



Evaluation of the European Union's Humanitarian Response to the refugee crisis in Turkey

Final Report

Written by Universalia
(with support from Landell Mills
and International Alert)
July 2019



**Final Report - Evaluation of the European Union's Humanitarian
Response to the refugee crisis in Turkey**

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

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Evaluation of the European Union's Humanitarian Response to the refugee crisis in Turkey

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**Evaluation of the European Union's Humanitarian Response
To the refugee crisis in Turkey**

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List of acronyms

3RP	Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan
AFAD	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (in Turkish: <i>Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı</i>)
ALP	Accelerated Learning Programme
CCTE	Conditional Cash Transfer for Education
DG DEVCO	European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	European Commission's Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management
DG NEAR	European Commission's Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EC	European Commission
ECA	European Court of Auditors
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESSN	Emergency Social Safety Net
EU	European Union
EUR	Euro
EUTF	EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (also known as Madad)
FAFA	Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GoTR	Government of Turkey
GNI	Gross National Income
HAR	Humanitarian Aid Regulation
HI	Handicap International / Humanitarian Inclusion
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMPR	International Middle East Peace Research Centre
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IPA	Individual Protection Assistance
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MCE	Mercy Corps (Europe)
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket

MF	Management Framework
MHC	Migrant Health Centre
MHPSS	Mental health and psychosocial support
MoFLSS	Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
MS	Member State
NFE	Non-formal Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PAB	Pre-Assistance Baseline
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
PDMM	Provincial Directorate of Migration Management
PICTES	Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System
SASF	Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIHHAT	Improving the Health Status of the Syrian Population under Temporary Protection and Related Services Provided by Turkish Authorities
SSC	Social Service Centre (SHM – MOFLSS)
TL	Turkish Lira
TPM	Third-Party Monitoring
TRCS	Turkish Red Crescent Society (Kizilay)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WFP	World Food Programme
WHH-GAC	Welthungerhilfe
WHO	World Health Organization

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Abstract

This evaluation covers DG ECHO's programming in Turkey in 2016-2017 (EUR 1.4 billion), implemented as the humanitarian component of the first phase of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (the Facility). DG ECHO's 45 projects were distributed across four sectors: protection, basic needs, health and education. The evaluation was conducted between July 2018 and April 2019, with fieldwork in ten provinces of Turkey from October to November 2018.

The evaluation found that DG ECHO is on track to achieving its objectives, and that the mechanism of the Facility permitted results and efficiencies at a scale that could not have been achieved with a conventional mix of DG ECHO and member state funding alone. The essential humanitarian needs of refugees in Turkey could not have been met without close cooperation with the Government of Turkey, which provides protection and social services to approximately 4.0 million registered refugees (but not to unregistered refugees), and which also allows DG ECHO's flagship cash transfer programmes to deliver through government systems nationwide.

Looking ahead, the foundations are in place for the ongoing needs of the protracted refugee population to be met by continued Government support and scaled-up social and economic programmes managed by DG NEAR.

Executive summary

This evaluation, commissioned by the European Commission's Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), covers all humanitarian aid actions under the European Union (EU) Facility for Refugees in Turkey (the Facility) during the period 2016-2017. The Facility is a coordination mechanism for the mobilisation of EU resources – both from the EU budget and from Member States – to assist Turkey in addressing the needs of refugees and host communities.


The evaluation examines the relevance, coherence, added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability¹ of DG ECHO's actions in Turkey. It also (1) provides a strategic assessment of how DG ECHO-supported services for refugees can be handed over to government institutions and/or development actors; (2) provides a structured and comprehensive retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's support for refugees in Turkey from an accountability perspective; and (3) includes elements of a real-time evaluation that provides feedback for immediate use, in particular regarding the second phase of the Facility.

Methodology

The evaluation was conducted between July 2018 and April 2019. It used a combination of research methods, including qualitative primary data collection (key informant interviews, focus group discussions with refugees, workshops with DG ECHO staff, an online survey and field observations) with secondary data collection

(document review, stakeholder mapping, and extraction of quantitative data from government and partner sources). A total of 286 key stakeholders were

interviewed and a further 363 stakeholders were consulted during focus group discussions. Over 280 documents were reviewed in total. The evaluation was divided into four phases, each with its own deliverable (see graphic).



Context and DG ECHO support

Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, with 3.65 million Syrians registered by the Government of Turkey. Approximately 80% of Syrians are registered in ten provinces, of which the majority are in Istanbul, Sanliurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep. Turkey also hosts 368,200 non-Syrian asylum-seekers, mainly from Afghanistan (172,000), Iraq (142,000), Iran (39,000), and Somalia (6,700). Finally, there is an unknown number of people with irregular status, estimated between 250,000 and 1,000,000, mostly assumed to be Syrians.

Building upon previous cooperation mechanisms and instruments, in 2015 the European Union (EU) and its Member States decided to increase their cooperation with Turkey, including accelerated financial support, in response to the refugee crisis. The current cooperation between the EU and Turkey is framed by the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan of 15 October 2015, that was activated by the EU-Turkey

¹ The evaluation criteria were: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, as described in the DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, and EU added value (<https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>)

Joint Statement of 29 November 2015. The EU immediately established the ‘Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ through a Common Understanding published on 5 February 2016, and the EU-Turkey Joint Statement was updated on 18 March 2016.

The first tranche of funding coordinated by the Facility consisted of EUR 3 billion (EUR 1 billion from the EU budget and EUR 2 billion from Member States), which was fully contracted by the end of 2017, and has an implementation deadline of 2021. A second tranche of EUR 3 billion (EUR 2 billion from the EU budget and EUR 1 billion from Member States) was mobilised in July 2018, to be committed by the end of 2019 and fully implemented by 2025. In the first tranche, EUR 1.4 billion was allocated to humanitarian aid, managed by DG ECHO. This is the financial support covered by this evaluation.

Evaluation findings and overall conclusions

Relevance: did DG ECHO reach the refugees most in need, and adapt to changing Turkish policies and capacities?	
Finding 1	The design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions generally took into account the needs of refugees in Turkey, but the major initiatives could not assess vulnerability at the household level (see Finding 13).
Finding 2	Projects working with United Nations (UN) agencies that were partnered with government ministries had the greatest reach. However, they rarely addressed the needs of unregistered or out-of-province refugees. Projects with Government ministries did, to some extent, assess the vulnerabilities of registered refugees.
Finding 3	Projects working with non-government partners addressed the needs of some unregistered and out-of-province refugees, and were well equipped to assess specific protection vulnerabilities. However, due to regulatory and resource limitations, they were limited in reach, and less able to assure follow-up action.
Finding 4	DG ECHO and its partners have completely transformed their approaches as the Government of Turkey has assumed the central role in the provision of services to registered refugees in all sectors.
<p>Overall conclusions: Working mainly through Government systems was the best way to proceed under the conditions, and has allowed DG ECHO to reach a very large number of refugees in a very efficient manner. However, it has also led to three constraints. The first is that DG ECHO is largely reliant upon Government sources for the data required to plan, monitor and measure programme results – and the available data is not sufficiently detailed or available to meet all of DG ECHO’s needs, despite continuous advocacy to obtain more granular data. Secondly, due largely to Government regulations, DG ECHO’s Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) partners have not been able to assess household needs in order to target specific vulnerabilities. Finally, despite substantial support to partners providing services directly (as a complement to the large programmes using government systems), DG ECHO has not been able to ensure full service coverage to a significant portion of the refugee population which is either unregistered, or registered and living outside its provinces of registration.</p>	

Coherence: was DG ECHO aligned with its own policies and country plans, and aligned with the plans of other EU agencies and the United Nations?

Finding 5	DG ECHO's response in all sectors was aligned with DG ECHO's annual strategies outlined in the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) and with the Management Framework that guided DG ECHO's work in Turkey overall, although projects approved under one HIP often continued into the period covered by the following HIP.
Finding 6	DG ECHO's operations in Turkey were mostly aligned with DG ECHO's sector policies, but there was room for improvement regarding mainstreaming of Gender in Humanitarian Aid.
Finding 7	Initial coordination between DG ECHO and the European Commission's Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) did not allow systematic streamlining and complementarity of assistance. However, coordination has become stronger at the strategic level, as both services have rallied behind the shared goals of the Facility. Transition discussions between DG ECHO and DG NEAR picked up in 2018, and are progressing at different speeds with variations according to the sector.
Finding 8	Coordination between DG ECHO and the UN system has steadily improved since 2015.
Finding 9	DG ECHO's response is built around, and explicitly complementary to, the Turkish response.
Finding 10	As European funding has grown quickly and to an unprecedented level, non-European donors have reduced their own humanitarian funding to Turkey.

Overall conclusions: DG ECHO's programme in Turkey was well aligned with its programming frameworks and with the Government of Turkey's policies. Coordination with DG NEAR and with the UN has improved.

EU Added Value: did the DG ECHO programme achieve more than if EU member states had responded individually?

Finding 11	The scale and scope of DG ECHO's Facility funding provides strong EU added value, and Member States ask that EU/DG ECHO further applies its consequent leverage.
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Overall conclusions: the mechanism of the Facility has allowed European Member States to undertake exceptionally large humanitarian initiatives at country-wide scale - initiatives that are best implemented when resources are combined in this way and managed as a single project.

Effectiveness: did DG ECHO achieve its strategic and sector objectives?

DG ECHO's strategic objective in Turkey was to:

- Ensure that an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey are protected from harm, until lasting solutions are modelled and integrated into Government systems – resulting in sustainable and equitable access to services.

DG ECHO's sector objectives were:

- **Protection:** ECHO successfully identifies an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees, their specific needs and links them with the right information to regularise their status to access social services and to improve their living conditions and well-being.

- **Basic Needs:** An initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey have the means to meet their requirements for everyday living and contingencies are in place for new emergencies.
- **Health:** 710,500 vulnerable refugees in Turkey have access to adequate primary and specialised healthcare.
- **Education:** 300,000 vulnerable out-of-school refugee children in Turkey are enrolled in the formal education system and regularly attend classes.

Finding 12	The strategic objective of the Management Framework has been largely achieved, and is on track to be achieved by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility.
Finding 13	Vulnerability targeting remains difficult, due to Government of Turkey restrictions on individual or household assessment, and limitations on data sharing.
Finding 14	The risks and assumptions of the Management Framework, and of the four thematic objectives (sectors) were for the most part appropriate and remain relevant.
Finding 15	DG ECHO's largest programmes for basic needs (Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN)) and for education (Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE)) provided exceptional reach and coverage to both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, with benefits evenly distributed across the country.
Finding 16	DG ECHO's major programmes benefit women and girls more than men and boys. DG ECHO's partners were somewhat effective at addressing physical (not mental) disabilities.
Finding 17	DG ECHO's programmes are not sufficiently sensitive to the different protection risks and vulnerabilities experienced by refugees according to their demographic profile and current location.
Finding 18	The ESSN is highly effective in providing timely, safe and regular support to 1.5 million refugees nationwide, but the amount of the monthly cash payment is no longer seen as sufficient to meet the basic needs of refugees.
Finding 19	DG ECHO's programme has considerably increased access to government and non-government services for refugees who are registered and in-province. However, a significant number of refugees are either unregistered, or registered and out-of-province, and existing measures might not be sufficient to reach them.
Finding 20	DG ECHO's education interventions enhanced the well-being of school-age children, and it is likely that CCTE has improved school enrolment and retention.
Finding 21	DG ECHO has filled some key gaps in health service provision and significantly increased refugee access to Government health services in Turkey.
Finding 22	DG ECHO's contracted visibility requirements seem to be met by all partners, but awareness of the EU's role and contribution are low among refugees and the Turkish public. These visibility efforts do not appear to be influencing refugee or Turkish views of the European Union.

Overall conclusions: the strategic and sectoral objectives of DG ECHO in Turkey have been largely achieved, and are on track to be achieved by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility. These results were greatly facilitated by the substantial political and financial commitments from the Government of Turkey to welcome refugees, and to include refugees within government health and education programmes. DG ECHO has met the expectations of the Facility Steering Committee.

Efficiency: did DG ECHO obtain good value for money, was the budget appropriate, and did DG ECHO put in place a good monitoring system?

Finding 23	System-wide, the main factors of efficiency stem from the huge scale of some activities, and the fact that they capitalise on government systems. Some inefficiencies resulted from the difficulties encountered by NGOs in complying with Turkish regulatory frameworks.
Finding 24	The EU's per capita budget for Turkey is larger than its budgets for comparable Syrian refugee-hosting countries. The DG ECHO share of the overall Facility budget was determined mainly by DG ECHO's ability to scale up rapidly and by its experience with cash-based assistance.
Finding 25	Despite the limitations on data collection and surveys, DG ECHO's monitoring and reporting system supports sound management of operations, and permits mid-course corrections as new challenges and opportunities arise.

Overall conclusions: the success factors for DG ECHO's efficiency in Turkey are the economies of scale (few partners with low fixed costs and relatively large flow-through funds), and delivery through established government systems, thereby achieving exceptional national reach with relatively little administrative expenditure.

Sustainability/connectedness: how well did DG ECHO coordinate with other EU services and with the Government of Turkey to facilitate handover of programmes, and integration of assistance within Government systems?

Finding 26	For refugees who are verified and in-province, assistance in health, education and basic needs is well-integrated in Government systems. However, there are some service gaps that DG NEAR and Government are unlikely to address (especially services in all sectors for unregistered refugees, and some specialised protection needs).
Finding 27	There were some examples of the Government adapting its systems as they learned from DG ECHO projects, but for the most part DG ECHO was fitting into Government systems that were not very flexible.

Overall conclusions: coordination between DG ECHO, DG NEAR and other services has greatly improved since the Facility was created, and the relevant services are now planning and working together with a deliberate division of labour according to comparative advantages. Because of this inter-service cooperation, and the continuing support of the Government of Turkey, the prospects are good for the essential needs of refugees in Turkey to continue to be met after the end of the Facility, at which point DG ECHO is expected to play a decreased role focused upon elements of its humanitarian mandate that are unlikely to be covered by other agencies.

Recommendations² to DG ECHO Turkey

Technical conclusions	Top recommendations
Targeting strategy for future DG ECHO programming in Turkey	
DG ECHO made the correct strategic choices to target needs based on broad demographic criteria, and to deliver through Turkish social protection systems. This succeeded in bringing a very large number of refugees into the core assistance programmes very quickly. However, the use of demographic targeting criteria and government delivery systems also resulted in important coverage gaps: refugees who do not meet the demographic criteria but are nevertheless highly vulnerable, and refugees who are unregistered or registered and out-of-province.	After the second phase of the Facility, and assuming that most basic needs, education and health services are covered by universal government and development donor programmes, DG ECHO should then target interventions (mainly protection and focused basic needs support) at all vulnerable refugees who are not covered by, or who have dropped out of, the universal programmes.
Gathering and using data for planning	
DG ECHO does not have the data required for optimal planning and performance measurement. The problem of data has two origins: the first is the limitation of Turkish regulation on the collection of personal data, conduct of surveys and household visits, unless the organisation has appropriate permissions. The second problem is the regulatory framework that limits how much of the data collected by Government can be shared with outside parties.	Support partners to work with the Government of Turkey to collect new data tailored to increase understanding of the refugee population, preferably including modalities for regular comprehensive needs assessment at the municipal level together with appropriate partners and authorities.
Improving gender mainstreaming	
DG ECHO's gender policy calls on partners to conduct gender analysis, to adapt programme design and implementation according to the differential risks and opportunities facing gender groups, and to report on results with gender-differentiated data. The team found little evidence of partners conducting explicit gender analysis, but that the gender-sensitivity of programme design and implementation improved over time.	Strengthen engagement with DG ECHO's partners to improve implementation of DG ECHO's Gender Policy, in particular gender analysis by partners at the design stage, to inform action leading to better gender results.
Supporting partners to plan for after the Facility	
After the end of the Facility, there is a risk that some organisations working with refugees in Turkey will experience a sudden collapse in their humanitarian funding. To prevent such a situation, donors would need to step back in and resume their direct humanitarian funding. Also, the agencies that manage the UN system-wide strategy (Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP)) will need to know the funding intentions of key donors, so that they can re-prioritise and re-size the 3RP accordingly, and set humanitarian support to Turkey back on a predictable and sustainable footing at the end of the Facility.	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Advocate for donor governments (Member States and others) to resume their direct contributions, so as to cover the remaining essential needs after the end of the Facility.2. Support Turkey refugee response stakeholders to anticipate a reduction in EU funding after the end of the Facility (2021).

² Initial recommendations were co-developed with DG ECHO staff in its headquarters and in the field, and these were then refined by the evaluation team, taking into account the overall evaluation analysis. They are deliberately pitched at the technical level, with the aim of informing DG ECHO and DG NEAR decisions regarding the final stages of the Facility, and planning for the post-Facility period.

Adjusting the planning and monitoring approach

DG ECHO's coordination with DG NEAR is good, in particular regarding the second phase of the Facility. However, the exit strategy from ESSN and the division of labour in protection remain to be decided. The Management Framework for the humanitarian leg of the Facility was a strong planning tool, but explicit measures to mitigate high risks were missing.

Strengthen the strategic planning for the second phase of the Facility, including greater harmonisation of DG ECHO and DG NEAR planning and reporting, and more robust processes of risk management including risk mitigation measures.

Filling gaps in education

The CCTE project has exceeded its participation targets and is likely to achieve its expected results, although more research is needed to confirm the causal relationship between CCTE and increased school attendance. Turkish authorities understand the importance of education, and there is scope to further encourage schools to admit refugee children even if they are not registered or in-province.

Continue in the short term with CCTE and outreach work related to school attendance, including initiatives to bring unregistered and out-of-province children into the formal education system, and advocate for refugees to be integrated fully into government systems in the medium-long term.

Filling gaps in health

The vast majority of refugees in Turkey can access primary health care. However there is concern about the provision of some specialised refugee health services that stakeholders felt were likely to become less available after transfer to Turkish health institutions, and about the limited services available to unregistered refugees.

Advocate for Government institutions to provide a wider range of health services to unregistered and out-of-province refugees, possibly by supporting the implementation of technical changes to health regulations.

Filling gaps in basic needs

ESSN monitoring results show that, in a range of areas, including indebtedness, quality of accommodation, food consumption, and recourse to negative coping strategies, ESSN beneficiaries are better off than non-beneficiaries, although there has been a little backsliding on some indicators (increased indebtedness and reduced spending on health) since the Turkish economic crisis started in 2018. Anticipating the end of the Facility and of ESSN, plans have been developed to transition its beneficiaries to different programmes tailored to the level of beneficiary dependency.

As proposed to the Facility Steering Committee, prepare for the transition to a new approach to basic needs by 2021, wherein beneficiaries with no capacity to work would be supported by Government welfare programmes, while beneficiaries with capacity to work would be supported in different ways to enter the labour market.

Filling gaps in protection

Progress with registration and verification has been rapid, as the Directorate General of Migration Management has continued to strengthen its capacities. However, there are a number of refugee sub-groups who are unregistered or, even if they are registered, fall through the net of available government services either because they are living out of province, or because their protection need is not addressed by existing programmes.

Advocate for expedited registration of refugees in registration backlogs or in provinces where registration has been temporarily suspended, and for the regularisation of inter-provincial residency transfers.

Strengthening communications

There is a communications deficit, a gap between what the EU has achieved with its unprecedented humanitarian programmes, and the low levels of Turkish and refugee understanding of what the EU has provided and achieved.

Work with DG NEAR and the EU Delegation in Turkey in order to help them improve refugee and Turkish public understanding of the nature of the EU's investments in Turkey, and of the results they have achieved.

1. Introduction


1.1. Evaluation subject, purpose and scope

This is the Final Report of the Evaluation of the European Union’s humanitarian response to the refugee crisis in Turkey, covering the period 2016-2017. This ambitious mandate was undertaken by Landell Mills in partnership with Universal Management Group and International Alert. The consortium was contracted by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) to carry out the evaluation between April 2018 and February 2019.

This Final Report provides a synthesis of the evidence collected during the first three phases of the evaluation (inception, desk and field phases). The findings and conclusions were developed by the evaluation team, and then validated by DG ECHO. The recommendations were subsequently developed through a participatory process with DG ECHO (Brussels and Turkey).

Purpose and objectives

The overall purpose of this independent evaluation is to assess all Humanitarian Aid actions under the European Union (EU) Facility for Refugees in Turkey, including those that are ongoing, in order to inform future programming and funding under a second phase of the Facility. More specifically, the evaluation objectives were threefold:



The evaluation approach was designed to provide evidence-based judgment on the extent to which the humanitarian actions under the Facility have been **effective and efficient**; **relevant** to the needs of the refugee population; **coherent** both internally and with other EU instruments, donors and regional interventions (i.e. Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan (3RP)); and have achieved **EU added value**. In addition, the evaluation also examines the **sustainability** of humanitarian actions within the Facility.

Scope of the assignment

The scope of the assignment was as follows:

- **Period covered:** the evaluation covered the Facility's interventions implemented during the period 2016 to 2018 which have been funded under the four Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) issued to date.³
- **Programmatic and sectoral coverage:** the evaluation covered all humanitarian interventions funded through the Facility, which were organised by DG ECHO in the sectors of protection, basic needs, education, and health.⁴ In total, this involved 45 projects for a total value of EUR 1.4 billion.
- **Target population:** the evaluation covered asylum-seekers and refugees, both Syrian and non-Syrian, under various protection status (temporary and international),⁵ and living inside and outside camps.⁶
- **Stakeholders:** DG ECHO staff in Brussels and Turkey, the Facility Secretariat, Steering Group for this evaluation, European Union Member States (MS), implementing partners (IP), European Commission (EC) staff responsible for other instruments under the Facility, other donors, the Government of Turkey (GoTR) and refugees.
- **Geographic coverage:** all of Turkey. The bulk of the refugees are concentrated in Istanbul, and in the south-eastern provinces along the Turkish-Syrian border.

1.2. Final Report structure

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:

- **Section 2** provides the evaluation context;
- **Section 3** reviews the methodological approach;
- **Section 4** presents the findings per evaluation question;
- **Section 5** provides the main conclusions; and
- **Section 6** elaborates recommendations.

This report is accompanied by four Appendices:

- **Appendix I:** Evaluation Matrix
- **Appendix II:** List of Stakeholders Consulted
- **Appendix III:** List of Documents Consulted
- **Appendix IV:** Survey results

³ HIP Syria 2015, HIP Syria 2016, HIP Turkey 2016 and HIP Turkey 2017. 24 projects approved within these 4 HIPs continued into 2018 (and even 2019) and were counted under the 1st tranche of the Facility

⁴ The two main references were the DG ECHO Turkey Management Framework 2016-2018, and the list of humanitarian projects provided on the European Commission website. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facility_table.pdf

⁵ Turkey has retained a geographic reservation to the Geneva Convention of 1951, as a result of which most of the asylum seekers entering Turkey are not granted refugee status. Throughout this report, Syrians under Temporary Protection and non-Syrians (usually International Protection applicants) are referred to as "refugees" as a convenience, but this does not imply that the EC or GoTR recognize them formally as refugees

⁶ The Government uses the term "Temporary Accommodation Centres," but for convenience this report uses the term "camps"

2. Evaluation context

2.1. Country context

The conflict in Syria, now in its eighth year, has caused 6.6 million people⁷ to become internally displaced and over 5.6 million to leave the country since 2011.⁸ The majority of those seeking safety are hosted in neighbouring countries: Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, with 3.646 million Syrians currently registered with the Turkish Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM).⁹ Approximately 80% of Syrians are registered in ten provinces, of which the majority are in Istanbul, Sanliurfa, Hatay and Gaziantep. Turkey also hosts 368,200 non-Syrian asylum-seekers from Afghanistan (172,000), Iraq (142,000), Iran (39,000), and Somalia (6,700), among others, who are registered as International Protection applicants and who mostly live outside government-run camps.¹⁰ Finally, there are an unknown number of people with irregular status, with estimates between 250,000 and 1,000,000, mostly assumed to be Syrians.

Figure 1 Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees in Turkey (source: UNHCR)



The Government and people of Turkey have extended an extraordinary welcome to the Syrian people. In addition to the sums provided by the international donors and foremost among them the EU, GoTR claims itself to have provided over EUR 30 billion¹¹ to cover their education, health, camp accommodation and other costs. In 2018 and 2019 the Government closed many of the camps so, by the end of 2018, 98% of refugees were living outside of camp settings, mostly in urban areas.

⁷ UNHCR Syria emergency, available at <http://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html>, accessed 14 January 2019

⁸ UNHCR, Operational Portal, Syria Regional Refugee Response, accessed 14 January 2019 and available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.265520714.416523051.1523991504-441649869.1511459522.

⁹ DGMM: http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/temporary-protection_915_1024_4748_icerik, accessed 24 March 2019. The number of arrivals has slowed down since 2014, and variations in numbers since 2014 reflect some new arrivals, some irregular and regular (resettlement) departures, in-country births and deaths, and the results of registration and validation exercises

¹⁰ UNHCR Turkey - Key Facts and Figures - October 2018, available at <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66795>, accessed 14 January 2019

¹¹ Media reports quoting the Turkish Foreign Minister in November 2017. The evaluation team could not find a breakdown of how this sum was sourced from the Government budget or allocated


Registered Syrians are accorded 'Temporary Protection' status, which affords social and economic rights, while not requiring individual refugee status determination or granting them all the formal rights of persons benefiting from international or subsidiary protection. Registered Syrian refugees have the right to the same basic social services as Turkish nationals, but their ability to access these services is often limited by a lack of awareness, administrative and language barriers, and the capacity of service providers to respond to high demand. Syrian refugees can work legally if they have a work permit or work in the agricultural sector without a permit, but most Syrian men as well as some women and children work in the informal sector without permits.

Public attitudes towards refugees have evolved over the eight years of their stay in Turkey. After an initial and enthusiastic welcome, the growing numbers of arrivals started to put pressure on municipalities along the border, and government costs escalated. From 2015 onwards the border became more closely managed, and refugee movement within Turkey became more restricted as the authorities sought to contain refugees to their provinces of registration, and prevent the drift towards Istanbul and other major urban centres. Over time, social tensions between Turkish citizens and refugees have slowly increased, in particular in regions with heavy refugee concentrations that have tested public services and increased competition for informal labour. However, despite a few localised eruptions into violent conflict, and the significant economic downturn in Turkey in 2018, for the most part, Syrian refugees continue to be welcome in Turkey and accepted into their communities.

The operating environment for United Nations (UN) agencies and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) has also evolved over this period. Initially, when numbers were small and the Government was focussed on refugees in camps, UN agencies and INGOs were not under close scrutiny and provided their support in an *ad hoc* and self-coordinated way alongside local organisations and municipal authorities. Throughout 2014-2015 the Government gradually came to grips with the growing out-of-camp population, moved from *ad hoc* local registration to a unified national registration system, and started enforcing regulations regarding the provision of services by Government and external actors, including regulations governing the sectors and locations where NGOs can work. The fairly relaxed operating environment for Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in particular became sharply constrained following the attempted *coup d'état* of July 2016, after which a large number of National NGOs and a handful of INGOs were asked to close their operations, many government officials were removed from their posts, and a tighter regulatory regime was introduced all over.

By 2017, the Government was firmly coordinating all aspects of refugee assistance and protection. While this level of Government ownership provides unprecedented support to refugees (inclusion of refugees in government health, education and social welfare systems), it also entailed control over the gathering and management of data regarding refugees (especially through regulatory changes introduced in late 2017). As the role of Government has grown, all agencies, including the UN, INGOs and Government itself, have had to make dramatic adjustments to their programmes. If there is one distinguishing feature of the first tranche of the Facility (see chapter 2.3 below) it is this total transformation of the DG ECHO programme from a relatively small programme of UN and INGO activities taking place alongside government, to an exceptionally large programme taking place through Government, and where UN agencies and INGOs play supporting or complementary roles.

Figure 2 Overall timeline of DG ECHO's response



2.2. Sector context

This section describes the regulatory and programming context in the four broad, and often overlapping, sectors in which ECHO has operated during the first tranche of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey.

Basic needs	<p>Turkish nationals benefit from a relatively small, but increasing level of economic social protection provided by the Turkish state. In 2014 social assistance expenditure was 22.9 billion Turkish Lira (TL), or 1.31% of GDP, an increase from 0.57% of GDP in 2003.¹² Social assistance in Turkey is managed at the national level by the Social Assistance Directorate General under the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services (MoFLSS)¹³ and is implemented by 1,000 locally based Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations (SASFs), using an integrated electronic platform which holds data on applicants and determines eligibility. All of ECHO's basic needs interventions have involved cash/voucher transfers, varying by scale and geographic scope. After an initial period of INGO-provided cash and vouchers, from 2016 most recipients of EU-funded cash transfer programmes were subsumed into the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN), delivered by World Food Programme (WFP) and the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS). ESSN is a nationwide programme that uses existing Government systems, and targets vulnerable Syrians and non-Syrians based on demographic eligibility criteria. At the time of writing, the ESSN is the largest humanitarian programme ever funded by the European Union, totalling EUR 998 million and reaching 1.4 million refugees.</p>
Health	<p>The health profile and the disease spectrum of the host population and the refugee population are very similar, however, transportation costs, language and cultural barriers prevent equitable access to healthcare. The most important barrier is that Syrian refugees in Turkey can only access free healthcare provided by the Turkish state if they are registered and in their province of registration. In addition, the Turkish healthcare system is not always able to meet the increased demand. There are also gaps in the services that the Turkish healthcare system offers: for example, some aspects of mental health care, as well as services to the war-wounded and to survivors of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). Non-registered refugees can only access emergency healthcare and vaccinations. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs have been constrained in their efforts to fill health service gaps and to extend healthcare access by the operational and regulatory environment. Some organisations have withdrawn from work in Turkey, following changes in Ministry of Health (MoH) policy which limit the permission of INGOs to operate in the health sector. ECHO's priorities in health have included: lifesaving care, primary care, physical rehabilitation, mental health and psychosocial support.</p>
Education	<p>In the early years of the response, Syrian children were assumed to be staying for only a short time in Turkey, and attended <i>ad hoc</i> schools and more structured Temporary Education Centres that followed the Syrian curriculum and in Arabic. In 2016, the Government made a key policy decision to begin admitting Syrian children to Turkish Government schools and to move them over to the Turkish curriculum and in the Turkish language. Despite significant efforts on the part of Turkish institutions and the international community, in September 2016, 63% of an estimated 934,000 school-aged</p>

¹² World Bank – Turkey's Integrated Social Assistance System -

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/401541468307671282/106847-WP-P148963-OUO-9-MISCase-Turkey-ENf.docx>

¹³ The Ministry of Family and Social Policy was merged with other Ministries and renamed the Ministry of Family Labour and Social Services in 2017

Syrian children (or 588,420) were out of school.¹⁴ The reasons refugee children are not in school are multi-faceted and intertwined. Economic vulnerabilities, particularly in single parent households or households with many children, place older children at risk of child labour, both domestically and in the informal sector. Refugee families are also highly mobile, have limited access to information regarding available education services and face language barriers. DG ECHO's response has focused on the integration of the most vulnerable refugee children into the formal education system in Turkey. ECHO aimed to integrate 260,000 vulnerable children into Turkish schools by removing three major barriers to education access: (a) conditional cash transfers to parents aim to mitigate economic barriers, (b) school transport provision aims to mitigate distance barriers and (c) non-formal 'accelerated learning programmes' aim to help school children 'catch up' with their peer group, so as to more successfully (re)integrate them into formal schooling.

Protection Major policy shifts by the GoTR between 2016 and 2017 affected the protection context for refugees in Turkey, and the corresponding policies and programmes of DG ECHO and its humanitarian partners. During the period there was a clear policy decision by the Government to include refugees in state-run services based upon their registration, which shifted a lot of emphasis towards processes of registration and validation, and providing counselling and referral support to refugees who were not registered for any reason, or not able to access services because they were not living in their province of registration. DG ECHO's direct protection activities also evolved in this period, as some INGOs and National NGOs (NNGOs) were asked to cease their activities after the attempted *coup d'état* in 2016, and from 2017 restrictions were placed upon the ability of INGOs to conduct household visits and to undertake case management. As reflected in the HIPs, from 2017 onwards INGOs reduced their direct protection services to refugees (i.e. SGBV and mental health and psycho-social support (MHPSS) counselling, child-friendly spaces and increased their emphasis on referral of refugees to government services. Also in 2017, INGO "Special Needs Funds" that provided cash and vouchers to meet the basic needs of the most vulnerable refugees were discontinued (as the ESSN scaled up), and protection partners introduced a more focussed instrument known as Individual Protection Assistance (IPA), through which individually-tailored in-kind support with a specific protection purpose was provided to refugees.

2.3. EU response to the refugee crisis in Turkey

Building upon previous cooperation mechanisms and instruments, in 2015 the EU and its Member States (MS) decided to increase their cooperation with, and financial support for Turkey in response to the refugee crisis. The shape of the current cooperation between the EU and Turkey was outlined in the *EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan (October 2015)* and agreed in the *EU-Turkey Statement (March 2016)*. Significant additional funding to support Turkey was approved by the Commission and the MS, and the EU established the 'Facility for Refugees in Turkey' (the Facility) in February 2016. The Facility is a coordination mechanism for the mobilisation of EU resources – both from the EU budget and from MS (as Gross National Income-calculated 'External Assigned Revenues') – to assist Turkey in addressing the needs of refugees and host communities.¹⁵ It has the following objectives:

¹⁴ UNHCR, Education External Update, Turkey, September 2016

¹⁵ The funding instruments used by the EU in response to the Syria crisis are the European Neighbourhood Instrument, the Development Cooperation Instrument, the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and funding under Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid

- Coordinate and streamline actions financed from the EU's budget and bilateral contributions from Member States;
- Enhance the efficiency and complementarity of support provided to refugees and host communities in Turkey;
- Complement actions undertaken in the EU's external financing instruments and by individual Member States.¹⁶

The Facility is implemented as both humanitarian and development assistance. The actions funded under the first tranche are managed by different EC services/instruments: DG ECHO manages humanitarian aid, the Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) manages the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian Crisis (EUTF-Madad), and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments manages the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The Facility is overseen by a Steering Committee, chaired by the European Commission, with representation from Member States, while the GoTR participates in an advisory capacity. A basic strategic framework for the Facility was outlined in the *Strategic Concept Note (2016)* and adapted for the second tranche in the *Updated Strategic Concept Note (2018)*.

The first tranche of the Facility managed EUR 3 billion (EUR 1 billion from the EU budget and EUR 2 billion from MS), which was fully contracted by the end of 2017, and has an implementation deadline of 2021. A second tranche of EUR 3 billion (EUR 2 billion from the EU budget and EUR 1 billion from MS) was agreed in July 2018, to be contracted by the end of 2019 and fully implemented by 2025. In the first tranche, EUR 1.4 billion (46%) was allocated to humanitarian aid and EUR 1.6 billion (54%) allocated to the other strands of the Facility. In line with the trends towards government ownership of the refugee response identified in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the Facility's second tranche has a reduced humanitarian leg (DG ECHO), increased development/pre-accession assistance and removes funding through IcSP and EUTF (the use of which will be exceptional).

EU-funded humanitarian assistance is designed to support the most vulnerable refugees and other persons of concern in urban and rural areas of Turkey, with a focus on the vast majority that are living outside of Government-managed camps. Specifically, "ECHO actions aim to ensure that an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey are protected from harm."¹⁷ DG ECHO manages the humanitarian leg of the Facility as described in Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) for Turkey. The Facility financial resources are added to the annual DG ECHO budget, with ECHO partners guided by Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) and Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) rules and regulations. The EU's humanitarian funding in Turkey between 2015 and 2016 was described in two regional HIPs focusing on the Syria crisis, and between 2016 and 2017 by two Turkey-specific HIPs. The overall response was guided by the internal *ECHO Turkey Management Framework 2016-2018* ("the Management Framework" or MF), which set out the strategy, the metrics and the evaluation plan. The HIPs, meanwhile, are public documents which described the humanitarian needs in Turkey, the envisaged response by DG ECHO, and the constraints. The activities funded by DG ECHO are implemented by humanitarian partners, which include UN agencies, INGOs, specialised agencies of MS, and members of the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement (in particular TRCS). DG ECHO has a Country Office in Ankara and Sub-Offices in Gaziantep and Istanbul. Field staff in country monitor funded projects, provide timely analysis of existing and forecasted needs, provide technical support to funded projects, and facilitate donor coordination.

¹⁶ Commission Decision of 24 November 2015 on the coordination of the actions of the Union and Member States through a coordination mechanism – the Refugee Facility for Turkey (2015/c 407/07), Article 2, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2015.407.01.0008.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2015:407:TOC. The Commission Decision of Nov 2015 was amended in Feb 2016.

¹⁷ ECHO Turkey Management Framework 2016-2018, version 3.0, 23 March 2017. The full statement of the objective is: "As part of the Government of Turkey provision of services to refugees, ECHO will ensure an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey are protected from harm, until lasting solutions are modelled and integrated into government systems – resulting in sustainable and equitable access to services."

The HIPs set out four main sectors for DG ECHO: basic needs, health, education and protection. Protection activities are both stand-alone and mainstreamed throughout the three other priority sectors. The humanitarian envelope under the first tranche of the Facility was programmed through 45 projects executed by 19 partners covering all four sectors. These 19 international partners in turn delivered some or all of their activities through 60 Turkish organisations which provided local knowledge and experience. Figure 3 below provides details on the number of projects and level of funding committed by DG ECHO to each sector.¹⁸ From the establishment of the Facility until March 2018, EUR 1.11 billion had been disbursed, benefiting a total of 1,561,940 refugees.¹⁹

Figure 3 Breakdown of DG ECHO funded projects in Turkey by sector 2015 - 2017

DG ECHO Sector	Description	Number of projects	Number of implementing partners	Total Funding (EUR)
ESSN	Stabilise or improve living standards of the most vulnerable refugee households through basic needs support via a nationwide ESSN.	2	4	998m
Basic Needs	Facilitating access for refugee populations to the government social welfare system and providing means by which the vulnerable populations can meet their basic needs for everyday living (subsistence for basic needs). ²⁰	4		60m
Health	With GoTR health system, supporting transitional primary health care service delivery and developing models for specialised health services required by the most vulnerable population (healthcare).	17	7	92m
Education	Facilitating access for refugee populations to the GoTR education system by providing the means for at-risk children to be able to go to school.	4	2	105m
Protection	Protection interventions aim to establish a strong outreach, intake, case management and referral system to other services (funded by ECHO and external actors).	18	11	153m

¹⁸ To complete this table, we used the descriptions provided in the ECHO Turkey Management Framework 2016-2018 and the list of humanitarian projects under the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey provided on the European Commission website. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/facility_table.pdf

¹⁹ European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Second Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, COM (2018) 91 Final, p.8. This is the latest data we have for the number of beneficiaries.


²⁰ Partners are delivering the support through the national system and in partnership with GoTR.

3. Methodology

3.1. Evaluation phases

The evaluation timeline was organised in four phases, with one deliverable per phase. It is presented in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4 Overview of the evaluation timeline by phase



3.2. Evaluation questions

This evaluation framework was built during the inception phase and updated at the beginning of the field phase using key insights from the desk review. The resulting evaluation matrix took into account the main strategies, policies and standards that guided DG ECHO humanitarian action, namely: the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR), the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (the Consensus), thematic and sectoral policies, the EU-Turkey Statement, the MF, the HIPs, and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD-DAC) criteria, norms, and standards.

As further explained below, the evaluation employed a mixture of data collection and analysis tools, and their use was guided by the information needed to answer the Evaluation Questions (EQs). In addition, the evaluation matrix focused on the data collection process and ensured that resources were used as efficiently as possible.


The evaluation matrix was revised twice. Changes and minor edits to the evaluation questions were approved by DG ECHO on 2nd August 2018 and included in the Inception Report. During an initial two-day team workshop in Ankara in October 2018, the team members reviewed the EQs and sub-questions in detail, adjusted some questions and addressed duplications, determined how sectoral teams would address cross-cutting questions, and confirmed how the fieldwork would test the assumed causal chain that would lead project activities to achieve sector-level outcomes.

The Evaluation Matrix is provided in Appendix I.

3.3. Data collection

The evaluation team used a variety of data sources and methodological tools to build this report. As presented in Figure 5 below, primary and secondary data collection strategies were combined and analysed with three key analysis methods.

Figure 5 Overview of data collection and analysis methods (for details see Appendices 2,3,4)



3.4. Limitations of the analysis

The most important limitation is data. The mid-term project reports and quarterly monitoring reports provided by partners to DG ECHO provided sufficient evidence that output performance was generally on track, although, as of the end of 2018, several key HIP 2017 final project reports were not yet available. Furthermore, the evaluation team is confident that the Facility achieved important results at the sector level (see Sections 4.4 and 5.4). With the data available, the evaluation team was able to provide real-time validation of performance to the DG ECHO country team. However, there was little reporting against the outcome-level indicators of the MF, partly because the surveys and assessments envisaged to measure MF outcome indicators were not carried out, and partly because some anticipated GoTR data was not available (see Section 4.4). For this reason, the evaluation team's analysis cannot be conclusive with respect to impact.

Regarding the field mission, the main challenge faced by the team during the field mission related to the complexity of the mission itself: five teams held meetings with 286 interlocutors and 363 beneficiaries in ten locations over a ten-day period. This was made more difficult by late approval of the overall mission schedule (leaving the teams limited time to organise specific appointments), a last-minute decision to drop one target province because of the absence of DG ECHO partners, and by the requirement that meetings with Government be arranged through DG ECHO. In addition, most UN partners required that meetings with their counterparts and sub-contractors be organised by the UN agencies. While the team was in the end able to meet with all the expected Government and non-government stakeholders, many of these arrangements were only confirmed at the last minute, and with considerable behind-the-scenes support from DG ECHO's and UN agencies' field offices.

Regarding the availability of relevant stakeholders, it is inherent in humanitarian work that international (and even national) staff are highly mobile, and this mobility was accentuated in Turkey by the fact that

several organisations within the evaluation scope had ceased their Turkey operations.²¹ To some extent the team was able to compensate for this by interviewing partner staff outside the country through Skype, and in other cases the incomplete understanding on the part of field office staff was compensated by following up with their Ankara offices (particularly for information related to the design decisions, which were rarely made at field level). A further challenge faced by some teams was that some of the HIP 2017 activities visited were still in their start-up phase, so those interlocutors tended to present to the evaluation team their plans, rather than their actual achievements.

A challenge stemming from the diversity of stakeholders was the wide range of understanding on the part of interlocutors regarding the programmes under consideration, DG ECHO, other EU instruments, the Facility itself, or the purpose of an evaluation (as distinct from a monitoring visit or an audit). In many instances, interlocutors were not clearly able to distinguish between what DG ECHO was funding and financial support delivered through other EU instruments and, in the case of subcontractors to UN agencies, the interlocutors often were unaware of which activities were tagged for DG ECHO funding as opposed to other funding sources.

Finally, another group of challenges facing the field mission stemmed from the centralised character of all organisations in Turkey (extending beyond Government to include UN agencies and NGOs), as a result of which, information that might have been available at field level was often not shared, information at Ankara level was only shared after repeated requests from the evaluation team, and stakeholders in general were reluctant to address issues and challenges encountered in their work. Partner reticence to speak openly about the DG ECHO relationship or implementation challenges was accentuated by the timing of the evaluation visit itself, which took place at a moment when three major reports had recently been issued (the second Needs Assessment report was a preoccupation of Government officials, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report was a preoccupation of DG ECHO staff, and the WFP evaluation of the ESSN was top of mind for basic needs stakeholders). At the same time, partners were preparing proposals for submission to DG ECHO, and there were highly dynamic discussions between DG ECHO, DG NEAR and the GoTR around the second phase of the Facility and the future division of roles within it.

To summarise, regarding the validity of the evaluation findings, the evaluation team has a high degree of confidence in its findings related to all the EQs except for two areas: (a) findings regarding EQ 8 “To what extent have DG ECHO’s objectives been achieved” are tempered by the difficulty in obtaining robust data on programme-level outcomes (as discussed above); and (b) findings regarding EQ 12: “To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response” are only partial (see Finding 23) because the evaluation team was not able to obtain sufficiently detailed input cost and output result data, across a comparable set of projects, to come to a confident conclusion on this matter.

²¹ Including Handicap International (HI), International Medical Corps (IMC), Médecins du Monde (MDM), Mercy Corps (MCE) and International Middle East Peace Research Centre (IMPR)

4. Findings

4.1. Relevance

EQ1: To what extent have the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions taken into account the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey (registered or unregistered, inside or outside camps), in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people?

***Finding 1:** The design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions generally took into account the needs of refugees in Turkey, but the major initiatives could not assess vulnerability at the household level.*

DG ECHO and its partners planned and implemented their initial (HIP 2015 and HIP 2016) projects with limited data and severe time constraints.²² The only planning information available in early 2016 was a dated Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey (AFAD) study from 2013,²³ and a patchwork of thematic or local academic studies and NGO surveys, none of which provided a full picture or at a level of detail useful for design and implementation of a large programme. Specifically, there was little disaggregated data available on women, children, elderly and disabled people. The EU's *Facility Needs Assessment (2016)*, itself decries the lack of data: "the lack of comprehensive data that has been collected and/or shared on demographics and vulnerabilities is also a serious hindrance to assessing needs and designing programs and interventions."

Nevertheless, INGOs were able to assess the specific needs and vulnerabilities of their relatively small beneficiary groups. For HIP 2016 and HIP 2017, partners with established projects in Turkey were usually able to extrapolate needs from earlier projects, but new programmes tended to rely on estimates or incomplete and outdated needs assessments.²⁴ The second *Facility Needs Assessment (2018)* still relied largely on secondary and incomplete data, and was reported by field staff as having been useful for framing discussions on Phase 2 of the Facility.²⁵

Three of ECHO's largest initiatives (ESSN, Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) and Verification) were planned by DG ECHO and its partners on the basis of Government policy decisions, population estimates and demographic assumptions regarding vulnerability,²⁶ and then improved their targeting during implementation as they gathered beneficiary data and adjusted direction accordingly (see Finding 13 on vulnerability assessment).

²² Detailed review of all project files during desk review, confirmed by DG ECHO staff interviews and partner site visits

²³ There was initially a proposal for AFAD to conduct a second comprehensive needs assessment, but this did not go ahead

²⁴ The detailed analysis of project documents revealed that the protection and basic needs sectors were particularly hindered by a lack of detailed and comprehensive data. In the numerous cases where data was insufficient, partners would base their project designs on broad needs statements, small sample sizes, or conventional wisdom for the sector at hand. Even though partners stated through the online survey that they planned based on needs (77% agree or strongly agree), a closer look at the project documents reveals that the quality of this assessment varied widely at the project level, and did not become noticeably better or more consistent under the 2017 HIP or beyond. Of all sectors, the education sector was found to have been the most successful in taking the needs of vulnerable refugees into account

²⁵ DG ECHO staff interviews

²⁶ CCTE was based upon assumptions made by GoTR for their similar scheme for Turkish children. ESSN was based upon a demographic model from cash programs outside Turkey, the demographic criteria were developed and chosen due to their high correlation with economic insecurity, and were contextually validated in Turkey before being rolled out at scale

Finding 2: *Projects working with UN agencies that were partnered with government ministries had the greatest reach. However, they rarely addressed the needs of unregistered or out-of-province refugees. Projects with Government ministries did, to some extent, assess vulnerabilities of registered refugees.*

The rapid scaling-up and universal scope of the ESSN and CCTE programmes²⁷ allowed DG ECHO to quickly cover most of the needs of the vast majority of the refugees – and to an extent that would not have been possible if specific household needs had been assessed individually prior to implementation. The demographic criteria used for ESSN eligibility resulted in an exclusion error of about 5%,²⁸ which was being addressed by DG ECHO in 2018 through the introduction of a discretionary SASF allowance.

“The ESSN was relevant to the needs of refugees, but was not designed to accommodate the specific needs of particular vulnerable groups ... There was no beneficiary consultation during design and little information on the needs of particularly vulnerable groups.”

ESSN Evaluation Report

Over time, Government agencies improved their capacity to identify and address the vulnerabilities of registered refugees. During fieldwork, the evaluation team was able to confirm the effective performance of the referral mechanisms of the Provincial Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM) protection desks and TRCS service centres, and observed diligent efforts to improve the outreach and referral work of the MoFLSS Social Service Centres (SSCs).²⁹

From the point of view of targeting needs, the major shortcoming of the DG ECHO programme is that Government agencies were (with a few exceptions)³⁰ not authorised or encouraged to provide services to refugees who were unregistered or out-of-province (see Finding 19).

Finding 3: *Projects working with non-government partners addressed the needs of some unregistered and out-of-province refugees, and were well-equipped to assess specific protection vulnerabilities. However, due to regulatory and resource limitations, they were limited in reach, and less able to assure follow-up action.*

NGO partners were able to provide services to refugees according to need, whether or not they were registered or out-of-province, but the amount of such support was limited by the operating parameters (permits) of the NGOs, financial resources, and the confined geographic coverage provided by a small number of NGO offices with fixed points of delivery.³¹ Over the review period, the operating space for NGOs became narrower, as Government introduced and enforced regulations on NGO staff and volunteer employment, international staff visas, organisational operating permits, the gathering of personal data through surveys, and household outreach. Several NGOs did not have their registration renewed and closed their operations.

Despite the tightening operating environment, fieldwork confirmed that health and protection NGOs in particular were able to continue to provide tailored services to meet the needs of some of the most vulnerable refugees, including specialised health, legal, and psychosocial counselling services not generally available through Government institutions. However, the number of such beneficiaries was small in relation to the overall needs, and there was little possibility to follow-up on NGO to Government referrals, to assess the extent of eventual services received.

²⁷ The UNHCR/DGMM verification programme also had universal reach for Syrians, but its assistance was limited to protection referrals

²⁸ There are several estimates for the exclusion error. 5% is the number found most frequently in WFP documents. 5% was not seen as an unacceptable margin of error: the initial target at design was “less than 10%”

²⁹ Staff implementing ESSN (staff in banks, SASF offices and TRCS) were given training on how to identify refugee protection risks, and guidance on referral to a WFP protection focal point. As of December 2018 WFP had referred 5,280 such cases to other services, 18% of them to DGMM. However, ESSN does not provide systematic protection screening at the point of application (unlike the DGMM protection desk), and UNHCR’s early offer to support the creation of this referral service was not accepted by GoTR

³⁰ In focus groups and field visits the team learned of examples where education services were being provided to unregistered refugees although, as “guest students,” they were (in most cases encountered) not receiving transferable certificates

³¹ Typically, cities with major refugee populations have 1-4 NGO service delivery centres, and maybe one mobile team. Secondary cities in provinces with large refugee populations might have 1-2 service centres, and most provinces do not have any NGO presence

EQ.2 To what extent have DG ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting and adjusting their approach and in addressing gaps as the capacity of GoTR to address the needs of refugees has evolved over time?

***Finding 4:** DG ECHO and its partners have completely transformed their approaches as GoTR has assumed the central role in the provision of services to registered refugees in all sectors.*

As demonstrated by the evolution in the HIPs, over the three-year period of the first phase of the Facility, DG ECHO and its partners have made exceptional efforts to reorient and redesign their programmes in response to GoTR’s policy and programme changes. Some examples of the more important policy changes were the decisions to implement general provisions in the refugee legalisation³² to allow all registered refugee children to register in Turkish government schools³³ and to allow registered refugees access to government health facilities,³⁴ and the decisions to create a system of Migrant Health Centres, to close most of the Government-managed refugee camps, to verify refugee registrations (and thereby to regularise some *de facto* inter-provincial transfers), and to limit the authority of UN agencies and NGOs to gather data on refugees through surveys and to conduct household visits.³⁵ On the programme side, DG ECHO programming with WFP, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) increased very rapidly as these agencies were the channels for DG ECHO support to GoTR implementation of (respectively) ESSN, CCTE and verification.

Despite its considerable resource commitments, the Government was not immediately able to provide services at full scale in health, education and protection, and government officials informed the evaluation team that the complementary work of DG ECHO’s partners (as well as DG NEAR with its flagship projects *Promoting Integration of Syrian Children into the Turkish Education System - PICTES* in education and *Improving the Health Status of the Syrian Population under Temporary Protection and Related Services Provided by Turkish Authorities - SIHHAT* in health) was essential to this successful transformation to a Government delivery model. Document review and fieldwork confirmed that UN and NGO partners provided technical support, accompaniment, translation, intake referral services and monitoring support in all sectors.

A major consequence of the shift to the Government service delivery model (in combination with operating restrictions) has been to reduce the role of many INGO and NNGO partnerships³⁶ in direct service delivery. Analysis of the project records shows that by 2017 NGOs had in most cases converted from direct delivery to a role of providing niche services, and filling gaps in service not provided by Government – either because the Government does not provide the service at all (for example legal counselling, specialised health services), or because the Government does not provide the service to unregistered refugees. Figure 6 shows the evolution in the partner mix over time, with a distinct drop in NGO agreements in 2017. Information provided by DG ECHO regarding the 2018 HIP allocations, covering the period beyond the scope of the evaluation, shows that this trend was to some extent corrected in 2018, as allocations to protection (7) and health

Figure 6 Evolution in DG ECHO partner agreements

	All DG ECHO partner agreements			
	HIP 2015	HIP 2016	HIP 2017	HIP 2018
NGO	10	13	4	9
UN	1	8	4	2
Total	11	24	10	12

³² For example, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (2013) Article 89 provided refugee applicants with access to education and health services, but initial application was focused upon service provision in refugee camps

³³ MoNE circular 2014/2321 of 23 September 2014 superceded *ad hoc* partial regulatory changes from 2013

³⁴ MoH circulars 2014/4 and 2015/9648 clarified what had hitherto been unspecified responsibilities of MoH to provide services to Syrians

³⁵ NGOs confirmed in interview that they can still visit refugee households in response to a specific invitation or service request

³⁶ Although a few INGOs were providing services directly to refugees within the framework of a Government Memorandum of Understanding, most INGOs were working in tandem with an established NNGO partner

(2) NGOs resumed,³⁷ in recognition of the extent of the remaining gaps in services to unregistered refugees.

4.2. Coherence


EQ.3 To what extent is the DG ECHO response in Turkey consistent with DG ECHO's strategy for Turkey as established in the relevant HIPs?

Finding 5: DG ECHO's response in all sectors was aligned with the HIPs and the Management Framework, although projects approved under one HIP often continued into the period covered by the following HIP

During the evaluation period, the four relevant HIPs captured two major changes in approach. Firstly, there was the transition from Regional Syria HIPs with a Turkish chapter (2015 and 2016), to Turkey-only HIPs (2016 and 2017) as a consequence of the creation of the Facility. Importantly, the 2016 and 2017 HIPs were only approved mid-year, and therefore can more accurately be seen as covering 2016-2017, and 2017-2018. The value of DG ECHO project approvals is illustrated in Figure 7.

Secondly, there was the change in direction from Turkey HIP 2016 (which combined some direct delivery in all sectors and limited assistance in camps, with the beginnings of Government delivery: "first-generation"), to Turkey HIP 2017 (which was characterised by large-scale UN/Government service delivery to out-of-camp refugees, including ESSN and CCTE, and limited direct service delivery by NGOs: "second-generation").

Figure 7 Values of project approvals in HIPs 2015 -2017



The evaluation team's exhaustive project document analysis confirms that projects were aligned with their respective HIP when they were analysed by DG ECHO staff and recommended for approval, but this alignment can be difficult to trace in the field because of the lag between HIP approvals and project start dates, and the time taken to implement projects (extended by widespread no-cost extensions). As a consequence of this unavoidable lag, throughout most of the period under evaluation DG ECHO's partners were implementing first-generation projects even after the overall strategy had moved on to the second-generation.³⁸ The MF remained relevant throughout, as it generally reflected the later, second-generation approach focused on Government delivery, and also updated its indicators in mid-2017.

EQ.4 How well aligned were DG ECHO's operations with DG ECHO's thematic/sector policies in place during the evaluation period? If policies were not followed, what was the reason?

Finding 6: DG ECHO's operations in Turkey were mostly aligned with DG ECHO's sector policies, but there was room for improvement regarding mainstreaming of Gender in Humanitarian Aid.

DG ECHO's sector policies are guidelines not rules. Three sectors where policy alignment experienced some minor challenges were protection, health and cash (basic needs).

³⁷ DG ECHO advised that some protection agreements were planned for 2017 but signature was delayed to 2018 for administrative reasons

³⁸ To illustrate the extent of this implementation lag, four HIP 2016 projects only have final reports due in mid-2019

In protection, firstly, the document review (confirmed by the field visits) showed that very few partners built their projects upon an explicit “comprehensive protection risk analysis,” as recommended in the *DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document 8: Humanitarian Protection (2016)*.³⁹ Second, the GoTR requirement that refugees be registered and in-province in order to access services inhibited DG ECHO from following an unfettered rights-based approach incorporating “protection-sensitive vulnerability targeting” (although as mentioned previously, NGO partners did provide limited protection services to unregistered refugees, within the constraints of Turkish regulation). Third, the evaluation team observed that most DG ECHO partners found it easier to address protection risks that were in the mainstream, i.e. unaccompanied minors, visibly impaired disabled persons, refugees evidently experiencing psycho-social distress, extreme poverty, or children out of school. However, it was observed in fieldwork that many partners, and government institutions in particular, had difficulty addressing protection risks that were less visible or that challenged cultural norms. Notably, protection risks that Turkish social service institutions themselves struggle with – for example SGBV, child labour, addiction, early marriage, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI), sex workers, and socially excluded minorities – were insufficiently addressed.

Regarding health, some of the interviewees challenged whether the health needs of the Syrian refugees met the mortality and morbidity thresholds of the *DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document 7: Health (2014)* sufficiently to trigger the creation of a health programme, especially given the capacity and willingness of the GoTR to respond, and have further questioned whether a humanitarian instrument was the best in this circumstance. On balance the evaluation team agreed with other interviewees, who were confident that DG ECHO’s response followed the health policy guidance.

In the end, the question of relative need was not a judgement that DG ECHO was asked to make, because EU MS and the GoTR decided at the highest levels that the inherent needs of refugees in Turkey were so great that a large injection of MS funding was needed in order to stabilise their situation and share some of the burden with the GoTR. Furthermore, in that context EC senior management decided that, since time was of the essence, humanitarian aid was the most appropriate EC instrument available to launch and rapidly scale-up a health programme for refugees in Turkey. With these overriding strategic imperatives in mind, the role of DG ECHO has henceforth been to provide the best humanitarian assistance possible to refugees in Turkey.

Regarding cash, early basic needs projects managed by NGOs provided seasonal cash allowances to refugees assessed as vulnerable, and were well aligned with *DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document 3: Cash and Vouchers (2013)*. ESSN was generally aligned with the policy. First of all, because its design was based on demographic parameters rather than individual vulnerability or needs assessments, it fell somewhat short on the objective that “in responding to humanitarian need, particular vulnerabilities must be taken into account.”⁴⁰ Secondly, in relation to the policy (in particular the supplementary *Guidance Note on the delivery of cash transfers (2017)*) there was not a full segregation of the planning and management from the performance assessment functions. In addition, the restrictive access to the Turkish formal labour market did not allow the ESSN to reach forward into building refugee resilience and livelihoods, as considered preferable in the policy.

Notwithstanding these technical observations, the evaluation team feels it is important to note that the Guidance itself recognises that “There is a delicate balance to be struck between inclusion and exclusion errors, and the costs, including time, of the targeting exercise compared to financial and impact losses incurred through poorly targeted resources or delayed assistance.” With this in mind, the evaluation team concludes (see Findings 15 and 18) that the demographic targeting principle was the most appropriate in

³⁹ Notwithstanding the near total absence of evidence of protection risk analyses to inform project planning, most partners (86% INGO, 93% UN) responding to the online survey stated that protection was taken into consideration in project design, although 24% of DG ECHO staff said that this was not the case

⁴⁰ [The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid \(2008\)](#) para 39

the exceptional circumstances of rapid scale-up to a large and scattered population, that DG ECHO did strike the “delicate balance” in Turkey, and furthermore that possible shortcomings of a demographic approach were mitigated by subsequent efforts to adjust the programme on the basis of active field monitoring, and to introduce the SASF Allowance to catch exclusion errors.

DG ECHO’s 2013 Thematic Policy no. 6 *Gender: Different Needs, Adapted Assistance* calls on partners to mainstream gender and when necessary to implement gender-targeted actions. DG ECHO’s four gender-targeted actions (three with UNFPA and one with DRC) were appropriately designed, but DRC’s action did not achieve its intended results, partly due to weak planning and capacity as well as regulatory factors beyond their control.

DG ECHO’s guidance on gender mainstreaming calls on partners to conduct gender analysis at the onset of a programme, to gather and use gender-differentiated data, to consult, to have gender-balanced staff with gender expertise, and to adapt programme design and implementation according to the differential risks and opportunities facing gender groups. Although some partners followed this policy more closely than others, and partners themselves claimed (75%) in the online survey that their projects systematically tailored responses to the specific needs of women and men, a review of project reports and interviews with partners in Turkey revealed that partners did not consistently apply all these aspects of the gender (mainstreaming) policy.

Partners explained that their gender analysis was constrained by the absence of gender-disaggregated baseline data and household vulnerability assessments – factors generally beyond the control of partners. Without this foundation, partners found it difficult to tailor efforts to meet the differential needs of women, men and children, and to focus attention on pockets of special need.

Regarding the other four components of gender mainstreaming: the collection of gender-disaggregated data was assessed by the evaluation team as “adequate” on collection but “poor” on analysis and use to inform the response; consultation with women and girls was assessed as “poor” (as was all beneficiary consultation); and the gender composition of humanitarian partner staff seemed to be balanced (“adequate”) although there were few staff with specific gender expertise (“poor”).

Regarding the fifth component of gender analysis, programme adaptation to specific needs, the team observed significant improvement during implementation. While initial project designs often showed few signs of adaptation, most projects, and in particular the flagship ESSN and CCTE projects, made significant efforts during implementation to understand the gender dimensions of their activities and to adapt, although the ESSN and CCTE ability to adapt was somewhat hindered by the rigidities of the GoTR programmes and institutions through which these mechanisms were managed (e.g. the CCTE allowances were set by GoTR policy for Turkish citizens and not changeable). Although beyond the scope of this evaluation, the team has strong evidence that several actions in the 2018 and 2019 HIPs have improved their gender analysis and shaped their activities to address specific gaps identified in the earlier period.

The primary tool used by DG ECHO to assess gender aspects of projects at the design stage and during implementation is the Gender and Age Marker. Projects are given a Gender and Age score of 0-2 at a minimum of three points in time: proposal (partner, desk and field officer), monitoring visit (field officer) and final report (desk and field officer). Thus, every project is receives at least 6 Gender and Age scores during its lifetime. The team’s analysis of the 45 project documents showed that the interpretation and application of the Gender and Age marker by partners and staff was uneven: the same project’s scores could jump up and down over time (or simply not be assessed) without explanation, and could be scored differently by the field officer and desk officer, with no explanation of variances or apparent efforts to reconcile different assessments and come to consensus. In addition, the analytical text accompanying the Gender and Age Marker was of uneven quality, and there were few instances where a weak rating resulted in action, such as a change in design or activities.

Finally, regarding education, this is a relatively recent sector for humanitarian engagement. DG ECHO did not have a stand-alone education policy during the first phase of the Facility, relying on a mid-2018 *Communication from the Commission on Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises*.⁴¹ Being a Commission policy (not a DG ECHO policy) it places emphasis on scaling up EU funding, and on coordination between EU instruments (seeking complementarity between short-term humanitarian financing and longer-term development financing). It also emphasises increasing access to education by specifically targeting out-of-school children and the most vulnerable. The evaluation team's assessment is that DG ECHO and DG NEAR fully complied with the main element of this Communication: increasing funding (beyond the target 10%), deliberately seeking complementarity between DG ECHO and DG NEAR, and although this proved a challenge, there is strong evidence in project documents that DG ECHO placed a very heavy emphasis on out-of-school children, in particular in their negotiations with UNICEF.

EQ.5 How successful has DG ECHO been in coordinating its operations with other EC financial instruments and with the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 3RP (i.e. promoting synergies and avoiding duplications, gaps and resource conflicts at the situational/regional, country and sector-specific levels)?

***Finding 7:** Initial coordination between DG ECHO and DG NEAR did not allow systematic streamlining and complementarity of assistance. However, coordination has become stronger at the strategic level, as both services have rallied behind the shared goals of the Facility. Transition discussions between DG ECHO and DG NEAR picked up in 2018, and are progressing at different speeds with variations according to the sector.*

DG NEAR and DG ECHO have different systems and especially mandates, which underlie the reasons cooperation has been more successful in some areas than others.

DG ECHO has a global humanitarian mandate, and the core humanitarian principle of independence does not sit comfortably, in the eyes of many DG ECHO staff interviewed, with the level of GoTR involvement in setting some of DG ECHO's operating parameters (for example by using permits to regulate which NGO partners can work where, or at all, by limiting the authority for NGOs to conduct outreach, and by guiding which NGO protection partners DG ECHO can sign agreements with).⁴² A frustration the evaluation team heard expressed by the Government side is that the EU's *Humanitarian Aid Regulation* prevents DG ECHO from contracting directly with GoTR or with NNGOs (the preferred approaches of the Turkish authorities). Thus, DG ECHO's humanitarian (especially protection) mandate and inability to contract directly with Turkish entities have generated frustrations within the Government and within DG ECHO. It must immediately be noted, however, that both DG ECHO and the GoTR have come to understand each other well, and that the evaluation team was universally informed that they enjoy a cordial, productive and professional relationship that has not allowed these frustrations to impede effective cooperation.

The lack of a perfect fit between DG ECHO's mandate and mechanisms, and the Turkey context, is all the more evident when DG ECHO is compared with DG NEAR. DG NEAR also has a complex relationship with GoTR (centred around Turkey's interest in becoming a member of the EU), but in contrast to DG ECHO, DG NEAR can programme directly with Government and with multilateral banks, and is predisposed to build long-term good relations.

Prior to the creation of the Facility, both DG ECHO and DG NEAR were already well-established in Turkey, each with its own separate programme: DG ECHO focused on the life-saving needs of refugees and oriented towards its mandated partners notably the UN and NGOs; while DG NEAR was oriented

⁴¹ A new policy is being developed in early 2019

⁴² The Court of Auditors Report para 47 noted that four agreements were ready to sign but did not proceed due to objections from the GoTR

towards Turkish citizens and Government institutions, and in a long-term perspective. Extensive interviews with DG ECHO and to a lesser extent with DG NEAR staff, supported by the findings of the ECA,⁴³ confirm that initial coordination between the services was not systematic – as both services were under pressure to ramp up quickly, and placed more emphasis on getting moving especially by amplifying what they were already doing, than on relative positioning. In this early period, DG ECHO and DG NEAR moved at different speeds according to their respective contracting modalities, which allowed DG ECHO to move significantly faster than DG NEAR. It was DG ECHO's experience with cash-based programming, and the need to scale this up very quickly, that led to an early decision that DG ECHO was the EC service best-placed to launch the ESSN.

Some of the basic elements of coordination were in place from the start (a common needs assessment, a single steering committee and a shared results framework) but these all had their limitations.⁴⁴ Importantly, there was no explicit joint strategic plan,⁴⁵ unclear division of labour between services in some sectors, no clear process for each service to review the projects of the other with a view to addressing gaps and overlaps, and very limited exchange of information at the province level. As a result, there were some early overlaps especially in the health and education sectors, as well as in the funding of community centres. However, neither the evaluation team nor the ECA found evidence of double-funding.

By 2017, an agreed division of labour had emerged in health and education, and by 2018 the two services had made much progress in working out most of the remaining boundary issues and establishing ways of working jointly on Facility-level planning, in particular regarding the planning for the second phase of the Facility, which includes preparing for DG ECHO to scale back to its normal humanitarian profile at the end of the Facility. Nevertheless, the online survey found that, among DG ECHO staff (N=21), as many DG ECHO staff feel that coordination between DG ECHO and other services has not been effective, as those that found it effective (43%).

Coordination with DG NEAR on transition

EU documents refer frequently (in particular in the context of Phase 2 of the Facility) to the transition from humanitarian assistance to development. The evaluation team believes that, because Turkey is not a developing country or a recipient of conventional development assistance (such as from the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, DG DEVCO), and because of the considerable contributions of the GoTR itself to the refugee response, the conventional view of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) as some sort of linear or sequential humanitarian to development programming transition is not a relevant frame within which to view the evolution of the refugee response. Instead, Turkey exemplifies a different sort of humanitarian-development nexus: one between international programming (humanitarian or development) and national systems funded from national budgets. In line with long-standing humanitarian policies to promote local integration as a durable solution to displacement and more recent Turkish commitments to refugee solutions, DG ECHO's exit strategy is premised upon the GoTR taking on (or continuing) service delivery, in some sectors with support from DG NEAR, and eventually integrating refugees fully within Government systems.

Regarding Government systems, and notwithstanding the unprecedented support that GoTR already provides to refugees in Turkey, it was clear from the field visits to Government facilities that there is still further work required across the board to ensure that Government bodies in each sector, and especially

⁴³ The ECA examined the question of inter-service cooperation in some detail, and gathered more data from DG NEAR than the current evaluation team – which was focused primarily upon DG ECHO. A key ECA finding was that “The Facility contributed to enhanced coordination but the streamlining and complementarity of the assistance was not systematically achieved”

⁴⁴ For example, as discussed earlier, the first “needs assessment” was late and relied on incomplete and secondary data, and the results framework did not have a full set of targets and indicators

⁴⁵ Nothing as concrete as, for example, the Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework of the EC in Jordan

at local level, are ready to take on primary responsibility for the substantial and indefinite logistical and financial burdens of full integration into Government services. Government officials as well as DG ECHO staff emphasised that policy support, technical assistance and capacity development will remain important in all sectors throughout Phase 2 of the Facility.


DG ECHO initiated transition discussions with DG NEAR early in the first phase of the Facility, but in those early days there was little progress as the vector of cooperation was more about complementarity (especially in education and health) than transition, and DG NEAR was itself focused upon building its own programme under similar pressures to those experienced by DG ECHO. By late 2017, it became increasingly clear that there would be a Phase 2 of the Facility, and by Q1 2018 the conceptual as well as planning and political space opened up for transition discussions. In late 2018, the evaluation team found evidence of well-advanced plans for phased handover from DG ECHO to DG NEAR (and to GoTR) in education and health, both sectors that the GoTR and DG NEAR are comfortable with, with the caveat that DG ECHO might need to maintain limited support for specialised health services to cover some gaps in GoTR programmes.

The pathway to transition and exit is less clear for ESSN, which is a victim of its own success. The programme has been effective and refugee expectations (some would argue dependency) are now set very high, but neither DG NEAR nor the Government are prepared to take it over – at least not in its current form and scale. Reportedly, GoTR is not ready to consider a cash transfer scheme with transfer values that are much greater than similar Turkish programmes, but it might be open to including, in a Government scheme, a smaller number of refugees without the capacity to work. DG NEAR explained to the team that their attention is more focused on approaches closer to their mandate: notably integrating refugees into the Turkish economy, through support for labour market access and technical training. Along these lines, DG NEAR might be open to complementing a smaller (Government) cash programme with an initiative to assist those refugees who can work to obtain the skills and permissions necessary to become self-reliant. Both of these possible pathways will need time and effort to plan and implement, until which time DG ECHO is likely to be left holding the ESSN.

Finding 8: Coordination between DG ECHO and the 3RP has steadily improved since 2015.

DG ECHO staff informed the evaluation team that the early (2015-2016) Turkey chapter of the 3RP was insufficient to frame the scale and scope of DG ECHO’s Facility commitments. As a result, DG ECHO invested in a parallel Management Framework more directly suited to its requirements (particularly its rapid growth) with its own results indicators. Over time, and sector by sector, coordination and convergence between DG ECHO and the 3RP have steadily improved, the 3RP itself has become more robust, results indicators have been harmonised and, as can be seen in Figure 8,⁴⁶ DG ECHO funding has largely moved from outside to inside the 3RP.⁴⁷ By 2018, EU

Figure 8 EU institution humanitarian funding for Turkey 2014-2018 (USD)



⁴⁶ Data from OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS). The appeal parameter includes the Turkey chapters of the 3RP and of the Regional Refugee Migrant Responses of 2016 and 2017

⁴⁷ “Inside the 3RP” does not mean that DG ECHO funding was pledged or provided to the 3RP itself, but rather that the contributions from DG ECHO were reported to UNOCHA/FTS as being within the scope of the 3RP. In 2018 this included contributions to ESSN and

funding (all sources) represented 76% of the 3RP Turkey on-appeal funding, and DG ECHO has become the dominant 3RP donor.

However, stakeholders informed the evaluation team that, even in late 2018, DG ECHO and the UN agencies responsible for the 3RP have not yet found the optimal way of working together. This was confirmed by the online survey, where 29% of DG ECHO respondents felt that coordination with the 3RP had been effective, contrasting with a more optimistic view from the UN side (60% felt that coordination with DG ECHO was effective). On the one hand, UN agencies and government donors stated that they would like DG ECHO to play a greater role in 3RP planning and yet, on the other hand, DG ECHO staff regretted that some sectoral coordination groups were reluctant to invite DG ECHO into their deliberations, out of concern that participating agencies would not speak freely about their challenges with their main donor in the room.⁴⁸

EQ. 6 To what extent has the DG ECHO response taken into account the Turkish response to refugees' needs and to a lesser extent other EU Member States and donors?


***Finding 9:** DG ECHO's response is built around and explicitly complementary to the Turkish response.*

From 2016 onwards, as explicitly outlined in the EU-Turkey Statement as well as in the Commission documents establishing the Facility, DG ECHO's programme in Turkey has been constructed in partnership with the GoTR, and designed to be complementary to the Government's initiatives. Despite concerns about lack of transparency on both sides (concerns that were still present during the evaluation team's field mission), by 2018 DG ECHO had largely⁴⁹ aligned with GoTR policies and programmes, and coordination with GoTR was described by stakeholders as good. This was confirmed by the online survey, where 80% of DG ECHO respondents stated that DG ECHO's "response was delivered in view of the actions of Turkish authorities and other donors."

***Finding 10:** As European funding has grown quickly and to an unprecedented level, non-European donors have reduced their own humanitarian funding to Turkey.*

As illustrated in Figure 9 (FTS), until 2018⁵⁰ the total amount of humanitarian funding to Turkey was fairly constant. What changed over the period 2014-2018 was the donor mix, as the USA and "others" reduced their spending from a combined total of USD 376M in 2014 to USD 123M in 2018.

Figure 9 Humanitarian funding for Turkey 2014-2018 (USD)



CCTE. Of the total USD 867M reported to FTS from the EU as "within the 3RP," the team calculates that USD 818M were contributions from DG ECHO. The USD 41M "outside the 3RP" funding is where all of DG ECHO's contributions to NGO partners are coded

⁴⁸ To some extent, the challenges of DG ECHO-UN coordination stem from the multiple roles played by key stakeholders: UNHCR (for example) shares responsibility with UNDP for coordinating the 3RP, has sole responsibility for coordinating protection, is a recipient (implementing partner) of DG ECHO protection funding, and is also a donor to protection organisations

⁴⁹ There are a few unresolved areas, for example regarding some aspects of protection, and regarding the role of INGOs in addressing gaps in services to unregistered refugees. In these respects, the DG ECHO programme can be seen as more compensatory than complementary

⁵⁰ The jump in 2018 is because this is the year when ESSN and CCTE were registered in FTS

As can be better seen in Figure 10 (FTS), starting in 2015, the USA reduced its funding by about 50%, and then in 2016 there was a further reduction in other donor funding (mainly a reduction in Middle East donors). Most importantly, there was a sharp increase in funding from EU Member States and from the Facility, which by 2018 represented 88% of all humanitarian funding to Turkey.

The dominant role of the Facility in the funding landscape of Turkey has brought some major benefits, but has also introduced a major risk: with so much of humanitarian spending now channelled through the Facility, key partner institutions and the refugees they support are highly vulnerable to a sudden drop in funding at the end of Phase 2 of the Facility.

If we consider the case of UNHCR, we can see in Figure 11 (UNHCR data) how overall funding increased significantly over the Facility period, but that the bulk of this in 2017 and 2018 was the boost in funding from the Facility itself (“EU” in the figure).

At the same time, USA funding to UNHCR has shrunk since 2016, and both Germany and “other donors” have reduced since 2017.

Figure 10 Combined EU spending as a percentage of total humanitarian spending in Turkey 2014-2018





Figure 11 UNHCR funding sources 2015 - 2018 (M USD)



4.3. EU Added Value

EQ.7 What is the added value of DG ECHO humanitarian aid interventions examined (i.e. the added value of EU intervention in parallel to Member States individual interventions, compared to leaving the initiative solely to EU Member States)?

Finding 11: *The scale and scope of DG ECHO’s Facility funding provides strong EU added value, and Member States ask that EU/DG ECHO further apply their consequent leverage.*

Member States are persuaded (and the evaluation team agrees) that the Facility permits programmes on a scale that would not be possible (or would be overly cumbersome) to manage on a bilateral basis – notably the ESSN and the CCTE. This is a possibility of scale beyond normal economies of scale. One MS has independently determined that the Facility’s value for money is exceptionally high, and that programming through the Facility is more efficient than spending bilaterally outside it.

In survey responses, stakeholders were detailed in listing the benefits of the Facility. The very size of the Facility allowed DG ECHO to invest in a large technical team and satellite field offices, who were in turn

able to improve the technical content of projects and better monitor performance.⁵¹ Furthermore, survey respondents highlighted the benefits of a single large programme (predictable funding, greater negotiation power, more efficient coordination, rapid mobilisation, greater flexibility, and streamlined reporting). In sum, with the Facility, there was more capacity for quality assurance, there were administrative cost efficiencies with having fewer and larger contracts, and there were management efficiencies resulting from having fewer parties to coordinate.

At the same time, however, some MS informed the evaluation team that in their view the EC had not used the considerable leverage granted by the Facility to make progress on humanitarian and protection issues, notably (a) restrictions on INGO registration, (b) unwillingness on the part of the Government to allow independent needs assessment and to share in aggregated form the demographic data that Government has collected, (c) unwillingness to regularise inter-provincial moves or to reopen and/or accelerate registration in some provinces, and (d) the retention of unreasonable restrictions on refugee access to the labour market. While the evaluation team respects this MS position, the team's assessment is that this MS view understates the extent of advocacy conducted by DG ECHO, and also overstates the extent of DG ECHO's leverage – as DG ECHO was not mandated or instructed by MS to make their programming conditional upon GoTR movement on these sorts of policy questions, and the team further believes that this would not have been effective.

4.4. Effectiveness

EQ.8 To what extent have DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus, the specific HIPs and the Decision establishing the Facility, as well as the Management Framework for Turkey) been achieved?

***Finding 12:** The strategic objective of the Management Framework has been largely achieved, and is on track to be achieved by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility.*

Data on results is still incomplete, for two reasons. Firstly, GoTR restricts the conduct of independent assessments and surveys as anticipated in the MF, and DG ECHO has not sought permission to conduct its own surveys, so the evaluation team concludes that it is unlikely that DG ECHO will ever get full outcome data.⁵² Secondly, the output data from partners is incomplete because many HIP 2017 projects had not provided their final reports by the time this report was drafted. Nevertheless, the picture from the monitoring data gathered by DG ECHO and partner interim reports suggests that strong results are being achieved in all sectors – albeit slower than expected in the initial planning.⁵³ In the online survey results, viewing the same dataset by sector rather than by organisation type, respondents identifying with the education and health sectors felt that these sectors had achieved the best results (over 70%), while respondents were somewhat more guarded in their views of performance in the basic needs sector (only 43% of basic needs respondents stated that they agreed or strongly agreed that DG ECHO's interventions achieved their objectives), and in protection (only 55% agreed or strongly agreed that objectives were achieved).

⁵¹ There was a dissenting minority view, that because the technical team was mostly made up of newly-recruited contract employees, it lacked experience with ECHO standards and systems, and encouraged too much of a hands-on approach

⁵² Key implementing partners for ESSN and CTE have obtained authorization to conduct robust Post-Distribution Monitoring surveys, and are able to confirm the performance of these specific programmes across multiple parameters

⁵³ The initial planning in 2016 did not anticipate a Phase 2 of the Facility, and therefore assumed that DG ECHO's work within the Facility would end in December 2018

DG ECHO's strategic objective (see box - right) has been exceeded in numerical terms - indeed it was pointed out in interviews that the core objective of protecting 1 million refugees from harm was broadly achieved from the moment that the GoTR agreed to register Syrians and to offer them the protection of the Turkish state as well as access to essential services. As of late 2018, the registration of over 2 million refugees with GoTR had been verified and these refugees thereby have foundational protection and access to Government services. Almost 1.5 of those 2 million benefit from ESSN, and it can be reasonably assumed that most of the registered refugee population of close to 4 million has access to some education and health services, as well as protection from harm. This picture of overachievement is confirmed by DG ECHO's monitoring reports to the Steering Committee, but it is more a reflection of setting the goal too low in the MF, than programme performance.

"As part of the Government of Turkey provision of services to refugees, ECHO will ensure an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey are protected from harm, until lasting solutions are modelled and integrated into Government systems – resulting in sustainable and equitable access to services."

DG ECHO's strategic objective within the Facility, from the *Management Framework*

Review of project reports shows that there are some variations in performance between partners. Unsurprisingly, small UN and INGO projects in protection and health (where the partners had more control over inputs) are achieving results closer to the planned schedule, albeit on a more limited scale. It is the large UN projects that rely upon Government capacity and delivery that have the most impressive results, but that are also slowest to implement.

Because of the decision to extend the Facility and double its size, combined with continually improving coordination with DG NEAR, the evaluation team assesses that the strategic goal of "lasting solutions through integration into Government systems" could be achieved in health and education by 2022.

As discussed below, those sectors where the extent of Government integration is less certain, or might only be partial, are basic needs and protection. In addition, three aspects where DG ECHO is not achieving the Facility's stated objectives are the lack of focus on vulnerability, inclusion of unregistered refugees, and the delayed move towards lasting solutions. To a large extent, these three weak points (discussed below) are not a matter of resources, but rather depend upon the operating context of Turkey, and upon the readiness of Government institutions to consider lasting solutions - particularly labour market integration.

Finding 13: *Vulnerability targeting remains difficult, due to GoTR restrictions on individual or household assessment, and limitations on data sharing.*

The Consensus, HAR, MF and HIPs all place considerable emphasis on reaching the most vulnerable. This is about more than satisfying needs and implies that DG ECHO should seek out the most vulnerable and deliberately target them. To do this requires a level of household and individual assessment that is not practical for large-scale programmes (for example ESSN and CTE, which rely on over 1,000 service points in all 81 provinces and which needed to ramp up extremely quickly), and is further inhibited by GoTR regulations, which limit the authority of non-state actors to capture personal data and to conduct proactive household visits.

A related problem is that those Government institutions who do gather personal and household data, most importantly DGMM at verification, and MoFLSS/SASF at ESSN enrolment, must follow long procedures to share their aggregate data with DG ECHO partners or even other Government agencies.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ It is important to note that we are referring here to aggregate statistical data that could be used for planning and performance measurement purposes. In accordance with Turkish law, which in this respect is similar to EC regulations on the collection and use of personal data, Government agencies do not share their case-level personal data with external parties

As a consequence of these limitations, neither DG ECHO nor any of its partners (including UNHCR) know precisely who is vulnerable, how they are vulnerable, or where they are.

It is to be noted that these two problems: NGO operating space and data sharing, have consistently been prioritised in DG ECHO's policy dialogue with GoTR, and review of Steering Committee minutes shows that they have been raised with GoTR in Steering Committee meetings.

***Finding 14:** The risks and assumptions of the Management Framework, and of the four thematic objectives (sectors) were for the most part appropriate and remain relevant.*

The highest-level theory of change laid out in the MF made a number of assumptions about the situation and the enabling factors, which have generally been confirmed. An analysis of the main elements of this theory of change has been developed as Figure 12, which includes some suggestions based on the team's analysis of which risk factors and assumptions need updating. Fieldwork and key informant interviews confirm that the identified risks were appropriate, but the evaluation team was not able to find explicit risk mitigation strategies for those factors assessed as high risk – despite the expectation raised in the MF itself.

Regarding the key elements of the intervention logic, the commitments of the EU Member States and of GoTR have been sustained, and refugees still do not have widespread access to the labour market - so they remain dependant on the large-scale intervention of the ESSN to meet the gap between their basic needs and what little they can gather from savings, informal labour and charitable donations. The situation of the refugees has stabilised, in part due to the foundational processes of registration and verification, which have provided a greater measure of protection and opened up access to other services. The availability of ESSN has (as intended) provided an important incentive for registration and verification, and has thereby provided an important indirect protection benefit. Finally, there is good complementarity and coordination between EU instruments in most sectors, and as a result, GoTR absorption of programmes launched by DG ECHO is well advanced in all sectors.

At the sector level, DG ECHO made some assumptions in the MF that turned out to be unfounded. For example, there were assumptions that vulnerable refugees could be identified and targeted (through ESSN referrals and INGO outreach), that out-of-province refugees would be regularised and enter the formal system of assistance,⁵⁵ and that INGOs would be able to keep working independently of Government in the health and protection sectors.⁵⁶ Finally, as mentioned earlier, the target dates to achieve planned results were too optimistic across the board.

⁵⁵ Either DG ECHO did not anticipate the size of the unregistered population and/or underestimated the factors preventing authorities from regularising them, particularly in Istanbul

⁵⁶ These assumptions might have held if there had not been an attempted coup, with the consequent tightening of Government controls

Figure 12: Analysis of selected enabling factors, risks and assumptions of the DG ECHO Intervention Logic

NEEDS

With over 4 million registered refugees, Turkey has become the largest refugee hosting country in the world. Despite Turkey's strong economy, capacity and other resources, the scale and stage of the crisis still leaves many refugees at risk. The most vulnerable among the population of refugees in Turkey continue to face critical challenges to their subsistence, health and children's education.

OBJECTIVE

As part of the Government of Turkey provision of services to refugees, ECHO will ensure an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey are protected from harm, until lasting solutions are modeled and integrated into government systems – resulting in sustainable and equitable access to services

INPUTS

- From ECHO and EU Member States: €1.4 B between 2016-2018, technical assistance, advocacy, enhanced coordination and monitoring
- From partner organisations: financial, human and material resources

EXTERNAL ENABLERS

- Strong GoTR willingness to facilitate access to permanent government services for refugees
- Strong relationship between ECHO, NEAR, GoTR and partners
- Continued funding support by EU Member States
- Planning and programming approaches between ECHO and other EU instruments will be compatible enough to complement one another and set up a coordination system

SECTORAL OBJECTIVES

The volume of needs is likely to outstrip resources, and thus prioritisation will be made based on vulnerability

Protection: ECHO successfully identifies an initial 1 million vulnerable refugees, their specific needs and links them with the right information to regularise their status to access social services and to improve their living conditions and well-being

Basic Needs: An initial 1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey have the means to meet their requirements for everyday living and contingencies are in place for new emergencies

Health: 710,500 vulnerable refugees in Turkey have access to adequate primary and specialised healthcare

Education: 300,000 vulnerable out-of-school refugee children in Turkey are enrolled in the formal education system and regularly attend classes

SELECTED ASSUMPTIONS (green=true brown=partly true)

- The EU/Turkey Statement will continue to hold
- Government policy and institutions are committed to identifying and addressing vulnerability
- Regularisation of refugees is an administrative priority
- Most refugees targeted by ECHO will continue to lack access to formal employment needed to become self-sufficient
- ESN will serve as an incentive for registration and contact with protection outreach, intake and referral services
- Modelling niche/specialised health services proves principle and leads to adoption and scale up by MoH.
- Reducing the out-of-school population will help protect children from harm

SELECTED RISKS (with original and revised risk ratings)

- GoTR unwilling to allow INGOs to implement actions under the Facility (high) (medium - variable by sector)
- Difficulties of re-registration for change of residence based on local policies to prevent "pull factors" likely to persist (medium) (high)
- Adequacy of the transfer value, intended to cover 60%-80% of average household expenditures, is insufficient (high) (medium)
- Application of a selection process and criteria that do not target vulnerable refugees (low) (medium)
- Shortage of qualified medical personnel who speak Arabic in areas with high concentration of refugees (high) (medium)
- Government registration restrictions and administrative hurdles limiting health partner organisations to work in Turkey (medium) (medium)
- Other cultural barriers and long-term dropouts impossible to reintegrate (medium) (medium)
- Education cash transfer value too low to adequately support children in completing an education (medium) (high)

EQ.9 To what extent have the needs of the final beneficiaries, in terms of socio-economical support, protection, health, education, etc., been satisfied?

***Finding 15:** ESSN and CCTE provided exceptional reach and coverage to both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, with benefits evenly distributed across the country.*

Detailed analysis of the Facility’s quarterly monitoring data yielded some interesting results. First of all, DG ECHO’s own footprint is quite comprehensive. DG ECHO has significant programming⁵⁷ in 19 provinces (not counting the nationwide-programmes ESSN and CCTE): this covers 91.8% of the Syrian population but only 10.1% of the non-Syrian population. The most populous province (for registered Syrians) without significant DG ECHO programming is Kocaeli.

Second, participation rates for non-Syrians are better than for Syrians, for both ESSN and CCTE (see Figure 13).

Figure 13 Key indicators for DG ECHO signature programmes

	Syrians	Non-Syrians
ESSN enrolment (cumulative Q3 2018) as % of the population	35%	45%
CCTE enrolment (cumulative Q3 2018) as % of the population	8.9%	13.2%
CCTE enrolled and not dropped out before summer 2018	69%	72%

The evaluation team undertook considerable analysis of the available datasets and attempted to calculate which provinces have higher or lower ESSN and CCTE coverage in relation to baseline population data as provided by DGMM in their website. The team

concluded that the ESSN data is the most robust, that the ESSN, Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and CCTE data is consistent across all 81 provinces, but that the DGMM provincial data is not sufficiently robust to be used as a baseline for calculating programme performance.⁵⁸

Specifically, the assessment of the evaluation team is that the DGMM data (as of January 2019) overestimates (by 15-30%) the size of the refugee populations in Şirnak, Muğla, Mardin, Mersin and Şanlıurfa; while underestimating (by 15-30%) the refugee populations in Kayseri, Kahramanmaraş, Ankara, Konya and Gaziantep.⁵⁹ Extrapolating from partial MoNE data on Syrians in Government schools, the evaluation team also estimates that there are 125,000 unregistered Syrian refugees spread between Sakarya, Samsun, Antalya, Çorum, Eskişehir and Yalova provinces.

When adjusting for the estimated variance in the Government data (the 15-30% above), the ESSN and CCTE coverage seem to be quite even nationwide. The few variations in ESSN coverage (in relation to the evaluation team’s estimated population) are that Gaziantep seems to have above average participation, and Hatay below average. Using the same projections, CCTE enrolment seems to be above average in Hatay and Kahramanmaraş, and below average in Şanlıurfa and Adana.

⁵⁷ Defined by the evaluation team as two or more NGO partners in a province, in addition to coverage through national programmes
⁵⁸ The DGMM data captures registration data that is periodically updated through the verification process, but verification itself is not complete yet nationwide, and there are known problems of registration in some regions (notably Istanbul and Hatay). As a result, the DGMM data only approximates where the refugees are actually residing, and is being updated constantly
⁵⁹ DGMM data changes monthly as the situation of registrations changes, so these DGMM numbers might change after verification

Finding 16: DG ECHO's major programmes benefit women and girls more than men and boys. DG ECHO's partners were somewhat effective at addressing physical (not mental) disabilities.

According to the Facility's Q3 2018 monitoring data, women and girls were enrolled slightly more than men and boys in ESSN. However, when it came to CCTE, Syrian girls were enrolled slightly more often than Syrian boys, while non-Syrian boys were enrolled slightly more than non-Syrian girls (see Figure 14). The higher CCTE enrolment of Syrian girls is all the more striking when it is considered that (according to DGMM's overall Syrian population data) girls represent only 44% of the population of 15-19 year-old Syrian refugees. The higher participation rate of girls in high school is an important protection result for DG ECHO, and shows the extent to which male child labour is still a major problem among Syrian refugees in Turkey.⁶⁰

Figure 14 Male/female variation in ESSN and CCTE

	Syrian		Non-Syrian	
	M	F	M	F
% overall ESSN beneficiaries	42.98	45.25	5.71	6.06
% overall CCTE beneficiaries	43.19	43.99	6.94	6.43
% CCTE high school beneficiaries	4.85	6.25	1.60	1.50

DGMM data shows that 7.3% of the Syrian refugee population is aged over 50, which is low considering that the proportion of persons aged over 50 in the national Syrian population is 10.7%. ESSN data confirms that most of the elderly (5.5% of the total Syrian refugee population or 75% of the elderly Syrian refugees) are ESSN recipients. The elderly seem to be well-covered by ESSN.

24,500 ESSN recipients are identified as disabled (1.6% of all recipients). DG ECHO made significant efforts to address the special challenges of disability by emphasising the war wounded and MHPSS in their INGO health programmes, as well as encouraging WFP to introduce the severe disability top-up allowance to ESSN⁶¹ and to provide additional support to refugees to obtain the required Disability Health Reports. However, difficulties with access to disability benefits was one of the more common issues raised by Syrian refugees in focus group discussions, indicating that the ESSN (and disability top-up) eligibility criteria for chronically ill patients, war wounded and mental disabilities are not yet sufficiently clear, and/or not yet consistently applied.⁶²

In general, the document review and fieldwork found that there is insufficient support for severe mental health illnesses, notably post-traumatic stress disorder and other stress-induced disorders that are not easily handled by the Turkish mental health system. In addition, it was widely observed in focus groups and in visits to community centres that few men participate in the psychosocial counselling services that are widely available in DG ECHO-supported governmental and non-governmental service centres. In the course of 2018, DG ECHO and its partners placed special attention on MHPSS, including efforts to improve the professionalism and structure of group counselling services, and to reach men. However, it was also recognised that mental health referral pathways are weak in Turkey, and refugee access to them is further limited because MoH usually does not consider mental health to be urgent (which could trigger referral to other locations with better services), and because GoTR mental health service providers are reluctant to accept referrals from NGOs.

⁶⁰ DG ECHO informed the evaluation team that their internal gender analysis had shown the need to focus more on boys for CCTE, but the system used by CCTE is modeled precisely, and inflexibly, on the Turkish system for CCTE, which provides a slightly greater financial incentive for girls. DG ECHO reported that they were unable to change this

⁶¹ In November 2018, according to WFP reports, the severe disability top-up payment of TL600 per person was made to 5,498 ESSN beneficiaries

⁶² The main concern is around the definition of disability, and the percentage quantification of the extent of the disability. This determination is made by MoH and is the key to unlock refugee access to this benefit

Finding 17: DG ECHO's programmes are not sufficiently sensitive to the different protection risks and vulnerabilities experienced by refugees according to their demographic profile and current location.

The social, economic and demographic profile of refugees is not uniform throughout the country, and yet DG ECHO's Management Framework and programme design do not explicitly consider this variability in needs and opportunities.

Reliable data is hard to find (in the absence of access to GoTR data), but several sources considered by the evaluation team⁶³ conclude that, in general, the refugee population in Ankara and in the North-West of Turkey (Marmara region and some parts of the Aegean region) is somewhat more educated, more employed/employable, has more divided families (with men working and the rest of the family elsewhere), and is more likely to see their long-term future as lying in Turkey or beyond in Europe. In contrast, the population in the region along the Syrian border is somewhat less educated, more dependent upon ESSN and charitable donations, possibly has larger family sizes, and is more likely to see their future as lying back in Syria. There are also cultural, demographic and economic variations between Kurdish and Arabic-speaking Syrians. However, data provided by partners shows that the ESSN and CTE enrolment in Kurdish-speaking regions is on track with national trends.

Very importantly, the vast majority of unregistered, or especially registered and out-of-province refugees, are in Istanbul and neighbouring provinces (Yalova, Kocaeli, Sakarya): the Government itself estimates at least 500,000. These refugees represent the biggest gap in protection and assistance in Turkey. Even if the vast majority of the out-of-province population in the North-West of Turkey is working illegally and can be assumed to be less in need of ESSN because they have income, they remain vulnerable in that they are not eligible for health and education services, and run the risks of interception by the authorities and/or abusive working conditions (because they have no legal recourse).

Finding 18: The ESSN is highly effective in providing timely, safe and regular support to 1.5 million refugees nationwide, but the transfer value is no longer seen as sufficient to meet the basic needs of refugees.

The external evaluation of ESSN, WFP's own monitoring, the evaluation team's fieldwork and ESSN beneficiary satisfaction surveys all confirm that satisfaction with the ESSN is very high. As long as a refugee is registered and in-province (see discussion below), then his/her complaints about eligibility are effectively addressed by various recourse and validation mechanisms, and the recent introduction of the SASF discretionary allowance is expected to address the known exclusion errors.

The problem that has emerged in 2018 is that the ESSN transfer value is no longer sufficient. It is possible that the transfer value was never really sufficient, but as Turkey has experienced an economic crisis throughout 2018 it has become clear that the combination of exhausted savings, pressure on the informal job market, and increased consumer prices have increased the size of the gap between refugees' disposable income (made up of employment income and the ESSN allowance) and the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB).⁶⁴ This worsening trend has been confirmed in WFP's periodic monitoring, which shows in the July-September 2018 period, and confirmed in October-December 2018, a reversed trend of increase in refugee debt as well as reductions in food consumption scores. Despite this worsening trend, comparison between populations receiving and not receiving ESSN continue to show that the population receiving ESSN is still doing better on most indicators than the population without ESSN, allowing the evaluation team to conclude that, even though the ESSN is not enough, it is still effective in providing timely, safe and regular support to most refugees in need.

⁶³ Focus group discussions, interviews with partners and key stakeholders including MoFLSS and DGMM in several provinces

⁶⁴ By December 2018, the MEB was calculated by WFP as TL338/person, and the base ESSN has remained at TL120/person (to which are added occasional seasonal top-ups). Considering assumed income and other factors, WFP calculated the average gap at TL63/person at the end of December 2018

EQ.10 To what extent has DG ECHO’s intervention contributed to increasing access to Government and non-government services (basic needs, health, education, protection), throughout Turkey?

Finding 19: *DG ECHO’s programme has considerably increased access to Government and non-government services for refugees who are registered and in-province. But a significant number of refugees are either unregistered, or registered and out-of-province, and existing measures might not be sufficient to reach them.*

The evaluation team looked closely at the challenges of registration and access to services. DG ECHO’s overall intervention logic was built around the core assumption that providing support and incentives for registration will bring more refugees into the Government system, and thereby provide them with greater services and protection. This underlying logic has been generally confirmed by this evaluation.

It is explicit in the Management Framework and project documentation that DG ECHO’s activities were designed with the goal of bringing refugees into the system, notably through support for the verification exercise (which regularised a large number of inter-province *de facto* transfers), through the incentives for registration provided by ESSN, and through enhanced referral services to government institutions embedded within all sectors.

Obstacles to refugee access to services

- Language barriers
- Not understanding rights and available services, or access procedures
- Cultural barriers (especially gender)
- Limits to Government capacity
- Limits to Government receptivity to referrals from DG ECHO partner NGOs
- Distance from services
- Cost

Most of the registered and in-province refugees are well covered by DG ECHO’s programmes (see Findings 2,3,15,17,18). The number of remaining unregistered refugees is not known with any certainty, but is estimated by different sources to be between 250,000 and 350,000.⁶⁵ This is made up of recently-arrived refugees in a pre-registration queue; refugees who cannot register because registration in their province is very restricted (Hatay) or open but subject to very long waitlists (tourist and coastal provinces); newborns with registration anomalies; refugees who were de-registered upon return to Syria and subsequently re-entered Turkey; Syrians and non-Syrians unaware of the registration process or who are aware of the process but believe they cannot register due to lack of documentation; stateless persons from Syria without Syrian nationality (Palestinians in particular, and some Kurdish-speakers); Syrians and non-Syrians who fear they would not pass a security check or who are planning to move on to Europe; ethnic minorities who see no benefit in registering or do not know how to register; and minorities who may fear more attention from the authorities if registered.

In addition to the unregistered refugees, there is a similarly unknown but larger number of refugees who are registered and out-of-province, including up to 500,000 in and around Istanbul.⁶⁶ Unregistered and out-of-province refugees cannot receive ESSN, CTE or Government services (except emergency medical and vaccination services), but can receive limited services from NGOs, most importantly legal counselling and urgent protection services. It is noteworthy that some registered refugee children can access education even if they are out-of-province, by registering as “guest students.”

For both of these groups – the unregistered and the registered but out-of-province – the challenges to further progress are not primarily technical, and it is doubtful that continuing the current approach of pushing refugees towards registration will continue to yield results. Specifically, the reluctance to continue with new registrations (in Hatay and in other provinces with long waitlists), or to verify the interprovincial moves of refugee workers in and around Istanbul, stem not so much from insufficient

⁶⁵ This would place the estimated total number of refugees in Turkey at between 4.25 and 4.35 million – but official records provided by DGMM show 3,646,889 Syrians under Temporary Protection as of 7 February 2019

⁶⁶ Informal estimates provided by Government officials in the Istanbul region

administrative capacity on the part of PDMM, but rather from provincial and municipal concerns with regularising such large numbers of refugees in regions where labour markets, schools, hospitals and Government services are already under stress.

The evaluation team heard a range of views on whether unregistered refugees are likely to be more vulnerable than the norm. Even though they do not have access to ESSN, CCTE and social services, at least some of the unregistered refugees are presumably making a calculation that the benefit of remaining out of official records is greater than the benefit of having their status regularised. It would be necessary to study this community in more depth in order to come to conclusions regarding their socio-economic vulnerability. However, their protection vulnerability is in no doubt, because residing illegally (wherever this is, or for whatever reason) exposes them to the risks of harm and abuse of persons without legal protection or recourse.

Finally, partners interviewed about their refugee referrals were quite consistent in their view that a combination of privacy regulations and weak information management systems mean that there is limited information on the quality of services actually received by refugees from Government providers. The evaluation team was informed that, in many locations, Government service-providers were less responsive to NGO referrals, and that refugees had reported back anecdotally that some services were not fully available to refugees because of supply constraints (unavailability of supplementary assistance for the partially disabled, limited classroom places, lack of facilities in remote locations, or simply absence of an appropriate service).

***Finding 20:** DG ECHO's education interventions enhanced the wellbeing of school-age children, and it is likely that CCTE has improved school enrolment and retention.*

The evaluation team concluded that CCTE benefits general child wellbeing, based upon the focus group discussions, and the evidence from the ESSN monitoring of the impact of cash on family welfare and reduced negative coping mechanisms (especially those regarding children).

Depending on which data sources are used, there are between 370,000 and 530,000 school-aged Syrians who are not in school. DG ECHO does not finance the delivery of formal education services (that is the responsibility of the GoTR supported by DG NEAR's PICTES program), but is instead focused on getting refugee children into school and helping them stay there. It does this by reducing three major barriers to formal education: cost, distance to school, and classroom adaptation obstacles such as language, and learning or equivalency gaps.

The cost barrier is tackled by CCTE. The coverage of CCTE is universal (all provinces, and non-Syrians as well as Syrians), and its rapid scale-up was possible because it was modelled on an existing Government programme as well as piggy-backed on the ESSN payment mechanism. UNICEF reporting and focus group discussions show that refugee families see substantial benefits in the CCTE, but refugees also pointed out that the amount of the CCTE payment only covers part of the costs of attending school (variously estimated by UNICEF as 33% - 80% of the costs, depending on grade level, the need for school transport, and regionally variable cost factors). UNICEF is planning to conduct a major study in autumn 2019 to assess the impact of CCTE, at which point (with longitudinal data from two full academic cycles) it is expected that outcome results will be measurable with confidence.

Until that research is completed, the best evidence available for assessing the performance of CCTE in relation to attendance comes from WFP. WFP asked about school attendance in their ESSN baseline survey (Pre-Assistance Baseline - PAB, May 2017) and later added information on CCTE participation in their periodic Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) surveys, of which the most recent available is PDM5 (November 2018).

The WFP data displayed in Figure 15 shows that there is much higher school attendance among households enrolled in CCTE, and that this number has grown over the 2017-2018 period. In itself this correlation is most encouraging about the benefit of CCTE, but it is not definitive regarding causality.

Indeed, additional data in Figure 16 suggests that other factors than the availability of cash might at least partly explain the high level of school participation among CCTE recipients. The important feature of Figure 16 is that, in households that *are* participating in ESSN, the school attendance rates are lower (59% and 80%) than in those *without* ESSN (see Figure 15: 66% and 86%). What the evaluation team could not determine is the causal chain: specifically whether this lower rate of school attendance among ESSN beneficiaries is because cash (ESSN or CCTE) is not the decisive factor in the rate of school attendance, or because the ESSN beneficiary households are *ab initio* very poor (non-ESSN households can more easily afford school, or maybe have fewer children), or because of other factors that these surveys are not checking for (including other measures taken by UNICEF to complement CCTE).

Further evidence of the overall effectiveness of CCTE is provided by the Third-Party Monitoring (TPM) of the CCTE (Figure 17), which shows that 15% of children initially reporting as out of school later enrolled in school (excluding first-graders for whom this would be the normal grade of entry), although here again, causality is not certain.

CCTE has an important child protection component in fifteen of the provinces with the highest concentration of Syrian refugees, and where TRCS does follow-up visits to households with children who have dropped out or are at risk of dropping out. This child protection activity might be a contributing factor to the increase in enrolment of out-of-school children observed in Figure 17.

Figure 15 Non-ESSN beneficiaries - Proportion of school attendance




Figure 16 ESSN beneficiaries - Proportion of school attendance






Figure 17 Percentage of children reported as out of school in TPM wave 1 who enrolled before TPM wave 2



In order to test this, and by trying to obtain a proxy for high school attendance on the assumption that this age bracket is most susceptible to dropping out, the team analysed the provincial distribution in the regular attendance rate of CCTE beneficiary children aged 11 years and older (UNICEF quarterly monitoring data provided to DG ECHO). Figure 18 shows that attendance rates in this higher age

Figure 18 Percentage of CCTE beneficiary children who are aged >11 years and regularly attend school, in top 40 CCTE provinces



bracket are lower in the provinces that have a child protection component (named provinces in the graph). But without more data (especially time series data) the evaluation team is not ready to draw conclusions from this. The fact that the provinces with a child protection component appear to have lower rates of attendance in the upper grades does not mean that the child protection programme is not effective, it could simply be that the scale of the child protection component is too small to make an impact on the overall trends (approximately 50,000 home visits so far), or it could be a signal that these provinces have the greatest need and are indeed correctly targeted for the child protection component. More research (and better data) would be needed before conclusions can be drawn regarding the performance of the child protection component of CCTE.⁶⁷

Despite this uncertainty regarding the causal relationship between CCTE and school attendance (which readers should recall will be researched shortly by UNICEF), the key things to keep in mind are that ESSN is not sufficient to meet the basic needs of refugees even assuming that the household is gaining some income from informal labour (see Finding 18), and that CCTE is not sufficient to cover all the costs of school participation (see above). This being said, both mechanisms are essential to the dignity and wellbeing of poor refugee households in Turkey.

UNICEF’s complementary programme of providing non-formal education, including an accelerated learning programme to help children catch up or reach grade equivalency, were assessed by the evaluation field mission and programme participants as very valuable and showing transformative potential. However, these activities were relatively new at the time of the fieldwork, the participant numbers were low, and there was limited reporting on results. For these reasons, the evaluation team

⁶⁷ The evaluation team attempted to analyse the CCTE data further in relation to the distribution of school enrolment of Syrian refugee children, but the required data from MoNE was not provided to the evaluation team

cannot come to a judgement regarding the performance of these activities, or their cost/benefit relative to other components such as CCTE or child protection follow-up activities.

For many refugee families, school transport is the largest cost component of school attendance, according to International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ranging from TL140-200 per child per month (depending on distance and local market prices for bus services).⁶⁸ It also removes an additional social or security barrier for children living far from school and for adolescent girls. Administrative data provided in IOM’s project reporting shows that its school transport projects achieved their intended results in terms of school attendance, but the scale of IOM’s school transport programme was so limited (between 2,000 and 8,000 students per month and only in a handful of provinces) that the evaluation team cannot determine how effective school transport is in reducing barriers to education in relation to CCTE. What is certain is that the contextual specificity and direct management requirements of school transport make it less efficient than CCTE, and render it difficult to replicate at national scale. At the end of the 2017-2018 school year, DG ECHO discontinued its support for school transport, which continues to operate in some locations in Turkey through IOM (funded by the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration), and through MoNE (funded by DG NEAR through the PICTES project).


Finding 21: DG ECHO has filled some key gaps in health service provision and significantly increased refugee access to Government health services in Turkey.

DG ECHO’s strategy for health shifted over the period under review. As illustrated in Figure 19, it started in HIP 2015 with NGO project support, then expanded in 2016 to include UN agencies, and by 2017-2018 had evolved to more structural support for the Government health system through UN agencies, in complementarity with DG NEAR. In another view, Figure 20, using DG ECHO’s quarterly monitoring data for three separate quarters, shows that the number of primary health care consultations directly funded by DG ECHO reduced sharply from 2016 to 2018 as the NGO programmes have wound up. As part of this evolution, several NGO-funded clinics were handed over to the MoH, and some specialised health services that were being provided by NGOs (for example physiotherapy and mental health services) were modelled for adoption by GoTR. The project with World Health Organization (WHO) for in-service retraining for Syrian health professionals enabled over 1,500⁶⁹ Syrians to qualify to practise in Turkey, and was a significant and strategic investment in increasing refugee access to Government health services in Arabic and in a culturally-adapted manner, as well as providing meaningful employment to a number of qualified refugee health workers and interpreters hired by the MoH. In an example of inter-service cooperation, the health worker training programme started by DG ECHO in 2016 was taken over and scaled up by the EUTF in 2018.

Figure 19 DG ECHO health partners 2015-2017

	HIP 2015	HIP 2016	HIP 2017
INGO	4	6	2
UN		3	1
Total	4	9	3

Figure 20 Primary Health Care consultations funded by DG ECHO



⁶⁸ UNICEF TPM data suggests that school transport costs are significantly lower, and might only account for 10-20% of a child’s total education cost. This variation might reflect the difference between the methods and costs of providing school transportation between IOM’s and UNICEF’s beneficiary groups

⁶⁹ WHO, public and project reports

As primary health care has been almost fully integrated into the Migrant Health Centres (MHCs), some of the more specialised refugee health services provided earlier by NGOs have become less available to refugees, and it was reported to the evaluation team (estimates are not available because of the sensitivity around health data) that there are still gaps in physical rehabilitation, specialised mental health services, and SGBV response. Secondary care is provided to registered refugees by existing MoH facilities, but except for medical emergencies MoH facilities do not provide medical services to the unregistered or out-of-province refugees (including migrant workers).

EQ.11 To what extent are refugees, local authorities and citizens aware of the EU’s presence and contribution? (Visibility)

Finding 22: DG ECHO’s contracted visibility requirements seem to be met by all partners, but awareness of the EU’s role and contribution are low among refugees and the Turkish public. These visibility efforts do not appear to be influencing refugee or Turkish views of the European Union.

During fieldwork, the evaluation team was systematic in validating that the DG ECHO (or sometimes EU) logo appears in offices, posters, brochures, Kizilay Karts, and other material that the refugees access. However, the more visible partners are the intermediary party (WFP, UNICEF, INGO, etc.), and it became clear in focus group discussions that refugees do not appear to understand that the most significant programmes such as ESSN and CTE are largely financed by the European Union. Still less do Syrian or Turkish stakeholders differentiate between DG ECHO and ‘Europe’ more generally.

Despite this technical compliance with DG ECHO’s visibility requirements, DG ECHO, its implementing partners, and GoTR all have very different views on the value and rationale for EU visibility, which continue to create discomfort between them. Partners mainly cite three reasons they are reluctant to give the EU more prominent visibility: (a) the partner priority is to advance their own organisational brand (including GoTR, for whom this is a matter of sovereignty), (b) most activities and especially facilities are usually funded by multiple donors, and Government facilities mostly provide services funded by Government, and (c) in the months following the EU-Turkey Statement and following the attempted coup of July 2016, risks of misunderstanding were high and the evaluation team was informed that many NGOs concealed their symbols of EU funding out of concern for staff and beneficiary security.⁷⁰

Figure 21 Three different generations of Kizilay Kart. Only the most recent ESSN card has the EU logo



GoTR messaging to the Turkish public on the EU-Turkey relationship often alleges that the EU is not meeting its commitments under the Facility. Based on analysis of financial and project reports, the assessment of the evaluation team is that DG ECHO has contracted and disbursed its allocation under Phase 1 of the Facility as rapidly as it could – while still meeting due diligence requirements.⁷¹ Media reports also suggest that part of the GoTR complaint is that Facility funding is not coming to the GoTR. In the case of DG ECHO, it is again a requirement of the *Humanitarian Aid Regulation 1257/96* that DG

⁷⁰ These concerns about public association with the EU brand were reportedly over by 2017

⁷¹ DG ECHO has in most cases paid out 80% in pre-financing, after which the implementing partners can take 12-24 months to implement the project. This means that a project approved under HIP 2017, for example, would receive 80% of its financing up front before the end of 2017, and then spend those funds in late 2017, 2018 and even into early 2019. The balance 20% is paid out a few months after the end of the project when all reporting has been completed and validated by DG ECHO

ECHO funding can only be directed to international organisations or NGOs registered in the EU. Within these parameters, DG ECHO has managed (through WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR) to ensure that the vast bulk of its Phase 1 financing has indeed flowed through these UN partners to programmes administered by the Government, respectively MoFLSS/SASF, MoNE and DGMM. However, despite DG ECHO's best efforts to work with the GoTR within DG ECHO's regulatory parameters, the evaluation team agreed with a comment heard from MS, that the EC as a whole⁷² has not succeeded in countering the narrative that "DG ECHO is not doing enough".⁷³

4.5. Efficiency

EQ.12 To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors have affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent?

***Finding 23:** System-wide, the main factors of efficiency stem from the huge scale of some activities, and the fact that they capitalise on Government systems. Some inefficiencies resulted from the difficulties encountered by NGOs in complying with Turkish regulatory frameworks.*

Despite advance work done by the evaluation team to develop a specific methodology for assessing efficiency systematically through key informant interviews, the four sectoral field teams were not able to obtain robust data on sector-level efficiency from the field mission. Firstly, it was not possible to compare year-on-year efficiency gains within the programme of the same partner operating in 2016 and 2017, because of the absence of reporting data on HIP 2017 projects. Secondly, team members encountered the problem that field staff were for the most part not aware of, or not authorised to speak to, questions of cost – and yet cost drivers and staff perceptions of cost-benefit ratios were two of the preferred parameters for efficiency analysis. Nevertheless, the combination of desk review and fieldwork allowed the team to make some observations about efficiency for each sector.

In protection, two efficiency issues arose. The first is that the NGO protection service delivery model in Turkey is premised upon a "classic" (pre-2016) package where an INGO assesses protection vulnerabilities in a community in order to plan an intervention, conducts outreach to identify specific households or individuals at risk, provides counselling and psycho-social support either through a mobile team or on-site in a community centre, provides targeted financial support to allow a refugee to obtain a specific protection outcome, helps beneficiaries access specialised protection service providers (through referral, accompaniment or interpreter support), and follows up with the beneficiary. Unfortunately, several elements of the "classic" model could not work as intended, and were described by one stakeholder as "being asked to deliver the undeliverable."⁷⁴ Given that NGOs for the most part (there are some exceptions) are prevented by regulation from conducting household visits in order to assess needs, that they are not licensed to provide advanced or individual psychological counselling, and that official entities do not consistently accept referrals from NGOs, then the only parts of the model that can operate normally in Turkey are the provision of individual legal counselling and group psycho-social support to refugees who "walk in," the supply of individual protection assistance to those who qualify, and an attempt at service referral. And yet, there is inefficiency in the fact that these few components do not work as well without the rest of the package.

The second inefficiency factor found in the protection sector was that, in some locations, there were several protection service providers (either NGO fixed service points, TRCS community centres or MoFLSS SSCs) providing similar services, while in other locations there were no services available.

⁷² In-country communications are managed by the EU Delegation and not separately by DG ECHO

⁷³ The evaluation team was informed by the EU Delegation that they do periodically survey the evolution of Turkish public opinion, but the evaluation team was not provided with a copy of this survey to be able to consider what specific questions were asked or results obtained

⁷⁴ By way of illustration, four protection agreements for a value of EUR 14 million were negotiated by DG ECHO with partners but in the end were not signed because the GoTR withheld its approval

Although it did not seem that any such centre was able to meet all the demand (the needs always appeared to be greater than supply), the evaluation team did hear in focus groups that some refugees “shop around” between service providers to see who gives the best package – implying that there is some measure of redundancy in the system of service provision.

In the health sector, most NGOs are working under six-monthly renewable “facility” operating permits – which incur the inefficiencies of administrative effort to perpetually seek renewals, and inhibit longer-term planning including staff continuity. On the other hand, the way that a large number of Syrian health workers were retrained and qualified to provide health services to refugees through DG ECHO’s WHO project seems to have resulted in greater efficiency, through more culturally appropriate, lower (salary and interpreter) cost, and more direct health services.

In basic needs, the scale of ESSN, its digitisation and multilateralisation, and the use of existing government systems (SASFs) make it significantly more efficient than smaller basic needs (cash, voucher or in-kind winterisation) investments split between multiple implementing partners, each with fixed costs and using stand-alone partner systems.⁷⁵ Furthermore, the demographic targeting approach, while not without its weaknesses regarding vulnerability targeting (see Finding 2), was efficient in that it allowed DG ECHO to reach more refugees much more rapidly than would have been possible with an approach centred on individual needs assessment. However, the agreement with WFP which included a fixed overhead rate (“Indirect Support Costs,” of initially 7% and later 6.5%) was challenged as inefficient by WFP’s external evaluation of the ESSN⁷⁶ as well as in the report of the ECA.⁷⁷ Even if this is seen as inefficient, there was little that DG ECHO could do to mitigate this, since the overhead rate was set by WFP’s Board of Directors and pre-agreed between the UN and the EC.

In education, the team noted that CCTE shares with ESSN the many important efficiency benefits of scale, digitisation and piggy-backing on other systems (in this case on the ESSN system and the Kizilay Kart), as also described earlier under Finding 11 (more capacity for quality assurance, administrative cost efficiencies with having fewer and larger contracts, and management efficiencies resulting from having fewer parties to coordinate).

In addition, the evaluation team considered in some depth two dimensions of efficiency that are not sectoral but system-wide. The first is the inefficiency inherent in “layered funding,” a situation where a delivery organisation is funded by an intermediary agency (in DG ECHO’s case this could be a UN agency, an INGO or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies - IFRC) which is funded by the donor, thereby accruing two or, in extreme cases, three layers of administrative effort and costs. This funding model is prevalent in DG ECHO’s Turkey programme, because so many of the end-point delivery agencies are Government ministries or national NGOs, which, according to DG ECHO regulations, cannot be funded by DG ECHO directly. While unavoidable, this is still inefficient.

With regard to layered funding, the evaluation team sees TRCS as something of a special case, because it is a very major DG ECHO partner and supported through several channels. TRCS is a significant subsidiary partner of DG ECHO through WFP (for ESSN), through UNICEF (for the child protection component of CCTE) and through IFRC for protection (through 16 TRCS community centres in 15 provinces). TRCS is also a significant partner for DG NEAR, and for most other humanitarian donors including UNHCR. Indeed, over the period under review, TRCS has emerged as the major intermediary organisation between the vast majority of refugees and state institutions, and appears to the evaluation team to have much of the flexibility and responsiveness of NGOs while at the same time it has the trust and confidence of Government institutions. TRCS has (or can easily obtain) permission to work in more provinces and on a wider range of issues than INGOs, as a major Turkish institution it is inherently more

⁷⁵ The Court of Auditors also compared ESSN to other similar projects in the region and found that ESSN was more efficient

⁷⁶ WFP/OPML/Development Analytics - [Evaluation of the DG ECHO funded Emergency Social Safety Net \(ESSN\) in Turkey](#), April 2018

⁷⁷ European Court of Auditors - [Special report No 27/2018: The Facility for Refugees in Turkey](#), November 2018

sustainable than INGOs, it has far more geographic reach than any INGO, and it provides better quality of service and follow-up than the MoFLSS SSCs.⁷⁸

This is not to suggest that TRCS is without weaknesses – its rapid expansion has placed strains on the organisation, it has observed difficulties with planning strategically and thinking beyond outputs to results, and it does not seek to provide services to refugees who are unregistered or out-of-province. Nevertheless, as with many other aspects of the Turkish refugee response, if DG ECHO wants to reach the vast majority of refugees with adequate support (rather than a smaller number of refugees with better support) - then TRCS is an unavoidable partner.

However, from the TRCS perspective, it is inefficient that so many of DG ECHO's intermediary partners (as well as other donors) provide earmarked funding on different project cycles and varying timeframes, conduct separate monitoring visits, and have different reporting requirements. If TRCS continues to consolidate its role as the primary manager of refugee community centres across the country, and continues to be a key vector of community engagement for the universal cash programmes, then there is an efficiency case for supporting them through some sort of strategic partnership, and a pooled funding mechanism rather than separate projects.

Finally, the evaluation team agrees with the ECA that the large number of no-cost extensions in the DG ECHO program will inevitably lead to an increase in overhead/management costs as a proportion of the overall project budgets, although evidence is again incomplete because so few HIP 2017 projects have final financial reports. The extent of these higher administrative costs might be to some extent masked by the favourable exchange rate shift over the evaluation period. Delays might also have inhibited the optimal implementation of related components in what are often quite complex projects (for example, not having the right people in the right place at the right time due to visa delays, or not being ready to assume a role in a planned interagency division of labour because of operating permit delays).

EQ.13 Is the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to the Facility appropriate and proportionate to what the Facility sets out to achieve? Could the same results have been achieved with less funding?

***Finding 24:** The EU's per capita budget for Turkey is larger than its budgets for comparable Syrian refugee-hosting countries. The DG ECHO share of the overall Facility budget was determined mainly by DG ECHO's ability to scale-up rapidly and by its experience with cash-based assistance.*

The amount of money allocated by the EC's various instruments and by EU MS to the Facility was not at the outset based upon an assessment of needs; it was "the result of a political decision agreed between EU Member States and Turkey."⁷⁹ The desire to slow the irregular movement from Turkey to Europe is an explicit objective of the EU-Turkey statement, but it is not the only objective. The decision to create the Facility also stemmed from understanding that poverty, lack of services and insecurity in Turkey were factors contributing to the desire of Syrians in particular to move on to Europe, from a recognition by European MS that Turkey was hosting the largest refugee population in the world, and from a desire on the part of MS to share the burden of this responsibility with the GoTR. In this respect, the Facility is similar to the EUTF for Africa and to the "Madad Fund,"⁸⁰ which were (respectively) created to address the drivers of African migration, and to alleviate the burden of countries hosting Syrian refugees.

⁷⁸ This is the assessment of the evaluation team based upon project reports, and site visits to four TRCS CCs and three MOFLSS SSCs

⁷⁹ European Court of Auditors - Special report No 27/2018, p.14.

⁸⁰ Indeed, the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the Syrian crisis, the "Madad" Fund, is one of the sources of funding for the DG NEAR components of the Facility

If we make a comparison with similar Syrian displacements in Jordan and Lebanon, both countries significantly lower on the Human Development Index than Turkey, we can see that, not only is Turkey better-funded, but also that the proportion of funding going to Turkey has increased rapidly thanks to the Facility. Figure 22 shows that the EC⁸¹ has taken on an increasing and now disproportionate share of all humanitarian funding to Turkey (excluding Turkey's own contributions), while the EC share of funding to Lebanon and Jordan has remained fairly consistent.

Figure 22 EC funding as % of all humanitarian funding





Figure 23 shows that, from a base in 2015 (which approximates to DG ECHO's "natural" pre-Facility funding level), the EC's per capita funding to refugees in Turkey has quadrupled to USD 262 per refugee in 2018.

Figure 23 EC per capita humanitarian spending (USD)



The underlying question of EQ 13 is: "Is USD 262 per capita enough?" Even if it is significantly more than the EC provides to refugees in Lebanon or Jordan, it could be argued that this is still not enough. For example, WFP data shows that the ESSN allowance (now the main component of DG ECHO spending) is still not sufficient to meet the MEB (see Finding 18). Furthermore, the total spending to Turkey, including all the EC spending that is reported as humanitarian spending to FTS, was in its peak year 2018 still only 66% of the amount requested in the Turkey chapter of the 3RP.

Regarding DG ECHO specifically, once the decision had been made to create the Facility and to commit EUR 3 billion over two years, then (according to interviews with senior EU officials) the division of labour between DG ECHO and DG NEAR within the Facility was decided based upon the comparative advantages of the different instruments (especially speed of contracting and disbursement), and the mandates of the different EC services. In this process, DG ECHO's experience with cash-based programming, and the agility of its funding arrangements with trusted multilateral partners such as WFP and UNICEF, made DG ECHO the logical choice to take on and scale up the signature programmes of ESSN and CTE. Protection also fell to DG ECHO, since protection is at the core of humanitarian work and a mandated responsibility of DG ECHO. In health, DG ECHO was not assigned the whole sector, but rather some specialised refugee health interventions that DG NEAR and the MoH were not initially equipped to implement.

⁸¹ All EC sources reporting as humanitarian assistance to FTS – note this includes some DG NEAR funding as well as DG ECHO

The evaluation team was not able to determine in a methodologically sound way whether the same results could have been achieved with less funding. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the results framework of the Facility (and the results frameworks of the projects) are not sufficiently granular – and do not have sufficient reporting against them -- to reliably attribute results to specific project investments. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the nature of the Turkey response is such that the generally good protection, health, education and well-being status of the refugees is the consequence of several streams of investment – from the Facility, from donors outside the Facility, and above all from the GoTR itself. The team does not consider it possible, by way of a specific example, to attribute the achievement of the overall DG ECHO strategic objective (“1 million vulnerable refugees in Turkey are protected from harm”) to the investments of the Facility. Protection of refugees in Turkey, which extends beyond 2 million refugees, is first of all the combined result of several programmes of the GoTR, supplemented by UNHCR and other actors, as well as by DG ECHO. DG ECHO is, in a sense, “topping up” a vast Turkish system, and cannot (and does not) itself claim all the credit for the system’s remarkable achievements.

EQ.14 To what extent has DG ECHO put in place a fit for purpose monitoring and reporting system that supports a sound management of DG ECHO’s operations? Is the monitoring and reporting system aligned to the Facility’s accountability requirement?

***Finding 25:** Despite the limitations on data collection and surveys, DG ECHO’s monitoring and reporting system supports sound management of operations, and permits mid-course corrections as new challenges and opportunities arise.*

DG ECHO’s normal monitoring and reporting system consists of three main elements: field-based Technical Assistants (responsible for contextual analysis, field coordination and troubleshooting), periodic formal monitoring visits (at least once in the lifetime of each project, and a pre-requisite for a follow-on project), and periodic partner self-reporting (at least one Interim Report during the implementation period, and one Final Report three months after the project ends). Even major changes in projects are possible if well-justified, and are relatively easy to approve through Modification Requests – a mechanism that was essential in the Turkey situation of frequent no-cost extensions and rapidly changing context.

This standard monitoring and reporting system is designed for relatively small, single-year projects, but does not provide sufficient management information on large and complex projects that are extended by long periods. To address this shortcoming, and to meet the tighter accountability expectations of the Facility Steering Committee, DG ECHO and DG NEAR put in place a supplementary monitoring and reporting mechanism coordinated by the Facility Secretariat.

This supplementary mechanism has captured a large amount of quarterly output information from partners, and has over time endeavoured to align its metrics with those of the 3RP in order to reduce the reporting burden on partners. With the addition of this mechanism, DG ECHO has a good overall real-time picture of programme performance, but this additional data is stronger for those projects that have robust quantifiable outputs (i.e. ESSN and CTE) and is less useful for tracking performance of protection and health projects (where data is not always available and GoTR data is not widely shared), or for measuring progress towards outcomes. The evaluation team also found that, until recently, DG ECHO was not sufficiently using the monitoring data collected in order to conduct secondary analysis of gaps and trends, but was instead more focussed on fulfilling the accountability requirements to the Facility Steering Committee.

In order to measure the sectoral indicators outlined in the Management Framework, DG ECHO would have required an ambitious programme of data collection, validation, surveys and comparisons with Government data. As far as the evaluation team could ascertain, and confirmed by staff interviews, the attempts to collect this supplementary performance data were largely set aside because DG ECHO does

not have the permissions required to conduct independent assessments and surveys, nor do they have full access to Government data - neither the demographic data captured by DGMM nor the socio-economic profiling captured through ESSN enrolment. The two projects that have the strongest performance data are ESSN and CTE. In these projects, the evaluation team observed a good partnership between the implementing UN agencies and their counterpart Government ministries and a collaborative approach to gathering supplementary data through surveys (for example WFP's Post-Distribution Monitoring, and UNICEF's Third Party Monitoring).

4.6. Sustainability/Connectedness

Q.15 How well (incl. timing) has the exit strategy and hand-over been prepared and carried out towards GoTR and development actors? To what extent have the DG ECHO-funded actions been successful in terms of operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus? How effectively has protection and assistance for refugees been integrated within the relevant Government systems at national and local levels?

***Finding 26:** For refugees who are verified and in-province, assistance in health, education and basic needs is well-integrated in Government systems. However, there are some service gaps that DG NEAR and Government are unlikely to address (especially services in all sectors for unregistered refugees, and some specialised protection needs).*

Based upon interviews and reports of transition planning, the evaluation team is confident that the transition discussions under way between DG ECHO, DG NEAR and GoTR will lead to a system, by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility, where registered refugees will receive adequate health, education and economic support for the long term, from a combination of services funded by GoTR and DG NEAR. However, this support will not extend to all the current suite of humanitarian protection services, some of which are beyond the normal experience of DG NEAR. As a result, it seems most likely, as of discussions in late 2018, that DG NEAR would pick up some of the ongoing work to strengthen GoTR social and legal protection capacity (DGMM and MOFLSS), and leave to DG ECHO, indefinitely, the delivery of specialised protection services (legal counselling and case management), support for unregistered refugees, and advocacy for refugee rights.

The evaluation team's assessment is that Government support will not extend to unregistered refugees, and unless there are policy changes, neither will it extend to out-of-province refugees. Furthermore, some protection risks facing refugees are not well-covered by Turkish Government systems, such as addiction, child labour, LGBTI, sex workers and excluded minorities. For these refugees there is no clear transition or exit pathway, especially not for specialised protection services.

EQ.16 How can lessons learned from ECHO humanitarian programming in Turkey better inform GoTR's future programming? How can lessons learned from ECHO humanitarian programming in Turkey better inform transition to development actors?

***Finding 27:** There were some examples of GoTR adapting Government systems as they learned from DG ECHO projects, but for the most part DG ECHO was fitting into GoTR systems that were not very flexible.*

Turkey is a developed country with sophisticated and stable systems for social protection and service delivery that are quite different from the stereotypical humanitarian environment, which is characterised by short-cycle direct delivery of limited services, usually through NGOs. Given the differences in scale, systems and organisational cultures, it is not surprising that Government has not significantly adapted its systems in light of DG ECHO's projects, and that – to the contrary – DG ECHO projects have adapted to the GoTR's systems.

Nevertheless, there have been some examples of Government making minor adjustments. Important among these is the way that DGMM has now integrated protection assessment and referral as a permanent feature of its registration/verification process. In addition, the team was informed that MoFLSS has learned from ESSN several techniques for rapid assessment and post-distribution monitoring; that MoNE is adopting elements of IOM's school transport standards for more widespread use, and adapting its Life-Long Learning curriculum (originally designed for seasonal workers) to the needs of displaced persons; and that MoH has made key regulatory changes to allow Syrian health professional to practise in MHCs as well as to incorporate psycho-social services into MHCs.

4.7. Lessons learned by the evaluation team

The evaluation team was asked if there are general lessons for DG ECHO to consider in future humanitarian responses. As a caveat to the comments below, it needs to be borne in mind that Turkey has some unique features that are unlikely to be replicated in many other contexts: most importantly a huge financial injection from the donors to the Facility, deliberate structural complementarity with another EC service (in this case DG NEAR), and a host Government that is ready and willing to make huge policy and resource commitments to support refugees. With that in mind, there are some broad lessons that DG ECHO can learn from this experience.

First of all, invest early in understanding the prevailing Government culture and regulatory environment, so that activities can be designed to be compatible with national systems, thereby both facilitating their implementation and increasing the prospects of transition. However, even in such a conducive environment as Turkey, expect Government systems to take some time to adapt and grow to accommodate the special needs of refugees, and plan accordingly (sequencing and realistic timeframes).

Second, if the conditions are right (as they were in Turkey), scaling up is easier and quicker, and programmes are going to be more sustainable, if this is done on the foundation of Government systems. This was a key to the success of ESSN and CCTE.

Third, early engagement with the prevailing humanitarian coordination mechanism (in this case the 3RP) will reduce the risk of divergent humanitarian approaches, and facilitate harmonised reporting. It should also facilitate continuity in situations like Turkey when a short-term injection of exceptional resources comes to an end, and normal humanitarian mechanisms remain.

Fourth, regarding the interface with DG NEAR, the evaluation team sees no reason why similar arrangements should not be commonplace with other EU services.⁸² Based on the Turkey experience, in countries where DG DEVCO is operating and where the context permits, DG ECHO and DG DEVCO should be able to work together more systematically on medium-term strategies for protracted crises, with joint analysis, agreed division of labour, common results frameworks, and complementary activities - with a view to eventual transition.

Fifth, having a Facility to channel EU MS funding has created many efficiencies both for donors and for the implementing partners. However, it is not strictly necessary, and having a Facility has reduced the visibility of individual EU MS. In the case of Turkey, EU MS did not seek separate visibility, but in other more conventional contexts they probably would. In those situations, many of the advantages achieved by the Facility could still be achieved by having very large programmes (like ESSN or CCTE), working through a single implementing partner, and financed with centrally-coordinated trust or pooled funding.

⁸² Prior to the World Humanitarian Summit, there were several *ad hoc* initiatives along these lines, including early examples of Joint Humanitarian Development Frameworks. Since 2016 the framework for inter-service coordination and cooperation was codified in [Communication COM \(2016\) 234](#) from the European Parliament

4.8. Lessons learned by the DG ECHO team in Headquarters (HQs) and in the field

The evaluation team facilitated a process of gathering and reviewing lessons learned from DG ECHO international and national staff involved in the Turkey response. The following represents a digest of the main strategic lessons captured by staff. Detailed sectoral and technical lessons learned are not summarised here.

First, staff were very concerned that DG ECHO had not been able to do more by way of reaching the most vulnerable refugees, in particular refugees who are not registered, and refugees who are out-of-province because they are seeking employment opportunities in order to help their families survive. It was recognised that the strategy of creating national programmes based on demographic criteria and government systems had allowed the vast majority of refugees to receive basic coverage and services in an extraordinarily short timeframe, but staff also felt that this needs to be followed up with a secondary process to address the exclusions and vulnerabilities not covered by the initial programming.

Second, staff were for the most part comfortable with how DG ECHO and DG NEAR were working together in 2018. However, staff also felt that more work could and should have been done by DG ECHO in 2016 and 2017, to develop a joint implementation plan with DG NEAR including a more explicit division of labour, to put in place improved mechanisms for coordination of activities especially at province-level, and to reach earlier agreement on the main elements of transition.

Third, staff (particularly Turkey-based staff) felt that it had been very important to engage frequently with GoTR and with consistent messages. More communication had resulted in greater understanding of how GoTR sees the situation and more ability to predict GoTR's own actions, although more communication had not always succeeded in influencing GoTR policy. It was also felt that partners should have engaged more with municipal authorities and with mukhtars (community leaders) to enhance effectiveness (for example more contextualised understanding of needs and better targeting of vulnerabilities) and to help social cohesion. DG ECHO's normal programming model does not work as closely with and through Government, deliberately favouring UN and NGO partners. Learning to work more closely with GoTR - while retaining DG ECHO's mandated humanitarian independence - had been a major adjustment for many staff.

Fourth, staff felt that DG ECHO was facing some reputational risks. The most important of these was the risk of not implementing a smooth and sustainable transition from DG ECHO programmes to DG NEAR and GoTR, as a result of which there was a concern that some key programmes (like ESSN, CCTE) or services (specialised health services) could lose continuity. In general, regarding reputational risk, many staff felt that DG ECHO was still poorly understood in Turkey, and that more work needed to be done to explain the results of the Facility to refugees and to the Turkish public.

5. Conclusions

5.1. Relevance

5.1.1. Needs and vulnerability (Findings 1, 2, 3, 13, 19, 26)

The commitments that EU Member States made in the EU-Turkey Statement, to support the GoTR's hosting of the world's largest refugee population, were very substantial and had a very ambitious timeframe. All EC services were under immediate pressure to deliver, but because DG ECHO has more streamlined modalities than DG NEAR, a lot of the early heavy lifting was done by DG ECHO. At the same time, GoTR restrictions on data collection and data sharing meant that there was, at the moment the Facility was launched, no strong data on the needs and vulnerabilities of refugees. And finally, GoTR had agreed that it would make its own social protection mechanisms available to refugees, opening the possibility of CCTE and ESSN.

In this context, DG ECHO made the correct strategic choices to adopt a targeting approach that relied upon broad demographic criteria, and a programme delivered through Turkish social protection systems. This succeeded in bringing a very large number of refugees into the core assistance programmes very quickly. However, the use of demographic targeting criteria and government delivery systems also resulted in two important coverage gaps: refugees who do not meet the demographic criteria but are nevertheless highly socio-economically vulnerable (including the so-called ESSN "exclusion error"), and refugees who are unregistered or who are registered and out-of-province.

DG ECHO is fully aware of these coverage gaps, and has introduced measures (such as adjusted demographic criteria, the disability top-up, and the SASF allowance) to address the basic needs of vulnerable refugees who fall outside the demographic criteria. In addition, DG ECHO endeavoured during the period under review to reach the refugees who are unregistered or out-of-province, by bringing them into the registration system (through support for verification and referrals from other programmes) and by providing assistance (particularly legal counselling and individual protection assistance but also some health and psycho-social support services) to them directly through NGO partners. This direct assistance has been somewhat limited in its impact because of the narrow operating permissions of DG ECHO's protection and health partner NGOs, and the limited scale and geographic scope of these projects.

Finding 1. The design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions generally took into account the needs of refugees in Turkey, but the major initiatives could not assess vulnerability at the household level.

Finding 2. Projects working with UN agencies that were partnered with government ministries had the greatest reach. However, they rarely addressed the needs of unregistered or out-of-province refugees. Projects with Government ministries did, to some extent, assess the vulnerabilities of registered refugees.

Finding 3. Projects working with non-government partners addressed the needs of some unregistered and out-of-province refugees, and were well equipped to assess specific protection vulnerabilities. However, due to regulatory and resource limitations, they were limited in reach, and less able to assure follow-up action.

Finding 13. Vulnerability targeting remains difficult, due to GoTR restrictions on individual or household assessment, and limitations on data sharing.

Finding 19. DG ECHO's programme has considerably increased access to Government and non-government services for refugees who are registered and in-province. But a significant number of refugees are either unregistered, or registered and out-of-province, and existing measures might not be sufficient to reach them.

Finding 26. For refugees who are verified and in-province, assistance in health, education and basic needs is well-integrated in Government systems. However, there are some service gaps that DG NEAR and Government are unlikely to address (especially services in all sectors for unregistered refugees, and some specialised protection needs).

5.1.2. Planning based upon data (Findings 1, 12, 13, 25)

DG ECHO has not been able to gather or access the data required for optimal planning and performance measurement. Early NGO projects, that were approved just prior to and immediately after the launch of the Facility, generally had good planning data carried over from their work when there were fewer restrictions on their operations. However, there was not good data on the whole population of refugees, including for example a breakdown of ages, genders and vulnerability factors at the province or municipal levels.

The first Needs Assessment confirmed this problem of primary data, and the second Needs Assessment was able to capture useful data from secondary sources, but was completed too late to be used for planning the first phase of the Facility (it has reportedly been used to plan the second phase).

The problem of data has two origins: the first is the limitation of Turkish regulation on the collection of personal data, on the conduct of surveys and on household visits. The combined effect of these regulations is to prevent NGOs and UN partners from collecting needs and vulnerability data unless they have permissions from the appropriate authorities. The evaluation team learned of several examples where such permissions have been sought and obtained, but the administrative processes are heavy and the data gathered from these specialised assessments is not comprehensive.

The second problem of data is the regulatory framework that limits how much of the data that Government collects can be shared with outside parties. It is certain that DGMM has detailed demographic data (especially after verification), that MOFLSS has household socio-economic profiles through ESSN enrolment, and that MoNE has education enrolment, attendance and performance data through the national education information systems. Government data can be shared with external parties upon request, but it was reported to the evaluation team that few such requests have been made, and that not all requests have been answered.

Even though DG ECHO does not have the comprehensive data required for robust planning, it has planned to the best of its ability based upon partial data, estimates and assumptions. Unfortunately, the same data weaknesses described earlier have also limited DG ECHO's ability to measure its overall performance against most of the outcome indicators of the Management Framework. Instead, DG ECHO has relied upon output data collected from partners, through a monitoring mechanism that is not part of the normal DG ECHO programming system, but which was built for Turkey precisely in order to capture quarterly progress against key indicators. Through this monitoring mechanism, supplemented by performance assessment work carried out directly by implementing partners, the evaluation team concludes that DG ECHO's programmes are on track to achieve their intended results – although these were not achieved by the end of the first phase of the Facility, and instead will be achieved by the end of the second phase of the Facility. Some further discussion of variable progress and gaps is found below.

Finding 1. The design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions generally took into account the needs of refugees in Turkey, but the major initiatives could not assess vulnerability at the household level.

Finding 12. The strategic objective of the Management Framework has been largely achieved, and is on track to be achieved by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility.

Finding 13. Vulnerability targeting remains difficult, due to GoTR restrictions on individual or household assessment, and limitations on data sharing.

Finding 25. Despite the limitations on data collection and surveys, DG ECHO's monitoring and reporting system supports sound management of operations, and permits mid-course corrections as new challenges and opportunities

5.2. Coherence

5.2.1. Planning for the Facility Phase 2 (Findings 14, 17, 25)

DG ECHO's planning system for the Turkey response is built around DG ECHO's normal planning tool, the HIP, and is supplemented by the quarterly monitoring mechanism described earlier, and by the Management Framework.

The Management Framework is a detailed planning and risk management tool that makes an explicit effort to describe the theory of change (or "Intervention Logic"), and that also entails detailed results frameworks for each sector. The evaluation team concludes that this was a strong planning system, although it had two weaknesses. The first, as described above in 5.1.2, is that the Management Framework anticipated that DG ECHO would be able to receive from external sources, or acquire through its own direct surveys, sector-level

performance data related to the Framework's indicators. The second weakness was that the Framework's risk assessment was incomplete. The evaluation team can confirm that the risks identified by DG ECHO were for the most part appropriate, but what appears to be missing are explicit measures to address those risks that were identified as high likelihood and high impact – several of which materialised.

The planning embodied in the HIPs and in the MF made certain assumptions about the refugee population (as explained in this report, there was an absence of comprehensive disaggregated data) and, in particular, assumed that needs and vulnerabilities of refugees were relatively homogeneous across Turkey, and that the vast majority of the Syrians were in the South-East. The programme was, accordingly, designed as a combination of large nationwide-projects (ESSN, CCTE and Verification) and additional programming (health and protection) focussed mainly on the South-East. Shortly after the Facility was underway, it became clear that there were some important variations across the country, notably that there were larger populations than originally assumed in secondary locations outside the South-East, including a very large population in and around Istanbul, and that there were significant seasonal movements in the refugee population particularly following the pathways of seasonal agricultural labour. DG ECHO has, to some extent, adapted its programmes to respond to this variation, for example setting up an office in Istanbul, and starting up new programmes in the North-West as well as in other secondary locations in the Aegean, but DG ECHO's province-level programmes are still unbalanced between regions and undifferentiated with regards to needs. In particular, the vast majority of out-of-province refugees are in and around Istanbul – creating a concentration of refugees without full access to services and exposed to additional protection risks.

Finding 14. The risks and assumptions of the Management Framework, and of the four thematic objectives (sectors) were for the most part appropriate and remain relevant.

Finding 17. DG ECHO's programmes are not sufficiently sensitive to the different protection risks and vulnerabilities experienced by refugees according to their demographic profile and current location.

Finding 25. Despite the limitations on data collection and surveys, DG ECHO's monitoring and reporting system supports sound management of operations, and permits mid-course corrections as new challenges and opportunities arise.

5.2.2. Working with GoTR (Findings 2, 4, 9, 11, 13, 15, 23, 27)

In humanitarian situations, DG ECHO seeks to establish good relations with host governments for the purposes of humanitarian access and coordination, but DG ECHO does not directly fund programmes of host governments. Instead, as mandated in the HAR,⁸³ DG ECHO works through international organisations, INGOs based in European Member States, and Member State specialised agencies. In

⁸³ *Humanitarian Aid Regulation* (1999) Articles 7-9 limit the eligible recipients of DG ECHO funding

this respect, it is unusual for DG ECHO that its Turkey programme is built so much around Turkish systems, and dependent upon the active cooperation of Turkish Government ministries.

The evaluation team concluded that the fit and complementarity between DG ECHO and GoTR were good, although each party has had to make adjustments to reach this current state. The Government has shown some flexibility, for example with adjustments to the ESSN, but on the whole the GoTR systems were less

flexible than DG ECHO's - and it was DG ECHO that had to make the major adjustments. For example, DG ECHO was not successful in its advocacy to vary the CCTE payment from the national system, or to allow NGOs to conduct outreach, or to remove registration bottlenecks. Instead, it was DG ECHO that had to make the main compromises, for example accepting Government

limitations on which partners could work in which provinces and in which sectors. This accommodation to Turkish systems had the great benefit that it allowed very large numbers of refugees to be included within government health and education programmes, and it allowed the exceptional national reach of ESSN and CCTE.

Finding 2. Projects working with UN agencies that were partnered with government ministries had the greatest reach. However, they rarely addressed the needs of unregistered or out-of-province refugees. Projects with Government ministries did, to some extent, assess the vulnerabilities of registered refugees.

Finding 4. DG ECHO and its partners have completely transformed their approaches as GoTR has assumed the central role in the provision of services to registered refugees in all sectors.

Finding 9. DG ECHO's response is built around and explicitly complementary to the Turkish response.

Finding 11. The scale and scope of DG ECHO's Facility funding provides strong EU value added, and Member States ask that EU/DG ECHO further apply their consequent leverage.

Finding 13. Vulnerability targeting remains difficult, due to GoTR restrictions on individual or household assessment, and limitations on data sharing.

Finding 15. ESSN and CCTE provided exceptional reach and coverage to both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, with benefits evenly distributed across the country.

Finding 23. System-wide, the main factors of efficiency stem from the huge scale of some activities, and the fact that they capitalise on Government systems. Some inefficiencies resulted from the difficulties encountered by NGOs in complying with Turkish regulatory frameworks.

Finding 27. There were some examples of GoTR adapting Government systems as they learned from DG ECHO projects, but for the most part DG ECHO was fitting into GoTR systems that were not very flexible.

5.2.3. Alignment with DG ECHO policies (Findings 5, 6, 24)

DG ECHO's programme in Turkey was fully aligned with the HIPs and with the MF, and (as far as can be seen from available reports) DG ECHO has met the expectations of the Facility Steering Committee.

DG ECHO's partners followed the guidance outlined in the prevailing sector policies in all respects except two. The first (as discussed earlier) is that DG ECHO's partners were not able to focus upon the most vulnerable refugees. The second, is that DG ECHO's partners fell short of fully meeting the expectations of DG ECHO's gender policy – particularly failing to demonstrate explicit gender analysis at the proposal stage and to show how programming was shaped by that analysis.

Finding 5. DG ECHO's response in all sectors was aligned with the HIPs and the Management Framework, although projects approved under one HIP often continued into the period covered by the following HIP.

Finding 6. DG ECHO's operations in Turkey were mostly aligned with DG ECHO's sector policies, but there was room for improvement regarding mainstreaming of Gender in Humanitarian Aid.

Finding 24. The EU's per capita budget for Turkey is larger than its budgets for comparable Syrian refugee-hosting countries. The DG ECHO share of the overall Facility budget was determined mainly by DG ECHO's ability to scale-up

Furthermore, the Gender and Age marker was not consistently implemented and did not seem to improve the gender performance of projects.

In some respects, DG ECHO went further than its policies expected. In education and in basic needs DG ECHO did not alone determine what strategy it should follow, but did this in conjunction with DG NEAR in a spirit of division of labour according to comparative advantages. As a result, DG ECHO's cash programming in Turkey reached a scale never before seen in the humanitarian universe, and some aspects of this cash programme have since been taken up and used to draft new guidance for DG ECHO's cash programming in large-scale responses.

5.2.4. Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP (Findings 7, 8)

DG ECHO's staff and partners confirmed that coordination with DG NEAR is now good, in particular regarding the second phase of the Facility. This does not mean that there are no unresolved issues: in particular the exit strategy from ESSN and the division of labour in protection remain under active discussion – but the key is that the discussion is reportedly solution-oriented.

Coordination between DG ECHO and the main stakeholders of the Turkey chapter of the 3RP has improved, but could still be better. In particular, some 3RP stakeholders stated that they would like DG ECHO to become a more active participant in the strategic planning process, while DG ECHO stated that they also would like to be more involved but are not invited. As a result, there remains a strategic planning gap between DG ECHO and 3RP.

Finding 7. Initial coordination between DG ECHO and DG NEAR did not allow systematic streamlining and complementarity of assistance. However, coordination has become stronger at the strategic level, as both services have rallied behind the shared goals of the Facility. Transition discussions between DG ECHO and DG NEAR picked up in 2018, and are progressing at different speeds with variations according to the sector.

Finding 8. Coordination between DG ECHO and the 3RP has steadily improved since 2015.

5.3. Facility added-value

5.3.1. Maintaining the benefits of the Facility (Findings 10, 11, 12, 15)

The Facility has allowed European Member States to pool their resources into a single mechanism, bringing with it economies of scale and the ability to undertake initiatives, such as an exceptionally large unified nationwide cash programme, that can only be achieved when resources are combined in this way and managed as a single project. Seen from a programming point of view, the Facility is a Programme Based Approach as is often found in development programming, or a Pooled Fund as is more often found in humanitarian situations, with DG ECHO solely responsible for the management of the whole portfolio on behalf of all donors.

Several donors regarded this as a more efficient way to deliver assistance than through conventional donor humanitarian programmes that tend towards fragmentation rather than concentration. The precedent established in Turkey, and the success of its flagship nationwide programmes, suggest that there would be benefits, and that there could be donor interest, in creating a successor pooled funding mechanism that would be able to receive voluntary contributions from EU Member States (and non-Member States), and continue to provide many of the efficiency and effectiveness benefits of the Facility - after the Facility as such has closed.

Finding 10. As European funding has grown quickly and to an unprecedented level, non-European donors have reduced their own humanitarian funding to Turkey.

Finding 11. The scale and scope of DG ECHO's Facility funding provides strong EU value added, and member states ask that EU/DG ECHO further apply their consequent leverage.

Finding 12. The strategic objective of the Management Framework has been largely achieved, and is on track to be achieved by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility.

Finding 15. ESSN and CTE provided exceptional reach and coverage to both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, with benefits evenly distributed across the country.

5.4. Effectiveness

5.4.1. DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement (Findings 12, 15, 18, 20, 21,26)

Even though the strategic objectives of the Facility are likely to be achieved by the end of the second phase of the Facility, the evaluation team has identified success factors and areas for improvement in each of the four sectors examined.

Basic needs

Critical to the success of ESSN was the combination of the strengths of its four main implementing partners: WFP brought experience of targeting, vulnerability mapping and capacity building; GoTR (MoFLSS) and the TRCS ensured national level coverage and staffing; while Halkbank delivered a reliable payments system. ESSN monitoring results show that, in a range of areas, including indebtedness, quality of accommodation, food consumption scores, and recourse to negative coping strategies, ESSN beneficiaries are significantly better off than non-beneficiaries, although there has been a little backsliding on some indicators (increased indebtedness and reduced spending on health) since the Turkish economic crisis started in 2018.

Areas for improvement to the existing programme include: operationalising the SASF allowance and addressing some of the obstacles to receiving the disability top-up; strengthening the protection referral mechanisms; and improving linkages to vocational training and labour market access for those ESSN recipients who might have better employment alternatives. The transfer value of the ESSN is not sufficient to cover the basic needs gap experienced by refugees, especially since consumer prices have increased and informal labour opportunities dwindled in 2018, and further advocacy on this would seem warranted.

Education

Starting from a series of studies that identified the major barriers to school enrolment as cost, distance and language, DG ECHO and partners planned three related initiatives: (a) CCTE to mitigate the financial barriers, (b) school transport, and (c) a non-formal education package that included sub-components of accelerated learning programs, Turkish language classes, and basic learning needs – all designed to help children learn Turkish and also catch up before moving into Turkish public schools. In addition, the CCTE included a child protection component, which followed up specific children identified as at risk of dropping out, or who have dropped out. The CCTE project has exceeded its participation targets and is likely to achieve its expected results, although more research is needed (and indeed is under way) to confirm the causal relationship between CCTE and increased school attendance. Success factors for the CCTE were the ability to piggy-back on two existing programmes: a GoTR conditional

Finding 12. The strategic objective of the Management Framework has been largely achieved, and is on track to be achieved by the end of Phase 2 of the Facility.

Finding 15. ESSN and CCTE provided exceptional reach and coverage to both Syrian and non-Syrian refugees, with benefits evenly distributed across the country.

Finding 16. DG ECHO's major programmes benefit women and girls more than men and boys. DG ECHO's partners were somewhat effective at addressing physical (not mental) disabilities.

Finding 18. The ESSN is highly effective in providing timely, safe and regular support to 1.5 million refugees nationwide, but the transfer value is no longer seen as sufficient to meet the basic needs of refugees.

Finding 20. DG ECHO's education interventions enhanced the well-being of school-age children, and it is likely that CCTE has improved school enrolment and retention.

Finding 21. DG ECHO has filled some key gaps in health service provision and significantly increased refugee access to Government health services in Turkey.

Finding 26. For refugees who are verified and in-province, assistance in health, education and basic needs is well-integrated in Government systems. However, there are some service gaps that DG NEAR and Government are unlikely to address (especially services in all sectors for unregistered refugees and some specialised protection needs).

cash transfer programme for Turkish children,⁸⁴ and the existence of the ESN/Kizilay Kart as a platform for managing CTE payments. The school transport component achieved its more modest objectives and was warmly welcomed by programme participants and school authorities, but was not operating at a sufficient scale to make a significant difference in overall school attendance rates. Finally, the non-formal education activities were considered by the evaluation team to have been well-designed and likely to meet specific needs, but their launch was too recent to be able to measure results.

Areas for improvement include: improving linkages between all three DG ECHO education components and PICTES, so that there can be better strategic linkages between school attendance (the goal of DG ECHO's programme) and educational performance (the goal of DG NEAR's PICTES); and further encouraging schools to admit refugee children as students even if they are not registered or in-province, as well as issuing these "guest students" with certification to allow academic progression.

Health

The vast majority of refugees in Turkey can access primary health care, and this access has improved over the Facility period. Three main success factors were (a) specialised health interventions (prosthetic services, MHPSS, SRH/SGBV) funded by ECHO and aimed at demonstrating models for adoption by the Turkish health system, (b) the creation of MHCs, some of which were taken over from NGOs, and (c) the retraining of Syrian health professionals to fill a staffing shortage in MHCs, with the additional benefit that refugees could receive more culturally appropriate services in Arabic and at lower cost.

Areas for improvement include: the provision of some specialised refugee health services (in particular mental health services, SGBV survivor services, disability services including prosthetics for war-wounded) that stakeholders felt were likely to become less available after transfer to Turkish health institutions; services to unregistered refugees; mobile health services to seasonal workers; and providing follow-up support to retrained Syrian health professionals in order to increase their capacities and consolidate their role and standing within the Turkish health system.

Protection

Progress with registration and verification has been rapid, as DGMM has continued to strengthen its capacities with the assistance of UNHCR and its key donors including DG ECHO. In particular, the protection desks deployed at PDMM verification centres have succeeded in raising awareness that protection is more than registration, and in achieving systematic referrals to supplementary services at a nationwide scale that would not have been possible with an NGO-managed intake and referral model. NGO protection partners have generally provided quality services and have, in most cases, been able to provide services to unregistered refugees, but due to regulatory restrictions the range of services NGOs can offer has reduced, and the coverage is also limited by geographically-constrained operating approvals. While MoFLSS SSCs aim to become nationwide protection service providers, the evaluation team found that they do not yet have the capacity to identify and respond to protection needs that are beyond socio-economic needs.

Even though the evaluation team concludes that there has been less success in protection relative to other sectors, there are still some success factors. First among these is the willingness of GoTR to admit the Syrian people onto its territory in large numbers, and to afford them the rights and benefits of Temporary Protection, including access to social protection (ESN), access to essential social services as long as they are registered and in-province, and limited access to the formal labour market. This is already more support than provided by most first-asylum countries. Secondly, the NGO provision of protection services, while limited in scope, has been of high quality because of the experience of the

⁸⁴ Şartlı Eğitim Yardımı (ŞEY), and Şartlı Nakit Transferi (ŞNT)

International NGO partners, and because of the way that they mostly work in conjunction with national NGOs who have good contextual understanding and strong local relationships.

Within the scope of current protection programming, there are two main areas for improvement. First, there are a number of refugee sub-groups who, even if they are registered, fall through the net of available government services. These groups include some SGBV and domestic abuse survivors, children who are working, and children who are married early (these are all challenges within Turkish society as well). In addition, there are some socially marginalised groups including ethnic minorities, LGBTI refugees and sex workers who are either reluctant to engage with state authorities, or for whom there are not appropriate services available. The second area of improvement would be if, in order to allow NGOs to reach these under-served groups, NGOs were allowed more latitude to conduct outreach and to provide specialised services that Government is not likely to provide at sufficient scale.

5.4.2. Filling some remaining gaps (Findings 19, 22)

In the course of the evaluation, the evaluation team has concluded that there are two strategic issues that need greater attention. These are addressed as a separate item in the conclusions because they are not strictly sectoral questions. The first strategic question is the population gap: the large number of refugees who are not accessing services fully or at all. This community is made up of three types.

One group is made up of the significant population of refugees in Turkey (Syrian and non-Syrian) who are not registered at all. This includes refugees who want to register, but who are either in a province where registration is restricted (and they cannot register in another province since they do not reside there), or who are in a very long registration backlog. Secondly, there is a smaller number of refugees who have been registered but who have been de-registered, either because they left Turkey for a visit to Syria and were not allowed to re-register upon re-entry, or because they were “no-shows” at verification. And third, there is a large number of refugees who are registered but not able to receive the full range of services because they are outside their province of registration. Altogether, perhaps as many as 20% of the refugees in Turkey fall into one of these three categories, and are not currently able to receive all the protections of the Turkish state. To address these gaps would require advocacy (and in particular, advocacy jointly with like-minded UN agencies and donors), and possibly technical assistance to enable the responsible Turkish institutions to make the regulatory and institutional capacity changes required to extend services to these groups.

A second strategic gap is the communications deficit, the gap between what the EU has achieved with its unprecedented humanitarian programmes, and the low levels of Turkish and refugee understanding of what the EU has provided and achieved. To address this gap the EU Delegation will need to work closely and carefully with DG ECHO to craft an appropriate proactive communications campaign oriented to refugees, the Turkish people and Turkish officials.

Finding 19. DG ECHO's programme has considerably increased access to Government and non-government services for refugees who are registered and in-province. But a significant number of refugees are either unregistered, or registered and out-of-province, and existing measures might not be sufficient to reach them.

Finding 22. DG ECHO's contracted visibility requirements seem to be met by all partners, but awareness of the EU's role and contribution are low among refugees and the Turkish public. These visibility efforts do not appear to be influencing refugee or Turkish views of the European Union.

5.5. Efficiency

5.5.1. DG ECHO's efficiency (Findings 23, 24, 25)

The Facility as a whole has been efficient, and its very large national programmes (ESSN and CTE) have been particularly efficient in terms of achieving national reach with relatively little administrative expenditure. The success factors for this efficiency are the economies of scale (few partners with low fixed costs and very large flow-through funds) and the fact that both ESSN and CTE, and to a lesser extent the verification programme of DGMM, piggy-backed on existing government programmes and were managed through established government agencies. In addition, regarding basic needs and food assistance, the modality of cash has been determined to be more efficient than the delivery of in-kind assistance in situations where markets are functioning normally.

Within this broad context of efficiency, there are, however, ways in which greater efficiencies could be achieved at the project and partner levels. Three of these stand out in particular. The first relates to the distribution of protection service providers in relation to the population. As argued earlier under 5.2, NGOs providing protection services are currently clustered in the South-East and are not providing sufficient coverage in the North-West (including no coverage in Kocaeli which appears to have a large refugee population), and in at least one location visited by the evaluation team, protection partners are providing similar services and in close proximity. While we did not conclude that any of the social service or community centres were working at capacity (i.e. there always seems to be more demand than supply), the distribution does not seem to be proportionate to need and, in particular, the exceptional needs of the large number of out-of-province refugees in Istanbul have not been given sufficient attention. If addressing the needs of the unregistered and the out-of-province refugees were a priority, then DG ECHO could be expected to support more service providers per capita in the North-West than in the rest of the country.

The second area of inefficiency is the prevalence of no-cost extensions. There are two aspects of concern with these. The first is that no-cost extensions usually result in increased administrative costs in relation to the overall budget (because most administrative costs are fixed costs: such as rent and salaries, and are incurred at a constant monthly rate). The second is that, when projects are delayed in implementation, this can cause delays in the implementation of linked projects.

The third is the inefficiency resulting from having several different DG ECHO (and DG NEAR) projects all working with the same local implementing partner – most prominently TRCS. TRCS's business model for working with refugees in Turkey is to operate a number of full-service community centres (16 at the time of the evaluation and a 17th has just been announced for Kocaeli). DG ECHO cannot fund TRCS directly, but depending on the services provided, each community centre can receive funding from DG ECHO through IFRC, UNICEF, UNFPA or WFP, as well as from UNHCR (not funded by DG ECHO) or from DG NEAR. This situation has arisen because TRCS has emerged as the preferred intermediary institution between the refugees and the government, and yet DG ECHO and its partners do not regard TRCS holistically but rather treat it as a technical partner for the delivery of specific services, through separate agreements each with different reporting timeframes and indicators. This is a situation where it would seem to be more efficient if TRCS's international partners (IFRC, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP and UNHCR) were to agree on a pooled-funding approach, to support a multi-year integrated programme.

Finding 23. System-wide, the main factors of efficiency stem from the huge scale of some activities, and the fact that they capitalise on Government systems. Some inefficiencies resulted from the difficulties encountered by NGOs in complying with Turkish regulatory frameworks.

Finding 24. The EU's per capita budget for Turkey is larger than its budgets for comparable Syrian refugee-hosting countries. The DG ECHO share of the overall Facility budget was determined mainly by DG ECHO's ability to scale-up rapidly and by its experience with cash-based assistance.

Finding 25. Despite the limitations on data collection and surveys, DG ECHO's monitoring and reporting system supports sound management of operations, and permits mid-course corrections as new challenges and opportunities arise.

5.6. Sustainability/connectedness

5.6.1. Readiness for the end of Facility financing (Findings 4, 7, 9, 10, 24)

The level of coordination and connectedness between DG ECHO and GoTR, and between DG ECHO and DG NEAR, have been discussed earlier under 3.2.2 and 3.2.4 respectively. To the extent that transition discussions are progressing well regarding some key programmes, and to the extent that the GoTR is committed to providing ongoing health and education services to the registered refugees in Turkey, the prospects for sustainability are good – and better than for other refugee situations (including the situations in Lebanon and Jordan) where the host governments are not carrying as much load as the GoTR.

However, when the Facility comes to an end, it is unlikely that DG NEAR and GoTR will pick up all the ongoing costs of the protection and basic needs programmes that have been covered by DG ECHO since 2016, even if the ESSN is scaled back to a core group of very vulnerable refugees who are unable to work, as is currently envisaged. Nor is it likely that DG NEAR and GoTR will pick up the costs of services to unregistered and out-of-province refugees.

Even if DG ECHO were to continue to support the refugees in Turkey after the end of the Facility, the evaluation team does not think it is likely that such future support would fully cover the gap. As a result, the team concludes that there is a risk that some organisations working with refugees in Turkey, and particularly the organisations participating in the 3RP (which readers will recall was in 2018 funded 76% by the Facility), will face the prospect of a sudden collapse in their funding at the end of the Facility. To prevent such a situation, two things need to happen. First, the European MS and other donors would need to step back in and resume their direct humanitarian funding preferably at pre-Facility levels. Secondly, the agencies that design and manage the 3RP will need to have clear advance warning of the funding intentions of their key donors, so that they can re-prioritise and re-size the 3RP accordingly.

Since this situation of a funding boom followed by a probable funding bust is one that was largely created by the Facility itself, investing EUR 6 billion in refugees in Turkey over a five-year period and creating the refugee and institutional expectations that went along with such a substantial programme, the evaluation team feels that the key managers of the Facility, namely DG ECHO and DG NEAR, have some responsibility for working with the EU member states and the broader donor community, in conjunction with the custodians of the 3RP, to help set humanitarian support to Turkey back on a predictable and more sustainable footing at the end of the Facility.

Finding 4. DG ECHO and its partners have completely transformed their approaches as GoTR has assumed the central role in the provision of services to registered refugees in all sectors.

Finding 7. Initial coordination between DG ECHO and DG NEAR did not allow systematic streamlining and complementarity of assistance. However, coordination has become stronger at the strategic level, as both services have rallied behind the shared goals of the Facility. Transition discussions between DG ECHO and DG NEAR picked up in 2018, and are progressing at different speeds with variations according to the sector.

Finding 9. DG ECHO's response is built around and explicitly complementary to the Turkish response.

Finding 10. As European funding has grown quickly and to an unprecedented level, non-European donors have reduced their own humanitarian funding to Turkey.

Finding 24. The EU's per capita budget for Turkey is larger than its budgets for comparable Syrian refugee-hosting countries. The DG ECHO share of the overall Facility budget was determined mainly by DG ECHO's ability to scale-up rapidly and by its experience with cash-based assistance.

6. Recommendations

These recommendations were co-developed with DG ECHO staff in HQs and in the field, and then further refined by the evaluation team, taking into account the preceding analysis. Rather than making a small number of recommendations with subsidiary details or enabling measures, these are presented under ten broad topics. All the recommendations are directed to DG ECHO, although some also have implications for DG NEAR and the EU Delegation. In each grouping, the recommendation that the evaluation team considers to be the most important (strategic/enabling) is highlighted in **bold text**.

Targeting strategy for future DG ECHO programming in Turkey

Recommendations	Related conclusions
1) Under the second phase of the Facility, maintain the current universal programmes in Turkey.	5.1.1 Needs and vulnerability
2) Under the second phase of the Facility, maintain the current footprint of region-specific sub-offices and partners (particularly for protection), and actively steer and support partners to focus on providing services to underserved beneficiaries, including unregistered and out-of-province refugees.	5.2.3 Alignment with DG ECHO policies
3) After the second phase of the Facility, and assuming that most basic needs, education and health services are covered by universal government and development donor programmes, DG ECHO should then target interventions (mainly protection and focused basic needs support) at all vulnerable refugees who are not covered by, or who have dropped out of, the universal programmes.	

Gathering and using data for planning

Recommendations	Related conclusions
4) Increase advocacy with Government to share existing data (MoNE, MoFLSS, DGMM) at a more granular level, but still in anonymised form respecting GoTR regulations.	5.1.1 Needs and vulnerability 5.2.3 Alignment with DG ECHO policies
5) Support partners to work with GoTR to collect new data tailored to increase understanding of the refugee population, preferably including modalities for regular comprehensive needs assessment at the municipal level together with appropriate partners and authorities.	
6) Use this improved data to frame DG ECHO work post-Facility.	

Improving gender mainstreaming

Recommendations	Related conclusions
7) Strengthen engagement with DG ECHO's partners to improve implementation of DG ECHO's Gender Policy, in particular gender analysis by partners at the design stage, to inform action leading to better gender results.	5.1.1 Needs and vulnerability 5.2.3 Alignment with DG ECHO policies
8) Make a concerted effort with partners to strengthen the implementation of the Gender and Age Marker.	

Supporting partners to plan for after the Facility

Recommendations	Related conclusions
<p>9) DG ECHO should use its institutional experience and convening abilities to assist key partners to plan for after the Facility and to obtain other sources of funding, using a two-pronged approach:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">i. Advocate for donor governments (Member States and others) to resume their direct contributions, so as to cover the remaining essential needs after the end of the Facility.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">ii. Support Turkey refugee response stakeholders to anticipate a reduction in EU funding after the end of the Facility (2021).</p>	<p>5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP</p> <p>5.3.1 Maintaining the benefits of the Facility</p> <p>5.4.1 DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement</p> <p>5.4.2 Filling some remaining gaps</p>
<p>10) Collaborate with the custodians of the 3RP Turkey chapter to ensure that any 3RP after 2021 is prioritised and scoped to match the needs of refugees post-Facility, and to match the likely levels of donor support.</p>	<p>5.6.1 Readiness for the end of Facility financing</p>
<p>11) In conjunction with DG NEAR and their strategic UN partners, support key Turkish entities (i.e. TRCS, MoFLSS, DGMM) to develop coherent, comprehensive and realistic multi-year programmes of support for refugees, blending Government and external funding.</p>	
<p>12) In conjunction with DG NEAR and their UN strategic partners, facilitate the creation of a multi-donor mechanism (i.e. pooled fund or joint programme financed by voluntary contributions) that could sustain many of the efficiencies of the Facility, and support these Turkish partners to implement, monitor and report on their multi-year programmes.</p>	

Adjusting the planning and monitoring approach

Recommendations	Related conclusions
<p>13) Strengthen the strategic planning for the second phase of the Facility, including greater harmonisation of DG ECHO and DG NEAR planning and reporting, and more robust processes of risk management including risk mitigation measures.</p>	<p>5.2.1 Planning for the Facility Phase 2</p>
<p>14) For actions funded under the Facility, apply the current DG ECHO project management and monitoring approach, using better data if it can be collected (see recommendation 6.2).</p>	<p>5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP</p>
<p>15) At the end of the Facility, scale back DG ECHO's management and monitoring activities to remain commensurate with any future DG ECHO programme.</p>	<p>5.3.1 Maintaining the benefits of the Facility</p>

Filling gaps in education

Recommendations	Related conclusions
16) Continue in the short term with CCTE and outreach work related to school attendance, including initiatives to bring unregistered and out-of-province children into the formal education system, and advocate for refugees to be integrated fully into government systems in the medium-long term.	5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP 5.4.1 DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement
17) By the end of 2019, transfer remaining education programme delivery (i.e. NFE) to DG NEAR and GoTR.	5.4.2 Filling some remaining gaps
18) Research the relative effectiveness for removing barriers to education of CCTE, NFE, school transport, in-school counsellors (for example former Syrian teachers) and child protection follow-up services, and adjust DG ECHO's CCTE and outreach work in 2020-2021 in ways that maximise school attendance for existing students and out of school children.	

Filling gaps in health

Recommendations	Related conclusions
19) Continue to hand over the current models and caseloads to the government health services (financed by DG NEAR, other donors or government resources).	5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP 5.4.1 DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement
20) Advocate for Government institutions to provide a wider range of health services to unregistered and out-of-province refugees, possibly by supporting the implementation of technical changes to health regulations.	5.4.2 Filling some remaining gaps
21) By the end of 2020, or at the latest 2021, disengage from funding health partners directly, and exit the health sector.	
22) Closely follow up on the quality of the transition, as well as the referrals system, and maintain a contingency measure to continue or to resume the provision of a limited range of health services if there are critical gaps remaining after hand over to government services.	

Filling gaps in basic needs

Recommendations	Related conclusions
23) Maintain the ESN programme for the remainder of the second phase of the Facility, ensuring follow-through on proposed measures to improve the inclusion of the most vulnerable refugees.	5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP 5.4.1 DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement 5.4.2 Filling some remaining gaps

Filling gaps in protection

Recommendations	Related conclusions
24) Maintain support for GoTR registration and verification programmes until the end of the Facility (2021).	5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP
25) Advocate for expedited registration of refugees in registration backlogs or in provinces where registration has been temporarily suspended, and for the regularisation of inter-provincial residency transfers.	5.4.1 DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement 5.4.2 Filling some remaining gaps
26) Strengthen the quality and follow-up of protection referral mechanisms within the national programmes supported by DG ECHO (i.e. ESSN, CTE and verification).	
27) Maintain in the second phase of the Facility, and after the Facility, support for NGO partners providing targeted protection services for refugees who either cannot access government services (i.e. unregistered or out-of-province or socially excluded groups), or who have specialised legal needs (i.e. detainees, stateless persons, civil documentation difficulties, survivors of domestic or gender-based violence requiring special assistance).	

Strengthening communications

Recommendations	Related conclusions
28) Work with DG NEAR and the EU Delegation in Turkey in order to help them improve refugee and Turkish public understanding of the nature of the EU's investments in Turkey, and of the results they have achieved.	5.2.4 Coordination with DG NEAR and 3RP 5.4.1 DG ECHO's results, and areas for improvement 5.4.2 Filling some remaining gaps

Appendix I: Evaluation Matrix

*Cross-cutting SQs for all four sectors

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
Relevance	EQ.1 To what extent have the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions taken into account the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey (registered or unregistered, inside or outside camps), in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people?	SQ.1.1 How have refugees (youth, adult, elderly, both men and women) been consulted (tools/ means), and where (urban setting/ rural areas/ camps), in the design of DG ECHO-funded projects (per sector and overall)?	The design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions have been informed and adapted to the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in Turkey Refugees have been consulted and this process has been translated into adapted and targeted design and the implementation of DG ECHO funded projects	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Extent to which, period and evidence that refugees (Syrian, others) have been consulted (e.g. consultation reports, etc.) • Estimated proportion of refugees consulted, per sector • Disaggregation of refugees consulted by origin (Syrians/Others) and gender • Evidence and extent to which the needs assessments from the most vulnerable refugees have informed the design and implementation of DG ECHO-funded interventions (e.g. baselines, indicators, targets, data disaggregated by age, gender, origin, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Needs assessments conducted by GoTR, DG ECHO and its partners, including UN agencies, NGOs and government authorities (ministries)⁸⁵ • Interventions design and implementation documentation • Partnership agreements with implementing / implementing partners • Eligibility criteria and funding requirements to select implementing partners • EU sectoral/thematic policies • DG ECHO staff • Steering Committee • Secretariat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document mapping • Desk review • Interviews • Focus groups discussions • Field observation • Partners survey
		SQ.1.2 How did DG ECHO's partners consider the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in the design and implementation of interventions? Is there a protection risk analysis? Is there a gender-sensitive needs assessment or a gender analysis?				
		SQ.1.3 To what extent did DG-ECHO funded-projects target the needs of the most vulnerable refugees? Is there evidence of protection- or gender/age sensitive vulnerability targeting?				

⁸⁵ For example, the 2016 Facility Needs Assessment.

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> refugee status, socio-economic status, location, etc.) Evidence that sectoral/thematic policies and implementation programmes have been adapted to the needs of the most vulnerable refugees (per sector) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Refugee beneficiaries and/or representatives Key national and international partners and stakeholders (UN, NGOs, GoTR) 	
	EQ.2 To what extent have DG ECHO and its partners been successful in adapting and adjusting their approach and in addressing gaps as the capacity of GoTR to address the needs of refugees has evolved over time?	<p>SQ.2.1 To what extent have partners managed to adapt their projects to meet the needs of vulnerable refugees in light of the evolving sectoral policies of the GoTR?</p> <p>SQ.2.2 To what extent have partners managed to adapt their projects to meet the needs of vulnerable refugees in light of the evolving sectoral capacities of the GoTR?</p>	DG ECHO and its partners have flexibly adapted their approaches and programming in view of changing GoTR capacity, which varies by sector.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key milestones of the emergency response and evolving capacity of the GoTR to respond to refugees needs Evolution of refugees needs over 2016-2017 Evidence (policies, implementation phases) of the evolving GoTR's (national, provincial, municipal) capacity to address needs of refugees Evidence and extent to which DG ECHO's and its partners' 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Documents on the evolution of refugee crisis and GoTR capacities Needs assessments conducted by DG ECHO and its partners (gaps identified as a result of varying capacity of GoTR) Intervention policies, approaches and implementation documentation DG ECHO staff Steering Committee Secretariat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document mapping Desk review Interviews Focus groups discussions Partners survey

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
				policies and actions have adapted to the evolving capacity of the GoTR.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refugee beneficiaries and/or representatives • Key national and international partners and stakeholders (UN, NGOs, GoTR) 	
Coherence	EQ.3 To what extent is the DG ECHO response in Turkey consistent with DG ECHO's strategy for Turkey as established in the relevant HIPs?	<p>SQ.3.1 How aligned are DG-ECHO-funded projects to their corresponding HIP under which they were approved? (per sector, per HIP)</p> <p>SQ.3.2 What are the reasons or factors that best explain the degree of alignment?</p>	DG ECHO's response matched the plans set out in the HIPs and the Management Framework for each sector.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that DG ECHO funded-projects are aligned with DG ECHO's HIP strategy for Turkey • Factors explaining differences between DG ECHO response vs DG ECHO's strategy for Turkey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interventions design and implementation documentation • Humanitarian Implementation Plan (HIP) Turkey / Syria • DG ECHO staff • Steering Committee Secretariat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Partners survey
	EQ.4 How well aligned were DG ECHO's operations with DG ECHO's thematic/sector policies in place during the evaluation period? If policies were not followed, what was the reason?	<p>SQ.4.1 To what extent did the design and implementation of projects within each sector follow their respective DG ECHO thematic/ sectoral policy?</p> <p>SQ.4.2 What could explain any discrepancies between DG ECHO-funded projects and DG ECHO's thematic/sector policies?</p>	DG ECHO funded interventions were aligned with thematic policies and approaches. The monitoring and evaluation methods were adapted to assess the alignment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence and degree of alignment of DG ECHO operations with DG ECHO thematic/sector policies in place • Factors explaining why DG ECHO operations were not following DG ECHO thematic/sector policies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ECHO sector policies • Intervention design and implementation documentation • DG ECHO operations reporting • DG ECHO staff • Steering Committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Focus groups discussions • Field observation • Partners survey

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	EQ.5 How successful has DG ECHO been in coordinating its operations with other EC financial instruments and with the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 3RP (i.e. promoting synergies and avoiding duplications, gaps and resource conflicts at the situational/regional, country and sector-specific levels)? What was the added value of DG ECHO as a contracting authority under the Facility?	<p>SQ.5.1 What has been the level of coordination between DG ECHO and other EC financial instruments?</p> <p>SQ.5.2 What has been the level of coordination between DG ECHO and the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 3RP?</p> <p>SQ.5.3 What is the comparative advantage of DG ECHO as a contracting authority under the Facility in relation to other EC financial instruments?</p>	<p>DG ECHO coordinated its operations with other EC financial instruments and with the 3RP.</p> <p>DG ECHO provides added value as a contracting authority under the Facility compared to other humanitarian donors.</p> <p>DG ECHO's funding through the Facility is advantageous compared to trust funds or traditional ECHO funding mechanisms.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature and type of coordination mechanisms supported by DG ECHO with other EC financial instruments and 3RP (per level and sector) • Evidence and nature of synergies facilitated by DG ECHO with other EC instruments, and the 3RP (per level and sector) • Evidence of duplications, gaps and resource conflicts that can be attributed to the quality of the coordination supported by DG ECHO with other EC financial instruments as well as the 3RP • Perceptions from DG ECHO, EC and 3RP about the coherence and effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms put in place 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO Management Framework • Reports of implementation of DG ECHO operations (incl. from partners) • Reports from other EC financial instruments and of the 3RP • DG ECHO staff at field offices • DG NEAR staff • FPI staff • Steering Committee • Secretariat • UN agencies and NGOs (partners or not) • Other donors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Focus groups discussions • Partners survey

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence and opinions related to the Value added of DG ECHO as contracting authority (e.g. degree of complementarity, predictability of funding, partnerships, field presence, etc.) 		
	EQ.6 To what extent has the DG ECHO response taken into account the Turkish response to refugees' needs and to a lesser extent other EU Member States and donors?	<p>SQ.6.1 How well and through which mechanisms has DG ECHO informed its response based on the actions of other donors and of Turkish authorities?</p> <p>SQ.6.2 To what extent do the projects of DG ECHO's partners, other donors, and Turkish authorities complement each other? (per sector)</p>	DG ECHO response is coherent with the actions of other donors and of Turkish authorities thereby contributing to reduced duplications and gaps in the coverage of the needs of refugees in Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of coherence and complementarity between DG ECHO response / interventions and those from other donors and the Turkish authorities Existence of duplications and/or gaps in the response from DG ECHO, other donors and Turkish authorities (types of needs, refugees, situations, locations, etc. that are less covered while others received more assistance / funding). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO Management Framework DG ECHO staff at HQ and field offices Steering Committee Secretariat Interventions design and reports, HIPs Donors (MS, and others) Turkish authorities Refugee beneficiaries and/or representatives Key national and international partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document mapping Desk review Interviews Focus groups discussions Field observation Partners survey

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
EU Added-Value	EQ.7 What is the added value of DG ECHO humanitarian aid interventions examined (i.e. the added value of EU intervention in parallel to Member States individual interventions, compared to leaving the initiative solely to EU Member States)?	SQ.7.1 What has DG ECHO's response provided that MS could not provide individually?	DG ECHO, as part of the EU, leveraged its financial, political and technical advantages and provided a value added that could not have been provided by Member States individually.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of added value elements of DG ECHO's intervention (principled-approach, needs-based approach, quality partnerships, field expertise and presence, coordination, coherence and complementarity, predictability and flexibility of funding, additional funding, thematic policies, GHD, LRRD, etc.) Degree of coverage before and after EU intervention in selected regions (urban/rural) and per sector. Comparison of MS operations before and after DG ECHO interventions (per sector) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reports of implementation of DG ECHO and MS operations, HIPs DG ECHO staff at HQ and field offices Steering Committee Secretariat Partnership agreements with partners MS policies and interventions MS donors and key staff Turkish authorities (national and sub-national) Refugee beneficiaries and/or representatives Key national and international partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk review Interviews Focus groups discussions Field observation Partners survey
		SQ.7.2 What have been the main comparative advantages of the DG ECHO in the response (i.e. funding, partnership, approach, policies, field presence, coordination, visibility, interventions, sectors, etc.)?				
		SQ.7.3 What have been the main factors limiting the value added of the DG ECHO intervention?				

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
Effectiveness	EQ.8 To what extent have DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus, the specific HIPs and the Decision establishing the Facility, as well as the Management Framework for Turkey) been achieved?	SQ.8.1 To what extent have DG ECHO's interventions in each sector (education, health, basic needs and protection) achieved their objectives?	DG ECHO's objectives for the Facility have been met through DG ECHO's response to the refugee crisis in Turkey.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence and degree of achievement of strategic, policy, programmatic and operational objectives, such as: needs-driven interventions; diversity of quality and effective partnerships; effective coordination, coherence and complementarity of interventions; speed, quality and equitable aid delivered. Number, proportion, distribution and disaggregation of most affected and vulnerable refugees who have seen their needs met by DG ECHO-funded interventions (through the partners), per sector Degree of achievement of DG ECHO's interventions in each sector 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HAR, Consensus, HIPs Decisions, Management Framework DG ECHO and partners reports and evaluations DG ECHO staff at HQ and field offices Steering Committee Secretariat Turkish authorities Donors Refugee beneficiaries Partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk review Interviews Focus groups discussions Partners survey Case studies
		SQ.8.2 To what extent have DG ECHO's interventions in each sector (education, health, basic needs and protection) respected humanitarian principles and in particular Impartiality, Independence and Humanity?				

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	EQ.9 To what extent have the needs of the final beneficiaries, in terms of socio-economic support, protection, health, education, etc., been satisfied?	<p>SQ.9.1 To what extent has DG ECHO provided the right amount and type of aid at the right time and in an appropriate way to the final beneficiaries?</p> <p>SQ.9.2 Is there any evidence of projects seeking feedback from vulnerable refugees and using that feedback to adapt and improve performance?</p> <p>SQ.9.3 To what extent did DG ECHO's projects in each sector systematically tailor responses to the specific needs of women and men of all ages?</p> <p>SQ.9.4 To what extent did DG ECHO's projects in each sector prevent, mitigate and respond to protection threats by ensuring the respect of fundamental protection principles?</p>	DG ECHO has deployed significant financial efforts in support of national and international implementing partners programmes in order to meet the right amount and type of aid in an accountable manner by responding to the specific needs of women and men of all ages, and by ensuring adequate protection response to all.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number, proportion, distribution and disaggregation of most affected and vulnerable refugees who have seen their needs met by DG ECHO-funded interventions (through the partners), per sector • Nature, type and use of AAP (Accountability to Affected Populations) put in place providing feedback from vulnerable refugees • Evidence that DG ECHO's projects tailored their responses to the specific needs of women and men of all ages • Evidence that DG ECHO projects monitored and responded to specific protection threats 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIPs Decisions, Management Framework • DG ECHO and partners reports and evaluations • DG ECHO staff at HQ and field offices • Steering Committee • Secretariat • Turkish authorities • Donors • Refugee beneficiaries • Partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Focus groups discussions • Partners survey • Case studies

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	EQ.10 To what extent has DG ECHO's intervention contributed to increasing access to government and non-government services (basic needs, health, education, protection), throughout Turkey?	<p>SQ.10.1 What have been the factors contributing to or limiting refugee access to government and non-government services throughout Turkey (basic needs, protection, health and education)?</p> <p>SQ.10.2 Are there any vulnerable groups (ethnicity, religion, gender, age, sexual orientation, disability, etc.) whose access to services remain a challenge?</p>	DG ECHO-funded projects have contributed to increasing access to government and non-government services for refugees throughout Turkey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Numbers, proportion and disaggregation of refugees having increased access to government and non-government services (per sector) • Types and reach of contributing and limiting factors that have contributed or hindered the increased access to services (per sector) throughout the country, particularly for vulnerable groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governmental data on services offered to refugees per sector • Non-governmental data produced by national/ international stakeholders about services offered per sector • DG ECHO field staff • Partners • Government authorities • Refugees and host communities • Service providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Focus groups discussions • Field observation (Community Centers, Schools, Health Centers, Local administrations) • Partners survey • Case studies
	EQ.11 To what extent are refugees, local authorities and citizens aware of the EU's presence and contribution? (Visibility)	<p>SQ.11.1 Has DG ECHO's visibility policy been implemented in DG ECHO-funded projects in Turkey?</p> <p>SQ.11.2 Has DG ECHO in Turkey monitored the awareness of refugees, local authorities and citizens of its interventions?</p>	DG ECHO-funded projects have achieved an adequate level of visibility among key stakeholders thereby ensuring a recognition of its efforts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence and nature of EU's visibility tools in the context of the intervention of the Facility in Turkey • Adequacy of the EU's visibility policy in line with the visibility tools and products deployed by national and/or international partners • Perceived level of awareness of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU's visibility policy and material • Facility Communication Strategy • Partnership agreements with implementing / executing partners • Reporting from partners • Perceptions of refugees, local 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Review of EU policies and products • Interviews in Turkey and at the EU • Focus groups discussions • Field observation

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
				EU's presence and contribution by refugees, citizens and authorities in Turkey	authorities and citizens <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Perceptions of EU officials as well as other national/ international stakeholders 	
Efficiency	Cost-Effectiveness of DG-ECHO funded actions EQ.12 To what extent has DG ECHO achieved cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors have affected the cost-effectiveness of the response and to what extent?	SQ.12.1 To what extent have ECHO-funded actions in each sector been efficient and cost-effective?	Humanitarian actions funded by ECHO in each sector were cost-effective (on a case study basis)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Qualitative evidence that the case study actions supported were efficient and cost-effective Where appropriate: Value of cash transfers reaching populations compared to administrative costs Where appropriate: Evidence that the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Study on Approaches to Assess Cost-Effectiveness of DG ECHO's Humanitarian Aid Actions (ADE) for methodological framework Guidance Note on Cost-Effectiveness (is provided in Appendix 3) applying ADE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Desk review Interviews at the EU in Brussels and in Turkey at country, provincial and local levels Interviews with partners at Head Office, country, provincial and local levels.
		SQ.12.2 To what extent have opportunities for improving efficiency and cost-effectiveness been recognised and seized at sector portfolio level?	Humanitarian actions funded by DG ECHO in each sector were efficient (on a case study basis) Sectoral portfolios were optimised for			

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
		<p>SQ.12.3 What internal and external factors have affected the cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO projects in Turkey?</p> <p>SQ.12.4 To what extent have these factors affected the degree of cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO response?</p>	<p>efficiency and cost-effectiveness</p>	<p>largest cost drivers were well-managed</p> <p>Where appropriate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cost per unit and/or per refugee • Qualitative evidence that the case study actions supported were cost-effective. 	<p>methodology proportionately.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIPs, project Single Forms and FichOps. • External project reviews and evaluations. • DG ECHO staff and partners at all levels. • Other donor and agency staff; external sectoral experts. • Where appropriate: Partner budgets, transfer cost analysis, cost-driver analysis and unit cost analysis. • Where appropriate: Partner analysis of quantitative or monetary outcomes against costs. • HIPs, interventions inputs (budgets), and performance reports • DG ECHO staff and partners • Staff in charge of similar interventions (other donors) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interviews with other donors, agencies and sectoral experts. • Where appropriate: Comparative analysis of transfer costs, input costs, or unit/refugee costs; • Where appropriate: Comparative analysis of quantitative or monetary outcomes against costs. •

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	Cost effectiveness of DG ECHO as a donor EQ.13 Is the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to the Facility appropriate and proportionate to what the Facility sets out to achieve? Could the same results have been achieved with less funding?	<p>SQ.13.1 To what extent did needs assessments, the actions of other donors, the total humanitarian funding available and DG ECHO's objectives inform the size and allocation of budget to the Facility?</p> <p>SQ.13.2 Were approaches other than the Facility considered?</p> <p>SQ.13.3 In what ways was the Facility expected to enhance efficiency, according to its business case, and to what extent has it done so?</p>	<p>DG ECHO's budget allocations to the Facility are based on needs, actions of other donors and DG ECHO objectives</p> <p>Other funding modalities were considered and found less efficient than the Facility.</p> <p>The Facility has enhanced efficiencies.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence that DG ECHO's budget allocations are based on needs • Evidence that DG ECHO's budget allocations considered the actions of other donors • Proportion of DG ECHO funding compared to total humanitarian funding in Turkey • Evidence that DG ECHO's budget size was commensurate to DG ECHO objectives and expected outcomes • Evidence that other funding modalities were compared with the Facility and found to be less cost-effective • The Facility has demonstrated the efficiencies proposed in its business case [whatever those are] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Facility business case, strategic plan and other formative documentation. • Country IAF, HIPs, SRPs and Dashboards. • OCHA FTS • Facility periodic reports, reviews and evaluations • DG ECHO, partner, other donor and GoTR staff • Budget and financial data of DG ECHO interventions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Partners survey • Field visits • Qualitative and quantitative cost-effectiveness analysis

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	EQ.14 To what extent has DG ECHO put in place a fit for purpose monitoring and reporting system that supports a sound management of DG ECHO's operations? Is the monitoring and reporting system aligned to the Facility's accountability requirement?	<p>SQ.14.1 What are the main characteristics of the system put in place by DG ECHO to monitor and report on its operations?</p> <p>SQ.14.2 To what extent is the system appropriate to monitor and report on the sectors and projects funded?</p> <p>SQ.14.3 To what extent has the system been able to capture key performance indicators (managerial and operational) and used to inform reporting requirements and decision-making?</p> <p>SQ.14.4 To what extent does the system support accountability requirements to EU citizens and Member States?</p>	DG ECHO monitoring and reporting system is well adapted to the response and supports a sound management of the operations while being aligned to the Facility's accountability requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Characteristics and adequacy of monitoring and reporting systems put in place by DG ECHO • Level of alignment of DG ECHO monitoring and reporting system to the Facility's accountability requirements • Evidence that DG ECHO M&E system has developed performance indicators informing reporting • Evidence that most sectors and projects were monitored, and outputs/outcomes supported by appropriate indicators 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU Monitoring policy guidelines • DG ECHO monitoring and reporting design and outputs • DG ECHO staff • Partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Field visits • Survey to partners •
Sustainability - connectedness	EQ.15 How well (incl. timing) has the exit strategy and hand-over been prepared and carried out towards GoTR and development actors? To what extent have the DG ECHO-funded actions been successful in terms of operationalising the	<p>SQ.15.1 Has the exit strategy of DG ECHO been presented to the Government of Turkey and initiated, and how was it received by GoTR?</p> <p>SQ.15.2 To what extent did DG ECHO cooperate with other EU instruments</p>	The DG ECHO exit strategy has facilitated a coherent, progressive and effective transition to the GoTR Ministries and other humanitarian aid stakeholders,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature of the exit strategy of DG ECHO (time, objectives, process) per sector • Evidence that the exit strategy was approved - or not - by the GoTR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intervention design and implementation documentation • Partnership agreements with implementing / executing partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Partners survey • Field observation

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	humanitarian-development nexus? How effectively has protection and assistance for refugees been integrated within the relevant government systems at national and local levels?	<p>to implement its exit strategy?</p> <p>SQ.15.3 To what extent have the DG ECHO-funded actions been successful in operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus in each of the four sectors?</p> <p>SQ.15.4 How effectively has protection and assistance for refugees been integrated within the relevant government systems at national and local levels in each sector?</p> <p>SQ.15.5 What is the evidence of government ongoing support for activities that were initiated or enhanced by DG ECHO projects?</p>	ensuring a smooth transition between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of cooperation between DG ECHO and other EU instruments in order to implement the exit strategy • Evidence of integration of the refugee caseload within the relevant GoTR national systems over time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperation agreements with relevant GoTR systems and institutions • DG ECHO field staff • Steering Committee • Secretariat, DG NEAR • Donors • Partners • Government authorities • Refugees 	
	EQ.16 How can lessons learned from DG ECHO humanitarian programming in Turkey better inform GoTR's future programming? How can lessons learned from DG ECHO humanitarian programming in Turkey better	SQ.16.1 For each sector, is there evidence of lessons learned from DG ECHO's projects informing GoTR refugee response?	Several measures have been taken to increase the uptake of results and lessons learned by the GoTR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nature of mechanisms leading DG ECHO relief projects into development planning • Evidence of transitional initiatives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation reports • GoTR policies and cooperation agreements • Emerging findings • DG ECHO field staff • Steering Committee 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Interviews • Partners survey • Field observation

Criteria	Key Evaluation Questions (EQ)	Sub-Questions (SQ)	Judgement Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Information	Methods
	inform transition to development actors?	SQ.16.2 What are the enabling factors that would support an enhanced uptake of refugee response mechanisms by the GoTR?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> building upon results from relief projects into development programming Evidence of GoTR ownership of lessons learnt from past relief projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secretariat, DG NEAR Donors Partners Government authorities Refugees 	

Appendix II: List of Stakeholders Consulted

Basic Needs team

General information

	# respondents	# men		# women	
Key Informant Interviews	26	18	69%	8	31%
Focus Group Discussions	43	16	37%	27	63%
Total	69	34	49%	35	51%

Complete list of interviewees

Organisation	Location	Position
WFP	Gaziantep	Programme Associate
SASF	Ankara	Manager of Kecioren district's SASF
GoTR	Sanliurfa	Deputy Sanliurfa Governor
Concern	Sanliurfa	Programme Director
DG NEAR	Ankara	Programme Manager Facility
DG NEAR	Ankara	Programme Manager Facility
DG ECHO	Ankara	Technical Assistant
SASF	Sanliurfa	Manager of Haliliye district' SASF centre
WFP	Ankara	Government Partnerships Officer
WHH	Gaziantep	Project Officer
GoTR	Sanliurfa	Governor's Advisor
TRCS	Ankara	Programme Coordinator
DG NEAR	Ankara	Programme Manager Facility
WHH	Gaziantep	Deputy Country Director
MOFLSS	Ankara	Director General
TRCS	Gaziantep	Deputy Programme Coordinator
DG ECHO	Gaziantep	Basic Need team
STL	Hatay	Operations Coordinator
MOFLSS	Ankara	Field Coordinator
DRC	Hatay	SW Protection Manager
WFP	Ankara	Head of Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping/ Monitoring and Evaluation
DG ECHO	Gaziantep	Technical Assistant
WFP	Gaziantep	Programme Policy Officer
WHH	Gaziantep	Senior Program Officer
Concern	Sanliurfa	Livelihood Officer
Concern	Sanliurfa	Livelihood Officer

Focus Group Discussions details

Organisation	# people met	# of men	# of women	Location
ESSN	3	0	3	Gaziantep
ESSN	2	2	1	Gaziantep
ESSN	25	4	21	Gaziantep
ESSN	1	1		Sanliurfa
ESSN	1	0	1	Hatay
ESSN	1	0	1	Hatay
ESSN	1	1	0	Hatay
STL/ESSN	8	8	0	Hatay

Education team

General information

	# respondents	# men		# women	
<i>Key Informant Interviews</i>	53	30	57%	23	43%
<i>Focus Group Discussions</i>	145	57	39%	88	61%
<i>Total</i>	198	87	44%	111	56%

Complete list of interviewees

Organisation	Location	Position
IOM	Ankara	Emergency coordinator
USSOM	Hatay	Center manager
UNHCR	İstanbul	Child Protection Associate
DG LLL	Ankara	Chief for LLL
PDONE	Gaziantep	Deputy Director
UNICEF	Gaziantep	Education Officer
Mavi Kalem Association	İstanbul	Project Coordinator
IOM	Gaziantep	National project officer
UNICEF	Gaziantep	Chief of field office
DG LLL	Ankara	Project officer for Facility projects
TRCS	Gaziantep	Protection specialist
PDONE	İstanbul	Branch manager
TRCS	Gaziantep	Protection officer
TRCS	İstanbul	İstanbul Bağcılar Community Center Manager
UNICEF	Gaziantep	UNICEF Education Officer
PDONE Sultanbeyli	İstanbul	Deputy Director
EU Delegation	Ankara	International cooperation officer
UNICEF	Ankara	Program specialist
UNICEF	Ankara	Education specialist
UNICEF	Ankara	NFE specialist
ECHO İstanbul	İstanbul	Programme Officer
TRCS	Gaziantep	Translator. Youth center

PDoNE	Gaziantep	PEC Deputy Dir
PDoNE	Hatay	PDoNE director
UNICEF	Ankara	Monitoring Expert
UNICEF	Ankara	Education specialist. NFE
DG ECHO/	Ankara	Technical Assistant, Education
UNICEF	Gaziantep	Education specialist. NFE
USSOM	Hatay	M&E coordinator
UNICEF	Ankara	M&E
USSOM	Hatay	Team leader
IOM	Gaziantep	M&E officer
TRCS	Gaziantep	Case worker
TRCS	Gaziantep	Deputy Dir. Of Gaziantep YC.
TRCS	Gaziantep	Gazi Kent Youth Center Dir.
UNICEF	Gaziantep	Child protection specialist
MONE	Istanbul	Provincial Director
UNHCR	İstanbul	Protection Assistant
UNICEF	Ankara	Social Policy,
MDM	Hatay	Refugee program coordinator
ECHO İstanbul	İstanbul	Technical Assistant
PDoNE	Gaziantep	PEC Dir.
PDoNE	Gaziantep	PEC Dir.
PDoNE	Gaziantep	Dir. Şehit Kamil PEC
EU Delegation	Ankara	Programme Manager. Education
MDM	Hatay	Medical program coordinator
DGLLL	Ankara	Project officer for Accelerated Learning Programme (ALP)
ECHO/Gaziantep	Gaziantep	GZT Head of sub-office
UNHCR	İstanbul	Protection Officer
DGLLL	Ankara	Project Officer for data collection
ECHO/Gaziantep	Gaziantep	ECHO/Gaziantep
USSOM	Hatay	Physical
UNICEF	Ankara	Deputy Representative

Focus Group Discussions details

Organisation	# people met	# of men	# of women	Location
ALP center UNICEF	40	19	21	Gaziantep
Households	8	0	8	Gaziantep
Households	6	2	4	Hatay
Mavi Kalem (UNHCR IP)	1	0	1	Istanbul
MDM	10	5	5	Hatay
TRCS	15	0	15	Istanbul
TRCS	3	2	1	Gaziantep
Youth center (UNICEF)	62	29	33	Gaziantep

Health team

General information

	# respondents	# men		# women	
<i>Key Informant Interviews</i>	59	35	59%	24	41%
<i>Focus Group Discussions</i>	83	33	40%	50	60%
<i>Total</i>	142	68	48%	74	52%

Complete list of interviewees

Organisation	Location	Position
EU Delegation	Ankara	Program manager
MdM/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Physiotherapist/ PR Center
MOH	Izmir	Director of Migration Health Provincial level
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	Gynecologist/MHC/ Sulymania
UOSSM/MdM	Hatay	PR Center Manager
UOSSM	Gaziantep	Technical MHPSS Officer/ MHPSS Center
NSPPL/ RI	Hatay	Center Manager/ P&O Center
RI/RI/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Deputy CEO Medical
NSPPL/ RI	Hatay	Project Coordinator
RI	Gaziantep	Deputy country director
RI/RI/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Program Deputy Manager
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	Midwife/MHC/ Sulymania
MdM/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Physiotherapist/ PR Center
UNFPA	Hatay	Field Associate/ MHC/ Antakya
UNFPA	Ankara	Humanitarian Program Regional Manager
MdM	Izmir	Facility Manager
MOH	Izmir	Director of Migration Health Provincial level
UNFPA	Hatay	Health Educator/ MHC/ Antakya
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	Field Associate/ MHC/ Yenci
RI/MUDEM	Izmir	Program Coordinator
UOSSM	Gaziantep	Program Coordinator/MHPSS Center
MdM/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Physiotherapist/ PR Center
EU Delegation	Ankara	Trust Fund Manager
MdM	Izmir	MHPSS Officer
MdM	Izmir	Field Coordinator
UNFPA	Hatay	Head Of doctors/ MHC/ Antakya
UNFPA	Ankara	Humanitarian Regional Program:
MdM/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Physiotherapist/ PR Center
RI	Gaziantep	Program manager
NSPPL/ RI	Hatay	Head of physiotherapists/ P&O Center
UOSSM	Gaziantep	MH Case Worker/ MHPSS Center

UNFPA	Hatay	WGSS Center's Supervisor/ MHC/ Antakya
UOSSM	Gaziantep	psychologist/ MHPSS Center
MOH	Ankara	Head of Migration
NSPPL/ RI	Hatay	Head of Technicians/ P&O Center
MdM/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Physiotherapist/ PR Center
DG ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Technical Assistant
WHO	Ankara/ Skype	Health Coordinator
UOSSM/MdM	Hatay	PR Center/ M&E Coordinator
GOAL	Skype	Country Rep
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	psychologist/MHC/ Yenci
UOSSM/MdM	Hatay	PR Center/ Team Leader
MOH	Hatay	Provincial Health
RI/RI/UOSSM	Gaziantep	Grants Manager
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	psychologist/MHC/ Sulymania
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	Gynecologist/ MHC/ Yenci
UNFPA	Ankara	Humanitarian program Coordinator
RI	Gaziantep	Country Rep
MDM	Hatay	Turkey Program Coordinator
MOH	Izmir	PRHP
MOH	Gaziantep	Provincial Health Director
UNFPA/Harran University	Sanliurfa	Program Coordinator/MHC/Yenci
MOH	Sanliurfa	Provincial Health resp
MOH SIHHAT	Ankara	General Director
MDM	Hatay	Medical Coordinator
RI/MUDEM	Izmir	M&E Coordinator
ECHO	Gaziantep	GZT Office
UOSSM/MdM	Hatay	PR Center/ Physician
RI	Gaziantep	Grants manager

Focus Group Discussions details

Organisation	# people met	# of men/boys	# of women/girls	# children	Beneficiaries /Staff	Location
UOSSM/MDM	8	4	4	3	Beneficiaries	Gaziantep/ MHPSS Center
UNFPA/ Harran University	5	0	5	0	Beneficiaries	Sanliurfa/ MHC/Yenci
UNFPA/ Harran University	6	0	6	0	Beneficiaries	Sanliurfa/ MHC/Sulymania
UNFPA/ Harran University	7	2	5	2	Beneficiaries	Sanliurfa/ MHC/Dugum
UNFPA/Kamar	6	0	6	0	Beneficiaries	Gaziantep/ MHC/ Kamar
UOSSM/MDM	5	0	5	0	Beneficiaries	Hatay/ Rehanly/ PR Center

UOSSM/MDM	5	4	1	1	Beneficiaries	Hatay/ Rehanly/ PR Center
NSPPL/RI	12	5	7	2	Beneficiaries	Hatay/ Rehanly/ P&O Center
MUDEM/RI	13	7	6	5	Beneficiaries	Izmir/MHC
MdM	16	11	5	6	Beneficiaries	Izmir/ Mobile Clinic

Protection team

General information

	# respondents	# men		# women	
<i>Key Informant Interviews</i>	116	64	55%	52	45%
<i>Focus Group Discussions</i>	77	23	30%	54	70%
<i>Total</i>	193	87	45%	106	55%

Complete list of interviewees

Organisation	Location	Position
PDMM	İstanbul	Head of Cohesion and Communication Unit
Social Service Center	Bursa	Case Worker
PDMM	Şanlıurfa	Deputy Director
WHH	Mardin	Senior Psychologist
TRCS	Bursa	Social Worker
Concern	Şanlıurfa	Case Management Officer
Kırkayak Association	Şanlıurfa	Head of Office
DRC	Şanlıurfa	Area Protection Manager
CARE International	Şanlıurfa	Protection Outreach Officer
WHH	Mardin	Senior Protection Expert
PDMM	İstanbul	Head of International Working Group
PDoFLOSS	Mardin	Project Coordinator
Social Service Center	Mardin	Outreach Worker
Social Service Center	Mardin	Interpreter
UNHCR	İstanbul	Child Protection Associate
UNHCR	Ankara	Assistant Communications and Branding Officer
TRCS	Bursa	Community Center Manager
WHH	Mardin	Case Worker
WHH	Mardin	M&E Officer
WHH	Mardin	Case Worker
UNHCR	Ankara	Senior Protection Officer
WHH	Mardin	Psychologist
Mavi Kalem Association	İstanbul	Project Coordinator
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Case Worker

PDoFLOSS	Şanlıurfa	Director
MOFLSS	İstanbul	Section Chief
TRCS	Bursa	Psychosocial Support and Health Officer
UNHCR	Ankara	EU Project Manager
Concern	Şanlıurfa	Programme Director
WHH	Mardin	Case Worker
Social Service Center	Bursa	Project Coordinator
TRCS	Bursa	Health Specialist
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Trainer
PDoFLOSS	Bursa	Project Manager
HRDF	İstanbul	Executive Director
Social Service Center	Mardin	Teacher
EUD	Ankara	International Cooperation Officer
WHH	Mardin	Translator
PDMM	Bursa	Sociologist
TRCS	Mardin	Livelihood Programme Officer
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Translator
TRCS	İstanbul	İstanbul Bağcılar Community Center Manager
WV	İstanbul	Protection Officer
MOFLSS	Ankara	Assistant Expert
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Psychologist
Refugee Rights Turkey	İstanbul	Director
PDoFLOSS	Mardin	Director
PDMM	İstanbul	Director
TRCS	Mardin	Case Worker
WHH	Mardin	Senior Project Officer
MOFLSS	Ankara	Assistant Expert
PDoFLOSS	Mardin	Deputy Director
TRCS	Şanlıurfa	Şanlıurfa Community Center Manager
CARE International	Şanlıurfa	Head of Office
EUD	Ankara	International Cooperation Officer
UNHCR	Ankara (Skype)	RSD officer
DGMM	Ankara	Project Coordinator
DGMM	Ankara	Migration Expert
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Manager
UNHCR	Ankara	Protection Associate (Verification)
PDoFLSS	İstanbul	Director
UNFPA	Mardin	Field Associate
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Outreach Worker
ECHO Ankara	Ankara	M&E Officer
CARE International	Şanlıurfa	Protection Outreach Coordinator
ECHO İstanbul	İstanbul	Programme Officer
PDoFLOSS	Mardin	Deputy Director
Social Service Center	Bursa	Center Manager

DGMM	Ankara	Migration Expert
UNHCR	Ankara (Skype)	Senior Inter-Agency Coordinating Officer
ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Programme Division and Reporting Officer
Support to Life	Mardin	Case Management Officer
UNHCR	Ankara (Skype)	Senior Inter-Agency Protection Coordinating Officer
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Trainer
Concern	Şanlıurfa	Psychologist
UNHCR	Ankara	Senior Regional Registration and Data Analyst-MENA
MOFLSS	Ankara	Section Chief
ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Regional Security Coordinator
UNHCR	Ankara (Skype)	Registration Officer
UNHCR	Ankara	Senior Protection Coordinator (Verification)
PDMM	Mardin	Verification Section Manager
UNFPA	Bursa	Field Associate
Social Service Center	Şanlıurfa	Outreach Worker
UNHCR	Ankara	Donor Relations Unit
TRCS	Bursa	Case Worker
PDoFLOSS	Bursa	Director
IBC	İstanbul	Sancaktepe Infohub Manager
MOFLSS	Ankara	Assistant Expert
Support to Life	Mardin	Project Manager
UNHCR	İstanbul	Protection Assistant
TRCS	Mardin	Case Worker
TRCS	Mardin	Case Worker
UNHCR	Ankara	Associate Communications with Communities Officer
ECHO İstanbul	İstanbul	Technical Assistant
PDMM	Mardin	Deputy Director
Social Service Center	Mardin	Social Worker
TRCS	Bursa	Case Worker
ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Technical Assistant
IBC	Bursa	Bursa Infohub Manager
PDMM	Şanlıurfa	Project Coordinator
Social Service Center	Mardin	Psychologist
CARE International	Şanlıurfa	CM/IPA Manager
Kirkayak Association	Şanlıurfa	Director
Social Service Center	Mardin	Trainer
MOFLSS	Ankara	Section Chief
Refugee Rights Turkey	İstanbul	Programme Manager
PDMM	Bursa	Director
TRCS	Bursa	Case Worker
MOFLSS	Ankara	Assistant Expert
UNHCR	İstanbul	Protection Officer
WHH	Mardin	Case Management Officer
UNFPA	Şanlıurfa	Field Associate

WHH	Mardin	Psychologist
PDMM	Bursa	Head of Cohesion and Communication Unit
TRCS	Mardin	Case Worker
Social Service Center	Mardin	Project Coordinator

Focus Group Discussions details

Organisation	# people met	# of men	# of women	Beneficiary/Staff	Location
TRCS	7	1	6	Beneficiary	Mardin
TRCS	16	5	11	Beneficiary	Şanlıurfa
DRC	8	0	8	Beneficiary	Şanlıurfa
CARE International	12	5	7	Beneficiary	Şanlıurfa
IBC	1	1	0	Beneficiary	Bursa
STL	15	7	8	Beneficiary	Mardin
Home Visit	1	0	1	Beneficiary	Mardin
Home Visit	3	1	2	Beneficiary	Mardin
Home Visit	2	0	2	Beneficiary	Mardin
Home Visit	6	3	3	Dom Refugees	Mardin
Home Visit	6	0	6	Beneficiary	Mardin

Strategic team

General information

	# respondents	# men	# women
<i>Key informant interviews</i>	50	28	44%
<i>Focus Group discussions</i>	16	2	13%
<i>Total</i>	66	30	45%

Complete list of interviewees

Organisation	Location	Position
IOM	Ankara	Emergency Coordinator
Vice-Presidency	Ankara	Chief Coordinator of Facility
DG ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Head of Office
EUD Delegation	Ankara	Monitoring and Evaluation Assistant
DFID Turkey	Ankara	Humanitarian and Migration Lead
UNFPA	Ankara	Assistant Representative
EUD Delegation	Ankara	International Cooperation Officer
EUD Delegation	Ankara	Head of EUD Delegation
UNHCR	Ankara	EU Project Manager
MdM	By Skype	Head of Unit, Syria/Iraq Crisis

WFP	Ankara	Deputy Country Director
Vice-Presidency	Ankara	Project Advisor
EUD Delegation	Ankara/phone	Head of Section (OPS3 - Facility for Refugees in Turkey)
Ohio State University	By email	Professor
Civil Society	Kartepe Summit	Activist and Syrian Student
UNICEF	Ankara	UNICEF Turkey Representative
DG ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Regional Information Officer
EUD Delegation	Ankara	Monitoring and Evaluation Manager
TRC	Ankara	Protection Team Leader
US Embassy	Ankara	Refugee Coordinator
EUD Delegation	Ankara/phone	Head of Cooperation – Minister Counsellor
WFP	Ankara	Government Partnerships Officer
TRCS	Ankara	Programme Coordinator - Community Based Programmes
DG ECHO Ankara	Ankara	PAR
DG ECHO Istanbul	Kartepe Summit	Programme Officer
DG ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Prog. Dev., Planning, Analysis and Reporting (PAR)
AFAD	Ankara	Team Leader
EUTF - DG NEAR	Brussels/phone	Deputy Trust Fund Manager
MoFA	Ankara	Section Chief
UNFPA	Ankara	UNFPA Representative in Turkey
UNHCR	Ankara	UNHCR Head of Turkey
MoNE Provincial Directorate	Eskisehir	MoNE Provincial Director
MoFSP Provincial Directorate	Eskisehir	Consultant
MoNE Provincial Directorate	Eskisehir	Deputy Director
IFRC	Ankara	Programme Coordinator
German Embassy	Ankara	Embassy Counsellor
US Embassy	Ankara	Senior Refugee Coordinator
MoFSP Provincial Directorate	Eskisehir	
MoFSP Provincial Directorate	Eskisehir	Deputy Director
Vice-Presidency	Ankara	Frit Communication Coordinator
UNDP	Kartepe Summit	United Nations Resident Coordinator Turkey
DG NEAR	Brussels/phone	Focal Point ECHO/ EUTF at Facility Secretariat, DG NEAR
Catholic University of America	Kartepe Summit	Adjunct Faculty Instructor
Vice-Presidency	Ankara	Consultant
WHO	Ankara	WHO Representative in Turkey
DG ECHO Ankara	Ankara	Programme Team Leader
AFAD	Ankara	Expert
Vice-Presidency	Ankara	Senior M&E Expert
MoH Provincial Directorate	Eskisehir	Head of Public Health
UNICEF	Ankara	Deputy Representative
DG NEAR	Brussels/phone	Evaluation Officer, FRiT Secretariat

Focus Group Discussions details

Organisation	# people met	# of men	# of women	Beneficiaries / Staff	Location	Type
UNFPA	10	0	10	Staff	Eskisehir	WGSS
UNFPA	3	0	3	Beneficiaries	Eskisehir	WGSS
GoTR	3	2	1	Staff	Alpu (Eskisehir Province)	Alpu Public Health Center

Appendix III: List of Documents Consulted

Project documentation reviewed

Basic needs

CONCERN

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91001 - Humanitarian emergency response to Syria crisis (*also reviewed by Protection sector*)

Literature reviewed for this project:

- 91009_2015_00495_CONCERN WORLDWIDE-IR_FichOp
- 91009_2015_00495_MR_04_01_CONCERN_WORLDWIDE-IR_SingleForm
- 91002_2016_01168_CONCERN WORLDWIDE-IR_FichOps
- 91002_2016_01168_IR_02_01_CONCERN WORLDWIDE-IR_SingleForm [Active]

DIAKONIE KATASTROPHENHILFE

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91035 - Unconditional cash assistance and protection for out-of-camp Syrian and Iraqi refugees settled in south-eastern Turkey

Literature reviewed for this project:

- 91035_2015_00582_DIAKONIE-DE_FichOps
- 171017_Comments on Final Payment advice_Diakonie_Katastrophenhilfe

MERCY CORPS (MCE)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91069 - Aegean Region & Turkey Emergency Refugee Response Programme

Literature reviewed for this project:

- 91069_2015_01079_FR_01_01_MCE-UK_SingleForm [Active]
- 91069_2015_01079_MCE-UK_FichOp
- 91069_2015_01079_MR_02_01_MCE-UK_SingleForm
- 91069_2015_01079_IR_01_01_MCE-UK_SingleForm [Active]
- 91005_2016_01359_FR_01_01_MCE-UK_SingleForm [Active]

WELTHUNGERHILFE (WHH-GAC)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91033 - Addressing the issue of food insecurity through cash card assistance in Turkey

Literature reviewed for this project:

- 91004_2017_00841_RQ_01_03_GAG-DE_SingleForm
- 91033_2015_00734_FR_01_01_GAC-DE_SingleForm [Active]
- 91033_2015_00734_GAC-DE_FichOps
- 91033_2015_00734_MR_04_03_GAC-DE_SingleForm

WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91001 - Food and other assistance to vulnerable refugee populations in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91012 - Emergency Social Safety Net Assistance to refugees in Turkey

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91009 - Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) Assistance to refugees in Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- WFP_TRCO_DG ECHO2016RegionalHIP_MR_20161212 Clean
- Volume 1 ESSN Evaluation Report Draft 2 06052018
- Volume 2 Consolidated Annexes for ESSN Evaluation Draft 2 06052018
- 91009_2017_00972_MR_01_01_WFP-IT_SingleForm
- 91009_2017_00972_MR_01_01_WFP-IT_SingleForm
- WFP_TRCO_DG ECHO_OctoberMonitoringMission_20161011_FINAL
- Annex 22 WFP_TRCO_NFR_WFP-DG ECHOMeetingAnkara_HIP2016MR_20160809_WFP-DG ECHO cleared
- 91012_2016_01199_WFP-IT_FichOp
- Annex 21D WFP_TRCO-DG ECHO_HIP 2016_MRMay2016_Comms Strategy FINAL 20160515
- 20161208_WFP_TRCO_MR_DG ECHO HIP2016_MR
- Annex 11 – IDS-WFP SPSN MENA
- Annex 7 – VAM WFP – Household Verification – November 2016
- Annex 18 WFP-TRC-UNICEF monitoring report_20160922_FINAL
- Annex 16 – WFP Turkey off-camp Food Security Report April 2016
- Annex 20 – TUR16-NFR11 – Selection of Halkbank as FSP for the ESSN – 23 December 2016
- Annex 18 WFP-TRC-UNICEF monitoring report_20160922_FINAL
- Annex 16 – WFP Turkey off-camp Food Security Report April 2017
- Annex 20 – TUR16-NFR11 – Selection of Halkbank as FSP for the ESSN – 23 December 2017
- Annex 13J ESSN Preparation Workshop_May_Presentation_ Resource Transfer model_20160505
- Annex 3B – MEB & Transfer Value
- Annex 13C ESSN Preparation Workshop_May_Day2_Summary_20160505
- 91033_2015_00734_MR_04_03_GAC-DE_SingleForm
- Annex_3b__E-voucher_impact_evaluation_HATAY
- Annex 13 – MOFLSS circular on ESSN implementation – October 2016 – EN translation
- Annex_26_ Illiterate individuals
- Annex_21_ ESSN_and_ CTE_Transfer_Amounts
- Annex 18 – ESSN applications by 30 January 2017 based on MOFLSS data
- Annex_20_ Protection Approach
- Annex_15_BNWG_ToR_June2017
- Annex_29_The World Banks New Poverty Monitoring Framework Implications for Turkey
- Annex_6_WFP_UNHCR_Report_Review_of_Targeting_of_Cash_and_Food_Assistance_for_Syrian_Refugees_in_Lebanon_Jordan_Egypt
- Annex_3c__E-voucher_impact_evaluation_AKC_URFA_centre
- ESSN2_RQ_DG ECHO_Budget_20171128
- Annex_11 Training Strategy Draft
- Vizibility_WFP_Mission_Note_-october_2016_Begum
- Annex_16_AboveStandardVisibilityPlan_20180215
- Annex_5_WB_UNHCR_Report_The_Welfare_of_Syrian_Refugees
- Annex_5_Overview_CTP_Refugee_Assistance_in_Turkey_092015
- Annex_16a_ESSN through Art – Plan 150218b (002)

- Annex 15 PDM 1 -IR May 2018-DG ECHOTURBUD201691012

Education

INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91010 – IOM – *Enhancing Protection in the humanitarian response in Turkey through better addressing Basic Needs, supporting access to education and integrated service provision.*

Literature reviewed for this project:

- IOM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016, FichOps and Annexes, last update 05/07/2018.
- IOM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 02/02/2018.
- IOM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 23/05/2017.

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND (UNICEF)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91006 – UNICEF – *Increased access to non-formal education programmes for vulnerable refugee children in Turkey.*
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91013 – UNICEF – Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91007 – UNICEF – Increased access to education and protection for vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugee children and families in Turkey (CCTE)

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91013, FichOps and Annexes, last update 27/07/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91007, FichOps and Annexes, last update 27/07/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91006, FichOps and Annexes, last update 27/07/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91006, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 24/07/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91007, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 13/07/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91007, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 27/06/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91013, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 30/04/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91006, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 27/02/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91013, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 27/11/2017.

Health

GOAL

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91063 – GOAL – Improving the health and protection of vulnerable Syrian and marginalized migrants in southern Turkey

Literature reviewed for this project:

- GOAL, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91063, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- GOAL, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91063, eSingle Form, Non-essential changes, 14/08/2017.
- GOAL, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91063, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 07/06/2017.
- GOAL, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91063, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 07/10/2016.

HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL (HI)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91015 – HI – Emergency intervention for the most vulnerable Syrian-crisis affected people in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91003 – HI – A multi-stakeholders and multi-sectoral response mechanism improves the access to inclusive and quality services for the most vulnerable Syrian and non-Syrian refugees including people with disabilities in West Turkey (Izmir and Istanbul city)

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- HI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91015, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- HI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91003, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- HI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91003, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 07/05/2018.
- HI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91015, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 06/05/2018.
- HI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91015, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 28/08/2017.
- HI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91015, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 16/06/2017.
- HI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91003, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 16/06/2017.

INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL CORPS (IMC)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91034 – IMC – Improving the well-being of Syrian refugees through physical rehabilitation, protection mechanisms and primary health care services in southern Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91015 – IMC – Provision of lifesaving health, physical rehabilitation, mental health, GBV and protection services in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91001 – IMC – Provision of lifesaving health care and GBV protection to the most vulnerable refugees in southern Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- IMC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91034, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- IMC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91001, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- IMC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91015, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- IMC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91015, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 20/02/2018.
- IMC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91001, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 11/07/2017.
- IMC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91034, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 28/04/2017.
- IMC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91001, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 23/12/2016.
- IMC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91034, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 30/11/2016.
- IMC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91034, eSingle Form, Intermediate report and Annexes, 30/09/2016.
- IMC, Mental Health and Psychosocial Support. Considerations for Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Sources of Distress, Coping Mechanisms, & Access to Support, January 2017.

MÉDECINS DU MONDE (MDM)

- ECHO/SYR/2015/91038 – MDM – Provision of medical relief to refugees and migrants in Turkey through direct support to health facilities and implementing partners
- ECHO/TUR/2016/91016 – MDM – Contribute to sustainable integration of refugees into host population
- ECHO/TUR/2017/91010 – MDM – Strengthen the longer-term resilience of refugees and migrants by improving the level of their emotional, mental, and physical well-being

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- MDM, An Invisible Crisis: Exploring Mental Health needs in the Syrian and Iraqi Crises, October 2018.
- MDM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91010, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 31/08/2018.
- MDM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91010, FichOps and Annexes, last update 27/07/2018.
- MDM, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91038, FichOps and Annexes, last update 05/07/2018.
- MDM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91016, FichOps and Annexes, last update 05/07/2018.
- MDM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91016, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 29/03/2018.
- MDM, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91038, eSingle Form, Request, 30/11/2017.
- MDM, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91016, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 29/09/2017.
- MDM, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91038, eSingle Form, Non-essential changes, 02/08/2017.
- MDM, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91038, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 30/06/2017.
- MDM, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91038, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 14/03/2016.

RELIEF INTERNATIONAL (RI)

- ECHO/SYR/2015/91049 – RI – Lifesaving Emergency Assistance for Protracted Conflict in Syria (LEAP)
- ECHO/TUR/2016/91014 – RI – Strengthening Access to Specialized Health Services in Turkey for Conflict-Affected Syrians (SASH)
- ECHO/TUR/2017/91002 – RI – Strengthening Access to Specialized Health Services for Refugees in Turkey – Phase II (SASH II)

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- RI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91014, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- RI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91002, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- RI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91049, FichOps, last update 09/07/2018.
- RI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91002, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 22/05/2018.
- RI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91014, Interim Report and Annexes, 30/03/2018.
- RI, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91014, Modification Request, 22/01/2018.
- RI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91049, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 12/06/2017.
- RI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91049, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 23/11/2016.
- RI, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91049, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 30/09/2016.
- Relief International, Post-evaluation of Prosthetics Survey, March 2017.

UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND (UNFPA)

- ECHO/TUR/2016/91009 – UNFPA – Support to most vulnerable refugee women and girls to access Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH) and Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) Services
- ECHO/TUR/2017/91001 – UNFPA – Improving access of most vulnerable refugees, particularly women, girls and key refugee groups to Sexual Reproductive Health (SRH) and better protection services including Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/2017/91003 – UNFPA – Improving access of most vulnerable refugees to Social Services in Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- UNFPA, Regional Situation Report for Syria Crisis Issue No. 72, August 2018.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91003, FichOps and Annexes, last update 27/07/2018.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91001, FichOps and Annexes, last update 27/07/2018.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91009, FichOps and Annexes, last update 05/07/2018.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91009, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 29/03/2018.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91009, eSingle Form, Non-essential changes, 29/03/2018.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91001, Modification Request, 29/11/2017.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91003, eSingle Form, Request, 26/09/2017.
- UNFPA, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91009, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 05/07/2017.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO)

- ECHO/SYR/2016/91012 – WHO – Supporting adapted and culturally sensitive healthcare services to Syrian refugees in Turkey
- ECHO/SYR/2016/91020 WHO – Supporting adapted and culturally sensitive healthcare services to refugees and migrants in Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- WHO, Donor alert: Syria crisis North-western Syria, August 2018.
- WHO, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91012, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- WHO, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91020, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- WHO, Health Cluster Turkey Hub: Health Indicators Report – March 2018.
- WHO, Health status of refugees and migrants in Turkey: an evidence review of published scientific papers, 2018.
- WHO, Annual Report 2017, Health Emergencies in Turkey: response to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, 2017.
- WHO, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91020, eSingle Form, Modification Request, Refused, 17/04/2018.
- WHO, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91020, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 21/12/2017.
- WHO, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91012, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 10/11/2017.
- WHO, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91012, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 07/08/2017.
- WHO, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91012, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 25/11/2016.

Protection

CARE

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91001 Humanitarian Emergency Response to Syria Crisis
- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91066 Urgent basic humanitarian assistance, and coordination of information needs, for refugees in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91017 Urgent protection assistance for refugees in Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91001, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91066, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91001, eSingle Form, Modification request, 11/04/2018.

- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91001, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 19/02/2018.
- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91066, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 30/06/2017.
- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91066, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 14/01/2017.
- CARE, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91066, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 04/11/2016.

CONCERN

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91002 Emergency Protection and Education Support to Refugees in Turkey

Literature reviewed for this project:

- CONCERN, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91002, FichOps, last update 09/07/2018.
- CONCERN, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91002, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 31/03/2017.
- CONCERN, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91002, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 30/09/2016.
- CONCERN, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91002, eSingle Form, Non-essential changes, 13/09/2016.

DIAKONIE KATASTROPHENHILFE

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91004 Enhancing access to effective services and protection for people of concern in Turkey

Literature reviewed for this project:

- DIAKONIE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91004, FichOps, last update 15/07/2018.
- DIAKONIE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91004, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 25/05/2018.
- DIAKONIE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91004, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 04/12/2017.
- DIAKONIE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91004, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 27/10/2017.

DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL (DRC)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91036 Humanitarian response to Syrian vulnerable refugees in southern Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91007 Proactive Actions to Prevent Sexual and Gender Based Violence in South East Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91018 Proactive Actions to reduce protection vulnerabilities among displaced populations in Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- DRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91018, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- DRC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91036, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- DRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91007, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- DRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91018, eSingle Form, Interim report and Annexes, 29/06/2018.
- DRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91007, eSingle Form, Interim Report and Annexes, 09/05/2018.
- DRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91018, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 02/05/2018.
- DRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91007, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 31/01/2018.
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- DRC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2015/91036, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 30/09/2016.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES (IFRC)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91017 Turkey Population Movement
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91008 Responding to Protection Needs of Refugees in Turkey

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- IFRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91008, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- IFRC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91017, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- IFRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91008, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 29/06/2018.
- IFRC, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91008, eSingle Form, Modification request, 20/04/2018.
- IFRC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91017, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 30/06/2017.
- IFRC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91017, eSingle Form. Intermediate Report and Annexes, 27/12/2016.
- IFRC, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91017, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 29/04/2016.

MERCY CORPS (MCE)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91005 Refugee Protection Response in Turkey

Literature reviewed for this project:

- MCE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91005, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- MCE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91005, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 06/09/2017.
- MCE, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91005, eSingle Form, Request, 05/12/2016.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91006 Providing protection and durable solutions to refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91005 Protection and improved access to services for refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey.

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- UNHCR, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91006, FichOps, last update 30/11/2018.
- UNHCR, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91006, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 29/11/2018.
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- UNHCR, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91006, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 28/11/2017.
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- UNHCR, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91006, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 05/05/2017.

UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY FUND (UNICEF)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91008 Increased access to protection and basic needs support for vulnerable refugee children and families.

Literature reviewed for this project:

- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91008, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91008, eSingle Form, Final Report and Annexes, 28/03/2018.
- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91008, eSingle Form, Intermediate Report and Annexes, 26/04/2017.

- UNICEF, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91008, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 14/07/2017.

WORLD VISION (WV)

- ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91005 Providing Life Improving Protection Support to Vulnerable Refugees and Host Families in Turkey
- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91019 Providing information and protection assistance to vulnerable refugees in Turkey, and linking them to protection services.

Literature reviewed for these projects:

- WV, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91019, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- WV, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91005, FichOps, last update 05/07/2018.
- WV, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91019, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 22/06/2018.
- WV, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2016/91019, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 24/10/2017.
- WV, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91005, eSingle Form, Final Report, 02/10/2017.
- WV, project ECHO/SYR/BUD/2016/91005, eSingle Form, Modification Request, 03/07/2017.

WELTHUNGERHILFE (WHH-GAC)

- ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91004 PIPS - Providing Integrated Protection Services for the most vulnerable people in Mardin Province

Literature reviewed for this project:

- WHH, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91004, FichOps, last update 27/07/2018.
- WHH, project ECHO/TUR/BUD/2017/91004, eSingle Form, Request 20/09/2017.

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All sectors

- European Commission, Updated Facility Strategic Concept Note, April 2018.
- European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Second Annual Report on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, COM (2018) 91 Final, p.8, 2018.
- European Commission, Management Framework Review – Final Version, October 2017.
- European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, ECHO Turkey Management Framework 2016-2018, Strategic Plan, Metrics and Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy, 23 March 2017, Version 3.0 Final.
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Appendix IV: Survey results

1. Survey methodology

Overall approach

The appropriateness of one or multiple surveys was discussed during the inception phase, in order to determine whether there should be a general online survey, or smaller targeted surveys with required partner organisations. It was not intended to conduct an online survey with Government of Turkey institutions and Ministries.

During the desk phase, it was decided that the survey would be a single general one addressed to a wide range of stakeholders: DG ECHO staff, implementing partners - UN Agencies and INGOs - and their local partners: Turkish or Syrian NGOs based in Turkey, other EU instruments staff, Member States representatives.

The list of survey recipients relied on a) lists of names shared with the evaluation during the Inception phase by DG ECHO and/or consulted stakeholders; b) additional lists that were shared with the evaluation in the context of the pre-field mission. The evaluation team compiled a total of 257 contact details.

The questionnaire was based on the evaluation matrix: key evaluation questions are adapted to a survey audience and sections are organised by criteria. The survey is structured as follow:

- General questions – for all respondents, to obtain some background information
- Common questions – for all respondents
- Sector questions - Implementing partners will reply according to the sectors they work in
- Stakeholder questions – only for certain respondents, indicated clearly before the question

The survey contained three types of entries: multiple choice questions, additional comments and open questions.

Analysis

The evaluation team analyzed the survey results using the R programming language, which was also used to produce graphical and tabular results. All data was grouped, and is herein presented according to their respective self-selected stakeholder group affiliation (for example, International NGO or Local NGO). Due to the complex nature of the evaluation, a methodological decision was made to include a “Do not know” option. “No Response” refers to respondents who skipped the question or respondents who were not asked the question. Both of these are represented as categories of response in Section 2 below. Over 400 qualitative responses were obtained from the 121 respondents. These written comments were categorically analyzed, with a synthesis of this analysis provided in Section 2.

Timeline

The survey was designed in September 2018 at early stage of Desk phase. It was launched in October and closed mid-November. The table below presents a brief timeline of the survey management:

September	3 rd October	15 th October	6 th November	12 th November	30 November
Design	Launch	1 st Reminder	2 nd Reminder	Closing	Analysis

Limitations






Before the launch of the survey and during its dissemination, the evaluation team faced a few limitations:

- Gathering contact details was a slow and laborious process: implementing partners in particular were not always responsive as expected and so the number of contacts we received was sometimes unbalanced between organisations.
- One inherent risk with online survey is that many invitations to answer the questionnaire ended in the junk emails box. Some recipients probably never saw the invitation and it has a significant impact on the number of responses.
- Finally, a few people opened the survey without answering to any question, which distorts the final number of “concrete” answers.

2. Survey results⁸⁸

2.1. Background Information

The survey was sent to 257 people. We received **121 answers**, which represents a response rate of 47%. Detailed results with exact counts are provided in Section 3 of this Appendix.




⁸⁸ In all graphic charts in sections 2.2 to 2.8, numbers in brackets represent the number of respondents in each category of stakeholder


2.2. Relevance

1. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO-funded interventions have taken into account the needs of the refugees in Turkey. (For this evaluation, this includes Syrians and non-Syrians, registered and unregistered, inside and outside camps, but not host communities and internally displaced persons).


1.1 Refugees have been consulted in the design of DG ECHO-funded projects




1.2 DG ECHO's partners considered the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in the design and implementation of their interventions



1.3 An analysis of protection risks was undertaken in the design and implementation of interventions




1.4 A gender-sensitive needs assessment, or a gender analysis, was undertaken in the design and implementation of interventions




2. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO and its partners have been adjusting their approach and been addressing gaps as the capacity of Government of Turkey (GoTR) has evolved.

2.1 Partners have adapted their projects to meet the needs of vulnerable refugees in light of the evolving sectoral policies of the GoTR? (Consider your particular sector)




2.3. Coherence

2.2 Partners have adapted their projects to meet the needs of vulnerable refugees in light of the evolving sectoral capacities of the GoTR? (within your sector)



3. Concerning whether DG ECHO's response in Turkey is consistent with DG ECHO's strategy for Turkey, as established in the relevant HIPs.

3.1 DG ECHO-funded projects correspond to their HIP (per sector, per HIP)



3.2 What are the reasons or factors that best explain the degree of alignment?

POSITIVE

- At proposal stage: rigorous process of selections of projects based on the assessment of the alignment with the relevant HIP, those projects deemed not in line with the HIP are therefore not supported by ECHO. Close coordination and cooperation with DG ECHO in proposal development in line with the HIP. Proposals from partners not in line with the HIP are rejected or negotiated until they are.
- DG ECHO's strategy is based on needs and context: needs of the refugee community and of the most vulnerable groups, based on the level of urgency. Close monitoring by ECHO of the operational environment (needs assessments and consultations meetings with different stakeholders) and close engagement with partners. Needs and gaps are identified collaboratively. HIPs are written in light of this information.
- Appropriation of the strategy by DG ECHO Technical Advisors who follow up the implementation of projects and support partners to ensure the alignment with the strategy.
- Knowledge of the context and understanding of the challenges faced by INGOs in Turkish environment from ECHO's TA, which led to a good and effective collaboration with the IPs.
- For the projects to be financed, ECHO also considers GoTR's capacities and policies to ensure complementarity and sustainability of the services proposed to the extent possible.

“The level of alignment to the HIP does not guarantee the accuracy of interventions.”

- **Basic Needs:** The ESSN aligned to the HIP and was described in detail within it, including what type of actors were to be part of the programme and their roles. This was due to preparatory work conducted with stakeholders prior to the publication of the HIP.
- **Education:** In terms of the CCTE, it was a copy of the national system but extended to refugees and using other cash delivery and monitoring processes, platforms and tools. DG ECHO was supposed to focus on OOSC, which the CCTE only does in part but not fully - it does not tackle the root causes. Although the child protection component does have the potential to do this. Hence the education strategy which should have focused mainly on OOSC was not fully reflected in the programming on the ground, although a small-scale programme did albeit try to do this. ECHO pushed for partners to conduct studies on OOSC and push for further influencing workshops and programming, which ended up occurring in 2018.
- **Health:** DG ECHO's health strategy closely followed Government's refugee health policy, other key donors and needs in the field. The HIPs were structured to ensure complementarity.


NEGATIVE

- “While the projects are well aligned with the basic needs/ESSN as a central backbone with other plug in sectors such as protection and education, the implementation has lacked ECHO support for cross sector fertilisation and coordination which would have ensured better alignment.”
- “The HIP related to basic needs (ESSN) was extremely prescriptive in terms of programme design.”
- “Currently projects are designed with no proper needs assessments, usually such assessments are not funded before the start of projects, clusters data are very poor, 3RP plan for 2019 for example has identical numbers of 2018's version.” Projects are usually designed according to the availability of partners, for health for example, in the middle of project implementation a partner may not start project activities due to legal registration issues. Projects are not always following their original plans.
- “1) Changing political environment in Turkey with the state of emergency with negative serious impacts for CSOs working in the refugee context as well as for CSOs in human rights field; 2) Changing priorities with the EU-Turkey Statement of March 2016 which lead to the politicisation of the asylum/migration field in Turkey; 3) Changing needs of refugees in Turkey (e.g. emphasise in DG ECHO's response was initially on short term emergency assistance rather than other long term protection needs of refugees within Turkey and advocacy. Medium to long term needs were partly ignored at the beginning; they were prioritised relatively later than they should have been.”

“Some of the ambitions of a given HIP (particularly those with a more development-type focus which require collaboration and integration with national systems as opposed to a pure humanitarian assistance delivery focus) may not be achievable on the ground in practice by the projects, particularly in the short time-frame of funding (typically one year) for each project.”

4. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO's operations were aligned with DG ECHO's thematic/sector policies in place during the evaluation period.

4.1 The design and implementation of projects follows DG ECHO thematic/sectoral policy (within your sector)



4.2 If not, what could explain any discrepancies between DG ECHO-funded projects and DG ECHO's thematic/sectoral policies?

- Discrepancies due to lack of vision of real needs in the field:
- What is appropriate in the Turkey context given the diversity of stakeholders, both state and non-state, and the partners who are able to deliver on the ground at scale- given the multiple limitations.
- Lack of communication and planning.
- DG ECHO partners have had to align to DG NEAR's defined monitoring and reporting system in place in Turkey.
- Only those that fall under nexus and LRRD/development go a bit out of scope.
- Protection: "The thematic/sectoral policy of DG ECHO must be redesigned for implementation of the protection projects. GoTR policies on Protection has changed by the MoFSP. The data privacy and confidentiality law restricted outreach and house to house visit in the provinces. These activities only could be conducted by Ministry of Family and Social Policies."

"While overall, I agree that operations were aligned with thematic/sectoral policies, I do not fully agree with regards to the DG ECHO cash guidance. Unfortunately, the cash guidance remains unclear to many agencies and apparently even to DG ECHO itself; it seems that this particular guidance needs to mature further in consultation with partners implementing on the ground, before becoming a meaningful DG ECHO policy."

5. Concerning how successful DG ECHO has been in coordinating its operations with other EC financial instruments and with the 3RP, i.e. promoting synergies and avoiding duplications and gaps. Question not asked to International and Local NGOs.

5.3 What is the comparative advantage of DG ECHO as a contracting authority under the Facility in relation to other EC financial instruments?

5.1 The level of coordination between DG ECHO and other EC financial instruments has been effective/adequate



During the contracting process:

- Easier and faster in contracting projects than other EC instruments

“The rapidity - but there is a danger here. DG ECHO is seen as the agile instrument - this is practical as not always used for the emergency response - DG ECHO is at risk of having more on its shoulders while DG NEAR is not doing any reform to speed its own process.”


- Only funding the NGOs and UN agencies and not the GoTR directly, which ensures stronger impartiality and independence than rest of the instruments under the Facility
- Needs based response - to ensure the continuity of the fund raising in accord with the needs of both community. Because, since the affected number of both communities are huge, the needs will have still been continuing until a certain level of stability is ensured. So, continuous and a solid fund raising is essential. Funding is available for a comparatively longer period.
- Good understanding of the humanitarian context - Strong humanitarian principles – well positioned to address emergency related issues.

During the implementation:

- Quick execution of projects, ECHO is pushing for faster delivery without compromise, it is easier to make alignments during the implementation of the project, flexibility. The reactivity and the capacity to scale up large operation such as the ESSN
- Easy to consult and changes in the project as per the changing ground realities.
- Technical expertise in relevant sectors is available at country level
- Strong involvement with partners and local authorities, close to the ground - presence on the field and knowledge of the context - continuous coordination with partners on the front line
- Strong access to beneficiaries (directly or via partner) - trying to focus on the most vulnerable at need crisis affected populations and supporting civil society.
- Ability to monitor programmes and context on the ground with regular field visits.

6. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO's response has taken into account the Turkish response to refugees' needs and other EU Member States and donors.

6.1 DG ECHO delivered its response in view of the actions of Turkish authorities and other donors.




6.3 Please illustrate how this is the case or not within your sector:

OVERALL

- Coordination with authorities in both central and provincial level to understand the needs and capacities. All actions funded by DG ECHO complement the existing services provided by the

6.2 DG ECHO-funded projects complement those carried out by Turkish authorities (within your sector)



government as well as facilitate the access to these services. Response is designed and based on a normative understanding of the GoTR capacities.

- Continuous and very productive communication with Turkish authorities.
- Dependence on GoTR willingness and interest to facilitate coherence and coordination. Compromise is essential to operate in the current political context in Turkey. “While this is well understood at Turkey-level, it is not always recognized at Brussels-level.”

“The GoTR has been at the forefront of the refugee response and, in almost all sectors, has the capacity and expertise to respond to the needs, counting on the support of ECHO. This is less the case though for unregistered refugees.”

BASIC NEEDS

- DG ECHO funded ESN focusing on out of camp refugees while GoTR oversees the basic needs of refugees in camps.
- ESN has enjoyed the full buy-in from GoTR and DG ECHO has co-chaired the SC with GoTR. GoTR is a very strong actor within the ESN, and has had the final decision-making power on many of the key programme elements (e.g. number of beneficiaries, transfer value, etc).
- DG ECHO has pushed all their partners to integrate as well as possible into existing GoTR systems such as the ESN with the MoFLSS.
- “While projects such as the ESN have been complementary to assistance offered by Turkish authorities, some unintended consequences have also arisen, e.g. ESN beneficiaries are no longer eligible for regular assistance offered through the national social protection system.”

EDUCATION

- Strong coordination with non-humanitarian aid.
- “The CCTE mirrors the national system, but uses different delivery platform, actors and processes, provides a cash incentive to encourage children to attend any public school. The GoTR wanted to transfer children into Turkish public schools and are investing in this, hence this supports this policy. It is partly funded by other donors. The ALP Project for OOSC is a pilot that will then be able to be integrated into the MoNE system. DG NEAR through PICTES and infrastructure programmes was delivering other complementary goods and services for public schools.”

HEALTH

- Referral into existing public services is essential for project design - close liaison is expected.
- Filling the gaps in rehabilitation of people that were injured, including training to their caregivers and facilitating access to health services denied refugees with and without registration. DG ECHO focuses on providing niche services (MHPSS and physical rehabilitation) for Syrian refugees inside Turkey.
- Ministry of Health is implementing EC-funded SIHHAT Project to increase access of Syrian refugees to health services in Turkey. DG ECHO has aligned its strategy in health sector to be complementary and avoid any possible duplications. For example, DG ECHO is no longer supporting new primary health care services but focusing its support to psychosocial support which is not covered under SIHHAT.
- The funding created synergies with local initiatives to streamline the health response and encouraged synergies for handover and sustainability. DG ECHO also supported renovation, equipment and supplies for GoTR health centres.

“This was specifically the case in late 2017, when DG ECHO advocacy work towards Turkish authorities proved to be efficient and enabled the joint implementation of

health activities between governmental and humanitarian entities. This model was really successful in the sense that it allowed to address multiple needs in one single place and also ensured the sustainability of the services provided.”


PROTECTION

- DG ECHO interventions in protection have been priorities with a consideration of GoTR capacities and policies. Complementing existing services with those not being able to be carried out by the GoTR, or available through GoTR but not adequately corresponding to the needs of refugees, is DG ECHO's main strategy orientation under protection. The approach is relying on NGOs/UN agencies to fill a gap in terms of response.
- One of the main objectives was to integrate and build bridges of communication between refugees' community and the host community.
- In Social Protection and Social Cohesion projects WALD supported existing mechanisms of local governments. DG ECHO funds were used in order to expand the services provided for refugees by local governments.
- Under the temporary scheme actions were funded to compliment the increased awareness of the practice in Turkey (aligning to the approach of the government).
- The registration of vulnerable refugee families links them thereafter with the services provided by the Turkish Government. Referral mapping is in place and constantly updated in order to avoid duplication and to make sure that people are referred to existing services as much as possible. Where necessary additional support is provided to beneficiaries to enable access to existing services (like translation services).
- As DG ECHO makes sure, that the complementarity of another EU funded project is ensured, UNHCR also makes sure that the complementarity component is within the project planning
- “We are supporting protection standalone actions (FAFA & FPA partners), and we are also supporting the Social Service Centres of the MoFLSS (previously known as MOFSP) for refugees to be integrated into the Ministry social schemes, and also supporting the Bar Associations to enable refugees to access to legal aid.”
- Regarding our sector (protection), some actions of Turkish authorities produced restrictions for CSOs in the field e.g. strict travel permit requirements, suspension of TP registrations in some cities, long waiting periods in IP registrations, requirements for outreach activities, hardening access to those in detention centres, refolement cases etc. Consequently, in protection sector some projects rather than complementing the actions of Turkish authorities had to deal with limitations introduced in the field.
- “I do not clearly see a complementarity between ECHO and GoTR in protection. I see DG ECHO activities addressing more this issue while I do not clearly see existing services working on responding to protection needs of Syrians and other refugees.”

2.4. EU Added-Value

7. Concerning the added value of DG ECHO humanitarian aid interventions, i.e. the value of the EU intervention compared to a situation where interventions were carried out by EU Member States only.

7.1 DG ECHO's response has provided what Member States could not provide individually



7.2 What have been the main comparative advantages of the DG ECHO in the response, i.e. funding, partnership, approach, policies, field presence, coordination, visibility, interventions, sectors, etc.?

Field presence

- Team on the ground and especially multiple technical assistants in country: knowledge of the context, technical expertise and availability to support the ECHO funded partners on programme implementation decisions.
- Make sure programmes are appropriate: capacity for solid monitoring and evaluation and conduction of risk assessments.
- Continuous monitoring of the humanitarian needs, the security context and the political situation.
- Advocacy efforts towards GoTR for humanitarian access in a shrinking space for civil society actors and UN.

“The impact of DG ECHO towards the Turkish Government is much more significant than the one of Member States, which was helpful in order to promote activities led by humanitarian agencies in Turkey and to advocate for their acceptance. DG ECHO has a strong understanding of the field reality and challenges, and thanks to their result-oriented vision, they were able to actively and efficiently support the partners.”

Funding

- Availability of one unique large and predictable funding, as opposed to multiple and fragmented funding: coherent and comprehensive assistance project; more negotiation power with stakeholders on the design of the project; more efficient coordination among stakeholders
- Flexibility in the use of the funds considering the challenges faced in the field
- Rapid mobilisation
- Easier for accountability

Coordination and Partnerships

- DG ECHO strived to have good external relationships with all stakeholders: linkages with development actors under the Facility, direct contact with refugees and local stakeholders, strong relationships with Turkish authorities
- DG ECHO favours partnerships between INGOs and LNGOs

Expertise

- Knowledge and extensive experience of DG ECHO in the humanitarian field
- Scale of programmes
- Consistent approach, clear policies and strategy
- Visibility
- Clearly articulated sectoral priorities
- Interest in innovative approaches

“The creation of the Facility as an instrument also supported the enlargement of ECHO field presence in Turkey, the funding and the impact of ECHO funded activities.”

7.3 What have been the main factors limiting the value added of the DG ECHO intervention?

Restrictive policy environment

- GoTR legislation constantly evolving, lack of willingness for cooperation by the Turkish Authorities, especially since the coup attempt in 2016
- Shrinking humanitarian space - protection particularly difficult
- Registration problems (e.g. Handicap International leaving the country) - limited number of partners who can implement, situation deteriorating.
- Operational access for the INGOs in working to respond the refugee crisis. No permits to address the needs of the unregistered population.
- The delay in granting work permits to humanitarian workers (sometimes several months) has a significant impact on securing the qualified personnel required to implement projects with high quality and efficiency. And the restriction in hiring Syrian staff especially in the South East, where applications to work permits take lot of time.
- Political rift between Member States and the Turkey causing misunderstanding and impact on running the Actions
- Economic crisis
- Limited knowledge and experience working in upper-middle income context with strong government leadership.
- Sometimes no visibility due to legal issues between INGOs and GoTR
- Limited influence over the GoTR on some key programmatic issues, and access to data and areas, due to over-politicised operating environment.

“DG ECHO has poorly played its advocacy role to support partners encountering administrative and operational difficulties in Turkey.”

Funding procedures

- Not direct funding to local/national NGOs – lack of experience and understanding of the context in Turkey by some of DG ECHO’s international implementing partners.
- The funding cycle, hence the lack of multi-year funding. Not a normal nexus environment where development actors have visibility and large-scale funding over at least 5 years.
- Pressure in terms of signature of contracts and expenditures - not based on programming.

“DG ECHO does not provide any flexible funding to national NGOs such as overheads. This has not helped the country to establish long term infrastructure to provide services. Funding through INGOs has created an unnecessary step of loss of funding reaching beneficiaries and has also caused a disruption of NGO sector (unbalanced and high salary scales not compatible to the times before crisis, loss in the level of voluntarism, lack of balance between services to refugees and disadvantaged host community. Many times, junior expats at INGOs had a bigger role in the intervention than the experienced local experts.”

Another survey respondent: *“In the initial stages, most international stakeholders had none or very limited knowledge and experience regarding Turkish legal framework and available structures and services in the country. Most, regardless of the realities in Turkey, tried to replicate their previous experiences gained in other countries. This no doubt caused serious delays, gaps, misunderstandings and mistakes in the interventions by the civil society and thus by DG ECHO. This approach also led to some constraints by the Turkish Government on the activities of CSOs in general. Moreover, the fact that DG ECHO funds available for national NGOs only through sub-contracts with INGOs or UN agencies creates hierarchical relationship between INGOs and NGOs rather than real partnership on an equal basis.”*

Coordination

- With other EU instruments: lack of buy in from NEAR for DG ECHO programmes; “the implementation of EU trust fund and division of sectors per instruments made DG ECHO added value limited at the end where focus was mainly on protection (for example no funding for shelter, no funding for health etc)”; DG ECHO has stressed numerous times the importance of coordinating efforts with IPA partners, however was not always able to clarify who were the IPA partners and where they were working.
- With its implementing partners: “DG ECHO has left the coordination to the individual agencies, which is understandable to a certain extent but is at the same time a missed opportunity to promote speaking with one voice for example towards the GoTR or with TRC”.

“In terms of coordination, DG ECHO has been very weak in Turkey, with poor effective synergies with the 3 RP. Despite a strong field presence, DG ECHO has been very poor in the conduction of humanitarian situation analysis, in its relationship with partners which was limited to field visits to projects and to the formal presentation of the HIPs. No regular meetings with partners were held.”

Humanitarian-Development Nexus and Exit strategy

- Concept of sustainability absent in the design stage of interventions.

- Lack of a balance between immediate response versus longer term solutions.
- DG ECHO was not able to influence the 5 years annual plan, which could have included refugees into the budget allocation.
- The decision to move from an emergency to development phase, interrupted the DG ECHO support. Having new donors required an adaptation and familiarization period for the new donors with the approach and achievements of the DG ECHO funded project.

Other

- In certain cases, insufficient needs assessment and geographical concentration of projects, not necessarily reaching the most vulnerable.
- The absence of a regional approach in the response to the crisis.
- “DG ECHO has its own agenda at times and not always wanted to listen to or respect the reality from the field”.
- Scale of the intervention.
- M&E and quarterly reporting is very time consuming – differences between each reporting format used (UN agency, NGOs and DG ECHO, other donors).

“DG ECHO's one single agency approach created competition and confusion among actors and went against the delivering across agencies and mandates as one that UN agencies had tried to promote.”


Protection: “Turkish State protection systems still require years of development. DG ECHO's response was mainly limited by the fact that there was a lack of suitable referral options for case management of child protection concerns and SGBV cases, especially for non-Turkish citizens. Protection responses were also limited by the fact that if PoCs lacked appropriate documentation (i.e. no temporary protection card, or geographical restriction on accessing temporary protection services), they could not access other state services, such as health. DG ECHO did however work with partners to adapt to this issue, and ensured that local level advocacy and accompaniment activities were supported.”

“The limiting factor has mainly been the gap between theory and practice; while in theory DG ECHO has promoted coherence between DG ECHO-funded projects and coherence between DG ECHO-funded projects and GoTR efforts, in practice DG ECHO has not always taken steps to facilitate this.”

2.5. Effectiveness


8. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO's objectives have been achieved (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus, the specific HIPs and the Decision establishing the Facility, and the Management Framework for Turkey).

8.1 DG ECHO's interventions achieved their objectives (within your sector)




9. Concerning the extent to which the needs of the final beneficiaries been satisfied (in terms of socio-economical support, protection, health, education, etc.)


9.1 DG ECHO provided the right amount and type of aid at the right time and in an appropriate way to the final beneficiaries (within your sector)




9.2 Projects have been seeking feedback from vulnerable refugees and used that feedback to adapt and improve performance (within your sector)



9.3 DG ECHO-funded projects systematically tailored responses to the specific needs of women and men of all ages (within your sector).



9.4 DG ECHO-funded projects prevented, mitigated and responded to protection threats by ensuring the respect of fundamental protection principles (within your sector)



10. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO's intervention contributed to increasing access to government and non-government services (basic needs, health, education, protection), throughout Turkey.

10.1 What have been the factors contributing to or limiting refugee access to government and non-government services throughout Turkey (basic needs, protection, health and education)?

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

- Availability of ESSN and CCTE programs
- Turkish language courses
- Efforts to encourage registration
- Local NGOs and CBOs' role
- The GoTR has already made major and rapid changes to its own systems in order to facilitate implementation of the ECHO-funded projects

"The GoTR is extremely capable and has a wide reach across Turkey."

LIMITING FACTORS

Administrative

- Lack of knowledge, information and awareness of services available, of their rights, unclear procedures
- Lack of registration – decisions to stop registrations in certain areas
- Government rules, legislation evolving context and complex regulations

Social / Cultural

- Language barrier – lack of sufficient translation services

- Social tension, miscommunication between two communities. Evolution of the situation with the host community. Humanitarian assistance & services available to refugees only or mostly because they contribute tension and hatred between host and refugee communities
- Cultural norms and practices - Complexity of issues and do no harm approaches (e.g. child marriage, child labour)

Physical access: Geographic coverage, restrictions on movement, distance, transportation cost, disabilities, outreach to the most vulnerable, women traveling alone

Capacities

- Unavailability of services, lack of capacity of government services (especially in health), crowded services
- Confidentiality issues – especially in Health sector (mental health issues)
- Some degree of discrimination (increased over the years) - willingness of service providers to provide services to refugees
- Lack of adapted non-formal education services at scale
- Prioritising cash or in-kind assistance (such as ESSN, CCTE) because they create dependencies
- Weakness of coordination
- Huge lack of data

Context

- Size of the country and of the refugee population: density of refugees in many locations has put pressure on public services
- Local, political and security context
- Concerns about the future resources
- NGOs' limited operational capacity due to restrictions from the government, different implementations of the regulations in the provinces, reluctance of local authorities to work with NGOs

“When the above problems - which concretely affect refugee access to services - have been encountered by the ECHO-funded projects, ECHO seems to have at times unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved within the scope of its projects, and what should instead be part of a broader engagement and advocacy with GoTR including linkages to e.g. DG NEAR.”

10.2 Are there any vulnerable groups (ethnicity, religion, gender, age, sexual orientation, disability etc.) whose access to services remain a challenge?

In order of most mentioned:

- Unregistered or recently deregistered refugees, undocumented migrants, those in detention and deportation process
- GBV survivors, abused women and girls, victims of early marriages/pregnancies and forced marriages - women in urban areas especially
- LGBTI
- Marginalised groups: Roma people, especially Dom community, and minorities: Yezidis in the South East & Kurdish Syrian, Non-Sunni and non-Muslim communities
- People with disabilities/illness (including mental illness) – people living with HIV
- Non-Syrian (Africans, Afghans, Iranian, Pakistani and Iraqi)


- Sex workers
- Seasonal workers (no access to ESSN)
- Elders
- Unaccompanied children, abused children including those in child labour, children requiring Special Education
- Rural based Syrians refugee living in remote areas
- Youth
- Survivors/victims of human/child trafficking
- Single women and single men

“We found all minority groups (especially sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender) were facing challenges in Turkey to a certain extent. I often came across vulnerable people who felt threatened and were even reluctant to leave their homes.”


2.6. Visibility

11. Concerning the extent to which refugees, local authorities and citizens are aware of the EU’s presence and contribution.

11.1 DG ECHO's visibility policy has been implemented in DG ECHO-funded projects in Turkey




11.2 DG ECHO in Turkey has monitored the awareness of refugees, local authorities and citizens of its interventions.




2.7. Efficiency

12. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO has achieved cost-effectiveness in its response. Question not asked to UN Agencies, Local NGOs.

12.1 DG ECHO-funded projects have been efficient and cost-effective (within your sector)




12.2 Opportunities for improving efficiency and cost-effectiveness have been recognised and seized at sector portfolio level (within your sector)




13. Concerning the extent to which the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to the Facility was appropriate and proportionate to what the Facility set out to achieve. Question not asked to UN Agencies, Local NGOs.

13.1 Needs assessments, actions of other donors, the total humanitarian funding available and ECHO's objectives informed the size and allocation of budget to the Facility




14. Concerning the extent to which DG ECHO has put in place a fit for purpose monitoring and reporting system that supports a sound management of DG ECHO's operations.


14.1 The system put in place by DG ECHO to monitor and report on its operations is appropriate and effective



14.2 The system has been able to capture key performance indicators (managerial and operational) used to inform decision-making




14.3 The system supports accountability requirements to EU citizens and member states




2.8. Sustainability

15. Concerning how well the exit strategy and hand-over has been prepared and carried out towards GoTR and development actors, and the extent to which DG ECHO-funded project have been able to link relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD).


15.1 DG ECHO has cooperated with other EU instruments to implement its exit strategy




15.2 DG ECHO-funded projects have been successful at linking relief, rehabilitation and development (within your sector)



15.3 Protection and assistance for refugees have been integrated within the relevant government systems at national and local levels (within your sector)




15.4 There is evidence of government ongoing support for activities that were initiated or enhanced by DG ECHO projects (within your sector)



16. Concerning the extent to which lessons can be learned from DG ECHO humanitarian programming in Turkey to better inform GoTR's future programming and more generally transition-to-development actors.

16.1 Is there evidence of lessons learned from ECHO's projects informing GoTR refugee response (within your sector)



16.2 What are the enabling factors that would support an enhanced uptake of refugee response mechanisms by the GoTR (for each sector/collectively)?

Overall

- Increased technical and financial capacities of the GoTR, including increased and improved outreach to refugees, more interpreters, better provision of information, harmonized application of circulars and legal framework at local and provincial level
- Increased willingness and proactivity of local and provincial authorities to include refugees in the services - working directly with the target population. More actions required on social cohesion
- Geopolitical context and clarity of the future situation in Syria

“Funding should be used to sustain and support both the Turkish and refugee population. Targeted assistance to refugees is challenging and risks to fuel tensions and conflicts within the most impoverished/vulnerable population groups.”

Coordination between stakeholders

- Building confidence on both sides, GoTR as well as donors and INGOs
- Improving the clusters coordination role
- Improving communication - more transparency - human rights approach rather than national security approach both by EU/Turkey and other states
- Enhance capacity building program from training to coaching and mentoring to local partners - Some national organisations have strong capacities and worked with international agencies for several years. Therefore, they should be included in the uptake process from the GoTR and more specifically, GoTR should build on their capacities to ensure the sustainable provision of services to refugees.

External support: Technical and financial support are still needed (considering the current economic situation). Continued funding. Budgetary support through GoTR institutions, continued EU / international oversight and support. Advice on project directions, needs assessments and prioritization of assistance across the population of concern.

- Health: level of permission for the health professionals such as doctors, midwives and nurses and their ability to work at PHC for their own community without receiving accreditation from the Ministry of Health. Mobile activities and increased translation support in existing facilities.
- Basic Needs: Main issue for the ESSN transitioning is financial - no national budget is available for this type/size of caseload. Investment in job creation.
- Education: For the CCTE, lack of available budget, although more manageable than ESSN. Strong buy in for the child protection component, from which the GoTR has said they want to learn and if possible also extend this to the programme for Turkish nationals. The CCTE overall has very good acceptance from all stakeholders.
- Protection: Operational support to the government to carry on the protection intervention as mandated by the UN resolution.

“Turkish uptake of response mechanisms will be determined by the political willingness but DG ECHO should not be relying on Turkey for its exit strategy.”

3. Survey - detailed results

Background Information		
	#	%
Stakeholder Groups		
DG ECHO	21	17%
Other EU	5	4%
UN Agency	30	25%
International NGO	30	25%
Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	24	20%
EU Member State	11	9%
Type of position		
Administration	8	7%
M&E	7	6%
Management / Donor relations	52	43%
Operations	33	27%
Other (please specify)	15	12%
Research / Policy	6	5%
Sector		
Basic Needs	14	12%
Education	10	8%
Health	23	19%
Protection	34	28%
Non Applicable	40	33%
Gender		
Female	64	53%
Male	55	45%
Prefer not to say	2	2%
Location		
HQ	33	27%
Turkey (currently or previously, during DG ECHO's projects implementation)	82	68%
Other (please specify)	6	5%

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
1.1 Refugees have been consulted in the design of DG ECHO-funded projects	DG ECHO	0	5	3	9	4	0
	EU Member State	0	1	5	1	0	4
	International NGO	0	6	5	14	4	1
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	2	0	6	7	8
	Other EU	0	1	2	1	1	0
	UN Agency	0	1	2	19	6	2
	Total Response Proportion		1%	13%	14%	41%	18%
1.2 DG ECHO's partners considered the needs of the most vulnerable refugees in the design and implementation of their interventions	DG ECHO	0	3	1	9	8	0
	EU Member State	0	0	2	5	0	4
	International NGO	0	2	1	11	15	1
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	2	0	7	7	8
	Other EU	0	0	1	3	1	0
	UN Agency	0	1	0	13	14	2
	Total Response Proportion		0%	7%	4%	40%	37%
1.3 An analysis of protection risks was undertaken in the design and implementation of interventions	DG ECHO	0	5	4	7	5	0
	EU Member State	0	0	4	3	0	4
	International NGO	0	2	1	20	6	1
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	2	0	8	6	8
	Other EU	0	1	2	1	1	0

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	UN Agency	0	0	0	20	8	2
	Total Response Proportion	0%	8%	9%	49%	21%	12%
1.4 A gender-sensitive needs assessment, or a gender analysis, was undertaken in the design and implementation of interventions	DG ECHO	0	5	3	8	5	0
	EU Member State	0	1	3	3	0	4
	International NGO	0	4	2	18	5	1
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	2	0	6	8	8
	Other EU	0	2	1	1	1	0
	UN Agency	0	3	0	18	7	2
	Total Response Proportion	0%	14%	7%	45%	21%	12%
2.1 Partners have adapted their projects to meet the needs of vulnerable refugees in light of the evolving sectoral policies of the GoTR? (Consider your particular sector)	DG ECHO	0	2	3	8	8	0
	EU Member State	0	0	3	3	0	5
	International NGO	0	3	0	16	9	2
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	0	0	9	6	8
	Other EU	0	0	0	2	2	1
	UN Agency	0	1	2	13	11	3
	Total Response Proportion	1%	5%	7%	42%	30%	16%
2.2 Partners have adapted their projects to meet the needs of vulnerable refugees in light of the evolving sectoral capacities of the GoTR? (within your sector)	DG ECHO	0	1	2	6	12	0
	EU Member State	0	0	3	3	0	5
	International NGO	0	1	0	19	8	2

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	1	0	8	6	8
	Other EU	0	0	0	2	2	1
	UN Agency	0	0	1	16	10	3
	Total Response Proportion	1%	2%	5%	45%	31%	16%
3.1 DG ECHO-funded projects correspond to their HIP (per sector, per HIP)	DG ECHO	1	0	1	6	13	0
	EU Member State	0	0	2	4	0	5
	International NGO	0	1	2	18	7	2
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	1	11	3	9
	Other EU	0	0	0	3	1	1
	UN Agency	0	0	1	14	12	3
	Total Response Proportion	1%	1%	6%	46%	30%	17%
4.1 The design and implementation of projects follows DG ECHO thematic/sectoral policy (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	1	1	11	7	0
	EU Member State	0	0	2	4	0	5
	International NGO	0	2	1	20	5	2
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	1	10	4	9
	Other EU	0	0	0	3	1	1
	UN Agency	0	0	3	18	5	4
	Total Response Proportion	1%	2%	7%	55%	18%	17%
	DG ECHO	1	8	1	6	3	2

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
5.1 The level of coordination between DG ECHO and other EC financial instruments has been effective/adequate	EU Member State	0	0	3	3	0	5
	International NGO	0	0	0	0	0	30
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	0	0	0	24
	Other EU	0	1	0	1	0	3
	UN Agency	1	11	2	10	2	4
	Total Response Proportion		2%	17%	5%	17%	4%
5.2 The level of coordination between DG ECHO and the Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan, 3RP has been effective/adequate	DG ECHO	0	8	5	2	4	2
	EU Member State	0	1	3	2	0	5
	International NGO	0	0	0	0	0	30
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	0	0	0	24
	Other EU	0	1	0	1	0	3
	UN Agency	0	3	4	18	1	4
Total Response Proportion		0%	11%	10%	19%	4%	56%
6.1 DG ECHO delivered its response in view of the actions of Turkish authorities and other donors.	DG ECHO	0	0	2	11	8	0
	EU Member State	0	0	3	3	0	5
	International NGO	0	2	2	13	10	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	2	1	8	3	9
	Other EU	0	0	0	3	1	1
	UN Agency	0	1	2	15	8	4

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	Total Response Proportion	1%	4%	8%	44%	25%	18%
6.2 DG ECHO-funded projects complement those carried out by Turkish authorities (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	2	2	7	9	0
	EU Member State	0	0	3	3	0	5
	International NGO	0	1	0	17	9	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	0	0	9	5	9
	Other EU	0	0	0	3	1	1
	UN Agency	0	0	1	14	11	4
	Total Response Proportion	2%	2%	5%	44%	29%	18%
7.1 DG ECHO's response has provided what Member States could not provide individually	DG ECHO	0	1	3	4	13	0
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	1	5
	International NGO	1	2	7	6	11	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	2	2	7	3	10
	Other EU	0	0	1	2	1	1
	UN Agency	0	3	5	9	9	4
	Total Response Proportion	1%	7%	17%	26%	31%	19%
8.1 DG ECHO's interventions achieved their objectives (within your sector)	DG ECHO	0	3	3	12	3	0
	EU Member State	0	0	2	4	0	5
	International NGO	0	4	2	19	2	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	1	1	11	0	10

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	Other EU	0	1	2	1	0	1
	UN Agency	0	0	6	15	5	4
	Total Response Proportion	1%	7%	13%	51%	8%	19%
9.1 DG ECHO provided the right amount and type of aid at the right time and in an appropriate way to the final beneficiaries (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	3	1	12	3	1
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6
	International NGO	0	3	1	21	2	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	6	1	4	2	10
	Other EU	0	0	0	4	0	1
	UN Agency	0	3	0	17	6	4
	Total Response Proportion	2%	12%	4%	50%	11%	21%
9.2 Projects have been seeking feedback from vulnerable refugees and used that feedback to adapt and improve performance (within your sector)	DG ECHO	0	5	2	8	5	1
	EU Member State	0	1	2	2	0	6
	International NGO	0	3	0	20	4	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	2	3	0	5	4	10
	Other EU	0	2	2	0	0	1
	UN Agency	0	4	1	12	9	4
	Total Response Proportion	2%	15%	6%	39%	18%	21%
9.3 DG ECHO-funded projects systematically tailored responses to the	DG ECHO	1	3	1	12	3	1
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
specific needs of women and men of all ages (within your sector).	International NGO	0	1	4	17	5	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	1	0	6	6	10
	Other EU	0	1	0	2	1	1
	UN Agency	0	2	2	17	5	4
	Total Response Proportion	2%	7%	7%	47%	17%	21%
9.4 DG ECHO-funded projects prevented, mitigated and responded to protection threats by ensuring the respect of fundamental protection principles (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	2	1	13	3	1
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6
	International NGO	0	1	0	19	7	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	1	1	7	5	10
	Other EU	0	1	1	1	1	1
	UN Agency	0	0	0	17	9	4
	Total Response Proportion	1%	4%	4%	50%	21%	21%
11.1 DG ECHO's visibility policy has been implemented in DG ECHO-funded projects in Turkey	DG ECHO	0	2	2	13	3	1
	EU Member State	0	0	1	4	0	6
	International NGO	1	1	1	15	9	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	1	1	7	4	11
	Other EU	0	0	1	2	1	1
	UN Agency	0	0	1	9	14	6
	Total Response Proportion	1%	3%	6%	41%	26%	23%

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
11.2 DG ECHO in Turkey has monitored the awareness of refugees, local authorities and citizens of its interventions.	DG ECHO	1	1	2	8	8	1
	EU Member State	0	0	3	2	0	6
	International NGO	0	2	6	16	3	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	3	1	8	1	11
	Other EU	0	1	2	1	0	1
	UN Agency	0	1	6	13	4	6
	Total Response Proportion		1%	7%	17%	40%	13%
12.1 DG ECHO-funded projects have been efficient and cost-effective (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	3	0	13	2	2
	EU Member State	0	0	3	2	0	6
	International NGO	0	6	1	17	1	5
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	0	0	0	24
	Other EU	0	0	0	2	0	3
	UN Agency	0	0	0	0	0	30
	Total Response Proportion		1%	7%	3%	28%	2%
12.2 Opportunities for improving efficiency and cost-effectiveness have been recognised and seized at sector portfolio level (within your sector)	DG ECHO	0	2	5	10	2	2
	EU Member State	0	0	3	2	0	6
	International NGO	1	3	4	16	1	5
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	0	0	0	24
	Other EU	0	0	0	2	0	3

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	UN Agency	0	0	0	0	0	30
	Total Response Proportion	1%	4%	10%	25%	2%	58%
13.1 Needs assessments, actions of other donors, the total humanitarian funding available and ECHO's objectives informed the size and allocation of budget to the Facility	DG ECHO	1	3	3	7	5	2
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6
	International NGO	0	4	4	16	1	5
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	0	0	0	24
	Other EU	0	1	0	1	0	3
	UN Agency	0	0	0	0	0	30
	Total Response Proportion	1%	7%	7%	22%	5%	58%
14.1 The system put in place by DG ECHO to monitor and report on its operations is appropriate and effective	DG ECHO	0	7	3	6	4	1
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6
	International NGO	0	3	1	19	4	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	3	1	6	2	11
	Other EU	0	1	1	1	1	1
	UN Agency	1	4	1	15	3	6
	Total Response Proportion	2%	15%	7%	41%	12%	23%
14.2 The system has been able to capture key performance indicators (managerial and operational) used to inform decision-making	DG ECHO	1	5	3	7	4	1
	EU Member State	0	0	3	2	0	6
	International NGO	0	3	2	19	3	3

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	3	2	6	1	11
	Other EU	0	1	1	1	1	1
	UN Agency	1	2	1	17	3	6
	Total Response Proportion	2%	12%	10%	43%	10%	23%
14.3 The system supports accountability requirements to EU citizens and Member States	DG ECHO	0	3	4	8	5	1
	EU Member State	0	0	4	1	0	6
	International NGO	0	2	2	17	6	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	1	3	7	2	11
	Other EU	0	0	1	2	1	1
	UN Agency	0	1	9	9	5	6
	Total Response Proportion	0%	6%	19%	36%	16%	23%
15.1 DG ECHO has cooperated with other EU instruments to implement its exit strategy	DG ECHO	0	0	4	11	5	1
	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6
	International NGO	0	5	10	10	2	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	3	7	3	0	11
	Other EU	0	0	0	2	2	1
	UN Agency	3	4	5	7	5	6
	Total Response Proportion	2%	10%	23%	30%	12%	23%
	DG ECHO	1	8	3	5	3	1

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
15.2 DG ECHO-funded projects have been successful at linking relief, rehabilitation and development (within your sector)	EU Member State	0	0	2	3	0	6
	International NGO	0	7	4	13	3	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	5	2	5	1	11
	Other EU	0	1	0	2	1	1
	UN Agency	0	8	2	12	2	6
	Total Response Proportion		1%	24%	11%	33%	8%
15.3 Protection and assistance for refugees have been integrated within the relevant government systems at national and local levels (within your sector)	DG ECHO	0	4	3	8	5	1
	EU Member State	0	0	3	2	0	6
	International NGO	0	5	1	15	6	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	5	0	4	3	11
	Other EU	0	3	0	1	0	1
	UN Agency	0	2	1	15	6	6
Total Response Proportion		1%	16%	7%	37%	17%	23%
15.4 There is evidence of government ongoing support for activities that were initiated or enhanced by DG ECHO projects (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	2	3	9	5	1
	EU Member State	0	1	3	1	0	6
	International NGO	0	3	6	11	7	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	1	3	0	7	2	11
	Other EU	0	0	0	4	0	1
	UN Agency	0	6	1	12	5	6

Question	Stakeholder group	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Do not know/ Not applicable	Agree	Strongly agree	No Response
	Total Response Proportion	2%	12%	11%	36%	16%	23%
16.1 Is there evidence of lessons learned from ECHO's projects informing GoTR refugee response (within your sector)	DG ECHO	1	3	7	6	3	1
	EU Member State	0	0	5	0	0	6
	International NGO	0	2	11	13	1	3
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	0	0	2	9	2	11
	Other EU	0	0	2	2	0	1
	UN Agency	1	3	2	11	7	6
	Total Response Proportion	2%	7%	24%	34%	11%	23%
Open-Ended Response	DG ECHO	-	-	-	-	-	11
	EU Member State	-	-	-	-	-	11
	International NGO	-	-	-	-	-	13
	Local (Turkish or Syrian) NGO	-	-	-	-	-	22
	Other EU	-	-	-	-	-	3
	UN Agency	-	-	-	-	-	21
	Total Response Proportion	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	67%

