Erik Bryld

Evaluation of Sida's Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts

Somalia Country Report

Sida

Foreword

Violent conflicts lead to immense suffering, constitute major obstacles to development and prevent people from escaping poverty. While poverty is generally decreasing on a global level, people living in poverty are increasingly concentrated to fragile countries affected by conflict. Today, there is a broad consensus within the international community on the need to invest in peacebuilding and conflict prevention to reach the Global Goals. As a response, Sida is increasingly focusing support to countries affected by conflict.

Support to peacebuilding is not new. Sida has been engaged in conflict and post-conflict countries since the agency was established. Often, the devastating effects of conflict, and in its aftermath, the prospects of supporting the development towards more peaceful inclusive societies, has been the very reason for Swedish engagement. In other contexts, support to peacebuilding has been more indirect through engagement in sectors and areas of support far beyond projects supporting conflict resolution and dialogue. Engagement in for example the health sector, institution building, decentralisation or livelihoods, has often had the purpose of contributing to sustainable peace or to implement peace agreements.

Effective support to peacebuilding implies learning from previous support, from what has worked well and what has worked less well. This evaluation is the first of its kind, taking a long-term perspective to capture general lessons learned and impact of Sida's approach to peacebuilding. The aim of the evaluation is to systematise experiences and learnings from Sida's support to peacebuilding from four different country contexts: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia. We hope that the findings of this evaluation can contribute to sharpen Sida's engagement for peacebuilding to support people's ability to escape poverty.

We wish to express our gratitude to the evaluation team and to the time and interest invested by all those who have participated in the evaluation. The evaluation process has served as a dynamic learning tool for Sida to compile the collected knowledge from staff at Sida, partners, experts and other stakeholders.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
AU	African Union
BRA	Benadir Regional Administration
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member State
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's
JPLG	Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
JNA	Joint Needs Assessment
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PSG	Peace and Statebuilding Goals
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNA	Somalia National Army
SNM	Somali National Movement
SRRC	Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SRSG	Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General
SSA	Somaliland Special Arrangements
SSF	Somalia Stabilisation Fund
TFC	Transitional Federal Charter
TFG	Transitional Federal Government

TNG	Transitional National Government
ToC	Theory of Change
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNTP	United Nations Transition Plan
US	United States
USC	United Somali Congress
USD	United States Dollar

Preface

This report provides the findings of a country evaluation of Sida's peacebuilding support to Somalia, which forms part of the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts. The other countries evaluated were Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala and Rwanda. The evaluation was commissioned by Sida and carried out by Tana Copenhagen between May 2018 and January 2019.

The Somalia evaluation was undertaken by Erik Bryld.

Members of the overall evaluation team were:

- Julian Brett, evaluator, lead author Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Nadia Masri-Pedersen, evaluator, lead author Guatemala
- Cécile Collin, evaluator, lead author Rwanda.

Quality assurance of the report has been provided by André Kahlmeyer.

This report incorporates feedback from Sida and the Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi.

Executive Summary

This report presents the Somalia case study for the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation is the first longitudinal evaluation of peacebuilding-related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida and has the objective *to evaluate how Sida has approached peacebuilding on the strategic level in different contexts*. The longitudinal approach means that the evaluation looks back to the early 1990s. The Somalia case study is based on extensive desk research, interviews with Sida and Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff in Stockholm and a field mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu 2-11 September 2018 where interviews were conducted with embassy staff, other development partners, implementing partners, representatives from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and resource persons. This was combined with Skype interviews to include those who could not be met in person.

The evaluation has divided the timeframe into five major periods relative to the relevance for Somalia as well as for Sida's level and strategic direction of aid to Somalia, which has increased significantly during the period 1990 till today covered from United States Dollars (USD) 5 million per year to USD 80 million. In this period, Sida has gone from being a primarily humanitarian provider of assistance to now being broadly engaged in direct and indirect peacebuilding activities through multiple bilateral and multilateral interventions.

Relevance
Across all the periods assessed from the 1990s till 2018, Sida has engaged in a number of projects relevant to the context with a peacebuilding lens. Sida has in the evaluation period moved from a portfolio which was highly NGO focused (using humanitarian funding) to becoming increasingly multilateral in its approaches seeking joint interventions often with the UN as lead. For all periods, the support has been relevant, if not fully comprehensive in terms of focusing on the key drivers of peace and conflict and the focus has been on activities where the risk was less and shared with other stakeholders. This prioritisation also means that some of the key conflict drivers such as clans and the marginalisation around this as well as the effect of aid as a driver in the conflict has not been explicitly addressed.

The Sida prioritisation in Somalia is in principle derived from the strategies, however there are only two country strategies for Somalia in the evaluation period of which the first (2003-2005) has a sound assessment of the conflict and lessons learned and the latest (2013-2017) is weak on peace and conflict drivers and too general to provide peacebuilding guidance for the Sida team. Instead, prioritisation is based on information from partners and external and internal analysis applied (though not in a systematic manner). Thus, staff of high capacity and the right partner mix have been the main driver for the relevance of Sida's prioritisation in Somalia. The evaluation found

that effective decision-making is a consequence of the staff quality at the embassy level and the dialogue and information with key long-term and trusted partners.

Effectiveness
In terms of providing the best framework for partners to work on peacebuilding, the evaluation found that in Somalia the Sida 'development classic' (Sida's usual modalities for conflict as well as non-conflict countries) modus operandi provided for enhanced effectiveness in this environment. Specifically, this was evidenced in terms of flexible funding, long-term engagements, and as a newer invention in the last strategy period *supporting the humanitarian-development nexus*. The evaluation has also found that throughout the evaluation period there is room for improvement to provide a fully effective Sida framework for peacebuilding in a context like Somalia. This includes clarity and risk management in terms of the high reliance on embassy staff to decide on projects (a process which is already improving); the past use of humanitarian funding for peacebuilding; the heavy reliance on partner information versus the use of third party Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by Sida itself; and limited partner guidance on risk and duty of care related to the operational risks as partners, but also the risk to beneficiaries in terms of ensuring Do No Harm.

There is little evidence in the Sida portfolios throughout the period evaluated of any significant emphasis on women and marginalised groups. While women and to some extent marginalised groups were more explicitly referred to than ever before in the latest strategy period, these were not prioritised in design and dialogue with partners 'as the context was too difficult'. The exception to this, was the substantial increase in the number of women in the new parliament which was in part attributed to the pressure form development partners including Sweden. Sweden as well as international partners interviewed, however, also agreed that this result came at the expense of ensuring inclusion on marginalised groups, which has had limited priority by Sida in Somalia.

Impact
Today, Somalia is still a country marred by conflict and an ever increasing number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), first and foremost in the southern and central parts of the country. Twenty-five years of Sida and international engagement has not changed this situation significantly, however progress has been made in terms of statebuilding and initial power sharing across Federal Member States (FMS). Most significantly over the period concerned Somaliland has remained stable with democratic traits and Puntland too has overall remained peaceful. All areas which have been prioritised by Sida in the past.

The impact of Sida's work vis-à-vis women's empowerment and gender equality is more limited, partly due to the difficult context but also because the prioritisation of Sida has varied over time. Women are referred to in all strategies, but are only really prioritised from a UN resolution 1325 perspective in the latest strategy and, from the projects assessed, there have been only limited results. Similarly, the absence of Sida prioritisation and dialogue in terms of promoting the most marginalised sections of

the Somali society, the minority clans and ethnic groups, means that the existing re-pressive political economy around these groups remains as it was 25 years ago.

However, Sida's approach to not only supporting the national statebuilding process of the FGS but also to staying engaged at FMS and local government level in the last periods of the evaluation show an understanding of the complexity of the Somalia conflict and the need to ensure a spread of development across geographical and po-litical areas. This minimises the risk for enhanced conflict between the centre and the periphery of the country.

Sustainability
When it comes to sustainability, the programmes and projects that have been relevant, effective and contributed to longer term impacts will also by default have a high sus-tainability element. This in particular includes the democratisation process in Somali-land and the self-operating and local governments across Somaliland and Puntland.

The support to the greater peacebuilding process, such as the constitutional review process and the FMS establishment, but also the FGS itself are still to prove their longer-term institutional sustainability. Whether Somalia has moved beyond the ver-bal culture and embraced a more formalised governance with clan-independent ac-countability links is still not evident but will become clearer in the next strategy peri-od. In the meantime, what is needed is a reflection on the possible risks around this, the conflict potential and the management of these risks.

1 Introduction

This report presents the Somalia case study for the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation is the first longitudinal evaluation of peacebuilding related strategic engagements undertaken by Sida and has the objective *to evaluate how Sida has approached peacebuilding on the strategic level in different contexts*. The focus is thus not on individual project results, but rather on the overall approach taken by Sida in the given context in terms of its influence on peacebuilding and the lessons that may be derived from this.

The evaluation utilises the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) standards and principles and focuses on four of the five major OECD-DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). Case studies of Sida approaches to peacebuilding over time in four countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, Rwanda and Somalia) are used to provide data. The longitudinal approach means that the evaluation looks back to the early 1990s. The evaluation is theory-based focusing on the causalities of the Sida support as expressed implicitly and explicitly in strategies by Sida staff working on Somalia in the given time period and maps these against conflict drivers, contextual needs and international events for the different periods of the evaluation – the timeline approach.

The Somalia case study is based on extensive desk research, interviews with Sida and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) staff in Stockholm and a field mission to Nairobi and Mogadishu 2-11 September 2018 during which interviews were conducted with embassy staff, other development partners, implementing partners, representatives from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and resource persons. This was combined with Skype interviews to include those who could not be met in person.

In the following we first present a historical perspective of peace and conflict in Somalia as well as an overview of key drivers that need to be considered and addressed to engage in effective peacebuilding. This is followed by an overview of the international engagement in Somalia in the evaluation period and a similar assessment specific to Sida in chapter 3. In chapter 4 we present the main findings from the Somalia case study listed in accordance with the four OECD-DAC criteria. And finally, in chapter 5, we present the conclusions and lessons learned from the evaluation findings in Somalia.

A few limitations need to be taken into consideration when reading the report. The longitudinal element of the evaluation means that data is needed all the way back to the early 1990s. However, the team has not been able to obtain much information from Sida or other sources around Sida's work prior to 1998. Similarly, it has been

challenging to identify Sida personnel as well as implementing partner staff to interview from this period. In spite of this, the team assesses that significant information is available to provide a coherent picture of Sida's peacebuilding approach in Somalia during the period evaluated.

2 Peace and Conflict in Somalia

2.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN SOMALIA SINCE THE 1990S

In the following, the team presents the contextual and international developments as well as Sida's support to Somalia since 1990.

While the evaluation focuses on the early 1990s until today, an understanding of the root causes of conflict and possible peacebuilding avenues requires a short introduction to the violent events, which predates the evaluation period. The country experienced relative calm after the independence with nine years of democratic, if inefficient and corrupt, governance followed by the first military dictatorship in 1969. The country remained fairly stable and democratic beyond the coup, which initially served to uproot corrupt practices. A failed attempt to occupy the ethnic Somali part of the Ogaden region in Ethiopia caused the first massive casualties on the Somali side of an estimated 25,000 persons, conflict started to erupt across all regions of Somalia gradually.

The loss in Ethiopia fostered the first range of independent movements in Somalia including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which initiated its operation in 1978 and contributed to the establishment of the autonomous region of Puntland. Of similar significance, was the Somali National Movement (SNM), which fought the Siyad Barre Regime for independence of what is now known as Somaliland. The struggle resulted in the death of an estimated 50-60,000 civilians, and eventually fuelled the declaration of independence of Somaliland in 1991.

The Siyad Barre regime actively exploited clan differences and monopolised and extracted state-controlled resources and forced land reallocations in favour of specific sub-clans (mostly benefitting the Darood clan). The increased level of exploitation and human rights abuses combined with the decreasing security significance of the Somali region following the end of the Cold War resulted in the freezing of military and development assistance to the country, crippling the Siyad Barre regime, which eventually was overthrown by the Hawiye clan dominated United Somali Congress (USC).

In Mogadishu, the USC's ouster of the Barre-regime also resulted in the expulsion from the city of the Darood clan and the appropriation of real estate by the new rulers. Similarly, across the southern and central parts of the country majority clans (Hawiye, Darood, Dir, Digil, and Mirifle) seized valuable minority clan and non-clan ethnic groups' arable land and valuable urban land. The process resulted in a mass reallocation of clans and sub-clans across the Somali territory and the first of many waves of

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internally displaced across the region. Starvation led to the first intervention of the UN (UNITAF) which had limited success, but which was later turned into the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in early 1990s which operated with decentralised authorities in Somalia. But General Aideed's attack on UN peacekeeping operations and the fighting between the United States (US) forces and local militias loyal to him, resulted in the drawdown of troops. In the next many years constant inter- and intra-clan conflict continued to escalate over access to land, resources and business opportunities.

In 2000, a revived Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed, but, with several key players not at the table and with insufficient will and capacity to engage in a reconciliation and statebuilding process, the TNG failed to deliver tangible results. With the support of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD), efforts to broker a more permanent cross-clan deal were partly successful with the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, which included a 275-member parliament with broad (majority-) clan representation (as per the politically decided 4.5 clan allocation formula). The TFG had varying success in its endeavours but did lay the foundation for the new preliminary constitution through the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC), which provided the first basis for the FGS.

The FGS held its first indirect election in 2012 and started the process towards state institution building with significant international support and the adoption of a new provisional constitution of Somalia. The electoral process was further expanded when the new parliament was elected in 2016 by 13,000 clan representatives and the presidential indirect elections in February 2017. While institutions were being built the FGS (and member states) were still to emerge as social service providers to the women and men of Somalia. In parallel to the central level statebuilding process, South-Central Somalia saw a proliferation of Federal Member State (FMS) establishments across the region. As an example, Galmudug declared its own state status in 2005 and signed bilateral agreements with Puntland in 2011 (see below), while Jubaland state declared independence in 2013. Recognising the federalisation challenges and the need for a decentralised structure to manage the country with relative stability, the FGS as of 2016 recognised six Federal Member States (FMS): Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug, South-West State, Hirshabelle and Somaliland (the latter not recognising itself as a member state, but as an independent state in its own right). The FMSs are still to be recognised formally in the constitution, which is currently under review.

Partly as a response to the grievances among excluded and marginalised sub-clans and ethnic groups in Somalia, South-Central Somalia saw the rise of the cross-clan Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 1999, which successfully managed to conquer and seize land across the South and introduce a sharia-based governing and judicial system in major urban centres such as Kismayo and eventually Mogadishu (in 2006). The ICU was however defeated by the TFG with substantial military backing from Ethiopia. The ICU youth wing, the al-Shabaab, emerged as the leading Islamic militant group post-2006 and re-gained control of large parts of the South-Central including Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to combat Islamic terrorism, enable the deliv-

ery of humanitarian aid, and enhance stabilisation processes with the TFG, the African Union (AU) established the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007 with military contingents from neighbouring African countries (notably Uganda and Burundi and eventually Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia). In spite of setbacks, AMISOM together with the Somalia National Army (SNA) and regional FGS loyal militia in among others Galmudug and Jubaland have managed to oust al-Shabaab from all major cities including Mogadishu (2011) and Kismayo (2013). Al-Shabaab however still control vast rural areas across South-Central Somalia and has managed to continue its terrorist attacks in Mogadishu (including the October 2017 bombing which killed close to 500 people) and other urban areas. The ongoing conflict together with recurrent droughts, floods and high unemployment rates across South-Central Somalia has further enhanced the level of internally displaced reaching an estimated 2 million in 2018 of which at least a quarter reside in informal settlements in Mogadishu.

The permanent – if geographically varied – high levels of conflict across South-Central Somalia have meant that large parts of the region have been inaccessible for NGOs and international donors for most of the evaluation period. There are exceptions to this. For a good period of time, UN and NGOs could access the city of Baidoa, and since 2011 Mogadishu has also been accessible (though security requirements mean that most internationals are still not allowed to leave the airport area). Before 2006 and after 2013, Kismayo was also accessible with a security contingency. Most of the southern and central part of the country has *de facto* been inaccessible for international staff for most of the period evaluated, prompting NGOs to rely on national staff for the delivery of aid where it was deemed sufficiently safe.

The conflict and peace developments in Somalia in the post-Barre era vary significantly according to the geographic regions in Somalia. Somaliland in the north-western part of the country has seen the highest level of stability in the period evaluated. Following initial internal skirmishes, the region, through clan negotiations and with support of the private sector, has established itself at the Boroma Conference in 1993 with its own governance structure with an elected parliament, an upper house (the Guurti) and consecutive (often delayed) democratic presidential and parliamentary elections classified as relatively free and fair by international observers. While there have been (and are) authoritarian tendencies from all the presidents of the past and a judiciary and administrative system which favours the Isaaq majority clan, the region has remained stable and kept Islamic terrorists at bay (bar the bombing of the UN and Ethiopian consulate in 2008 and the killing of an international aid worker a few years after). This has also enabled long-term development assistance to be applied focusing on statebuilding and human rights.

The exception to this is the ongoing territorial dispute between Somaliland and Puntland over the Sool and Sanaag regions in eastern Somalia which are claimed by both Somaliland and Puntland and where both have overlapping administrations within the colonial borders of former British Somaliland which have resulted in recurrent battles between military units from the two regions followed by a few more tranquil years.

The latest exchange of fire erupted spring 2018. Somaliland's stance on independence has remained throughout with no significant movement towards formally joining a federal state structure. The difference between Somaliland and the different governments representing the federal level has remained political following the fall of the Barre-regime with no significant violent conflicts (partly as a consequence of Somaliland's significant military power and the fact that Puntland lies as a geographical buffer zone between the federal government and Somaliland). Most NGOs and international donors have been able to access all of Somaliland (with less access to Sool and Sanaag) since the mid-1990s.

Puntland in the north of Somalia, has over time had a continuum of internal negotiations and consensus around keeping the peace and seeking development led by the traditional clans as well as the religious institutions in the region. This was formalised in the 1998 Grand Community Conference where a power-sharing agreement was reached between the dominating Darood sub-clans declaring Puntland an autonomous region under a Somali federal state. With the exception of minor skirmishes (partly fuelled by the federal level) following initial discrimination and exclusion of minority groups, Puntland has seen relative stability since then. However, different Islamic extremist groups have over time continued to seek to undermine security and stability in individual hotspots (primarily Bossaso and Galckayo), which includes continued pressure from al-Shabaab (the latest include the capture of the small town of Urir 60 kilometres from Bossaso in spring 2018).

With the passing of a new draft constitution in 2009, Puntland has since held a number of indirect presidential and parliamentary elections aligned with the clan system (and with the president promising free multi-party elections by 2020). The negotiated power sharing also means that the Puntland government does not have full control of its territory in a Weberian sense. This also explains why Puntland became a piracy hub in the late 2000s, initially a reaction to illegal fishing and dumping of toxic material at sea, where local sub-clans and militia groups (and individuals at central level) benefitted from the significant financial returns from the piracy business, which later evolved into kidnapping of international aid workers for ransom. However, a combination of international pressure and support and the ability of the government to negotiate settlements across its territory has all but alleviated the piracy and kidnapping industry in the region. Access to Puntland for NGOs and international donors has remained fragile and geographically specific throughout the evaluation period, but has seen some deterioration since mid-2000, requiring significant security support when operating in the major towns of Bossaso, Garowe and in particular in Galckayo which is marred by sub-clan violent disputes. Though Puntland has its own flag, anthem, governance and revenue generation system, as well as a constitution, the region has throughout the evaluation period remained formally committed to be part of a federal republic of Somalia, although the relationship has often been strained.

Today, Somalia is still a conflict torn country with significant violence in large parts of in particular the southern and central part of the country – though less in some parts compared to the early 2000s. Most of the drivers of conflict (outlined in the sec-

tion below) have remained present for the full evaluation period. The level of conflict in the country is also evidenced by the continued enhanced number of internally displaced, which has increased substantially in the last ten years as well as the high corruption levels and lack of basic freedoms (see table 3.1 below). However, as the table below also shows, there are improvements – if marginal - in the key development indicators.

From a statebuilding perspective progress was made in Somaliland and Puntland in the early 2000s. At the national level government structures have been established over the past 6-8 years as well as a new FMS which has potentially provided the basis for a longer-term statebuilding process. This may eventually, according to several interviewees, serve as a long-term peace agreement of Somalia. Though many of the root causes of the conflict which still fuels local and national conflicts, including the ongoing fight with al-Shabaab still remain unaddressed.

Table 3.1 Key indicators for Somalia 1990-2018

	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2018
Freedom in the World (0.0-7.0) 0=Most free 7=Least free	N/D	7.0 (1999)	6.5	6.8	7.0	7.0
Freedom of Press (0-100) 0=Most free 100= Least free	N/D	N/D	82.75	83.83	82.83	79
Gender Inequality Index (GII) (0-1)	N/D	N/D	N/D	N/D	0.78	0.78
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births)	106.85	4,3770833	105.3	101.55	91.33	85.0 (2015)
Internally Displaced Persons(total displaced by conflict and violence)	N/D	200000	400000 (2005)	1015163	1225431	1264086
Refugee population by country or territory of origin (up to 2016)	643284	573667	422551	554427	1055880	2116705 (2016)
Voice and Accountability (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-1.80	-1.71	-1.89	-2.09	-1.92
Goverment Effectiveness (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-2.07	-1.98	-2.23	-2.24	-2.19
Political Stability & Absence of Violence (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-2.2	-2.5	-3.06	-2.79	-2.36
Control of Corruption (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-2.22	-1.52	-1.75	-1.65	-1.66
Rule of Law (-2.5 - 2.5)	N/D	-1.41	-2.16	-2.40	-2.37	-2.34

Positive change compared to previous period						
No change compared to previous period						
Negative change compared to previous period						

Source: Data for table obtained from Freedom House, UNDP, UNHCR, and SIPRI

2.2 SIGNIFICANT DRIVERS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN SOMALIA

The long history of cross-country conflict in Somalia has also provided strong evidence of the main conflict and peace drivers, which peacebuilding support should have related to in the past and present. These include:

- *Clannism as a driver and mediator of conflict*. The existence of clans (and ethnic groups) permeates all aspects of Somali society. The unity of clans and sub-clans is used and misused to control resources formally and informally and has and remains to be a vehicle for conflict across Somalia. However, the role of clans and the customary law system (the *xeer*) is also a key driver in negotiating local as well as regional level peaceful settlements. Formal agreements are thus always preceded by informal negotiations by elders and traditional clan leaders.[1]

- *The state as a spoiler and enabler*. Since the Barre-regime, the state has been synonymous with exploitation by leading clan groups, as has local administrations with clan majorities such as Mogadishu (the Benadir Regional Administration (BRA)). However, as is evident in Somaliland, to some extent Puntland, and some of the later FGS related initiatives, the state can also play a faciliatory and more inclusive role with enhanced state-citizenship legitimacy. Similarly, at local municipal level, more formalised state structures have emerged all over Somalia with an enhanced state-citizen levels of trust.[2]

- *Access to and management of valuable rural and urban land.* Land has for generations been a key driver of conflict in times of drought where pastoralists have sought access to grazing on farmland often through the use of force. In the evaluation period this has been expanded to conflict over ownership of urban land as well as a consequence of the use of informal (clan and economic) power and the lack of legitimate central land registers at national, regional, and municipal levels (again Somaliland is an exception with its process of enhanced level of land registration and titling system).[3]

- *Horizontal inequalities*. The clan system provides degrees of exclusion for women and men who do not belong to any of the four to five major clans or are a minority in their area of residence. This exclusion may prevent citizens from accessing resources formally (in terms of land registration and financing) or informally through the unfair treatment by the informal or formal justice system. The horizontal inequalities thus motivate the use of violence as a

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1 World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics; Gardner et al (2004): Somalia – the untold story; Gundel (2009): Clans in Somalia; Tana (2016): Engaging the Gatekeepers; Menkhaus (2007) The Crisis in Somalia: The Tragedy in Five Acts; Menkhaus (2014) State Failure, State Building and Prospects for a Functions State in Somalia (2018): Accountability Survey in Somalia; Tana (2014) Analysis of Displacement in Somalia.

2 Menkhaus (2014) State Failure, State Building and Prospects for a Functions State in Somalia; World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics; Gardner et al (2004): Somalia – the untold story; UNICEF 2014: Somalia conflict Analysis Summary; Tana (2016): Engaging the Gatekeepers; Menkhaus (2007) The Crisis in Somalia: The Tragedy in Five Acts; (2018): Accountability Survey in Somalia.

3 *Ibid*

means of changing the status quo. As an example, al-Shabaab has been able to attract a large number of young male Bantus to the group (while in some areas the Bantus have also been subject to al-Shabaab attacks).[4]

- *Economic interests*. Business in Somalia is a driver for peace as well as conflict. Sections of the business thrive on the security needs in terms of trading in arms as well as in providing security for locals as well as internationals. Part of the business furthermore benefits from the irregular administration of the business sector. However, large parts of the business sector also work towards enhancing stabilisation as this will improve the investment environment and thus longer-term business opportunities.[5]

- *The role of women in peacebuilding*. The conflict in Somalia has resulted in increased vulnerability and abuse of women. Women are still excluded from being directly involved in most informal negotiations but have also been documented to influence these indirectly through their husbands and family relations and can thus be a contributor to peaceful development. They also play an increasingly important role at the formal level in terms of standing for public office or holding leading positions at FGS as well as BRA level. In urban areas, women also increasingly take on power and (sometimes exploitative) positions at the informal level such as holding gatekeeper positions at IDP settlements in Mogadishu.[6]

- *Foreign aid*. Development and humanitarian assistance have in the past been a mitigatory source as well as a driver of conflict. Aid has been subject to misuse and looting and motivated an increase in the use of force when aid is induced indiscriminately without the application of a conflict sensitive approach. It has in the past created unsound informal power structures such as the gatekeeper system in Mogadishu. On the other hand, development aid has helped sustain institutional building processes in Somaliland as well as at the federal level.[7]

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4 World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics; Webersik (2004): Difference that matter – the struggle of marginalized in Somalia; Gundel (2009): Clans in Somalia.

5 Menkhaus (2016) Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia; World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics.

6 RVI (2016): the impact of war on Somali men and its effects on the family, women and children; Gardner et al (2004): Somalia – the untold story; UNICEF 2014: Somalia conflict Analysis Summary; Tana (2016): Engaging the Gatekeepers.

7 World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics; Menkhaus (2007) The Crisis in Somalia: The Tragedy in Five Acts; Tana (2014) Analysis of Displacement in Somalia; Crisis Group (2017): Instruments of Pain (III): Conflict and Famine in Somalia; Menkhaus (2016) Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Somalia.

- *The role of foreign powers*. External actors have played an important role in the politics of Somalia since the 1980s. During the cold war, Somalia was influenced by US as well as Soviet (proxy-war) financing. The US also played a key role in the efforts of combatting instability during the UNOSOM period. 2000s onwards, in particular Ethiopia, but also Kenya, Burundi and Uganda, played a key part in foreign military interventions either unilaterally (Ethiopia and in part Kenya) or as part of AMISOM. Other key actors include the countries on the Arabian Peninsula, and lately the conflict between Qatar and a few other Arab states has directly impacted financial and military support with the UAE entering into agreements with Somaliland (having been asked to leave Mogadishu, and Qatar increasing its footprint in the South, while Turkey is operating in both regions.[8]

2.3 KEY SOMALIA PEACEBUILDING RELATED EVENTS WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

The following highlights key initiatives with international support aimed at enhancing peace and development, which the team has identified as relevant for Sida and the evaluation. Major events are listed below:

1990-2000
- 1991 – Djibouti peace talks (opens up for UNITAF deployment, but without substantial peace gains)
- 1992 – UNITAF peacekeeping operations initiated but fails to meet mandate
- 1993 – UN/Ethiopian reconciliation conference
- 1993 – UNOSOM takes over responsibility of peacekeeping from UNITAF with expanded mandate
- 1993 – Boroma Grand Conference on National Reconciliation
- 1994 – UN peace conference resulting in the Nairobi declaration
- 1995 – UNOSOM withdraws without being extended. Fighting continues
- 1996-1997 – Unsuccessful peace conferences in Ethiopia and Egypt respectfully
- 1998 Puntland Grand Community Conference

2000-2005
- 2000 – Somalia National Peace Conference arranged by IGAD resulting in the establishment of the TNG
- 2001 – Kenya-backed Nakuru agreement signed between TNG and Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). Limited peace progress
- 2002-2003 – Multiple minor peace mediation initiatives

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8 Crisis Group (2018): Somalia and the Gulf Crisis; World Bank (2005): Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics; van der Berg (2018): Ports & Power – the securitization of port politics.

- 2004 – IGAD (led by President Museveni of Uganda) brokers peace agreement and TFG agreed

2005-2010
- 2005-2007 – Donors under World Bank and UN leadership undertake the first country-wide Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), which development partners can align to
- 2006 – Khartoum peace talks between TFG and ICU mediated by Arab League but with no outcome
- 2007 – AMISOM deployed to Somalia and National Reconciliation Conference held in Mogadishu
- 2008 – International actions against piracy initiated including the deployment of war ships
- 2008 – TFG and ARS peace agreement is reached but immediately broken
- 2008 – The JNA is by the UN with the TFG turned into a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), in support of this the UN launches the United Nations Transition Plan (UNTP)
- 2009 – UN Peace talks with limited outcome

2010-2017
- 2010 – Somaliland launches its Vision 2030
- 2012 – Somaliland launches its first National Development Plan (NDP) 2012-2016
- 2013 – International donors agree on New Deal, the Somali Compact, and the five Peace and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) for Somalia
- 2014 – The Somaliland Special Arrangements (SSA) aligned with the Somali Compact is agreed between donors the Somaliland Government
- 2017 – Somalia launches its first NDP, which donors agree to align to (though the partnership principles are still to be finalised)
- 2017 – Somaliland launches its second NDP 2017-2021

The international community's peacekeeping and development response has over the evaluation period been aligned with the nature of the conflict as well as the international trends in development and peacebuilding assistance as defined by in particular OECD-DAC. In the first one and a half decade of the evaluation period, this resulted in an excessive number of externally brokered and facilitated peace agreement initiatives all of which had limited results on the ground. At the same time peace-keeping operations were first undertaken with a narrow UN mandate. This was then replaced with a more permanent (UN-endorsed) peacekeeping through the AU.

As the externally brokered peace agreement with various factions in Somalia initially failed to have any effect, the attention changed to creating an institutional arrangement in Somalia (statebuilding) through the TNG-TFG-FGS (and eventually FMS) process. In parallel to this, donors moved towards joint efforts aligned with the priorities in the country as expressed first in the JNA and then more importantly with the radical shift of the New Deal and the five PSGs against which all major OECD-DAC

donors aligned. This provided the first fully coordinated donor response to state and peacebuilding in Somalia. The New Deal ended 2017 and was replaced by the NDPs of Somaliland and Somalia that were aligned with the OECD-DAC fragile state principles and the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness.

Women as well as marginalised groups have only been involved in a few of the international efforts, and reference to international commitments such as UN Security Resolution 1325 have been minor. This lack of attention to gender and women's role in peacebuilding is explicit in all of the peace conferences and processes. On the development side, women's needs as well as (some) recognition of ethnic exclusion has been included in the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) from 2005/7, but no specific activities or goals specifically aimed at enhancing women's and marginalised groups involvement in political processes. This is improved with the New Deal, which explicitly states that women and marginalised groups should play an 'equitable' role in the political processes. This commitment, however, has not been translated into commitments in the PSGs or the PSG priority areas, which are largely gender- and marginalisation blind. The same pattern is repeated in the Somaliland SSA. The situation is somewhat improved with the introduction of the NDP in 2017, which includes specific goals of enhancing women's representation in senior government positions to 30% and a stated commitment to include women in the political processes (marginalised groups receive less attention in the NDP). However, again the commitments stated in the text are not followed by relevant indicators in the NDP (none of these are gender sensitive).

3 Sida's key priorities and Theories of Change

The following outlines the team's overview of Sida's support to peacebuilding in Somalia based on the data available.

3.1 OVERVIEW OF SIDA SUPPORT

Overall, Sweden's engagement in Somalia has increased substantially over time from around USD 5 million per year between 1998 and 2003 to around USD 80 million in 2017 (with substantial fluctuations between 2010 and 2017. Note that the team have not had data made available from Sida for the period prior to 1998 as illustrated in the table below (fig. 3.1).[9]

Figure 3.1 Sida's aid to Somalia 1998-2017 according to openaid.se

Sida's Aid to Somalia 1998-2017 in mill. USD

When we assess the type of peacebuilding provided (assessed and categorised by the team based on data available), the change in funding was followed by a change in overall approach to peacebuilding in the country (see figure 3.2 below).

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9 https://openaid.se/aid/sweden/somalia/2017.

Figure 3.2 Classification of Sida peacebuilding activities in Somalia 1998-2017 based on the team's assessment of data from OpenAid

Type Classification of Sida's funding to Somalia as a % of total aid (1998-2017)

|	1998-2002	2003-2007	2008-2012	2013-2017
Other	49%	62%	71%	43%
Significant & Multilateral/Joint	12%	13%	10%	38%
Significant & Bilateral	17%	20%	10%	9%
Principal & Multilateral/Joint	1%	5%	4%	6%
Principal & Bilateral	22%	9%	5%	3%

Percent of ODA in USD — Year

Legend: ■ Principal & Bilateral   ■ Principal & Multilateral/Joint   ■ Significant & Bilateral   ■ Significant & Multilateral/Joint   ■ Other

Type 1: Principal peacebuilding through bilateral intervention
Type 2: Principal peacebuilding through multilateral or joint intervention
Type 3: Significant peacebuilding through bilateral intervention
Type 4: Significant peacebuilding through multilateral or joint intervention
Type 5: Funding not targeted peacebuilding but which has an influence on peace-building and stabilisation, including humanitarian funding

Figure 3.2 also shows a significant change from a relatively more principal peace-building engagement towards enhanced focus on significant peacebuilding (*de facto* statebuilding activities) as well as a relative shift from bilateral NGO interventions towards enhanced use of multilaterals for delivering the Sida support in Somalia. The latter should be seen in light of the substantial increase in Sida funding to Somalia 2011 onwards.

The team has developed rudimentary Theories of Change (ToC) for the individual strategies and/or country reports available. These are first and foremost used to test the relevance of the Sida support in light of the context at the time.

3.2 SIDA SUPPORT AND THEORIES OF CHANGE

In the following we provide an assessment of what the team assess as Sida's priorities in the periods where written data is available only:

Early 1990s till 2002 (no strategy for this period)
For the full period, Sida provided all funding through the humanitarian budget line with a limited budget of USD 5 mill. per year. In the first decade this primarily focused on humanitarian aid and some assistance to strategic peacebuilding NGOs, specifically Life and Peace Institute (LPI) and later also the War-Torn Societies Project (later Interpeace). Sida had in the early 2000s, a strong focus on interventions that focused on institution building as significant to peacebuilding. Even the principal peacebuilding activities focused on local level capacity development related to conflict mediation. While there is no explicit ToC in the documents, the team assessed that Sida focused on local level institutional development as these - in the thinking of Sida - would create pockets of stability, which eventually would lead to the strategy objective of reconciliation and reconstruction. According to Sida the results were mixed.[10] Sida in this strategy had a strong focus on stable areas such as Somaliland and Puntland. Women and marginalised groups were only referred to in relation to refugee reintegration and capacity development, which according to Sida had been successful.[11] An estimated total of 47% of the funds were used for principal and significant peacebuilding in this period.

2003-2006
In the Swedish 2003-2005 Strategy additional interventions were added with a stronger focus on principal peacebuilding. There was a continued focus on capacity development of local institutions as well as civil society organisations. A significant change from the last strategy period was the enhanced referencing to gender with specific support to e.g. women's groups. In addition, Sida engaged more directly in peacebuilding by supporting the IGAD Somalia Peace Process. As a new explicit ToC, Sida planned to support stable areas to promote stability based on the assumption that support to instable areas would enhance the conflict potential (primarily Somaliland and Puntland). In terms of the overall objective of the 2003-2005 Strategy there was a shift away from reconstruction and a first move towards statebuilding. There was in the strategy an enhanced focus on private sector development, and while not explicitly stated as peacebuilding, Sida recognised the opportunity for using the private sector for cross-clan dialogue. Children were also a specific target group for several of the interventions. No financial data is available for this strategy, however

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10 Sida Country strategy for development cooperation Somalia January 2003 – December 2005. This does not mean that individual projects would not prioritise women through own means. Focus is on Sida strategic priorities.

11 *Ibid.*

from OpenAid it is clear that focus is in particular on the local interventions with NGOs like LPI and Interpeace.

2007-2010 (previous strategy extended for this period)
While still maintaining the local level institutional capacity development focus, Sida increased the emphasis on national reconciliation efforts in 2007 under the principal peacebuilding support. Additional funding was provided for democratisation process with election support specifically focused on Somaliland process, while funding for the southern and central parts of the country remained primarily humanitarian. The support became increasingly channelled through joint initiatives and pooled funds. The role of women in Sida's efforts in Somalia was less explicit at this stage. The ToC remained similar to the 2003-2005 Strategy period.

2011-2014 (previous strategy extended until 2013)
In 2011, Sida significantly increased the funding to Somalia, doubling it compared to previous years. It was also a period where the new strategy is developed. The emphasis on principal and significant peacebuilding continued, but with an increase in funding for significant peacebuilding explicitly related to rule of law, electoral assistance, democracy and human rights. Sida was thus increasingly focused on statebuilding as a rationale for underpinning peace in the country. Women were much more explicitly targeted and involved in the process. The institutional capacity building was now much more targeted at long-term sustainable solutions rather than shorter term mediation efforts. In 2013, Sweden introduced a new strategy for Somalia till 2017, which had an enhanced focus on democracy, livelihoods and health (see next section).

2015-2018
With the new strategy, the overall objective shifted more towards the capacity of the Somali people to withstand crisis (resilience), with less explicit focus on governance and institution building (though these remain sub-themes). National and local level conflict resolution were reintroduced as a capacity development theme. Key for this new strategy was the enhanced focus on jobs for youth. The ToC behind this focus (as deducted from the strategy) was that unemployed youth are a conflict driver and the assumption that increased youth employment will reduce conflict. The focus on women and marginalised groups was the most articulated of the strategies available thus far, with explicit emphasis on women's role in the political processes. While conflict remained a specific support area, the financial support to principal peace-building was further reduced while there was an enhanced emphasis on the statebuilding processes and significant peacebuilding. In practice, however, Sida had shifted already in 2014 to align fully with the New Deal and the PSGs for Somalia under the Somali Compact. This again included substantial support to the FGS, FMS creation and operationalisation.

3.3 TIMELINE OVERVIEW

Based on the country assessment, a timeline for the Somalia country study (fig. 3.3 below) has been developed. The timeline provides an overview of key contextual events and international efforts, which Sida would have needed to relate to in one way or the other, and which is used as a basis for the analysis of findings in the next chapter. Examples of reference points include:

- The establishment of the TNG and TFG
- The establishment of the FGS and later the FMS
- The key planning instruments like JNA, New Deal, and the NDP
- The democratic elections and statebuilding in Somaliland from the early 1990s
- Puntland's relative stability

Figure 3.3 Somalia timeline

Somalia

Context	Action	
National	International	Sida

2018
Focus on resilience, Jobs for youth. Strong on women. Emphasis on national reconciliation

2013-2017

National	International
Somaliland SL NDP II	
Somaliland Vision	
Somaliland SSA	New Deal
Somalia National development plan	Reconstruction and Development Programme
Somaliland Presidential election	

2007-2012

National	International
Somaliland SL NDP	Focus on ROL, democracy, human rights, electoral assistance, and women
Somaliland Vision 2030	AMISOM
Proliferation of Federal Member States	
Federal Government of Somalia first election	Joint Needs Assessment

2003-2006

National	International
Al Shabaab formed	Targeted PB Focus on state building local inst. in stable areas, civil society & gender
Relative Stability in Puntland	
TFG Established	
Somaliland First Elections	TFG Peace Conference

2000-2002

National	International
Islamic Courts Union formed	Local level institution building to create stability
Transnational National Government Established	TNG Peace Conference

1990's

| National	International
Puntland Grand Community Conference	Multiple Peace Conferences
Somaliland Declaration of Independence	
Borama conference	UNITAF
Intra/inter-clan conflicts	UNOSOM
Civil War in Somaliland	
Instability in Puntland	
Fall of Barre Regime	

4 Findings

In the following, we present and analyse the findings in accordance with the OECD-DAC criteria as identified in the ToR. Given the longitudinal aspect of the evaluation, the assessment against the evaluation criteria will have to relate to the individual periods of importance for the Somalia context and Sida's engagement as identified in the timeline in the chapter above. Thus, based on the contextual developments, international support and Sida's funding levels and strategies for Somalia, the team has identified the five periods as key for the evaluation of the Somalia support. The periods identified relate to contextual developments in Somalia and shifts in Sida's approach in terms of funding and strategy developments: (i) early 1990s till 2002, (ii) 2003-2006, (iii) 2007-2011, (iv) 2012-2014, and (v) 2015-2018.

4.1 EARLY 1990s TILL 2002

Note: while the evaluation period starts in the early 1990s, the team has only obtained written documentation on Sida and Swedish support from 1998 onwards. Thus, the support in advance of this period is based on interviews only as well as documentation available online.

Key features for this period included: (a) extensive clan in-fighting and the first rise of the ICU, (b) poor progress on the peacebuilding front with multiple peace initiatives but no significant progress; (c) limited international joint efforts in support of the peace process; (d) major exception was the forming of the TNG; (e) Sida funding limited and primarily for humanitarian aid. See illustration below for timeline overview:

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period:

4.1.1 RELEVANCE

The funding to Somalia in this period was limited to around USD 5 million of humanitarian assistance per year.[12] From a peacebuilding perspective, most significantly, was the use of some of this humanitarian funding for local level mediation and peacebuilding work. Including support to local level peace conferences though LPI and the War-Torn Societies Project (later Interpeace) as well as some limited funding to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[13] The remaining funding was used for a more traditional humanitarian response. From a peacebuilding perspective the support to LPI and Interpeace in Somaliland and Puntland was (if limited) very relevant at the time as reconciliation was still needed and this contributed to the regional sub-state formation processes of Somaliland and Puntland.[14] According to interviewees, priorities were made on a demand basis without any strategic direction on Somalia on the side of Sida. This also means that there is no reference in interviews with Sida staff nor from Sida documentation to the UNOSOM support in the early 1990s, the Ethiopian and Egyptian peace conferences in the late 1990s, the LPI and War-Torn Societies peacebuilding work, or maybe most importantly, the establishment of the TNG in 2000.

4.1.2 EFFECTIVENESS

Overall effectiveness was limited due to the limited scope of the support. This is confirmed by Sida in the 2003-2005 Strategy, which states that the interventions in 1999-2002 were delivering mixed results related to peacebuilding.[15] Already at this stage, Sida decided to use humanitarian funding for more medium-term interventions related to local level peacebuilding to LPI and Interpeace. The support was not a strategic intervention but based on an assessment of the needs by the concerned programme officer in dialogue with the implementing partners.[16] Non-the-less the support remained relevant according to interviewees.

The limited attention to Somalia was also a consequence of limited staff allocations for Somalia. At the Swedish embassy this included a half-time international only with a regional focus. However, according to interviewees, decentralised humanitarian funding meant that the embassy was quick at responding to NGO needs such as those from LPI and Interpeace in support of local level peacebuilding[17] (see box 4.1 below).

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12 Openaid.se .

13 Interviews with Sida staff and lessons learned section of 2003-2205 Swedish Strategy for Somalia.

14 According to Sida staf and project interviewees.

15 P 13.

16 Interviews with Sida staff and projects.

17 LPI and Interpeace have been engage in extensive local level mediation and peace conferences. The success of this was highlighted by several Sida staff. Evaluations made available to the team and found through desk research indicate that both organisations have been successful in establishing local level capacities for mediation and also, in the case of Interpeace, in establishing local institutions such as the Academy for Peace and Development in Somaliland which is still operational in local

Box 4.1 The effectiveness of LPI's work in Somalia

LPI: The Life and Peace Institute (LPI) is the longest development partner to Sida in Somalia and has received funding throughout the evaluation period.

LPI has been working in Somalia since 1993 primarily on local level peacebuilding and mediation with a strong focus on Somaliland and Puntland in the first ten years and then expanded to also include the southern and central part of Somalia as well as more work related to policy development and dialogue (though Sida's funding in the past has mostly focused on the first area).

Interviewees across the board confirmed that LPI has played an important role in local level mediation and peacebuilding and addressing capacities at local level in conflict transformation. The main concerns of the support relate to the long-term sustainability of the support and the possible (currently limited) feedback into the national level reconciliation. This is largely confirmed by the evaluation reports of the LPI programme, which the team has had access to:

Paffenholtz in (2000) p 59 pp found that LPI's peacebuilding work 1990-2000 was inclusive and addressed peacebuilding across communities and was also able to involve women in the process already from the activities of the early 1990s. But also that the link to track I peacebuilding was less clear.

A 2005 evaluation report (G. Tamm et al p 1) found that: *In Somalia the likely impact is considerable, directly through LPI's pioneering role of strengthening civil society and its focus on women, indirectly through promoting local-level peace consciousness through extensive skill-training. But both programmes (particularly Somalia) lacked a strategy of linking to wider supra-local peace efforts.*

A 2015 evaluation report (LPI-CRM Final report p 13) found that: *Throughout this evaluation, participants noted a decrease in the frequency and intensity of conflicts, as well as the voluntary returning of stolen property and unprecedented freedom of movement over clan boundaries: participants also discussed improved relations between clans that have spread to more informal engagement, like trade.*

A 2016 mid-term review of LPI's regional programme found that for Somalia (Sipu p vii): *The achievement of results under Strategic Priority 1 (ed.: capacity development of conflict transformation CSOs) is perceived to be relatively high. The capacity of partners in addressing conflict transformation strategies and organisational matters has been strengthened. There are also a number of reported achievements from partners' engagement in local level*

level efforts and as a research institutions for development partners. In terms of impact none of the evaluations document long-term peacebuilding effects and Sweden in the assessment of the results from the late 90s term the results to be 'contradictory' and 'failed to contribute to national reconciliation or prevent local conflict from flaring up', see 2003-2005 Strategy p 13. In addition to the evaluations referred in Box 4.1 above see Menkhaus evaluation (2000) and War-Torn Societies project evaluation (2002). Note that the level of funding to these activities were limited to 6% in 2003 and 2% of the Sida envelope by 2010.

conflict transformation. It is the understanding of the evaluation team that there is a need to further strengthen the focus on long-term solutions to these conflicts that move beyond agreements on compensation for recent and historic crimes (killings).

A 2017 evaluation report (Hikman & Rogers p 5) found that: *the project introduced dialogue and demonstrated that it is a viable alternate option giving pause to the default practice of immediate and sometimes deadly retaliation. Alone, these demonstrations of viable, peaceful alternatives may not be sufficient to leverage the cultural changes needed to transform Somali cultural drivers of violence.* The evaluation found the project to be situationally responsive but not addressing the root causes of conflict.

Sources: interviews with Sida and LPI staff and desk review of LPI documents and non-public evaluations of LPI's work received from LPI as well as public reviews (see list of references in Annex D)

4.1.3 IMPACT

There is no written evidence available to make it possible to assess longer term impact of the interventions in this period.

4.1.4 SUSTAINABILITY

There is no written evidence available to make it possible to assess sustainability of the interventions in this period.

4.2 2003-2006

Key features for this period included: (a) ICU reached Mogadishu; (b) TFG established; (c) JNA undertaken; (d) Sida increased funding 100% compared to previous period; (e) Sweden launched first country strategy for 2003-2005. See below for timeline overview:

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period:

Note: this period provides first real opportunity for strategic assessment of Sida in Somalia of which many of the findings are valid in the following periods.

4.2.1 RELEVANCE

In early 2003 Sweden developed the first country strategy for Somalia with a relevant peacebuilding response. With the multiple-year country strategy Sida increased the level of funding to the country with 100%[18]. The strategy was launched at the same time as the first significant peace agreement was negotiated in Djibouti by IGAD and did include specific funding for the IGAD peace process and implementation of recommendations.

Overall, the strategy had a strong and relevant peacebuilding focus relating specifically to the context (see assessment of alignment with peace and conflict drivers in Annex A). The strategy included specific reference to the clan dimensions of the Somalia conflict and also specifically refers to the regional aspects and the role of neighbouring and Arab countries as drivers of peace and conflict. The strategy also had a strong focus on lessons learned from the previous three years of operations to inform the new strategy. All in all, the strategy thus had a strong contextual foundation for informing the following three years' work.

The portfolio did in many ways identify support aligned with the conflict analysis but did not refer specifically to all the key peacebuilding opportunities at the time. The most significant omission was the lack of more reference to and support planned for the IGAD process and outcome. While the process is referenced in the document, the content was limited and there is no reference to or planned support for the TFG, which was a cornerstone in the peace agreement. However, the document included a number of other relevant interventions in support of peacebuilding and relevant to the context. Most important this included:

- Continued support to local level reconciliation and dialogue to reconcile and mitigate future local level conflicts and enhance security, including the introduction of support to the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) to complement the existing LPI and Interpeace support
- Continued support to statebuilding in Somaliland and Puntland, aiming at enhanced stability in already stable areas
- Support to Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) processes (while less successful in the long run, these were contextually relevant at the time)
- Support to rule of law and human rights through UNDP

All the areas highlighted here build on what the evaluation team assess from the strategy is an implicit ToC focusing on promoting security and peace in already stable areas to enhance long-term stability. The ToC is thus more focused on short-term stability rather than long-term national peacebuilding efforts.

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18 Openaid.se.

While the strategy provided significantly more development and peacebuilding-oriented direction for Sida, the support remained more or less limited to stable areas and funding through NGOs like Diakonia and LPI. The explicit Sida rationale stated in the strategy document that engaging in conflict affected areas of Somalia will increase the conflict[19] remains a foundation for the geographical priorities of the support *de facto* resulting in very limited Sida assistance to southern and central Somalia in this period, and thus only limited support to the areas with the highest level of conflict.

The strategy did relate to the state of affairs of gender equality as well of the plight of children in conflict. This included specific support to women's groups as well as activities aimed at preventing and reintegrating child soldiers. However, the strategy ran short of integrating the role of women in the peace process when defining the actual support to be provided by implementing partners.

The country level policy was by and large aligned with Sida's global policy at the time (see Annex B).

4.2.2 EFFECTIVENESS

In this first full Swedish country strategy period for Somalia, Sida thematically moved beyond humanitarian aid and the period thus allows the evaluation team to assess effectiveness of Sida (humanitarian and development). Overall, implementing and development partner interviewees as well as Sida staff identified the following key trades, which enhanced the effectiveness of Sida peacebuilding in Somalia. These trades were repeated for all timeline periods assessed by the team in Somalia:

1) *Long-term engagement*. All implementing partners stressed the importance of Sida's long-term commitment to the same partners (as an example LPI, Interpeace and Diakonia have been funded by Sida throughout the evaluation period). According to the implementing partners interviewed, the long-term commitment allowed partners to have a more strategic approach to their peacebuilding work aiming at long-term results rather than short-term outputs. In the early 2000s, this is in contrast to the reliance on short-term funding provided by a range of other like-minded donors. As some implementing partners stated: *relationship building is key in Somalia from a peacebuilding perspective and short funding periods is not conducive for a peacebuilding approach.*

2) *Flexibility*. A key message from all implementing partners was the appreciation of the flexibility of Swedish funding. The funding flexibility provided

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19 P 11.

partners with an opportunity to adapt programming to changes in the context allowing them to address drivers of peace and conflict as they emerged and/or influenced the programme. All partners emphasised that the administrative burden related to changing programming was limited compared to most other partners. As one interviewee put it: *Sida has a strong ability to jump in and out with funding as per need, crisis and as opportunity emerges, and Sida is more responsive than other donors. Most donors are very destination focused and not understanding the process. Sida does.*

3) *Linking diplomacy and development*. All project partners and development partners interviewed stressed the coherence between Sida's funding and the political dialogue efforts by the political section at the embassy. The 2003-2006 timeslot also provided the first real opportunity for such a cooperation with the first appointment of a Swedish envoy to the Somalia peace process. While the 2003-2005 Strategy has very limited reflection on the peace process, funding was set aside and eventually applied to support the IGAD peace process. This eventually resulted in support to LPI for enhanced cooperation with the UN on the peace process. According to Sida staff, this was complemented by a flexible peace fund which allowed a joint Sida/MFA response to opportunities related to the peace process. This fund was, according to the interviewees, among others used for funding conferences around reconciliation processes.

While the modalities provide a strong basis for implementation effectiveness, there were – at this stage in the timeline – Sida modalities which ran counter to having a more strategic approach to peacebuilding in Somalia (of which some remain in 2018). These include:

1) *HQ guidance*. Interviewees overall agreed that there was limited understanding of the concept of peacebuilding and what was required to operate in a fragile and conflict affected context at Sida headquarters and thus limited strategic guidance.

2) *Local level independence vs. strategic guidance*. There was a lot of flexibility in terms of decision-making by embassy level staff with little organisational guidance. This, according to interviewees, provided the and possibility to adapt to the circumstances but also resulted in significant reliance on the quality and knowledge of staff and the information received from partners (which by project interviewees were assessed to be competent).

3) *Use of humanitarian funding for peacebuilding*. In this timeline period, there was very limited development funding available.[20] Instead, humanitarian

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20 Openaid.se.

funding was used for peacebuilding activities (even long-term) such as dialogue processes, democratisation and rule of law as evident from Openaid and confirmed by interviewees. In other words, the rationale of the budget lines did not match the activities undertaken.

4) *Limited Somalia specific staffing*. According to interviewees at the Swedish Embassy as well in Stockholm, there were limited staff resources dedicated to Somalia (at the embassy, the team understands that there was only one international with a regional focus and a part-time national staff dedicated to Somalia).

5) *Reliance on partner information vs. the use of non-partner information (e.g. third-party monitoring) M&E*. In this, as well as all the following periods, Sida relied heavily on (the same) partners' information sharing on conflict and peace drivers according to interviewees and evident in the reporting. As several interviewees pointed out, this was also based on the high level of trust between Sida and the implementing partners. However, as was also referred by several interviewees, Sida had limited information to verify and/or triangulate this information without a more systematic M&E and information gathering system in place (in addition to the partner reporting and review requirements).

6) *Limited guidance on conflict sensitivity and Do no harm*. The team has not been able to identify any systematic use of tools or similar for ensuring a conflict sensitive approach in the difficult Somali environment or the application of guidelines focusing on Do No Harm.

Irrespective of the strategic challenges, the country strategy was largely followed for this period when assessed against the actual Sida portfolio for Somalia 2003-2006. Sida made some critical decisions at the time, which influenced future Sida peacebuilding work in the country. These included:

* Initiation of support to Interpeace and the Somaliland democratisation process (see box 4.2 below)
* Support to the IGAD peacebuilding process and eventually the TFG formation
* The use of LPI beyond community level engagement to support the peace process

There is little evidence in the portfolio, however, of any significant emphasis on women and marginalised groups. Nor were the team able to identify any results or policy dialogue efforts in this respect. As one partner from that time states: *Sida – like other donors – were never good at actually forwarding women in Somalia. The problem is high ambitions at home resulting in 'a show' rather than genuine results.*

4.2.3 IMPACT

From an impact perspective, several of the peacebuilding priorities made by Sida in the period 2003-2006 have contributed to important impact in the long-term. Interventions started in 2003-2006 of specific significance from an impact perspective included:

- Support to Interpeace for democratic developments in Somaliland (see Box 4.2). Interpeace was key in supporting and facilitating the democratic elections in Somaliland in the last 15 years[21]

- Support to the IGAD peace process which established the TFG, and which over time transitioned into the FGS paving the way for a statebuilding process in Somalia

- Support to sectoral institutional development in Puntland contributing to stabilisation efforts in the region[22]

Box 4.2 The effectiveness of Interpeace's democratisation work in Somaliland[23]

Interpeace: From early 2000s till today, Interpeace is working on the democratisation process in Somaliland (and Puntland). From capacity development of the electoral commissions to voter registration, election logistics as well as capacity development to civil society and awareness raising initiatives (in addition, through other programmes also with contributions from Sida, Interpeace works on local level reconciliation).

Given the political challenges around Somaliland's claim for independence, the UN was not in a position to support the election process in the region. Instead Interpeace stepped in and provided a platform for joint donor financing and policy dialogue. Enabled by strong donor funding and a development approach building on long-term relationship with in particular the Somaliland Election Commission, Interpeace has, in accordance with all concerned interviewees, played a lead role in supporting the institutionalisation and implementation of three parliamentary and presidential elections and democratisation around this in Somaliland with peaceful transition of power between parties.

While the elections have always seen significant delays and attempts of political influence, all of them have eventually been categorised as free and fair by international and local level observers. In this way the elections form a key part of a long-term peace process for Somaliland.

Sources: no evaluation reports of Interpeace democratisation work have been made available

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21 Document review of Somaliland (and Puntland) historical progress combined with interviews from resource persons and development partners.

22 *Ibid.*

23 Note that this box only relates to Interpeace's democratisation work and not the local level reconciliation and civil society capacity development work.

to the team and the box information is therefore based on interviews with Sida, Interpeace staff, other development partners and resource persons as well as Interpeace and Sida's own reporting

The team has not been able to identify specific impact related to support to gender equality, women's empowerment nor to marginalised groups.

With the longitudinal lens applied by the evaluation there were, according to resource persons and partners interviewed, also a number of more or less bold peacebuilding decisions that Sida could have been made to further the peacebuilding agenda in Somalia at this time. Or decisions made, which may run counter to long-term sustainable peace in Somalia. None of these have been addressed explicitly in the documentation, though interviews indicate awareness of these considerations. These include:

- The conscious decision not to engage in the conflict ridden southern and central part of Somalia is in the strategy founded on the possible risk of escalating conflict by being engaged. However, experience from other partners show that it was feasible to engage in peacebuilding interventions in some parts of this area, which would be a foundation for establishing pockets of peace to build from (this approach - as an example - is what Sida is doing today through the Somalia Stabilisation Fund (SSF))

- Supporting the TFG process was also a formal endorsement of the 4.5 clan power structure of Somalia, which at the time was assessed by several international partners as a needed compromise to finalise the TFG settlement. However, in this process the existing marginalisation of the minority clans as well as marginalised ethnic groups like the Bantus were also sanctioned and are still replicated in the FGS structures today. There was not in 2003-2006 (nor of any significance later) any reflections on mitigating actions to ensure more inclusive process in the future

- 2006 also saw the ICU at its highest level and eventually its fall. Interviewees have pointed to the fact that not engaging with the ICU as a stabilising factor in 2005-2006 was a missed opportunity from a peacebuilding perspective. However, such a move would have been controversial at first and impossible later, once the group was labelled as a terrorist organisation by the US.

4.2.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The degree of long-term sustainability for any of the interventions in this period is difficult to assess in light of the limited data available. This is in particular the case with local level peacebuilding initiatives. However, what remains is that the two regions in focus of the Sida support at this time remain more or less stable (with some insecurity in parts of Puntland).

From an institutional perspective, the democratic development and awareness raising in Somaliland had been successful with consecutive peaceful (if delayed) elections held over time and with transfer of power between competing parties. In Puntland, institutions that had been built though the election records were more meagre. At the national level, the TFG was established and did function until it eventually transitioned into the FGS, indicating a sustainable – if weak - statebuilding process.

4.3 2007-2011

Key features for this period included: (a) al-Shabaab is formed; (b) AMISOM is fielded; (c) FGS preparations on the way; (d) Sida again doubled funding compared to last period. See timeline below for overview:

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period:

4.3.1 RELEVANCE

There was no new Swedish country strategy for Somalia between 2005 and 2013. A drafting process was initiated but never finalised. Instead, according to interviewees, the 2003-2005 Strategy was extended on a yearly basis and thus the ToC remained largely the same. Nonetheless, Sida doubled its funding to Somalia in 2007, though the rationale for this increase is not clear from the interviews. However, interviews indicate that Sida had plans for enhanced development engagement in Somalia, but that this was paused due to cut backs on the state budget in Sweden.

From a relevance perspective, much of the analysis from the 2003-2005 Strategy remains valid in this rather insecure period in Somalia, where there was limited traction in terms of securing enhanced peace, stability and statebuilding. There were however, some important developments to relate to and where an updated strategy could have provided enhanced guidance. These include:

- The implementation and conclusion of the JNA, which provided the first comprehensive overview of reconstruction and development needs across Somalia, and thus a basis for enhanced donor coordination and engagement. Interviews indicate a general dissatisfaction in Sida with the limited Somali

ownership with the JNA. However, it did provide a first joint donor initiative for a comprehensive approach as did the follow-up RDP[24]

- The fielding of AMISOM and change in the access pattern across southern and central Somalia, including enhanced access in Galmudug and in the end of the time period also access to large parts of Jubbaland and all of Mogadishu

- Multiple peace conferences were also undertaken in this period, though many of these produced no tangible results in the longer run

The lack of a new strategy also meant that there was limited official documentation to guide the peacebuilding work of Sida on the ground. Interviews confirm that it was primarily the MFA undertaking the more peacebuilding related projects (type 1 principal peacebuilding, see fig.3.2), while most of the Sida funding, in particular in the first years of this period, were humanitarian funding supporting community level engagements (type 3 and 4 significant peacebuilding).

Irrespective of the lack of a new strategy and the primarily humanitarian funding, the portfolio did expand in the period with an enhanced peacebuilding focus following the implicit ToC that peacebuilding was mostly effective in stable areas through local level dialogue and capacity development engagements. In practice this meant a continued focus on Somaliland and Puntland, which was now expanded to also funding larger multilateral interventions through UNDP's capacity development efforts aimed towards local level institutions as well as civil society.[25] At the same time the Sida focus on LPI and Interpeace remained relevant in this context.

There is no evidence from reporting or from interviews of any significant Sida portfolio prioritisation related to women or marginalised groups, though there was continued support to women CSOs.

4.3.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The lack of strategy meant that Sida staff on the ground were relatively self-driven with limited support in terms of defining the direction of the aid.[26] In spite of the JNA, interviewees found that there was no joint donor support as such. Instead, the Scandinavian programme officers teamed up to promote joint efforts. The limited strategy direction also provided a lot of space for the staff on the ground as well as in Stockholm to make decisions on peacebuilding projects resulting in a continuation of relevant support as identified above. Effective interventions supported included the continued efforts of Interpeace in democratisation processes in Somaliland and Punt-

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24 Other development partners were more keen to align with the JNA according to interviews.
25 Openaid.se.
26 Interviews with Sida staff and projects.

land. It was also in this period (2008) that the UNDP Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG) was launched (see box 4.3), which eventually over time, according to evaluations and interviewees, succeeded in assisting in the development of capacitated and more inclusive local governments in Puntland and Somaliland. However, several interviewees also pointed towards Sida going for the safer options (track II engagements) and avoiding the more controversial engagements which could have made a more significant change in terms of peacebuilding. Similarly, Sida, according to interviewees of Sida/MFA, at the time continued to refrain from any significant engagements in more conflict affected areas of Somalia.

Box 4.3 The effectiveness of JPLG's work in Somalia

JPLG: The Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG) has an overall objective of: The achievement, within Somalia and Somaliland, of local government institutions that contribute to peace and stability by effectively and accountably responding to the needs and rights of all Somalis. This is done through support to the regulatory frameworks, capacity development of district administrations, and community engagement in planning and monitoring processes.

The programme has in the evaluation period been active in 15 districts, 8 in Somaliland, 7 in Puntland, and will in the next years expand to the FMS and Mogadishu.

From a development perspective, the programme has been successful as there has been enhanced capacity development in districts in Somaliland and parts of Puntland resulting in improved planning and budgeting; revenue generation increases of up to 300% in some districts and an increase in basic service delivery in particular in the transport, market and to some extent education sector (though the latter suffers from support to reimbursables, salaries etc.).

While the major activities are statebuilding oriented, the programme has also important peacebuilding elements (and thus the evaluation team classifies the assistance as significant peacebuilding (type 4)). Key peacebuilding features include:

- Bringing opposing parties together at a federal level (*de facto* track II activities). In the lengthy periods where Somaliland and/or Puntland and the federal level government (be it TFG or FGS) were not in a position to meet for reconciliation, peace and federalisation talks the parties could still meet at technical working group and steering committee level of the JPLG and discuss programme implementation
- Formalising resource allocations at the local level. The programme has engaged in a process of agreeing on intergovernmental transfer, which in the past has been one of the key drivers of conflict (e.g. the resource distribution between the centre and periphery) and institutionalised this process (even though the bulk of this funding comes from the development partners and is thus 'new funding')
- Formalising and facilitating community level discussions on development funding prioritisation expanding the number of people at local involved in prioritising resource allocations (though the female representation remains limited and with limited attention to clan issues)

The programme has not been evaluated against these peacebuilding activities and the contribution to peacebuilding thus is solely based on interviews with stakeholders and resource persons.

A 2014 evaluation of JPLG (Donelly P. et al) found that *the support provided to participatory planning processes at District level, which, along with the processes and incentives offered by the Local Development Fund, served to promote the qualities of accountability, transparency and participation.* The JPLG is thus addressing the past spoiler tendencies of the state at the local level, which is one of the drivers of conflict.

Sources: interviews with Sida, JPLG staff and other development partners; JPLG documentation and evaluations

In parallel to the Sida funding, the MFA envoy was engaged in dialogue with the TFG on the future state arrangements for Somalia. It is also clear from the interviews, that there was regular dialogue between Sida staff and the Swedish envoy. While there is merit in operating these two streams (MFA political, Sida on the ground), there is little evidence of a more strategic direction in the Sida support in terms of more long-term peacebuilding support plans beyond the local level engagements in this period.

In addition to the limited strategic direction, there was, according to interviewees from Sida/MFA as well as implementing partners, also limited attention to what it meant to work in a fragile and conflict affected environment (continuing the concerns raised in the assessment form the previous period). This meant that the support provided and the demands to partners did not differ from how Sida would implement development assistance in more stable countries. Internally, there were no tools nor discussions on conflict drivers, Do No Harm, and, as several interviewees mentioned, the role of aid in Somalia as a mitigating factor but also as a driver of conflict. For partners this meant that the dialogue with Sida continued to be on a very personal level and dependent on the individual programme officers' assessment of the situation and their priorities. Similarly, there was little guidance and dialogue on what it meant for the partners in terms of operating in this context at a time of enhanced access issues and when duty of care became still more important. The lack of dialogue from Sida (as well as other donors) in terms of e.g. the demand of taxation by al-Shabaab or ransom demands for kidnapped personnel left, according to some interviewees gives partners the choice of disengaging or applying a 'don't see/don't tell' approach towards Sida and other clients.

While Sida may not have been fully geared to operate in conflict contexts at the time, the positive traits of Sida's implementation modalities in terms of flexibility and long-term engagement, as outlined in the assessment of the previous period continued to support an effective implementation by partners on the ground. However, some partners also mentioned how that change in government and strategy at the global level in Sida with enhanced results-focus curbed some of this flexibility and provided enhanced transaction costs for the partner. Having said that, most partners still complemented Sida for a high degree of flexibility. In addition to this, partners stressed the importance of Sida's limited vested political or security interests in Somalia as an advantage, as this provided the partners with funding which was perceived by the

beneficiaries as without political interests and thus created enhanced trust in the partnership between the implementing partner and the beneficiaries.

As in the previous period, partners did not identify gender as a topic brought up by Sida in the partner negotiations, with some exceptions. This is partly confirmed by Sida's own reporting, which requests that there should be an enhanced focus on UN Resolution 1325 in the future.[27] There are however a number of examples of support to women specifically such as Interpeace's focus on women (and youth) in civic education exercises and Diakonia's education related activities in Puntland but limited focus on women's active involvement in peacebuilding activities and related decision-making processes.

4.3.3 IMPACT

The positive impact of Sida's support remains as assessed for the previous period. This includes the statebuilding, democracy and stabilisation results in Somaliland and Puntland. Also, as in the previous period, the team has not been able to identify specific impact related to support targeted gender equality, women's empowerment nor to marginalised groups.

In addition to the above, the 2007-2011 period also laid the groundwork for many of the new joint initiatives of in particular the UN, but also the World Bank in Somalia, where Sida played a key role, according to interviewees from Sida, the UN as well as other development partners.

In terms of negative impact, the enhanced level of aid, not only from Sida but from other donors as well, combined with the limited dialogue on aid as a conflict driver is according to several interviewed resource persons on Somalia a driver of conflict. The international funding has in part contributed to cement existing power structures among dominating clans and also paved the way for enhanced focus on diversion of aid.

There are no changes in the conflict and peace pattern until the end of the period which can be presented as impact related.

4.3.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The degree of sustainability of the interventions remain as described in the previous period as no new major institutional processes were launched. The exception to this is the UNDP support which eventually transitioned into the JPLG, see above.

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27 Sida (2011): Strategirapport för Somalia, September 2010-Augusti 2011, p 2.

4.4 2012-2014

Key features for this period included: (a) FGS was formed, (b) first presidential elections, (c) all new FMS established; (d) New Deal launched; (e) Sida increased funding with an average of 30% compared to the last period; (f) the Swedish Government launched second full Somalia Country Strategy 2013-2017. See timeline below for an overview:

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period:

4.4.1 RELEVANCE

2012-2014 saw significant changes in Somalia as well as for Sida's engagement in the country (see chapter 3). Sida further increased the funding by 30% and Sweden prepared and launched the first five-year Swedish country strategy for Somalia (and the first new strategy since 2005).

In spite of the significant changes in Somalia at the time (FGS formation, presidential election, and the launch of the New Deal) these developments are only mentioned shortly or not at all in the new strategy. The ToC built on the last strategy but added the elements that jobs for youth will prevent youth from joining militant groups and also emphasises the role of women in peacebuilding. The new additions were not irrelevant but were not presented as a coherent ToC linked to peacebuilding. The relatively short length of the strategy and the general nature of its design means that there is little room for actually portraying the situation on the ground and linking the identified thematic and sub-thematic priorities with the contextual realities on the ground. There were no reflections on major conflict or peace drivers (identified in chapter 3 above) or how Sweden will address these, with the said exception of reference to inequality, unemployment and women's role as well as democracy under the sub-thematic themes.

The limited reference to the drivers of peace and conflict and a related Swedish ToC does however not mean that Sida was not aware of the context in the drafting period. Sida developed its own suggestions for the Swedish strategy (Resultatförslag för Somalia 2013-2017). This underlying document represents the first more comprehensive Sida analysis made available to the team since 2003. The strategy includes specific

reference to the clan system and structure as a conflict and peace driver and to the regional dimension of the peace and conflict drivers. While the document underscores the importance of focusing on root causes of conflict, the link to the result areas and theory of change related to root causes remains weak.[28]

Interviewees point to the fact that not all steps of analysis were undertaken to inform the new policy development. However, the team has taken note of the Sida reporting from this period, which underlines the importance of aligning future activities with the New Deal (which eventually was what Sida did) as well as Sida's funding for the new constitution[29], which was the backbone of the formation of the FGS and thus very relevant from a peacebuilding perspective.

While the 2013-2017 Strategy was less contextually explicit, the priorities identified are aligned with the Sida sub-documentation and show that reflections had been made and follow the trend of other development partners by shifting activities from more principal peacebuilding interventions (type 1 and 2) towards statebuilding and thus the lesser category of significant peacebuilding (in particular type 4 interventions). Thus, while there was still support to the NGOs of the past, new funds were allocated for multilateral and joint interventions supporting the institutional developments. Thematically too, the areas identified are relevant to the context relating to resilience (even though the 2011 drought is not reflected), human rights, democracy as well as health.

There were however, significant peacebuilding opportunities which the strategy (or the Sida sub-documentation) did not relate to in this time period. This in particular included the formation of new member states (FMS), which by most resource persons and stakeholders interviewed, is a key part in the stabilisation and peacebuilding process.[30] Also, the significant shift in displacement and migration patterns, which pose new conflict risks in key areas such as Mogadishu and Kismayo were not discussed to any great extent. However, in particular the first is addressed later on as Sida, after some consideration decided to engage in dialogue and support for the FMS. Similarly, Sida after the launch of the strategy, and according to interviewees, completely revisited the strategy and designed the Swedish support so that it was fully aligned with the New Deal and the five PSGs for Somalia. The latter shows, as several stated to the evaluation team, that the strategy was not used for prioritisation and management once the strategy period is started, but only serves as overall sectoral guidance.

While the strategy may not be as elaborate on peace and conflict, it provided the most gender mainstreamed Swedish strategy document for Somalia so far, with references

28 Underlag för Resultatförslag för Somalia 2013-2017 p1-4 and link to p.6 pp.

29 Sida (2012) Strategirapport för Somalia september 2011 - september 2012.

30 Note however, that there are also experts who see the FMS creation as retaining the clan divide and effectively countering long-term peacebuilding. See among others Ingiriis (2018).

to gender in all three thematic areas from support to women entrepreneurs to more targeted support to women's involvement in the peace process. The document also contains some of the first explicit references to marginalised groups.

The country level policy is by and large aligned with Sida's global policy at the time (see Annex B).[31]

4.4.2 EFFECTIVENESS

As in the past, there are several examples of where the Sida team on the ground was able to identify and support interventions of relevance to peacebuilding in Somalia as the opportunities emerged. However, this time, most of these engagements were in joint setups. Key interventions confirmed by interviewees included (but were not limited to):

- Support to the World Bank Partner Trust Fund's work on institution building aimed at FGS and the FMS (this was in parallel to the active involvement of the Swedish ambassador in the negotiations between the FMS and FGS and thus a strong example of combined Sida and MFA work in Somalia – this was confirmed by several Somali and international stakeholders)

- Continued support to the JPLG (see box above) and the Rule of Law programme

- Join the SSF with other like-minded donors, which among others focused on capacitating the administrations in the new FMS and support local level reconciliation processes in the same areas. Given the importance attributed to the FMS to ensure long-term stability according to several resource person interviewed, this forms a key peacebuilding element.[32] This is also one of the first examples of Sida providing funding to CSO support in an arrangement which is not bilateral nor through the UN[33]

- The strategic support to UN-Women enabling UN-Women's presence and promotion of women in peacebuilding processes in Somalia[34]

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31 Note also that this is the first period where the need to link humanitarian and development efforts is made explicit in the Swedish documentation with funding to the Somalia Resilience Programme, though without specific reference to peace, Sida (2013) Strategirapport för Resulttatstrategien 2013, p 2.

32 The SSF in its own reporting claim to have settled 42 local conflicts in 2014. See Sida (2014): Strategirapport för Resultatstrategin, p 4.

33 While no evaluation has been made available to the evaluation team, ODI did a case study on the SSF in 2018, which found the SSF to have well-informed Somali staff, strong analytical capabilities, and focus on supporting locally-defined priorities.

34 The effect of which the team has not been able to assess with the information provided

- Smaller strategic interventions to support: (a) the continued IGAD work on peace processes, (b) advisory support to the New Deal process, (c) secondments to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to mention a few. These, according to Sida and MFA staff – together with the political dialogue - allowed Sweden to influence peacebuilding processes[35]

The effectiveness of the multilateralisation process is on the one hand ensured through enhanced FGS and Somali ownership as these are approved through the – in principle – government led New Deal linked approval process, However, the rationale of multilateralisation was also, by several interviewees, identified as serving other purposes, including:

1) A way of manging enhanced funds with few staff on the ground
2) Risk reduction (or delegation): financial, security and reputational
3) Ensuring a coordinated and harmonised approach

Sida however, did not just provide multilateral funding but did, according to interviews with other development partners and implementing partners, play an important role in actively facilitating the improved implementation of the UN and the World Bank through policy dialogue and active engagement as member of the respective steering groups. This was in particular the case with JPLG and the World Bank trust fund, as well as it its verbal support to the UN system and alignment (MFA led) behind the SRSG for Somalia.

While women and to some extent marginalised groups were more explicitly referred to than ever before in the strategy, these were *not really a topic or priority* as the context was too difficult when *the show is fully run by men in Somalia* according to several interviewees. There were local level gender disaggregated interventions, but it was not yet a major issue and often not included specifically in several of the partner dialogues.[36] The exception to this, was the substantial increase in the number of women in the new parliament which was in part attributed to the pressure form development partners including Sweden. The result was significant in a Somali context where there have in the past been limited female representation at the political level. Sweden as well as international partners interviewed, however, also agreed that this result came at the expense of ensuring inclusion on marginalised groups.

From a modality perspective, partners confirmed the positive elements of flexibility and long-term commitment as in the past, as well as the joined approach of the Swedish MFA and Sida in Somalia. In addition, Sweden started to become more present

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35 The team also notes that Sweden started its first more comprehensive diaspora programme with Forum Syd and with IOM in operation seconding 26 people to Somalia (2 women) at this period, but that the link to peacebuilding is limited.

36 See also indicator reflections in Sida (2014) Strategirapport för resultatstrategin, p 13-14.

on the ground and one of the most active donors in terms of meeting with FGS and FMS, which provided a better understanding of the situation in Somalia, which was otherwise in many ways managed from Nairobi. This was in parallel to the enhanced transfer of UN staff from Nairobi to Somalia. This active engagement was also a consequence of the significant increase in staff working on Somalia at the embassy from four in 2012 to fourteen in 2015.

In spite of the evidently enhanced engagement in Somalia as well as more direct exposure to the conflict, many of the effectiveness challenges of Sida concerning working in a conflict affected environment remained in this period from Duty of Care considerations to risk averseness according to interviewees. This also included limited guidance and rules concerned with the costs and overhead related to working in this environment. Some also found the Sida programming process cumbersome and slow compared to the sometimes need for urgent interventions, though the team was not able to benchmark this with the data available.

The expanded budget also required an enhanced overview and monitoring of changes in performance as well as conflict and risk patterns, however according to interviewees, there was not a formalised and institutional process in place for this, nor any application of e.g. third party monitoring agents as some suggested. Sida is, according to interviewees, compensating this by *working with strong partners and strong staff*.

4.4.3 IMPACT

Sida's, as well as other development partners', support to the constitutional review process assisted with the development of the new constitution which paved the way for the FGS establishment. Further alignment and support to the FGS and the presidential elections contributed to the formation of the FGS and the first federal state structures in Somalia since 1992 as a significant statebuilding and peacebuilding result. At the same time, the continued support to Somaliland and Puntland furthermore contributed to continued long-term stability in these regions.

The presidential election process and the FGS leadership however also reflected the old 4.5 power delineation and thus the exclusive nature of the clan system in Somalia and eventually one of the conflict drivers in the country, as per the desk analysis above and interviewees. According to some interviewees, this was based on the ToC that enabling the state to provide services would give the state legitimacy and at the same time the formalisation would dilute the clan influence. However, the exclusion remained with close to no representation of marginalised groups and ethnic minorities in leading positions or in parliament, which according to some interviewed Somalia experts further cements the status quo.

Also in this period, the first local elections for a decade were held in Somaliland and assessed as credible by national and international observers with 300 individuals elected (though only 10 women). This brings another element of stability for the So-

maliland region – even if some violence did occur immediately after the elections. A process which has been supported throughout by Sida through Interpeace.

4.4.4 SUSTAINABILITY

Short-term sustainability of Sida's work can be identified as a contributor to the establishment of the UN and World Bank trust funds and the alignment behind these of the international community. From a more medium-term and statebuilding perspective, Sweden with the other donors played a key role in the establishment of the FGS and the FMS structure, which may become a long-term federal institutional arrangement for Somalia. This however depends on the passing of a new constitution and as part of this a formula for the sharing of resources across the country, which remains uncertain.

At the local level the local governments in Somaliland and Puntland have enhanced effectiveness and institutionalisation providing a basis for formal governance in the future.

4.5 2015-2018

Key features for this period include: (a) second round of elections completed; (b) general elections in Somaliland in 2015 and presidential elections in 2017; (c) first NDP launched; (d) development partners align to NDP; (e) Sida funding level reaching USD 80 million/year. See timeline below for an overview:

Key contextual events of relevance for this time period:

4.5.1 RELEVANCE

This most recent period of the evaluation covers the second half of the 2013-2017 Strategy period as well as the drafting of the new strategy, which is yet to be approved. The assessment of relevance of the 2013-2017 strategy is outlined in the period above. The strategy is so broad (i.e. covers so many sub-themes) that most of it will still be relevant though, as mentioned above, it still does not fully cover key contextual areas of relevance. However, as Sida has the flexibility to adapt the prioritisation to the context, additional relevant engagements were prioritised and are referred to under effectiveness below.

The embassy, in agreement with external interviewees, sees the constitutional review process as peacebuilding at the national level and then use international (often Swedish) NGOs as peacebuilding at local level and have prioritised both in the present period.

The 2018+ strategy was still being drafted during the work with this report and thus not available to the team but was assessed by interviewees as still 'very generic'. However, many of the pointers and recommendations outlined at the end of the previous strategy period from the strategy reports as well as what was stated in interviews with embassy staff suggest continued relevance in terms of:

- Enhanced focus on 2021 elections
- Enhanced focus on CSOs for women as well as youth as key
- An assessment of the link between CSOs and clans

There is limited evidence from the interviews of substantive analysis/documentation in support of the 2018+ strategy – though a more detailed version of the strategy has also been drafted by Sida according to interviewees. The embassy would have liked the context to drive the narrative with the individual Somali in the centre of it but found that the present guidelines for the strategies do not allow for this.

4.5.2 EFFECTIVENESS

From an effectiveness perspective, Ehe embassy has also been able to address key principal as well as significant peacebuilding initiatives in this time period. These include:

- Bringing the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) to Somalia in support of the constitutional review process which *de facto* by most interviewees is seen as a key peacebuilding process and the - at the time - upcoming 2016 elections to assist in enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of the same and it this way seek to address some of the criticism of poor representation in the 2012 elections[37]

- Continued and renewed engagement with the World Bank Trust Fund and support to the establishment and eventual funding of the new UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF). This in 2017 also materialised in funding specifically for the reintegration of ex-combatants

[37] Note that the FMS establishment and constitution process according to several interviewees is also a key conflict driver as: (i) it involves regional power and resource distribution, (ii) the FMS boundaries are currently following major clan lines de facto further excluding ethnic groups and minority clans from the power sharing and thus any such support should include specific attention to Do No Harm.

What is particularly interesting is that the two most potentially important engagements EISA and SSF (identified for support in 2014) are only partly legitimised by the Swedish strategy (though this is so broad that it seems manageable), yet both are in particular relevant from a Somalia peacebuilding perspective. The increased attention to stabilisation (as opposed to principal peacebuilding) is also evidenced by Sweden's decision to bilaterally fund the construction of the main buildings for the Ministry of Finance (see image at the end of this report) and the Ministry of Health.

Again in this period, the UN plays a key role in the implementation, which, according to interviewees, is due to its ability to: access insecure areas; implement at scale; serve as a platform for policy dialogue; provide lower administrative costs for Sweden (though the actual administrative costs for many of the joint UN projects in Somalia remain high – for JPLG it is 30%) and as a risk mitigating solution. The embassy, in interviews, also recognises that administration takes a lot of resources, so the ability to support smaller individual (and likely good projects) are not available. Instead Sida has to search for partners that can take such projects onboard.

Again, the modality effectiveness of Sida is highlighted by partners interviewed, with emphasis on being a flexible partner that provides long-term assistance in a transparent and accountable way and is perceived as neutral. The flip side of the coin is that partners also agree that some of the hindrances for effectiveness in terms of risk awareness and management, duty of care etc. remain. From Sida's perspective this also means that there is no systematic use of information from non-partners or own assessments available to provide a different perspective on the conflict and to check changes in peace and conflict drivers across Somalia. However, implementing as well as development partners all agree that Sida has staff of high capacity in place to make sound decisions. Similarly, all agree that the political and development sections at the embassy complement each other and provide a consistent message to partners with development funding providing the 'muscle' for the political dialogue.

In the last period evaluated, Sweden is in particular recognised by most development partners as well as implementing partners for ensuring that gender and women's empowerment are included in the policy dialogue and project design of NGOs and the UN as well as for being successful in changing outputs and indicators. On the other hand, development and implementing partners agreed that Sida has not had an active role in enhancing the profile and access to decision-making of minority clans and ethnic groups in Somalia. Interviewees recognise this and state that this is a conscious choice between ensuring stabilisation even if this overrules these human rights perspectives – this is *a calculated risk and trade-off.* The limited progress in terms of addressing violence against women is recognised by Sida in the 2016 'strategirapport' p 2.[38]

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[38] Note also that while the Sida (2016) Fördjupad strategirapport för 2013-2016 assess progress against

4.5.3 IMPACT

The impact of existing projects identified in the previous time periods remain. It is too early to assess long-term impact of the newer interventions though short-term impact is evident with the successful completion of the second round of elections (with 13,000 representatives of voters) and appointment of a new president. This includes a significant number of women in parliament, though the degree of inclusion from a clan and ethnicity perspective is limited. These new results are difficult to attribute specifically to Sida as the interventions were mostly through joint arrangements, but Sida was, according to interviewees, an active partner in terms of funding and dialogue in this process even if a special Sida footprint cannot immediately be identified.

There remains limited evidence to suggest a thorough internal reflection of key conflict and peace drivers in Somalia and Sida's influence on the same. Several resource persons interviewed point to the fact that the significant focus by development partners on FGS may undermine the FMS and the local government levels and become a conflict driver with the reestablishment of Mogadishu as the centre of power and resources, with the continued cementation of the existing exclusive political economy of the major clans. Sida however, is one of the donors which have a fairly balanced development programme in terms of support local mediation and institution building in combination with FGS and FMS support.

4.5.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The sustainability assessment is identical to the previous period.

1325, the reported evidence is limited.

5 Conclusions and lessons learned

In the following we present the conclusions in accordance with the OECD-DAC critria.

5.1 RELEVANCE

The extent to which the approaches in the case studies were aligned with the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries and the peace and security challenges
Across all the periods assessed from the 1990s till 2018, Sida engaged in a number of projects which were relevant to the context with a peacebuilding lens. Sida has in the evaluation period moved from a portfolio which was highly NGO focused (using humanitarian funding) to becoming increasingly multilateral in its approaches, seeking joint interventions often with the UN as lead. However, the relevance of most of the portfolios have remained through the evaluation period, though the Sida specific priorities have been reduced relative to the financial envelope with Sida increasingly acting and prioritising as other like-minded donors with a portfolio that is highly similar to the other Nordic countries and e.g. DFID.

While the projects have - in the majority of cases - been relevant, the portfolio has in most cases had limited emphasis on projects where peacebuilding is a principal objective, which have a higher risk factor but also would address key peacebuilding needs more directly. Instead, the focus has been on the next tier of multilateral interventions and/or where peacebuilding may be a significant part but not a primary objective and where there is less risk and it is shared with other stakeholders.

The prioritisation also means that some of the key conflict drivers such as clans and the marginalisation around this as well as the effect of aid as a driver in the conflict has not been explicitly addressed or significantly influenced the portfolio prioritisation. It is also not spelled out explicitly in any of the Sida documents (with very few exceptions).

Attention to women's empowerment and gender equality has varied across the evaluation period. Prior to the latest strategy, women have either primarily been a focus as a beneficiary and only later as a part in the decision-making process. However, not until the last evaluation periods has this resulted in relevant interventions for the context.

The Sida prioritisation in Somalia is in principle derived from the Swedish Government strategies, however there are only two country strategies for Somalia in the period evaluated, of which the first has a sound assessment of the conflict and lessons

learned (though still omitting some of the key conflict drivers) and the latest lacks explicit mentioning of peace and conflict drivers and is so general that it runs short of providing any peacebuilding guidance for the Sida team. Instead, prioritisation is based on information from partners and external and internal analysis applied (though not in a systematic manner). Thus, high capacity staff and the right partner mix has been the main driver for the relevance of Sida's prioritisation in Somalia.

5.2 EFFECTIVENESS

The extent to which the approaches undertaken have contributed to intended outcomes

Sida has at several times in the evaluation period effectively prioritised projects which in one way or the other contributed positively to peacebuilding in Somalia as highlighted in the findings section and in the examples from the boxes in the text. The evaluation found that the effective decision-making is a consequence of the staff quality at the embassy level and the dialogue and information with key long-term and trusted partners (partners such as Interpeace, Diakonia and LPI who have been receiving Sida funding throughout most of the evaluation period and continue to receive funding today). The evaluation has not identified any other systematic approach promoting this effectiveness.

While Sida does not have a specific modus operandi or guidelines for engaging in fragile and conflict affected states the evaluation found that in Somalia the Sida 'development classic' modus operandi provided for enhanced effectiveness in this environment. Specifically, this was (for the full period evaluated) evidenced in terms of:

1) *Flexible funding:* which allows for implementing partners to shift funding between outcomes and budget lines and effectively address opportunities and challenges as they emerge in the challenging Somali context

2) *Long-term engagements:* which allows partners to focus on longer-term outcomes in a context which for most other donors is marred by one to two-year funding cycles and focus on immediate and short-term outputs

3) *Having a joint and coordinated effort between the political dialogue of the MFA and the development funding of Sida*: allowing Sida to provide funding to back the political dialogue when promoting up-stream peacebuilding initiatives such as elections, women in parliament, FMS formation etc. This is in particularly relevant and used in the latest strategy period, but first emerged as relevant in the IGAD peace process around 2004

4) And as newer invention in the last strategy period *supporting the humanitarian-development nexus*: by including humanitarian funding in development programmes to address immediate or emerging humanitarian crisis from a more development oriented perspective

The evaluation has however, also found that there is throughout the evaluation period room for improvement to provide a fully effective Sida framework for peacebuilding in a context like Somalia. This includes:

1) *Local level independence vs. strategic guidance*. The limited strategy guidance provides a lot of flexibility in terms of decision-making by embassy level staff. However, this also means that there are no guidance and safeguards in place (in case of less qualified staff)

2) *Use of humanitarian funding for peacebuilding*. In the initial period of the evaluation humanitarian funding was used for peacebuilding activities enabling Sida to react to peacebuilding in spite of (and not as a consequence of) the central level humanitarian funding allocation mandate

3) *Reliance on partner information vs. the use of checks and balances M&E*. Sida rely heavily on (the same) partners' information sharing on conflict and peace drivers. Sida and the embassy has limited self-generated information on peace and conflict drivers to verify and/or triangulate partner assessments without a more systematic independent M&E and conflict information gathering system in place

4) *Limited partner guidance on risk and duty of care*. For Sida partners in Somalia there are limited reflections on and dialogue related to the risks the partners face. This includes:

   a. *Operational risks*, such as: (i) guidelines and approaches related to security of operations and the duty of care vis-à-vis partner staff. While Sida has *de jure* delegated this risk to partners, there are no specific requirements to partners for having such policies in place and system to react to crisis; (ii) financial risks including the link to access and diversion of aid at beneficiary level. During the evaluation period there has to a varying degree been a requirement for local NGOs and subcontractors to pay taxes and/or risk diversion of aid through e.g. the gatekeeper system around IDPs. While Sida has zero tolerance for corruption and misuse of funds and this is clear to partners it is not feasible to operate in certain areas without these risks. There is thus a need for a more open discussion and clear and more context relevant response to this risk

   b. *Risks to beneficiaries and Do No Harm*. The team has not been able to find any guidance on risk management and safeguarding (Do No Harm) around Sida beneficiaries. This includes e.g. the risk of women in the formalisation of rule of law and GBV referral mechanisms or the risk for marginalised groups when local or national power arrangements are redesigned. A requirement for partners to have policies and

procedures in place and Sida follow-up on this is not evident from the evaluation in Somalia.

There is little evidence in the Sida portfolios throughout the period evaluated of any significant emphasis on women and marginalised groups. While women and to some extent marginalised groups were more explicitly referred to than ever before in the latest strategy period, these were not necessarily prioritised in design and dialogue with partners 'as the context was too difficult'. The exception to this, was the substantial increase in the number of women in the new parliament which was in part attributed to the pressure form development partners including Sweden. Sweden as well as international partners interviewed, however, also agreed that this result came at the expense of ensuring inclusion on marginalised groups. Which, as described under relevance, remains less prioritised by Sida in Somalia.

5.3 IMPACT

The overall impact of Sida's peacebuilding efforts in terms of direct, indirect, intended and unintended, negative and positive results

As is evident from chapter 3, Somalia is still a country marred by conflict (with pockets of stability and relative peace in Somaliland and Puntland) and an increasing number of internally displaced persons first and foremost in the southern and central part of the country. Twenty-five years of Sida and international engagement has not changed this situation significantly, however progress has been made in terms of statebuilding and initial power sharing across federal member states. Most significantly over the period concerned, Somaliland has remained stable with democratic traits and Puntland too has overall remained peaceful (with smaller pockets of conflict emerging). Al-Shabaab remains an active destabilising factor and most of the conflict drivers identified in chapter 3 remain present in 2018.

Currently the fifth largest provider of development assistance to Somalia (according to OECD-DAC), Sida has been an important contributor to development and eventually also to peacebuilding activities in the country in particular since 2003. For the general trends around statebuilding in Somalia, it is difficult to assess the extent of Sida's specific influence as most of this support is provided through multilateral mechanisms - where Sida, however, is credited for its active engagement in making those work. Sida's engagement in newer initiatives which have a more direct effect on peacebuilding in Somalia such as the SSF may hold the potential for longer term peacebuilding impact as they address several of the conflict drivers at local level. But it is too early to assess the longer-term effect.

When it comes to Somaliland and Puntland the funding to in particular Interpeace but also LPI and JPLG cannot be underestimated in terms of supporting the democratisation and local level reconciliation and stabilisation processes. Here Sida played an important role in partnership with others (in the case of Interpeace and JPLG) and in more stand alone interventions (such as Diakonia and LPI).

The impact of Sida's work vis-à-vis women's empowerment and gender equality is more limited, partly due to the difficult context but also because the priorities of Sida have varied over time. Similarly, the absence (by Sida and most other development partners) of prioritisation and dialogue in terms of promoting the most marginalised sections of the Somali society, the minority clans and ethnic groups, is a significant omission to addressing conflict drivers and ensuring outreach to the most vulnerable groups in Somali society. Today, the existing repressive political economy around these groups remain as it was 25 years ago (in spite of these groups comprising anywhere between 15 and 25% of the population).

However, Sida's approach to not only supporting the national statebuilding process of the FGS but also to staying engaged at FMS and local government level in the last periods of the evaluation show an understanding of the complexity of the Somalia conflict and the need to ensure a spread of development across geographical and political areas, minimising the risk for enhanced conflict between the centre and the periphery of the country.

5.4 SUSTAINABILITY

The extent to which the results have been sustainable

When it comes to sustainability, the programmes and projects that have been relevant, effective and contributed to longer term impacts will also by default have a high sustainability element. This in particular includes the democratisation process in Somaliland and the self-operating and local governments across Somaliland and Puntland. Arguably, Sida's long-term engagement with partners have allowed these to focus on longer term results and institution building, which is likely to have contributed to a sustainable approach to peacebuilding.

The support to the greater peacebuilding process, such as the constitutional review process and the FMS establishment, but also the FGS itself are still to prove their longer-term institutional sustainability. The process is challenged by internal disputes over resource allocation and is largely funded by the international community. There is awareness of this among most of the development partners interviewed but also confidence that the formalisation process and written agreements will suffice in this process. Whether Somalia has moved beyond the verbal culture and embrace a more formalised governance with clan-independent accountability links is still not evident but will become clearer in the next strategy period. In the meantime, what is needed is a reflection on the possible risks around this, the conflict potential and the management of these risks.

6 Annexes

ANNEX A: ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICT DRIVER CONSIDERATIONS IN COUNTRY STRATEGIES

Assessment of inclusion of / reference to conflict and peace drivers in country strategy

Strategy	Criteria: reference to conflict/peace drivers in:	Assessment	Drivers included in strategy background analysis
Resultatstrategi för Sveriges internationella bistånd i Somalia 2013-2017	1. Context analysis	Reference to need for conflict sensitivity. No overall assessment of conflict or peace drivers	Reference to New Deal, which includes basic drivers for peace. No evidence of other background analysis beyond internal Sida discussions and discussions with implementing partners
	2. Overall ToC	No reference to overall ToC except for objectives	
	3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention focus	Reflections on elements of drivers such as inequality, unemployment and women's role as well as democracy. But very limited analysis	
Country Strategy for development cooperation Somalia 2003-2005	1. Context analysis	Good contextual description, as well as strong conflict analysis related to the clan aspect and regional dimension	Analysis of 1999-2002 support basis for conflict assessment. No evidence of use of outside/secondary analysis
	2. Overall ToC	Strong reflections on peace drivers and Sida overall priorities in light of these (e.g. local level engagement; dialogue for DDR; aid as a conflict driver etc.)	
	3. Rationale for sector and/or intervention	Most cooperation areas linked to mitigate conflict (e.g. children in	

	focus	schools vs recruitment; IDPs and resources as conflict potential). Less conflict analysis/rationale related to sectoral prioritisation	48

Legend:

Conflict and peace drivers well integrated in strategy document (or clearly aligned with background analysis of drivers)	
Conflict and peace drivers included in part of the document	
Conflict and peace drivers mentioned but not prioritization not substantiated based on this	
Conflict and peace drivers not included in strategy	

ANNEX B: OVERVIEW OF SWEDISH GLOBAL POLICY GUIDANCE AND SOMALIA COUNTRY STRATEGIES

Swedish Global Policy Guidance	Swedish Strategies Somalia
Strategi Hållbar fred 2017-2022 (Swedish Government Policy) Objectives: • Improve the prevention of armed conflict, • Effective conflict resolution, • Sustainable peace- and state building • Increased human security • Strong emphasis on women, youth and marginalised groups • Emphasis on UN and OECD-DAC alignment • Support should be long-term, yet fast/responsive, flexible and with a calculated risk	N/D
Peace and Security for Development 2010-2014 (Swedish Government Policy) • The policy defines peacebuilding as the process that endeavours to support the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace, reconciliation and stability (including creating increased trust between the parties to a conflict; peace negotiations; implementation of peace agreements; participation of women and their influence in the peace process; creating reconciliation and actions that address the structural causes underlying the conflict) Objectives: 1. Promote peace • Dialogue, confidence-building and conflict management • Women, peace and security • Institutions of the rule of law with a	**Somalia Country Strategy (2013-2017)** Objectives • Strengthen opportunities for the poor • Support democracy • Strengthen human rights • Increase employment opportunities Target: Women and youth Expected Results: 1. Human security and livelihood • Improved conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms at local and national level • Increased number of people, particularly youth, with jobs that provide sufficient income to support themselves. 2. Health and gender equality • Increased number of people with access to

particular emphasis on "transitional justice" • influencing actors to support peace-building; capacity development to manage conflicts; involvement of women in peacebuilding process; promoting dialogue processes 2. Promote security • Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) • Security sector reform (SSR) • Small arms and light weapons, mines 3. Peace dividends • improvement in people's lives to ensure population support for peace (jobs, health, education etc.)	clean drinking water and improved sanitation • Improved access to good-quality healthcare • Fewer women being exposed to gender-based violence, including more local communities renouncing female genital mutilation. 3. Democracy and human rights • Enhanced capacity of local and central institutions to provide basic services, the rule of law and opportunities for democratic participation. • Increased number of people having knowledge of, and the opportunity to act for, strengthened human rights. • Improved independence and journalistic quality in Somali media • Enhanced empowerment of women, including increased participation in political processes.
Policy for Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation 2005 (Sida policy) Approaches: • Risk awareness: understanding the effects of development cooperation in a violent context • Conflict sensitivity: ensure development cooperation does not have a negative impact • Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviours of parties to conflict (e.g. house and road construction, good governance and democracy that is inclusive of marginalised groups; trade; media; agriculture; SSR). The interventions must contribute to prevention or resolution of conflict	N/D
Strategy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding 1999 (Sida policy)	**Sida Somalia Country Strategy 2003-2005** • Contribute to peaceful egalitarian and

- Conflict management: aid financed projects implemented during armed conflict
- Conflict prevention: activities aimed at preventing violence or escalation of violence
- Long and short term measures to reduce risk of violent conflict

Objectives:
- Promote a culture of prevention
- Identify structural risk factors
- Develop the international system of norms and strengthen its implementation
- Strengthen the international institutional framework and its preventive instruments
- Strengthen Sweden's capacity for international conflict prevention activities in different policy areas (foreign policy and security, trade, migration and development assistance)
- Enhancing respect for human rights and international law
- Strengthen measures to protect civilian populations
- Integrate conflict prevention with development co-operation work and develop a common perspective
- Prevention language
- Conflict analysis should be a natural part of the preparatory process

democratic society
- Promote human rights
- Mitigate consequences of armed conflict
- Promote peace and reconciliation
- Local capacity building
- Peace building and conflict management – promoting dialogue, support local peace initiatives
- Focus on education, healthcare/nutrition/sanitation, human rights/democracy/good governance Refugees and IDPs, landmine clearance, role of business sector

Objectives:
- Further the development of a peaceful, egalitarian, democratic society, promote respect for human rights and mitigate the effects of conflict and natural disasters. It is expected that achievement of these aims will help reduce levels of poverty in the country.

Overall guidelines:
- Local capacity building measures
- Peace building and conflict management

Priority target groups:
- Children
- Women
- Internally displaced people and refugees returning from elsewhere in the region.

Priority cooperation areas:
- Education
- Healthcare, nutrition and water/sanitation
- Human rights/democracy and good governance
- Re-integration of refugees, internally displaced people and minorities
- Land mine clearance
- The role of the business sector
- Local level capacity building, features here but not in the global

No global policy data available pre-1999	

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Analysis of policy alignment	
(1999 Global) – (2003-2005 Country)	• Both global as well as country strategies are lacking specificity • Difficult to formulate a directed and targeted country strategy off of a vague and broad global one • Somalia country speaks of mitigating the effects of the current crisis rather than focusing on the long-term: language in country is about mitigating while the language in the global strategy is about prevention • There is alignment between the two in the sense of taking a 'holistic approach'
(2010-2014 Global) - (2013-2017 Country)	• More results oriented, inclusion of a specific "expected results" section in the country strategy: Important to ask what changed in the global strategy that could have led to this • Definitions of peacebuilding become more specific to include the participation of women and their role in the peace process • Focusing specifically on initiatives that seem to translate into more long term, sustainable capacity building of the local community (employment, renouncing FGM, providing people with knowledge so they can think and act for themselves) • More direction from global therefore and this reflects in the country strategy where outcomes are operationalised, and broken down into smaller steps • Global is more specific about *how* to support peace • Seeking out joint donor programmes is explicitly mentioned- this correlated with the Sida aid patterns for Somalia during these years (more emphasis on joint and multilateral) • Suggests that engagement should be preceded by a risk and conflict assessment no evidence of these for Somalia • No security sector reform in country

ANNEX C: LIST OF PERSONS MET

Name	Designation (during the evaluation period)	Organisation
Abdi Ainte	Minister of Planning	FGS
Abdullahi Shirwa	Director	Peaceline
Anne-Maria Madsen	Somalia Counsellor	Embassy of Denmark, Nairobi
Charlotte Booth	Director	LPI
Emma Bjerten	Somalia focal point	SIPRI
Erik Petterson	Programme Officer	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Eva Atanassova	Democratisation Lead	EU Somalia
Fulgenzio Garrido Fuiz	Programme Lead	EU Somalia
Halima Ibrahim	Director	NIEC
Iman Icar	Deputy Mayor Mogadishu	BRA
Ivanoe Fugali	Commuity Development Lead	DRC
Janni Anderson	Programme Officer	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Jenny Svanberg	Director	LPI
Jens-Peter Dyrbak	Governance Lead	DFID
Jerry McCann	Director of Interpeace Somalia	Interpeace
Jody Henderson	Director	LPI
Johan Svensson	Somalia peace and reconciliaiton advisor (former LPI and Interpeace)	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Judith Gardner	Rift Valley Institute	Resource person
Katharina Zinn	Programme Officer	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Ken Menkhaus	Lecturer	Resource person
Kristina Normann	Programme Officer	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Mads Frilander	Head of DDG	DRC
Marika Fahlen	Special Envoy Horn of Africa	Swedish MFA
Mathias Krüger	Programme Officer	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Michael Lindvall	Ambassador	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Michele Cesari	Director	LPI
Nina Berg	Deputy Head of Mission	Embassy of Denmark, Nairobi
Ole Thonke	Deputy Head of Mission	Embassy of Denmark, Nairobi
Paul Simkin	Overall Programme Manager	JPLG
Per H Karlsson	Head of Development Cooperaiton	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi
Simon Nziokha	Director for Somalia	DRC
Stephen Ndichu	Director	Diakonia
Tariq Chaudry	Director Political Affairs	UNSOM
Urban Sjöström	Head of Development Cooperaiton	Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi

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Ministry of Finance main building in Mogadishu funded by Sida through bilateral funding. Photographed during the evaluation mission 9 September 2018

Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts
– Somalia Country Report

This report presents the Somalia case study for the Evaluation of Sida's support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts and is an annex to the evaluation synthesis report. The evaluation has been commissioned by Sida and undertaken by Tana Copenhagen. It assesses Sida's approach and support to peacebuilding at the strategic level and seeks to identify what has worked well and what has worked less well. The evaluation finds that the support has been relevant, if not fully comprehensive in terms of focusing on the key drivers of peace and conflict. Effectiveness has been promoted through flexible funding, long-term engagements, and recent support to the humanitarian-development nexus. Sida's recent approach supporting national statebuilding processes while staying engaged at Federal Member State and local government level shows an understanding of the complexity of the Somalia conflict and the need to ensure a spread of development across geographical and political areas. This minimises the risk for enhanced conflict between the centre and the periphery of the country. However, there is little evidence of any significant emphasis on women and marginalised groups in the peace-building support.