

UNICEF IRAN

BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME 2003 – 2006

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent the official views or policies of UNICEF.

TABLE OF CONTENTS


Acronyms	
Map	
Executive Summary	i
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Overview	1
1.2 Methodology	2
1.3 Constraints	3
1.4 Outline of the Report	3
2. CONTEXT	4
2.1 Country Context	4
2.2 A Disaster-prone Country	4
2.3 Bam Context	5
2.4 UNICEF Context	6
3. THE BAM EARTHQUAKE DISASTER	7
3.1 Overview	7
3.2 Initial Response	7
3.3 Recovery and Reconstruction	8
4. UNICEF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW	9
4.1 Preparedness	9
4.2 Initial Response	9
4.3 Recovery Programme & UNICEF's Core Commitments to Children	10
5. EDUCATION	13
5.1 Introduction/Context	13
5.2 Overview/ What UNICEF has done	13
5.3 Analysis/ Findings	16
5.4 Conclusions	21
5.5 Lessons	21
5.6 Recommendations	22
6. PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT PROJECT	23
6.1 Introduction/Context	23
6.2 Overview of the UNICEF Programme	23
6.3 Initial Response	23
6.4 Beyond Initial Response	24
6.5 Findings	26
6.6 Conclusions	30
6.7 Lessons	30
6.8 Recommendations	31
7. WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION	32
7.1 Overview	32
7.2 Overview of UNICEF response	32
7.3 Findings	33
7.4 Conclusions	37
7.5 Lessons	37
7.6 Recommendations	37

8. FAMILY REUNIFICATION	39
8.1 Overview	39
8.2 Overview of UNICEF response	39
8.3 Findings	40
8.4 Conclusions	44
8.5 Lessons	44
8.6 Recommendations	45
9. CHILD FRIENDLY SPACES	46
9.1 Overview of UNICEF response	46
9.2 Findings	47
9.3 Conclusions	50
9.4 Lessons	51
9.5 Recommendation	52
10. HEALTH AND NUTRITION	52
10.1 Overview	52
10.2 Overview of UNICEF response	52
10.3 Findings	53
10.4 Conclusions	57
10.5 Lessons	58
10.5 Recommendations	58
11. CHILD FRIENDLY CITY PROGRAMME	59
11.1 Introduction	59
11.2 Overview of the Programme	59
11.3 Findings	60
11.4 Lessons	61
11.5 Recommendations	62
12. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES	63
12.1 Gender Analysis	63
12.2 Vulnerability	64
12.3 Human Rights-based Approach to Programming	65
12.4 International Standards	66
12.5 Programme Integration	66
12.6 Partnership	67
12.7 Coordination	67
12.8 Preparedness, Disaster Response and Risk Reduction	68
12.9 Zarand and Lorestan Earthquakes	69
12.10 Lessons	70
12.11 Recommendations	70
13. OPERATIONS & PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT	71
13.1 Overview	71
13.2 Human Resources	71
13.3 Supplies	72
13.4 Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation	72
13.5 Lessons	73
13.6 Recommendations	73
14. CONCLUSIONS	74
15. LESSONS	76
16. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS	77
Sources	79
Annexes	85

ACRONYMS

ACH	Accion Contre el Hambre
BRCSR	Bureau for Research and Coordination of Safety and Rehabilitation Activities
CAG	Cash assistance to government
CCC	Core Corporate Commitments for Children in Emergencies
CFC	Child Friendly Cities
CFS	Child Friendly Schools
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CWC	Child Welfare Committee
ECCC	Early Child Care Centre
ECHA	UN Executive Committee for Humanitarian Assistance
EPRP	Emergency Preparedness and Response Plan
EVSM	Effective vaccine storage and management
HNK	Healthy Nutrition Kiosks
HRBAP	Human Rights Based Approach to Programming
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDTR	Identification, Documentation, Tracing and Reunification
IECD	Integrated early childhood development
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IK fund	Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IK fund).
INDMP	Integrated National Disaster Management Plan
IRCS	Iranian Red Crescent Society
IRIB	Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
IT	Information technology
LMO	Literacy Movement Organisation
LoU	Letter of Understanding
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MENARO	UNICEF Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MTSP	Mid-Term Strategic Plan
NCRND	National Committee for the Reduction of Natural Disasters
NDTF	National Disaster Task Force
NFI	Non food items
NGO	Non governmental organisation
NIMS	National Infant Mortality Surveillance
NOSAZI	National Renovation Organisation
NYHQ	New York head Quarters
PM&E	Programme Monitoring and Evaluation
PTA	Parents and Teachers Association
RCC	Recreational and cultural centre
ROSA	UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia
RWWC	Rural Water and Waste Water Company
SAF	Science and Arts Foundation
SSA	Special Services Agreement
SWO	State Welfare Organization
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TIP	Twin indirect pit latrines
ToR	Terms of reference
ToT	Training of Trainers
TRC	Teachers resource centres
UNDAF	United Nations Development Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

BAM EARTHQUAKE DISASTER 26 DECEMBER 2003



EVALUATION OF THE UNICEF BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Introduction

The earthquake that struck the city and district of Bam on December 26, 2003 claimed over 26,000 lives, left 10,000 injured, 75,000 homeless and caused estimated overall losses of US\$1.5 billion. The response to the disaster was led by the Iranian government which has a well-developed disaster response system. Highly unusually, the government invited in international agencies and created 'open skies' for the flow of relief aircraft. This resulted in a massive influx of international agencies and relief material. However, the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) played a central role in the relief response, drawing on its own very substantial resources.

UNICEF immediately responded to the disaster in a generally timely and appropriate way, although, in fact, its contribution which was mainly channelled through the IRCS was small compared to the overall response and the IRCS's own resources. UNICEF subsequently developed recovery programmes with government counterpart departments in the areas of education, water and sanitation, psychosocial support, health and nutrition and child friendly cities. UNICEF's National Committees and other donors and responded strongly, eventually raising over US\$27 million.

UNICEF, working with its government partners, has made an important and lasting contribution to recovery in Bam and to the lives of children and their families. This contribution is widely recognised by citizens and government officials. The evaluation also notes ways in which UNICEF could improve its performance in the future.

It is commendable that UNICEF has stayed in Bam and has had the resources to follow through on its programmes, at the same time incorporating the city and district into its longer-term country programme. The team found that recovery and reconstruction in Bam was by no means finished towards the end of 2006. Many houses remained to be constructed and social issues of drug addiction and depression remain.

It is too early to be sure about the degree of sustainability and longer-term impact of the programmes supported by UNICEF and there are likely to be mixed results. UNICEF has commendably encouraged innovation in its programme support to the government. In some areas, such as family reunification and psychosocial approaches this is very likely to have produced lasting developments in government practice and policy. The prospects for introducing innovation in post-disaster programmes are probably highly context specific and in some areas such as the introduction of computer labs and libraries, the results may be less successful.

2. Education

All 131 schools in Bam and the surrounding region were destroyed or very severely damaged. The earthquake took the lives of an estimated one-third of the city's teachers. UNICEF very quickly provided supplies and tents so that temporary classrooms could be established. The opening of temporary schools and the gathering the surviving children together in friendlier spaces than streets was probably a major contributor to the post-earthquake normalisation process. The back-to-school campaign supported by UNICEF achieved excellent coverage.

In its rehabilitation projects, UNICEF supported and promoted the child friendly school concept, school hygiene promotion and capacity building, professional development, and emergency preparedness for Ministry of Education teachers and staff. This work has been relevant and much appreciated by students, school teachers, principals and Ministry staff. There are questions about the sustainability of some of the projects supported by UNICEF, including the computer laboratories.

3. Psychosocial Support Project

The Bam earthquake had a devastating effect on survivors in Bam, especially on children, given the huge loss of life amongst friends, parents and teachers. It was estimated that 60% of the children suffered from strong post-traumatic reactions and corresponding behavioural problems.

The UNICEF's support for psychosocial responses in both the emergency and rehabilitation phases was highly relevant and important and the coverage of the psychosocial projects was very high. However, the work may not have responded fully to the psychosocial problems of Bam's youth.

The Neshat Centres, established later in the programme, were specifically expected to provide culturally-appropriate psychosocial services to children and the community. The centres need stronger ties with the community to be useful and responsive to the needs of potential clients.

The psychosocial approaches supported in Bam could be adopted as the model for disaster-related interventions at national level and have an impact on national policy and practice. At the time of the evaluation, a national emergency preparedness plan has been developed based on the achievements of psychosocial project in Bam.

4. Water and Environmental Sanitation

In the initial relief period, UNICEF provision included water storage bladders, water purification tablets and other items. UNICEF's main rehabilitation contribution has been to provide over 560km of earthquake-resistant pipes for the renewal of the Bam water system. This was a substantial infrastructure contribution to the overall rehabilitation of Bam and will be a significant achievement. UNICEF's role was to supply materials and monitor progress. It is probable that the Iranian government would have funded this scheme although many of the officials interviewed felt that UNICEF's contribution was very important in helping to avoid delays.

UNICEF could have made more of an input into social aspects of the project and network design. When the scheme goes live UNICEF should monitor accessibility by the poorest and most vulnerable households, particularly looking at issues relating to charges for connections and water metering.

UNICEF was not successful with its latrine-building programme, largely due to the model it chose for implementation and the time delays in starting the project.

5. Family Reunification

Approximately 4,000 children lost one or both parents as a result of the earthquake. Although traditional practice in Iran is to place children without parents in residential care, official policy has moved toward family based care where possible. UNICEF supported a family reunification programme with the Social Welfare Office of the government which was relevant, appropriate and effective and resulted in the majority of children without primary care givers living in extended family-based care. Only 120 children were reported to be living in residential care. This was probably one of UNICEF's greatest achievement in its work in Bam.

In addition to the direct impact of this programme on children, the project experience has also influenced the way that the State Welfare Organisation views childcare in the aftermath of disasters as shown by its response to the Zarand earthquake in 2005.

The family reunification programme demonstrated UNICEF using its position as an inter-governmental organisation, combining practical experience and solid policy work to maximum effect.

6. Child Friendly Spaces

One of UNICEF's first responses to the disaster was the provision of tents where children could enjoy supervised play. This happened within a week of the earthquake and was widely regarded as one of the most visible and successful of the early UNICEF interventions. Subsequently the progression of these tented care centres into kindergartens (ECCCs) was also relevant and appropriate. Coverage was also good. This intervention will certainly have had a positive impact on the lives of children affected by the earthquake and is one of UNICEF's interventions most appreciated by the people of Bam.

The recreational and cultural centres (RCCs) were an important attempt at providing services for adolescents, a group traditionally neglected in the aftermath of disasters. However, the relevance and appropriateness of the RCCs is less clear, as is their future sustainability.

A long term aim of the UNICEF country programme is to increase pre-school education to 25% nationally. This target has already been achieved in Bam and Baravat and shows evidence of an attitudinal change almost certainly produced by the post-disaster ECCC project.

7. Health and Nutrition

The health and nutrition programme was patchy in both design and implementation. The provision of essential drugs, although not monitored, was a sensible emergency measure. The replacement of the cold chain equipment in Bam and districts was useful if not essential. Of the nutrition programmes, the flour fortification will probably have the greatest impact. Human resource constraints have been the biggest issue affecting this sector of UNICEF's response.

Some aspects of the current nutrition programme are interesting and could provide a link to the longer-term programming. The nutrition care centres provide a base on which UNICEF could design some interesting future programmes, especially in poor areas such as Rigan.

8. Child Friendly City Programme

At an early stage after the Bam earthquake, UNICEF saw that there was an opportunity to promote the CFC concept, given the high level of urban destruction. At the time of the evaluation, ten of the twenty school playgrounds were nearly completed. These facilities are a considerable improvement on the standard designs and as such welcomed by the teachers interviewed. The playground designs were weakened by lack of consultation with staff and children about details and by lack of disabled access.

The Olia complex, comprising an early child care centre, primary school and teachers' resource centre, is intended to be a model for future child friendly designs and will probably be completed by May 2007. Construction work on a community centre started in October 2006 and detailed planning work on the child friendly zone has yet to be completed. It was therefore too early to evaluate the outcomes of these projects.

The UNICEF Country Office strategy for Bam avoided involvement in large scale construction projects. At some point this policy changed, possibly prompted by the arrival of a large contribution from the Italian National Committee earmarked for school construction. It has not been possible to find any clear paper trail of how and when the strategy was changed.

UNICEF has limited expertise in construction and in the CFC concept and the project has been hindered by inadequate supervision of the project. The organisation therefore needs to decide whether it gears up its expertise and resources to be able carry out projects of this kind.

9. Cross Cutting Issues

In traditional manner, UNICEF focused on women and children and to some extent on girl children in its programme responses. However, gender analysis was largely absent from programme documentation and UNICEF's response to the disaster lacks a well defined gender policy approach.

UNICEF worked with some of the most vulnerable children, including those who had lost parents or care givers and women-headed households (with latrines). However, the evaluation team did not find evidence of a written vulnerability analysis. This may explain why, for example, the needs of disabled children appear to have been neglected.

In a 2004 strategy document for the Bam programme, UNICEF placed a rights-based approach at the heart of the recovery programme. An extremely positive achievement is that UNICEF succeeded in reminding policy makers and government of the importance of children's rights in the response. However, in this context, more could have been done to encourage government departments to provide more information to and facilitate participation by beneficiaries.

UNICEF has taken a planned and managed approach to integrating the Bam projects into the Iran country programme. This appears to have worked well so far when there is a direct alignment of sectors as with education. To some extent the structural arrangements for the programmes are of less importance than ensuring that all the 'residual' parts of the Bam programme are adequately supported and supervised and the full advocacy and scaling-up opportunities are capitalised on.

As has been noted earlier, UNICEF's pre-existing relationships with government partners in its country programme provided a crucially important asset in carrying out the Bam programme

work. The evaluation team found that generally there was positive collaboration between UNICEF and its government counterparts, although this varied considerably. The Bam programme has generally strengthened and broadened relationships with government counterparts.

UNICEF appears to have fulfilled its coordination commitments in its allocated sectors and forged a strong relationship with the Reconstruction Task Force in Bam.

10. Operations and Programme Management

The sudden expansion of UNICEF's programme in Iran created immense demands on management, administrative structures and capacities. It took a long time to get key posts filled in the programme both on the programme and operations side. The lack of experienced technical staff is particularly important for a developed country such as Iran where UNICEF's comparative advantage is in technical expertise as much as in funding.

The supply component of the Iran programme expanded nearly ten fold in 2004 and most operations were constrained by delivery delays with some stretching to over six months. There were also, at times, administrative delays in making payments to partners.

Both UNICEF and government counterparts faced the challenge of making their respective administrative and financial systems work together and there was frustration at times with each other's bureaucracies. This was probably exacerbated on the UNICEF side by the fact some of the staff were new to UNICEF and they themselves were discovering how the systems worked.

In terms of planning, there was a lack of a single overarching document or plan of action that described the rationale for UNICEF's programming decisions, analysis, the assessment of need etc. Programme quality could have been improved by more focus on assessment, analysis and planning to determine who is in need and how UNICEF can help. Monitoring activity tended to focus on outputs and on the liquidation of cash assistance to government, rather than looking at issues of programme quality, what beneficiaries think and whether any groups have been missed.

11. General Lessons

1. In order for UNICEF to respond effectively to major, sudden onset disasters it is crucial that experienced staff are fielded quickly to back up country office staff. It is unacceptable that there are long waits for staff in key areas such as education. It is also crucial that key operational personnel in human resources, finance and supplies are in place equally quickly.
2. If UNICEF is to be involved in major construction projects, it must develop the policies and in-house expertise to handle such work
3. In terms of quality programming, UNICEF should ensure that there is an adequate focus on the needs of poorer and vulnerable groups, including children with disabilities and that there is also a focus on community consultation and participation. The challenge in post-disaster planning of this kind is to be able to plan and implement rapidly while working very much in a developmental context.
4. In a middle income country such as Iran, inputs that have the highest impact are technical, rather than financial. UNICEF's advocacy for children is important, as is it

experience from other disasters, especially in the area of social policy and practice. However, robust and relevant responses give UNICEF credibility which provides a valuable base to have influence on children's issues in post-disaster situations.

5. Although UNICEF has stayed the longest of any international humanitarian agency in Bam, by the end of 2006 there was still a great deal of work left to be done before the city is fully recovered. UNICEF should consider a five year time frame for major rehabilitation programmes, particularly those involving physical construction.
6. The CFC project has shown that there must be a clear and transparent decision-making process within UNICEF whenever major capital expenditure commitments are made and when decisions are being made that, apparently, change the programme policy in place.
7. UNICEF Iran's partnership work with its government counterparts has been an important and generally positive feature of the Bam response. In post-disaster situations where large amounts of funding are being dispersed rapidly, experience in Bam has shown the importance of time being spent to ensure that both parties understand each other's administrative and financial requirements.
8. The Bam disaster has underlined the importance of preparedness and disaster risk reduction work and UNICEF Iran should continue to build these elements into its country programmes.

12.1 General Recommendations

Country Specific Recommendations

1. UNICEF should ensure that there is adequate follow-up to the Bam programmes to maximise sustainability and advocacy potential. Recommendations in the programme areas can be found in the relevant sections of the report (**Country Office. Immediate**).
2. Because of Iran's disaster prone nature and the emergency prone nature of the region, it is strongly recommended that UNICEF should retain an emergency preparedness and response capacity. Building on the Bam experience, each programme sector should regularly update a preparedness and response plan. This work should be done in conjunction with the UNICEF Regional Office. This work should be incorporated into Annual Work Plans and consideration should be given to an addendum to the CPAP (**Country / Regional Office. Action plan for implementing this recommendation by mid 2007**).
3. A senior UNICEF staff member should have clearly assigned management responsibility for overseeing and developing the disaster response and disaster preparedness part of UNICEF work in Iran. Consideration should also be given to an emergency post within the country programme. (If that person was also available to neighbouring countries, some cost sharing arrangements for the post could be considered) (**Country/Regional Office. June 2007**).
4. UNICEF continues to develop its emergency preparedness frameworks, such as the EPRP. It should ensure that preparedness plans are practical, up-to-date and 'live' documents, not just box-ticking exercises (**Country/Regional/HQ. Ongoing**).

5. For first phase relief responses, UNICEF should develop a limited list of child-friendly items that supplement the basic relief materials provided by the IRCS to be available in-country and regionally (**Country Office with Regional Office / Supplies Department. Finalise by June 2007**).
6. On the policy and advocacy side, UNICEF should continue to work with government counterparts and disaster management structures, the IRCS and other agencies such as UNDP to develop policy, guidelines, good practice in favour of children in emergencies. UNICEF should determine whether it can support the Ministry of Education, the IRCS in areas such as school safety and earthquake preparedness and awareness (**Country Office. Ongoing and review progress at end of 2007**).
7. UNICEF Iran should draw up a management response to this evaluation stating which recommendations have been accepted, the reason for the rejection of any and a work plan for the implementation of the accepted recommendations (**Country Office. Immediate**).

Global Recommendations

1. UNICEF should develop and implement assessment, programme planning, implementation and monitoring methods that focus on situation and vulnerability analysis, beneficiary consultation and programme quality. Elements of this work can very usefully be shared with government counterparts (**NYHQ/Regional/Country Office. Demonstrable progress by end 2007**).
2. UNICEF needs clear policies about whether or not to embark on post-disaster infrastructure projects. There is a strong argument for UNICEF to be involved in school reconstruction, so that it can introduce and promote child friendly concepts. UNICEF will therefore need better global expertise in large scale infrastructure and reconstruction projects. This should go beyond the MoU with UNOPs and should include partnerships with multi-laterals such as the World Bank who have this expertise. UNICEF can develop expertise in social aspects of infrastructure projects as well as understanding better how to manage such projects. This will necessitate the development of in-house capacity (**NYHQ. Clear policy and implementation plan by mid 2007**).
3. UNICEF should give consideration to including vulnerability considerations within the CCCs, so that there is a clear instruction that vulnerable groups be sought out and supported (**NYHQ. Mid 2007**).

EVALUATION OF THE UNICEF BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME 2003 - 2006

FINAL REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

The earthquake that struck the city and district of Bam on December 26, 2003 claimed over 26,000 lives and left 10,000 people injured and 75,000 homeless, including many workers of the city's services. The basic infrastructure of the city was severely damaged.

UNICEF responded immediately to the disaster, flying in relief goods and assessing the situation on the ground. Subsequently it developed recovery programmes in the areas of education, water and sanitation, psychosocial support, health and nutrition and child friendly cities. UNICEF's National Committees and other donors and responded strongly, eventually raising over US\$27 million for UNICEF's post-disaster work in Bam.

UNICEF Iran commissioned this independent evaluation which took place in October and November 2006 towards the end of the Bam rehabilitation programmes.

The evaluation aims to identify and analyse the achievements and results of UNICEF's emergency programme in Bam, present lessons learned and recommendations for the future.

The objectives of the evaluation are:

1. To evaluate the programme in terms of the standard evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness (including timeliness), impact, coverage, efficiency (including cost effectiveness) and sustainability.
2. To evaluate to what extent UNICEF has been able to fulfil its global and national commitments to women and children affected by the disaster as stated in its "Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies" and other policy documents and guidance.
3. To extract lessons learned during the programme that can help UNICEF in future disaster responses.
4. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of UNICEF's collaboration with its partners, particularly with the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in terms of institutional capacity building, policy and practice development and future sustainability.
5. To assess the way in which UNICEF has managed the Bam programme, including the transition from Phase I (immediate disaster response) through II (immediate recovery and rehabilitation) to III (longer term programming integrated into UNICEF's country programme).

The full ToR can be seen in Annex 1.

1.2 Methodology

The evaluation team consisted of two international and one Iranian consultant (see Annex 2). Interpretation for the international consultants was necessary in some interviews.

The evaluation field work was undertaken between 9 October and 6 November 2006 (Annex 3). After a nine day period of preliminary interviews and scoping in Tehran, Bam and Kerman, the evaluation team presented an inception report to a meeting of UNICEF and government staff in Kerman on 18 October 2006 (Annex 4).

Following discussions with UNICEF Iran staff, the original terms of reference (ToR) for the evaluation were reformulated in the inception report to make them shorter and more user friendly (Annex 1).

The evaluation methodology has been a mixture of qualitative and quantitative investigation. Time and resources did not allow for a full quantitative survey of affected persons and other key stakeholders. 'Triangulation' was used to verify and validate information and findings by cross-checking information against a number of different sources in order to establish its validity.

The selection of field interview sites and interviewees (e.g affected persons; project level staff) was done on a purposive basis, targeting a selection of individuals, groups, projects etc. that could provide information needed to cover the areas under investigation. Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were used.

UNICEF's programme focuses on Bam city and Baravat, but also covers the district of Bam. The evaluation coverage reflected this with several visits to rural areas outside the city. However, 80% to 90% of the evaluation team's field work took place in Bam city itself, reflecting the major proportion of UNICEF expenditure in that location.

In Bam and Baravat the evaluation team conducted over 100 individual and focus group interviews with government officials, UNICEF staff, recipients of UNICEF assistance, families caring for separated children, teachers, kindergarten teachers, social workers, health workers, engineers and other professionals. The team also visited villages outside Bam such as Ghossamabad and Kordesan, a nutrition clinic in Rigan and a flour factory in Jiroft.

A full list of interviewees can be found in Annex 5.

The evaluation covers all phases of UNICEF's work in Bam:

Phase I: Immediate relief (up until February 2004)

Phase II: Recovery– start up and initial implementation (provision of temporary services, shelter etc) (timing varies according to project, but roughly from March 2004 to end 2005)

Phase III: Transition phase to longer term work and integration into UNICEF's country programme.

As indicated in the Inception Report, the evaluation focused less on Phase 1, given the time that had elapsed since the initial disaster. Moreover, an earlier evaluation (Dessallien 2005) took a detailed look at UNICEF's response during 2004. Although the overall tone and some of the

findings of that evaluation were strongly disputed by the Country Office, the report, part of a regional evaluation of three earthquake responses, contains a very detailed account of the first weeks and months of the response.¹

The evaluation team took into account a variety of UNICEF global and country specific documents including UNICEF's Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies, UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRPs), UNICEF's Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) and UNICEF's global Medium Term Strategic Plans (MTSP) 2002 - 2005 and 2006 – 2009. (A list of sources is given on page 79).

The evaluation team's draft findings were presented to a meeting of UNICEF and government staff in Tehran on 5 November 2006. The draft evaluation report was revised after two rounds of feedback and comment from UNICEF country staff, the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office and the Evaluation Office in UNICEF New York headquarters.

1.3 Constraints

The ToR for the evaluation were broad and represented a challenge to the evaluation team, particularly as the working time available was reduced by approximately a week because of the Eid-ul-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan and the fact that the international consultants' visas could not be extended beyond their original 30 day periods. As a result, the evaluators did not look in any depth at communications and media issues. Interviews with UNICEF staff in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional office and New York headquarters were very limited in number.

A notable difficulty was the lack of official government information relating to the reconstruction of Bam. For example, the evaluation team, and apparently UNICEF Iran, could not obtain a copy of the master plan for the reconstruction of Bam. This seems quite extraordinary and must raise a question mark about the effectiveness of the coordination of the reconstruction effort (see also section 12.7). Other official data, such as the number of houses and schools rebuilt was also not available.

1.4 Outline of the Report & Terminology

Section 2 covers the various contexts of the Bam disaster, section 3 provides an overview of the disaster and section 4 an overview of UNICEF's response. Sections 5 to 11 cover the programme areas of UNICEF's work. Section 12 looks at cross-cutting issues and section 13 at operational and programme management topics. Conclusions are given in section 14, lessons learned in section 15 and general recommendations in section 16.

For simplicity, in much of the report, UNICEF is used where technically UNICEF Iran or the UNICEF Country Office should be used. Again for simplicity, the report refers to UNICEF's programmes where properly they should be described as UNICEF – supported programmes, or, in many cases, government programmes supported by UNICEF. UNICEF was and is not operational in Iran in the sense of running its own projects.

Lessons and recommendations can be found at the end of each section and consolidated in Annex 7.

¹ The Dessallien report looked at UNICEF's earthquake responses in Algeria, Morocco and Iran.

2. CONTEXT

2.1 Country Context

The Islamic Republic of Iran ranks 99 on the UN's human development index, lying between Jamaica and Georgia in the upper middle band in medium human development terms.² Iran ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child with a general reservation in 1994. According to UNICEF's Country Programme Action Plan 2005 - 2009 with the government, Iran is on track towards achieving the commitments of the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals, although regional disparities within the country persist.

Major progress has been made in access to primary health services, primary education and female literacy. Access to community health services is almost universal. Child and maternal mortality have decreased significantly, with an infant mortality rate of 28.6 per 1,000 live births, an under-five mortality rate of 42 per 1,000 live births and a maternal mortality ratio of 37 per 100,000 live births.

In education, net primary school enrolment ratio stands at 74%. The literacy rate of the population aged 6 years and above has reached 80.4% (85.1% men, 75.6% women), but is lower in the poorer provinces, particularly among women.

Despite these significant advances, poverty estimates for Iran still range between 18% and 35% of the population. Large disparities exist between and within provinces. For example, in Sistan and Baluchistan province only 55% of the population have access to safe water compared to 83% nationally. The gaps between national and provincial literacy, nutrition and birth registration indicators are similarly wide. Malnutrition remains a challenge, especially at community level in the 'disparity' provinces on which UNICEF focuses, where there is a prevalence of underweight, wasting and stunting amongst children and micronutrient deficiencies among children and women.

Unemployment rates for women aged between 15 and 24 have risen from 26.8% in 1996 to 40.6% in 2001 and for men generally, unemployment has risen from 20.5% to 35% in the same period.

2.2 A Disaster-prone Country

Iran is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. In the 20th Century 19 large earthquakes claimed between 143,000 and 178,000 lives.³ The 1990 earthquake in Gilan and Zanjan provinces killed 40,000 people. Iran is also susceptible to frequent droughts and floods.

Iran has a well-developed disaster response system, with the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) playing a key role and drawing on massive resources. The IRCS has 360 branches throughout the country, 3,700 heavy and light vehicles and 8,000 fully trained volunteers.

The IRCS led and played the major role in the relief effort after the Bam earthquake and was widely praised for its work.

The responsibilities and functions related to disaster management in Iran are formally assigned to the Ministry of Interior with two organisations playing an important role: the Bureau for Research and Coordination of Safety and Rehabilitation Activities (BRCSR) and the National

² UNDP 2005.

³ World Disaster Report 2004.

Disaster Task Force (NDTF). BRCSR conducts research on safety measures, formulates preparedness and mitigation plans and collects, analyses and disseminates information on disaster management. The NDTF is an inter-organisational body chaired by the Ministry of Interior, whose activities vary during different phases in the aftermath of disasters. When a sudden disaster occurs, the NDTF assumes the task of coordinating relief operations carried out by technical ministries and relief organisations. At other times, NDTF is concerned with coordination of preparedness and mitigation activities. A Disaster Task Force headed by the provincial Deputy Governor General is also positioned in each province and district of the country. The role of the Ministry of Interior is enforced by the National Committee for the Reduction of Natural Disasters (NCRND) that includes various Ministries, research institutes, and the IRCS.

With support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), an Integrated National Disaster Management Plan (INDMP) was developed and approved by the Cabinet in April 2003. The INDMP provides a framework for emergency management at the national, provincial and local levels during preparedness, mitigation and recovery phases.

The Bam disaster was the first test of the new government regulations and structure for disaster response. According to Lawry-White *et al* (2004) the operation was complicated by role overlap and a degree of competition between authorities because the regulations had not yet been internalised by the various government ministries and authorities.

Following the Bam earthquake in December 2003, in order to improve coordination of all organisations involved and manage responses to the crisis, a Prevention and Management of Natural Disasters High Task Force was instituted. This Task Force is made up of the Ministers of Interior, Housing and Urban Development, Defence and Army, the Head of Army Forces Task Force, the President of Management and Planning Organization, the Head of Iran TV and Radio Organisation, the President of Iran Red Crescent, and two experts to be selected by the Head of the Task Force. The execution of the task Force's approvals is obligatory for all organisations in the three forces (executive, judiciary, and legislation), the organisations and the army forces, which are under the leadership of the Supreme Leader.

2.3 Bam Context

Bam is located 1,000 km southeast of Tehran, 190 km from Kerman, the provincial capital, 1,000 m above the sea level in a semi-desert region.

The population of Bam city before the earthquake was thought to be between 120,000 and 140,000. Bam is an important area in Iran for the production and export of dates. However the socio-economic context of the desert city and the district was, and remains, generally poor, with high levels of unemployment, in spite of the Special Economic Zone with its automotive industry on the outskirts of Bam.

In particular, the rural areas around Bam are poor and have suffered several years of drought and crop failures. As a result, the population was already economically vulnerable before the earthquake struck.

Bam is on a major route for illegal drugs from Afghanistan and drug addiction rates are reported to have risen since the earthquake.

Tourism to Bam has suffered badly because of the extensive damage to the Bam citadel World Heritage site. The citadel was also an important cultural and relaxation spot for local people and cited by children in interviews.⁴

2.4 UNICEF Context

UNICEF has been operating in Iran since 1962 although it left for a period after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Its agreement with the Iranian government is described in the CPAP. A new CPAP (2005 – 2009) was finalised in 2005. The priorities for the country programme are:

1. Integrated Early Childhood Development
 - Birth registration
 - Child health and nutrition
 - Early childhood development (ECD)
2. Girls' Education & Women's Empowerment
 - Girls and non-formal education project
 - Women's empowerment project
3. HIV/AIDS and Adolescent Friendly Services
 - HIV/AIDS communication and education project
 - Adolescent Friendly Services
4. Child Protection
 - Legal reform and policy development
 - Prevention of child abuse
5. Promotion and Monitoring of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

UNICEF focuses on 12 disparity districts in 3 provinces, selected after surveys for their socio-economic indicators. A 13th district, Bam, was included after the earthquake.⁵

UNICEF has been and remains a fully participating member of the UN country team in Iran. The framework for the UN agencies' work is described in the UN Development Assistance Framework 2005 – 2009. The priorities expressed in the UNDAF are:

- Strengthening capacities and capabilities for achieving the MDGs.
- Strengthening good governance.
- Improving economic performance and management and generating employment.
- Sustainable development, disaster management and energy efficiency.
- Facilitating the transfer of science and technology for development in all areas of cooperation.

⁴ Iltus 2004.

⁵ The disparity provinces and districts are Hormozgan province (Hajiabad, Ghesm, Bandarlenge, Jask), Sistan and Baluchistan province (Chanbahar, Sarbaz, Khash, Nikshahr), West Azerbaijan province (Chaldoran, Takab, Sardasht, Shahindej), Kerman province (Bam district – included after the earthquake).

3. THE BAM EARTHQUAKE DISASTER

3.1 Overview

The earthquake hit Bam and surrounding areas at 5.26 am on 26 December 2003 when the majority of the population were asleep at home. The epicentre for the quake, registering 6.5 on the Richter scale, was very close to Bam city and also close to the surface. The official number of deaths given by the Iranian Office of Statistics is more than 26,000. According to UNICEF some 75,000 people were made homeless. Almost one third of all school children were killed (10,000 out of 32,433) as well as a third of their teachers (1,000 out of 3,400). Approximately 3,800 children lost one parent or care giver and 726 lost both parents.

Accurate population figures for Bam are hard to obtain. The town had a population of approximately 100,000 before the earthquake and the district as a whole approximately 200,000. The earthquake resulted in various overlapping population movements. Some 10,000 people may have left the city immediately after the disaster, in addition to those medically evacuated. However a much larger number entered the town looking for relatives and to access relief supplies. In all, the population of the city rose to approximately 200,000 which severely increased the burden on the relief effort, complicated the effective delivery of aid and made targeting of priority and vulnerable groups more difficult.⁶

Over 85 percent of the buildings in Bam collapsed. 131 schools were totally destroyed and the remaining 64 were rendered unusable, all three hospitals and 10 urban health centres were destroyed, as well as 10 rural health centres damaged. The high death and casualty figures given earlier were a result of the time of day and the poor and inappropriate construction of many houses. The World Bank estimated the overall losses from the Bam earthquake at US\$1.5 billion.⁷

3.2 Initial Response

In the first few hours after the disaster, rescue operations were carried out by local people very quickly joined by the IRCS and then by government and military teams. In a substantial departure from normal practice, the Iranian government requested international assistance, facilitated entry visas for international relief workers and declared an open skies policy so that international relief flights could come in.

Bam and the surrounding affected areas were divided into 13 zones which received help from different provinces of the country. The Iranian Red Crescent, together with other aid organisations, set up family tent camps with water, some sanitation and some basic health services. Large distributions of basic supplies were made. The population was registered and rations cards distributed to rationalise food distribution.

As always, in sudden-onset disasters of this kind the first few days were chaotic with a large number of national and international agencies arriving in Bam. However it is reckoned that within three weeks most of the basic needs of the affected population had been met in terms of rudimentary temporary shelter, food and water. There were no significant outbreaks of communicable diseases.⁸ Problems raised by beneficiaries were about the problem of unequal

⁶ Dessallien 2005.

⁷ World Bank 2004.

⁸ Sources: UN News Service; OCHA IRIN; USAID; Dessallien 2005

distribution, insufficient heating and blankets in the winter cold and the lack of showers. In some areas there was a shortage of children's clothing and shoes.⁹

Although used to responding to earthquakes, the IRCS pointed out that the Bam disaster was somewhat unusual in Iran in having a high proportion of casualties and damage in a concentrated urban area. In the early stages, there was a shortage of excavators and other mechanical equipment.

Security remained an issue of concern for some weeks. The population was, understandably, deeply unsettled. Some fled the city while more moved into the city in search of relief and the opportunities that the relief operation offered.

The conditions for relief workers with after shocks, cold winter temperatures and tented accommodation were also difficult.

The UN launched a flash appeal for US\$ 31 million on 8 January 2004 which included US\$ 10.9 million for UNICEF. UNICEF subsequently issued a separate appeal on 13 January 2004 for US\$14.3 million.

3.3 Recovery and Reconstruction

The reconstruction phase started in February and March 2004, after the expiration of the 40 days period of official mourning.

The number of international agencies present in Bam reduced quickly, partly because relief needs were being met by the government and the IRCS. Also a number of international NGOs could not or did not want to function within the parameters set by the Iranian government. The international focus on Bam faded almost as quickly as it started and to some extent it has become a forgotten disaster, overshadowed by the subsequent Indian Ocean tsunami and Pakistan earthquake disasters.¹⁰

As mentioned in 1.3 above it is not possible to give any official figures for progress on reconstruction in Bam. Some details in the areas of education and water are given in the relevant sections 5 and 7 below. On the face of it, progress seems slow and the government has been criticised for its bureaucracy and slow pace. The Master Plan for the reconstruction of the city of Bam was completed in December 2004. However, as with the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, there may be a tendency to over optimism about the pace at which physical reconstruction can take place.

⁹ Melville. 2004.

¹⁰ The Bam disaster's degree of invisibility is reflected by the lack of evaluations; In ALNAP 2005, there is only one reference to Bam.

4. UNICEF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW

More detailed analysis of UNICEF's programme response can be found in sections 5 to 11.

4.1 Preparedness

As with other agencies, UNICEF was largely unprepared for the scale and nature of the Bam disaster. The event also coincided with the holiday season for many staff.

In line with all UNICEF country offices, UNICEF Iran had an Emergency Preparedness and Response plan (EPRP) in place, dated August 2003. This EPRP had been prepared within the context of the 2000 UNICEF's Core Corporate Commitments¹¹ and was written with a number of emergency scenarios in mind.

The EPRP was not used during the Bam response and has subsequently only been partially updated. The reasons for the lack of reference to the EPRP are not entirely clear, but it apparently lacked usefulness as a practical document and was not used as a live document in the heat of the moment.

However, the UNICEF country office did have some emergency experience and limited capacity arising from earlier work with Afghan refugees in Iran which was finishing and preparedness for Iraq refugees. The country office had just closed its Iraq emergency operation and a communication and logistics officer were mobilised to go to Bam. Assets such as vehicles and radios were also available.

In addition, presciently, UNICEF supported a training of trainers course for psychosocial work in emergencies in Tehran just over three weeks before the Bam disaster. The 30 school counsellors who attended this course made up an important asset for the Bam response within the Ministry of Education.

4.2 Initial Response

UNICEF staff were on the ground quickly and UNICEF rapidly flew in two plane loads of materials from Kabul and Copenhagen within 48 hours (Box 1 below).

The bulk of these supplies were handed over to the IRCS for distribution. This UNICEF response was generally appropriate and timely, but should also be seen in the context of the massive resources that the IRCS had at its disposal. UNICEF's contributions to the IRCS were a small part of a massive inflow of relief material which, for a time, overwhelmed IRCS's capacity.

¹¹ This document was developed and revised in 2004 to become UNICEF's Core Corporate Commitments for Children.

Box 1: Initial UNICEF Relief Supplies

- 72 emergency health and essential drug kits
- winter tents and plastic sheeting
- special obstetric and surgical kits;
- 14,000 blankets, including 7,600 for babies;
- 625,000 water purification tablets;
- 6,000 jerry cans
- 16 x 5,000 litre community water tanks;
- Water testing kits
- 312 school-in-a-box kits
- three portable generators;
- 36 classroom-size tents, tarpaulin, rope and other shelter supplies

UNICEF's relief effort was led by the Country Representative.¹² The MENA RO sent a logistic officer, a health officer and a radio operator to Bam. Unfortunately a regional emergency advisor was not available at the time for health reasons.

Responsibility for non-food items (NFI) within UNICEF was apparently unclear, both in Tehran and Bam. While government officials were claiming that the needs were covered, there remained some problems as mentioned in 3.2 above which highlighted the need for continuous field-based monitoring of basic needs.¹³

4.3 Recovery Programme & UNICEF's Core Commitments to Children.

UNICEF's appeal target of US\$ 14.3 million was quickly passed, with the total appeal raising in excess of US\$ 27.6 million, of which over 60 per cent came from UNICEF National Committees.¹⁴

Up until the end of December 2006, a total of US\$ 26 million is reported as being spent or committed for expenditure in 2006. The allocation of spending between sectors is shown in Figure 1 below. The unspent balance of US\$1.7 million has been carried forward to 2007 for the completion of a number of programmes, mainly the Child Friendly Cities project.


At the time of the Bam earthquake, UNICEF's Core Corporate Commitments focused on the immediate response. It was not until 2004 that the CCCs were revised to distinguish between the initial response and beyond the initial response. Annex 6 gives an overview of UNICEF's response in terms of the 2000 commitments. Broadly UNICEF either met its commitments, or they were not relevant because other agencies dealt with the needs or they were not appropriate in the context.

¹² The UNICEF Country Representative was out of the country at the time of the disaster but returned immediately.

¹³ Melville. 2004.

¹⁴ The main governmental donors were USAID, ECHO and DFID.

**FIGURE 1: PROGRAMME EXPENDITURE & COMMITMENTS
 JANUARY 2004 – DECEMBER 2006
 (TOTAL: US\$ 26 MILLION)¹⁵**



UNICEF’s programme in Bam has covered the transition from emergency response to development. This transition, often labeled Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), has been much studied and a subject of concern since the 1990s, if not earlier. Much of the LRRD debate has focused on the rigidities of programming, the funding gaps that open up after the initial relief phase has ended and the failure of agencies to develop rehabilitation plans that take into account both past and future contexts. Also, much of this debate has focused on conflict-affected countries. Early debate saw LRRD in terms of a continuum, moving smoothly from relief to development, but now the analysis acknowledges the messiness of many post-emergency situations in which elements of relief, rehabilitation and development may be taking place at the same time and there maybe fluctuations in and out different modes – referring more to “a conundrum than to a gilded path” as a recent study on LRRD for the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition noted.¹⁶

¹⁵ The figure of US\$26 million represents expenditure and commitments for expenditure up until the end of 2006.

¹⁶ Christoplos 2006. See also Buchanan-Smith & Fabbri 2005; Goyder *et al* 2006.

UNICEF's Executive Board approved a post-crisis transition strategy in June 2006 which notes that post-natural disaster transition periods are usually considerably shorter than post-conflict ones, although their duration depends on the magnitude of the disaster and the national government's ability to deploy its assets and capacities to take full ownership of managing the post-crisis transition process.

This observation certainly applies in the Bam post-disaster context, in which a relatively strong government was firmly in charge of rehabilitation work. The large amount of funding available to UNICEF from very near the beginning of the rehabilitation work meant that an LRRD funding gap was avoided. As noted elsewhere in this report, any transition gaps have been related to gearing up for the programme work in areas such as human resources, programme expertise and supplies. By working as normal in Iran with the government as its main partner, programme work has been rooted in government policies, albeit with UNICEF at times encouraging innovation and development.

The question also arises as to how well UNICEF's planning and budgeting periods have fitted with the reality of the various post-emergency phases in Bam. The emergency phase was relatively short (up to a month). The interim recovery phase lasted at least a year when people were still living in tents and containers. In Bam the reconstruction phase is likely to last 10 years, of which the first five will be intense and particularly focused on basic physical reconstruction. UNICEF needs to consider this time frame when considering its fundraising and planning. There could be a danger in Bam of premature closure of programmes because the funding has ended although, in fact, UNICEF's most significant role was probably during the recovery period.

UNICEF's Bam programmes highlight the limitations of labelling. Although described as post-disaster programmes and viewed partly through a humanitarian lens, in fact they have many of the characteristics and values of long-term development programmes, but mounted without the leisure of long planning periods. They are development programmes that need a sprint start even though the overall track is a long one.

5. EDUCATION

5.1 Introduction and Context

Forty-eight percent of the population of Bam was under the age of 20 before the earthquake. All 131 schools in Bam and the surrounding region were destroyed or very severely damaged. The earthquake took the lives of an estimated one-third of the city's teachers. The exact number of surviving school-age students remains unknown, but it was estimated that 20,000 students were living in Bam and its surrounding areas after the earthquake in comparison with 32,000 before the disaster.¹⁷

5.2 Overview - What UNICEF Has Done

UNICEF overall mandate for educational activities in Iran includes quality education, disparity reduction in education, and inclusive education for disabled children. UNICEF intervened in emergency education immediately after the earthquake. Its main objective for the emergency period was to restore education for the children of Bam as quickly as possible. For the recovery and reconstruction periods, UNICEF developed programmes that aimed to guarantee the rights of children, enable them to access to quality education, and help them become “agents of change in their communities and families”.¹⁸

5.2.1 Emergency Stage

Within 48 hours UNICEF delivered supplies, equipment and technical support of which 312 school-in-a-box kits related to education.¹⁹ Each school kit contained educational materials for 80 students. 16 Rofi tents were provided to the authorities in Bam to be used as temporary classrooms in 26 pre-selected school sites. The tents could accommodate 30-40 children. These schools opened around January 20th 2004.²⁰ About 1,210 teachers attended the MoH psychosocial support program so that they could help with the resumption of education in Bam.²¹ A workshop for about 100 teachers was organised to familiarise them with activity-based skills so that they encourage students to come back to schools eagerly through a soft entry.²² Two mobile libraries were donated to the Ministry of Education (MoE) in Kerman Province for use in Bam.

September 22, 2004 was considered as the landmark for the emergency education project when the temporary schools were officially opened and classes in tents finished. UNICEF with collaboration of MoE mobilised 44 teachers to start a “house-to-house registration activity” and track non-registered children in the 14 zones of Bam. They advocated the urgent need for the registration of all children. Some children were also mobilised to pass the “back-to-school” to their peer groups in different zones in Bam. Press and media were utilised to encourage the parents to send their children to schools.²³ During this period the main implementing partners of UNICEF were the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the MoE.

¹⁷ UNICEF. 2004. *Consolidated Emergency Donor Report: Bam Earthquake*, March 2004.

¹⁸ UNICEF. 2004. *Education Plan of Action: Bam Earthquake Response*. August 2004.

¹⁹ UNICEF. 2004. *Report on UNICEF to Taskforce*.

²⁰ Reports vary between 18 and 24 January.

²¹ UNICEF. 2004. *Education Plan of Action: Bam Earthquake Response*, August 2004.

²² UNICEF. 2004. *Bam Earthquake Situation Report 16*, 20–26 January, 2004.

²³ UNICEF. 2004. *Start of New School Term Bam*.

5.2.2 Beyond Initial Response

After the MoE and UNICEF entered into a basic cooperation agreement on the 31 May 2004, a master plan of operations was agreed on. At this point, UNICEF officially started the implementation of recovery education activities. These activities fall into three main categories on education:

- Child friendly schools
- School hygiene promotion
- Capacity building, professional development, and emergency preparedness of MoE teachers and staff.

A wide variety of supplies were procured and distributed to support the above activities.²⁴

5.2.3 Child Friendly Schools

Child friendly school concept was promoted through establishment of libraries, activity rooms, science labs and computer workshops. It also included the advocacy for community-based school management systems.

By the end of 2004, UNICEF had supported 56 primary and guidance school, hosting more than 11,000 children and more than 270 teachers, in providing access to quality education. To raise required sensitivity about child-friendly school concept, UNICEF organised workshops on school hygiene and sanitation in schools, participatory and child-centred teaching methods, and child-friendly school buildings for 30 MoE officials in 2004. Mobile libraries were functioning and ten librarians were trained by the end of 2004.²⁵

In 2005, the promotion and creation of CFSs gathered momentum and the following activities took place:

- 30 Kerman and Bam education sector officials and 102 primary and middle school principals in Bam attended CFS workshops;
- CFS Steering Committee in Bam was formed;
- 15 Bam Department of Education warehouse assistants were trained on warehouse management upon the MoE request;
- 25 Kerman and Bam education officials attended training on DevInfo;
- 20 Kerman and Bam education officials attended a workshop on tracking out-of-school children;
- 30 schools were equipped with libraries, science and computer laboratories;
- Two mobile libraries were provided with 3,000 books each;
- 120 teachers were trained on the proper use and maintenance of IT equipment; 70 teachers were trained to function as librarians.²⁶

²⁴ UNICEF provided backpacks, stationery, student desks, student chairs, teacher desks, office chairs, filing cabinets, bookshelves, chairs and tables for teachers' lounges, computers, printers, photocopiers, items for recreational and sports activities, and miscellaneous items like fire extinguishers, refrigerators and water fountains for primary and guidance schools in Bam based on the needs reported by the MoE. (from UNICEF. 2004. *Education Coordination Meeting, 21-07-2004.*)

²⁵ UNICEF. 2004. *Donor Update December 2004.*

²⁶ UNICEF. *Bam Earthquake Response: Education (MI207-03 E133).*

In 2006²⁷, UNICEF is supporting the following activities:

- Training of trainers for 35 Bam Department of Education teachers on child-friendly teaching/learning principles;
- Training 300 primary and guidance school teachers in Bam on child-friendly learning/teaching principles;
- Training 50 teachers in 10 selected primary and guidance schools in Bam on Child-Friendly assessment and evaluation systems;
- Establishing libraries/activity rooms, science labs and computer labs in at least 15 primary and guidance schools;
- Training 600 teachers on utilizing Teachers' Resource Centres.

5.2.4 School Hygiene Promotion

School hygiene promotion sub-project started constructing latrines and ensuring the proper use of them. It also promoted the Child-to-Child approach in improving the health and hygiene of schools. In October 2004 a work plan for hygiene education as well as for the provision of latrines, hand washing facilities and safe drinking water in primary and guidance schools was developed. This was initially implemented in five selected schools in December 2004. However, the hygiene interventions in schools started later in January and February 2005.²⁸

In 2005, more hygiene promotion resource materials and more hygiene education with child-to-child approach were developed. The Hygiene Committee in Bam Department of Education was formed and 50 schools received training of hygiene promotion and hygiene kits for 7,500 school children. Furthermore, construction of hygiene facilities in 30 schools was in progress.²⁹

In 2006, UNICEF has been supporting development of resource materials for the promotion of hygiene in schools based on the child-to-child approach; providing hygiene facilities in 19 primary and guidance schools; supporting the training of 200 teachers in primary and guidance schools to promote hygiene through the child-to-child approach; organizing the training of 10 trainers for the child-to-child approach.

5.2.5 Capacity Building, Professional Development

This project mainly aims to increase teachers' access to resource materials in and out of their schools and build up their capacities by organising training workshops.

In 2005, in addition to organising different workshops for teachers, UNICEF established and equipped five Teachers' Resource Centres.

²⁷ All the information for activities in 2006 has been quoted from UNICEF. 2006. *Annual Work Plan - Girls' Education*.

²⁸ UNICEF. 2004. *Situation Report (No. 10) Education – 01-12-2004 to 31-12-2004*.

²⁹ UNICEF. *Bam Earthquake Response: Education (MI207-03 E133)*.

In 2006, UNICEF aims to:

- Train 600 teachers on utilising the Teachers' Resource Centres;
- Support development of a manual for training of trainers and teachers on optimal and creative use of spaces in schools;
- Organise training of twenty selected teachers on optimal and creative use of spaces in schools.

During this period the main implementing partners of UNICEF have been the MoE, Iran Children's Book Council and the Science and Arts Foundation (SAF).³⁰

5.2.6 Emergency Preparedness of Ministry of Education Teachers and Staff

Emergency Preparedness of MoE teachers and staff was targeted soon after the earthquake. UNICEF supported the MoE to develop an emergency preparedness and response plan by organising a workshop for 30 MoE officials.³¹ In 2005, a national emergency preparedness was based in the MoE.³²

In 2006, UNICEF aims to;

- Design an Iranian school-in-a-box kit to respond appropriately within the cultural context and provide supply items needed for 500 school-in-a-box kits;
- Support the design of a prototype prefabricated school structure for emergencies;

5.3 Analysis/ Findings

5.3.1 Relevance/Appropriateness

Emergency Education: During the first few weeks, the efforts UNICEF made to restore the education system in Bam were highly relevant. Some believe that the opening of schools and gathering the surviving children together in friendlier spaces than streets was the main contribution to the normalising process. From an educational point of view, the introduction of "using soft activities as an entry point to normal curriculum based schooling"³³ was also highly appropriate in encouraging students to return to school eagerly.

Providing children with supplies that would amuse them as well as strengthen their learning abilities was also relevant, although it would have helped if the kit instructions had been in Farsi.

Beyond Initial Response: The various activities done during the recovery and reconstruction periods have all been relevant. The contributions with tangible results such as the construction of latrines, provision of equipment and supplies and training workshops, have been much appreciated by students, school teachers, principals and MoE staff.

³⁰ They are two national NGOs; CBC's mandate is reviewing books for children and promote further reading for students. SAF helps with the promotion of quality education and IT support to the youth.

³¹ UNICEF. *Bam Earthquake Response: Education (MI207-03 E133)*.

³² In November 2006, there was a call for an exercise for emergency preparedness at Tehran level. All schools took part in this event and the preparedness of the MoE at national level was assessed.

³³ UNICEF. 2005. *Report on UNICEF to Taskforce*.

It is less certain whether the extensive provision of computers to schools has been appropriate in the Bam context. It is not clear that all the practical implications (regular power supplies, maintenance, running costs etc) have been fully worked out. The question is raised as to whether the Bam context is favourable for the introduction of new technologies at this stage.

There is also some questioning as to whether as many as five teachers' resource centres are needed.³⁴

5.3.2 Effectiveness (including timeliness)

Emergency Education: This programme was effective, though there were some problems regarding timeliness of some activities. Delays were sometimes due to the procedures and regulations that both UNICEF and counterparts were committed to.³⁵ UNICEF was limited by a lack of human resources in the early stages of the education work. It took time for both bodies to understand each other's timetables and deadlines for implementing activities.

Child Friendly Schools: UNICEF has been largely effective in the distribution of required materials and equipments. The distribution of items mainly depended on the completion of the school construction and therefore in cases where the buildings were ready the distribution process went on more smoothly. On occasions there was mismatch between the teaching materials made available and the existence of trained teachers.³⁶

During the academic year of 2005, many of the school libraries and workshops were not functional and nor fully equipped though the ones that were working were appreciated by both teachers and students. In the academic year of 2006, more schools were having libraries and computer workshops, but they were suffering from the shortage of computer instructors and librarians. Science laboratories were used more frequently. Libraries, where functional, were open to students during the break times. The policy of lending books to children to take them home varies from school to school. The principals were reluctant to lend the books in fear of losing them and not being able to replace them.

The use of computers for the libraries was another important aspect of the project. The school counsellors³⁷ trained in the library skills should have learned how use computers at work. But some were not in use because the library software was needed.³⁸ The preference and taste of the school principals for utilising the training materials and equipments determined the effectiveness of the project. There were schools that despite of the lack of a fixed term librarian would keep the library open and active.

Overall therefore, there is mixed picture in this area.

³⁴ The officials of MoE and UNICEF staff are now doubtful if five TRCs were needed. The establishment of TRCs is considered relevant, however, the number was an issue.

³⁵ For instance, the Literacy Movement Organization (LMO) could not begin the training of its librarians before receiving all the requirements for the mobile libraries. (UNICEF. 2004. *Situation Report (No. 8) Education: 01.10.2004 – 31.10.2004.*)

³⁶ For example in some cases the teachers were trained in library skills but the school that they had been appointed to for the following year did not have a library.

³⁷ They are different from the counsellors that helped with Psychosocial Support Interventions.

³⁸ Iran Children's Book Council was expected to offer a second round of training and provide the librarians with the required software in November 2006.

The formation of CFS Steering Committee and Hygiene committee, consisted of elected members and three appointees from MoE, has been an effective part of the CFS promotion process. The committees meet regularly and discuss the related issues and plan activities. Presently, UNICEF plays a significant role in ensuring the members meet regularly, have an agenda, take down minutes, and put their plans into practice.³⁹

CFS also relies on community-based school management systems. This aspect of CFS is unfamiliar in the Iranian context. The educational system authorises the establishment of a Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) within schools. The charter/constitution of PTAs has clarified its mandate. It has limited scope for involvement of elected parents in the management of schools. In many schools visited, the parents had met with school authorities and teachers and carried out the election, but the shift in the PTAs function toward a system with more decision-making power over the schooling had not happened yet. In some cases, the schools did not know how this shift was going to take place and in other cases they were not aware that a different management approach was being proposed. In this respect, the effectiveness of previous interventions to promote CFS may be jeopardised.⁴⁰

There have been instances that some items, such as library books and laboratory supplies, are over protected and not shared with students as instructed. Of course, the school authorities argue that these items are indispensable and if they are damaged the MoE will not replace them.

School Hygiene Promotion: Constructions of latrines in schools began as soon as the assessments showed that the unhealthy situation of the schools was threatening children's health. In some schools the construction was soon finished and the children began using the facilities. Some were not yet complete at the time of the evaluation. Based on observation, some of the school latrines were not well maintained and cleaned. This appears to be an issue of management, a shortage of cleaning staff and in some cases, poor water pressure. Schools with an active health committee, consisting of some students, a teacher and the principal, influence the health situation effectively. Schools with children from higher socio-economic families had grasped the health and hygiene messages more successfully and were able to pass them on to their peers.

Capacity Building, Professional Development: The total number of training courses and people that attended them is substantial. The courses have varied from technical ones for the proper use of teaching equipments to educational management courses. The process of organising of these courses has brought UNICEF and the MoE closer together and helped them overcome initial conflicting ideas. The training courses themselves have been another effective part of UNICEF support to MoE. Teachers benefited from these courses in different professional ways.⁴¹

With respect to the training activities planned for 2006, it is difficult to comment on their effectiveness since some have not been delivered or have been recently delivered. So teachers need time to utilise the skills they have learned in schools.

³⁹ It should be noted that the Hygiene Committee needs far less support and supervision.

⁴⁰ Some of these concerns are also reflected in Kiamanesh 2005.

⁴¹ Some of them were saying that they would have not had the chance to update their teaching skills in normal non-earthquake hit situation. The science teachers, in particular, felt so honored that the author(s) of the science textbooks had personally came to Bam and lectured for them and answered to their questions.

Emergency Preparedness of MoE Teachers and Staff: It is also too soon to assess how prepared MoE is for emergencies, apart setting up a team at national level and carrying out the training.

5.3.3 Impact

Broadly speaking, UNICEF's provision of such huge services, materials, and equipments has been valued greatly by their recipients.⁴² However some of the outcomes expected by the programme by the end of 2006 such as the "National Model for Iranian Schools prepared based on CFS principles" and "Strengthened awareness of the community-based school management systems increased amongst education stakeholders, PTAs respectively village education committees and active community involvement observed in school management"⁴³ may not be achieved.

Though MoE and UNICEF have both looked at the CFSs as models for future. While the equipment and teaching materials have been supplied, further training, for example, for principals in CFS management will be required.

5.3.4 Coverage

Coverage of the programme during the emergency period was remarkable. Approximately 80% of Bam's surviving students were registered for schools that UNICEF supported.⁴⁴ About 9000 students had received supplies by July 2004. With respect to reopening of schools in September 2004, UNICEF and Department of Education in Bam tracked about 1,000 out-of-school-children.⁴⁵

The coverage of some aspects of the education project, such as mobile libraries was also remarkable. In 2004, two mobile libraries were outreaching 49 sites that included 34 primary schools, mainly in the rural areas of Bam, and 15 Literacy Movement Organization classes.⁴⁶

At present UNICEF covers 85 schools with 9,635 students⁴⁷. In general, the priority of Education project has been given to primary girls' schools, primary boys' schools, middle girls' schools, middle boys' schools, and then girls' high schools. There has been no specific programme for the disabled children. Some of the latrines had been designed with disabled children in mind, but were not easily accessible because of steps outside.

5.3.5 Efficiency

UNICEF has been efficient in many aspects of the project. Due to the assessments that it undertook, UNICEF improved its planning and implementation.⁴⁸ The postponement of some

⁴² One MoE informant said, "With UNICEF support, Bami children do have everything they need for the next 20 years."

⁴³ UNICEF. 2004. *Education Plan of Action: Bam Earthquake Response*, August 2004.

⁴⁴ Tierney 2005.

⁴⁵ UNICEF. 2004. *Annual Report 2004*.

⁴⁶ UNICEF. 2004. *Donor Update December 2004*.

⁴⁷ extracted from Education Database.

⁴⁸ UNICEF is also planning to conduct two more studies in 2006. One is to appraise effectiveness of the Child-Friendly assessment and evaluation system, and another one is to assess the education situation of all primary and guidance schools in Bam. Regarding the fact that certain aspects of the education project has been integrated in the Country Programme the results of these assessments increases the efficiency of UNICEF to fill in the current gaps.

services at the early stages was due to delay in signing the LoU on the support to education. When it was finally signed in May 2004, many obstacles were removed and delivery process and planning for training became smoother. However, at times, MoE and other relevant government bodies were unable to give exact information on needs for supplies.

UNICEF developed a database on the education project. It has recorded the name and specification of all schools with items given to each school. After its monitoring visits it updates the database. In 2006, it is recorded that 40 schools have been visited; out of which 20 schools have not been able to use the supplies because there has been no training for their use. Such updating process has potentially ensured the efficiency of UNICEF since there are follow up actions for each case.

Another efficient aspect of the work of UNICEF is reflected in its strong coordinating role in the education activities of the government and NGOs.

5.3.6 Sustainability

It is expected that the teachers, principals and MoE staff that have been trained in different skills will utilise their learning in future for the benefit of the children. Furthermore, the attempts such as developing resources materials for the promotion of hygiene in schools based on the child-to-child approach and guidelines and standards for CFS will always remain within the national educational system for use and follow up.

In terms of other aspects of the project, two approaches have been taken up to help with the overall sustainability of the education project. A series of efforts have been made to increase the sense of ownership by MoE so that after UNICEF phases out, the government takes over the responsibilities and treats the projects as its own. It is believed that the recent changes in the management and staffing of MoE in different levels can affect the “ownership” of the education programme by the government negatively since the new people need time and motivation to feel attached to the achievements of the project and follow up actions to fill in the gaps.

The second approach has been the integration of the elements of Life Skills Training as foreseen in Child Friendly Schools, Hygiene Promotion, and Training of Teachers on principles of Global Education Initiatives, and Emergency Preparedness and Response education project in Bam into the UNICEF country programme.

There are some parts of the current project that need specific attention. For the proper use of computer laboratories SAF and UNICEF have a plan to carry out before December 2006. SAF will also help with the functioning of one of the TRCs.

To have more active libraries the issue of permanent librarians should be solved. At the moment, the tasks of a librarian and of a “school education counsellor” are mixed together in smaller schools. The regulations of MoE would not let the schools have both for smaller schools, which the case of the majority of schools in Bam and its surrounding areas. The principals were instructed to choose the trainees for the library skills from “school education counsellor”, but during the academic year they require them to focus more on their “school counselling” job. Since the regulations do not let the principals pay them extra salary for doing “library” job, the trained people are not motivated to help with the proper functioning of the libraries. Some believed that the national education system does not value further reading in reality and ignores

its direct link to quality education. In this regard, the sustainability of the libraries depends on the preference of the principals and their capacity and inventiveness for keeping them active.

5.4 Conclusions

The most challenging component of the education project is the promotion of CFS in Bam. It is too soon to comment if the models set up in Bam are replicable in other cities as more time is needed for that. It is questionable if it is possible to introduce the new concept of CFS at a time when Bam has been struggling to get over its recovery and reconstruction problems and has not yet been able to fully replace the loss of its human resources.

It took some time for UNICEF and MoE to get to know each other's restrictions and procedures. This had created delays and complaints in the initial stages from both sides. In recent times, changes in the management and staffing of MoE in different levels have reduced the chance of "ownership" of the education programme by the government to some degrees.

The proper use of computer labs and all TRCs are questionable, though there are plans for utilising the computer workshops and the TRCs.

The sustainability of the libraries depends on the preference of the principals and their capacity and inventiveness for keeping them active.

One aspect of the CFS is the advocacy for community-based school management systems. In the Iranian context, PTAs are the structures that, despite their limited scope of work, may act as an entry point for creating a basis for community-based management systems.

Education activities in Bam have been integrated into the Country Programme in 2006, under the Girls' Education and Women's Empowerment. This should guarantee the sustainability and continuity of the projects that UNICEF has supported after the disaster in 2003.

5.5 Lessons

1. Opening schools was an important and effective way to start "normalising" process in post disaster/recovery situation.
2. Wherever principals and teachers had warmly received the concept of CFS, the project was implemented with more success, and they have made use of the teaching materials and equipment more effectively.
3. Schools with more children from better-off families and parents that value education greatly have responded to CFS concept more visibly.
4. The construction of latrines with involving children and teachers in supervising their regular cleanness ensures the improvement of health situation of schools.

5.6 Recommendations⁴⁹

1. Negotiate with MoE to find practical solution for the proper use of all TRCs (even if it leads to relocation of them)
2. Arrange for visits of some MoE officials, principals, teachers and students from Bam as well as other cities to the schools that have met the standards of CFS⁵⁰
3. Conduct studies on specific barriers for grasping and applying the idea of CFS
4. Initiate advocacy on CFSs through press and media and bring into foreground the achievements of the project with the intention of introducing a working model for education system in Iran
5. Review the articles of previous LoUs with MoE (in participation with the MoE staff) to increase ownership of the programmes in future collaboration”

⁴⁹ Unless otherwise stated, recommendations in the programme sections of this report are intended for the UNICEF Country Office.

⁵⁰ There are two purposes of giving such a recommendation; one is that the visitors learn about CFS in practice, and secondly the CFS committee will be motivated to keep on going the same.

6. PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT PROJECT

6.1 Introduction and Context

The Bam earthquake had a devastating effect on survivors in Bam, especially on children, given the huge loss of life amongst friends, parents and teachers. People underwent serious psychological and social problems, due to personal losses as well as the chaotic environment surrounding them. The disaster caused many people to suffer from grief, guilt, anxiety, depression, insomnia, intrusive images and many other symptoms of trauma experienced during critical events. Children were mostly experiencing fear, anxiety, aggression, and nightmares. They had witnessed the most stressful event in their life and were not prepared to deal with the condition. It was estimated that 60% of the children suffered from strong post-traumatic reactions and corresponding behavioural problems.⁵¹

6.2 Overview of the UNICEF Programme

The objective of the UNICEF psychosocial project was to assist children and their families to cope with the stresses of the disaster and to prevent later problems and development of associated disorders in order to:

- Reduce long-term effects among children and their care providers
- Consolidate and strengthen care- providing capacity
- Increase general understanding of the psychological impacts of the disaster
- Normalise and validate the reactions of children and parents by giving them the opportunity to understand and share their reactions
- Supervise and coordinate health volunteers
- Strengthen the counterparts' disaster preparedness by providing training, counselling and documentation on psychosocial intervention
- Strengthen counselling services at provincial and district level.⁵²

6.3 Initial Response

UNICEF worked with three different government partners in the psychosocial project, the Ministry of Health (MoH) Mental Health Division, the Ministry of Education (MoE) Division of Counselling and Cultural Development and the State Welfare Organization (SWO) Psychosocial & Prevention Unit.

During the first seven months, the MoH and the team from its Mental Health Division were the main actors in providing psychosocial support to the disaster stricken people in Bam and nearby villages. UNICEF supported the MoH financially and by providing technical assistance from the Centre for Crisis Psychology /Norway as its international consultant. The Norway-based Centre for Crisis Psychology carried out the task of personnel training in a series of workshops in Bam.

In the first few weeks after the earthquake, trained professionals of the MoH in teams of two visited 17,127 tents and temporary settlements. After initial assessment, 67,108 people received initial psychosocial support, and 33,422 were identified as more traumatised and received group

⁵¹ Stuvland 2004.

⁵² UNICEF. *Extracts from Annual Report.*

trauma counselling. More than 700 public/parent meetings were held, and toys were distributed to most of the children in Bam. Meanwhile the MoH disseminated 35,000 pamphlets and 5,000 posters targeting parents, teachers, and religious leaders, with a separate campaign for adolescents.⁵³

6.4 Beyond Initial Response

MoH: As time passed, attention was given to training in order to normalise the situation with the help of remaining human resources of Bam. One way of bringing a degree of normality was to re-open the schools, but teachers and school counsellors were not ready to begin work and needed counselling themselves. The MoH trained 1,380 teachers and 105 counsellors in skills to identify and deal with the psychosocial problems of themselves and children. In addition, a total of 135 voluntary health workers were trained in four workshops. These were women, often housewives, that wanted to be helpful during the recovery period.⁵⁴

In the next 10 months, the MoH continued tent visiting with more than 4,413 visits made. The MoH distributed about 62,500 pamphlets and 5,200 posters on psychosocial health targeting parents, teachers and religious leaders and for adolescents to raise public awareness. It also produced and broadcast TV and radio programmes with collaboration of IRIB focusing on psychosocial issues. Norouz, the Iranian New Year fell in this period and the MoH and UNICEF distributed 28,000 gifts to children.

Training of professionals continued with the total number of trained school counsellors amounted to 200. Several workshops on Psychosocial Intervention, Life Skills Training, and Basic Skills in Counselling were organised and more than 180 psychologists and/or psychiatrists attended them. Later the number of trained psychologists and psychiatrists increased to 417, a total of 280 to 300 health volunteers were also trained in four more workshops and 50 GPs were trained in basic psychosocial and referral skills. The MoH trained 175 health workers as well.

MoE: UNICEF and the Ministry of Education worked together to strengthen disaster preparedness and counselling services at provincial and district level. The main activities of MoE with respect to psychosocial interventions aimed to enable children and their families to return to a normal life, and in particular, restore the educational system and to strengthen the coping mechanisms and social skills of community members, in response to natural disasters.⁵⁵

School-based psychosocial support in Bam continued with a pilot project in four primary schools in Bam with the collaboration of the MoE. Afterwards in 2005, the school intervention was applied to 29 primary schools with over 3,800 students in Bam and Baravat. By the end of 2005, at least, four three-day training workshops were held to improve school counsellor skills, cumulative experience-sharing and awareness raising sessions were conducted for 3,485 parents, and 240 school principals trained in basic counselling and referral skills. Moreover, a series of debriefing sessions were held for the community with the aim of experience sharing and raising awareness, wherein 149 teachers had attended.⁵⁶

⁵³ Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Undersecretary for Health, Bureau for Psychosocial and School Health, Mental Health Office. 2004. *First Seven Months of Psycho-social Intervention in Bam*. November 2004.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

⁵⁵ UNICEF. *Consolidated Donor Report: Bam Earthquake*. 2004.

⁵⁶ The seminars were on school crisis management, group trauma counselling, assessment and evaluation, and disaster intervention.

For emergency preparedness purposes, 10 school counsellors from neighbouring provinces were trained and gained experience in conducting post-disaster psychosocial support programmes and school-based intervention programmes.

Activities that started on January 2006 were still continuing at the end of 2006 and included continuation of school-based activities through offering Life Skills Training to middle and high schools, compilation and creation of a teaching guide for MoE Counsellors implementing Life Skills Training, compilation and creation of “Counselling Lessons Learnt” booklet to evaluate MoE post-emergency psychosocial intervention, and establishment of a psychosocial information centre to contribute to the referral system and to give children, adolescents and parents using MoE services the necessary information regarding psychosocial issues. So far UNICEF has been covering 16 junior schools and high schools with respect to Life Skills Training.

Taking into account the importance of referral systems in psychosocial interventions, UNICEF and MoE agreed that the existing School Counselling/Community Centre would expand its services to mornings and add several aspects to its work to turn a treatment centre to an open-door community centre. It was technically supported by UNICEF to respond to the psychosocial needs of the teachers and students. The newly set up centre organised relevant activities including individual and group therapy sessions with children and their parents so that a rate of 50 referrals per month is reached. To be able to do so, two counsellors were integrated into Bam counselling centres’ staff run by MoE. Besides, UNICEF helped with the establishment of a National Emergency Preparedness team in MoE.

SWO: A significant component of UNICEF’s psychosocial work was the establishment of three community counselling centres/drop-in centres in Bam and Baravat, two of which have been run by SWO. They were named Neshat, which meant “joy” in Persian. The concept was to provide a safe and lively space for the youth. The establishment of community counselling centres/drop-in centres became a significant component of UNICEF’s psychosocial work in Bam. At the beginning of 2005, it was agreed between UNICEF and SWO that, beyond initial emergency response, the drop-in centres would offer psychosocial services to 50 service users per month per centre.⁵⁷ In later stages, the number of referrals increased by 40%.

The referral system established as such was based on many activities including training of 240 principals and pedagogic aids (all those present in Bam) from all schools in basic referral skills and ‘Do No Harm’ concept, training of all Bam area general practitioners (altogether 80 including 15 from Zarand) in psychosocial principles and referral skills, and training for child protection-SWO staff in Bam on referral skills and reiterating these principles in coordination meetings.

From September 2005 to August 2006, 172 individual counselling sessions, 10 workshops, 58 group counselling, 70 activities for children, 190 arts and crafts lessons, 267 children participated in football games, and 25 structured play activities were conducted.⁵⁸ Trainings at the Neshat were extensive and included sessions on grief, depression, dealing with drug related problems (carried out by FR external consultant), psychosocial approach and play therapy. Furthermore, UNICEF paid for a Kerman SWO Clinical Psychologist to visit Neshats in Bam and conduct twice-a-week training sessions for the counsellors.

⁵⁷ Cited in LoU with SWO in 2006.

⁵⁸ Lazo and Balanon 2006.

6. 5 Findings

6.5.1 Relevance and Appropriateness

The UNICEF response at the emergency phase through its partners, especially with the MoH, was highly relevant in the chaotic initial relief phase. A critical issue for survivors was the quick burial of the dead in mass graves. People felt very frustrated and upset because there was no chance for proper burials. Even after years, remembering how people failed to clean their loved ones or were forced to collect them and bury them collectively is a heavy burden on the affected people. The current project was appropriately designed to address this frustration.

UNICEF acted with cultural sensitivity and supported its counterparts in organising mourning ceremonies during the first 40 days after the disaster as well as the anniversary programmes. The process was seen as a part of the psychosocial component of the project, since going through the ceremonies helped people to get over the trauma of losing their loved ones and helped them return to the routines of normal life. As for children, it was thought that participating in the mass grieving could just close the traumatic situation for them and make them ready to proceed with their lives. However, there was a debate on the extent the children should be exposed to the issue.⁵⁹

The UNICEF-supported psychosocial projects were very relevant and important. However, the work may not have responded fully to the psychosocial problems of Bam's youth. By November 2006present, 30 to 40 percent of the city has been rebuilt, but there is a lot remaining to be done. People suffering from the dust and fatigue caused by the reconstruction complained that there is almost no public space for the youth (mainly young men) "to use up their energy". The symptoms of misbehaviour among the youth have changed since the emergency phase, and "anger" drives the youth to violence and anti-social behaviour.⁶⁰ It seemed that expansion of life skills training to all children, which UNICEF started in 16 junior schools and high schools in 2006, would have been very relevant.

It was wise and appropriate to seek support from the clerics to talk to people and offer counsel. During 2005, UNICEF project officers worked with their counterparts to invite parents to listen to the clerics to point out that the earthquake was not a punishment from God. However, it should be noted that there were some inconsistencies in such guidelines. There were certain recommendations and pieces of advice on the wall of some schools implying that fearing God would save you from catastrophes and mishaps.

In several cases, the content of the psychosocial training was adjusted to the Iranian context. After the pilot project in four schools of Bam, the materials were revised and adapted to fit in the local culture. This process has led to the drawing up of guidelines on counselling/psychosocial approach in the Iranian cultural context will be produced and made available across the country and to MENA countries by December 2007.

6.5.2 Effectiveness (including timeliness)

The psychosocial projects were effective in various ways. In a self evaluation of psychosocial intervention, it was noted that among children who had received psychosocial intervention, 52%

⁵⁹ In any case, the MoH facilitated the collaboration of 750 adolescents in the anniversary programmes that happened on December 23 to December 27th 2005.

⁶⁰ It is quoted from the interviews with the MoE and SWO counselors.

of children recovered and 34% recovered partially.⁶¹ Also, the rate of committing suicide had dropped from 11 in 100,000 people in the pre earthquake period to 7 in 100,000 people afterwards. Reportedly, after the Qazvin earthquake 94% of adults were referred with post-traumatic stress disorder, whereas in Bam that figure was 50% of the adult population.⁶²

The effectiveness of the project is largely due to the basic techniques that were taught to people in the counselling sessions. Teachers interviewed said that they had also used the techniques for relaxation and coping with difficulties themselves. Many parents believed that the briefing sessions helped them better understand the behaviour of their children.

The effectiveness of the project at the initial stages relies on the previous relationship of UNICEF and MoH. Given Iran's disaster-prone nature, the MoH and UNICEF had collaborated since 2002 on a national program to develop psychosocial interventions. UNICEF was helping MOH to train national level trainers in a workshop a few weeks before the Bam disaster.⁶³ Thirty mental health experts from various provinces of the country, including Kerman Province, had attended this workshop and were trained in psychosocial interventions in emergencies. Many of them were later engaged in providing services in Bam.⁶⁴

However, the project suffered from insufficient human resources within UNICEF during the initial phases. Dealing with counterparts, especially with MoE and SWO on a new concept like psychosocial interventions and its continuity in later stages, required more personnel and support.⁶⁵

The duration of some of the courses has been questioned. The time limitation was felt in two ways; some of the counsellors and principles commented that certain training sessions were too short for them to grasp the new concepts and techniques.⁶⁶ They were also concerned that the same thing was true about the counselling sessions with children and also the life skills courses.⁶⁷ The insufficient duration of the psychosocial activities in schools was also echoed in the recent evaluation of psychosocial interventions.⁶⁸

It is less easy to judge the effectiveness Neshat Centres, especially with regard to the objectives of setting up these centres. They are specifically expected to provide culturally-appropriate psychosocial services to children and the community so that the latent psychological effects of the disaster are reduced. The Centres are also responsible for the healthy emotional growth and development of children under its coverage through the provision of activity and play based interventions and participatory programmes. It is true that Neshat Centres are open to children free of charge to play, learn skills, and talk to counsellors if they need to. Parents can also come

⁶¹ Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Undersecretary for Health, Bureau for Psychosocial and School Health, Mental Health Office. 2004. *First Seven Months of Psycho-social Intervention in Bam*. November 2004.

⁶² As quoted from the MoH informants.

⁶³ Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Undersecretary for Health, Bureau for Psychosocial and School Health, Mental Health Office. 2005. *Second phase of psycho-social intervention in Bam*. September 2005.

⁶⁴ UNICEF. 2004. *Consolidated Donor Report: Bam Earthquake*.

⁶⁵ UNICEF. 2004. *Annual Review Meeting*. December 20-21, 2004.

⁶⁶ For instance, according to the document MoE-PoA2-Amended, the trained counsellors would have given a one-day training in psycho-education to approximately 1210 teachers. The number of participants is significant, but the duration can undermine the quality of the training.

⁶⁷ In case of working with children at schools, the headmistress of one middle girls' school said that as soon as the counsellors attracted the trust of the girls they were surrounded by the students all the time to answer their questions and listen to their problems. She added that it was a pity that the counsellors had to leave the school after the training sessions were over. Then there was nobody else to help the students with their psychosocial problems. She believed the counsellors left when the girls had just opened up to raise their problems with someone.

⁶⁸ Lazo and Balanon 2006.

and benefit from free consultation with counsellors but the point is that the centres, especially the Baravat Centre, were still struggling to get settled and become fully recognised by the community at the time of the evaluation.⁶⁹ It seemed that the centres need stronger ties with the community to be useful and to be responsive to the needs of potential clients.

The methodologies of Life Skills training have been developed by two international consultants commissioned by UNICEF. However, the MoE counsellors were consulted for their input. This flexibility in teaching increases the effectiveness of the project because it relies on the local knowledge, capacity and relevance. However, the acceptance of UNICEF to give the freedom to MoE on adding certain components or excluding certain chapters may have affected the project.⁷⁰

6.5.3 Impact

Although the Department of Mental Health of MoH was familiar with psychosocial approach, the Bam disaster gave it an opportunity to practice the methodologies and develop its usefulness. The psychosocial approach could prove its feasibility by becoming a working model for disaster-related interventions at national level and have an impact on national policy and practice. At the time of the evaluation, a national emergency preparedness plan has been developed based on the achievements of psychosocial project in Bam.

It is difficult to determine the impact of the project on the children that have dropped out of school and/or are affected by drug abuse. Many people, including the youth, have been at risk of addiction. Several reports and assessments reflected this problem, noting that “the price of drugs has decreased since the earthquake and it is more accessible to a larger part of the population”,⁷¹ and “between 70-80 per cent of people in Bam are using drugs, basically opium”.⁷² Drop-out children are supposed to be under the coverage of the Neshat Centres. It is noted that these children and their remaining families usually have financial problems. Although some efforts were made to bring some of them together in recreational camps and offer them some skills, they are still in need of systematic support. The counsellors working in Neshat Centres help the ones that are referred to them. So the whole community, especially in Baravat, is left to itself to deal with its socio-economic problems. Under this condition, the preventive activities of Neshat Centres to immunise the children against any form of abuse is probably insufficient. Economic empowerment is not part of UNICEF’s mandate, but it may be able to advocate with the SWO to identify agencies (governmental or NGO) that could work on underlying livelihood issues.

6.5.4 Coverage

The coverage of the psychosocial projects was extraordinarily high. The MoH Mental Health Disaster Team starting on day 1 after the disaster has had a total of 80,000 beneficiaries. Some 40,000 individuals attended primary crisis intervention sessions. In the first few weeks after the earthquake the MoH specialists visited 78% of all households in Bam.⁷³ During the next phase nearly all the survivors based on previous need assessments were attended to. The number of

⁶⁹ Once the young men in Baravat demonstrated their protest at a change in working hours of the centre by damaging the ceiling and threatening the counsellor.

⁷⁰ Some MoE counsellors in Bam were not happy with the content of the pre-test and post-test sheets and thought the local adaptation done at Tehran level was not appropriate.

⁷¹ UNICEF and Norwegian Church Aid 2004.

⁷² Skjeggedal *et al.* 2003.

⁷³ Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Undersecretary for Health, Bureau for Psychosocial and School Health, Mental Health Office. 2004. *First Seven Months of Psycho-social Intervention in Bam*. November 2004.

survivors who received this initial support and screening reached 17,035 persons. Adding up this number with the first phase data yields a small drop out of the people from this intervention.⁷⁴

The coverage of MoE's primary school-based activities was satisfactory, too. It reached 2,250 boys, 2,842 girls, 378 teachers, and 10,029 parents.⁷⁵

UNICEF did not target the children with physical and mental disabilities though these children needed special care and support. Some partners reported a lack of attention to this population.⁷⁶ It is not known why this at-risk group was excluded. Perhaps other international agencies had volunteered to target them.

6.5.5 Efficiency

Out of the total investment of UNICEF in Emergency Child Protection Programmes, the psychosocial component of the programme took up 41% of the budget. (\$ 1,594,022 out of \$ 3,853,625). Though the disaster was extensive the ratio of the allocated amount to psychosocial interventions was reasonable and indicates the significance of the project from UNICEF's perspective.

As part of the CPAP 2005-2009, UNICEF will support the projects that pay special attention to community participation. Since the Neshat Centres will be integrated into the country programme the Drop-in/Community Centres will have to manage their activities on the basis of community feed-back on the type of services needed. The management of the centres is not strong enough and the existing human resources have not yet gained skills to mobilise the community.

UNICEF worked with three counterparts on this programme and has sought to strengthen coordination between the partners by organising joint training workshops.⁷⁷

UNICEF has efficiently recorded the progress in project in term of quantity. It has built in mechanisms so that the implementing bodies can electronically record the data. However, less guidance has been provided for monitoring of the project in terms of quality.⁷⁸

6.5.6 Sustainability

The psychosocial work will be sustainable if the knowledge and skills gained through training sessions are utilised systematically. One good example is the existence of professionals of MoH, MoE, and SWO in different provinces who have gained psychosocial skills both through training workshops and through extensive supervised work in Bam. However, when it comes to the specific aspects of the project in Bam, sustainability is less certain. Some of the activities were designed to be carried out only for the duration of the project, such as group counselling. Whereas some are meant to continue even after UNICEF phases out. The drop-in/community

⁷⁴ Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Undersecretary for Health, Bureau for Psychosocial and School Health, Mental Health Office. 2005. *Second phase of psycho-social intervention in Bam*. September 2005.

⁷⁵ Lazo and Balanon. 2006.

⁷⁶ Stuvland. 2004.

⁷⁷ In LoU with SWO in 2006, UNICEF has explicitly asked for the coordination meetings and has encouraged the involvement of MoE in those meetings.

⁷⁸ For instance, in the MoU with SWO and in Final MoE PoA 2006 the partners agree to collect numerous quantitative data to assess the achievements. The provision of computers and softwares by UNICEF facilitates the process. However, it is less clear, from the document as well as from interviews, how the partners should know the users are satisfied with services offered.

centres are to offer their services as long as needed. The counterparts have signed agreements to keep them functional. But it all depends on the allocation of sufficient budget to these activities and their prioritisation by government. At the time of the evaluation, it was already agreed that LoU the two added counsellors at the centres will continue their work at the Centre to ensure the centre remains open during the morning hours after UNICEF leaves.

6.6 Conclusions

The working relationship between UNICEF and MoH on the psychosocial approach was a major reason for the success of this intervention.

The emergency needs were responded to extremely well with excellent coverage. The transition to recovery and reconstruction phases has not been so smooth, partly because community participation was not sought and encouraged as adequately and efficiently as required. UNICEF worked hard to ensure community participation it was not fully achieved, partly because external factors hindered the process. Mechanisms such as involving parents in the community centres have been thought of and applied in certain circumstances but it has been extremely difficult to overcome the limitations.

The novelty of the project was an opportunity with some risk attached. However, generally the chance to practice this approach brought about undeniable success.

This model of psychosocial intervention has the capacity to be adopted as a nationwide policy for emergency response.

The country now has professionals trained in psychosocial interventions and is therefore better prepared for future disasters.

6.7 Lessons

1. Previous reliable working relationship in routine situations, as between UNICEF and MoH, will maximise achievements during the crisis response.
2. Research and study on the social, economic, and cultural issues of the disaster-hit areas prior to the crisis can help with a better understanding of social behaviour of people. Consequently, this helps with more sensible programming with respect to psychosocial interventions.
3. As the transition to recovery period started, the role given to community should be strengthened. The community should have changed from the “recipients” of aid to “agents” of development. Though the documents say that children and the community have an important role in designing and programming, they are not consistently involved in the post-emergency work. The involvement of beneficiaries in programming and monitoring can help social integrity and counteract tendencies to community breakdown.
4. A balanced proportion of local, provincial, and national coordination is helpful for sustainability. Agreements at local levels can ensure faster project progress, but agreements at national level should also be considered, particularly to increase the possibilities of replication and to avoid policy and financial blockages.

6.8 Recommendations

1. Agree with the government partners more certain ways for integration of the services into the current infrastructure.
2. Organise seminars/annual conferences (and every possible joint gathering) that can remind the officials, researchers, social workers, and etc. of the comparative advantage of this approach in disaster and post disaster situations and perhaps support the launch of bi-lingual website on psychosocial interventions to keep the trained people (including UNICEF staff) in contact with each other, or at least support the publication of a quarterly journal in this regard (with the collaboration of relevant departments of MoH, SWO and MoE so that the achievements are not lost and are kept within the ministries).
3. Translate documents related to psychosocial intervention into Farsi and disseminate them among the MoH and SWO technical staffs at provincial level.
4. Continue to produce and disseminate documents that promote best practice of psychosocial interventions.
5. Provide opportunities, such as training workshops on using participatory tools in psychosocial projects, for the government staff and related NGO members at provincial and local levels with the aim of expanding community based activities and improving the quality of M&E systems from a community participation perspective.
6. Support the surveys and research activities for collection of relevant data on the areas prone to disasters.
7. Involve agencies (governmental or NGO) that can work on underlying livelihood issues for adolescents to complement the activities that are done for children.

7. WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION

7.1 Overview

The earthquake destroyed or damaged most of the houses in Bam⁷⁹ and up to 80% of the piped water system in places⁸⁰. It caused mass population displacement with some 70,000 people made homeless and living in tents or with relatives⁸¹. On 28 December the IFRC working with the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) reported that the immediate priorities were shelter and clean water.

7.2 Overview of UNICEF response

7.2.1 First six to eight weeks

UNICEF's initial relief assistance from Kabul and Copenhagen included 16 water bladders, 625,000 water purification tablets and three generators to be used with the water equipment. This material was given to the IRCS to distribute. In February, approximately a month after the earthquake a further planeload of supplies arrived from Copenhagen containing 2,000 'squatting plates' and plastic sheets to construct emergency latrines, 850 of which had been distributed by early March. UNICEF had also purchased 20,000 dustbins and 80,000 bin bags for the municipality to assist with garbage collection and disposal. At this time it was reported that 8 of the 16 water bladders were in use.

7.2.2 Beyond initial response

Initially UNICEF's main focus in the recovery phase was to be sanitation. The flash appeal of January 2004 list the principal objectives as:

- Provide latrines and other sanitation facilities in Bam and surrounding villages
- Support the rehabilitation of wells, pumps and water storage facilities in affected villages
- Provide water quality testing equipment and chemicals
- Disseminate information on good hygiene practice and waste disposal

The largest share of the funding requested was for the first objective (\$4m from \$5.8m), which intended to reach up to 75,000 people.

By March 2004 this had changed as the provincial authorities and NGOs appeared to have covered many of the sanitation needs⁸² and UNICEF instead decided to focus on assisting government to rebuild the piped water network. In addition 2,000 individual 'sanitary units' (toilet and shower block) were planned as well as a number of toilet blocks for schools, pre-schools and recreational clubs. Water testing equipment was to be provided and a programme of hygiene education was planned.

Working with the Urban Water and Waste Water Company (UWWC), UNICEF has provided pipes and fittings for 563.5km of pipes (472km in 2004 and 2005 + 91.5km in 2006) of pipe out of a planned 758km and approximately 430km has been laid in Bam and Baravat. In the

⁷⁹ Only 0.35% of houses had no damage.

⁸⁰ Takada *et al.* 2004.

⁸¹ UNICEF Flash Appeal. 29 December 2003.

⁸² UNICEF plan of action for water supply. March 2004.

surrounding villages the Rural Water and Waste Water Company (RWWC) has laid 150km of new pipe with UNICEF providing 105km of this; UNICEF supplied cement, re-bar and pipes for eight new reservoirs and equipped three new boreholes. UNICEF has supplied equipment for testing laboratories for both water companies. Government has funded (through the water companies) all of the implementation of these projects (design, management, labour and the rest of the material needed).

UNICEF supplied materials for 583 individual sanitary units, working in partnership with housing associations from other Iranian provinces and with the municipality. An earlier project to supply people with 'eco-sanitary' latrines was abandoned as it was determined to be culturally inappropriate. Of a planned 40 school toilet blocks approximately 35 are complete; toilet blocks in pre-fabricated units ('connexes') were supplied to all UNICEF supported kindergartens and recreation clubs.

UNICEF also undertook a hygiene promotion project in schools in collaboration with ACF (see section 5).

7.3 Findings

7.3.1 Appropriateness and relevance

The UNICEF response was relevant throughout, apart from a rather minor failure with eco-sanitary latrines. The water network sustained acute damage and despite a good job of temporary patching, there was a need to quickly rebuild. Water is currently being pumped out of the ground at over double the rate pre-earthquake due to a combination of leaks and increased usage for construction. The patched network remains fragile and there are areas on the periphery that still receive trucked water. It remains especially vulnerable to shocks and even without these there is a risk of parts of the network failing over time, and as attention shifts elsewhere the funds for repair being difficult to source.

The same is true of the provision of latrines. After the earthquake it was a major issue for weeks as people did not have spaces to wash and toilets were in short supply. The risk of diarrhoea outbreaks increases in such circumstances further endangering children.

The appropriateness of the UNICEF intervention is less easy to judge, especially with regard to the water network project. This was essentially substituting for government who would normally fund such work. The water companies operate with different models – the urban company is semi-autonomous (there are 70 in Iran), the rural company completely within the government structure. Both companies charge users and the urban company uses profits for routine maintenance. For both, capital investment (for instance the installation of a new network), comes directly from government through the Ministry of Energy and Power which all water companies come under.

The UNICEF investment has been something over \$5 million US for the pipes and other sundry equipment related to the network installation. The annual Iranian national budget was \$33 billion US in 2004⁸³ (and has subsequently expanded significantly). This suggests that the Iranian government could have found this type of funding if they had considered it a priority. They could also have raised the finance in the form of soft loans - in fact this type of infrastructure project is

⁸³ MSN Encarta online. http://encarta.msn.com/fact_631504784/Iran_Facts_and_Figures.html

more often the territory of the multi-lateral banks that arguably also have the experience to help government with such projects, both managerial and technical. UNICEF does not have this expertise and has really brought nothing to the project apart from the financing.

This raises questions about the rationale for the project. There is no written analysis. The supply of some pipes for the patching up of the network was a relevant and appropriate emergency intervention, and this may have led logically into the network replacement project. The UNICEF funding may well have leveraged the larger government financing, enabling the project to be done far more swiftly. With hindsight UNICEF might have used its strong position as a donor to influence some of the social aspects of the water network project – involving users in the design, making better provision for the most vulnerable, ensuring that poorer neighbourhoods and villages had equal access and so on.


UNICEF might also have played a role in the design stage of the project in bringing other experiences of this type of project – perhaps tapping into the expertise of organisations like the World Bank. Original estimates for the project had to be revised; this is normal in such projects and more flexibility could have been built into the financing from the government side. A review of project management models for similar work elsewhere might have been useful in designing in this flexibility.

A project that was not appropriate was the proposed introduction of eco-sanitary or TIP latrines. The plan to pilot twin indirect pit latrines (TIP) was abandoned after it became clear that people were not interested in this idea. This type of system is used in India and other parts of Asia. When a pit is full it is then composted to use for home gardens. In Iran not only is using human waste as compost culturally distasteful, but people have used chemical fertilisers for many years and this approach was simply out of tune with the context. Whilst there is always an argument for trying new approaches, this was simply inappropriate and ill conceived. Attitudes and practice can change following disasters – the way in which the government promoted family based care instead of residential care for separated and unaccompanied children is a case in point. This was connected to a particular problem however; there was no compelling reason for people to change sanitary practices, something even a cursory analysis should have shown.

7.3.2 Impact

It is not possible to be definitive about the impact of UNICEF's water and sanitation work at this stage as the main project is the rebuilding of the piped water network and this has not yet been completed. The emergency response of supplying pipes for patching the network contributed to the rapid re-establishment of the network, in turn helping to ensure people had clean water and preventing outbreaks of communicable disease. The new network will almost certainly reduce wastage and increase the supply of clean drinking water to the population. Both represent a demonstrable impact.

The incidence of diarrhoea was not significantly greater than comparable times of year following the earthquake and this can be viewed as a major impact for the public health authorities. Certainly there was a huge effort to provide drinking water and to build emergency toilets. UNICEF contributed to this effort.



7.3.3 Effectiveness

The implementation of the pipeline project has been mainly effective to date. UNICEF placed the largest orders for material with Kerman based suppliers and although this has not proven as efficient as anticipated, nevertheless pipes have mostly been delivered on time; water-testing equipment has been installed and is working. Compared to similar types of project in Iran and elsewhere over 500kms of rural and urban network has been built quickly.

Implementation of the latrine programme has been less effective. Apart from the TIP pilot, UNICEF also experienced difficulties in getting the shower and toilet (sanitary) units built. Originally the plan was to provide construction materials for these units and government through the various housing associations in the 3 zones UNICEF had targeted, would provide financing to allow households to hire the labour. This scheme did not work for a variety of reasons.

Firstly, UNICEF had targeted the most vulnerable for this assistance, in particular women headed households. Unfortunately it is not easy for single women to hire builders in the Iranian context – they do not normally do such things and therefore have little knowledge of how to do it, neither is it easy in a society where there is routine segregation of the sexes.

Secondly, there was a significant delay in the start of the project, meaning that by the time UNICEF had started the work people had received government loans for their houses and were busy trying to arrange this construction work. Thirdly, many people had emergency latrines that were of a sufficient standard that they were not interested in the UNICEF work. Finally, the master plan for the reconstruction of Bam has not been released to the public and as a result people are not sure where they can build (toilet and shower blocks are traditionally in the yard, and so not being sure where the boundaries of the yard might be can hold people back from constructing).

7.3.4 Efficiency

The implementation of water projects appears to have been efficient. UNICEF supervision has been light but effective, and the project management of the water companies has been professional. Systems of stock control were not examined in depth by the evaluation team but an earlier internal audit did not highlight this as a concern, indicating that the system is robust.

One UNICEF inefficiency was the miscalculation of its tax status, which led to suppliers initially selling pipes without paying tax. UNICEF had assured them that their international status exempted them from domestic taxation; of course this is not normally the case – tax exemption is usually for imported items such as vehicles. As a result suppliers had to retrospectively pay tax and increase the amount they charged UNICEF leading to a delay of some six months in the supply of 90mm pipe whilst UNICEF renegotiated. This situation creates an adverse incentive. A negotiation in advance of placing the order might have achieved a reduction in domestic taxes liable.

7.3.5 Coverage

Coverage has been good in both the water and sanitation projects. The piped water network will reach every household in Bam, Baravat and surrounding areas. This is the same for the rural areas, although there are a number of households at the edge of the network who are currently not going to receive piped water. This is because they were served by an elevated tank before the earthquake and this has been replaced by one at ground level. This means that they have to rely on water tankers filling communal tanks. This not only makes life more difficult for people in the short term, but also makes them vulnerable to disruptions in the water trucking service. These households are amongst the poorest in the area.

The coverage has also been good in construction of sanitation units, with most households in Bam receiving some kind of facility. The majority of these were built by NGOs. This sector was coordinated by UNICEF and is a good example of how good coordination maximises coverage and minimises duplication.

UNICEF has not thought about ensuring the poorest or most vulnerable households are covered. This may not be an issue as the network intends to supply all households, but there are issues around the affordability of meters and connections that should at least be considered.

7.3.6 Sustainability

The piped water network is seismically resistant (built with flexible joints) and made of materials that should last for 50-100 years if laid properly. The water companies are responsible for the management and maintenance of the network. The sanitation units are well constructed and should last people well.

The current level of water usage in Bam is potentially unsustainable in the long term, as there is a risk it will deplete the aquifer. Water charging will be introduced once the new network is switched on and this should bring consumption back to a sustainable level. The switch over of the network will have to be carefully managed – currently only 7000 households have bought water meters (households have to buy the meters to get connected) out of a potential 30,000. Some thought should be given to ensuring the most vulnerable households do not lose out.

7.4 Conclusions

This was a solid infrastructure contribution. The water and sanitation project will be successful and much appreciated. The water pipe network will have been built relatively quickly and will benefit all. It will secure the future of Bam as a living town and ensure that it continues to grow and prosper. This project was outside UNICEF's expertise and apart from some technical inputs to the initial design of the network, UNICEF's role has merely to supply material and monitor progress. Along the way the social aspects of water use and of network design have been neglected – precisely the role that UNICEF could have played. It will be a significant achievement, providing clean water for the children of Bam for years to come. Whether this project would have taken place with the same speed as with UNICEF funding is impossible to determine. Many of the officials interviewed in the course of this evaluation say it would not have, but government is already making the largest financial contribution and has been both generous and responsive in other areas of Bam reconstruction.

UNICEF was not as successful with its latrine-building programme and this was largely due to the model it chose for implementation, and the time delays in starting the project. Asking people, especially those least able to help themselves, to organise construction work did not work. The twin indirect pit latrine project was not well conceived.

7.5 Lessons

1. Big urban water system building is possible in countries where government has this knowledge. UNICEF's added value could be sharing knowledge and the introduction of some of the social aspects of water consumption and management.
2. If UNICEF chooses to target vulnerable families with assistance such as latrine and shower blocks, then the best model of implementation is to help with construction as well as finance. NGOs are often more flexible partners in this kind of work.
3. Attitude change is easiest to achieve when there is a clear and compelling reason. Trying to change sanitary practices in Bam post-earthquake did not work because there was not obvious benefit for people.

7.6 Recommendations

1. Ensure that households and villages at the periphery of the network receive supply as a priority. UNICEF staff should carry out a short inventory before the close of the project of villages that have significant numbers of households without supply and the reasons for this. The solutions should then be costed with the UWWC or RWWC and an agreed schedule of works put in place. UNICEF should consider part funding these works to expedite their progress.
2. Develop a strategy for the switch over to the new network, including a clear communication plan.
3. Consider most vulnerable households for extra support in switch over.

4. UNICEF's water section in New York should visit Iran before the end of this project and ensure that lessons are learnt as UNICEF rebuilds its in-house capacity in WES.
5. A regional WES post should be considered.

8. FAMILY REUNIFICATION

8.1 Overview

Over 26,000 people died in the Bam earthquake with a similar number injured. Many children were killed and something like 4,000 lost parents.

Traditional practice in Iran is to place children without parents in residential care. It is considered a serious social impediment to children to not belong to a family within Iranian culture. Since 1999 official policy has moved toward family based care where possible. In Islamic (Sharia) law the father is the legal and moral guardian of children and their mothers. In the event of the father dying guardianship passes to the paternal grandfather. In instances when guardians are considered unfit by the local state social welfare agents, legal and moral guardianship can be transferred to another male relative. More usually Courts can grant residence and care (supervision) to mothers or other appropriate (relevant) family members, usually on the advice of social workers from the State Welfare Organisation (SWO).

In the aftermath of the Bam earthquake the SWO appointed social workers to undertake tent-to-tent visits in Bam. In the first days following the disaster they identified 3,402 children and young adults (up to 24 years old) who had lost both parents and/or their father. Initially many of these children were placed in residential care. With the intervention and support of the family placement programme however, the vast majority are now living with extended family with only 120 still in residential care. Of the children in residential care, the majority are children with disabilities. To date SWO and UNICEF have identified 3806 children and registered 3696. Of these, 3106 cases remain active, and 1000 cases have been closed. There are 726 orphans (both parents lost) and 11 child headed households.⁸⁴

The SWO gives all families supporting children a payment for their upkeep. The payment is roughly US\$45 US per month for those caring for one child up to about US\$100 a month for those caring for five children (although these payments have not taken place for a year in Bam due to budgetary constraints). This is based on what it costs the state to pay for residential care and in Bam is set higher than the normal national payment. Boys receive this payment until they are eighteen, girls until they are married. Children and young people with disabilities receive the payment for the extent of their dependency. The SWO administers a system of welfare payments for women headed households, commonly called “coverage”. This is the same system of payments.

8.2 Overview of UNICEF response

8.2.1 First six to eight weeks

UNICEF was given responsibility within the United Nations system for child protection at an early stage (beginning of January) and quickly deployed a psychosocial consultant. Tents for semi-structured schooling were the first response, followed by distributions of children’s clothing including underwear. The family reunification programme was relatively slow to start

⁸⁴ Figures from SWO.

however, with a staff member for this component of the child protection only arriving in early February.⁸⁵

UNICEF coordinated the child protection sector, holding daily and then weekly meetings, and contributed equipment to the State Welfare Organisation (SWO) for the tracing effort including computers and digital cameras.

8.2.2 *Beyond the initial response*

Following the deployment of a child protection officer specialised in tracing, UNICEF became more involved in family reunification. By June 2004 an ambitious plan to support SWO to deliver a large-scale family reunification programme in Bam was developed. By the end of 2004 approximately 80 social workers had been employed and trained with UNICEF assistance, a database had been established, 13 zone offices established⁸⁶ and 4000 individual and 100 family kits distributed⁸⁷. Over the two-three year period of the programme UNICEF contributed to the wage bill of the social workers (incentives), continued with a comprehensive system of training, refined the database and established a 'hotline' service where children and their carers could call for anonymous and impartial advice (and from where referrals are made when necessary).

Over the three years of operation this programme ensured that the vast majority of children who lost a primary care-giver were placed in family based rather than residential care and were followed up by case workers.

8.3 Findings

8.3.1 *Impact*

The impact of the joint SWO and UNICEF programme has been significant. The majority of children without primary care givers are living with extended family – “family based care”. In fact only 120 are living in residential care. This is a major departure from the prevailing practice, if not policy, in Iran.

The impact of the change in care arrangements for these children from the norm will not be able to be judged for many years, if ever. To make an empirical judgement on whether children grow up better adjusted as a result of family based or residential care following natural disasters on the scale of Bam would need a longitudinal study for decades. Even then the results would probably be inconclusive – so many factors affect our lives it may be impossible to make this judgment definitively. Nevertheless, the prevailing wisdom and universally accepted principle amongst

⁸⁵ On the 17th January SWO head Rah Chamani told IRNA news agency; "*UNICEF promised a lot for helping the children in Bam but so far only delivered four tents to the social welfare organizations which is the only body in charge for the quake children.*"

⁸⁶ UNICEF supplied pre-fabricated connex units for these offices as well as vehicles, office furniture, IT equipment, and general supplies.

⁸⁷ The contents of the individual kits were based on the children's ages and gender (15-18, 11-14, 7-10, 3-6, and 0-2). Generally the kits include: **Boys**: for 15-18 years old: sports bag, football, shoes, slippers, shirts, trousers, T-shirts, socks, underwear, geometry set, colour pencils, eraser, cassette player, blanket, bed sheet, chess, cap, and a badminton set. **Girls**: 15-18 years old: sports bag, shoes, slippers, blouse, trousers, T-shirts, socks, knickers, bra, Manteau, geometry set, colour pencils, exercise book, pencils, eraser, cassette player, blanket, bed sheet, soft toy, badminton set, and handbag. For younger children (three to six years old and zero to two years old) lego, soft toys, infant suits were added. Family kits included coolers and fridges.

social workers and social science academics is that family based care is preferable to residential care.

These practitioners draw upon a well researched body of evidence into the field of resilience and childhood trauma which concludes in brief that there is additional protection offered by meaningful relationships by consistent primary care givers and that family membership is in itself a protective factor when measured against institutional care. Children raised in institutional care, especially those without a meaningful and protective family relationship are at significantly higher risk of social exclusion, exploitation, poor mental and physical health, and lower economic and social achievement for the extent of their lives. There is also clear evidence that children raised in institutional care are also more compromised when they become parents themselves, and the intergenerational transmission of neglectful parenting and trauma are well documented. This is also the principle underpinning the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of which Iran is a signatory.

The body of research evidence was reflected in the findings of the evaluation team who visited a small sample of children in family based care (chosen randomly) and talked to some children in residential care. Whilst all of these children faced many challenges in their lives, the children in residential care were less happy with their circumstances. The children in family based care appeared to live more normal lives, with greater opportunity for play, for adult support and with obvious links to their life before the earthquake. Whilst the standard and type of residential care in Iran is high, it was the evaluation team's opinion that children were much better off in family based care, especially with regular visits by social workers to ensure they are adequately cared for.

In addition to the impact that this programme has had on individual children, the experience has also influenced the way that the State Welfare Organisation views childcare in the aftermath of disasters. In a subsequent earthquake in Zarand the SWO fielded teams of social workers to run a tracing and reunification team, resulting in all children being placed within family care. This would arguably not have been the case without UNICEF's technical and financial support in Bam. Whilst there is still some way to go before this practice is routine, the signs are extremely encouraging.

8.3.2 Appropriateness and relevance

The family reunification was both relevant and appropriate. The children who have lost their parents in the earthquake are amongst those made most vulnerable. Ensuring adequate care for such children is UNICEF's core mandate and it was thus highly appropriate that this became a priority area of work for the organisation. There was also a great need to find practical solutions for the care of these children; initial plans were for children to be placed in residential care across the country. UNICEF provided timely technical support and financing to the SWO to ensure they could provide the most appropriate care for these children.

8.3.3 Effectiveness

This was an effective programme, albeit started a little later than is ideal. UNICEF provided both technical and financial assistance and this combination was of maximum use to government. Critical to the success of the project was the policy alignment of government in the shape of the State Welfare Organisation (SWO) and UNICEF. The contribution that UNICEF made was to

offer approaches and tools from other disasters that could be easily used by SWO to implement the policy of family based care over residential care.

Providing both material and support proved to be an extremely effective way of supporting and influencing a partner. The relationship with the SWO is now one of mutual admiration and respect; it was not always so however. At the beginning of the Bam earthquake response there was some suspicion of UNICEF within SWO (as evidenced by the quote above), and there was quite a bit of negotiation before the programme went ahead. This combination of material assistance – both to the families and the SWO, and tools and approaches worked well. Without the practical support the programme may not have been possible (for instance assistance in paying social workers and provision of office support and transport for them), and goodwill would certainly have been harder to generate; without the tools and approaches the family based care might not have been possible to deliver.

Tools and approaches that proved particularly influential were the emphasis on outreach and the use of the Identification, Documentation, Tracing and Reunification (IDTR) protocol. 80 new social workers had to be employed to carry out the outreach programme and forms were developed (based in part on the UNICEF programming notes) that acted as case notes for the social workers. In essence each child placed in family care had a social worker that would work with the family to ensure proper care. Guardianship and supervision was arranged through the courts, usually on the basis of SWO advice. Regular follow up visits continue to be made.

Another effective part of the UNICEF support to SWO was the training programme carried out for new social workers. This was done on the job, and was responsive to needs. This proved to be very effective; new staff were trained in some basic principles of social work, in how to use the IDTR system and were then periodically given refresher courses and training as the need arose. A good example of this was the training on how to deal with drug addiction within families, a widespread problem in Bam.

Another important and effective part of the mechanism, and the collaboration between UNICEF and the SWO was the Child Welfare Committee. This is the body that is convened to deal with cases that are not straightforward and that deals with case closures. It sits on a zone, district and provincial level. UNICEF is part of the provincial committee. The CWC has sat 115 to date.

Also highly effective was the distribution of material aid to children and their families. These kits were well thought through and appreciated by the families. Two years later this assistance is still remembered, in particular the bicycles (these were much envied by other children, perhaps helping in some small way to lift spirits, even if only temporarily).

An area in which UNICEF has not been as effective as it might have been is in the development of a database to support the SWO programme. The database is currently being revised, as the first version did not really allow users to search for data. The main reason for this is that data entry was done on the basis of the case-note forms that contained as much qualitative data as quantitative. The qualitative data could not be compiled and compared in the first version – it required either a database with space for notes on individual cases, or a simple database for numbers with a complimentary paper based note system. The first design fell between these two and as a result was not useful. IT projects developed quickly under duress rarely work – a key learning point for UNICEF from this experience will be to devise an ‘off the shelf’ system similar to the one operated by the ICRC.

The hotline initiative also proved to be of medium effectiveness. It received calls and undoubtedly helped people access the support system, however with greater publicity and with a different design it may have boosted its 'hit rate'. In particular the hotline relied on poster publicity to inform people of the service. These were placed in public places such as clinics and offices. However, whenever there was radio, television or newspaper publicity calls went up.

The hotline service was primarily designed for children to access services and as another way to ensure they could get protection from state services if they needed this. In fact the vast majority of callers were women, with a variety of needs from simple advice to more complex issues that required referral. This service was valuable in itself but was not quite the model SWO and UNICEF had originally envisaged. Telephones are not ubiquitous in households in Bam and accessing the hotline requires that children use public telephones. Girls are not often allowed out unaccompanied and thus may find making confidential telephone calls quite difficult. Finding the money, using an unfamiliar piece of technology, speaking to an unknown adult – all of these may be quite high barriers to children using such a service. Regular social work visits are probably the best ways of ensuring children can voice concerns about their care, especially if the social workers are rigorous about spending time alone with the children. School based systems for seeking advice may also be better avenues for children than a hotline system, although this is not to discount the model entirely.

8.3.4 Coverage

The coverage of this programme has been good, covering by the estimates of UNICEF and SWO something in the region of 85 – 95% of the children who had lost a primary care giver. This is probably about as good a coverage figure as is possible considering the chaos of an earthquake and the situation of Bam as one of the less developed parts of Iran.

Latterly the number of social workers has been reduced in Bam as UNICEF support has finished and SWO have had to pay all of their wages. This has left about 25 social workers to deal with remaining cases. They have also had to take on the normal "social cases" (usually women headed households who receive a welfare payment from government through SWO). Although many of these cases overlap and this "integration" is logical, it has left the social workers overstretched, with some trying to cover well over 100 clients. This is simply not possible to provide regular and in depth support and as a result the service will inevitably diminish.

8.3.5 Sustainability

Experience in Bam demonstrates that large-scale family based care for children who have lost their primary care giver in the aftermath of a large natural disaster is possible in Iran. Given the frequency and magnitude of such disasters in Iran (the last large earthquake to kill 40,000 people was in 1992 and there have been two large earthquakes following the one in Bam) it is certain that Iran will be faced with large numbers of children in need of care in the future. Ensuring that family based care on a large scale is possible, and that residential care is usually a last resort rather than a first resort is possible using the Bam experience.

That this will be the case in the future is not a given however. Any large organisation takes time to change and policy change is usually contested. Even within SWO in Bam it is becoming harder to find resources to employ social workers and follow up cases. Major individual donors, on whom SWO to an extent relies, much prefer to sponsor residential care than give their money to families – orphanages are tangible, families can be complicated. UNICEF and SWO

must continue to work to ensure the experience of Bam is shared and integrated and can be readily (and practically) used in the next disaster.

8.4 Conclusions

The fact that so many children are being cared for within families is first and foremost a reflection of generosity and incredible spirit of the people of Bam. Families are close in this region; nevertheless it is extraordinary that so many children are being cared for in this way. That government and UNICEF were able to support these efforts has increased the possibility of long-term success. The SWO in particular should be acknowledged for its role in this achievement.

This has been an excellent programme and will have a major impact on the lives of many children and their families. It demonstrates how UNICEF can use its position as an inter-governmental organisation, combining practical experience and solid policy work to maximum effect. Working with and through a strong government partner, using its knowledge base and leveraging its funding to ensure the best interest of the child is foremost.

The programme was slow to start, mostly because it took over a month for UNICEF to deploy someone with tracing and reunification experience. The first weeks are important in tracing children and early interventions can result in rapid reunifications as demonstrated in Zarand. UNICEF must be able to deploy expertise rapidly if it is to fulfil both its stated and its moral commitments to children affected by disasters.

There are many good lessons to be drawn from this programme both for the government of Iran and for UNICEF. There are some things that did not go well, inevitably, and these experiences should also be used to improve future performance.

8.5 Lessons

1. The combination of practical (financial) and technical support using proven approaches made this project a success. This type of approach works well in a country like Iran that has a relatively sophisticated social welfare bureaucracy with both the technocratic capacity and the policy alignment to implement such ideas comprehensively.
2. The practical, “on the job” training worked well in bringing in new social workers rapidly.
3. The individual kits given to children were well thought out and worked well. This experience should be captured and replicated.
4. The lack of support for disabled children meant that they stayed a relatively neglected group, despite being probably the most seriously affected by the earthquake (losing parents and suffering a permanent disability in some cases). Increased care payments might have made it easier for family to take in these children; UNICEF needs to give both practical and policy consideration to this group of children in future.

8.6 Recommendations

1. The Iranian government and the SWO must ensure that payments due to families for the caring of children are maintained. Some have not been paid for a year and this risks compromising the success of the programme.
2. UNICEF and SWO should actively consider the situation of disabled children and investigate whether a different support payment regime is needed to ensure their care within families.
3. UNICEF should work with the SWO and the Iranian legislature to demonstrate the success of family based care in Bam. Visits for parliamentarians to Bam would keep this issue on the agenda and would help in practically addressing some of the legislative changes that may be needed.
4. UNICEF should work with the SWO to ensure that the principal and practice of family based care is understood and supported in the wider organisation. This will involve workshops, production of simple materials on how the system works in the Iranian context and perhaps exchange visits between provinces. The leadership of SWO in Kerman province is a valuable resource in advocating this approach.
5. The training course used in Bam should be further developed and used as a model for new social workers. Recruits without the requisite courses in their degree could receive “on the job” training and qualify for an SWO certification that allows them to practice at a certain level. This could form the basis for future professional social work qualifications.
6. UNICEF needs to have more rapidly deployable expertise in family reunification globally, regionally and nationally. Serious consideration should be given to having standby capacity either within the country or the region as part of a contribution to global preparedness.

9. CHILD FRIENDLY SPACES

9.1 Overview of UNICEF response

9.1.1 First six to eight weeks

One of UNICEF's first responses was the establishment of tents where children could enjoy supervised play. This happened within a week of the earthquake and was widely regarded as one of the most visible and successful of the early UNICEF interventions. In total UNICEF provided 19 tents and a similar number of recreation kits. These were distributed through and supervised by the State Welfare Organisation (SWO). By the end of January 16 of these tents were functional and were essentially operating as kindergartens. UNICEF supported staff incentives and provided training.

9.1.2 Beyond the initial response

In mid January 2004,⁸⁸ UNICEF, together with the SWO formulated a plan to support 36 kindergartens and to open 10 recreational and cultural centres (RCCs). These were established relatively quickly although the majority of UNICEF material support did not come until early 2005.

UNICEF support included paying the salaries (strictly speaking 'incentives') of the 250 early child care centre (ECCC) staff for two years as well as the 50 staff working in the RCCs. In addition UNICEF supplied over 100 pre-fabricated units to house the facilities (two per ECCC and three per RCC), latrine blocks, children's classroom furniture, stationery, books, eating utensils, colour television sets, heating and cooling devices and electrical appliances, playground equipment such as swings and sliding-boards, toys and play materials. In addition the RCC had drawing, calligraphy, sculpture, musical, and educational games, table football and chess supply, computers, video player and radio-cassette player, and other audio equipment.

In total UNICEF organised and paid for, together with SWO and other NGOs, 36 workshops and 24 internal review meetings for staff and parents over the three years following the earthquake. A training facility was supplied and equipped to support this programme.

Before the earthquake, there were 1,237 children enrolled in ECCCs at Bam and surrounding villages. By 2004, 2,455 were enrolled in the ECCCs and this even increased in 2005 at 3,063.

In 2004, 50 RCC staff members were paid incentives with UNICEF support. This increased to 74 staff members in 2005. Overall attendance in the RCCs was at 2,647. Initially all 10 RCCs were managed and supervised by the SWO. Five of these were handed over to the Centre for the Intellectual Development of Children (Kanoon) in 2005, and further consolidation means there are now seven in total.

⁸⁸ As outlined in the first Plan of Action referring to a 13 January 2004 meeting.

9.2 Findings

9.2.1 Appropriateness and relevance

The UNICEF rapid introduction of safe places for children to play (where parents could leave children to play with good supervision) was both relevant and appropriate. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake people were living in tents, often crowded together in makeshift camps. The trauma of the earthquake was compounded by cramped living conditions and the duress of basic survival. For parents to have somewhere where children could play safely with supervision was extremely useful, both in giving them time to undertake essential tasks, and allowing them some space in which to recover. For children, having routine and an opportunity to play and be creative away from the tent, with friends, must have been helpful. One SWO senior staff observed that initially children's paintings were in dark colours, but these gradually got lighter.

Subsequently the progression of these tented care centres into kindergartens were also relevant and appropriate. The reconstruction of Bam is still continuing three years later; even after the tented camps had disappeared people were living in tents in building sites on their own plots and the opportunity for young children to play, and to be with friends remained constrained. The provision of free places to a large number of children continued to assist families in the recovery process – both physical and psychologically. A recently commissioned UNICEF evaluation found that parents and children saw improvement in behaviour and mothers talked of having useful time for day-to-day chores as well as satisfaction with the quality of the service⁸⁹. This was confirmed in random interviews with parents and children during this evaluation. Pre-school education is also documented to produce long-term gains in school success through contributions to cognitive abilities⁹⁰.

The relevance and appropriateness of the recreational and cultural centres (RCC) is less straightforward. Providing services for adolescents is highly relevant – this group is often neglected in the aftermath of large disasters and yet is at some risk. The UNICEF RCCs took six months to get established and as a result did not provide this service when the majority of the population were in tented camps. Whilst a significant part of the population still in camps were served by the RCCs, more and more people established themselves on their property. This meant that accessing the RCCs became less straightforward than in a classic camp situation where the resource was right on the doorstep.

Approximately 1,000 children attended the 10 RCCs regularly between mid-2004 and mid 2005. This is a high rate of attendance for the size and type of the facility (essentially three containers), and probably represents a tenth of the population in the age group 6-16⁹¹. Given that the main users were probably in a narrower age range, this also suggests that the service was relevant and therefore attractive to those targeted. In late 2006, as this evaluation was being conducted, attendance appeared to be a lot lower. This may mean that the service has served its purpose and that families and children now have other, better options; that 'normal' life in the town for this age group has more or less returned. It should be noted that those running the centres supply attendance statistics, and therefore not independently verified.

⁸⁹ Lazo and Balanon 2006.

⁹⁰ See for instance Barnett 1992.

⁹¹ MoH figures in September 2004 based on immunisation give under 5s in Bam and Baravat as approximately 5,000 or 1,000 children per age year.

9.2.2 *Impact*

The impact of these interventions is difficult to quantify, as the effects will be long term. Broadly however, the provision of these services has been much appreciated by parents and children.

The principal purpose of this intervention was “to facilitate a return to normalcy for children of Bam affected by the earthquake”⁹². If the intent was to create a sense of safety, a nurturing environment that might in time help children deal with a part of the trauma from earthquake, to help with cognitive and social development potentially hindered by the disaster, then this project has almost certainly had a positive impact. Given the higher level of coverage of kindergartens it is likely that the impact will be high; this can only be measured in a number of years in terms of average academic achievement, school drop out rates, social factors such as drug addiction and so on. Given there are so many other factors that will affect these variables; it will be impossible to attribute impact. The mere fact of high attendance must indicate a high level of need and at least satisfaction with the service; this suggests the more prosaic impact of being useful to families.

Another impact appears to be a sustained interest in the concept of pre-schooling. UNICEF withdrew its support for carer’s salaries at the end of 2005 but the ECCCs have continued (see 9.2.6 sustainability below).

9.2.3 *Effectiveness*

The ECCC project, with a few timing and supplies hiccups, has largely been effective. It has offered a popular service to the people of Bam, Baravat and surrounding villages and has potentially contributed to the cognitive and social development of children who have lived through the Bam earthquake.

One critical aspect of the programme has been ensuring that a quality service was provided. The current situation where there are 58 ECCCs of which 36 are UNICEF supported, is a significant increase on the situation prior to the earthquake. Some of those involved in running kindergartens were killed during the disaster. Managers and trainers⁹³ have relocated from Kerman, but not in sufficient numbers so an effective way to increase capacity was to train new staff and to ensure quality through ongoing training.

Probably the most critical factor in determining the effectiveness or otherwise of all of the UNICEF programmes were the competence and capacity of the partners responsible for implementing. In the Bam earthquake the partner was almost exclusively the government. In the case of both the ECCCs and the RCCs the partner was the State Welfare Organisation (SWO), and with the RCCs latterly Kanoon as well.

The SWO has the supervision of kindergartens within its remit and in Kerman province, and Bam district, had staff working in this field before the earthquake. This meant that they were in a good position to run the emergency response and to support the UNICEF programme of re-starting ECCC provision. In addition kindergarten’s are normally run commercially and therefore there is a pool of both trainers and managers on the market. By contrast, the RCCs were an experiment and although the SWO were very keen to see such services set up, they did not have the in house experience to run them. This hindered the effectiveness of the RCCs; the

⁹² From the ECHO funding documents.

⁹³ Carers in kindergartens are called trainers in Iran.

centres latterly taken over by Kanoon show how an organisation that has experience of running these services can do it.

9.2.4 Efficiency

UNICEF was inefficient in many aspects of its support to this project. Incentives for managers and staff of centres took eight months to pay in 2004. Supplies – and especially the critical pre-fabricated buildings (connexes) without which none of the other supplies could be distributed – also took over six months to arrive. Of the initially promised 36 tents, only 19 were provided (the reason for this was the alternative supply of connexes, but these then took a long time to arrive). The recreational kits were culturally inappropriate, containing games such as bowling that are not widely known in Iran (although some items were useful). The supplies were distributed equally amongst ECCC, although they varied quite significantly in the number of children attending (so an ECCC with 50 children got the same number of toys and chairs as one with 200 attending). Coolers initially supplied were not appropriate for the climate. Desks were given that were too big to fit in the connexes supplied. Some toys were supplied singly, meaning ECCC managers would not use them for fear of creating discord.

This list is not exhaustive, and mostly relate to the first year of operation. Once the supplies had arrived and systems were established things appeared to function more smoothly. A change of staff on the UNICEF side appears to have had a positive impact.

9.2.5 Coverage

The coverage of the ECCC project has been excellent. In 2005 more than 3,000 children attended kindergartens. These figures are monitored by SWO and so unlikely to be massaged. ECCC visited during the course of this evaluation appeared to confirm this level of attendance.

Population figures from the MoH based on immunisation figures in September 2004 gives under fives as 7,500 in Bam, Baravat and damaged villages. This is from a total population of 102,000. Accurate demographic data is impossible to ascertain, UNICEF is also working in a slightly larger geographical area than this. There are consistent reports of population being higher as people have come in from surrounding areas to settle in Bam. Nevertheless, if we use these figures then we can crudely extrapolate a figure of roughly 1,500 children per age year. If we assume that children are mostly attending pre-school between the ages of 3 and 6 then we might estimate the eligible population of children at around 6,000. This would suggest 50% coverage for ECCC. This is higher than the national average and higher than UNICEF's own target of 30% in the 2005 Annual Work Plan.

Whilst these figures suggest great success, it is likely that those attending will be from better off families. Parents put their children in kindergartens if they are both working, if they believe in the education value, if they are accustomed to doing so; the majority of these will be from economically better off groups. Emerging evidence from the UK⁹⁴ suggests that even free pre-school care and pro-poor policy is not a guarantee of reaching these families. It may be that UNICEF has to think about the type of tactics needed to ensure the most vulnerable families have access to these services, especially in the aftermath of disasters when they are being provided free.

⁹⁴ Pending. Sure Start scheme. <http://www.ness.bbk.ac.uk>

9.2.6 Sustainability

The UNICEF country programme has as one of its long term aims to increase pre-school education to 25% nationally. This has already been achieved in Bam and Baravat and all of those the evaluation team spoke to involved in the management of these services think the current level of pre-school education will continue. They speak of an attitude change in the town. This was also the judgement of the recent UNICEF commissioned child protection evaluation; this team spoke to parents and managers of ECCCs and also concluded that there had been a change in the way the general population viewed the value of pre-school education.

The acid test for whether the current level of pre-school education will be sustained will be whether attendance levels stay high following the introduction of charging. This has been gradually introduced and was starting to be seriously implemented when the evaluation team was in Bam. The SWO is subsidising something like 10 places per ECCC and some are setting their rates low in the hope of keeping those parents who find it difficult to pay. The rate is 10,000 tomans or 10 US dollars a month. GDP per capita in Iran is around 2,500 US dollars which makes this reasonably affordable.⁹⁵ Initial attendance figures post charging appear to support the optimism of UNICEF and SWO staff; it seems likely that ECCC attendance will stay higher than the national 25% average. This has interesting policy implications in terms of promoting kindergartens.

The future of RCCs is more in the balance. Five of the RCCs have been taken over by the Centre for Intellectual Development (Kanoon), a quasi-governmental organisation that has a forty-year history of arranging children's activities. The five centres that Kanoon have taken over appear to have a good future; they have been very nicely decorated and have staff actively working in the centres, if not great attendances (although there is one that the evaluation team visited in a school playground that receives all of the children during break times and straight after school). The three centres that have been left under the supervision of the SWO may find a useful purpose – two of the centres have started “women's empowerment” activities (essentially income generation) which is both promising and necessary.

9.3 Conclusion

This was a useful and much appreciated intervention and will certainly have had a positive impact on the lives of children affected by the earthquake. Resuming and expanding early education for children took pressure off parents and gave small children a much needed routine (and safe environment) when their home lives had been terribly disrupted. The psychological value of this type of intervention post-disaster has been documented, as has the general benefit of pre-school education for children's social and cognitive development. This is one of the interventions most appreciated by the people of Bam, and one of UNICEF's most visible programmes.

The resumption and expansion of early childcare centres has been the more successful of the two programmes in terms of attendance and sustainability. The RCCs were a good attempt at providing services for adolescents, a group traditionally neglected in the aftermath of disasters. They suffered from not having a robust institutional home and with hindsight might have been either closed earlier or significantly altered earlier. They also could have had outdoor play facilities for boys such as football pitches.

⁹⁵ http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_IRN.html

Whilst conceptually the programme was good, the early management of supplies was less so. Many of the delays and inappropriate supplies are similar to other UNICEF emergency responses. In another context this might have seriously affected the implementation of the programmes.

9.4 Lessons

1. Involving managers, staff and parents in the design of programmes is proven to make them more responsive and more appropriate. In particular UNICEF should have consulted on its supply list (initially) and the way in which supplies were to be distributed.
2. The provision of services to adolescents is important but challenging, especially where there is no obvious partner. UNICEF needs to develop guidance on best practice in this area.

9.5 Recommendation


1. Develop regional recreation kits that can be stored in regional hubs. Ideally this should be undertaken by each UNICEF regional office in collaboration with the Copenhagen supply section and EMOPs. MENARO could pilot this approach, with the design for each recreation kit developed with the involvement of country offices. The design stage should take no longer than six months with an initial stock purchased as and when funds allow.

10. HEALTH AND NUTRITION

10.1 Overview

The earthquake injured 9,647 people many of whom were airlifted to hospitals around the country for treatment. In Bam all 10 urban health centres were destroyed and 10 of the 19 rural centres were damaged. Many health staff were killed or injured and others were busy with their own families immediately following the earthquake. Despite this a few of the staff managed to tend to survivors at the hospital, although this quickly became overwhelming and chaotic.

The government of Iran deployed teams from other provinces who each managed the health response in one of the 13 zones that Bam town was divided into. Services, including immunisation were quickly restored, and there were no significant communicable disease outbreaks.



In addition to the government response there was a large-scale international response with something like four field hospitals being deployed in the first weeks. Although this was much appreciated by the people of Bam it also added to the difficulty of coordinating the response.

10.2 Overview of UNICEF response

10.2.1 First six to eight weeks

The initial UNICEF response was in the form of supplies on two relief flights and a medical doctor from Afghanistan. The plane from Kabul brought a WHO emergency health kit; further WHO emergency health kits from Copenhagen as well as obstetric and surgical kits augmented this. The medical doctor stayed for a couple of weeks to help UNICEF assess their role. The health supplies were donated to the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) and the army in Bam and the IRCS in Kerman.

10.2.2 Beyond the initial response

After the initial response with medical items UNICEF undertook two discreet initiatives in health and nutrition. The health intervention concentrated on supplying material and training to re-establish storage and transport for vaccines – the ‘cold chain’. The nutrition intervention was four-fold and consisted of adding micro-nutrients (iron and folic acid) to flour used for bread making; supporting a nutritional survey with Accion Contre el Hambre (ACH), a Spanish NGO; establishing a schools based nutrition education programme centred around ‘healthy nutrition kiosks’ (HNK) also with ACH and establishing ‘nutritional care centres’ with the Ministry of Health.

The cold chain restoration project was initiated after a request from the Ministry of Health. An assessment team consisting of an immunisation specialist from the regional office in Nepal and a supply specialist from Copenhagen came to Iran in early February. Based on this assessment UNICEF agreed to replace the majority of the cold chain equipment in Bam, Baravat and surrounding districts: 95 motorcycles & vaccine carriers, 118 fridges, 2 freezers, 22 cold boxes & one car for monitoring. The Ministry of Health in Bam remembers these supplies arriving 6 or 7 months after the earthquake.

In July 2004 UNICEF delivered 4 tons of high-energy biscuits to children in Bam through the Early Child Care Centres.

Between September and December of 2004 ACH conducted a two-part nutrition survey in Bam and surrounding districts. This showed there had not been an increase in malnutrition following the earthquake but that pre-existing developmental problems (in particular stunting) continued.

In December, partly in response to their survey, ACH initiated with UNICEF support the HNK project targeting 37 primary schools (including three special needs schools) with a kiosk and the education programme. The first kiosk was opened in March 2005 and the programme had been implemented by the end of that year, including production of a series of books for primary school children’s nutritional education.

The UNICEF flour fortification programme was initiated in mid-2005. Nine micro-feeders were supplied to factories processing flour in Kerman province for the supplementation of micronutrients. These machines feed the correct quantities of iron and folic acid ‘pre-mix’ into the flour. UNICEF also supplied a year’s pre-mix.

Two nutritional care centres were set up in Bam and Rigan (a small town about 100kms from Bam) as part of the community based nutrition project in early 2006. A number of nutrition workshops were conducted through these facilities as well as a high level workshop for ministry of health officials.

10.3 Findings

10.3.1 Appropriateness and relevance

The health and nutrition project has been mixed in terms of its appropriateness and relevance, and it may be helpful to separate out the two components – health and nutrition and discuss these separately.

The health project essentially consisted of an early delivery of supplies to the IRCS and then a later delivery of cold chain equipment to the Ministry of Health (MoH). The evaluation team had limited access to the IRCS and as a result it has not been possible to determine the use of the initial supplies. From what we know of the high level of competence of the IRCS, Iranian health authorities and the excellent reputation that the Iranian health system enjoys, it is safe to assume however that a) the supplies will have been well used and b) they probably would not have been life saving, rather they would have contributed to general usage.

The cold chain equipment is in use and has been much appreciated by the MoH. Approximately a third of UNICEF’s assistance replaced damaged equipment – the rest was replacing old equipment (the MoH replaced 40 damaged fridges early in the response). The rationale for replacing old cold chain equipment was to ensure the system was in accordance with the latest WHO guidelines on effective vaccine storage and management (EVSM). The supply of equipment has been accompanied by training on EVSM, which has continued into 2006, and WHO have recently expressed their satisfaction with the cold chain management in Bam. Some of the fridges were the wrong models for the climate (it is very hot in Bam and some of the fridges initially supplied could not cope with this heat).

It is appropriate and relevant to ensure that routine immunisation is re-started as quickly as possible, and is part of UNICEF’s core commitments to children in emergencies. Routine immunisation had recommenced before the UNICEF intervention. As a result of the earthquake the cold chain equipment has been upgraded throughout the district and this is good for the medium term prospects of ensuring good immunisation coverage.

The nutrition survey was relevant if a little late. The epidemiology of natural disasters suggests that there is not often an appreciable rise in malnutrition following a major earthquake.⁹⁶ However, it is sensible to conduct a survey and in line with UNICEF’s core commitments for children. The survey showed that malnutrition had not risen against previous surveys and that stunting appeared to be less than a few years earlier, although the area in which ACH conducted their survey was much smaller than the area covered by the national survey, which includes the worst off parts of southern Kerman province bordering Sistan and Baluchistan.

	1998 national survey (Kerman)	ACH survey post earthquake (2004)
Global chronic malnutrition (stunting)	21.7%	9.8%
Global acute malnutrition (wasting)	7.9%	5.8%

The ACH survey also contained a qualitative exercise in which the same households who had participated in the weight for height measuring answered questions about their household income and dietary habits. This showed that poor nutrition and stunting were related to socio-economic status and was worse in poorer rural areas than richer urban areas. Despite this finding ACH concluded that a major nutrition education project would improve children’s nutrition, and designed their HNK programme to meet this need.

The ‘healthy nutrition kiosk’ (HNK) was basically a facility where mothers would sell healthy snacks at break times to children. It was to be self-financing and therefore sustainable. A

⁹⁶ See for instance Seaman 1972.

nutrition education component was also designed with a number of textbooks that teachers were expected to lead lessons from on a regular basis.

The flour fortification project was initiated in response to high levels of anaemia identified in the 2002 NIMS study, showing Kerman was amongst the worst provinces in the country. Flour factories are private enterprises that process state wheat for a fixed price. Bread is subsidised in Iran and so the whole process strictly controlled by government. This makes the fortification project high impact as almost everyone eats bread and therefore receives the supplement. Similar projects have demonstrated high impact, suggesting this to be an appropriate intervention, if not entirely relevant to post-earthquake recovery.

The community based nutrition project has only really been in operation in 2006. It basically involves the establishment of a nutrition clinic in health centres in Bam and Rigan, and a number of training/ workshops for mothers based around these centres. The clinics work on a referral basis and offer simple nutritional information to mothers whose babies are underweight. They operate every morning and both have consistent levels of attendance.

The clinic in Bam appears to be both relevant and appropriate to the need in the town. This is the only dedicated nutrition facility in the town and operates pre- and postnatal classes for mothers in good nutrition practice as well as the referral clinic. The types of nutrition problems presenting themselves lend themselves to this type of service – they are either complicated by intestinal diseases, derive from poor weaning practices or in some cases are poverty related. The clinic can give appropriate advice and referral to either other medical services or welfare assistance through the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IK fund). The clinic in Rigan seems far less appropriate or relevant. The advice being given is confusing and the equipment supplied has not been used. Worse, the majority of problems appear poverty related – those who are presenting appear to be doing so in the hope of accessing relief through the IK fund.

10.3.2 Impact

UNICEF's contribution of essential medical supplies to the IRCs and government organised relief effort was a minor but meaningful one and as such will have played a part in the general effort that kept communicable disease incidence low. The cold chain replacement will have an impact in the medium term, ensuring that routine immunisation coverage stays above 95% in Bam and surrounding district. This will have a direct impact in keeping deaths from diseases such as measles extremely low.

The ACH nutrition education project appears to have had an impact in the lifetime of the project. Parents are extremely happy with the initiative – all those interviewed by the evaluation team expressed satisfaction and this is confirmed by ACH data. Nevertheless, genuinely changing dietary practice takes time as it is (often) linked to cultural practice. An ACH monitoring team is continuing to gather data on dietary habits in the schools where the HNKs were placed. The evaluation team saw products on sale in the HNK that could only tenuously be described as 'healthy' (biscuits and cakes). The profit factor involved in sustaining these kiosks may influence their future direction, especially as this was often a source of extra revenue for head teachers in the past.

A more interesting question will be whether this intervention has had any effect on malnutrition levels. The original ACH survey identified socio-economic factors as the main reason for stunting and this is consistent with experience elsewhere. A further survey is needed to

determine what the effect of these and other interventions have been. The same is true of the flour fortification, which if working should have appreciably reduced anaemia levels, especially in comparison with the 2002 survey.

10.3.3 Effectiveness

The health interventions have been largely effective in their management and implementation. Initial supplies arrived quickly, the survey of cold chain equipment was timely and the subsequent supply of equipment and training has also been reasonably well implemented.

The same is less true of the nutrition interventions. The original ACH survey has not been followed up; it would be of far greater benefit if it were complimented with some kind of follow up. The flour fortification took over a year to organise despite being planned from early 2004 and the nutrition care centres have only started this year, making them over two years late. The supervision regime within the Ministry of Health is lax at enforcing proper scrutiny of storage and proper testing of appropriate levels of micronutrient. Although UNICEF monitoring is good in this area, they have limited power to enforce proper management.

The nutrition care centres have as one of their guiding rationales that they are community based, building on UNICEF and MoH experience elsewhere. In the sense that they are in health centres, accessible to the population, these services are very much community based. This is excellent and definitely increases their effectiveness compared to hospital based services at provincial level. The next step in this project will be making the services responsive to community needs.

The main issue for UNICEF in nutrition has been a lack of staff. Until very recently UNICEF has not had a nutritionist on staff, nor has there been an Special Services Agreement (SSA) post, or even a support visit from the region or the headquarters. Given that the original budget for nutrition was in the order of US\$1.4 million this could be regarded as negligent.

10.3.4 Coverage

The coverage of the UNICEF health and nutrition programme has generally been good. The cold chain equipment covered all of the available health facilities; the flour fortification covered the province. The HNK programme covered all of the primary schools in Bam and the nutritional care centre serves all of Bam.

One interesting aspect of the programme has been the establishment of the care centre/ clinic in Rigan. This area was not affected by the earthquake, but has some of the lowest nutritional indicators in the province. This highlights a perennial dilemma in disaster response – if the principal criterion on which assistance is given is need, and there are people with greater needs outside the affected area should they also receive assistance? The fact that UNICEF has at least attempted to do something for these areas is a very positive aspect of the programme.

This area has a large population of ‘nomads’. The exact numbers and status was unclear to the evaluation team but the area visited during data gathering was in fact a settled nomadic area – people were living in structures similar to nomadic camps but had electricity and water connections and had not moved for something like 10 years. The men were working as agricultural labourers and kept some small livestock. In fact following the earthquake the majority of those interviewed were working on building sites in Bam. This population is both

marginal and vulnerable and UNICEF could do valuable work with children in these communities.

10.3.5 Sustainability

There is a mixed picture with regard to sustainability in these interventions. The cold chain programme is highly sustainable – immunisation is well resourced and managed by the Iranian government and the new protocol is being taken seriously. Similarly the flour fortification programme is sustainable as it is being taken up by central government and in Kerman province will be continued for some time. This is both sensible and necessary to make a proper impact on levels of anaemia.

The HNK project has continued for some months after support was withdrawn from ACH. As these kiosks make a profit, there is ever chance that they will continue in operation. For now, parents remain committed to the idea of their children eating healthy food in school and so may continue to keep the ‘healthy nutrition’ aspect of the snack kiosks alive. Long term the sustainability of this project is limited without formal backing from government in some form. Teachers complain of having to teach nutrition and it is likely that this aspect will be dropped without formal incorporation into the syllabus.

The nutritional care centres are an interesting idea, and may gain currency within the Ministry of Health. The Iranian health system is acknowledged as one of the best in the region and has made dramatic gains in recent years. Much of this success comes from the community-based nature of the service – health houses serving populations that otherwise might find it difficult to access health care. Nutritional clinics in health centres fits with this ethos; the challenge will be addressing underlying socio-economic causes of poor nutrition.

10.4 Conclusions

The health and nutrition programme was patchy in both design and implementation. The provision of essential drugs, although not monitored was a sensible emergency measure. The replacement of the cold chain equipment in Bam and districts was useful if not essential. Of the nutrition programmes the flour fortification will probably have the greatest impact, and the nutrition care centres (especially as they are so new) the least. Human resource constraints have been the biggest issue in advancing these programmes; given the size of the budget UNICEF should have considered more specialist staff at an earlier point.

Some aspects of the current nutrition programme are interesting and could provide a link to the longer-term programming. The nutrition care centres provide a base on which UNICEF could design some interesting future programmes, especially in poor areas such as Rigan.

10.5 Lessons

1. Specialist staff should be employed early in projects with significant budgets.
2. Basic delivery of health care items is appreciated by government and populations and is useful. In countries such as Iran that have a well developed health system however, an organisation like UNICEF has a greater role in sharing knowledge than in service delivery.

3. UNICEF's culture of risk taking and pilot project innovation is well suited to a country like Iran where government can replicate projects where it sees value (for instance with the flour fortification project). It is all the more important in such project therefore, to ensure technical design and management is good so that projects are replicated with the requisite supervisory regime.

10.6 Recommendations

1. UNICEF, or the Ministry of Health, or both should undertake a second nutritional survey to determine the impact of programmes to date before the end of the first quarter 2007.
2. UNICEF should undertake a household economy type survey in Rigan to understand the underlying causes of malnutrition and what some of the potential solutions might be. This type of work can be used to help formulate policy on how best to support settling nomadic communities. Ideally this too would be undertaken in 2007.

11. CHILD FRIENDLY CITY PROGRAMME

11.1 Introduction

The Child Friendly Cities (CFC) Initiative was launched in 1996 to act on the resolution passed during the second UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) to make cities liveable places for all. The Conference declared that the well-being of children is the ultimate indicator of a healthy habitat, a democratic society and of good governance. A Child Friendly City is defined as a local system of good governance committed to fulfilling children's rights.

A Child Friendly City is actively engaged in fulfilling the right of every young citizen to:

- Influence decisions about their city
- Express their opinion on the city they want
- Participate in family, community and social life
- Receive basic services such as health care and education
- Drink safe water and have access to proper sanitation
- Be protected from exploitation, violence and abuse
- Walk safely in the streets on their own
- Meet friends and play
- Have green spaces for plants and animals
- Live in an unpolluted environment
- Participate in cultural and social events
- Be an equal citizen of their city with access to every service, regardless of ethnic origin, religion, income, gender or disability⁹⁷

Given the high level of urban destruction in Bam city, UNICEF saw at an early stage that this disaster offered an opportunity to promote the CFC concept.

UNICEF contracted a CFC expert, Dr Selim Iltus, to visit Tehran, Kerman and Bam in April / May 2004 to carry out a situation analysis, draw up a UNICEF CFC plan of action. Dr Iltus presented the CFC concept to a workshop in Kerman on Social Sector Planning and Development for the City of Bam on 3/4 May 2004 organised by UNICEF, with the collaboration of UNDP, with the participation of more than 80 Bam residents, NGO's, local and state government representatives.

From these initiatives grew the idea of practising the CFC idea in a zone of Bam adjacent to the Arg-i-Bam, the ancient citadel.

11.2 Overview of the Programme

UNICEF, UNDP and the Mayor of Bam signed a joint letter of understanding on the overall modalities of the CFC interventions in the selected zone in Bam in December 2004. A geographical zone for implementation of the plan about 1.3 square kilometres in size and situated near the ancient Citadel was agreed on.

⁹⁷ CFC website: <http://www.childfriendlycities.org>

The overall objective of the collaboration was expressed as follows:

To improve and promote the planning and design of the integrated urban planning process at the home, neighbourhood, and city levels (being child-friendly, ecological, culturally-sensitive, affordable, and earth-quake resistant). Planning of physical school environment, public urban spaces, and housing to be conducive to quality of life and quality of learning in compliance with CFC and CFS principles

The UNICEF CFC programme is made of the following elements as shown in Table 2:

Table 2: Child Friendly City Programme Components

Project	Budget (as per LoU)	LoU
Olia project: Early Child Care Centre Primary School Teachers' Resource Centre Child Friendly School Yards & Playground	US\$ 1,867,582 US\$ 494,505 US\$ 494,505	UNICEF / NOSAZI ⁹⁸ – Sept 2005
Playgrounds as part of children's play avenue	US\$148,780	UNICEF / Bam Municipality
Community Centre (to include early childhood development centre, Neshat centre, Women's centre, teacher resource centre, community centre)	US\$395,604	UNICEF / Bam Municipality / Kerman SWO ⁹⁹ / Kerman Education Department
Social mobilisation support to the child friendly zone in Bam	?	UNICEF / Kerman Shahid Bahonar University
Traffic lights etc for the child friendly zone in Bam	?	?

The Annual Work Plan 2005 for the CFC programme describes the objectives as “*to improve and promote the planning and design of the integrated urban planning process at the home, neighbourhood and city levels (being child friendly, ecological, culturally sensitive, affordable and earthquake resistant).*” The overall budget is given as US\$ 3 million.

11.3 Findings

At the time of the evaluation, ten of the twenty school playgrounds were nearly completed. Clearly these facilities are a considerable improvement on the standard designs and as such welcomed by the teachers interviewed.

However, both teachers and children did raise questions about details, such as whether more shade could have been included and more greenery (trees and grass). In two of the four schools visited, the evaluator was told that they did not have sports equipment to make full use of the play areas. This raises the issue of whether there could have been more specific consultation with the school staff and children on a school by school basis to fine tune the designs.

⁹⁸ Organisation for the Restoration and Development of National Schools

⁹⁹ According to UNICEF staff, the SWO may not in the end be a signatory to this LoU.

It is also important to note that the playgrounds visited did not seem to have been designed with disabled access in mind.

The larger construction projects in this programme were still in progress at the time of this evaluation. The Olia complex will probably be completed by May 2007, construction work on the community centre started in October 2006 and detailed planning work on the child friendly zone has yet to be completed. It was therefore too early to evaluate the outcomes of these projects. However, a number of observations can be made:

1. Early on in the CFC work, UNICEF undertook a consultation exercise with children in Bam using 10 young specially trained architects undertaking sessions in 10 schools. Four workshops were conducted with girls, their mothers, with boys and their fathers. Further community consultation was undertaken by a visiting consultant in 2006.¹⁰⁰ These are good examples of consultation at work.
2. In her strategy paper of May 2004, the Country Representative said that UNICEF would not engage in large scale construction projects.

“As a principle UNICEF Iran will not be involved in any construction activities but rather focus on the content and quality of the services provided through different institutions like health and education for children and women. (Exceptions to this principle should only be negotiated by the Representative as UNICEF would not take part in construction activities that will tie up resources that are difficult to monitor and where the organization has little or no expertise).”¹⁰¹

At some point this policy changed, possibly prompted by the arrival of a large contribution from the Italian National Committee earmarked for school construction. It has not been possible to find any clear paper trail of how the decision to move ahead with the CFC construction projects was taken.

3. Since the international CFC coordinator and the national CFC officer left, the staffing has reduced to a new national officer.¹⁰² Overall management responsibility has reverted to UNICEF’s Programme Officer who has a heavy workload.
4. UNICEF appointed an on-site engineer to monitor construction by NOSAZI’s contractor, but this is inadequate for a project of this size and value.
5. As the introduction to this section shows, the CFC concept is very much a rights-based approach, of which the physical environment for children is a part. There is a danger that other ‘softer’ parts of the concept are neglected in the effort to get the construction completed. However, it is good to note that a project to stimulate community involvement was due to start in November 2006.

11.4 Lessons

1. UNICEF has limited expertise in construction and in the CFC concept. The latter is not a priority in UNICEF’s Medium Term Strategic Plan. UNICEF should not consider

¹⁰⁰ Iltus 2004; Voigt 2006.

¹⁰¹ Egge 2004.

¹⁰² The international CFC officer left January 2006 and the national project officer at the end of August 2006.

entering into projects of this kind in the future without the assurance of adequate know-how and experienced staffing.

2. In situations such as the Bam disaster, where funding is available, UNICEF needs to make an early decision about moving into school reconstruction. If UNICEF had decided to fund some of the immediate school rebuilding programme in Bam, it might have been possible to introduce child friendly principles earlier and on a wider scale.
3. The larger construction elements of this project seem to have come about partly as a result of the timing and scale of earmarked funding from a National Committee.
4. Advocating the CFC concept requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving planners, administrators, architects, engineers, sociologists and a range of government departments. This makes it a labour intensive activity that has to be led consistently by a senior UNICEF staff member or consultant.

11.5 Recommendations

1. UNICEF should decide by mid-2007 whether to gear up its expertise and resources in post-disaster school construction and in the CFC approach.
2. UNICEF should further develop dialogue and procedures with funders including National Committees to ensure that tied funding does not lead to inappropriate programming.
3. By March 2007, UNICEF should follow up with the Bam Department of Education about sports and play equipment needs for the schools that have UNICEF funded playgrounds.
4. UNICEF should immediately appoint an international consultant to oversee and follow the progress of this project both in terms of the Bam programmes as well as wider advocacy of the CFC idea.
5. The CFC programme in Bam will only be fully justified if it has spin-offs and replication more widely on school and city design in Iran. This means that the UNICEF Iran office should programme for the continuation of the programme at least until the end of 2007.
6. The project should be evaluated towards the end of 2007.

12. CROSS CUTTING ISSUES

12.1 Gender Analysis

There is no doubt that UNICEF, in traditional manner, focused on women and children, and to some extent within children on girl children in its programme responses. For example:

- UNICEF responded to the basic needs of women and girls through provision of 20,000 packets of women's sanitary napkins and 20,000 pairs of undergarments in 2004.¹⁰³
- In the emergency period, UNICEF advocated for women and girls to have access to separate latrines, sanitation and bathing facilities.
- UNICEF was aware that single parents, especially single mothers, would have difficulties in raising and caring for their children. It collaborated with SWO to address this need.¹⁰⁴
- During the tent schooling UNICEF helped 400 school leavers, mostly girls, to attend specific courses in Kerman which were not available in Bam. Without this support these students would not have been able to take their final exams and qualify for university entrance.
- From the beginning, UNICEF raised gender issues in its discussions with the Iranian authorities and its partners.¹⁰⁵
- During the recovery and reconstruction period, UNICEF developed plans that were built on the Child Friendly School principles with a specific focus on girls. The construction latrines followed the rule that there should be one latrine with a bigger space for every 20 girls versus one for every 25 boys.¹⁰⁶

In 2004 UNICEF prepared with Norwegian Church Aid a report on female-headed households in Bam.¹⁰⁷ UNICEF included some exercises on gender issues in its training workshops. In one occasion participants were asked to discuss the discriminations women and girls face with in their environment.¹⁰⁸

However, gender analysis is largely absent from programme documentation and UNICEF's response to the disaster lacks a well defined gender policy approach. Gender sensitivity has been interpreted as ensuring that girls and women benefit from the various programme components but there was no well defined and consistent mechanism that related the practical gender needs to the strategic gender needs of female beneficiaries of the Bam programme.

As noted in Section 7 in relation to the latrine project, it was not foreseen that single women would find it very difficult to hire builders in the Iranian context. Section 7.3.3 notes that in the hotline service the vast majority of callers were women, with a variety of needs from simple advice to more complex issues that required referral but that it could be particularly difficult and intimidating for girl children to find telephones and to use them.

¹⁰³ UNICEF. 2004. *Report on UNICEF to Taskforce*.

¹⁰⁴ UNICEF. 2004. *Consolidated Emergency Donor Report: Bam Earthquake*. March 2004.

¹⁰⁵ UNICEF. 2004. *Situation Report*. 13 January 2004.

¹⁰⁶ UNICEF. 2004. *Education Plan for Action: Bam Earthquake Response*. August 2004.

¹⁰⁷ UNICEF / Norwegian Church Aid. 2004.

¹⁰⁸ UNICEF. 2005. *A Protective Environment for Children: Report on the National Policy Seminar 17-18 July 2005*. The seminar was held with 42 people from the Ministries of Education, Health, Welfare and Social Affairs, the Police, the Judiciary, national NGOs, and the media.

Kiamanesh 2005 noted that some school girls were complaining of harassments and were not as satisfied as their teachers with the Life Skills and Health Education sessions.¹⁰⁹ In the Life Skills programme four topics were selected to be presented in the classes, but there was no specific guidance for girls on how to cope with sexual harassments and intimidations.

Gender analysis involves looking at the position of boys and young men as well as girls. Section 6.5.1 indicates that psychosocial work should have looked at the symptoms of misbehaviour among the youth that have changed since the emergency phase producing anger and anti-social behaviour.

12.2 Vulnerability

UNICEF's mission statement states "in everything it does, the most disadvantaged children and the countries in greatest need have priority."¹¹⁰ UNICEF did work with some of the most vulnerable children including those who had lost parents or care givers and women-headed households (with latrines). However, the evaluation team did not find evidence of a written vulnerability analysis, economic, social or otherwise. This may be the reason why UNICEF did not focus on other particularly vulnerable groups, such as children disabled by the earthquake, particularly those who had a lost a care giver.

Where there was analysis, it was not necessarily acted on – for instance the ACH nutritional survey identified low income as the main reason for stunting in children, but rather than seeking to address this problem, or work particularly with that group UNICEF and ACH undertook a nutritional education programme through schools and clinics. Referrals are made through the nutritional care centres to the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee, but UNICEF was not involved in this and had not engaged with the committee on how best to assist such families.

In water and environmental sanitation (WES) UNICEF did prioritise recipients of toilet and shower blocks by use of criteria that implicitly referenced vulnerability:

- Families headed by woman
- Families hosting children without primary care giver
- Families with children under 5
- Families with adolescent girls
- Families with old people unable to work.

The method employed for implementation however, was not appropriate to the situation of these households, especially female-headed ones (UNICEF supplied materials, the task force finance and families had to arrange construction).

In the installation of the piped network UNICEF did not pay particular regard to either vulnerability or the social and economic profile of the users. In fact the only people who will not be connected to the network immediately appear to be the poorest in the immediate rural community. The same is true with regard to connection and water meter charges, where all are being treated equally including those households surviving on SWO payments and the charity of family and neighbours.

¹⁰⁹ *Education Situation Assessment in Bam*. January 2005

¹¹⁰ [www.unicef.org/](http://www.unicef.org/history) history

In the early childhood care programme there has been attention given to helping the most disadvantaged children, as the SWO intends to subsidise ten places per ECCC. Looked at within the bigger picture however, this is a service that tends to disproportionately target the better off; it is they who send their children to pre-school either because they understand the educational value or because both parents are working and therefore need the service. This is not an easy conundrum to solve – UNICEF is committed to advancing pre-school education for its proven value in cognitive and social development for younger children. Nevertheless, there could be more attention to reaching disadvantaged children and encouraging them to use the service.

12.3 Human Rights-based Approach to Programming

The human rights-based approach to programming (HRBAP) is a core part of UNICEF's development work. It is also becoming core to emergency response work. At heart the approach sets the achievement of human rights as an objective of development, both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural.

UNICEF Iran had invested in training for staff and counterparts in HRBAP prior to the earthquake and saw it as a central theme of their development programming. The May 2004 strategy, setting out UNICEF's medium to long-term approach in Bam, placed the rights based approach at the heart of the recovery programme as well.

For UNICEF Iran ensuring that the rights approach was introduced quickly into the Bam recovery programme was important in principle, but was also a way of ensuring early linkages with the country programme and approaches.

An extremely positive achievement for UNICEF in their Bam earthquake response is that they succeeded in reminding policy makers and government of the importance of children's rights in the response. Several senior civil servants told the evaluation team that UNICEF reminded the authorities that children's issues were important. The degree to which this is directly attributable to "the human rights based approach" rather than simply UNICEF's concentration on children is moot; the point is that keeping children and their right to assistance following the earthquake on the policy agenda was an achievement.

Another area where it was possible to see the principles of HRBAP at work was in the design of the child friendly cities (CFC) project. This was an attempt, at least in its original conception, to connect people in Bam with those designing the new town. A number of workshops sought to bring people together to debate how to incorporate spaces and facilities that were friendly to children into urban planning. Although this project was far from complete at the time of this evaluation and work had tended to concentrate on the physical construction components, the principle was certainly based on HRBAP.

Despite this, UNICEF could have done more to provide information and facilitate participation. Some core elements of HRBAP are good assessment and analysis (of stakeholders, rights holders, duty bearers and so on), facilitating participation, building community capacity and strong communication and information provision.

UNICEF did encourage participation in projects, but this was not consistent. The ECCC project is a good example of this. Many of the supplies and the way in which these were distributed could have been improved if UNICEF has spent more time consulting managers and parents of the centres. Later there were several meetings between parents, staff, SWO and UNICEF. Time

pressure may have led UNICEF to neglect participation earlier in the programme. The change in project officer may also have led to better programming.

UNICEF did not conduct the sort of analysis that the HRBAP sets out. This is a complicated and time-consuming exercise. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the programme is light on documented analysis.

An area where UNICEF could have done more, and would have made a great difference to people, was in providing more information both within their own programmes and lobbying authorities for better information provision. Good information is crucial in enabling people to know what their rights are and to claim them. One of the obstacles to the implementation of UNICEF's latrine programme was that without access to the Bam master plan, people were reluctant to build structures that might have to be removed. UNICEF could have lobbied for this to be made public.

12.4 International Standards

Probably the most widely used set of international standards for disaster response are the Sphere minimum guidelines.¹¹¹ Although UNICEF did not use Sphere explicitly in its programme work, where this was relevant (water, hygiene, sanitation, health and nutrition) UNICEF and the government of Iran broadly met these standards. In some areas such as the provision of water, standards were quickly exceeded; in others such as sanitation it took time. In health the government response was very rapid and efficient and met all of the standards set out in Sphere. In the education sector an inter-agency group to which UNICEF belongs has developed a set of minimum standards for emergency response, which again UNICEF broadly complied with and in places exceeded.

Where the UNICEF response was not as robust in terms of standards was in its assessment and in facilitating participation. In both sets of standards touched on above there is significant emphasis placed on good assessment and analysis and on the active participation of the affected population in programme design and implementation. This report highlights these issues in greater depth in other sections.

There appears to be scope for UNICEF Iran, in conjunction with other agencies, to disseminate humanitarian principles and standards. In the Kerman workshop to discuss the evaluation inception report it was clear that most of the participants, both UNICEF staff and government officials, were not aware of the Sphere minimum standards.

12.5 Programme Integration

UNICEF has taken a planned and managed approach to integrating the Bam projects with the country programme.¹¹² This appears to have worked well when there was a direct alignment of sectors as in education. Perhaps inevitably the process has worked less well when the sector is not part of the existing country programme. The psychosocial programme has been put into the HIV/AIDS / Adolescent Friendly Services section when it might more naturally go into the Child Protection section. In the case of WES and CFC projects there is no country programme component at all and therefore they have to be managed by the UNICEF Programme Officer.

¹¹¹ www.sphereproject.org. Collaboration of NGOs and the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement.

¹¹² A number of staff felt that there had been insufficient consultation about the programme integration decisions.

To some extent the structural arrangements for the programmes are of less importance than ensuring that all the 'residual' parts of the Bam programme are adequately supported and supervised and the full advocacy and scaling-up opportunities are capitalised on. This will require careful management supervision.

It is important to note that UNICEF's country programme has continued without, it seems, unduly negative disruption by the Bam disaster response. The period under consideration included intensive planning for a new CPAP. Several sources indicated that the country programme should have been put more on hold in the first months of the Bam response, while the human resources and Bam programme structures were being put in place.

12.6 Partnership

As has been noted earlier, UNICEF's pre-existing relationships with government partners in its country programme provided a crucially important ingredient in carrying out the Bam programme work. The evaluation team found that generally there was positive collaboration between UNICEF and its government counterparts. The Bam programme has generally strengthened and broadened relationships with government counterparts, although there was some disruption in 2005 with a change of many higher and middle ranking officials.

UNICEF has also developed new relationships that have worked well such as the water companies and SWO. In the case of the SWO, UNICEF has been able to forge a new relationship at the provincial level and that has worked well.

Both UNICEF and government counterparts faced the challenge of making their respective administrative and financial systems work together and there was frustration at times with each other's bureaucracies. This was probably exacerbated on the UNICEF side by the fact some of the staff were new to UNICEF and they themselves were discovering how the systems worked.

12.7 Coordination

Soon after the earthquake disaster it was agreed between the UN agencies that UNICEF would lead coordination in the areas of education, child protection and water and sanitation. UNICEF was also an active participant in coordination within the UN country team and took part in the joint UN needs assessment and in the preparation of the UN flash appeal.

UNICEF appears to have fulfilled its coordination commitments in its allocated sectors. For example, as has been mentioned in section 7.3.5 above UNICEF coordinated the sanitation sector mainly with NGOs and was a good example of how good coordination maximises coverage and minimises duplication. Coordination in the area of child protection brought together the SWO, MoE and MoH.

As this was the first time that many international NGOs had operated in Iran, for UNICEF there was delicate balance to be made in facilitating cooperation but not allowing itself to become too involved in advocating for the NGOs with the government.

UNICEF's coordination work diminished rapidly as the government ministries established their roles. For example, education coordination was taken over by the Ministry of Education in February 2004.

UNICEF has forged a strong relationship with the Reconstruction Task Force in Bam and that relationship has been important in unblocking some of the implementation problems that have occurred and ensuring that there is good coordination.

The development of a psychosocial code of principles was also an important coordination activity. This code of principles was developed in response to the concerns by both local and international actors working in psychosocial programming in Bam for the need to have minimum standards and principles agreed to by all actors. As a result, UNICEF organised and facilitated an initial workshop, followed by a series of meetings and revisions to produce the psychosocial code of principles.¹¹³

12.8 Preparedness, Disaster Response and Risk Reduction

UNICEF's preparedness for the Bam earthquake has already been covered in section 4.1 above.

The issue remains as to the stance UNICEF should take in relation to future disasters and emergencies, given Iran's disaster-prone nature. On the one hand, as the Bam disaster showed, Iran has the resources, skills and structures to handle substantial disasters itself. On the other hand, UNICEF has a global mandate and commitment to respond to disasters and, in practice, UNICEF Iran will be expected to respond to any sizeable disaster, particularly if there is significant international media coverage.

The Bam experience has shown that UNICEF can bring added value to the Iranian response in disaster situations in terms of technical expertise incorporating international approaches backed up financial and material support. When working with counterparts on new approaches to disasters, UNICEF has more leverage and credibility if it also has financial and material support to offer.

In the current CPAP, there is limited reference to UNICEF's disaster preparedness and response role. However, there is a financial allocation for "developing capacities, among UNICEF project staff and partners, to plan for eventualities. Specific disaster-related activities, including training of trauma counsellors, or training on child tracing and family reunification, will be included in the project."

This report strongly supports this area of work and would advocate for strengthening it. Building on the Bam experience, each programme sector should regularly update a preparedness and response plan. This work should be done in conjunction with the UNICEF Regional Office.

For first phase relief responses, UNICEF should develop, in consultation with the IRCS, a limited list of child-friendly items that supplement the basic relief materials provided by the IRCS to be available in-country and regionally.

Following the Zarand earthquake in 2005, UNICEF's lesson learning paper noted that to speed up future emergency responses, pre-approved templates, translated into Farsi, should be created. Such documents could include Letters of Understanding, Plans of Action, monitoring sheets and supply lists. For a response such as family reunification, equipment and supplies such as training

¹¹³ Melville 2004.

materials, standard forms and questionnaires and computers pre-loaded with the family reunification database should be ready to deploy immediately.¹¹⁴

UNICEF is already developing with its counterparts of number of protocols and guidelines for emergency response work and this work should be pursued energetically. UNICEF should determine whether it can support the Ministry of Education, the IRCS in areas such as school safety and earthquake preparedness and awareness. It should also see whether there are areas where it can collaborate with and complement UNDP's project to strengthen capacities for disaster risk management in Iran.

This area of work should be clearly incorporated into UNICEF's Annual Work Plans.

12.9 Zarand and Lorestan Earthquakes

Subsequent earthquakes in Zarand and Lorestan, albeit on a much smaller scale than the Bam disaster, showed that both UNICEF and its partner government departments had learned lessons from Bam.

UNICEF responded to an earthquake of 6.4 magnitude in Zarand, in the south-eastern province of Kerman, on 22 February 2005. The disaster badly affected about 10 mountainous villages with a population of over 100,000 people, killing about 600 people and injuring 1,500. On the basis of the experience in Bam, UNICEF's response to the disaster in Zarand was swift and efficient. Within days, supplies were provided including emergency latrines, tarpaulin sheets, blankets, clothing, shoes, individual support kits, connexes, tents, toys, recreational and school-in-a-box kits.

The MoH with the financial and supply support of UNICEF initiated its psychosocial interventions. The outreach activities included the establishment of psychosocial centres in four villages where at least 8,876 people received services.¹¹⁵

The series of earthquakes with a magnitude between 4.7 and 5.7 on the Richter scale struck Lorestan province on 30 and 31 March 2006 affected more than 220,000 people, including 42,000 children, and resulted in widespread destruction of buildings. According to Iranian Government reports at least 63 people were killed and some 1,418 injured, 60 villages were completely destroyed and nearly 320 villages experienced damages from 10% to 100%.¹¹⁶

UNICEF provided 10,000 blankets 280 tents and 5,300 sets of winter clothes for children under six to the area. In addition to 193 temporary school tents provided by the IRCS, Bam Department of Education released six school tents originally supplied by UNICEF for the Bam earthquake.

UNICEF also supported 10 rural ECCCs in both Zarand and Lorestan.

¹¹⁴ UNICEF Iran. *Lessons Learned from Zarand*. 2005. According to the Country Office, standard templates, LoUs, PoAs have now been prepared in the areas of family reunification, child friendly schools and psychosocial responses (Comment of February 2007).

¹¹⁵ Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Undersecretary for Health, Bureau for Psychosocial and School Health, Mental Health Office. 2005. *Second phase of psycho-social intervention in Bam*. September 2005.

¹¹⁶ Source: UNDP.

12.10 Lessons

1. Gender considerations should move beyond programmes for women and girl children and analyse how programmes will differentially impact according to gender and be designed accordingly, consideration being given to the needs of boys as well as girls.
2. Vulnerability analysis should be a key element of programming, so that the needs of vulnerable, disadvantaged or neglected groups can be identified and taken into account.
3. If there is an influx of new staff for an emergency, priority must be given to ensuring that they are well-briefed and trained in UNICEF systems. Time must be spent with counterparts early on explaining about UNICEF and its priorities and its financial and administrative systems.

12.11 Recommendations

1. Practical training and support on gender analysis in programming should be provided to staff (UNICEF Iran and RO).
2. Practical training and support on vulnerability analysis in programming should be provided to staff (UNICEF Iran and RO).
3. UNICEF should provide guidelines to country offices on how to handle the winding up of emergency programmes and the integration of continuing or residual elements into country programmes (UNICEF HQ).

13. OPERATIONS & PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

13.1 Overview

The sudden expansion of UNICEF's programme in Iran created immense demands on management, administrative structures and capacities. Staff members increased from 33 in December 2003 to 65 in December 2004. The number of international staff members increased from 3 to 14 in the same period. Programme expenditure in 2004 tripled and procurement rose by a factor of ten.

The management structure, human resources and infrastructure for an effective emergency office in Bam developed somewhat slowly. It was not until March 2004 that an Emergency Officer based in Tehran and a field coordinator based in Bam were both in position.

It also took time for programme staff in Tehran to assume full involvement in the Bam operation and to visit regularly. All decision making, financial management operations etc remained in Tehran. The question arises as to whether the Bam office should have been upgraded to a full sub-office with the Emergency Officer located in Bam. It is uncertain whether the advantages of such a move, with more decision-making capacity and 'weight' on the ground would have outweighed the danger of the operation becoming detached from the country office and there being a resultant lack of advocacy for the programme in the country team.

However it does seem certain that if the centre of gravity of the operation had been shifted more to Bam, there would have been results in terms of higher staff morale, more support and guidance for project staff and more flexibility in adapting plans to meet changing situations.

It should be pointed out that the country office received a generally good internal audit report towards the end of 2004, demonstrating that UNICEF's procedures were adhered to.

13.2 Human Resources

Six emergency international professional funded posts at L3 level were created in response to the Bam disaster: communications, planning, monitoring and evaluation, child protection, supply, finance and human resources.

A number of evaluations have shown that UNICEF's humanitarian responses are often held back by the slow deployment of appropriate human resources and rapid staff turnover.¹¹⁷ The Bam disaster was no exception to this. It took a long time to get key posts filled in the programme and in some cases vacancies continued for many months.

Most noticeably, the international human resource post was not filled until April 2006 and the huge load of additional recruitment had to be carried out by national staff with little additional help. Supplies and logistics posts were typified by rapid turnover. An international operations officer was not appointed in Bam until the end of March 2004.

The key senior post of Emergency Officer was not filled on a long-term basis until the end of February 2004. It is precisely this initial period when one would expect an experienced

¹¹⁷ Brown *et al* 2005; Wiles and Sida 2006.

Emergency Officer to be provided by the regional office, New York HQ or by a secondment from another office.

There were also crucial shortcomings on the programme side in the early stages, for example in education, child protection and health. The lack of experienced technical staff is particularly important for a developed country such as Iran where UNICEF's comparative advantage is in technical expertise rather than funding, although the latter is, of course, important.¹¹⁸

Weaknesses caused by rapid turnover and staff new to UNICEF were exacerbated by the lack of any systematic briefing, induction and training programmes. Many national staff struggled to understand UNICEF's procedures in situations where they were meant to be explaining these to their government and NGO counterparts.

In spite of these difficulties, the Bam programme has given important opportunities and experience to a number of UNICEF's Iranian staff, some of whom will continue in the country programme.

This evaluation took place at a time when most of the Bam programme and operational staff's contracts were coming to an end. In this difficult period it appears that the country office was providing significant support and advice to the staff concerned.

13.3 Supplies

As mentioned above, the supply component of the Iran programme expanded by nearly 10 times in 2004. As the UNICEF Annual Report noted, supply management was an area for improvement. Dessailon noted that all operations were constrained by delivery delays with some stretching to over six months. This finding was borne out by the evaluation team's investigations. The main reasons for these delays seem to have been:

- Insufficient supply staffing and changes of international supply officers
- Lack of feedback on items requested
- Return to normal supply procedures after 6-8 weeks
- Members of the Bam team were mainly new to UNICEF, did not know what tools were available, how to draw up specifications etc.

Efforts were made to improve the supply situation, including temporary support from UNICEF Supplies Division in Copenhagen and training of the staff in July 2004.

13.4 Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation

Following the immediate relief period, each UNICEF programme section started work on recovery plans. However, there was a lack of a single overarching document or plan of action that described the rationale for UNICEF's programming decisions, analysis, the assessment of need etc.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ It was not possible within the scope of this report to identify the reasons why there were significant delays in the appointment of key staff.

¹¹⁹ The January 2004 UNICEF Appeal Document cannot be regarded as a considered programme plan given that it was drawn up rapidly in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. An "Internal Review and Strategy Meeting on Bam Emergency Programme, First Phase, January-May 2004" did not give rise to such a document. This lack of an overarching plan of action has been noted in other evaluations of UNICEF's humanitarian responses.

Programme quality could have been improved by more focus on assessment, analysis and planning to determine who is in need and how UNICEF can help.

Quarterly impact monitoring exercises were undertaken but the evaluation team found that monitoring activity tended to focus on outputs and on the liquidation of cash assistance to government (CAGs), rather than looking at issues of programme quality, what beneficiaries think and whether any groups have been missed. There was also little evidence of a feedback loop from monitoring information to the revision of implementation plans.

These programme planning, monitoring and implementation issues are also key issues that for UNICEF should pursue with its counterparts.

13.5 Lessons

1. In a major emergency response that depends on a sub-office, the managerial, logistical and decision-making centre of gravity should be shifted as far as possible to the sub-office in order to ensure timely and effective programme implementation.
2. The timely appointment of well-qualified and experienced technical staff is particularly important for a developed country such as Iran where UNICEF's comparative advantage is in technical expertise as much as in funding.
3. The quality of the assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation cycle should be improved with an increased focus on impact on beneficiaries.
4. The rapid supply of materials required for post-emergency programmes is essential. Delivery schedules should not revert to development programme timescales.

13.6 Recommendations

1. It is crucial that UNICEF's emergency responses are underpinned by the rapid deployment of senior, experienced staff both in key programme areas and equally importantly in the areas of human resources, operations and supplies (UNICEF).
2. UNICEF has to overcome the supplies gap that develops after the initial relief phase of an emergency programme by improving systems throughout the organisation and ensuring adequate staffing in this area (UNICEF).
3. Immediate post-emergency planning guidelines for the rehabilitation period need to be improved, including aspects of assessment, gender and vulnerability analysis (UNICEF).
4. Systems need to be developed and implemented so that the focus broadens from checking on deliveries and outputs to looking at programme outcomes and quality issues (UNICEF).

14. CONCLUSIONS

UNICEF, in collaboration with its partners, has made a very important and lasting contribution to recovery in Bam and to the lives of children and their families. This contribution is widely recognised by citizens and government officials. It is commendable that UNICEF has stayed in Bam and has had the resources to follow through on its programmes, at the same time incorporating the city and district into its longer-term country programme.

UNICEF has shown that it can make a valuable contribution to disaster response and rehabilitation in a middle income country that has substantial resources and expertise. Given the national resources available for immediate emergency response, UNICEF's immediate material disaster response in the future is likely to be limited in all but the largest disasters to specific, agreed inputs such as children's recreational kits recommended in section 9.5. However, it can provide important communication and advocacy inputs, reminding and reinforcing policy and good practice in areas such as child protection. Longer-term rehabilitation work should be, as has been demonstrated in Bam, a combination of policy and technical inputs, together with funding support.

Although UNICEF's preparedness for a disaster on the scale of the Bam earthquake was very limited, it has an important role in this area with its government partners, in collaboration with other UN agencies and NGOs.

The programme interventions have, in the main, been relevant and appropriate as have the outcomes, although the report notes some exceptions. Programme quality could have been improved by an increased focus on assessment, analysis, including vulnerability analysis and planning. Beneficiary consultation has generally been weak, although efforts have been made in some areas such as CFC. Monitoring too could have been improved to move beyond a focus on outputs and the liquidation of CAGs to look more at quality, at what beneficiaries have to say and who has been missed.

As has been the case in other emergency responses in, UNICEF was slow in gearing up for a major rehabilitation programme, including in some areas of technical programme support, human resources and supplies.

One of the strengths of UNICEF'S response has been its work with its government counterparts in the various programmes. This has not always been easy for either side, but has definitely paid dividends in terms of programme results. UNICEF's work has contributed to innovation and triggered learning in some areas. The country office is to be congratulated on its efforts to include its government partners in this evaluation, particularly through the counterparts' involvement in the inception and report-back meetings near the beginning and at the end of the evaluation.

It is too early to be sure about the degree of sustainability of the programmes that will continue and there are likely to be mixed results. UNICEF has commendably encouraged innovation in its programme support to the government. In some areas, such as family reunification and psychosocial approaches this is very likely to have produced lasting developments in government practice and policy. Concrete changes have been seen in the way the government later responded to the Zarand and Lorestan earthquakes.

The prospects for introducing innovation in post-disaster programmes are probably highly context specific and in some areas such as the introduction of computer labs and libraries, the results may be less successful.

UNICEF committed US\$27.6 million to relief and recovery work in Bam with a population including the district of approximately 200,000 people. In comparison to any disaster or emergency in Africa this is a high per capita expenditure. In comparison to some expenditures during the Indian Ocean tsunami and Kosovo conflict it may not be considered high. UNICEF could have reduced its expenditure by, say, US\$ 3 - 4 million by, for example, not doing the large scale construction projects in the CFC programme and the children and women of Bam would have not noticed the difference in humanitarian terms. However, the argument for the inputs like the CFC is that they are an investment in future policy and practice development throughout Iran. Only time will tell whether these inputs have been a good investment.

Although the CFC programme was far from complete at the time of the evaluation, it seems clear that UNICEF should only have embarked on such a programme if there had been a clear policy decision to undertake the programme and if adequate expertise was available throughout the life of the project.

From the country office point of view, it was academic to consider whether the budget for Bam should have been reduced. Under current UNICEF procedures, money committed by National Committees for particular disasters has to be spent and cannot be returned or used for other less well-funded appeals. UNICEF globally has to undertake further work to ensure that post-disaster programmes are not supply-led and distorted by funding requirements.

The large amount of funding available to UNICEF from very near the beginning of the rehabilitation work meant that the traditional LRRD funding gap was avoided. The full reconstruction phase in Bam is likely to last 10 years, of which the first five will be intense and particularly focused on basic physical reconstruction. UNICEF needs to consider this time frame when considering its fundraising and planning for rehabilitation work.

15. LESSONS

1. In order that UNICEF can respond effectively to major, sudden onset disasters it is crucial that experienced staff are fielded quickly to back up country office staff. It is unacceptable that there are long waits for staff in key areas such as education. It is also crucial that key operational personnel in human resources, finance and supplies are in place equally quickly.
2. If UNICEF is to be involved in major construction projects, it must develop the policies and in-house expertise to handle such work
3. In terms of quality programming, UNICEF should ensure that there is an adequate focus on the needs of poorer and vulnerable groups, including children with disabilities and that there is also a focus on community consultation and participation. The challenge in post-disaster planning of this kind is to be able to plan and implement rapidly while working very much in a developmental context.
4. In a middle income country such as Iran, inputs that have the highest impact are technical, rather than financial. UNICEF's advocacy for children is important, as is its experience from other disasters, especially in the area of social policy and practice. However, robust and relevant responses give UNICEF credibility which provides a valuable base to have influence on children's issues in post-disaster situations.
5. Although UNICEF has stayed the longest of any international humanitarian agency in Bam, by the end of 2006 there was still a great deal of work left to be done before the city is fully recovered. Whilst it is timely to reduce staffing levels in Bam, UNICEF should consider a minimum five year time frame for major rehabilitation programmes, particularly those involving substantial financial commitments and physical construction.
6. The CFC project has shown that there must be a clear and transparent decision-making process within UNICEF whenever major capital expenditure commitments are made and when decisions are being made that, apparently, change the programme policy in place.
7. UNICEF Iran's partnership work with its government counterparts has been an important and generally positive feature of the Bam response. In post-disaster situations where large amounts of funding are being dispersed rapidly, experience in Bam has shown the importance of time being spent to ensure that both parties understand each other's administrative and financial requirements.
8. The Bam disaster has underlined the importance of preparedness and disaster risk reduction work and UNICEF Iran should continue to build these elements into its country programmes.

16. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Implementation levels and timings are indicated at the end of each recommendation. Recommendations specific to each programme can be found at the end of the relevant section and consolidated in Annex 7.

16.1 Country Specific Recommendations

1. UNICEF should ensure that there is adequate follow-up to the Bam programmes to maximise sustainability and advocacy potential. Recommendations in the programme areas can be found in the relevant sections of the report (**Country Office. Immediate**).
2. Because of Iran's disaster prone nature and the emergency prone nature of the region, it is strongly recommended that UNICEF should retain an emergency preparedness and response capacity. Building on the Bam experience, each programme sector should regularly update a preparedness and response plan. This work should be done in conjunction with the UNICEF Regional Office. This work should be incorporated into Annual Work Plans and consideration should be given to an addendum to the CPAP (**Country / Regional Office. Action plan for implementing this recommendation by mid 2007**).
3. A senior UNICEF staff member should have clearly assigned management responsibility for overseeing and developing the disaster response and disaster preparedness part of UNICEF work in Iran. Consideration should also be given to an emergency post within the country programme. (If that person was also available to neighbouring countries, some cost sharing arrangements for the post could be considered) (**Country/Regional Office. June 2007**).
4. UNICEF continues to develop its emergency preparedness frameworks, such as the EPRP. It should ensure that preparedness plans are practical, up-to-date and 'live' documents, not just box-ticking exercises (**Country/Regional/HQ. Ongoing**).
5. For first phase relief responses, UNICEF should develop a limited list of child-friendly items that supplement the basic relief materials provided by the IRCS to be available in-country and regionally (**Country Office with Regional Office / Supplies Department. Finalise by June 2007**).
6. On the policy and advocacy side, UNICEF should continue to work with government counterparts and disaster management structures, the IRCS and other agencies such as UNDP to develop policy, guidelines, good practice in favour of children in emergencies. UNICEF should determine whether it can support the Ministry of Education, the IRCS in areas such as school safety and earthquake preparedness and awareness (**Country Office. Ongoing and review progress at end of 2007**).
7. UNICEF Iran should draw up a management response to this evaluation stating which recommendations have been accepted, the reason for the rejection of any and a work plan for the implementation of the accepted recommendations (**Country Office. Immediate**).

16.2 Global Recommendations

1. UNICEF should develop and implement assessment, programme planning, implementation and monitoring methods that focus on situation and vulnerability analysis, beneficiary consultation and programme quality. Elements of this work can very usefully be shared with government counterparts (**NYHQ/Regional/Country Office. Demonstrable progress by end 2007**).
2. UNICEF needs clear policies about whether or not to embark on post-disaster infrastructure projects. There is a strong argument for UNICEF to be involved in school reconstruction, so that it can introduce and promote child friendly concepts. UNICEF will therefore need better global expertise in large scale infrastructure and reconstruction projects. This should go beyond the MoU with UNOPs and should include partnerships with multi-laterals such as the World Bank who have this expertise. UNICEF can develop expertise in social aspects of infrastructure projects as well as understanding better how to manage such projects. This will necessitate the development of in-house capacity (**NYHQ. Clear policy and implementation plan by mid 2007**).
3. UNICEF should give consideration to including vulnerability considerations within the CCCs, so that there is a clear instruction that vulnerable groups be sought out and supported (**NYHQ. Mid 2007**).

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ANNEXES

- 1. Terms of reference**
- 2. Background of Evaluation Team Members**
- 3. Evaluation Timetable**
- 4. Inception Report**
- 5. Interviewees**
- 6. Core Corporate Commitments**
- 7. Consolidated List of Lessons Learned and Recommendations**

ANNEX 1

UNICEF IRAN EVALUATION OF THE BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE (20 OCT 2006)

1. Background and Context

The Iranian city of Bam and surrounding areas were struck by a devastating earthquake on December 26, 2003, measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale, claiming the lives of 30,000 people, leaving 30,000 injured and 75,000 homeless. Extensive damage was not only caused to the basic service infrastructure of the city, such as hospitals, city health houses, community health houses and schools, but it also affected the workers employed in the facilities. Bam's local government was devastated with the loss of civil servants and the destruction of city buildings. Children and women were the most vulnerable victims: 10,000 out of 32,433 school children and 1,000 out of 3,400 teachers lost their lives.¹ 964 children lost both parents and 3,685 children lost one of the parents.

UNICEF initiated the humanitarian response driven by "Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies" within 48 hours of the onset of the disaster providing essential supplies through the Iranian Red Crescent. Following the UN flash appeal and the initial relief phase, UNICEF directed its assistance towards rehabilitation and restoration in the areas of child protection, water and sanitation, education, health and nutrition and introduced the concept of the Child Friendly City.

In 2005, the phase-out plan of Bam emergency programmes was discussed, and agreed to be incorporated into a longer-term plan, namely 2005-09 the Gov. of Iran and UNICEF Country Programme of Cooperation. In 2006, activities to be implemented in Bam, either to be completed as emergency rehabilitative efforts or to be evolved into a part of the model that will be developed to inform the relevant policies, has been integrated into the 2005-09 Country Programme.

2. Justification

Lessons learned from this particular experience of the Bam earthquake need to be consolidated and utilised to strengthen the emergency preparedness and response capacity of the country office in the future. The stakeholders of the Bam programme are primarily the "rights holders"- children and women of Bam, secondarily their families, thirdly local government officials of Bam city and Kerman province and national government officials, all of whom are responsible for the fulfillment of the rights of children and women either in emergency or non-emergency situations. Further, other programme implementing partners, such as local and international NGOs, together with generous donor communities have a high stake in knowing the impact of the programme.

These terms of reference were revised following a meeting between the evaluation team, UNICEF and government staff in Kerman on 18 October 2006 to discuss the evaluation inception report.

3. Purpose and Objectives

The evaluation aims to identify and analyse the achievements and results of UNICEF's emergency programme in Bam, present lessons learned and recommendations for the future.

Objectives:

1. To evaluate the programme in terms of the standard evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness (including timeliness), impact, coverage, efficiency (including cost effectiveness) and sustainability.
2. To evaluate to what extent UNICEF has been able to fulfil its global and national commitments to women and children affected by the disaster as stated in its "Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies" and other policy documents and guidance.
3. To extract lessons learned during the programme that can help UNICEF in future disaster responses.
4. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of UNICEF's collaboration with its partners, particularly with the government of IRI, in terms of institutional capacity building, policy and practice development and future sustainability.
5. To assess the way in which UNICEF has managed the Bam programme, including the transition from Phase I (immediate disaster response) through II (immediate recovery and rehabilitation) to III (longer term programming integrated into UNICEF's country programme).
6. To assess the extent to which UNICEF's systems, operational resources and capacity supported and facilitated the implementation of the Bam emergency programme (in areas such as planning, monitoring and assessment, human resources, logistics, systems, financing etc.)

The evaluation will take note of the following cross-cutting areas:

- Rights of the child and Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HBRAP)
- Gender
- Vulnerable and marginal groups
- Inter-agency coordination
- Disaster preparedness & risk reduction
- Adherence to international standards e.g Sphere Minimum Standards
- Advocacy / influencing
- Programme communications and beneficiary participation
- External communications and work with the media.

4. Methodology

The evaluation will be undertaken using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, principally based on:

- Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with a wide range of stakeholders
- Desk review of relevant documentation

Given the qualitative nature of much of the investigation, findings will be based on 'triangulation' from a wide range of sources.

Validation of findings will take place at a stakeholders meeting in Tehran on 5 November 2006, followed by comment and feedback on the draft report.

5. Outline Work Plan and Schedule

The key phases in the work plan are as follows:

1. Scoping & inception period - preliminary interviews in Bam, Kerman and Tehran; document review
 - **Inception report meeting - 18 October, Kerman**
2. Field work period - interviews and focus group discussions with primary and key stakeholders, mainly in Bam (also some follow-up work in Tehran); continuing document work
3. Analysis and writing-up period – including some final interviews (Tehran)
 - **Evaluation findings workshop - 5 November, Tehran**
 - **Draft evaluation report – 17 November**
 - **Final report – 4 December**

6. Evaluation Team

The team consists of three independent evaluators:

Peter Wiles (team leader)
Lewis Sida
Nastaran Moossavi

Bam
20/10/06

ANNEX 2

BACKGROUND OF EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS

Mr Peter Wiles (team leader) has worked in international development and humanitarian work since 1972, including postings in south-east Asia, India and East Central and Southern Africa, primarily with OXFAM GB. He has been an independent consultant since 1992, specialising in evaluations and reviews of humanitarian and development programmes, as well as management reviews, working with a wide range of agencies including Danida, the European Commission, IFRC, Overseas Development Institute London, Oxfam GB, UNOCHA and the World Bank. Recent consultancy work has included the global evaluation for DFID of UNICEF's humanitarian response capacity and writing, with Mr Sida, the synthesis evaluation report of UNICEF's tsunami disaster response.

Mr Lewis Sida has worked as a consultant in humanitarian aid for the past two years for clients including UNICEF, the British Red Cross and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Work has included the evaluation of UNICEF's tsunami response as team leader for the three country case studies, evaluations of Red Cross and Crescent tsunami response, a joint evaluation with USAID of UNOCHA's humanitarian information centres and various policy development on subjects from food security to humanitarian principles. Formerly Mr Sida worked as the emergencies director at Save the Children (UK) and has managed humanitarian response programmes in Africa; south, east and central Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

Mrs. Nastaran Moossavi has represented Ockenden International, a British NGO specializing in work with refugees and displaced people, in her native country Iran between 1997 until February 2004 when she was transferred to a similar position in Cambodia. In both countries, she has been in charge for developing programmes appropriate for some of the most marginalized people. These programmes involved struggle for rights to education, employment and natural resources. During this period, she was accountable to a variety of donor agencies such as DFID, ECHO, the European Commission, and CIDA.

ANNEX 3

UNICEF BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME EVALUATION OVERALL PLANNING SCHEDULE

Date	Location / Activity			Notes
October				
Su 8 Oct				
Mo 9	Tehran			
Tu 10	Tehran			
We 11	To Bam			
Th 12	Bam			
Fr 13	To Tehran			
Sa 14	Tehran			
Su 15	Tehran			
Mo 16	To Bam			
Tu 17	To Kerman			
We 18	Kerman: Inception Report presentation			
	Peter	Lewis	Nastaran	Team will split during this period
Th 19	To Bam			
Fr 20	To Bam			
Sa 21	Bam			
Su 22	Bam			
Mo 23	Tehran (wait-listed)		To Kerman/ Tehran (afternoon)	
Tu 24	Tehran		To Tehran (leave)	Eid-ul-Fitr
We 25	To Esfahan		Tehran (leave)	
Th 26	Esfahan		Tehran (poss. Interviews)	
Fr 27	Esfahan - Tehran			
Sa 28	Tehran	Return Bam	Return Bam	
Su 29	Tehran			
Mo 30	To Bam			
Tu 31	Bam			
We 01 Nov	Team return to Tehran			
Th 02	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Fr 03	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Sa 04	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Su 05	Presentation of draft report findings			
Mo 06				
Tu 07	Peter / Lewis depart			
	Report drafting			
23/11/06	First draft report			
	Comments & feedback			
17/01/07	Second draft report			
13/02/07	FINAL REPORT			



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.	INTRODUCTION	1
2.	REVIEW OF EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE	3
	2.1 Overall Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation	3
	2.2 Scope of the Evaluation	4
3.	METHODOLOGY	5
	3.1 Framework Documents	5
	3.2 Overall Approach	5
	3.3 Geographical Coverage	6
	3.4 Evaluation Report Outline	6
	3.5 Evaluation Team	7
	3.6 Evaluation Schedule	7
4.	CONCLUSIONS	8
5.	ISSUES ARISING	9

ANNEXES

1.	List of Interviewees (up to 19 October 2006)	11
2.	A Note of Points Arising from Kerman meeting	12
3.	Revised Terms of Reference	14
4.	Original Terms of Reference (extract)	17
5.	Definitions of Evaluation Criteria	18
6.	Background of Team Members	20
7.	Team – Division of Tasks	21
8.	Evaluation Planning Schedule	22
9.	Bam work schedule	23

(The information and views in this report are those of the evaluators and do not represent official UNICEF policies or positions)

EVALUATION OF THE UNICEF BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

DRAFT INCEPTION REPORT

1. INTRODUCTION

The earthquake that struck the City of Bam on December 26, 2003 claimed over 28,000 lives and left 30,000 injured and 75,000 homeless including many workers of the city's services. The basic infrastructure of the city was severely damaged. 10,000 out of 32,433 school children and 1,000 out of 3,400 died, 1,964 children lost both parents and 3,685 lost one.

A particular feature of the relief phase was the Government of Iran's decision to relax visa and flight controls for the large influx of international relief agencies. The final evaluation report will give more in terms of both national and UNICEF contexts of the disaster.

UNICEF immediately responded to the disaster with emergency supplies, mainly channelled to the Iranian Red Crescent Society, and then developed with its government partners medium-term recovery programmes in the areas of child protection, water and sanitation, education, health, nutrition and Child Friendly cities.

In 2005 UNICEF began the process of phasing out some its post-disaster work in Bam and integrating other parts into its country programme priorities, aiming to complete this process by the end of 2006. The overall budget for UNICEF's Bam emergency programme is in the region of US\$30 million.

UNICEF now wants to take stock of this sizeable programme and learn lessons from it, particularly about responding to a sudden-onset natural disaster in an upper middle-income country, working with and supporting the government. It has commissioned an independent evaluation for this purpose, drawn up an initial Terms of Reference (ToR) and contracted three experienced consultants, two international and one Iranian, to carry out the work.

The evaluation team started work in Tehran on 9 October 2006 and have carried out initial scoping interviews with UNICEF staff and government officials in Tehran, Bam and Kerman, as well as scanning the programme documentation provided (Annex 1 for list of interviews).

The purpose of this Inception Report is to interpret and refine the ToR and describe how the team intends to carry out its work.

An outline of the Inception Report was presented to a meeting of UNICEF and government staff at a meeting in Kerman on 18 October 2006. That meeting provided valuable feedback and comment on the team's approach to the evaluation and has been taken account of in this report. A note of that meeting can be found in Annex 2.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ The Powerpoint presentation file is available electronically.

The detailed evaluation field work will be carried out between 19 – 31 October. The findings of the evaluation team will be presented at a meeting of UNICEF and government staff in Tehran on 5 November for comment and discussion. The written draft report will be delivered on 17 November. Following comments and feedback on the draft, a final report will be produced by early December 2006.

This report starts with a review of the ToR and then looks at various aspects of the methodology for the evaluation. Section 4 contains conclusions and section 5, issues arising.

2. REVIEW OF EVALUATION TERMS OF REFERENCE

Following discussions with UNICEF Iran staff, the evaluation team reformulated the original ToR that were lengthy and somewhat difficult to use as a working tool for the evaluation. A reformulation of the purpose and objectives follows in section 2.1. The team believes that this reformulation covers the key areas of the original ToR while taking into account the expectations of key stakeholders (the revised ToR and an extract from the original ToR are in Annexes 3 and 4).

2.1 Overall Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The evaluation aims to identify and analyse the achievements and results of UNICEF's emergency programme in Bam, present lessons learned and recommendations for the future.

Objectives:

1. To evaluate the programme in terms of the standard evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness (including timeliness), impact, coverage, efficiency (including cost effectiveness), sustainability and connectedness (see Annex 5 for definitions of these terms).
2. To evaluate to what extent UNICEF has been able to fulfil its global and national commitments to women and children affected by the disaster as stated in its 'Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies' (CCCs) and other UNICEF policy documents and guidance.¹²¹
3. To extract lessons learned during the programme that can help UNICEF in future disaster responses.
4. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of UNICEF's collaboration with its partners, particularly with the government of IRI, in terms of institutional capacity building, policy and practice development and future sustainability.
5. To assess the way in which UNICEF has managed the Bam programme, including the transition from Phase I (immediate disaster response) through II (immediate recovery and rehabilitation) to III (longer term programming integrated into UNICEF's country programme).
6. To assess the extent to which UNICEF's systems, operational resources and capacity supported and facilitated the implementation of the Bam emergency programme (in areas such as planning, monitoring and assessment, human resources, logistics, systems, financing etc.)

The evaluation will take note of the following cross-cutting areas:

- Rights of the child and Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HBRAP)
- Gender

¹²¹ The first version of UNICEF's CCCs were issued in 2000 and subsequently revised in 2004 and 2005.

- Vulnerable and marginal groups
- Inter-agency coordination
- Disaster preparedness & risk reduction
- Adherence to international standards e.g Sphere Minimum Standards
- Advocacy / influencing
- Programme communications and beneficiary participation
- External communications and work with the media.

2.2 Scope of the Evaluation

The evaluation will cover the period from the day of the disaster, 26 December 2003, until September 2006. This covers three phases of the UNICEF programme:

1. **Phase I:** Immediate relief (up until February 2004)
2. **Phase II:** Recovery– start up and initial implementation (provision of temporary services, shelter etc) (timing varies according to project, but roughly from March 2004 to end 2005)
3. **Phase III:** Transition phase to longer term work and integration into UNICEF's country programme

The evaluation will look at Phase 1, the immediate relief phase, but probably in less depth than the following phases, given the amount of time that has elapsed and the desire of UNICEF stakeholders to focus on Phases II and III.

Primary Stakeholders:

- The people of Bam district – children, women, families, marginal and vulnerable groups (direct or indirect beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of UNICEF assistance)

Key Stakeholders:

- Government officials in the relevant ministries and departments at Bam, Kerman and Tehran levels.
- Present and former UNICEF staff at Bam and Tehran levels; UNICEF regional office Amman and UNICEF New York HQ.
- Donors to the UNICEF Bam programme (UNICEF National Committees, governmental and inter-governmental donors)
- Other UNICEF partners including relevant international, national and local NGOs, universities and other organisations.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Framework Documents

The guiding framework for this evaluation is provided by the following key global documents:

- Evaluation terms of reference
- UNICEF's Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies
- UNICEF Emergency Preparedness and Response Plans (EPRPs)
- UNICEF evaluation standards
- UNICEF evaluation report standards (Sept 2004)
- Standard humanitarian evaluation criteria.¹²²

The evaluation will also keep in view the overall context of UNICEF's work in Iran as described in the Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP), particularly when looking at the integration of parts of the emergency programme into the country programme. UNICEF's global Medium Term Strategic Plans (MTSP) 2002 - 2005 and 2006 – 2009 also provide a background to the work.

At programme and project levels, key documents have already been identified in the original ToR, including Letters of Understanding, Plans of Action and Annual Work Plans.

3.2 Overall Approach

The evaluation methodology will therefore be a mixture of qualitative and quantitative investigation. Time and resources do not allow for sampling and undertaking a full qualitative survey of affected persons and other key stakeholders.

In this context, 'triangulation' will be used to verify and validate information and findings. That is to say, information will be cross-checked against a number of different sources (interviews, documentation) in order to establish its validity.

Selection of field interview sites and interviewees (e.g affected persons; project level staff) will be on a purposive basis. Purposive selection involves the targeted selection of individuals, groups, projects etc. that provide information across a range of characteristics. The characteristics will include:

- Information-rich sources (i.e. people, groups who know a lot)
- Extremes (e.g. more or less affected groups; examples where projects have gone very well / not well)
- Average or typical as judged by local people, government and UNICEF staff.

The evaluation will rely on semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions. This method provides a framework for interviews, but also allows flexibility for subjects arising during the interview to be explored.¹²³

¹²² OECD/DAC criteria.

¹²³ It was suggested at the 18 October Inception Report meeting in Kerman that questions should be provided in advance to interviewees. While this is appropriate in some cases, given the lack of lead time for the field work it may prove difficult in practice.

3.3 Geographical coverage

UNICEF's programme focuses on Bam city, but also covers the district of Bam. The team will visit some rural locations. It is expected that 80% to 90% of evaluation team's field work will be in Bam city.

The team will take into account zonal differences within Bam in its selection of sites to visit and people to interview, including:

- Location of UNICEF supported projects
- Level of physical damage
- Variety of socio/economic contexts (poor, less poor)
- Coverage of any particularly vulnerable or marginal groups
- Area where there are no UNICEF supported projects.

3.4 Evaluation Report Outline

This will follow UNICEF guidelines with a proposed table of contents as follows:

1. Executive summary
2. Background, purpose, method
3. Context (external & UNICEF)
4. OECD-DAC criteria (Relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness (including timeliness), impact, coverage, efficiency (including cost effectiveness), sustainability.
5. Programme commitments
6. Cross-cutting issues (e.g integration into country programme; partnership working; coordination; operations issues)
7. Lessons
8. Recommendations
9. Annexes

The team aims to make its recommendations SMART (i.e. specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and timebound and specifically targeted), be it to UNICEF Iran, regionally, globally or via appropriate UNICEF mechanisms to the Iranian government.

One of the main tools for validating the reports recommendations will be discussion at the Report Back meeting on 5th November.

3.5 Evaluation Team

The evaluation team is made up of three persons:

Peter Wiles - UK-based independent consultant (team leader)

Lewis Sida - UK-based independent consultant.

Nastaran Moossavi - Iran based independent consultant

The background of the team members is given in Annex 6.

Each member of the team will lead on certain programme areas (Annex 7).

3.6 Evaluation Schedule

The key phases in the evaluation work plan are as follows:

4. Scoping & inception period - preliminary interviews in Bam, Kerman and Tehran; document review
 - **Inception report meeting - 18 October, Kerman**
5. Field work period - interviews and focus group discussions with primary and key stakeholders, mainly in Bam (also some follow-up work in Tehran); continuing document work
6. Analysis and writing-up period – including some final interviews (Tehran)
 - **Evaluation findings workshop - 5 November, Tehran**
 - **Draft evaluation report – 17 November**
7. Written feedback to the evaluators by 27 November
8. **Final report by 4 December 2006.**

(See Annex 8 and 9 for a more detailed schedules).

4. CONCLUSIONS

The ToR for this evaluation are ambitious in scope having, if anything, expanded during the scoping and inception period. At the same time the field work period has been reduced by two days and there will be a brief pause during the Eid-el-Fitr holiday at the end of Ramadan.¹²⁴

Inevitably, as in all such work, there will be other constraints:

- The time since the original disaster will limit the detail which can be gone into for the initial relief phase. However, the fact that over 2.5 years have elapsed means that it should be possible to get a good picture of the results of much of UNICEF's recovery and rehabilitation work.
- Turnover of key individuals, particularly some international staff in UNICEF, may limit evidence gathering, but every effort will be made to interview by telephone or email key informants who are no longer involved.
- The extent to which programme results will also depend on how well objectives and indicators have been formulated and progress monitored.
- The need to interpret for the international consultants during some interviews and to translate the workshop presentations also puts pressure on available time.

In spite of these constraints, the team feels that the evaluation will be able to add value for UNICEF, and hopefully for the government too. In particular, a concentration, albeit in a limited period of time, on interviews with beneficiaries and with project implementation staff (teachers, social workers, counsellors etc) should make a useful contribution.

UNICEF Iran is to be congratulated on its efforts to include its government partners in this evaluation, particularly through the latter's involvement in the Inception and Findings meetings.

¹²⁴ The shortened length of the field work is due to the fact that the UK consultants' visas could not be extended beyond their 30 day validities. The Eid holiday will provide an opportunity for the consultants to refresh themselves and catch up on reading and writing up work.

5. ISSUES ARISING

During this preliminary phase of the evaluation, the team has noted a number of issues and questions that seem important and should, if possible, be covered in the final evaluation report. These issues have arisen from initial interviews and document study:¹²⁵

- To what extent has UNICEF's work in Bam influenced national policy (e.g fostering, 'neshat' centres, counsellors in education dept)?
- Cultural appropriateness of the programmes? For example, in the psychosocial project, to what extent was the introduction of new ideas done in a culturally appropriate and sensitive way?
- Will UNICEF (and the government) be better prepared and able to assist in future disasters?
- Can major disasters, such as the Bam earthquake, provide opportunities for innovation and testing new approaches and methods?
- Will the projects that UNICEF has supported which should become longer-term programmes be sustainable in the future after UNICEF support is withdrawn?
- How aware are UNICEF's partners of its core commitments and priorities?
- What is UNICEF's role in an emergency / reconstruction in upper middle income country like Iran?
- Is UNICEF equipped to deliver large-scale reconstruction programmes?
- Developing a culture of evaluation: this issue was raised by some government participants at the Inception Report meeting, noting that lessons could be learnt from this independent evaluation process.

Peter Wiles
Team Leader
Bam, 20 October 2006

¹²⁵ These items are not presented in any order of importance.

ANNEXES

1. List of Interviewees (up to 19 October 2006)
2. A Note of Points Arising from Kerman meeting
3. Revised Terms of Reference
4. Original Terms of Reference (extract)
5. Definitions of Evaluation Criteria
6. Background of Team Members
7. Team – Division of Labour
8. Evaluation Planning Schedule
9. Bam work schedule

ANNEX 1

DRAFT LIST OF INTERVIEWEES UNTIL 19 OCTOBER 2006 (to be completed with names)

Tehran

UNICEF staff – introductory meetings

Ministry of Education
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OCHA
UNDP

Bam

UNICEF staff – introductory meetings

Mayor of Bam
Department of Education
Department of Health
Task Force
WWC
SWO

Kerman

Department of Education
Ministry of Health
Kanoon
SRO
SWO
WWC

ANNEX 2

INCEPTION REPORT MEETING - BAM EVALUATION 18.10.06.

Attendees: 20 representatives of Government departments in Bam & Kerman; UNICEF staff from Bam and Tehran (total 41 people including evaluation team and translators)

1. Opening remarks

Christian Salazar, UNICEF Country Representative. Three important but challenging questions:

- Was the money spent well? Did it help children and their families? Did it help build the capacity of government agencies.
- What are the lessons learnt for future disasters in Iran. How can the Bam experience help GOI in future responses, especially how do they help children. What is the UNICEF role? Iran is relatively rich – what is UNICEF's role?
- What are the lessons learned from Bam for future disaster response in other countries? Since Bam there have been disasters in tsunami and Pakistan – what can we take from Bam to help in these types of responses.
- Hopes that it helps everyone here learn and document experience and that this is useful for the future. Forward looking, not just backward looking.
- Emergency programme will end 31 December 2006. Some finishing off of construction programmes (including WES), but substantively the programme will be closed. Closing the emergency programme does not mean leaving Bam; UNICEF will continue with the regular country programme there. This means that the UNICEF perspective on Bam is changing. Looking at it through a developmental lens. As Bam is a district in a province, this will mean looking more at a provincial level as well as at the district level. Looking at collaboration with province.

Mr Ibrahim, Co-chair, Deputy Bam Task Force: UNICEF's collaboration has been significant and excellent and we particularly single UNICEF's contribution out from other international agencies.

2. Presentation by Peter Wiles (team leader)

(Powerpoint file available separately)

3. Issues

- Extent to which UNICEF has influenced national policy
- Cultural appropriateness
- Disaster preparedness
- Can major disasters serve as testing ground for new approaches
- Sustainability
- Are partners aware of CCC's
- UNICEF role in emergency response in a middle income country
- Extent to which UNICEF is configured for major reconstruction programmes.

4. Question and answer session.

- Do people actually know about Sphere standards – only if they know about them can they comment on whether they were achieved properly.
- Question about the indicators we plan to use to determine impact. Answer: can't guarantee to fully measure this area. Will involve looking at UNICEF's monitoring and evaluation systems, data that partners have. Measurement of impact will tend to be qualitative.
- General point 1: a few years on it is easy to evaluate. At the time though, it was chaos and we had to make decisions. Example – usually it takes months to get a visa or get flights in; we abandoned those rules; just to demonstrate that when it is an emergency standards are abandoned.
- General point 2: Bam disaster was unprecedented for us. Unprecedented in scale, but also in the way we had to interact with foreign organisations. Bulk of activities were done in an admirable way by government and internationals, but there were shortcomings and we have to admit to this.
- General point 3: two pitfalls that might jeopardise the evaluation. Impact – could be interpreted as either more positive or more negative than it is. More positive because attribution to UNICEF or government or NGO activities. More negative – low capacity of the health network in infrastructure to absorb the services provided.
- General point 4: asks whether it's better to use questionnaires. It's sometimes not possible to criticise in face-to-face interviews, but can do so in questionnaires. Gives people more time to think about the issues. Answer: will take this into account. Questionnaires can be time-consuming to do properly. We will consider providing questions in advance.
- Attribution. Very important theme for this evaluation. Will be quite difficult to identify what was UNICEF and what was government as we were in partnership. But it's a partnership of an elephant and a mouse as we are quite small and the government is big. Impact, accountability – if we look at decisions taken in UNICEF then we would expect also to look at decisions taken in government. Didn't see this strongly in the questions in the TORs. Answer: may be something we need to discuss a little more. Extent to which we are evaluating UNICEF's response or evaluating the government's response?
- There is also a point about overlap of government services.
- At the back of our minds there is the question of success or failure. How can we judge success or failure?

5. Closing remarks

Mr Ibrahim: Had active participation from the international community; of all of them UNICEF was the most collaborative. An example of this is that UNICEF is the first organisation to have a team here evaluating their efforts. He is hoping that other evaluation teams will follow. He thinks the fact they are the first to do this is indicative of the fact that UNICEF has had the most successful projects. The task force have had their own evaluation and UNICEF got the highest marks. This may be the result of a tradition of evaluation elsewhere. Past successes of our projects notwithstanding, the future successes are the things we should be looking forward to.

UNICEF IRAN
EVALUATION OF THE BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME
REVISED TERMS OF REFERENCE (20 OCT 2006)

2. Background and Context

The Iranian city of Bam and surrounding areas were struck by a devastating earthquake on December 26, 2003, measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale, claiming the lives of 30,000 people, leaving 30,000 injured and 75,000 homeless. Extensive damage was not only caused to the basic service infrastructure of the city, such as hospitals, city health houses, community health houses and schools, but it also affected the workers employed in the facilities. Bam's local government was devastated with the loss of civil servants and the destruction of city buildings. Children and women were the most vulnerable victims: 10,000 out of 32,433 school children and 1,000 out of 3,400 teachers lost their lives. 1,964 children lost both parents and 3,685 children lost one of the parents.

UNICEF initiated the humanitarian response driven by "Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies" within 48 hours of the onset of the disaster providing essential supplies through the Iranian Red Crescent. Following the UN flash appeal and the initial relief phase, UNICEF directed its assistance towards rehabilitation and restoration in the areas of child protection, water and sanitation, education, health and nutrition and introduced the concept of the Child Friendly City.

In 2005, the phase-out plan of Bam emergency programmes was discussed, and agreed to be incorporated into a longer-term plan, namely 2005-09 the Gov. of Iran and UNICEF Country Programme of Cooperation. In 2006, activities to be implemented in Bam, either to be completed as emergency rehabilitative efforts or to be evolved into a part of the model that will be developed to inform the relevant policies, has been integrated into the 2005-09 Country Programme.

2. Justification

Lessons learned from this particular experience of the Bam earthquake need to be consolidated and utilised to strengthen the emergency preparedness and response capacity of the country office in the future. The stakeholders of the Bam programme are primarily the "rights holders"- children and women of Bam, secondarily their families, thirdly local government officials of Bam city and Kerman province and national government officials, all of whom are responsible for the fulfillment of the rights of children and women either in emergency or non-emergency situations. Further, other programme implementing partners, such as local and international NGOs, together with generous donor communities have a high stake in knowing the impact of the programme.

These terms of reference were revised following a meeting between the evaluation team, UNICEF and government staff in Kerman on 18 October 2006 to discuss the evaluation inception report.

3. Purpose and Objectives

The evaluation aims to identify and analyse the achievements and results of UNICEF's emergency programme in Bam, present lessons learned and recommendations for the future.

Objectives:

1. To evaluate the programme in terms of the standard evaluation criteria of relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness (including timeliness), impact, coverage, efficiency (including cost effectiveness) and sustainability.
2. To evaluate to what extent UNICEF has been able to fulfil its global and national commitments to women and children affected by the disaster as stated in its "Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies" and other policy documents and guidance.
3. To extract lessons learned during the programme that can help UNICEF in future disaster responses.
4. To assess the strengths and weaknesses of UNICEF's collaboration with its partners, particularly with the government of IRI, in terms of institutional capacity building, policy and practice development and future sustainability.
5. To assess the way in which UNICEF has managed the Bam programme, including the transition from Phase I (immediate disaster response) through II (immediate recovery and rehabilitation) to III (longer term programming integrated into UNICEF's country programme).
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The evaluation will take note of the following cross-cutting areas:

- Rights of the child and Human Rights Based Approach to Programming (HBRAP)
- Gender
- Vulnerable and marginal groups
- Inter-agency coordination
- Disaster preparedness & risk reduction
- Adherence to international standards e.g Sphere Minimum Standards
- Advocacy / influencing
- Programme communications and beneficiary participation
- External communications and work with the media.

4. Methodology

The evaluation will be undertaken using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, principally based on:

- Semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with a wide range of stakeholders
- Desk review of relevant documentation

Given the qualitative nature of much of the investigation, findings will be based on 'triangulation' from a wide range of sources.

Validation of findings will take place at a stakeholders meeting in Tehran on 5 November 2006, followed by comment and feedback on the draft report.

5. Outline Work Plan and Schedule

The key phases in the work plan are as follows:

9. Scoping & inception period - preliminary interviews in Bam, Kerman and Tehran; document review
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 - **Evaluation findings workshop - 5 November, Tehran**
 - **Draft evaluation report – 17 November**
 - **Final report – 4 December**

6. Evaluation Team

The team consists of three independent evaluators:

Peter Wiles (team leader)
Lewis Sida
Nastaran Moossavi

Bam
20/10/06

ANNEX 4

EXTRACT FROM ORIGINAL VERSION OF THE TOR

Purpose of the Evaluation

The evaluation aims to (1) review the Bam emergency programme covering the immediate response through the transitional intervention and how it is to be/have been integrated into the UNICEF long-term programme –i.e, 2005-09 Country Programme of Cooperation, and (2) extract the lessons learned and action-oriented recommendations that are specific to projects.

Objectives

The major objectives of the evaluation work are the following:

- (1) To assess and extract lessons as to the effectiveness and the efficiency of initial assessment and post-earthquake responses
- (2) To assess and extract lessons as to the relevance, the effectiveness, the efficiency of and the coordination for the implementation of post-earthquake plans of action
- (3) To assess and extract lessons as to the appropriateness/ adequacy of decision in transiting from initial to post-initial response phase, and from emergency programme to country programme activities
- (4) To assess and extract lessons as to the adequacy of the coverage of UNICEF post earthquake responses
- (5) To assess and extract lessons as to the timeliness, the effectiveness and the efficiency in the mobilization and the use of operational resources
- (6) To assess and extract lessons as to the effectiveness of the use of media for resource mobilization
- (7) To assess and extract lessons as to the gaps to be filled in the area of institutional capacity development

ANNEX 5

OECD/DAC HUMANITARIAN EVALUATION CRITERIA¹²⁶

These are the internationally accepted criteria for humanitarian evaluations and, for example, used by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).¹²⁷

Relevance/appropriateness

Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities (as well as donor policy). It refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme.

Appropriateness - the need to tailor humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly ... is more focused on the activities and inputs.⁶

Effectiveness (including timeliness)

Effectiveness measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criteria of effectiveness is **timeliness** of the response. (*Although **coordination** is not a formal criterion, the OECD/DAC Guidance suggests that given its importance, it should be considered under this criterion*).

Impact

Impact looks at the wider effects of the project - social, economic, technical, environmental - on individuals, gender, age-groups, communities, and institutions.

Coverage

The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas. (Have vulnerable and marginalised groups been missed?)

¹²⁶ Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee. 1999. *Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies*, Paris. The 'coherence' criterion has been omitted as that applies to complex political emergencies, much less so to natural disaster.

¹²⁷ www.alnap.int

Efficiency (including cost effectiveness)

Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most

efficient process has been used.

Cost-effectiveness looks beyond how inputs were converted into outputs, to whether different outputs could have been produced that would have had a greater impact in achieving the project purpose.

Sustainability/connectedness

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether an activity or an impact is likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. (Many humanitarian interventions, in contrast to development projects, are not designed to be sustainable. They still need assessing, however, in regard to whether, in responding to acute and immediate needs, they take the longer-term into account.)

ANNEX 6

BACKGROUND OF TEAM MEMBERS

Mr Peter Wiles (team leader) has worked in international development and humanitarian work since 1972, including postings in south-east Asia, India and East Central and Southern Africa, primarily with OXFAM GB. He has been an independent consultant since 1992, specialising in evaluations and reviews of humanitarian and development programmes, as well as management reviews, working with a wide range of agencies including Danida, the European Commission, IFRC, Overseas Development Institute London, Oxfam GB, UNOCHA and the World Bank. Recent consultancy work has included the global evaluation for DFID of UNICEF's humanitarian response capacity and writing, with Mr Sida, the synthesis evaluation report of UNICEF's tsunami disaster response.

Mr Lewis Sida has worked as a consultant in humanitarian aid for the past two years for clients including UNICEF, the British Red Cross and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). Work has included the evaluation of UNICEF's tsunami response as team leader for the three country case studies, evaluations of Red Cross and Crescent tsunami response, a joint evaluation with USAID of UNOCHA's humanitarian information centres and various policy development on subjects from food security to humanitarian principles. Formerly Mr Sida worked as the emergencies director at Save the Children (UK) and has managed humanitarian response programmes in Africa; south, east and central Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

Mrs. Nastaran Moossavi has represented Ockenden International, a British NGO specializing in work with refugees and displaced people, in her native country Iran between 1997 until February 2004 when she was transferred to a similar position in Cambodia. In both countries, she has been in charge for developing programmes appropriate for some of the most marginalized people. These programmes involved struggle for rights to education, employment and natural resources. During this period, she was accountable to a variety of donor agencies such as DFID, ECHO, the European Commission, and CIDA.

ANNEX 7

EVALUATION TEAM – LEAD ARRANGEMENTS (as at 20 October 2006)

Peter Wiles:

Evaluation management; strategic overview; reports and presentations; back up to other team members etc.

- Child Friendly Cities (with Lewis)
- Psychosocial (back-up to Nastaran)
- UNICEF operational issues (with Lewis)
- Inter-agency coordination
- UNICEF policies, systems, budgets, expenditure (overview)
- Preparedness
- Bam programme phasing (integration into country programme)
- Programme planning, monitoring and evaluation (general) (with Lewis)
- Advocacy (general)
- External Communications and media
- Overall context (including Lorestan and Zarand earthquakes)

Lewis Sida:

- Child protection (tracing; IDTR; CFS; CFC(with PW); etc)
- Nutrition and vaccination
- WES
- Human Rights Based approach to Programming
- Vulnerable and marginal groups
- International standards (Lewis)

Nastaran Moossavi:

- Education
- Psychosocial
- Health & hygiene promotion
- Gender
- Relations with partners
- Capacity building with partners

NOTE: This division of work may change and there will be a considerable amount of sharing and mutual back-up.

ANNEX 8

**UNICEF BAM EMERGENCY PROGRAMME EVALUATION
OVERALL PLANNING SCHEDULE (20 October 2006)**

Date	Location / Activity			Notes
October				
Su 8 Oct				
Mo 9	Tehran			
Tu 10	Tehran			
We 11	To Bam			
Th 12	Bam			
Fr 13	To Tehran			
Sa 14	Tehran			
Su 15	Tehran			
Mo 16	To Bam			
Tu 17	To Kerman			
We 18	Kerman: Inception Report presentation			
	Peter	Lewis	Nastaran	Team will split during this period (SEE SEPARATE DETAILED SCHEDULE FOR BAM)
Th 19	To Bam			
Fr 20	To Bam			
Sa 21	Bam			
Su 22	Bam			
Mo 23	Tehran (wait-listed)		To Kerman/ Tehran (afternoon)	
Tu 24	Tehran		To Tehran (leave)	Eid-ul-Fitr?
We 25	To Esfahan		Tehran (leave)	Eid-ul-Fitr ? / UN holiday
Th 26	Esfahan		Tehran (poss. Interviews)	
Fr 27	Esfahan - Tehran			
Sa 28	Tehran	Return Bam	Return Bam	
Su 29	Tehran			
Mo 30	To Bam			
Tu 31	Bam			
We 01 Nov	Team return to Tehran (tbc)			
Th 02	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Fr 03	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Sa 04	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Su 05	Presentation of draft report findings			
Mo 06				
Tu 07	Peter / Lewis depart			
Fri 17	Interviews / analysis / drafting presentation			
Mon 27	Deadline for comments on draft report			
Mon 4 Dec	Deadline for final report			

tbc = to be confirmed

ANNEX 9

Draft schedule for Bam Evaluation work (as at 17 Sept 2006)

General notes

1. This schedule is a first draft for discussion. Input from UNICEF staff on what is possible and desirable is essential.
2. Can section staff review this and make suggestions about other groups that can be interviewed and suggest where ideas are not possible or appropriate.
3. Individual household interviews will be random. Evaluation team will choose general area together with UNICEF staff and then simply walk around to find individual willing to be interviewed.
4. Household interviews with a specific focus will have to be pre-arranged i.e. families caring for separated children, mothers who have received nutrition training, parents with children in UNICEF supported schools etc.
5. Village visits will be general (i.e. looking at all aspects of programme).
6. This schedule will inevitably have to be changed as we try to arrange sessions. The evaluation team is highly flexible!

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
16	17	18	19	20	21	22
Bam Interviews with counterparts	Kerman Interviews all day	Kerman Interviews Inception presentation	LS - WES Site visit Engineers Contractors	LS - WES Household interviews	LS - CFS ECCCs	LS - CFS RCCs
			NM -Prep.	NM- Household interviews	NM - PSYCH.	NM – PSYCH RCCs Neshat centres
			PW – Bam	PW – Bam	PW – Bam	PW – Bam
23	24	25	26	27	28	29
LS - HEALTH	LS – Family reunification	Eid-el-Fitr	Esfahan/ desk work	Esfahan/ desk work	LS – Family Reunify	LS - Village visit
NM - PSYCH. GPs, health personnel.	Tehran		Interviews Tehran with partners	Tehran	NM- Education	NM - Village visit
PW- Bam	PW - Tehran				PW – Tehran	PW – Tehran
30	31	1	2	3	4	5
LS - Nutrition	LS - Nutrition	LS - CFC	LS - CFC	Report writing	Report writing	Report writing
NM - Education Teachers	NM - Health & hygiene Health	NM - Health & hygiene				

focus groups & individual	workers	Children home visits				
PW- Tehran	PW – Bam	PW - Bam	PW - Bam			
6	7	8	9	10	11	
Report writing	Report writing	Draft report presentation				

Interviews – Lewis Sida (LS)

A. WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION (WES)

1. Consultant engineers and contractors for WES/ site visit.
2. Household interviews (random) in zones 5 & 10.
3. UNICEF project staff

B. CHILD FRIENDLY SPACES

1. ECCC managers and staff
2. RCC managers and staff
3. Parents with children in ECCC and RCC
4. Children in ECCC and RCC
5. UNICEF project staff

C. HEALTH

1. Visit to urban health centre/s that have received UNICEF cold chain support.
2. Visit to health house/ interview with vaccinators.
3. Interviews with MoH staff using cold chain cars.
4. UNICEF project staff

D. FAMILY REUNIFICATION

1. Separated children being cared for in extended family.
2. Separated children in institutions.
3. Focus group discussion with social workers.
4. UNICEF project staff

E. NUTRITION

1. Nutrition centre staff in Bam and Rigan.
2. Mothers trained in nutrition programme, both those active in schools nutrition stands and those not active.
3. Visit to flour fortification factory
4. UNICEF project staff

F. CHILD FRIENDLY CITIES

1. Municipality
2. Site visit and tour of CFC area. Interviews with residents.
3. Ministry of Urban planning, Tehran University, consultant architects for CFC (PW)
4. UNICEF project staff

Interviews – Nastaran Moosavi (NM)

General points

1. Interviews should be with men and women, perhaps separately?
2. Individual interviews in the first week, focus group discussions in second week.

A. EDUCATION

1. Teachers who have attended psychosocial course (ideally focus group)
2. Teachers attending refresher courses (focus group)
3. Students (groups and individual interviews)
4. Visit to regular, non-supported school.
5. Principal of schools
6. Visit to schools with UNICEF constructed toilet blocks.
7. Parents in PTAs (group)
8. Women who are parents but not in PTA (random sample?/ home visits).

B. PSYCHOSOCIAL

1. Counsellors in Neshat centres
2. Informal conversation with children/ adults in Neshat centres
3. Doctors (GPs) who have received training. Health people from MoH who have received training. Others?
4. Teachers/ counsellors who are giving “life skills” classes. Is it possible to observe one of these lessons?
5. Women referred to RCCs?

C. HEALTH AND HYGIENE

1. Health workers who have been trained
2. Children who have participated in child-to-child method. Those trained and those who received.

ANNEX 5

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

General

1. Mr Tootonchian Head of Specialized Agencies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Mr Hemmati Najad, Deputy Governor, social affairs, Bam districts and head of Bam Disaster Task force.
3. Mr. Ebrahimi, Deputy to Mr. Hemmati Najad
4. Mr Bagherizadeh, Mayor of Bam

MoH Kerman & Tehran

5. Dr. Nakha'ee, Head of Department of Health, Kerman
6. Mrs. Rangavar, Nutrition Specialist, Department of Health, Kerman
7. Mrs Riazi, Nutrition Specialist, Department of Health, Kerman.
8. Mr. Bahraminezhad, Office of Mental Health, Department of Health, Kerman
9. Mrs. Omidian, Office of Mental Health, Ministry of Health, Tehran

MoE Kerman & Tehran

10. Mr. Karimi Firozjahiee, Head Division of Cultural Affairs & Counseling, Tehran.
11. Dr. Karimi, Director General Bureau of International Scientific Cooperation (BISC), Tehran.
12. Mr. Safizadeh, Finance Deputy of SRO, Kerman
13. Mr. Arman, former Manager, Department of Education, Bam
14. Mr. Zang-abadi, former Manager, Department of Education, Bam

Centre for the intellectual development of children (Kanoon)

15. Mr. Zareh, Head of Kanoon, Kerman

MoH Bam

16. Dr Daneshjar. Head of health centres, Bam Ministry of Health.
17. Mr Jalali, Immunisation and HMIS, DOH, Bam.
18. Mrs. Azizi, Department of Health, Bam
19. Mrs. Bagheri, Psychologist, Department of Health, Bam
20. Mrs. Zia, Psychologist, Department of Health, Bam
21. Mrs. Ghabilizadeh, General physician, Department of Health, Bam
22. Mrs. Sarhadi, Psychology specialist, Department of Health, Bam
23. Mrs. Ostadi, Psychology specialist, Department of Health, Bam
24. Ms Afshar. Nutritionist. 22 Bahman health clinic, Bam.
25. Mr Zahmatkesh, Mrs Azizi. Deputy, Bam Health Centre

SWO Kerman & Tehran

26. Dr Mohammed Khabaz, Deputy Social Affairs, SWO.
27. Mr Javadi, Deputy Juvenile Justice, SWO
28. Mr Ishiri. Director General orphans and foster care, SWO
29. Mrs Rahimi. Social worker and translator, SWO.
30. Dr. M. Setayesh. Head, SWO Kerman
31. Mr. Khoshnood. Deputy of Social Affairs, SWO Kerman
32. Ms. Ghazizadeh. Field Manager Family Reunification, SWO Kerman.
33. Ms. Najafpour. Family Reunification, SWO Kerman.
34. Ms. Abbaspour. Coordinator Child Friendly Spaces. SWO Kerman.

SWO Bam

35. Mr Moussazadeh. Head, SWO Bam.
36. Mr. Bahrami. Project manager Family Reunification, SWO Bam.
37. Mr. Asef Khakizadeh. Data base operator Family Reunification, SWO Bam.
38. Mrs Tahroodi, Social worker, baravat.
39. Mr. Ashrafzadeh. Counselling Centre Focal Point, SWO Bam.
40. Ms. Rasouli, Co-head of Neshat Center, Baravat
41. Mrs. Mohammad-abadi, Co-head of Neshat Center, Bam
42. Ms. Jalali, Co-head of Neshat Center, Bam

UWWC, RWWC Bam and Kerman

43. Mr Tabah. Head UWWC, Kerman Province.
44. Mr Rezale. Head RWWC, Kerman Province.
45. Mr Toromian. Genco Corporation.
46. Mr Hesani, Head of finance, Bam UWWC
47. Mr Amini, Head of UWWC Bam.

MoE Bam

48. Mr. Hafezabadian, Head of Department of Education, Bam
49. Mr. Nemati, Warehouse Deputy of Department of Education, Bam
50. Mr. Borji, Head of Educational Consultancy Office, Department of Education, Bam
51. Mr. Poorali, Team Leader of Life Skills Trainers, Department of Education, Bam
52. Mrs. Akbari, Head of Mahdieh Girls' High School, Bam
53. Mrs. Taghavi, Life Skills Trainer, Department of Education, Bam
54. Mrs. Nosrat Jahan-shahi, Head of Molla-sadra Girls' Junior High School, Bam
55. Mr. Vali Razzagh, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
56. Mr. Assad-ol-lah Shahmoradi, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
57. Mr. Balavar, Head of Imam Hassan Asgari Primary School, Bam
58. Mrs. Mir-ahmadi, Head of School, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam
59. Mrs. Jahanbakhsh, High School Teacher, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam
60. Mrs. Jahan-abadi, High School Teacher, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam
61. Mrs. Barani, Office Administrator, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam
62. Ms. Behravan, Mobile Librarian, Department of Education, Bam
63. Mr. Hossein-shahi, Head of Shohada Boys' Junior High School, Bam
64. Mrs. Shoja-heydari, Head of Hejab Girls' Junior High School, Bam

65. Mr. Ali-abadi, Head of Hejab Boys' Primary School, Bam (afternoon shift of the Hejab's Girls' School)
66. Mrs. Samnezhad, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
67. Mrs. Sharifiyan, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
68. Mr. Yoosefi, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
69. Mr. Allah-abadi, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
70. Mr. Dehghani far, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
71. Mr. Zangi-larestani, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
72. Mr. Behjati, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam
73. Mr. Ebrahimzadeh, Teacher, Hejab Primary School, Bam

UNICEF staff

74. Christian Salazar, Representative
75. Jan Pieter Kleijburg, Programme Officer.
76. Afshin Parsi, Assistant Project Officer, Education
77. Hedieh Eghtesai, Project Assistant, CFC
78. Renato Linsangan, Project Officer, HIV/AIDS
79. Shadi Safavi, Project Assistant, Emergency
80. Shirin Nayernouri, Project Officer, Child Protection
81. Shirin Rateshtari, Senior Programme Assistant
82. Abyud Kamau, Finance Officer
83. Rosa Izquierdo, Assistant HR officer
84. Dr. Berina Arslanagic, Project Officer Family Reunification, Tehran
85. Andrea Berther, Programme Manager, Bam.
86. Morteza Mollanaghi, Operations Assistant, Bam
87. Amir Nasser Ghaderi, Assistant Project Officer Family Reunification, Bam.
88. Maneli Aghakhan, Assistant Project Officer Child Friendly Spaces, Bam
89. Maziar Taleshi, Assistant Project Officer HIV/AIDS - AFS, Bam
90. Sina Saemian, Assistant Project Officer WES, Bam.
91. Lilli Azari, Project Assistant Education, Bam
92. Soroush Saneie, Project Assistant HIV/AIDS – AFS, Bam.
93. Sogol Zand, Assistant Project Officer Education, Bam
94. Laleh Najafizadeh, Project assistant child friendly spaces, Bam.
95. Peyman Majidzadeh, Project assistant family reunification, Bam.
96. Gholam Reza Niroomand, Driver, Bam
97. Bahram Rashidi, Driver, Bam.
98. Morteza Morad Talab, Driver, Bam
99. Ali Solhjoo, ICT, Bam
100. Pedram Moosavi, Assistant Project Officer, HIV/AIDS
101. Seyed Aseai, Project Officer, IECD
102. Bahar Azemati, Nutrition Consultant, Bam
103. Babak Reza Akhavan. Monitoring assistant (WES) consultant, Bam
104. Reza Manavi, Assistant Project Officer, Child Friendly Cities
105. Mr. Tabatataee, CFC Site Supervisor
106. Steven Lauwerier, former Emergency Officer, UNICEF Iran
107. Kari Egge, former Country Representative, Iran
108. Thomas McDermott, former Regional Director, MENARO
109. Dan Toole, Head of EMOPS, New York HQ
110. Rene Dierkx, former CFC Project Officer (by email)

UN staff

111. Ali A. Mojtahed Shabestari, Head of Office, OCHA
112. Shariar Delavar, assistant OCHA
113. Soudabeh Ahmadzadeh, Assistant Representative, UNFPA
114. Devendra Patel, UN Security Advisor
115. Victoria Kianpour Atabaki, Programme Analyst, UNDP
116. Frederick Lyons, former UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator

Iranian Red Crescent Society

117. Dr. Seyed Hadi Samaei, Director General, International Affairs Department
118. Mr Fahihi, Head of Operations Department
119. Ms Bagher, Head of Programm Coordination
120. Mr Eftar Dansi, International Relation and Reporting Office

NGO

121. Amirhossein Yarpavar. Accion contre la Hambre, Iran

Members of a School Hygiene Committee

122. Sima Nik Mehr, Grade 2, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam
123. Razieh Rashidi-nezhad, Grade 3, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam
124. Reyhane Farsad, Grade 3, Farzanegan Girls' Junior High School, Bam

Members of Parents and Teachers' Association, Bam

125. Mr. Jooshayee, Self-employed
126. Mr. Motamedi, Government Employee
127. Mrs. Azadi, High School Teacher
128. Mrs. Arman, Clerk, Department of Education, Bam
129. Mrs. Movahed, Clerk, Department of Education, Bam

Trained as Librarians, but School Consultants by Profession

130. Mr. Pourmoghadam, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
131. Mrs. Azimi, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
132. Mrs. Jorjandi, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
133. Mrs. Hejrati, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
134. Mrs. Zarehpour, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam

Science Teachers

135. Mrs. Maryam Nabipour Salmanabadi, Asoode Girls' Junior High School, Bam
136. Mrs. Roohangiz Moazemi, Shahed Girls' Junior High School, Bam
137. Mrs. Mozghan Zolfaghari, Shahed Girls' Junior High School, Bam
138. Mrs. Maryam Afghani, Shahed Girls' Junior High School, Bam
139. Mrs. Tayebe Namakshenas, Central Laboratory, Department of Education, Bam

- 140. Mr. Ahmad Rafi, Bagher-ol-oluum Boys' Junior High School, Bam
- 141. Mr. Abbas Nadizadeh, Sheikh Morteza Ansari Boys' Junior High School, Bam
- 142. Mr. Ali Ehsani, Shahid Mohammad-ol- dowreh Boys' Junior High School, Bam
- 143. Mr. Changiz Darijani, Abbas Sayadizadeh Boys' Primary School

Members of Child Friendly School Committee, Bam

- 144. Mrs. Razazi
- 145. Mrs. Iran-nezhad
- 146. Mrs. Dehghani
- 147. Mr. Bahrami

Members of Health and Hygiene Committee, Bam

- 148. Mrs. Zeynab Razazi, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
- 149. Mr. Mahmood Talebedini, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
- 150. Mrs. Zeynab Seddighi, School Consultant, Department of Education, Bam
- 151. Mr. Hamid Sadeghi, Department of Education, Bam
- 152. Mrs. Zohreh Soleymani, Department of Education, Bam
- 153. Mrs. Nahid Rashidi, Department of Education, Bam

Others

- 154. Family interviews to discuss sanitation project: Three families were interviewed following random selection and their facilities inspected.
- 155. Visit to a UNICEF supported flour factory in Jiroft: interviews with quality control team and management of factory. Inspection of factory.
- 156. Visits to two ECCCs in Baravat: interviews with staff and parents of children. Inspection of facilities and observation of classes.
- 157. Visit to ECCC in Kordesani village. Focus group discussion with approximately five mothers and the head of centre.
- 158. Visit to RCC in Bam, hosted within a school. Interview with Mrs Ranjbar Zadeh of Kanoun who runs the centre. Observation of children using the centre.
- 159. Visit to an SWO run RCC in Bam. Interview with two women who manage the centre and with a third woman who runs a centre in another part of the town.
- 160. Visit to an RCC in Bam that is now running women's empowerment activities. Interviews with staff running the centre and providing course.
- 161. Visit to a health house hosted within a health centre in Ghosamabad village. Interview with woman running the centre and observation.
- 162. Visit to three families hosting separated and unaccompanied children
- 163. Visit to the SWO run hotline. Interview with social worker manning the line.
- 164. Focus group discussion with social workers; Mrs Nejad, Mrs Holepi, Mrs Abadi, Mrs Moosavi, Mrs Abadi, Mrs Abadi.
- 165. Visit to nutrition clinic hosted within the health centre in Rigan. Interview with woman running the centre and mothers attending. Observation of facilities and advice provided.
- 166. Visit to Nomadic community outside Rigan. Interview in tent.
- 167. Site visit with engineer from consulting company managing the water pipe network renewal.
- 168. Visit to villages surrounding Bam being supplied by the new rural pipe network. Interviews with contractor, villagers and RWWC official.
- 169. Enghelab School – staff

170. 15 Khordad School – staff
171. Almahdi School – staff
172. Soodoh School

ANNEX 6

Programme	UNICEF CORE CORPORATE COMMITMENTS IN EMERGENCIES (2000)	What UNICEF Iran did	Commitment met?
Health and nutrition	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide essential supplies, including: emergency health kits (essential drugs); oral rehydration salts; basic clinical equipment (e.g., supplementary health kits); fortified nutritional products; micronutrient tablets (vitamin A, iron and folic acid, multiple micronutrients); and blankets. 2. Provide measles vaccinations and critical inputs required, for example, vaccines, cold-chain equipment, syringes, training and financial support for advocacy, and for the immunization of children between 6 months and 12 years of age among target population. A companion dose of vitamin A will be provided as required. 3. Provide tetanus toxoid and such other critical inputs as vaccines, cold-chain equipment, syringes, training and financial support for advocacy, and for the immunization of pregnant and lactating women, as well as adolescent girls. 4. Based on rapid assessments and agreed roles and responsibilities among key partners, initiate and support therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes for children and pregnant and lactating women. 5. Ensure the provision of messages on health and nutrition issues, including the importance of breastfeeding and safe motherhood practices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided WHO kits and emergency obstetric kits. Provided 7,000 blankets for children. • Provided equipment for re-establishment and upgrading of cold chain in Bam and surrounding district. • Undertook a nutritional survey with ACF. • Implemented a programme of nutritional education in primary schools with ACF • Supported MoH to establish two nutritional care centres in Bam and Rigan • Supported fortification of flour in Kerman province with iron and folic acid to combat anaemia. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UNICEF did supply essential drugs, blankets and micronutrients, meeting this commitment 2. UNICEF did not provide measles vaccinations, but this was valid as the MoH was in the middle of a campaign as the e/quake hit, which was subsequently continued. UNICEF supplied material to replace and upgrade the cold chain. 3. UNICEF did not provide tetanus toxoid, but the Iranian health system does. UNICEF provided training on effective vaccine storage and management. 4. UNICEF did not initiate feeding programmes, although an assessment was undertaken. The threshold was too low to trigger such a programme so a nutrition education programme was commenced with mixed results. 5. Messages were provided on nutrition including breastfeeding.

Water, sanitation & hygiene	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure the availability of a minimum safe water supply, through provision of technical and material support to external implementing partners. 2. Provide bleach, chlorine or purification tablets, and detailed user and safety instructions in the local language. 3. Provide jerry cans, or appropriate alternative, with user instructions and messages, in the local language, on handling of water and disposal of excreta and solid waste. 4. Provide soap and disseminate key hygiene messages on the dangers of cholera and other water- and excreta-related diseases. 5. Facilitate safe excreta and solid waste disposal through provision of: shovels; cash for contracting local service companies to dispose of solid waste; messages on the importance of keeping excreta (including infant faeces) buried and away from habitations and public areas; messages on disposal of human and animal corpses; instructions on, and support for, construction of trench and pit latrines. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided 625,000 water purification tablets, 16 water bladders, 3 generators, 2000 squatting plates and plastic sheets, 20,000 dustbins and 80,000 bin bags. • Supported the urban and rural water companies to replace the entire piped water network. 758kms of pipe in Bam and Baravat and 150kms of pipe in surrounding villages. • Provided water testing facilities to rural and urban water companies • Supported the provision of 583 shower and toilet blocks to families in Bam and Baravat. • Supported the provision of 40 school toilet blocks and temporary toilet blocks for kindergartens and recreation centres. • Supported establishment of school hygiene committees. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A minimum safe water supply was quickly established through the prompt action of government and the IRCS. UNICEF contributed to this and to the quick ‘patching’ of the network. 2. UNICEF provided water purification tablets. The evaluation team was unable to verify if instructions were in Farsi, although this seems unlikely. 3. UNICEF did not provide soap, although there was a successful hygiene promotion campaign through schools. There were no outbreaks of communicable diseases. 4. UNICEF both coordinated and implemented a programme of latrine construction.
Child protection	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure the identification, registration and medical screening of unaccompanied children, with priority given to preventing separation of children under five; ensure the registration of all parents who have lost their children; provide leadership and support for photo tracing and for care and protection of separated children. 2. Provide orientation and financial support to local partners and social workers involved in tracing, care and reunification; and ensure the provision of tracing kits for partners. 3. Where necessary, initiate the process of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worked with SWO to place over 3,000 children in family based care and support these families. Provided incentives and training for social workers as well as equipment. • Provided personal kits to 4,000 separated children and 100 family kits. • Supported the establishment of a database for managing separated children case management. • Supported the provision of a hotline where people could access services and 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UNICEF worked with SWO to identify and register separated children and implement a robust protection regime. 2. UNICEF provided both training and financial assistance to SWO for tracing, care and reunification of separated children. 3. UNICEF did not engage in mine awareness as this was not relevant. 4. UNICEF did not work to identify violations of children’s rights. 5. UNICEF worked with a variety of partners to mount a successful and wide

	<p>development, refinement and field testing of appropriate mine awareness materials for implementation of mine awareness programmes.</p> <p>4. Identify and address violation of children’s rights through advocacy and work with United Nations and NGO partners.</p> <p>5. Develop, provide and strengthen psychosocial support services for children and their caregivers.</p>	<p>advice.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supported establishment and running of 36 early child care centres (ECCC) and 10 recreation centres. Provided equipment, incentives for staff and training. • Supported MoH to provide psychosocial assessment and counselling to 67,108 people. Distributed large numbers of posters and pamphlets on how to access services, as well as radio and TV messages. • Distributed 16,500 gifts to children for Iranian New Year. • Worked with MoE to provide schools based psychosocial counselling in 29 primary schools with student population of 3,800. • Established three community based psychosocial centres with SWO to provide ‘drop in’ type services. 	<p>ranging psychosocial programme.</p>
Education	<p>1. Establish “safe environments for children” for learning, recreation and psychosocial support.</p> <p>2. Initiate basic education services, in collaboration with communities and camp and local government authorities.</p> <p>3. Provide education kits and basic learning materials for primary school children.</p>	<p>1. Provided 16 tents for temporary classrooms, 312 school in a box kits, XX recreation in a box kits, two mobile libraries and several training workshops.</p> <p>2. Worked with MoE on child friendly schools (CFS). CFS committees were formed and a large scale training programme supported.</p> <p>3. Provided two mobile libraries with over 3,000 books. Provided training to staff.</p> <p>4. Provided 30 schools with libraries, science and computer laboratories.</p> <p>5. Provided XX teachers resource centres.</p>	<p>1. UNICEF working with the SWO and MoE quickly established “safe environments” for children in tents in Bam (within a week).</p> <p>2. The government of Iran restarted schooling in Bam in September, the beginning of the new term. UNICEF supported both temporary provision and the drive to re-open schools.</p> <p>3. UNICEF provided kits and learning materials.</p>

Child friendly city	Not applicable.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertook workshops on CFC zone with residents including children. • Provided 10 playgrounds in CFC zone, with 10 more planned. • Currently building school complex in CFC zone. Commitment to build community centre. 	
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ANNEX 7

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EDUCATION (Section 5)

Lessons

5. Opening schools was an important and effective way to start “normalising” process in post disaster/recovery situation.
6. Wherever principals and teachers had warmly received the concept of CFS, the project was implemented with more success, and they have made use of the teaching materials and equipment more effectively.
7. Schools with more children from better-off families and parents that value education greatly have responded to CFS concept more visibly.
8. The construction of latrines with involving children and teachers in supervising their regular cleanness ensures the improvement of health situation of schools.

Recommendations

6. Negotiate with MoE to find practical solution for the proper use of all TRCs (even if it leads to relocation of them)
7. Arrange for visits of some MoE officials, principals, teachers and students from Bam as well as other cities to the schools that have met the standards of CFS
8. Conduct studies on specific barriers for grasping and applying the idea of CFS
9. Initiate advocacy on CFSs through press and media and bring into foreground the achievements of the project with the intention of introducing a working model for education system in Iran
10. Review the articles of previous LoUs with MoE (in participation with the MoE staff) to to increase ownership of the programmes in future collaboration”

PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT PROJECT (Section 6)

Lessons

5. Previous reliable working relationship in routine situations, as between UNICEF and MoH, will maximise achievements during the crisis response.
6. Research and study on the social, economic, and cultural issues of the disaster-hit areas prior to the crisis can help with a better understanding of social behaviour of

people. Consequently, this helps with more sensible programming with respect to psychosocial interventions.

7. As the transition to recovery period started, the role given to community should be strengthened. The community should have changed from the “recipients” of aid to “agents” of development. Though the documents say that children and the community have an important role in designing and programming, they are not consistently involved in the post-emergency work. The involvement of beneficiaries in programming and monitoring can help social integrity and counteract tendencies to community breakdown.
8. A balanced proportion of local, provincial, and national coordination is helpful for sustainability. Agreements at local levels can ensure faster project progress, but agreements at national level should also be considered, particularly to increase the possibilities of replication and to avoid policy and financial blockages.

Recommendations

8. Agree with the government partners more certain ways for integration of the services into the current infrastructure.
9. Organise seminars/annual conferences (and every possible joint gathering) that can remind the officials, researchers, social workers, and etc. of the comparative advantage of this approach in disaster and post disaster situations and perhaps support the launch of bi-lingual website on psychosocial interventions to keep the trained people (including UNICEF staff) in contact with each other, or at least support the publication of a quarterly journal in this regard (with the collaboration of relevant departments of MoH, SWO and MoE so that the achievements are not lost and are kept within the ministries).
10. Translate documents related to psychosocial intervention into Farsi and disseminate them among the MoH and SWO technical staffs at provincial level.
11. Continue to produce and disseminate documents that promote best practice of psychosocial interventions.
12. Provide opportunities, such as training workshops on using participatory tools in psychosocial projects, for the government staff and related NGO members at provincial and local levels with the aim of expanding community based activities and improving the quality of M&E systems from a community participation perspective.
13. Support the surveys and research activities for collection of relevant data on the areas prone to disasters.
14. Involve agencies (governmental or NGO) that can work on underlying livelihood issues for adolescents to complement the activities that are done for children.

WATER & ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION (Section 7)

Lessons

1. Big urban water system building is possible in countries where government has this knowledge. UNICEF's added value could be sharing knowledge and the introduction of some of the social aspects of water consumption and management.
2. If UNICEF chooses to target vulnerable families with assistance such as latrine and shower blocks, then the best model of implementation is to help with construction as well as finance. NGOs are often more flexible partners in this kind of work.
3. Attitude change is easiest to achieve when there is a clear and compelling reason. Trying to change sanitary practices in Bam post-earthquake did not work because there was not obvious benefit for people.

Recommendations

6. Ensure that households and villages at the periphery of the network receive supply as a priority. UNICEF staff should carry out a short inventory before the close of the project of villages that have significant numbers of households without supply and the reasons for this. The solutions should then be costed with the UWWC or RWWC and an agreed schedule of works put in place. UNICEF should consider part funding these works to expedite their progress.
7. Develop a strategy for the switch over to the new network, including a clear communication plan.
8. Consider most vulnerable households for extra support in switch over.
9. UNICEF's water section in New York should visit Iran before the end of this project and ensure that lessons are learnt as UNICEF rebuilds its in-house capacity in WES.
10. A regional WES post should be considered.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION (Section 8)

Lessons

5. The combination of practical (financial) and technical support using proven approaches made this project a success. This type of approach works well in a country like Iran that has a relatively sophisticated social welfare bureaucracy with both the technocratic capacity and the policy alignment to implement such ideas comprehensively.
6. The practical, "on the job" training worked well in bringing in new social workers rapidly.
7. The individual kits given to children were well thought out and worked well. This experience should be captured and replicated.

8. The lack of support for disabled children meant that they stayed a relatively neglected group, despite being probably the most seriously affected by the earthquake (losing parents and suffering a permanent disability in some cases). Increased care payments might have made it easier for family to take in these children; UNICEF needs to give both practical and policy consideration to this group of children in future.

Recommendations

7. The Iranian government and the SWO must ensure that payments due to families for the caring of children are maintained. Some have not been paid for a year and this risks compromising the success of the programme.
8. UNICEF and SWO should actively consider the situation of disabled children and investigate whether a different support payment regime is needed to ensure their care within families.
9. UNICEF should work with the SWO and the Iranian legislature to demonstrate the success of family based care in Bam. Visits for parliamentarians to Bam would keep this issue on the agenda and would help in practically addressing some of the legislative changes that may be needed.
10. UNICEF should work with the SWO to ensure that the principal and practice of family based care is understood and supported in the wider organisation. This will involve workshops, production of simple materials on how the system works in the Iranian context and perhaps exchange visits between provinces. The leadership of SWO in Kerman province is a valuable resource in advocating this approach.
11. The training course used in Bam should be further developed and used a model for new social workers. Recruits without the requisite courses in their degree could receive “on the job” training and qualify for an SWO certification that allows them to practice at a certain level. This could form the basis for future professional social work qualifications.
12. UNICEF needs to have more rapidly deployable expertise in family reunification globally, regionally and nationally. Serious consideration should be given to having standby capacity either within the country or the region as part of a contribution to global preparedness.

CHILD FRIENDLY SPACES (Section 9)

Lessons

3. Involving managers, staff and parents in the design of programmes is proven to make them more responsive and more appropriate. In particular UNICEF should have consulted on its supply list (initially) and the way in which supplies were to be distributed.
4. The provision of services to adolescents is important but challenging, especially where there is no obvious partner. UNICEF needs to develop guidance on best practice in this area.

Recommendation

2. Develop regional recreation kits that can be stored in regional hubs. Ideally this should be undertaken by each UNICEF regional office in collaboration with the Copenhagen supply section and EMOPs. MENARO could pilot this approach, with the design for each recreation kit developed with the involvement of country offices. The design stage should take no longer than six months with an initial stock purchased as and when funds allow.

HEALTH AND NUTRITION (section 10)

Lessons

4. Specialist staff should be employed early in projects with significant budgets.
5. Basic delivery of health care items is appreciated by government and populations and is useful. In countries such as Iran that have a well developed health system however, an organisation like UNICEF has a greater role in sharing knowledge than in service delivery.
6. UNICEF's culture of risk taking and pilot project innovation is well suited to a country like Iran where government can replicate projects where it sees value (for instance with the flour fortification project). It is all the more important in such project therefore, to ensure technical design and management is good so that projects are replicated with the requisite supervisory regime.

Recommendations

3. UNICEF, or the Ministry of Health, or both should undertake a second nutritional survey to determine the impact of programmes to date before the end of the first quarter 2007.
4. UNICEF should undertake a household economy type survey in Rigan to understand the underlying causes of malnutrition and what some of the potential solutions might be. This type of work can be used to help formulate policy on how best to support settling nomadic communities. Ideally this too would be undertaken in 2007.

CHILD FRIENDLY CITIES (Section 11)

Lessons

5. UNICEF has limited expertise in construction and in the CFC concept. The latter is not a priority in UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan. UNICEF should not consider entering into projects of this kind in the future without the assurance of adequate know-how and experienced staffing.
6. In situations such as the Bam disaster, where funding is available, UNICEF needs to make an early decision about moving into school reconstruction. If UNICEF had decided to fund some of the immediate school rebuilding programme in Bam, it might have been possible to introduce child friendly principles earlier and on a wider scale.

7. The larger construction elements of this project seem to have come about partly as a result of the timing and scale of earmarked funding from a National Committee.
8. Advocating the CFC concept requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving planners, administrators, architects, engineers, sociologists and a range of government departments. This makes it a labour intensive activity that has to be led consistently by a senior UNICEF staff member or consultant.

Recommendations

7. UNICEF should decide by mid-2007 whether to gear up its expertise and resources in post-disaster school construction and in the CFC approach.
8. UNICEF should further develop dialogue and procedures with funders including National Committees to ensure that tied funding does not lead to inappropriate programming.
9. By March 2007, UNICEF should follow up with the Bam Department of Education about sports and play equipment needs for the schools that have UNICEF funded playgrounds.
10. UNICEF should immediately appoint an international consultant to oversee and follow the progress of this project both in terms of the Bam programmes as well as wider advocacy of the CFC idea.
11. The CFC programme in Bam will only be fully justified if it has spin-offs and replication more widely on school and city design in Iran. This means that the UNICEF Iran office should programme for the continuation of the programme at least until the end of 2007.
12. The project should be evaluated towards the end of 2007.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES (Section 12)

Lessons

4. Gender considerations should move beyond programmes for women and girl children and analyse how programmes will differentially impact according to gender and be designed accordingly, consideration being given to the needs of boys as well as girls.
5. Vulnerability analysis should be a key element of programming, so that the needs of vulnerable, disadvantaged or neglected groups can be identified and taken into account.
6. If there is an influx of new staff for an emergency, priority must be given to ensuring that they are well-briefed and trained in UNICEF systems. Time must be spent with counterparts early on explaining about UNICEF and its priorities and its financial and administrative systems.

Recommendations

4. Practical training and support on gender analysis in programming should be provided to staff (UNICEF Iran and RO).
5. Practical training and support on vulnerability analysis in programming should be provided to staff (UNICEF Iran and RO).
6. UNICEF should provide guidelines to country offices on how to handle the winding up of emergency programmes and the integration of continuing or residual elements into country programmes (UNICEF HQ).

OPERATIONS AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT (Section 13)

Lessons

5. In a major emergency response that depends on a sub-office, the managerial, logistical and decision-making centre of gravity should be shifted as far as possible to the sub-office in order to ensure timely and effective programme implementation.
6. The timely appointment of well-qualified and experienced technical staff is particularly important for a developed country such as Iran where UNICEF's comparative advantage is in technical expertise as much as in funding.
7. The quality of the assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation cycle should be improved with an increased focus on impact on beneficiaries.
8. The rapid supply of materials required for post-emergency programmes is essential. Delivery schedules should not revert to development programme timescales.

Recommendations

5. It is crucial that UNICEF's emergency responses are underpinned by the rapid deployment of senior, experienced staff both in key programme areas and equally importantly in the areas of human resources, operations and supplies (UNICEF).
6. UNICEF has to overcome the supplies gap that develops after the initial relief phase of an emergency programme by improving systems throughout the organisation and ensuring adequate staffing in this area (UNICEF).
7. Immediate post-emergency planning guidelines for the rehabilitation period need to be improved, including aspects of assessment, gender and vulnerability analysis (UNICEF).
8. Systems need to be developed and implemented so that the focus broadens from checking on deliveries and outputs to looking at programme outcomes and quality issues (UNICEF).

GENERAL LESSONS (Section 15)

9. In order that UNICEF can respond effectively to major, sudden onset disasters it is crucial that experienced staff are fielded quickly to back up country office staff. It is unacceptable that there are long waits for staff in key areas such as education. It is also crucial that key operational personnel in human resources, finance and supplies are in place equally quickly.
10. If UNICEF is to be involved in major construction projects, it must develop the policies and in-house expertise to handle such work
11. In terms of quality programming, UNICEF should ensure that there is an adequate focus on the needs of poorer and vulnerable groups, including children with disabilities and that there is also a focus on community consultation and participation. The challenge in post-disaster planning of this kind is to be able to plan and implement rapidly while working very much in a developmental context.
12. In a middle income country such as Iran, inputs that have the highest impact are technical, rather than financial. UNICEF's advocacy for children is important, as is its experience from other disasters, especially in the area of social policy and practice. However, robust and relevant responses give UNICEF credibility which provides a valuable base to have influence on children's issues in post-disaster situations.
13. Although UNICEF has stayed the longest of any international humanitarian agency in Bam, by the end of 2006 there was still a great deal of work left to be done before the city is fully recovered. Whilst it is timely to reduce staffing levels in Bam, UNICEF should consider a minimum five year time frame for major rehabilitation programmes, particularly those involving substantial financial commitments and physical construction.
14. The CFC project has shown that there must be a clear and transparent decision-making process within UNICEF whenever major capital expenditure commitments are made and when decisions are being made that, apparently, change the programme policy in place.
15. UNICEF Iran's partnership work with its government counterparts has been an important and generally positive feature of the Bam response. In post-disaster situations where large amounts of funding are being dispersed rapidly, experience in Bam has shown the importance of time being spent to ensure that both parties understand each other's administrative and financial requirements.
16. The Bam disaster has underlined the importance of preparedness and disaster risk reduction work and UNICEF Iran should continue to build these elements into its country programmes.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS (Section 16)

Country Specific Recommendations

8. UNICEF should ensure that there is adequate follow-up to the Bam programmes to maximise sustainability and advocacy potential. Recommendations in the programme

areas can be found in the relevant sections of the report (**Country Office. Immediate**). (Iran).

9. Because of Iran's disaster prone nature and the emergency prone nature of the region, it is strongly recommended that UNICEF should retain an emergency preparedness and response capacity. Building on the Bam experience, each programme sector should regularly update a preparedness and response plan. This work should be done in conjunction with the UNICEF Regional Office. This work should be incorporated into Annual Work Plans and consideration should be given to an addendum to the CPAP (**Country Iran/ rRegional Office. Action plan for implementing this recommendation by mid 2007**).
10. A senior UNICEF staff member should have clearly assigned management responsibility for overseeing and developing the disaster response and disaster preparedness part of UNICEF work in Iran. Consideration should also be given to an emergency post within the country programme. (If that person was also available to neighbouring countries, some cost sharing arrangements for the post could be considered) (Iran / regional).(**Country/Regional Office. June 2007**).
11. UNICEF continues to develop its emergency preparedness frameworks, such as the EPRP. It should ensure that preparedness plans are practical, up-to-date and 'live' documents, not just box-ticking exercises (**Country/Regional/HQ. Ongoing**).
12. For first phase relief responses, UNICEF should develop a limited list of child-friendly items that supplement the basic relief materials provided by the IRCS to be available in-country and regionally (**Country Office with Regional Office / Supplies Department. Finalise by June 2007Iran**).
13. On the policy and advocacy side, UNICEF should continue to work with government counterparts and disaster management structures, the IRCS and other agencies such as UNDP to develop policy, guidelines, good practice in favour of children in emergencies. UNICEF should determine whether it can support the Ministry of Education, the IRCS in areas such as school safety and earthquake preparedness and awareness (**Country Office. Ongoing and review progress at end of 2007Iran**).
14. UNICEF Iran should draw up a management response to this evaluation stating which recommendations have been accepted, the reason for the rejection of any and a work plan for the implementation of the accepted recommendations (**Country Office. Immediate**).

Global Recommendations

1. UNICEF should develop and implement assessment, programme planning, implementation and monitoring methods that focus on situation and vulnerability analysis, beneficiary consultation and programme quality. Elements of this work can very usefully be shared with government counterparts (**NYHQ/Regional/Country Office. Demonstrable progress by end 2007**).
2. UNICEF needs clear policies about whether or not to embark on post-disaster infrastructure projects. There is a strong argument for UNICEF to be involved in

school reconstruction, so that it can introduce and promote child friendly concepts. UNICEF will therefore needs better global expertise in large scale infrastructure and reconstruction projects. This should go beyond the MoU with UNOPs and should include partnerships with multi-laterals such as the World Bank who have this expertise. UNICEF can develop expertise in social aspects of infrastructure projects as well as understanding better how to manage such projects. This will necessitate the development of in-house capacity (**NYHQ. Clear policy and implementation plan by mid 2007**).

3. UNICEF should give consideration to including vulnerability considerations within the CCCs, so that there is a clear instruction that vulnerable groups be sought out and supported (**NYHQ. Mid 2007**).