

Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake

Final Report
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Abbreviations

AAR	After Action Review
ACAPS	Assessment Capacities Project
ACE	Assessment and Classification of Emergencies
AO	Administrative Officer
ASG	Assistant Secretary General
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CDAC	Communication for Disaster Affected Population
CDC	Center for Disease Control
CO	Country Office
CRC	Crisis Response Cell
CRD	Coordination and Response Division
CSC	Coordination Support Committee
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
DyHoO	Deputy Head of Office
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Assistance Office
EO	Executive Office
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERRF	Emergency Relief Response Fund

ETF	Emergency task Force
EU-MIC	European Civil Protection Mechanism
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCS	Funding Coordination Section
GenCap	Gender Standby Capacity
GoH	Government of Haiti
GVA	Geneva
GVB	Gender Based Violence
HAO	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
HLCC	High Level Coordination Committee
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HDC	Humanitarian & Development Coordinator
HQ	Headquarters
HoO	Head of Office
IA RTE	Interagency Real Time Evaluation
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICC	Inter-cluster coordination
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHP	International Humanitarian Platform
IMO	Information Management Officer
IRC	International Rescue Committee
JOTC	Joint Operations and Tasking Centre

INGO	International Non Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
NATF	Needs Assessment Task Force
NFI	Non Food Items
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NY	New York
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSOCC	Onsite Operations and Coordination Centre
OTF	Operational Task Force
PaP	Port au Prince
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organisation
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery Framework
PIO	Public Information Officer
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
RINAH	Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti
REDLAC	Risk Emergency Disaster Working Group for Latin America and the Caribbean
ROLAC	Regional Office Latin America and the Caribbean
RC	Resident Coordinator
RO	Regional Office
RTE	Real Time Evaluation

SAR	Search and Rescue
SbPP	Stand-By Partnership
SF	Strategic Framework
SMS	Short Message Service
SMSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TS	Tables Sectorielles
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children' Fund
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	Under Secretary General
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Executive Summary

The devastating Haiti earthquake struck the capital and nerve centre of the country destroying much of the capital city, including critical government infrastructure, and left over two hundred thirty thousand dead, including scores of government and UN officials. The humanitarian response had to evolve in a situation of destruction, chaos and severely damaged capacity of critical players who would normally be expected to lead humanitarian response. To this extent, it can be said that Haiti has been an exceptional disaster, unlike any other disaster in recent humanitarian history.

The international humanitarian community launched a massive response, and OCHA declared Haiti earthquake a 'corporate emergency' and deployed significant resources to support the response.

This evaluation was commissioned in line with OCHA's Evaluation Strategy for 2010-2013, which calls for an evaluation of every declared corporate emergency response. The evaluation was carried out between August and September 2010, and examined OCHA's response policies, structures and processes and their overall effectiveness in execution of OCHA's core coordination functions.

Overall Findings:

Despite the fact that the UN system including OCHA was very badly affected by the emergency, they were operational and contributed to the humanitarian response quickly. UNDAC arrived within 24 hours of the emergency, and OCHA mobilised key staff from all departments in New York, Geneva and the regional office in Panama to support the badly affected OCHA country office. Coordination and leadership were challenges from the beginning in the chaotic circumstances where much of local capacity had been destroyed or disrupted, and thousands of humanitarian and faith-based organisations arrived on the scene to provide relief to the affected communities. The response to the earthquake in the first three months was successful in quickly mobilising aid, setting up cluster coordination and mobilising important resources in the form of funds, military assets and staff. However, weak humanitarian leadership and lack of local ownership, the humanitarian sector's difficulty in preparing for and responding to an urban disaster, as well as a weak assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs delayed the response and led to important gaps in geographical and sector-based coverage¹.

In specific terms, some of the key achievements of OCHA were as follows:

(a) The speed of disbursement and volume of funds were critical factors in the response. The Central Emergency Fund (CERF) and the Flash Appeal based primarily on estimates and assumptions provided by field staff was rapidly prepared and launched by headquarters three days after the earthquake. The appeal was quickly funded by donors.

1 Francois Grunewald, Andrea Binder. Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months after the Earthquake, June 2010.

(b) In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, international Search and Rescue (SAR) teams began to arrive. A total of 26 SAR teams were in the country by 15 January who rescued a total of 134 people, the highest number of live rescues by international SAR teams ever recorded².

(c) From the time of the earthquake up until the end of the declared 'OCHA Corporate Response' (12 Jan – 12 Mar) a total of 87 emergency deployments of humanitarian coordination personnel were made through OCHA-managed mechanisms to deal with the response – the deployments were made in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Miami and Washington (latter two for liaison with US authorities)³.

(d) All of the above enabled OCHA to facilitate and support a massive mobilisation of humanitarian response by the international community for delivery of assistance in very difficult circumstances: in the first six months of the response, 4 million people were provided with food aid; 1.2 million people provided access to safe water daily; 1.5 million people received emergency shelter materials; 2.1 million household received Non-Food Items (NFIs); 11,000 latrines installed; and over half a million children and pregnant/lactating mothers received supplementary feeding, as a result of the collective humanitarian effort. (IASC, 6 Months Report).

Detailed Findings and Recommendations:

Coordination:

Despite the chaos that followed the earthquake and with the arrival of hundreds of organisations on the scene, OCHA was able to rapidly put in place mechanism for coordination of all humanitarian players. Deployment of senior staff from the region and UNDAC team within the first 24 hours enabled OCHA to undertake this. Although clusters were activated within the first three days, it took about 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become functional. OCHA coordinated well at the operational level. However, inter-cluster coordination remained weak. Linking coordination at national level to those happening at local level remains an issue. Furthermore, since Port-au-Prince (PaP) had a large concentration of humanitarian organisations spread over several departments in the city, more localised coordination structures closer to the point of action would have helped overcome the problems of access to log base and overcrowding in meetings. The interface between clusters and government-led coordination mechanisms remain weak and there is no clear guidance on how the two will relate to each other and ensure coherence between humanitarian response and recovery/development work.

On the issue of coordinating with military, especially in non-conflict countries like Haiti, the humanitarian community appears to have varied interpretation of the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines. One additional factor complicating OCHA's role has been the relationship between OCHA's humanitarian mandate and the mission's (MINUSTAH) long term role in the country. Clear guidance does not exist which clarify how in times of major crises which warrants

2 IASC, Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti, following the 12 January 2010 earthquake, 6 Months Report. June 2010.

3 OCHA. Haiti Earthquake Surge Review, January - March 2010

sizeable deployment of OCHA and clusters, the latter's humanitarian role interface with those of the mission.

Recommendations:

Operations Management:

R2: OCHA needs to clarify for its staff its role in coordinating local organisations and institutions.

R3: Cluster coordinators ought to be sufficiently briefed and orientated on local institutions and structures and must have the competence to facilitate building relationship with local government and institutions.

R6: OCHA's Policy Instruction on relationship with integrated mission needs to be adapted to local situations, and it is not too late to undertake an exercise for Haiti in order to develop a SOP which spells out the details of the relationship with MINUSTAH in general, and the humanitarian part of the latter in particular.

R8: Given that bulk of the humanitarian agencies and their operations are in the city of PaP, OCHA needs to establish a field office (on the lines of the field office in Leogane and Jacmal) in the centre of the city to be accessible to stakeholders. The CO needs to focus on strategic issues, and providing support to the HC, leaving all operational issues to the field office.

R9: OCHA needs to work with the HC/DSRSG and clearly spell out the modalities of the clusters' interaction with the table sectoriales (TS), and establish an indicative time-frame for the clusters to gradually transfer their functions to the government.

Strategic Management and Leadership:

R1: Working through the IASC, OCHA needs to facilitate embedding of cluster coordinators by cluster lead agencies of, as a minimum, critical lifesaving sectors namely, WASH, Logistics, Health, Food, shelter and Camp Management, in UNDAC teams deployed immediately after a disaster.

R4: Working with IASC, develop guidelines on how OCHA can delegate to and support some of the coordination functions to government agencies, with involvement of key local NGOs to address the needs of a large number of new humanitarian actors who arrive after a disaster and require support in the nature of 'survival' tips.

R5: OCHA needs to identify, train and develop a small group of experienced and senior inter-cluster coordinators with high facilitation and strategic thinking skills who can be readily deployed in complex emergencies when clusters are deployed.

R7: Working with the IASC, OCHA needs to facilitate discussions on clarifying how the humanitarian agencies in general, and the clusters in particular, need to relate to military forces (both foreign

government and UN peacekeepers) in natural disaster situations not involving open armed conflict where military forces tend to deploy on humanitarian missions.

Humanitarian Financing, Policy & Advocacy:

In this response, OCHA's leadership on appeal and financing was crucial in mobilising support of the donor community for a massive humanitarian response. The ERRF is a useful tool to ensure participation of small and medium NGOs, including National ones and according to the ERRF Guidelines, one of its priorities is implementation of pilot projects fostering innovative initiatives. However, the ERRF decision-making process is perceived by NGOs to be non-transparent, and bulk of the funding so far has gone to the UN agencies.

In the Haiti response, daily key messages produced for ERC in the early weeks worked well, combined with media stories produced from the field enabled by embedding of a videographer with the UNDAC team. On policy and advocacy issues, the HC has not been fully supported by OCHA with evidence-based data and analysis for advocacy on critical issues of the humanitarian response and the need for a coherent approach to relief, recovery and development which needs to determine future financing.

Recommendations:

Operations Management:

R10: Better guidance needs to be provided to CO and HC on management of ERRF mechanism which needs to be more transparent and inclusive of NGOs.

R12: While continuing to focus on the ongoing relief efforts, OCHA needs to bolster its capacity to bring evidence-based analysis and thinking to support the HC in his dialogue with the government, donors and reconstruction authorities to ensure that humanitarian needs do not get neglected in the process of transition and reconstruction.

Strategic Management and Leadership:

R11: OCHA needs to ensure that in future emergencies a public information /media relations officer is deployed on the scene as one of the first-priority deployments.

Information Management and Needs Assessment:

OCHA deployed the right IM capacity in the early phase of the response, and contributed well to the information needs of an evolving humanitarian response at that stage, although some of the tools like 3W (who, what, where) and One Response in particular did not work. As OCHA continued doing more of the same in the latter phases, these tools provided by OCHA did not add substantial value to the work of others. OCHA's failure to facilitate a quality needs assessment has been a serious handicap in the entire response, and this has meant loss of opportunities for the humanitarian community to influence the role of military in the humanitarian response as well as in the planning of recovery and reconstruction plans

which were developed after the PDNA.

Recommendations:

Operations Management:

R13: OCHA needs to identify generic IM needs at different stages of a complex emergency response and ensure that staff skills and competencies match the changing nature of demands of IM at different stages of a response to support OCHA's coordination of each step of the humanitarian programme cycle (needs assessment and analysis, joint planning, resource allocation, monitoring, evaluation) with appropriately-designed products.

Strategic Management and Leadership:

R14: In future emergencies, OCHA needs to ensure that it manages the rapid needs assessment, and therefore has in-house capacity to deploy suitably qualified staff/partners to conduct needs assessment. In this regard, the evaluation acknowledges the current work being carried out by ACE and Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF), and further recommends that OCHA revisit its policy instructions to ensure that appropriate guidance being developed now are incorporated in the policy instruction.

Leadership, Management and Administration:

OCHA did well in terms of rapid deployment of a substantial number of people in the first six weeks. The deployments, however, faced major challenge in getting the right balance of numbers and quality, skills and expertise, and duration of deployment which were generally very short leading to frequent changes at all levels of staff, and staff continuity became a major problem which continues to affect the programme even now. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for deployment were not always followed and these caused serious problems in the field. OCHA does not have a functioning system for induction and briefing of staff before deployment. Besides briefing and induction, OCHA also does not have a system of training for its serving staff which could prepare them for different managerial roles. OCHA staff deployed in the first few weeks had little support by way of office facilities, accommodation and survival gear, and it took over four weeks to get some acceptable facilities in place to give the office and staff a minimum living and working conditions.

Failure to deploy experienced senior leaders in the country cost OCHA dear. If OCHA had taken clear decisions early on regarding the management capacity it needed to deploy in the country, there were options available for it to deploy senior managers. The Emergency Task Force and Operational Task Force (ETF/OTF) mechanism helped in coordinating between the two locations of HQ. However, these task force meetings were sometimes too large and lacked clear focus and structure. There was no single central point for clearing of information-demands and queries made on the CO by different parts of the HQ, and this wasted a lot of time of the deployed staff causing frustrations. This was compounded by the fact that OCHA has a highly complex organigram, with overlapping functions split between GVA and NY which has a tendency to cause delays and unclear locus of responsibility, not geared to efficient and timely decisions.

Recommendations:

Operations Management:

R15: OCHA needs to get better at following the SOPs it has (PI Emergency Response, SOP for ETF, Deployment, etc). Staff at all levels need better orientation on the existing SOPs and this needs to be done as a regular process before an emergency.

R16: Emergency Response Procedure needs to ensure that during a major emergency, there is a single focal point in the HQ which facilitates all communication with the CO/field office so as to minimise making unnecessary demands for information which may be already available in the HQ.

R19: OCHA needs to review its staff development policies and practices, and put in place a functioning system of training and orientation for staff deployed in emergencies.

R20: OCHA needs to invest in putting in place contingency stock of office-in-a-box and staff accommodation module for at least 100 staff to be deployed in 2-3 big emergencies at any point of time. This can be done through partnership with International Humanitarian Partnership (IHP) or the World Food Programme (WFP), and the modules need to be fully response-ready before an emergency sets in. Ensuring operational self-reliance for OCHA surge deployed will be critical in future emergencies.

R21: Review the arrangements with UNDP for providing administrative support in country, and ensure that avoidable inefficiencies do not come in the way of fast and efficient response.

Strategic Management and Leadership:

R17: Taking lessons from Haiti, ERC needs to ensure that in future emergencies, the senior level leadership (HC) in country is strong and has the capacity to lead an appropriate response. If not, the ERC needs to take whatever action is necessary to bolster the capacity by bringing in staff with appropriate leadership skills to work alongside existing leadership, or in extreme cases, temporarily replace existing leadership. A 'step aside' policy may also be considered in some circumstances.

R18: In 'corporate response', the ERC needs to ensure that at the HQ a senior leader (D2) is designated as operations director with full authority and responsibility to command and control all necessary resources within the organisation. This should be in place for at least three months, and reviewed at the end of ten weeks of the response.

R22: The Dalberg report on administrative and organisation systems is a good start, and OCHA needs to speed up implementation of the recommendations on structural relationship and accountability made in that report.

Section 1:

Introduction, Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation

1.1 Introduction:

Following the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, the humanitarian community initiated a massive relief and recovery operation in Haiti. The Flash Appeal, launched within 72 hours, requesting for US \$575 million for an initial 6-month period, was over 100 per cent funded. The Revised Humanitarian Appeal, launched on 18 February asking for \$1.4 billion over a one-year period for relief and early recovery, is already 67 per cent⁴ funded. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocations exceeded US\$ 39 million, and the Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF) support has increased from US\$ 5 million in 2009 to over US\$ 78 million.

Given the scale of the humanitarian response, OCHA had to step up its own capacity to support the humanitarian response. On January 13, OCHA classified the response to Haiti earthquake as 'corporate', requiring the 'whole of organisation' effort. OCHA Haiti office was expanded from five to over 50 international staff within the first week through the Emergency Response Roster (ERR), surge missions and stand-by partners (SBP). The Cluster Approach was implemented with the rollout of 12 clusters in Haiti and mirroring clusters in Dominican Republic.

This evaluation was commissioned in line with OCHA's Evaluation Strategy for 2010-2013, which calls for an evaluation of every declared corporate response. This is the first such internal evaluation conducted by the organisation.

1.2 Background:

In view of the size of the Haiti disaster and the subsequent response, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) triggered a Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) for Haiti to assess the disaster response and inform decision-makers, (primarily at country but also at the headquarters level), draw lessons, and allow corrections to be made, where necessary, in real time. The RTE mission in April 2010, covering the first three months of the response, was part of a larger multiphase RTE process; a subsequent mission later in the year is expected to cover the transitional issues⁵.

While the findings of the first phase of IA RTE evaluation address the performance of the humanitarian system as a whole, this evaluation will examine OCHA's response policies, structures and processes and their overall effectiveness in execution of OCHA's core coordination functions.

4 FTS 27/08/10

5 OCHA. Evaluation of OCHA Emergency response to the Haiti Earthquake - Terms of Reference, 28 July 2010

Additionally, internally within OCHA, there were several After-Action Reviews (AAR) and Lessons Review conducted on different functions by various Divisions and sections. This evaluation will take all these exercises into account and ensure that the findings of the evaluation build on the ongoing learning processes.

1.3 Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation:

1.3.1 Objectives of the Evaluation:

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- Examine whether meaningful results were achieved and whether OCHA successfully identified and performed its core coordination functions;
- Examine the timeliness, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of OCHA's response to Haiti earthquake and produce lessons for improving future OCHA operations;
- Review performance of all processes and structures employed during the Haiti response;
- Examine the extent to which the operation represents an appropriate response from OCHA in view of its mandate and priorities as laid out in the Strategic Framework; and
- Assess adequacy and utilisation of existing OCHA policies and procedures in guiding the emergency response.

1.3.2 Scope and Focus:

The evaluation reviewed OCHA's response to Haiti earthquake and examined its evolution through different phases and time periods, covering the period from 12 January to the end of August⁶. The evaluation did not focus on the results of the overall coordination effort on the affected population in Haiti as these issues were already covered by the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation⁷.

As such, this internally mandated evaluation focused on the following specific aspects:

- Adequacy of planning and goal setting: the extent to which goals were adequate, appropriate, and clearly defined;
- Management processes and effectiveness: assessment of the response management from headquarters and the field, including structures established (e.g. Operational Task Force, Emergency Task Force) and decision making processes; and
- Nature and extent of internal and external relationships, cooperation, and exchange of information.

OCHA's core functions as stated in its Strategic Framework⁸ are: Co-ordination, Humanitarian Financing, Policy Development, Advocacy, and Information Management. These formed the key focus along with

6 In some cases, references have been made to developments in September when the field work for the review was carried out, but by and large the period covered by this evaluation has been upto the end of August, 2010

7 Francois Grunewald, Andrea Binder. Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months after the Earthquake, June 2010. (IA RTE)

8 OCHA. Reference Guide for OCHA's Strategic Framework 2010-2013

leadership, management and administration of emergency response around which key evaluation questions will be designed keeping in mind the five objectives of the evaluation as articulated in section 1.3.1 above.

1.4 Methodology:

1.4.1 Evaluation Framework:

Using OCHA's core functions and issues of leadership and management of emergency response as the main focus for data gathering and analysis, the findings were further analysed using the standard Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Criteria⁹ for humanitarian evaluations. The OECD/DAC criteria were applied to the findings to draw overall conclusions on Relevance and Appropriateness, Timeliness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence, and Connectedness. The data gathered through the questions outlined in the inception report (Annex 2 attached) provided the main evidence for drawing conclusions on these criteria.

1.4.2 Methodological Approach:

The overall methodology of the evaluation was based on both inductive and deductive approaches using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a carefully selected range of sources as indicated below.

Key Methods:

The evaluation followed the following steps in conducting research, data collection, triangulation, analysis and reporting:

- 1) Briefing and scoping: Key Informant Interviews in HQ and Geneva, document research;
- 2) Detailed document research: a comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and data on Haiti response, as well as OCHA's policies and frameworks relevant to emergency response; a detailed list of documents studied is appended as Annexe 3.
- 3) Preparation of inception report which was agreed with OCHA stakeholders; annexed as Annexe 2
- 4) Country visits to Haiti and Panama Regional Office for Latin America (ROLAC) of OCHA formed the basis of data gathering. and supplemented with data obtained from surveys and telephone interviews;
- 5) Surveys – two sets of questionnaires were administered: one for external key informants (for example, cluster members, other humanitarian organisations) and another for internal (OCHA) key informants;
- 6) Semi-structured and structured interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone with a range of stakeholders including cluster members, UN agencies, NGOs, partners, donors, international organisations and governments;

⁹ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, 1999.

- 7) Data analysis and preliminary findings;
- 8) Oral Presentation to OCHA stakeholders in New York as part of validation process;
- 9) Preparation of first draft of the report, and obtaining comments from OCHA;
- 10) Preparation of second draft based on feedback on the first draft;
- 11) Final report.

Bulk of the data gathering and field work for this evaluation was carried out between August and September, 2010.

Key Informant Interviews:

Key informants were selected on the basis of discussions with the Evaluation Office and other internal stakeholders during the briefing process in the early days of the evaluation as well as during discussions on the inception report. Key informants included:

- Key managers and staff in OCHA New York office, Geneva office, Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean (ROLAC) and Haiti country office (CO).
- Donor representatives from ECHO, World Bank and USAID in Haiti.
- Staff from UN agencies in their regional and country offices in Panama and in Haiti.
- Other humanitarian actors such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGOs which participate in clusters.
- Government officials in Haiti.

A total of 124 key informants were interviewed (Annex 3) between 23 August and 15 October, of which 65 (52 per cent) were OCHA internal and 59 (48 per cent) external. A full breakdown of the interviewees is given below:

Table 1: Breakdown of Key Informants and Interviews Held

Category of key informant	No. of interviewees	Percentage of total no. of interviewees (%)
OCHA: NY/Geneva	47	38
OCHA - Haiti/Panama	18	15
Other UN agencies/Offices	34	27
NGOs/OCHA partners	16	13
Government officials	5	4
Donors	4	3

Surveys:

Two survey instruments were designed and administered in order to take inventory of perceptions of key external stakeholders, and gather views and feedback from a number of OCHA staff who had been

deployed or involved in Haiti response. These were to supplement information gathered through in-depth interviews and data gathering that were conducted with both internal and external stakeholders.

The purpose of the surveys was twofold:

- To take inventory of perception of external stakeholders (partners, HC/RC, other UN cluster leads, UN agencies, IFRC, etc) of OCHA's strengths and competencies and its leadership as demonstrated in the Haiti response. Questionnaire attached as Annex 5.
- An internal survey to complement data gathered from direct observations and field visits and key informant interviews. This elicited individual staff's views, feedback on decision making, overall leadership and communication during the response, effectiveness of deployment, administrative support and guidance. Questionnaire attached as Annex 6.

Key Questions:

Key questions examined in this evaluation are detailed in the inception report attached as Annex 2 of this report:

1.5 Triangulation:

The team used the different data sources and various meetings throughout the process of the evaluation to triangulate information – checking and corroborating findings to ensure that they were consistent. In particular:

- i. Source triangulation. Team members compared information from different sources, i.e. at various management levels in different OCHA functional units (at HQ and in the field), other UN agencies, cluster members (GOH, NGOs), and donors.
- ii. Validation workshop. A validation workshop was held in New York, attended by key stakeholders from OCHA HQ, Regional Office for Latin America & Caribbean (ROLAC), country office (CO) and Geneva office where the key findings of the evaluation were presented, and comments obtained;
- iii. Draft Report. Two rounds of draft reports were made available for comments to OCHA stakeholders to review findings and ensure accuracy, logic and consistency.

1.6 Limitations and Constraints:

The main limitation of the evaluation was in administering the survey instruments. It was intended that the survey would go out to about 80 internal and 60 external people. However, the contact list made available to the consultants was much smaller, and when the survey was sent out through emails, many of these bounced back as the addresses were not up-to-date. This resulted in a much lower return of the survey forms than was anticipated¹⁰. However, time did not permit the consultants to resend the questionnaires to new contact lists. It is important to point out that the survey was an additional

¹⁰ Only 5 internal and 2 external responses were obtained.

instrument used in this evaluation to complement information in a few key topics. Therefore, the low rate of response does not have an impact on the findings of this evaluation.

1.7 Format of the Report:

The report is presented in eight sections, with section 2 providing a description of the overall context of humanitarian situation and OCHA's response in Haiti. Sections 3-5 present the findings of the evaluation under different core functions namely: Coordination (section 3), Humanitarian Financing, Policy & Advocacy (section 4) and Information Management (section 5). Findings on Management, Leadership and Roles & Responsibilities are presented in section 6. In these sections (3-6), key conclusions drawn from the findings are presented at the end of each sub-section or section, and recommendations made wherever appropriate. Section 7 analyses the overall findings and conclusions against the OECD/DAC¹¹ criteria.

In the final section (8), the evaluators summarise the findings and present their recommendations for the organisation in terms of its humanitarian capacity and programming.

Section 2:

Operational Context and Overview of OCHA's Response to the Haiti Earthquake

2.1 The Context:

The Haiti earthquake was the second-most deadly earthquake in the last 100 years, and struck the capital and nerve centre of the country in several ways¹². Much of the capital city including critical government infrastructure was destroyed. Besides leaving over two hundred thirty thousand dead, including scores of government officials, the earthquake left the government paralysed and traumatised for several days after the earthquake. The United Nations which played a key role in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake was severely affected as it lost some of its most senior officials on the day of the earthquake. OCHA was a small office with a team of seven¹³, and the head of office (HoO) lost his entire family in the quake. Office premises of OCHA and most of the UN were destroyed or severely damaged.

In that setting, the humanitarian response had to evolve from a point of little or severely-affected in-

11 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/Development Assistance Committee, 'Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies', Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness, OECD/DAC, Paris, 1999.

12 John Holmes, ERC. Introductory remarks at the IASC launch of the Haiti 6 months report, 15 July 2010, New York

13 International 4; National 3

country capacity of critical players who would normally be expected to lead humanitarian response. To this extent, it can be said that Haiti has been an exceptional disaster, unlike any other disaster in recent humanitarian history.

Coordination and leadership were challenges from the beginning in the chaotic circumstances where much of local capacity had been destroyed or disrupted, and thousands of humanitarian and faith-based organisations arrived on the scene to provide relief to the affected communities. As was noted in the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE), the response to the earthquake in the first three months was successful in quickly mobilising aid, setting up cluster coordination and mobilising important resources in the form of funds, military assets and staff. However, weak humanitarian leadership and local ownership, the humanitarian sector's difficulty in preparing for and responding to an urban disaster as well as a weak assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs delayed the response and led to important gaps in geographical and sector-based coverage¹⁴.

Addressing humanitarian needs in Haiti was always going to be a challenge. Haiti was chronically impoverished even before the earthquake, with deep systemic problems and weak governance. "Nearly 80 percent of Haitians live in extreme poverty, and more than half suffer from malnutrition. Unemployment is a staggering 70 percent, and tens of thousands of people die each year from preventable illnesses related to a lack of clean water. Average life expectancy at birth is only 50 years, and one in 16 women faces a lifetime chance of dying during childbirth¹⁵." The earthquake devastated Haiti's frail infrastructure, including housing, public buildings, main roads, and the port and airport of Port-au-Prince. The disaster worsened the already inadequate and inequitable access to basic social services throughout Haiti. It also created a severe lack of safety and security especially for those living in camps exacerbating the already grave problem of sexual violence that exists in Haitian society.

2.2 OCHA's Response:

OCHA mobilised its staff resources for rapid deployment, and by the end of the second week after the earthquake, OCHA had over sixty staff in the country, up from seven before the earthquake. Given the scale of destruction and serious impairment caused to the country office capacity by the earthquake, OCHA HQ immediately took charge of driving the response. Working through task forces led by New York (NY) and Geneva (GVA) in two different time zones allowed almost round-the-clock monitoring and management of the fast-evolving response.

Despite the fact that the UN system including OCHA was very badly affected by the emergency, they were operational and contributed to the humanitarian response quickly. UNDAC arrived within 24 hours of the emergency and OCHA triggered a "corporate response", mobilising key staff from all departments in New York, Geneva and the regional office in Panama to support the badly affected OCHA country office and ensure coordination. The UNDAC established a coordination structure that OCHA was able to take on and develop further through timely surge capacity. Five key clusters (Food, WASH, Health, Shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI) and Logistics) were mobilised within the first two days. The roles and responsibilities of cluster leads were generally clear. Participants valued cluster coordination mainly as a

14 IA RTE *ibid*.....

15 Ensuring Haitian Women's Participation and Leadership in All Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction - A Gender Shadow Report of the 2010 PDNA

means to exchange information and network with other humanitarian organisations¹⁶.

Some of the significant achievements in the first eight weeks of the response were as follows:

(a) The speed of disbursement and volume of funds were critical factors in the response. In Haiti, the Central Emergency Fund (CERF) made ten million US dollars available on the day of the earthquake itself. A Flash Appeal based primarily on estimates and assumptions provided by field staff was rapidly prepared and launched by headquarters three days after the earthquake. The appeal was quickly funded by donors. Significant funding also came through bilateral and private channels as well as through other funding mechanisms, such as the Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF), which helped UN agencies and NGOs to quickly start their operations. (IA RTE)

(b) In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, international Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams began to arrive, amongst which many were the members of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG). A total of 26 USAR teams were in the country by 15 January. 67 teams had rescued a total of 134 people, the highest number of live rescues by international USAR teams ever recorded¹⁷.

(c) UNDAC team, composed of 18 members was mobilised on 12 January and the first members arrived in-country within 24 hours of the earthquake. The UNDAC team established an Onsite Operations and Coordination Centre (OSOCC) in the MINUSTAH Logistics Base in Port-au-Prince (PaP), supported by the European Civil Protection Mechanism (EU-MIC), staff of OCHA, and technical support team deployed by Map-Acton, Americas Support team, TSF and IHP.

(d) From the time of the earthquake up until the end of the declared 'OCHA Corporate Response' (12 Jan – 12 Mar) a total of 87 emergency deployments of humanitarian coordination personnel were made through OCHA-managed mechanisms to deal with the response – the deployments were made in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Miami and Washington (latter two for liaison with US authorities)¹⁸.

(e) As was noted in the IA RTE, in the Haiti response, OCHA hosted three innovative inter-agency initiatives: the Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) mechanism, the Gender Capacity Standby Project (GenCap) and the Communication with Disaster Affected Communities Initiative (CDAC).

(f) All of the above enabled OCHA to facilitate and support a massive mobilisation of humanitarian response by the international community for delivery of assistance in very difficult circumstances: in the first six months of the response, 4 million people were provided with food aid; 1.2 million people provided access to safe water daily; 1.5 million people received emergency shelter materials; 2.1 million household received Non-Food Items (NFIs); 11,000 latrines installed; and over half a million children and pregnant/lactating mothers received supplementary feeding, as a result of the collective humanitarian effort. (IASC, 6 Months Report).

16 IA RTE....Ibid

17 IASC, Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti, following the 12 January 2010 earthquake, 6 Months Report. June 2010.

18 OCHA. Haiti Earthquake Surge Review, January - March 2010

Section 3:

Findings on OCHA's Core Function - Coordination

Key Questions/Issues examined in this Section: 1. How effective was OCHA in supporting the development of adaptive, inclusive and coherent coordination architecture in Haiti? How effectively did OCHA support the HC and cluster coordinators in their roles in Haiti? 2. How effective was the inter-cluster coordination in Haiti after the earthquake? 3. How did OCHA facilitate the government's participation in and ownership of cluster processes? 4. How effective was OCHA in facilitating coordination with DPKO and to what extent it effectively interacted with MINUSTAH on behalf of humanitarian community to build up a mutually supportive relationship? 5. Examine the role played by OCHA in leveraging the capacity of military forces while ensuring independence, neutrality and impartiality of all humanitarian response?

3.1 Mechanism to Manage and Support Accountable Humanitarian Coordination:

Clusters were first activated in Haiti in 2008 following the massive floods in Gonaives. As is usually the case with clusters, they petered out after the peak of operations, although some clusters (like health, WASH) continued to operate in some form. Following the earthquake, these were reactivated on 15 January. Additional clusters were also launched. In total twelve clusters were launched in Haiti: Camp Coordination and Camp Management (IOM); Education (UNICEF); Emergency Shelter¹⁹ and Non-Food Items (IOM); Food (WFP); Logistics (WFP); Nutrition (UNICEF); Protection (OHCHR with UNICEF for Child Protection and UNFPA for GBV); WASH (UNICEF); Agriculture (FAO); Early Recovery (UNDP); Emergency Telecommunications (WFP); Health (WHO/PAHO). Six clusters were established in the Dominican Republic: Logistics/Telecommunications (WFP), Health (WHO), Emergency Shelter (IOM), WASH (UNICEF), Nutrition (UNICEF), and Protection (OHCHR), although these did not have strong linkage with the clusters in Haiti.

Initially coordination and cluster roll out was concentrated in Port-au-Prince, and after the first week OCHA deployed staff in Jacmal and Leogane to support NGOs and UN agencies in coordinating their response as it advocated for agencies to initiate emergency response outside of PaP as well. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Haiti was inactive for the first three weeks after the earthquake. Some clusters were unable to rapidly identify and deploy senior and experienced coordinators, leading to a leadership gap – and a resulting lack of coordination - in some critical sectors²⁰. Except for a few clusters, effective cluster meetings generally began quite late, almost three weeks after the earthquake, when they were able to produce some level of leadership and information to guide the response and that too only after the USG/ERC visited the country and emphasised the need for all cluster lead agencies to play a more robust role in getting the clusters off the ground.

¹⁹ Lead agency for this was later changed to IFRC

²⁰ IASC. Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti....ibid

“The delay with which the clusters became operational seemed to be the biggest challenge, combined with the lack of governmental capacity to bring the process forward”.

UNDAC team member, Exit Survey for the Inter Agency Evaluation of Haiti Response.

OCHA tried to strengthen coordination with NGO partners, particularly during the first months of the response, through the NGO Coordination Support Office, supported by Interaction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), to facilitate better communication among NGOs, create linkages and partnerships with local Haitian organisations unfamiliar with the international humanitarian system, and to ensure that key NGO issues of concern were communicated and taken into account in the response²¹.

However, operating out of the log base has been a serious constraint for OCHA as this has worked against getting the involvement of local NGOs and some INGOs. Apart from access to log base and language issue, the sheer travel involved in getting to log base puts off many organisations. Even now, when the roads are all open and access normal, it takes almost one hour from the centre of the town to get to log base. In the early days, when most roads were blocked, for people travelling from the centre of the city, it took 3-4 hours simply to get to the log base. Only those agencies who had surplus staff could afford to send people to attend meetings every day.

It has been argued by some OCHA interlocutors that OCHA’s role is not to coordinate local NGOs but the international community and its links with National Authorities. This however is not the view of the evaluation team based on a review of instruments²² and guidance²³ defining OCHA’s mandate which refer to coordinating “international emergency assistance” - i.e., including all those involved in delivery of international humanitarian assistance. The interpretation in some quarters that “international humanitarian assistance” implies international organisations (and their links with national governments) needs clarifying.

“Since the earthquake, most UN coordination meetings are held in English, rather than French or Creole, effectively excluding many local NGOs and other Haitians both from contributing their local knowledge and experience and from building their own capacity to contribute to Haiti’s long-term future. To date, the UN, like the government itself, has shown little of the strategic leadership needed in this crisis. High turnover and low capacity in the UN’s technical coordination bodies (clusters) have meant that overworked coordinators struggle to consolidate even the most basic coordination information. At the same time, when information and messages are communicated, the formal decision-making mechanisms have been seemingly by-passed, raising questions about how decisions are being made. Combined with the tremendous influx of NGOs with little experience in emergency response, the coordination of humanitarian assistance, and in particular the UN’s leadership, has thus far been ineffective.” Oxfam Briefing Paper 136, *Haiti: a Once-in-a-Century Chance for Change*, March 2010 (p.10).

21 IASC. Six Months Report...ibid.

22 A/RES/46/182: 78th PLENARY MEETING, 19 DECEMBER 1991: Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations

23 UNDAC, 2006. OCHA’s Role in Coordination

An issue that arose in Haiti was the links between coordination at national level and those happening at local/department level. Both seem to work independent of each other as the discussions happening in the national clusters (in PaP, mostly at the MINUSTAH log base, except for WASH and Health clusters) are focused on the issues in PaP, while those in Jacmal and Leogane focus on their respective departments. Even within PaP, which has seven departments/local authorities with some NGOs concentrating only on particular departments, the reach of the OCHA-led coordination process does not touch all the affected departments. Within the UN system, it is only the MINUSTAH which has had ongoing relationship and presence in each department, and was the local authorities' point of contact in the past through the Humanitarian & Development Coordinator (HDC) of MINUSTAH. Some departments complained that in the past few months, they started receiving phone calls from OCHA officials informing the former that OCHA was now responsible for coordination.

As clusters were being rolled out and OCHA was trying to coordinate on operational issues, a Coordination Support Committee (CSC) was set up by DPKO. CSC was co-chaired by Minister for Tourism (who was tasked with the reconstruction portfolio) and 2 DSRSGs. CSCs met at Log base once every week, to which OCHA HoO was invited. Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) members were not sufficiently involved in the CSC and High Level Coordination Committee²⁴ (HLCC). A government/humanitarian/military coordination body known as the Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC) was formed to ensure that CSC decisions were implemented in a coordinated manner. PMCC was overseen by a Management Oversight Board which was chaired by OCHA, and co-chaired by a senior government official and a USAID official and it enabled some cohesion between the political, humanitarian and military actors in their response²⁵.

Conclusions:

1. Although clusters were activated within the first three days, it took about 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become functional. As noted in the UNDAC Mission report, clusters coordinating lifesaving activities should have the capacity to become operational within hours after the onset of an emergency in order to effectively coordinate incoming relief organisations²⁶.
2. OCHA's ability to coordinate and relate to local NGOs and humanitarian players remains a challenge in major emergencies. This was an issue in OCHA's response to the Myanmar cyclone two years ago²⁷, and not much appears to have changed since then.
3. Linking coordination at national level to those happening at local level remains an issue. Furthermore, since PaP had a large concentration of humanitarian organisations spread over several communes in the city, more localised coordination structures closer to the point of action would have helped overcome the problems of access to log base and overcrowding in meetings.

Recommendations/Lessons:

24 This was co-chaired by the Prime Minister and SRSG.

25 OCHA Donor Support /Group High Level Meeting – Lessons from the Haiti Response, June 2010

26 UNDAC MISSION REPORT Haiti Earthquake, January 2010

27 IASC/OCHA. Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the response to Cyclone Nargis; Robert Turner, Jock Baker, Dr. Zaw Myo Oo, Naing Soe Aye, 17 December 2008.

R1: Working through the IASC, OCHA needs to facilitate embedding of cluster coordinators by cluster lead agencies of, as a minimum, critical lifesaving sectors namely, WASH, Logistics, Health, Food, shelter and Camp Management, in UNDAC teams deployed immediately after a disaster.

R2: OCHA needs to clarify for its staff its role in coordinating local organisations and institutions.

R3: Cluster coordinators ought to be sufficiently briefed and orientated on local institutions and structures and must have the competence to facilitate building relationship with local government and institutions.

3.2 Predictable and Scalable OCHA Services and Tools:

Inter-cluster coordination (ICC) has been weak in the response. The IA RTE noted that instead of coordinating clusters, the inter-cluster meetings resembled inter-agency meetings. One of the problems has been providing continuity in staffing for the ICC position. Although it improved in later part of the response when OCHA was able to use the ICC process to develop a resettlement strategy which was endorsed by the Government, by and large, inter-cluster coordination neglected multidisciplinary questions and cross-cutting issues, which were left to the individual clusters. Inter-cluster coordination requires high level of analysis and strategic thinking and influencing skills. The people deployed to perform this role, though had high individual capability, did not often have any systematic briefing and orientation on what the role involved in the context of Haiti. As some of the clusters were being rolled out only after the week two, inter-cluster meetings were already taking place as OCHA had deployed an inter-cluster coordinator right in the first week, leading to some commentators observing that OCHA had put the cart before the horse.

OCHA's coordination role in any emergency has two inter-related dimensions to it: (a) it needs to perform an operational coordination role by providing its stakeholders (humanitarian community) practical support and information through which a collaborative and coordinated response can be provided by the myriad agencies that arrive in the country, and (b) a strategic humanitarian coordination role in terms of enabling the HCT to lay down broad parameters and set directions for the overall response in coordination with the government and local authorities. While in the best of times in the Haiti response, OCHA may have done well on the operational coordination, there was little by way of its strategic role in

Weaknesses of the inter-cluster coordination was raised the maximum number of times by interviewees who commented on coordination - 9 of the 32 people commenting on different aspects of coordination mentioned this as a key issue.

terms of enabling the HC/HCT to provide a clear sense of direction to the humanitarian community. An instance where the HC, with the support of OCHA, played a decisive role was in changing the cluster lead agency for shelter as the role of the original lead agency (IOM) became untenable due to serious confusion over some of the data mistakenly provided by the cluster to

the government which were later found to be untrue.

A crucial issue that came up in Haiti due to the influx of a large number of NGOs, religious groups, private sector providers numbering about a thousand, according to some Haiti-watchers, was the chaotic nature

of the humanitarian environment involving the army, MINUSTAH and the NGOs of all shapes, sizes and forms. Many had no idea about clusters or of the role of OCHA, and what professional humanitarianism meant. It was therefore very difficult for OCHA to coordinate humanitarians of all hues. Some came to coordination meetings seeking information on how to find hotel accommodation, still others wanting to find out how to apply for a vehicle registration, and the more professional organisations wanting OCHA to provide an assessment of needs, or how to coordinate with the military forces. OCHA staff being new to the country themselves²⁸, it was unrealistic to expect OCHA to meet the interests of such diverse participants. In the first two weeks, some coordination and cluster meetings had over 80-150 (on one occasion the shelter cluster had 212 participants), all packed in a tent, all shouting to be heard. Needless to say, cluster meetings therefore worked on the principle of lowest common denominator, and at their best, only served as platforms for information exchange in the early phase.

This does raise the question whether OCHA should at all try to bring in its tent all those multitude of players with diverse interests and expectations, or should it try to coordinate only those who can be coordinated – i.e., the professional humanitarian organisations – and facilitate coordination of the rest through the government or local NGO focal points. OCHA's mandate seems to throw it into a classic catch 22 situation: if OCHA is seen to be successful in its role, it may attract a large number of participants in the meetings which are not ideal platform for strategic discussions; or if OCHA is perceived to be ineffective, it only attracts a small number of organisations, and thus the bulk of the organisations remain uncoordinated!

Inter-cluster mechanism could have been used to encourage clusters to initially form smaller but representative memberships of operational actors for both strategic planning and operational programme coordination (i.e., giving a wider mandate to strategic advisory groups within clusters) of government/UN/Haitian civil society, and held in French/creole. This would have excluded many but would arguably have stood a greater chance of achieving better strategies with credible buy in from the key actors. A suggestion that was put on the table was to consider grouping clusters together for joint planning purposes in larger theme groupings. Such 'grouping' could have helped in cross-cluster strategy development (eg. infrastructure: shelter/WASH/etc; social services: protection, health, education, etc).

Conclusions:

4. OCHA's role in coordination remained confined to coordinating at operational level. Inter-cluster coordination remained weak for large part of the response.

5. It is increasingly common to see hundreds and thousands of organisations of all hues, capacity and competency to arrive on the scene, especially after rapid onset natural disasters, making any coordination unwieldy and chaotic. There is not enough guidance on how to deal with non-professional humanitarian organisations, private citizens groups, religious organisation etc., which have little understanding of and commitment to humanitarian coordination.

Recommendations:

²⁸ Prior to the earthquake, OCHA had only seven staff, including the HoO who was a P5.

R4: Working with IASC, develop guidelines on how OCHA can delegate and support some of the coordination functions to government agencies, with involvement of key local NGOs to address the needs of a large number of new humanitarian actors who arrive after a disaster and require support in the nature of 'survival' tips.

R5: OCHA needs to identify, train and develop a small group of experienced and senior inter-cluster coordinators with high facilitation and strategic thinking skills who can be readily deployed in complex emergencies when clusters are deployed.

3.3 Relationship with DPKO/MINUSTAH:

DPKO set up Crisis Response Cell (CRC) in NY immediately after the earthquake and this became the nerve-centre of all UN's communications with the media and outside world. The CRC was the primary HQ coordination mechanism for the Haiti earthquake response. The CRC was chaired by the Director of DPKO's Europe and Latin America Division. The running of the operations room and external communication were all managed by an Under-Secretary General (USG), Assistant Secretary General (ASG) and senior Directors of DPKO. OCHA was represented there sometimes by the ERC, but mostly by a P4 staff who was the main point of contact for DPKO and DFS. As the MINUSTAH and other military authorities were asking for guidance on humanitarian priorities, and this was not coming from OCHA (or HC/HCT), DPKO soon assumed the role of leading the humanitarian agenda.

The lack of visible leadership from the OCHA HQ was mirrored at the country level where the HC and OCHA soon found DPKO taking the lead in terms of providing strategic direction for the response. A senior DSRSG (Political) with humanitarian background was deployed by DPKO who set up a Coordination and Support Committee (CSC) involving senior government officials nominated by the President of Haiti, senior MINUSTAH officials, and OCHA HoO.

MINUSTAH is an integrated mission, and this makes OCHA's position and role complicated. The HC has a triple-hatted function. In integrated missions, the Humanitarian Coordinator also acts as Resident Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). In his/her role as DSRSG in Haiti, s/he manages the Section of Civil Affairs, Humanitarian & Development Coordination Section (HDCS), and several other technical sections (Gender, HIV/AIDS, Child Protection, etc) in MINUSTAH. HDCS has Humanitarian and Development Coordinators (HDC) based in several departments in the country, and there is an overlap in the role they are required to play and OCHA's humanitarian coordination role.

Technically, in the humanitarian architecture, OCHA has the role of coordinating humanitarian response, especially in big emergencies. Historically, OCHA has had a weak presence in the country. Over the years, MINUSTAH had taken on a humanitarian role as it filled in the void. MINUSTAH appointed HDCs in most departments of Haiti whose work was to act as focal point with local authorities and NGOs on development and humanitarian issues. Till 2008, OCHA's presence was sporadic, with 1 international staff (P3) and 3 local staff based in PaP. It did not have any presence whatsoever outside of PaP. In July 2009, a senior (P5) staff was deployed in the country as HoO who started taking initiatives to ensure that OCHA had some links outside the PaP as well by establishing focal points using other UN agencies and INGOs.

Slowly over the months preceding the earthquake, OCHA tried to establish its presence in some of the departments like Jacmal, Leogane, Gonaives through focal points. After the earthquake OCHA reinforced its presence in some of the departments (Jacmal, Leogane, Gonaives), and coordination in these areas has been smooth. However, in large parts of the country, including in several departments of PaP, there is a still confusion as to who was leading the coordination – MINUSTAH or OCHA?

The IA RTE noted a lack of coordination between the UNCT and MINUSTAH with an unclear division of roles and responsibilities arising from the fact that there are no policy guidelines on how the cluster system should relate to integrated UN missions and foreign military forces in different humanitarian settings. These factors further complicated international coordination in Haiti. In the provinces, OCHA field offices did not take advantage of the presence of MINUSTAH Civil Affairs Officers who had good local knowledge and long-standing relations with local authorities.

3.4 Civil Military Relations:

Twenty-six countries, including Argentina, Canada, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, provided significant military assets in support of the earthquake response, including field hospitals, troops, military aircraft, hospital ships, cargo ships, port handling equipment, and helicopters. Canada, the US and the Dominican Republic provided the largest contingents initially²⁹. Civil military coordination has therefore been a vital part of the Haiti response.

OCHA's significant contribution in civil-military coordination was to, working with MINUSTAH, set up the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre (JOTC), as a single point of contact for requests for military or police assistance. This setup ensured that military and police forces received validated and prioritised requests from humanitarian organisations through a single source to provide for an efficient and coordinated utilisation of military and police assets. The JOTC became operational on 26 January working under strategic guidance of the GoH, MINUSTAH and the humanitarian community, with management consisting of senior staff from these entities³⁰.

The HC, HCT and OCHA were not sufficiently strategic in managing civil-military coordination issues. They waited too long to engage MINUSTAH and foreign military. As a result, strategic civ-mil coordination was conducted primarily in Miami (US SOUTHCOM) and Washington, DC where strategic level decisions were being made by the US. With over 22,000 US army and several thousand peacekeepers in the country, the military did their own humanitarian operations whilst also looking for the humanitarian community to guide it in the response. However, as no systematic needs assessments were carried out, the military relied more on some of the assessment information that were coming out of the US and Canada military HQs. Although the military were attending the cluster meetings, they found that they were taking strategic guidance more from the MINUSTAH and DPKO, rather than the HC/OCHA, as was happening in NY. Several military interlocutors interviewed during this evaluation commented that they found the concept of clusters useful in understanding how the humanitarian community organised themselves in terms of response, although they found it lacking in providing a strategic direction.

As Haiti was seen by the army commanders (from US, Canada as well as the Office of Military Affairs of

29 IASC. Achievements and Challenges.....ibid

30 UNDAC MISSION REPORT Haiti Earthquake, January 2010

the UN) as primarily a humanitarian support mission, and involved a non-conflict³¹ country, the armies were keen to work alongside the humanitarian community. However, except for responding to requests for providing military escorts for relief distribution, the armies were not being utilised by the humanitarian community in the first 2-3 weeks for tasks like rubble clearance, repairing access roads and bridges, etc., apart from managing the airport and the incoming air traffic. Frustrated by this, the US army went ahead and started distributing some of the relief supplies themselves, including questionable food airdrop. Later however, the situation improved and working through the PMCC, the US and French military undertook a whole range of tasks including rubble removal (French Military focused on schools) work in the camps, movement of IDPs surveying work, camp site preparation and bridge and road repair.

In the early weeks, working with WFP, OCHA designed an Awareness and Humanitarian Refresher Training for MINUSTAH contingents in view of numerous complaints of inappropriate behaviour of MINUSTAH military personnel³². Now, after nearly eight months of the earthquake³³, OCHA's role in civil-military coordination still remains supporting and coordinating through JOTC requests for providing armed escorts during relief distribution. Several UN agencies and NGOs continue to use armed guards for their relief convoys and on-site distributions in PaP and Leogane.

An important issue that emerged from the Haiti experience is how the humanitarian community relates to the military in situations of natural disasters in countries not involving open armed conflict. The principle of last resort when it comes to using military assets was influenced strongly by ground realities of complex emergencies in conflict situations. As the Tsunami and Haiti earthquake have shown, mobilisation of military assets can be vital for saving lives in these non-conflict situations, and increasingly military of foreign governments are getting involved in humanitarian operations especially following natural disasters. The Policy Development and Studies Branch of OCHA clarified best practices in civil-military relations in the context of Haiti immediately after the earthquake³⁴, and this formed the basis of engagement with the military actors.

Conclusions:

6. The liaison with the DPKO Situation Centre in NY should have been at a high-level. In this case it was a P4 from OCHA who was the focal point from OCHA. OCHA did not have enough information and internal coordination to respond to DPKO's repeated requests for what was needed of them by the humanitarian community. (CRD Haiti After-Action Review 13 May 2010).

7. Recognising that where there are integrated missions in 'non-conflict' countries and where OCHA does not have strong ongoing presence, it is likely that the mission will often take on a humanitarian role, along with its development functions. Clear guidelines do not exist which clarify how in times of major crises which warrant sizeable deployment of OCHA and clusters, the latter's humanitarian role will interface with those of the mission.

31 Haiti has a level of low-intensity conflict, mostly involving political riots and breakdown in law and order, and is not like open armed conflict and warfare as one finds in high-intensity conflict countries.

32 OTF Handover Note from Geneva. 28 January, 2010.

33 The field work for this evaluation was carried out in September, 2010

34 Best practices and principles of civ-mil engagement in natural disasters, OCHA, 22 January 2010

8. Initially the humanitarian community was reluctant to strategically leverage the huge military resources which could have been at its disposal, except making use of logistical support and, in some cases, availing military escorts for relief distribution. By contrast, there are also individual humanitarian organisations which continue to use military escorts even in areas which have had no history of trouble (Jacmal, Leogane), contravening the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines.

Recommendations:

R6: OCHA's Policy Instruction³⁵ on relationship with integrated mission needs to be adapted to local situations, and it is not too late to undertake an exercise for Haiti so as to develop a SOP which spells out the details of the relationship with MINUSTAH in general, and the humanitarian part of the latter in particular³⁶.

R7: Working with the IASC, OCHA needs to facilitate discussions on clarifying how the humanitarian agencies in general, and the clusters in particular, need to relate to military forces (both foreign government and UN peacekeepers) in natural disaster situations not involving open armed conflict where military forces tend to deploy on humanitarian missions.

3.5 Engagement with National and Local Institutions:

The OSOCC reception centre was established in the early days to provide information to all humanitarian actors, which was perceived as very useful. However, after the second week the security control to enter the UN compound became more restricted and it became difficult for local actors to have direct access to the Centre. As the products were mainly in English, some of which sent by e-mail, the local organisations and the government could not make use of these. Because of these, in the beginning, the government agencies and local NGOs were not involved in the coordination meetings or of the clusters as (a) almost all meetings were in English, and (b) the log base where most the meetings were taking place was inaccessible to local people.

The IA-RTE was highly critical of international humanitarian agencies for their lack of engagement with local NGOs, national Government and local authorities. OCHA engaged with the national government regularly at senior level, but till now it has not been able to engage the local NGOs and local governments (departments) in its coordination work. In the departments like Jacmal and Leogane there is some engagement with local authorities and NGOs, while in PaP the engagement with government is slowly beginning to take shape. During the storm in September, OCHA worked closely with the DPC³⁷. Being in the log base does tend to isolate OCHA from the outside world, and it ends up speaking to only those who are able to visit the log base regularly, and until recently, only those who could speak fluent English.

35 OCHA. Policy Instruction – OCHA's Structural Relationships within An Integrated UN Presence, 2009

36 The evaluation team was made aware at the OCHA HQ that there is an existing procedure that was agreed at the field level and shared widely at the field and HQ on the role of MINUSTAH and OCHA/HC in case of disaster in Haiti. However, if that exists, awareness and understanding of this among number of current key staff of both OCHA and MINUSTAH is weak.

37 The DPC is responsible for operational coordination and is thus often described as the government's OCHA. The DPC is present at the national, provincial and municipal levels.

"We do not interact with local NGOs or government, forget about interacting with communities".

OCHA staff member, Haiti

It needs to be noted that some of the clusters like WASH and Health moved their cluster meetings to the government premises, and ensured that these were being co-chaired by the government authorities, and in these clusters the participation of local NGOs and government has been strong. Language barrier remains an issue throughout the response in Haiti. OCHA meetings were predominantly in English until very recently. Some of the clusters (CCCM, for example) still conduct their meetings in English. It is an irony that many international staff of agencies complain that local NGOs do not participate in clusters. Gender-based violence (GBV) working group had a similar experience until they switched to French. Overnight, local NGOs began to come to the meetings, and INGOs' dominance in the meetings reduced as they started to drop off initially, but slowly came back again.

Most clusters worked almost to the exclusion of the Government in their deliberations and planning. The IA RTE concluded that OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team, the Government of Haiti and donors needed to make a concerted effort to embed clusters within technical ministries, with their inclusion in the government structure as the ultimate goal. Alternatively, clusters could be co-led by the government.

An issue now becoming increasingly important is the interface between clusters and tables sectorielles (TS), the Government-led coordination system for dealing with technical issues in different sectors (e.g. Agriculture, Health, WASH, Infrastructure, Education, etc) which has existed in the country for several years. As recovery operations intensify and donor funds are channelled into reconstruction and development work, the TS mechanism will become the main platform for coordination by the government. For some clusters like health, WASH, agriculture etc., the interface will be easy as (i) there are nodal ministries in the government dealing with these issues, and (ii) the clusters have already started to develop a 'joined up' approach with the government's long term plans. However, clear guidance on how such an interface can be developed or how the clusters will seamlessly flow into the recovery/reconstruction phase led by the GoH does not exist. The cluster guidelines do not outline how a strong and seamless interface needs to be developed and managed between clusters and local coordination structures, an issue that comes up in many countries time and again.

Conclusions:

9. The single-most important factor, apart from language, that has continued to undermine OCHA's ability to engage with the government and local NGOs has been its operating from the MINUSTAH log base in PaP.

10. The interface between clusters and government-led coordination mechanisms are weak and there is no clear guidance on how the two will relate to each other and ensure coherence between humanitarian response and recovery/development work. This lack of linkage was also noted in the IA RTE six months ago, but not much has changed since then.

Recommendations:

R8: Given that bulk of the humanitarian agencies and their operations are in the city of PaP, OCHA needs to establish a field office (on the lines of the field office in Leogane and Jacmal) in the centre of the

city to be accessible to stakeholders. The CO needs to focus on strategic issues, and providing support to the HC, leaving all operational issues to the field office.

R9: OCHA needs to work with the HC/DSRSG and clearly spell out the modalities of the clusters' interaction with the TS, and establish an indicative time-frame for the clusters to gradually transfer their functions to the government.

Section 4:

Findings on OCHA's Core Functions – Humanitarian Financing, Policy & Advocacy

Key Questions/Issues examined in this section: 1. Did OCHA facilitate joint planning and appeals through the clusters and provide leadership on humanitarian financing in the Haiti response? 2. How effectively were different funding mechanisms and tools employed and administered? 3. What role did OCHA play in facilitating media relations, public communication and advocacy by the humanitarian community? 4. How adequate were the mechanisms put in place to ensure that the humanitarian response took into account cross-cutting issues and specific needs of vulnerable groups? 5. How effective was OCHA in ensuring that the early recovery concerns and transition issues were reflected in the emergency response? 6. Examine the innovative practices mentioned in the IA RTE Haiti (PSEA Coordinator, Gencap, and CDAC), their effect on the response and possibilities for replicating to other emergency settings.

4.1 Humanitarian Financing:

4.1.1 Flash Appeal and Funding:

An initial Flash Appeal requesting \$562 million for the humanitarian response was issued within three days of the earthquake and included activities of 12 NGOs, 16 UN organisations and IOM. The Guidelines for Flash Appeal³⁸ give to the HC and cluster leads the main responsibilities for formulation of the Appeal and require them to ensure clear guidance on the parameters for the scope and size of the appeal, sectoral coordination and consultation with key humanitarian actors, including governments. In Haiti, the Appeal was formulated at OCHA HQ, led by the CAP Section and based on remote sensing, background information, and secondary information gleaned from various sources. Given the urgency of producing the response framework and the flexibility to revise projects in the Appeal, the process adopted in Haiti was a fair trade off, which allowed fast publication of the Appeal and ensured that donor interest in the evolving operation was generated right from the early days. By February 16, i.e. a little over a month after the disaster, the appeal was 100 per cent funded (counting committed as well as 'realised' funding).

38 OCHA Revised Guidelines for Flash Appeal. March 2009.

Even without waiting for the CO's request, the CRD sent in specialised staff to do sitreps which were critical to provide first-hand information for donors, public and managers. This was a good practice, given the situation on the ground. Similarly CERF allocations were also made by the HQ without waiting for proposals to come from the country as this would have delayed the process. The result was very fast and timely appeal and CERF allocation which were crucial for getting the response off the ground.

The Revised Appeal was launched on February 18 requesting US\$ 1.4 billion. It gathered projects from 76 humanitarian organisations³⁹ with a budgeting horizon of 12 months period (January to December 2010). According to the procedures set in the Guidelines, the Revised Appeal is the opportunity to incorporate updated and analysed information, identify gaps in the response, assess capacities and ensure a strategic humanitarian response. The timeline suggests that the HCT conduct the revision about one month after the initial launch. During this period, HCT should take stock of consultations with key stakeholders, and undertake a more in-depth needs analysis, define strategic priorities and objectives. In Haiti, the revision of the Appeal was mostly driven by OCHA HQ, with the direct assistance on the ground of two staff members from the CAP Section (deployed from 30 January to 14 February). This was mainly because humanitarian coordination structures were not fully operational in the early phase and staff on the ground were preoccupied with emergency operations. The HCT was re-established only three weeks into the response⁴⁰ and several clusters were still identifying needs and priorities, while struggling with a massive influx of humanitarian actors. The Rapid Needs Assessment⁴¹ was not yet ready to be used.

The revised Appeal for Haiti is the best-funded of all appeals in 2010, with 70⁴² per cent of its requirements covered (as of 15/10/10). Nine months after the emergency, funding for previously underfunded sectors, such as agriculture (49 per cent covered requirements) and education (96 per cent), have improved, showing a better distribution of resources between the sectors. Early recovery is still underfunded with 38 per cent of its requirements met, which is partly linked to the inadequate functioning of the early recovery cluster.

In May, cluster leads and partners again reviewed the needs, and revised the overall strategy, response plans, and project requirements in line with Government priorities, and the Appeal was revised slightly upwards to \$1.5 billion. Till July, \$907 million was received in response to the Flash Appeal⁴³.

The CERF allocated US\$ 36.6 million, with the first allocation of \$10 million authorised just hours after earthquake struck, allowing agencies to kick-start the response. A second allocation of \$16 million, made just 72 hours after the earthquake, meant that CERF was the largest single source of funding to emergency operations in Haiti for the first five days. The standard CERF decision making process indicates that the HC/RC and country teams make a request based on needs assessment and consultation with governments. In Haiti, the decision to allocate the resources was taken predominantly at HQ level based on the experience of sector's needs. This rapid decision enabled CERF to play a crucial role, ensuring resources to kick start operations in the very early phase of the response. This rapid funding enabled

39 OCHA Revised Humanitarian Appeal. February 2010

40 IASC. Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti. 6 months report.

41 ACAPS Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti. Feb 2010.

42 <http://fts.unocha.org>

43 IASC. Response to the Humanitarian Crisis.....ibid

humanitarian agencies to launch immediately some of the most urgent programmes as prioritised by the HCT - emergency telecommunications, logistics, food, health and shelter. In late February, another \$10 million was made available, to cover gaps in funding for key camp management, agriculture, shelter, and health programmes.

4.1.2 The Emergency Relief Response Fund (ERRF):

The ERRF - a pooled fund mechanism managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator, with support from OCHA, since the hurricanes in 2008 - also played a critical role in the earthquake response. The fund is supported by DAC donors and had been funded nearly US\$ 5 million each year. The fund was designed to be an Emergency Response Fund (ERF) with an annual volume of a few million dollars, and it was meant to support NGOs in responding to smaller shocks (e.g. hurricane related needs). This was the basis on which the guidelines were developed (funding of NGOs only, support to pilot projects to foster innovative approaches, etc).

As the HCT had no prior experience of how pooled funds like the ERRF worked and OCHA CO staff had limited spare capacity to deal with this, OCHA sent out a staff from the Funding Coordination Section (FCS) after about two weeks of the disaster. Internal OCHA procedures for quickly scaling up the operation of an ERF were put in place, including guidance on how best to remotely support an ERF when capacity (OCHA and/or clusters) is not in place in-country.

In September 2010, the ERRF amounted nearly US\$ 81 million, and had funded forty-nine projects with nearly 80 per cent of funds disbursed. ERRF was able to fill funding gaps, ensure that most urgent actions were adequately resourced, and support under-funded clusters to maintain life-saving activities. The ERRF has constituted a means to provide funding to the Haiti humanitarian response overall without committing funds to a specific organisation within the Flash Appeal. The Haiti ERRF represents a good example of the unprecedented engagement of many non-traditional donors in supporting humanitarian response operations⁴⁴, and indicates an increasing interest among member States to engage with pooled funding mechanisms that are flexible and managed at country level.

According to the ERF Guidelines⁴⁵, the pooled funds project funding may range from US\$ 50-500 thousand, unless exceptionally approved by the HC; in the case of Haiti, funding ceiling per project was set at US\$ 750 thousand during the first six months of the response⁴⁶. ERF funds are intended predominantly for facilitating NGO response in an emergency, although some funds may also support humanitarian action by UN agencies and IOM. Sixty three per cent of ERRF in Haiti was allocated to IOM and UN Agencies (WFP, UNDP, UNOPS, FAO), for logistics, early recovery (rubble removal), shelter, camp management and food security projects⁴⁷, with the rest going to NGOs. The rationale behind this decision given by the ERRF team was that UN Agencies were ready to make the requests and start operating

44 IASC, June 2010. Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti following the 12 January 2010 earthquake.

45 OCHA ERF Guidelines. December 2009. In August 2010 specific management guidelines were formulated for ERRF Haiti.

46 ERRF Guidelines (December 2009) stipulates that grants to applicants should fall within the range of US\$50,000 – 500,000, unless exceptionally approved by the HC. In the case of Haiti, the limit was raised to US\$750,000 during the first phase of the response. In May 2010, the limit was set back to US\$500,000 given that the fund had been reduced at that stage of the response.

47 OCHA Haiti. Emergency Relief and Response Fund. Report 12 January to September 2010.

immediately, while several NGOs did not have the ability to prepare adequate proposals. The evaluation team had no means to verify this, although NGOs claim that they had no information or notice of when the proposals were to be submitted. NGOs felt that approval processes and communication on the use of the Fund was not adequate. Even though ERRF Section in Haiti sends out an e-Newsletter reporting on the use of the funds, it is not disseminated widely.

The question of demonstrating effectiveness of the funds by organisations poses a significant challenge. The Humanitarian Reform puts emphasis on coordination, planning and accountability of the humanitarian system and structures. However, there are no mechanisms to ensure a transparent and systematic interagency reporting system for projects financed in the Humanitarian Appeals. The challenge now is to put in place an adequate mechanism that tracks progress on disbursements, expenditures and outcomes of projects implemented by UN Agencies and NGOs, in order to complement the financial information available in the Financial Tracking System.

4.2 Media and Advocacy:

4.2.1 Media:

OCHA spokesperson was one of the few media-facing UN officials available on the ground in the first five days as MINUSTAH was still re-establishing its media unit after all its offices were destroyed in the earthquake. OCHA deployed three information and reporting staff within the first three days, including a spokesperson and a videographer. However, media deployed their own correspondents within a few hours of the earthquake, and so by the time OCHA public information officers were on the ground, highly critical media stories started appearing, particularly in the US. OCHA was hard put to defend the seemingly 'slow' response by the international humanitarian community. With hindsight, OCHA ought to have deployed a spokesperson within the first 24 hours along with the first UNDAC deployment – even two days of delay meant that subsequently OCHA was always pushed to defend itself and react to media stories which were generally critical of UN response, rather than being able to proactively put its stories and messages in the media.

This is twenty-first century media. They arrive on the scene within hours, and start controlling how the situation is portrayed in the global media and thus influence how the world responds to a disaster. Much of the press coverage on Haiti was negative, with a focus on slow arrival of supplies, poor coordination and bureaucratic bottlenecks. However, the USAR phase provided opportunities to highlight exceptional achievements and the capacity to film USAR operations and upload footage swiftly to UNIFEED and other channels helped balance the coverage. OCHA spokesperson established daily joint press briefings from day five with the MINUSTAH spokesperson which, alongside strategic interviews and support to the HC, meant that media received constant flow of information on the humanitarian response. Cluster lead/partners were also invited to provide operational updates, to ensure balance between UN and non-UN partners. (UNDAC Report). OCHA also set up coordination between cluster lead/partner agency public information officers and MINUSTAH in Port-au-Prince, to ensure coherent messaging and a strategic approach to handling challenging media stories.

At the end of week one, OCHA deployed an additional Public Information Officer (PIO) who acted as a

focal point for liaising closely with CDAC group (Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities - a group comprising InterNews, Reuters AlertNet and BBC WST) and the clusters, thus ensuring a well-coordinated system of messaging to the affected population through local, national and MINUSTAH radio⁴⁸. In this response, OCHA produced key messages for daily press briefings for the ERC. Key messages were sent to all member States.

4.2.2 Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC):

The CDAC initiative was established in 2009 by a group of international organisations (InterNews, Save the Children, IFRC, OCHA, Thomson Reuters Foundation, BBC World Service Trust and IMS). This service aims to improve communication between the humanitarian community and the affected population. Coordination of CDAC Haiti is provided by the media NGO, InterNews. Initiatives such as the CDAC project are at the forefront of establishing two-way communication between humanitarian actors and the people they are trying to help. The Haiti response was the first disaster in which the CDAC initiative was operationalised, and it met with some success. It has attempted to create awareness among the humanitarian organisations about using local media and foster closer relationship between the local media and humanitarian agencies. So far, participation in the CDAC process has remained confined to a few INGOs only.

OCHA supported the CDAC initiative in Haiti and through the ERRF-funded Internews project to improve two-way flow of information between UN clusters, humanitarian community and the affected population⁴⁹. The project organises 'meet the press' events for humanitarians and promotes dialogue and awareness on key issues through street drama, films, music, local media, live TV and talk shows and public debates with participation of humanitarian and government officials. A cross-cluster service was established in Haiti to advise humanitarians on outreach and communication strategies and techniques, while activities such as a daily news programme on local radio and information kiosks for people affected by displacement were appreciated and commended by national NGOs and communities.

Social media played for the first time in Humanitarian crises a critical role in collecting donations to help disaster victims⁵⁰. Haiti response has also seen a number of new initiatives by non-traditional humanitarian organisations on communication and information sharing using innovative technology and approaches.

Besides CDAC, the following initiatives were launched by various organisations and citizen's groups⁵¹:

- Direct incident and needs reporting by SMS from the affected population, including injured/trapped individuals. In the SAR phase, this information was vital for prioritisation of the SAR operations.

48 OCHA/CISB. Mission Report – Public Information Surge Deployment in Haiti EQ, January 2010

49 OCHA. InterNews – Humanitarian Information Project, Interim Report, 15/07/2010

50 BBC News 15/01 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8460791.stm>. Organisations such as the American Red Cross and Disasters Emergency Committee, UK used Twitter and Facebook to collect donations that were added to their cell phone bills. In less than 48 hours, the American Red Cross had received more than nearly \$32m individual donations via text message.

51 OCHA/CISB, undated. Humanitarian Information after Haiti.

- Mapping and geocoding of existing and damaged facilities and IDP sites using the Open Streetmap which now provides one of the most detailed map of the post-earthquake Haiti, with the communities actively engaged in discussions on how to scale this up for other emergencies.
- Deployment of Ushahidi, a platform that allows anyone to gather and disseminate data via SMS, email or web and visualise it on a map or timeline. Users can submit eyewitness accounts or other relevant information from disaster zones via e-mail, text or other online media. Its goal is to create the simplest way of aggregating information from the public for use in crisis response. Besides Haiti, Ushahidi was also deployed in Chile after the February earthquake.

These non-traditional humanitarian initiatives which sit outside the formal cluster coordination system are here to stay and will play increasingly vital role in engaging communities in their own relief and recovery processes. OCHA and the wider humanitarian community will need to systematically engage with these innovative processes and leverage their expertise to improve humanitarian performance and accountability.

4.2.3 Deployment of GenCap and PDSEA:

Two GenCap⁵² Advisers to the humanitarian inter-cluster system were deployed in Haiti, the first arriving 11 days after the earthquake. In early March OCHA sent a Senior Policy Officer in Gender Equality to support GenCap to mainstream gender issues into the clusters. During the first period, the GenCap adviser also assisted the gender-based violence (GBV) sub-cluster led by UNFPA in ensuring that (GBV) was taken into account in planning the response. The GBV and the Gender in the Humanitarian Response Working Group played a strong role in advocating for increased lighting and improved access to food and shelter as well as for the installation of separate sanitation (toilets and showers with lockable doors) facilities for women and girls to reduce their vulnerability. In this regard, one of the actions taken was the approval of a project to place more lighting in camps implemented by Electriciens Sans Frontières. Later on in the response, the GenCap focused on the Inter-cluster coordination group (ICCG) led by OCHA to provide technical support and guidance, which was delivered through training to assessment teams, such as ACAPS and cluster leads for the formulations of the survey and analysis of the information of the RINAH. The GenCap supported the clusters in identifying entry points for gender-related concerns in cluster response plans and operations, with focus on health, food distribution, WASH, camp management, shelter, non-food items and protection. Few communication tools were developed and disseminated to the humanitarian community, such the Gender briefing kit for field staff, the list of “Do's and Dont's of Shelter allocation”, considered useful in providing guidance particularly to non-experienced and small NGOs.

The presence of GenCap advisors was appreciated by humanitarian actors and helped raise awareness on mainstreaming gender and protection issues amongst clusters' members. However, collecting and analysing gender disaggregated data to design and implement appropriate plans and projects⁵³ remains a

52 The Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap) is collaboration between the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). GenCap seeks to build capacity of humanitarian actors at country level to mainstream gender in all sectors of humanitarian response. Oneresponse.info/crosscutting/GenCap

53 The report “Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and leadership in all stages of national relief and reconstruction. A Gender Shadow Report of the 2010 Haiti PDNA” highlights gender concerns absent from Haiti’s PDNA.

challenge.

To assist the humanitarian community in addressing issues of Protection from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (PSEA), the ERC wrote to the Humanitarian Coordinator in February 2010 and proposed the deployment of a PSEA Coordinator to put in place a coordinated PSEA programme for the post-earthquake response in collaboration with MINUSTAH. OCHA requested a stand-by deployment from OCHA Geneva and Irish Aid deployed a PSEA Coordinator in early April⁵⁴. This could have been a key initiative and played a vital role in dealing with issues of protection in camps. However, as there was no continuity, the initial momentum created fizzled out soon after the first coordinator left.

4.2.4 Advocacy:

High-level political support, such as the Emergency Coordinator's support⁵⁵ for the PSEA mechanism and the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator's support for the inclusion of gender in inter-cluster coordination were critical in getting some of the cross-cutting initiatives integrated into the response.

However, in several vital areas of the response, the ability of humanitarian community in general, and OCHA in particular, to influence policy and strategy has been found to be wanting. Mention has been made earlier about lack of needs assessment affecting coordination with military actors. The work of the clusters was also not adequately incorporated into the PDNA or post-PDNA processes which would have been an ideal opportunity for clusters and government sectors to work more closely together. As will be discussed in the Information Management section, lack of vital data and analysis has weakened OCHA's ability to support the HC and humanitarian community in their advocacy efforts with Government. The government is still struggling to provide a clear road map for the response, even as the interim commission on reconstruction tries to support the government. So far, the HC or OCHA has not been able to substantively influence the thinking on recovery and reconstruction.

OCHA initiated contingency planning process in the country in March, in close collaboration with the DPC. The process was supported by a consultant provided by DFID. However, the work produced by the consultant did not deliver the results the HCT or the government focal points wanted. The HC then assigned the Humanitarian and Coordination section in MINUSTAH to undertake this work. In August, OCHA was finally able to deploy an experienced staff to work on this and since then the leadership of working on the contingency plan has moved to OCHA. Stakeholders complained that they had to deal with four different OCHA staff on this in the first five months⁵⁶ since the process began. As part of the contingency planning, stakeholders would have expected OCHA to be able to collate information on contingency stocks held by all agencies in the country. However, this has not happened as OCHA sent out highly complicated forms requiring very detailed information which agencies have found difficult to fill in and return back to OCHA. As a result, there was no consolidated picture of the contingency stocks that existed in the country even when a storm hit the capital at the end of September (although OCHA did a good job of pulling together a coordinated assessment).

54 Kate Burns, Mission Report - Technical Support Mission to Haiti, OCHA/PDSB Senior Policy Officer: Gender Equality, 28 March – 8 April 2010

55 IA RTE.....ibid

56 A commentator on the first draft indicated that , by December, there have been six different staff handling ICC.

A general lack of strategic thinking and evidence-based analysis has weakened OCHA's ability to undertake advocacy work. In the last few weeks, warnings of food shortages are coming from some of the camps. However, as the GoH imposed a ban on food distribution in camps, humanitarian organisations are unable to distribute food to the vulnerable people. It would be expected that OCHA would facilitate a robust data-gathering and analysis, either through the food cluster or through an inter-cluster process involving food, nutrition, and food security specialists, which could then be taken to the government and a push for appropriate changes to policy be made. Forced eviction (by private landlords from their land where camps are currently established) is another issue on which there have been some sporadic lobbying and advocacy by humanitarian community, but the Government is yet to take clear action. Although humanitarians have voiced their concerns, a more robust and ongoing engagement and dialogue with the government has not been forthcoming. Humanitarian organisations do not know if OCHA and HC are having any dialogue with government on these issues, nor have they seen OCHA trying to get the entire humanitarian community to speak with one voice.

4.3 Early Recovery and Transition Issues:

Haiti presents a highly complex political environment for developing a coherent post-disaster plan. With elections on the horizon, political expediency, rather than informed humanitarian and development analysis and thinking, has been the hallmark of the Government's approach to the response. Nine months into the response, nearly a million people are still living in tents or under plastic sheeting, with no one knowing if there is any plan for providing them with shelter or housing anytime in the future. Rubble removal in PaP continues to be an issue as the Government is unable to decide on sites for dumping of the rubbles. At the end of July, over six months after the earthquake, only a quarter of a million of an estimated total of 20 million cubic meters⁵⁷ of rubble was removed.

OCHA's Meta⁵⁸ evaluation pointed out that there is lack of continuity of the roles of task forces and the coordination efforts in general after emergency situations subside. In Haiti emergency, when the PDNA process to link relief to recovery started, OCHA had weak capacity to coordinate the humanitarian community, the clusters and liaise with the PDNA Coordination Committee. This was partly because of language barriers and distance between PDNA and humanitarian base camps⁵⁹, and partly due to the humanitarian community's inability to understand at what point it needed to interface with the PDNA. This was a missed opportunity, and since then the voice of the humanitarians has been barely audible in the deliberations on recovery and reconstruction.

While the government appears to be stuck in populist thinking⁶⁰ in an election year, there is not much evidence-based thinking and analysis coming from the humanitarian community either. While land may not be available for every displaced family to be provided a house as happened in the Tsunami countries, various options need to be examined, including in situ construction, owner-build houses, transition

57 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, Introductory remarks at the IASC launch of the Haiti 6 months report, 15 July 2010, New York.

58 OCHA. OCHA Meta Evaluation. July 2009. Pierre Robert and Dr Achim Engelhardt.

59 IASC. Response to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, *ibid*

60 The GoH has for some time now argued that the entire country is need of 'reconstruction' – in other words, instead of focusing on the needs of the earthquake-displaced, investment needs to be geared to all round development.

shelter, and long term management of urban slums. This can only happen through dialogue with local communities, local authorities, GoH, donors and humanitarian/development community. OCHA took the lead and drafted a strategy on safer shelter (resettlement) which was endorsed by the GoH in April, but because of lack of follow up and wider dissemination, this work did not lead to much.

It is very likely that regardless of what happens in the long run, a large majority of the displaced will continue to live in their temporary camps for years to come, and their humanitarian needs in terms of water, sanitation, food, healthcare will remain until the government is able to take over management of these services. It needs to be noted that as the government (and donors) jump into development and reconstruction, there is likely to be a trade-off between the humanitarian budget and development budget as the funding pot is limited and, from all indications, unlikely to generate additional funding.

This will require high level advocacy by the HC and OCHA, who will need to bring hard evidences and well thought-through analysis to the discussions with GoH and donors. It is understood that OCHA is now working on an advocacy strategy on transition funding.

Conclusions:

11. In this response, OCHA's leadership on appeal and financing was crucial and successful in mobilising support of the donor community for a massive humanitarian response.

12. The ERRF is a useful tool to ensure participation of small and medium NGOs, including national ones, and, according to the ERRF Guidelines, one of its priorities is implementation of pilot projects fostering innovative initiatives. However, the ERRF decision making process is perceived to be non-transparent by the NGOs, and bulk of the funding so far has gone to the UN agencies.

13. In the Haiti response, daily key messages produced for ERC in the early weeks worked well, combined with media stories produced from the field enabled by embedding of a videographer with the UNDAC team.

14. With the Haiti response, the use of social media and powerful grassroots public information medium has come of age, but humanitarian organisations have not fully engaged with these community-driven processes which will play a key role in future emergencies.

15. The HC has not been fully supported by OCHA with evidence-based data and analysis for advocacy on critical issues of the humanitarian response and the need for a coherent approach to relief, recovery and development which needs to determine future financing.

Recommendations:

R10: Better guidance needs to be provided to CO and HC on management of ERRF mechanism which needs to be more transparent and inclusive of NGOs.

R11: OCHA needs to ensure that a public information/media relations officer is deployed on the scene in any emergency as one of the first-priority deployments.

R12: While continuing to focus on the ongoing relief efforts, OCHA needs to bolster its capacity to bring evidence-based analysis and thinking to support the HC in his dialogue with the government, donors and reconstruction authorities to ensure that humanitarian needs do not get neglected in the process of transition and reconstruction.

Section 5:

Information Management

Questions/Issues examined in this Section: 1. Assess OCHA's role in supporting common humanitarian programme cycle involving needs assessment, data gathering and joint analysis, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian outcomes. How coherent was the linkage between needs assessments, planning, funding and monitoring of relief and early recovery? 2. How effective was OCHA in identifying, collecting and analysing information regarding capacities and activities of various response actors, and how was the information used? 3. Examine OCHA's information management system to promote knowledge management and systematic learning.

5.1 Information Management Capacity and Tools:

Information Management (IM) is central to good coordination and leadership of humanitarian action. During the initial phase of the response, OCHA with the support of the UNDAC team⁶¹ and partners was able to quickly start producing information outputs for different audiences (humanitarian partners in Haiti and globally, OCHA HQ and media).

The UNDAC Handbook and the OCHA Field Information Management Guidelines⁶² outlines the standardised information products and provides the procedures, tools and templates to collect, process, report and disseminate information. Based on this guidance, the SitReps, Maps⁶³, 3W, contact lists, meeting schedules/agendas/ minutes and assessment reports started to be produced within 72 hours, despite the problems of poor connectivity and inadequate availability of communication equipments (Blackberries). Subsequently, OCHA deployed a sizeable information management team fairly rapidly and a large Information Management cell was set up with reinforcements arriving through the first week,

61 UNDAC had four team members, out of 22, dedicated to Information Management. The UNDAC support team included 9 people from Map Action.

62 OCHA. UNDAC Field Handbook. 2006. Part F: Information Management sets UNDAC team's IM responsibilities. The Guidelines for OCHA Field Information Management (April 2006), outlines the minimum products to be made available by an OCHA Field Office.

63 OCHA PI on Field Map Production and Dissemination sets accountabilities, and general guidance for production, clearance, quality assurance and dissemination. Detailed and technical instructions are available in the OCHA Field Map Production and Dissemination Guidelines.

complemented by the services of MapAction, ACAPS, iIMAP and others. They took over management of the OSOCC reception desk on January 13 for the humanitarian community, and did a good job in an extremely difficult situation. This centre was established⁶⁴ at the Port-au-Prince airport to collect information and provide humanitarian partners on the ground with general information, contacts, orientation on logistics and admin operations and maps. A 5-member team from a SBP was deployed who started producing good quality maps which was highly appreciated by the humanitarian organisations arriving in the country. There was a huge demand for the OCHA maps in the early days as they captured

13 of the 23 interviewees who commented on OCHA IM stated that OCHA sent out complicated forms for organisations to fill in, and that was one reason why many found it hard to provide the detailed information OCHA wanted for the 3W.

critical information about the camps, displacements, acute needs, etc. OCHA was also able to establish a focal point with the Government (Direction de la Protection Civile) through which it could coordinate information flowing out of the government system.

The UNDAC team set up an e-mail system at the beginning of the mission, which worked as a hub for collection and dissemination of information. During the early phase, OSOCC reception desk and the UNDAC e-mail system became an important source of information about coordination and response activities. Requests, appeals and inquiries from community-based organisations, civil society, and other actors were collected and collated in a spreadsheet and the shared with the cluster-leads for follow up and action.

OCHA also deployed a Reporting Officer by day 4 after the earthquake and thereafter situation reports were produced every day. Sitreps produced by the reporting staff would be approved by the HoO on the same day and sent to CRD in New York for approval by the Desk Officer, Head of Reporting in CISB and the Deputy Director CRD, in that order.. In the first four weeks of the response, OCHA was producing sitreps every day, after which it was twice a week, and after 2 months the frequency became once a week. CRD brought in specific staff capacity just to do sitreps. External stakeholders interviewed in Haiti and Panama found OCHA sitreps very informative and rich source of information which helped them to appreciate what was going on at the time. The situation report quality was in large part due to the consistent engagement of OCHA's reporting unit. This capacity was provided at the specific request of CRD which did not have the capacity in NY to finalise sitreps. This was a best practice that was very important to the response and should be institutionalised (CRD Haiti After-Action Review, 13 May 2010).

While the sitreps were informative, one of the weaknesses was in their inability to pick up problem areas early on – some issues were not picked up in the sitreps, such as the problem with the WASH cluster that was focusing on water supply and neglecting sanitation. It has been argued that sitreps ought to have flagged up slow roll out of clusters even before the visit of the ERC at the end of January when he took serious note of the delays which were then taken up with individual agencies at the highest level.

Other tools like One Response website and 3W (who, what, where) were also launched. According to OCHA's SOP⁶⁵, a Country Office must produce two of OCHA's standard IM products, contact directory and 3W information, after the first month into the crisis. 3W did not deliver what it was supposed to do – it did capture the names of some of the organisations, but never moved beyond it, nor could it have an

64 OCHA Haiti Earthquake SitRep n°2. 13th January 2010.

65 OCHA. Guidelines for OCHA Field Information Management (April 2006)

automatic update of changes in contact addresses of organisations, let alone capture the activities and location where different organisations were working. It took OCHA about four weeks after the earthquake to design a standard form which went out to agencies to provide information. One Response did not work most of the time, and by February all clusters and partners concluded that the tool was not user-friendly and the site complicated. Several clusters started to develop their own webpage. However, as OCHA could not undertake any corrective measures or decide on any alternative to One Response, the site continued to be maintained until early October when it was finally decided to scrap the One Response site completely and go for alternative site.

The Nargis cyclone RTE⁶⁶ made similar observations about 3W. 3W data was of only limited value as it often did not provide sufficient detail for planning purposes and failed to differentiate between an organisation with a significant, long-term presence and one doing a one-off relief distribution.

OCHA continued to concentrate on producing maps. However, after a few weeks, other organisations and clusters also started producing maps, often much more detailed than what OCHA was producing. There was a need for more analytical maps drawing information from various clusters, and providing critical information to HC/HCT for taking strategic decisions or for dialogue with the government. When the OCHA HoO and the HC were meeting the President and Prime Minister of Haiti regularly to discuss the progress on the response, they needed vital data and analysis which individual clusters were unable to provide. However, OCHA could not produce the kind of information which would have interested government policy makers, donors and media. Even now, the HC does not receive the kind of data and analysis which would help him shape or influence broader policy on various aspects of the response as it stands now. OCHA still produces maps which are generally being produced by most of the clusters and agencies like USAID. A purely supply-orientation, instead of a demand/needs-driven approach, has meant that organisations or clusters do not find much value in the maps being produced by OCHA now. OCHA's information management tools appear to be more geared towards generating information for the USG, SG, media and the donors than to support the needs of the field and HC, according to several interlocutors.

It is understood that, since September, OCHA is sending out IM team members to all the field offices in order to get better connected with the field, with the aim of developing more relevant products. In early September, a map and a dashboard showing who is working where and in which cluster was produced which is now being shared with all agencies/NGOs for their input. The dashboard graphs show information relevant to each cluster, such as funding status, number of beneficiaries, etc., but without inter-cluster analysis.

5.2 Needs Assessment:

Needs assessment was recognised as an area that needed to be prioritised in the context of Haiti. A rapid assessment of the initial damage and impact in the earthquake-affected area was conducted within the first week after the earthquake, with support of the UNDAC team, in cooperation with technical experts from the EU-MIC team and the Centre for Disease Control (CDC). The UNDAC Field Handbook provides

66 Turner, Robert, Jock Baker, Zaw Myo Oo, Naing Soe Aye, Inter-Agency real Time Evaluation of the response to Cyclone Nargis, (p.18), 17 December 2008

guidance and a check list of the information to be collected and analysed in priority sectors through consultation, interviews, direct observation, etc. In Haiti, the UNDAC assessment team faced major logistical constraints (access to transportation means, strict security rules to reach certain areas, etc.) to collect the information needed. The output of the needs assessment contained information on the situation, a list of the priority sectors' needs in different geographical areas and the initial response activities for Port au Prince and other seven provinces.

However, there was limited in-house capacity and guidance or modalities in place within OCHA to support the process for a more systematic multi-sector assessment⁶⁷. After the rapid needs assessment conducted by UNDAC, a more detailed Rapid Needs Assessment was facilitated by OCHA in 10 communities of PaP and in 44 quadrants in the rest of Haiti. The Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) was led by ACAPS (Assessment Capacities) with inputs from operational clusters on the ground and the support from OCHA HQ. ACAPS, an NGO consortium⁶⁸ that provides needs assessment expertise and is attached to the IASC Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF), informed OCHA on January 13 that it planned to deploy to Haiti in order to support multi-sector needs assessment efforts. The OCHA/ACE⁶⁹ project agreed to support ACAPS in their deployment effort as there was no formal IASC or NATF agreement yet established on how the ACAPS needs assessment roster would operate. It was therefore agreed to deploy two ACAPS needs assessment experts through the Norwegian Refugee Council's (NRC) Stand-By Partnership (SBPP) agreement with OCHA to support the RC/HC and the clusters to carry out coordinated multi-cluster needs assessment⁷⁰.

The multi-cluster assessment commenced on January 25 and involved the Government, UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross movement. The assessment built on the initial assessments carried out by UNDAC and included over 110 assessors – 40 of which were provided by national authorities - rapidly trained prior to the assessment. Data collection was conducted using both written questionnaires and electronically through the use of PDAs, and data entry was carried out on a rolling basis. The findings and the final assessment report, published on February 25, 2010, did not provide the required information on the actual needs on the ground. It lacked in-depth analysis to prepare an adequate response strategy, such as cluster level needs, the response capacity of organisations and government to operate against the priorities, and the existing vulnerabilities and gaps⁷¹. This caused disappointment at various levels, including the HC who was unable to convey a clear picture of needs to senior officials in Haiti, nor use it for the PDNA process. The assessment report was also too late for the revised Flash Appeal. The team used the Immediate Rapid Assessment⁷² (IRA) tool and methodology which did not take into account the needs of a multi-cluster assessment, thus limiting the usefulness and acceptance of the survey. ACAPS tools were seen to be cumbersome – each individual survey took over three hours to complete, and the team had over 110 people on it. The AAR recommended the need for NATF to carry out development of a

67 There is currently no policy instruction on Needs Assessment in emergencies. The PI on information management does not lay adequate emphasis on systematic information needs assessment throughout the emergency.

68 Consortium members include Help Age International, Merlin and NRC.

69 Assessment and Classification of Emergencies Project falls under OCHA/PDSB.

70 OCHA. After Action Review: Rapid Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment in Haiti, 5 April 2010

71 OCHA. RINAH February 2010.

72 The IRA is a tri-cluster tool developed by the health, nutrition and WASH clusters to enable faster and better assessments in the first few days of a sudden-onset crisis.

simplified and adaptable tool/questionnaire⁷³ based on key indicators to conduct rapid multi-cluster needs assessments.

Because of this lack of an acceptable common assessment tool, different organisations used their own mechanism and conducted individual assessments. While a few agencies were carrying out assessments at the onset, there was limited or no coordination among agencies, within clusters and across clusters on

19 interviewees for this evaluation commented on Needs Assessment tool and they all stated that the OCHA-coordinated assessment was of little use in the response.

assessments, making it impossible for the HC to ascertain gaps and coverage in humanitarian needs. Although some clusters clearly demonstrated a capacity to undertake rapid needs assessments, the multi-sectoral needs and capacity assessment was inadequate in the initial stages of

the response⁷⁴. Overall, a weak assessment of the humanitarian situation delayed the response and led to significant gaps in geographical and sector-based coverage. A better needs assessment would have enabled a more strategic targeting of humanitarian assistance, and established stronger linkages between the strategic and operational levels within the humanitarian community, which could have pre-empted or at least reduced population movements, thereby avoiding additional needs and vulnerabilities arising later on (IASC, July 2010).

"This lack of capacity has meant that several clusters have yet to establish a concise overview of needs and develop coherent response plans, strategies and gap analyses. This is beginning to show and is leading others to doubt our ability to deliver." Extract from John Holmes leaked e mail on Turtle Bay/Foreign Policy, February 17, 2010⁷⁵

The Needs Assessment AAR (April 2010) noted that the deployment of needs assessment capacity and expertise was done on a last-minute basis and geared towards "planning on the go" and "learning while doing." The deployment of the ACAPS team was not initiated by OCHA. OCHA was informed that ACAPS were deploying to carry out rapid assessments in emergencies. Upon arrival in Port au Prince, the ACAPS team was offered a leadership position within UNDAC for coordinating and leading assessments. This gave ACAPS recognition within the humanitarian system.

The poor quality of needs assessment in the Haiti earthquake was very much understood and acknowledged by ACE and the NATF. It is understood that OCHA may have taken lessons from this experience and has now appointed an Assessment Coordinator for Haiti in October. In the recent floods in Pakistan, an inter-cluster coordination group on assessment was formed and an Assessment Coordinator appointed early on in the response by OCHA. Clusters were used for conducting rapid assessments through tools (Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment Methodology, MCRAM) developed earlier in the country.

The After-Action Review and subsequent work of the NATF has concluded that any future external multi-cluster assessment expertise should be firmly embedded in OCHA with clear management lines of authority. The Haiti experience was pivotal in the development of Operational Guidance on Coordinating Assessments in Emergencies, the development of key humanitarian indicators, the terms of reference for

73 This should build on the best practices including ROLAC's REDLAC, the IFRC Needs Assessment Tool, the IRA, among others.

74 IASC. July 2010. Ibid...

75 <http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy>

a roster and pool of assessment experts to be deployed under the management of OCHA and clusters. The roll out and use of these products to guide coordination and conducting of assessments has now been approved by the IASC Working Group and will take place throughout 2011. The rigidity of the IRA has been acknowledged by the NATF which is currently developing a common assessment methodology that allows for country teams to develop their own rapid assessment questionnaire choosing from a menu of options.

Conclusions:

16. OCHA deployed the right IM capacity in the early phase of the response, and contributed well to the information needs of an evolving humanitarian response at that stage, although some of the tools like 3W and One Response in particular did not work.

17. OCHA's IM in the early stage was able to respond to the needs of the humanitarian community, but as it continued doing more of the same in the latter phases, these tools provided by OCHA did not add substantial value to the work of others.

18. Prior to the earthquake, OCHA's capacity to facilitate a quality needs assessment was weak. OCHA's policy instructions on IM do not lay adequate emphasis on needs assessment. This weakness has been a serious handicap in the entire response as inadequate needs assessment has meant loss of opportunities for the humanitarian community to influence the role of military in the humanitarian response as well as in the planning of recovery and reconstruction plans which were developed after the PDNA.

Recommendations:

R13: OCHA needs to identify generic IM needs at different stages of a complex emergency response and ensure that staff skills and competencies match the changing nature of demands of IM at different stages to support OCHA's coordination of each step of the humanitarian programme cycle (needs assessment and analysis, joint planning, resource allocation, monitoring, evaluation) with appropriately-designed products.

R14: In future emergencies, OCHA needs to ensure that it manages the rapid needs assessment, and therefore has in-house capacity to deploy suitably qualified staff/partners to conduct needs assessment. In this regard, the evaluation acknowledges the current work being carried out by ACE and NATF, and further recommends that OCHA revisit its policy instructions to ensure that appropriate guidance being developed now are incorporated in the policy instruction.

Section 6:

Findings - Leadership and Management of the Response

Key Questions/Issues examined in this Section: 1. How well prepared was OCHA to respond to a large scale corporate emergency at HQ, regional and country level? To what extent OCHA demonstrated ability to take clear decisions and provide leadership to the humanitarian response in Haiti? 2. How timely was the surge deployment and how effectively did OCHA support the deployed staff in becoming operations-ready in a fast-evolving situation? Are the existing structures and procedures adequate to ensure staff welfare prior and after the deployment? How appropriate were the structures established to respond to needs on the ground? 3. To what extent OCHA policies and guidance applied, and what was their relevance to and effect on the intervention in different phases of the response? 4. What systems were put in place to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of OCHA response? Have appropriate AAR and lessons learned processes been put in place? 5. Examine internal OCHA decision-making processes and comment how clear, coherent and effective were the internal coordination mechanisms, accountabilities and decision making processes at various levels?

13 of the 16 (over 80 per cent) OCHA staff who commented on ETF/ OTF stated that the forum was too large, too much of information exchange, and took up huge amount of time of the attendees.

6.1 Leadership:

6.1.1 Emergency Task Force (ETF) and Operational Task Force (OTF):

Emergency Task Force, a coordination mechanism involving OCHA NY, GVA and CO, was established on the day of the earthquake and began meeting twice a day. During a Corporate Response, the Director of CRD is responsible for chairing and leading the task force. In Haiti, this responsibility was delegated to the Deputy Director of CRD. GVA convened the OTF which is a Geneva-internal tool, for which there are functional SOPs built on past experience. The model for interaction with the ETF is supposed to be that only the chair of the OTF and a select few others from Geneva as necessary participate in the ETF, while the OTF members carry out their operational support and coordination activities. The ETF included the field and representatives of the OTF.

Generally, the two task forces set up in Geneva and New York worked in tandem and helped provide almost a round-the-clock oversight to the Haiti response. The ERC also held coordination meetings twice a day in NY to brief the NY team about significant developments and also to get advice from different divisions/units in the early weeks. While OCHA now has a template to coordinate its response, there is need to streamline the purpose and structure of the task force meetings so that they remain focused and facilitate decision-making by managers and ensure follow up at appropriate levels.

Sometimes the meetings went on for up to two hours and, as many of these were being attended by 30-50 people, the discussions were more in the nature of information-exchange. The field (CO) found

participation in the ETF a drag on its precious time as they rarely found these meetings focusing on any decision, or action or strategic guidance, and mostly found that these forum were more for the CO/field staff to provide information to dozens of people in the HQ who often did not have much of a background about what had gone on in the response. This was compounded by the fact that participation in the meetings kept changing, and new participants often asked questions which may have been discussed numerous times before. The ETF went on for about eight weeks, although its perceived value to participants started declining by the end of week 2, and participation dropped significantly.

The CRD AAR questioned if all the key OTF staff needed to be at the ETF, and flagged up the need for clarity as to who the OTF and ETF were serving. There are agreed policy guidelines on the ETF-OTF purpose, composition and procedure in the Policy Instruction on Emergency Response. However, the 'Policy Instruction' is still in a draft form and that may be a reason why it was not followed thoroughly in the response.

There appears to be a significant lack of understanding in various parts of the house (HQ) about the role of the ETF and the desk. Various entities from GVA and NY were often repeatedly calling up the field for additional information which sometimes was already available in the HQ. Requests for information were coming from every part of the organisation, and sometimes the same information was being asked for by different departments in NY/GVA, adding to the burden on the field staff who had little capacity and communication facility. "With only one person monitoring and responding to the UNDAC Gmail account on-site, in addition to the frequent interruptions in internet connectivity, a back log of hundreds of emails was built up in few hours." UNDAC noted⁷⁶ that in such a large scale operation, with limited capacity and communication problems, it would be helpful to have only one focal point at headquarters to filter and prioritise the inquiries to the field, thus minimise wasteful demands being made on the CO.

"Headquarters e-mails were massive volume and were not really relevant to OSOC operations. HQ needs a single focal point to filter flow to UNDAC⁷⁷."

Conclusions:

19. The ETF/OTF mechanism helped in coordinating between the two locations of HQ. However, they were sometimes too large and lacked clear focus and structure.

20. There was no single central point for coordinating and/or clearing of information-demands and queries made on the CO by different parts of the HQ, and this wasted lot of time of the deployed staff causing frustrations.

Recommendations:

R15: OCHA needs to get better at following the SOPs it has (PI Emergency Response, SOP for ETF, Deployment, etc). Staff at all levels need better orientation on the existing SOPs and this needs to be done as a regular process before an emergency.

76 UNDAC MISSION REPORT Haiti Earthquake, January 2010

77 SWOT Analysis, UNDAC Mission Haiti Earthquake, January 2010

R16: Emergency Response Procedure needs to ensure that during a major emergency, there is a single focal point in the HQ which facilitates all communication with the CO/field office so as to minimise making unnecessary demands for information which may be already available in the HQ.

6.1.2 Leadership and Strategic Management:

On January 13, Haiti response was classified as Corporate⁷⁸. Corporate response is declared when robust international aid and coordination is expected⁷⁹, and by declaring the Haiti earthquake a ‘corporate response’ the management was able to ensure that the entire organisation rallied behind supporting the response and this gave managers authority to draw on support from various departments and units whenever needed.

As discussed in section 2, Haiti presented a highly complex challenge for the humanitarian community in general and OCHA in particular. While OCHA did well on operational leadership of the response in terms of deploying people on time and making sure that clusters were activated and supported in the roll-out process, a strategic leadership of the response had been lacking in all stages. With in-country humanitarian leadership severely traumatised and paralysed, there was a need to reinforce the capacity of the HC who wore triple hats, either by ensuring that a temporary HC was deployed, or a senior humanitarian professional having the gravitas to guide the entire humanitarian and military community in the response was deployed. Most other UN agencies deployed D1 or D2⁸⁰ to provide leadership to their response once they realised fairly early on that Haiti was a highly complex scenario which would demand very high level of leadership. OCHA was able to deploy an experienced P5 and several P4s⁸¹ in the first three weeks, and later in February, it brought in a D1 from another UN agency who stayed for a few weeks and failed to relate to the HC/HCT or OCHA in Haiti.

Several major time-critical decisions were delayed by weeks and months which led to a vacuum in leadership and ultimately affected OCHA’s ability to perform its role effectively. From the lack of senior level support to the HC in the early weeks, dithering over the grade of the Head of Office which dragged on for several weeks, failure to put in place a long-term HoO for over seven months after the earthquake, to inability to regulate and control a free-for-all self-deployment to Haiti immediately after the earthquake creating unmanageable confusion on the ground, all point towards lack of decisive leadership from the HQ at critical points of time.

4 OCHA senior HQ staff attributed the failure to recruit senior managers as HoO early on to indecisiveness within OCHA over whether the post of HoO should be P5 or D1 which took weeks of discussion. Had decision been taken on time, there were D1/D2s available to be deployed.

78 <http://ochanet.unocha.org> Message from John Holmes, 13th January.

79 OCHA Draft Policy Instruction on Emergency Response. “OCHA will categorize a new emergency as either a minor, major or corporate emergency within 72 hours of the initial triggering event.” Pp 6.

80 WFP had their Deputy Executive Director stationed in Haiti for over two weeks after the response.

81 The Acting HoO in Haiti was a P4, and the P5 was working as Senior Adviser to the HC.

The evaluation concludes, based on various documents and reports studied and interviews conducted, that failure to appreciate the complexity of the Haiti response and failure to ensure that highly experienced senior leaders were deployed in the country cost OCHA dear. Realising that OCHA had been unable to provide robust humanitarian leadership, the DPKO, working with the Secretary General's office, ensured that it deployed a highly experienced D2 with strong humanitarian background as DSRSG (Political) in Haiti. This DSRSG(P) occupied the vacuum left by a weak HC/OCHA leadership and started providing humanitarian leadership in the country as the humanitarian situation was serious. This undermined the role of OCHA, as DPKO/MINUSTAH was seen to be leading the humanitarian response from the front, with OCHA playing a subsidiary role.

The UN system (and its relationship with government) in Haiti is highly hierarchical, being a peacekeeping mission led by military command where rank and hierarchy carry all the weight. With OCHA being represented by a P4 at the highest level or the Sr. Humanitarian Advisor at P5, sitting beside the Generals of the Army and D2s, ASGs of other parts of the UN, one reckons the foot-soldiers of OCHA were hardly in a position to influence the shape of the humanitarian response as it was evolving. Despite this, OCHA was

31 of the 38 interviewees, who commented on the leadership provided by HC/OCHA, were strongly of the opinion that OCHA had failed to appreciate the complexity of the Haiti response, and failure to deploy senior leaders on par with other organisations affected the entire humanitarian community as the military and MINUSTAH began to shape the humanitarian agenda.

able to provide coordination support to the incoming NGOs and roll out the clusters due to the hard work and commitment of some of the staff deployed in Haiti. An additional factor may be attributed to the fact that the concept of clusters have found greater acceptance in the past four years and there is a clear understanding and expectation that

OCHA will take the lead on humanitarian coordination.

The CISB Lessons Learned exercise noted that OCHA not sending senior managers to Haiti was a “step backwards”. This evaluation concurs with this view. OCHA failed to deploy senior managers on the ground until early September when a regular HoO was appointed at D1 level. The same happened in the case of Administrative Officer – recruited only in early July, nearly six months after the earthquake. These two positions constitute the backbone of any OCHA office. Combined with this, the fact that no senior director - except for the Deputy Director CRD who paid a brief visit to the country - visited the country to provide any guidance meant that the staff deployed there had to manage things on their own. This was further compounded by the fact that after the departure of the Deputy of CRD who was overseeing the response from NY in early March, there has been no senior oversight of the response from NY/GVA.

All these meant that the CO was left to coordinate a massive humanitarian response involving a large number of players with limited capacity, in a highly complex emergency situation. The consequences of this major gap have been enormous: (i) the country office has been functioning in a survival mode, struggling to maintain its presence from day to day; (ii) lack of strategic direction as reflected in the fact that except for a cost plan which was produced in the early weeks, the CO had no workplan until August-September; (iii) a predominantly ad hoc approach to staffing and resourcing as reflected in some functions being over-staffed, or staffed with inappropriately qualified people. That the OCHA CO was able to play its role of coordination despite these internal challenges owed entirely due to the dedication and commitment of staff deployed in the field.

It is generally acknowledged that recruiting for Haiti has been problematic for all humanitarian organisations, especially for the language requirements. Compared to most other UN agencies and major NGOs, OCHA seems to have had a particular problem in deploying at the senior management level, while it filled positions at P2 and P3 levels through use of its roster and SBP. At some point, it had about 60 international staff, mostly P2-P3s, being managed by a temporary P5, assisted by an experienced P4. Adding to this mix was the fact that a sizeable number of the deployed staff were new recruits into OCHA and had little prior experience of clusters or of complex humanitarian operations in natural disasters.

The evaluation concluded that had OCHA taken clear decisions early on regarding the management capacity it needed to deploy in the country, there were options available for it to deploy senior managers. Even if it could not find someone for regular long-term deployment, there is no reason why one of its senior directors from the HQ could not have been deployed for some weeks in the early stage – an approach several UN agencies took, with great effect. It has been presented to the evaluation team that sometimes people were not prepared to go to Haiti. This does raise questions about the notion of 'corporate response' – many organisations have an accepted rule that organisational priorities over-ride individual preferences in some instances, and Haiti certainly was a case which needed to be managed through strong command and control, not through consensual decision-making.

"A mega-event like this was not the time to test your new staff. OCHA needed to send its A-team". An external Agency Head, Haiti.

An issue that remains unclear is whether the duration of the corporate response was the right one or needed to have been longer in order to give greater leverage to managers to ensure that medium to long-term deployments (Administrative Officer, for example) were in place before the phase out of corporate response. The deactivation of the corporate emergency after two months (12/03) had an impact on the response because the Country Office was not yet fully staffed. The critical emergency phase was still in place in Haiti, but the procedures and priorities of the organisation went back to business-as-usual.

Conclusion:

21. Failure to deploy highly experienced senior leaders in the country cost OCHA dear. If OCHA had taken clear decisions early on regarding the management capacity it needed to deploy in the country, there were options available for it to deploy senior managers. Even if it could not find someone for regular long-term deployment, there is no reason why one of its senior directors from the HQ could not be deployed for some weeks in the early stage – an approach several UN agencies took, with great effect.

Recommendations:

R17: Taking lessons from Haiti, ERC needs to ensure that in future emergencies, the senior level leadership (HC) in country is strong and has the capacity to lead an appropriate response. If not, the ERC needs to take whatever action is necessary to bolster the capacity by bringing in staff with appropriate leadership skills to work alongside existing leadership, or in extreme cases, temporarily replace existing leadership. A 'step aside' policy may also be considered in some circumstances.

R18: In 'corporate response', the ERC needs to ensure that at the HQ, a senior leader (D2) is designated as operations director with full authority and responsibility to command and control all

necessary resources within the organisation. This should be in place for at least three months, and reviewed at the end of ten weeks of the response.

6.2 Surge and Rapid Deployment:

From the time of the earthquake up until the end of the declared 'Corporate Response' (12 January – 12 March), a total of 87 emergency deployments were made through OCHA-managed mechanism to deal with the response to Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Miami and Washington (latter two for liaison with US authorities)⁸². Within 72 hours of the earthquake, OCHA had 19 international staff in Haiti, all deployed through emergency response roster (ERR). By 16 January, UNDAC team leader⁸³ had to ask OCHA to slow down the deployments as the country could not cope with demands for accommodation and office space⁸⁴. It is understood that in the past, OCHA's surge was chaotic, and hence OCHA had invested in the past couple of years in developing its surge capacity which worked well in Haiti. By the end of week 3, OCHA had about 60 staff deployed for the response. Information management, for example, had up to 22 staff in Haiti at one point.

The ERR worked well in terms of rapidly deploying a sizeable number of people to Haiti (and Dominican Republic⁸⁵). The average ERR deployment timeframe – the time between the receipt of a request and the actual deployment – was 4 days; this compares well to 7 days over the course of 2009. The average Stand-By Partnerships Programme (SBPP) deployment timeframe was 6 days; this compares to 47 days over the course of 2009 (Surge Review). Besides the deployment made through ERR, the Regional Office for Latin America and Caribbean (ROLAC) played a crucial role in early deployments, deploying five staff from the region within the first three days, including two senior staff who became HoO and Senior Adviser⁸⁶ to the HC. The SBPP, managed by 11 partner organisations, also facilitated short-term deployments consisting of experienced humanitarian staff, with average missions lasting four months.

The staff involved in the response came first from: the pre-existing OCHA Haiti Office – 7 staff; the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC) – 7 staff; the OCHA-internal Emergency Response Roster (ERR) – 35 staff; the SBPP – 8 staff; and, other specialised sources within OCHA – 20 staff. (Surge Review)

The deployments, however, faced major challenge in getting the right balance of numbers and quality, skills and expertise. Taking lessons from previous emergencies, OCHA deployed a few critical staff like Inter-cluster coordinator and Reporting Officer by day five. However, adequate administrative staff to support such a large response was not deployed for the first 20 days of the response which was a serious handicap in setting up a functioning office. Twenty one of the 32 interviewees who commented on rapid deployment by OCHA mentioned that sometimes OCHA had too many staff, some not even knowing what they were supposed to be doing, and many with no prior experience of working with OCHA in large

82 OCHA. Haiti Earthquake Surge Review January - March 2010

83 OCHA Task Force Handover Note from New York, 16 January.

84 In the early weeks, staff sent from Geneva had to wait in Dominican Republic for few days as the capacity of the CO to provide adequate logistical support to incoming staff was seriously overstretched.

85 A small UNDAC team (3) and 2 OCHA staff from ROLAC were also deployed in Dominican Republic by day 3 as it was realised that DR was becoming a hub for logistical support to humanitarian aid coming into Haiti.

86 Initially deployed as Deputy HC. However, as this was not approved by IASC, the staff was then appointed as Senior Adviser.

emergency operations or clusters.

The declaration of corporate emergency rallied different parts of the organisation behind the Haiti response. In the rush to provide all possible support to the Haiti operation, sometimes SOPs for deployment were flouted in the first week. Different departments/branches sometimes sent people to Haiti without any authorisation or clearance by the desk or CO or the overall Operations Manager who was the Deputy Director of the CRD. Even after the CO alerted the HQ to their inability to accommodate any more staff, branches continued sending people unannounced. Clarification was required on the authority of CRD with and without the ETF to stop the deployments⁸⁷. This caused serious problems of security and logistics in the country as (a) there were limited capacity to accommodate staff, and (b) security clearances were not obtained prior to staff arrival in the country. It took about a week or so for the ERC to intervene and ensure that all deployments were cleared with the Deputy CRD. Pre-approved cost plans and staffing table were used early on and were very helpful, but then the practice drifted away from it. Specialised staff sent by branches sometimes refused to take instructions from the HoO as they said that their supervisors had told them to do something else.

“.....lack of discipline within OCHA regarding the sending of staff to the field created a dangerous security situation (HoO didn’t know who was in-country!)”

CRD Haiti After-Action Review 13 May 2010

Conclusions:

22. OCHA did well in terms of rapid deployment of a substantial number of people in the first six weeks. The deployments, however, faced major challenge in getting the right balance of numbers and quality, skills and expertise.

23. SOPs for deployment were not always followed and these caused serious problems in the field. Major problems were: people being sent to the field without being cleared by the Operations Manager or the CO; staff deployed without any ToR or job description, or consultation with the CO.

Recommendation:

The evaluation is not making any specific recommendation on this, except to state the obvious that better adherence to SOPs is needed.

6.3 Roster and post-surge Deployment:

OCHA had begun to develop a roster of pre-screened and approved candidates when the Haiti earthquake struck. For emergencies, OCHA is allowed to recruit people on the roster, instead of going through normal UN recruitment which takes upwards of 9 months. Recruiting through the pre-approved roster allows OCHA to have a person in place within 90 days of the recruitment process starting. CRD manages a Humanitarian Affairs Officer (HAO) roster which at the time of the earthquake had about 100 people. The IMO and Admin/ Finance roster were not operational that time. Currently the HAO Roster has some 460

87 OCHA After-Action Review: Haiti Earthquake 2010, 12-13 May 2010

people. Recruitment under this process could be made for up to one year.

The roster is meant for post-surge deployment where it is expected that people would be deployed for longer than a few weeks, and could be for up to a year. As laid down by the OHRM, all recruitments for durations longer than 90 days need to be advertised in central UN Jobs system. OCHA was given exemption for one year for recruitments for Haiti. This exemption came within the first two weeks of the earthquake. This allowed people who applied for the roster vacancy but not have not yet been interviewed to be recruited by OCHA for a year for Haiti prior to Central Review bodies' evaluation to save time, with an understanding that they will be evaluated by the Central Review bodies eventually (within a year).

After the surge, when it came to replace the 'first-responders' from week 3 onwards, OCHA had problems in identifying people. Although as part of corporate response, internal deployments were being made, it was difficult to find people who were prepared to go to Haiti and/or who spoke French. Despite SOPs requiring staff to be deployed for at least eight weeks, many managers were reluctant to deploy their staff for any more than 3-4 weeks. The harsh living conditions in Haiti, particularly in the very first few weeks when the base camp was not yet established, was one of the factors that influenced deployments shorter than the normal period. Moreover, Haiti is a non-family duty station, which imposes limitations to find staff immediately available to deploy for longer term contracts. This led to frequent changes at all levels of staff. Head of Office changed five times in the first six months, 5 Administrative Officers deployed over a period of six months, each deployment lasting for 10 days to 6 weeks until early July when OCHA got its first long-term AO, Heads of Field Offices changed 5-6 times in Jacmal and Leogane during the first six months.

All external agencies (59 interviewees) interviewed by the evaluation team stated that OCHA was a big "revolving door", and the former did not always know who to talk to, or who in OCHA was doing what. Staff sent for short periods of time did not facilitate networking and building of trust, which undermined OCHA's reputation and capacity to coordinate effectively. Staff continuity was a problem in Haiti for most agencies; however, in the case of OCHA this was a more serious issue as other agencies were at least able to ensure some stability at their management level and key senior staff, while in case of OCHA the biggest problem was at this level (P4, P5). It appears that OCHA has a systemic problem on the issue of staff continuity - the Mozambique floods and Myanmar cyclone inter-agency RTEs⁸⁸ both highlighted this as a problem in OCHA's deployment.

In the post-surge phase, there were number of cases of staff being deployed without any ToR or job description, or communication with the CO. Several instances where people were told one thing in GVA, and by the time they arrived in Haiti, their assigned tasks changed.

Conclusion:

88 (i) Cosgrave, John, Célia Gonçalves, Daryl Martyris, Riccardo Polastro, Muchimba Sikumba-Dils, *Inter-agency real time evaluation of the response to the February 2007 floods and cyclone in Mozambique*, May 2007;
(ii) Turner, Robert, Jock Baker, Zaw Myo Oo, Naing Soe Aye, *Inter-Agency real Time Evaluation of the response to Cyclone Nargis*, 17 December 2008

24. After the surge, when it came to replace the 'first-responders' from week 3 onwards, OCHA had problems in identifying people who were prepared to go to Haiti and/or who spoke French. Despite SOPs requiring staff to be deployed for at least eight weeks, many managers were reluctant to deploy their staff for any more than 3-4 weeks. This led to frequent changes at all levels of staff, and staff continuity became a major problem which continues to affect the programme even now.

Recommendation:

The evaluation is not making any specific recommendation on this, except to state the obvious that better adherence to SOPs is needed.

6.4 Staff Development, Induction and Staff Training:

OCHA Strategic Framework and its 2010 Annual Plan⁸⁹ emphasises organisational learning and development as a way to achieve better results. One of the aspects of staff development is the induction and briefings that staff receive before deployment. OCHA staff development policy mentions a series of compulsory training available on-line which focuses on issues of security and ethics. There are also few on-line induction programmes⁹⁰, briefing kits that should be prepared and distributed by the Information Management Unit, as well as an Orientation Handbook on Complex Emergencies (1999), currently being updated. These materials provide general information about the UN and OCHA, but do not include country or function-specific orientation.

OCHA's system for induction and briefing of staff did not work in the Haiti response. This had a marked effect on the response as a substantial number of staff were recruited from outside who had no orientation to OCHA. One Acting HoO was deployed without any induction whatsoever; another senior staff coming from another organisation had no briefing before or after arrival in the country, and only received four emails with several policy documents as part of the induction. Another first-timer who had no induction at the time of joining learnt that there is an online induction course after being in the job for six months. An Administrator coming from another agency found the first two weeks a struggle as this person had no proper orientation to OCHA systems and procedures. An inter-cluster coordinator was hired in the early days, and was given no briefing and orientation on how the government system functioned in Haiti and the focal points OCHA will need to relate to.

As mentioned earlier, staff continuity was a big problem. By the time those deployed on short-term contracts learnt the basics of their work, they had to move on. What made things worse for OCHA was that there was generally no proper handover process⁹¹ or even a briefing from those leaving. This was one reason why over three-fourths of non-OCHA interviewees mentioned that they found it difficult to cope with OCHA's demands as the latter had a tendency to ask for the same information several times

89 OCHA Strategic Framework 2010-2013: Objective 3.3: Improved organizational learning and development to achieve better results

90 For examples of on line induction and handbooks: <http://ochanet.unocha.org/induction>, http://www.irinnews.org/OCHA/1_AM_OCHA_INDUCTION_FINAL.html

91 The findings of this evaluation based on information from various data sources and triangulated using the methods described in section 1 do not agree with the Surge Review Report where it is stated that 70% staff deployed had gone through a handover process.

over as incoming staff did not take time to find out for themselves what went on before them. This wasted lot of energy and time on part of all agencies.

Besides briefing and induction, OCHA also does not have a system of training for its serving staff which could prepare them for different managerial roles. As usually happens in complex and fast-onset emergencies, staff playing a specialist or support role are often called upon to take on managerial or team leadership responsibilities. If people have been through systematic training which prepared them to undertake multi-disciplinary and managerial role involving running an office, handling HR, staff support issues, or dealing with clusters, OCHA would be in a much better position to ensure that in an emergency like Haiti, when staff are given bigger responsibilities, they have some pre-training which prepares them to undertake such roles⁹².

Conclusion:

25. OCHA does not have a functioning system of induction and briefing of staff before deployment. In the emergency response procedure, there is no mention of a mandatory handover process. Besides briefing and induction, OCHA also does not have a system of training for its serving staff which could prepare them for different managerial roles to deal with complex emergencies.

Recommendation:

R19: OCHA needs to review its staff development policies and practices, and put in place a functioning system of training and orientation of staff deployed in emergencies.

6.5 Administrative Capacity, Logistics and Staff Support:

OCHA was unable to deploy suitable Administrative staff for the response for most part of the first six months which undermined the office's capacity seriously. The Acting HoO had to spend substantial part of time on routine administration and housekeeping tasks, leaving little time for providing programmatic leadership to the team and clusters. Before the first long-term AO joined in July, there were four temporary AOs deployed in Haiti. The overall picture that emerges on the deployment of AO is as follows:

First three weeks: No AO

Early March: No AO

April: No AO for first three weeks

Between January and April: 3 AOs deployed, with a total gap of nearly seven weeks when there was no AO.

The consequences of this were serious on the office's functioning, as the following list indicates:

- Incoming staff had inadequate administrative support on arrival in country;
- No HR capacity for local recruitment. Most local staff recruitment could not take place until June

⁹² For one Acting HoO, Haiti was his first managerial assignment, and he did not feel confident that he had clear understanding of what was involved, nor did he have any support from HQ.

when the process for vetting, interviewing and selection had been completed. It is understood that as UNDP handles all local recruitments and procurement, the process gets delayed by months;

- Temporary staff who were recruited could not be paid for weeks;
- Staff received insufficient support on R & R as no there was confusion on which R & R policy applied;
- Vehicles bought but could not be used as paperwork to obtain road license was delayed for weeks;
- Deputy HoO (who became Acting HoO) had to spend most of the time on administrative tasks simply to keep the office functioning;
- Different departments/units had to start doing various administrative tasks in their own way, without adhering to standard established procedures;
- Lack of monthly attendance of personnel deployed in Haiti. The CO Admin was having difficulties to respond to requests from staff claiming DSAs or hazards payment, because there was no formal record to prove that the person was actually working in Haiti for the contract period;
- Delays in payment for services (to WFP for staff staying at Camp Charlie for example);
- No monitoring of staff leave, travel, reporting on missions, etc.
- No adequate inventory of equipments. Only now the CO is producing an inventory based on the equipments that are on the ground as against what was procured/ purchased in order to have a clear picture of assets.

OCHA's IT and telecom capacity in the country remained weak throughout the response. While a Lotus Notes server was deployed, it was not functional until the second week. OCHA Haiti had insufficient connectivity⁹³ and had no access to emails for ten days, and sufficient number of handsets was not available for incoming staff in the first two months. UNDAC had deployed one IT expert in its team, and OCHA deployed 1 staff from GVA for two weeks, but not enough telecom equipments. OCHA staff are not provided any blackberry, and monthly usage of mobile phone is set at a maximum limit of \$20 which forces staff (Heads of sub-offices for example) to use their personal phone for office work.

It is understood that taking lessons from Haiti, OCHA has now a stockpile of ICT equipments in GVA for up to 25 staff.

The Check-list of Actions for Opening an OCHA office was not fully adhered to. The check-list requires that an organisational chart and job descriptions be established as the first action related to personnel, and the recruitments of a qualified administrative staff is a priority. It also outlines as the first action on financial issues, the formulation of a cost plan to be authorised by HQ.

93 OCHA/CISB. Haiti – Initial Lessons Learned Discussion, 11 February 2010.

Although OCHA was able to deploy a substantial number of staff rapidly, 'logistics' was consistently highlighted as an area of weakness, both in terms of office space and administrative support for OCHA to operate as well as the availability of personal deployment kits including camping and survival gear⁹⁴. After the earthquake, OCHA had no office of its own. UNDAC set up its tent in the log base and people were working from there, and were also sleeping in the same tents. OCHA staff arriving in the country had no kits or personal tents, or any other equipment which would enable them to become operational. Only those deployed as part of the surge through ERR were given some basic survival kits. There was no base camp set up until about the fourth week after the disaster. Staff in the field had to beg and borrow from WFP, MINUSTAH, Search & Rescue teams and even NGOs anything they could find – like sleeping bags, tents, chairs, desks, containers, etc.

Most other agencies interviewed during this evaluation were able to bring in their office modules, telecom equipments and base camps fairly rapidly after the earthquake, but it took OCHA at least over four weeks to have their first proper office set up during which they were operating from tents which were set up in the first few days. A senior Director of DPKO who was deployed in Haiti after the earthquake recalled that OCHA approached him after two months of the earthquake asking for office furniture to set up offices.

Of the 124 interviewees, 31 (25%) mentioned staff support and logistics as one of the three most important things OCHA needs to fix (others being lack staff continuity and appropriate staff capability to provide leadership).

The evaluation team could find no explanation as to why OCHA, which is supposed to facilitate and lead humanitarian response by the international community, was so poorly resourced and unprepared for the response that even NGOs commented that they felt sorry for the OCHA staff who were sent into the country and literally had to beg anyone who had something to give for basic necessities. International Humanitarian Partnership which provides base camp for several UN agencies were prepared with their modules for accommodation and would have been able to deploy immediately, if requested but OCHA took no action.

Basic office stationery and forms (for example, vehicle use form, leave records register, attendance register) etc., were not available for months. Staff welfare issues like R & R were not clarified for the first four months causing a sense of frustration amongst staff. Some staff arrived even without a laptop in the early days and expected the office to provide these.

The Staff Counsellor's Office (SCO) of the Department of Management activated on 13 January an emergency response mechanism, which included crisis counselling by phone or in person, counselling sessions for NY based staff, and a hotline to assist staff worldwide. Although the SCO reports 350 individual counselling sessions in NY or by phone to UN or MINUSTAH staff, the interviews for this evaluation showed that large majority of deployed OCHA staff did not receive any significant support for stress management, before or after their mission to Haiti. In the very early days, there were several cases of HQ staff members deployed to Haiti, without field experience and had no orientation on what to expect. Staff members found themselves unprepared to bear with the extremely stressful working and living environment, where death and horror was an everyday reality.

94 OCHA. Haiti Earthquake Surge Review January - March 2010

Conclusions:

26. OCHA's arrangement with UNDP for administrative support towards local recruitment, payments and local procurement causes significant delays and affects the functioning of the office.

27. OCHA staff deployed in the first few weeks had little support by way of office facilities, accommodation and survival gear, and it took over four weeks to get some acceptable facilities in place which gave the office and staff a minimum living and working conditions. OCHA has no SOP or central point within the organisation to provide mandatory logistical support to staff deployed in emergencies.

Recommendations:

R20: OCHA needs to invest in putting in place contingency stock of office-in-a-box and staff accommodation module for at least 100 staff to be deployed in 2-3 big emergencies at any point of time. This can be done through partnership with IHP or WFP, and the modules need to be fully response-ready before an emergency sets in. Ensuring operational self-reliance for OCHA surge deployed will be critical in future emergencies.

R21: Review the arrangements with UNDP for providing administrative support in country, and ensure that avoidable inefficiencies do not come in the way of fast and efficient response.

6.6 Communication between NY, GVA and CO:

OCHA's Strategic Framework for 2010 – 2013 defines one of the organisation's goals as: "Strengthened OCHA management and administration" (Goal 3) through: (i) effective, timely, transparent and accurate financial, budgetary and resource management and reporting; (ii) adequate and timely recruitment, deployment and retention of qualified and diverse staff; and (iii) improved organisational learning and development to achieve better results.

As discussed in the preceding sections, in several areas OCHA has improved its capacity to support major humanitarian operations. Besides resource mobilisation and surge in which OCHA demonstrated significant capacity for a response as complex as Haiti, coordination between its two HQ locations through the task forces also worked well, despite unduly cumbersome nature of functioning of these forums described earlier.

An issue that came up, however, repeatedly in interviews with staff who were deployed in the field was the multiple layers and split between GVA and NY that one has to go through to get a decision. Currently, EO, AO, and CRD provide varying levels of administrative support from OCHA's two headquarters locations in New York and Geneva⁹⁵. Most operational decisions are required to be presented first to GVA and then to NY (and sometimes in the reverse order), and this takes time. To the evaluation team, sometimes it appeared that there was duplication, without adding much value to the decision-making or action.

95 Review of the Administrative Function, Management Report, April 2010, Dalberg

A concrete example of this was in how the organigram for Haiti evolved. The staff planning in the very early phase was based on pre-approved cost plans and staffing tables, which were updated by the UNDAC team based on the initial situation. After the first month, staff planning was conducted by Coordination and Response Division (CRD) in NY, Administrative Office (AO) and Surge Capacity Section (SCS) in Geneva and the Country Office in Haiti. An interim organigram was regularly updated, and due to the fast-changing staffing situation on the ground, in July, the responsible offices in Geneva (AO), New York (CRD) and Haiti were referring to three different organigrams, none of which reflected the reality of staffing on the ground.

It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to examine the role of different branches and sections and their structural relationships. However, the evaluators were left, like scores of field staff interviewed during the evaluation, confused by the mosaic of structures between GVA and NY, and the overlaps in their roles. For the operations, the consequences of this manifest, for example, in the following ways:

- For a normal contract extension, the HoO has to first make a recommendation to NY (CRD) who then sends it to GVA, before the latter issues a contract. The time taken depends on the availability of staff in both NY and GVA handling this.
- Staff in the field often do not know who in NY or GVA to turn to for a decision. This was a major problem in the first few months as on many occasions, the CO requested certain decisions/actions (for example, procurement of base camps, logistics support, etc), and would hear nothing for several weeks or months, and were unaware of where in the chain the matter was sitting. One Response website was known not to work way back in February and since then CO staff have raised it with HQ number of times, but it took another seven months for the organisation to take a decision.
- Except for the first seven weeks when the Deputy CRD was managing the operation from the HQ, there was no clarity as to who was the overall manager of the operation.
- The biggest problem from the field perspective was the absence of an overall senior level decision maker (after the Deputy CRD moved to GVA). In the absence of that, no one was able to look across the whole organisation and determine where assets were best deployed and required (for example, leaving the office without AO for long periods of time).

Conclusion:

28. OCHA has a highly complex organigram, with overlapping functions split between GVA and NY which has a tendency to cause delays and unclear locus of responsibility, not geared to efficient and timely decisions.

Recommendation:

R22: The Dalberg report on administrative and organisation systems is a good start, and OCHA needs to speed up implementation of the recommendations on structural relationship and accountability made in that report.

Section 7:

Assessment against OECD/DAC Criteria

7.1 Coverage:

Coverage is about the need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas.

OCHA is in the businesses of facilitating and supporting humanitarian actors in their provision of lifesaving assistance to those facing life-threatening situations. Its performance on this (and other criteria as below) needs to be assessed against its role as an 'enabler' and coordinator, rather than being a 'deliverer' itself.

OCHA scaled up its presence and capacity almost immediately after the disaster, and mobilised all resources at its command to support a robust response. The deployment of the UNDAC and USAR teams, and over sixty staff in a matter of two weeks, and subsequent opening of offices in Jacmal and Leogane within about ten days of the disaster were vital for the response by the international humanitarian community. With million and a half people living in the camps at one time, and Government and civic infrastructure nearly paralysed, that there were no epidemics or starvation deaths⁹⁶ as was feared initially, owes a great deal to a robust international and national response. OCHA played a significant role in this, despite having faced challenges in terms of its management and leadership capacity as described in previous sections.

Usually, in most responses, OCHA starts to scale back after the first 3-6 months as agencies move into recovery and reconstruction phase. However, in Haiti, as the relief phase is likely to continue in foreseeable future, OCHA has maintained a strong presence – its management capacity is stronger now than it was ever before. This demonstrates OCHA's appreciation of the fact that the humanitarian needs of the population will remain for months, and possibly a year or more, to come, and its core role of coordination and facilitating the work of humanitarian community will remain.

7.2 Relevance and Appropriateness:

Relevance is concerned with assessing whether projects are in line with local needs and priorities and refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme. Appropriateness is about the need to tailor humanitarian activities and inputs to local needs, and examines the correspondence between input/resources and the intended result.

OCHA's initial interventions for setting up the reception centre and getting coordination and clusters

⁹⁶ As the report was being written at the end of October, over eight months after the earthquake, reports of first cholera epidemic in the country were coming in. At the time of writing, the densely populated city of PaP is still unaffected, and the epidemic started in non-earthquake area.

going, as well as bringing in critical IM tools which enabled the humanitarian community to plan their response were highly relevant. Another critical and relevant intervention was the rapid needs assessment which OCHA attempted to facilitate, although as it turned out, the tools used for this were inappropriate.

Even after nearly nine months of the earthquake, OCHA's role in overall coordination, contingency planning, inter-cluster coordination and information dissemination continues to be as relevant as was the case in the early chaos and 'overcrowding' in the humanitarian scene immediately after the disaster. Going into the future, however, it needs to ensure that its work complements the role HDCS of MINUSTAH plays and ensure that in the long run, the government can take over the roles currently being played by OCHA.

As discussed in section 4.1, good information management is critical to OCHA's role. As OCHA continued to use the same tools that were highly valued in the early phase of the response even in the latter phases and has been unable to adapt to the changing requirements of IM, some of the tools it now uses are inappropriate. This has the danger of undermining OCHA's capacity to continue playing its relevant role.

7.3 Effectiveness and Efficiency:

Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Timeliness is generally implicit within the criteria of effectiveness. Efficiency measures how economically inputs (funds, expertise, time) have been converted into outputs.

The declaration of corporate response was critical to enabling OCHA to launch a fast response of a scale that was required in Haiti. OCHA's leadership on appeal and financing was critical to mobilising the support of the donor community for a massive humanitarian response. OCHA's surge deployment in the first two weeks was instrumental in bringing about some coordination among the thousands of organisations that had landed in the country immediately after the disaster. However, not having a strong leadership in the country undermined OCHA's ability to play a stronger role in influencing and shaping the humanitarian response which began to be led by DPKO.

In terms of timeliness, the efficiency with which the flash appeal was prepared and released was exemplary. Several donors who were dithering over the scale of the response took cue from the appeal and were able to mobilise their headquarters for fast decisions. Daily key messages produced for ERC in the early weeks worked well, combined with media stories produced from the field enabled by embedding of a videographer with the UNDAC team.

OCHA has also significantly improved speed of its surge deployment. In the case of Haiti, the time between the receipt of a request by the HQ and the actual deployment was 4 days, compared to 7 days over the course of 2009. However, post-surge deployments took time and often critical deployments were not made for months, which seriously affected the operations. In order to ensure efficiency in deployments for emergencies, OCHA was given exemption for one year from following the mandatory lengthy central recruitment process for Haiti; this exemption came within the first two weeks of the

earthquake. Given this, when OCHA could not find candidates on its roster, it should have gone out for external candidates, but this was not done in most cases.

In the post-surge phase, there were number of cases of staff being deployed without any ToR or job description, induction and briefing, or communication with the CO. Mention has been made earlier about the multiple layers of administration and management between GVA and NY which add to the time taken for quick decisions and action in emergencies. In the country, the arrangement with UNDP for administrative support is almost dysfunctional in emergencies, and has seriously delayed critical actions like recruiting local staff, making payments to suppliers. UNDP is not an emergency-oriented organisation and hence its systems are geared to 'development' response.

7.4 Coordination:

Coordination is the degree and quality of collaboration with different local and international partners and stakeholders.

This is one of the four functions of OCHA and has already been discussed in detail in section 3.

7.5 Connectedness:

Connectedness is about the need to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.

Historically, OCHA has had a weak presence in Haiti. After the earthquake, OCHA reinforced its presence in some of the departments (Jacmal, Leogane, Gonaives). Over the years, MINUSTAH had taken on a humanitarian role acting as a focal point with local authorities and NGOs on development and humanitarian issues. Even now, in large parts of the country, including in several departments of PaP, there is a still confusion as to who is leading the coordination – MINUSTAH or OCHA?

Recognising that where there are integrated missions in non-conflict countries and where OCHA does not strong have ongoing presence, it is likely that the mission will often take on a humanitarian role, along with its development functions. Clear guidelines do not exist which clarify how in times of major crises which warrants sizeable deployment of OCHA and clusters, the latter's humanitarian role interface with those of the mission.

The use of military assets and how humanitarians interact with military in non-conflict situations remain ambiguous. In Haiti, it has varied from reluctance to leverage military assets and capacity for speeding up relief work in the early days when military could have played a strategic role, to current situation in which number of humanitarian organisations continue to use military escorts even in areas which have had no history of trouble (Jacmal, Leogane), contravening the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines.

The issue of linking short-term emergency response with long term development programmes is becoming increasingly important in the country. The interface between clusters and tables sectorielles

(TS) which are Government-led coordination system for dealing with technical issues in different sectors (e.g. Agriculture, Health, WASH, Infrastructure, Education, etc) which have existed in the country for several years is unclear. The cluster guidelines do not outline how a strong and seamless interface needs to be developed and managed between clusters and local coordination structures, an issue that comes up in many countries time and again.

7.6 Coherence:

Coherence refers the need to ensure that there is consistency in policies and practices which need to take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations.

The deployment of GenCap Adviser and PSEA Coordinator helped agencies in integrating gender perspectives and addressing the issue of sexual exploitation right from the early phase of the response. The PSEA coordinator has played a crucial role in helping the CCCM cluster in taking practical action in the camps to ensure safety of camp residents and minimisation of sexual exploitation and abuse within the camps. However, lack of continuity of these initiatives beyond the first three months has negated what could otherwise have been achieved.

As discussed in section 3, eight months into the response, nearly a million people are still living in tents or under plastic sheeting, and a large majority of them are likely to remain in need of humanitarian assistance in foreseeable future. As the government (and donors) jump into development and reconstruction, there is likely to be a trade-off between the humanitarian budget and development budget as the funding pot is limited and, from all indications, unlikely to generate additional funding. There is not much evidence-based thinking and analysis coming from the humanitarian community or the development fraternity on how to deal with the situation. Donors will need to be educated about the situation that a large majority of the displaced will continue to live in their temporary camps for years to come, and their humanitarian needs in terms of water, sanitation, food, and healthcare will remain, until the government is able to take over management of these services.

Section 8:

Overall Conclusions and Summary of Recommendations

Haiti earthquake response challenged the capacity of all humanitarian organisations and the humanitarian response system in general, including those which had significant presence in the country before the earthquake. OCHA had a small office and had to build up its capacity almost from a scratch after the earthquake. OCHA did very well to be able to deploy UNDAC within 24 hours of the earthquake and build up its staff strength to nearly sixty within about two weeks of the disaster. Rapid decisions and action by OCHA on flash appeal and CERF funding were instrumental in mobilising a massive response by the international humanitarian community right from the start.

OCHA's support on the cluster roll-out process and its information management tools in the early weeks were crucial in bringing about a coordinated response by the humanitarian organisations, despite challenges in the process. That clusters were able to bring into their fold the military actors who deployed in large numbers was a significant achievement of the coordination process, although coordinating with the military and peacekeepers was not without its challenges.

With million and a half people living in the camps at one time, and Government and civic infrastructure nearly paralysed, that there were no epidemics or starvation deaths⁹⁷ as was feared initially, owes a great deal to a robust international and national response. OCHA played a significant role in this, despite having faced challenges in terms of its management and leadership capacity as described in previous sections.

The following paragraphs summarise the key findings and recommendations made in the report:

8.1 Coordination:

8.1.1 Support to Clusters:

Although clusters were activated within the first three days and a few clusters started functioning, it took about 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become functional. Clusters coordinating lifesaving activities should have the capacity to become operational within hours after the onset of an emergency in order to effectively coordinate incoming relief organisations.

Recommendations:

⁹⁷ As the report was being written at the end of October, over eight months after the earthquake, reports of first cholera epidemic in the country were coming in. At the time of writing, the densely populated city of PaP is still unaffected, and the epidemic started in non-earthquake area.

R1: Working through the IASC, OCHA needs to facilitate embedding of cluster coordinators by cluster lead agencies of, as a minimum, critical lifesaving sectors namely, WASH, Logistics, Health, Food, shelter and Camp Management, in UNDAC teams deployed immediately after a disaster.

R2: OCHA needs to clarify for its staff its role in coordinating local organisations and institutions.

R3: Cluster coordinators ought to be sufficiently briefed and orientated on local institutions and structures and must have the competence to facilitate building relationship with local government and institutions.

R5: OCHA needs to identify, train and develop a small group of experienced and senior inter-cluster coordinators with high facilitation and strategic thinking skills who can be readily deployed in complex emergencies when clusters are deployed.

8.1.2 Engagement with Government and Local Institutions:

OCHA's ability to coordinate and relate to local NGOs and humanitarian players remains a challenge in major emergencies. This was an issue in OCHA's response to the Myanmar cyclone two years ago⁹⁸, and not much appears to have changed since then. The single most important factor, apart from language, that has continued to undermine OCHA's ability to engage with the government and local NGOs has been its operating from the MINUSTAH log base in PaP. Moreover, the interface between clusters and government-led coordination mechanisms are weak and there is no clear guidance on how the two will relate to each other and ensure coherence between humanitarian response and recovery/development work.

Recommendations:

R4: Working with IASC, develop guidelines on how OCHA can delegate to and support some of the coordination functions to government agencies, with involvement of key local NGOs to address the needs of a large number of new humanitarian actors who arrive after a disaster and require support in the nature of 'survival' tips.

R9: OCHA needs to work with the HC/DSRSG and clearly spell out the modalities of the clusters' interaction with the TS, and establish an indicative time-frame for the clusters to gradually transfer their functions to the government.

8.1.3 Linking National and Local Coordination:

OCHA's role in coordination remained confined to coordinating at operational level. Inter-cluster coordination remained weak. Linking coordination at national level to those happening at local level remains an issue. Furthermore, since PaP had a large concentration of humanitarian organisations spread over several departments in the city, more localised coordination structures closer to the point of action

98 IASC/OCHA. Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the response to Cyclone Nargis; Robert Turner, Jock Baker, Dr. Zaw Myo Oo, Naing Soe Aye, 17 December 2008.

would have helped overcome the problems of access to log base and overcrowding in meetings. It is increasingly common to see hundreds and thousands of organisations of all hues, capacity and competency to arrive on the scene, especially after rapid onset natural disasters, making any coordination unwieldy and chaotic. There is not enough guidance on how to deal with non-professional humanitarian organisations, private citizens groups, religious organisation etc., which have little understanding of and commitment to humanitarian coordination.

Recommendation:

R8: Given that bulk of the humanitarian agencies and their operations are in the city of PaP, OCHA needs to establish a field office (on the lines of the field office in Leogane and Jacmal) in PaP, and this needs to be established in the centre of the city to be accessible to stakeholders. The CO needs to focus on strategic issues, and providing support to the HC, leaving all operational issues to the field office.

8.1.4 Civil-military and Integrated Mission:

Initially the humanitarian community was reluctant to strategically leverage the huge military resources which could have been at this disposal. Humanitarian community appears to have varied interpretation of the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines.

OCHA's liaison with the DPKO Situation Centre in the early days should have been at a high-level. OCHA did not have enough information and internal coordination to respond to DPKO's repeated requests for what was needed of them by OCHA. Recognising that where there are integrated missions in non-conflict countries and where OCHA does not have strong ongoing presence, it is likely that the mission will often take on a humanitarian role, along with its political and development functions. Clear guidelines do not exist which clarify how in times of major crises which warrants sizeable deployment of OCHA and clusters, the latter's humanitarian role interface with those of the mission.

Recommendations:

R6: OCHA's Policy Instruction on relationship with integrated mission needs to be adapted to local situations, and it is not too late to undertake an exercise for Haiti in order to develop a SOP which spells out the details of the relationship with MINUSTAH in general, and the humanitarian part of the latter in particular.

R7: Working with the IASC, OCHA needs to facilitate discussions on clarifying how the humanitarian agencies in general, and the clusters in particular, need to relate to military forces (both foreign government and UN peacekeepers) in natural disaster situations not involving open armed conflict where military forces tend to deploy on humanitarian missions.

8.2 Humanitarian Financing, Policy & Advocacy:

8.2.1 Humanitarian Financing:

In this response, OCHA's leadership on appeal and financing was crucial in mobilising support of the

donor community for a massive humanitarian response. The ERRF is a useful tool to ensure participation of small and medium NGOs, including national ones and according to the ERRF Guidelines, one of its priorities is implementation of pilot projects fostering innovative initiatives. However, the ERRF decision-making process is perceived by NGOs to be non-transparent, and bulk of the funding so far has gone to the UN agencies.

Recommendation:

R10: Better guidance needs to be provided to CO and HC on management of ERRF mechanism which needs to be more transparent and inclusive of NGOs.

8.2.2 Media, Communication, Policy & Advocacy:

In the Haiti response, daily key messages produced for ERC in the early weeks worked well, combined with media stories produced from the field enabled by embedding of a videographer with the UNDAC team. With the Haiti response, the use of social media and powerful grassroots public information medium has come of age, and humanitarian organisations have not fully engaged with these community-driven processes which will play a critical role in future emergencies. The HC has not been fully supported by OCHA with evidence-based data and analysis for advocacy on critical issues of the humanitarian response and the need for a coherent approach to relief, recovery and development which needs to determine future financing.

Recommendations:

R11: OCHA needs to ensure that a public information/media relations officer is deployed on the scene in any emergency as one of the first-priority deployments.

R12: While continuing to focus on the ongoing relief efforts, OCHA needs to bolster its capacity to bring evidence-based analysis and thinking to support the HC in his dialogue with the government, donors and reconstruction authorities to ensure that humanitarian needs do not get neglected in the process of transition and reconstruction.

8.3 Information Management and Needs Assessment:

OCHA deployed the right IM capacity in the early phase of the response, and contributed well to the information needs of an evolving humanitarian response at that stage, although some of the tools like WWW and One Response in particular did not work. As OCHA continued doing more of the same in the latter phases, these tools provided by OCHA did not add substantial value to the work of others. OCHA's failure to facilitate a quality needs assessment has been a serious handicap in the entire response, and this has meant loss of opportunities for the humanitarian community to influence the role of military in the humanitarian response as well as in the planning of recovery and reconstruction plans which were developed after the PDNA.

Recommendations:

R13: OCHA needs to identify generic IM needs at different stages of a complex emergency response and ensure that staff skills and competencies match the changing nature of demands of IM at different stages to support OCHA's coordination of each step of the humanitarian programme cycle (needs assessment and analysis, joint planning, resource allocation, monitoring, evaluation) with appropriately-designed products.

R14: In future emergencies, OCHA needs to ensure that it manages the rapid needs assessment, and therefore has in-house capacity to deploy suitably qualified staff/partners to conduct needs assessment. In this regard, the evaluation acknowledges the current work being carried out by ACE and NATF, and further recommend that OCHA revisit its policy instructions to ensure that appropriate guidance being developed now are incorporated in the policy instruction.

8.4 Leadership, Management and Administration:

8.4.1 Leadership:

Failure to deploy experienced senior leaders in the country cost OCHA dear. If OCHA had taken clear decisions early on regarding the management capacity it needed to deploy in the country, there were options available for it to deploy senior managers. Even if it could not find someone for regular long-term deployment, there was no reason why one of its senior directors from the HQ could not be deployed for some weeks in the early stage – an approach several UN agencies took, with great effect.

Recommendations:

R17: Taking lessons from Haiti, ERC needs to ensure that in future emergencies, the senior level leadership (HC) in country is strong and has the capacity to lead an appropriate response. If not, the ERC needs to take whatever action is necessary to bolster the capacity by bringing in staff with appropriate leadership skills to work alongside existing leadership, or in extreme cases, temporarily replace existing leadership. A 'step aside' policy may also be considered in some circumstances.

R18: In 'corporate response', the ERC needs to ensure that at the HQ a senior leader (D2) is designated as operations director with full authority and responsibility to command and control all necessary resources within the organisation. This should be in place for at least three months, and reviewed at the end of ten weeks of the response.

8.4.2 Internal Management and Operational Issues:

The ETF/OTF mechanism helped in coordinating between the two locations of HQ. However, they were sometimes too large and lacked clear focus and structure. There was no single central point for clearing of information-demands and queries made on the CO by different parts of the HQ, and this wasted a lot of time of the deployed staff causing frustrations. OCHA has a highly complex organigram, with overlapping functions split between GVA and NY which has a tendency to cause delays and unclear locus of responsibility, not geared to efficient and timely decisions. OCHA has no SOP or central point within the organisation to provide mandatory logistical support to staff deployed in emergencies.

Recommendations:

R15: OCHA needs to get better at following the SOPs it has (PI Emergency Response, SOP for ETF, Deployment, etc). Staff at all levels need better orientation on the existing SOPs and this needs to be done as a regular process before an emergency.

R16: Emergency Response Procedure needs to ensure that during a major emergency, there is a single focal point in the HQ which facilitates all communication with the CO/field office so as to minimise making unnecessary demands for information which may be already available in the HQ.

R21: Review the arrangements with UNDP for providing administrative support in country, and ensure that avoidable inefficiencies do not come in the way of fast and efficient response.

R22: The Dalberg report on administrative and organisation systems is a good start, and OCHA needs to speed up implementation of the recommendations on structural relationship and accountability made in that report.

8.4.3 Deployment and Staff Support:

OCHA did well in terms of rapid deployment of a substantial number of people in the first six weeks. The deployments, however, faced major challenge in getting the right balance of numbers and quality, skills and expertise. SOPs for deployment were not always followed and these caused serious problems in the field. After the surge, when it came to replace the 'first-responders' from week 3 onwards, OCHA had problems in identifying people who were prepared to go to Haiti and/or who spoke French. Despite SOPs requiring staff to be deployed for at least six weeks, many managers were reluctant to deploy their staff for any more than 3-4 weeks. This led to frequent changes at all levels of staff, and staff continuity became a major problem which continues to affect the programme even now. OCHA staff deployed in the first few weeks had little support by way of office facilities, accommodation and survival gear, and it took over four weeks to get some acceptable facilities in place which would give the office and staff a minimum living and working conditions.

OCHA does not have a functioning system for induction and briefing of staff before deployment. In the emergency response procedure, there is no mention of a mandatory handover process. Besides briefing and induction, OCHA also does not have a system of training for its serving staff which could prepare them for different managerial roles.

Recommendations:

R19: OCHA needs to review its staff development policies and practices, and put in place a functioning system of training and orientation of staff deployed in emergencies.

EVALUATION OF OCHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

Terms of Reference

BACKGROUND

On 12 January 2010, a powerful earthquake measuring 7.0 (USGS) on the Richter scale hit Haiti. The earthquake had an epicenter near the town of Léogâne (reported to be 80% destroyed), approximately 25 km west of the capital Port-au-Prince.⁹⁹ The capital suffered extensive damage and the nearby cities of Carrefour and Jacmel and other urban areas to the west and south of Port-au-Prince were also badly affected.

The death toll from the Haiti Earthquake was the fifth largest in recorded history of natural disasters. The Government of Haiti estimates that 230,000 people died, including 101 United Nations staff, and some 300,600 were wounded. Over 97,000 houses were destroyed, and over 188,000 damaged to some degree. Three million people have been affected, of whom the Government estimates 1.9 million have lost their homes and over 511,000 have left the affected cities.

Several factors made the humanitarian response in Haiti especially complex. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world, with high malnutrition rates, low access to basic health services, fragile security situation, and extremely limited government capacity. Logistical obstacles were immense: as the seaport was damaged, all staff, relief supplies, and operational assets and supplies had to be flown in via a single runway airport in Port au Prince¹⁰⁰. Shortage of fuel and water supplies and damaged infrastructure hampered the response. The urban setting of the disaster and the large number of relief agencies (over 1000, many new) and non-traditional actors, including MINUSTAH¹⁰¹ and other deployed forces, presented a challenge in itself.

On January 13, OCHA classified the response to Haiti earthquake as ‘corporate’, requiring a ‘whole of organization’ effort¹⁰². OCHA Haiti office was expanded from five to over 50 international staff within the first week through the Emergency Response Roster, surge missions and stand-by partners. The Flash Appeal, launched in a record of 72 hours and requesting US\$575 million for an initial 6-month period, was over 100% funded. The Revised Humanitarian Appeal, launched on 18 February asking for \$1.4 billion over a one-year period of relief and early recovery, was adjusted following a Mid-Year Review (MYR) to \$1.488 billion, of which 64 percent is funded¹⁰³. CERF allocations exceed US\$ 36 million, and the Emergency Recovery and Reconciliation Fund (ERRF) support has increased from US\$ 0 in 2009 to over US\$76 million, out of which some US\$ 60 million have already been disbursed. The Cluster Approach was implemented with the rollout of 12 clusters in Haiti and mirroring clusters in Dominican Republic.

Six months onto the emergency, the humanitarian needs remain immense

RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

⁹⁹ population 9,780,064, Humanitarian Development Index rank 149

¹⁰⁰ Logistical hubs were established in the seaport and airport of Santo Domingo (capital of neighboring Dominican Republic) plus logistical support along the road from Santo Domingo to Port-au-Prince

¹⁰¹ The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, established 1 June 2004

¹⁰² Deactivated on 12 March 2010

¹⁰³ As of 24 July 2010; for humanitarian operations alone

In view of the size of the Haiti disaster and the subsequent response, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) triggered a Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) for Haiti to assess the disaster response and inform decision-makers, (primarily at country but also at the headquarters level), draw lessons, and allow corrections to be made, where necessary, in real time. The RTE mission in April 2010, covering the first three months of the response, was a part a larger multiphase RTE process; a subsequent mission in October is expected to cover the transitional issues.

While the findings of the first phase of IA RTE evaluation address the performance of the humanitarian system as a whole, this evaluation will examine OCHA's response policies, structures and processes and their overall effectiveness in execution of OCHA's core coordination functions. The evaluation is commissioned in line with OCHA Evaluation Strategy for 2010-2013, which calls for an evaluation of every declared corporate response. This is the first such evaluation ever conducted by the organization.

OBJECTIVES

Objectives of the evaluation are to:

- 1) Examine whether meaningful results were achieved and whether OCHA successfully identified and performed its core coordination functions;
- 2) Examine the timeliness, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of OCHA's response to Haiti earthquake and produce lessons for improving future OCHA operations;
- 3) Review performance of all processes and structures employed during OCHA Haiti response;
- 4) Examine the extent to which the operation represents an appropriate response from OCHA in view of its mandate and priorities as laid out in the Strategic Framework; and
- 5) Assess adequacy and utilization of existing OCHA policies and procedures in guiding the emergency response.

While the evaluation is expected to produce lessons for future emergencies, it will need to take into account the extent to which these lessons can be generalized.

SCOPE AND FOCUS

The evaluation will review OCHA's response to Haiti earthquake and examine its evolution through emergency phases (0 to 72 hours, 72 hours-1 week, 1 week to 1 month, 1 month to deactivation of corporate response, and until the evaluation team arrives in Haiti). The evaluation will not focus on the results of the overall coordination effort on the affected population in Haiti as these issues will already have been covered by the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation¹⁰⁴.

As such, this internally mandated evaluation will focus on the following specific aspects:

- 1) Adequacy of planning and goal setting: the extent to which goals were adequate, appropriate, and clearly defined;
- 2) Management processes and effectiveness: assessment of the response management from headquarters and the field, including structures established (e.g. Operational Task Force, Emergency Task Force) and decision making processes; and
- 3) Nature and extent of internal and external relationships, cooperation, and exchange of information.

¹⁰⁴ April-May 2010

EVALUATION CRITERIA

The evaluation will use the following evaluation criteria: timeliness, effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness, coherence, and connectedness. Added to these standard criteria will be leadership effectiveness¹⁰⁵.

KEY ISSUES AND QUESTIONS

The key question the evaluation will address is: *how effective was OCHA in ensuring that humanitarian assistance in Haiti was delivered in a timely, cohesive and effective manner?* Specific sub-questions below are grouped around different components of the response.

PREPAREDNESS

How well prepared was OCHA to respond to a large scale corporate emergency at HQ, regional and country levels?

To what extent did preexisting plans, previously established relationships and identified lessons facilitate OCHA response in Haiti?

What were the effects of OCHA's tools, guidance and training on OCHA's performance and on the functioning of coordination systems in Haiti?

RESPONSE COORDINATION

How effective was OCHA in supporting the development of adaptive, inclusive and coherent coordination architecture in Haiti? How effective was the support to the established in-country coordination structures (e.g. direct support to the HC/DHC, support to the HCT)?

How well were stakeholders identified and partnerships developed? What were the modalities of engagement with partners, what worked well and what did not, what were the constraints?

What were the expectations of different stakeholders, and how did they relate to and influence OCHA priorities and strategies? What were the constraints?

How appropriate was the structure, strategy and style of coordination to the circumstances at country, regional and international level and with specific actors? Were the coordination tools appropriate and effectively administered under the circumstances? How coherent were the responsibilities of reporting and decision making within the various levels of coordination established?

How appropriate and effective were OCHA strategy and modalities of engagement with various deployed forces in Haiti with respect to: 1) establishing civil-military coordination mechanism in support of a coherent humanitarian response; 2) ensuring that policies and strategies of various military actors take into account humanitarian and human rights concerns; and 3) utilizing military assets to enable, facilitate, and strengthen humanitarian assistance?

How effective was OCHA in supporting clusters as platform for joint needs analysis, planning, funding and monitoring? How effective was OCHA in establishing and supporting inter-cluster coordination mechanisms?

How effective was OCHA in advocating for and ensuring the involvement of civil society, NGOs, and government

¹⁰⁵ in line with TEC: Coordination of Humanitarian assistance in Tsunami-affected countries, 2006

counterparts in humanitarian response?

How adequate were the mechanisms put in place to ensure that the humanitarian response takes into account cross cutting issues and specific needs of vulnerable groups¹⁰⁶?

How were protection issues identified, analyzed, reported, and addressed?

How effective was OCHA in ensuring that the early recovery concerns and transition issues were reflected in the emergency response? How coherent were the linkages between needs assessments, planning, funding, and monitoring for relief and early recovery?

How effective was OCHA in identifying and addressing critical factors regarding humanitarian space, access and security?

Examine the innovative practices mentioned in the IA RTE Haiti (PSEA Coordinator, Gencap, and CDAC), their effect on the response and possibilities for replicating to other emergency settings.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND FUNDING MECHANISMS

How effective was OCHA in the provision of timely availability of funding, channeling it to the priority areas, and ensuring that funding supports local and national capacities?

How different funding mechanisms and tools were employed and administered (e.g. CERF, ERRF, Flash Appeal)?

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

How effective was OCHA in supporting a coordinated approach to assessing humanitarian needs in Haiti? How adequate, relevant and timely was the information collected and how was the information used and disseminated?

How effective was OCHA in identifying, collecting, and analyzing information regarding capacities and activities of various response actors, and how was that information used?

What were the information needs of different stakeholders, including affected population, and how did they develop over time? How were the audiences/stakeholders identified and targeted? How was information collected, processed, analyzed, targeted, and disseminated?

How effective and systematic was OCHA in communicating timely, relevant, appropriate and reliable information from the field to enable OCHA to coordinate actors at all levels and raise/promote humanitarian concerns?

COMMUNICATION AND ADVOCACY

How coherent were communication messages to various stakeholders, including affected population? Did OCHA speak with one voice through out the response?

How was the information about the humanitarian situation, needs, achievements and constraints presented to the media? How proactive was OCHA in its relation to the media?

¹⁰⁶ age, disability, gender, HIV/AIDS, PSEA, GBV

How was the advocacy agenda formulated and to what extent was it driven by the evolving humanitarian needs in Haiti? How well were key messages developed and articulated? Were the advocacy goals, objectives, strategies and tactics timely, relevant, and coherent?

MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

To what extent were OCHA policies, and guidance applied, and what was their relevance to and effect on the intervention?

What were the implications of activation and deactivation 'corporate' response on internal mechanisms employed and on the overall effectiveness of the response?

Were the goals, priorities, and approaches clearly defined, appropriate, and relevant to OCHA strategic priorities as laid out in the Strategic Framework? How were OCHA needs and constraints (internal and external) identified, prioritized and addressed at different stages of the response?

How appropriate, efficient and effective were internal cost-planning processes and preparation of the OCHA Flash project/donor fundraising proposals?

How effective was surge capacity in deploying the right people, on the right positions, at the right points in time?

How were OCHA human resource procedures and practices (e.g. level of experience/expertise of field staff; use of national and expatriate staff; staff turnover; recruitment/deployment procedures; briefing and debriefing procedures) applied and what was their effect on the response as it evolved?

Did OCHA provide adequate and timely support for affected and deployed staff in Haiti (administrative, IT, logistics, staff welfare/health/psychosocial)?

Did OCHA provide relevant and timely guidance, tools and resources to enable staff to respond, in particular with regard to the relationship to other stakeholders?

What systems were put in place to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of OCHA response? Have appropriate after action review and lessons learned processes been put in place? How adequate are these for measuring progress against objectives?

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

How was leadership practiced and perceived at all levels?

Given the timelines and key decision points identified in the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation, examine the role of OCHA decision making processes (e.g. what parts of the decision-taking had been taken place at the strategic level with the USG's office, within OCHA at the working level, at the MINUSTAH level, etc.?)

How clear, coherent and effective were internal OCHA coordination mechanisms, accountabilities and decision-making processes at various levels, and particularly those of the Country Office, Emergency Task Force and Operational Task Force? How appropriate were the structures established to needs on the ground?

How did OCHA financial and administrative procedures impact the effectiveness of the response?

METHODOLOGY

The evaluation shall take into consideration results as identified through the Inter-Agency Real Time evaluation so as to put the findings about OCHA performance into context. The evaluation will also build on various after action reviews conducted by different sections of OCHA.

The details of the methodology, including finalization of key questions, will be developed by the evaluation team and outlined in the Inception Report. Broadly, the methodology will employ participatory approaches and incorporate:

- desk review of all relevant documentation;
- desk review of 'remote monitoring' conducted by OCHA as part of the Inter-agency Real Time Evaluation;
- key stakeholder and focus groups interviews with:
 - key informants in OCHA headquarters (Geneva and New York), and relevant field offices (regional office in Panama and country offices in Haiti and Dominican Republic)
 - key informants who participated in the response at national and/or international level
 - key informants among stakeholders (UN, MINUSTAH, (I)NGOs, government, military, donors)
 - key informants among external partners
- survey of deployed/affected staff members
- survey of external partners
- establishment of timelines to identify key events and key decision-making points;
- country-level and HQ-level workshops, including focus groups: to present initial findings, discuss emerging key issues and lessons, and formulate recommendations.

While formulating recommendations, the evaluation is expected to take into account the implications of findings and recommendations of recent real-time evaluations of humanitarian responses and of the Cluster 2 Evaluation on OCHA.

DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

All reports listed will be written in good Standard English. If in the estimation of the EGS the reports do not meet this required standard, the evaluation team will, at their own expense, undertake the editing necessary to bring it to the required standards.

Inception Report

Inception Report will iterate the parameters and work plans to operationalize and direct each aspect of the evaluation, including the design of any tools to be employed. The Inception Report will elaborate on these terms of reference by describing how the evaluation will be carried out; mapping the issues identified in the terms of reference; refining and specifying the expectations; outlining the methodology; clarifying roles and responsibilities; identifying potential key informants, and the timeframe. The inception report will incorporate the design of the survey to be administered to affected/deployed staff members. The Inception Report should also present an outline for the Final Report.

Analysis of survey of deployed/affected staff members

Analysis of survey of deployed/affected staff members, conducted by a team member, should be submitted to the evaluation team leader and the evaluation manager.

Draft Report

The draft report of the evaluation must be submitted to the evaluation manager first, who will distribute it to the Advisory Group set up to guide the evaluation. The Evaluation Section will share the comments received with the evaluation consultant(s), who is responsible for documenting all comments received in a tabular format (including who sent them, location in the draft report, whether they were accepted or not, and, if not, why).

Final Report

The final evaluation report should be logically structured, containing evidence-based findings, conclusions, lessons and recommendations, and should be free of information that is not relevant to the overall analysis. The report should be presented in a way that makes the information accessible and comprehensible. The final report of the evaluation should:

- Present main findings and conclusions up-front in the Executive Summary and use the rest of the report for more detailed analyses and presentation of findings;
- Focus on readers' expectations with regard to the object of evaluation;
- Have clear overall structure that is easy to understand;
- Explain the evaluation questions, and be explicit about evaluation criteria and standards of performance;
- Present negative findings constructively;
- Use a consistent and conventional system for footnotes and references in the text,
- Explain abbreviations and list them in a separate glossary,
- Use tables and figures to facilitate understanding, where appropriate.

The evaluation report should provide a clear analysis of the crisis, including key events and key decision making points (and a chronology where appropriate).

Recommendations should:

- follow on from the main conclusions and reflect consultation with key stakeholders;
- addressed to (the group of) persons who in the opinion of the evaluator need(s) to take action;
- be clear, relevant and achievable, with a reasonable level of effort and within the reach of the addressees competency and authority;
- be specific in terms of separating the action required into specific "units of work" that can be attributed to (a group of) persons;
- be prioritized, with timeframe for implementation and suggestion as to where responsibility for follow-up should lie.

Power Point Presentation

Power Point Presentation of the findings, conclusions and recommendations

Summary Précis

The evaluation précis of approximately 4 pages, providing a concise summary of the methodology and main findings, conclusions and recommendations.

MANAGEMENT OF THE EVALUATION

The evaluation will be managed by OCHA's Evaluation and Guidance Section (EGS), Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB), who will assign an evaluation manager to oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. The

external consultant team (team leader) will report to the evaluation manager.

The Advisory Board (AB) will be composed of the members of the SMT or their appointed senior level representatives, with the aim to promote ownership, transparency and learning effects of evaluations. The Evaluation AB will participate in meetings convened by the evaluation manager at critical points in time and assist in guiding the evaluation process throughout its cycle. The AB will comment on the evaluation design and review the draft evaluation reports, the recommendations, the lessons identified and related follow-up.

USE OF EVALUATION REPORT

It is expected that the evaluation will contribute to organizational thinking about emergency response in OCHA and derive lessons for improving future humanitarian response operations. The conclusions and recommendations shall be discussed by the SMT. A management response matrix shall be prepared within three months of the finalization of the report.

The evaluation report will be assessed against UNEG Quality Checklist for Evaluation Reports.

EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation will employ the services of a consultant company / research institute which will consist of a team of 3 international consultants embodying the following collective experiences:

- Proven senior-level experience and ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders;
- Good knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations;
- Good knowledge of humanitarian system and its reforms, including of UN agencies, IFRC, NGOs, and local government disaster response structures and systems;
- Experience in engaging in or evaluating civil/military coordination;
- Experience in organizational/systems analysis;
- Demonstrated experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes;
- Experience in participatory approaches to evaluation;
- Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusions and to prepare well-written reports in a timely manner;
- Strong workshop facilitation skills;
- Excellent writing and presentation skills in English.
- Knowledge of French

The evaluation team will be expected to adhere to the UNEG Norms and Standards and Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN system.

TIME SCHEDULE

23 to 27 August	New York interviews
30 August to 2 September	Geneva Interviews
6 September	Inception report, including survey design
9 September	Survey administered
20 to 21 September	Panama
22 September to 1 October	Haiti
4 to 5 October	Dominican Republic

6 to 9 October	Debrief and interviews, New York
01-Nov	Draft Report
01-Dec	Final Report

Abbreviations

HoO: Head of Office
KII: Key Informant Interviews
CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund
CO: Country Office
RO: Regional Office
RC: Resident Coordinator
HC: Humanitarian Coordinator
IA: Inter-Agency
RTE: Real time Evaluation
AAR: After Action Review
CRD: Coordination and Response Division
NY: New York
ERC: Emergency Relief Coordinator
ASG: Assistant Secretary General
SF: Strategic Framework
GoH: Government of Haiti
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations
PSEA: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Evaluation of OCHA Emergency Response to the Haiti Earthquake

Inception Report¹⁰⁷

1. Introduction:

Following the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010, the humanitarian community launched a massive relief and recovery operation in Haiti. The Flash Appeal, launched within 72 hours requesting US \$575 million for an initial 6-month period, was over 100% funded. The Revised Humanitarian Appeal, launched on 18 February asking for \$1.4 billion over a one-year period of relief and early recovery, is

¹⁰⁷ Evaluation Team: Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Roberta Lossio & Francesca Citossi

already 67% funded¹⁰⁸. CERF allocations exceed US\$ 39 million, and the Emergency Recovery and Reconciliation Fund (ERRF) support has increased from US\$ 0 in 2009 to over US\$ 78 million.

Given the scale of the humanitarian response, OCHA had to step up its own capacity to support the humanitarian response. On January 13, OCHA classified the response to Haiti earthquake as 'corporate', requiring the 'whole of organisation' effort. OCHA Haiti office was expanded from five to over 50 international staff within the first week through the Emergency Response Roster, surge missions and stand-by partners. The Cluster Approach was implemented with the rollout of 12 clusters in Haiti and mirroring clusters in Dominican Republic. This evaluation was commissioned in line with OCHA Evaluation Strategy for 2010-2013, which calls for an evaluation of every declared corporate response. This is the first such evaluation ever conducted by the organisation.

2. Background:

In view of the size of the Haiti disaster and the subsequent response, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) triggered a Real Time Evaluation (IA RTE) for Haiti to assess the disaster response and inform decision-makers, (primarily at country but also at the headquarters level), draw lessons, and allow corrections to be made, where necessary, in real time. The RTE mission in April 2010, covering the first three months of the response, was part of a larger multiphase RTE process; a subsequent mission in October is expected to cover the transitional issues¹⁰⁹.

While the findings of the first phase of IA RTE evaluation address the performance of the humanitarian system as a whole, this evaluation will examine OCHA's response policies, structures and processes and their overall effectiveness in execution of OCHA's core coordination functions.

Additionally, internally within OCHA, there were several After-Action Reviews (AAR) and Lessons Review conducted on different functions by various Divisions and sections of OCHA.

2.1 Issues Emerging from the IA RTE, Reviews and OCHA Internal Documents:

Staff Mobilisation:

OCHA mobilised its staff resources for rapid deployment quickly using pre-approved cost plans and staffing table, which were used early on. However, the planning of staff availability and the matching of skills with needs was not done effectively, particularly after the first round of deployments. OCHA and the ERC did not provide the Humanitarian Coordinator (and Deputy Special Representative) with adequate support to deal with a disaster as large and complex as the Haiti earthquake has been. Staff deployment also reflected a lack of internal management discipline within OCHA regarding the sending of staff to the field without any system of clearance or prior intimation to the country management before arrival, which caused serious security problems¹¹⁰!

Taking Charge:

¹⁰⁸ FTS 27/08/10

¹⁰⁹ OCHA. Evaluation of OCHA Emergency response to the Haiti Earthquake - Terms of Reference, 28 July 2010

¹¹⁰ CRD Haiti After-Action Review 13 May 2010

Given the scale of destruction and serious impairment caused to the country office capacity by the earthquake, OCHA HQ immediately took charge of driving the response. Working through task forces led by New York and Geneva in two different time zones allowed almost round-the-clock monitoring and management of the fast evolving response. The HQ directly handled the preparation and from various sources in NY and Geneva. This saved crucial time and ensured that donor interest in the evolving operation was generated right from the early days. Even without waiting for the CO's request, the CRD sent in specialised staff to do sitreps, which were critical to provide first-hand information for donors, public and managers. This was a good practice, given the situation on the ground.

Weak Humanitarian Leadership:

As articulated by the IA RTE¹¹¹ and noted in several internal AARs, the response to the earthquake between January and April 2010 was marked by weak humanitarian leadership and local ownership. The humanitarian sector's difficulty in preparing for and responding to an urban disaster as well as a weak assessment of the humanitarian situation delayed the response and led to significant gaps in geographical and sector-based coverage⁵.

Lack of Engagement with Disaster-Affected Communities: Humanitarian agencies in general and cluster lead agencies, in particular, isolated themselves from the local communities who were not actively included in design and implementation of the response. Apart from the fact that local people had little access to the log base from which most of the clusters operated, the use of English as the dominant language in most meetings meant that the French and Creole speaking participants found it difficult to engage. The IA RTE recommended that all humanitarian actors and the Government of Haiti must improve the way the affected population were informed and communicated to. Clusters should use the services of the Communication with Disaster Affected Communities Initiative and develop a communication strategy as part of the cluster work plan (IA RTE).

Relationship between Humanitarian Country Team and Integrated Mission:

The RTE noted a lack of coordination between the UNCT and MINUSTAH with an unclear division of roles and responsibilities arising from the fact that there are no policy guidelines on how the cluster system should relate to integrated UN missions and foreign military forces in different humanitarian settings. These factors further complicated international coordination in Haiti. In the provinces, OCHA field offices did not take advantage of the presence of MINUSTAH Civil Affairs Officers who had good local knowledge and long-standing relations with local authorities.

Cluster Coordination:

Most clusters worked almost to the exclusion of the Government in their deliberations and planning. The IA RTE concluded that OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team, the Government of Haiti and donors need to make a concerted effort to embed clusters within technical ministries. The ultimate goal should be the inclusion of clusters into the government structure. Alternatively, clusters should be co-led by the government. The good practices mentioned in the RTE are the Ministry of Agriculture that co-lead the agriculture cluster and the WASH cluster meetings, which were held at the national authority for water and sanitation (DINEPA). The capacity of OCHA Haiti was too limited during the emergency response to meet the task of inter-cluster coordination, which was found to be weak. This was because instead of

¹¹¹ Inter-agency Real Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake; François Grunewald (Groupe URD) Andrea Binder

coordinating clusters, the meetings resembled inter-agency meetings. Inter-cluster coordination neglected multidisciplinary questions and cross-cutting issues, which were left to the individual clusters.

Working with partners:

The media attention received by Haiti earthquake attracted a large number of actors with different capacities and interests, some of them new to the humanitarian context. This created a coordination challenge that overwhelmed OCHA and cluster leaders' capacity to plan the response adequately. Additionally, the humanitarian response in Haiti missed the opportunity to work closely with private sector actors. Most clusters were unable to respond positively to the estimated \$70 million in offers from the private sector, because the bureaucratic systems and procedures for receiving and utilising these resources had not been pre-established¹¹². Information management was a weak point of cluster coordination in Haiti. OCHA's "Who does What and Where" was not timely, information got lost and the cluster's institutional memory barely existed. The low quality of information management was partly related to OCHA's stretched capacities during the emergency (IA RTE).

Needs Assessment:

Needs assessment, though recognised as an area that needed to be prioritized right from the start, there were no clear structures, guidance or modalities in place to support this process. The deployment of needs assessment capacity and expertise was done on a last-minute basis and geared towards "planning on the go" and "learning while doing"¹¹³.

Although some clusters clearly demonstrated a capacity to undertake rapid needs assessments, the multi-sectoral need and capacity assessment was inadequate in the initial stages of the response¹¹⁴.

OCHA's Lack of Preparedness to Support Deployed Staff: Although OCHA was able to deploy a substantial number of staff rapidly, 'logistics' was consistently highlighted as an area of weakness, both in terms of office space and administrative support for OCHA to operate as well as the availability of personal deployment kits including camping and survival gear. Ensuring operational self-reliance for OCHA surge deployed will be critical in future emergencies.

Weak link between relief and recovery:

OCHA's Meta evaluation¹¹⁵ pointed out that there is lack of continuity of the roles of task forces and the coordination efforts in general after emergency situations subside. In Haiti emergency, when the PDNA process to link relief to recovery started, OCHA had weak capacity to coordinate the humanitarian community, the clusters and the PDNA Coordination Committee. This was partly because of language barriers and distance between PDNA and humanitarian base camps¹¹⁶.

2.2 Issues Emerging from Preliminary Briefings in New York and Geneva:

The Notion of Corporate Response:

By declaring the Haiti earthquake a 'corporate response' the management was able to ensure that the

¹¹² ASC. RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN HAITI, Achievements, Challenges and Lessons To Be Learned

¹¹³ After-Action Review, Rapid Multi-cluster Needs Assessment in Haiti, 05 April, 2010

¹¹⁴ IASC. RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN HAITI, *ibid*

¹¹⁵ OCHA. OCHA Meta Evaluation. July 2009. Pierre Robert and Dr Achim Engelhardt.

¹¹⁶ IASC. RESPONSE TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN HAITI, *ibid*

entire organisation rallied behind supporting the Haiti response and this gave managers authority to draw on support from various departments and units whenever needed. However, an issue that remains unclear is whether the duration of the corporate response was the right one or needed to have been longer in order to give greater leverage to managers to ensure that medium to long term deployments were place before the phase out of corporate response.

Decision making within OCHA:

Several major time-critical decisions were delayed by weeks and months, which led to a vacuum in leadership and ultimately affected OCHA's ability to perform its role effectively. From the lack of support to HC in the early weeks, dithering over the grade for the Head of Office which dragged on for several weeks, failure to put in place a long-term HoO for over seven months after the earthquake, to inability to regulate and control a free-for-all self-deployment to Haiti immediately after the earthquake creating unmanageable confusion on the ground, all point towards lack of decisive leadership at critical points of time.

Lack of Staff Continuity and long-term Deployment Plan: For the first few weeks, Haiti had no administrative staff and in the following six months of the response, the Haiti office had no 'regular' administrative support and had to rely on short-term deployments for 3-6 weeks, with gaps lasting several weeks in between. This incapacitated the CO and forced the HoOs who were themselves on short-term deployments to focus bulk of their time on administration just to ensure that the office functioned. The HoOs and Deputy HoOs have also changed several times in the past seven months as OCHA failed to plan the deployments after the initial surge.

Lack of Staff Survival Kit and Logistical Support: Staff arriving in Haiti had no access to even basic survival kit for their personal well-being or even the minimum facilities for becoming functional (office space, IT, computer, etc). OCHA had to set up its office from a scratch as the previous office was totally destroyed, but it had no office-in-a-box which the deployed staff could use to become functional. Almost all staff who were deployed in the first four weeks who were interviewed by the reviewers were of the opinion that OCHA was the only major humanitarian organisation which had its staff turn up virtually empty-handed, expecting that things will somehow materialise once they were deployed.

Task Forces:

The two task forces set up in Geneva and New York worked in tandem and helped provide almost a round-the-clock oversight to the Haiti response. However, in the first couple of weeks, these task force calls were attended by over 30-50 people, and at times these dragged on too long. While OCHA now has a template to coordinate its response, there is need to streamline the purpose and structure of the task force meetings so that they remain focused and facilitate decision-making by managers and ensure follow up at appropriate levels.

Policies and SOPs: OCHA has developed number of policies on various aspects emergency response, from preparedness, deployment, to management of various support functions like information management, IT, logistics, administration, resource mobilisation, coordination, etc., and this review needs to assess how these policies were utilised in shaping and managing the response.

3. Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation:

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- 1) Examine whether meaningful results were achieved and whether OCHA successfully identified and performed its core coordination functions;
- 2) Examine the timeliness, relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of OCHA's response to Haiti earthquake and produce lessons for improving future OCHA operations;
- 3) Review performance of all processes and structures employed during OCHA Haiti response;
- 4) Examine the extent to which the operation represents an appropriate response from OCHA in view of its mandate and priorities as laid out in the Strategic Framework; and
- 5) Assess adequacy and utilisation of existing OCHA policies and procedures in guiding the emergency response.

3.1 Scope and Focus:

The evaluation will review OCHA's response to Haiti earthquake and examine its evolution through emergency phases (0 to 72 hours, 72 hours-1 week, 1 week to 1 month, 1 month to deactivation of corporate response, and until the evaluation team arrives in Haiti). The evaluation will not focus on the results of the overall coordination effort on the affected population in Haiti as these issues will already have been covered by the Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation¹¹⁷.

As such, this internally mandated evaluation will focus on the following specific aspects:

- 1) Adequacy of planning and goal setting: the extent to which goals were adequate, appropriate and clearly defined;
- 2) Management processes and effectiveness: assessment of the response management from headquarters and the field, including structures established (e.g. Operational Task Force, Emergency Task Force) and decision making processes; and
- 3) Nature and extent of internal and external relationships, cooperation, and exchange of information.
- 4) While examining the above aspects, the evaluation will assess how these developed over different phases of the response, namely, first 3 days, first fortnight, first month, three months and subsequent period.

4. Methodology:

4.1 Evaluation Framework:

¹¹⁷ April-May 2010

OCHA's core functions as stated in its Strategic Framework¹¹⁸ are: Co-ordination, Humanitarian Financing, Policy Development, Advocacy, and Information Management. These will form the key focus along with leadership, management and administration of emergency response around which key evaluation questions will be designed keeping in mind the five objectives of the evaluation as articulated in section 3 above. The findings from these will then be further analysed using the standard Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Criteria¹¹⁹ for humanitarian evaluations. The OECD/DAC criteria¹¹⁹ will be applied to the findings to draw overall conclusions on Relevance and Appropriateness, Timeliness, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Coherence, and Connectedness. The data gathered through the questions outlined in section 5 below will provide the main evidence for drawing conclusions on these criteria.

4.2 Methodological Approach:

The overall methodology will be based on both inductive and deductive approaches using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a carefully selected range of sources as indicated below.

4.2.1 Key Methods:

The evaluation will follow the following steps in conducting research, data collection, triangulation, analysis and reporting:

- · Briefing and scoping: Key Informant Interviews in HQ and Geneva, document research;
- · Detailed document research: a comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and data on Haiti response, as well as OCHA's policies and frameworks relevant to emergency response;
- · Preparation of inception report, which will be agreed with OCHA stakeholders;
- · In-depth Country visits to Haiti and Panama Regional Office (RO) of OCHA will form the basis of data gathering and, supplemented with learning obtained from questionnaires and telephone interviews;
- · Surveys – two sets of questionnaires will be administered: one for external key informants (for example, cluster members, other humanitarian organisations) and another for internal (OCHA) key informants;
- · Semi-structured and structured interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone with a range of stakeholders including cluster members, UN agencies, NGOs, partners, donors, international organisations and governments;
- · Data analysis and preliminary findings;
- · Oral Presentation to OCHA stakeholders in New York as part of validation process;
- · Preparation of first draft of the report, and obtaining comments from OCHA;
- · Preparation of second draft based on feedback on the first draft;
- · Final report.

¹¹⁸ OCHA. Reference Guide for OCHA's Strategic Framework 2010-2013

¹¹⁹ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies, 1999.

4.2.2 Surveys:

Two survey instruments will be designed and administered in order to take inventory of perceptions of key external stakeholders, and gather views and feedback from a number of UNICEF staff in different countries. These will supplement the information gathered through more in-depth interviews and data gathering that will be conducted with both internal and external stakeholders.

The purpose of the surveys is twofold:

- An internal survey will complement data gathered from direct observations and field visits and key informant interviews. This will elicit individual staff's views and overall leadership, feedback on decision making and communication during the response, effectiveness of deployment, administrative support and guidance (*Questionnaire attached as Annex 5*).
- To take inventory of perception of external stakeholders (partners, HC/RC, other UN cluster leads, UN agencies, RCRC, etc) of OCHA's strengths and competencies and its leadership as demonstrated in the Haiti response (*Questionnaire attached as Annex 6*).

5. Key Evaluation Questions and Key Informants:

The purpose and the objectives of the evaluation as outlined in the terms of reference will be achieved by using the following key questions that will be addressed during the evaluation.

The evaluators will use these lead questions as reference point to adapt the questions to different interlocutors during interviews with UNICEF staff, partners, other UN agencies, country visits and telephone interviews, etc.

Key Areas of Enquiry	Lead Questions/Issues to be examined	Sources of information/ data; data collection methods
1. Coordination	<p>1.1 How effective was OCHA in supporting the development of adaptive, inclusive and coherent coordination architecture in Haiti? How effectively did OCHA support the HC/DHC and cluster coordinators in their roles in Haiti? Were Coordination tools appropriate and effectively administered?</p> <p>1.2 How effective was the inter-cluster coordination in Haiti after the earthquake?</p> <p>1.3 How did OCHA facilitate the government's participation in and ownership of cluster processes?</p> <p>1.4 To what extent national and regional organisations participated in the response tools namely, UNDAC and INSARAG?</p> <p>1.5 How effective was OCHA in facilitating coordination with</p>	<p>KII with RC/HC, GoH, Heads of UN Agencies in Haiti; External survey.</p> <p>KII with cluster coordinators, key NGOs, Red Cross.</p> <p>KII with cluster Coordinators; GoH.</p> <p>KII with UNDAC members,</p>

Key Areas of Enquiry	Lead Questions/Issues to be examined	Sources of information/ data; data collection methods
	<p>DPKO and to what extent it effectively interacted with MINUSTAH on behalf of humanitarian community to build up a mutually supportive relationship?</p> <p>1.6 Examine the role played by OCHA in leveraging the capacity of military forces while ensuring independence, neutrality and impartiality of all humanitarian response?</p> <p>1.7 How effective was OCHA in facilitating clusters in transition phase from moving from relief to recovery/reconstruction?</p> <p>1.8 Role played by OCHA in developing tools and processes for system-wide learning on key issues. What were the effects of OCHA's tools, guidance and training on OCHA's performance and on the functioning of coordination system in Haiti?</p> <p>1.9 Did the HC and cluster members find OCHA's support 'predictable and systematic' in the Haiti response?</p> <p>1.10 To what extent OCHA's support enabled the HC to report on performance of the entire humanitarian system in terms of results?</p>	<p>HC/RC, key NGOs, Red Cross.</p> <p>KII with DPKO, RC/HC, Policy Division</p> <p>KII CivMil coordinators, NGOs, UN agencies; IA-RTE</p> <p>External survey; KII cluster coordinators, external agency staff; RC/HC.</p> <p>A/a</p> <p>A/a</p>
2. Humanitarian Financing	<p>2.1 Did OCHA facilitate joint planning and appeals through the clusters and provide leadership on humanitarian financing in the Haiti response?</p> <p>2.2 What role did OCHA play in facilitating media relations, public communication and advocacy by the humanitarian community?</p> <p>2.3 Assess OCHA's role in building relationships with private actors, community-based organisations, religious organisations, etc., which were highly active in the emergency response?</p> <p>2.4 How effectively did OCHA engage with Government of Haiti (GoH) and other relevant local authorities in determining the nature of humanitarian response?</p> <p>2.5 To what extent did previously established relationships facilitate the response in Haiti? How well were stakeholders identified and partnerships developed during the response?</p> <p>2.6 How effective was OCHA in the provision of timely availability of funding, channelling it to priority areas, and ensuring that funding supported local and national capacities?</p> <p>2.7 How different funding mechanisms and tools were employed and administered?.</p>	<p>Desk research preparedness plans; KII with key CRD staff, RO.</p> <p>KII GoH, cluster members, UN agencies.</p>
3. Policy Development and Advocacy	<p>2.1 Did OCHA facilitate joint planning and appeals through the clusters and provide leadership on humanitarian financing in the Haiti response?</p> <p>2.2 What role did OCHA play in facilitating media relations, public communication and advocacy by the humanitarian</p>	<p>KII with RC/HC, HoO, key HQ staff, Deployed staff; Internal survey.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HoO, HC, Internal survey.</p>

Key Areas of Enquiry	Lead Questions/Issues to be examined	Sources of information/ data; data collection methods
	<p>community?</p> <p>2.3 Assess OCHA's role in building relationships with private actors, community-based organisations, religious organisations, etc., which were highly active in the emergency response?</p> <p>2.4 How effectively did OCHA engage with Government of Haiti (GoH) and other relevant local authorities in determining the nature of humanitarian response?</p> <p>2.5 To what extent did previously established relationships facilitate the response in Haiti? How well were stakeholders identified and partnerships developed during the response?</p> <p>2.6 How effective was OCHA in the provision of timely availability of funding, channeling it to priority areas, and ensuring that funding supported local and national capacities?</p> <p>2.7 How different funding mechanisms and tools were employed and administered?</p>	<p>Desk research; KII with cluster members, OCHA staff; External Survey.</p> <p>KII with cluster members & GoH; External Survey.</p> <p>KII OCHA staff, cluster members, Desk research.</p> <p>Internal survey; KII CERF, CAP sections, resource mobilisation staff, cluster coordinators.</p> <p>KII CERF, CAP sections, resource mobilisation staff, cluster coordinators, NGOs.</p>
4. Information Management	<p>3.1 Examine role played by OCHA in gathering data and facilitating collective policy development and advocacy issues.</p> <p>3.2 How did OCHA provide data and analysis to support ERC in shaping the humanitarian agenda within the UN system?</p> <p>3.3 How adequate were the mechanisms put in place to ensure that the humanitarian response took into account cross-cutting issues and specific needs of vulnerable groups?</p> <p>3.4 How effective was OCHA in ensuring that the early recovery concerns and transition issues were reflected in the emergency response?</p> <p>3.5 How coherent were the communication messages to various stakeholders, including the affected population?</p> <p>3.6 How was the information about humanitarian situation, needs, achievements and constraints presented to the media, and how proactive was OCHA in its relations with the media?</p> <p>3.7 How was the advocacy agenda formulated and to what extent was it driven by the evolving humanitarian needs in Haiti? How well were key messages developed and articulated? Were the advocacy goals, objectives, strategies and tactics timely, relevant, and coherent?</p> <p>3.8 Examine the innovative practices mentioned in the IA RTE Haiti (PSEA Coordinator, Gencap, and CDAC), their effect on the response and possibilities for replicating to other emergency settings.</p>	<p>Desk research, key policy documents; KII HQ staff, HoO, HC/RC.</p> <p>KII ERC, HoO, IM staff.</p> <p>KII GoH, NGOs, UN agencies, cluster coordinators. IA RTE; Internal survey</p> <p>PDNA; KII HC; HCT Planning documents.</p> <p>KII GoH, NGOs, UN agencies, cluster coordinators. KII HQ media and communication staff;</p> <p>KII communication/ media staff, PDSB.</p> <p>KII GenCap advisors, OCHA staff, HC, cluster coordinators.</p>
5. Management and	4.1 Assess OCHA's role in supporting common humanitarian	IAAR needs assessment; KII

Key Areas of Enquiry	Lead Questions/Issues to be examined	Sources of information/ data; data collection methods
Administration	<p>programme cycle involving needs assessment, data gathering and joint analysis, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian outcomes.</p> <p>4.2 How coherent was the linkage between needs assessments, planning, funding and monitoring of relief and early recovery?</p> <p>4.3 How effective was OCHA in identifying, collecting and analysing information regarding capacities and activities of various response actors, and how was the information used?</p> <p>4.4 How effective and systematic was OCHA in communicating timely, relevant, appropriate and reliable information from the field to enable OCHA to coordinate actors at all levels and promote humanitarian concerns?</p> <p>4.5 What were the information needs of different stakeholders, including affected population, and how did these develop over time? How were the audiences/stakeholders identified and targeted, and how was information collected, analysed and disseminated?</p> <p>4.6 Examine OCHA's information management system to promote knowledge management and systematic learning.</p>	<p>cluster members; external survey.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HQ staff, HoO, Internal survey. Desk research, KII deployed staff, HQ staff, HoO</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HQ staff, HoO, Internal survey.</p> <p>KII external agencies, cluster coordinators.,</p> <p>KII HQ staff.</p>
6. Roles and Responsibilities	<p>5.1 How well prepared was OCHA to respond to a large scale corporate emergency at HQ, regional and country level?</p> <p>5.2 To what extent OCHA demonstrated ability to take clear decisions determining the level of OCHA scaling up in Haiti?</p> <p>5.3 Did OCHA have the necessary tools and capacity to respond to fast-evolving response by the humanitarian community?</p> <p>5.4 What were the implications of activation and deactivation of 'corporate' response on internal mechanisms and on the overall effectiveness of the response?</p> <p>5.5 How timely was the surge deployment and how effectively did OCHA support the deployed staff in becoming operations-ready in a fast-evolving situation?</p> <p>Are the existing structures and procedures adequate to ensure staff welfare prior and after the deployment?</p> <p>5.6 How effective was OCHA's workforce plan when it came to replacing the surge deployed once their mission was over?</p> <p>5.7 To what extent were the deployments informed by clear analysis of capacity needs of the country office?</p> <p>5.8 To what extent accountability and decision making processes are clearly established and agreed upon in HQ, GNV and NY, and CO?</p> <p>5.9 Is OCHA's Resource allocation made on the basis of clear result-driven plans? Comment on OCHA's financial</p>	<p>Desk research preparedness plans; KII with key CRD staff, RO.</p> <p>KII GoH, cluster members, UN agencies.</p> <p>Desk research; KIIs; Surveys.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HQ staff, HoO, Internal survey.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HQ staff, HoO, Internal survey.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HoO, Internal survey.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HQ staff, HoO, Internal survey.</p> <p>KII deployed staff, HQ staff, Internal survey</p> <p>Desk research – FTS, donor</p>

Key Areas of Enquiry	Lead Questions/Issues to be examined	Sources of information/ data; data collection methods
	<p>monitoring and reporting.</p> <p>5.10 How did OCHA's financial authority allocations and financial systems work in the Haiti response on the ground?</p> <p>5.11 To what extent OCHA policies and guidance applied, and what was their relevance to and effect on the intervention in different phases of the response?</p> <p>5.12 To what extent is knowledge managed internally to ensure that lessons learned are integrated into policy, planning and operation? Assess if OCHA helped disseminate and integrate lessons from previous emergencies in determining the priorities and strategies for the Haiti response.</p> <p>5.13 What systems were put in place to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of OCHA response? Have appropriate AAR and lessons learned processes been put in place?</p>	<p>reports.</p> <p>KII HoO, AO, Internal survey.</p> <p>Desk research, AARs, KII HoO, CRD</p>
	<p>6.1 Examine the internal OCHA decision-making processes and comment how clear, coherent and effective were the internal coordination mechanisms, accountabilities and decision making processes at various levels? How appropriate were the structures established to respond to needs on the ground?</p> <p>6.2 How was leadership practised and perceived at all levels?</p> <p>6.3 Examine the role of OCHA decision-making processes at strategic and operational levels.</p>	<p>IA-RTE; OTF/ETF minutes; KII, CRD, ERC.</p> <p>Internal survey; KII deployed staff.</p> <p>OTF/ETF minutes; KII, CRD, ERC; Internal survey; KII deployed staff.</p>

5.1 Key Informants and Agencies:

A list of key informants identified at this stage based on the above table is shown below. The evaluators may add to this list in the course of their research in the coming weeks:

Stakeholder group	Possible candidates for interview/meetings by the evaluation team
OCHA HQ senior management	ERC, ASG, Director New York and Geneva, Directors and Deputy Directors of CRD, EO and AO, Chiefs of PDSB, CISB, ERSMB, ESB and Strategic Planning Unit, CERF.
OCHA-Middle	Americas and the Caribbean, Central Asia, Europe and Middle East Section,

Managers; section chiefs & Deputies	Human Resources Section, Finance Section, Funding Coordination Section, IASC Secretariat, Communication services section, Information Services Section, Advocacy and Visual Media Unit, Information Technology Section, Evaluation and Guidance Section, Disaster and Vulnerability Policy Section, CAP Section, Brussels Liaison Office, Civil Military Coordination Section, Emergency Preparedness, Field Coordination Support Section, Logistics Support Unit, Surge Capacity Section, UNDAC team.
OCHA – Specialists, desks	Gender Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Officers and desks deployed in Haiti.
OCHA- CO/RO	Head and Deputy in RO; HoO/Deputy Haiti, Sub-offices in Jacmel, Petit Goave, Léogâne and Gonaives, Civil Military Coordination in Haiti.
Other UN agencies	Heads and humanitarian officers of UNICEF, WFP, IOM, FAO, UNHCR, WHO/PAHO in Haiti; senior management of DPKO in NY; MINUSTAH in Haiti, RC/HC in both Haiti and Dom Republic.
Cluster members, partners	All cluster coordinators, Heads of Emergencies/Operations for OXFAM, CARE, World Vision, IFRC, ICRC, Save the Children, Concern, ACF in Haiti.
GoH	Senior management of Direction Nationale de Protection Civile, Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA), Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire, Ministries (i.e. Agriculture, Plan and Public Works, Ministre à la Conditions Feminine) and Municipal Authorities (i.e Port au Prince, Léogâne).
Key Donors	Key representatives Permanent Mission of Brazil in NY, Permanent Mission of USA in NY, Permanente Mission of the UK in NY, Permanent Mission of Canada in NY, DFID, ECHO in Haiti, USAID. CIDA.
National NGOs	Senior management and specialists of Fanm Viktim Leve Kanpe (FAVILEK), Haiti Response Coalition (HRC), Observatoire Citoyen.
Others	GenCap Expert, PSEA coordinator, NGO Coordination Support Secretariat.

6. Timetable:

Key Activity	From	To
Briefing in NY	08/23/10	08/27/10
Briefing GVA	08/30/10	09/02/10
Preliminary Desk Research	09/03/10	09/06/10
Drafting Inception Report and survey instruments	09/07/10	09/10/10
Finalisation of Inception Report & Questionnaires	09/13/10	09/20/10
Testing of survey instruments and administering the survey	09/13/10	10/05/10
Visit to Panama	09/21/10	09/22/10
To Haiti	09/23/10	10/03/10
NY debriefing preparation, debriefing and meetings	10/04/10	10/06/10
Further desk research, Analysis of survey results and drafting of 1 st Draft Report	10/07/10	10/17/10
Submission of 1 st draft Report		10/18/10
Incorporate comments on 1 st draft Report	10/27/10	10/31/10
2 nd Draft Report submission		11/01/10
Final Report, with comments on 2 nd Draft incorporated, and all Annexes finalised	11/10/10	11/11/10

7. Deliverables:

As outlined in the ToR, the deliverables will be as follows:

- Inception Report.
- A presentation of key findings to OCHA in NY.
- Draft Report with survey findings incorporated.
- A second draft incorporating comments on 1st Draft.
- Final Report with Annexes.

8. Organisation & Management of the Evaluation:

The evaluation will be managed by OCHA's Evaluation and Guidance Section (EGS), Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB), who has assigned an evaluation manager to oversee the conduct and quality of the evaluation. The external consultant team (team leader) will report to the evaluation manager.

An Advisory Board has been set up to provide oversight to the evaluation. The Advisory Board (AB) is composed of the members of the SMT or their appointed senior level representatives, with the aim to promote ownership, transparency and learning effects of evaluations.

The Evaluation AB will participate in meetings convened by the evaluation manager at critical points in time and assist in guiding the evaluation process throughout its cycle. The AB will comment on the evaluation design and review the draft evaluation reports, the recommendations, the lessons identified and related follow-up.

8.1 Format of the Report:

The report will be laid out in six sections as below:

Executive Summary, with Key Lessons and Recommendations.

Section 1: Introduction, Background, Objectives and Methodology of the Evaluation.

Section 2: The Context – Complexities of the country context, humanitarian needs, role and priorities OCHA.

Section 3: Key Achievements of OCHA in Haiti.

Section 4: Main Findings of the Evaluation – presented against OCHA's Strategic Framework, which define its role in emergencies.

Section 5: Assessment against OECD/DAC Criteria for Evaluations.

Section 6: Summary of Key Lessons, Conclusion and Recommendations.

8.2 Performance Criteria:

Broadly the following four criteria will be used to assess the quality of the evaluation process and outcome:

1. The evaluation process needs to engage a sizeable section of OCHA staff, especially those at the operational end of humanitarian action;
2. The report establishes clear links between the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations on the specific questions outlined in the TOR. It is important that the evaluation process contributes to developing a common, widely shared analysis within OCHA of the organisation's humanitarian response capacity and the priority issues to be addressed;
3. The report enhances the analysis and identifies recommendations that are SMART as well as take the learning beyond what was provided by the previous evaluation;
4. The Reports conforms to OCHA Evaluation Standards and UNEG Evaluation Standards.

LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

NAME/FUNCTION	ORGANISATION	POSITION
NEW YORK		
Mr. John Holmes	OCHA	Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator
Ms. Catherine Bragg	OCHA	Assistant Secretary-General Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
Mr. Hansjoerg Strohmeier	OCHA	Chief of Policy Development and Studies Branch
Ms. Patricia BANKS	OCHA	Chief of Communications and Information Services Branch (CISB)
Mr. Oliver Lacey-Hall	OCHA	Deputy Chief CISB
Mr. Carlos Monteiro-Pereira	OCHA	Chief Americas and the Caribbean, Central Asia, Europe and Middle East Section Coordination and Response Division
Ms Kate Burns	OCHA	Senior Gender Policy Advisor
Ms. Arzu Hatakoy	OCHA	Associate Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Coordination and Response Division
Mr. Nicholas Reader	OCHA	Public Information Officer CISB
Ms. Amanda Pitt	OCHA	Information Officer CISB
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Mr Peter Goossens	WFP	Emergency Coordinator
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Ms Nadia Lochard	DPC	West Department Coordinator

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Ms. Jaunier Marie Kertine	HRC (National NGO)	Manager
Mr. Russell Lavalasse	HRC (National NGO)	Facilitator
Mr. Victor Jean Marc	HRC (National NGO)	Chief Logistics
Ms. Edna Banhonme	HRC (National NGO)	Project Manager
Mr. Roland Van Hauwemeiren	OXFAM	Country Director
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Mr. Gregory Brady	CARE Haiti	Team Leader
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Ms. Nicole Peter	World Vision	Operations Director
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Mr. Antoine Gerard	OCHA Geneva	Head of OCHA Brussels Liaison Office

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EVALUATION OF OCHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

Internal Survey Questionnaire

Dear

OCHA is undertaking an evaluation of its response to the Haiti earthquake for which it has commissioned a group of independent consultants. As part of the research, the consultants are undertaking a survey using the following questionnaire. This questionnaire is only meant for OCHA internal survey, and being administered to current and former staff members who were involved in the Haiti response, either being deployed in the country, or providing direct support to the operations from HQ.

You should have received this questionnaire together with the Terms of Reference for the **EVALUATION OF OCHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE**. The period under evaluation is from 12 January to 31 August and we would ask you to reflect this in your response. Your responses will be treated confidentially. Please note that data gathered through this questionnaire is only meant to supplement extensive data that is being gathered through various other methods, and therefore does not cover all aspects being evaluated.

There are ten questions, each question having two parts: Part (a) contains a series of statements about how OCHA managed its business processes in relation to timely and effective emergency response in the case of Haiti earthquake with which we are inviting you to agree or disagree; Part (b) invites you to share your views and/or expand on particular aspects of emergency response capacity.

We do not insist that you sign the questionnaire. However, if you want to, please do so at the end. Where the questions have multiple choices, please either tick or put a 'X' mark on only one:

Filling in the questionnaire can take between 15 - 30 minutes, depending on how much information you want to provide on part b questions.

We thank you for your cooperation in sharing with us your views on OCHA's emergency work as per this questionnaire. **Once completed, please email this before 05 October 2010 to Francesca Citossi of the Evaluation Team directly at: *Francesca citossi* francesca17@hotmail.com**

Internal Questionnaire	
<p>1a. Authority and Decision-making during emergency response was streamlined, and we knew exactly who was responsible for what in the Country office, Regional office and HQ.</p> <p><i>1b. If you want to make any comments or cite any examples of excellence or difficulty, please do so here:</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>
<p>2a The speed of decision making during Haiti emergency response and clear communication of decisions helped in shaping our response rapidly.</p> <p><i>2b Please give up to three examples of rapid and effective decision making and communication of decisions during Haiti response. If you want to make any comments or cite any examples of excellence or difficulty please do so here.</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>

<p>3a. Our rapid deployment system (ERR, standby partnership, staff deployment, pre-screened personnel etc) worked well during the Haiti response in terms of deploying the right people with right skills at the right time.</p> <p><i>3b. If you want to make any comments or cite any examples of excellence or difficulty, please do so here:</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>
<p>4a. OCHA provided adequate and timely support to the affected and deployed staff in terms of administrative, IT, logistics, staff welfare and psychosocial needs.</p> <p><i>4b. If you want to make any comments or cite any examples of excellence or difficulty, please do so here:</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>

<p>5a. OCHA's preexisting preparedness plans made our CO and HQ response-ready, in terms of ability to act fast in the emergency.</p> <p><i>5b. Please give examples of where and how preparedness plans have been helpful in getting you response-ready in case of Haiti?</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>
<p>6a. The staff who were deployed in the first three months were given clear terms of reference/job description, briefing and relevant guidance and tools to function on the ground.</p> <p><i>6b. If there was any dramatic improvements or glaring weakness in particular aspects of ToR or tools and guidance that clearly enabled or undermined performance during the response, please describe here.</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>

<p>9a. OCHA developed a cost plan quickly which provided a clear blueprint for deployments in the early phase and subsequent plans clearly articulated the direction of OCHA's response for the first one year.</p> <p><i>9b. If you want to make any comments or cite any examples of excellence or difficulty, please do so here:</i></p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>
<p>10a. OCHA put in place effective systems to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of OCHA response</p> <p><i>10b. If you want to make any comments or cite any examples of particular systems that were put in place in the Haiti response, please do so here:</i></p>	<p>5 Fully agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>

Name: (optional)

Capacity in which you were involved in the Haiti response:

If you were deployed in Haiti after 12 January, date and duration of deployment:

Current job title/organisation:

Date:

EVALUATION OF OCHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE

External Survey Questionnaire

Dear

OCHA is undertaking an evaluation of its response to the Haiti earthquake for which it has commissioned a group of independent consultants. As part of the research, the consultants are undertaking a survey using the following questionnaire. This questionnaire is meant for external stakeholders, and is being administered to about fifty individuals from two dozen selected agencies (NGOs, UN agencies, NGO networks, government/Red Cross) who were involved in the Haiti response, and were/are active members of various clusters and interagency processes within Haiti.

You should have received this questionnaire together with the Terms of Reference for the **EVALUATION OF OCHA EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE**. The period under evaluation is from 12 January to 31 August and we would ask you to reflect this in your response. Your responses will be treated confidentially. Please note that data gathered through this questionnaire is only meant to supplement extensive data that is being gathered through various other methods, and therefore does not cover all aspects of the evaluation.

There are ten (10) questions (statements) - each question contains a statement about how OCHA played its role in coordinating and providing guidance on various aspects of the emergency response in the case of Haiti earthquake with which we are inviting you to agree or disagree. **Filling in the questionnaire should take you only 5-7 minutes.**

If you want to add any comments, in addition to answering the ten questions, please feel free to do so at the end of the questionnaire. Or attach a separate sheet if necessary.

We do not insist that you sign the questionnaire. However, if you want to, please do so at the end.

We thank you for your cooperation in sharing with us your views on OCHA's role in the Haiti Earthquake response as per this questionnaire. **Once completed, please email this before 05 October 2010 to Francesca Citossi of the Evaluation Team directly to:** Francesca Citossi <francesca17@hotmail.com>

External Questionnaire	
There are fifteen questions or statements about the role OCHA played in supporting the humanitarian architecture and processes during the Haiti response in the first six months with which we are inviting you to agree or disagree. The questions are all multiple choice types, please either tick or put a 'X' mark on only one.	
About You (Please tick the appropriate one that applies to you)	
Have you been involved in working together with OCHA in the Haiti emergency response following the earthquake?	Yes No
Is your experience of working with OCHA in the Haiti response at the field or HQ level?	Field HQ Both
What is your position within your organisation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Senior country Manager o Sector Specialist in country o HQ Support Staff o HQ Humanitarian Specialist
Is your organisation:	a) UN organisation b) INGO c) NGO network, d) other (Red Cross)
Please tick one only in the right hand column.	
1. OCHA was able to deploy staff with right skills and competence to provide overall leadership on coordination of the response, and was able to establish necessary coordination structures rapidly after the earthquake.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all

2. Despite the chaos immediately following the earthquake, OCHA was able to develop effective coordination mechanism with the military forces in support of humanitarian response.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all
3. OCHA established good relationship with the national/local government authorities (civil society, NGO?) and enabled the humanitarian community to work in partnership with the government.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all
4. OCHA was highly proactive in identifying, advocating for and addressing issues related to humanitarian space, access and security.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all
5. OCHA was able to provide leadership and guidance in key sectors and clusters for rapid needs assessment.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all
6. OCHA ensured that there was effective inter-cluster co-ordination and facilitated the humanitarian country team's engagement with the clusters.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all
7. OCHA was able to facilitate adequate integration of the humanitarian needs and concerns into the post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) in the country and subsequent national reconstruction and recovery plans.	5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all

<p>8. OCHA actively facilitated different clusters functioning as the principal venue for sector planning and producing financing plans, and advocated for adequate financing of the clusters by donors.</p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>
<p>9. OCHA was effective in gathering, analysing and disseminating vital information and data on evolving humanitarian response by the entire humanitarian community.</p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>
<p>10. OCHA handled the public communication and media about the humanitarian response and communicated the overall plans and challenges effectively to the public, governments and donors.</p>	<p>5 Fully Agree 4 Partly Agree 3 Not sure 2 Don't quite Agree 1 Don't agree at all</p>

Name (optional):

Organisation:

Cluster(s) in which you have been involved and are reporting back on here:

Your comments:

Date: