

Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Indonesia

**Emery Brusset
Birthe Nautrup
Yulia Immajati
Susanne B. Pedersen**

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Non-Governmental Organisations
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Sida Evaluation 04/27

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Authors: Emery Brusset, Birthe Nautrup, Yulia Immajati, Susanne B. Pedersen.

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SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY

Address: SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden. Office: Sveavägen 20, Stockholm

Telephone: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Telefax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64

E-mail: sida@sida.se. Homepage: <http://www.sida.se>

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Executive Summary

Introduction and Background

In 2003 a group of aid donors (Danida, Sida, The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ECHO, DFID, AusAID) took the decision to commission comparative evaluations on assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This decision reflects concern that the population group, caught in humanitarian emergencies, might not benefit from the same standard of assistance and protection as others (in particular refugees).

Indonesia was selected by Sida, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, as the country in which it would lead this multi-donor enquiry, to define the *“key cross-cutting issues which in general all agencies and implementing bodies face”* (ToR 2.3). The evaluation was given three objectives:

*“To assess the relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, coherence and connectedness of humanitarian assistance to the internally displaced. To assess in which way the challenges in targeting internally displaced people are reflected in agency policies. To assess donor agency policy under various financial mechanisms.”*¹

A team of four persons carried out the evaluation over the period March to July 2004, with visits to Stockholm, Brussels, London, The Hague, Geneva, and five locations inside Indonesia plus the capital. The approach combined small scale anthropological assessments with a review of institutional responses (at the implementation level, and the donor level).

Internally displaced persons are defined in the principal relevant UN Document as: *“persons, or groups of persons, who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence... and who have not crossed an internationally recognised border”*².

From 1998 displacement increased dramatically in Indonesia, following the economic crisis and subsequent conflicts. The number of IDPs peaked in 2002 with a reported 1.4 million persons affected³. It has since decreased; although estimates indicate a current number of some 600,000⁴. The drop is due to successful reintegration, but also reflects a limited understanding of displacement. Many, displaced over a short period of time and for short distances, are not included, and the figures are weak⁵. The emergency was declared over by the government at the end of 2002 (then delayed to the end of 2003), and in the current central policy IDPs are assimilated to the poor (statements by Minister Jussuf Kalla).

The assistance provided internationally from early 2001 to 2004 reached US\$81 million (€67 million) as reported to the UN, of which 60% was channelled through the three successive UN appeals for which figures are available (the appeal for 2004 was only launched in April).

Population Level Assessment: Effectiveness, Impact and Relevance

The evaluation was not able to identify evidence of prolonged and widespread exceptional rates of morbidity and mortality (as opposed to national averages). Agencies have responded effectively to the

¹ ToR Specific Objectives 2.2.

² « Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement », UN, 1998.

³ UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2004.

⁴ This estimate is an extrapolation on continuity in figures provided by OCHA for 2003, corroborated by reports by the Provincial authorities and the agencies working with IDPs

⁵ The Consolidated Appeal for 2004 and the OCHA maps of June 2003 mention 535000 – but the Bakornas/OCHA seminar of the same month mentions 586769.

more accessible emergencies. This effectiveness must be partly attributed to the high quality of Indonesian institutional and physical infrastructure.

At the level of stated IDP policy objectives there has been a very relevant programming focus on women and children, as well as on peace-building, communication, and advocacy activities. In many cases this focus unfortunately tends to be lost in the mode of delivery and consultation of the population (in particular concerning gender), as one descends progressively closer to local NGOs and beneficiaries in the villages.

Field relevance in relation to needs is variable. There is a tendency for crises to be declared over when people are in their areas of origin. This approach means that vital needs are not covered, for example when people are near their areas of origin but are not able to return to their property. Women's needs tend to be consistently overlooked, such as privacy. In cases where the authorities are closely linked to the source of displacement (security strategy, or unclear legal status, for example) few agencies engage in protection (for example in Aceh).

National Level Assessment: Efficiency and Coherence

If coordination is defined as balanced and efficient interaction, then Indonesia on the surface can be presented as a positive example within the global aid scene. There are few examples of significant duplication of effort, and the division of labour between the State, donors, and other agencies is coherent, even if on many occasions, more the fruit of circumstances (isolation, decentralisation) than design. Occurring coordination is concentrated in the areas of greater focus, and has in some instances aggravated the bias towards certain regions (for example Maluku).

There is no coherent regulatory and legal environment governing the life of IDPs. There are many constraints in making meaningful contact with personnel at the higher levels of public administration, especially in Jakarta. Aid agencies have had little impact on its overall policies. This reduces their ability to provide timely assistance and durable solutions.

The aid agencies have made a unique and necessary contribution to the assistance given to IDPs. However the number of levels of programme implementation between donors and the target population is very high (in some cases five). This leads to an over emphasis on 'contractual logic' rather than a needs based approach, and the differentiation between agencies is lost. In some cases there is much more direct implementation (donor directly to INGO to local NGO). The value created by the longer chain management system is not clear, other than because each level feels it is not given the resources to manage directly what are complex programmes.

This leads to loss of efficiency and coherence. Since needs assessments are not well carried out, particularly where access is limited (for security or geographical reasons), assistance is artificially concentrated in some areas. The NGOs, particularly the local ones, are seen as expendable contractors, and this perpetuates the limited capacity of civil society, and discontinuity in the aid effort. Institutional sustainability suffers, as well as the ability of local NGOs to speak out in the interest of the IDPs.

Donor Level Assessment: Connectedness and Relevance

The gradual shift from emergency to rehabilitation has been actively reinforced by the implementing agencies, in spite of administrative guidelines within some donor administrations (separating emergency aid from development aid). This effort increases the connectedness of the response.

The Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) has been well supported by donors, giving the UN agencies a good capacity to predict their access to financial resources, and a multi-annual planning timeframe. The CAP improves the presentation of programmes and the ability of the UN to negotiate with donors and the state.

The structure of the UN appeal is however more conducive to earmarking, as well as a narrow response to the threats facing IDPs. Specific programmes are supported from a variety of donor procedures, limiting their flexibility. Certain areas, population groups, sectors and agencies are played down in deference to State policies, which is not without risks in civil conflict. Fortunately the UN appeals only channel a fraction of the funding.

Paradoxically the donors have been more eager than the agencies to support protection. The evaluation identified an instance in West Kalimantan where unspent funding for protection had to be reallocated, while a successful programme was phased out. Protection has been the sector most well covered in the UN appeals, even if it remains small in absolute financial terms, leaving unexplained the low priority given effectively to protection, outside a few specialised agencies.

Overall Observations

The unique needs of internally displaced persons are a sub-set of the needs of populations affected by armed conflict or natural disaster, and resemble but do not coincide completely with those of the very poor. Displacement is a reliable indication of specific rights violations and socio-economic needs, to be addressed through humanitarian aid.

The IDP category in Indonesia is seen to include only people still displaced, rather than including those “who have been displaced” (which is the proper UN definition). The State does not provide a specific definition of the term, and the laws are mostly silent as regards their entitlements. There is a resulting risk of not responding to the protection needs and vulnerability of many groups who are blocked from leading a normal life because of tension in the society. These in turn represent a factor of future instability.

Of particular concern is access to IDPs caught in the “vertical conflicts”, where the authorities are fighting organised groups among the population (Aceh), or where groups have fled as a result of lasting political change (East Timor). IDPs are also occasionally overlooked as a result of administrative guidelines. In these cases there is no coherence with needs, and the agencies are less effective in their bargaining with the authorities, in identifying those who are in need, or in designing durable solutions.

The evaluation finds that the notion of ‘protection’ used in Indonesia is too limited, even while special material assistance has been provided. This inadequacy reflects the traditional focus of the agencies on the executive branches of government, and on economic needs. There is a range of IDP problems which remain unaddressed relating to legal ambiguity, or failure to develop the existing legal system to provide IDPs with a coherent and accessible framework of justice, if not with the rule of law.

Recommendations

1. Protection Actors

- 1.1. Displacement should be used as indicator of vulnerability, rather than to define target groups. It should be understood as including past displacement, and be linked to other situations of stress, such as for hostage populations.
- 1.2. IDPs should be covered through an expanded range of protection activities which include long term programmes at the province level, and below (access to justice, technical assistance to the public administration).
- 1.3. Protection should become more gender sensitive, and its links to peace-building and public awareness be more amply implemented in Indonesia.

2. UN and NGOs

- 2.1. The commissioning and sharing of needs assessments must be increased. These should be linked to evaluations, carried out at a variety of levels, much more systematically, as a form of quality assurance.
- 2.2. Appeals should be focused on a clear identification of needs and intended results, be published in a timely manner, and linked to financial reporting which includes a description of the impact of shortfalls.

3. Donor Agencies

- 3.1. Earmarking to sectors and projects should be reduced, and more justification be given for channeling funding through the UN system or outside it. This can be based in particular on the importance of taking a more independent line to that of the government.
- 3.2. The programmes should be implemented through as small a number of operational layers as possible, and management capacity should be financially supported. Funding procedures should be kept direct, simple and rapid.

List of Acronyms and Terms

ACF	Action Contre La Faim
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BAKORNAS-PBP	Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Pengungsi, national-level inter-departmental coordination mechanism for disaster/emergency assistance management
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Agency), this can be at provincial level or district level
BAPPENAS	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (National Development Planning Agency)
BKKBN	The National Coordinating Board for Family Planning
BPD	Badan Perwakilan Desa (Village Legislation Council), a village level legislation system mandated in the Law/22 on decentralization
BPS	Biro Pusat Statistik, The Statistic Centre Bureau
BULOG	Badan Urusan Logistik, National Logistics Agency
CA	Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal. Annual Resource Mobilization Document for humanitarian programmes, coordinated by OCHA, see CHAP
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process, which includes also the coordination and joint planning under the lead of OCHA, see CA
Cardi	Consortium Assistance to Refugees and Internally Displaced in Indonesia
CCF	Common Country Framework, now referred to as “Programme”—5 year UNDP country-level planning framework

CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan, strategic plan upon which the annual CAP is based
CHF	Swiss Franc
CPRU	Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit of UNDP Indonesia
CRP	Community Recovery Programme
CSPS	Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DFID	Department for International Development, Government of the UK
Dinas	Provincial or District-level local Government agency
Dinas PU	Dinas Pekerjaan Umum, Provincial or District-level Government Public Work Technical Agency
Dinas Kesehatan	Government Health Agency, can be at provincial level or district level
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka. Free Aceh Movement
GoRI	Government of the Republic of Indonesia
GRDP	Gross Regional Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HR	Human Rights
HQ	Head Quarter
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICCPR	International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights
ICMC	International Catholic Migration Commission
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IDR	Indonesian Rupiah
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IMC	International Medical Corps
INGO	International NGO
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KOMNAS	Komisi Nasional Perempuan, The National Women Human Rights Commission Perempuan
KTP	Karta Tanda Penduduk Merah Putih. Red and White ID Card (blue for UN) issued to persons allowed to operate in Aceh

LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MYR	Mid-year Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National Non-Governmental Organisation
NMMRP	North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a US Government agency for international disaster assistance
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PGI	Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, Communion of Churches in Indonesia
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia, literally Indonesian Red Cross
SATKORLAK	Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksanaan, provincial-level inter-Government coordination mechanism for disaster/emergency assistance
SATLAK	Satuan Pelaksana, district-level inter-Government coordination for disaster/emergency assistance
SCRAP	Support for Conflict Ridden Areas Programme (World Bank)
SC-UK	Save the Children – United Kingdom
SEK	Swedish Krona
Seka-Hum	Sida's Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia, defence force of Indonesia
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USD	United States Dollars
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Monitoring
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

1 Introduction

The present evaluation is a segment of a multi-donor exercise (Danida, Sida, the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ECHO, then DFID, Ireland and USAID) to take stock of interventions in situations of civil strife and states of emergency. The task of the present evaluation is to increase understanding of the effects of the assistance provided by members of the wider donor community to internally displaced persons in Indonesia. AusAid has also expressed interest in facilitating this assignment.

The evaluative method could not be based here on a "gap analysis" between what was intended in a particular donor line of financing and what was achieved, as the objectives are too varied, focused on very different national or local target groups, on sectors or on agencies (a term we shall use to include operational bodies, Indonesian government bodies, or donor institutions). Instead of this the evaluation has used primary evidence drawn from the perceptions of the experiences of Indonesian IDPs and their host communities, partly during the team's visits, partly from agency studies.

To capture management, funding and institutional responses, the analysis reviewed recurring patterns in the commentary provided to the evaluators by the agencies themselves. In other words specific strengths and weaknesses with common causes, which occurred many times in the evidence, were used as the basis to extrapolate on the overall performance. The evidence used comes from direct observation, documents, and interviews.

The aim of the evaluation is to help identify which elements of the system should be supported or strengthened. The reason for the study is that Sida, and other donors such as Danida, DFID, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, ECHO, are keen to address weaknesses in the system of humanitarian assistance. Past studies have noted that IDPs have received less attention and assistance than other vulnerable groups.

This concern about systemic qualities is particularly relevant to the Sida approach to humanitarian assistance, which is not to drive the system, but to respond to its strengths. The quality of the response depends in great part on a valuable understanding one has of the system, its possible failings, and best practices. The reference is necessarily to the needs of the displaced population, but it includes the "value creation" by the chain of UN, Red Cross, bilateral and NGO actors.

Two synthesis documents have been written prior to the present evaluation on the topic of IDP assistance:

- "Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs" commissioned by Danida, final version approved on 20 October 2003, written by Buchanan-Smith, Rudge, Telford.
- "Synthesis of Findings on ECHO's Policy of Treating Affected Populations Without regards to Pre-conceived Categories, Specifically IDPs, Returnees and Refugees" commissioned by ECHO, final version approved on 28 January 2004, written by John Cosgrave (Channel Research).

There have also been four complete evaluation reports:

- Evaluations commissioned by ECHO in Sudan (SHER), Angola 5GFE) and Afghanistan (Channel Research)
- Evaluation by Danida in Angola (Channel Research).

Two other evaluations, one led by The Netherlands in Somalia (ETC UK), and one led by Danida and DFID in Afghanistan, are planned to take place after the present evaluation. A synthesis study is also planned, to which the present report is intended to contribute.

2 Presentation of Subject and Approach

2.1 Methodology

The Terms of Reference require a system-wide performance assessment to cover a large variety of agencies (either implementing agencies or donors) and the whole country. This calls for a streamlined management of information in the evaluation. The unifying point of judgment is the well-being of the beneficiary population, defined as those who have suffered from forcible displacement due to large scale armed violence at some point in the recent history of Indonesia (approximately 6 years). This understanding refers to the definition used by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Contrary to many evaluations the point of reference is not the funding source (for example an Embassy), nor the objectives of the funded agencies.

This evaluation could not consequently analyse specific individual donor policies, nor the channels of funding chosen by donors, nor to donor coordination.

It was decided not to include in the evaluation persons displaced by natural disasters, as these are highly spread out in Indonesia, and the beneficiaries are often quite different from the ones displaced by conflict. They also face different challenges in the medium term.

The evaluation is not limited to a review of the operational work carried out in the country, but is also asked to examine overall donor policies. A two dimensional approach was described in the ToR:

“A distinction in the review should be made between donor policy and funding practise on the one hand and for the implementing agency policy and operational practise on the other hand. This distinction between policy and implementation should be carried through the evaluation.”

The evaluation examines the performance from a dual standpoint: that of prevention and recovery on the one hand (admittedly different objectives but often not easy to distinguish in practice), and emergency response on the other.

The displacement scenarios in Indonesia flow from situations which contrast from province to province. The assistance provided by Sida (and other donors, in particular ECHO, AusAID, DFID and the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for IDPs is channelled through three international “networks”: the Red Cross Movement (Swedish Red Cross to IFRC to PMI, the Indonesian National Society and direct to ICRC), the UN agencies (mostly expressed through the Consolidated Appeals, but provided directly to UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, OCHA, UNFPA). NGOs have also received considerable support from their traditional relations with many donors, in the case of Sida mostly for development aid. The agencies (operational organisations) which deal with IDP needs engage in conflict prevention and human rights programmes. The programme objectives covered reflect this cross-over, leading to a complex approach, focusing on the short term aid as well as long term aid.

The difficulty for the evaluation team further lies in the fact that the Indonesian government does not allocate a specific legal status to IDPs. The guidelines drawn up by the government are concerned with the objectives of assistance more than definition. IDP-numbers are notoriously unreliable. Even the perception the IDPs have of their own displacement condition merges with historical migration patterns as well as communal relations and other concerns relating to civil war situations. At the same time the state has assumed a very important role in the provision of assistance, calling on considerable resources, some of them tied to the process of decentralisation, some to poverty reduction, some to the security sector institutions, some to corporate social responsibility.

To overcome these complexities the conceptual framework used is based on the Common Approach paper which constitutes an inherent part of the ToR. This indicates that:

“One creative way to arrive at a more unified analysis and approach towards IDPs is through the lens of overall humanitarian protection. The key proposition here is that the work of all humanitarian organisations should be viewed as the practical and impartial realisation of people’s rightful legal protection in situations of acute or generalised violence where human rights violations occur.”⁶

This leads to *“an approach which takes the denial of rights as its starting point (which translates) into an assessment of protection requirements to save human life and to ensure human security.”⁷* The legitimacy of the evaluation findings is based on the correct identification of all the threats to human dignity, in all its forms, in as much as dignity is the source of rights.

However this evaluation is not a protection evaluation. The rights based approach will coincide with the efforts of some of the agencies on the ground, but not all. This means that we maintain in analytical terms a distinction between assistance and protection, even if the ultimate standard is the respect of rights, particularly as they are defined by the beneficiaries and international norms.

Although the overall effect of the aid can be seen from the point of view of the protection and promotion of human rights, the evaluation did not subsume assistance under the mantle of protection. The evaluation treats protection as a sector which comes either before or after violations and deal with causes, while assistance tries to mitigate the consequences of violations. Protection, which is normally broken down into the three modes of persuasion, substitution, and denunciation⁸, is here analysed solely in terms of persuasion and denunciation. Actions of substitution have not occurred in Indonesia.

States have the responsibility to care for their citizens. The evaluation consequently concerns the performance of the international agencies and organisations in assisting the Republic of Indonesia, at all administrative levels, in fulfilling its obligations under international law, human rights law, and under the laws of war of which it has recognised by signing the Geneva Conventions. It is hence not an evaluation of state policies, but of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the actions undertaken in reference to them. The focus of the evaluation is to consider international assistance to IDPs by analogy as a form of protection of the fundamental rights of the person.

We have used three lines of enquiry for evidence and indicators:

1. The *beneficiary enquiry* to beneficiaries and non-beneficiary groups, and their communities
2. Review of policy and management: both at the level of *national capacities* (Government and NGOs or civil society) and *international donor funding* mechanisms.

2.2 Collection of Information: Timing, Sources, Data Limitations

⁶ Buchanan-Smith, Margie, Philip Rudge, John Telford: Framework for at Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs. Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering. Danida, 20 October 2003.

⁷ Slim, H., & Eguren, L.E., ‘Humanitarian Protection: An ALNAP Guidance Booklet’, May 2003 (draft in progress) and comments from OCHA, July 2003.

⁸ « Les modes d’action des acteurs humanitaires : critères d’une complémentarité opérationnelle », Paul Bonard, ICRC, 1998. Denunciation is understood as the publicising of violations, to put pressure on the authorities. Persuasion relies instead on convincing the authorities to act based on their own policies. Substitution is when the agencies take over the responsibilities of failing public structures. A fourth mode is increasingly introduced by the ICRC, the support mode, which includes small scale support for a variety of actors to weave coalitions in an environment where coherent policies cannot be applied.

The field survey has been used for interviews of beneficiaries, host groups, local authorities and local experts. The trips organised in the affected area have allowed for a contrast between different scenarios of crisis.

Apart from the interviews and debriefing in Jakarta, there have been two field scenarios visited, one focusing on a low profile and (today) low intensity but continuing crisis (West Kalimantan), one on a conflict which gained considerable international attention but is nearing some form of resolution (North Maluku). Displaced persons were also visited in Madura for people from Kalimantan, and in North Sulawesi for people from North Maluku. Evidence based on a visit to Aceh was also used for the population level assessment.

In addition to data collected during the field mission in Indonesia, the team leader visited the headquarters of some of the main donors involved in the multi-donor evaluation on assistance to Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs). Stockholm, Brussels, London, The Hague and Copenhagen were visited before the fieldtrips. Also ICRC HQ in Geneva were included in this round trip in Europe.

The chronology of tasks has been the following:

- *8 March to 16 April*: first meetings, collection of information, roundtrip to donor capitals, and preparation of field study.
- *17 April to 5 June*: information collection in Indonesia, analysis and report drafting.
- *7 June*: Draft report sent to Sida
- Finalisation of report by 1 August.

A complete bibliography and list of persons met are included in annex 2.

The evaluation was designed to maximise access to bodies of information. However the task was daunting, considering the scale of the country, the short timeframe, the range of expertise required, and above all the low preparedness of the aid effort to evaluation.

The Indonesian operations have yielded important amounts of agency literature, but surprisingly few systematic analyses of an evaluative nature⁹. The only comprehensive needs assessment found was carried out under the auspices of WFP's VAM Unit. Only five evaluations were found (of a formal manner with external teams), four of which were commissioned by the same agency on its own operations (UNDP).

The general lack of needs-assessments, monitoring reports and evaluations made it impossible to carry out a documentary evidence based synthesis of the country-wide assistance towards IDPs. It was difficult to discuss field performance with UN staff as most UN-agencies had left the conflict areas, for example West Kalimantan when the conflicts were declared over in 2003 (UNDP still funded programmes in West Kalimantan, but the Community Recovery Programme (CRP) did not include any reconciliations activities and was not directed towards former IDPs).

Humanitarian agency reporting within the UN is not directly related to joint structures such as the Consolidated Appeals, while development does not target IDPs specifically. In some cases parallel assessments which could have provided complementary evidence were cancelled due to security reasons (International Council of Voluntary Agencies, ICVA), or results not shared with the team. For example

⁹ This is defined as analysis based on standards which are explicit, that is, they must clearly show why an intervention will be judged better or worse in meeting its objective. To be used in an evaluation, a standard should indicate a form or level of success at which an intervention will be considered good.

an OCHA initiated need-assessment mission to the resettlement sites in West Kalimantan took place at the same time as the evaluation team visited Indonesia, but it is not known what the outcome of this mission has been. Staff turnover also made it difficult to collect lessons learnt from some of the INGOs in the field (e.g. save the Children in West Kalimantan).

In West Kalimantan and in Madura the evaluation teams managed to conduct interviews with local government representatives on IDP issues. However, it was not possible to conduct interviews with government representatives in Jakarta and in North Maluku, which could have provided a more triangulated analysis of the situation of the IDPs in conflict and post-conflict. Findings on policy and practice of government are based to a great extent on written materials and the perceptions of the agencies and the IDPs themselves, as well as those involved in diplomatic relations. The data quality of the interviews with the beneficiaries will be elaborated upon in annex 4.

The analysis of the financial figures ran into considerable constraints. The data was on many occasions not directly accessible and seldom allowed for comparisons, as the agencies and organisations apply various reporting formats and financial tracking systems. As regards the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) significant information is to be found in the annexes of the annual appeals for Indonesia, which allows for comparison of contribution rates within sectors over the years. However, the information is not comparable to the financial analysis of the Mid-Year Reviews (MYR) at global level. The MYR 2004 does contain new and interesting analyses regarding response rates and sectoral coverage but without considering the fact of the delay of the Indonesian CA: the 2% total coverage for Indonesia is quite misleading, and the comparative relevance is low.

One interesting aspect of the funding concerns the ratio of contributions in and outside the CAP, showing the proportion of humanitarian aid which is not controlled by UN agencies. OCHA explains that the information about outside contributions is only based on voluntary reporting by the agencies. This indicates a significant degree of uncertainty.

The overview of Sida 'Seka-Hum' contributions is based on investigations of the archives in Stockholm. Only documentation which has actually reached these archives is included which could be a weakness, although the team has reason to believe that the overview is comprehensive.

For our purpose, a simultaneous strength and a weakness of the data on ICRC funding is that the financial reporting across sectors focuses on expenditures rather than contributions. Flexibility and relevance in disbursement of grants e.g. for protection is ensured but information about donor policy and focus are diminished. Also end of the year statements on individual donor country contributions are not publicly available (even though mid-year statements are). Pending donor approval the information would have been made available to the evaluation team by ICRC, but considering the timeframe and value added to the analysis the evaluation team decided not to request this onerous service.

2.3 Brief Overview of Displacement in Indonesia¹⁰

Internally displaced persons are defined in the principal relevant UN Document as:

*“persons, or groups of persons, who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised border”.*¹¹

¹⁰ For reasons of space important additional information on displacement is placed in annex 3, in particular as regards the nature of the Indonesian state response.

¹¹ « Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement », UN, 1998.

There are 214 million people in Indonesia¹², with an estimated 4 million children born every year¹³, making it the fourth most populous country in the world. GDP growth went from 3.7% in 2002 to a forecast 4.2% in 2005, barely allowing new entrants on the labour market to obtain an income. 53% of the population lives on less than US\$ 2 income per day.

Compared to these figures, in 2002, at the peak of the displacement, there were an estimated 1.4 million internally displaced persons in the country, with a further 3 million affected by the conflict, which includes the host communities receiving the IDPs¹⁴. This represents a total of 2% of the population.

While these numbers may seem disproportionately small, the problems of IDPs have called for international attention on three counts:

- The absolute numbers represent some 5% of the global IDP population as presented by the UN (which estimates the IDP population at about 24 million worldwide), and a third of those present in the Asia Pacific region, according to the Global IDP Project.
- The state of Indonesia has formulated an important National Policy on the Acceleration of the Handling of Internally Displaced Persons/Refugees (*pengungsi*) in Indonesia, which was one of the first issues dealt with by the Gotong Royong Cabinet of the Government of the time.
- There is a permanent risk that the IDP problem could become a source of future instability because of unresolved grievances and the creation of a disenfranchised population in areas open to acts of provocation. The National Policy document states that “*The longer the IDP problem remains unsolved, the more complex it will become, and in the end it will threaten the government process and national development*”.

Table 1: Number and Distribution of IDPs as of July 2003

Region	Number of IDPs July 2003	Percentage of Total Number of IDPs	Regional Population 2000*	Percentage Regional Population*
Maluku	202 783	35%	205 539	17%
North Maluku	34 166	6%	785 059	4%
North Sulawesi	13 000	2%	2 012 098	1%
East Java	129 919	22%	34 783 640	0%
North Sumatra	22 184	4%	11 649 655	0%
Central Sulawesi	156 620	27%	2 218 435	7%
East Nusa Tenggara	28 097	5%	3 952 279	1%
Total	586 769	100%	56 606 705	1%

Source: BAKORNAS-PBP and UN OCHA in The Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003.

*Estimate based on BPS Statistics Indonesia, Population Statistics 2000 (<http://www.bps.go.id/sector/population/table1.shtml>)

Even though the numbers of IDPs and regional population figures are based on different years and sources, table 1 does indicate that the IDP problem in some cases is considerably worse when viewed at regional rather than national population levels. This would be even more evident if other conflict affected persons e.g. in the host communities were included in the table.

¹² The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, March 2004.

¹³ UNDP Human Development Report, 2001

¹⁴ Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia, 2003, quoting WFP figures, quoting Government registry records with a figure of 1,396,565.

The humanitarian assistance provided internationally from early 2001 reached US\$81 million (•67 million) as reported to the UN, of which 60% was channelled through the three successive UN appeals for which figures are available (the appeal for 2004 was launched in April). Practically all this assistance went to the IDPs, although some programmes (such as UNICEF support to health and education) benefited the local communities too. This compares to most other humanitarian emergencies in the world over this time period.

On the other hand the displaced in Indonesia can often count on the support of families, aid agencies and the State to obtain minimum conditions of life in their place of refuge – from which they do not often have to flee again. This stability of havens is more common in Indonesia than in many other countries where there is displacement, with the exception of areas of active conflict, where displacement has happened repeatedly.

3 Population Level Assessment

3.1 Humanitarian Response

IDPs interviewed in West Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Madura and North Maluku all agree that the humanitarian assistance offered met their basic needs during displacement. The IDPs (Madurese from West Kalimantan) interviewed in Madura described receiving assistance while on the boats taking them out of Kalimantan, but could not state the source of this assistance. Curiously even PMI, which was most probably the final distributor, was not recognised as one of the providers, the IDPs referring vaguely to “the Government”. This was taken to show a strong degree of field level coordination.

As reported by agencies, there does not appear to have been high rates of malnutrition, morbidity or mortality in Indonesia¹⁵. The evaluation found no signs of malnourishment or unusual signs of morbidity among the IDP children. According to agency reports¹⁶ the health status of the IDPs are lower than the average standard of the population due to a general diminishing standard of water and sanitation facilities in the camps and in the resettlement areas (in West Kalimantan) and after return to a totally destroyed infrastructure in the villages in North Maluku.

The exception has been Papua (for example an outbreak of malaria, bloody diarrhoea and measles has been noted on 18 February 2003 in the Jayawijaya district of the Papua province), but the causes are linked to the isolation of the population from the outside world, as well as a result of the civil conflict, rather than to displacement (the team is told reliably that a report by Yale University attributes mortality to a genocide). Reliable figures from this remote area have been notoriously difficult to collect.

Unusually for a humanitarian crisis, and reflecting the strong state services prevailing in Indonesia, until the end of the nineties the public policy was for IDPs to receive cash donations. However, the IDPs also had to contribute with salaries from employment in the informal sector. The situation in North Maluku seems to have been worse than the situation in West Kalimantan and Madura, at least when comparing the IDPs’ own perceptions in the provinces visited. Most IDPs in West Kalimantan

¹⁵ For detailed information see annex on displacement.

¹⁶ See e.g. World Food Programme. 2002. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Indonesia: Livelihood Survey: Synthesis Report*; World Vision Indonesia. February: 2004. Assessment Report North Maluku; World Vision Indonesia. 2004 (n.d). *Participatory Assessment and Evaluation report. West Kalimantan Rehabilitation Response*; Save the Children UK (Sc UK). 15 July 2003. Project Proposal: *Integrated Child Development Programme. IDPs resettlement sites, Pontianak district, West Kalimantan*.

received education and health services during displacement and got access to land, enabling them to survive although they also had to rely on food distribution and governmental assistance.

In North Maluku the provincial government does not have a comprehensive policy towards the IDPs, and there exist significant differences in access to governmental aid for those who return as part of a government programme and those who return individually. The last are in a more vulnerable situation, even if they returned at the same time as those who receive Governmental assistance.

Most IDPs also received support from the host community. This was particularly pronounced in Madura (Bangkalan and Sampang districts) where kinship ties played an important role in reducing the stress on IDPs. IDPs had the same level of access to health services and education as the population in the host community, meaning that the human rights norms concerning non-discrimination were met in most cases. This however was not always possible: some IDPs in West Kalimantan who were resettled in the least developed sites¹⁷ had to travel long distances to attend schools and health facilities, and some IDP children in North Maluku (Jailolo district) did not receive any education during one year of displacement in a camp. One interviewee in Ternate stated that some IDPs denied their IDP status when in contact with the health system in order to avoid negative discrimination such as long waiting lists and poor access to medicine. NGOs report that the situation is worse in South Halmahera.

Most of the IDPs did not complain about the standard of housing provided during displacement, resettlement and return, although the water and sanitation facilities found in the barracks in Ternate (used as IDP camps) were clearly inadequate (well below the SPHERE standards for shelter, for example) and camp life gave little room for privacy. The money provided by the government to build new houses did not cover those who chose not to be integrated in governmental programmes for resettlement or return, and these in many cases seem not to have been covered by aid agencies either such as UNDP which followed state priorities.

The IDPs who participated in the governmental programmes in North Maluku and who succeeded in receiving the housing package did not receive enough support to build houses of the standard they had before the conflict. In many of the villages visited in Jailolo and Tobelo districts houses remained unfinished one to two years after return. Consistent patterns reveal that houses which had been supported by international organisations were more complete than those provided by the Government, suggesting some uncoordinated delivery between the Ministry of Infrastructure and the foreign agencies.

The most serious problem declared by the returnee communities was that not everybody had been able to receive the housing package, even when entitled to it. This means that some villagers are now living in new houses while others are still living in temporary shelters, barracks or together with relatives who have received a new house¹⁸ in their village of origin.

No evidence was found of double coverage of assistance to a particular group, and the indications collected by the evaluation were not significant considering the scale of needs to be covered at the time. Different agencies took different approaches to avoid duplication, for example in the relations with village level committees. The potentially aggravating consequences this could have were diminished by the fragmentation of the country: isolated programmes could not contradict one another.

Gaps have existed, as a consequence of difficulties of access, or the occasional failure of the Government to fulfil its role: The agencies have not taken over programme components where the

¹⁷ There are in total 12 resettlement sites in West Kalimantan. Some of these sites are well developed and some are not. Unfortunately, the team only managed to visit one of the most developed sites (SP1), but from interviews with SC-UK, World Vision Indonesia and IOM, agencies working in the least developed sites, we got information from these sites

¹⁸ In order not to escalate this conflict, the evaluation team were recommended by the aid workers from UNDP and Cardi not to investigate this problem further.

Government did not do so. In West Timor for example the ex-refugees have languished in a state of legal non-status to which UNHCR and other UN agencies were not able to respond because the area has been declared unsafe by the UN security coordinator (it has been classified as “level 5”, i.e. evacuation status, since the murder of three UN staff members in December 2000). In a different scenario it was only after considerable logistical efforts and long field assessments that the well established Dutch NGO Cordaid was able to reach parts of South Halmahera, from where large displacement had occurred three years before.

Although the speed of reaction was contrasted, all agencies have managed to achieve their objectives in their material aspects. This has been done in part by the use of the national resources (transportation contractors, the state logistics agency Bulog), as well as an emphasis given by the agencies to field presence.

The Red Cross Movement has for example established a relief warehouse near Surabaya (non-food items) which can be used to respond to natural disasters when victims of conflict are few (for example victims of landslides and floods during the rainy season). Contributions are borrowed by PMI and/or IFRC to ICRC through its strong relations with the IFRC (specifically here: a tripartite agreement), which reimburses ICRC in cash or occasionally in kind. The warehouse was visited by the evaluation team and showed a high degree of organisation and management, although the level of activity has dropped over the past year (most of the war related relief supplies are intended for Aceh).

3.2 Prevention and Recovery

Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention

In West Kalimantan People in general feel safe as long as there is no contact between the Madurese and the other population groups living in Sambas. The level of ethnic tension is still very high. Although the people we met in Sambas tried to be balanced in their views, there is still a lot of stereotyping about the Madurese. Respondents from Sambas admitted however, that the Madurese are very hard working and that some Madurese are able to fit into the dominant local culture of Sambas. There used to be many (10%) mixed marriages. The Madurese IDPs know that there is no possibility of return for the time being, and all seemingly seek to establish a living in the new places.

All Madurese consulted by the evaluation team said that they had good relations with neighbouring communities, but other informants mentioned jealousy because the Madurese received considerable attention from the government and from the international aid community. In the views of the host community, they are themselves as poor as the displaced Madurese.

Peace-building is almost non-existent in West Kalimantan, although the government has initiated some reconciliation activities (together with IOM). There is, however, no reconciliation process at grassroots level, and the Madurese and the Malays only expressed a wish for peaceful co-existence with neighbouring communities during the interviews.

In North Maluku, in contrast to West Kalimantan, many reconciliation processes have been initiated, mainly facilitated by INGOs in cooperation with local NGOs and the government. These efforts are highly appreciated by the population involved in the activities. The IDPs, who have been able to return to their place of origin, seem to be rather optimistic about the future, at least when they talked about peaceful relationships with neighbour communities of another religions. Even in Taicim, where the neighbouring village participated in the attacks on the villagers and the destruction of the whole village. Most assistance to North Maluku today is development oriented, but INGOs include reconciliation and peace-building components in all activities.

Recovery

Long term assistance is characterised by backward linkages to earlier stages of development, such as the reconstruction of houses, or integration into existing conditions at the site of displacement. This leads to a neglect of the development of new solutions. The humanitarian and peace-building aid agencies have found it difficult to help the population adapt to new situations, as well as cultivate the ability of the population to enforce its own rights.

For example the UNDP Mid-Term Programme Review (October 2003¹⁹) notes:

“It can be seen from the list (of activities) that most accomplishments fall under the heading of service (project) delivery. Some of these projects contained a peace-building element in the form of joint (paid) labour for the duration of the project. Some of the projects supported or implemented by UNDP have been more overt and successful in their peace-building and reconciliation design. ... But for most of the service delivery projects it is the case that the value added peace element is just ‘bolted on’ to reconstruction projects. ... The implicit assumption (in relation to the value added factor) is that infrastructure reconstruction in itself promotes peace, stability and reconciliation. I would argue that without the process element given equal place (dialogue and relationship building) then the situation remains fragile, especially if there are still vulnerable and excluded groups present.”

There has been a clear global shift to more consultation from the end of 2003 for all aid programmes, as recommended by the few evaluations carried out, as permitted by an easing of the security situation. The early focus on material survival, and then on the construction of houses and cash grants, is gradually moving to economic recovery, public advocacy, and media programmes. This is leading to more ownership and better impact, as well as a more gender differentiated approach.

Besides general development programmes which do not target the IDPs specifically, there are few other actors. Few agencies other than the World Bank SCRAP focus on economic growth. The particular economic opportunities which differentiate IDP areas in Indonesia from those elsewhere are not exploited. The implementation of foreign investment projects to Indonesia has been stagnating since 1997, with only 0.6% of total project approvals realised for example in 2001²⁰.

This is particularly slow for larger multi-million projects in the oil and mining sectors²¹, which present a hope for IDPs outside the richer manufacturing regions of Java and Bali. As shown in Table 1 and from human rights reports, it is precisely where the potential of the extractive industries is highest (Aceh, Papua, Maluku, Sulawesi, Kalimantan) that most displacement occurs. Long term solutions for IDPs depend on growth, which could paradoxically be much greater in their areas of origin if the investment climate improved.

The number of projects approved in fact continues to fall, while investment laws and forestry protection laws have impeded the creation of employment or corporate sector investment in community relations projects, for example in North Maluku, where PT Nusa Halmahera is only providing USD 200,000 a year, while it keeps its investment of USD150 million ticking over pending clarifications in its security and legal environment. The gold mine is located in an area where precisely tensions due to successive waves of displacement are very high.

¹⁹ Section 3, Programme Performance, UNDP NMMRP Mid-Term Review

²⁰ The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, March 2004.

²¹ A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 2003 survey of Indonesian mining found exploration and feasibility spending by participants fell to USD18.9 million in 2002 from USD 160.2 million in 1996. Greenfield exploration slipped to USD 7.3 million in 2002 from an average of around USD 43.8 million from 1996 to 1998. PwC Mining Partner Marc Upcroft said Indonesia’s total expenditure on greenfield mining exploration in 2003 was around USD 8 million to USD 9 million, and was likely to be only marginally higher in 2004. The decline from the late 1990s was part of a global exploration downturn, but PwC said Indonesia was viewed as a poor investment destination and recent strong commodity prices were having limited impact in sparking new investment.

3.3 Protection and Vulnerable Groups

Protection

The social and political tensions in Indonesia at the time of the visit by the evaluation team members follow different rhythms in different provinces, but all reports point to a less tense if very unpredictable environment. Part of this unpredictability is due to the co-existence of conflicting public policies, and what the agencies and organisations report as the difficulty of establishing a meaningful high level dialogue to change policy.

A current example of conflicting public policies can be found in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province. On 19 May at 01.00 pm, the Governor announced that Martial Law was lifted and replaced by a state of Civil Emergency. However, the Army Authority declared that the number of troops would remain the same and the security operation would be continued. In villages near mountains and hills, such as *desa Siron* in *Aceh Besar* district, security checks and “sweeping” of villages are still conducted, whereby villagers are asked to leave their villages for a week or more, and often return to find their possessions looted.

The integrated operation of humanitarian assistance, economic recovery, law enforcement, governance and security, conducted under Martial Law, will be continued. The KTP (*Kartu Tanda Penduduk*) Merah Putih (the red and white ID card, blue for the UN agencies which are allowed to operate in the province under tight control) which state validity until the end of Martial Law, are still applied and mandatory. People reportedly do not know that the identity cards are still valid, and joke that they now have all of the freedom to choose what they want to be in terms of nationality.

The insecurity affects not just the persons who are IDPs counted as living in Northern Sumatra, but also those who have to stay in their villages under threat of temporary expulsion, even if the socio-economic conditions in the province are surprisingly good considering the crisis. *“Martial Law should have been conducted to the full, and not partially like this. We are the ones who suffer later”* said one peasant woman, feeling it would be better to let the stronger forces, i.e. the army, complete their operations, so that villagers would feel free from fear. Another woman from another conflict zone said that people from her village felt so unsafe in entering the Civil Emergency that they had asked the army to stay. They did not say whom they were afraid of, however. They simply said ‘OTK’ (*Orang Tak Dikenal*) – The Unidentified People, which could be GAM, could be the police, could be army personnel, or anyone.

In this context the presence of aid agencies is extremely relevant, playing the role of advisors in interpreting the norms set out in the international instruments and guidelines, in carrying out *démarches*, or in denouncing violations. With the notable exception of the ICRC, foreign aid personnel have been effectively excluded from the province, except in some very restricted areas of the capital.

Mentioning the low number of IDPs (10,000 and dropping to 2,000) as an indicator that the emergency has passed, UN officials have accepted assistance going to other more accessible regions, or being delivered without monitoring by the district authorities. Declaring the emergencies over, OCHA has applied to phase out from the country at the end of 2004, while international NGO personnel are not allowed in the province.

Under Martial Law local NGOs have had to obtain a recommendation letter from the Ministry of Interior and to report regularly to the Martial Law Authority to be allowed to operate. Some were able to obtain the letter. Most of the NGOs that could not get the recommendation work in human rights, civil education, and legal advocacy related areas. Some of these NGOs continued their work without the permission of the authorities. Although there is no data on the number of local NGOs working

under Martial Law, it is reported to the team that the number has decreased significantly, as many are closing down due to limited funding.

Some indicators of change may point to the effectiveness of some of the protection work carried out to increase compliance with International Humanitarian Law, by the development of legal guidelines in public bodies, in particular among Governors and district heads. In Aceh, the TNI now always alert the villagers whenever they are going to search the villages. They ask the residents to flee to safer areas, some of which were prepared by the Martial Law Authority. In the initial stage of Martial Law, villagers were displaced for over three months with no prior notice. It is also reported that each Battalion Commander (overseeing 300 men) now has a legal adviser.

In less politically charged environments protection has been able to develop effectively. In West Kalimantan trafficking in human beings is a problem according to the INGOs working in the area (ICMC, IOM and SC-UK), mostly to Malaysia but also to other areas of Indonesia and to Singapore, Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia. It was, however, not mentioned as a problem by the IDPs who saw it as a possibility for additional income for men and women, married and unmarried and as new opportunities for the youth. This highlights the need for the inclusion of the notion of deception in the definition of trafficking, promoted by agencies such as the ICMC.

According to an ICMC publication holding centres in West Kalimantan have been cited as places for exploitation and abuse of migrant workers, including restrictions on freedom of movement; accumulation of debt resulting in debt bondage; sexual harassment, abuse and exploitation and violence. In addition the district of Singkawang, West Kalimantan, is well known for the practice of “mail-order brides”²².

Between 2001 and 2004 only a few agencies have been focusing on protection of the rights of IDPs nationally. In West Kalimantan only IOM has a systematic protection approach (without including protection in its mandate) and its ECHO funded programmes in West Kalimantan combine development assistance with protection assistance. Save the Children-UK also works with social protection of children in conflict areas and have considerable experience in working with communities to support them to establish child protection mechanisms. These agencies report that because West Kalimantan is no longer a priority area for the international humanitarian assistance, both agencies are suffering from lack of funding to activities in post conflict situations²³. However, donors have reported on the contrary a lack of interest among these aid agencies for the funding available to protection.

SC-UK began working in West Kalimantan in early 2000, and has taken an active role in supporting the provincial government with the planning and reviewing of their resettlement programme. SC-UK is also member of the Child Protection Task Group established by the Governor. Unfortunately, this task group is not well-functioning. It was, however, not possible for the team to identify why this group was not well-functioning due to staff turnover in SC-UK. However, at a meeting with the Vice Governor of West Kalimantan, SC-UK’s programmes in West Kalimantan was given as an example (the only one) of assistance very much appreciated by the regional government

As long as the IDPs do not have identity cards they are not able to buy land. Their legal status also complicates negotiations with the government concerning sale of their former land and other property left behind, as well as compensation for property lost. The IDPs in West Kalimantan managed, how-

²² Rosenberg (ed.): *Trafficking of Women and Children in Indonesia*. International Catholic Migration Commission, ICMC 2003: 186ff

²³ IOM has to close down their office in West Kalimantan within a couple of months because ECHO funding for the programmes in the resettlement sites stopped in January 2004. Save the Children – UK stay in the region, but have no funding for protection work in the future.

ever, to get a temporary (during elections) identification enabling them to participate in the election. It is, however, possible to buy ID cards on the black market. The usual price in West Kalimantan is about IDR 5.000, (with the exchange rate of 10,000 IDR = 1 USD, this equals USD 0.5) but if an IDP wants to buy an identity card the current price is 30.000 IDR (USD 3), a cost not affordable for most IDPs. In North Maluku during the election period the IDPs without ID-cards faced many difficulties by being located in other areas than where they were registered. In the end many IDPs boycotted the election or were simply unable to vote and effectively disenfranchised.

The Situation of Vulnerable Groups

IDP camps have generally been small, and food, water and other essential resources can be found in the vicinity of the camps. Except in situations of military conflict, acute crises have not lasted long. In some cases however the more dramatic needs become more chronic, particularly in the conflict affected areas, such as in specific parts of Aceh. More importantly however these needs are not only of the more easily visible socio-economic nature. It is not only in terms of daily livelihood that IDPs suffer, but also in their spiritual life, for example the obligation of burying dead bodies.²⁴

It is a recurrent finding that the children, according to their mothers have coped fairly well with the situation although they of course felt anxious during the conflict and after displacement. Many women said that the children liked camp life because of the many playmates close by. Few children according to their mothers have faced serious health problems due to the conflict. Nor have they encountered particular problems when attending new schools during displacement. After return to areas of origin the children have not experienced problems in multi-ethnic and multi-religious schools either. One mother, a schoolteacher herself, said that the children after having returned to Ternate (where they are now living in a camp) from Manado, were more careful when choosing friends than they used to be, but generally they reported being happy about their return to North Maluku.

Children (and parents) are often returning to more segregated communities. The evaluation saw a school in Soatobaru Village in Galela, which was mixed before the crisis but is now entirely Christian as the Muslims live in another area.

In North Halmahera (North Maluku) women play a traditional role in peace-building. However, most programme interventions related to women (and their socialized position) relate to economic activities such as supporting women's groups in markets, income generation, and peasant groups. There is no doubt that the active women's groups need help, but women's income generation activities do not constitute a gender focus.

²⁴ According to Islam, dead bodies have to be buried properly or those responsible for them would be considered as committing a sin. It is a struggle for the people of the region of Aceh. One woman met epitomised this, as reported to the team. In her crying she kept on saying that she had to find and bury her son or otherwise her *shollah* – prayer – would not be accepted by God. “Just tell me where the location is and I will collect it myself. It's been 15 days!”, she said impatiently when the *keuchik* answered that it was not possible for them (men from the village) to collect it due to the conflict. The *keuchik* knew exactly that she would go and put her life at risk to collect the body. Women from her village know the forests very well, even better than their male counterparts since they are the ones who collect wood and rattan.

4 National Level Assessment

4.1 Public Policy Context and Organisation

Due to the strength of public services in Indonesia, the agencies have not experienced the need to become involved in the manner seen in locations such as Sudan, where relations and advocacy are established with rebel groups. The roles have been complementary.

The different crises in Indonesia have called on the wealth of response mechanisms which are available to donors for humanitarian and recovery assistance. The main mechanisms have been the UN agencies (through the UNDP, UN-OCHA, UNICEF and World Food Programme mainly, but also FAO, WHO, and UNFPA), as well as the Red Cross (Federation appeal, ICRC appeal). Two inter-governmental organisations have played the role of donor (European Commission) and implementing agency (IOM) respectively. Some of the NGOs have operated independently, using their own resources, or those provided by the UN mechanisms. Direct bilateral assistance from Sida has not taken place.

The humanitarian assistance system is tuned to situations where the state and national economic assets are unable or unwilling to address the needs of the IDPs. It consequently generates its own information flow and resource mobilisation systems, and then seeks towards the end of the emergency to hand over to the national actors. In the case of Indonesia the state presented contrasting positions, some in direct parallel to the aid effort, some acting exclusively as a force of public order so reducing the humanitarian space, and in some cases as one of the parties to the conflict causing the displacement.

The resources of the economic and state actors in the country are vastly superior to the aid effort, even if the site where decisions are made is often situated outside the conflict/IDP area (Java and specifically Jakarta). The national environment has provided the agencies with exceptionally good logistical and communication assets. The international economic environment presented opportunities of growth to the local market, giving some of the IDPs a dynamic of reintegration and economic conversion rarely seen in other situations.

In some cases the state has even assumed full responsibility for the IDPs, such as in Aceh. The budget allocated in 2004 for managing the IDPs was around IDR 200 billion or around USD 25 million (with 1 USD = IDR 8,000). However this assistance was only provided to those residing in government camps and not to those outside the camps. An NGO activist pointed this out as discrimination against some IDPs which signifies a violation of the guiding principles on IDPs Rights.

Apart from the internal budget, the Martial Law Authority also received international aid channelled through government agencies and the Indonesian Red Cross. This is based on the regulation that all humanitarian assistance from International Aid should be provided through bodies identified by the Indonesian authorities, and foreign aid workers are required to go through a long registration process. UNICEF explains such a policy of continuing assistance as a preference for engagement as opposed to complete withdrawal, in both cases a choice which has its costs.

This meant that the aid effort had to show a unique combination of cooperation with public authorities, while preserving a neutral distance, and being mindful of the opportunities for reconstruction. Moreover the complexity of the environment demanded a particularly strong basis in the provinces, and strong analytical skills to plan strategically and avoid the risk of being manipulated

The responsibility for the management of budgets has remained very widely distributed across the state. This has meant that specific Government Ministries interacts with different humanitarian aid

actors, such as the Ministry of Interior with ICRC, the Ministry for Social Welfare with UNICEF, and the Ministry for Infrastructure with UNDP. While reporting to BAKORNAS-PBP, these ministries have retained the initiative for programmes.

Some laws provided for a favourable environment for the delivery of assistances. An example of this is law N° 27/2003 on the alleviation of civil emergency of North Maluku province, and the Presidential Instruction (*Instruksi Presiden*) N° 6/2003 on the speeding up of recovery of Maluku and North Maluku provinces. Another example is Law N° 3/2001 that aimed at modifying the mandate of BAKORNAS-PBP to tackle natural disasters as well as man made disasters. This was not always the case. For instance the two evaluations carried out of the UNDP reconstruction and conflict prevention programmes²⁵, as well as OCHA, noted the considerable constraint posed to the programme by the arduous process to obtain travel authorisations to areas of conflict, such as Maluku and North Maluku. However practically none of the general laws in Indonesia relate specifically to the needs of IDPs, or even mention them²⁶, even if they do aim at the alleviation of poverty.

4.2 National NGO Performance

The NGOs in Indonesia are very heterogeneous. In Indonesian parlance NGOs are grouped into ‘red plate’, for those who are closely affiliated with the Government; ‘yellow plate’ for those who served as public service NGOs; and ‘black plate’ for those who mainly served personal interests, usually constituted by members of the upper class or wives of high rank government officers, who are into NGO type activities. The evaluation noted many interconnections between political parties and NGOs, reflecting the fact that NGOs work from a broad normative base, not merely as contractors for technical tasks.

The evaluation team concluded that Indonesian society has a low level of understanding of NGOs as they are conceptualised by the international aid agencies. The delivery of a service for a defined period of time, for a specific grant, is not what they are perceived to be good at. The NGOs themselves feel under-used, seeing as they do their work more in terms of advocacy and communication. A short visit to Madura island and meetings with four groups revealed widespread popular ignorance of those organisations which background documents had described as working in the province (FK4, a lobby group; Tarekat, a Moslem brotherhood; women’s groups; Kompak; SP2M; Nurani Dunia, the latter funded by Sida through WHO for a project there). Even among the IDPs which had settled in Madura the perception was that all assistance came from the government.

This lack of understanding is also reflected among the foreign aid agencies. Many respondents have complained of the absence of civil society in Indonesia. This is directly contradicted by the prevalence of religious associations, credit unions (which are admittedly more widespread among Christian groups), and village groupings. The conflicts even revolved to a great extent around the ability to organise

²⁵ Vaux, Tony, Hugh Goyder, Yulia Immajati, Maria Pakpahan: Conflict Prevention and Recovery Programme. Strategic Review for DFID. CONFIDENTIAL. November 2003

²⁶ One example is RASKIN (Beras untuk si miskin) – Rice for the poor, which is intended for the poor, although of course IDPs are included under it. There is also the Presidential Decree No 3 year 2001 on the establishment of BAKORNAS PBP (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi), the National Coordinating Body for Natural Disaster and IDP management. One finds the Ministry of Labour and Transmigration’s Decision no 109 year 2002 – on the establishment of teams for poverty management. The Circular from the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare No B.50A/MENKO/KESRA/III/2002 dated 25 March 2002 on poverty management, which is based the Ministry’s decision no 109 year 2002. Government Regulation no 2 year 1999 on Transmigration Management, in which the overall stages and activities, as well as relevant government institution for the implementation of transmigration program is regulated. And finally the joint decision of Ministry of Home Affairs and Director of BULOG (The National Body for Logistics) no 25 year 2003 and no PKK-12/7/2.003 for the implementation of Rice for the Poor.

through private militia and solidarity groups. It highlights the difficulty which the aid agencies have had in relating their discourse concerning vulnerability to those with the power to mobilise.

NGO capacity, where it has been harnessed by the aid agencies, varies considerably from one region to another. There is a tendency that those in the Western part of Indonesia, particularly Java where there are few IDPs, have more capacity than those in the Eastern part of Indonesia. Most of the Java NGOs possess strong capacities and some have long standing experiences in community development, such as Yayasan Dian Desa which was established in 1968.

Referring to their geographical coverage, the organisations are clearly defined into national and local NGOs. The national NGOs are generally understood as ones that cover national issues and work in different provinces (which most likely are in different islands) in the country. Most of these concern human rights, and concentrate on lobbying the central Government. In most cases, NGOs that work at national level deliver their assistance in the provinces through either their local contacts or own branch offices. In cases where no branch offices exist, local NGOs act as sub-contractors. The sub-contract relationship of national and local NGOs became a common picture during the emergency period of 1999–2003. Some agencies, which value close supervision and technical back-up, have argued for this sub-contracting relationship as a capacity building strategy. This is reasonable considering the time limit given by fund agencies and lack of capacity of local counterparts. Others have argued that the relationship should not last longer than the programme, and that once the assistance is over the local counterparts should be dissolved.

The emergence of violent conflict in Indonesia led to the mushrooming of local NGOs. In North Maluku alone, for example, the number of local NGOs suddenly rose to around 60 (probably more) after the violence. Nevertheless, with limited travel and physical presence in the region, the National, International, and UN agencies, could not advocate and build the capacity of the ‘new born’ and therefore they tended to use those which were already established. Often they chose to use NGOs from Java as their partners. Consequently this created social jealousy and tensions amongst local NGOs, which was further aggravated by the “contamination” of identity conflicts from the society into the organisations. In some cases tension also merged with the perception that INGOs or UN agencies favoured certain types of local NGOs due to the personal or ideological affinity of people in these organisations.

National and local NGOs have nevertheless benefited from the multi annual, participatory planning, secondment, and technical assistances provided by International NGOs. Examples of this are what the PMI has conducted in West Kalimantan with the support of the IFRC; or CARDI and CORDAID with their local counterparts in North Maluku; and ICMC and IMC with their local counterparts in Maluku. UNICEF has provided equipment to schools run by the state or by associations, thus accelerating the process of reconstruction in IDP affected areas.

There were a number of NGOs working within the peace building framework which, in the Peace Building Directory (an NGO document for Indonesia), are understood as initiatives aimed at promoting the conditions and relations within society for peace and justice²⁷. The Directory noted there were at least 465 NGOs established after 1998, that for the past two years have worked in this direction with human rights promotion as the third priority of assistance after strengthening civil society and advocacy or lobbying. Legal support was not in the list of types of assistances during the past two years, however.

²⁷ The work of Gemawan from West Kalimantan with their BIMA – Biak Merdeka – psycho social counseling for children is an example of these activities. Along with these local NGOs initiatives, there were also other local initiatives, such as Baku Bae (roughly ‘Be in Peace’), the local initiatives for land issues from Maluku, Forkanis – Forum Komunikasi Lintas Etnis (the Crossed Ethnic Communication Forum) from West Kalimantan, and Tim Tiga Belas (The Team Thirteen) from Jailolo of North Maluku province.

This is in line with the evaluation team findings that not much has been done for legal support, during the evaluation period 2000–2003. This may have happened due to the period being a time of emergency, within which the focus was mainly on urgent issues. However, legal support has become an emerging need especially in and after the resettlement period, with particular regards to land rights. It is reported by aid agencies that most of the NGOs dealing with land issues come from the environmental activist sector, and are not equipped to work consensually on legal solutions for prolonged periods of time, or in other words are advocacy groups not established to seek permanent legal solutions.

4.3 Aid Delivery Structure

The uncertain relation to local organisations is exacerbated by the difficulty the international humanitarian agencies have had to establish a presence in particular parts of the country. Delivery of programmes is heavily influenced by the ease of access to an area; the leverage the population has on national and international politics; media coverage and donor preferences (for example leading to an exceptional focus on Tobelo, Galela, and Kei Islands). The large majority of Dutch humanitarian aid for example over the period 1999–2003 (even if 70% of it passes through the UN) is earmarked for the two Provinces of Maluku and North Maluku, because of historical and Parliamentary ties to the population of those islands.

This has led to inconsistencies in standards of humanitarian assistance. In many cases in the early stages of involvement the agencies have concentrated on the delivery of the programme, to the detriment of contextual analysis, in particular of the local NGO sector. Funding has been given to agencies because of their geographical focus and ability to present funding proposals, rather than their proximity to the populations in need. Reporting on assistance generally suffers from a paucity of outcome and impact indicators, and if these are present, as for example in the UNICEF/Government of Indonesia Mid-Term Report, it concerns general national statistics and is not relevant to IDPs.


There were however not many cases where ‘double cover’ of a particular group was found by the evaluation team. Informal coordination was much in evidence, even if different agencies took different approaches, for example to local execution (for example UNDP opting for Direct Execution and the near exclusive use of donor voluntary funding channelled through a variety of international organisations, while IFRC and donor National Societies worked very closely with the national Red Cross). The potentially aggravating consequences this could have had on coordination were diminished by the sheer immensity of the country: isolated programmes could not contradict one another.

The funding flows are characterised by long management chains made up of successive sub-contracting arrangements. The apparent reason is the arduous process of relating to local resources, and limited local knowledge. Most donors have argued that they have very limited administrative capacity to deal with complex projects, a complaint which is echoed in many UN agencies, where the additional burden of coordinating contradictory donor guidelines was also mentioned. The agencies also mentioned the need to gain in legitimacy by using increasingly local actors as one moves towards the beneficiary population, to avoid the awkward political connotations of international organisations, often still seen in the light of the secession of East Timor from Indonesia.

The figure below provides a simplified map of the funding flow from one particular donor. Should another donor such as AusAID be included, one would need to include an array of 30 to 60 links to INGOs (for individual contracts), plus the existing ones to different UN agencies (which are in the figure here lumped together). The actual complexity of the aid distribution system simply defies all representation. Paradoxically however interviews carried out by the evaluation team in capitals and in Indonesia yielded no particular strategy for the choice of one modality versus another, apart from

general references to multilateralism (leading to a 70% funding for the UN in the case of Holland for example, even though the programme is geographically extremely focused).

Diagram 1: Mapping of Funding Flows




Two observations flow from the present diagram. The first is that if one uses a conservative figure of 15% of overhead costs for the handling of a given amount of money (and this does not include aid handling costs such as logistics, which can be high in a country such as Indonesia), the average total overhead for the delivery of assistance is about 40% (three levels of management). This does not compare well with more direct execution, for example through one NGO, supervised by a project management unit (to carry out all auditing, evaluation and capacity building functions for example) to ensure a sufficient level of accountability.

The second observation is that this network based system creates a superimposition of very different contractual and programme rationales. In the absence of agreed reporting frames (for example based around operationally viable and verifiable indicators) this reduces the transparency in the management of resources, and we find an overlap of different strategies of intervention. Beyond the unifying discourse on the needs of the population, there are in fact only a limited number of sectors carried out through a wide variety of relations to the population; some of which, such as the OPS in North Maluku, evolve over time from a contractor to a participatory planning mechanism.

Consultation processes have improved, but occasionally yield odd anecdotes. In one village in Tobelo a very solid road bridge was built on a river for IDR 259 million (approximately USD 25,000). The road had previously run over a wooden bridge, leading to a palm grove. The team found that the road further down connects with the main artery of the village of Wasi, making the grove and surrounding areas fully accessible. The explanation given was that at the time when the agency in charge had arrived to propose a project, the main village street had been made impassable to cows and ox carts (a particularly strict military officer, concerned about road safety and cleanliness, would force the villagers to clean the road and crawl on their knees if droppings were found). The money offered by the agency was used to create an alternative, although the respondents would now prefer to have seen it go to the renovation of a school.

This misinterpretation of need occurred because of the short time frame for consultation, execution and disbursement of money, as well as because of the limited latitude given to agencies in the funding of projects. This is often the result of the complicated management of funds. The structure for the funding of the UNDP North Maluku Maluku Recovery Programme, to take an example, is the following:

Diagram 2: Funding Structure of the North Maluku, Maluku Recovery Programme



In this figure each box represents a particular fund or bank account managed by a donor or by UNDP. The superimposition of levels of disbursement is required by the fact that some donors need to create the impression that their assistance is targeted in a way which is rationally linked to a strategy, while others prefer to give the initiative much lower down, according to a rule of subsidiarity (the agencies closer to the beneficiaries are better able to manage the funds). Below this figure should be introduced, for this single agency, as many as five different implementing modalities (grants for LNGOs, INGOs, OPS, government, joint funding with other UN agencies, and service contracts), not to mention very different forms of engagement with the population. The net result is a high degree of rigidity, which contributed, in the case of the above programme, to its multi-annual delay²⁸.

When each donor gives its own timeframe and reporting guidelines for the funds disbursed, it is natural for the actual delivery to be highly constrained, obliging the programme officers to take more into account the donor funding procedures than the actual constraints on the ground. In this case 80% of the funds disbursed were given to two provinces, Maluku and North Maluku, which have already receiving considerable assistance. Within North Maluku, a large amount of the funds were in turn spent on the district of Tobelo, based out of an office in the town. In the end this focus was interpreted by many observers as reflecting a pro-Christian bias in the UN and NGO agencies for this predominantly Christian area.

While the original focus of the donor agencies is to concentrate resources to increase efficiency, the end result is reduced relevance, coherence and efficiency. This goes under-reported in project analyses and end of year reports, due to the absence of systematic evaluative analysis, not to mention external validation – with the notable exception, that is, of the UNDP programme analysed above.

²⁸ Cf “Strategic Review for DFID”, and “Mid-Term Review for UNDP”. In particular: “The team concluded that CPRU has not taken a dynamic leading role in coordinating activity relating to conflict... The reasons for this seem to be firstly a lack of any overall analysis by the Unit and secondly the overburdening of the Unit managers with problems relating to the day-to-day running of the programme” (DFID, 1.2).

5 Donor Level Assessment

5.1 UN CA Mechanisms and Volumes

The main channel for the formulation of funding requirements for humanitarian assistance in Indonesia has been the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) whose steering committee is chaired by OCHA. It is paralleled by the IFRC and the ICRC appeals, and naturally by the direct contacts of a web of NGOs with bilateral donors and the EC. This web is particularly pronounced for some donors, such as the Netherlands (in the early stage of the emergency), Australia, and USAID (both of which are also in the process of reducing it), which handled up to eighty individual contracts with NGOs. Other humanitarian aid donors, such as Sida, and to a lesser extent DFID, have preferred to allocate funds to the UN, which then develop their own portfolio of projects.

The Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal (CA) 2001 for the Maluku Crisis was followed by three CAs which focused on Indonesia as a whole. According to CA 2004 the international humanitarian community in Indonesia anticipates that it will be the last nationwide, and that focus of the humanitarian partners in the future will shift from emergency assistance to recovery and longer-term development. Also, the CA 2004 stresses that “*the protection of civilians affected by crisis, particularly IDPs and other vulnerable groups, should be an integral part of any humanitarian assistance strategy*”.²⁹ The most prevalent rights to protect mentioned in the CA are:

- The right to accurate and consistent information, especially on available options for durable solutions and types and contents of assistance packages;
- The right to citizenship and identity papers;
- The right to land/property ownership.

One major asset of the CA process is that for protection, it provides an entry point for actors of “persuasion”. According to one respondent the CAP process is a forum for: “*High level, low profile consultation with the Government of Indonesia*”. In 2004 e.g. intensive debate on issues such as geographic focus and change of the IDP vocabulary caused a delay of the CA. It is also quite distinct from the Red Cross Movement funding mechanisms, giving these a different degree of autonomy and more general reporting guidelines in the case of ICRC, more compatible with the confidentiality of its protection role, which constitutes the focus of its activities in Indonesia.

However, the state’s potential blocking influence on the CA; on the recognition of crises, and on the overall coverage (geographically, sectorally, or group of beneficiaries), and the concurrent risk of politicization of humanitarian assistance is inevitable. The CAP may not be most adequate for actors of denunciation, raising the need of other fora in which the “contrary” defence of human rights could be coordinated and presented. The absence of funding for such actors by Sida, at least as concerns humanitarian aid, poses the question of a coherent focus on protection.

The CA for Indonesia in 2004 was prepared at the end of 2003, but could only be released in April 2004. The reason for this was the coverage to be given to the crisis in Aceh (particularly the characterisation of needs), and the abolition of the category of IDPs, where a considerable difference of opinion existed between the UN and the government. In the end compromise solutions were reached (essentially endorsing the restrictions on access until “the situation is deemed conducive for foreign aid”³⁰).

²⁹ Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal 2004 p. 7.

³⁰ Executive Summary, CA 2004.

This delay in execution had a negative impact on the overall coherence of the humanitarian aid programme, including for example reporting, where the Mid Year Report published in May against the Appeal contained information with no statistical relevance (cf further down).

The CAP has been well supported by donors, giving the UN agencies a good level of predictability on the possibility of funding and a long planning timeframe which improves the presentation of programmes and elaboration of strategies. According to the CA 2004: 31.5% of total requirements in 2002 were met. In 2003 this had risen to 54%³¹. This compares well with the global average for the funding of UN appeals.

However the distribution of funds and the coverage of sectoral needs were uneven. Almost half of the 2003 coverage went to WFP food assistance programmes, *“while projects in the sectors of agriculture, economic recovery, education, health, protection, security and water and sanitation received no or at best limited funding”*³².

The impact of this shortfall on the assistance provided and on IDPs was not evaluated, however, weakening the future strength of persuasion of the needs assessments carried out by the UN agencies. It is remarkable that even though shortfalls in funding are carefully noted by the UN, the impact of these shortfalls is not explained in any systematic form (particularly based on indicators of impact).

The CA is not a central fundraising mechanism for all agencies. One INGO stated that: *“Presence in the CAP is merely a token – to show that we are “out there”*”. This INGO received the main part of its funding from other sources, and was of the opinion that: *“donors don’t fund on basis of the appeal. They fund on basis of what they see, when they visit.”* The overview of CA funding in annex 5 does show significant contributions outside the CAP. In 2001 and 2002 the contributions outside the appeal were double (or almost) the amount of the contributions inside. This changed dramatically in 2003 where outside contributions were only a third.

One of the main reasons is that large “outside” contributions from the United States, Australia and the Netherlands were replaced by “inside” contributions. The reason for this, as found through interviews carried out by the evaluation team, was predominantly a capacity concern: the fear amongst donors that they would not have the capacity to oversee a large array of individual grant contracts, and hence a perception that the UN would be a good out-sourced alternative. The large increase in total contributions in 2003 (from USD 11.3 to 30.7) mainly benefited the food sector; going up from USD 2.4 mio. to USD 15.8. Other sectors which also received increased funding were: Multi-sectoral, Health, Economic Recovery and Infrastructure and Protection/HR/Rule of Law³³.

In 2001 the contributions outside the appeal superseded the amount of unmet appeals. In 2002–3 they amounted respectively to about 60 and 40 percent of the unmet appeals. This proportion of external resources corrects the perception of a deficit of funds for Indonesia which could be induced by the figures of UN shortfall, and reflects a preference for maintaining parallel NGO funding channels. This shift has not had a perceptible negative impact on coordination, or on the response, over time.

Some respondents (donors and agencies) expressed criticism of the sectoral and geographic focus of the CA because of the limited flexibility: *“It is awkward since you never know where and to what intensity emergencies will occur”*. One of the donor representatives pointed out that the *“CAP process itself might be part of the problem [of lack of coverage and cohesiveness] because the donors demand planning, coordination and pick favourite projects.”* Donors which provide un-earmarked funding are encouraged to select a project, so that the financial reporting can be simplified.

³¹ There is a slight difference between these percentages and the percentages in annex 5 which is however based on the financial reporting in the annexes of the CAs.

³² Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2004: p. 3

³³ All information on contributions outside the appeal is based on decisions reported to OCHA and may not be comprehensive.

This unearmarked funding still fulfills a role within the fund raising of the UN, one of increasing relevance, particularly when it is given to agencies, rather than to particular sectors or areas. During the interviews several representatives of both INGOs and UN organisations expressed great satisfaction with the un-earmarked funding of Sida, for example, which was considered “*very unique*”. Even though the relative amounts in some cases were small, the un-earmarked funds provided flexibility, and resources for activities with less donor attention, and enabled the agencies to overcome the constraints of divergent procedures, timeframes, and late payments. It contributed positively to efficiency.

However a review of the SEKA-HUM files in Sida show that even with the absence of earmarking, many organisations still felt the need to identify where the funding went. This leads to frequent and repeated requests for the prolongation of spending timeframes, as funds are disbursed much more slowly than intended. This contrasts with the ICRC appeals for example, which provide country level priorities, and then allocate resources on the basis of internal objectives based on target population groups (supported with indicators) which can be adjusted according to the evolution of the situation. Even the reporting against contributions focuses on money spent as opposed to money received. While requiring a greater amount of trust on the part of the donors, this system protects the independence and flexibility of the agency even when donors have geographical preferences, and is particularly appropriate for protection work. This is reflected in turn in the presence of ICRC precisely in two of the least favoured provinces, Aceh and Papua.

Timeliness of funding was highly important to all agencies, as was appreciated the timeliness of the payments made by some donors. A time-lag between the formulation of a programme and the actual receipt of funding in country was a pivotal concern as it distorted entire programmes. This is acknowledged in the CAP 2001:

“when preparing an appeal, a four-month delay between the launching of the appeal and the effective start date for implementing activities should be taken into account. It is therefore recommended, that the UN Agencies draw upon their emergency reserve funds once pledges are firm and forthcoming to speed up implementation”.³⁴

This highlights the importance of having a good anticipation of the funding to be reliably expected. The problem of time lag is exaggerated when the CAP itself is a delaying factor. In 2004 the Indonesian Consolidated Appeal was not presented to the public until April, partly because of discussions with the state partners. Considering the 4-months time-lag, implementation in 2004 will only start in September. Vulnerability to this time lag will cause some implementing agencies to seek their funding outside the CA.

The delay of the CA 2004 is probably the major explanation why Indonesia with only 2% coverage comes in as a poor second to last in the overview of funding response in the UNDP Mid Year Review of the global Humanitarian Appeal 2004, published in June. At the same time in 2003 Indonesia was placed in a middle category with 35.4% coverage and according to the latest statement dated 27 July 2004, total contributions have risen to about USD 13m equalling 30.2% of the appeal³⁵.


The fact that agencies could often respond effectively to the crises in the country is the indicator that a satisfactory quality of donor/agency coordination and preparedness exists (although the scale of sudden onset emergencies is much smaller than in many other areas of the world as noted earlier).

³⁴ Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2001: p. 4

³⁵ Updated overviews of pledges and contributions etc. can be found in the financial tracking system on www.reliefweb.int/fts. The figures here are from the overview dated 27 July 2004: http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/reports/pdf/ocha_21_2004.pdf

Appeals within the sector “Protection/HR/Rule of Law”, except for a low in 2002, were met to the highest extent (87.8% in 2003). The diagram below illustrates this in comparison to the total percentage of appeals met for all sectors, as well as for other selected sectors. Only food assistance had a higher fulfilment rate (110.8%).

Diagram 3: Percentage of Appealed Amounts Received by Sectors




Even though the numbers are not fully comparable it is interesting to note, that the protection sector according to the MYR of June 2004 only had a fulfilment rate of 16%. The high percentage of funds provided for protection in 2003 ostensibly indicates a high interest among donors to fund protection initiatives in Indonesia. This has been confirmed in exchanges with the evaluation team. However, despite growing over the years, the actual amount of funding for protection is still limited: USD 1.3 m. at its peak in 2003, going up from 0.3m in 2001 and 0.1m in 2002. (In the same period the appeals for protection doubled every year: from 0.3m in 2001, 0.7m in 2002, to 1.5m in 2003).

Whereas the USD 15.8m. for food aid covered 51.7% of the total contributions within the Indonesian CAP in 2003, aid to the “Protection/HR/Rule of Law” sector only amounted to 4.4% of the total contributions, which is even a little less than the 5.5% contributed to Economic Recovery, a sector that only receives about 20% of what is appealed for.

The question arises whether donors would be willing to fund more CAP appeals for Protection, if more proposals were made by the agencies. A few interviews have shown this to be the case: protection is perceived as a higher priority by donors than by agencies. This is based partly for them on the importance of the state in the overall response, set against the difficulty of many governance and judicial cooperation projects in the development sphere. The lack of interest for protection appears to come from agency headquarters in Jakarta and abroad. The tendency is reflected at the global level where the Protection sector only received 2.4% of contributions in 2003, while Food (43.4%); Multi-Sector (25%) and Economic Recovery and Infrastructure (11.7%) received the majority of total contributions.³⁶

³⁶ All figures on global contributions 2003 are to be found at: http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/reports/pdf/ocha_16_2003.pdf

Diagram 4: Percentage of Total Contributions Received by Sectors



The overview of CAP funding in annex 5 shows an increased tendency for “Multi-sectoral” appeals in Indonesia. There were no appeals for this sector in 2001, in 2002 the appeal was USD 12m, and in the 2003 and 2004 CAP the appeals were above USD 15m. This makes “Multi-sectoral” the largest sector (by appeal), closely followed by “food” in 2003.³⁷ Donor response is also increasing when looking at the percentage of appeals met: from 18.6% in 2002 to 33.6% in 2003. When it comes to actual funding Multi-sectoral projects received 19.8% of the total contributions in 2002 and 16.7% in 2003 – that year the second largest contribution rate after food. This is perceived by the evaluation as the main factor which has facilitated the good links observed in the preceding sections between relief, rehabilitation and development.

The group of donors behind this evaluation (which is however commissioned by Sida), are also the major contributors to the CA in Indonesia. In the period of the evaluation they provided 68,5% of the contributions within the CAP. Within the group Sweden is by far the largest contributor; providing 37% of the total contributions from all donors.

Table 2: Selected Donor's Contribution Within the CAP

Selected donors' contribution within Consolidated Appeals	USD			Total Within CA	Percentage of total contribution
	2001	2002	2003		
Sweden	259.368	862.548	15.636.342	16.758.258	37,0
Australia	499.800	2.155.244	2.947.896	5.602.940	12,4
Netherlands	1.567.000	1.639.813	928.500	4.135.313	9,1
ECHO	-	346.457	2.866.334	3.212.791	7,1
Norway	113.379	557.863	416.144	1.087.386	2,4
United Kingdom	-	-	242.358	242.358	0,5
Denmark	-	-	-	-	0,0
Total contribution selected donors	2.180.179	4.699.377	7.401.232	31.039.046	68,5
Total contribution within CA all donors	3.363.897	11.264.799	30.676.914	45.305.610	

³⁷ The peak in the food appeal in 2003 is a response to a reduced appeal in 2002. The actual budgets were the same. In 2004 the appeal is reduced again, because the urban poor are no longer covered by the appeal.

At the same time, according to donor reports to OCHA, the group also provides 60.2% of the funding outside the appeal process. Here Australia and the Netherlands take the lead each providing about 25%. The smallest donor is Denmark, who only made a small contribution outside the appeal in 2001.

Table 3: Selected Donor's Contribution Outside the CAP

Selected donors' contribution outside Consolidated Appeals	USD			Total Outside CA	Percentage of total contribution
	2001	2002	2003		
Sweden	416.667	-	104.615	521.282	1,4
Australia	1.312.194	6.415.014	670.690	8.397.898	23,3
Netherlands	4.355.008	3.842.024	883.947	9.080.979	25,2
ECHO	-	-	2.185.273	2.185.273	6,1
Norway	-	148.830	45.423	194.253	0,5
United Kingdom	-	-	1.318.865	1.318.865	3,7
Denmark	29.621	-	-	29.621	0,1
Total contribution selected donors	5.696.823	10.405.868	5.104.198	21.728.171	60,2
Total contribution outside CA all donors	8.021.693	17.929.915	10.144.939	36.096.547	

5.2 Red Cross Movement Funding Mechanisms and Volumes

During the period covered by the evaluation the total ICRC appeal has decreased from CHF 12.4m in 2001, 10.9m in 2002, to a low turning point of 8.6m in 2003. The appeal for 2004 shows a small rise to CHF 9.8m. The Annual Reports show a more steady development when it comes to actual expenditure, which has fluctuated between CHF 6.4m and 6.9m. This is in contrast to the scenarios of phasing out proposed by OCHA, and reflects continued attention to the problematic areas where few agencies operate such as Papua and Aceh.


Even though there is no directly accessible public ICRC information about contributions from donors by the end of each year, the available information about mid-year contributions shows a clear tendency for the countries behind this evaluation to be major contributors to ICRC work in Indonesia: Over the years they have provided respectively 76.1%; 79.2% and 73.8% of the total contributions.

The appealed amounts for protection fluctuate over the period from CHF 2.2m in 2001; 0.8m in 2002 to CHF 1.5m in 2003. However the actual expenditures are on a steady rise both in real terms (CHF 0.8m; 1.2m; 1.5m) and as a percentage of the total expenditure:

Table 4: Red Cross Movement: Expenditure by Sectors as Percentage of Total Expenditure

Sector Expenditure as % of Total Expenditure	2001	2002	2003
Protection	11,6	18,6	21,7
Assistance	37,5	37,9	37,5
Preventive Action	18,4	24,6	21,0
Cooperation with National Societies	24,2	17,9	19,8
General	2,1	1,0	0,0
Overheads	6,3	0,0	0,0
TOTAL	100,0	100,0	100,0

Diagram 5: Red Cross Movement: Expenditure by Sectors



At the same time ICRC is using more on protection than appealed for, reflecting the flexibility and autonomy in its operations which many of the UN related humanitarian work suffered from lacking.

Table 5: Red Cross Movement: Expenditure by Sectors as Percentage of Appeal

Sector Expenditure as % of Appeal	2001	2002	2003
Protection	35,8	140,4	100,5
Assistance	43,3	45,7	63,3
Preventive Action	73,3	86,5	94,1
Cooperation with National Societies	89,0	53,7	92,8
General	175,8	93,0	0,0
Overheads	55,9	0,0	0,0
TOTAL	54,5	59,0	80,3


IFRC

Even though IFRC's Annual Report from 2001 notes that programmes were underspent in 2001 since no permanent delegates were present until June, the level of expenditure seems relative stable over the period: CHF 0.9m in 2001; 1.1m in 2002 and 1.4m in 2003.

Again the donors most supportive of the present evaluation provide a major part of the annual contributions; between 58.2% and 73.5%. Almost half of the expenditures are for "personnel" followed by "general administration".

Diagram 6: IFRC: Expenditure by Sectors as Percentage of Total Expenditure

The IFRC’s focus on building up the capacity of what it reports to be one of the stronger National Societies in the region means that it was not possible for the present evaluation to assess impact on the single target group of IDPs. It was however interesting to observe the ease of transfer of resources from the response to natural disasters to so-called man-made emergencies, enhancing coherence and efficiency in the country conflict.



6 Overall Findings

6.1 Conceptualising IDPs

The impact of assistance on the overall conditions of the IDPs in Indonesia have been significant and verifiable, in great part thanks to the response from the Indonesian authorities and population, well supported by the aid agencies. They have worked together efficiently in the field, even though in some cases lack of access and transparency impeded assistance. The specific fundamental rights which are the privilege and due of each IDP, such as the right to live and grow, be safe and secure, be free of abuse, receive health care, and be educated, are overall fulfilled inasmuch as resources permit. The connectedness to development aims has been strong.

Of greater concern are the IDPs caught in the “vertical” conflicts where the authorities are fighting organised groups hiding in the population, or where groups have fled as a result of lasting political change. The IDPs are also occasionally overlooked as a result of restrictive administrative guidelines and restraining security provisions of the organisations themselves, including an unwillingness to press for access. In these cases a lack of coherence with needs becomes evident. In this area the agencies are less effective in their bargaining with the authorities. Overall there is a lack of attention to preventive actions (protection, peace-building, advocacy) for IDPs, and this leads to the questions of what constitutes vulnerability and risks for an IDP and what applications to give to protection.

IDPs lose the enjoyment of their rights as a consequence of displacement at one point in time. Yet the IDP category in Indonesia is seen to apply really only to people still displaced, rather than including those “who have been displaced” (UN definition). The State does not provide a specific definition of the term, while in workshops with the aid agencies on IDPs it implicitly accepted the UN guidelines.

In Aceh for example people may be at home again and in North Maluku they may have returned to their sub-District, but in fact they remain in emergency conditions. This may be because they have lost assets, or are caught in violent conflict (even if latent). There are consequently problems of relevance to needs in defining IDPs only as people who are prevented from returning to their areas of origin, in particular the risk of excluding the protection needs and general vulnerability of many groups who stay near their homes, but are blocked from returning to a normal life because of tension in the society.

We find that targeting IDPs should logically lead to a targeting of ex-IDPs, which have returned, as well as of hostage populations whose movements are restricted – categories of persons with continuing needs for protection and assistance. This means that poverty reduction aid instruments are not adequate. To treat IDPs in a manner similar to the extremely poor would risk locking them into a passive position when in fact with minimal capital they could begin a productive rehabilitation process, thanks to their ability to adapt and start again (a point forcibly made by OCHA).

Humanitarian assistance should not seek to privilege IDPs over other vulnerable people, even when vulnerable for other reasons than displacement. It should instead seek to identify precisely who they are, where they are and what their particular needs are. The evaluation team finds that the notion of ‘protection’ used in Indonesia is too limited for this to take place, even while special assistance has been provided. There is a range of IDP problems which remain unaddressed relating to legal ambiguity, to gender rights, or failure to utilise the existing legal system to provide IDPs with a coherent and accessible framework of justice, if not with the rule of law.

For IDPs there are often important matters which are not addressed, relating to, for example, identity papers, the status of voters (which may lead to manipulation of the movements of IDPs), land rights, arbitration in court for compensation for loss of property. This reflects the traditional focus of the agencies on the executive branches of government. The problems in regards to the judicial system are left un-addressed by the agencies dealing with IDPs in the field, often removed from the national level programmes of donors in Jakarta.

6.2 Testing the Programming Matrix

To capture the beneficiary perspective and to relate it to the wider debates, we have explored the matrix developed by Channel Research in the “*Synthesis of Findings on ECHO policy of treating affected populations without regards to preconceived categories, especially IDPs, refugees and returnees and local population*”. The matrix was intended as a crude attempt to demonstrate that special categories were more subject to cross-cutting problems than the general population. It was based on the reviews carried out so far in Sudan, Angola and Afghanistan for ECHO.

The table drawn up for the report was the following, in which each cross represents a higher (but not absolute) degree of relevance as could be rapidly and subjectively assessed:

Diagram 7: Matrix of Social Categories and Cross-Cutting Themes

Social categories and ECHO's cross cutting themes.

The degree to which cross cutting themes are more likely to affect members of a social category than those who are not members:

- + Somewhat more
- ++ Significantly more
- +++ Very much more

	<i>Social Category</i>												
	Refugees	Returnees	Internally displaced	Widows	Single Young Women	Single Young Men	Female headed households	Children	Disabled	Occupation	Geographical location	Low wealth	Poor Health Status
<i>Child-related issues</i>	+	+	+	++			+++	+++	+			+	+
<i>Gender</i>	++	+	+	+++	+++	+	+++	++	+	++		++	++
<i>Protection</i>	+++	++	+++	++	++	+	++	++	++	+	+	+	+
<i>Human Rights</i>	+++	++	++	+	+		+	+	+	+	+	+	++
<i>LRRD</i>	+	+++	++	++			++	++		++	++	++	+
<i>Disaster Preparedness</i>			+		+		+	+	++	+	+++	++	+

The team reviewed the evidence base in Indonesia with a view to refining this grid as a justification for targeting or not particular groups. The evaluation attempted in the population level assessment to find out which aspects are more important to IDPs, or other vulnerable groups, and which are secondary, as seen from the point of view of a response to their needs.

In an Indonesian context the matrix does not add value to an understanding of the relationship between the proposed social categories and the cross cutting themes. The categories mentioned have a very different status in this society, where they benefit from some social support. At the same time the categories are overlapping, i.e. the IDPs, might concurrently be widows, maybe disabled and with a poor health status, living in a marginalised area. The same presumably applies to the returnees and the refugees, but in Indonesia the last category was not relevant as even people from East Timor do not have refugee status.

The evaluation finds that the extremely poor (5 to 10% of the population), and the ex-IDPs have vulnerabilities that are particularly urgent to address, similar to the urgency of needs of IDPs. The ex-IDPs in particular could legitimately be the object of continued protection activities:

- To rebuild homes, and lands;
- to re-establish title to land and to other resources;
- to restore family roots and community structures;
- to re-establish their legal residence and;
- for protection and psychological support.

In contrast the risk reduction strategies most important for IDPs are access to key social and economic services in addition to a need for safety and protection. Concerning the IDPs the following issues have to be addressed:

- Access to vital health services
- Access to shelter, water and fuel
- Food security
- Employment
- Formal education
- Access to land and traditional patterns of natural resource use
- Access to safety and protection including psychological support

Based on rapid assessments it is relevant to compare the needs of IDPs and ex-IDPs in order to address through relatively rapid measures the main threats to their dignity and safety. However the needs of the poor are quite different in that the more structural causes must be addressed.

When speaking about the IDPs and ex-IDPs it is important to differentiate between different categories of people and make sure that the most vulnerable groups are targeted. In this perspective the different vulnerable categories outlined in the matrix document are the more vulnerable: widows, single young women, single young men, female headed households, children, and disabled, those with a fragile occupational status, people living in marginalised areas, people with low wealth and a poor health status.

In conclusion the matrix could be simplified by using three vertical columns (IDPs, ex-IDPs, and the extremely poor). One could add another category relevant to Indonesia but not covered by this evaluation, besieged or hostage populations (which have lost their freedom of movement but live in their area of origin, among their social groups). The horizontal lines would then include prevention and recovery activities, relief assistance, and protection (in many more forms than frequently understood in Indonesia, i.e. including gender, human rights, migration issues, etc...).

More crucially however, the evaluation notes that a semantic shift has occurred around the notion of internal displacement, which can be potentially detrimental to the people concerned. By thinking of displacement as a defining characteristic for a group of people, one tends to draw a line within the population which is too crude to be fair, or even useful. By placing IDPs alongside other clear categories such as women, or refugees, the aid agencies are assuming a degree of clarity which rarely exists. It is for example not easy to say whether people who have fled from East Timor to West Timor are IDPs in the same manner as those that have fled Aceh, and this is not a good definition of their level of need. On the other hand displacement makes it more probable that a group of persons is faced with much higher risks. Rather than defining a population group, displacement is an indicator of vulnerability, such as freedom of movement.

6.3 Towards a New Protection Paradigm

All agencies leave it to ICRC to deal with Geneva Convention protection, while at the same time a new concept of protection has emerged based on the dissemination of information and the identification of solutions to IDP problems. This includes:

- Training workshops for state officials.
- Assessment of existing monitoring and reporting mechanisms in cases of complaint or of violations.
- Development of procedures for reporting protection gaps and rights violations.
- Community-based programmes that support the reintegration of ex-combatants in the communities of absorption.

The unusually cooperative attitude of the government has encouraged many agencies, particularly the UN system, to concentrate on the advocacy of the social and economic rights of IDPs, particularly by translating and publicising very broadly the UN IDP Guidelines. These are widely mentioned in Indonesia around the aid projects.

Protection activities in relation to the IDP Guidelines, international legal instruments relating to the rights of children, women, and social and economic rights, have been promoted on a growing scale since 2002. There are signs that this is bearing fruit at the level of dialogue with local and national government (for example the repeated objective of finding durable solutions without sacrificing humanitarian principles, mentioned by BAKORNAS-PBP), but there is little evidence of lasting policy impact: the IDP policies are decided separately from the priorities of the agencies. One such policy was the decision to declare all IDP emergencies over in December 2003.

Significant issues remain to be addressed in some parts of the country where IDPs are less accessible and displaced over smaller distances over short periods of time. Aid agency attention drops when IDPs are reintegrated into their areas of origin, or when they are not administratively recognised, even alongside large recovery programmes. Human rights issues, in particular as they relate to property, the right to return, to safety, access to services, have not been addressed overall as thoroughly as those pertaining to the conflict.

There is a large range of problems relating to legal ambiguity or failure to utilise the existing legal system to provide IDPs with a coherent and accessible framework of justice, if not with the rule of law. In some cases the state authorities have felt little supported and advised by the aid agencies, in particular as relates to the implementation of the IDP Guidelines at the local level.

There are often important matters relating to, for example, identity papers, the status of voters (which may lead to manipulation), land rights, arbitration in court of compensation for losses of property, which remain unaddressed. This reflects the traditional focus of the agencies on the executive branches of government, and on protection in regards to the Geneva Conventions. The problems in regards to the judicial system are overlooked by the agencies dealing with IDPs in the field, often removed from the national level programmes of donors in Jakarta. The identification of IDP concerns is correct, but incomplete.

The preventive quality of clarifying at the local as well as national level the legal framework over land, for example, has escaped attention, even for issues as pressing as mining and forestry. Aid agencies do not speak to investors, for example, and investors remain at the mercy of wide variations of interpretation of decrees and laws, slowing investment, to the detriment of the IDPs and host populations.

7 Recommendations

7.1. Recommendations from the Population Level Assessment:

- In order to prevent outbreaks of new conflicts after return to home areas it is recommended for donors and aid agencies to support the government in developing a comprehensive policy towards vulnerable groups which have suffered from displacement (a clear indicator of vulnerability), and so to escape discrepancies in assistance to different groups of people, and to avoid that even in states of emergency different standards be applied to different groups situated across the country. This should

focus on identifying multiple interlocutors in the central government, with official responsibilities, with which meaningful relations of cooperation and debate can be had.

- The aid agencies should work earlier for local ownership, a more gender differentiated approach, by moving as soon as possible from material survival, construction of houses and cash grants, to economic recovery, community management of aid initiatives, public advocacy, and media programmes. It is recommended that the agencies do not only focus on material aspects in the assistance to IDPs, but also pay attention to the cultural and spiritual life of the IDPs, which play an important role in restoring balance in Indonesia. It is important for the aid agencies to make sure that IDP camps give room for privacy in order to prevent violence towards women. It is recommended to pay a special attention to women and children from ethnic/religious mixed marriages who may have needs other than IDPs do not have.
- Although IDPs and returnees have problems which other vulnerable groups do not have, it is important to minimise jealousy and tension between neighbouring groups. Donors should follow broad funding guidelines, emphasising multi-sectoral assistance for the provision of assistance tailored to host communities and/or to neighbouring groups in need.
- Reconciliation processes have to be initiated among the general public (“grass roots level”) in addition to peace building on higher levels among power-holders, including notions of human rights and drawing on the legal codes in Indonesia. It is recommended not only to focus on women’s access to economic assets when women are targeted as special vulnerable. Women’s peace-building capacities have to be supported by the aid agencies in the reconciliation processes. It is recommended that the donors and the aid agencies give more resources to the translation of the IDP guidelines into local level directives which the local administration and implementing bodies can use in the design and evaluation of assistance.
- It is recommended that the donors and the aid agencies together not accept denial of access to conflict areas, but insist in playing the role of advisors in interpreting the norms set out in the international instruments and guidelines. Insisting on physical presence on the ground, through partners in direct contact with the grant managers, is key. This should be achieved through as wide a variety of channels of funding, accepting in some cases less earmarking and lower reporting guidelines to safeguard neutrality.

7.2. Recommendations from the National Level Assessment

- The aid agencies should encourage the state authorities to elaborate guidelines which include a sharper definition of the IDP status, and outline the nature and extent of the entitlements of IDPs, even in states of emergency, martial law, or when they have not claimed assistance. A nuanced understanding of the nature of displacement should be used by aid agencies in combination with other analytical tools such as freedom of movement, and the coverage of the needs of beneficiaries from local resources (NGOs, the state).
- The fluid agency mandate arrangements which have emerged in the nineties have proven to be efficient in Indonesia (UN/Red Cross Movement/NGO division for example) and should be continued in other emergencies in the future. Local level coordination is an appropriate manner of reinforcing overall coordination. NGOs can develop different forms of action toward the authorities, combining persuasion and cooperation, as well as denunciation and long term legal assistance. This calls for a very decentralised approach, and the use of organisations with very different identities. Efforts to allocate exclusive and continuous central coordination roles to a single actor are not realistic and should be avoided in future.

- The cleavage between emergency actors (focusing on protection and on relief) and development ones (focusing on capacities and development) is not the most helpful and should be avoided. In many instances a rights based approach calls for agencies to respond at first in an emergency manner, but also to remain present on the ground for a long period of time. The tools which they must elaborate include technical assistance to the judicial authorities and to the population, through progressively elaborated mechanisms of consultation. In other instances there is a need to develop campaigns of awareness through prolonged interventions and followed by capacity building (for example in gender sensitivity).
- Protection and legal assistance should be stepped up by the agencies as regards human rights and legal issues relating to forced displacement. The objective of protection should continue to include fostering the demand for equitable solutions by the population (beneficiaries as protection actors). This “access to justice approach”, and “protection advocacy”, require in particular a more sustained policy of support at the level of the province and other administrative units situated below it: to independent local NGOs, an even wider coverage given to public communication, and other devices such as the deployment of legal assistance teams for IDPs and the state.

7.3. Recommendations from the Donor Level Assessment

- Donors should retain a more sophisticated understanding of the distinction between modes of protection. In some cases it may be important to justify funding outside the UN agencies with NGO and human rights groups, and agencies with an explicit protection mandate. For long term aid some post-emergency programmes of support to governance and access to justice could be usefully expanded at the local level for particularly vulnerable groups affected by displacement.
- There is a need for greater relevance and coherence within and between the multiple levels and networks of sub-contracting agencies. If good reasons cannot be given for successive sub-contracting of the handling of aid resources, these layers should be ruled out. This can be implemented through a more extensive use of information feedback systems relating to the evolving needs of the population, based on gradually refined indicators. Donors should prioritise funds to agencies that can clearly demonstrate competent human resource management including a presence close to the field (which has been one main factor in agency effectiveness), and that can demonstrate that they use the existing information about population vulnerability and local stability to draw up their strategies.
- Donors should contemplate the possibility of a financial allocation specifically to support the management of a number of projects by a sole agency – so limiting the current temptation to outsource delivery successively to lower levels, which multiplies overhead costs unnecessarily. This could take the form of contracted project management units to oversee complex programs with many components in different sectors.
- Generally more systematic indicator based needs assessments and reporting, monitoring systems, and periodic evaluations, are strongly recommended. They should be linked to fundraising and planning cycles (for example in annex to the CAP) to ensure a more efficient and coherent system. They should replace the current extensive use of narrative reporting with heavy emphasis on activities, which often represents a waste of time and resources, as it is not read, and is not valuable for evaluative analysis of outcomes and impact.
- There should be more consistency of timing in the CAP between the needs assessments and the actual transfers of funds. Donors should be prepared to allocate funds with low earmarking against the appeals, but require more precise and timely information on what the funds were used for, and

what impact funding shortfalls had. This could lead toward a reform of the UN Consolidated Appeal Process, away from a project by project focus, towards a beneficiary population focus, akin for example to the ICRC Planning for Results. This is based on the principle that given resources can be traced down to changes in the environment, via given structures and the delivery of results (intended, or introduced at a later stage). There is currently a significant absence of *ex post* information in the appeals, which is concentrated on *ex ante* analysis of a general nature.

7.4. Recommendations from the Overall Observations

- Displacement is an important indicator of vulnerability, and is easily identified in a complex situation, unlike other forms of vulnerability. It should be preserved as an important humanitarian aid analytical tool. This is not the same as creating a quasi-legal category of persons, called IDPs, akin to that of refugees, which would need specialised agency mandates to be properly assisted. There has been a significant strengthening of the legal basis on which to view the rights and responsibilities of IDPs, including some governmental decrees in Indonesia. They have fundamental human rights by virtue of being human, irrespective of their current situation as displaced people. Attention should be focused on ensuring that these norms are respected in the wide variety of scenarios that prevail in Indonesia.
- The evaluation demonstrates a growing awareness that the ill treatment of many millions of people displaced in the world cannot be left to the concept of national sovereignty, nor to the arbitrary exercise of foreign policy for reasons of national interest (even preventive war) when sovereignty has been breached. However the ‘duty to protect’ doctrine makes for a system-wide state-based policy to protect and assist IDPs because of the risks generated by present or past displacement, not arbitrarily because they are in a situation of displacement. The focus of attention should shift away from mandates, toward sharper needs assessments, differentiated roles to respond to needs, and the development of national law. The wide range of agencies currently involved in a formal manner in this process should be promoted, including the protection dimension of their work.
- Humanitarian assistance should not seek to privilege IDPs over other vulnerable people. It should instead seek to identify precisely who they are, where they are and what their particular needs are. The tendency to reduce the concept of IDPs to people far away from their areas of origin should be avoided. It should be clear that persons who have suffered from displacement but may not be displaced any longer continue to have specific needs. This category would then usefully complement besieged and hostage populations in needs assessments, as well as women, and be included within the humanitarian notion of people at risk, hence seen as priority clients. We find that targeting IDPs should logically lead to a targeting of ex-IDPs, which have returned, as well as of hostage populations whose movements are restricted – categories of persons with continuing needs for protection and assistance.
- To treat IDPs in a manner similar to the extremely poor would risk locking them into a passive position when in fact with minimal capital they could begin a productive rehabilitation process, thanks to their ability to adapt and start again. Similarly to assess the needs of IDPs through finite population numbers (which can mislead into believing that an emergency is over) should be avoided, as it risks hiding other forms of grave vulnerability, and leading to a premature phasing out of assistance.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

1. Background

Responding to a Swedish proposal in the EC Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC), a group of donors have decided to conduct a number of evaluations of humanitarian assistance with special focus on internally displaced people (IDPs). The overall plan is to conduct a range of evaluations in different countries from which findings and recommendations will feed into a synthesis with general recommendations for donor policy and assistance to IDPs. A Framework for a Common Approach Evaluating Assistance to IDPs has been developed for this purpose. The synthesis will be based primarily on the evaluations, but may include other relevant evaluations or studies.

Sweden, represented by Sida, has offered to take responsibility to lead and coordinate the evaluation exercise to be conducted in Indonesia. Other donors, in particular UK and Netherlands, have offered and provided valuable input and co-ownership in the process.

This document together with the Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs¹, (document attached herewith) constitute the Terms of Reference for the evaluation. The evaluation will be carried out by an independent Consultancy team with skills and experiences both in the humanitarian field and in the evaluation of humanitarian aid as well as thorough knowledge and understanding of the Indonesian context).

2. Purposes of the Evaluation

2.1 Global objective

The global objective is to evaluate whether the international community, with special emphasis on some donors, has responded accurately to the IDP emergency in Indonesia, i.e. to evaluate results of donor response and the way that these results have been achieved (accountability).

2.2 Specific objectives

- To assess the *relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, coherence and connectedness* of humanitarian assistance to those among the vulnerable groups in Indonesia that are or have recently been internally displaced.
- To assess in which way the challenges in targeting internally displaced people are reflected in agency policies towards IDPs as distinct from other vulnerable groups, and the possible impact, positive and negative, on local populations of the assistance provided.
- To assess donor agency policy under various financial mechanisms with regard to meeting humanitarian needs of the IDPs.

The evaluation should be conducted in accordance with the proposed Framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to IDPs, specifically around the concept of humanitarian protection.

¹ Framework for a common ... Annex 1:1

2.3 Anticipated results

The anticipated results from the evaluation are:

- An analysis of key and cross-cutting issues in the Indonesian context which in general all agencies and implementing NGOs and INGOs and UN bodies are faced with in the overall funding and implementation of their humanitarian assistance and protection programmes in Indonesia.
- Conclusions and recommendations for the improvement of future policy, strategy, methodology and implementation of assistance to IDPs in Indonesia, with special reference to the concept of humanitarian protection.
- A presentation of conclusions and recommendations from the Indonesian context at both strategic and operational levels. A distinction in the review should be made between donor policy and funding practice on the one hand and for the implementing agency policy and operational practice on the other hand. This distinction between policy and implementation should be carried through the evaluation.

3. Risks

Security issues and non-access to certain areas in Indonesia might at worst cause delays in implementation of the evaluation but is not anticipated to impact decisively on the possibilities to conduct the study and obtain sufficient information as planned. A general prerequisite for implementation will be permissions and approval granted to the consultancy team by Indonesia to enter the country. Another risk of delays of carrying out the evaluation, as the case might be, is connected with natural disasters, frequent in various parts of the archipelago.

There could be a risk that the inclusive and holistic aspirations of this evaluation contribute to a lack of focus. It is anticipated that the consultants will use the common framework in a way that makes it possible to strike a balance between a holistic approach, in-depth understanding and specific recommendations within the given time-frame.

4. Methodology

An independent consultancy team will carry out the evaluation. Essential and desired skills and competencies required by the consultants will be specified in the Invitation to Tender document.

The evaluation shall be based on (i) written documentation and (ii) interviews in Indonesia, in donor capitals and countries, and elsewhere, as found relevant for the evaluation.

The evaluation shall cover the period 2001–2003.

The scope of evaluation shall be as broad as possible, looking into a variety of financial sources, through the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CA), IDP assistance outside the CA, directly through NGOs and INGOs and additional financing mechanisms.

The consultancy team will carry out the evaluation through:

- Research into the background documents, including the document sets provided by Dfid, Sida, the Netherlands and any agency or margins interested to support the evaluation effort with agency specific information.
- Information as made available by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, INGO, and any other actors involved in the provision of assistance to IDPs in Indonesia.

- A review of IDP assistance projects on the ground in at least two provinces in Indonesia.
- Interviews with IDP beneficiaries, community leaders, national and local authority staff and members of the local community.
- Observations, including through field visit(s).

Travel to the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Indonesia and any other country, as needed, is foreseen.

The consultancy team will be responsible to identify and collect relevant material for the evaluation. Examples of documentation that should be studied by the consultants are i.a. protocols, strategies and decision instruments related to humanitarian assistance, existing assessments and reviews of humanitarian assistance support to IDPs, OCHA and other United Nations documentation and Indonesia documentation related to support to IDPs and vulnerable groups affected by conflict.

5. Time and Work Plan

The consultancy team shall carry out the evaluation mission during February–April 2004.

The evaluation is to be made in 4 stages:

- (i) Information gathering and briefing in joint evaluation partners capitals and agency HQs as needed and in Indonesia.
- (ii) Presentation of draft report to Sida.
- (iii) Commenting of draft report.
- (iv) Presentation of findings and recommendations and submission of reports.

6. Reporting

The evaluation will result in a final report in English to be submitted by the consultancy team to Sida not later than 30 May 2004, in 4 paper copies and two CD-Rom discs.

The consultancy team shall be prepared to participate in 2 presentations of the report, one in Jakarta or Bangkok and one in Europe.

Annex 1:1 Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDP's

Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering

Responding to a request by EU's Humanitarian Aid Committee (HAC) a group of donors consisting of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and ECHO decided to conduct a number of evaluations of humanitarian assistance with special focus on internally displaced people (IDP's). The overall plan is to conduct a range of evaluations, some in cooperation and some done individually by each organisation. In order to synthesize the results of these and possibly more evaluations it was agreed to establish a common framework. Danida therefore commissioned Margie Buchanan-Smith, Philip Rudge and John Telford to formulate a framework for a common approach in evaluating humanitarian assistance to IDP's. Their proposal was slightly revised in view of comments received from Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, ECHO, OCHA and UNCHR. As of October 20 the following agencies are participating in this exercise: Danida (Denmark), DGIS (the Netherlands), DCI (Ireland), USAID, ECHO, OCHA and UNHCR.

Purpose of the Paper

1. This paper proposes a framework for a common approach to evaluating assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs), specifically around the concept of humanitarian protection. The *first part* of the paper identifies key issues – at both policy and operational levels – that must be highlighted and prioritised in such an evaluation. It draws on current debates and recent contributions to the literature and thinking on humanitarian assistance. The *second part* of the paper translates this into relevant questions that need to be addressed in order to evaluate the overall impact and effectiveness of assistance to IDPs. Such an evaluation will necessarily include the perspectives of other actors, NGOs, IGOs, and UN bodies. These evaluative questions are organised according to the key criteria used for evaluating humanitarian assistance. This is important to ensure consistency of approach, reinforced by a process of dialogue between actors and hence comparability of the findings of the different evaluations that are to be carried out. This paper presumes that the overall objective of this joint exercise is to draw out key, system-wide lessons and thereby greatly improve the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection to IDPs in the future.

Introduction

2. Internally displaced persons “*are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border*” (Definition contained in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998, hereafter the “Guiding Principles”). The focus of this paper is principally on persons displaced by conflict rather than on those displaced by natural disasters or that category of persons displaced by inappropriate development strategies.

3. The scale of the IDP issue is large and increasing. It is estimated that currently some 25 million persons are displaced by conflict in some 47 countries, over and above the 12 million refugees identified by UNHCR. As a large proportion of these displaced people are women, children and the aged, humanitarian responses face major challenges of gender and generation. International interest in the position of IDPs has intensified in the decade since the appointment of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, Dr Francis Deng. In many international fora there is a vigorous debate about

how to improve the international response to situations of internal displacement. Many UN agencies, national and international NGOs, local authorities in countries affected by internal displacement and the aid community have mandates and support activities that relate to internal displacement. The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is now tasked with improving coordination and ensuring that protection needs of the internally displaced are addressed. Recent initiatives have included the creation of a Senior Inter-agency Network on Internal Displacement, who recommended the creation of an Internal Displacement Unit within OCHA and reconstituted itself as the advisory body to the Unit. The trend in assistance and protection for IDPs is towards the so-called ‘Collaborative Approach’.

4. IDPs are entitled to benefit from the same human rights as anyone else. These rights belong to him/her by virtue of their humanity, irrespective of the current situation – in this case internal displacement – that they may face. However, the notion of ‘internally displaced person’ is not a legal concept like ‘refugee’. There is, moreover, no one formally designated international body mandated to protect and assist IDPs as UNHCR does for refugees. Both refugees and IDPs share many of the same characteristics associated with flight. The critical difference is that one has crossed an international border and the other has not. Beyond the Guiding Principles (sometimes known as the ‘Deng Principles’), which explicitly incorporate established norms of national and international humanitarian and human rights law, there is no great pressure for a separate international legal instrument on IDPs. Furthermore donor states differ in the way they approach protecting and assisting IDPs. Some find it helpful to stress the specificities of the IDP situation; others prefer to focus on what are sometimes called ‘integrated approaches to vulnerability’ in general.

5. Given the pressures on humanitarian assistance budgets, a greater global awareness of internal displacement and increased international co-operation, a common framework for evaluating assistance to IDPs is not only inherently desirable but also consistent with the evolving collaborative approach on the international level. Such a common framework however will need to acknowledge these differing policy approaches while aiming to establish greater consistency and coherence.

Humanitarian Protection: A Unifying Concept?

6. One creative way to arrive at a more unified analysis and approach towards IDPs is through the lens of overall humanitarian protection. This approach can both draw on evolving common principles and shared understandings, and contribute to strengthening the international regime at all levels of humanitarian action. The key proposition here is that the work of all humanitarian organisations should be viewed as *the practical and impartial realisation of people’s rightful legal protection in situations of acute or generalised violence where human rights violations occur*¹. It should be noted that not all conflict-induced IDPs are in recognized “humanitarian situations/emergencies”. A large number of IDPs are in situations which are not overt or well recognized conflicts (such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, Nepal etc.).² The supply of food, water and shelter are clearly critical factors for the survival of all vulnerable persons, including IDPs. Beyond these essential requirements for basic survival, the notion of protection can apply, for example to livelihood programmes like seeds and tools (economic protection), medical and sanitary action (health protection), education programmes (child protection), detention monitoring programmes (judicial protection), and the protection of women from rape (personal protection from violence).

7. Taking protections as the starting point, IDPs pose immediate and complex challenges to humanitarian intervention. Under international law it is states that have primary responsibility for the security

¹ Slim, H., & Eguren, L.E., ‘Humanitarian Protection: An ALNAP Guidance Booklet’, May 2003 (draft in progress) and comments from OCHA, July 2003.

² Comments from OCHA, July 2003.

of all of their citizens, including IDPs. However in many cases the state authorities may be the authors of the displacement, or may not have the political will or capacity and resources to assist and protect the affected population. This sovereign responsibility of all states, particularly its protection element, needs to be viewed in the light of recent thinking on the international community's 'responsibility to protect':

"Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect" (report of the International Commission on Intervention and State sovereignty).

The source of this responsibility lies in evolving states' practice, the responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and in *"specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law."* (ibid).

This responsibility comprises three elements:

- i) *The responsibility to prevent and mitigate:* to address both root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man made crises putting populations at risk;
- ii) *The responsibility to react:* to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution and in extreme cases military intervention;
- iii) *The responsibility to rebuild:* to provide, particularly after military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.

8. In the context of overall agency policy towards a given country where IDP issues arise, prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect. Since many humanitarian crises arise and endure in the absence of political solutions to conflict, more commitment and resources should be devoted to preventative strategies addressing both the root causes for conflict and prevention of human rights violations, from high level political intervention to local initiatives at reconciliation. However, that issue is beyond the principal focus of this paper which is mainly concerned with the second and third of these elements relating to humanitarian, and, to some extent, development assistance. In the event of conflict, civilians face major violations of their civil, political, social and cultural rights, and their protection from personal violence, impoverishment and the vulnerability caused by conflict and displacement becomes critical. The challenge confronting policy makers, therefore, is how to orientate their humanitarian assistance to address the protection gap caused by the grave violations of humanitarian law and to ensure that millions of internally displaced persons may realise their full rights as civilians in a conflict.

A useful, and widely accepted model of humanitarian protection is the 'egg model' that has developed out of the ICRC-led workshops on protection. It has 3 elements:

- i) Division of all agency work around violations and protection in 3 spheres of programming: *responsive, remedial, environment building*
- ii) Description of all forms of protective practice in 4 modes: denunciation, persuasion, substitution and support to services
- iii) Endorsement of the principle of inter agency complementarity as central to all protection planning

Key Issues of Policy and Definition

Threats, risks and needs

9. The identification of the affected IDP group is often difficult. This is very much to do with the changing nature of conflicts and displacements and the objective difficulty in many field situations of identifying who are internally displaced persons, and for how long they can be so described.

Particularly in situations where internal displacement is a very protracted phenomenon, the issue of when humanitarian assistance ends and development assistance starts comes into sharp focus. Linkages with other structural reasons for conflict in the Post Cold War period have emerged in the last decade and add complexity to the IDP issue. These include conflicts over identity and resources, the suppression of the rights of minorities, poverty, bad governance, human rights violations, and environmental and infrastructural degradation. All this in the light of the proliferation of internal conflicts where often the ethnic cleansing of whole communities and the wider displacement of civilians is not an accidental consequence but the central objective of the conflict.

10. IDPs are a heterogeneous community of vulnerable people often living among other vulnerable people and sharing many of their needs and aspirations. Given this complexity humanitarian agencies have raised the following pros and cons in targeting IDPs as a category worthy of specific attention. The arguments usually go as follows:

Advantages of targeting:

- IDPs will not be forgotten or ignored as a result of their political marginalisation;
- There can be more effective advocacy for the needs and rights of IDPs and greater pressure on local and national authorities to assume their rightful responsibilities;
- A greater focus on durable solutions for IDPs will emerge;
- Greater assistance and protection can be rendered especially for highly vulnerable child, women and elderly IDPs.

Disadvantages of targeting:

- Camps of IDPs may grow up, relieving states of their fundamental protection responsibilities and prolonging or cementing the IDP status;
- The serious needs of local populations may not receive sufficient attention, thereby producing tensions between displaced people and the host community;
- 'Fake' IDP camps may act as with a pull effect whereby people self-define themselves as IDPs to receive assistance they would not otherwise receive.

11. The European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and some governments and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) support the view against categorising IDPs as a special case group. Some governments, lawyers and policy thinkers take a more assertive view about the specifics of internal displacement. A helpful trend discernible in recent thinking about humanitarian intervention is the focus on *threats and risks* rather than simply *need*, and an approach that seeks to be more specific about kinds of vulnerability.

The point of compromise for donor, operational agency, host communities and IDPs themselves could be this: that the central concern is not to grant the internally displaced a privileged status, but to identify as accurately as possible who and where they are, and then to ensure that their needs are not ignored.

The end of displacement

12. When internal displacement can be described as at an end is a matter of intense current debate. This is partly because of imprecision about the many possible factors that cause displacement, and partly because of a concern that decisions about continuing need are too often arbitrary and ad hoc or based on administrative or political convenience. The heart of the matter is the point at which the focus should shift from assisting and protecting IDPs to a more holistic community-based rehabilitation and development approach. It is clearly necessary for the IDPs themselves also to know where they stand.

13. The planning of exit strategies needs to avoid mere resource-based considerations and be based on strategies based on needs, risks and threats. Interventions on behalf of IDPs could usefully include analysis of what happens to those who return to their home or resettle elsewhere in the country. Such an analysis should involve a sophisticated understanding of what constitutes 'return' and 'home', and which activities should be undertaken to prevent reoccurrence of displacement and promote durable solutions.

Key Operational Issues

Assessment and analysis

14. Conducting an assessment is the critical first step of any humanitarian intervention. Conventionally, most assessments in humanitarian emergencies focus on a population's lack of access to basic commodities such as food, water, health services and shelter, and the extent to which this is life threatening. This, in turn, is translated into the need for material relief resources which forms the basis of a humanitarian relief operation launched by international humanitarian agencies. Darcy describes this as a 'supply-driven response', which may be exacerbated if the assessment is skewed according to the particular sectoral or specialist expertise of the agency undertaking the assessment³. For instance, food relief needs may be prioritised by a food distribution agency over and above more pressing shelter or water requirements. What is often missing from this kind of assessment is an analysis of a population's vulnerability to the consequences of violent conflict, and the impact on that population's rights. In contrast to the first scenario, an approach which takes the denial of rights as its starting point would translate into an assessment of protection requirements to save human life and to ensure human security. It would necessitate a much more politically informed analysis than is often the case.

15. This second approach to conducting a humanitarian assessment is much more demanding, but it is also more comprehensive and appropriate to situations of violent conflict, not least to addressing the needs of the displaced. It encourages more in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of vulnerability, at macro and micro levels. Two recent contributions to the literature are helpful in developing such an approach:

- (i) Collinson on implementing a political economy approach, which is concerned with changing power relationships in society and the processes associated with conflict and vulnerability⁴
- (ii) Slim and Eguren's framework (2003) for conducting a 'violation assessment and responsibility analysis', which comprises an analysis of power relations, an analysis of the nature of violations, of perpetration and threat, and of responsibility for responding to and stopping violations.

³ Darcy, J., 2003, 'Measuring humanitarian need. A critical review of needs assessment practice and its influence on resource allocation. Preliminary findings', Prepared for Montreux VI: Donor retreat on the CAP and coordination on humanitarian emergencies, London: ODI

⁴ Collinson, S. (ed), 2003, 'Power, livelihoods and conflict: case studies in political economy analysis for humanitarian action', HPG Report 13, London: ODI

A further challenge is how to categorise different groups of vulnerable people within the population, to guide programme design and targeting. This lies at the heart of whether or not to categorise IDPs as a group distinct from other vulnerable people. Darcy makes the useful suggestion that specific vulnerabilities are distinguished according to ‘numbers at risk of...’.

16. There is a very real danger that a long-term humanitarian crisis amongst a displaced population somehow becomes ‘normalised’. Agencies and governments become de-sensitised to consistently high levels of deprivation and suffering, only reacting to indicators that the situation is worsening. This phenomenon has been well-documented in the case of Sudan, in relation to IDPs in the north of the country, and in relation to IDPs and settled populations in the south of the country. It is clearly in violation of the core humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity.

Access

17. A major and recurring challenge in providing humanitarian assistance and protection to many IDP populations is one of access. Warring parties may deliberately deny access to humanitarian agencies as part of their conflict strategy. Where civilians are displaced within a war zone, it may be extremely dangerous for humanitarian agencies and aid workers to reach them. Or it may be that displaced populations are simply hidden within the host population. Where access is difficult or denied, protection requirements and need may have to be ‘guestimated’. More seriously, this may prevent the effective and timely delivery of assistance.

Shelter, land rights and livelihoods

18. Almost by definition, shelter is one of the principal relief needs of many IDPs. Yet it is one of the areas of least well-documented best practice in humanitarian operations. Many evaluations report highly variable performance, and there are few NGOs with this kind of sectoral expertise. In the case of IDPs, shelter issues are often closely linked to issues to do with access to land. In the short term, it may be politically difficult for IDPs to be allocated space for temporary dwellings. This becomes more acute as the displacement becomes longer-term, if IDPs continue to be denied land rights. Operational agencies may be faced not only with the challenge of implementing effective shelter programmes, but also with difficult advocacy issues.

19. Similarly, IDPs may be denied access to an income-generating livelihood. This is often a consequence of being denied access to land, and hence to agricultural opportunities. It may extend to lack of access to trading and other economic opportunities.

Return and rehabilitation

20. As explained above, decisions to end aid flows because the problem of displacement has ‘ended’, are often arbitrary and ad hoc. Although it may be deemed that the humanitarian emergency is over, and therefore the humanitarian aid tap should be switched off, there is frequently a gap before the necessary development assistance is made available to re-establish livelihoods and support rehabilitation. In long-running situations of displacement, donors’ political will may begin to evaporate when the high-profile crisis stage is over. Yet the plight of IDPs persists.

Fundamental requirements of an agency: questions to be addressed by the evaluation

21. There are a number of issues which confront all donors and operational NGOs, IGOs and UN bodies in the overall delivery of their humanitarian assistance and protection programmes which equally apply to their support for IDPs. The following questions should be used as a checklist for all evaluations within the IDP framework in order to make crosscutting analysis much easier.

- i) Does the agency offer policy leadership nationally and internationally through more informed advocacy of the protection issues raised by internal displacement?
- ii) Does the agency have a focal point to draw together the different humanitarian/development strands within the government departments concerned?
- iii) Does the agency encourage cooperation and complementarity with other agencies, the UN system and local and international NGOs? Do agencies act as a united group to influence policies and actions in the host country, or is there an unhealthy unilateralism impacting negatively on operational partners?
- iv) How is information regarding the IDP situation being collected and how do agencies agree on the size and scope of an IDP problem? Should there be some form of IDP registration?
- v) Is the agency committed to the collaborative approach involving dialogue about best practice in terms of policy and operations?
- vi) Does the agency advocate for the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement nationally and internationally through public policy statements, training of government officials and integration of the Principles into programming? Does the agency include the treatment of IDP issues in its critical human rights work in international fora?
- vii) Does the agency give priority to the issue of IDPs in the ongoing debate about when relief gives way to longer-term development assistance?
- viii) Does the agency ensure that its programming is informed by accurate conflict analysis, particularly so as to avoid exacerbating conflict by inappropriate humanitarian assistance to IDPs?
- ix) Does the agency have an evenhanded approach to funding IDP issues around the world to counteract the Euro centric bias evident in the 1990s?
- x) Do projects involving local NGO partners aim to build long-term in-country capacity?
- xi) Does the agency operate rigorous selection of operational partners to ensure they have the capacity, probity, political impartiality and experience to deliver?
- xii) Does the agency focus sufficiently on the gender and generation dimensions of operations?
- xiii) Does the agency work with local communities and local resources?
- xiv) Does the agency have an institutional memory so that lessons and experiences gained are integrated into the planning of further responses?

The following section proposes how these questions should be addressed in the evaluation.

From the Key Issues to Evaluation Criteria: A Guide to Designing Terms of Reference

Just as every country is different from every other; each IDP phenomenon will have its own special characteristics. Nevertheless, the terms of reference for each individual evaluation should be developed according to the criteria indicated below. Specific questions that are pertinent to the context and case of IDPs have been identified for each criterion. Some of these questions relate directly to the policies and operational programming of the agency concerned. Some relate to the programming and performance of its operational partners (whether INGOs, local NGOs or UN agencies). Where possible,

this distinction is indicated. A distinction has also been drawn between a review of donor policy and an evaluation of operations on the ground. This distinction between policy and operations should be carried through to the final evaluation reports.

1. Relevance

This criterion is concerned with assessing whether programming is in line with local needs and priorities. Specifically, is humanitarian assistance being provided impartially, proportionate to need?

Review of agency policy

This part of the evaluation should establish whether there is a clear commitment to humanitarian principles (in particular the principles of impartiality and humanity) in agency policy on humanitarian assistance.

- Does agency policy refer to and/ or incorporate the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement?
- What is agency policy towards IDPs? Are they regarded as a special category, distinct from other vulnerable groups? How are IDPs defined? Is policy towards IDPs implicit or explicit? Are policies consistent between HQ and missions and between multilateral and bilateral donors?
- To what extent is agency policy on IDPs generic, and to what extent is it flexible and determined by the specific country/ context? How appropriate and relevant is the approach adopted? For example, if internal displacement is a consequence of the violation of minority rights, to what extent is this addressed by agency policy?
- Does the agency have IDP a focal point in HQ that monitors application of policy? How does the agency disseminate policy to make sure country offices are aware and understand?
- Is agency policy on IDPs sensitive to gender and generational issues?
- How are countries and cases being prioritized by agencies? To what extent is there an impartial allocation of agency resources to IDPs at global level, according to need?

Evaluation of operations

- How are the needs and/or rights of IDPs defined by a) the agency agency in the country concerned, and b) its operational partners in the country concerned?
- To what extent is the vulnerability of IDPs understood as a protection issue where rights are violated through violent conflict and consequent displacement, versus an issue of material deprivation which threatens lives and livelihoods?
- What are the implications of this understanding for the assessment and provision of programme assistance? How appropriate is this to the context and needs of IDPs in the country/region of concern?
- How have humanitarian needs assessments been carried out by operational
- partners (and, where relevant, by the agency)?
- To what extent has the assessment explored the underlying causes of vulnerability and displacement? To what extent is it informed by political analysis, including an analysis of the conflict, of power relations and an analysis of how rights are being violated?
- What categorizations have been applied to understand the vulnerability of different groups, and how appropriate is that to the specific context?

- What level of need is regarded as the ‘trigger’ for the provision of humanitarian assistance? Has this remained constant or changed over time? Is there any evidence of the ‘normalisation’ of the humanitarian emergency? Does this respect the humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity?
- To what extent have IDPs (and other vulnerable people) been consulted about their needs and about an appropriate response? To what extent do they feel that agency assistance has been relevant?
- Is the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid proportionate to need?
- How is targeting being carried out by operational partners? For example, is it being done according to pre-determined categories of vulnerable people (i.e. separating out IDPs), and/ or is it being done according to a comparative assessment of need? How appropriate and relevant is this approach to targeting?
- Have issues of gender and generation been adequately addressed in the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid?
- If IDPs are being targeted as a separate category of vulnerable people, is there any evidence that this is at the expense of other vulnerable groups, or is it proportionate to the vulnerability and needs of other vulnerable groups?
- Are the programming choices of operational partners appropriate to the needs and rights of IDPs?
- To what extent have issues of protection been addressed and met, directly and/ or through advocacy? (see point under coherence).
- Does the programme combine an appropriate mix of material assistance and other protective activities, e.g. lobbying, advocacy etc?
- Are there any gaps?

2. Effectiveness

Evaluation of operations

This criterion assesses the extent to which programmes achieved their purpose. As far as possible, this should draw on the views of IDPs and vulnerable people themselves.

- How clearly stated are the overall objectives and outcomes of the agency’s strategy/programme for responding to the needs/rights of IDPs? How clear is the strategy in terms of finding the best way to achieve these outcomes? Does the agency strategy on IDP’s include an advocacy component? Has advocating for IDP’s with authorities and humanitarian community been effective?
- Has progress towards achieving these objectives and outcomes been carefully and consistently monitored, by the agency and by its operational partners, informing subsequent modification of programming? Have appropriate indicators for monitoring been used?
- How timely has the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs been?
- How successfully has access to IDPs been secured, within and outside conflict zones?
- To what extent have operational partners demonstrated awareness of ‘Sphere’ and been able to meet Sphere standards?

- What lessons about providing assistance to IDPs have been learned and applied between different emergencies, particularly by the agency, but also by its operational partners?

3. Impact

This criterion assesses the real difference that programmes and projects have made in addressing the needs of IDPs – positive and negative, short and long-term, direct and indirect.

On the international humanitarian system

- How has agency policy towards IDPs impacted on the ability of the international humanitarian system to respond to the specific needs of IDPs? For example:
- What has been the impact on institutional mandates to address the protection needs of male and female IDPs, children and aged, in terms of clarity, appropriateness, and effectiveness of the division of responsibility?
- What are the implications of the agency's choice of operational partners for channeling its funds to address the needs of various groups of IDPs, both positive and negative?

On IDPs and other vulnerable people

- To what extent have the protection and material relief needs of IDPs been met taking gender, age, and ethnicity into consideration, and what has been the impact?
- To what extent have the underlying causes of the various IDP groups' vulnerability been addressed, and what is the impact?
- What impact has the provision of humanitarian assistance had on relations between IDPs and host/ other vulnerable people (positive and negative), for example in terms of exacerbating or reducing conflict?
- What has been the overall impact of treating IDPs as a special category, or not – depending on the respective agency policy?

4. Efficiency

Evaluation of operations

- Were financial resources used efficiently by the agency (and in turn, by its operational partners), in terms of achieving maximum impact?
- Has the agency made well-informed decisions (according to expertise and capacity) about its choice of implementing partners?

5. Coherence

This criterion assesses the coherence between the policies and programming of different agencies, and therefore addresses issue of coordination. For each individual agency, it is concerned with consistency across agency policy, and between policy and operations.

Review of agency policy

- How coherent is the respective agency's policy towards IDPs with the policies of other agencies? What are the implications?
- Has the agency supported a collaborative approach to IDPs, in both policy and operational terms? What have been the implications (positive and negative)?

- To what extent does the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) encourage a coherent approach amongst agencies to assisting IDPs? Does the agency participate in CAP workshops where strategies are developed, and does it monitor CAP with a view to ensuring gaps do not exist? How effective is this?
- How effectively does the agency participate in information sharing – with other agencies, with the host government, and with coordination bodies

Evaluation of operations

- To what extent are operations on the ground consistent with the agency's policy on IDPs? What are the implications?
- To what extent is there coherence between the programming approaches of different agencies and their implementing partners in the country concerned? What are the implications? To what extent have agencies identified and acted upon their particular comparative advantage/added value in addressing the humanitarian needs and rights of IDPs?
- How effective is coordination? How has the agency engaged with coordination mechanisms and processes, and/or to what extent has it encouraged its operational partners to engage with coordination mechanisms and processes? What are the implications?

6. Connectedness

Evaluation of operations

This criterion assesses the extent to which short-term emergency interventions have been carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account? Specifically:

- Has the agency (or its implementing partners) attempted to address the root causes of displacement and vulnerability, at an operational and/or political levels? To what extent is short, medium and long-term objectives geared towards creating lasting solutions.
- Has responsibility for addressing the needs of various groups of IDPs been appropriately identified (i.e. with states) and encouraged/ advocated by the agency and its implementing partners?
- To what extent has capacity building of local structures and organisations been part of the agency's (and its operational partners') approach? Was this appropriate? To what extent was it informed by an analysis of conflict dynamics?
- Has the design and implementation of emergency interventions by operational partners been informed by an analysis of conflict dynamics? To what extent have interventions exacerbated, or reduced the likelihood of violent conflict, either as an explicit objective, or indirectly?
- Has the design of programme interventions by operational partners taken into account and attempted to minimise the potential negative impact on vulnerability of IDPs in the longer-term (for example, that the provision of large quantities of relief resources might make IDPs more vulnerable to attack in the future)?
- Has the design of programme interventions by operational partners taken into account the longer-term environmental consequences of the provision of humanitarian assistance to IDPs?
- How has the agency decided that there is no further need for humanitarian assistance to IDPs? In other words, how has the agency decided that displacement has ended? How appropriate was this decision? And how effective was the exit strategy?

- Is there any evidence of follow-up monitoring of the situation of IDPs after they have returned home, or been re-settled, and aid assistance has ceased?
- To what extent have different aid instruments (ie humanitarian and development aid) been used coherently and effectively to address the needs of IDPs, and the protracted nature of many IDP situations? Have there been any gaps? How are decisions made and how flexible are agencies to respond to displacement especially when it is short term or unexpected?

Evaluation Department

October 20 2003

Annex 2: List of Persons Met

Evaluation of assistance to IDPs in Indonesia

List of Persons Met

Meetings in Europe and Telephone Interviews

Date	Person and Title	Organisation
17.03.2004	Ms Ellen Buch-Hansen, Development Administrator, The Evaluation Secretariat	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen
18–19.03.2004	Ms Katarina Zinn, Programme Officer, Division for Humanitarian Assistance & Conflict Management Johan Schaar, Head of Division for Humanitarian Assistance & Conflict Management	Sida, Stockholm
	Mr Ted Kliest, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department Drs Mariska van Beijnum, Researcher, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department Ms Eliane Provò Kluit, Senior Policy Adviser, Humanitarian Aid Division Drs Harald Boerekamp, Humanitarian Aid Division, Indonesia Desk	The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
22.03.2004	Tim Heath, Assistant Conflict Adviser, CHAD	DFID, London
05.04.2004	Mrs Florence Séchaud, Deputy Head of Operations for South East Asia and Pacific Mrs Judith Greenwood, Head of Unit, External Resources Division Mr Christoph Luedi, Head, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Mr Patrick Saez, Head of Project, Central Tracing Agency Mr Pierre Gerber, Chef de secteur, Unité sécurité économique	ICRC Geneva
05.04.2004	Mr Mikael Lindvall, Premier Secrétaire	MFA Sweden, Geneva, Permanent Mission to the UN.
05.04.2004	Mrs Marie Spaak, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, former Desk Officer Indonesia Mr Toby Lanzer, Chief, CAP Section	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
08.04.2004	Mr Peter Cavendish, Head of Evaluation Section Mr Michael Gowen, Deputy Head of Unit, Asia	ECHO

Jakarta

Wednesday 21 April 2004

Time	Person and Title	Organisation
09.00–10.30	Mr Ulf Samuelsson, Second Secretary	Embassy of Sweden
11.30–13.00	Mr Ole Johan Hauge, Head of Delegation	IFRC
13.00–14.00	Mr John F. Mamoedi, Head of Disaster Management Unit	PMI – Indonesian Red Cross Headquarters
14.30–16.00	Mr Boris Michel, Head of Delegation	ICRC

Thursday 22 April 2004

11.30–13.30	Ms Sri Kuntari, Project Leader and Social Development Specialist Ms Melina Nathan, Consultant Mr Richard Manning, Social Development Specialist Ms Risa Joan Toha, Consultant	World Bank Social Economic Revitalisation Project, (SERP) (former SCRAP)
14.00–14.30	Mr Martin Dawson, First Secretary Development. Deputy Head of DFID Indonesia	British Embassy
16.00–17.30	Mr Mohammed M. Saleheen, Representative & Country Director Ms Terri Toyota, Deputy Country Director Mr Zhigang Weng, Programme Adviser Mr Rasmus Egendal, Emergency Officer	WFP

Friday 23 April 2004

08.00–09.15	Ms Barbara Porter Lauer, (former) Regional Director for Indonesia and Timor Leste Mr Charles Davy, (new) Regional Director for Indonesia and Timor Leste	ICMC – International Catholic Migration Commission
09.30–10.30	Mr Maurice R. Pourchez, Attaché Political Section	Royal Netherlands Embassy
11.00–12.00	Mr Ahmer Akhtar, Technical Officer, Emergency & Humanitarian Action	WHO
11.00–12.00	Mr Hoffstetter, Coordinator, relief	ICRC
14.30–15.30	Mr Abdul Haq Amiri, Deputy Chief	OCHA Indonesia

Team A**Friday 23 April 2004**

Time	Person and Title	Organisation and location
17.00–	Departure for Surabaya, West Java	

Saturday 24 April 2004

10.00–10.30	Mr Ir H Alisjahbana, Director	PMI, Surabaya
11.15–12.30	Ms Lidya Nahayu, Logistician, Surabaya Ms Enny Idiawati, Senior Logistician, Jakarta	ICRC Warehouse, Surabaya

Sunday 25 April 2004

09.00–18.00	Day trip to Madura 1. Visit at Campus of Trunojoyo University of Bangkalan, observation of hunger strike against nuclear power 2. Meeting the Secretary of the Bupati of Sampang, Desa Kelbung – Kecamatan Cupolo; Katol Barat – Kecamatan Geger. Also talks with Aliman Harish, Director of Lembaga Kajian Sosial Demokrasi. 3. Meeting Kepala Desa of Betokorogan. Interviewed two IDPs: Mr Abdul Beri, teacher from Sampit and Mr Habi Budin, farmer from Sampit 4. Visit with former host community (relatives of IDPs recently returned to West Kalimantan)	Beneficiaries, Village Heads and Local Government Representatives
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Monday 26 April 2004

08.30–	Departure for Denpasar, Bali	
19.00–23.00	Ms Karin Michotte, Expert	ECHO

Tuesday 27 April 2004

08.00–	Departure for Manado, North Sulawesi	
19.00–21.00	Mr André Walla, Head of CRP Manado	CRP – Community Recovery Programme (Indonesian NNGO)

Wednesday 28 April 2004

09.00–10.15	Mr André Walla, Head of CRP Manado Ms Vivi George	CRP and Local Women's NGO: Swara Parangpuan Sulut (targets local women)
10.30–	Departure for Ternate	
13.30–14.15	Update and situation report Mr Jopie Sinanu, Area Based Project Manager Ms Devi Suryani A, Administrative Assistant	UNDP. Ternate, North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme
14.30–16.00	Ms Nicolle Spijkerman, Office Manager/Financial Coordinator	Cordaid, Maluku Utara
16.15–17.15	Mr Lukman Hakim, North Maluku Project Officer	International Relief and Development
17.15 – 18.30	Mr John Holmes-levers, Field Coordinator	CARDI, North Maluku

Thursday 29 April 2004

Departure for North Halmahera, Tobelo		
08.45–10.30	Visit to Tataleka Village Meeting Kepala Desa and Muslim returnees from Ternate living in houses and barracks.	Housing project
11.30–12.00	Visit to Ake Ara Village Experienced village meeting on school house construction project	UNDP-UNOPS financed participatory project.
13.45–15.15	Mr John Blake, General Manager	Newcrest Mining Ltd. Nusa Halmahera Minerals
17.45–18.30	Mr El Tayeb Musa, Programme Manager North Maluku Mr Tasman Muda, Senior Project Officer, Education Ms Diyah Perwitosari, Project Officer, ENACT Programme	Save the Children, UK – Tobelo

Friday 30 April 2004

09.00–09.45	Mr Mohammad Sabar, National Programme Officer. Engineer. (Deputy Area Programme Manager)	UNDP Tobelo. North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme
10.00–11.00	Meeting District Secretary Dr Salahuddin Baba, Sekda Dr Josafat Nyong, Ka Bawasda	District Secretary's Office
14.00–15.00	Meeting with National UN Volunteer Specialists: Ms Sitti Haryani Kadir (Ani), Industries & Trade, (Women) Mr Pandu Haitojo, Livestock Mr Kusnadi, Fisheries Mr Sarip Aklah, Agriculture	UNDP Tobelo. North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme
16.15–17.30	Ms Marianne De Haan, Education Adviser Mr Philip Siahaan, Education Officer	World Vision, Tobelo

Saturday 1 May 2004

Field trip to Galela Sub-District		
09.30	Site Visit: Wasi Bridge, Togawa Village	UNDP North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme
10.00–11.30	Meeting with Inter-Religious Women's Group in Togawa Village	UNDP Project Proposal in Pipeline: "Income Generation for Conflict-affected Women"
11.30–12.15	Meeting Kepala Desa of Togawa Village	Kepala Desa
13.00–14.00	Site Visit: Elementary School Building, Soatobaru Village. (Owned by GEMIH: Evangelise Church of Halmahera Foundation. Before the conflict the school was mixed). Meeting Kepala Desa: Adreanous Dilago and two female teachers.	UNDP North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme
16.30–18.30	Site Visit: Wood Pier Tolonuo Village/Island Mr Misbach Kanaha, Secretary of Kepala Desa and village representatives	UNDP North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme

Sunday 2 May 2004

05.00	Departure for Ternate	
16.00–17.00	Ms Yusni Yanti Sofyan Se Ms Salma AminMs Haeriah Tahane	Daur Mala, Daulat Parangpuan (Local Womens Group)

Team B

Saturday 24 April 2004

Time	Person and Title	Organisation
09.30–12.00	Departure for Pontianak, West Kalimantan	
14.00	Drs. Rusman Namsurie, Wk. Ketua Bid. Penanggulangan Bencana, Vice Head of Disaster Management Section Ibu Ny. Anik M. Rachmat, Wk. Sekretaris/Kamada PMI Kalbar, Vice Secretary	Local PMI- Kalimantan Barat, Pontianak
17.00	Mr Fubertus Ifur, CRP coordinator and his team Ms Yiana – Administrator, Ms Yanti-financial staff, Mr Mohammad – Monitoring officer Mr Joli – Auditor Mr Martinus – Janitor	CRP (UNDP funded) programme staff

Sunday 25 April 2004

08.00–10.00	Field visits to Singkawang District	
10.00–12.00	Interviews with beneficiaries in Marhaban village	Beneficiaries
14.00–15.00	Meeting with PMI staff from Singkawang and Sambas (facilitated by staff of PMI province) Mr Said, Head of PMI Singkawang Mr Hanafi, Head of PMI Sambas Mr Mustaikan, Head of project Mr Abdulhadi, Treasury	
16.00–18.30	Interviews with local people in Sambas, Sempadung Village Dinner with PMI staff from Pontianak, Singkawang and Sambas.	Beneficiaries PMI Staff

Monday 26 April 2004

08.00–10.00	Meeting with head of PMI Singkawang	PMI Singkawang
10.00–14.00	Return to Pontianak	
14.30–16.00	Meeting with the PMI Province of West Kalimantan: Ny. Sri Kadarwati Aspar Aswin, Chair Lady of PMI in Pontianak Fs. Barmaniki, Kabid Diklat & SDM (head of Training and education and Human Resources Management) Drs. Rusman Namsurie, Wk. Ketua Bid. Penanggulangan Bencana, vice head of disaster management section Ibu Ny. Anik M. Rachmat, Wk. Sekretaris/Kamada PMI Kalbar, vice secretary	Chair Lady of PMI in Pontianak, Wife of the former Governor of west Kalimantan and Head of several women's org. in West Kalimantan PMI Staff Pontianak

Tuesday 27 April 2004

	Planned field visit cancelled due to unpredictable weather	
10.00–12.00	Mr Muhammad Isa, Director Mr Ireng Maulana, Staff	Meeting with Gemawan – Local NGO dealing with IDPs and Post IDPs assistance
13.00	Meeting with Save the Children UK Peter Morrison, Programme Manager	Save the Children- UK, Pontianak
15.30	Meeting with IOM Arie Mirjawa, Programme Assistant	IOM

Wednesday 28 April 2004

11.00	Drs L.H. Kadir, Vice Governor of Kalimantan Barat. Yatin Kusumawaty, Pemberdayaan Perempuan, the Women's Empowerment Section Nyoman Sudana, Bappeda Kalbar, the Regional Planning Bureau Agus Sarwono- Kesbang- Linmas/Satkorlak PB-P – Kesatuan Bangsa – Perlindungan Masyarakat (The Nation Unity – Community Protection) (Note: The meeting was facilitated by PMI- FS Barmaniki, Kabid Diklat & SDM, and Drs Rusman Namsurie, Wk. Ketua Bid. Penanggulangan Bencana)	Vice Governor and his staff PMI Kalimantan Barat
13.00	Field trip to resettlement site (SP1) at Tebang Kacang Subdistrict, and interviews with beneficiaries (the Head of Village and two women)	Beneficiaries and Kepala Desa

Thursday 29 April 2004

8.00–10.00	Ms Marites de la Cruz, Project Officer	IOM. Liason Office for Indonesia
10.00	Departure for Jakarta	PMI

Friday 30 April 2004

04.00–14.30	Departure for Manado, North Sulawesi (Reorganisations of meetings due to flight delay) Visit facilitated by Mr Deny from CRP – UNDP funded program, Manado Office)	
15.00–17.00	Field visit to the BP7 IDP camp, Manado	Beneficiaries
18.00–19.00	Mr John Holmes-levers, Field Coordinator.- North Maluku	Cardi

Saturday 1 May 2004

8.00–09.00	Meeting with CRP, Manado office.	CRP
10.00–11.00	Departure for and arrival at Ternate	
12.30	Lunch with UNDP Staff	UNDP Ternate
15.00–16.00	Mr Elva CH. F. Rori, Project Manager, Protection Information & Advocacy Program	Cardi
16.00–18.00	Visits to two IDP camps in Ternate city: The Bimoli Camp for re-displaced IDPs The Muhajirin Camp IDP camp	Beneficiaries
19.00–20.00	Meeting and Dinner with Mr Elva CH. F. Rori, Project Manager, Protection Information & Advocacy Programme and Ms Devi Suryani, Administrative Assistant., UNDP Ternate office	Cardi & UNDP Ternate, North Maluku & Maluku Recovery Programme

Sunday 2 May 2004

8.00–16.00BN	Field trip to two villages in Jailolo District, North Maluku	Beneficiaries
09.00–10.00	Ms Rainannur M, Hum, Head of Women Study Centre	Women Study Centre, University of Khairun, Ternate
10.30–13.00	Mr Gafar Tuanany, Chairperson	'Tim Mitra Kerja Teknis – PKM' (The Technical Partner Team – Community Recovery Programme), Ternate, North Maluku
15.00–16.00	Ms Astuti Usman and her staff.	Daurmala, a local women organisation in North Maluku

Jakarta (Occasionally Divided Team)**Monday 3 May 2004 – Muslim Holiday**

Time	Person and Title	Organisation
08.00 All	Departure for Jakarta	
14.00–15.00	Mr Martin Dawson, First Secretary Development. Deputy Head of DFID Indonesia	British Embassy

Tuesday 4 May 2004

08.00–09.30	Mr Kees Gronendijk, Country Director	CARDI
08.00–13.00	Internal Co-ordination meeting	
14.00–15.00	Ms Vanessa Johanson, Country Director	Common Ground Indonesia
16.30–17.45	Mr Thomas E. Hensleigh, Country Director Mr Nigel Pont, Director of Programmes	Mercy Corps
16.30–17.00	Ms Sydney Jones	ICG
17.00–18.00	Mr Patrick Sweeting, Head of CPRU, UNDP	UNDP CPRU

Wednesday 5 May 2004

09.00–10.00	Mr Michael Elmquist, Deputy to Humanitarian Coordinator and Chief OCHA Indonesia	OCHA
10.30–	Preparation of De-Briefing Seminar	

Thursday 6 May 2004

09.00–10.00	Ms Catherine Yates, First Secretary Development Cooperation Ms Prisca Seridanta, Program Manager	AusAID
09.00–10.00	Ms. Elisabeth Sidabutar, Programme Assitant	UNFPA
10.30–11.00	Telephone Conference Ms Jenny McAvoy, Programme Coordinator	OXFAM
12.00–13.00	Ms Yin Yin Nwe, Senior Programme Officer Mr Siddharth Chatterjee, Chief Emergency Section	UNICEF
14.30 – 15.45	Mr Wynn Flaten, Senior Operations Manager Mr Mindaraga Rahardja (Iwan), Team leader Disaster Management Department	World Vision
16.30–17.30	Ms Lies Marantika, member of KOMNAS Perempuan.	National Commission on Violence against Women. Ms Marantika also works for PGI Crisis Centre, where the meeting was held
16.30–17.30	Ms Eva Mellgren, Sida Regional Advisor, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management	Sida/Swedish Embassy
19.30–	Dinner with: Mr George Conway and Mr Patrick Sweeting	UNDP

Friday 7 May 2004

10.00–12.00	Donors' Debriefing	
12.00–13.00	Lunch with representatives from Sida and the Swedish Embassy	Sida
15.00	Departure of three members of the team	

IDP Evaluation Debriefing, 7th May 2004

List of Invitees & Participants (✓)

✓ Abdul Haq Amiri	OCHA
Ahmer Akhtar	WHO
✓ Anders Eriksson	Sida/Emb. Sweden
✓ Antonio Villamor	CARDI
Babara Porter Lauer	ICMC
Birgitta Soraya	World Vision
Boris Michel	ICRC
Budi Atmadi Adiputro	BAKORNAS-PBP
Cathrine Yates	AusAid
✓ Cédric Hofstetter	ICRC
Charles Davy	ICMC
✓ Danco Apizaukoski	CARDI
David MacDonald	OXFAM
✓ Eugenia Piza-Lopez	UNDP
✓ Eva Mellgren	Embassy of Sweden
✓ Ewa Wojkowska	UNDP
✓ George Conway	UNDP
✓ Jimmy Nadapdap	World Vision
John F Mamoedi	PMI
✓ Jørgen Schonning	Sida, Stockholm
Karin Michotte	ECHO
Kees Groenendijk	CARDI
Kevin Byrne	Save the Children
Lies Mailoa-Marantika	National Commission on Violence Against Women
✓ Maria Israelsson	Sida, Stockholm
✓ Marites de la Cruz	IOM
✓ Martin Dawson	DFID
Maurice R Pourchez	Embassy of the Netherlands
Melina Nathan	The World Bank
Michael Elmquist	UN OCHA
Michael L Bäk	USAid
Mindaraga Rahardja	World Vision
Mohamed M Salaaheen	WFP
Nigel Pont	Mercy Corps
Ole Johan Hauge	IFRC

Patrick Sweeting	UNDP
Prisca Seridanta	AusAid
Rasmus Egendal	WFP
✓ René Suter	FAO
Richard Manning	The World Bank
✓ Samuel Egero	Sida, Stockholm
Sarah Domingo	IOM
Sarah Richards	British Embassy
✓ Siddarth Chatterjee	UNICEF
Sidney Jones	International Crisis Group
Sri Kuntari	The World Bank
Terri Toyota	WFP
Thomas E. Hensleigh	Mercy Corps
✓ Ulf Samuelsson	Swedish Embassy
Vanessa Johanson	Common Ground
Wynn Flaten	World Vision
✓ Yin Yin Nwe	UNICEF
Yuniyanti Chuzafah	Common Ground
✓ Zhigang Weng	WFP

Annex 3: Description of Displacement and its Context in Indonesia

The Unique Status of IDPs

Significant forms of violent organised conflict erupted in Indonesia from 1999 to 2001 in Maluku (Ambon and North Maluku), East Nusa Tenggara Timor, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. The endemic conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya/Papua also accelerated. The exact number of IDPs remain unclear and very much debatable among agencies, but according to BAKORNAS-PBP and UN-OCHA, as of July 2003 there was 586,769 IDPs, far less than around 1,4 million declared at the peak in 2002. The major numbers were in Maluku, East Java, and Central Sulawesi. With 55.8 million Indonesians living below the poverty line in 1999,³⁸ this has required a particularly targeted form of humanitarian and development intervention, dealing with urgent consequences as well as causes.

The statistical indicators provided by the UN agencies (ICRC and IFRC do not publish figures of their own) are partly misleading. All reports mention registration problems, poor access to certain areas, and frequent changes, to explain that the figures are approximations. They also reflect people who are away from their home areas for prolonged periods of time, and do not include people moved from their homes for a few days, or people who have returned to their area but are unable to return to their homes which are occupied by intruders.

In periods of return and reintegration the internally displaced have needs that other war affected groups do not experience so acutely: to rebuild homes and lands; to re-establish title to land and to other resources; to restore family roots and community structures; to re-establish their legal residence; protection and psychological support. All require an exceptional re-investment, and since capital is often exhausted, lead to an impoverishment of affected populations. Poverty is a consequence but not a cause of forced displacement.

Migration and, especially, transmigration are inherently linked to instability and subsequent displacement in Indonesia. The transmigration programme of the New Order, which was strongest in the eighties, aimed to reduce demographic imbalance among regions in the country, especially between Java and other islands. Apart from some success stories, the programme also generated new risks, especially in its lack of sensitivity to the issue of ethnic unbalance and to land disputes³⁹.

Migration and transmigration have contributed to unequal distribution of and access to resources. This has further impoverished local communities dominated by the new comers, especially those who have close access to the power centre of Java. In certain regions such as Aceh and Papua, for example, this issue has become one of the central elements in the discourse concerning autonomy.

Indonesia had benefitted from a steep decline in income poverty over the years from 1975 to 1997, from 40% to 11% of the total population⁴⁰. Inequality remained limited (the Gini coefficient declined from 0.35 in the early 1970s to 0.32 in the late eighties) although it began rising slightly again in the late nineties. The UNDP Human Development Report notes a modest disparity in incomes between districts (Kabupaten), accounting for 20% of total inequality, even including domestic product generated by oil and gas, which is the major source.

³⁸ UNDP Human Development Report, 2001

³⁹ NRC 2003

⁴⁰ UNDP Human Development Report, 2001.

This was thrown off course by the Asian economic crisis from July 1997, which triggered a rapid rise in the incidence of poverty. The UNDP report⁴¹ notes that it leapt to 37% of the total population in September 1998 (although it declined again to 23% in February 1999). The poorest were hit particularly hard, with a 47% increase in the number of those living below 80% of the poverty line.

The Role of the Government

In spite of a significant foreign debt burden, and social service expenditure under acute pressure, the central Government made an important effort to assist. In responding to the incident of violent conflict and the resulting outflows of IDPs in Indonesia, the Government made efforts at both institutional and practical levels. The UN and donor documents report that in 2002 alone an allocation of 100 million USD was made to address the problem. This was originally disbursed in the form of cash compensations to the IDPs, but, under the impetus of the Ministry for Infrastructure, this was rapidly overtaken by support to shelter in the form of the reconstruction of houses (burning of houses and property was a form of physical destruction which particularly marked the civil conflicts in the islands). This reflected an earlier pattern adopted during the policies on transmigration, which relied to a considerable extent on making land and houses available.

New guidelines emerged in September 2001 which sought to reduce and finally resolve the IDP problem. The state, through the Coordinating Ministry of Social Welfare, shifted its focus from humanitarian assistance to speeding up the solution to IDPs from early 2002. This regrouped all aid into three forms of assistances, namely *'pemulangan'* – repatriation, *'pemberdayaan'* – empowerment (meaning integration into the host society), and *'pengalihan'* – relocation or resettlement to new sites. One of the main consequences of resettlement and relocation programmes is that land rights became an issue in the overall conflict affected areas. This is especially true when the conflict of *hak ulayat* or the traditional land rights versus legal rights is prominent, especially in the regions where data on land ownership is not managed centrally.

The policies were made in accordance with the concern that assistance could in fact entrench the status of IDPs, or even increase the numbers by creating a pull factor. At the institutional level, with Law no 3/2001, the Government has modified the role of BAKORNAS-PBP, the National Coordinating Body. Changing the agency's previous focus on natural disaster, BAKORNAS-PBP became responsible for formulating policies, coordinating and providing guidance in relation to natural as well as man-made disaster management.

Today BAKORNAS-PBP' role includes prevention, relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, shelter, settlement and return/relocation. BAKORNAS-PBP, which became the interlocutor for most of the aid agencies at the policy level, is composed of all relevant ministries, with the Vice-President as the chairperson, and the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare as the Vice-Chair. It is a non-structural body, but has a secretariat to support coordination and policy development.


The members of BAKORNAS-PBP are the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy, Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure, Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunication, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Labour and Transmigration, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry of Environment, Chief of the National Armed Forces, Chief of the National Police, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, as well as Governors from affected provinces.

At provincial and district levels, similar bodies were also established, ie. *Satkorlak* (*Satuan Koordinator Pelaksanaan* – The Implementation Coordinating Unit) and *Satlak* (*Satuan Pelaksanaan* – The implementation unit). *Satkorlak* was aimed at coordination, and *Satlak* aimed at implementation.

⁴¹ Ibid.

A visual representation of the Government structures at the provincial level reflects a relatively centralised system, as one comes closer to the population:

Diagram 8: Government Structures at Provincial Level



The line ministries have provided humanitarian assistances in accordance with their main mandates, mostly by establishing a special section or task force for addressing IDPs problems at the central level. The Ministry of Health, BKKBN (The National Coordinating Board for Family Planning-used to be a separate entity but now is under the Ministry of Health), and at the later stage, the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure, for example, have a special section on IDP issues and allocated certain budget for the humanitarian assistances. They use both their internal budget and outside supports from, especially, UN Agencies, such WHO, UNFPA, and UNDP. These line ministries, in some cases, became the main channel for deliverance of assistances.

Country Trends and Dynamics

Over the evaluation period the number of IDPs gradually dropped to 586,769 in 2003, and the IDP emergency was declared officially over by the Government at the end of 2003.

The reasons for such a dramatic drop in IDP numbers are varied. The primary reason which the evaluation could verify has been a reduction in societal tensions in many areas, which gave families the opportunity to return to their areas of origin. Another reason is the support given to reintegration in its many forms (“return, empowerment or resettlement”) given by the state and the international aid agencies. It is also probable that the figures are not as consistent as one would wish. The actual number may be higher since some IDPs fled on their own and stayed in unofficial camps or with their relatives or friends and thus do not figure in the official statistics.

A peculiarity of assistance to IDPs is that the term is inherently foreign to the beneficiaries. In the Indonesian language there is no word for IDP. The IDPs themselves use the word *‘pengungsi’*, which literally means a refugee. The IDPs (and officials) are however aware of the way they are targeted by the international aid community, and some use the word *‘pengungsi internal’* when speaking about themselves. Other terms are also used colloquially. IDPs from Ambon call themselves *‘saudari dari Ambon’*, which literally means ‘brothers and sisters from Ambon’.

While the UN Consolidated Appeal for 2004 refers to the reclassification of the IDPs as “vulnerable people” by the Government, the evaluation finds local authorities very ready to quote consistently high IDP figures for their districts. The agencies are caught in the obligation of assisting groups which should in theory have ceased to be a cause of concern. Oxfam in Nusa Tenggara Timor reports to ECHO that it is providing assistance to 37,706 persons, of whom 32,530 are persons with the status of former refugees, in other words displaced from now independent East Timor, all residing in camps and settlement sites.

The needs of the IDPs resemble but do not coincide with those of the very poor. The WFP Livelihoods Survey of June 2002 notes in 45 of 50 districts (90%), daily per capita caloric intake from staples is 50% or more of the daily minimum recommended level of 2,100 Kcal. Sixty percent of all districts (30 of 50) consume between 50% and 70%. In four districts, however, average daily consumption from staples is less than 50% of the recommended daily intake.

The average percentage of IDP households below their district-level poverty line is 55%, and almost all districts have at least 30% of IDP households below the district-level poverty line. This compares unfavorably to the overall average of district-level poverty in Indonesia, according to BPS, of 19%.⁴² Only two districts, Kupang Urban and Manggarai, have poverty levels below 20%. A total of 31 out of the 50 districts (62%) have poverty levels of 50% or higher.

Yet the IDPs show greater resilience. Poverty rates of IDP households decline significantly the longer the period of displacement. For those households displaced for a short time period (nine months or less), 74% are under the district poverty level. This rate drops to 56% and 52%, respectively, for medium (10–18 months); and long periods of displacement (greater than 18 months). This trend is similar for unemployment rates that decline about 20% over time, from 64% for short duration of displacement to 51% for long. Likewise, income increases significantly the longer households are displaced. The average per capita income for households displaced for nine months or less is 57,000 IDR. Medium term households have almost double this income (104,000 Rp) while those households displaced longer than 18 months have the highest per capita income at 112,000 Rp per month. There is a significant trend in income whereby each month of displacement accounts for an increase in per capita income of 2,127 IDR.

Six indicators from the Human Development Index (HDI) are compared by the WFP team with corresponding indicators from the IDP survey⁴³. Results show that IDP households are better off in terms of access to safe water, but fair poorly compared to the general population with respect to access to health services, general health, and school dropout rates. The results for access to sanitation are mixed. The indicators compiled tend to show that the health situation worsens the longer the displacement lasts.

The WFP survey also included proxy indicators of emotional trauma and feelings of insecurity in the IDP site. These were remarkably low, except for some districts in the province of Aceh, Pontianak Urban, and Maluku Utara, which are areas this evaluation has particularly concentrated on.

Displacement is closely linked to the phenomenon of conflict. Violent conflicts in Indonesia have taken on forms that can be broadly grouped into ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ conflicts. The ‘horizontal’ conflicts refer to religious or socially based violent conflicts between communities in the same region, such

⁴² Year 2000 district-level poverty lines were calculated by Puguh Irawan, of BPS, for all provinces except Maluku, Maluku Utara, and Aceh. For these three provinces, security concerns meant that the Year 2000 censuses could not be conducted, and thus 1999 thresholds were used in this report.

⁴³ % with no access to safe water; % with no access to formal health facilities; % with health problems; % of 7–15 year old dropouts; and, % without proper sanitation facilities

as in the violent conflict between the Malay and Dayak against Madurese in West Kalimantan, the Dayak against Madurese in Central Kalimantan, and the Moslems versus Christians in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. The ‘vertical’ conflicts refer to violence between the rebel fighters and state security agencies in Aceh and in Papua, and recently in Maluku.

The causes are multifaceted. The evaluation has identified, based on a UNDP commissioned INSIST report and on World Bank SCRAP background papers, as well as other analyses and the team’s observations in Indonesia, three relevant proximate causes of displacement due to violence:

- Within the population, the changing and complex relationships to natural resources and land; political entrepreneurs seeking to manipulate voting, the cultural susceptibility to *agents provocateurs* which leads to sudden outbursts of collective violence against neighbours of different identity;
- The deterioration of social capital as a bridge between different communities with very sharply defined identities and different economic roles; the poor level of public debate, and the growing lack of common goods shared between the communities”
- The inclusion of the population in insurgency and counter-insurgency warfare, and the low level of appreciation by the general public of administrative attempts at resolving disputes; this all exacerbated by the still poorly implemented body of national law regarding land rights, national identification, and dispute resolution.

Related to this is the lack of clarity of the implementation of decentralisation which, according to the World Bank (2003)⁴⁴, is due to the weaknesses of Law no 22/1999 and 25/1999 on the regional autonomy and financial balance of central and regional government respectively. Some laws and presidential decrees which were passed after these two laws have further added to the confusion. These laws not only conflict with the spirit of regional autonomy and blur the autonomy of different government levels, but also lack sensitivity to their potential for exacerbating conflict..

The Rights of IDPs

It is possible to define the specificity of IDPs by the rights to which they are entitled by law. Three sets of norms apply to the situation of IDPs. The first is international law applicable specifically to the scenario of displacement, the second is international human rights relevant to the situation of displacement, and the third is national law.

International law contains a number of provisions which expressly address the issue of IDPs.

International Humanitarian Law takes as its starting point that the parties to the conflict are prohibited from forcibly and arbitrarily moving civilian populations during conflicts. This is a manifestation of the principle that the civilian population must be spared as much as possible from the effects of hostilities. It should be noted that Indonesia has signed the three Geneva Conventions, but still needs to ratify the third protocol on....

International Criminal Law forbids some of the acts which have triggered displacement, such as war crimes, and genocide. Under Human Rights Law the norms can be inferred from the right to freedom of movement, and choice of residence (International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR), although these rights are subject to a number of exceptions, including measures for the protection of national security in times of national emergency. While refugee law does not prohibit displacement as such, the principle of *non-refoulement* puts an important limitation on states’ powers to order the movement of persons.

⁴⁴ “Decentralising Indonesia: A Regional Public Expenditure Review”, World Bank, June 2003

Finally the 1998 “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”, finalised by the Representative of the Secretary General Mr Francis Deng, is a non-binding document which brings together the various forms of protection afforded to IDPs by existing rules. It deals with the prevention and prohibition of displacement, fundamental safeguards and rights during displacement, and the right to return. It should be pointed out that this document, being of a general nature, does not provide specific guidance for province and district level administrations, which have to deal with concrete dilemmas, choosing between different solutions, for example to land ownership. By mentioning standards such as “appropriate compensation”, the state authorities feel exposed to easy but not constructive criticism.

The main international human rights obligations which apply to states in their relationship with the condition of IDPs apply essentially to non-discrimination, equality, minorities, right to an effective remedy, protection of family life, and even the Convention on biological diversity 1992 as it relates to the right to protect local cultures and knowledge. Worthy of mention are also the right to a prompt appearance before a judge to challenge the lawfulness of arrest and detention, equal access and equality before the Courts, the right to be assigned legal assistance, in any case where the interests of justice so require and for such assistance to be without payment if you do not have sufficient means to pay.

Special mention should be made of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. It stipulates that migrant workers and members of their families shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. Migrant workers and members of their families have the right to freedom of expression, and this right includes freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art or through any other media of their choice.

The exercise of the rights provided carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these are only applicable as provided by law, and are necessary:

- a) For respect of the rights or reputation of others;
- b) For the protection of the national security of the states concerned or of public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals;
- c) For the purpose of preventing any propaganda for war;
- d) For the purpose of preventing any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.

ICCPR Article 20 specifies that any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.

The Declaration on the Right to Development covers the Economic and Social Rights which are relevant to IDPs, which has been endorsed by Indonesia. These “positive rights” have not been ratified by Indonesia, but the state declared its strong support to the Declaration at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in April 2001, saying it attached “great importance to the realisation of the right to development, both at national and international levels. It has been estimated that Indonesia “despite limited resources, has arguably been more effective at ensuring basic standards of education or health than it has been at delivering justice”⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ Peter Stalker and Satish Mishra: “The Right to Development in Indonesia”, UNSFIR Working Paper No 03/01,.

There has been a significant strengthening of the legal basis on which to view the rights and responsibilities of IDPs. They have fundamental human rights by virtue of being human irrespective of their current situation as displaced people; and in addition the international instruments demonstrate a growing awareness that the ill treatment of many millions of people displaced in the world cannot be left to the concept of national sovereignty, or to the arbitrary exercise of foreign policy for reasons of national interest (even preventive war) when sovereignty has been breached. The ‘duty to protect’ doctrine is growing, and makes a system-wide state-based policy to protect and assist IDPs more and more necessary, realistic and possible.

Annex 4: Additional Information on the Population Level Assessment

Introduction

The objective of this evaluation is to assess international assistance provided to IDPs from the perspective of the beneficiaries, with a focus on protection and vulnerability. To focus on protection means that humanitarian work is seen as much about ensuring respect for international humanitarian and human rights norms as it is about giving aid to support minimal living conditions in the long term. It includes contributions generating an environment of stability.

In tackling the problem of IDPs since 1998, the Government, together with donors, UN agencies, International and National NGOs, have delivered humanitarian relief and, to a greater extent, targeted development. From 2001 UN-OCHA states that the number of IDPs has decreased significantly, but this does not necessarily mean that the problems of IDPs have been reduced at similar account. IDPs remain a problem in the country, especially in regions that have experienced violent conflicts.

As noted by OCHA officials in interviews, IDPs pose some unique challenges of their own to the state: they rely on public authorities to facilitate their return to areas of origin, and they require reliable safeguards to their property while they are gone. Their needs are also closer to the humanitarian standards of assistance than to normal development aid.

The current needs of IDPs in Indonesia can be grouped into the following categories:

1. Emergency needs, more specifically those relating to minimal conditions for survival and continued health and psychological balance.
2. Socio-economic livelihoods, and higher than normal rates of infant mortality, illiteracy, life expectancy.
3. Exposure to the Rule of Law in line with national codes, and all bodies of human rights law and International Humanitarian Law, with particular reference to discrimination, and access to justice. This is due to the erosion of an environment of stability and security.
4. Assistance to particularly vulnerable groups, such as children, women, the elderly.

Different categories of IDPs

Each form of displacement is related to the local situation, presenting a myriad of contrasting scenarios. This evaluation will not attempt to present these scenarios, but the main factors generally include the following:

- Widespread fear of communal violence at a given point in time in a location, often caused by *agents provocateurs*, spreading rapidly by word of mouth and through displacement.
- Possibility for long standing grievances to become expressed in the will to reverse previous policies of transmigration
- Insurgency and counter-insurgency operations hinging on the control of the population and the popular economy.
- Displacement caused by issues of access to natural resources and the communal ownership of land

This evaluation has consequently taken a comprehensive view of well being and survival needs, based on the perspective of those concerned. This has led to a finely graded vision, based on different categories of stages of displacement: IDPs are still away from their areas of origin (for example North Sulawesi for many from North Maluku), or ex-IDPs who have returned to their areas, not all of whom may have been able to reintegrate their own homes.

IDPs who are still in displacement face problems of access to key social and economic services which would give them a secure and sustainable livelihood, in addition to needs concerning compensation for productive resources and other property lost during the conflict. For short periods of time some may also face acute survival needs, such as food, medical assistance, or elementary shelter. At the same time some may have resettled into the new host society, and may have become indistinguishable from the local population.

The different categories of IDPs have however a common problem: hostility from local groups or security sector agencies. These have either caused or been complicit in the displacement. In all cases seen by the evaluation hostile groups have remained in the area of origin, and may even be present in a way in the havens chosen by the IDPs. IDPs often also have to face the jealousy of neighbours, caused by being targeted as IDPs and by receiving assistance to social and economic recovery after displacement.

More Information on the Field Enquiry

Localities

The livelihood situation and the need for safety and protection differ from place to place and from one province to the others, making it difficult to speak in general. The focus of this evaluation is on the *Madurese/West Kalimantan groups*, and *religious/ethnic groups of North Maluku*. These two provinces were chosen for the more in depth study, while other affected provinces are also used for illustration. A secondary focus was given to *Aceh*, because of the urgency of needs as provided in indicator based assessments in the country.

West Kalimantan is chosen because the few agencies that chose to become present are tending to leave the region as the IDP situation was declared resolved by the end of 2003 by the central government. During the field trip to *West Kalimantan*, the team visited Pontianak district, Singkawang district and Sambas district. Conversely, *North Maluku* is a province where many international organisations are still involved, after some large scale programmes. Jailolo and Tobelo districts were visited. Together these two provinces cover the range of IDP stages of displacement, one where the tensions are still strong and one where return has occurred on a substantial scale⁴⁶.

The situation of the IDPs in *West Kalimantan* and *North Sulawesi/North Maluku* is very different as are the root causes of conflicts. Both regions can be characterised as belonging to the peripheral areas of the country in political terms, even though their place in the Human Development Index puts them slightly above the 64 average (*North Maluku* with 67) and below (*West Kalimantan* with 61)⁴⁷.

West Kalimantan has a population of approximately 3.5 to 4.1 million people and is the most highly populated among the four provinces in Kalimantan. It is estimated that in 1998 25% were living below the poverty line⁴⁸. The population consists of ethnic Dayaks, Malays, Chinese Indonesians, Bugis originat-

⁴⁶ Of the ca. 200,000 persons displaced by the conflict in North Maluku, approximately 75%–85% have returned. Other 15%–20% persons remain displaced within North Maluku and another 5% in North Sulawesi (Figures drawn from the UNDP NMMRP Internal Review, based on data obtained from Dinas Sosial, May 2003).

⁴⁷ Human Development Report, 2001.

⁴⁸ UNICEF/GOI. January 2000. *Challenges for a new Generation, Situation of women and Children in Indonesia*. Op.cit.: Save the Children UK. 15 July 2003. Project Proposal: *Integrated Child Development Programme. IDPs resettlement sites, Pontianak district, West Kalimantan* p.3.

ing from South Sulawesi, Javanese and migrants from Madura. The Madurese are the minority ethnic group in *West Kalimantan* with less than 3% of the provincial population and without any political power.

Most Madurese have settled in *West Kalimantan* as transmigrants under the Indonesian Government policy over 40 years ago. The majority of the population (54%) are Muslims⁴⁹ The Madurese were displaced twice; first within the Sambas subdistricts and subsequently to Pontianak in 1999. According to the Ministry of Regional Settlement and Development 60,000 Madurese were displaced in Pontianak in August 2001 of which 23,000 were living in 10 camps with poor water availability and sanitation. In 2002 the provincial government started implementation of a programme aimed at resettle the IDPs to locations outside Pontianak, the so called resettlement sites. The majority of these sites are located in swampy forest land.

The IDPs in *West Kalimantan* are all Madurese from Sambas district and the main conflict is with the Malay population, although Dayaks have sided with the Malays in the conflict against the Madurese. Both the Malays and the Madurese are Muslims. It is now generally accepted by the political authorities, by the populations groups living in the conflict area, and the international aid community and the IDPs themselves that the Madurese will not be able to return to Sambas for a long period of time, as the local people will not allow them to return due to continued hostility. The Madurese are now either relocated to new resettlement areas (2,900 Households or 12,000 persons⁵⁰ or are integrated in an older Madurese community in Singkawang district and in Pontianak, the capital of *West Kalimantan* and have benefited from the state's empowerment fund (ca.11,100 Households).

In *North Maluku* the conflict has been simplified as dividing Muslims and Christians, but deeper causes relate to the complex: competition around natural resources (mines, forest and traditional land entitlement claims), uneven development within the region, as well as marginalisation in Indonesia as a country, ethnic differences, influx of transmigrants, political competition between two Sultans of Ternate and Tobelo, and influence from national religious movements of Islamic and Christian orientation.

From 1999 to 2003 few IDPs have wanted to return because of the fear of new assaults, but when the government in 2001 gave a safety guarantee for some regions, such as in *North Maluku*, and initiated a reconciliation process people began to return to their villages of origin (for example only 1 village out of 30 refused to return in that province).

Qualitative Data Methodology

The findings presented in this enquiry are based on structured qualitative interviews with IDPs and former-IDPs (depending on the definition) in combination with participant observation and analysis of documentary literature from the international aid community. In *West Kalimantan* the team conducted Focus Group Interview (FGI) with male ex-IDPs relocated in an old village in Marhaban in Singkawang district; male and female ex-IDPs in a resettlement village (SP1) outside Pontianak; and male members of the place of origin (Sambas) for the Madurese now relocated in Singkawang or in the resettlement sites outside Pontianak or in Pontianak city. Representatives from PMI in Pontianak, Singkawang and Sambas participated in these discussions but according to our Indonesian team member, who worked as interpreter during the interviews with the beneficiaries, the respondents were not influenced in an inappropriate manner when answering our questions.

In *North Sulawesi* Focus Group Interviews were conducted with male and female IDPs from North Maluku, living in a governmental building in Manado, waiting for housing and integration in Manado city. The team also planned to visit the IDP camps in Bitung, inhabited by IDPs waiting for return to North Maluku, but due to logistic problems and time constraints this visit was cancelled.

⁴⁹ Rosenberg (ed.), 2003: 185.

⁵⁰ The Provincial Development Planning Bureau (BAPPEDA), aug.2003

In Ternate city in *North Maluku* the team conducted Focus Group Interviews with male and female IDPs living in 2 abandoned buildings in the city centre. In the first camp visited the IDPs were all Muslims from Tobello, who waited for return to their villages of origin in North Maluku and who had only been living in Ternate city during displacement. In the other camp, all the IDPs were Christians who had returned to Ternate from Bitung in North Sulawesi and who were now waiting for return to their place of origin in *North Maluku*.

The team spent two days in Jailolo district and two in Tobelo district and conducted interviews in two villages where the IDPs had returned to their place of origin in 2001. In Tacim, the first village visited, the inhabitants were all Muslim living very close to a Christian village where the population had been actively involved in the conflict and in the destruction of all belongings, (including the school, the health centre and the mosque) and agricultural assets of the Muslim inhabitants of the neighbouring village. The interview was conducted in the home of the female Village Head. Her husband and two male inhabitants, who participated in the committee structure set up by Cardi in the village as part of their economic recovery programme, also participated in the interview. All village members had been displaced in Ternate city after the outbreak of the conflict in 1999, but had been able to return after only one year of displacement.

The second village visited in Jailolo district was inhabited by a Christian population who had also lost all belongings during the conflict and who had been able to return after one year of displacement in a military camp in Akadin village in Jailolo sub-district in *North Maluku*. The Focus Group Interview (FGI) with the male and female villagers was conducted in the church where most of the village population participated. This sub-village neighbours another sub-village with Muslims, who did not participate in the destruction of the Christian village where all buildings including the school and the church were burned down. The damage was done by attackers coming from outside (Jawa) the local area, and they were not recognised by the victims in the Christian village. Actually the two groups sided when they were attacked by outsiders and both sub-villages were burned down.

In both localities visited the population groups in the neighbouring villages were of the same ethnic origin although they were segregated by religion a long time ago.

In all interviews conducted in *North Maluku* local representatives from

Cardi participated in the Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and in Jailolo a female staff member from UNDP worked as interpreter. It is not an optimal interview situation, but we tried as far as the time allowed checking the data collected during the interviews by combining interviews and observations and by crosschecking all information with statements from the government and national and international NGO's. This way we also compensated to some extent for a possible lack of representativeness of the respondents included in the sample.

Literature studies are an integral part of anthropological research before and after interviewing local people. In the *West Kalimantan* and *North Maluku* displacement scenarios the aid-literature⁵¹ paints a more pessimistic picture of the victimised population than the perceptions collected by the evaluation. It has however not been possible to thoroughly test this gap in perceptions. In this section we rely main-

⁵¹ See e.g. World food Programme. 2002. *Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Indonesia: Livelihood Survey: Synthesis Report*; World Vision Indonesia. Februar: 2004. Assessment Report North Maluku; World Vision Indonesia. 2004 (n.d). *Participatory Assesment and Evaluation report. West Kalimantan Rehabilitation Response*; Save the Children UK (SC UK). 15 July 2003. Project Proposal: *Integrated Child Development Programme. IDPs resettlement sites, Pontianak district, West Kalimantan*; Rosenberg (ed.). 2003. *Trafficking of Women and Children in Indonesia*. ICMC.

ly on the response from the IDPs, acknowledging however, that a more lengthy anthropological survey would establish a truer picture of the conflict and post conflict situation from the beneficiaries' point of view⁵².

Conflict Resolution and Perceptions of Safety

The evaluation found that conflict resolution was very widespread in the aid effort, particularly in *North Maluku*. In Tacim for example the youth are not involved in any decision making processes at village level, and Cardi try to empower the youth with different sport activities aimed at reconciliation between Christian and Muslim youth. The female village Head, a mother to a young boy herself, appreciated this initiative, but at the same time she was also afraid that these activities could turn the attention of the youth away from what she named their main duty: education.

Cardi also has a public infrastructure project in the village, aimed at improving the water supply, but has also included a peace-building component in this programme. This development aid programme is heavily appreciated by the villagers, because fencing water from the traditional well is very time-consuming, and the villagers who participated in the implementation had received the necessary training enabling them to maintain the water facilities themselves after project completion according to their own opinion. The parallel decision-making structure set up as part of the programme did not cause any problems and the villagers felt they very well informed before the project start and that village participation was cared for in a satisfactory manner. The villagers were also aware that acceptance of the reconciliation component was a precondition for getting development assistance. However, the recent conflict in Ambon in Maluku province make people feel worried, especially the women.

The returnees lost all their cattle, when they had to flee, and had not been able to restock. According to the IDPs interviewed, the cattle just ran away, and the farmers did not expect any compensation, but other sources indicate that there was widespread organised looting, resulting in sales of unusual quantities of cattle in other provinces. There is fear that this could happen again, leading to even further impoverishment.

Some of the Christians still living in camps in Ternate city feel less safe than the ones who have returned to the country side, and the Muslim camp dwellers in the city. All Christians in Ternate were displaced during the conflict and the Muslims have now taken over many governmental job positions usually staffed by Christians, and the Christians are now a minority compared to the Muslims living in Ternate (it is estimated by UN staff that the total number of Christians, including Catholics which have not been as affected by the conflict, is 2%). It means that the composition of the labour force has been changed and those who return to governmental jobs now have to cooperate and socialise with new workmates of another religious orientation.

The Muslims affected by the conflict have been displaced to Ternate and most of the Christians to North Sulawesi and towns to the North-East of Halmahera island (particularly Tobelo). Today, however, most of the IDPs from North Maluku have been able to return to their place of origin, although some of the returnees from North Sulawesi are still waiting in camps in Ternate for governmental assistance enabling return. Of the approximately 200,000 persons displaced by the conflict in *North Maluku*, approximately 75%–85% have returned. Other 15%–20% persons remain displaced within *North Maluku* and another 5% in *North Sulawesi*.⁵³

This process has been further strengthened by increased return of ethnic minorities to religiously mixed communities (e.g. Muslims to Tobelo and Christians to Ternate), although major sources of

⁵² Sida has, however, in TOR for this evaluation given more space than is usual in evaluations for communication with the beneficiaries.

⁵³ Figures are based on data obtained from Dinas Sosial, May 2003.

concern are the uneven and fragile community-level reconciliation and the remaining potential for land/property disputes, the struggle between Sultan Ternate and Makian dominated bureaucracy of *North Maluku* – especially in controlling the natural resources (Nusa Halmahera Mining; Nickel reservoir; timber etc).

Many families displaced in Manado have decided to stay in *North Sulawesi*, where some of them have already received permanent houses from the government while others (around 30 households) are still living in a governmental building. Those who have decided to stay have got jobs in the informal sector and find that the job opportunities in Manado are better than in *North Maluku*. In addition to this, many IDPs displaced in Manado also feel that living in a Christian community is safer than the urban life in Ternate with its mix of ethnic groups and with the Muslims being the majority of the population.

Access to Key Social and Economic Services

People's access to key social and economic services is a big challenge in humanitarian assistance and in protection work, and in each interview with IDPs the following issues were addressed: Food security; employment opportunities; formal education opportunities; access to vital health services; access to land and traditional patterns of natural resource use; access to shelter, water and sanitation, protection etc. In addition we asked the IDPs how their access to services was compared with the services available for other population groups living in the same area (during displacement and after the return).

In the beginning of each interview we asked about the group's or the family's IDP history; what kind of assistance they had received during displacement and after return/relocation as well as their perceptions of the assistance offered. We always ended the interview by asking about their plans for the future and their perceptions on future threats and risks.

The team had to travel long distances between the different IDP camps and the place of origin and/or return, and due to time limits it was not always possible to speak to both female and male IDPs. There are more male respondents than female respondents in this small anthropological survey because the team was always met by the village head, who in all cases except one was a male. However, the team tried hard to hear the women's voice during the visits in the camps and in the villages. In each interview we also asked about how the widows had been able to cope with the situation, and if possible we also interviewed the widows themselves. We did, however never get the chance to speak to widows without married and single women around, which may have influenced the responses of the widows.

In order to save time the team asked the women about access to health and education services during and after the displacement if the men had commented on the other issues systematically researched during the interviews with the beneficiaries. If possible questions related to children's coping with the situation of displacement and return/relocation were also discussed with the women. Many children attended the interviews, but we never interviewed the children themselves⁵⁴. However, some of the older children sometimes added comments to the grown up's answers.

In the following box is an example from *West Kalimantan* on the assistance received according to information given by male IDPs in a focus group discussion in a small village (Marhaban) in Singkawang district:

⁵⁴ According to SC-UK staff in *West Kalimantan*, the children and the youth do not like to speak about the conflict-ridden past.

Assistance Received: There are 30 farmer families living in this Madurese village in Singkawang district. When they had to flee Sambas district in 1999 the Government decided to move the IDPs to this village, where they lived in temporary buildings until 2002 when they decided to receive the empowerment package from the government aimed at integrating the IDPs in local communities of their own choice. As part of the package each family received:

- 5.000.000 IDR for housing cost of which they had to pay 500.000 IDR to administrative costs
- The money was provided in two rates: Nov. 2002 and Marts 2003
- In addition they had to buy land for the house by own means. Price: 1.000.000 IDR
- When the Madurese first arrived in the village they received:
- Water and sanitation assistance from IMC; rice from USAID and Japan
- Health assistance and help to pay additional costs for school attendance from World Vision

The first year the needs were met. Later there were some time lack (6 months) in the delivery and the male Madurese had to work in a nearby gold mines (an illegal one) in order to survive.

May 2003 the assistance stopped from the state.

June 2003: Food supply from Java Post Group in cooperation with the Chinese community in *West Kalimantan*.

The women never participated in any activities targeted towards women and children.

After 2003 they were not labelled as IDPs any longer by the provincial government. They are now entitled to receive rice distributed to the poor and to benefit from services from the social security net, but the lack of identity cards makes them unable to receive these services. However, in cases where the head of households (non-IDP) living in the same village has identity papers the possibility exists to put one's name on this household's list.

The reason why the local government does not issue identity cards is (according to the former IDPs) that they consider the IDPs stay in the Marhaban village only temporarily. The IDPs themselves however, want to stay forever in Singkawang district. They rent the land they cultivate from the local government on a sharecropping basis (9/1). They try to sell their former land trough middle men, because they can't go back to Sambas, but so far without any success. Because they do not have IDs they cannot buy new land. Not all houses in Sambas belonging to this group of people were burned down during the conflict, and some people try to sell their former houses. Many houses have however been taken over by poor people among the inhabitants of Sambas.

Life was not without hardship. Some returnees in *North Maluku* claimed that lack of income during displacement (in a military camp in *North Maluku*) made it difficult to buy medicine for the children, leading to higher morbidity. Some IDPs in *West Kalimantan* and in *North Sulawesi* also found it difficult to pay the extra expenses related to sending the children to the public schools, where the education is compulsory and free of charge.

In Jailolo district, *North Maluku*, the villagers have received 25% of the total cost for reconstruction of churches and mosques from the provincial government. The villagers all participated in the reconstruction, and paid the 75% of the total cost by own means without any complains.

Most IDPs, both women and men, displaced in urban areas managed to get jobs, but not on a permanent basis, and mostly in the informal sector. The men are involved in different activities whereas women primarily work as domestic workers or in small scale business (making biscuits for sale in the market,

sewing, establishing small shops etc... In all the IDP communities the evaluation team met, both women and men contributed to the family income, but men are generally looked upon as the main providers of families⁵⁵.

In the following box is an example of assistance received during displacement and after return to Jailolo district, *North Maluku* and the population's response to the assistance received:

Assistance Received: The whole village was destroyed when the population had to flee in 1999. The Christian population were displaced in a military camp in Akedior village in Jailolo sub-district for one year. The Muslims from the other sub-village were displaced to Ternate. The military camp was very small and camp life very uncomfortable according to the IDPs.

The children did not receive any education during displacement. After return the church (rebuilt by the villagers) has been used as a school, staffed only with 1 teacher from Ambon who has however, stayed with the villagers for 20 years. He gets help from a village volunteer. All children are now attending school and the senior-high school students attend ethnic and religious mixed schools outside the local area. The young people work in the fields together with their parents and do not participate in any youth programmes outside the village. In the village, the church has a meeting group for young people 4 times a week.

The villagers had access to one health post free of charge during displacement. The villagers received food help and other basic needs from ACF; Cooking equipment and clothes from ICRC; and from Dinas Social each family once received rice and 30.000 IDR for each family member (max. 5 ps.). After return some of the villagers have received BBR (The housing package), while others are still waiting for this governmental assistance. The returnees were promised a return package of 7.500.000 IDR from the government but have only received 4.500.000 IDR which has given rise to complaints, but this protest has been ignored by the government.

Both men and women worked in the informal sector during displacement because the assistance they received was not sufficient to make ends meet, and the women found it very difficult to feed the family due to lack of money.

The women have never participated in any programmes targeting women and children.

Today the village only gets assistance from an INGO (Cardi), subcontracted by UNOPS, itself subcontracted by UNDP funded by a number of donors. The programme includes reconstruction of schools and water facilities, which is highly appreciated, but the implementation of the programme based on an assessment from 2002, has just started (2004). The community conducted 4 meetings facilitated by Cardi for all villagers, men and women, where the community chose 3 people to receive training from Cardi. This training has been very useful according to the villagers and those who received training have trained other people in the village. The villagers spoke very warmly about Cardi, and Cardi's participatory approach was very much appreciated.

⁵⁵ According to an assessment done by The National Commission on Violence against Women in the IDP camps in Ternate, women were able to earn more money than the men because it was easier for them to get jobs. This caused a lot of problems in the marriages and is given as an explanation on why violence against women increased during displacement. This assessment also concluded that lack of room for privacy made women reluctant to sexual intercourses, which also raised the tension between the genders (Interview with a member of the Commission in Jakarta).

Access to Land

For the Madurese still displaced in *West Kalimantan*, who mainly are farmers, access to land has been a problem as they do not have the possibility of return to Sambas. The local community (for those integrated in a Madurese community in Singkawang district founded after the 1979 conflict between the Dayaks and the Madurese) has provided some land, but not in a scale similar to the land the IDPs used to cultivate. For the Madurese involved in the resettlement programme of the government, it is mainly the quality of the soil that has caused problems and many farmers have left the resettlement sites⁵⁶, because they were not able to get a living from the land offered. According to the IDPs, the land is state owned, but according to IOM staff, running a programme in the least developed sites, there are serious land disputes because some part of the land in the resettlement area, belong to the indigenous people.

Informants⁵⁷ also reported that the host community in Singkawang, an old Madurese community who came to *West Kalimantan* in 1979 and are well adapted into the local culture of Malays and Dayaks, were afraid to be identified with the Madurese from Sambas. They did, however support the Madurese from Sambas when they arrived in Singkawang in 1999 in many ways.

The Madurese who still live in the resettlement sites do not want to be dependent on assistance, but as stated by one respondent from SP1: “We want to receive assistance on how to cultivate the land here in this location enabling us to be independent in the future so we can provide for our families and get a living, because we would now like to stay on this relocation site”. The only way to access most relocation sites is by boat; accordingly the farmers have many difficulties with marketing and sale of their agricultural products. Besides this, the output of production pr. ha is only half of the output they used to have when living in Sambas. The women complained about how difficult it was to produce, transport and sell vegetables.

In Jailolo district in *North Maluku*, the IDPs have returned to their former land, and there have not been any apparent land disputes. The farmers do not have any land certificates, but everybody knows how the land is distributed among the villagers.

Income Opportunities

The economic situation is still not conducive to a natural normalisation of conditions for IDPs. Work opportunities in two provinces surveyed (*West Kalimantan and North Maluku*) are still very limited, but not only due to the conflict. Most IDPs manage to get jobs, at least in the informal sector. Most of West Kalimantan’s Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) comes from the agriculture, manufacturing, trade, hotel and restaurant industries, comprising about 65.97% of the total GRPD (BKPM, 2001). The main export commodities of the province are wood products and logs. Other export products are rubber, fishery and forest products (BKPM, 2001)⁵⁸.

In terms of GRP, the main industries in *North Maluku* in 1988 consisted of manufacturing industries (38.1%), followed by agriculture (33.4%) and trade/small-scale retails (15.5%). This composition has not changed over time. However, the overall production level dropped considerable during the conflict. The drop in the production level consisted in lower income and increased unemployment (PBS Gross Regional Income *North Maluku Kabupaten* 2001).

⁵⁶ 50% of the IDPs have left the most difficult areas and 25–25% have left in less difficult areas. Around 15% of the population work in Malaysia as migrant workers and many women migrate to Pontianak and work as domestic workers.

The migration figures are however similar to the migration figures in the local communities in the resettlement areas.

⁵⁷ PMI staff from Singkawang and Sambas and local people from Sambas

⁵⁸ Rosenberg (ed.), 2003

Vulnerable Groups

In all the field sites visited, the *women* participated in agricultural activities and/or worked in the informal sector, and nobody complained about being involved in the workforce or about not being involved in decision making. It was, however, easy to see that the living conditions in the camps put women under stress and that the decrease in income due to the conflict also gave the women problems in everyday life. Also the women living in the resettlement sites in *West Kalimantan* found life in general more difficult compared to their former life in Sambas due to difficulties in cultivating and selling vegetables and due to a diminishing access to health facilities e.g. hospitals.

In *West Kalimantan* where the ethnic tension is still very high the Madurese didn't have any contacts with former neighbours and friends in Sambas. For *women in mixed marriages* this caused a lot of problems. If the husband was a Madurese, the wife could stay in Sambas if she wished, but all the boys belonged to their father's family and left Sambas together with him. The girls could stay with the mother if they wanted. Madurese women married to Malays or Dayaks were allowed to stay in Sambas. Some women married to Madurese men stayed more permanently in Sambas, but some visited their husbands in the resettlement sites. It was, however, more difficult for women to get jobs in the informal sector in the resettlement sites compared to the possibilities in Sambas and Pontianak, and many women had to live separated from their husbands for economic reasons. Polygamy is very wide spread among Madurese, but it was not possible for the team to find out, if the rate of polygamy had increased due to displacement. We heard, however, about a man having wives in several relocation sites, as intra-village endogamy is not common.

Generally the *widows* have to provide for their own children without support from extended families, but in the IDP communities visited the widows were not labelled as much more vulnerable than women in general. Among the Madurese in *West Kalimantan*, however, the widows benefit from a tradition of collective work in the fields belonging to individuals or families, and in an IOM project site a widow were head of a working group. We did, however never get the chance to speak to widows without married and single women around, which may have influenced the responses of the widows.

In the field sites visited the evaluation met no handicapped people, and problems with the *elderly* and the *disabled* were not an issue of concern. When asked about the needs for psycho-social support for the children after the conflict, two Madurese *women* explained that the *children* in general coped very well, but that they themselves had experienced trauma. Until they received electricity in the relocation site in which they lived they were afraid during the night, and for a long time after they had to flee Sambas they were crying every night. None of the men interviewed talked of serious psychological problems or a need for psychological counselling, but male respondents in a Christian village in Jailolo district appreciated the psychological counselling offered by the church in the community.

Annex 5: Overview of Funding

Funding Overview - Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals

By Sector in USD	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Appeal	Contribution	Unmet	Appeal	Contribution	Unmet	Appeal	Contribution	Unmet	Appeal	Contribution	Unmet
Coordination & Support Services	2,679,000	770,343	1,908,657	1,729,531	1,700,636	28,895	2,760,042	1,423,243	1,336,799	2,806,909	74,627	2,732,282
Economic Recovery & Infrastructure	1,107,430	-	1,107,430	375,000	-	375,000	8,096,184	1,578,421	6,517,763	2,075,432	-	2,075,432
Education	640,000	410,000	230,000	2,313,107	2,079,984	233,123	2,866,983	2,068,851	798,132	2,566,523	-	2,566,523
Family Shelter & Non-Food Items	1,048,747	-	1,048,747	662,717	570,717	92,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health	4,116,800	1,563,325	2,563,475	11,221,793	873,743	10,348,050	5,454,442	2,438,244	3,016,198	5,240,613	216,763	5,023,850
Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law	315,000	322,729	(7,729)	699,350	100,000	599,350	1,532,826	1,345,156	187,670	4,708,210	643,078	4,065,132
Security	260,000	-	260,000	-	-	-	987,557	-	987,557	353,200	-	353,200
Water & Sanitation	630,000	307,500	322,500	1,630,405	321,600	1,308,805	1,310,952	528,952	782,000	482,774	-	482,774
Food	-	-	-	7,750,000	2,422,300	5,327,700	14,300,000	15,846,878	(1,546,878)	7,163,149	-	7,163,149
Agriculture	-	-	-	2,452,000	962,000	1,490,000	2,931,000	327,040	2,603,960	2,181,625	-	2,181,625
Multi-Sectoral	-	-	-	11,989,655	2,233,819	9,755,836	15,216,916	5,120,129	10,096,787	15,632,950	-	15,632,950
TOTAL	10,796,977	3,363,897	7,433,080	40,823,558	11,264,799	29,558,759	55,456,902	30,676,914	24,779,988	43,211,385	934,468	42,276,917

Note: From the Original Appeal 2001 to the Donor Response Annex in the 2002 Appeal the sector categories changed

By Donor in USD	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total
Australia	499,800	1,312,194	1,811,994	2,155,244	6,415,014	8,570,258	2,947,896	670,690	3,618,586	-	48,760	48,760
Canada	-	460,526	460,526	62,570	437,907	500,477	270,660	318,471	589,131	74,627	375,940	450,567
Cyprus	5,000	-	5,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	29,621	29,621	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	-	154,083	154,083	-	12,675	12,675	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11,698	11,698	-	60,723	60,723
Japan	110,000	-	110,000	2,413,029	120,414	2,533,443	6,391,809	-	6,391,809	-	-	-
Netherlands	1,567,000	4,355,008	5,922,008	1,639,813	3,842,024	5,481,837	928,500	883,947	1,812,447	-	85,777	85,777
New Zealand	209,350	-	209,350	244,000	37,012	281,012	65,000	25,727	90,727	-	-	-
Norway	113,379	-	113,379	557,863	148,830	706,693	416,144	45,423	461,567	216,763	-	216,763
Sweden	259,368	416,667	676,035	862,548	-	862,548	1,536,342	104,615	1,640,957	-	86,925	86,925
Switzerland	167,442	-	167,442	598,802	-	598,802	735,294	-	735,294	-	-	-
UNICEF	600,000	-	600,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	242,358	1,318,865	1,561,223	-	72,000	72,000
United States	-	1,126,152	1,126,152	2,384,473	6,711,795	9,096,258	12,031,642	3,879,743	15,911,385	-	-	-
European Commission	-	-	-	346,457	-	346,457	2,866,334	2,185,273	5,051,607	262,438	-	262,438
Private/NGO/intl.	-	-	-	-	204,254	204,254	2,244,935	700,487	2,945,422	-	-	-
Unearmarked funds by UN Agencies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	380,640	-	380,640
TOTAL	3,363,897	8,021,693	11,385,590	11,264,799	17,929,915	29,194,714	30,676,914	10,144,939	40,821,853	730,125	934,468	1,664,593

Funding Overview - Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals - Percentages

By Sector	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	% of Appeal	% of Contribution	% Covered	% of Appeal	% of Contribution	% Covered	% of Appeal	% of Contribution	% Covered	% of Appeal	% of Contribution	% Covered
Coordination & Support Services	24.8	22.9	28.8	4.2	15.1	98.3	5.0	4.6	51.6	6.5	8.0	2.7
Economic Recovery & Infrastructure	10.3	-	-	0.9	-	-	14.6	5.1	19.5	4.8	-	-
Education	5.9	12.2	64.1	5.7	18.5	89.9	5.2	6.7	72.2	5.9	-	-
Family Shelter & Non-Food Items	9.7	-	-	1.6	5.1	86.1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Health	38.1	46.2	37.7	27.5	7.8	7.8	9.8	7.9	44.7	12.1	23.2	4.1
Protection/Human Rights/Rule of Law	2.9	9.6	102.5	1.7	0.9	14.3	2.8	4.4	87.8	10.9	68.8	13.7
Security	2.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Water & Sanitation	5.8	9.1	48.8	4.0	2.9	19.7	2.4	1.7	40.3	1.1	-	-
Food	-	-	-	19.0	21.5	31.3	25.8	51.7	110.8	16.6	-	-
Agriculture	-	-	-	6.0	8.5	39.2	5.3	1.1	11.2	5.0	-	-
Multi-Sectoral	-	-	-	29.4	19.8	18.6	27.4	16.7	33.6	36.2	-	-
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	31.2	100.0	100.0	27.6	100.0	100.0	55.3	100.0	100.0	2.2

Note: From the Original Appeal 2001 to the Donor Response Annex in the 2002 Appeal the sector categories changed

By Donor	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total	Appeal	Outside Appeal	Total May 2004
Australia	14.9	16.4	15.9	19.1	35.8	29.4	9.6	6.6	8.9	-	6.7	2.9
Canada	-	5.7	4.0	0.6	2.4	1.7	0.9	3.1	1.4	8.0	51.5	27.1
Cyprus	0.1	-	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	0.4	0.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	-	1.9	1.4	-	0.1	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	3.3	-	1.0	21.4	0.7	8.7	20.8	0.1	0.0	-	8.3	3.6
Netherlands	46.6	54.3	52.0	14.6	21.4	18.8	3.0	8.7	15.7	-	-	-
New Zealand	6.2	-	1.8	2.2	0.2	1.0	0.2	0.3	4.4	-	11.7	5.2
Norway	3.4	-	1.0	5.0	0.8	2.4	1.4	0.4	0.2	-	-	-
Sweden	7.7	5.2	5.9	7.7	-	3.0	5.0	1.0	1.1	23.2	-	13.0
Switzerland	-	2.1	1.5	5.3	-	2.1	2.4	-	4.0	-	11.9	5.2
UNICEF	17.8	-	5.3	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	-
United Kingdom	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	-	-	-	-
United States	-	14.0	9.9	21.2	37.4	31.2	39.2	38.2	3.8	-	9.9	4.3
European Commission	-	-	-	3.1	-	1.2	9.3	21.5	12.4	28.1	-	15.8
Private/NGO/Intl.	-	-	-	-	1.1	0.7	7.3	6.9	7.2	-	-	-
Unearmarked funds by UN Agencies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Funding Overview - Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals - Ratios

Ratios	2001	2002	2003	2004
Ratio Unmet / Funding Outside CA	0,93	1,65	2,44	57,90
Ratio Funding Inside / Outside CA	0,42	0,63	3,02	1,28

ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross. Emergency Appeals for Indonesia

Cash contributions by Sector in CHF	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet
Protection	2,180,837	779,663	1,401,174	848,733	1,191,890	(343,157)	1,492,941	1,500,284	(7,343)	1,492,941	1,500,284	1,918,000
Assistance	5,838,026	2,527,920	3,310,206	5,323,987	2,432,119	2,891,868	4,103,942	2,597,993	1,505,949	4,103,942	2,597,993	3,716,000
Preventive Action	1,688,605	1,238,285	450,320	1,827,987	1,581,034	246,953	1,549,171	1,457,662	91,509	1,549,171	1,457,662	2,392,000
Cooperation with National Societies	1,831,625	1,630,748	200,877	2,141,169	1,149,868	991,301	1,477,859	1,371,984	105,875	1,477,859	1,371,984	1,751,000
General	81,595	143,437	(61,842)	68,518	63,735	4,783	-	-	-	-	-	-
Overheads	755,345	422,521	332,824	663,675	-	663,675	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	12,376,033	6,742,474	5,633,559	10,874,069	6,418,646	4,455,423	8,623,913	6,927,923	1,695,990	8,623,913	6,927,923	9,777,000
Comments					Incl. Overheads		Incl. Overheads			Incl. Overheads		Incl. Overheads

By Donor in CHF (Total for Governments and National RC Societies)	Contribution 31 Oct. 2001	Contribution 31 July 2002	Contribution 31 Aug. 2003	Contribution 31 Mar. 2004
Australia	1,365,000	533,040	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	2,418,081	334,436	638,000	-
Norway	139,382	-	-	-
Sweden	669,200	791,250	-	680,320
United Kingdom	3,036,000	337,412	1,493,940	1,495,340
European Commission	190,000	-	-	-
Total SELECTED Gov. + Nat. RC	7,817,663	1,996,138	2,131,940	2,175,660
Total ALL Governments + National RC	10,278,018	2,521,098	2,890,590	2,650,160
Percentage selected donors	76.1	79.2	73.8	82.1

IFRC - International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Cash, Kind and Services Contributions by Sector in CFR	2001			2002			2003			2004		
	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet	Appeal	Expenditures according to Annual Report	Unmet
Shelter & Construction	185.735	11.396	174.339	39.136	-	39.136	15.000	73.217	(58.217)	-	-	
Clothing & Textiles	3.377	-	3.377	12.409	-	12.409	18.500	47.118	(28.618)	-	-	
Food/seeds	-	-	-	13.364	-	13.364	-	-	-	-	-	
Water	-	56.101	(56.101)	80.229	-	80.229	-	9.331	(9.331)	-	-	
Medical & First Aid	80.791	9.475	71.316	5.819	-	5.819	-	140.583	(140.583)	-	-	
Teaching Materials	18.768	154	18.614	-	58.716	(58.716)	66.451	-	66.451	-	-	
Utensils and Tools	-	14.630	(14.630)	9.545	-	9.545	-	125.139	(125.139)	-	-	
Other Relief Supplies	144.228	7.166	137.062	40.133	94.014	(53.881)	21.900	42.328	(20.428)	-	-	
Capital Expenses	76.585	115.660	(39.075)	130.741	127.674	3.067	237.260	64.156	173.104	2.700	2.700	
Transport & Storage	23.379	41.192	(17.813)	85.612	16.899	68.713	32.231	37.138	(4.907)	21.804	21.804	
Personnel	822.608	485.169	337.439	540.271	422.348	117.923	1.105.014	681.501	423.513	1.127.267	1.127.267	
General Administration	293.618	145.067	148.551	875.342	246.740	628.602	161.527	158.030	3.497	212.236	212.236	
Programme Support	203.820	79.503	124.317	226.500	102.107	124.393	115.253	5.214	110.039	94.824	94.824	
Operational Provisions	-	(42.324)	42.324	-	184	(184)	-	(184)	184	-	-	
TOTAL	1,852,909	923,189	929,720	2,059,101	1,068,682	990,419	1,773,136	1,383,571	389,565	1,458,831	1,458,831	

By Donor in CHF (Total for Governments and National RC Societies)	Contributions According to Annual Report		
	2001	2002	2003
Australia	27.454	-	17.796
Denmark	207.510	-	-
Netherlands	124.686	142.635	227.380
Norway	201.756	202.096	166.993
Sweden	218.215	161.205	196.215
United Kingdom	-	-	190.978
European Commission	-	-	-
Total SELECTED Gov. + Nat. RC	779.621	505.936	799.362
Total ALL Governments + National RC	1,339,909	687,993	1,302,475
Percentage selected donors	58.2	73.5	61.4

Overview of Swedish Humanitarian Assistance Support to Indonesia 2001-2003 (1/2)

Organi-sation	Objectives	SEK						USD Equi.
		2001		2002		2003		
		New	Carried over	New	Carried over	New	Carried over	
WHO	Madura IDPs from Sampit : Epidemiological Surveillance, Two Water Wells, Health Promotion. Original appeal: Morbidity and mortality among IDPs in Maluku INS-01-1/N04A: Health assistance and support to health systems	600.000	430.000					
WHO	Support in Aceh, Original appeal: INS-02/H01 Public Health Management and coord. in IDP and conflict areas INS-02/H02 Surveillance and communicable diseases outbreak response INS-02/H03 Community based mental health care and psychosocial support INS-02/H04 Health as a bridge for peace				No cost extension 400.000			80.364
WHO	INS-03/H05 Communicable diseases surveillance, common disease control INS-03/H06 Health as a bridge for peace INS-03/H07 Health sector emergency preparedness INS-03/H08 Making pregnancy safer INS-03/H09 Community based mental health INS-03/H10 Management and coord of the health sector			1.000.000			No cost extension	133.940
UNDP	Support to the North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme NMMRP (UNDP Trust Fund) Appeal for 2002 and 2003					1.000.000		133.940
OCHA	The Maluku Crisis: Monitoring system of UN supported activities and coordination of programmes (1/N02C Field Coordination)	300.000						669.700
OCHA	Coordination			1.000.000				40.182
OCHA	Coordination, durable solutions, support to host communities (INS03/CSS03)					1.000.000		133.940
UNICEF	The Maluku Crisis: Humanitarian assistance and better environment for peacebuilding. INS-01-1/N02 C Field Coord in the Maluku INS-01-1/N04 B Health Assistance and support to health systems INS-01-1/N05 Vitadele assistance to vulnerable children INS-01-1/N06 Access to water and sanitary facilities INS-01-1/N07 Emergency education programmes INS-01-1/N08 Support to reconciliation and peace initiatives INS-01-1/N10A Assistance in capacity building	1.600.000						214.304
UNICEF	Sectors: Education, Health, Protection of Children's Rights, Water and Sanitation INS-02/E01-02 INS-02/H05-H09 INS-02/P/HR/RL01-02 INS-02/WS01			5.000.000			No cost extension	669.700
UNICEF	Sectors: Education, Health, Coordination and Support Services, Protection of Children's Rights INS-03/CSS04 INS-03/MS01; MS03; MS04; MS11; MS14 INS-03/E2 INS-03/E10 INS-03/H04					8.000.000		1.071.520

Exchange rate (www.oanda.com 3 June 2004): SEK 1 = USD 0,13394

Overview of Swedish Humanitarian Assistance Support to Indonesia 2001-2003 (2/2)

	Organisation	Objectives	SEK						USD Equi.	
			2001		2002		2003			2004
			New	Carried over	New	Carried over	New	Carried over		New
Swedish Red Cross	SRC	Amount in Appeal dedicated for Support to Indonesia (Capacity Building) Excl. Regional/Global Programmes	750.000							100.455
	SRC	Amount in Appeal dedicated for Support to Indonesia (Organisational Devl.) Excl. Regional/Global Programmes			850.000					113.849
	SRC	Amount in Appeal dedicated for Support to Indonesia (Capacity Building) Excl. Regional/Global Programmes					850.000			113.849
	SRC	Disaster Management Programme (SEK 485000) Organisational Development (SEK 165000)							650.000	87.061
ICRC Appeal	ICRC	The Maluku Crisis	4.000.000							535.760
	ICRC	Humanitarian Assistance, protection			5.000.000					669.700
	ICRC	Humanitarian Assistance, protection					4.000.000			535.760
Framework for Smaller Humanitarian Assistance Grants	SRC	Support to IFRC: Earthquake response: Manokwara District, Papua			250.000					33.485
	SRC	Support to IFRC: Floods: Jambi, Riau, Palembang Provinces in Sumatra, and South Sulawesi.							900.000	120.546
NGOs	Forum-Syd	"Naturbruk" (Natural Resource Management)			1.121.000			895.000		270.023
	LO-TCO	Human Rights and Democracy			1.672.000			1.918.000		480.845

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SE-105 25 Stockholm, Sweden
Tel: +46 (0)8-698 50 00. Fax: +46 (0)8-20 88 64
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