provided in some instances. In terms of flexibility, as mentioned previously, AusAID's grants were untied and generally for broadly stated purposes.

The agencies funded by the Australian Government are listed in the table provided in section II above. WFP, OCHA, IOM, IFRC, UNICEF etc. were in their respective roles key to the response. They were selected on the basis of sectoral needs and their mandate, local capacity and anticipated effectiveness (past experience with AusAID in the affected country; swiftness and capacity to respond to emergencies). The Australian NGOs funded were for the most part those with existing emergency cooperation agreements with AusAID by virtue of which they have been recognized as key emergency response NGOs.

10. Appeals and Action Plan

*Has the donor contributed responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to **United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals** and to **International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals**, and actively supported the formulation of **Common Humanitarian Action Plans**?*

- *What do we consider to be a responsible contribution to appeals? (% of coverage of appeals in this emergency).*
- *Does the percentage of coverage of the appeal differ from that of other emergencies?*

Response: Yes, the Australian Government contributed responsibly. Australia contributed to the IFRC Indonesia appeal and funded agencies with appeals included in the UN Flash Appeal.

The Australian Government supports the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal process in principle, but notes that such appeals need to be timely and inclusive. The Australian Government made funding decisions for Indonesia and Sri Lanka before the UN Flash Appeal was released. The UN inter-agency appeal was useful for the Maldives.

As an active member of the OCHA Donor Support Group, Australia supports the CHAP process but did not contribute directly to the formulation of a CHAP in relation to the tsunami.

The scale of Australia's response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami was unusual. The commitments made to Indonesia are the biggest one-off commitments ever made by the Australian Government in response to a humanitarian disaster. This was a result of the extent of the disaster, proximity, and the importance to Australia of its relationship with Indonesia.

11. Response capacity

*Has the donor supported mechanisms for **contingency planning** by humanitarian organizations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, strengthening capacities for response? ⇒List contingency planning mechanisms and types of funding that strengthen response capacity (i.e. training, professionalization of staff, disaster preparedness, emergency stocks, contingency funds, disaster response teams). (Target: specific budget line allocating 5-10% of annual funding for preparedness activities of the organizations). ⓄSee page 61 of August 2005 Humanitarian Response Review.*

Response: The Australian and Indonesian Governments announced in March 2005 that AIPRD would fund an A\$10 million program to strengthen Indonesia's disaster management and response systems. A\$4 million of this is to develop a partnership with BAKORNAS and Emergency Management Australia (EMA). A design is expected from EMA by the end of 2005. In the meantime, officials from BAKORNAS will visit Australia in October 2005 to get an overview of Australia's capabilities in this area. In November, EMA plans to undertake a Training Needs Assessment of BAKORNAS, and it is hoped that the formal agreement between EMA and BAKORNAS will be signed in Jakarta in December. A\$6 million is for strengthening

Indonesia's disaster response systems, and will likely include institutional strengthening at government level as well as working with local NGOs.

An additional A\$5m was also allocated for the development of a package of assistance to address needs arising from disasters in Nias, Alor and Nabire. A\$1 million to Nias to provide shelter, food, clean water and medical care through Interplast/SOS, SurfAID International, Red R and logistical support through the Australian Government. This includes A\$825,000 to rehabilitate local health services in Alor, and AusAID is considering a proposal from Project Concern International regarding a health and disaster management project in Nabire.

12. Civilian humanitarian action

What efforts have been engaged in affirming primary position of civilian organizations in the implementation of humanitarian action?

- *If military assets were provided, did the donor ensure that civilian organizations had an overarching role over the military in the humanitarian response? And if so, list measures that were undertaken.*

Response: Substantial in-kind and technical assistance was provided by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Defense Force (ADF). The AFP played a role in victim identification in Thailand. The ADF provided considerable assistance to Indonesia. Two RAAF C-130s containing medical supplies, collapsible water containers, water purification tablets, a small number of ration packs and a medical team departed on December 27th with a further two with similar payloads departing on December 28th. This occurred under the AusASSIST plan which details coordination arrangements to use Commonwealth resources, including defense assets, to provide emergency assistance in the region. The plan is managed and formally activated by AusAID.

In the initial phase of the emergency, civilian and military arms of the Australian Government worked cooperatively from HQ to field level. Later in the response, once the military withdrew, the civilians took over from where the military left off. Ongoing communication and cooperation ensured a smooth transition and hand-over.

The relationship between the ADF and AusAID varies according to the circumstance. In Indonesia, the ADF had to work under the supervision of the TNI in order to be able to operate in Aceh. The whole humanitarian effort was essentially run by TNI despite UN efforts to push civilian agencies into more prominent roles.

13. Evaluation

*Has the donor supported the **evaluation** of the tsunami response?*

- *Is the donor supporting the TEC with funds?*
- *Is the donor carrying out its own evaluation processes?*
- *Did the donor cooperate with the evaluation (agree to the interview, provide necessary data and information)? Is the donor interested in the results of the TEC?*
- *Will the donor participate in its dissemination and in the implementation of evaluation results?*

Response: Yes, the Australian Government has supported evaluations on the tsunami response. Although the Australian government has not provided funds for the TEC evaluation, AusAID is

supporting the TEC evaluation by participating in TEC evaluation, attending regional TEC meetings and providing necessary information and data to the TEC evaluation. AusAID is currently conducting an evaluation of AusAID's emergency response to the tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. AusAID looks forward to receiving the evaluation results and considering how it can appropriately contribute to implementing the recommendations.

14. Financial transparency and accountability

*What efforts have been engaged to ensure **accuracy, timeliness and transparency in donor reporting** on official humanitarian tsunami response spending? How has the donor reported its contributions?*

Response: Press releases and information posted to Australian Government websites detail the Australian Government response. Quarterly reports have been compiled and distributed by AusAID. Australian Government contributions are regularly reported to the DAC by AusAID. AusAID has reported its financial contributions against the Financial Tracking System (through the Geneva post).

Australian NGOs have independently undertaken strict accountability measures, including in relation to Australian Government funding.

IV. Decision-making criteria

Have past experiences had an influence on decision-making processes and if so what are the principles and criteria?

Response: Australia's whole-of-government response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami reflects accumulated experiences from East Timor in 1999, through the Bali and Jakarta Embassy Bombings, and state crises such as fires. These experiences have forged a central coordination and decision-making process that draws on Federal, State, commercial and NGO capacities. This whole-of-government approach has become a significant underlying principle reflected in decision-making mechanisms such as the Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force referred to above.

Australian Humanitarian Aid Overview

Australia provides rapid and generous support for the survivors of crises and disasters both within our region and globally. Australia's highest priority is the Asia Pacific, a region that is often ravaged by natural disasters and is not immune to conflict. It is expected and accepted that Australia takes a leadership role in this region. Australia recognizes that the needs in Africa are real and great, and AusAID has a program that contributes \$70 million to humanitarian efforts in that region.

Response Criteria and Mechanisms

In the event of a disaster, the Australian Government considers the following in determining a response:

- The impact of the event and the extent of the casualties
- The capacity of the affected country to mobilize a national response
- Official requests for assistance and assessments of priority needs
- The contributions of other donors, including the UN.

When unmet needs are identified, we then turn to our existing response mechanisms, including:

- Contributions to accredited Australian NGOs and international agencies including the UN
- A whole-of-government response in deployment of resources, such as medical teams, emergency expertise and logistics
- Provision of emergency standby staffing in support of UN agencies
- International collaborative agreements (such as FRANZ with France and New Zealand).
- Provision of medical supplies, food and shelter items.

We select those mechanisms that best enable us to meet the immediate needs.

A critical aspect in provision of assistance is the timeliness and cost effectiveness of the response.

- For example, geographic proximity to our immediate neighbors such as Indonesia means that the cost of transporting supplies (medical, food, shelter) and the time taken to reach the affected population is significantly lower than transporting to more distant regions.
- For disasters that are more distant we would ascertain whether supplies and logistics could be sourced locally or regionally, and provide funding to support their purchase/acquisition.

In terms of determining the volume of aid:

- The aid program's funds for disaster response are finite, and fall within the Australian Government's \$2.5 billion international development program.
- Funding for a disaster response is sourced from an allocation specifically identified for unforeseen emergencies throughout the financial year.

Have these criteria been developed in collaboration with others or are they part of a top down approach?

Response: AusAID has developed its response options, including volume, based on 30 years of experience in responding to crises and dialogue with external humanitarian agencies, most recently informed by GHD principles.

More broadly, response options are the subject of consultations between Australian government departments and agencies. AusAID manages the Australian Government's official aid program. The role of a donor Government agency is to uphold neutral and independent humanitarian action and to conduct effective humanitarian action, while maintaining and advocating for humanitarian space and access for humanitarian workers.

In seeking to fulfill this role, AusAID is faced with a number of donor-specific challenges:

- The Australian Government is accountable not only to those we seek to assist in our role as a donor; we are also accountable to a range of other stakeholders.
- How do we best demonstrate acceptance for the principles of independence, impartiality and neutrality? AusAID channels a significant proportion of funding through multilateral channels, demonstrating an acceptance of these principles in our humanitarian partners

- An increasing number of Australian Government agencies are involved in humanitarian preparedness and response activities. This means that for other stakeholders, the Australian Government as a donor has become a more complex entity, and inherent in that complexity is a greater need to coordinate in the whole-of-government environment.

Were specific criteria utilized for decision-making or were decisions taken on an ad hoc basis?

Response: The parameters of an appropriate response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami were agreed at senior levels in the Australian Government, bearing in mind what is stated herein in relation to criteria (above) and response strategy (below), and further developed as more complete information came to hand. AusAID played a key role in advising the government.

Did agency competence (organizational capacity, experience, ability to raise funds, quality of proposal) or needs assessments play a role in decision-making?

Response: Yes, AusAID knowledge of agency/organization presence, previous effectiveness and likely capacity to be effective following the tsunami were considered. While based on visits, program reports and anecdotal advice, AusAID also drew on: i) strategic agreements with key agencies (e.g. WFP, ICRC); ii) AusAID/NGO Emergency Cooperation Agreements pre-qualifying key NGOs; and iii) AusAID's Multilateral Assessment Framework, a formal periodic assessment of UN Agencies.

How much of the funding allocated was supply driven?

Response: The initial A\$10m was from within existing aid program allocations for unforeseen emergencies. The subsequent A\$50m in humanitarian assistance and A\$1 billion program with Indonesia were additional to the aid budget.

The provision of emergency medical teams, which was one way in which Australia responded initially, was based in informed assessments of likely need. That said, it was supply driven in the sense that Australia had the capacity to deploy them rapidly, and did so based on typical first response phase needs.

Likewise, initial emergency stores were drawn from stocks held in Australia based on experience in likely disaster response needs. Elements of these stores were drawn down in the initial response. Additional procurement was required and undertaken to meet specific and identified needs, e.g. greater quantities of collapsible water containers.

V. Response strategy

Provide an overview and appraisal of standing donor state disaster response for the tsunami.

Response: AusAID's response strategy is centered on three key principles: i) we seek to stand up for, work with and strengthen affected communities own response processes (we do not claim or seek to be the response); ii) AusAID has a range of effective and quick response stand-by mechanisms in place to draw on; and iii) we do not seek to have a mechanism for every eventuality, rather we augment key stand-by mechanisms with clear, workable and flexible access agreements and protocols to access other Federal Government assets, State Government assets and private sector capabilities.

Was there a specific strategy being implemented and if so what are the main features of this strategy?

Response: The specific relief strategy for the Indian Ocean Tsunami was developed in the days immediately following the disaster. An Australian Government Inter-Departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) was established in Canberra at 6 pm on Sunday December 26th to coordinate Australia's response. Represented departments and agencies including AusAID provided input to the IDETF and helped shape the Australian Government's relief strategy, initially day by day. The main features of the Australian Government strategy for the relief phase were: i) location and support to affected Australians; ii) humanitarian (immediate life-sustaining) assistance to affected communities; and iii) provision of longer term reconstruction assistance.

The recovery phase differed from the initial humanitarian response in that recovery was more deliberately guided by community and local authority coordination and consultation and looked to what opportunities existed to enhance infrastructure and processes that previously existed.

To what extent did the donor take into account the conflict situations in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and carry out conflict mapping and analysis? Was a risk analysis or ex-ante evaluation undertaken prior to specific intervention and if not how was a risk assessed?

Response: The conflict situation in both countries was taken into account. Although no formal risk analysis was undertaken, initial Aceh/Sri Lanka deployments were specifically counseled about risks and challenges posed by the pre-tsunami conflict dynamic. The Australian Government contributed to ICRC funding for Aceh.

Have funding strategies been adapted over time to the needs of the affected countries, and, if so, what are the external influences that caused these changes?

Response: Yes, funding strategies have been adapted over time. For example, medical teams were provided in the initial relief phase but stood down once public health and other issues become dominant. The relevant external influences included stronger articulation of national priorities; and evolving coordination with other donors providing the ability to manage and address gaps.

Has the donor state engaged in efforts to facilitate donor agreement on common operational objectives?

Response: Yes, Australian Government representatives worked closely with other donors to facilitate a coherent approach particularly in Indonesia. This was pursued in formal coordination meetings and in informal contacts. In the case of Indonesia, Australia was a member of an initial core group (the US, Australia, Japan and India) that dialogued in the early days to determine response options and to communicate needs.

VI. Human Resources

To what extent were responsibilities assigned and how were personnel needs addressed? Were additional means provided? Were responsibilities to manage these funds delegated adequately? Did donors provide support to staff in order to administer, distribute and allocate funds in an effective manner?

As noted earlier, an InterDepartmental Task Force was established in Canberra to oversee the Australian response to the tsunami. It held its first meeting at 9 pm on December 26th. Initially Australian Posts in the affected countries deployed staff to gather information and to liaise with host governments to identify needs. Obtaining information on the needs of Indonesia were at first difficult.

The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs announced an initial contribution of \$10 million on December 27th and advised that assets were available if needed.

Within AusAID the decisions of the IDETF, and responses based on information from AusAID posted officers and other sources, were directed by an AusAID Task Force chaired by the Assistant Director General, Humanitarian Coordination and Public Affairs Branch. Staff resources from all affected geographic areas of AusAID, as well as staff at posts, were brought in to assist and ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered in a timely and efficient manner.

AusAID has standard operating procedures (e.g. AusAssist Plan) established to respond to emergencies, and a store of emergency supplies. There is liaison with Emergency Management Australia and other government departments. Additional support in responding to disasters can be obtained rapidly through RedR and other arrangements.

The Australian Defense Force has its own procedures for responding rapidly to disasters, and is able to provide initial air assets and emergency rations at short notice.

Were staff withdrawn from other operations and crises to address tsunami operation needs?

AusAID Humanitarian and Emergency Staff were recalled from the Christmas 'shutdown' to manage the exercise. Obviously there was an additional workload on all Canberra-based and posted officers dealing with Indonesia, in particular, and also Sri Lanka and Thailand.

Extensive support for international agencies and international NGOs ready to respond at short notice to emergencies, reduced some of the pressure on Agency officers.

What efforts, if any, were engaged to ensure professional humanitarian staff at donor and implementing actor level?

The resources of specialist organizations including Emergency Management Australia, RedR, NGOs accredited by AusAID to receive funding to assist in humanitarian emergencies, and appropriate international organizations, as well as trained AusAID staff from the Humanitarian and Emergencies Section, were used where possible. Substantial funding was provided to international agencies with the requisite professional skills.

Defense Force personnel were appropriately trained for the services they provided. The Australian Federal Police were also professionally trained, e.g. training and experience in Disaster Victim Identification.

Annex 1:

II. Overall Allocation and Disbursement: Mapping the volume and distribution

Donor	Country	Total Committed**	Disbursed A\$ (As at June 30, 2005)	Disbursed A\$ (July 1 - Sept. 30 2005)***	Humanitarian Relief %	Reconstruction %	In kind %	Grant %
AusAID	India	425,000	425,000		100			100
AusAID	Indonesia	34,393,116	34,393,117	0	100			100
AusAID	Indonesia AIRPD*	113,000,000	7,853,868	7,325,896		100		
Other Government Departments	Indonesia	40,264,470	37,407,000	2,857,470	100		Minor amount	100
AusAID	Maldives	3,826,903	3,826,903		100			100
Other Government Departments	Maldives	80,000	80,000				100	100
AusAID	Seychelles	566,454	566,454		100			100
AusAID	Sri Lanka	12,399,921	12,399,921		100			100
AusAID	Sri Lanka	8,000,000	8,000,000			100		100
Other Government Departments	Sri Lanka	186,554	150,000	36,554				100
AusAID	Thailand	145,705	145,705		100			100
AusAID	Regional/Unallocated	8,971,612	8,971,612		100			100
Other Government Departments	Regional/Unallocated	13,550,464	9,300,464	4,250,000	100		Minor amount	100
		235,810,198	123,520,044	14,469,920				

* The Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development includes long-term assistance - \$500 million grant, \$500 mill concessional loans. Not all of this has been allocated to tsunami-affected areas.

** For 'Other Government Departments' reports to DAC set Commitments = Disbursements.
 *** Estimates only

Sector Allocations and Geographic Focus by Donor and Budget Humanitarian Aid*

Sectors	Countries	Region	Donor Agency	Amount Pledged	Committed	Spent (A\$)
Food & NFI	India		AusAID			200,000
Food & NFI	Indonesia		AusAID			6,385,340
Food & NFI	Sri Lanka		AusAID			2,750,000
Food & NFI	Maldives		AusAID			500,000
Food & NFI	Australian NGOs		AusAID			11,720,000
Shelter	Indonesia		AusAID			2,750,000
Shelter	Sri Lanka		AusAID			1,050,000
Shelter	Maldives		AusAID			1,000,000
Shelter	India		AusAID			100,000
Health & Water/Sanitation	Indonesia		AusAID			11,139,028
Health & Water/Sanitation	Sri Lanka		AusAID			2,161,121
Health & Water/Sanitation	India		AusAID			25,000
Health & Water and Sanitation	Thailand		AusAID			19,950
Education	India		AusAID			25,000
Education	Indonesia		AusAID			1,750,000
Education	Maldives		AusAID			348,875
Coordination & Support Services	Indonesia		AusAID			10,349,968
Coordination & Support Services	Sri Lanka		AusAID			3,095,522

Coordination & Support Services	Maldives	AusAID				1,381,056
Coordination & Support Services	Seychelles	AusAID				500,000
Protection	Indonesia	AusAID				625,000
Protection	Australian NGOs	AusAID				280,000
Environment	Maldives	AusAID				46,973
Environment	Seychelles	AusAID				66,454
Environment	Thailand	AusAID				125,755
Other	India	AusAID				175,000
Other	Sri Lanka	AusAID				2,000,000
						60,570,042

* AusAID expenditure only – Indonesia and Australian NGO figures based on early estimates only.

Administrative expenses not included.