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Sida Decentralised Evaluation

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Evaluation of the BetterAid and Open Forum Programmes

Final Report

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December 2012**

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With Ian Christoplos and Jessica Rothman**

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The views and interpretations expressed in this report are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
BA	BetterAid
BACG	BetterAid Co-ordinating Group
BPd	Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, sometimes referred to as the BOD, the Busan Outcome Document
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSO-MG	Civil Society Organisation - Management Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCG	Donor Co-ordinating Group
DE	Development Effectiveness
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GFG	Global Facilitation Group (Open Forum)
GPEDC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
HLF	High Level Forum
ISG	International Steering Group
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
OF	Open Forum
PD	Paris Declaration
RoA	Reality of Aid
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference

Preface

This independent evaluation of the *BetterAid and Open Forum Programmes* was commissioned in early 2012 by Sida's Civil Society Unit, Department for Global Development, on behalf of a *Donor Coordination Group* consisting of; Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and a *CSO Management Group* established by BetterAid and Open Forum. The evaluation was jointly overseen by the two groups, and managed by Karin Fallman at Sida. A Reference Group was also formed to provide guidance to the evaluation process.

Indevelop carried out this evaluation which was contracted through Sida's framework agreement for reviews and evaluations. Jessica Rothman was the Project Manager with overall responsibility for managing the implementation, and quality assurance of the methodology and reports was done by Ian Christoplos.

The independent evaluation team included the following key members:

- Ms. Angela Christie, Team Leader: a monitoring and evaluation and governance specialist with significant experience of leading complex policy, programme and project evaluations, applying international quality standards and using mixed methods and tools.
- Mr. Jean-Michel Rousseau, Evaluation Specialist: experienced advisor on monitoring and evaluation issues, organizational and strategy development and process planning
- Mr. Jonas Norén, Researcher: experienced within the fields of democracy, human rights, advocacy and business for development in complex markets.

This evaluation has engaged a large number of stakeholders through a consultative manner. Utilization has been at the core of the process. Feedback on the draft report was received from the Donor Coordination Group, BetterAid, Open Forum, and the Reference Group, after which a working session was held with all stakeholders to agree on the finalization of the evaluation report to ensure maximum usefulness of the evaluation findings. This final report has incorporated the comments received that are line with the evaluation team's independent assessment.

We wish to thank all persons who provided valuable input and guidance throughout the evaluation, especially to persons at Open Forum and BetterAid. Very special thanks are due to Karin Fällman who managed this evaluation project within Sida, and did so with remarkable professionalism.

Executive Summary

This evaluation report examines two programmes conducted between 2009 and 2011 on behalf of two global civil society organisation (CSO) coalitions:

Civil society voices for BetterAid (BA). Programme Proposal 2009-11. *Moving the aid effectiveness agenda to address development effectiveness.* Submitted by IBON and

Open Forum (OF) for CSO Development Effectiveness: *A process towards defining and promoting a global development effectiveness framework for CSOs.* Project duration: 1 June 2009-31 December 2011. Submitted by CONCORD

The coalitions and programme proposals were complementary: BA focusing on development effectiveness in aid reform and OF focusing on CSO development effectiveness. More specifically, the BetterAid programme proposal responded to the space created by the heightened recognition of CSOs as legitimate and independent development actors (and so articulated an intention to contribute meaningfully to the movement of the aid effectiveness agenda towards development effectiveness, by advocating for appropriate reforms of the aid architecture and practices); and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness to the related issue of CSO development effectiveness (CSOs developing a global framework for their own effectiveness in development, to improve the impact of their development work and advocate for a more favourable enabling environment for CSOs).

The two processes were financed through pooled donor funds, guided by principles set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between donors and the CSOs. One of the MoU's stipulations was that “*donors and CSOs will consider jointly overseeing an independent evaluation of the outcomes and impact achieved by the two CSO processes, to be financed by donors, and carried out following the Fourth High Level Forum (HLF4) in Busan*”. The Terms of Reference for the evaluation outlined a dual purpose: accounting for results achieved, and highlighting lessons learned and good practices.

The key questions posed for the evaluation were:

1. How relevant were the BetterAid and Open Forum programmes?
2. Were the programmes well designed?
3. How economically were programme resources used?
4. To what extent have the programmes achieved their intended outputs and outcomes?
5. Are there early signs that the programmes will achieve their intended impacts?
6. Are results and associated enhanced capacities likely to be sustained?

7. Were consultation and co-ordination processes transparent, democratic, inclusive and representative?
8. Was learning facilitated?
9. What are lessons learned?

This report describes the mixed methods approach used for the evaluation and presents findings framed by the OECD-DAC criteria.

Top ten key findings of the evaluation are:

1. BA and OF made very relevant contributions to the aid and development effectiveness debate at the global level.
2. Networks enhance legitimacy (although no network can represent the priorities and positions of every member).
3. Both BA and OF programmes successfully supported ambitious, complex and dynamic processes.
4. Programme design could have been more explicit with regard to the intervention logic and theory of change.
5. The pooled funding mechanism reduced reporting costs; on the donor side it may, by diffusing accountability, have led to a certain level of donor disengagement; donors and CSOs have had communication misunderstandings over “value-for-money” (VFM) - CSOs saw donor insistence on VFM as a focus on “immediate and tangible outcomes.
6. There should be tighter focus by CSOs during global processes in which they are engaged; as they add more issues to their list of priorities, the risk of losing focus on the most important becomes greater.
7. OF performed well against its performance framework, achieving all outputs and most outcome targets although the key outcome document (the Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, sometimes referred to as the Busan Outcome Document (BOD) or BPD) from the Fourth High Level Forum (HLF4) in Busan did not go as far as had been hoped in defining the enabling environment.
8. BA had a significant impact on the BPD because it was recognised as a credible actor in its own right; CSOs were seen to engage constructively from a well-informed position.
9. Many CSOs believe that BA and OF would have served their constituencies better if they had focused on capacity building at the national level; there is currently little evidence of progress at the national level as a consequence of the programmes but there is potential to be realised.
10. Access to core and programme funding to be used as CSOs choose is an issue for CSOs. For donors too, reconciling accountability with independence is a critical challenge. That said, there is unequal resourcing of the processes in which multi-stakeholder participation is essential so donors do need to identify new CSO strategies and aid modalities.

Findings have been translated into five key recommendations:

1. Global and National Platforms are needed as focal points for aid and development effectiveness but they need funding if they are to engage in global and national processes; donors should consider new aid modalities to balance the need for funding accountability with independence.
2. CSOs need to fiercely prioritise in advance of global negotiations – since here “less is more”; and they should lobby harder to make best use of global space and opportunity (this particularly applies to the future Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC)).
3. More entry points for multi-stakeholder engagement need to be found at the national level. Development effectiveness, heralds a new form of development cooperation governance and accountability, which requires creating engagement mechanisms for the different stakeholders involved and strengthening the capacities of weaker stakeholders – particularly CSOs – in order that they can actively participate in these mechanisms on a level playing field.
4. There needs to be a stronger consistency and coherence between donor CSO policy and strategies and the practical behaviours of donor agencies in partner countries and in international meetings. Funding is a key element of an enabling environment, particularly core funding which enables CSOs to carry out an independent leadership role.
5. Donors also have to ask themselves what their role is in engagement mechanisms. If democratic ownership really is the desired goal, then it means that the traditional bilateral dynamic between donors and governments will have to be enlarged. New stakeholders – notably CSOs and the private sector – will have to come to the table to join in deliberations, and donors will have to respect this ownership by taking on more of a facilitative rather than directive role.

1. Introduction: Scope of Work

BACKGROUND TO THE EVALUATION

The recognition of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) as independent development actors, with a fundamental contribution to make to both development and aid effectiveness, was a key outcome of the Accra High Level Forum (HLF3 September 2008) as expressed in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). This created a potential space for greater CSO engagement but also threw a spotlight on three related issues: firstly that CSOs needed to be equal partners in advancing reforms in aid architecture and practices; secondly, that more attention was needed to address and improve CSO development effectiveness at the organisational level; and thirdly, that the operating environment in which CSOs worked, in significant measure generated by national and donor governments, created conditions which could constrain or enable development effectiveness.

These new perspectives and priorities created opportunities for policy and process initiatives. Two global CSO coalitions – BetterAid (BA) and Open Forum (OF) – rose to this challenge and submitted distinct but closely inter-related proposals for donor finance. Each proposal described a global CSO process that would build towards the implementation of Accra commitments and with a specific intention to work towards and achieve tangible progress at the next and fourth High Level Forum (HLF-4) in Busan, scheduled for 2011 - as well as providing a framework that would serve as a reference for CSOs in the longer term¹.

The coalitions and proposals were intended to be complementary, with BA focusing on development effectiveness in aid reform and OF focusing on CSO development effectiveness. More specifically, the BetterAid programme proposal responded to the space created by the heightened recognition of CSOs as legitimate and independent development actors (and so articulated an intention to contribute meaningfully to the movement of the aid effectiveness agenda towards development effectiveness, by

¹ The history and scope of each platform extends well beyond the programme of work evaluated here. For example, OF did not originate with the AAA but in the months previous, and over the three years carried out a work programme that was largely independent of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) processes. Equally BA's overall purpose was linked to CSO's pre-Accra agenda on development effectiveness, including gender equality, decent work, sustainability and a human rights framework for development effectiveness. See Annex I for further background.

advocating for appropriate reforms of the aid architecture and practices); and the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (OF) to the related issue of CSO development effectiveness (CSOs developing a global framework for their own effectiveness in development, to improve the impact of their development work and advocate for a more favourable enabling environment for CSOs).

This complementarity led to the two processes being financed through pooled donor funds, guided by principles set out in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between donors and the CSOs. A Donor Coordination Group (DCG) and a CSO-Management Group (CSO-MG) were both created to contribute to the development and governance of this MoU. The funding period was July 2009 to December 2011 in both cases. One of the MoU's stipulations was that *“donors and CSOs will consider jointly overseeing an independent evaluation of the outcomes and impact achieved by the two CSO processes, to be financed by donors, and carried out following HLF 4”*. It is in response to this stipulation that the Terms of Reference (ToR) for an independent evaluation were drawn up and the current team commissioned to carry out the assignment².

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND KEY QUESTIONS

The Terms of Reference outline a dual purpose for the evaluation:

- a) accounting for results achieved, i.e. looking back;
- b) highlighting lessons learned and good practices in order to improve similar future initiatives and programmes, i.e. looking forward³.

According to the ToR, the evaluation is geared towards BetterAid (BA) and Open Forum (OF) membership and constituents and towards donor and developing country government stakeholders. This multi-stakeholder perspective on audience, coupled with the joint overview arrangements for the independent evaluation, underscore the priority placed on usability of findings and recommendations. The evaluation team endorses this perspective and has sought to respect this both in the processes it has undertaken and the presentation of evidence and analyses it has produced.

² Terms of Reference are included as Annex II.

³ We also understand from talks with donor and CSO representatives that the lessons learned from this evaluation carry the potential to contribute to the forward thinking of the joint platform currently being formed between BA and OF, and with this in mind we have included a section in this report relating specifically to this intention (section 5).

In broad summary, the key questions posed for the evaluation were:

1. **How relevant were the BetterAid and Open Forum programmes** in terms of improved development effectiveness (including aid effectiveness and CSO development effectiveness)?
2. **Were the programmes well designed**, particularly with regard to the theory of change associated with each?
3. **How economically were programme resources used**; did the pooled funding mechanism and the collaboration between the DCG and the CSO-MG help?
4. To what extent **have the programmes achieved their intended outputs and outcomes**?
5. Are there **early signs that the programmes will achieve their intended impacts**?
6. **Are results and associated enhanced capacities likely to be sustained**?
7. **Were consultation and co-ordination processes transparent, democratic, inclusive and representative**?
8. **Was learning facilitated**; what were the challenges of global multi-stakeholder engagement?
9. **What are lessons learned**, particularly in relation to the future unified CSO platform?

The approach adopted by the evaluation team to address these questions is presented in section 3.

2. The Evaluated Interventions

For ease of reference, this section provides a brief summary of each of the evaluated interventions, drawing heavily upon the funding proposals. The full details of both programme plans appear in the respective proposal documents:

1. Civil society voices for BetterAid. Programme Proposal 2009-11. *Moving the aid effectiveness agenda to address development effectiveness*. Submitted by IBON on behalf of the BetterAid Co-ordinating Group.
2. Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness: *A process towards defining and promoting a global development effectiveness framework for CSOs*. Project duration: 1 June 2009-31 December 2011. Submitted by CONCORD on behalf of the Open Forum Global Facilitation Group.

Note that both BA and OF are **open platforms**, meaning that CSOs are not required to formally join up or in but can enter and leave the space provided for engagement at will.

CIVIL SOCIETY VOICES FOR BETTERAID: PROGRAMME PROPOSAL 2009-11

The BetterAid Platform is coordinated by a BetterAid Coordinating Group (BACG) which is a collegiate body of 32 CSOs actively engaged in the development and aid effectiveness agenda and who together provides a global outreach to CSOs around the world.

The **BetterAid Programme Proposal** covers the period from 15 June 2009 to 31 December 2011 and was designed to enable CSOs, through BetterAid, to contribute to the meaningful implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) as well as move the aid effectiveness agenda to address development effectiveness by advocating for appropriate reforms of the international aid architecture and practices. The programme's global civil society consultation process was coordinated by the BACG and was expected to reach more than 20,000 CSOs through 36 national, 7 regional, 4 continental and 5 thematic/sectoral consultations specifically in order to provide evidence-based policy proposals for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness to be held in Busan, South Korea in 2011. IBON International was the financial management agent responsible for the receipt of funds and overall management of the BA programme; it also hosted the substantial part of BetterAid's secretariat.

The programme's stated objectives were to:

1. Achieve a greater and more meaningful involvement of CSOs in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice;
2. Develop a series of realistic CSO policy proposals that promote global policy changes from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness;
3. Ensure that key aid effectiveness actors (donor and recipient countries, parliamentarians, CSOs etc) are fully exposed to CSO positions and policy recommendations.

These were presented in a *Performance Management Framework*, which was agreed between BetterAid and donors and appears as Table 1 below:

Table 1: BetterAid Performance Management Framework

Purpose: To contribute to a meaningful1 implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and move the aid effectiveness agenda to address development effectiveness by advocating for appropriate reforms of the international aid architecture and practices.				
Strategic Objectives		Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions and Risks
SO1. Achieve a greater and more meaningful involvement of civil society organisations in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice	SO 1.01	By 2011, at least 20,000 CSOs are reached in planned events: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • seven (7) regional AAA consultation workshops, • five (5) thematic/sectoral workshops, • four (4) continental consultation workshops, • thirty-six (36) AAA implementation related national consultations organised. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National workshop reports; lists of workshop participants; post national workshop evaluation; regional preparatory workshop reports; • BetterAid policy paper • Activities of CSOs on aid effectiveness issues • CSO policy recommendations adopted at these consultations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That CSOs are willing, open and able to participate in national & regional aid effectiveness processes. • That country conditions allow for regional and national workshops as projected in BACG's plans. • That where BACG is conducting these workshops, national government and local donor representatives are willing to engage on the issue. • That local policy environment is amenable to CSO action. • That the level of sophistication and organisation of civil society in each country will be different. • That BACG plans can adapt to the specificities of each country.
	SO 1.02	By 2011, at least nine (9) case studies conducted in various countries to inform and support CSO policy reform recommendations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 case studies documenting mechanisms, processes and structures that demonstrate CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation, • 5 case studies capturing aid supported projects/programs that demonstrate nationally-significant impacts to the poor and marginalised as a result of CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Case study documents 	
SO2. Develop a series of realistic CSO policy proposals that promotes global policy changes from aid	SO 2.01	A collective CSO Policy Position Paper making the case for the adoption of development effectiveness as the framework for global policy reform is produced and adopted by 500 CSOs attending the Parallel CSO Forum3 on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO policy position paper. • WP/EFF reactions to the paper. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That donor & recipient governments recognise CSOs as independent development actors and, as such, are rightful players in aid policy formulation, and in

2 THE EVALUATED INTERVENTIONS

effectiveness to development effectiveness.		HLF-4.		<p>particular as full members of the WP-EFF and its subsidiary groups and work streams.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That commitments in the AAA and other international conventions/instruments will be implemented and will have resulted in broad, multi-institutional based, inclusive and development oriented policies. • That donors recognise the integrity of policy proposals that CSOs produce and respect these as evidence in policy formulation.
	SO 2.02	Policy proposals for equity-promoting development cooperation- one (1) each in the areas of gender justice, decent work, and climate justice- officially submitted to the WP-EFF for discussion and consideration in the lead up to HLF-4.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO policy proposals • Elements of CSO policy proposals in the Draft Outcome document of HLF-4, including process documentation/ discussion papers of WP-EFF distributed to governments and donors. • Discussion of CSO proposals within the WP/EFF's structure and processes • Elements of CSO proposals in WPEFF document 	
	SO 2.03	Production of HLF-4 materials based on BACG Policy Position Paper, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • four (4) continental statements and specific proposals towards the HLF-4; and, • five (5) sectoral statements and proposals towards the HLF-4 (output from the 5 sectoral consultations: trade unions, women's, farmers, etc.). 	BACG and other CSO communications with the WP-EFF. Reflections of this engagements in WP/EFF documents and reports.	
	SO 2.04	Policy changes that have been influenced by BACG policy messages or by the CSO policy position paper.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minutes of meetings of WP and clusters • WP-EFF and cluster documents and reports • Outcome document of HLF-4 	
S03. Ensure that key aid effectiveness actors (donor and recipient countries, parliamentarians, CSOs, media, etc.) are fully exposed to CSO positions and policy recommendations.	SO 3.01	Increase in awareness of aid effectiveness actors regarding CSO positions and policy recommendations by 100% compared to 2009 baseline.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perception studies in the form of key informant interviews on awareness of aid effectiveness actors regarding CSO positions and policy recommendations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • That CSOs have access to official and citizen data for both qualitative and quantitative approaches to produce robust CSO proposals (e.g., statements, studies, policy positions, etc.) to compensate for official data sets that are limited or not publicly available. • That links can be made between aid & development effectiveness and citizens' needs to interest the public and the media despite times of economic slowdown. • That BACG can broker discussions among groups from different regions, facilitate international CSOs and execute joint actions to find consensus among CSOs. • That consensus will be reached among CSOs and the diversity of positions do not distract from coherent messaging.
	SO 3.02	Extended outreach to donor agencies, recipient country governments, parliamentarians, and media in the 36 sites of CSO consultations on AAA implementation related developments and issues in these countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of outreach events; • Circulation number of BACG's newsletter to these stakeholders (including print and online); • Number of new sign-up for BACG's materials; • Follow-up meetings in consultation countries prior to 2011 	
	SO 3.03	Increased use of BA website by 100% (from baseline of 3,593 visits in August 2008).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statistics on BA website use; BA website forum & list-serves reports 	
	SO 3.04	Increase in online media coverage of BACG activities and positions by 100% compared to 2009 baseline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring surveys of online media coverage 	

OPEN FORUM FOR CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness was launched in 2008 in Paris, following the International Forum on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness, by a group of more than 70 representatives of CSO networks and platforms from around the world. It was established as a dedicated CSO-led process to collectively define and promote their development effectiveness as a stakeholder group, in dialogue with official donors and governments. The Open Forum Global Facilitating Group (GFG) is an elected representative group of 29 CSO networks and platforms supporting this initiative and acts as the governing body for the OF. A consortium of 5 regional platforms was also formed to help facilitate the implementation of the OF workplan. CONCORD is the financial management agent of the Consortium and was responsible for the receipt of funds and the overall management of the OF programme, as well as hosting the OF secretariat.

The focus of this evaluation is the programme of activities of the OF covering the period from 1 June 2009 to 31 December 2011. During this time the Open Forum specifically sought to:

1. Develop and promote a framework for CSO Development Effectiveness based on CSOs' own development visions, approaches, relationships and impacts of actions in order to improve and ensure their own effectiveness. The intention was that the framework would include a set of principles, indicators, implementation guidelines, good practice for accountability mechanisms and minimum standards for enabling conditions. To facilitate significant CSO buy-in and utilisation, the framework development process was to be open and participatory, reflecting to the maximum extent possible, the overall institutional and contextual realities of CSOs.
2. Facilitate a learning environment on CSO Development Effectiveness that would provide a space for CSOs to discuss issues and challenges relevant to their work as development actors. In addition, a scoping exercise on existing CSO development effectiveness initiatives was planned to allow CSOs to use existing experience to learn from each other and to avoid duplication of effort.
3. Engage in a political dialogue with donors, governments and other stakeholders to build understanding and support for an enabling environment for CSOs. This engagement would aim to facilitate an agreement between all stakeholders, particularly official donors, governments and CSOs, on a set of minimum enabling conditions critical to the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors. This engagement was also expected to promote further multi stakeholder collaboration to advance the development effectiveness agenda.

The Performance Management Framework agreed between Open Forum and donors appears as Table 2 below:

Table 2: Open Forum Performance Management Framework

Strategic Objectives	Indicators	Means of Verification
Objective 1: To develop and promote a framework for CSO development effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A global framework for CSO development effectiveness, to include a set of principles, indicators, implementation guidelines, good practices for accountability mechanisms and minimum requirements for enabling conditions • Framework endorsed by CSOs at the second Global Assembly of the Open Forum in 2011 	<p>Framework published</p> <p>Published report from the second Global Assembly of the Open Forum</p>
Objective 2: To promote and facilitate a learning environment on CSO development effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Range and number of stakeholders participating in a minimum number of multi-stakeholder and CSO consultations and meetings (minimum of 50 country, 4 thematic/sectoral and 2 international consultations) • Research conducted on prior frameworks and mechanisms of CSO development effectiveness • Number of initiatives on CSO development effectiveness that acknowledge the contribution of the Open Forum to their processes 	<p>Report on multi-stakeholder and CSO consultations and meetings</p> <p>Research reports produced</p> <p>Activity reports of Consortium</p>
Objective 3: Engage in a political dialogue with donors, governments and other stakeholders to build understanding and support for an enabling environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A proposal for minimum standards for an enabling environment • Range and number of donors, governments and other non-CSO stakeholders in processes that aim to improve the enabling environment for CSOs • The Open Forum is acknowledged by governments and donors as a concrete contribution to the implementation of Article 20 of the Accra Agenda for Action 	<p>Proposal document published</p> <p>Reports on multi-stakeholder consultations</p> <p>Declaration adopted by governments and donors</p>

3. Approach and Methodology

THE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

To meet the objectives of the evaluation and to follow good practice, a framework was developed within which each of the questions raised in the ToR or during the inception phase⁴ was aligned to one of the OECD-DAC⁵ criteria. On this basis, the questions were organised under the headings of Relevance, Design (particularly to explore *Theory of Change* and *Results Chain*), Impact, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability. Emphasis was also placed on Coherence, Coverage and Co-ordination and Lesson Learning. The key evaluation questions posed in the ToRs are presented in Table 3 below (with priority criteria underlined); new or revised questions appear in italics⁶. Indicators were developed against each question to focus and direct data gathering approaches and to act as a checklist against which findings could be assessed. These indicators are included as Annex III.

Table 3: Key Questions asked of the Independent Evaluation

OECD-DAC Criteria	Evaluation Questions (from ToR)
<u>Relevance</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What is the relevance of the programmes in relation to international and external obstacles to CSO, aid and development effectiveness? ○ What is the relevance of the programmes with regards to the broader aid and development effectiveness agenda? ○ What is the relevance of the programmes in relation to CSO development effectiveness and the civil society sector?
<u>Design</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How well did the programmes articulate their intended strategic objectives and impact (i.e. their theories of change and results chains)?
<u>Impact</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What are the trends towards the achievement of intended impacts?
<u>Effectiveness</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To what degree (and why) have the programmes achieved their intended qualitative and quantitative outputs and outcomes?
<u>Efficiency</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Value for money: how economically have the programme resources/ inputs (funds, expertise, time) been used to produce results – if possible relative to programmes of a similar nature?

⁴ Although the questions included in Annex III were derived from the ToRs, stakeholders were also invited during the inception phase to revise or elaborate them; thus new or revised questions are included in the annex III.

⁵ OECD Development Assistance Committee.

⁶ Priorities and additions/revisions were determined through conversation with CSO-MG and DCG.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How effective and efficient has the pooled funding mechanism been in reducing transaction costs for BA, OF and donors? ○ How effective and efficient has the cooperation been within DCG and between the DCG and the CSO-MG?
Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What evidence is there of sustainability of programme results (outcomes and impact)? How enduring are results? ○ How sustainable is the increased capacity of stakeholders?
Coherence, Coverage and Co-ordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ How transparent were the processes? ○ How democratic were the processes? ○ How inclusive were the processes? ○ How representative were the processes?
Lesson Learning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To what extent were OF and BA processes learning-based (e.g. challenges and opportunities, experiences in implementation continuously taken into account)? ○ What were challenges and benefits of multi-stakeholder engagement? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Facilitating global CSO engagement in policy processes? ▪ Capacity development for sustainable CSO engagement? ▪ Pooled funding mechanisms and coordinated management (DCG and CSO-MG)?

Stakeholder priorities identified during the inception phase were taken into consideration throughout – these priorities are summarised in Table 4 and listed in full in Annex IV. The evaluation team would like to acknowledge the validity (and level of ambition) of each of these priorities in terms of the insights they represent - which became apparent during the evaluation - and to this end, a brief comment on each appears in the table below.

Table 4: Stakeholder Priorities for the Evaluation

Stakeholder Priorities for Evaluation Approach	Evaluation Team Comment	
	<i>Why is this important?</i>	<i>Why is this a challenge?</i>
1. Facilitate a genuine learning exercise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is important in terms of ownership of findings but also to encourage a view of evaluation as a positive rather than negative/judgmental process. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Such an approach is time-consuming and requires sensitivity to the specific concerns, priorities and capacity challenges faced by each of a range of stakeholders.
2. Validate outcomes and impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is fundamental in terms of value for money analysis and the overall justification for funding; it relates to the clarity of theory of change analysis which shaped design and provides an essential basis for determining and measuring contribution/attribution. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This was challenging in this case because of weaknesses in programme design (both for BA and OF) which were raised as issues at an early stage of programme implementation but never resolved (discussed in section 4.2). • Further, the CSO process toward “success at Busan” was inherently highly dependent on the actions of other stakeholders (and from an evaluation perspective requires more than a reflection on assumptions – see section 4.5).
3. Provide infor-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The achievement and momen- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Processes were fostered on a global scale

<p>mation on process not just results</p>	<p>tum for global engagement could itself be considered an outcome, since this constitutes new institutional behaviours and mechanisms which carry the potential to trigger critical future changes to CSO performance and contribution.</p>	<p>but some were already under way; separating out what was initiated by the programmes from what was successfully utilised (since it was already under way) would have required a complex analysis well beyond the resource constraints of the evaluation team. Thus although comments can be made on the value of these process, it is less easy to be clear about the contribution of the programme to those processes, particularly in sustainability terms.</p>
<p>4. Assess joint donor funding arrangement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An important “new” aid modality that has the potential to benefit all parties. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It would be difficult to compare this with the cost and benefits of a set of bilateral arrangements supporting a global CSO process, since there is little precedent to compare with. There is of course much precedent across the CSO sector of trying to manage projects funded by a number of bilateral arrangements.
<p>5. Assess joint management arrangement</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is critical to learn whether and how coalitions and collaborations create workable avenues for donor support; this is particularly important if donors are to find new ways to provide longer term financial support for processes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This is a difficult topic to raise at a time of sensitive negotiations towards a combined BA/OF platform; interviewees might be more than usually reluctant to discuss the issue.
<p>6. Tell the story of CSO Development Effectiveness</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This would emphasise the importance of process, the need to be opportunistic and the dependencies on other actors’ (sometimes changing) priorities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Much of this very well recorded in Brian Tomlinson’s study⁷, it is important not to duplicate or attempt to “compete” with a much longer and inevitably well informed study.
<p>7. Explore whether national concerns were translated to the global level</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is important to determine the extent to which the global process really did or can meaningfully represent the needs and priorities as presented by stakeholders during the national consultation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only three case studies were possible with four days available for each – so the evaluation could only hope to provide snapshots and impressions.
<p>8. Explore potential for global initiatives to have an impact at the national level</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Critical in terms of outcomes and impact assessment and in light of the “global light, country heavy” thinking which is shaping current thinking on develop- 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> This presents the team with a methodological challenge given the short visit duration.

⁷ CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan: CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness. Brian Tomlinson, 2012.

	ment effectiveness.	
9. Explore complementarity between BA and OF as the foundation of the future CSO platform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Important at a time when platforms are discussion merging. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The evaluation team will need to take care not to create or inflame sensitivities at a critical time in negotiations.
10. Enhance understanding of policy processes at country level; look at read across to Joint Evaluation of CSO engagement in policy dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A multi-stakeholder agreement on the role and function of CSOs as development actors is fundamental to the debate on the kind of support required to facilitate ownership and engagement. • Policy dialogue is a key stage in the policy cycle and engagement at this level (or not) provides a strong signal of the value placed on CSOs as development actors. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Difficult to meaningfully assess policy processes during short country visits.

THE EVALUATION APPROACH

Full details of the evaluation approach are provided in the evaluation's inception report⁸. The approach was designed to be as consultative as possible within the time constraints⁹ and has sought to achieve a balance between synthesis and validation using a mixed-methods approach covering documentary review, field research, online survey, focus group discussions and semi-structured one-to-one interviews (in person and/or by telephone/Skype¹⁰).

- **Documentary review** was largely based on materials available on the BetterAid and Open Forum websites, supplemented by recommendations and additions contributed by individual stakeholders¹¹.

⁸ *Independent Evaluation of the BetterAid and Open Forum Programmes: Inception Report (Final)*. Indevelop, June 2012.

⁹ A total of 85 days was available for the evaluation team (of three people) including the inception phase, documentary review, online survey, interviews, events and visits (including the first visit which – as the pilot - was attended by two team members). 21 days was allocated to the inception phase and 20 to the visits, leaving a total of 44 days for 3 people to cover the rest of the assignment.

¹⁰ A full list of stakeholder interviews conducted by telephone/Skype, in person or during field visits is included as Annex IV.

¹¹ A full list of reference materials appears at the end of the report.

- **Field research** involved visits to countries selected consultatively and for the following reasons: Uganda: to allow comparisons with a separate, longer terms study underway at the time of the evaluation - the *Joint Donor Evaluation of CSO Engagement in Policy Dialogue*¹²; Colombia: since national CSOs and government there were reported to have made a significant contribution to the global process (for example hosting the High Level Event on South-South Co-operation); Indonesia: where a clear evolution of CSO thinking on their own development effectiveness was reported as well as an opening with government on policy dialogue during the time frame. On the basis of experience, the evaluation team agreed with this rationale.
- **Focus Group Discussions** were organised at the country level with CSO and Donor Groups (separately) to examine the relationship between global processes and national realities and priorities¹³.
- **Semi-structured interviews** were conducted with key members of all stakeholder groups (CSOs, Donors and Government Officials as well as Multilaterals). A full list of individuals who participated in focus group discussions or interviews appears as Annex V.
- An **online survey** (see Box 1) was designed by the evaluation team as a “snapshot” exploration of processes and outcomes - and invited reflection on:
 - the relevance of CSO messages delivered to Busan,
 - the key recommendations of the Busan Outcome Statement;
 - local impact post- Busan
 - personal experience of the national consultation process.

Box 1: The Independent Evaluation Online Survey

As part of the evaluation and mixed-methods approach, an online survey, with a purpose to gather evidence and validate preliminary findings, was rolled out amongst key stakeholders. Evidence of participation rates in other BA and OF surveys suggested that there might only be a limited response and that findings would need to be interpreted with caution. To increase the conditions for success the evaluation team took a range of precautions available under existing time and resource constraints¹⁴.

¹² An evaluation commissioned and managed jointly by Danida, Sida and ADA on behalf of a larger donor group and implemented by consultancy firms ITAD and Cowi alongside three international consultants.

¹³ See for example the list of CSOs who took part in a Focus Group Discussion in Jakarta, Annex IV.

¹⁴ 1) The survey structure (i.e. on-line questionnaire) was designed to be user-friendly and easy to fill in with pre-coded check-box alternatives, which were followed with questions with possibility for open elaboration. 2) The main channels of distribution – members of BACG/GFG and activity participants – were followed by three re-

A vital step in the process was the identification of a potential target group with the ability to validate preliminary findings and reported results through a perception-based web survey. The prime target group was originally limited to the unique e-mail addresses provided by BA and OF. However, after additional discussions with BA and OF, it was decided to extend the reach of the survey by using online channels such as programme websites, newsletters, Twitter accounts and Facebook pages. This alteration changed the research methodology, from data gathering from a fixed target group to a more general input from a wider population.

Finally, after 22 days in the field, 86 responses in total were collected¹⁵ providing a valuable snapshot that has enriched the evaluation and (to some extent) been used to validate the findings in this evaluation. Based on calculations for participants from BetterAid and Open forum activities (the 321 unique e-mail addresses) the response rate is concluded to be 18% (BACG/GFG 26%; Remaining participants 15%).

The timing of the evaluation presented some important potential collaborative and engagement opportunities:

1. Firstly, that the evaluation process might *contribute to the ongoing debate around the new “joint” CSO platform* intended to bring BetterAid and Open Forum together as one (the Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness, CPDE). The DCG was supportive of the idea that the evaluation team should attend an April meeting in Amsterdam which coincided with the start of the evaluation. However, after some discussion with the CSO-MG it was decided that the team should instead attend meetings scheduled later in the year when both the negotiation and evaluation processes would be further forward. In response to this and as the evaluation progressed, it was proposed that the team should attend the meeting of the “Group of 13” (G-13) CSOs discussing the “merger” in Madrid in August, where they were specifically focusing on what the new platform wants to achieve, the way it might work and the governance arrangements required to support this. The evaluation team proposed a Theory of Change (ToC) workshop to help the group reflect upon the clarity of the programmes to date with regard to outcome and impact and associated change pathways – as the basis of useful lesson learning to support forward thinking. However, after discussion, it was decided by the BetterAid and Open Forum Secretariats that the evaluation team should not carry out a ToC workshop, although interviews in the margins of these meetings were facilitated.
2. Secondly, the evaluation team was encouraged by DCG to explore *links with a study on CSOs engagement in policy dialogue*, the purpose of which is summa-

mindings in order to increase the response rate. 3) BetterAid and Open forum were asked and gave support with the distribution of the survey within their online channels. 4) However, due to limited resources and time constraints the demand for trilingual dissemination of the survey could not be met – survey was only distributed in English.

¹⁵ Since close to half of the respondents did not complete the full questionnaire, this result must be regarded as relatively poor.

rised in Box 2 below with the possibility that a presentation on both studies might be possible at events scheduled in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Vienna for September 2012¹⁶. Although in practice, the BetterAid/Open Forum evaluation has not been completed in time for a co-presentation¹⁷, the sharing of information between the two studies has been an important initiative, particularly in ensuring that the visit to Uganda built on, rather than repeated, discussions on CSO development effectiveness and the enabling environment.

Box 2: Objectives of the Joint evaluation of civil society engagement in policy dialogue

1. Gain a better understanding of how CSOs engage in policy dialogue (issues raised, strategies pursued and the role of the enabling environment).
2. Assess the achievements – relevance, effectiveness and outcome of their work.
3. Identify the enabling and disabling factors affecting CSO willingness and ability to play an effective role in policy dialogue.
4. Discuss strengths and weaknesses of different development partner support strategies.
5. Provide recommendations for further support to CSOs in the area of policy dialogue.

3. Thirdly, in the “lull” following Busan, during which there is a risk that Busan is viewed as an end rather than a beginning, the evaluation provided an opportunity to *promote lesson learning and utilisation* as national CSO forums as well as the BA and OF platforms consider how to “implement the BPD” and donors consider their associated CSO support strategies and the challenges of implementing their Busan commitment to development effectiveness.

A number of challenges also emerged as the evaluation progressed:

1. The *scale of the assignment* was significant – essentially requiring the simultaneous evaluation of two programmes, both of which had been attempting and are supported by organisations continuing to attempt a global outreach, engaging with a very large number of (sometimes the same) stakeholders and which both produce very large quantities of information and documentation. This required substantial synthesis work prior to analysis.
2. Given the *enormous amount of documentation available and stakeholders involved*, the potential for scope creep beyond the programmes was significant: it

¹⁶ On 10 September 2012, Danida’s Evaluation Department in collaboration with the Civil Society Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish NGO Forum hosted a consultative meeting on findings emerging from a current joint evaluation of CSO development effectiveness in policy dialogue.

¹⁷ The delay in the visit to Indonesia to avoid overlap with the Eid el Fitr holiday meant that this draft report would not have been distributed to stakeholders before presentation of the findings at a public event.

was important that the team stayed closely focused on the evaluation of the programmes and not the Platforms or the wider processes.

3. Although the Terms of Reference were clear, *the lack of clarity in programme design* (from the perspective of the explicit use of terms to distinguish between output, outcome and impact statements) meant that the interpretation and application of the questions raised in the ToR was not straight-forward (see section 4.2 on programme design).
4. The short time scale since Busan meant that there might only be *weak or preliminary signals of programme impact*.
5. The evaluation would be *contingent on the accuracy of the data* on which it could draw, as it was not within the scope of the evaluation to verify the authenticity of such copious reporting information. An early review of exchanges between the DCG and the CSO-MG suggested that progress reporting against performance frameworks may not have been comprehensive throughout the life of the programmes; concerns had been raised about gaps in reporting on emerging outcomes, causal links, contribution/attribution and lessons/uptake to support utilisation analysis. It took time to confirm the existence and explore the extent of these gaps.
6. Lesson learning at a *time of sensitive negotiations about the combined platform* is important but lessons need to be presented constructively in order not to create or exacerbate tensions and without appearing to compare and set one platform against the other.
7. Although the focus of the evaluation was a CSO process, the fact that this was part of and subject to the effects of a much wider multi-stakeholder process meant that *dependencies upon (the evolving perspectives and priorities of) other powerful key stakeholders* would need to be considered for lesson learning to be brought to the appropriate audience. In other words, a “failure” of CSOs to have influence in a multi-stakeholder context might have nothing to do with the way in which the programmes were designed and delivered and everything to do with the way other stakeholders pursued their own agendas. Of course, risk and dependencies are high in any global process but nevertheless, the evaluation team needed to consider from the outset whether the outcomes and impact of CSO consultations and negotiations could be evaluated without taking into close consideration the (evolving) motivations, priorities and agenda of the donor and recipient governments playing active parts in these negotiations.
8. As described above, the *coincidence with key CSO events* in Amsterdam and later in Madrid and Copenhagen was a mixed blessing; discussions over how the evaluation team might present and/or contribute to these events put pressure on the limited time available for the evaluation.

9. The *steering of the evaluation* was time-consuming. For example, *setting up country visits* took far longer than anticipated and fell to the evaluation team in collaboration with national contacts within CSO platforms contacts provided by BetterAid and Open Forum.
10. *CSOs hosting the visits were not resourced for the evaluation* and the team's requests for assistance, therefore, needed to be made tactfully and proportionately. It is worth mentioning that throughout the evaluation, the team was conscious that CSO stakeholders interviewed or giving their time to Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were doing so without a "budget line" to cover their engagement¹⁸. In the Colombian case, CSOs suggested arranging for a group of sub-national CSO platform representatives to travel to Bogotá to attend a FGD, but no funding was available for this either. This is symptomatic of a wider issue around the *unequal resourcing of multi-stakeholder processes* involving CSOs at national and international levels, *in which an equal funding playing-field would be essential for a real equality between the different stakeholder groups*¹⁹.
11. The *visit to Indonesia was later than originally planned* to fit around national holidays – this was unavoidable but meant that the evaluation team were in data collection mode throughout the period from the first visit to Uganda until three days before report submission deadline, squeezing the writing phase of the evaluation.

¹⁸ Whereas donors and government officials the evaluation met with were salaried. It is also worth noting that no CSO raised this as a concern, rather accepting this state of affairs as a norm in which voluntary contributions were part of their way of work.

¹⁹ Note that creating a level-playing funding field applies not only to donors, but also to national governments – for example, the Colombian government, according to information it communicated to the evaluation team, provided close to 100.000 USD in 2010/2011 for civil society and academic capacity-building to strengthen development effectiveness, the preparation of Colombian participation in Busan, and Open Forum activities in Colombia.

4. Findings

RELEVANCE

Background: Both programmes are best understood as a next step in a process of evolution which began in 2002 with the first High Level Forum (HLF1) with its commitments on donor harmonisation and which was followed by a second **High Level Forum in Paris (HLF2)** during which it was asserted that:

Partner countries commit to:

- *Exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national development strategies through broad consultative processes.*
- *Translate these national development strategies into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes as expressed in medium-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets.*
- *Take the lead in co-ordinating aid at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with donors and encouraging the participation of civil society and the private sector.*²⁰

This commitment was built upon at the third **High Level Forum (HLF3)** in Accra in 2008 where the Accra Agenda for Action promised that:

We will take action to accelerate progress to:

- *Build more effective and inclusive partnerships. In recent years, more development actors – middle-income countries, global funds, the private sector, civil society organisations – have been increasing their contributions and bringing valuable experience to the table. This also creates management and coordination challenges. Together, all development actors will work in more inclusive partnerships so that all our efforts have greater impact on reducing poverty.*²¹

We will broaden country-level policy dialogue on development:

- *Developing country governments will work more closely with parliaments and local authorities in preparing, implementing and monitoring national develop-*

²⁰ The Paris Declaration (2005), available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf>, p. 3.

²¹ The Accra Agenda for Action (2008), available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf>, p. 16.

ment policies and plans. They will also engage with civil society organisations (CSOs).

- Donors will support efforts to increase the capacity of all development actors – parliaments, central and local governments, CSOs, research institutes, media and the private sector – to take an active role in dialogue on development policy and on the role of aid in contributing to countries’ development objectives.²²
- Aid is about building partnerships for development. Such partnerships are most effective when they fully harness the energy, skills and experience of all development actors—bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, CSOs, and the private sector. To support developing countries’ efforts to build for the future, we resolve to create partnerships that will include all these actors.²³

We will deepen our engagement with civil society organisations:

- We will deepen our engagement with CSOs as independent development actors in their own right whose efforts complement those of governments and the private sector. We share an interest in ensuring that CSO contributions to development reach their full potential. To this end:
- We invite CSOs to reflect on how they can apply the Paris principles of aid effectiveness from a CSO perspective.
- We welcome the CSOs’ proposal to engage with them in a CSO-led multi-stakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness. As part of that process, we will seek to i) improve co-ordination of CSO efforts with government programmes, ii) enhance CSO accountability for results, and iii) improve information on CSO activities.
- We will work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximises their contributions to development.²⁴

We will continue to change the nature of conditionality to support ownership:

- Developing countries and donors will work together at the international level to review, document and disseminate good practices on conditionality with a view to reinforcing country ownership and other Paris Declaration Principles by increasing emphasis on harmonised, results-based conditionality. They will be receptive to contributions from civil society.²⁵

Origins of the Programmes: The BetterAid programme was developed in response to these “invitations” expressed in the PD and AAA, legitimately so, given the official position of BetterAid as CSO representative within the WP-EFF (the OECD’s Working Party on Effective Development Cooperation) – the principle forum for dis-

²² Accra (2008), available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf>, p. 16.

²³ Accra (2008), available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf>, p. 17.

²⁴ Accra (2008), available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf>, p. 18 – 19.

²⁵ Accra (2008), available at <http://www.oecd.org/development/aideffectiveness/34428351.pdf>, p. 20.

cussion on issues of aid effectiveness and development priorities in the context of official development assistance since 2003²⁶. Note, that it was at HLF3 in Accra that the WP-EFF was strengthened as an international partnership for aid effectiveness, bringing together a fuller range of stakeholders and development actors “to continue monitoring progress on implementing the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and to report back to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Korea in 2011.”²⁷ During HLF3, CSOs had challenged the implicit assumption of the Paris Declaration that more efficient delivery of aid would automatically lead to improved development results – the official establishment of the WF-EFF thus demonstrates how HLF3 set an important precedent in terms of the extent of CSO participation in what previously were discussions between bilateral, multilateral and government representatives.

The **Open Forum Programme** emerged in part from a challenge presented to CSOs from donors and partner countries, calling on CSOs to demonstrate and account for their own development effectiveness. This was received positively by CSOs, who were already debating this internally and who took up the challenge by launching the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness supporting the call to develop measures of development effectiveness specifically for CSOs.²⁸ *An Exploratory Meeting on the (Development) Effectiveness of Civil Society Organisations in 2008* provided the basis for setting up the governance, management and communication structures that would support the substantive work conducted from 2009 and which forms the basis for this evaluation.

Thus the BetterAid and the Open Forum Platforms were distinct, yet complementary global CSO-led processes: **Open Forum** focusing on how CSOs can improve their own development effectiveness as development actors (including by improving the enabling environment provided by official donors, governments and other development stakeholders for CSOs) and **BetterAid** focusing on monitoring and influence the implementation of the AAA (with specific focus on democratic ownership), while broadening the agenda to include development effectiveness and addressing this within the reform of the international aid architecture.

Both Platforms built their programmes on CSO-led consultation processes – although at different levels with distinct objectives - and included a coordinated dialogue with

²⁶ About BetterAid, <http://www.betteraid.org/en/about-us/about-better-aid.html>.

²⁷ The Working Party for Aid Effectiveness, <http://www.betteraid.org/en/about-us/betteraid-in-official-processes/working-party-on-aid-effectiveness.html>.

²⁸ Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, History of the Process, <http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/histoire-du-processus,017>.

official donors, governments and other development stakeholders. The consultations related to the BetterAid agenda, followed an advocacy logic to gather policy-oriented CSOs to monitor and influence implementation of the AAA and contribute to policy directions for the HLF-4. The imperative that called for consultation on a global scale lay with the fact that the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action would be at country level, and different stakeholders – including civil society organisations – would be expected to hold their country governments and financial partners/donors to account to respect these commitments. The Open Forum built on the expertise of a much wider mix of CSOs as development practitioners, policy interveners, social mobilisers and constituency-based organisations, and focused on the enabling conditions within and between CSOs and in official donor and government policies that are determinants in CSOs development effectiveness.²⁹

The BetterAid and Open Forum initiatives were also informed and evolved in response to a number of other important global processes. Most significantly, during HLF3, the efforts of CSOs had been strengthened by the work of the *International CSO Steering Group (ISG)* of the “CSO Parallel Process to the Ghana High Level Forum Network”, whose members initiated various consultations, seminars, research and other activities in promotion of CSO positions on aid and development effectiveness partly as preparation to Accra. Also at the national and regional level CSO workshops and multi-stakeholder consultations on the theme of CSOs and aid effectiveness were launched under the auspices of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS), with some implemented by the Reality of Aid (RoA)³⁰ and others led by donors or donor-CSO collaborative efforts.

Box 2: The IBON/Reality of Aid Outreach Programme

‘The IBON/Reality of Aid country outreach programme for the broad implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) seeks to achieve greater and more meaningful involvement of civil society organisations (CSOs) in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice. The strategy towards this is capacity development of CSOs in order for them to initiate policy dialogue spaces that allow for broader and inclusive participation of various kinds of CSOs at country and local level. These efforts are expected to contribute to changes in

Post-Accra, RoA continued to implement a “*Country Outreach Programme for Broad Implementation of the AAA: from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness*”. RoA’s country outreach work was based on the country-level plans of CSOs involved in aid effectiveness and development effectiveness advocacy. A broad range of CSOs were encouraged to participate and work together to engage their respective governments, parliaments and development partners in the im-

²⁹ Open Forum, ‘Open Forum Bodies and Partners’, available at <http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/open-forum-bodies-and-partners,014>.

³⁰ Note that the majority of ISG leaders were *Reality of Aid* representatives. The Reality of Aid (RoA) network is a network of country-level CSOs working on issues of aid reform since 1993.

policy along a development effectiveness approach. Country outreach work will be based on the country-level plans of CSOs who are involved in aid effectiveness and development effectiveness advocacy. A broad range of CSOs will be encouraged to participate and work together to engage their respective governments, parliaments and development partners in the implementation and monitoring of AAA implementation. IBON International and RoA are the partner agencies of BetterAid in this programme. IBON International is implementing the outreach through the RoA network.³¹

plementation and monitoring of AAA.³² Aiming to contribute to country level implementation of the AAA through CSO capacity building, multi-stakeholder dialogue and promotion of good practices, the RoA project (implemented by IBON) included capacity building of national CSOs and case studies/research documenting CSO involvement in aid policy reforms. These processes were expected to contribute towards strengthening civil society voice in the High Level Forum 4 in 2011.³³

Note that the AG-CS (set up in January 2007) was a multi-stakeholder group established to bring in a civil society perspective on aid effectiveness. Reporting to the OECD DAC's Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, it set up the global consultation process described that culminated in an International Forum in Gatineau/Ottawa in February 2008. Its final meeting took place in October 2008 and its mandate was not renewed. However, a Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment essentially replaced the AG-CS. This Multi-Stakeholder Task Team was launched in April 2009 within Cluster A (Ownership and Accountability) under the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness of OECD-DAC with the aim to promote implementation of civil society-related commitments in the Accra Agenda for Action and the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. Membership of the group included donor governments, developing country governments and CSOs representing both Open Forum and BetterAid. Open Forum was one of the three co-chairs alongside Sida and Mali (Office of the President). This Task Team played a key role in facilitating the multi-stakeholder dialogue towards HLF4, gathering evidence³⁴ and proposing themes through Cluster A.

Thus both programmes were designed against a background of ongoing effort, in which they had deep origins; the BetterAid programme focusing on the implementation of the Paris Declaration and Accra while the Open Forum programme responded

³¹ Reality of Aid, 'About the Country Outreach Programme', available at <http://www.realityofaid.org/index.php/country-outreach/index/About-the-Country-Outreach-Program>.

³² BetterAid 'What are the country consultations?', available at <http://www.betteraid.org/en/country-consultations/introduction.html>.

³³ Reality of Aid, 'About the Country Outreach Programme: A Short History', available at <http://www.realityofaid.org/index.php/country-outreach/index/About-the-Country-Outreach-Program>.

³⁴ This evidence suggested some progress in meeting the AAAs civil society related commitments but still some substantial issues to be addressed, for example the increasing vulnerability of CSOs in the face of more restrictive financial and regulatory regimes, limiting activity and in some cases endangering their existence.

to challenges made on CSO Development Effectiveness. Both platforms converged in their recognition of the importance of the policies of other development actors – donors, governments and CSOs themselves – in providing CSOs with the political space and associated opportunities to participate. Referring to these policy conditions as the “enabling environment”, both Platforms sought to identify priority enabling environment concerns to raise in Busan. With the *enabling environment* in mind as a context for all development initiatives, it is worth noting that it follows that the achievement of each of the programmes evaluated here would be constrained or facilitated by the policies of other development actors involved in the HLF4 processes.

Overall, the evaluation team conclude that BetterAid and Open Forum programmes were very relevant – both initiatives were informed by and evolved in response to a number of important global processes; both Platforms built their programmes on CSO-led consultation processes. They were also complementary et distinct global CSO-led processes: **Open Forum** focusing on how CSOs can improve their own development effectiveness as development actors and **BetterAid** focusing on monitoring and influence the implementation of the AAA (with specific focus on democratic ownership), while broadening the agenda to include development effectiveness (and so inclusive of Open Forum initiatives) and addressing this within the reform of the international aid architecture.

DESIGN

Inevitably this evaluation began with a reflection on the BA and OF proposals in the light of the ToR. Both programme proposals provide good background information supporting the rationale for the programme. However, each presented challenges in terms of programme design for a number of significant reasons:

1. Clarity on programme design in terms of the output-outcome-impact proposition was an essential starting point if questions raised in the ToR were to be answered. However, neither programme was explicit in their **use of terminology**³⁵ – specifically in making distinctions between activities, outputs, outcomes and indicators; in particular, the use of the word *objective* in the performance frameworks blurred the boundaries between outputs and outcomes. See example 1 from BetterAid’s proposal.

2. Open Forum’s programme **focus was on activities and outputs** – specifically the development and delivery of a *Framework of Principles*. There was a lesser focus on outcomes and impact (and indicators to support monitoring and reflection on output to outcome linkages or the *theory of change* supporting the investment proposition), how they would be sustained and how the contribution to development effectiveness would be measured. See example 2 from the Open Forum proposal.

Example 1: Strategic Objective 1 (BetterAid)

Objective: Achieve a greater and more meaningful involvement of civil society organisations in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice.

Indicator (extract): 7 regional AAA consultation workshops
Assessment:

1. *The objective could be better expressed – is this an output level objective focused on the pre-Busan process or an outcome level objective focused on the consequences of Busan (improvements in democratic ownership)?*
2. *The indicator is an activity; if for example this was referring to the pre-Busan process, then the indicator might be “policy change priorities agreed by majority consensus”.*

Example 2: Objective 1 (Open Forum)

Objective: To develop and promote a framework for CSO development effectiveness.

Indicator: a global framework for CSO development effectiveness to include a set of principles, indicators, implementation guidelines, good practices for accountability, mechanisms and minimum requirements for enabling conditions.

Assessment:

This is an output; it is not clear what response is expected from CSOs in terms of implementation (i.e. the outcome) nor what the effect of this implementation might be (impact) or how either will be measured (indicators).

Concerns over **BetterAid** programme design (and associated reporting) were raised by the DCG on a number of occasions during implementation. These concerns/requirements were summarised in the final report from the DCG to BetterAid in May 2012:

- ‘More (clarity is required) on the "intended impacts". As previously requested, an outline of the expected causal chain and/or theory of change would have strengthened reporting by illustrating how activities and outputs are intended to contribute to development outcomes and impacts. (The evaluation may be able to look at this issue of defining and assessing impact of the BA program). ‘

³⁵ CSOs might argue that this was because they were not prepared to commit to unrealistic outcomes and impacts, because the process was organic and because there were uncertainties over funding – these are of course reasonable considerations in programme design; the issue raised here is more to do with the logic that is conveyed through clear definitions rather than level of ambition.

- ‘Greater consideration to recommendations by the DCG meeting in Montreal 09/2011, specifically regarding analysis of the activity/output to outcome linkages. In effect, whilst acknowledging the limitation of the performance framework and indicators, the report would have benefitted from a stronger analysis of the links between BA’s activities/outputs and outcomes/impacts. Again, the report tends to list activities rather than changes (e.g. outputs of objective 2 SO2).’
- ‘More on contribution analysis. Though in some cases it is clear that BA influenced outcomes (e.g. clear link to, and role of, the CSO Sherpa in Busan work), it is in most parts unclear how contribution/attribution has been measured and linked to BA (e.g. “Actual Policy changes influenced by CSO positions”).’


Almost identical concerns were expressed over the **Open Forum** design:

- ‘More (clarity is required) on the "intended impacts". As previously requested, an outline of the expected causal chain and/or theory of change would have strengthened reporting by illustrating how activities and outputs are intended to contribute to development outcomes and impacts. For example, can anything be said about the trend toward impact of enhancing CSO development effectiveness at this time? (The evaluation may be able to look at this issue of defining and assessing impact of the OF program).’
- ‘Greater consideration to recommendations by the DCG meeting in Montreal 09/2011, specifically regarding analysis of the activity/output to outcome and impact linkages. In effect, whilst acknowledging the limitation of the performance framework and indicators, the report would have benefitted from a stronger analysis of the links between OF’s activities/outputs and outcomes/impacts. The report tends to list activities rather than changes.’

However, DCG feedback on this state of affairs (in response to the first draft of this report) pointed out that “*programme design negotiation and agreement was a joint CSO-donor responsibility*” and that “*during the proposal negotiation phase (April-Sept 2009), all were eager, and there was considerable pressure on donors from the CSOs to expedite the negotiations and get agreements in place and funds flowing before too much time passed following the Sept 2008 HLF3. The fact that donors (DFID) recruited a consultant to help the CSOs design their PMFs is a demonstration that donors were themselves lacking time and the human resources to work with the CSOs to elaborate a fully satisfactory PMF.*” On balance, donors were comfortable with “*an incremental, iterative approach...tried to strike a balance between being prescriptive and letting the CSOs self-direct*”. This chimes with feedback from the Reference Group: “*.. it was impossible to predict ...the receptivity of other stakeholders, the ability of CSOs to take advantage of new spaces in which we had never had any roles and therefore the implications of this inclusion within the Working Par-*


ty. The work of BetterAid was very much an iterative policy influencing process in which the ambition changed somewhat with the opportunities at all levels that were taken up, or missed.”

The above Reference Group observation highlights the risk associated with exploratory programmes of this nature. However, the view of the evaluation team holds that an ability to distinguish between outputs, outcomes and impact is important when presenting programme objectives. In light of this and to assist the evaluation process, the evaluation team attempted during the inception phase to formulate a *logic model* for each CSO process around the results achieved - connecting activities through outputs and outcomes to impact. These models evolved during the evaluation process and final versions are attached as Annexes VI and VII. Diagrams 1 and 2 below capture the output-outcome-impact propositions presented in the annexed logic models. They have been finalised in a meeting of the evaluation team with the CSO Management Group (CSO-MG) and DCG representatives in Paris on October 25th, 2012.



³⁶ An unplanned output produced in response to feedback and requests from the sector.

³⁷ As above.



Other general observations on programme design include:

1. **Sustainability objectives and indicators were not well defined** – for example, it was not clear whether the CSO learning environment referred to in Open Forum’s proposal was meant to last. Nor whether the Platform itself was temporary or permanent.
2. The **BetterAid proposal provided useful information not included in the Open Forum proposal**: for example specific plans for engagement with key stakeholders; assumptions made against programme objectives. Closer reporting on assumptions would have realised the potential of this important aspect of programme design.
3. It is **not clear in either proposal how gender equality as a strategy was to be measured** in terms of indicators of achievement.

Unresolved design issues limited BetterAid and Open Forum’s ability to report satisfactorily to the DCG throughout the implementation period and have presented a significant challenge to the evaluation process.

EFFECTIVENESS

Open Forum

Taking the Open Forum Performance Framework agreed at the proposal stage as a starting point, Open Forum reports significant progress against all three strategic objectives. These are summarised in Table 5 below:

Table 5: Progress against the Open Forum Performance Framework

Specific objective	Indicators	Progress and Achievements
Objective 1: To develop and promote a framework for CSO development effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A global framework for CSO development effectiveness, to include a set of principles, indicators, implementation guidelines, good practices for accountability mechanisms and minimum requirements for enabling conditions Framework endorsed by CSOs at the second Global Assembly of the Open Forum in 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness finalised. Complemented by 2 Advocacy and Implementation Toolkits. Endorsed at the Second Global Assembly (now referred to as the Siem Reap Consensus).
Objective 2: To promote and facilitate a learning environment on CSO development effectiveness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Range and number of stakeholders participating in a minimum number of multi-stakeholder and CSO consultations and meetings (minimum of 50 country, 4 thematic/sectoral and 2 international consultations) Research conducted on prior frameworks and mechanisms of CSO development effectiveness Number of initiatives on CSO development effectiveness that acknowledge the contribution of the Open Forum to their processes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 70 plus national consultations, 6 thematic consultations and 2 Global Assemblies held. Multi-stakeholder component to all meetings. Lessons learned were shared at meetings. OF co-chaired the Multistakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, hosted the Task Teams' webpage. OF website developed to support DE learning and information sharing. Awareness and information exchange generally increased. IP's disseminated, used and officially acknowledged.
Objective 3: Engage in a political dialogue with donors, governments and other stakeholders to build understanding and support for an enabling environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A proposal for minimum standards for an enabling environment Range and number of donors, governments and other non-CSO stakeholders in processes that aim to improve the enabling environment for CSOs The Open Forum is acknowledged by governments and donors as a concrete contribution to the implementation of Article 20 of the Accra Agenda for Action 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Siem Reap Consensus contains a full section on enabling environment. OP engaging in dialogue with governments and donors as well as other development actors International Framework and enabling environment acknowledged and included in the final outcome document of HLF4.

However, for reasons outlined in the reflections on programme design above, the evaluation team concluded that the “results chain” from completed activity, to delivered outputs, to (behavioural) outcome change to impact was not easy to infer from

this table and so sought to examine the results chain against the programme logic as interpreted by the evaluation team. Broadly speaking, the team felt that the effectiveness of Open Forum can be judged against the delivery of the following outputs and outcomes:

Outputs³⁸:

1. Common understanding shared by CSOs of challenges to realising DE
2. Increased awareness of tools, frameworks and mechanisms for CSO DE
3. Framework for DE proposed by CSO stakeholder group
4. Implementation toolkit produced published and disseminated
5. Imposed minimum standards for EE
6. Advocacy Toolkit produced, published and disseminated

Outcomes:

1. HLF4 and other external development actors endorse the CSO Development Effectiveness Framework including Minimum Requirements for an Enabling Environment.
2. Independent initiatives arising from CSOs taking responsibility for their own development effectiveness and accountability.

Table 6 below records performance against delivery of these outputs; table 7 against achievement of these outcomes.

Table 6: Output Level Performance – Open Forum (evaluation team interpretation of programme outputs)

Planned Output	Delivery	Data Sources	Level of Achievement
1. Common understanding shared by CSOs of challenges to realising DE	The Evaluation Results of the First Global Assembly , November 2010 record positive experiences in terms of shared understanding. The 'joint learning' score rose (from 4.0 to 4.1 out of 5) within the survey for the Second Global Assembly in Siem Reap , June 2011. A full account of Open Forum outreach process and achievements is recorded in Brian Tomlinson's report: <i>CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan</i> , June 2012	A number of surveys were conducted to find evidence of improved understanding: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/post_global_assembly_me_analysis_final.pdf http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/post_global_assembly_me_analysis_final.pdf http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/post_global_assembly_me_analysis_final.pdf http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/csos_on_the_road_from_accra_to_busan_final.pdf	Full or significant achievement

³⁸ Note that these chime relatively well with Open Forum's own web-based answer to the question "What is the Open Forum?" to which the response is: 1. The creation of an open process; 2. The development of a CSO vision on development effectiveness; 3. An agreement on common principles; 4. An agreement on guidelines on how to apply these principles and documentation of good practices for context –relevant mechanisms; 5. A global agreement on minimum standards for an enabling environment.

2. Increased awareness of tools, frameworks and mechanisms for CSO DE	An inventory of resources, methods, tools, good practices, standards, models is provided as Section IV of <i>Putting the Istanbul principles into practice</i> , a 'companion guide to the Siem Reap consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness' (Jan 2012)	A number of surveys were conducted to find evidence of improved awareness: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/230111-implementation-toolkit-en-web.pdf	Full or significant achievement
3. Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness agreed by CSOs as a stakeholder group	Siem Reap CSO Consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness was agreed by the second Global Assembly, Jun 2011. This is a global framework generated by drawing on the country consultations.	http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/international_framework_open_forum.pdf http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/participant_list.pdf	Full or significant achievement
4. Implementation toolkit produced published and disseminated	Putting the Istanbul Principles into Practice , by Christina Bermann-Harms and Nora Lester Murad, was published as a 'companion guide to the Siem Reap consensus on the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness' (Jan 2012) and made available to download on website in three languages (English, French, Spanish), inviting people to 'use and disseminate them widely'. The Toolkit is disseminated through links on other websites e.g. trialog information services, the Learning Network on Capacity Development, and GOPA Worldwide Consultants. A Youtube clip about implementing the Istanbul Principles (3 languages) (Jul 2012) is also available (see clip for viewing count).	http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/230111-implementation-toolkit-en-web.pdf http://www.lencd.org/document/putting-istanbul-principles-practice-companion-toolkit-siem-reap-consensus-international-fr http://trialog-information-service.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/putting-development-effectiveness-into.html http://www.gopa.de/index.php?id=42&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=874&cHash=4a5fbcc8c5b3084bc996904a2d9dff0d http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=ZRgrdGdMzkg#	Full or significant achievement
5. Agreed minimum standards for EE ³⁹	Included in Siem Reap (Jun 2011): ' An enabling environment for CSO development effectiveness '- lists 'fundamental principles or standards' that are preconditions for a 'robust and effective civil society', p. 22; list the WP-EFF Task Team's ⁴⁰ call on all development stakeholders to enhance CSO DE and EE, p. 29. A Youtube clip is available on the enabling environment (3 languages) (Jul 2012) (see clip for viewing count)	http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/international_framework_open_forum.pdf http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2SQrw_S3uA&list=UUWl2RnWtoESwRNSoo-ftMKQ&index=2&feature=plcp	Full or significant achievement

³⁹ See Annex VIII for Siem Reap statements.

⁴⁰ The Multi-Stakeholder Task team on CSO Development Effectiveness and the Enabling Environment was a multi-stakeholder group launched in April 2009 within Cluster A (Ownership and Accountability) under the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness of OECD-DAC to promote implementation of civil society-related commitments in the Accra Agenda for Action and the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness. Membership of the group included donor governments, developing country governments and CSOs representing Open Forum and BetterAid. Open Forum was one of the three co-chairs alongside Sida and Mali (Office of the President). The Task Team played a key role in facilitating the multi-stakeholder dialogue towards HLF4.

6. Advocacy Toolkit produced, published and disseminated	Advocacy Toolkit by Costanza de Toma published, to provide ‘guidance on how to advocate for a more enabling environment for civil society in your context’ (Jan 2012) and made available to download on website. Available in English, French and Spanish. Also disseminated through links on other websites e.g. trialog information services, Korea Civil Society Forum on International Development Cooperation and, the Learning Network on Capacity Development as three examples.	http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/120110-of-advocacy_toolkit-en-web-2.pdf http://trialog-information-service.blogspot.co.uk/2012/02/putting-development-effectiveness-into.html http://kofid.org/en/bbs_view.php?no=1240&code=news http://www.lenccd.org/document/advocacy-toolkit-guidance-how-advocate-more-enabling-environment-civil-society-your-context	Full or significant achievement
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Table 7: Outcome Level Performance – Open Forum⁴¹ (evaluation team interpretation of programme outcomes)

Planned Outcome	Achievement	Data Sources	Level of Achievement
HLF4 and other external development actors endorse the CSO Development Effectiveness Framework including Minimum Requirements for an Enabling Environment.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. BPD: ‘We will... encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability and their contribution to development effectiveness, guided by the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness’ p. 6 (22b) 2. A list of international agreements, and endorsements by regional governments (EU), national governments (Japan, Finland, US, S Korea, Cambodia) and other endorsements (Aung San Suu Kyi) can be found at the link provided. Plus tools to assist advocacy (e.g. civil society letter to Colombian Government). 3. BPD: ‘We will... implement fully our respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development’ p. 6. (22a) 4. Open Forum Press Release: ‘Busan Partnership a compromise says civil society. Civil society standards acknowledged but enabling environment remains stumbling block’ (Jul 2011) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. http://www.fao.org/filead_min/user_upload/capacity_build-ing/Busan_Effective_Development_EN.pdf 2. http://www.fao.org/filead_min/user_upload/capacity_build-ing/Busan_Effective_Development_EN.pdf 3. http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/InternationalFramework 4. Link to Press Release available here: http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/-busan-partnership-for-effective,190-.html 	<p>Full or significant achievement in terms of endorsement.</p> <p>Partial achievement in terms of enabling environment (although a specific indicator was developed post-Busan)</p>
Independent initiatives arising from CSOs taking responsibility	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Evidence of initiatives being taken and alliances established by CSOs post Busan can be found at the post Busan link provided. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/post-busan-interim-group,202 2. http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/post-busan-interim-group,202 	Full or significant achievement

⁴¹ Initial feedback from Open Forum pointed out that “...the Open Forum process contributed the statement around minimum standards for an enabling environment, via the Multi-Stakeholder Task Team and the International Framework. Open Forum cannot be evaluated based on results of multi-stakeholder negotiations to which it did not directly participate.” However, after discussion with the evaluation team it was decided that the outcomes listed above represent the level of ambition of Open Forum (albeit stretching) with regard to the behavioural changes (outcomes) they hoped to influence.

for their own development effectiveness and accountability.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Civil society and media reactions can be found at the second link. 3. Specific individual examples of implementation of the toolkit are provided at link3. 4. Examples of IP implementation are provided at link 4. 5. A comprehensive website also records and facilitates the sharing of these examples, including through a blog and newsletters. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/Toolkits 4. http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/istanbul-principles-implementation,567 	
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On the Istanbul Principles specifically, the team explored perceptions through the online survey. Results appear in Box 3.

Box 3: Results of the Evaluation Online Survey⁴² (from a total of 85 respondents)

Top three Istanbul Principles in terms of impact:

- Practice transparency and accountability (53%)
- Embody gender equality while promoting women and girls’ rights (47%)
- Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning (47%)

Value added:

22% thought the Istanbul Principles have increased their organisation’s credibility.
 19% thought the Istanbul Principles have increased their organisation’s legitimacy
 13% thought the Istanbul Principles have increased international cohesion
 9% thought the Istanbul Principles have increased their organisation’s efficiency

It is worth clarifying that the Istanbul Principles were “not new” in the sense that these principles were already widely understood and practiced. The document itself was of course new, although in some countries there was a close equivalent already in operation. For example, in Uganda: the QuAM (Quality Assurance Mechanism). Here, one CSO said they were on a list of CSOS waiting to be “*QuAMed*” to establish their credibility as a professional organisation able to counter potential accusations of unprofessionalism or fraudulent behaviour (see Box 4). This is not duplication, the IPs were always understood to be a common set of principles fed from the national to the global level. However, this example demonstrates that the measure of success of the IPs should be that they guide or enhance existing initiatives and have been reflected back into local contexts.

Box 4: The Ugandan QuAM	
1.	Enhance its credibility. One of the ambitions of NGOs is to defend the rights of our fellow citizens. To do so, one must adhere to the highest ethical standards and best possible practices. With the QuAM, we aim to ensure that the credibility of NGOs is widely recognised in the eyes of the public, Government, and other stakeholders. As the public gains confidence in the certification mechanism, we anticipate that Quality Assured NGOs will be identified as partners of trust.
2.	Enhance its legitimacy. Given the doubts that sometimes surround the legitimacy of NGOs, you may wish to re-assert the ‘bona fide’ character of your organisation. We anticipate that the QuAM will become widely recognised as a ‘seal of approval’ for NGOs working in

⁴² See Annex IX for full results.

Uganda.	
3.	Enhance protection and autonomy. To work effectively, the freedom of action of NGOs (as guaranteed by our Constitution) must be respected, especially by Government. If NGOs are seen as trustworthy, effective organisations, they are better able to secure their necessary freedom of operation. By enhancing your organisation's credibility and profile, you will also be better placed to defend its interests against any pressure or manipulation.
4.	Contribute to better cohesion amongst NGOs. By working together to develop standards of good practice, by sharing and applying these standards across the sector, we expect enhanced cohesion amongst NGOs, reducing the competitive pressures that often undermine unity. In particular, the Certification mechanism will strengthen district NGO networks and fora.
5.	Help to constantly improve performance. We realise that, as NGOs, we shall never be perfect, but we can strive towards perfection. The QuAM has been designed to promote constant improvement, so that we become more effective, more efficient, and better learners. Every two or three years, new standards of achievement will sharpen your organisational ambitions.
6.	Learn from examples. You may wish to learn from those NGOs that are setting high standards in your local community. Quality Assured NGOs will set a trend for us all to follow.
7.	Enhance accountability. As NGOs, we are accountable to the general public, to our members, to our local and external donors, to our government. The QuAM will help us enhance our accountability to these parties.
8.	Raise profile. Having an NGO Certificate will signal to the public that you belong to a genuine, recognised group of voluntary organisations, striving to adhere to high ethical and operational standards and to constantly improve your performance. The list of certified NGOs may be published from time to time. A Certificate may help your organisation gain support from potential sources of assistance (local governments, the general public, other donors, etc).

BetterAid

Based on the initial Performance Framework agreed with donors, the evaluation team's assessment of achievement is as presented below in table 8.

Table 8: Progress against the BetterAid Performance Framework

Strategic Objectives	Indicators	Progress and Achievements
SO1. Achieve a greater and more meaningful involvement of civil society organisations in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice	By 2011, at least 20,000 CSOs are reached in planned events: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • seven (7) regional AAA consultation workshops, • five (5) thematic/sectoral workshops, • four (4) continental consultation workshops, • thirty-six (36) AAA implementation related national consultations organised. 	BetterAid reports <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • seven (7) regional AAA consultation workshops, • four (4) thematic/sectoral workshops • the continental consultations were cancelled due to insufficient funding cover • sixty-four (64) AAA implementation related national consultations organised
	By 2011, at least nine (9) case studies conducted in various countries to inform and support CSO policy reform recommendations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 case studies documenting mechanisms, processes and structures that demonstrate CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation, • 5 case studies capturing aid supported projects/programs that demonstrate nationally-significant impacts to the poor and marginalised as a result of CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation. 	The planned 9 case studies became 15 shorter case stories in October 2010, and were delivered by the Reality of Aid (RoA) International Coordinating Committee and not the BACG. BetterAid reports that the case stories document mechanisms, processes and structures that demonstrate CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation. No mention is made of the topics of the second batch of 5 case studies that had been planned ("nationally-significant impacts to the poor and marginalised as a result of CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA

		implementation”).
SO2. Develop a series of realistic CSO policy proposals that promotes global policy changes from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness.	A collective CSO Policy Position Paper making the case for the adoption of development effectiveness as the framework for global policy reform is produced and adopted by 500 CSOs attending the Parallel CSO Forum ³ on HLF-4.	A collective CSO Policy Position Paper entitled, CSOs on the road to Busan: Key messages and proposals produced and endorsed by 1,983 CSOs.
	Policy proposals for equity-promoting development cooperation- one (1) each in the areas of gender justice, decent work, and climate justice- officially submitted to the WP-EFF for discussion and consideration in the lead up to HLF-4.	BetterAid reports policy proposals to advance equity-promoting development cooperation in aid architecture, aid for trade, conflict and fragility, private sector & climate justice.
	Production of HLF-4 materials based on BACG Policy Position Paper, including <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • four (4) continental statements and specific proposals towards the HLF-4; and, • five (5) sectoral statements and proposals towards the HLF-4 (output from the 5 sectoral consultations: trade unions, women’s, farmers, etc.). 	BetterAid reports “HLF- 4 materials based on BACG Policy Position Paper, including the civil society statement entitled, Better Aid and Development Effectiveness for the World We Want and sectoral statements and proposals from the women, trade unions and rural groups; Position Papers on drafts 1 -4 of BOD; ten (10) theme and four (4) Building Block proposals for HLF4; negotiation points from CSOs for the HLF-4 Sherpas’ group”.
	Policy changes that have been influenced by BACG policy messages or by the CSO policy position paper.	Indicator not quantifiable; for qualitative assessment, cf. the detailed assessment based on the formulated Theory of Change.
SO3. Ensure that key aid effectiveness actors (donor and recipient countries, parliamentarians, CSOs, media, etc.) are fully exposed to CSO positions and policy recommendations.	Increase in awareness of aid effectiveness actors regarding CSO positions and policy recommendations by 100% compared to 2009 baseline.	The comparison between two perception surveys carried out at the beginning and end of the programme reveal that “issues identified by external stakeholders as the key messages of BetterAid represent an accurate reflection of what BetterAid has sought to communicate”. However, the surveys provide no quantification regarding the increase.
	Extended outreach to donor agencies, recipient country governments, parliamentarians, and media in the 36 sites of CSO consultations on AAA implementation related developments and issues in these countries.	BetterAid reports “extended outreach to donor agencies, recipient country governments, parliamentarians, and media in the 50 of the 64 sites through multi-stakeholder consultations on AAA implementation

		related developments and issues in these countries“, but indicator completion not quantifiable.
	Increased use of BA website by 100% (from baseline of 3,593 visits in August 2008).	58% increase report for peak month; reporting is unclear about how sustainable increase was.
	Increase in print and broadcast media coverage of BACG activities and positions by 100% compared to 2009 baseline.	Better Aid reports a monitoring survey of online media coverage indicate significant online coverage of BetterAid. However, there are no numbers available regarding percentage increase regarding print and broadcast media coverage.

However, analysing BetterAid’s effectiveness constitutes a more challenging task than this suggests, because of the issues raised above on programme structure and – linked to this - the way the international policy dialogue in which the programme is involved is structured. As reported above, the BetterAid programme proposal contained planned activities and outputs, as well as objectives, but did not specifically lay out an intended Theory of Change or results chain to distinguish outputs, outcomes and impact. Based on the proposal, the evaluation team thus formulated the logic model (described) that tries to capture the programme’s intended outputs, outcomes and impacts (Diagram 2 and Annex VII).

Table 10: Output Level Performance – BetterAid (evaluation team interpretation of programme outputs)

Planned Output	Delivery	Level of achievement reported
1. A series of realistic CSO positions and policy proposal/recommendations (from AE to DE) that key AE actors are fully exposed to	<p>By 2011, at least nine (9) case studies conducted in various countries to inform and support CSO policy reform recommendations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 case studies documenting mechanisms, processes and structures that demonstrate CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation, • 5 case studies capturing aid supported projects/programs that demonstrate nationally-significant impacts to the poor and marginalised as a result of CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation. <p>Policy proposals for equity-promoting development cooperation- one (1) each in the areas of gender justice, decent work, and climate justice- officially submitted to the WP-EFF for discussion and consideration in the lead up to HLF-4.</p>	<p>Full or significant achievement with regards to production of a wide range of realistic CSO positions and policy proposal/recommendations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The planned 9 case studies became 15 shorter case stories in October 2010, and were delivered by the Reality of Aid (RoA) International Coordinating Committee and not the BACG. BetterAid reports that the case stories document mechanisms, processes and structures that demonstrate CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation. No mention is made of the topics of the second batch of 5 case studies that had been planned (“nationally-significant impacts to the poor and marginalised as a result of CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation”). • BetterAid reports policy proposals to advance equity-promoting development cooperation in aid architecture, aid for trade, conflict and fragility, private sector & climate justice.

<p>2. More meaningful involvement of CSOs in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice</p>	<p>A collective CSO Policy Position Paper making the case for the adoption of development effectiveness as the framework for global policy reform is produced and adopted by 500 CSOs attending the Parallel CSO Forum³ on HLF-4. Production of HLF-4 materials based on BACG Policy Position Paper, including</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • four (4) continental statements and specific proposals towards the HLF-4; and, • five (5) sectoral statements and proposals towards the HLF-4 (output from the 5 sectoral consultations: trade unions, women’s, farmers, etc.). 	<p>Full or significant achievement with regards to concrete HLF 4 preparation and input:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A collective CSO Policy Position Paper entitled, CSOs on the road to Busan: Key messages and proposals produced and endorsed by 1,983 CSOs. • BetterAid reports “HLF- 4 materials based on BACG Policy Position Paper, including the civil society statement entitled, Better Aid and Development Effectiveness for the World We Want and sectoral statements and proposals from the women, trade unions and rural groups; Position Papers on drafts 1 -4 of BOD; ten (10) theme and four (4) Building Block proposals for HLF4; negotiation points from CSOs for the HLF-4 Sherpas’ group”.
<p>3. Increased awareness of AE actors regarding policy positions and recommendations.</p>	<p>Increase in awareness of aid effectiveness actors regarding CSO positions and policy recommendations by 100% compared to 2009 baseline.</p> <p>Extended outreach to donor agencies, recipient country governments, parliamentarians, and media in the 36 sites of CSO consultations on AAA implementation related developments and issues in these countries.</p> <p>Increased use of BA website by 100% (from baseline of 3,593 visits in August 2008).</p> <p>Increase in print and broadcast media coverage of BACG activities and positions by 100% compared to 2009 baseline.</p>	<p>Achievement cannot be quantified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The comparison between two perception surveys carried out at the beginning and end of the programme reveal that “issues identified by external stakeholders as the key messages of BetterAid represent an accurate reflection of what BetterAid has sought to communicate”. However, the surveys provide no quantification regarding the increase. • BetterAid reports “extended outreach to donor agencies, recipient country governments, parliamentarians, and media in the 50 of the 64 sites through multi-stakeholder consultations on AAA implementation related developments and issues in these countries”, but indicator completion not quantifiable. • 58% increase report for peak month; reporting is unclear about how sustainable increase was. • Better Aid reports a monitoring survey of online media coverage indicate significant online coverage of BetterAid. However, there are no numbers available regarding percentage increase regarding print and broadcast media coverage.

Table 11: Outcome Level Performance – BetterAid (evaluation team interpretation of programme outcomes)

Planned outcomes	Achievements	Level of reported achievement
<p>HLF4 Outcome Statement reflecting: Governments progress on key selected issues in implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action.</p>	<p>1. Stakeholders involved in HLF4 did reach a common position on some key issues and these were reported in the <i>Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation</i> (BPd) as the outcome statement from HLF4.</p>	<p>Full or significant achievement</p>
<p>HLF4 Outcome Statement reflecting: Governments follow-up on initial commitments in the AAA with a broadening of development effectiveness.</p>	<p>1. CSOs genuinely viewed as taking part as “independent developing actors in their own right” in the HLF4 and the process leading up to it. 2. However, political shifts away from supporting a CSO role in policy advocacy in the time period between Accra and Busan – towards greater interest in a tripartite relationship involving the emerging economies backed by a “new development para-</p>	<p>Partial achievement</p>

	<p>digm” framed by economic growth priorities.</p> <p>3. The BPD contains a significant number of key CSO asks, yet some are actually focused on “classic” aid effectiveness issues and not on development effectiveness issues. Out of this latter category, only two CSO asks are fully agreed: an endorsement for the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework (both drafted by the Open Forum) and a commitment to “deepen, extend and operationalise” democratic ownership.</p>	
HLF4 Outcome Statement reflecting: Reforms of the international aid architecture	<p>1. With regards to the international aid architecture, the two BA indicators named – an end of the exclusive role of the OECD DAC for the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the HLF4 being hosted jointly between the OECD and the UN’s Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) – were not achieved.</p> <p>2. However, international aid architecture has opened up to CSOs in the OECD context and particularly in the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment.</p>	Not achieved with regard to BA objectives; however CSOs were clearly an actor.
Country level and international initiatives for multi-stakeholder dialogue strengthened or initiated (arising from CSO policy lobbying and capacity development).	<p>1. National Consultation processes valued as a means by which CSOs were brought together and awareness raised around aid effectiveness and development effectiveness issues. The programmes have acted as a catalyst for regional, national and even sub-national NGOs interested in DE.</p>	Partial achievement given the need to ensure future sustainability
<i>Implicit outcome: Creation of a unified CSO platform</i>	<p>1. <i>BetterAid and Open Forum recognised as full partners and about to merge into CPDE.</i></p>	Full or significant achievement

In trying to delve deeper into the programme’s achievements, the team’s thinking (enhanced by stakeholder input and feedback) is that on the one side, the programme’s intended *outcome* was to focus on a multi-stakeholder commitment to CSO policy proposals in Busan regarding three key targets:

1. Governments making progress on key selected issues with regards to the implementation of the Accra Agenda for Action;
2. Governments following up on initial commitments in the AAA with a broadening of development effectiveness;
3. Reforms of the international aid architecture.

In parallel, as an outcome of BetterAid’s CSO policy lobbying and capacity development outreach,

4. Country-level and international initiatives for multi-stakeholder dialogue were to be strengthened or initiated.

The *impact* assessment is focused on evidence of actual change at the national and global level as a consequence of the commitments made at Busan and the result of country-level and international multi-stakeholder dialogue.

Bringing about a change in government positions during the international policy dialogue on aid and development effectiveness at HLF4 (relating to targets 1 and 2)

A general comment made by those interviewed for the evaluation was that, of the different stakeholder groups present at HLF4, the CSO group was both the most engaged and best prepared. This - combined particularly with the experience of donors of working together with CSO representatives in the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment – contributed to the granting of CSOs an equal seat at the table at the HLF4 – something they had wished for, but were themselves surprised to see concretised, according to several interviewees. CSOs were genuinely viewed as taking part as “independent developing actors in their own right” in the HLF4 and the process leading up to it; a key element from the HLF in Accra was thus effectively enacted.




The funding experience (of these programmes) in itself does not seem have been a catalyst for reflections inside donor agencies on their support for CSO’s role in the new development effectiveness setting. Indeed, CSO interviewees argued that they felt the individual donor staff members handling the BetterAid and Open Forum programmes were isolated within their organisations, which they identified as having made, on average, political shifts away from supporting a CSO role in policy advocacy in the time period between Accra and Busan – towards greater interest in a tripartite relationship involving the emerging economies backed by a “new development paradigm” framed by economic growth priorities. Non-CSO interviewees agreed that many donor representatives at Busan did not seem to have been briefed to understand and take their own position on CSO positions and requests. Feedback from the DCG confirms these changes in donor positioning and that they should be acknowledged in this evaluation. *“During the period of the programme, at least five of the donor governments underwent elections which led to significant change of approach of each of those governments – which in turn led to change of approach within the donor group”*

Nevertheless, stakeholders involved in HLF4 did reach a common position on some key issues and these were reported in the *Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (BPD) as the outcome statement from HLF4. This was approved by Heads of State, Ministers and representatives of developing and developed countries, heads of multilateral and bilateral institutions, representatives of different types of public, civil society, private, parliamentary, local and regional organisations. BetterAid states that “the BPD represents what CSOs were able to realise in terms of po-

litical objectives, both in content and process.”⁴³ The BPD contains a significant number of key CSO asks, yet some are actually focused on “classic” aid effectiveness issues and not on development effectiveness issues. Out of this latter category, only two CSO requests are fully agreed: an endorsement for the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework (both drafted by the Open Forum) and a commitment to “deepen, extend and operationalize” democratic ownership.

Table 12: BetterAid demands vs. Busan Partnership commitments

Key issues for CSOs according to BA proposal	Key issues for CSOs according to BA's Key messages	Issue covered by Busan Declaration?
Aid effectiveness improvements		
Extension of untied aid and local purchases	Fully untie all forms of aid	Partial achievement (accelerate efforts to untie)
	Country systems as default option	Full or significant achievement
	Address the unpredictability of aid flows	Full or significant achievement
Significant reduction of conditionality	End policy conditionality	Not covered
Development effectiveness improvements		
Democratic ownership ⁴⁴	Democratic ownership	Full or significant achievement (“Deepen, extend and operationalize”)
	Endorse Istanbul Principles and acknowledge International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness	Full or significant achievement
	Equitable and inclusive multilateral forum for policy dialogue and standard setting	Partial achievement (Global Partnership with regards to dialogue)
	Minimal standards on enabling environment ⁴⁵	Partial achievement (Indicator developed post-Busan on enabling environment)
Transparency	Transparency	Not covered
Mutual accountability (and an equitable aid architecture framework)	Inclusive accountability frameworks at country and global levels	Not covered
Demand-driven technical assistance	Demand-driven technical assistance	Not covered
	Orient private sector development for self-sustaining livelihoods	Not covered
	Human-rights approach, Decent Work Agenda	Not covered
	Gender equality and women's rights	Redouble efforts to implement existing commitments

 for entirely covered issues,  for partially covered issues,  for issues not covered

Box 5 below compares CSO priorities with achievements based on the online survey and Box 6 adds an Indonesian snapshot view.

⁴³ Post-Busan Transition Year Project Proposal. May to December 2012. BetterAid, 2012.

⁴⁴ Note that in the CSO online survey, when establishing the top 3 for the messages and statements CSOs deem to be the most important from BetterAid's Key Proposal, the Task Team and the BPD, democratic ownership or components of it constitute 5 out of 9.

⁴⁵ 2 out of 9 in the aforementioned ranking.

Box 5: Online Survey Results: CSO Messages and the BPD

Istanbul Principles regarded to have had the largest impact in regards to change of organisations strategies, operations or system		
Top three of the Istanbul principles	Total	%
Practice transparency and accountability	16	53%
Embody gender equality while promoting women and girls' rights	14	47%
Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning	14	47%
Most important "Key messages and proposals" for CSOs delivered pre-Busan		
Top three messages and proposals	Total	%
Establish democratic ownership as the core aid and development effectiveness principle	32	60%
Commit to and implement rights-based approaches to development	21	41%
Agree on minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws, regulations and practices that create an enabling environment for CSOs	19	36%
Most important key messages for CSOs delivered by the Task Team on Ownership and Accountability of the WP-EFF to Busan		
Top three messages	Total	%
Guarantee fundamental rights (freedoms of expression, of association, of non-state interference rights to communicate, to seek and secure funding, to protection by the State)	26	52%
Emphasise ownership and leadership by local CSOs, communities and citizens	21	42%
Support transparent and inclusive multi-stakeholder policy dialogue and capacity building towards this end	14	28%
Most important statements for CSOs relating to messages which were included in the Busan Outcome Document		
Top three statements	Total	%
Enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors	38	78%
Deepen, extend and operationalize democratic ownership of development policies and processes	35	71%
Encourage active participation of all development cooperation partners in mutual assessment reviews	17	35%

Box 6: An Indonesian CSO Snapshot View

During the country visit to Jakarta, 15 CSOs attending the focus group discussions were asked to list the most important statements made in the BPD from their perspective. Their answers were:

1. Enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors.
2. Deepen, extend and operationalise democratic ownership of development policies and processes.
3. Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability.

The top two are the same as the survey results.

One other achievement relevant to CSOs is the establishment of a new forum for policy dialogue (the Global Partnership) with a CSO representation. Additionally, although this was achieved post-Busan, discussions relating to BPD monitoring indicators did in the end lead to an agreement that one of the indicators should measure the enabling environment for CSOs.

Bringing about a change in the international aid architecture (target 3)?

With regards to the international aid architecture, the two BA targets named (see Table 11) – an end of the exclusive role of the OECD DAC for the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the HLF4 being hosted jointly between the OECD and the UN's Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) – were not achieved. The BPD does "invite" the OECD and UNDP to support the effective functioning of the Global Partnership"; also, the Global Partnership is to "engage with other international fora, such as the United Nations Development Co-operation Forum (UNDCF)". However, the first issue relates to a technical support function, whereas the second one is clearly not binding in the way it was originally intended. However and paradoxically perhaps, it should be noted that the most effective international participation of CSOs regarding the international aid architecture has been within OECD structures. While this might appear contrary to CSOs preference for a multilateral approach, it seems this is due to the OECD being particularly cognisant of the benefits of partnership, and key OECD donors (particularly Canada, Netherlands, and the Nordic countries)

being very receptive to CSOs as important stakeholders and thus actively supporting their inclusion in international dialogue.

In the feedback provided for the first draft of this report, Sida pointed out that ‘It would be fair to say that a change in aid architecture, though not actually in place in HLF4, was committed to at HLF4 and has since been put in place with the Global Partnership Secretariat co-managed by the OECD and UNDP.

Did process get in the way of creating a strong CSO thematic input in the international dialogue?

Reading through the documents and reflecting on the interviews, it is apparent that while activities are well described and enumerated, causalities with regards to outcome are weakly understood and explained (to quote donor reports, “it is in most parts unclear how contribution/attribution has been measured and linked to BA”⁴⁶ and “again, the report tends to list activities rather than changes”⁴⁷). This is most likely due to the fact that the prime intention of BetterAid – apart from country level and international initiatives for multi-stakeholder dialogue – seems to have been the creation of a *platform* to impact policy at HLF4 – as it states, “a BetterAid Sherpa⁴⁸, negotiating with 17 government and donor Sherpas the text of the Busan Outcome document, was the unique and defining experience of HLF4 for civil society”⁴⁹. BetterAid’s success in creating such a platform is underlined by the donors (“BA’s successful approach to consensus building [sic], clearly was one of the most meaningful achievement of the initiative; in particular the great achievement of attaining a common position / CSO key asks for Busan”⁵⁰). While donors acknowledge the value of the process towards Busan, they appear less comfortable with the consensus among CSOs being viewed as the key outcome (or indeed an outcome at all) – rather seeing this as the output of a process which should lead to significant changes in CSO and other stakeholder behaviour at the national as well as the global level.

Additionally, with regard to the process at Busan (rather than leading to Busan), more than one interviewee suggested that CSOs overplayed the internal consultation process once actual negotiations were underway and could have achieved more if they had stayed “in the room” having been given authority to represent CSO interests (based on earlier consultations); the same stakeholders felt CSOs could have spent more time lobbying stakeholders in the margins of key meetings.

⁴⁶ Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. May 21st, 2012.

⁴⁷ Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. May 21st, 2012.

⁴⁸ Representatives of specific groups that were selected as part of the negotiating team drafting the BPD.

⁴⁹ *CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness*. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

⁵⁰ Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. May 21st, 2012.

What are BetterAid’s outcomes with regards to strengthening or initiating country level and international initiatives (and corresponding CSO capacities) for multi-stakeholder dialogue (target 4)?

The following very general observations are offered as a result of the country based interviews; they are of course tentative given the very short time spent in each country:

1. The **National Consultation processes were valued** as a means by which CSOs were brought together and awareness raised around aid effectiveness and development effectiveness issues. The programmes have acted as a catalyst for regional, national and even sub-national NGOs (the latter at least in the Colombian case) interested in the concept of development effectiveness as well as the challenges to the current development cooperation structure.
2. The team perceived a three-way **suspicion between CSOs, government and donors**, creating a **tendency to speak in terms of problems rather than solutions**; yet there appears to be considerable scope for each partner to take greater initiatives towards multi-stakeholder dialogue. **CSOs could do more to facilitate engagement with other actors – they may not be responsible for the enabling environment** but they perhaps could do more to kick start conversations about the changes required and how to make them work.
3. **Governments and donors recognise CSOs as having better reach to the community than any other stakeholder** – although both also see a similar potential in the private sector.
4. Being a recognised development actor does not convey equal rights to make policy decisions in all settings; consultation may be all that is on offer and **CSOs need to be stronger negotiators**. Consultation comes in a variety of forms and there would be benefit in thinking more closely about whether criteria can be developed to describe “**good consultation**”.
5. For CSOs to full explore and engage in such processes, **CSOs need access to strategic (programme) and core funds or process funding arrangements need to be developed**.

Examples of progress in terms of multi-stakeholder engagement worth noting from a good practice perspective include in Indonesia, for example where the Jakarta Commitment to 2014 states how *“Indonesia....will work closely with its development partners, including private sector and civil society to support its development efforts. Government will propose a regular dialogue mechanism to provide a platform for discussing the development agenda.”*

Box 7: Development Partner Coordination Apparatus in Uganda.

The Uganda Cooperation Apparatus represents an example of structural arrangements supporting development cooperation. Three main coordinating groups exist:

- **Partners for Democracy and Governance which consists of Ambassadors**

- **Local Development Partner Group which is sectoral/thematic and consists mainly of Heads of Cooperation (donors)**
 - **Government of Uganda Development Partner Interfaces which is also sectoral.**
- More formal arrangements to include other development actors in these groups would help make progress towards wider democratic ownership.

Overall, country visits made it clear that the main challenges for CSOs at the regional, national and sub-national levels is the respective *environment* they are operating in, not the international *dialogue* per se. BetterAid and Open Forum are seen as important signs of global solidarity among NGOs, yet the concrete changes they were able to bring about at the national level during the programme period remains unclear. The apparent lack of capacity building on the ground has contributed post-Busan to calls for country level implementation (“Sustaining and giving priority to a focus on country level implementation requires a deliberate effort [...] Civil society must live up to its commitments. They must build systematically upon voluntary CSO initiatives in many countries to work with the *Istanbul Principles* and the *International Framework*.”⁵¹ “Still, much is to be done in terms of building capacity of CSOs particularly in the national and subnational levels to be meaningfully involved in development policy dialogue and programming.”⁵²).

IMPACT

At the impact level and given that the performance frameworks did not identify impact statements explicitly, the evaluation team based its assessment of impact on its interpretation of programme logic. Evidence was sought to assess achievements with regard to:

1. Enhanced Development Effectiveness as a consequence of implementing the CSO DE Framework.
2. Actions by governments, donors and other stakeholders to improve the Enabling Environment.
3. Meaningful implementation of the effectiveness agenda in the form of significant multi-stakeholder participation in support of Development Effectiveness.

It is of course not to be expected that there will be considerable evidence of impact only six months after the end of the programme.

⁵¹ *CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness*. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

⁵² *BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011*. March 23d 2012.

1. **Evidence of achievement with regard to Enhanced Development Effectiveness as a consequence of implementing the CSO DE Framework.**
 - The Open Forum website provides a list of organisations and initiatives that demonstrate the implementation of the Istanbul Principles. These are included as Annex X. (<http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/istanbul-principles-implementation,567.html>) It is not clear if these initiatives were taken after Busan nor if they have led to enhanced development effectiveness.
 - It is relatively easy to find evidence elsewhere of attempts to utilise the Istanbul Principles towards improved development effectiveness. Some examples appear in Table 13 below. However, it would require a more substantive study than is possible here to attribute DE impact to the implementation of the Istanbul Principles.

Table 13: Promoting the Istanbul Principles

Evidence	Data Source
<p>Canada: In the spring of 2011, CCIC held provincial meetings to stimulate organisational reflections on how CCIC and its members can situate and work with the Istanbul Principles and the Framework within the Canadian context – more specifically in relation to CCIC’s existing Code of Ethics and Operational Standards and the current political environment that frames Canadian CSO work on development effectiveness.</p> <p>The outcomes from these provincial meetings led to a one day Forum on Implementing the Istanbul Principles with CCIC members and with staff from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), on May 26, 2011.</p>	<p>http://www.ccic.ca/what we do/osc e.php</p>
<p>DFID, UK: The Siem Reap Framework creates a foundation for improving transparency and accountability in NGOs – establishing this as one of the eight headline principles.</p> <p>Purely on the financial side, NGOs that receive money from DFID are about to have to implement the International Aid Transparency Initiative standard. That’s a big deal, closely aligned with the High Level Forums.</p> <p>The Framework emphasises that CSOs (including NGOs) have to be accountable to the poor people they serve – who are “the primary stakeholders in development”. It says: “Accountability for CSOs means maximising efforts to take into account the views of people living in poverty.”</p> <p>To take an analogy, the Framework emphasises that gender equality has to apply internally within CSOs (e.g. in their employment practices) as much as externally, by organisations they lobby (e.g. in setting laws). In the same way, the principles of participation and democracy have to apply internally within CSOs, as well as externally.</p>	<p>http://ngoperformance.org/2011/08/18/the-istanbul-principles-for-cso-effectiveness/</p>
<p>In Kenya, Kijiji Cha Upendo, a grassroots cooperative working with children orphaned through HIV/AIDS, has successfully put Istanbul Principle 6 (Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity) into practice by collaborating with the Village of Love Canada, a small group of Canadian supporters committed to fund raise, and larger and internationally established CAP/AIDS.</p>	<p>http://www.cso-effectiveness.org/istanbul-principles-a-preview-of,566.html</p>

2. **Evidence of achievement with regard to Actions by governments, donors and other stakeholders to improve the Enabling Environment.**

A list of countries which have endorsed the BPD can be found online⁵³. To follow-up on these endorsements, since January 2012, a Post Busan Interim Group (PBIG) has been working on building multi-stakeholder consensus on the monitoring framework and governance arrangements of the new Busan Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Civil society through BetterAid previously highlighted the need for an ambitious global monitoring framework, greater political commitment to move forward the aid effectiveness agenda, the development of a global code of conduct on monitoring, and strong global accountability processes. The resulting proposal includes a set of indicators and associated targets (with baseline figures where available), to act as a basis for promoting international accountability for implementing the Busan Partnership agreement in accordance with a “country heavy - global light” approach. The list of indicators includes one for the **Enabling Environment for civil society**, although is very weak: “Enabling environment for civil society: continued progress over time”.

One clear example of achievement appears In the European Commission’s September 2012 communication “The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations“, where the concept of enabling environment is central:

“The ability of CSOs to participate in different domains of public life depends on a set of preconditions commonly referred to as the “CSO enabling environment”, for which different actors carry responsibility. [...] The international community, the EU included, has a duty to advocate for a space to operate for both CSOs and individuals. The EU should lead by example, creating peer pressure through diplomacy and political dialogue with governments and by publicly raising human rights concerns. [...] In its cooperation with partner governments, the EU will seek to scale up public authorities' capacity to work constructively with civil society, increasing trust and competencies to build up dialogue and opportunities for partnerships. The EU will continue to offer advice and support in strengthening democratic institutions and reforms, also by improving the capacity of policy makers and civil servants to work with CSOs. [...] Indirectly, CSOs also have a role to play, particularly in ensuring their independence from the State, their representativeness and internal governance, transparency and accountability. As development actors, CSOs share the responsibility to demonstrate the results of their actions, in particular to their constituencies. Various self-regulatory initiatives are gaining international recognition, such as the Istanbul CSOs Development Effectiveness Principles and other actor-specific char-

⁵³ http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/images/stories/Busan_Partnership_endorsements.pdf

ters of accountability or national codes of conduct. The EU encourages further efforts in this area.”

The concrete in-country implementation of this communication is of course the next key stage.

3. Evidence of achievement with regard to meaningful implementation of the effectiveness agenda in the form of significant multi-stakeholder participation in support of Development Effectiveness.

BetterAid asserts (quite rightly) in its report *CSO Country Level Engagement for Development Effectiveness* that “Despite notable achievements in global processes, the reality on the ground reflects little change in opening spaces in official dialogue mechanisms”. The report presents a useful summary of case studies of positive experiences and challenges to democratic ownership. Adding to this, table 14 below identifies some new spaces at the global level and at national level (based on case studies) as a consequence of HLF4.

Table 14: Impact in terms of multi-stakeholder participation in support of Development Effectiveness.

Evidence	Data Sources
Global: A post Busan architecture and monitoring framework has been developed (see above). The Building Blocks are initiatives launched at the Fourth High Level Forum enabling development partners and organisations to unite behind pressing development issues and to make concentrated efforts to further progress in these areas. Voluntary coalitions have also been set up to discuss <i>Building Blocks</i> . CSOs were invited to contribute by the WP-EFF Chair.	WP-EFF (24 Feb 2012)
Global: Building on the discussions of the Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG), the new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) replaces the WP-EFF from June 2012 as the new global body to improve aid and development effectiveness. “ <i>The GTEDC is the most immediate and tangible legacy of the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness</i> ” ⁵⁴ . CSOs had hoped for one of three Co-Chair positions in the GPEDC but all three were allocated to government representatives. CSOs have a seat on an expanded Steering Committee, which includes representatives from the private sector, parliamentarians, multilateral organisations, leaving CSOs feeling that their influence may well have been diluted rather than consolidated. In June 2012, BetterAid wrote: “...we increasingly doubt that consensus, compromise and change is possible. Our confidence in the process has been seriously shaken.” CSOs need now to reflect on how to make best use of the space they have.	See: <i>Development effectiveness: Working Party good-bye, Global Partnership hello! Is it a turning point in development?</i> Luca de Fraia, Actionaid. Global Partnership out of starting blocks on wrong foot (www.ituc-csi.org/global-partnership-out-of-starting.html)
Global: The Cebu Consensus was drafted in March 2012 to guide discussions towards a combined BetterAid/Open Forum Platform, which was discussed further by the G13 in Madrid in August to follow up on BPd, promote democratic ownership. The outcome of this meeting has not yet been shared.	
Global: the aforementioned European Commission’s communication states that “a renewed EU response is proposed with a view to empower primarily local CSOs in their actions for democratic	

⁵⁴ *Development effectiveness: Working Party good-bye, Global Partnership hello! Is it a turning point in development?* Luca de Fraia, Actionaid.

governance and equitable development.	
<p>National: There is some anecdotal evidence of improvements in space for multi-stakeholder dialogue as a consequence of the HLF4 process – for example Brian Tomlinson asserts that “<i>in Indonesia CSO country outreach resulted in the government’s 2011 invitation of CSOs to engage directly with its planning offices and technical ministries</i>” However, Indonesian officials consulted on this issue during the country visit related these decisions to the Jakarta Commitment rather than to the HLF4 process.</p> <p>Open Forum in its final report confirms that in the Pacific Region a decision was taken at the Regional Meeting to increase collaboration of CSOs with the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.</p>	<p>http://www.antarantt.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/jakarta-commitment-121208.pdf</p> <p>See: Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, Final Report March 2012.</p>

Is there evidence of achievement at the national level?

The team met with CSOs, government officials and donors in three countries to determine whether there was any evidence of initial changes at the **national level** n knowledge, attitude or practice as a consequence of HLF4 generally and the BetterAid and Open Forum programmes in particular. Key findings are listed below:

1. Not much has happened since the national consultation process to build on this experience; not every country has a clear CSO platform lead on aid and development effectiveness (Indonesia does not) to take up the challenge, and the outcomes of HLF4 (the BPD) remain little known or understood. The real challenge now lies with “the formation, broadening and strengthening of CSO platforms engaged in aid and development effectiveness.”⁵⁵
2. The Istanbul Principles have increased awareness and are in use in a variety of ways. Some CSOs use them as an organisational “health check” – although not a requirement (“enforcement for smaller CSOs would be restrictive” according to CSOs attending the Indonesian focus group discussion). Having and knowing about the IPs however is seen as helpful in terms of credibility and legitimacy (“the IPs may change government more than CSOs”) and they can be used to encourage good practice (e.g. transparency of other stakeholders).
3. Starting points need to be found – preferably non-contentious ones – to explore mechanisms and processes for multi-stakeholder engagement. As mentioned earlier, three-way suspicion between CSOs, government and donors was apparent in each country visited, creating a tendency to speak in terms of problems rather than solutions, yet there appears to be considerable scope for each partner to take greater initiatives towards multi-stakeholder dialogue.

⁵⁵ Response from BA to *Comments from the Donor Coordination Group (DCG) in response to the 2011 mid-year reports from Open Forum and BetterAid*. December 9th 2011.

In Indonesia, whilst CSOs remain cautious at best about taking up Government offers to engage, Government officials from a variety of institutions including the National Planning Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance were each able to articulate the benefit and make a convincing case for the mechanisms by which multi-stakeholder dialogue could be facilitated.

Governments can of course adopt multiple positions on development effectiveness issues even without altering the overall enabling environment. In Colombia, for example, the government of President Uribe (2002-2010) was highly critical of CSOs and created a negative political environment for them; at the same time, it also constructed an international cooperation strategy (2006-2010) through an inclusive multi-stakeholder dialogue and took over a prominent role in the international dialogue (co-chair of the ownership roundtable in Accra where it pressed for the notion of “democratic ownership”, High Level Event on South-South cooperation in Bogotá). This approach was meant to both defuse international pressures and increase Colombia’s foreign policy stance through a qualitative work in the international aid and development effectiveness dialogue. The administration of Colombia’s new President Santos (since 2010) is much more open to CSO input and dialogue on politically sensitive topics, yet at the same time has decided to downgrade Colombia’s participation in the international dialogue: it has constructed its Cooperation Strategy with a “national ownership” approach, arguing that “democratic ownership” had led to a tedious coordination process for the last strategy and that now the focus of development cooperation has to be on programme implementation.

With regards to donors generally, country visits were important in highlighting to the evaluation team what one might call a “HLF fatigue”. Donors use the word development effectiveness a lot, but what they talk about actually refers to aid effectiveness; it is thus unclear how much will really change in donor practice in this respect. In Indonesia for example, donor representatives interviewed did not know of a post-Busan plan with regard to CSOs – one agency feeling that the focus had shifted away from CSOs, another feeling that attention should be focused on the quality of government systems (particularly monitoring and reporting) as the best approach to improving aid effectiveness. Balanced against this, however, CSO members underplay the coordination challenges donors face at home and potentially overplay their own as suggested in this comment, referring to the challenges of CSOs in terms of their commitments to normative agendas when coming to negotiations where compromise is necessary: “There were challenges in representing a normative and inclusive civil society constituency in inter-governmental negotiations. [...] While others only rep-

resent their respective governments, the CSO Sherpa was accountable to hundreds of CSOs coming from all regions and sectors.”⁵⁶

Governments were generally either interested in aid effectiveness gains or new aid paradigms (South-South Cooperation) and particularly see the HLF in Accra as having delivered in this regard. The HLF in Busan is already seen as having produced fewer and less significant results and any future HLF is viewed with caution. All this implies that core notions from Busan, such as the enabling environment and democratic ownership, might suffer both as a by-product of HLF fatigue and a lack of political interest – and that a lack of progress in this regard will be attributable to a range of stakeholders and for a range of reasons.

Box 8: The Enabling Environment in Colombia

Talks with sub-national ('regional') NGO platforms in Colombia made it clear the main challenge for them is the respective *environment* they are operating in, not the international *dialogue* per se. BetterAid and Open Forum are seen as important signs of global solidarity among NGOs, and sub-national NGO platforms are emphatic about having a window into the international dialogue.

At the same time, it is clear that the outreach of the international platforms did not create additional capacities or funding, and no change in the patterns of donor or government funding for sub-national CSOs. Donor funding continues to dwindle, and while there are access possibilities to government funding, this is through calls and CSOs have to compete with various actors on this. This includes UN organisations vying for third-party funding, and private sector foundations (*fundaciones empresariales*) that can offer government to match or multiply public funds with their foundations' ones. Even if the CSOs can demonstrate the strongest grounding in the respective communities, they find themselves competing with actors with more prestige or financing possibilities than they can dream of.

BetterAid's Final Report focuses on external causes in explaining implementation challenges, such as “the difficulty in expanding discussion at the country-level amid myriad development challenges such as hunger, fuel crisis, political conflict, natural calamities, and so on”, as well as “governments' reception of civil society initiatives and the overall political climate”⁵⁷. It rightfully highlights the challenge and the importance of CSO solidarity; for example, trade unions suggested after Accra to table a convention in support of a consolidated multi-stakeholder framework (“if you want standard-setting, you need a coherent system”) and also proposed a Global Partnership co-chair for CSOs for the same reason. As one interviewee said, the Global Partnership and the role for CSO at the table is “game-changing”, but not fully understood yet by some CSOs.

⁵⁶ *CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness*. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

⁵⁷ *BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011*. March 23d 2012.

Overall and taking into account the positive signals detectable in the examples above, the reality is that it is probably too early to expect much by way of impact at the organisational, institutional or national level so soon after HLF4. In any case, there appears to be widespread agreement that more needs to be done to build awareness and support CSOs towards constructive engagement in development partnerships before commitments can translate into action.

SUSTAINABILITY

In assessing the sustainability of the *programme achievements* in terms of whether they have created the potential, capacity or momentum for change, it is important to keep in mind that the respective *platforms* had existed previously and continue to exist beyond the programme funding period. Sustainability of effect thus has to be viewed in a different light than if the platforms had been created through the programmes.

The prime added value of the programmes for CSOs at the national level has been to expose them to global issues and conceptual inputs. Additionally, the process helped identify and strengthen core individuals or groups at the national level by giving them conceptual input and opening their views to the global level; this core will continue to exist, with or without an international platform and can be considered a sustainable achievement. Additionally, the Open Forum toolkits are both important efforts to increase capacity at national level, and CSO capacities have been punctually strengthened for the involvement in multi-stakeholder initiatives (cf. the outcome section).

One of the key capacity challenges already mentioned, that became apparent in carrying out the evaluation itself, was core funding. The budget assigned for country visits only allowed for a very small amount of funds to support the secretariats of the national CSO platforms that were organising the country visits; in the Colombian case, the CSOs had wished to bring in participants from different regions of the country for a joint workshop in Bogotá, but there were not enough funds to support this financially. Without adequate core funding – an element that is especially dwindling away in Latin America – CSOs will have a very hard time being able to engage other development stakeholders in a development effectiveness setting on a level playing field.

Equally, the capacities and resources of CSOs remain limited, coupled with a high staff turn-over. One key CSO actor stated that in the current programme phase, “30 to 40 people around the world did 80%” of the work. To this must be added the very real danger that key CSO positions in many countries might be personalised – “assigned to an individual” – rather than created as spaces that will be sustained and be occupied by different people with the same role. If all this is to change – and it must for CSOs to be able to engage in development effectiveness, effectively – donor support for national platforms and their members appear necessary.

The Istanbul Principles and the International Framework have been created, but in the country visits, it was clear that their influence has not yet been fully felt at the national level. It remains to be seen how these principles can feed back into and be adapted to national settings or be coupled with national self-regulation; how for example will the IPs combine with the Uganda National NGO Forum’s QuAM to enhance CSO development effectiveness. CSO interviewees in Indonesia thought that the application of the IPs would need to be “loose” in order that they would not be viewed as restrictive or somehow used to split up CSOs into “good” and “bad” ones through a potential certification process.


Perhaps the most overarching consideration in terms of sustainability relates to the Busan Outcome Document itself which remain voluntary in nature. It remains to be seen whether the voluntary basis of the Busan Partnership in the end undermines any progress in norms that were achieved at Busan.

EFFICIENCY

Do the programmes represent value for money?

The diagram below presents a standard view of how value for money can be assessed. The sections above have already explored effectiveness from an output-to-outcome perspective, this section looks more specifically at overall cost in relation to outcomes (cost effectiveness) and the cost for which outputs were delivered (efficiency).

Diagram 3: Value for Money



How much did the programmes cost?

The total budget sum provided to both platforms taken together was \$5,754,399 (\$2,930,298 for BetterAid and \$2,824,101 for Open Forum). Open Forum used 77.2%

of the allocated funds and BetterAid 77.5%⁵⁸. The fact that both programmes were nearly fully funded⁵⁹ underscores the level of commitment from donors to support CSO initiatives towards improved development effectiveness. We note that we were provided with the financial reports for the entire duration of the Open Forum programme, but only the financial report for the 2011 phase of the BetterAid programme was available⁶⁰.

Were programmes efficient?

While it was not possible to find data on the costs that other aid/development effectiveness actors (such as donors and governments) incurred in the period between the High Level Forums in Accra and in Busan with regards to their reflection, coordination and advocacy concerning aid and development effectiveness, the total sum allocated to CSOs certainly appears reasonable in the light of the outreach and policy advocacy it financed:

1. BetterAid reports seven regional AAA consultation workshops, four thematic/sectoral workshops, and sixty-four AAA implementation-related national consultations organised;
2. The Open Forum in its final narrative report talks of 70+ national consultations, 6 Thematic Consultations, 10 Regional Workshops and 2 Global Assemblies.
3. Additionally, to focus just on the most important products, the Open Forum formulated both the Istanbul Principles (September 2010) and the Siem Reap Consensus - the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness (June 2011), while BetterAid produced a CSO position paper for the HLF4 – *CSOs on the road to Busan: Key messages and proposals* – and numerous policy proposals and case stories.

Were there changes to the activity plan?

Not all activities included in the original proposal and associated budget went ahead:

⁵⁸ Open Forum: 2,180,095.43 EUR out of 2,824,101 EUR. BetterAid: 2,217,722 USD out of 2,930,298 USD. For the full numbers, cf. Annex XI.

⁵⁹ The evaluation team had assumed BetterAid to have been fully funded, based on interview feed-backs. However, the BetterAid's secretariat feed-back to the Draft Final Report notes that "BA was not fully funded. The original proposal budget amount for the BA programme is USD 3,218,105. The budget was revised to USD 2,930,298 to respond to funding gaps eliminating the 4 HLF4 Continental Workshops amounting to USD 280,000." In its feed-back, the DCG equally underlined the fact that the programmes were not fully fund.

⁶⁰ According to feedback on the draft report, BetterAid reports do exist; it was an oversight that they were not shared.

- BetterAid’s 9 planned case studies became 15 shorter case stories in October 2010⁶¹, and were delivered by the Reality of Aid (RoA) International Coordinating Committee and not the BACG.
- According to BetterAid’s final report, the planned 4 “continental consultations were cancelled due to insufficient funding cover in 2010”⁶². According to the BetterAid’s secretariat feed-back to the Draft Final Report, this was due to a revision of budget given funding gaps in 2010.
- The number of AAA implementation related national consultations organised increased from 36 to 64⁶³ in the programme phase (2009-2011). According to the BetterAid’s secretariat, this was done when it became clear that the funding sub-granted to RoA would enable them to cover more countries than originally planned.
- The number of case studies conducted by BetterAid in various countries to inform and support CSO policy reform recommendations increased from 9 planned to at least 14. However it is unclear whether these focused on the originally specified topics (4 case studies documenting mechanisms, processes and structures that demonstrate CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation, and 5 case studies capturing aid supported projects/programs that demonstrate nationally significant impacts to the poor and marginalised as a result of CSO involvement in aid effectiveness policy reform and AAA implementation). According to feed-back received from BetterAid’s secretariat to the Draft Final Report, the focus of the case studies was slightly modified and its ambition lowered based on the decision of RoA ICCC as explained in the BA 3rd Narrative Report for Jan--Dec 2010. It is unclear why this decision was made by RoA and not BetterAid. Finally, it is also unclear why the number of specified policy reform recommendations is given in the final report as an estimate (“at least”) and not as a certainty.
- The BetterAid indicator concerning “policy changes that have been influenced by BACG policy messages or by the CSO policy position paper” has been changed in the final report on achievements to “policy changes in the overall human rights focus in Busan principles of DE”.⁶⁴ This seems like a narrower-focusing of the outcome.
- From the documentation found, it is unclear whether the BetterAid programme financed all of IBON/Reality of Aid’s country outreach for 2009-2011, or whether there were additional activities and funding (IBON/Reality

⁶¹ BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011. March 23d 2012.

⁶² BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011. March 23d 2012.

⁶³ BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011. March 23d 2012.

⁶⁴ *BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011*. March 23d 2012.

of Aid's country outreach report in 2011⁶⁵ and a second 2011 IBON publication⁶⁶ do not mention the Country Outreach link with BetterAid).

How far was the reach?

Within the time available for the evaluation, a full analysis of whether there was optimal use of resources to maximise return on investment in order to achieve best possible value-for-money could not be carried out. What is clear is that because the platforms were basing their outreach efforts on their existing membership and networks, they were able to offer an immediate multiplier effect that added enormous value to the consultation process. BetterAid reporting for 2011 suggests a ratio of about 4.8 CSOs reached indirectly for every CSO reached directly.⁶⁷ The evaluation team understand the number of "at least 20,264 CSOs" that BetterAid claims were reached to be a simple totalling of the constituencies of BetterAid's members. We are unable to determine whether this approximation is correct in terms of actual engagement.

Did the pooled funding mechanism contribute to greater efficiency?

The pooled funding mechanisms meant that funding coordination that would previously have had to be carried out by the CSO platforms and by non-DCG members was taken on by the Donor Coordination Group and particularly the lead donor, resulting in additional workload on that side and practical challenges to be addressed in terms of how to manage accountability to and among donors. The lead role itself, taken on by Sida, was not clearly defined either in the MoU or in the ToRs, and so no rotation took place. The DCG developed a dynamic of its own according to a donor agency representative, resulting in two tiers of donors. Some economies were generated through coordination efforts, but it is unclear whether transaction costs were reduced at the contracting stage, since donors still used bilateral financing agreements in parallel to the MoU.

Even with pooled funding, agency representatives had to at least carry out their fiduciary responsibilities for the funding their agencies disbursed; they could reduce their workload by not taking part on every aspect of the coordination, although they had to stay informed of the bigger picture. What is certain is that reporting was simplified and the MOU gave the donors more flexibility than usual. On the basis of our conversations across the stakeholders, we assess that the main added value of pooled funding lay not with donors, but with the CSO platforms and their fiscal agents. A

⁶⁵ *CSO Country Level Engagement for Development Effectiveness*. IBON/Reality of Aid, 2011.

⁶⁶ *Case Stories of Civil Society Engagement on Aid Effectiveness*. IBON, 2011

⁶⁷ "The database reveals that of [sic] the 1,743 CSOs directly reached out to, 8,389 CSOs are reached indirectly". Response from BA to *Comments from the Donor Coordination Group (DCG) in response to the 2011 mid-year reports from Open Forum and BetterAid*. December 9th 2011.

bilateral approach would have meant the platforms' financial agents having to deal with 6 individually funding donor agencies in the case of BetterAid and 12 in the case of the Open Forum. Taking total funding and dividing this by the number of donors and time available (to gain a purely statistical average), each individual donor contributed on average about \$195,000/year for BetterAid and about \$95,000 for Open Forum. An individual approach would have meant obtaining and following-up separately on each of these funding agreements as well as writing 12 to 18 annual reports for each one of these relatively small sums.

Was there a potentially more cost effective approach?

No written analysis of alternative approaches prior to the development of the proposals is available in the provided documentation; in its feed-back to the Draft Final Report, the DCG notes that “through verbal exchange at two donors meetings (Stockholm and Prague in April and June 2009 respectively) and subsequent email exchanges, it was clear that alternatives such as full delegated authority to one donor was [sic] not feasible for the donors”. Given that both BetterAid and Open Forum were already in existence independent of any donor funding as platforms designed by CSOs for specific purposes, the question of alternative approaches to achieve intended outcomes did not arise. The focus was on funding for existing processes.

CSOs originally presented proposals for three initiatives – BetterAid, Reality of Aid's Country outreach, and the Open Forum –the first two eventually being funded through one common programme at donor insistence. With regard to approaches to *programme implementation* and looking at the different budget items, the Open Forum used 74.7% of its funds on outreach and BetterAid 84.3%⁶⁸. Open Forum was able to operate through set of pre-existing regional networks and organisations, which meant that it could base both decision-making and outreach activities on those. While BetterAid certainly made use of existing networks for decision-making input, its Secretariat was much more directly involved than Open Forum's in outreach activities. Travel costs for Secretariat staff to visit different regions were higher than the cost that would have been incurred had regional networks been tasked with facilitating outreach (in the Latin American context, a recurrent claim was that “with the costs of a plane ticket from Manila to Latin America, two workshops in the region could have been paid for”).

⁶⁸ Note this analysis is based on a budget-clustering exercise carried out by the evaluation team; information for BetterAid was available for 2011 only.

So were the programmes cost-effective?

Despite the limited evidence of impact and the only partial achievement of outcomes, the team conclude that value should also be judged against the outputs and the process. The vision, ambition, and sheer determination required to facilitate an outreach on a global scale, providing translation and interpretation as required, is to be admired and although the benefits are difficult to attribute and monetise, when compared to the costs incurred by other stakeholders and taking into consideration the reported professionalism of the CSO team in Busan, it appears reasonable to conclude that the CSO effort represents value for money in relative and comparative terms. Some stakeholders did suggest that during the final negotiations at Busan, BetterAid would have achieved more if they had stayed in the room to negotiate rather than leave to consult further with CSO representatives. This would of course depend on representatives having the mandate to negotiate without this further consultation. Whether this is a route to realising better value in future global negotiations is now a question that the shared platform may want to consider. Realising the full value of the negotiations to date is a challenge which all development partners need to address as a shared responsibility.

COVERAGE, COHERENCE AND CO-ORDINATION

This section of the report findings explores issues of transparency, democracy, inclusiveness and representativeness of the programmes and associated processes.

1. A **range of modalities was used to share information** by both Platforms – websites, e-mail subscriptions, newsletters, blogs, press releases, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. A brief assessment of research conducted⁶⁹ suggests an outreach close to 6000 recipients (mainly individuals, organisations and governmental actors). Both platforms provided good access to information from a language perspective, information being generally trilingual presented – English, French, Spanish⁷⁰. Notifications were delivered to alert stakeholders when key additions were available online.
2. In terms of **breadth and depth of CSO and other stakeholder consultations**, an impressive 166 national, regional and thematic activities/consultation in 96 countries has been reported from the two platforms. A rough estimation⁷¹

⁶⁹ Research based on e-mail subscribers; website members and Twitter followers. No attempt to check and exclude for duplicates has been made.

⁷⁰ Occasionally additional languages have been observed.

⁷¹ Estimation based on 10 % random selection of the held consultations/activities.

suggests that the average number of participants reached was 55 participants per consultation. Key occasions furthermore brought together larger numbers of CSO representatives (e.g. the HLF4 in Busan that gathered over 600 CSO representatives). Low participation in surveys⁷² always raises questions on the actual depth of stakeholder inclusiveness, but is not unique to either platform.

3. Although geographically, the coordinating bodies (BACG/ GFG) are located in the Philippines, Belgium and Kenya⁷³, CSO coverage is global. Estimates suggest that the **platforms potentially and indirectly represent thousands of organisations/members**⁷⁴. The core thematic focus of participants is effectiveness, poverty reduction, and rights based approaches via advocacy or aid delivery programmes.
4. **Governance documents set out procedures for nominations, elections and changes within central organs for both platforms.** Standards and criteria on e.g. gender balance, organisational and geographical representation and thematic focus were set as prerequisites for the coordinating bodies (BACG/GFG) as well as for CSO representativeness at strategic occasions (e.g. presence at the HLF4). However, the memberships and role of the BetterAid Coordination Group (BACG) and the Global Facilitation Group (GFG) differed in the respective ToRs:
 - For the BACG, *“membership in the BetterAid CG implies an explicit commitment to contribute an equitable share to carrying out the work plan of the BetterAid CG. To ensure these tasks are achieved, maximum total membership of the BetterAid CG should not exceed 35, and will depend on access to funding to enable its meetings. Membership of BetterAid CG will be evaluated on an annual basis in terms of active participation and balance allowing for new qualified members who wish to come in.”*
 - *“The composition of the GFG should reflect the diversity of global CSOs and will be balanced in terms of regional representation (minimum 1/2 from Global South), gender (minimum 1/3 from either sex) and type of organisa-*

⁷² The majority of assessed surveys, polls and self-assessments as well as much of the shared information (e.g. Facebook and Youtube) have display low degree of participation and response rates, which indicates limited inclusiveness. In addition, the validation survey within this evaluation has struggled with getting people to engage.

⁷³ Estimation based on analysed organisations location of their HQ.

⁷⁴ A rough estimation suggests that potentially up to 8000 entities (members, organisations, networks) are represented. Estimation based on presented networks and member stocks on analysed organisations webpages. No attempt to secure and exclude for duplicates have been made.

tions (2/3 from national/regional CSO associations, 1/3 from international CSO networks). The GFG should be a mix between CSO policy/advocacy specialists, CSO practitioners, CSO managers and CSO quality experts. The membership within the GFG is given to organisations or consortia of organisations (not individuals). GFG members must have a mandate of the largest constituency possible. [...] The total number of its members will be 25” [a regional repartition follows].

From an outside perspective, while breadth of membership can be important in allowing for the widest participation possible, it can also create challenges in terms of reaching consensus and taking ownership of decisions. Added to this, the MoU states that it is the financial agents that are “responsible for preparing *and* submitting reports, work plans, and budget” [italics added], thus removing a crucial accountability and responsibility item from the platforms’ steering groups and constituents. While according to feed-back from BetterAid’s secretariat to the Draft Final Report, strategic decisions were not taken by the financial agent IBON, but by the BACG, it remains unclear why the ToRs would not include such a provision from the start.

Interviewees credited the Open Forum as having created accountability and representativeness through well thought-through GFG structure and mechanisms, with BetterAid’s reflection- and decision-making process being described as a more complex given the possibility for all stakeholders to be able to voice opinions at any time. It is relevant here to reflect that the Open Forum was focusing on a relatively technical issue more likely to generate CSO consensus, while BetterAid was dealing with a variety of much more politically sensitive topics.

5. There appears to have been **limited co-ordination between the two platforms**, despite governance documentation which stresses the importance of co-ordination between them⁷⁵. In early 2009, the BACG (including IBON/RoA Country Outreach) and the Open Forum presented to donors a “Chapeau Proposal”, a joint presentation of two interlinking three-year proposals for activities by the BACG and Open Forum, in which they “proactively acknowledged the essential importance of a comprehensive and coordinated approach to national, regional, and global CSO activities leading to HLF4”.

⁷⁵ See e.g. MOU: Consortium – Open Forum for CSO development effectiveness 2009; BetterAid Coordinating Group Terms of Reference (March 2009)

“However, as these parallel processes evolved, avenues for cooperation sometimes proved to be elusive. Regular contact between the co-chairs was sometimes episodic until the final months in 2011 prior to Busan. A minority of members on both the BACG and the GFG informally helped each body understand directions and political strategies”⁷⁶. On the ground, activities were often carried out by the same CSO platforms. “The involvement of a common platform certainly facilitated coordination between Open Forum and BetterAid at the country level, but this reliance on a few also affected the relative emphasis on each agenda, depending on the interests and context for each CSO platform.”⁷⁷

Box 9: Country Consultations in Colombia

The Colombian country visit revealed a very pragmatic approach by Latin American CSOs to BetterAid and Open Forum, as those did not create a new structure and do not seem to have created new dynamics, but simply were the vehicles – as well as financial means – to channel on-going discussions in the Latin American CSO community. Given that Open Forum’s regional supporting organisation in Latin America was the *Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo* (ALOP) which already had a solid membership base, a lot of those CSO activities took part through ALOP’s network – and so were labeled Open Forum. Additionally, Open Forum’s topics – CSO as development actors and the enabling environment – were more in sync with the regional reality, given that aid is not the defining topic in Latin America.

BetterAid was much less represented in Latin America, as its dynamics were virtually unknown and the Latin American participation in BetterAid’s coordination was limited. Additionally, there was no Latin American organisation that assumed the BA agenda. Finally, CSO interviewees commented that Latin American CSOs were disappointed by HLF4, as they felt that what they had done in OF was not reflected as their own in-country effort, but simply taken over by BA.

6. Each of the two CSOs platforms once created each developed an organisational life of its own. However, joint funding and common goals appear to have led to increasing co-ordination⁷⁸ over time. A joint body assisted in determining CSO participation in Busan and in co-ordinating CSO priorities for the Busan Outcome Document. At the end **the two platforms were able to go into the HLF4 with a common agreement**. This was an impressive achievement and the joint Busan strategy meeting of BACG and GFG that took place in Harnösand, Sweden, in March 2011 appears to have been the critical juncture in bringing together a unified document with the *Key Messages and Proposals for Busan*. While sometimes problematic, this meeting launched the basis for joint political strategies, which were to be led by BetterAid in close coordination with the Open Forum GFG.

⁷⁶ CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

⁷⁷ CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

⁷⁸ Main evidence for the existence of co-ordination: Governing documents – ToRs and MOUs; the Common funding mechanism; a Chapeau proposal; Mutual policy statements; outcome from the Harnösand meeting/consensus for the runner-up to HLF4, and coordinated webpages.

7. **On a more technical level, collaboration between BetterAid and Open Forum took place through the civil society communications group** in the lead-up to HLF4. “Open Forum's communications officer played a key role in drafting civil society's communications strategy directly before and during HLF4” and the “BetterAid's communications officer had overview and supported members as they led various channels of the communications work.”⁷⁹
8. **The CSO-MSG, intended to facilitate stakeholder coordination, does not appear from documentation and interviews as having played a relevant role and its added value is unclear.** There seems to have been a direct communication between donors and the two respective platforms, bypassing the MSG. This might also be due to the fact that the MSG/DCG MoU included no steering functions for the MSG in its part on “Responsibilities of the CSO Management Group”.
9. It remains unclear **whether donors and BetterAid had the same vision on the relationship between platform objectives and programme funding.** From the documents, it seems that the donors were looking at the BetterAid *programme* as capturing all the platforms efforts with regard to Busan, whereas BetterAid was focused on the work of its overall *platform* and saw the programme as one of several funding sources (for example, in BetterAid's Public Report 2011, the financial report lists the programme alongside several other sources of external funding; all donors providing additional funding also funded the programme).

Results of the Evaluation Online Survey			
Platform performance:		Most inspirational part of the process:	Key change required in approach to global consultation:
Score out of 5 for <u>Communication</u> of Processes	BetterAid 3.7 Open Forum 3.9	CSO collaboration (36%) CSO coherence (26%) Results achieved (24%)	Adapt approach to secure efficiency (32%) Improve inclusiveness and democratic ownership (30%) Improve coherence and coordination (16%)
Score out of 5 for <u>Inclusiveness</u> of Processes:	BetterAid 3.9 Open Forum 4.2		
Score out of 5 for <u>Democracy</u> of Processes:	BetterAid 3.7 Open Forum 3.6		

LESSON LEARNING

In the documentation, BetterAid states with regards to learning that “the action- reflection-action cycle is deeply embedded in BetterAid's practice. All activities are

⁷⁹ BetterAid Final Report 1st July 2009 – 31st December 2011. March 23d 2012.

followed by assessment and recommendations for future work. These recommendations are subject to discussion for decision on how to apply learning moving forward. It is perhaps because such practice is so integrated into operations that it was missed in the written reporting.⁸⁰ However, an evaluation has to base itself on evidence and based on documentation reviewed, it is unclear what institutionalised learning mechanisms were in place and what lessons were learnt through these.

BetterAid's feed-back to the Draft Final Report argues that the project framework did not set institutionalised learning mechanisms and the DCG raised comments on lesson learning and causal links only with regards to the last progress and the final report. To quote a donor document: *"though there is an increased reporting on lessons, it would have been beneficial to outline how a) BA measures learning uptake (how does BA know how lessons are being taken on, institutionalised or affecting change in how things are done?) and b) how can BA or similar networks do things differently as a result of this new learning [...] In addition, some of the lessons are rather vague and difficult for the observer to interpret e.g. lesson on having a CSO platform as interlocutor to the official process 'separate' from the internal CSO process."*⁸¹

Overall, it is unclear whether BetterAid and donors saw eye-to-eye on M&E and lesson learning. Following the request from donors for a better communication of lessons learned, Better Aid stated that that it would draw the lesson from the interaction *"that donors are (equally, if not more) interested in analysis and lessons and therefore M&E systems should likewise be designed as such."*⁸²

However, both BetterAid and Open Forum do make statements on lessons learned. In their final narrative report on the programme, Open Forum provides an overview of lessons learned at the organisational level under the broad headings of *Operational/Logistical Challenges and Lessons, Strategic Challenges and Lessons* and *Regional Reports on Lessons Learned* and from these overviews highlights three key strategic lessons:

1. Communication is key in a global process this large.
2. Flexibility is essential.
3. Multi-stakeholder dialogue requires planning.

In a presentation to the Global CSO Meeting in Cebu in February 2012, BetterAid put forward the following key lessons learned:

1. CSO solidarity is key

⁸⁰ BetterAid response to Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. June 4, 2012.

⁸¹ Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. May 21st, 2012.

⁸² BetterAid response to Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. June 4, 2012.

2. Pursuing strategic and tactical partnerships with other key aid effectiveness actors (is critical)
3. Organisation of CSOs need to be responsive to context and objectives
4. Ensuring synergy in multiple platforms and initiatives in one policy arena (is important)
5. Challenge of intergovernmental negotiations for CSOs (raises again the question of legitimacy – are CSOs really an equal development partner)
6. innovation in country level work (is vital and should be shared)

5. General Evaluative Conclusions

ON PROGRAMME PROCESS AND OUTCOMES:

- 1. Both BetterAid and Open Forum made very relevant contributions to the aid and development effectiveness debate at the global level.**

Given BetterAid's official position within the WP-EFF, it was appropriate that BA should coordinate the CSO effort (including the Open Forum) towards a global policy position.
- 2. Networks are important as they enhance legitimacy** (although representation will probably always be an issue – no network can encompass all positions).

We have used the word platforms so far because this is how BetterAid and Open Forum were represented, but they are both in many ways open “networks” within which the membership is constantly shifting and adapting. This kind of open platform or network, with flexible membership but maintaining the potential to mobilise members, appears to be a model that works.
- 3. Both BA and OF programmes have successfully supported ambitious, complex and dynamic processes and represent an extraordinary achievement in terms of vision, determination and focus.**

OF had the easier task since they were clearer from the outset about what they were trying to achieve; BA's task was more complex – to facilitate a CSO policy building process from national to global level, through an inclusive mobilisation of diverse actors towards “one voice”.
- 4. OF performed well against its performance framework, achieving all outputs and most outcome targets** although the BPd did not go as far as had been hoped in defining the enabling environment.
- 5. BA as CSO voice (including OF) had a significant impact on the BPd because it was recognised as a credible actor in its own right.**

CSOs were seen to engage constructively from a well-informed position; not all CSO priorities were met – possibly because there was too much emphasis on consultation meaning that BA “lost the thread of negotiations at times”; “BA should have spent more time lobbying other stakeholders”. Other stakeholders, however, share responsibility for what was and was not achieved at Busan. An expansion/shift in priorities by other stakeholders (towards emerging economies, private sector) played a significant part in the determination of outcomes.

6. **Many CSOs believe that BA and OF would have served their constituencies better if they had focused on capacity building at the national level,** although it is unclear that this was ever a reasonable proposition given the resources available.
7. **There is little evidence of progress at the national level as a consequence of the programmes, but there is future potential.**
However, first there are key issues to address at the national level both in terms of capacity and relationships. Certainly, there is a need for much greater local capacity to engage - for CSOs to start behaving like a development partner, they need the capacity to do so. But engagement is a responsibility as well as a right and there is more that CSOs – and obviously also other stakeholders, notably national governments and donors – could do to initiate multi-stakeholder dialogue at the local level. Trust is key but fragile.
8. **Access to core funding is an issue** for CSOs, as is accessing funding for setting strategic direction (i.e. programme funding) – reconciling donor funding with independence is always a challenge.
9. **Lesson learning could be improved and probably requires external review and/or facilitation.**
Earlier synthesis of information would have helped.
10. **Overall the programmes represent value for money.**
Although the cost of other stakeholder engagement in Busan is unknown, most stakeholders consulted believe that CSO engagement was relatively low cost. The value of CSO engagement should not be measured only in terms of outputs and outcomes – the process itself added value.

ON PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT:

1. **The programmes, the evaluation and relationships between the CSO-MG and DCG would have benefitted from earlier resolution of DCG concerns over programme design.**
The DCG had been concerned from the outset over weaknesses in the performance framework and associated Theory of Change, although they share equal responsibilities with the CSOs for approving the performance frameworks. These concerns remained unresolved throughout the programmes' life, despite being raised in DCG responses to CSO-MG reporting. Nor were they reflected in the ToR, presenting a challenge to the evaluation team at start-up. More could have been done (as with the logic model) to specify strategic direction without being overly prescriptive about policy outcomes.

2. Pooled Funding can help but requires its own discipline.

The pooled funding mechanism reduced reporting costs although not accounting; on the donor side it may, by diffusing accountability, have led to a certain level of donor disengagement. Nevertheless, CSOs want “enabling financing for CSO development effectiveness, including predictable, transparent, easily understandable and harmonised terms”. For this to work, donors might consider whether a pooled arrangement towards organisational funding (where funds can be used for both overhead/core costs and strategic programmes of work) with reporting arrangements agreed based on key consolidation points (perhaps as simple as quarterly) with progress reports including plans developed during the reporting period as well as results. This would push ownership “down” to CSOs without losing transparency and accountability to donors.

3. Value for Money: a conceptual misunderstanding?

Donors and CSOs have had communication misunderstandings on VFM that ought to be addressed. CSOs saw donor insistence on value-for-money as a focus on “immediate and tangible outcomes as opposed to ‘softer’ outcomes that aim for sustainable transformational changes [...] CSOs assert that CSO work by virtue of its nature, operations and code of conduct creates and adds value.”⁸³ The compatibility between the value-for-money approach and the building of social capital (one being an approach to processes, the other one a desired outcome and impact) was thus unclear. The evaluation team noted, for example, that the value-for-money approach highlighted in the Inception Report was frequently criticised for supposedly trying to quantify and monetise social change.

ON THE EVALUATION PROCESS:

1. Some annual and preliminary synthesis work would have created significantly more scope to focus on the learning and utility objectives of the evaluation process (important at a time of sensitive negotiations on the “joint platform”).

In order to reach the stage where the evaluation team could focus on utilisation and additional learning, a significant proportion of the days available for the study had had to be taken up with documentation review and basic data gathering.

2. Reaching consensus on the identification of and approach to address priority concerns (for the evaluation) was sometimes a challenge for the DCG and CSO-MG. It is likely that this is also true of the implementation phase.

⁸³ BetterAid response to Donor Coordination Group comments on BetterAid final report. June 4, 2012.

Discussions around potential participation of the evaluation team in Amsterdam and Madrid offered and then withdrew an opportunity for key stakeholder interviews (in the case of Amsterdam) and learning (in the case of Madrid) and created resource intensive diversions for the team (for example developing the outline for a Theory of Change Workshop for Madrid). The team concludes that these experiences were the consequence of the challenge faced by DCG and CSO-MG in agreeing on and addressing priorities in a mutually accountable manner – while the CSO-MG were keen to stay focused on the internal dynamics and confidentiality of their negotiation, DCG remained concerned about the clarity of thinking around the change process (to date and in future). It would have been helpful if the DCG and CSO-MG had found ways to weigh the opportunities and risks associated with these options and reach consensus on ways forward as part of the preparations for the evaluation.

ON FORWARD THINKING (LEADING TO RECOMMENDATIONS):

1. **There is unequal resourcing of the processes in which multi-stakeholder participation is essential.**

This is true at the national level creating unequal power dynamics between governments, donors and CSOs. It was also reflected in the evaluation process; all CSOs met with during the evaluation were not salaried or otherwise resourced to participate. Multi-stakeholder processes must be adequately resourced at all levels to be meaningful.

2. **There should be tighter focus in global processes.**

As more issues are added to the demand list, the risk of losing the most important becomes greater. “Too many priorities mean no priorities at all.” CSOs should focus on a limited number of issues to ensure they retain global attention – for example protecting the rights of CSOs to convene. However, BetterAid points out that reduction of focus to one or two issues is next to impossible given the diversity of the constituency and the breadth of development cooperation policy.

3. **Donors need new CSO strategies and aid modalities**

There is scope to support CSOs in identifying mechanisms and processes for multi-stakeholder dialogue at the national level; to build new alliances, to strengthen negotiation skills; local ownership and local partnerships are key but they need more systematic space and dialogue and ways to engage constructively using robust evidence.

6. Key Recommendations

1. **Global and National Platforms are needed as focal points for aid and development effectiveness but they need funding if they are to engage in global and national processes. Donors should focus more explicitly on developing funding modalities that better balance accountability and independence requirements.**

Detail: the team questions whether a traditional programme structure and methodology is the most appropriate framework for financing participation in global and multi-stakeholder processes – specifically because such processes are not linear and because “sometimes direction is more important than destination”. Also, outcomes relate as much to dependencies on the actions and priorities of other stakeholders as on the implementers’ performance plan. This requires more than the identification and monitoring of assumptions; it requires flexibility to create and take advantage of best opportunities as they arise in a dynamic setting. BA’s ambition evolved over time as the possibilities and prospects grew. Although not linear and programmable, (engagement in) change processes can be monitored to record results and compare the value of these results to the cost. More appropriate financial (and associated evaluation) instruments are needed to facilitate CSO engagement. There is scope for an aid modality that combines **strategic and core funding**⁸⁴ with “**consolidation points**” when progress is reviewed periodically to determine what has been achieved and the extent to which this represents value for money. Donors could work with CSOs to develop and pilot approaches towards this end. This would give CSOs the independence they need to self-determine next steps (research, consultation, etc.).

2. **CSOs need to fiercely prioritise in advance of global negotiations – since here “less is more”; and they should lobby harder to make best use of global space and opportunity (this particularly applies to the future GPEDC).**

Detail: CSOs could select priorities from the HLF4 “not achieved” list or review the original CSO priorities and select from there. Results from the online survey

⁸⁴ Funding that can be used for strategic programmes of work (not just core funding to cover overheads which cannot be met from programme funds).

suggest that CSOs might select one “ask” in relation to the enabling environment and to the rights based approach, for example *CSO rights of association*, and lobby hard to achieve that at the global level. Internal consultation (with the CSO constituency) might need to be suspended once negotiation is underway (around a table).

3. **More entry points for multi-stakeholder engagement need to be found at the national level.**

Detail: All stakeholders have a role in this including CSOs who share some responsibility for the creation of an enabling environment. To fully take on the role of a development partner means being able to adopt different approaches – for example to offer a solutions focused constructive approach, bringing negotiation skills to play and demonstrating an ability to reach consensus - as well as sometimes adopting a more challenging position and approach. In this regard, evidence based advocacy at the national level appears to be a strength to build on. A practical guide on multi-stakeholder dialogue towards democratic ownership could be developed and would be very useful at the national level.

7. Lessons Learned specifically in relation to the Future Platform

The new global structure vs. national implementation

It is the intention that the new unified CSO platform that is to be created – the Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) – will be global light and country heavy. This makes sense: while the international policy dialogue is important, the priority focus must be for capacity-building on the ground, providing funding for national actors, since funding creates ownership and an accountability dynamic. At the same time, it might make sense to create a permanent sub-structure at the global level in the framework of the Global Partnership – something that is being done for the Private Sector. It will be important that in this new arrangement the OF achievements on CSO development effectiveness are not under-played or under-represented.

Expanding the view on stakeholders

An element that came up in interviews with non-NGO related CSO representatives was the fact that the CSO community does not limit itself to NGOs. Trade unions and the academia, for example, are clearly a part of the CSO community and should be incorporated at all levels into the work of the platform, something that has not been achieved so far (the trade unions were influential in shaping the outcomes of BetterAid but undertook a parallel development effectiveness initiative). Equally, the platform will have to find a *modus vivendi* and cooperation modus with international NGOs (INGOs), who often provide donor funding to national NGOs (so effectively operate as funders) as well as operate in receipt of such funding. Their participation in each of the platforms warrants deeper consideration. Finally, a key cooperation partner could be national parliaments and the International Parliamentary Union (IPU), given that parliaments are probably the other most-overlooked stakeholder in development effectiveness.

Box 10: Trade Unions at Busan

The *Confederación General del Trabajo* (CGT) is the biggest of Colombia's three main trade unions, totaling 700,000 members⁸⁵. It is an affiliate of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and receives development cooperation both from developed country unions as well as from donors (such as USAID). It has been involved through ITUC in the aid ad development effectiveness discussion, sending a representative to take part in HLF4 as part of ITUC delegation. However, it has been involved neither in BetterAid's nor in Open Forum's outreach work in Colombia, and does not have institutionalised contacts with NGOs and NGO platforms.

⁸⁵ Source: International Trade Union Confederation. November 2011.

What role for CSO development effectiveness?

The importance of CSO development effectiveness in the overall achievements of CSOs seems to be a contentious point between OF and BA, as well as inside the CSO community in general. Some interviewees involved in the CSO platforms noted that “the most important achievement was the consensus on the Istanbul Principles. This was something new, something very concrete.”⁸⁶ Yet this element is not given such prominence in the BA reporting; additionally, some CSO interviewees saw CSO development effectiveness as a donor-driven ‘Western’ topic. Also, there seems to be different interpretations on the engagement within the WP-EFF (Cluster A). While the CSO co-chair of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness hailed from Open Forum, BetterAid’s final report states that the cluster “was a crucial space for the BACG (and Open Forum) to develop its core ideas around democratic ownership and strengthening the practices of mutual accountability”, and does not mention Open Forum’s co-chair function of the Task Team. BetterAid also states that “as the umbrella open platform that facilitates CSO engagement to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), actively facilitating CSO engagement in the WP-EFF’s various working groups and task teams and representing CSOs in its Execom since Accra, BetterAid effectively gave voice to advocacies of its CSO constituency on advancing RBA in development cooperation and poverty eradication in accordance with internationally agreed development and Human Rights goals.”⁸⁷

Development Effectiveness requires a new Governance Model

Development effectiveness, if implemented, effectively heralds a new form of development cooperation governance and accountability, which requires creating engagement mechanisms for the different stakeholders involved and strengthening the capacities of weaker stakeholders – particularly CSOs – in order to actively participate in these mechanisms on a level playing field. Engagement mechanisms for CSOs exist (for example the ILO’s tripartite model) but given the amount of funding likely to be available and the complexity of the task, it is now a priority that practical multi-stakeholder models of engagement are identified and piloted in a number of implementation countries and focusing on a number of critical issues (perhaps to begin with where there is most apparent convergence of views) so as to create concrete examples of engagement mechanisms which others can then replicate. Countries that see their own HLF commitments as something rather theoretical and non-binding, at least with regards to development effectiveness, would benefit from such translation from good practice advice into seeing what works in practice.

⁸⁶ Ruben Fernandez, ALOP (Colombia), Interview. CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

⁸⁷ Post-Busan Transition Year Project Proposal. May to December 2012. BetterAid, 2012.

The role for CSOs in policy dialogue needs closer definition

A key challenge highlighted in the documents relates to the on-going debate within CSOs on their role in the international negotiation process; combining a watchdog function with sitting at the negotiation table is challenging. One author states “that the key question remains: are political leaders from all sectors ready and open to continue, deepen and implement the commitments and directions they set in Busan?”⁸⁸ One could argue that this question also holds true for the CSOs.

Future donor strategy

There also needs to be a stronger consistency between supporting CSO platforms striving for development effectiveness, and the concrete practices of donor agencies in the partner countries and in the international dialogue. A paramount element missing so far from donor considerations is the fact that funding actually is a key element of an enabling environment, particularly core funding which enables CSOs to carry out an independent leadership role. Yet direct support for CSOs is dwindling, either because of a general reduction in aid (Latin America) or because of a focus on national ownership, more funds get channelled through direct budget support or government-led programme-based approaches.

Donors also have to ask themselves what their role is in engagement mechanisms. If democratic ownership really is the desired goal, then it means that the traditional bilateral dynamic between donors and governments will have to be enlarged. New stakeholders – notably CSOs and the private sector – will have to come to the table to join in deliberations, and donors will have to respect this ownership by taking on more of a facilitative rather than directive role.

In their future work, donors should strive to better link funding coming from headquarters sources with a watch-dog role for their country offices. In the evaluation, most donor country offices were unaware of the support being given to BetterAid and Open Forum, yet at the same time were clearly aware of the national work environment for CSOs. Country offices should identify CSOs that have sufficient capacities to engage at the national level and more actively promote multi-stakeholder engagement mechanisms that involve national CSOs that have taken part in the international dialogue.

Finally, donors should strive to further simplify and harmonise their future support, by implementing pooled funding arrangements to enable CSO access to funds from multiple sources through a single funding agreement.

⁸⁸ CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan. CSO Initiatives to Strengthen Development Effectiveness. Published by BetterAid in cooperation with Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness. June 2012.

Annexes

I: SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF BETTERAID AND OPEN FORUM

BetterAid

In 2007, several international NGO networks and civil society organisations (CSOs) gathered at the Nairobi World Social Forum to discuss collaboration for the 2008 HLF3 in Accra. This led to a CSO International Steering Committee (ISG) of about 20 CSO networks and INGOs; most of its leaders were *Reality of Aid* representatives⁸⁹.

By HLF3 in September 2008, more than 700 civil society organisations had identified with the ISG agenda, mainly through the Accra Civil Society Forum⁹⁰ and the launch of the BetterAid Platform representing them (promoted by the ISG). 80 CSO delegates had full access to HLF3 Roundtables and Plenary sessions as well as to government delegates, but not to the negotiations for the *Accra Agenda for Action* (AAA). Both the ISG and a multi-stakeholder Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (AG-CS) of the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness promoted the inclusion of civil society in the preparations for HLF3.

At the end of October 2008, the then-ISG proposed full CSO participation in an expanded post-Accra Working Party, including a 10% representation for CSOs (similar to the number of CSO representatives at the HLF). The BetterAid Platform, coordinated by the ISG/BACG, was to be the mechanism for determining this representation. The Working Party did expand and two positions reserved for CSOs at the table, with CSO being able to rotate in and out based on their expertise. Representation was determined through the BetterAid Coordination Committee.

⁸⁹ Action Aid International (AAI), AFRODAD, Alliance 2015, Arab NGOs Network for Development (ANND), Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), Canada's Coalition to End Global Poverty (CCIC), Civicus, Concord, Eurodad, The African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET), Ghana Aid Effectiveness Forum, IBIS, IBON Foundation, Interaction, International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Reality of Aid (RoA), Social Watch, UK Aid Network (UKAN), and Women in Development Europe (WIDE). The Reality of Aid (RoA) network is a network of country-level CSOs working on issues of aid reform since 1993.

⁹⁰ In terms of donor support for the Civil Society Forum, SIDA, to name an example, approved funds for an IBON proposal for "CSO participation and parallel forum to the Ghana 2008 High Level Forum".

The post-Accra Paris ISG meeting in October 2008 launched a review of membership and operational guidelines. The ISG became the *BetterAid Coordinating Group* (BACG)⁹¹ at its first meeting in Johannesburg in February 2009. The ISG also decided that its post-Accra mandate was not to directly carry out country-level activities, thus remaining focused on the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (and to a smaller extent on the United Nations (UN) Development Cooperation Forum (DCF)). Regarding country-level activities, IBON International with the RoA network to deepen a Country Outreach Program to strengthen CSO capacity and catalyze country-level policy spaces through 11 workshops and 62 country consultations (IBON and the global Reality of Aid network had been very active, alongside the AG-CS, in organising pre-Accra regional and country consultations).

In practical terms, a CSO wishing to identify with the Platform would only agree not to speak explicitly against any of its core positions, expressed in a position paper; it was not required to adopt it. Before the HLF4 in Busan in November 2011, more than 1,700 CSOs had identified with the Platform and its agenda for Busan.

Open Forum

The AG-CS deliberations lead to a multi-stakeholder International Forum on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness in Quebec in February 2008. Several CSO coalitions and INGOs initiated a side discussion on issues of CSO development effectiveness, which led to a gathering of more than 70 CSO platforms and networks in Paris in June of 2008 in the so-called “Exploratory Meeting on CSO Development Effectiveness”. The Exploratory Meeting on CSO Development Effectiveness was organised under the auspices of a preliminary Global Facilitation Group by CONCORD⁹².

The meeting was coordinated by the European CSO platform Concord. Over three days, the CSOs present established an overarching mandate and key approaches for a CSO-driven initiative that would result in global CSO commitment to a framework to guide their development effectiveness efforts. The Paris meeting launched the *Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness*, and also addressed the governance of the Open Forum through the establishment of a CSO Global Facilitation Group (GFG)

⁹¹ Tony Tujan (IBON) has been a constant co-chair; other co-chairs have included Mayra Moro-Coco and Cecilia Alemany (both AWID).

⁹² The members of this group were: APRODEV - Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe, ACFID - Australian Council for International Development, BOND – British Overseas NGOs for Development, CARE International, CCIC - Canadian Council for International Cooperation, CONCORD – European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development, Coordination SUD – French National NGDO Platform, IBON Foundation, InterAction – American Council for Voluntary International Action, ITUC – International Trade Union Confederation.

made up of 25 CSO nominated members⁹³. At the first meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2009, the GFG delegated a Consortium to provide day-to-day management support with Concord for staff and logistics to carry out the main areas of work.

Based on a outreach and consultation process in 2009 and 2011, (4,500 CSOs through more than 70 consultations and multi-stakeholder dialogues at different geographic and thematic levels), the Open Forum adopted the *Istanbul Principles for Development Effectiveness* in September of 2010, and, in June 2011, more than 250 different civil society actors from around the world came together the *Siem Reap Consensus on the International Framework for Development Effectiveness* in the final Global Assembly of the Open Forum.

Coordination between BetterAid and Open Forum leading up to HLF4

In early 2009, the BACG (including IBON/RoA Country Outreach) and the Open Forum presented to donors a “Chapeau Proposal”, a joint presentation of two inter-linking three-year proposals for activities by the BACG and Open Forum, in which they “proactively acknowledged the essential importance of a comprehensive and coordinated approach to national, regional, and global CSO activities leading to HLF4”. “However, as these parallel processes evolved, avenues for cooperation sometimes proved to be elusive. Regular contact between the co-chairs was sometimes episodic until the final months in 2011 prior to Busan. A minority of members on both the BACG and the GFG informally helped each body understand directions and political strategies” (Tomlinson). On the ground, activities were often carried out by the same CSO platforms. “The involvement of a common platform certainly facilitated coordination between Open Forum and BetterAid at the country level, but this reliance on a few also affected the relative emphasis on each agenda, depending on the interests and context for each CSO platform.” (Tomlinson)

The multi-stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment was started by a process initiated through a meeting in early 2009 in Stockholm. It was co-chaired by Sweden (Sida), Mali (Office of the President), and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC, representing the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness), and located within Cluster A (Ownership and Accountability) of the Working Party. Membership of the Task Team included over a dozen donor governments, a few developing country governments and a number of CSOs representing Open Forum and BetterAid.

⁹³ IBON International had been selected at the Exploratory Meeting to be part of the GFG. The Open Forum homepage now counts it as one of the “former GFG members who are no longer serving on this Open Forum group”.

In March 2011, a joint Busan strategy meeting of BACG and GFG took place in Harnösand, Sweden. This meeting was a critical juncture in bringing together a unified document with the *Key Messages and Proposals for Busan*. While sometimes problematic, this meeting launched the basis for joint political strategies, which were to be led by BetterAid in close coordination with the Open Forum GFG. A joint body assisted in determining CSO participation in Busan and in coordinating CSO priorities for the Busan Outcome Document.

Both platforms were present at HLF4. Prior to the meeting, 600 CSOs attended the Busan Global Civil Society Forum, which prepared 300 official civil society delegates to the HLF4 (the 300 CSO representatives were selected in a BACG/Open Forum coordinated regional selection process from all regions and sectors) and produced a Civil Society Statement to the HLF. The CSO were represented in the negotiations through a CSO Sherpa (BACG co-chair Tony Tujan).

In February 2012, CSOs from the global facilitation groups of BetterAid and Open Forum met in Cebu, Philippines, for the Post-Busan Global CSO meeting. Formulated through a joint working group called G13, the outcome Cebu Consensus looks at the values, objectives and organisational principles of a new Civil Society Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE), an open global CSO platform. (The G13 is composed of 11 CSO representatives and chaired by Tony Tujan (BA co-chair) and Emele Duituturaga (OF co-chair). The G13 met in April 2012 in Amsterdam to discuss the draft single platform proposal and to subsequently submit proposals to GFG and BACG. The objectives of the “overall BetterAid platform transition” for 2012 are the following: “policy development will seek to articulate key policy proposals to ensure an equitable and inclusive development cooperation governance structure and monitoring framework, push for the progressive implementation of the BPd, and advance CSO engagement in the Building Blocks.” (BA Proposal 2012)

BetterAid and Open Forum also proposed to expand CSO representation in the Global Partnership, notably by auto-nominating Tony Tujan (IBON) as co-chair and Mayra Moro-Coco (AWID) as CSO representative to the Steering Committee (i.e. BetterAid’s two co-chairs). Neither a CSO co-chair nor a CSO representative to the Steering Committee in the Global Partnership had been considered so far.

Finally, a meeting in Amsterdam of the Pre-Busan Multi-stakeholder Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment discussed possible options for establishing a *Building Block on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment* in the framework of the to-be-created Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPEDC, currently being prepared by the Post Busan Interim Group (PBIG) of which the CSO are a party).

II: TERMS OF REFERENCE: EVALUATION OF THE BETTERAID AND OPEN FORUM PROGRAMS

Introduction

The outcome document of the Accra High Level Forum, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), reflects an enhanced understanding of development and aid effectiveness. More specifically, it recognises that the involvement of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right is fundamental to both development and aid effectiveness, and commits donors and developing country governments to deepen their engagement with them to help ensure CSOs' contributions to development reach their full potential.

Also emerging from Accra is increased attention to CSO development effectiveness as something to be pursued both by CSOs themselves and as a shared responsibility. This is reflected in the commitment to engage with CSOs in a CSO-led multi-stakeholder process to promote CSO development effectiveness. It is further reflected in the commitment to work together to ensure that CSOs enjoy a favourable enabling environment, including appropriate donor support models that are conducive to CSOs' aid and development effectiveness.

With this recommendation and the AAA commitments as their foundation, and building on the experience of CSO engagement in the lead up to Accra, two CSO coalitions submitted two distinct but closely inter-related proposals for two global CSO processes toward the fourth High Level Forum (HLF-4) in 2011. These two proposals are for the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (OF) and the BetterAid Platform (BA).

A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed to outline basic principles to guide donors in their pooled financial support to these two CSO processes toward HLF4, and to guide CSOs in their receipt and management of this support.

The Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation of the MoU (paragraph 47) indicates that "...Donors and CSOs will consider jointly overseeing an independent evaluation of outcomes and impact achieved by the two CSO processes, to be financed by donors, and carried out following HLF-4 but prior to the expiration date of this MOU."

Background to the CSO Programs

The global BA CSO process aims to contribute to a meaningful implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) and move the aid effectiveness agenda to address development effectiveness by advocating for appropriate reforms of the international aid architecture and practices. Specifically, the Project seeks to achieve the following Strategic Objectives (and see the BA Performance Framework in annex I):

- a. Achieve a greater and more meaningful involvement of CSOs in bringing change in aid effectiveness policy and practice;
- b. Develop a series of realistic CSO policy proposals that promotes global policy changes from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness; and,
- c. Ensure that key aid effectiveness actors (donor and recipient countries, parliamentarians, CSOs, etc.) are fully exposed to CSO positions and policy recommendations.

The global Open Forum process aims to promote CSO development effectiveness, so that CSOs from around the world maximise their contributions to sustainable positive change. It is an international CSO-driven process towards defining a global development effectiveness framework for CSOs in the run-up to HLF-4. Specifically, the OF's Strategic Objectives include (see OF Performance Framework in annex #):

- a. Develop and promote a framework for CSO development effectiveness based on CSO's own development visions, approaches, relationships and impact of actions in order to improve and ensure their own effectiveness.
- b. Promote and facilitate a learning environment on CSO development effectiveness that will provide a space for CSOs to discuss issues and challenges relevant to their work as development actors.
- c. Engage in a political dialogue with donors, governments and other stakeholders to build understanding and support for an enabling environment for CSOs. This engagement is aimed at resulting in an agreement between all stakeholders, particularly governments and CSOs, on a set of minimum enabling conditions critical to the effectiveness of CSOs as development actors.

Management and Oversight of the Programs

BetterAid Coordinating Group (BACG): The BACG operates as a collegial body composed of 32 CSOs that together provides a global outreach. The overall mandate of the BACG is to use the global CSO BetterAid Platform to coordinate and facilitate (at the international level) the engagement of CSOs promoting reforms in international cooperation for development and aid effectiveness.

IBON International is the financial management agent responsible for the receipt of funds and overall management of the BA program, including hosting BA program staff.

The BA program budget originally proposed was US\$3,218,105 or €2,260,075 between 1 June 2009 to 31 December 2011. This was later reduced to US\$2,930,298 or €2,140,250 adjusting to the actual amount of donor contributions from the pooled fund. As of October 2011, BA was funded by: Sida, DFID, ADA, Denmark, Germany and Belgium.

Open Forum Global Facilitating Group (GFG): The GFG is an elected representative group of 29 CSO networks and platforms from around the world that meets on a regular basis. It acts as the governing body for the OF and engages in political dialogue

with appropriate donor and government bodies. Its main task is to provide overall guidance and leadership to the OF process. A Consortium of 5 regional platforms was also formed to help facilitate the implementation of the OF work plan.

CONCORD is the financial management agent of the Consortium, and is thus responsible for the receipt of funds and overall management of the OF program, including hosting OF program staff.

The OF program budget originally proposed was €2,991,307. This was later reduced to €2,824,101 adjusting to the actual amount of donor contributions from the pooled fund. As of October 2011 OF was funded by: DFID, Sida, ADA, Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Czech Republic.

Donor Coordination Group and CSO Management Group: In April 2009 when OF and BA (and Reality of Aid) first submitted their post-Accra proposals to a newly-formed Donor Group at a meeting in Stockholm, Sweden, the donors designated a four-member group comprised of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) to act as a Donor Coordination Group (DCG) to intermeditate between the CSOs and funding donors.

BA and OF in turn established a CSO Management Group to also play the intermediating role between the participating CSOs and funding donors.

The DCG and CSO-MG played a lead role in elaborating the above-referenced MoU to guide donors in their pooled financial support to these two CSO processes toward HLF4, and to guide CSOs in their receipt and management of this support. The MoU, which incorporates terms of reference for the DCG and CSO-MG, is attached in annex III.

Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The overarching purpose of this evaluation is twofold:

- 1) Accounting to BA and OF membership and constituents, and to donors and developing country government stakeholders in the OF and BA processes, for results achieved.
- 2) Lesson learning for BA, OF and donors, which can be integrated into their respective future programming.

The evaluation's objectives are to assess the degree to which the BA and OF programs have each achieved expected results, and the efficiency of management of the BA and OF programs, recognising that program management has a significant impact on results achievement. The objectives are thus:

1. *With regard to program results:*

• Achievement of Strategic Objectives and Impacts i.e. assess:

- Whether, why (under what conditions) and the degree to which the programs achieved their intended qualitative and quantitative outputs and outcomes as articulated in the Performance Frameworks;
- The degree to which the programs are showing trends toward the achievement of intended impacts.

In reviewing the program's achievements with regard to program results, the evaluation will also seek to assess the degree to which the programs articulated their intended Strategic Objectives and Impacts, i.e. their theories of change and intended results chain. Lessons with regard to how performance frameworks could be developed in future for such programs.

• Relevance, in relation to:

- Internal and external obstacles to CSO aid and development effectiveness, as prioritised by OF and BA membership, other CSOs, and by donors and developing country governments;
- Issues/asks raised as obstacles to the broader aid and development effectiveness agenda, as prioritised by OF and BA, other CSOs, and donor and developing country governments.

• Sustainability of results (outcomes and impact)

In assessing these questions the evaluation will give consideration to the challenges and opportunities presented by the programs' operating contexts.

2. *With regard to program management*

• Cost Efficiency i.e. assess

- The efficiency of BA and OF program management, in particular the question of value-for-money, looking at how economically the programs' resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) have been used to produce results, if possible relative to other programs of similar nature;
- The effectiveness and efficiency of the pooled funding mechanism in reducing transaction costs for BA, OF and donors, and the cooperation within DCG and between the DCG-CSO-MG.

• Process i.e. assess the extent to which the BA and OF processes were:

- Transparent (e.g. breadth of information sharing to various stakeholder groups, ease of access to information by these stakeholder groups and others (who accessed the information?), clarity and transparency of mandate, directions, decision-making);
- Democratic (e.g.: governance of process including decision making bodies and processes);
- Inclusive (e.g.: breadth and depth of CSO and other stakeholders at consultations, process of selection and invitation);

- Representative (e.g. representativeness of participating CSOs);
- Sustainable (e.g. enduring results, including increased capacity of stakeholders);
- Learning-based (e.g. challenges and opportunities, experience in implementation continuously taken into account).

Throughout the evaluation, effort will be made to identify and document lessons learned and good practice that could usefully inform any future work of this nature. As reflected in the objectives of the evaluation, there is particular interest in gathering lessons from the two CSO programs on:

- Facilitating global CSO engagement in policy processes
- Capacity development for sustainable CSO engagement
- Challenges and benefits of multi-stakeholder engagement
- Pooled funding mechanisms and coordinated management (DCG and CSO-MG)
- Development and use of performance frameworks and the theories of change for programs of this nature

The primary intended users of the evaluation are BA and OF, including the financial management agents and coalition members. The participating donor agencies are also primary users, in particular their civil society departments that have funded the BA and OF processes. For both the CSOs and donors the evaluation will provide lessons that can be integrated into future programming of this nature. The evaluation will also provide an evidence base of results achieved which CSOs and donors can use for communications and fund-raising purposes.

The wider CSO, donor, and developing country government community are also potential users of the evaluation.

Methodology

The evaluation will involve a mix of methods including:

- a. Document review – Review of proposals, reports, DCG feedback on reports and CSO responses, DCG-CSO-MG meeting minutes, BA and OF meeting minutes or reports, BA and OF products (e.g. International Framework, policy papers, etc), products of BA and OF consortium members and participating national-level CSOs, Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) minutes and outcomes.
- b. Interviews – Interviews and possibly focus groups with key stakeholders from all stakeholder groups that have been engaged in the OF and BA processes (Northern and Southern CSOs, donors, developing country governments, WP-EFF representatives, etc) as well as with individuals that have not been directly involved to obtain expert and unbiased views.

- c. Online survey (in English, French, and Spanish) – Administered to participating national level CSOs on the effectiveness and impact of the OF and BA processes. Possibly also to be administered to other key stakeholders.

The evaluation will seek to balance information-gathering from stakeholder and non-stakeholder sources, and from different stakeholder groups (CSOs, donors, developing country governments). Information-gathering will include country visits (up to 3) for interviews and focus groups.

Additional details on methodology will be proposed by the evaluation team for discussion with the DCG and CSO-MG. Stakeholder participation will be fundamental to the evaluation. The independent evaluation is expected to be participatory providing for active and meaningful involvement by CSOs, donors, and other relevant stakeholders.

The evaluation team will probably be able to take advantage of Donor Group- and Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment meetings foreseen to take place in Amsterdam 16-19 April to interview key stakeholders and to collect additional documentation/information to inform the evaluation.

See annex IV for a preliminary list of sources and stakeholders to be consulted. Methodological rigour and quality are key elements in ensuring the evaluation's legitimacy and hence use. The evaluation process and reports must adhere to the OECD/DAC Evaluation Quality Standards.

Management of the Evaluation

As per MOU, donors and CSOs will jointly oversee the independent evaluation. The DCG and CSO-MG lead this joint management of the evaluation. Effort will be made to establish a wider "Reference Group" with additional donor and CSO members and a developing country government member of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment.

The DCG and the CMG will be responsible for:

- Overall responsibility and accountability for the evaluation
- Guidance throughout all phases of execution
- Approval of all deliverables, and
- Co-ordination of the donors and CSOs internal review process

The Reference Group will be consulted at key milestones during the evaluation process. In particular they will be requested to provide input on the inception report, and the preliminary and final evaluation reports.

Sida, as a member of the DCG, will contract an evaluation team to conduct the independent evaluation from the framework agreement Sida has with an acknowledge consultancy company. The evaluation team will be vetted by both the DCG and the CSO-MG.

Evaluation Outputs

Expected outputs from the evaluation team include:

1. An inception report describing how the evaluation will be carried out (methodology) and an evaluation schedule. Delivery – four weeks following the signing of evaluation contract.
2. A preliminary evaluation report. Delivery – by [?] 2012.
3. A final evaluation report, including executive summary. Delivery - by [?] 2012.

The evaluation team may be called upon to present these outputs to the DCG and CSO-MG either via videoconference or in person if opportunities are available.

These deliverables are to be:

- Prepared in English only, except for the final evaluation report that will be submitted in English, French and Spanish
- Submitted to the members of the DCG and CSO-MG electronically via e-mail and/or on flashdrive in Microsoft Word or pdf, and,
- For the final evaluation report, submitted in hard copy format (number of copies to be determined).

Effort will be made by the DCG and CSO-MG to make the evaluation available on relevant websites.

Composition and qualifications of the evaluation team

To be completed – referring to Sida’s evaluation helpdesk.

III: EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (INCLUDING INDICATORS)

DAC Criteria	Questions raised in ToRs	Indicators to be used in Evaluation
Relevance	What is the relevance of the programs in relation to international and external obstacles to CSO, aid and development effectiveness?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International and external obstacles to CSO, aid and development effectiveness addressed by programs. 2. Programs suited to the priorities and policies of the CSO target group and of the donors (as reflected in the commitments/objectives in the AAA).
	What is the relevance of the programs with regards to the broader aid and development effectiveness agenda?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. Alignment of the programs to the international dialogue on aid and development effectiveness (degree of relevance and feasibility of the programs' objectives, activities and outcomes to the international dialogue on aid effectiveness from Accra to Busan and to stakeholders' work and priorities. 4. Relevance of the processes to CSO development effectiveness and to the civil society sector.
Design	How well did the programs articulate their intended strategic objectives and impact i.e. their theories of change and intended results chains?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Match between performance framework and the results chains proposed within the program proposals. 2. Is "theory of change" and cause-effect linkages appropriate for this type of program? 3. Can a theory of change be identified which makes a more explicit link to poverty reduction/development results?
Impact	What are the trends towards the achievement of intended impacts?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Contribution to reforms to aid architecture and practice. 2. Improved awareness of CSO development effectiveness amongst internal and external stakeholders. 3. Extent to which CSO platform/organisational strategies look at issues raised by the Istanbul Principles with country CSOs or within a given organisation. 4. Extent to which networks are working with their members to enable CSOs to improve their practice on the basis of the Istanbul Principles.
Effectiveness	To what degree (and why) have the BA and OF programs achieved their intended qualitative and quantitative outputs and outcomes?	<p>Outcomes (OF)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of initiatives on CSO development effectiveness that acknowledge the contribution of the Open Forum to their processes. 2. Improvements in function of CSO sector processes. 3. Range and number of donors, governments and other non-CSO stakeholders engaging in processes that aim to improve the enabling environment in response to the consensus proposal from CSOs <p>Outcomes (BA)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Extent to which BA has been successful in advancing the development effectiveness agenda to inform reforms in aid architecture and practices 2. Extent and nature of engagement of CSOs in aid policy review and reform at country level. 3. Extent and nature of engagement of CSOs in aid policy review and reform at international level. 4. Acknowledgement of BA policy messages in policy changes.

		<p>5. Positive media messages on BA positions.</p> <p>Outputs (OF)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Numbers and percentage of participants attending consultation meetings report positively on lessons learned. 2. Level of multi-stakeholder engagement in OF program. 3. Number of CSOs utilising tools produced or delivered through Open Forum process. 4. Global Framework is produced and includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a set of principles, • indicators and implementation guidelines, • minimum standards for an enabling environment for CSOs. <p>Outputs (BA)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Documented evidence of CSO engagement mechanisms. 2. Documented case studies of CSO development effectiveness. 3. Submission of policy proposals to WP-EFF and UN-DCF 4. HLF4 materials (base on BACG policy position papers) include 4 continental statements and 5 sectoral statements 5. Level of multi-stakeholder engagement in BA program. 6. Level of BA website use. 7. Written evidence of aid effectiveness actors' awareness of CSO policy positions.
Efficiency	Value-for-money: how economically have the program resources/ inputs (funds, expertise, time) been used to produce results – if possible relative to programs of a similar nature?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Evidence of alternatives analysis. 2. Quality of risk analysis and management. 3. Evidence of maximisation of reach to yield best value for money.
	How effective and efficient has the pooled funding mechanism been in reducing transaction costs for BA, OF and donors?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Combined cost of bilateral alternatives.
	How effective and efficient has the cooperation been within DCG and between the DCG and the CSO-MG?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Clarity of responsibilities. 2. Clarity of rules regarding cooperation. 3. Agreements reached on key issues. 4. Implementation of Agreements. 5. Joint gains achieved.

Sustainability	What evidence is there of sustainability of program results (outcomes and impact)? How enduring are results?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Utilisation of participatory tools for planning, monitoring and evaluating development activities. 2. Institutionalised policies regarding transparency, multiple accountability, and integrity in internal operations. 3. Sustainability/accessibility of outcomes and outputs (e.g. tools) for longer-term use and reference. (AB recommendation) ..
	How sustainable is the increased capacity of stakeholders?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Facilitation of global CSO engagement in policy processes. 2. Issues of environmental sustainability explicitly incorporated into CSO policies and work. 3. Capacity Development for sustainable CSO engagement, i.e. fostering sustainable and learning-based processes. 4. Institutionalised coordination mechanisms with different development actors, particularly with donors and governments. 5. Institutionalised long-term relationships and commitments (incl. funding). 6. Work with governments to strengthen their role in delivering and be accountable for the provision of public goods.

IV: STAKEHOLDER PRIORITIES FOR THE EVALUATION:

- The evaluation should be a **genuine learning exercise** that provides information, inspiration and energy at the start of the future (merged) CSO platform process (see 5.3).
- Share views on the **complementarity between BA and OF** and how this evaluation might usefully contribute towards the emergence of the future (merged) CSO platform (ways of better understanding BA/OF competencies; help towards multi-year advocacy plan) (see 5.3).
- Go beyond activities/outputs and **validate the results achieved in terms of outcomes and impact**; what actually was contributed at Busan? What actually was contributed to the longer-term development effectiveness of the CSO sector? (Impact and Effectiveness questions).
- It is essential that the evaluation **contribute to a better understanding of the policy processes** (or lack thereof) **at the country level** in the post-Accra period, **the capacity issues** and the **potential for future engagement** and **monitoring of outcomes** at country level (Impact, Effectiveness and Sustainability questions).
- Country visits should also look at the **extent to which national level achievements or concerns have been translated to the global level** (Impact and Effectiveness questions)
- **We want to know about results but also process**; the process questions in the ToR come from the CSO groups (Efficiency and Sustainability questions).
- The evaluation should **tell the story of CSO development effectiveness** in a way that enables people to see themselves and their part in the process (relates to documentation project).
- Assess the **joint donor funding arrangement** as a financing modality; Look at the **CSO-MG arrangement** which did not always work well – it is important to understand why because in the future the joint platform might like to allow flexibility and initiative within decentralised financial units but some negative experience suggests that more needs to be learned about how to mitigate the risks. (Efficiency question).
- **Read across to the Joint Evaluation of Civil Society Engagement in Policy Dialogue** (look at the relationship between/impact of BA initiatives on policy dialogue models) (see 5.2)
- There are issues that have not been sufficiently reflected upon in order to learn the lessons for the future – particularly at country level (case studies would be valuable to help understand **what can be achieved at country level through initiatives taken at the global level**) (Effectiveness and Impact question).


V: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS INTERVIEWED - EITHER BY TELEPHONE/SKYPE OR DURING FIELD VISITS

Name	Affiliation	Position	Location
Miranti Maruto	Tiri Integrity Action	Program Manager and Head of Indonesia Progra	Indonesia
Syamsul Ardiansiyah	Yakkum		Indonesia
Ario Adityo	Institute for National and Democracy Studies	Managing Director	Indonesia
Ade Siti Brokah	Kemitraan	Program Manager for Poverty Eradication and Ec	Indonesia
Wismana Adi Suryabrata, Kukas Adhyaakso	National Development Planning Agency Development	Deputy Minister for Development Funding Affairs	Indonesia Indonesia
Denny Abdi	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Deputy Director	Indonesia
Judha Nugraha	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Environmental Affairs	Indonesia
Lukas Adhyakso	AusAID	Performance and Quality Unit Manager	
Rini Widiastuti	UNDP	Evaluation Analyst and Learning Manager	Indonesia
Ari Yahya Pratama	UNDP	Programme Officer for Aid Effectiveness	Indonesia
Ngakan Putu Miharjana	Planning	Co-Team Leader/PPP Development Specialist	Indonesia
Farah Sofa	British Embassy	Governance Programme Manager	Indonesia
Lukman Hakim	FITRA		Indonesia
Wicaksono Sarosa	Kemitraan Partnership	Executive Director	Indonesia
Sita Supomo	Kemitraan Partnership	Program Director, Sustainable Development Gov	Indonesia
Don K Marut		Former ED Indies	Indonesia
Siti Khoirun Nikmah	INFID		Indonesia
Nurharsono	Migrant Care		Indonesia
Taryudi Caklid	Aman		Indonesia
Surya Rahman	HFI		Indonesia
Miranti Maruto	TIRI'		Indonesia
Udin	LP3ES		Indonesia
Ahmad Bahrul	JEMARI		Indonesia
Lily Pulu	Konsil LSM Indonesia		Indonesia
M Firdaus	ASPPUK		Indonesia
Riza Iskandar	A4DES		Indonesia
Irhash Ahmady	WALHI		Indonesia
Barry Aditya	IGJ		Indonesia
Misiyah	KAPAL Perempuan		Indonesia
Yasir Sami			Indonesia
Apio Adatyo	INDIES		Indonesia
Apris	HFI		Indonesia
Ahme disni	Kemitraan		Indonesia
Bailona	Kemitraan		Indonesia
Wicaksono Sarosh	Kemitraan		Indonesia
Amy Bartlett	Open Forum	Programme coordinator	HQ/Skype
Gaële Nicodeme	Open Forum	Programme coordinator	HQ/Skype
Tony Tujan	BetterAid	Chairperson	HQ/Skype
Roberto Pinauin	BetterAid	Programme coordinator	HQ/Skype
Jan Dereymaker	ITUC-SCI		HQ/Skype
Andreas Vogt	Formerly Open Forum Secretariat		HQ/Skype
Karin Fallman	Sida	Lead Policy Specialist, Civil Society Unit	HQ/Skype
Jaqueline Wood	CIDA		HQ/Skype
Margrethe Holm Andersen	Danida	Deputy Head, Evaluation	HQ/Skype
Karin Kohlweg	ADA		HQ/Skype
Erika Pasquini	European Union		HQ/Skype
Philippe Besson	OECD	Conseiller d'Ambassade, Délégué au C	HQ/Skype
Brian Tomlinson	Open Forum		HQ/Skype
Jorge Baibis	ALOP		HQ/Skype
Hubert de Milly	DAC DCD	Senior policy adviser, Aid Effectiveness Divi	HQ/Skype
Mayra Mioro-Coco	AWID		HQ/Skype

ANNEXES

Rubén Fernandez	Formerly ALOP	Former Outreach Officer OF in Latin America	Colombia
Rosa Inés Ospina	Rendir Cuentas	Co-Director	Colombia
Mauricio Cadavid Restrepo	Confederación Colombiana de ONG	President	Colombia
Xenia Tovar	La Alianza	Observatory	Colombia
Liliana Patricia	Confederación Colombiana de ONG	Executive Director	Colombia
Claudia María Mejía Duque	Sisma Mujer	Executive Director	Colombia
Natalia Eugenia Velasquez Rios	Synergia	Executive Director	Colombia
María Carolina Suárez Visbal	Asociación de Fundaciones Empresariales	Executive Director	Colombia
Julio Roberto Gómez Esguerra	CGT union	Director	Colombia
Miryam Luz Triana Alvis	CGT union	General Secretary	Colombia
Philipp Schönrock	CEPEI	Director	Colombia
Enrique Maruri	Colombian Foreign Ministry	Former Head of International Cooperation	Colombia
Sandra Alzate Cifuentes	Former Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Aid	Former Director, International Cooperation Department	Colombia
Ricardo Melo Acosta	Former Head of New Partnership Unit, International Cooperation Department	Former Head of New Partnership Unit, International Cooperation Department	Colombia
Karla Guerrero	Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)	Technical Cooperation Assistant	Colombia
Ivo Hoefkens	European Union	Counsellor/Head of Development Cooperation	Colombia
Brigitte d'Aoust	Canadian Embassy	First Secretary	Colombia
Diana Muñoz Jiménez		Development officer	Colombia
Lucie Arlandis	French Embassy	Assistant to the Development Cooperation Advisor	Colombia
Harman Idema	Embassy of the Netherlands	Head of Development Cooperation	Colombia
Martha Lucia Arevalo	Embassy of the Netherlands	Development Cooperation officer	Colombia
Yasuaki Tanaka	JICA		Colombia
Miguel González Gullón	AECID	Country Coordinator	Colombia
Alba Lucia León Giraldo	NGO Federation of the Quindío department	Director	Colombia
María Elena Urbano	Fundación Luis Felipe Velez	Director	Colombia
María Ruales	Sociedad de Economistas del Quindío	Director	Colombia
Juana García	Universidad de los Andes		Colombia
Isaline Bergamaschi	Universidad de los Andes		Colombia
Liliana Ávila Osorio	Colombian Foreign Ministry	Multilateral Cooperation Coordinator, Division of International Cooperation	Colombia
Juanita Olarte Suescun	International Cooperation Agency of the Government (APC Colombia)	Advisor	Colombia
Ignacio Gironella Merino	International Cooperation Agency of the Government (APC Colombia)	Advisor	Colombia
Ana Leonor Rueda	NGO Federation of the Santander department	Executive Director	Colombia
Gloria Hidalgo F.	YMCA Bogotá&Cundinamarca	General Director	Colombia
Martha Muñoz		Assistant Director	Colombia
Xenia Tovar	La Alianza	Coordinator, International Cooperation Observatory	Colombia
Natalia Eugenia Velasquez Rios	Synergia	Executive Director	Colombia
Rosa Inés Ospina	Rendir Cuentas	Co-Director	Colombia
Rodríguez Burgos	Confederación Colombiana de ONG		Colombia
Ester Bagwana	Uganda National NGO Forum		Uganda
Arthur Larok	ActionAid	Country Director	Uganda
Rachael Nyakecho	Uganda Joint Christian Council	Programme Officer Governance	Uganda
Annette Were Munabi	Development Research and Training (DRT)	Policy Analyst Economic Policy & Livelihoods	Uganda
Kasirye Samuel	SEATINI	Programme Officer	Uganda
Emmanuel Nshakira Rukundo	Development Initiatives	Research Analyst	Uganda
Richard Sewakiryanga	Uganda National NGO Forum	Executive Director	Uganda
Christine Johansson	Embassy of Sweden	Counsellor/Head of Development Cooperation	Uganda
Maureen Nahwera	Embassy of Sweden	National Programme Manager Human Rights, Gender, Corruption, Civil Society	Uganda
Mr. Lars Christensen	Democratic Governance Facility	Head of Programme	Uganda
Gloria Mugambe	DfID	Governance Advisor	Uganda
Jose Soler	EU	First Counsellor, Head of Co-operation	Uganda
Peter Ashton	EU	Attaché, Economic & Social Section	Uganda
Fred Tusiime	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development	Aid Liaison Department	Uganda
Richard Sewakiryanga	Uganda National NGO Forum	Executive Director	Uganda
Beatrice Nabajja Mugambe	Development Research and Training (DRT)	Executive Director	Uganda
Lawrence Bategeka		Senior Research Fellow	Uganda
Isaac Shinyekwa	Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC)	Research Fellow	Uganda
Jakob Freudensburg-Rasmussen	World Bank		Uganda
Gabriel W. Kangwagye	National NGO Board	Chairperson	Uganda
Patrick Nahabwe		M&E Officer	Uganda


VI: OPEN FORUM FOR CSO DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAMME (2009-11) – LOGIC MODEL HYPOTHESIS OF EVALUATION TEAM



VII: BETTERAID PROGRAMME (2009-11) – LOGIC MODEL HYPOTHESIS OF EVALUATION TEAM

BetterAid Programme (2009-11)

Monitoring and influencing the implementation of the AAA (with specific focus on democratic ownership) while moving the aid effectiveness agenda to address development effectiveness¹ by advocating for appropriate reforms to the international aid architecture and practice



¹Development effectiveness addresses the impacts of aid relationships in development cooperation from the comprehensive framework of democracy, human rights and social justice.

VIII: SIEM RIEP

Note that in terms of the **enabling environment** the Siem Reap document states:

Democratic government requires laws, regulations and practices that respect several fundamental principles or standards – pre-conditions for a robust and effective civil society. These include:

- Freedom of association and assembly
- Legal recognition facilitating the work of CSOs
- The right to freedom of expression
- Freedom of movement, mobility and the right to travel
- The right to operate free of unwarranted state interference
- The legal space to seek and secure necessary resources in support of legitimate roles in development

Guidance is provided on what is required from Partner Governments and Donors in terms of behaviours to create this enabling environment:

1. Recognising CSOs as development actors in their own right

- Full participation of CSOs as independent development actors their own right affirmed and ensured by governments and donors through legislation, policy and programming

2. Structuring democratic political and policy dialogue to improve development effectiveness

- Systematic inclusion of diverse views, particularly those from grassroots-based social organisations, women’s organisations and indigenous peoples’ representatives
- Transparency and clarity of purpose and process
- Freedom to access information, including country strategies and programme plans
- Access to documentation in the languages of those being consulted
- Timeliness of consultations in order to impact decisions
- Recognition of the responsibilities and contributions of other actors, especially parliamentarians and local government
- Appropriate resources to enable full participation of stakeholders

3. Being accountable for transparent and consistent policies for development

- Full transparency and accountability for development priorities, strategies plans and actions by governments
- Place and role for CSOs clearly defined in donor strategic frameworks and plans


4. Creating enabling financing for CSO development effectiveness

- A long-term results-oriented perspective, which includes core institutional support, based on the notion that CSOs provide public goods
- Responsiveness to CSO initiatives
- Access for a diversity of CSOs, including support for different-sized CSOs, and support for coalitions and networks
- Predictable, transparent, easily understandable and harmonised terms
- The view to promoting the mobilisation of local resources
- Support for the full range of CSO programming and innovation, including policy development and advocacy

Finally, the documents lay out what is required of all stakeholders:

1. **Reaffirm CSOs as independent development actors in their own right** and the importance of multi-stakeholder policy dialogue
2. Commit to and **promote an enabling environment** for CSOs as independent development actors, both in law and in practice, at minimum in keeping with existing commitments in international and regional instruments that guarantee fundamental rights
3. **Assure that the Paris Declaration principles**, including ownership and alignment, **are not** in any way **interpreted or applied to narrow the enabling environment**
4. **Implement donor models of support that can contribute to CSO development effectiveness...** through policies and requirements that are appropriate to promote CSO roles as effective, independent development actors in their own right
5. **Acknowledge existing efforts and progress in demonstrating CSO’s accountability ...** [while] CSOs recognise the need to continued progress and commit to actively strengthen the application of self-managed accountability and transparency mechanisms and standards
6. **Encourage context specific adoption and application of the principles of aid and development effectiveness**, including the Istanbul Principles, accompanying guidelines and indicators, and CSO’s own on-going efforts to implement and monitor these self-regulating standards and tools.
7. **Recognise that all development actors have a responsibility to be accountable for their aid and development efforts**, and share responsibility to promote each other’s accountability
8. **Encourage efforts by all stakeholders to increase transparency...** in keeping with their respective access to information regulations, the scale of resources and agreement on modalities that do not jeopardise the continued operations, safety and security of CSOs or individuals associated with them

IX: VALIDATION SURVEY WITHIN THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE BETTERAID AND OPEN FORUM PROGRAMMES



Perception on communication, inclusiveness and democracy of BetterAid's and Open Forum's processes (average score)	
(1=Low, 5=High)	
	1 2 3 4 5
View on <u>communication</u> of processes	
BetterAid	3,9
Open Forum	4,2
View on <u>inclusiveness</u> of processes	
BetterAid	3,7
Open Forum	3,9
View on <u>democracy</u> of processes	
BetterAid	3,7
Open Forum	3,6



Most important statements which have led organisations into follow-on dialogue and practical change:		
Top three statements for <u>international dialogue</u>		
	Total	%
Deepen, extend and operationalize democratic ownership of development policies and processes	28	65%
Enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors	23	53%
Improve the availability and public accessibility of information on development cooperation and other development resources	21	49%
Top three statements for <u>national dialogue</u>		
	Total	%
Deepen, extend and operationalize democratic ownership of development policies and processes	25	58%
Enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors	25	58%
Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability	23	53%
Top three statements for <u>organisational change</u>		
	Total	%
Encourage CSOs to implement practices that strengthen their accountability	23	53%
Improve the availability and public accessibility of information on development cooperation and other development resources	15	35%
Enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors	15	35%

Looking back on the overall experience, what inspired me most was:			Looking forward, if we did this again, the key change in our approach should be:		
Frequent given qualitative answers cluster categories					
	Total	%		Total	%
CSO collaboration	15	39%	Adapt approach to secure efficiency	12	32%
CSO coherence	10	26%	Improve inclusiveness and democratic ownership	11	30%
Achieved results	9	24%	Improve coherence and coordination	6	16%
Mission and vision	2	5%	Improve information sharing	4	11%
Specific event	1	3%	No change	2	5%

Istanbul Principles regarded to have had the largest impact in regards to change of organisations strategies, operations or system		
Top three of the Istanbul principles	Total	%
Practice transparency and accountability	16	53%
Embody gender equality while promoting women and girls' rights	14	47%
Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning	14	47%
Most important "Key messages and proposals" for CSOs delivered pre-Busan		
Top three messages and proposals	Total	%
Establish democratic ownership as the core aid and development effectiveness principle	32	60%
Commit to and implement rights-based approaches to development	21	41%
Agree on minimum standards for government and donor policies, laws, regulations and practices that create an enabling environment for CSOs	19	36%
Most important key messages for CSOs delivered by the Task Team on Ownership and Accountability of the WP-EFF to Busan		
Top three messages	Total	%
Guarantee fundamental rights (freedoms of expression, of association, of non-state interference rights to communicate, to seek and secure funding, to protection by the State)	26	52%
Emphasise ownership and leadership by local CSOs, communities and citizens	21	42%
Support transparent and inclusive multi-stakeholder policy dialogue and capacity building towards this end	14	28%
Most important statements for CSOs relating to messages which were included in the Busan Outcome Document		
Top three statements	Total	%
Enable CSOs to exercise their role as independent development actors	38	78%
Deepen, extend and operationalize democratic ownership of development policies and processes	35	71%
Encourage active participation of all development cooperation partners in mutual assessment reviews	17	35%

Outcome field research					
	BACG/GFG	Remaining participants	BACG/GFG + participants	Open channels	Total
Target group	80	241	321	-	-
Viewed	29	53	82	74	156
Incomplete	9	17	26	16	42
Complete	12	19	31	13	44
Response rate	26%	15%	18%	-	-

Origin of respondents top five countries		
Country	Total	%
Philippines	6	10%
Belgium	4	6%
Dominican Republic	4	6%
Burundi	3	5%
Kenya	3	5%



X: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISTANBUL PRINCIPLES

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 1: Respect and promote human rights and social justice

Organization	Initiative	Type of initiative and more information
CBM	Resource Kit on Disability-inclusive MDGs	Toolkit to understand and advocate for the importance of disability-inclusive development.
Plan International	Child Centred Community Development	Resource for rights-based programming , especially for children, which outlines environmental factors, the program plan, and M&E plan in the context of principles and rights
Leonard Cheshire Disability	Disability-Inclusive Millennium Development Goals and Aid Effectiveness	Conference on disability-inclusive development
Catholic Relief Services	Integral Human Development Approach	Cross-cutting approach that this organisation applies in their strategies and work.

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 2: Embody gender equality and equity while promoting women and girls' rights

Organization	Initiative	Type of initiative and more information
Ontario Council for International Cooperation	Embodying Gender Equality and Equity while Promoting Women's and Girl's Rights	Conference on overcoming violence against women, increasing women's and girls' participation and representation in governance, and economic empowerment as a means to achieve gender equality in Ghana.

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 3: Focus on people's empowerment, democratic ownership and participation

Organization	Initiative	Type of initiative and more information
Save the Children Zimbabwe	Children's Feedback Committees - an Experiment in Humanitarian Accountability	Evaluation of delivery of food aid programmes from the point of view of the recipients and their communities
Various (published by DFID)	Gender and Citizenship at the Grass-roots: Assessing the Effect of NGO Initiatives in Social Mobilization and Political Empowerment in Kenya and Bangladesh	Evaluation article that seeks to evaluate the impact of NGOs empowerment initiatives on the life of women, taking as examples cases in these two countries.
PRADAN	Self-Help Groups (SHG)	Promoting informal associations empowering their members to gain their identity as individuals, while realising – and utilising – the immense power of mutual aid.

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 4: Promote Environmental Sustainability

Organization	Initiative	Type of initiative and more information
Kepa	- EnviroMeter	Tool measuring the degree of environmental friendliness of NGOs.
	- Climate Sensor	Tool for climate sensitive planning to help organisations to take into account the effects of climate change in their projects and improve the project planning.
Islamic Relief	Environment Policy	Internal guidance which reflects Islamic Relief's vision of environment, based in Islam teachings.
LEAD Pakistan	- Ecological Footprint Office Calculator	Resource accounting tool that measures how much biologically productive land and sea is used by a given population or activity, and compares this to how much land and sea is available.
	- And others	Misc

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 5: Practice transparency and accountability

Organization	Initiative	More
Cominsud	Code of Ethics for Civil Society Organisations in Cameroon	
Co-operative for Research and Education	Civil Society Accountability: Principles and Practice	Toolkit exploring what accountability means for civil society organisations in South Africa and provides suggestions on how to put accountability into practice.
NGO Federation of Nepal	Code of Conduct of NGO	
ANONG	Código de conducta ética de la Asociación Nacional de ONG Orientadas al Desarrollo Uruguay (only in Spanish)	
UNITAS	Sistema de Informacion para la Transparencia y la Rendicion de Cuentas Bolivia (only in Spanish)	

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 6: Pursue equitable partnerships and solidarity

Organization	Initiative	Type of initiative and more information
The Village of Love Canada - Kijiji Cha Upendo - CAP/AIDS Network	Three Way Partnership	Partnership where each organisation offers their knowledge and expertise to take care of AIDS orphan children.

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 7: Create and share knowledge and commit to mutual learning

Organization	Initiative	More
ActionAid	REFLECT - comprehensive methodology for promoting communication and meaningful participation of base communities in decision making	More information
Collaborative Learning Projects	Non-profit organization that gathers and analyses practices and experiences in the humanitarian sector to learn from the lessons encountered	http://www.cdainc.com
Equal Access Nepal in cooperation with UNICEF	Radio show focusing providing young listeners with a platform from which to speak about important issues and connects listeners to an online discussion forum to read what others are saying about a particular topic.	More information here
HEARTLINES	Award-winning NGO with an 8-year track record of multifaceted interventions using mass and digital media	More information here
United Nations Development Programme	Mobile technologies and empowerment: Enhancing human development through participation and innovation	Download here

ISTANBUL PRINCIPLE 8: Commit to realizing positive sustainable change

Organization	Initiative	More
PRADAN	Promotes Self-Help Groups; develops locally suitable economic activities; mobilises finances; and introduces systems to improve livelihoods of the rural poor and sustain their progress	http://www.pradan.net
LEAD Pakistan	Works to create and sustain a global network of leaders who are committed to promote change towards the patterns of sustainable development that is economically sound, environmentally responsible and socially equitable	http://www.lead.org.pk

XI: BUDGET AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Open Forum Budget

All costs in UR	2nd Semester 2009	2010	2011	
Outreach costs				
Regional, country, thematic/sectoral and international consultations and workshops (minus High-Level Leadership Meeting)	60,713.67	885,115.00	537,749.00	
Communication and outreach	3,667.99	41,193.00	75,779.00	
Political/multi-stakeholder dialogue	1,395.84	2,120.00	20,452.00	
SUB-TOTAL	65,777.50	928,428.00	633,980.00	1,628,185.50
SUB-TOTAL in %				74.7%
Steering costs				
GFG Meetings	15,008.89	32,007.00	47,264.00	
High-Level Leadership Meeting			56,437.00	
SUB-TOTAL	15,008.89	32,007.00	103,701.00	150,716.89
SUB-TOTAL in %				6.9%
Support structure costs at centralized level				
Staff support and programme management (CONCORD staff overhead costs (Consortium meetings))	39,027.40	121,689.00	55,157.64	
Financial management	7,681.00	88,517.00	89,121.00	
SUB-TOTAL	46,708.40	210,206.00	144,278.64	401,193.04
SUB-TOTAL in %				18.4%
Support structure costs at decentralized level				
Staff support and programme management	22,000.01	121,934.00	154,705.36	
Research contracts on specific SOE aspects		20,891.00	43,354.00	
SUB-TOTAL	22,000.01	121,934.00	154,705.36	298,639.37
SUB-TOTAL in %				13.7%
TOTAL				2,180,095.43

BetterAid Budget

All costs in USD

	2nd Semester 2009	2010	2011	
Outreach costs				
Regional, country, thematic/sectoral and international consultations and workshops (minus High-Level Leadership Meeting)		855,708.00		
Communication and outreach		150,251.00		
Political/multi-stakeholder dialogue		863,002.00		
SUB-TOTAL		1,868,961.00	1,868,961.00	84.3%
SUB-TOTAL in %				
Steering costs				
GFG Meetings				
High-Level Leadership Meeting		138,191.00		
SUB-TOTAL		138,191.00	138,191.00	6.2%
SUB-TOTAL in %				
Support structure costs at centralized level				
Staff support and programme management (BON staff + overhead costs (Consortium meetings) Communications		149,736.00		
Research contracts on specific CODE aspects				
Financial management		60,834.00		
SUB-TOTAL		210,570.00	210,570.00	9.5%
SUB-TOTAL in %				
Support structure costs at decentralized level				
Staff support and programme management		149,601.00		
SUB-TOTAL		149,601.00	149,601.00	6.7%
SUB-TOTAL in %				
		2,367,323.00		
TOTAL			2,217,722.00	

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Evaluation of the BetterAid and Open Forum Programmes

This evaluation report examines two complementary programmes undertaken between 2009 and 2011 by two global coalitions of Civil Society Organisations - Civil Society Voices for BetterAid and Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness.

The evaluation finds that: coalitions enhance the legitimacy of CSOs as development actors but balance is needed between representation and prioritisation; national and global coalitions are important focal points for aid and development effectiveness but more entry points for multi-stakeholder engagement are needed at the national level; CSO networks need funding arrangements which do not compromise independence. The evaluation findings suggest that donors will need to identify new aid modalities to balance accountability with independence and should reconsider the traditional bilateral dynamic between donors and governments, recognising inclusivity as a key requirement towards development effectiveness.

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