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*Full Report of the Evaluation of WFP's
Operations in East Timor*

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The evaluation team visited East Timor from 19 January to 23 February 2001. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Acronyms

BULOG	National Logistics Agency of Indonesian Government
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CO	(WFP) Country Office
CTS	Commodity Tracking System
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EMOP	Emergency Operation
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ETTA	East Timor Transitional Administration
FAO	(UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation
FDP	Final Distribution Point
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group
IDP	Internal Displaced People
INGO	International Non-Government Organisation
IP	Implementing Partner (of WFP)
LTSH	Landside Transport, Storage and Handling
LOA	Letter of Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PKF	Peace Keeping Force
SAT	(WFP) Security Awareness Training
SBA	Stand By Agreement
SI	Shipping Instruction
SO	Special Operation
SRSG	Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
TNI	Indonesian armed forces
UNTAET	UN Transitional Authority in East Timor
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
VGf	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WFP	(UN) World Food Programme



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Executive Summary

WFP's operations in East Timor were successful overall and characterised by the commitment and energy of WFP personnel. There was a high level of inter-agency cooperation under the umbrella of the OCHA Humanitarian Coordinator, with WFP as a very pro-active partner. WFP's strengths were displayed most prominently in the initial crisis phase. Although contingency planning was deficient in the months preceding the ballot, the reaction time was short, starting from a "zero" base in both Darwin and East Timor (i.e. no pre-existing WFP field office or presence). Food stocks were more than adequate, due to the early securing of food stocks in Dili from BULOG, the Indonesian food agency, and rapid mobilization of additional food resources. An effective, service-oriented logistics operation was established, which was appreciated by UN sister agencies, NGOs and others, and distributions commenced in Dili and expanded across the territory without undue delay. The initial objectives of saving lives and maintaining nutrition were met and food aid helped provide social stability.

Key weaknesses during the initial phase included the lack of effective support for the advance team and gaps in staffing - several critical core international staff positions were not filled or were filled for too brief a period of time. There was an initial over-estimation of food needs due to the lack of reliable data as well as pressure to make rough estimates for an early Common Appeal Process (CAP). As a result the EMOP was very probably oversupplied, which may have been a factor in its longevity. Commodity control was initially poor.

WFP's performance in the post-crisis phase was less than optimal with limited success in effecting a transition from relief to recovery. There were weaknesses in the choice of post general distribution targeting mechanisms (principally vulnerable group feeding) and these relief activities continued for too long (in the case of vulnerable group feeding up to March 2001). Food-for-work was introduced early, indeed WFP seemed *driven* to do so, but it was applied without rigour in a design sense and with inadequate attention to targeting.

Other weaknesses in the post-crisis phase included inadequate reassessment of food security and vulnerability through 2000, inadequate attention to the deterioration of some commodities stockpiled, little substantive progress in honouring WFP Commitments to Women, and poor monitoring of final distributions and programme results. Monitoring was not approached in a systematic way and as a result WFP is not in a good position to know with certainty how effective the EMOP has been.

If EMOP 6177 is to be extended until the end of 2001 the objectives statements should first be revised in the light of a) the mission's findings and recommendations and b) with the benefit of a reassessment of food security and vulnerability, and relief and recovery needs.

A number of WFP staff members who read early drafts of this report remarked that it does not give enough room to WFP's achievements and that it is unbalanced and unfair on the field staff who gave their best to the operation. The evaluation mission acknowledges this concern but does not consider the report to be unjustifiably critical. It is certainly not the intention of the mission to detract from the efforts of WFP staff or from the very real successes of the operation. Rather the intention is to focus on what can be built on and improved in future EMOPs.



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Evaluation objectives

The objectives of the evaluation were to analyse the achievements of WFP's emergency operations in East Timor, in particular the degree to which stated objectives have been achieved, and to assess the evolution in programming of WFP assistance, adjusting the targeting mechanisms in order to more adequately address the food insecurity experienced by the displaced and crisis affected population groups. The primary focus is EMOP 6177 'Emergency Assistance to Victims of Civil Strife in East Timor' which commenced in November 1999 and has been extended twice, currently until mid-2001.¹ The evaluation also considers EMOP 6175, which preceded 6177, and covered WFP's initial response (formally the first two months)², and SO 6178 (logistics support) which also preceded EMOP 6177 and which is still current. By the end of 2000 WFP had received almost US\$40 million for the three operations (80% of appeal amounts).

The evaluation addresses six key issues:³

- a) Speed and adequacy of initial response by WFP.
- b) Assessment and reassessment of food aid needs of at-risk population groups.
- c) Targeting of food aid to the civil strife affected population groups.
- d) Delivery, distribution and monitoring.
- e) Role of food aid within the new socio-economic environment and in transition from emergency to recovery.
- f) Programme resourcing, management and coordination.

1.2 Method

The mission was composed of four independent consultants. The mission leader visited Rome for a briefing in January 2001 and the whole team visited Jakarta en route to East Timor on 29-30 February to consult the CO and representatives of agencies and organizations that had been involved in the humanitarian intervention. The mission spent 25 days in East Timor in February 2001 and in addition to consultations in Dili visited all WFP Sub-Offices and eight out of the thirteen districts. The mission split into two groups for the majority of the fieldwork to give the mission a wider coverage.⁴

¹ The objectives of EMOP 6177 were to:

- facilitate the return and settlement of displaced persons, with special attention to female headed households;
- assist with rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, including homes and other facilities; and
- enable returning IDPs to devote all their efforts to rebuild their homes and restore their livelihoods by temporarily freeing them from the need to meet their day-to-day food requirements.

² EMOP 6175 sought to assist 150,000 IDPs. The objectives were to:

- save lives;
- maintain or improve health/nutritional status with special attention to women and other groups at high risk; and
- prevent mass migration.

³ The ToR required the team to address points (b), (c), (d), (e). Points (a) and (f) were subsequently added in consultation with WFP OEDE.

⁴ See Annex B, Itinerary and Workplan; Annex C, Method; Annex D, People Met



2. CONTEXT

2.1 Impact of the violence and destruction

From late 1998 and leading up to the UN-sponsored popular consultation on independence on 30 August 1999 there was a violent campaign of intimidation against independence which resulted in considerable disruption and displacement of the population. In the immediate aftermath of the consultation a vicious reaction was instigated through armed militias that caused much larger scale disruption and displacement. The majority of the East Timorese population⁵ was displaced internally, most hiding in the hills, or forced across the border into West Timor.⁶ This violence, destruction and displacement created considerable trauma, numerous people were wounded or killed and people's houses, belongings, productive assets and food stocks were in most cases looted or destroyed. Agricultural production was disrupted, there was massive destruction of infrastructure, and economic activities came to a standstill. The level of destruction and disruption was most severe in the western districts bordering West Timor (including the Oecussi enclave).

The impact of the violence and destruction on food security was immediate with so many displaced or in hiding and so much destroyed. Some people were able to pay the militia not to destroy their house and possessions; some people were spared because they were pro-integration; some who could pay for transport were able to flee into West Timor with some of their property, and some people were able to hide possessions, including agricultural implements, and some foodstuffs. Some crops like cassava remained in the fields. But by and large there was a huge loss of productive assets including livestock, tools and seed. Those that returned to destroyed homes and who were unable to plant the next crop became particularly vulnerable, as were those who had previously relied on cash crops (including coffee) due to the collapse of the economy.

East Timorese farmers were already vulnerable and without savings having gone through the prolonged drought caused by the ENSO phenomena (1997-98). They had also been affected by the general economic decline of the Indonesian economy (from late 1997) and in many cases had been disrupted by the TNI/militia pre-ballot campaign.

2.2 Distinguishing features of the Operation

The unique feature of the East Timor operation was the vacuum left by the departure of the governing regime and professional and commercial elite. There was essentially no state other than what the UN could establish as an interim measure. This was compounded for WFP (and most other agencies) by the lack of an existing office or presence and the fact that the CO that had been responsible (Jakarta) could no longer be involved for political reasons and a new CO had to be created. The operation is also distinguished by the limited information available about the country before the ballot and the systematic physical destruction and looting. Distinguishing features on the positive side were the high international profile given to the crisis; the commitment of WFP's donors to assist; and the presence of a substantial stock of staple food that WFP was able to secure from the departing regime.

⁵ The pre-crisis population was said to be approximately 750,000 people, including professionals, civil servants and traders from other parts of Indonesia who fled in the period leading up to and after the ballot.

⁶ Over 200,000



The humanitarian crisis in East Timor was a 'complex emergency' in that it involved a breakdown of the authority that had prevailed up to the ballot and required the Security Council and several UN agencies to intervene. Initially the security of personnel was a dominant issue that dictated the pace of WFP's response at the district level, but the persistent armed conflict that has characterised so many other WFP operations was largely absent because the TNI and the militia withdrew and INTERFET thoroughly secured almost all parts of East Timor against incursions. Some insecurity persisted in districts bordering West Timor due to incursions by militia however this was well managed by INTERFET and subsequently the PKF and no non-military international personnel were killed or injured. Thus the specific humanitarian issues that usually arise in a complex emergency (such as the manipulation of food aid by parties to a conflict) were absent and WFP personnel were exposed to comparatively little risk.

3. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

3.1 Preparedness

A staff person from the CO in Jakarta participated in a three-day UN Inter-Agency Assessment Mission to Dili in April 1999 and an internal WFP report was subsequently written which gathered some important basic information (particularly on logistics and food stocks) and considered a number of scenarios for East Timor. The authors considered the possibility that East Timor could become independent with closed borders, preventing the transport of food aid from West Timor. This was an important step but it was not developed into a contingency plan. It is evident from internal email traffic that WFP gave further consideration to how WFP could respond if there was a renewed crisis but this was not gathered into one document and there was still no contingency plan.

Thus when the crisis unfolded in the first week of September 1999 WFP was not as prepared as it could have been. There was no standby team or equipment and no presence in Darwin. WFP did manage to get two experienced personnel into Dili on 20 September right on the heels of the UN intervention force, INTERFET, which arrived over the weekend of 18-19 September.⁷ This was a significant achievement. On the other hand, due to the lack of preparation (not the fault of the individuals concerned) they were poorly equipped. This was compounded by poor support (e.g. lack of telecommunication/email, vehicles and basic survival kits) in the first two to three weeks.

⁷ One staff member arriving from Jakarta via Surabaya with ICRC and one from Darwin with the OCHA Humanitarian Coordinator. ICRC staff returned to Dili on 14 September; World Vision established a presence even earlier.



This made it harder for the advance team to do an extraordinarily difficult job. It also caused the operation to commence in the absence of some fundamental operation systems.⁸

This situation could have been ameliorated if WFP had developed and refined a contingency plan in the six months before the ballot by gathering information, testing scenarios and acting on their operational implications.⁹ It is true that WFP had difficulties getting access to East Timor and that nobody anticipated the level of systematic destruction. Nevertheless it was known to WFP from early 1999 that there was considerable violence and internal displacement occurring in East Timor and one scenario that should have been considered and planned for was the possibility a) that the ballot would trigger a larger and sharper crisis sufficient to substantially increase population displacement and require an emergency response and b) that it might not be possible to provide logistic support for such an operation from within Indonesia. The latter would have brought forward consideration of Darwin as a necessity for political and logistic reasons and could have led to a relatively earlier presence in Darwin and a better informed, equipped and supported advance team. (WFP's position is that it would not often be feasible to establish an office in anticipation of an imminent humanitarian crisis.)

As it happened it took WFP nearly two weeks (from the beginning of the crisis) to make a definitive determination that the Jakarta office could not be involved. Working this through in the first weeks of the crisis rather than anticipating it put WFP 'behind the curve' (as one WFP staff member put it) by its relatively late arrival in Darwin compared to some other humanitarian actors.

Another WFP staff person involved at the time pointed that even though some other agencies and organizations were 'faster out of the blocks' in terms of establishing a presence in Darwin¹⁰ and starting an effective response in East Timor¹¹, WFP gathered speed quickly. This is a fair comment – WFP soon anchored its humanitarian operation by ensuring a supply of relief food and providing logistic support.

Despite their handicap, WFP's advance team performed very well under trying circumstances. They faced many immediate practical difficulties and initially had to camp (staying at the Australian Consulate Building for a week before moving to the school compound with other UN and INGO staff), borrow UNAMET vehicles initially, and rely on a satphone (although communications were established relatively quickly and efficiently they were without email and telephone contact for the first month). They also had to compete with others for scarce local personnel to act as interpreters and assistants.

⁸ The mission acknowledges that WFP is now in a better position to provide personnel and equipment to equip a new CO in a crisis given the establishment of an emergency roster in 2000 to ensure the deployment of trained staff within 48 hours, and the establishment of a UN Humanitarian Response Depot in Brindisi in June 2000. There are also plans to establish regional offshoots. However, for this capacity to be effectively utilised attention to contingency planning is still required.

⁹ ICRC had a contingency plan and prepositioned food and non-food items in Attambua and Dili (1,000 tonnes of rice in Dili). ICRC vessels arrived with trucks and loaders.

¹⁰ Eg UNHCR

¹¹ Eg ICRC



Meanwhile WFP continued to invest staff and resources into building up the Liaison Office in Darwin, which was the initial logistics hub¹² and which Dili had to rely on for supplies and banking. To some staff it appeared that this investment was at the expense of equipping the Dili team and office.

3.2 Securing rice stocks

In early September 1999 the Indonesian national logistics agency (BULOG) contacted the CO in Jakarta and requested that WFP take over its Dili warehouses and rice stocks, which were being looted, and replace this rice from WFP's stocks in Indonesia (i.e. EMOP 6006 stocks). This clearly represented an outstanding opportunity and the CO in Jakarta helped to facilitate the arrangement and the subsequent release of BULOG's Dili stocks. Not surprisingly, giving effect to the arrangement on the ground proved difficult and the advance team had to negotiate with the outgoing Indonesian military for several days to secure their agreement to the release of the rice to WFP and its IPs.

A total of approximately 6,500 tonnes of rice was originally believed to be in the BULOG warehouses in Dili.¹³ On 2/3 October WFP carried out an inventory of the four warehouses, accompanied by a TNI liaison officer, and came up with a figure of 6,528.8 tonnes of which 300 tonnes was earmarked for the TNI's use leaving 6,228.8 tonnes for WFP. This was the amount eventually replaced in Indonesia. However, according to CTS records inspected by the mission WFP was only able to account for 4,812 tonnes, a discrepancy of 1,416 tonnes. WFP had sought to avoid such a problem by drafting an agreement to be entered into with the TNI that provided that 'the precise quantities of rice in stock shall be determined following the completion of the uplifting.' The TNI did not sign it. WFP.

It is difficult to judge precisely how the discrepancy occurred. The TNI controlled the smallest of the four warehouses holding 795 tonnes at the time of the WFP inventory, which included the 300 tonnes they had earmarked for their own use. It is possible that they exceeded this amount but that would only explain up to 495 tonnes of the discrepancy. WFP put locks on the other three warehouses but they were evidently not totally secure because repair work had to be carried to improve security. There was probably considerable pilferage and indeed the mission heard reports of this. The mission was also told that INTERFET troops responsible for guarding one of the BULOG warehouses felt obliged to allow the general public to help themselves to some of the rice to avoid public disorder.

Nevertheless it is hard to accept that such a large quantity (over 200 x 5 tonne truck loads) can be accounted for by pilferage and informal distribution. There were some reports that the TNI loaded rice on departing troop ships but it is hard to credit that this could be organised without WFP and/or INTERFET knowing about it. WFP's implementing partners (principally World Vision) were loading rice from the warehouses for distribution in September/October. WFP believes this was recorded (it is in the IP's interests to do so to claim LTSH), but perhaps there was a period when it was not. Rice was also released to organisations and agencies which did not have a formal agreement with WFP including the Catholic Church through the local Caritas

¹² It was anticipated that Darwin would be the transport hub for longer than it was and that food would be air dropped for 20 days from Darwin

¹³ On 21 September WFP announced that it has secured 6,500 tonnes of BULOG rice and 8,000 tonnes warehouse capacity.



office. The mission is inclined to conclude that in the initial weeks of the operation large amounts of rice were simply released for distribution by WFP without any paperwork, or that the paperwork was not processed.

Despite the difficulty in accounting for the rice secured, the takeover of BULOG's rice stocks and warehouses in Dili was a coup for WFP – it was cost and delivery effective and put WFP in a very good position to secure supply for the operation and commence distributions without delay.¹⁴

After the restriction on distributing food aid in East Timor had been lifted by the UN and the Government of Indonesia in July 1999, the CO in Jakarta made arrangements with BULOG to ship 6,400 tonnes of rice from Surabaya for use in East Timor under EMOP 6006.¹⁵ The post-ballot crisis soon intervened but having arrangements in train was fortuitous for EMOP 6175/6177 and WFP was able to finalise the order with BULOG on the basis that this rice would also be replaced.¹⁶

However, there is an argument that the Surabaya shipment should not have been called forward. The matter was discussed among senior WFP staff in late September in Dili and the consensus was that given that food needs were apparently less than initially believed and given the obvious congestion of Dili port the shipment should probably not be called forward. WFP Dili asked WFP Jakarta to delay the shipment but this was not endorsed by Jakarta.¹⁷

3.3 Agreements with implementing partners

After the lifting of the UN restriction the CO in Jakarta had also set in train discussions with CARE, WVI and CRS to provide food aid to IDPs and vulnerable groups in East (and West) Timor. Again, these arrangements were overtaken by events but they provided the basis for agreements signed in Jakarta in September for the distribution of emergency relief.¹⁸ An agreement was also entered into with a Timorese consortium of NGOs (POSKO).¹⁹ This enabled the NGOs involved to utilise rice WFP was securing from BULOG through the TNI. As anticipated these agreements were later superseded by agreements entered into in Dili.²⁰

The TNI began to grant WFP and its IPs access to the BULOG rice in the last week of September.²¹ WFP thereafter released stocks almost daily for distributions by WFP's IPs in Dili and for limited helicopter airlifts and reconnaissance flights beyond Dili. IPs were able to hire several of the few remaining small trucks that had survived the systematic looting and destruction to conduct general food distribution in Dili town and its suburbs. However the lack of trucks and the need to wait for INTERFET to secure districts were key operational constraints in undertaking distributions beyond Dili in the first couple of weeks.

¹⁴ WFP did not supply all food needs. CARE had some stocks in Dili and ICRC flew in food early in the crisis.

¹⁵ It is unclear to the evaluation team how the quantity of 6,400 tonnes was derived – it seems a large amount in the pre-ballot context.

¹⁶ See further Commodity Management

¹⁷ Ibid

¹⁸ For a total of 5,900 tonnes of rice (122,917 beneficiaries at 400 gr/day for 4 months).

¹⁹ Bringing the total to 6,440 tonnes.

²⁰ An agreement was also subsequently signed with Caritas Australia for distributions in the Oecussi enclave.

²¹ Conflicting reports say variously from 24 and 29 September.



3.4 Achievement of short-term objectives

Despite some shortcomings the mission concludes that WFP and its implementing partners responded quickly and adequately to the crisis, significantly supplementing the short-term food needs of a large proportion of the population.²² In some, perhaps many cases, WFP saved lives,²³ although this should not be overstated given that the crisis was sudden, nutrition levels were normal or near normal at that point, and people evidently gained access to food despite their displacement. WFP and its partners certainly helped to maintain the health and nutritional status of much of the population, or, at a minimum, prevent worse declines.²⁴ The evaluation team is not aware of any confirmed cases of starvation.

A wide range of informants were positive about WFP's response and pointed out that if there were problems in reaching people it was due to lack of assured security (initially) and to transport constraints. WFP and its IPs could only move as fast as INTERFET, which was initially constrained by the continued presence of the TNI. INTERFET's deployment sped up with the departure of the TNI and was quickly followed, in most cases, by WFP or IP operations (sometimes within a few days). The borders were secured first, which meant that some internal districts like Ermera were not secured until later, delaying humanitarian activities including food distributions.

WFP and its IPs helped to resettle and stabilise the population, and together with INTERFET's presence, food distributions drew people down from the hills in many locations.²⁵ Initially (in September and October 1999) it was believed that there would be a large influx of returnees from West Timor. WFP moved quickly to preposition food and WFP played a vital role in assisting returning refugees by making food available for distribution upon arrival in a timely and efficient manner, although there does not appear to have been any particular focus on women. The standard ration for returnees was 5 kgs of rice per person representing a full cereal ration for two weeks, although in the early stages some returnees crossing the border only received 2 kgs early in the operation. A small quantity of other foodstuffs was often added (BP5, HPB, pulses, oil), the precise package depending on the entry point. There was inadequate follow up of destitute returnees whom it was assumed would get equal access to existing food aid programmes (or face the same conditions as the existing population).²⁶

One of WFP's original objectives was to enable returning IDPs to devote all their efforts to rebuilding their homes and restoring their livelihoods by temporarily freeing them from the need to meet their day-to-day food requirements.²⁷ This was in the main achieved by the general distributions, albeit for a short time and in the form of relatively modest amounts of food that complemented what people were able to secure. Although 'full' rations were distributed initially, in most instances it was only rice or maize (beans, oil, fish and salt came later) and it took two months to reach 80% of the beneficiaries and three months to complete the first distribution

²² In this respect we concur with the External Review of the Humanitarian Response conducted on behalf of UNTAET/HAER (External Review of the Humanitarian Response to the East Timor Crisis, September 1999 – May 2000)

²³ A stated objective of EMOP 6175

²⁴ Also a stated objective of EMOP 6175

²⁵ Third objective of EMOP 6175 was to 'prevent mass migration' and first objective of 6177 was to 'facilitate the return and settlement of displaced persons, with special attention to female headed households'.

²⁶ See further Assessing Needs of IDPs and Returnees

²⁷ An objective of EMOP 6177



cycle.²⁸ In this sense nutritional needs were not fully met by WFP at the height of people's need and the type and amount of food provided would have been inadequate for anyone who did not have access to other food.

The commitment and energy of WFP and IP staff in securing and distributing food greatly encouraged the East Timorese, although to a lesser extent lack of information and imperfect local distributions of food aid created social tensions. Delays with other forms of assistance, most notably shelter materials, exacerbated people's frustrations.

Lessons

- Assessments made in preparation for a potential crisis have to be turned into contingency plans and regularly updated as events unfold to be useful when a crisis breaks.
- Far more preparation is required for countries/territories in which WFP has no office and little or no presence.

Recommendation

- WFP should strengthen its capacity at the regional level to undertake contingency assessment and planning. This may now be possible with the establishment of a Regional Office in Bangkok.

4. LOGISTICS SUPPORT

4.1 Logistics coordination unit

Special Operation 6178 was approved on 16 September 1999 to establish a Logistics Coordination Unit tasked to assist with the receipt, transport, storage and distribution of relief commodities (for all agencies and organizations). It was also tasked to coordinate and plan with other agencies and NGOs, and liaise with the military.²⁹ This enabled WFP to quickly build up the logistics and coordination capacity required for WFP and its IPs to commence relief operations (the first general ration was 80% complete by the end of November). The joint logistics approach was operationally effective in East Timor and was presumably cost effective to donors.

4.2 Communications

Communication facilities were non-existent at the commencement of the emergency. The first WFP personnel in Dili had to rely on a satphone for internal and external voice communications for some weeks which they initially had difficulty recharging. They initially lacked data communication (email), which was a considerable constraint. By the end of November 1999 WFP's Logistics Coordination Unit had replaced the satphones with a HF network covering Dili,

²⁸ On 18 November 1999 WFP reported that the first WFP general distribution of 10 kgs of rice per person was nearly complete, with over 4,700 MT of rice having been distributed to 50 of 63 sub-districts.

²⁹ The projected cost of SO 6178 was US\$16,665,353 70% of which had been resourced by the end of 2000. The objectives also included (this is paraphrased) providing air, sea and road logistic support, warehousing, staffing and communications.



Baucau, Maliana, Same, Suai and Darwin. By the end of 1999 all of WFP's light vehicles had the capability to access data. WFP also installed and managed a VHF network for use by the Dili offices of the humanitarian agencies (including INGOs), which provided a vital common communications link for the day-to-day coordination of humanitarian operations.

4.3 Port services and warehousing

WFP's provision of personnel and equipment in Dili Port ensured that food aid shipments were discharged in the initial weeks. WFP negotiated for quayside openings with INTERFET and WFP's Port Captain trained local workers employed as stevedores and winch men. WFP took almost complete charge of all aspects of cargo handling for food aid shipments in the port. The lack of an independent company to carry out superintendence on WFP cargoes exacerbated the tallying and reconciliation problems that arose. The bunching of arrivals in November/December 1999 and May/June 2000 exacerbated warehouse problems and led to difficulties adhering to a 'first in, first out policy'.

Although WFP was fortunate to find BULOG's main Dili warehouses in fairly good order, rehabilitation was required, particularly to improve security. In some districts there was little or no storage available and WFP quickly deployed RubbHall prefabricated units.

4.4 Air operations and services

In the initial weeks of the operation some 300 tons of food and non-food items were air dropped on Australian air force and WFP chartered C-130s originating in Darwin. The airdrops attracted critics, particularly the 'snowdrop' system of delivering high protein biscuits. Airdrops were suspended when a boy was injured by a bag of food dropped from one of the non-WFP C-130s.

The UNTAET/HAER review of UN operations³⁰ questioned the advisability of airdrops on the grounds that there was no evidence that IDPs in the hills were dying from food shortage, that most of the country's terrain was unsuitable, and that the location of the IDPs was uncertain. The review suggested that the main purpose was boosting morale. This analysis is plausible but WFP had little hard information and may have initially believed the airdrops to be necessary.

WFP chartered a C-130 Hercules and an Antonov 12 to establish a daily cargo service from Darwin to Dili which commenced in early October 1999 and transported a total of approximately 800 metric tons of emergency supplies for the humanitarian community operating in East Timor. This service played a vital part in promptly transporting those infrastructure items required by UN agencies and NGO's to set up their bases in the early stages of the emergency before any ocean shipping routes could be established.

WFP also contracted a 19-seater aircraft in Darwin to establish a regular twice-daily passenger flight to Dili without which it would have been very difficult for humanitarian agencies and organisations to operate in East Timor. A daily passenger service linking East and West Timor was also made available to humanitarian personnel.

³⁰ External Review of the Humanitarian Response to the East Timor Crisis, September 1999 – May 2000



The chartering of a MIL 17 helicopter from October 1999 was appropriate and successful overall, albeit expensive³¹ and tied to emergency deliveries that may have gone on for too long.³² It played a significant role in transporting humanitarian cargo (including food aid and seeds) and personnel to areas inaccessible by road. During November 1999 at the peak of the emergency the MIL 17 transported a total of 542 tons of humanitarian aid to remote areas of the country.³³ WFP accepted cargo and passengers for other UN agencies as well as INGOs, thus providing a vital general service. Although INGOs sometimes experienced frustrations getting cargo and personnel on WFP flights, it is generally accepted that WFP worked hard to serve them.

In the same spirit WFP also established vital passenger and air cargo air-bridges between Darwin, Dili and Kupang. In the initial months INGOs relied heavily on the WFP Darwin-Dili service.

4.5 Trucking and barge operations

INGOs operating in East Timor prior to September 1999 relied on commercial transport operators to do their distribution. After the ballot they had to scramble to import trucks. Some of WFP's IPs did so expeditiously and one was able to assist WFP to pre-position commodities at extended delivery points (EDPs) while WFP was building up its fleet. Others encountered delays (one IP did not secure trucks until well into 2000) and as a result some IPs had little or no transport capability during the fourth quarter of 1999 and beyond and were dependent on WFP.

By the end of October 1999 WFP had managed to get 45 trucks into Dili, which established the backbone of the humanitarian aid transport infrastructure in East Timor. The airlifting of Nissan trucks from WFP's Cambodia operation contributed to this build-up. The Logistics Coordination Unit played an important role in optimising the use of trucks but even though trucks continued to arrive through November and December to boost trucking capacity, WFP and its IPs continued to face transport constraints (compounded by poor roads and security issues) and there was a coverage issue in the early months. Even with the assistance of the chartered MIL 17 and military helicopters it took a long time to complete distribution cycles in some areas and some communities received no food for several weeks.

Given the poor condition of East Timor's infrastructure WFP relied heavily on barges to move food and cargo around East Timor and to serve the land-locked enclave of Oecussi. The barge operations were very successful by all accounts – one IP representative expressed the view that 'WFP delivered when others were floundering'. A total of 5,430 metric tonnes of food was shipped by WFP chartered barges during the first six months of the emergency.³⁴

The use of second-hand Cambodia operation trucks and later donated ex-US military M35s filled a gap but were expensive to operate and it was difficult to obtain the necessary spares. The Nissans were in reasonable condition despite their age (seven years) but the M-35s had been mothballed for decades and were unreliable. Both the Nissans and M-35s lacked power steering and were dangerous to operate on narrow winding roads. The new HINOs purchased by WFP and

³¹ Initially US\$4,900 per hour

³² Particularly VGF. See Programming and Phasing of Activities

³³ By February 2001 the MIL 17 had carried about 3,200 metric tons of humanitarian cargo (95% food) and 3341 humanitarian personnel.

³⁴ As of 31 January 2001 a total 7,278 tonnes of food had been transported by barge, approximately 20% of the total distributed.



a number of IPs performed well although the electric differential switching was too sophisticated and some had very low differential specifications – the two combining to result in breakdowns. In view of the absence of any local vehicle maintenance facilities WFP established a fleet maintenance facility in Dili and created a mobile workshop to carry out emergency repairs at the district level.

Lessons

- The ‘service’ approach adopted by WFP towards other agencies and organizations is appropriate and in the broader scheme of things cost effective.
- Trucks destined for use in territories with narrow roads and steep gradient roads require power steering. More attention needs to be paid to transmission load ratings and electrically operated transmissions (for changing from low to high and 2WD to 4WD) may not be suitable where trucks are to be driven by relatively inexperienced drivers.

Recommendations

- As lead UN agency for food relief operations, WFP (with the support of the OCHA Emergency Relief Coordinator) should exert more control over objective setting for air drop operations involving UN mandated military aircraft.
- WFP’s regional office in Bangkok should identify potential sources of supply of appropriate trucks in preparedness for similar operations.

5. COMMODITY MANAGEMENT

5.1 Commodity Tracking System (CTS)

The CTS (commodity tracking system) is a vital WFP control mechanism but it got off to a bad start in East Timor because the ‘raw material’ for the tracking system - accurate records of discharge and storage - was faulty at the outset. This has been attributed to having to establish documentary procedures in the port from scratch and train up inexperienced local staff to compile documentation, and to difficulties in the warehouses with WFP staff apparently becoming overwhelmed.³⁵ As a result the record of quantities discharged and transported from the port, warehoused in Dili and finally distributed to beneficiaries are faulty and the problem cannot be satisfactorily rectified. Efforts made by the mission to obtain accurate commodity figures in respect of total distribution since the commencement of operations and current stock balances resulted in several inconsistent tables and final figures. (See Annexure.) It is unlikely that the reported CTS loss of 185 tonnes of cereals out of a total throughput of approximately 39,000 tonnes is accurate.³⁶

There are also several gaps in the Logistics Coordination Unit’s shipping files for the period and the practice of keeping all hard copy in one omnibus shipping instruction (SI) file makes

³⁵ It was also said that not all Nordic SBA placements performed optimally.

³⁶ EMOP 6175 throughput was approximately 18,000 tonnes, with reported losses of 66.6 tonnes, and EMOP 6177 throughput was approximately 21,000, with reported losses of 118 tonnes.



reconciliation difficult. The warehouse ledger systems maintained in WFP's warehouses are sub-optimal and there is too much reliance on stack cards.

In the initial months of the operation, military landing craft arrived in Oecussi with WFP food shipments without any documentation whatsoever. The IP was left to try to count the bags as they were hurriedly offloaded landside. In one instance this led to a disagreement with WFP concerning a discrepancy of 350 bags.

5.2 Pipeline management

Supply was secured by WFP and it is always better to err on the side of caution in a crisis. Nevertheless there were considerable problem with the 'bunching' of arrivals and the operation was very probably oversupplied. There were a number of shipments into Dili in late 1999, most notably the *Fitria Permatra* carrying 6,340 tonnes of rice from Surabaya, which arrived off Dili on 10 October 1999. This was the shipment organised by the CO in Jakarta. There were discharge problems with the *Fitria Permatra* due to the low capacity of Dili port and its facilities and INTERFET's prioritisation of its needs. The CO did well to work within these constraints and came up with some innovative solutions including offloading directly to barges for transport to coastal destinations and delivery by beach landing. But it took several months to discharge the vessel and a large demurrage bill was incurred.³⁷

The next most significant shipment was a large consignment of maize provided by the USA, which had been diverted from another destination. It began to arrive in Dili harbour at the end of November (fortunately transhipped in smaller vessels). WFP Dili had requested WFP Rome's Transport Division to delay this consignment but was either reluctant to get the donor to do so, or unsuccessful.

When asked why so much entered the pipeline given the constraints in Dili, Transport Division staff told the mission that the total tonnage had to be landed within the original six months timeframe of EMOP 6177 (November 1 1999 to April 30 2000). In fact this was not achieved because half the cereals shipped to East Timor for WFP's emergency operations, including the bulk of EMOP 6177 cereals, arrived in May/June 2000 (17,000 tonnes in all which presented considerable discharge problems).³⁸ The more important question is: 'Why was the original cereal requirement fulfilled at all given the revised needs?'³⁹ EMOP 6177 is still current due in part to the fact that monthly commodity requirements fell to nearly a third the quantity anticipated early in the operation.⁴⁰

5.3 Commodity quality

The slower than anticipated utilisation of food stocks has meant that commodities had to be stockpiled and some parcels of rice and maize are nearing the end of their shelf-life and only the

³⁷ US\$80,000.

³⁸ This includes cereals for EMOP 6175. If this is excluded then one would have to say that the bulk of cereals required for EMOP 6177 arrived after the expiry of the initial operational period.

³⁹ If needs had been as acute as originally thought the inability to get 17,000 tonnes of cereals in country within the timeframe would have had serious consequences. If on the other hand it was recognised that the operation did not require as much food as initially thought and that the EMOP would be extended, why not spread the arrivals out over the first three quarters of 2000?

⁴⁰ The initial anticipated requirement was 6,000 tonnes of food per month.



repeated use of phototoxin (which is not recommended) keeps down insect infestation. BULOG'S fumigation practices for its rice stocks and warehouse fabrics may have been neglected in the final months of Indonesian rule so leaving WFP with a legacy of infestation. In any event an inspection of current maize stocks in the main Dili warehouse revealed that some is aesthetically poor in appearance. Despite this, some parcels of maize are being despatched to district stores in a poor condition. An example of this was observed by the mission leader during a VGF distribution in Ermera sub-district – the maize was heavily infested with insects and unfit to be distributed to beneficiaries. The mission leader and the logistics expert subsequently visited the store in Ermera that the maize had been taken from and found the bags heavily infested with weevils.⁴¹ The implementing partner claimed that infested supplies had been received from WFP before. However, the mission does not suggest that infestation is widespread – there is no evidence that this is the case. The CO stressed to the mission that, except for a few cases of infestation, the quality of food (mainly rice and maize) in the main warehouses of Dili, where the bulk of food is stored, is satisfactory.

Nevertheless the issue of some stocks being despatched in a poor condition should be investigated. Moreover, if the large tonnage of cereals that is now under fumigation sheets is not distributed within the next few months and particularly if it requires further fumigation its fitness for human consumption and its nutritional value should be demonstrated before distributions continue.

The mission has also been informed about problems experienced with the deterioration of CSB and some has had to be withdrawn, although CSB stocks are now low.⁴² It is further reported that some edible oil stocks will have exceeded their shelf-life date before the completion of the emergency operation, although the CO believes it will nevertheless still be fit for distribution and this may well be the case.

Substantial stocks of pulses and canned fish are available that the CO seems to be having some difficulty programming, although the CO contends this is not the case and that its utilisation of commodities is based on pipeline analysis and is well programmed.

Lessons

- Revised estimates of food needs have to be responded to quickly, if necessary by delaying or cancelling shipments. Excess commodities can be programmed over a longer timeframe but the commodities may be difficult to manage and such operations risk becoming supply driven.
- WFP needs to be cautious about resorting to diversions of large grain shipments in the event of new emergencies, especially when diverting to small countries with limited port facilities.
- Initial records of commodities landed, warehoused and distributed are critical in the establishment of the CTS in an emergency setting and requires the attention of a full-time logistics officer and experienced, assertive staff from the outset.

⁴¹ That is, *Sitophilus Tribolium*, a secondary pest, could also have been present. The mission understands the sample provided to the CO has now been sent to Darwin for analysis.

⁴² There is no record in the CTS of any incident of withdrawal and disposal of a commodity yet the mission learned from the WFP Sub-Office in Same that 8.75 tonnes of CSB was rejected by an IP operating a clinic, condemned as unfit for human consumption by the Sub-Office. There was said to have been correspondence with the CO on the matter.



Recommendations

- The CO should ensure post-CIF losses are more realistically captured in future.
- WFP should consider instituting a two-step process for providing estimates of food needs. This could involve specifying the amount that is needed immediately and should be sourced, and confirming or revising the overall estimate within (say) one month.
- WFP should establish a mechanism for rapidly reducing commodity call-forwards and/or the allocation for an EMOP in the event of an over-estimation of food aid needs. In doing so WFP will need to work with donors to establish procedures for rescheduling or cancelling arrivals and diverting shipments between programmes.
- Where port facilities including berthing, storage and transport are a major constraint WFP's Transport Division should liaise regularly with the CO and donors to space shipments appropriately to avoid bunching.
- Where the climatic conditions are harsh and there is a lack of fumigation facilities no more commodities should be called forward than can be utilised before deterioration becomes a credible risk.
- In view of the evidence of infestation and the possibility that phostoxin may no longer be effective, the CO should call in a phyto-sanitary expert to assess the situation as soon as possible, advise on measures required to combat the problem and provide appropriate training if required.
- Only commodities that are in a good condition (and of nutritional value) should be despatched to outlying centres where fumigation and ample storage facilities are not readily available.
- The CO should establish a clear procedure for examining stocks, responding to reports of infestation, declaring stocks fit or unfit for human consumption, and disposal.

6. ASSESSMENT OF FOOD SECURITY AND VULNERABILITY

6.1 Initial assessments of food needs

WFP's post-ballot assessment of emergency food needs were 'rough and ready' due to lack of access and poor data. Big picture guestimates were made in large part relying on NGO informants in Darwin that resulted in an overestimation of food relief needs.⁴³ WFP was under some pressure to provide an early estimate of food needs for the UN's Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and it is likely that had WFP been able to take a further month to assess needs the amount would have been up to one half the estimate provided for the CAP and subsequently EMOP 6177.

This is not how it played out and EMOP 6177 was based on the initial assessment that up to 550,000 (the vast majority of the population) would require food assistance of which WFP would have to cater for 75% (anticipating that other donors/INGOs would take care of 25% of the caseload). For planning purposes the EMOP was originally intended to provide assistance for six months for an average monthly caseload of 344,000 persons comprising 200,000 at full rations (those without sufficient resources to produce or purchase food) and 144,000 at half rations

⁴³ The CO later concluded that the views of these informants were clouded by their emotional reaction to the post-election violence and that they had over-estimated the level of crop destruction and food losses.



(those with access to alternative sources of food). Anticipated returnees from West Timor were included in this planning.

In October and November 1999 WFP improved its rough estimation of needs. The daily evening meeting convened by the Humanitarian Coordinator was a key forum for exchanging information. Information was also gathered from IPs, UN staff (including the military) and the CNRT. WFP increasingly had a district presence that better illuminated the needs in certain areas. The information gathered in this way was generally subjective in that it was dependant on the experience of the organizations and personnel involved and their geographic interest. Nevertheless WFP came to understand that food aid needs were less generalised and more location specific than first thought and that there had been a considerable overestimation of total food aid requirements for the EMOP. In November or December 1999 WFP made plans for the early phase out of general distributions. But the commodity requirements of EMOP 6177 were still not amended (the idea was evidently to extend the EMOP instead).

6.2 FAO/WFP joint assessments

A joint FAO/WFP Food Supply and Crop assessment was conducted in November 1999. This was timely but the team had difficulties obtaining reliable data and made assumptions that resulted in another overestimation – of the likely shortfall in food production. A follow-up joint assessment was conducted after the main maize harvest in April that rectified this, finding that the consequences of the crisis on overall production had been less pronounced than expected and that the output of maize and rice was likely to be ‘satisfactory’. The CO had already discounted the November assessment (at least by mid-December, probably earlier). The mission doesn’t know how it became evident to the CO that the FAO/WFP assessment was so far off the mark. It raises questions about the way the findings of joint assessments missions are dealt with.

One factor in the swift return to production was undoubtedly the resilience of the East Timorese, although there is little documentation of this. Farmers appear to have been able to hide more seeds and tools from the militia than expected (burying them under the ground or hiding them up trees, in caves or along river banks, etc.) although it should be stressed that not all had time to do so or were successful in keeping what was hidden from the militia. On their return from West Timor many families acted strategically bringing back seeds, piglets, chicks, etc. Farmers whose grass houses had been burned to the ground were pragmatic and planted maize on the ruin to gain the benefit of the enriched soil. Some communities initially worked collectively to get a first crop in the ground.

The April 2000 joint assessment mission argued that despite the improving food security situation a large number of people would be vulnerable to food insecurity through 2000 due to ‘the disruption to the economy, especially markets, and the loss of productive assets and income generating activities’. This may have provided justification for extending EMOP 6177 beyond six months, although the mission has not seen any documentation related to the rationale for the extension.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ The statement is repeated in WFP’s Summary of Food Aid Strategy for East Timor, undated but apparently drafted in the second half of 2000.



6.3 Lack of reassessment of food security

Ideally WFP should have periodically reassessed (i.e. monitored) food security through 2000, district by district in collaboration with its IPs. At the very least WFP should have reassessed food security at least once through 2000, in collaboration with its IPs, to better define district and intra-district variations (providing the data required to better utilise VAM capabilities), as well as test the efficacy of VGF and FFW. The failure to do so is considered by the mission to be a major flaw.⁴⁵ The CO expressed the opinion that WFP and its IPs are not qualified and do not have the capacity to do this, which begs the question: *How can programming respond to need in the absence of periodic reassessment?*

This should not detract from the fact staff in some Sub-Offices developed a reasonable understanding of their areas (although with a high degree of staff turnover their experience was frequently lost). A plethora of informal village level visits were carried out by the CO, SOs and IPs, often in response to requests or reported problems and that quite solid attempts were made to collect more information in a few districts through the leadership of IPs and other actors. Nevertheless in the main the field visits undertaken were not methodical and were inadequate in terms of testing assumptions about vulnerability and improving programming. Training of SO personnel in vulnerability assessments by the CO focal point in late 2000 may have helped to address this problem but was not followed through.

A better understanding of food security was vital not only to better target food assistance but also as a basis for planning the phasing of emergency and recovery activities, and ultimately WFP's exit. An emergency mode should only be maintained (generally or in a particular district or sub-district) if food relief is not justified.⁴⁶ Ongoing operations should not be justified merely on the basis that the commodities are available and represent a useful resource, although on the other hand it is accepted that stocks have to be utilised in some way once they are in-country.

It has been suggested that the East Timor operation was 'too big for too long' - it is difficult to make a judgement on this in the absence of data on food security through 2000 and into 2001, but there are indications that the operation was driven by supply and stayed in an emergency mode for too long.

6.4 Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM)

The CO did not regard VAM as a priority in the initial months and even though an officer with VAM experience was contracted (on the urging of a VAM officer in Rome) she had additional responsibilities and was reassigned after only three months. Some valuable work was undertaken but it was not adequately followed through. As WFP was not able to hire another VAM officer it had to rely heavily on the assistance of the VAM officer in Jakarta.

The programme benefited substantially from his support through 2000 (three visits were made to East-Timor, each for 2-4 weeks). Contributions included participation in the second FAO/WFP

⁴⁵ The World Bank Joint Assessment Mission, November 1999, recommended that WFP undertake assessments every two months to monitor planted area and revise estimates of food import needs. This frequency would however probably have been impossible to achieve.

⁴⁶ Ongoing contingency needs (such as provision for returnees) are also a valid basis for continuation but this is a separate activity.



crop assessment mission, preparation of two detailed field visit reports with specific targeting and programming recommendations, vulnerability maps for the UN's CCA, and dissemination of a targeting and vulnerability manual to DFO's.

Nevertheless, VAM's impact on programming appears to have been limited for several reasons:

- The Dili CO was not able to establish a permanent VAM unit during this initial, critical phase, and two national staff resigned. Several proposed activities were not followed through, for instance, a market survey. In addition to the Jakarta VAM officer TDY'd to Dili, a nutrition consultant with limited familiarity with VAM techniques and several other responsibilities was assigned responsibility for VAM.
- Initial vulnerability assessments would have required more detailed location-specific follow-up, particularly on sub-regional and sub-district geographic vulnerability mapping. The nutrition consultant responsible for vulnerability assessments undertook several field visits in response to reported needs and to determine if particular villages should move from geographic targeting to VGF. These visits did not however constitute a systematic reassessment of district and village needs.
- In addition, it appears that a major reason for a loss of coordination between VAM and CO programming was the nature of some of the recommendations. They tended to emphasize creative and 'out-of-the box' concepts, e.g. provision of diverse seeds, livestock restocking, and nutrition education. More time and active involvement by the VAM unit would have been required to transform these ideas into food aid policies and programmes compatible with WFP's food pipelines and other constraints.

The VAM unit's poor presence in the Dili CO during the emergency and recovery/rehabilitation phases appears to have been a major factor in its limited effect on programming and targeting. Therefore it is welcomed that the CO now appears determined to strengthen the role of this unit.

6.5 Reassessing needs of IDP and returnees

WFP was right to begin with general distributions and not seek to identify IDPs but more should have been done to reassess the needs of particular groups of IDPs through 2000. An example is the failure to recognise a new IDP crisis in Same District that developed in October 2000. As pointed out by a local PKF commander, WFP declined to feed 3,000 people who had fled their homes due to militia infiltration and lived for two months in temporary shelters. Despite declaration of a clear security problem, food assistance was reportedly denied on the ground that IDP's should not be encouraged to stay dislocated, an argument which either was based on wrong information or wrong principles. As similar incidences may occur in the future, WFP should have clear policy and assessment procedures in place.

There were shortcomings in reassessing the needs of returnees as the programme developed. WFP did not test the assumption that a ration on arrival was adequate for all returning refugees and the circumstances of returnees was not monitored by WFP so far as the mission is aware. It was assumed that if returnees needed further assistance they could benefit from existing WFP food distribution programs (general feeding for a short period and VGF or FFW since early 2000). Returnees might however have encountered difficulties getting the local leadership to include them in general distributions due to their perceived political allegiance and the majority of returnees would not have qualified for VGF or FFW. WFP's minimalist approach seems to have been influenced by the stereotype of returnees arriving with considerable food and/or other



resources and WFP appears to have been more cognisance of the risk that giving 'special treatment' to returnees would lead to social tension. This masked the fact that a substantial number of refugees returned on foot and destitute, including returnees that passed through established entry points.

While a once off distribution of 5 kg per of cereals per person may have been satisfactory early in the operation when there were general distributions in most areas, general distributions stopped after only one round in many districts.

The exception to the rule was Bobonaro District where WFP agreed to provide follow-up rations to returnees for three months for distribution by its implementing partner WVI (in addition to the 5 kgs of rice and HDR provided on arrival through UNHCR). This is a prudent arrangement which encourages returnees to register with UNHCR and provides a means of follow-up for protection and other purposes. It is unclear why the arrangement does not apply in any other district.

6.6 Appropriateness of rations provided

WFP intended to distribute a balanced ration but as has been noted earlier only rice and maize were provided during initial distributions - beans, oil, fish and salt came later when it was less critical and subsequently became a regular part of the ration in the VGF, FFW and school feeding programmes. The initial distribution of a cereal ration in the absence of pulses, oil and other commodities seems to be something of a syndrome for WFP operations and deserves to be addressed.

Some donors offered rice and some maize, and to this extent WFP's hands were tied. Nevertheless there were different views about which was the more appropriate. At one point the CO expressed the view that maize was most appropriate because it was the most common staple. But it became evident that rice was generally preferred (indeed expected). Notwithstanding that maize is a staple for many, the vast majority of East Timorese want to include rice in their diet. Rice also has a higher exchange value than maize. This is a conundrum. In practical terms there was general consensus that hard unground maize was inappropriate for small children and older people, but it would have been very difficult to set up a separate distribution of rice to target them.

6.7 Nutritional assessments

Acute malnutrition is rare in East Timor and seems mostly related to infections or recurrent diseases. Moderate chronic malnutrition among children is more prevalent, probably as a result of widespread micronutrient and protein-deficiencies in the diet, as well as poor weaning practices. Nutritional status may have been exacerbated by the drop in protein intake that followed the crisis. Seeds (particularly legumes) were often stolen and, in many locations, livestock were decimated.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ There are some indications that the overall nutritional status of the population has steadily improved in the last year. A recent nutritional sample survey undertaken in Bobonaro District revealed a low incidence (about 3%) of mild malnutrition (weight/height 70-80%) and a larger incidence (about 16%) of potential malnutrition among young people. This is substantially lower than incidence rates in early 2000, although seasonal variations seem to be present and could discount the improvement.



With the exception of some supplementary feeding through clinics and logistic support to the few NGOs that provided pulse seed, WFP has not specifically addressed this form of nutritional vulnerability. Expanded supplementary feeding, more appropriate composition of food rations, and promotion or provision of high protein food items could perhaps have been given more consideration. Certainly future strategies need to address the issue of moderate chronic malnutrition among children.⁴⁸

Lessons

- Urgency associated with the CAP process can lead to a less precise WFP estimation of food needs. This does not suggest avoiding the CAP process – it suggests the need for immediate improvements in WFP's capacity to make rapid needs assessments.
- Food security and vulnerability has to be reassessed periodically (for rural areas in line with the agricultural cycle) if an EMOP is to be well targeted and appropriately phased from emergency to recovery.
- A strong VAM unit is essential to provide 'processed' (i.e. mapped) vulnerability information to the CO. VAM needs to be closely linked to and supportive of M&E functions within the CO.
- The apparent relative wealth of returning refugees and concern about exacerbating tensions with the population that remained can cloud judgements about what is an appropriate level of assistance.

Recommendations

- COs should document their response to the forecasts, analyses and recommendations of joint Food Supply and Crop Assessment teams. This could be in the form of a matrix detailing the key forecasts, analyses and recommendations and noting whether or not the CO has any reason to doubt or question the point, as well as proposed action.
- Food security and vulnerability should be reassessed at least bi-annually in the first year of an EMOP to improve geographic and/or other means of targeting and test the efficacy of programming. This should be undertaken in collaboration with IPs and counterparts.
- WFP should study the reasons for the 'syndrome' of initial distribution of a cereal rations tending to take place in the absence of pulses, oil and other commodities that arrive later.
- The VAM unit should be strengthened in order to make vital contributions to CO programming, particularly in achieving better targeting and beneficiary orientation through regular reassessments.
- The CO should develop clear procedures for assessing and assisting prospective new IDPs and for launching contingency plans.

⁴⁸ See further, Future Programming



- WFP should conduct follow-up monitoring of the food needs of returnees (in collaboration with UNHCR) and adjust the level or duration of food aid provided to individual returnees or categories or groups of returnees. The need for better follow-up and the possible need to target destitute returnees should be taken up with UNHCR as a matter of urgency.
- The CO should better incorporate more specific nutritional objectives, such as improving the population's protein intake, weaning practices, and nutritional education in its programmes.

7. TARGETING

7.1 Targeting of general distributions

As noted earlier WFP had originally intended to differentiate on the basis of need (access to food) and provide full rations for up to 250,000 individuals and half rations for up to 188,000 (concurrently). This plan was not followed and instead WFP initially provided a full ration to everybody that could be reached, then differentiated by only continuing general rations in those districts that had suffered the most destruction and disruption and which had a high proportion of recent returnees. From January 2000 full rations ceased in those districts⁴⁹ and general distributions were phased out via half rations.

District targeting, as opposed to household targeting, was a sensible approach under the circumstances, although not all needy districts were well served due to problems with access and IP capacity, and it disadvantaged pockets of need in the districts that were excluded completely.

In some cases (several Western sub-districts and Oecussi) WFP subsequently accepted (on the urging of IPs) that some areas within districts and sub-districts should continue to receive half rations.⁵⁰ These were areas with considerable damage to homes and a high proportion of recently returned refugees or extremely remote areas with poor agricultural production and a collapsed market for coffee (eg Lolotoe in Bobonaro District). Each person in the targeted area received a half ration each month. This form of geographic targeting was very appropriate and demonstrated flexibility on WFP's part.

The mission is unsure if Dili was adequately served by general distributions. On the face of it an urban population returning to a burnt and plundered city is extremely vulnerable with no resources to produce or purchase food. Yet there were only two general distributions in Dili and there was a long break between these distributions (during which mounting demands were made by the CNRT and the local Caritas office). It seems WFP was focused on serving the periphery, which is understandable, and afraid of attracting displaced people to Dili and creating 'dependency'. But the consensus appears to be that the second distribution should have taken place earlier than it did.

⁴⁹ Except for Oecussi where full rations continued through January 2000

⁵⁰ This was referred to by the CO as 'GVGF' i.e. geographic VGF. This is a misnomer in that the selection was not linked in any way to the indicators used in VGF.



7.2 FAO's approach to vulnerability

The April 2000 FAO/WFP Food Supply and Crop Assessment tentatively concluded that the most vulnerable households were likely to be:

- Firstly, households that rely primarily on cash income from non-export cash crops;
- Equally, until June/July those households practicing mixed strategies of growing non-export cash crops and export commodity crops for their income (mainly coffee);
- Thirdly, households likely to be moderately to highly vulnerable and late-returning subsistence farmers reliant on maize.

The assessment mission also referred to the following households as vulnerable:

- Households that suffered post-September losses of productive and household assets;
- Households affected by the collapse of the formal and public sectors (mainly in Dili);
- Female-headed households (based on trends in other countries).

The CO did not adopt this approach to vulnerability and targeting, presumably because it had already committed itself to VGF (following).⁵¹ Whichever approach to vulnerability was most appropriate, the CO should have documented its response to the analysis of the joint FAO/WFP assessment.

7.3 Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)

The initial conception of vulnerable group feeding incorporated in the EMOP project document was the provision of a supplementary ration (i.e. a supplement to general rations) to children-under-five, pregnant women, lactating mothers and the elderly (female-headed households were not included). The vulnerable caseload on this basis was estimated to be 58,000. Instead VGF was implemented in the absence of a general ration and the categories of vulnerability were expanded, so much so that VGF included more than 135,000 beneficiaries by September 2000.⁵² Most of the people targeted lived within communities - WFP relied on village leaders to produce lists of beneficiaries. A minority were institutionalised and their allocations were made to the orphanages, hospitals and other institutions concerned.

It would have been helpful if the rationale for these changes had been documented and incorporated in a revised EMOP reference document. The focus on VGF is presumed to have been a function of WFP's reassessment of food aid requirements in December 1999 and the need for a mechanism to narrow (target) the distribution of relief. When VGF was put to UNTAET, the major donors and NGOs in early 2000 it was explained that targeting food in this way would reduce overall food assistance (and avoid 'dependency').

The transition to using VGF as the main distribution and targeting mechanism was handicapped by several factors, most importantly:

⁵¹ It had been discussed with IPs in October 1999

⁵² The categories included female headed households, single headed households with more than 5 children, pregnant women, lactating women, the handicapped, the mentally disabled, orphans (without both parents) under 15, elderly (over 55), medical patients/the sick, and orphanage institutions.



- Untested general indicators of vulnerability incorporated in VGF and insufficient information and data on actual vulnerability to improve them;
- The resistance by the political leadership at national and local levels to targeted distributions in general, and a village culture that often required that everyone be included in distributions;
- No community involvement in selection of targeting criteria;
- Long start-up time for VGF, particularly in obtaining VGF lists from village heads;
- Misunderstandings about categories, as well as unreliable, incomplete, and sometimes deliberately inaccurate figures provided by village heads resulting in large variations in the reported percentage of vulnerable people (ranging from 10% to more than 50%);
- Resistance and/or lack of capacity on the part of IPs which led to relatively 'loose' implementation and monitoring of final distributions to beneficiaries.

Several key informants met by the mission claim that targeted distribution programs may have been set up too quickly, without proper analysis and involvement of key agents, and without sufficient recognition of the costs involved in effective targeting. Nevertheless discussions were held with IPs and although some regarded the categories 'pre-packed' and one questioned the definition of 'orphan' in the Timorese context none seemed willing to challenge the concept.

But the mission contends that VGF as it applies to people living within communities has fundamental flaws. Like other societies, East Timorese society has traditional safety-net mechanisms that generally support the categories of people considered vulnerable by WFP. In a crisis this is not necessarily the case but a general distribution applies at that stage. Once a crisis wanes and the level of stress on a community subsides, extended families and clans are probably able to 'look after their own'. VGF should have been reviewed at least by mid-2000 if not earlier.

Some groups of people including female-headed households may still *tend* to be more vulnerable but one would have to question if WFP should target *all* female-headed households as a matter of course. It is not efficient and social action to empower women may be more effective overall. This line of argument implies that once the justification for a general ration passes the justification for VGF within communities may also have passed.⁵³ At the very least WFP needs test the key underlining assumptions in such circumstances.

This is not to say that WFP should not be concerned about vulnerability. It should remain a key concept and WFP should monitor groups tending to vulnerability and if necessary intervene.

Wherever it intervenes WFP should in future be more cautious about VGF programmes and rely on more elaborate, location specific assessments of vulnerability and food insecurity and local knowledge. Given the location-specific variability of vulnerability in East Timor and the difficulties and questions involved with VGF, geographic targeting on a larger scale, in retrospect, might have been a preferred system for targeting, in combination with some charity type of food distribution through existing local networks in other areas, e.g. church-based organisations. The network of catechists and CARITAS social services committees may be helpful in the future.

Whether or not it was sound in theory, VGF was reportedly unsuccessful as a targeting mechanism in those districts where WFP's IP did not supervise the distributions (the majority of

⁵³ Similarly, it was pointed out by one of WFP's implementing partners that VGF distributions 'tend to break down when a community comes under renewed stress'.



distributions overall) because local leaders tended to distribute the food to the whole community, with the result that the value to beneficiaries was diminished to the point where it may have had little discernable nutritional impact (depending on the quantity individuals actually received).

The mission supports the planned phasing out of VGF in its current form by March 2001, but with a thorough review by the CO of the basic targeting principles and mechanisms involved in case food relief is required in future and needs to be programmed.

7.4 Food for Work

The principle objective of FFW in the recovery phase was agriculture and infrastructure rehabilitation, not targeting. There was no policy for targeting FFW geographically or for targeting specific population groups within villages (a practice favoured under CARE projects) although some Sub-Offices made efforts to target women. There may have been some geographic targeting, particularly recently, because the mission found that in some Sub-Offices FFW projects were targeted for those villages that had been most damaged and were least assisted by other aid organizations (although in other cases there was no such targeting). It could also be argued that the implicit wage rate of FFW rations compared to other public employment projects was relatively low. This might have steered a number of FFW projects to villages and participants who were most deserving, although it must be stressed there is no data to confirm this. The conclusion of the mission is that there was sub-optimal use of FFW for targeting purposes.

The mission finds that where FFW is utilised the activities should be targeted on the most vulnerable communities, with clear criteria and implementation mechanisms. The CO stated that FFW should also aim at asset generation of some type. The mission does not disagree with the value of creating assets but believes that the focus of FFW in a post-emergency situation should be the short-term food security of the most food insecure, not assets, and that if FFW is not an effective targeting mechanism in this context (which is likely) another approach should be adopted. WFP is in danger of treating FFW as an end in itself.

7.5 Commitments to Women

It is WFP policy that food distributions be directed to households and that WFP ensure that women control the family entitlement in 80%⁵⁴ of operations handled and subcontracted by WFP.⁵⁵ During the first large scale distribution in Dili (under EMOP 6175) attention was given to directing family rations to women and it was stated in the proposal for EMOP 6177 that this would be 'the model'. There was no follow-through and for the most part village heads (males) were in charge of distributions and husbands were regarded as heads of households and received rations on behalf of the family. No monitoring was undertaken to determine how rations were handled within the family so it is impossible to say to what extent women controlled the family entitlement.

Women were a strong focus of the VGF programme, which included female-headed households (families that rely on the income of a women), pregnant women and lactating mothers. It is positive that WFP gave this level of consideration to women however the shortcoming was in not

⁵⁴ The Gender Action Plan for East Timor drafted in 2000 amended this to 40%.

⁵⁵ Checklist for Meeting the World Food Programme Commitments to Women 1996-2001, Commitment I A



monitoring the VGF programme to determine how effectively it was implemented and to test the appropriateness of the categories.

Towards the end of 2000, some Sub-Offices began to insist that women be included in FFW projects and WFP's policy that at least 25% of the outputs/assets of FFW projects be of direct benefit to and controlled by women was met. Nevertheless some Sub-Offices seemed unaware of the requirement.

Literacy programmes targeting women were introduced in three sub-districts in Bobonaro District, which was positive. They should be continued if confirmed to be sound.

7.6 Targeting costs

The real and hidden costs (opportunity costs in terms of work that could not be done) of targeting were considerable and WFP may not have taken adequate cognisance of the fact that although targeting may represent a more efficient use of resources for WFP, there are significant costs to IPs that have to be weighed against these savings. The LTSH of US\$ 24/tonne did not necessarily cover targeting costs and may not have been intended to. Direct Support Costs (DSC) may have been more appropriate a mechanism but it was not provided to IPs in East Timor for reasons that are unclear. If the IP does not have additional funding from another source it is inevitable that targeting will not be conducted properly. This applies equally to monitoring (discussed below).

Access to alternative funding appears to have at least in part determined which INGOs participated in which WFP programme and how well they performed. INGOs variously participated in VGF, but not in FFW, allocated only a small share of their resources to FFW, or withdrew from FFW after a period. It is noted in passing that there is currently a lack of transparency in relation to funding sources and indeed neither WFP nor major donors like USAID have adequate controls in their contracts against double-dipping on LTSH or any other cost.

Lessons

- Targeting of WFP food aid involves substantial programming, set-up and monitoring costs that should be paid for by food aid donors, ideally through WFP in the case of WFP's implementing partner INGOs.
- Given the difficulties involved with VGF, geographic targeting may often be a preferred system for targeting, in combination with traditional mechanisms and some charity food distribution through existing local networks, e.g. churches.
- Successful implementation of targeted programmes requires the active participation of the communities and beneficiaries involved. This practical necessity reinforces WFP policy directives concerning active local participation.

Recommendations

- The geographic and seasonal variability of vulnerability should be explicitly incorporated in targeting, which may lead to a wider application of geographic targeting and concentration of both revised VGF and FFW at the most critical time(s) of the year (peak lean season).



- WFP should not continue applying general categories of vulnerability for targeted distributions in an EMOP without testing the underlying assumptions as soon as practicable, including the community's presumed inability to assist the groups concerned. Greater cognisance should be taken in future of the practical and theoretical problems associated with (community-based) VGF.
- The CO should conduct a thorough review (in cooperation with IPs and Timorese representatives from UNTAET/ETTA) of the basic principles and mechanisms for targeting food aid in East Timor, in case there is a need to programme limited food relief in future.

Where FFW is utilised in an EMOP the activities should be targeted on the most food insecure communities and clear criteria and implementation mechanisms for such targeting should be developed. If FFW is not an efficient means of targeting food insecurity another mechanism should be adopted. Given that there are different views on the uses of FFW in an EMOP, WFP should clarify its position, particularly in relation to non-targeted uses of FFW.

8. FINAL DISTRIBUTION

8.1 Role of implementing partners

From the earliest days of the operation to the present WFP has relied heavily on its IPs for final distribution and indeed the WFP operation could only have been as good as the performance of its IPs (and the local leaders they in turn generally relied on). In the initial months of the emergency IPs had their management and staffing problems however their record on the whole is good. WFP initially worked with five IPs – World Vision, CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARITAS and Timor Aid. CARE and Timor Aid discontinued as IPs in early 2000.

Responsibilities for coverage were worked out in coordination meetings held in Dili in late September 1999. This gave relatively clear roles to IPs but it did result in some districts being poorly served or not being served at all by an IP in which case WFP had to manage final distributions (as it did in Suai).⁵⁶

8.2 Transport to FDPs

As expected, delivery to final distribution points (FDPs) proved challenging, particularly in the wet season, but IPs appear to have coped, with WFP assistance. WFP allocated trucks to some IP operations at different times and the MIL 17 helicopter played a vital role in accessing areas that could not be reached by truck, although there were sometimes difficulties in the utilisation of the helicopter due to weather conditions.

Distributions have in the main been appropriately 'decentralised' with an adequate number of FDPs in each district (in the best case representing a ratio of 500 people to one FDP). Records of final delivery appear to have been provided to WFP by IPs, although not always in the form required by WFP partly because IP documentation for final distribution does not necessarily

⁵⁶ The initial division of responsibilities was World Vision assumed for Bobonaro, CRS for Baucau and Viqueque, CARE for Manatuto and Lautem, and CARITAS Australia for Oecussi.



relate well to WFP's warehouse release format - WFP tends to focus on the truck or total convoy quantity whereas the IPs tend to focus on the (generally small) administrative unit served.

WFP Sub-Offices and IPs do not appear to pay adequate attention to the establishment of truck journey plans and FDP distances and journey times from base. It is very difficult to calculate the true transports costs of each sub-district operation without this data. Nevertheless the US\$24 per tonne LTSH cost estimate included in the agreements signed with IPs appears to have covered IP transportation costs up to FDPs (but not necessarily targeting and monitoring costs – discussed elsewhere).⁵⁷

8.3 IP approaches to final distribution

In some cases distributions were supervised by WFP or its IPs, including the early general distributions in Dili. But in the majority of cases IPs did not witness distributions (either by waiting after delivering commodities or by returning if a distribution was conducted on another day) and relied on the capability and integrity of village leaders.

The main exception was VGF. Some (but not all) IPs fielded local teams which called names from lists, thumb-printed those that came forward, and dished out rations (as WFP evidently intended). This may have seemed necessary and it ensured the lists were followed. However it is a resource intensive approach with high opportunity costs. It is also disempowering and possibly even demeaning and on these grounds inappropriate in the post-crisis phase (when VGF was implemented). IPs should avoid taking over distributions in this way. A strategic approach is preferable where the IP works with communities to establish the parameters for distributions (distribution committees, representation of women, etc) and then monitors their performance, intervening to clarify misconceptions and right wrongs if necessary.

It is of particular concern to the mission in this regard that distribution committees were not formed and that no real attempt seems to have been made to broaden involvement in the distributions beyond the village head. Active local participation in distributions is essential to ensure transparency and avoid tension.

8.4 Publicising distributions and entitlements

The population has a right to be informed about the rationale for particular programmes and their ration entitlements. Yet village heads were not necessarily well briefed by WFP or its IPs on these matters and even when they were village heads often failed to pass this information on to the community. As a result, people were often left in the dark about the amounts received for distribution, the programme or programmes it related to, the criteria for inclusion/exclusion, the ration scales, etc. The mission visited villages where the village heads reportedly kept the waybill evidencing their receipt of commodities 'deep in their pockets'. This may have exacerbated existing social tensions. It should have been made clear by WFP that waybills are public documents and WFP should have caused information in the form of written materials and pictograms (for the illiterate) to be distributed at final distribution points and posted in public places. This would incidentally have provided the basis for self-monitoring by communities.

⁵⁷ Based on an examination of WVI expenses relating to one relatively short-haul FDP operation in Bobonaro and a long-haul operation in Ermera District



8.5 Commitments to Women

Although EMOP 6177 made reference to focusing on women, there was a failure to honour WFP's Commitments to Women particularly in relation to participation. There were exceptions but it is evident that no systematic measures were taken to ensure women's equal access to and full participation in decision-making. The CO stressed to the mission that East Timor is 'highly male dominated' but this is true of many societies and a special effort simply has to be made to overcome these obstacles. Very little effort was made and tellingly the CO did not even recommend that women's representatives be involved in final distribution. Some Sub-Offices made attempts to involve women in certain recovery activities, including the Maliana Sub-Office which involved the OMT (Organization of East Timorese Women). But this was not pursued systematically by the CO.

Lessons

- Participation by the affected population and their representatives in programme formulation, monitoring and evolution doesn't just happen because it is WFP policy – it has to become an operational priority, reflected in Sub-Office guidelines and supported by standards and procedures.
- WFP's Commitments to Women are in danger of being reduced to focusing on the number of women included in vulnerable categories and targeted for assistance.

Recommendations

- WFP needs to place greater emphasis on the participation of affected populations and their representatives in decision-making, including women. WFP should insist on the establishment of local distribution committees, taking into account gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status to ensure fair representation.
- WFP needs to provide practical guidance and training for its entire staff to ensure their support in implementing WFP's policies concerning participation, including women.
- IPs should be contracted to work with communities to establish the parameters for distributions (distribution committees, representation of women, etc), rather than to conduct distributions directly. WFP should as a matter of course insist that IPs establish distribution committees that adequately represent women.
- WFP should make it clear that waybills are public documents and cause public notices to be posted advising communities of the rationale for programmes, criteria and ration scales (incorporating pictograms to convey the message to the illiterate). WFP should also provide in future that at least two members of a distribution committee should sign waybills evidencing receipt (ideally including a women's representative).
- In future WFP COs should check that IPs formulate journey plans to ensure that this component of LTSH is an accurate reflection of cost.
- WFP should enter into discussions with its IPs in an effort to find a common solution to the question of dual referencing the paperwork for the final link of the commodity delivery chain. It is not recommended that WFP seek to impose its format for final distribution.



9. MONITORING OF DISTRIBUTIONS AND PROGRAM RESULTS

9.1 Monitoring of final distributions

WFP and its IPs made some limited efforts to supervise final food distributions (as discussed above) and monitor how well intended beneficiaries were being reached, but in the main there was no post-distribution monitoring. This is considered by the mission as a major flaw. The CO argues, however, that the limited national capacity was the main impediment for establishing a systematic monitoring system.

WFP and its IPs should have regularly scheduled visits to a sample of FDPs to check if:

- Any difficulties were being encountered in distributions, including problems related to unclear instructions or incorrect population statistics;
- Any persons or groups were being excluded from distributions;
- There was any evidence of malfeasance;
- Women were playing a role in distributions;
- Men were perhaps disposing of food relief before or after it reached the household.

This type of follow-up is generally considered indispensable.⁵⁸

9.2 Low priority of monitoring

WFP and its IPs argued that they did not have the resources (trained staff, funds, transport, and time) to monitor distributions effectively. The CO stressed that they faced great difficulties recruiting and retaining local staff to implement the monitoring plans that were developed by the responsible officer in 2000.

While shortcomings in national staff have to be acknowledged, the major impediment to better monitoring was a lack of commitment by the CO. M&E simply was not a management priority. The monitoring officer as well as available food aid monitors were frequently assigned other responsibilities (such as implementing and supervising FFW schemes). There is a basic prioritisation issue here, indeed a WFP officer working in the CO in the early months told the mission that there is a trade-off between effective monitoring and pushing ahead with immediate concerns. This undervalues monitoring and WFP should not let itself get into the position where monitoring is the first casualty of an emergency. From a rights perspective monitoring is indispensable because WFP has a responsibility to ensure it is meeting emergency needs and this cannot be satisfied in the absence of information. From an efficiency perspective a relatively small investment in monitoring can greatly improve the delivery and targeting of food relief.

9.3 Malfeasance and complaints

In relation to malfeasance, the mission was frequently told that social control within villages prevented major food leakages. This was probably the case although the mission did visit villages where the local leadership withheld some food from distribution. Although respondents referred to some of this food being sold it is also possible that some of the food withheld was later

⁵⁸ See The SPHERE Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, Chapter 4 Minimum Standards in Food Aid, Guidance notes and critical issues on monitoring, 4 and 5, p 12.



distributed to the needy and/or returnees. On another occasion the mission attended a VGF distribution where four bags were said to have been removed by a leader prior to the distribution.⁵⁹ There was no way that the mission could determine what typically happened in the absence of monitoring information. WFP staff stated that they understood there were cases where population figures had been inflated and where names were added to VGF lists to increase allocations. They also said that in Liquica and Ermera Districts there were cases where food was delivered for VGF but used instead for FFW.

The mission was told that few complaints were received and that distributions were thus presumed to be on the whole fair. But no complaints procedures were put in place and there were no post-distribution household visits to illicite complaints. Intended recipients should have a means of redress and WFP and its IPs should be accountable for the coverage and fairness of distributions.⁶⁰ Neither can be realised in the absence of procedures.

In a sense the CNRT and the Catholic Church provided an informal complaints procedure. But the type of complaints submitted were typically 'macro' village complaints from local leaders, e.g. that their village had not yet been served. There were in contrast few 'micro' complaints that certain people had been excluded, for instance, because they may have been considered pro-integrationist.

9.4 Discrimination against pro-integrationists

The issue of suspending assistance due to political or human rights concerns did not arise as it often does in complex emergencies. There was no military or authority left to commit gross human rights abuses and WFP was able to rely on INTERFET and the PKF to monitor incursions from West Timor. Nevertheless it was recognised from the outset that there was some risk that village heads would discriminate against pro-integrationists (those who did not support independence) and deny their fair share. Although it does not appear to have been a common occurrence during the operation the mission was made aware that it had occurred. The CO states it did not receive any reports of such discrimination, but it must have been aware of the risk. On the face of it WFP and its IPs did not do enough to monitor this kind of discrimination.

9.5 Self-monitoring

Greater involvement of beneficiaries in distributions (through distribution committees) would have provided WFP the basis for an effective and cost-efficient means for monitoring distributions and reassessing needs, eliminating the (perceived) need for micro-management and complementing 'strategic' monitoring and reassessment by WFP and IPs.

9.6 Gender-disaggregated data

The CO affirms that since April 2000 all Sub-Offices have been collecting gender-disaggregated data. The Mission reviewed the data and found that some categories of information were omitted (including the percentage share of benefits and percentage of management positions for women).

⁵⁹ The mission informed the local CivPol.

⁶⁰ See Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Government Organizations in Disaster Relief, principle 9. WFP is not a signatory, most INGOs are.



Moreover, some Sub-Offices and IPs have reportedly failed to collect the information regularly or at all. This makes it difficult to analyse outcomes.

9.7 Monitoring results

Much of the monitoring (and reporting) by WFP and its IPs has been done in a rather non-systematic, qualitative, decentralized, and often reactive way. While this has resulted in a substantial amount of information and local knowledge, this information has not been systematically aggregated, analysed and disseminated. Moreover, it has not been used very effectively as a tool for testing assumptions and performance against objectives and targets.

An effective M&E system is more than the ad-hoc collection of data. It includes the systematic processing and presentation of information to management a) to provide generalizable and quantitative feedback to management on implementation and to facilitate programming decisions, and b) to ensure accountability and compare planned objectives with actual achievements. In this regard, WFP has not been very effective. Post-distribution monitoring, including intra-village distribution and leakage, food utilization and impact on beneficiaries, intra-household distribution, as well as food losses, quality and acceptance, was particularly deficient. More information on who your beneficiaries are, what their needs and problems are, and how you can reach them more effectively should be a main priority for WFP, complementary to commodity tracking.

EMOP 6177 was not designed for results monitoring in so far as there is no monitoring framework (no indicators or means of verification at the objective or output level, no report formats for tracking programme performance against targets, no risk management matrix). This was never rectified leaving WFP in a poor position to gauge efficiency, effectiveness or impact. For example, in the absence of monitoring data WFP is not in a position to say if VGF was ultimately effective or not. More broadly, the CO has not really been able to satisfactorily measure its performance against EMOP objectives.

The Mission identified four major reasons for relatively poor results monitoring:

- WFP put more emphasis on program implementation and food distribution, and systematic M&E was never a management priority. Efforts by the M&E focal point in the CO to systematically collect beneficiary monitoring information through Sub-Offices were never followed up and implemented.
- M&E was never well institutionalised at the CO with the only person in charge of monitoring - the M&E focal point - also being responsible for vulnerability assessments and nutrition. M&E was always part of the programming unit, and there were no separate resources, staffing and transport for independent field visits. This greatly constrained M&E effectiveness.
- Most field monitoring was carried out by field assistants and program officers, often as part of their regular implementation activities, and in an informal manner. As WFP was heavily involved in implementation of FFW activities most Sub-Offices did not have specialized food aid monitors, nor did any monitoring checklists exist.
- Priority information needs for programming, reporting and accountability purposes have not been systematically formulated by CO management. Major project objectives shifted or were not always clear as they were not formally re-formulated after the EMOP moved into the recovery/rehabilitation phase. Performance indicators were completely missing.



On the other hand, the mission noted significant efforts by WFP to introduce improved monitoring forms and systems for its expanded school feeding programme that has recently been launched. If the schools have the capacity to collect the information, it should provide critical performance and results information, particularly on the links between school feeding and student enrolment and attendance.

9.8 Monitoring costs

A major impediment to better monitoring is the cost of doing so. As mentioned in the context of targeting, the LTSH provided by WFP is inadequate reimbursement for all that is involved, although many INGOs presumably have access to other funds.⁶¹ In the mission's view, WFP and its IPs need to convince donors of the need to invest more in monitoring distribution and program results. It is not enough to establish plausible distribution models; the success of any food relief operation can only satisfactorily be judged in the end by determining who gets the food and what they do with it. Where recovery is also an objective, success has to be judged on the value of the assets created and the impact on household food security.

Lessons

- In the absence of monitoring beyond the EDP, WFP will never be able to say confidently that its operational objectives have been or are being achieved and its responsibilities fulfilled.
- WFP needs to pay more attention to the potential for greatly improving the efficiency and effectiveness of final distributions by making relatively small investments (in overall operational terms) in monitoring.
- By failing to invest in the involvement of beneficiary communities in reassessment and monitoring WFP is foregoing the opportunity to establish effective and cost-efficient means for reassessing needs and monitoring distributions.
- Monitoring of WFP food aid involves substantial costs that should be paid for by food aid donors, ideally through WFP in the case of WFP's implementing partner INGOs.

Recommendations

- IPs should be contracted to monitor final distributions systematically, but efficiently, by randomly selecting a sample of FDPs each month to undertake post-distribution checks to assess efficiency and fairness. This should involve the community to improve communication and ensure transparency.
- COs should have experienced monitoring personnel are present from the commencement of an EMOP. Ideally they should be constituted as an independent M&E unit, in close coordination with a VAM unit or focal point. Monitoring should focus on testing the quality of information and the effectiveness of final distributions and programme mechanisms.
- M&E should be better institutionalised in the CO. In particular, management should better formulate priority information needs and data collected should be systematically aggregated and analysed at CO level.

⁶¹ The WFP audit mission of November 2000 was critical of the LTSH paid by the CO, both the way in which it was arrived at and the amount, which the audit mission believed to be too high. The evaluation mission was not made aware on what basis the auditors concluded the rate to be too high.



- IPs should be contracted to work with communities to establish the parameters for distributions (distribution committees, representation of women, etc), rather than to conduct distributions directly, and to monitor final distributions efficiently by randomly selecting a sample of FDPs each month. The emphasis should be on random in-depth monitoring to thoroughly test effectiveness.
- As provided for in the guidelines issued by the Director of the Transport Division on 15 December 1999, the current IP LTSH costs should be reviewed to a) take fully into account the costs of distributions and b) consider the eligibility of IP monitoring costs under WFP Other Direct Operational Costs (ODOC).
- WFP should consider allocating a minimum percentage of overall EMOP costs to monitoring. This will require negotiation with donors.
- WFP and its IPs should as a matter of course institute a complaints procedure to ensure intended recipients have redress and to ensure WFP and its IPs are accountable for the coverage and fairness of distributions.
- WFP M&E systems should more actively involve the local population in monitoring of distributions, ensuring transparency and sharing information about food supplies.
- The CO should ensure gender disaggregated data is collected, if necessary training staff and instituting other measures to radically improve documentation. Once collected the data should be regularly analysed (e.g. quarterly) to assist management honour WFP's Commitments to Women.
- WFP should amend its Letters of Agreement by inserting a provision that IPs must advise WFP of any 'topping-up' of LTSH or any other cost partly borne by WFP.

10. PHASING OF ACTIVITIES AND CONTRIBUTION TO RECOVERY

10.1 Sustenance and 'food for recovery'

The rapid and widespread response of WFP and its IPs in the first months following the crisis made an enormous contribution to recovery simply by helping people sustain themselves in the short term. This is 'core business' and WFP's greatest contribution in East Timor.

The objectives of EMOP 6177 went beyond this and included enabling returning IDPs to devote all their efforts to rebuilding their homes and restoring their livelihoods by temporarily freeing them from the need to meet their day-to-day food requirements. This could be termed 'food for recovery', distinguished from FFW by the generality of the distribution and the emphasis on sustaining people while they rebuilt rather than providing incentives to mobilise labour for discreet projects. 'Food for recovery' could have been employed for longer in some areas.

10.2 Phasing of activities

WFP seemed driven to end general distributions and introduce FFW and targeting from December 1999. It is telling that the CO points to the introduction of FFW as evidence of a shift to a recovery, as if that is all it is about. WFP had the stocks to maintain general rations (full or half as appropriate) for another month or two in the most disrupted districts. This would have given WFP and its IPs longer to prepare longer-term interventions. VGF was introduced with inadequate analysis and not tested. Geographic targeting would have been a better mainstay as a



targeting mechanism and a better waypoint between general distributions and recovery programmes.

WFP's drive to start widespread FFW met with considerable resistance from the CNRT because they believed people should not be paid for community work (Xanana Gusmao literally shed tears over it), and from IPs because they were concerned about their capacity to implement FFW effectively. WFP persisted, often managing FFW itself.

It is not that WFP should not have sought to tailor the operation to (revised) needs and do so by targeting the most vulnerable. The problem was that the decision to shift from geographically targeted half rations to FFW+VGF was made too quickly with inadequate consideration.

There has been a general failure to document changes in the programme and to update key EMOP reference documents when programming has departed from what was initially put to the Executive Board. EMOP 6177 was originally planned for only six months and has now run for eighteen but the objectives have not been revised. They have simply 'evolved' with programming.⁶²

There have been a number of unsatisfactory programming decisions in recent months including phasing out VGF by going from a half ration to a quarter ration for the last two months. In Bobonaro District the IP distributed both quarter rations at the same time, but tried to explain that they were quarter rations for two months. This could only have lead to confusion and it would have been preferable to simply state that it was the last VGF ration. Similarly there were instances where geographic targeting (GVGF) was converted to VGF for just one month.

10.3 Seeds and tools

WFP's role in the FAO/WFP seed exchange programme was a significant contribution to short-term food production. WFP provided storage and transport for rice seed collection (unhusked seed was exchanged for relief rice) and redistributed in the worst affected districts during the 1999/2000 planting season. This was innovative, met an important need and had a positive impact on food production. Maize seed was also provided with WFP's assistance, but it was an imported variety and not optimal. There has also been a widespread need for legume seeds that has not been met. WFP could probably have played a role here although when discussed with the CO it emerged that there is uncertainty amongst staff about WFP's mandate in relation to the provision of seed. In many countries WFP is not so reticent about this.

There is a troubling gap in the provision of farm equipment and basic tools, little of which has been provided, surprisingly given that it was widely known that much was stolen by the militias in September 1999. This has limited the amount of land that can be prepared. Some equipment (e.g. hand tractors) has been provided by other donors. In both upland and lowland areas the lack of basic tools has meant that some, perhaps many people (commonly women) are using traditional digging sticks for land preparation.

Overall, the lack of tools and seeds may represent one of the main limiting factors on restoration of food production.

⁶² This is evident from WFP East Timor's Food Aid Programmes and Operational Guidelines



10.4 Schools and other institutions

The school feeding programme and assistance to teachers were good initiatives although it is unclear how well they were implemented. A pilot (i.e. a smaller programme) is now being undertaken.

In Bobonaro and Oecussi Districts (and perhaps others) the provision of food to inpatients has made it possible for them to remain in hospital for the full course of treatment (most notably TB cases). Without this aid they would have been forced to leave because the hospital does not have the resources to provide food.

Food was also provided to boarding schools and orphanages.

10.5 Increasing food production through FFW

Initially FFW was sometimes used inappropriately for incidental work that would have been done anyway, eg cleaning village streets and repairing house fences. In these instances it is apparent that the label 'FFW' was applied to fit the requirement that FFW replace general distributions. But in other cases FFW was used appropriately to mobilise communities and groups to pool their labour to undertake tasks directly related to production e.g. rebuilding damaged irrigation canals and clearing large areas of overgrown land for planting. These projects resulted in the increased production of rice and maize in early 2000, although this should not be overstated because only a small proportion of the population were mobilised into these activities.

In one district the mission found that FFW projects were essentially general one-off distributions because every family in the administrative unit concerned had a member on the distribution list. The activity in these instances was often a 'construct' to fit the FFW requirement (e.g. group gardening projects) and based on atypical production methods, inefficient, unsustainable and with plenty of opportunity for the distribution of benefits to be skewed to the leaders that organised them.

In another district the IP persisted with FFW despite grave misgivings because food was needed in the communities concerned and FFW was WFP's requirement. Theoretically VGF picks up the needy who can't participate in FFW, but FFW+VGF was not sufficient to cover needs.

10.6 Rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure through FFW

The use of FFW varied considerably from Sub-Office to Sub-Office and from IP to IP. Overall, hundreds of FFW projects contributed to the repair of deteriorated or damaged non-agricultural infrastructure including roads, schools, clinics, hospitals and water supply systems. The scale and hence impact of this was perhaps not great nationally but it has represented an important contribution to recovery. In some cases FFW has been used for development projects including fishponds, terracing, handicrafts, school furniture and community buildings. The type of FFW activities and the mechanisms for approving and managing projects have generally improved over the life of the program, but they still lack rigour and there are some underlying problems.

Firstly, there is no problem analysis in the development of FFW projects and the link to food security is not well tested. Gender equity in FFW projects is questioned in some Sub-Offices but not in others. These specific shortcomings could be addressed, but there is a more fundamental



problem relating to the application of FFW to longer-term recovery in general. The principle obstacles faced by East Timorese in the repair and maintenance of community infrastructure and services are the lack of materials and tools, technical advice and community leadership. With regard to the latter, FFW may make it easier for leaders to mobilise the community in a particular instance (e.g. to repair a village water supply system) but there is a risk that the use of FFW will undermine 'primary governance' by making it more difficult to organise community work in future. Thus although it may be appropriate to use FFW for emergency tasks like repairing irrigation canals immediately after a crisis, it may not be appropriate to use FFW to mobilise community work in the recovery phase because it may not be compatible with sustainable development processes. If correct this poses considerable problems for WFP because FFW is currently WFP's principle recovery mechanism.

The foregoing discussion concerns community works as distinct from public works normally undertaken by the state, but both have been supported with FFW. There is no doubt that paid labour is appropriate in the case of public works (whether cash or food) and there is a lot of work required to repair and maintain public infrastructure for which East Timor lacks a budget. However, using food to pay labourers engaged on public works is strictly speaking outside WFP's mandate. FFW is supposed to be directly linked to household food security or at the very least the rehabilitation of community infrastructure or services.

Not all members of the mission agreed that FFW had such a potential to undermine the development process, finding instead that the principle problem through 2000 was that WFP was unable to adequately develop its FFW programme - it remained too ad hoc and development principles were not applied. As a consequence a large proportion of the FFW projects implemented are not likely to make a long-term contribution to community self-reliance. The mission members concerned found contributing factors included language problems, shortage of WFP and IP staff experienced in assisting in the preparation and supervision of (even small-scale) development projects, and general staff shortages at the field level for supervision.

Some technical assistance has been provided in conjunction with FFW (from the districts, donors, NGOs, the PKF or UNTAET technical staff) but it is the exception rather than the rule. In some projects local skilled workers were available to guide and implement the projects. In general, the main inhibition has been a lack of funds and materials to undertake any but the most basic of restoration projects.

The quality of restoration efforts for infrastructure, e.g. irrigation, water supplies and roads, is difficult to judge as most of these projects have only been recently completed and were just becoming operational, and it was only possible to visit a few of these types of project. To the best of the mission's knowledge there have been no formal agreements made with communities for maintenance of assets restored using FFW.

10.7 'Dependency'

WFP's rationale that FFW had to be introduced to avoid 'dependency' is of concern to the evaluation mission because it is based on untested assumptions about human behaviour. In any event dependency does not develop in the first months of a crisis. Indeed FFW could have contributed to dependency in so far as the reliance of donors on FFW (and cash for work) as a means of restoring infrastructure has created expectations on the part of local people that all



group work will be 'paid' for by international agencies. Given budgetary constraints the upkeep of local infrastructure will have to be the responsibility of the community and/or local authority.

10.8 The economy and FFW

Lack of cash flowing through the economy was a major problem from the outset. Cash for work schemes have the potential to assist in overcoming this problem and reinvigorating local economies that are stagnating. This is in contrast to FFW that does not initiate economic 'multipliers' in the same way. Thus where the local economy is stagnating for want of cash, interventions should have a cash component involving local transactions.

10.9 Conclusion

The general conclusion of the mission is that the CO has remained in an 'emergency mode' well beyond the time when it should have shifted into true recovery mode (at least by mid-2000) and in so doing missed opportunities for contributing to longer-term recovery. VGF continued for too long and the orientation of FFW did not evolve sufficiently. WFP could also have played a greater role in restoring community self-reliance by beginning to involve communities in planning and implementation.

Lessons

- The transition from relief to recovery is not made simply by phasing out general distributions and promoting FFW. It requires developmental thinking, design rigour and popular consultation.
- WFP has to focus more attention throughout operations on testing distribution models and transition strategies

Recommendations

- In future the CO should apply more rigour to prospective FFW projects, including the conduct of a problem analysis. If the problem relates to community mobilisation, WFP should be cautious about using FFW as an incentive.
- WFP should study a number of EMOPs to determine how well VGF + FFW serves as a transition strategy following general distributions.
- WFP should also examine the relative merits and application of 'food for recovery' (general distributions to sustain the population during a recovery phase) and FFW (restricted distributions tied to projects).
- WFP should be careful in using the term 'dependency' and a short document should be prepared for circulation analysing how dependency may or may not arise in the context of food relief operations.
- Where the local economy is stagnating for want of cash for local transactions, WFP should encourage donors and other agencies to fund/undertake cash-for-work projects.



11. PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION

11.1 Staff performance and staffing levels

WFP staff were clearly highly motivated and worked exceptionally hard to serve the East Timorese people – even heroically. It was pointed out to the mission time and time again that WFP staff worked extremely long hours under trying circumstances, most notably in the crisis phase. The shortcomings of the operation and of WFP institutionally that are discussed in this report should not detract from this.

As discussed above, contingency planning for the operation was deficient and as a result the first personnel on the ground were ill-prepared and initially poorly supported. They were drawn into performing tasks that they should have been able to delegate, including watching warehouses, meeting flights from Darwin very early every morning and so on. There simply weren't enough hands on deck. There were several critical gaps in staffing - an assessment officer was needed from the outset, as was a personnel officer and a financial officer.

The number of international staff positions (including UNVs) was about 40 but only about 30 of these posts were filled at any time during the first three months and staff turnover was high due to TDY status, which created problems. The mix of WFP and Nordic SBA in the early months was satisfactory although not always easy to manage and a few Nordic SBA staff did not perform well.

The key underlying problem appears to be WFP's HR policies that do not facilitate establishing and retaining fully qualified teams within operations. WFP relied too heavily on short-term volunteers from within WFP.

11.2 Management of human resources

Operations appear to have been well managed from Dili in the crisis phase. Morale was certainly high. There appears however to have been some 'drift' through 2000. The mission is concerned about the current management approach, which is confrontational.

Staff were typically well briefed before assuming their functions in the field however this was not always the case in the first six to nine months of the operation when three personnel were put in charge of Sub-Offices without job descriptions and without an adequate orientation in policies and procedures. Moreover, although good communications were established early the CO was not always able to provide adequate guidance and support to its Sub-Offices in the early period. This situation was remedied to a large extent with the preparation of operational guidelines although it would have been preferable if they had been available from the outset.⁶³

The CO now holds regular Heads of SO meetings and a Sub-Office focal point was recently established in the CO to deal with Sub-Office matters, which is positive.

WFP did not invest sufficiently in establishing reasonable office space or accommodation for its field staff. Everybody roughed it in the early months, and this is understandable, but soon thereafter other agencies and organizations did much more to improve their offices and

⁶³ Food Aid Programmes and Operational Guidelines. The mission was given a copy headed 'Draft – October 2000' but was informed that the first draft had been circulated in January.



accommodation (in the process helping to rehabilitate damaged buildings). Some WFP Sub-Offices could not get basic supplies, including diesel pumps with filters which have still not been sourced (dirty fuel from drums was possibly the biggest single cause of breakdowns).

The management of Dili port and Dili and Baucau warehouses in particular proved difficult due to the absence of trained workers and a high turnover of WFP personnel in the early stages of operations. There was a considerable amount of tension amongst porters that resulted in several labour disputes that sometimes brought operations to a halt. Inadequate attention to the management of workers, and at times lack of tact, may have contributed to this, although WFP did provide some training and there is so little paid work available in Dili that some tension was perhaps inevitable. Labour disputes have persisted.

11.3 Financial controls

The mission did not set out to examine this aspect but was told that there had been inadequacies in the first three months in Dili, mainly due to the lack of an international finance officer. (There was such an officer in Darwin due to the fact that banking and payments were initially organised there.)

11.4 Security

Although the security risks to personnel were low compared to many other operations, there were risks, particularly in the initial weeks and generally in those districts bordering West Timor. Appropriately, security awareness played a prominent role in WFP operations in East Timor, particularly in the first months. In that period, security issues formed a major part of the daily briefings chaired by OCHA for all heads of UN agencies and the general daily meetings that followed (also chaired by OCHA) included briefings from INTERFET on the current status (security coding) of areas and roads and they were a useful clearing house for information from INGOs and other sources.

In October 1999 WFP appointed a full time security officer whose services were shared with UNICEF. This officer was responsible for all aspects of security including the preparation of information pamphlets and the briefing of new arrivals. Sharing the services of the security officer with UNICEF worked well and could be repeated in future operations. WFP was able to dispense with the security officer at the end of March 2000 as the overall security situation had improved and UNTAET and CIVPOL had established a strong security network. The WFP Head of Logistics then assumed responsibility for all security measures including the updating of a WFP security information pamphlet. In April 2000, WFP initiated Security Awareness Training (SAT) for all staff including those locally recruited personnel who had a limited knowledge of English.

UNTAET and CIVPOL also provided WFP staff serving in Dili and the Sub-Offices with regular security briefings particularly those officers serving in districts bordering West Timor. UNTAET currently provide a weekly security report that is distributed to WFP staff. Through 2000 security was handled increasingly at the district level. UNTAET has a security focal point in all districts and the PKF provide security briefings at the District Administrator's regular meetings.

WFP has continued to operate a strict in-country travel authorisation scheme in conjunction with UNTAET, and WFP's excellent radio communications network enables the CO to keep in touch



with staff on the road. Other UN agencies and INGOs are able to avail themselves to WFP's network and obtain information on routes and potential dangers.

It is possible that WFP has now become more relaxed than it should. For example, the CO is supposed to provide security information to all newcomers, but the evaluation mission was not given any written material on security and there was no security briefing.

11.5 Participation of East Timorese

From the outset, and from the highest to the lowest level, there was virtually no participation by the East Timorese in the planning and management of EMOP 6177 and very little participation in its implementation other than at final distribution. The UNTAET/HAER review⁶⁴ noted that 'no initial framework agreement was established between UN agencies or NGOs to ensure East Timorese participation and as a result local participants were mostly marginalised by the international community during the initial humanitarian response'. It conceded that the international community had difficulty identifying legitimate representatives of civil society.

Initially there was some hesitancy about involving district leaders because the vast majority represented the CNRT, which was unelected. When this was resolved efforts were made to involve CNRT representatives with WFP inviting CNRT representatives to food coordination meetings in Dili and in some districts with WFP and/or IPs inviting local representatives to district level food meetings. But representatives of the East Timorese were rarely engaged satisfactorily by WFP or its IPs at any level, partly because there were very different outlooks that made it difficult to establish efficient working relationships, partly because WFP and its IPs simply did not try hard enough or look for the opportunities that were there.

There was virtually no attempt to engage at a sub-district level and as a result there was no community participation in the formulation, monitoring or evolution of EMOP 6177 (most notably in relation to 'second phase' mechanisms such as VGF and FFW). However, participation of disaster-affected people in all aspects of a food aid intervention is generally considered essential.⁶⁵

Village heads were of course very much involved in distributions (as mentioned above) and this represented considerable control, but it was by default and their power was unchecked. It is surprising that no attempt appears to have been made to establish distribution committees and involve the broader community, including women and younger people, when this is a feature of many other operations. Active local participation in distributions is essential to ensure transparency and effective food aid utilization and targeting.

While these omissions were perhaps understandable in the early (crisis) phase of the operation, it would be reasonable to expect this to have improved through 2000. There have been some improvements, evidenced by the formation of FFW committees in many districts. Lately, the district administration has become more involved and District Field Officers have been given responsibility for signing completion reports which is positive. But the East Timorese population remains disengaged.

⁶⁴ External Review of the Humanitarian Response to the East Timor Crisis, September 1999 – May 2000, p 9.

⁶⁵ See The SPHERE Project, Minimum Standards in Food Aid, Section 2, Participation.



Although WFP policies mandate community participation in programming and implementation, practical guidelines and training for WFP staff (many of whom were inexperienced UN Volunteers) for this appear to be lacking. Moreover, the in-field responsibility for working closely with communities falls on WFP's IPs, which were evidently hampered by lack of funds and staff. The fact that the EMOP has stayed in an 'emergency mode' for so long delayed the shift in orientation necessary for systematically adopting a participatory approach.

There have been shortcomings in WFP's communication with the general population and the dissemination of major decisions has been uneven. Although great efforts were made to provide information about the termination of VGF in March 2001 through Sub-Offices and IPs, the mission met some district level officials, local leaders and beneficiaries who were unaware that VGF was being terminated. People and their representatives have a right to know the extent of WFP's commitments.⁶⁶

The CO believes that all major decisions have been shared with East Timorese authorities and communities, including the termination of VGF. However, in the mission's estimation communication did not get down to the grassroots. In the case of the termination of VGF the mission found that IP staff in Bobonaro District were not passing on the information because they were afraid to.

The UNTAET/HAER review noted that: 'In general humanitarian agencies lacked a mediation process between themselves and their operations and beneficiaries. For this reason, the population of East Timor was poorly informed about the working procedures of the agencies, their responsibilities' etc.⁶⁷

11.6 Gender Action Plan

The Gender Action Plan for East Timor⁶⁸ is cursory and deficient as a planning instrument – it appears to comprise no more than a one and a half-page matrix and a one-page spreadsheet. The objectives in the first column of the matrix have not been synchronised adequately with WFP's stated Commitments to Women, the activities column is cursory, there is no baseline information (this column is blank), no targets are given (the entries in this column are irrelevant) and the stated achievements (fifth and final column) are again cursory. For example in relation to the participation of women in decision-making the target given is 'monitoring' and the achievement given is 'women participation in more activities for the betterment of their families'.

A number of laudable activities have presumably been undertaken but as a *plan* the document made available to the mission is patently inadequate.

11.7 Coordination

There was excellent coordination between humanitarian actors, in large part due to the level of commitment of those involved and the willingness to be flexible to achieve common objectives. There was also very good coordination between the humanitarians and INTERFET/PKF in Dili and at the district level, although one WFP respondent said that there was inadequate coordination in Darwin in the first months of the operation between OCHA/WFP and senior

⁶⁶ See The SPHERE Project, Minimum Standards in Food Aid, Appendix 1, Transition and exit strategies

⁶⁷ External Review of the Humanitarian Response to the East Timor Crisis, September 1999 – May 2000, p 10

⁶⁸ East Timor Gender Action Plan dated June 2000.



commanders of UNTAET. OCHA made an important contribution in facilitating coordination and establishing working groups including the Food Coordination Meetings which WFP took responsibility for. WFP's main contribution to coordination was the establishment and management of the joint Logistics Coordination Unit and the adoption of a 'service' outlook.

In principal local authorities should have the primary responsibility for coordinating humanitarian interventions.⁶⁹ It is accepted that there were impediments to achieving this in the early phase of the East Timor operation and that UNTAET's subsequent control of district administrations may have had the effect of further marginalizing the East Timorese. But it is apparent that no plans are currently being made by WFP to involve East Timorese at the national, district or local level in reviewing the EMOP and planning its implementation for the remainder of 2001.

There were regular meetings through 2000 between senior staff of the Kupang and Dili offices and there was a joint operation to respond to flooding in West Timor. However, coordination between the East Timor and West Timor operations was not optimal, a shortcoming which applies as much to WFP as any other agency.

11.8 SPHERE standards; human rights

The SPHERE Project includes Minimum Standards in Food Aid (i.e. chapter 4), which cover a number of areas in which EMOP 6177 was generally deficient including problem analysis, results monitoring and participation of the people affected by the emergency. The mission has been asked not to apply these standards because they are not binding on WFP, although it is acknowledged that WFP collaborated in the formulation of the Minimum Standards in Food Aid and that they are intended to be normative. The mission however encourages WFP to make greater use of the SPHERE Standards and disseminate them within WFP as a key reference. They provide sound advice in relation to policy and practice. Moreover, WFP's implementing partners subscribe to the SPHERE Standards, which provides COs with a useful basis for establishing IP responsibilities.

Some WFP staff attended SPHERE Project training conducted in Dili early in the operation, but the standards were not utilised in any way by the CO and staff interviewed by the Mission were not aware of them.

In relation to human rights, it is evident that despite the Secretary General's injunction,⁷⁰ WFP as an institution has not sought to adopt a human rights approach and senior staff are unsure what it would mean to do so and are apprehensive that it will leave WFP 'hostage' to the right to food. WFP staff commonly say that WFP is addressing human rights by providing food, but this demonstrates a lack of understanding of the human rights approach, underlined by a generally hostile attitude to the concept of rights or entitlements. One WFP staffer explained (in relation to the mission's observation that some returnees may have been entitled to more than a ration on arrival) that WFP's approach is to 'limit dependencies' and 'diminish entitlement psychology'. This approach is also used to promote FFW over free distributions, as if there is something wrong *per se* with free distributions. WFP is right to avoid having a negative impact and, if appropriate, to use food aid to mobilise communities to secure food production after an emergency, etc. However terms like 'entitlement psychology' are out of place.

⁶⁹ The SPHERE Project, Minimum Standards in Food Aid, Section 3, Coordination

⁷⁰ Secretary-General's Reform Programme



Mainstreaming human rights is certainly challenging in so far as it involves acknowledging responsibilities and being held to account. It also takes time for an organization to work through what is involved (this has been UNICEF's experience). But WFP has to venture down this path. Adopting the human rights approach would actually assist WFP to focus on its 'core business' and to bring greater clarity to objective setting and operational priorities.

In operational terms the human rights approach requires WFP to inform local authorities and the general population about WFP's responsibilities (while explaining the limitations imposed by the level of support from WFP's donors) and to be totally transparent about the progress of operations. It also requires WFP to enable beneficiaries to complain if their entitlements are not met by WFP or its IPs. This requires instituting complaints procedures.

For the remainder of EMOP 6177 and in future operations WFP should take cognisance of the recommendation of the Thematic Study of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies that 'WFP should ... review with other members of the IASC the implications for humanitarian agencies of the mainstreaming of human rights within the work of the United Nations and provide necessary information and guidance to all WFP staff'.⁷¹

Lessons

- There is often inadequate time to brief personnel as they arrive during an emergency operation and it is thus critical to have pre-prepared briefing materials and guidelines available.
- When it becomes clear that the capacity of local staff is problematic, very substantial resources have to be invested in local staff training.
- It is relatively easy for an EMOP to 'run out of steam' after the initial crisis passes and for programming to drift.
- A considerable investment of time, effort and tact has to be made to effectively manage labourers and secure efficient warehouse operations in an emergency situation.
- Participation by the affected population, including women, in programme formulation, implementation and monitoring doesn't just happen because it is WFP policy – it has to become an operational priority, reflected in detailed Sub-Office workplans and supported by standards and procedures.
- WFP's Commitments to Women are in danger of being reduced to focusing on the number of women included in vulnerable categories and targeted for assistance.

Recommendations

- EMOPs should be formulated more rigorously and include a problem analysis, objectives, subordinate outputs, and a statement of key planning assumptions. A means of applying these design disciplines in an emergency setting should be developed by WFP.
- The changes made in the course of implementation and the associated reasoning should be documented and the key EMOP document should be updated to serve as a reference for implementation, monitoring, review and evaluation.

⁷¹ WFP/EB.3/99/4/3 Recommendation V-1



- From the commencement of an operation greater efforts need to be made to ensure intended beneficiaries and civil society understand EMOP objectives, operational frameworks and procedures. This will require public notices translated into local languages.
- WFP needs to place greater emphasis on the participation of affected populations and civil society. At a minimum WFP should insist on the establishment of local distribution committees, taking into account gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status to ensure fair representation.
- WFP should develop a model and associated guidelines for consultation and participatory policy setting and decision-making within its COs.
- For the remainder of 2001, and beyond if a PRRO succeeds EMOP 6177, WFP should take steps to work much more closely with the nascent government of East Timor at the national and district levels in all aspects of assessment, programme planning and monitoring. This will incidentally provide a means for building capacity and ensuring sustainability. In conjunction with ETTA and district administrations, steps should be taken immediately to define the means for more active collaboration and cooperation.
- WFP should make use of the SPHERE standards in the design and implementation of operations and staff should be familiarised with their content and purpose.
- WFP should undertake an assessment of the implications of mainstreaming human rights in the design and implementation of operations.⁷²
- WFP HR policies need to facilitate establishing and retaining fully qualified teams within EMOPs and SOs.
- To avoid having personnel assigned to the field without job descriptions, key policy documents and operational manuals, appropriate materials should be placed on WFPgo global office including job descriptions with recommended content for various positions.
- An experienced person should be assigned to guiding and supporting staff in the Sub-Offices from the outset of an operation.
- For large-scale emergency operations WFP should endeavour to identify a source of experienced warehouse managers who have a background of handling large casual labour forces in developing countries.
- Where WFP operates on both sides of a border and problems are enmeshed the Regional Office should oversee the two halves of the operation and consider appointing a coordinator.

12. FUTURE PROGRAMMING

12.1 Ongoing commitments

WFP has a number of ongoing commitments, including support for TB patients and the pilot school feeding programme. These should of course be maintained. The mission considers adult literacy (particularly for women) to have been a good undertaking and would support it in principle. WFP intends to continue to promote FFW. The mission supports this but the approach should be more rigorous, more targeted to vulnerable areas and better linked to food security.

⁷² This is consistent with recommendation V-1 (a) of the Thematic Study of Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies (WFP/EB.3/99/4/3)



Very little potential would appear to exist for market interventions, particularly given the prevailing World Bank policy influence.

12.2 Internal Review

It is vital that WFP consider both ongoing and new activities in the context of relevant operational objectives. The objectives of EMOP 6177 have 'evolved' but there is no formal statement of these amendments. The mission also notes that a Country Strategy Outline (CSO) has not been prepared as a policy framework for preparing the PRRO. Thus before determining ongoing activities it is vital that WFP review EMOP 6177 taking into account the Mission's findings and recommendations (assuming that the intention is to extend it until the end of 2001). This should involve conducting a brief but formal problem analysis (including an assessment of likely short-term needs) to ensure that the revised EMOP objectives are appropriate. Revised strategies and objectives should flow from this exercise.

12.3 Factors to consider

There are a number of factors that need to be taken into account when planning for the remainder of 2001 (EMOP 6177) and possibly preparing a PRRO:

- Although harvests are expected to be generally good, there may be pockets with significant deficits and/or food access problems and reasonable expectations of assistance may be placed on WFP.⁷³
- Economic stagnation is likely to continue with little money in circulation, little paid employment and little opportunity for the marketing of produce.⁷⁴
- ETТА capacity will not increase radically in the short term but new policies, priorities and procedures will gradually be developed, affecting WFP's plans and operations.
- Because ETТА's agricultural strategy will focus on irrigated, lowland rice production and coffee. Upland farmers (without coffee) could suffer from neglect.
- Estimates from various sources suggest that 30-60,000 people may return between April and June 2001.⁷⁵ A large proportion if not the majority may come with very little and be destitute. WFP Dili confirms that it has a corresponding contingency plan and stocks ready should such a high number of refugees return.
- There is a possibility of a mild El Nino developing later in 2001.

These factors, singly or in combination, may place increased demands on WFP's resources and accordingly the CO should outline contingency plans and resource implications.

12.4 Reassessment of food security

With regard to the first point, it has become apparent to the mission that WFP, its partners and other donors are working to some extent in an information vacuum. WFP needs to assess food availability and access at the sub-district level. The mission has discussed this critical issue with

⁷³ This is based on the mission's assessment in February 2001. The results of the harvest will be known by the time this report is circulated.

⁷⁴ The CO has recently noted that it is putting in place the foundations for a sustainable VGF and social safety net system by working with local and traditional organisations.

⁷⁵ In March 2001 UNHCR reported that 50,000 refugees remained in Indonesia.



the CO and IPs and there is general agreement that such a reassessment needs to be conducted as soon as possible. This could be done with existing WFP and IP resources, lead by WFP's VAM staff.⁷⁶

The mission proposes that the CO gather as much information as feasible from a range of secondary sources, i.e. key informants at national, district, sub-district and parish levels (district agricultural officers, church sources, women's groups, etc.). This information should however be tested to minimise inaccuracies. On the whole, data should be collected using *ordinal* (i.e. scale) means of measurement as opposed to *cardinal* means (real numbers). A follow-up assessment should be conducted towards the end of 2001.

12.5 Provision for relief later in 2001

At the time the mission was in East Timor it was anticipated that the maize and rice harvests would be good however there were worrying signs that the maize harvest in some coastal areas would be low due to irregular rains, lack of suitable seed or crop damage (e.g. Oecussi, Bobonaro, and Ainaro). Areas which depend on sale of their coffee crop (e.g. Ermera, Lolotoe) to purchase staple foods also seemed vulnerable, due to the stagnation of the rural economy and breaks in the export marketing chain. It was anticipated that communities in these areas may require assistance later in the year. If assistance proves to be needed, local area geographic targeting may be the best way of dealing with immediate food insecurity, perhaps combined with FFW if a) realistic projects can be identified b) an IP with the necessary materials and technical support is available; and c) the projects do not compete with voluntary community mobilisation.

In areas which are shown by the food security reassessment to be most likely to experience food shortages later in 2001, arrangements could be made with local District Agricultural and Field Officers, NGOs, churches and UNMOs to report critical food needs to WFP Dili or Sub-Offices. Agreed check lists of key information and training in their use would need to be provided.

12.6 Geographic focus

The agricultural rehabilitation development strategy defined by major donors⁷⁷ proposes an almost exclusive focus on lowland rice and upland coffee – to the exclusion of upland areas and dryland crops, i.e. the majority of agricultural families and land. It is recognised that this strategy may be revised in the future. However, in terms of food security it is generally accepted that people in the upland areas dependent on dryland crops and with limited or no cash crops are those that are most vulnerable in terms of (seasonal) food security, especially towards the end of the dry season (August-October) and before the maize harvest (February-March).

WFP should focus attention and added resources on upland (no coffee) areas, both in terms of addressing (potential) food deficits and in the transition towards a more development WFP orientated programme. More precise prioritisation would be based on the information flowing

⁷⁶ The CO has responded that the mission's suggestion is unrealistic given the means that would be required to undertake such an exercise. WFP Dili is envisaging other avenues where it will 'tap into' surveys currently undertaken by the World Bank and UNTAET to capture food security related data. It also plans to set up an information gathering system with existing indigenous and UNTAET network to collect relevant information on a regular basis. This is inadequate and the mission remains of the view that WFP needs to invest in an assessment of food security (in as cost-efficient a way as possible).

⁷⁷ Agriculture in East Timor: A Strategy for Rehabilitation and Development, May 2000



from the recommended food security and vulnerability reassessment. If WFP assistance continues beyond 2001, the location and types of support provided should be reviewed on a semi-annual basis, based on the results of regular vulnerability reassessments.

12.7 Focus on food security

The natural emphasis for projects in upland areas should be on projects that enhance local food security, including cash crops for sale in local and regional markets. Potential types of projects could include, reforestation, terracing, training in conservation farming techniques, seed multiplication, processing and distribution, new crops (e.g. stone and citrus fruits, herbs and spices), school and church gardens, and others identified by local communities. The mission acknowledges that WFP would need an IP to pursue activities of this type, which is a considerable limitation.

The mission believes that a strong emphasis should be placed on supporting projects where women take the lead or implement the project. At the same time, the mission cautions that if WFP opts to pursue a development approach it will need to do so rigorously, with adequate resources and not necessarily on the basis of FFW alone.

WFP needs to consider that food security in East Timor, tenuous at the best of times, was already under severe stress over two years before the wholesale destruction and pillaging inflicted on East Timor by ABRI and their militias retreating to West Timor after the ballot in August 1999. Thus, WFP needs to take fully into account the loss of agricultural capital (social, natural and economic) during the preceding two years. In essence, food security in East Timor will be marginal and under threat for some time to come, especially for the deeply impoverished rural communities where almost all Timorese live and try to make a living.

12.8 Targeting vulnerable households/communities

FFW alone is not a means of addressing relief needs because the most vulnerable and the most isolated, food insecure communities are unlikely to be able to participate. Moreover, isolated, upland communities do not have the same level of infrastructure as urban and lowland (paddy rice growing) communities and thus FFW is more difficult to identify and plan. It is also far more difficult to supervise and provide technical support.

Thus vulnerable communities and groups may have to be targeted separately. The recommended food security reassessment provides the initial means for identifying these communities and groups. Additional analysis, including consultation with key stakeholders at village, sub-district and district levels, is essential for developing a range of interventions suited to the needs, constraints and opportunities of each community. In line with WFP policy both the community, and especially women, should be an integral part of detailed planning and implementation.

12.9 Food security policy

WFP could play an important role assisting the government with food security policy development (in collaboration with FAO). There is at present a vacuum in this regard. As a first step in this direction WFP and FAO could take the lead in establishing a 'National Food Security and Nutrition Working Group'. The Mission cautions however that government resources for policy development will be minimal, and may be a low priority.



12.10 Development of ETTA

Although it is not expected that ETTA capacity will increase radically over the remainder of the year, it is clear that new policies, priorities and procedures will be developed that have the potential to affect WFP's plans and operations. Increasingly WFP will have to work within an evolving, externally set, framework.

Key programming recommendations

- The CO should conduct a reassessment of the probable food security situation and possible food aid needs for the remainder of 2001, down to the sub-district level if feasible. This should be in close collaboration with UNTAET/ETTA, UN agencies and NGOs.
- If EMOP 6177 is extended into the second half of 2001 the CO should first conduct a brief internal review of the EMOP to revise its objectives and anticipated outputs, incorporating a problem analysis and taking into account the mission's findings and recommendations. This could be integrated with the preparation of a PRRO.



Annexes



ANNEX 1

TERMS OF REFERENCE

General Terms of Reference

* The EMOP has been extended to December 2000; a further extension is expected until June 2001. A PRRO (Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation) is scheduled to be prepared during the first half of 2001.

** The total budget of WFP operations in East Timor (i.e. EMOP 6175, 6177 and Special Operation 6178) exceeds US\$ 40 million.

Background

In the immediate aftermath of a UN-sponsored popular consultation on independence (30 August 1999), violent civil strife was instigated by armed militias causing large-scale displacement of the population of East Timor. Massive destruction of the territory's infrastructure took place, agricultural production totally disrupted, food stocks looted, while numerous people were wounded or killed. Economic activities came to a standstill.

Based on an early assessment, it was established that out of an estimated total population of 890,000 persons, some 458,300 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees who fled to Western Timor would require food assistance.

An initial batch of emergency food aid was provided under EMOP 6175 to 150,000 civil strife victims during the first two months of the crisis.

Objectives of EMOP 6177:

- a) to facilitate the return and settlement of displaced persons, with special attention to female headed households;
- b) to assist with rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, including homes and other facilities;
- c) to enable returning IDPs to devote all their efforts to rebuild their homes and restore their livelihoods by temporarily freeing them from the need to meet their day-to-day food requirements.

Assuming the overall food aid co-ordination, WFP's assistance would cover about 75% of the identified caseload. A distinction was made between 'worse-affected returnees and IDPs', receiving a full ration, and 'less-affected remainees' who would be given half rations.

The initial purpose of WFP's intervention in East Timor was to ensure an adequate nutritional diet of population groups who had temporarily lost all means of self-support. Special emphasis was given to the re-settlement of returnees and displaced people, and also the establishment of a social safety net for other vulnerable groups. Although this is still being pursued, WFP has now moved into the reconstruction and recovery phase of its operation. Currently, WFP is aiming to utilise food as a catalyst for rehabilitation activities through food-for-work projects and school feeding. In shifting the focus of its attention, WFP is confronted with newly emerging structural challenges such as devastated infrastructures, severely disrupted/weak market mechanisms, high levels of unemployment, depressed purchasing power, etc.

The outcome of a joint WFP-FAO food and crop assessment mission, scheduled in March 2001 will provide guidance as regards East Timor's population continued need for food aid.



WFP launched Special Operation 6178 in order to support and strengthen the logistic capacity of the humanitarian community in East Timor. Collaborative arrangements regarding transport and delivery of food aid have been agreed with other humanitarian organisations on a cost recovery basis.

A multi-national military force (INTERFET: International Force for East Timor) was deployed to restore peace and security, protect the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), and also to facilitate humanitarian operations. Arrangements were made with INTERFET to protect WFP food stocks from looting, and to plan and implement the movement of staff and food commodities.

At present, WFP is managing both the warehouse and trucking operations with its own staff, equipment and leased facilities from the UN Transitional Administration. WFP has also set up a workshop facility servicing a fleet of 80 trucks. The logistics workforce numbers more than 110 people, employed on short term contracts.

Proposal

A unique feature of the humanitarian relief efforts in East Timor is the fact that victims of organised armed aggression are being aided within the fragile context of a prospective independent state (with no previous WFP presence), and sensitive geo-political and security considerations.

This is a relatively large and rather complicated WFP operation. An evaluation would provide useful insights into the particular constraints and challenges with regard to planning, implementation and co-ordination with other partners, in particular installed UN-civil (UNTAET: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) and military authorities.

An evaluation of EMOP 6177 is proposed in order to learn from the experience in programming and implementing this WFP intervention within a complex emergency situation, characterised by virulent insecurity. Lessons derived from the evaluation are expected to contribute to improving the formulation of similar interventions in the future.

Objectives

- (1) To analyse the achievements of this EMOP, in particular the degree to which stated objectives have been achieved.
- (2) To assess the evolution in the programming of WFP assistance under this operation, adjusting the targeting mechanisms in order to more adequately address the food insecurity experienced by the displaced and crisis affected population groups.

Arriving at the time when the transition from EMOP to PRRO is being prepared, will allow the mission to also focus on the forward linkages with the programming of the next phase of WFP's intervention in East Timor. It is being proposed that a planning workshop will be organised immediately following the evaluation mission. This would allow for fresh evaluation findings and recommendations to be incorporated into the design of the PRRO.

Key issues to be examined

- Assessment, re-assessment of food aid needs of at-risk population groups affected by a complex emergency characterised by serious civil strife.
- Role of food aid within the new socio-economic environment, characterised by the absence of governmental structures (though a UN-supported transitional administration exists) and emerging structural challenges.
- Targeting of food aid to the civil strife affected population groups.
- Delivery, distribution and monitoring (food aid logistics, humanitarian access)



Mission schedule

The evaluation is planned to take place over a period of three weeks: from 31 January until 22 February 2001.

Mission composition

The evaluation team will be composed of the following members:

- Team leader/emergency expert (planning/assessment/design of the operation, implementation, co-ordination and security issues).
- Socio-economist (rural and urban food insecurity, coping mechanisms, role of food aid, recovery and rehabilitation aspects).
- M&E expert (targeting of WFP food aid, monitoring and evaluation, use of VAM).
- Logistics expert (efficiency/effectiveness of delivery and distribution arrangements, ITSH).

The responsible evaluation officer will join the mission to:

- act as a liaison between the evaluation team and the Dili office,
- ensure compliance with the agreed thrust of the evaluation,
- finalise the draft guidelines on the management of evaluations of WFP-assisted (complex) emergency operations.

Reporting

The mission is expected to yield the following reports:

- Aide Memoire to be written towards the end of the mission, with contributions from each team member. This document will contain the mission's tentative findings and recommendation, and serve as the basis for the debriefing at both the WFP Dili and WFP Headquarters level.
- Evaluation Summary, maximum of 5,000 words, prepared by the team leader and to be submitted to OEDE by 30 March 2001. It should be noted that this Summary will be presented to the WFP Executive Board in October 2001 (EB3/2001) for its consideration; RECC (WFP Rome editors) deadline for this document is 20 July 2001.
- Technical reports to be prepared by the socio-economist, food security and logistics experts, covering the issues under their responsibility, by 15 March 2001.
- Full (consolidated) mission report by the team leader, based on the inputs from all team members, by 15 April 2001; technical reports by mission members will be presented in conjunction with (possibly as Appendices to) the full/consolidated report.

In addition, a final draft of the OEDE guidelines on managing the evaluation of WFP-assisted (complex) emergency operations will be prepared by the evaluation officer.

Methods

It is anticipated that the evaluation mission will:

- a) review relevant documents and (primary and secondary) information to be made available through WFP Headquarters and the Dili Office, or locally gathered while visiting East Timor;
- b) consult WFP East Timor staff, WFP implementing partner agencies, representatives of local authorities, incl. UN civil and military authorities;



- c) undertake visits to a representative sample of sites where field-based activities under EMOP 6177 can be reviewed;
- d) use participatory approaches to seek the views of beneficiaries and, where appropriate, non-beneficiaries.

Individual TOR: Team leader

Within the scope and overall objectives of the Evaluation as presented in the general Terms of Reference, and in close consultation and collaboration with the other team members and OEDE mission co-ordinator, the team leader will assume overall responsibility for the conduct of this evaluation, and may modify the tasks allocated to each member of the team, if deemed necessary.

Without limiting him/herself to these subjects, the team leader will examine and assess the following:

- a) Social, economic, political and security **context** within which the man-made disaster took place and the subsequent WFP response was planned and implemented.
- b) **Overall WFP readiness and response** to the emergency, considering the assessment of food aid needs (was it timely, accurate?). Possibilities to undertake **field crop and needs assessments**, in view of the prevailing security situation. How timely and accurate were these assessments? Establishment of the **WFP presence** East Timor (which measures were taken, how effective were these?). Use of delegated authorities, IRA (Immediate Response Account). Use of in-country (BULOG) food stocks, call forward contingency provision ongoing EMOP in Indonesia. Lead time needed to (re-)programme and commence the implementation of the WFP intervention.
- c) Adequacy of EMOP contribution to addressing the **food needs of the internally displaced** population groups. Which programming provisions were made to meet the food needs of (spontaneous and organised) **returnees** from West Timor?
- d) Nature and effectiveness of **co-ordination** and collaboration between WFP and available (UN) **civil authorities** at central, provincial and district level, including the outgoing (Indonesian) authorities/agencies, especially BULOG.
- e) Effectiveness (formal/informal) modalities of co-operation between WFP and **other international providers of humanitarian aid**, including the supply and utilisation of **non-food relief** assistance, its complementary role vis-à-vis food aid.
- f) Operational capacity of **implementing partners**: their overall management of the food aid operations. **NGO partnerships**: in which areas (food aid management/final delivery, technical assistance, provision of essential non-food inputs, beneficiary targeting, etc.) and how did NGO involvement facilitate the achievement of stated objectives under this EMOP? Have WFP-NGO partnerships been formalised (MOUs, other operational agreements)? Have these agreements been useful in establishing respective roles/contributions? Adequacy of cost-sharing arrangements, if any.
- g) Nature and effectiveness of **co-ordination** and collaboration between WFP and available UN military (INTERFET) at central, provincial and district level.
- h) **Transition from relief (EMOP) to reconstruction and rehabilitation (PRRO)**; adjustments to be made in programming and implementation of the WFP response; moving away from free food distributions, while introducing and expanding FFW activities. Any possible prospects for a firmer move towards development-oriented assistance?
- i) **Phasing-down and exit strategies** to be considered by WFP in East Timor: which assumptions to be made, measures to be considered (changes in food basket), activities to be prioritised and time frame to be observed? Relation between improved targeting and phasing down opportunities.
- j) Extent to which the response by WFP, in conjunction with initiatives by the local authorities and other donors, has presented opportunities to **address structural causes of poverty**, both in rural and urban areas.
- k) Formulate **findings, conclusions, recommendations**, and possible **lessons** as to guide similar WFP interventions in the future, and contribute to strengthening the orientation of forthcoming PRRO.



Moreover, the team leader will:

- Prepare an Aide Memoire for presenting the mission's preliminary findings and recommendations at the debriefing in Dili prior to departing from East Timor.
- Present the mission's findings and recommendations at the mission debriefing in both Dili and at WFP Headquarters in Rome.
- Prepare the Executive Board (EB3/October2001) Evaluation Summary Report and submit its draft to OEDE by 30 March 2001.
- Prepare the Final Mission Report and submit it to OEDE by 15 April 2001.

Individual TOR: Socio-economist

The expert will co-operate with the team leader and other members of the team in order to facilitate the mission's timely compliance with its tasks and overall Terms of Reference as stated.

The specific tasks of the expert are indicated further below. However, they are not to be considered as exhaustive. It is the responsibility of the expert, to identify and analyse, in consultation with the team leader, additional issues he/she might consider important for the performance of the evaluation. Moreover, the team leader is free to modify the tasks allocated to each member within the team, if it is deemed necessary.

Specifically, the expert will examine/clarify:

- a) Effects of the crisis on the **food security** of poor, at-risk households, taking into account coping mechanisms at their disposal. What difference (**value added**) is **WFP supplied food** making in the lives of the targeted population groups (by beneficiary category): has it increased their food security, was the duration appropriate, did the choice of commodities/ration size correspond well to their needs?
- b) Adequacy, appropriateness of **food rations** in relation to actual/available coping mechanisms.; other nutritional considerations.
- c) Effectiveness of the **vulnerable group feeding** component of the EMOP.
- d) To which extent are targeted beneficiaries benefiting from food aid provided, **assets** created through **food-for-work**?
- e) Relevance and adequacy of the EMOP contribution to recovery and restoration of **community self-reliance**.
- f) Methods and effectiveness of **community participation**; degree of involvement targeted beneficiaries in programming and implementation of food aid distributions and assisted activities (beneficiary selection criteria/practices); beneficiaries' views of WFP assistance.
- g) Effectiveness of FFW assisted schemes, in terms of **technical proficiency**, quality of (completed) works, technical assistance needed, **sustainability** of assets created; formal and/or informal maintenance agreements with beneficiary communities.
- h) Scope of **complementary inputs and services** provided by implementing partners, UN/bilateral agencies and other partners. Support to farmers attempting to rehabilitate their land and other assets, on return from their displacement, is a crucial part of the operation. As many of them lost all assets and farm equipment, **seeds and agricultural tools** have to be provided. The extent to which needs have been covered, and the timeliness of the supplies, should be assessed.
- i) Extent to which **gender concerns**, as expressed under the WFP Commitments to Women, have been incorporated in the programming and implementation of WFP assistance, considering possible variations in the way the economic crisis has affected the livelihoods/well-being of men and women.
- j) Extent to which **environmental vulnerability** and environmental health (basic sanitation) concerns have been addressed.
- k) Formulate findings, conclusions, recommendations and possible lessons learned as to guide similar WFP interventions in the future, and contribute to strengthening the orientation of forthcoming PRRO.



Moreover, the expert will:

- Provide the team leader a written contribution to the mission's Aide Memoire which will be used to present early findings and conclusions at the in-country debriefing.
- Participate in and contribute to the debriefing at both WFP Dili Office and WFP Headquarters in Rome.
- Submit to the team leader, not later than two weeks after the team's departure from Dili, a more detailed report, developing and documenting the technical aspects of her/his contribution to the mission's work.

Individual TOR: Food Aid Targeting/M&E Expert

The expert will co-operate with the team leader and other members of the team in order to facilitate the mission's timely compliance with its tasks and overall Terms of Reference as stated.

The specific tasks of the expert are indicated further below. However, they are not to be considered as exhaustive. It is the responsibility of the expert, to identify and analyse, in consultation with the team leader, additional issues he/she might consider important for the performance of the evaluation. Moreover, the team leader is free to modify the tasks allocated to each member within the team, if it is deemed necessary.

Specifically, the expert will examine:

- a) Effectiveness of the **monitoring and evaluation system** (relevance and quality of data/-bases and research methodology) established by WFP, possibly in partnership with other aid providers (NGOs). M&E practices, constraints faced: system's ability to provide reliable feedback on the effects of WFP interventions, and contribute to a possible assessment of longer-term impact.
- b) Has the **focus** of the M&E system properly **shifted** as WFP assistance is preparing to move from relief (EMOP) to recovery (PRRO)?
- c) With improvement of nutritional status as a major objective, is the EMOP's M&E system capable of adequately **assessing** changes in the **nutritional status** of targeted vulnerable population groups (surveillance of groups at risks)? How are nutrition related (baseline) data collected? How relevant/reliable are they?
- d) Adequacy of **targeting practices**: identifying most affected areas and most needy population groups; relevance/validity of (vulnerability) **selection criteria** used. Are the target groups and their needs well defined, or, is there a need for refinement? Does the assistance provided by WFP and partner organisations address these needs?
- e) Extent to which partnerships with **NGOs** facilitated targeting, monitoring and evaluation of the effects and impact of WFP interventions on beneficiaries?
- f) Effectiveness in using **VAM** (Vulnerability Assessment Mapping) in beneficiary targeting, monitoring (and evaluation of) WFP food aid.
- g) Formulate findings, conclusions, recommendations and possible lessons learned as to guide similar WFP interventions in the future, and contribute to strengthening the orientation of forthcoming PRRO.

Moreover, the expert will:

- Provide the team leader a written contribution to the mission's Aide Memoire which will be used to present early findings and conclusions at the in-country debriefing.
- Participate in and contribute to the debriefing at both WFP Dili Office and WFP Headquarters in Rome.



- Submit to the team leader, not later than two weeks after the team's departure from Dili, a more detailed report, developing and documenting the technical aspects of her/his contribution to the mission's work.

Individual TOR: Food Aid Logistics Expert

The expert will co-operate with the team leader and other members of the team in order to facilitate the mission's timely compliance with its tasks and General Terms of Reference as stated.

The specific tasks of the expert are indicated further below. However, they are not to be considered as exhaustive. It is the responsibility of the expert, to identify and analyse, in consultation with the team leader, additional issues he/she might consider important for the performance of the evaluation. Moreover, the team leader is free to modify the tasks allocated to each member within the team, if it is deemed necessary.

Specifically, the expert will examine:

- a) Effectiveness of food aid management arrangements: recording, reporting, monitoring of supply pipeline (**CTS: commodity tracking system**).
- b) Quantity, type and quality of commodity **deliveries**; incidence, level of post-CIF losses.
- c) Effectiveness of food aid **initial and current delivery arrangements**: shipping, customs clearance, inland transportation (use of extended delivery points), storage facilities and final delivery arrangements, especially from district /sub-district to beneficiary communities.
- d) Possible use of **private companies** for the delivery of food aid.
- e) Effectiveness, cost-efficiency of delivery/storage **arrangement with BULOG, the outgoing State Logistics Agency** of Indonesia (incl. taking over their existing rice stocks) during the start-up of the EMOP.
- f) Effectiveness and efficiency of the activities under **Special Operation 6178**, aimed at supporting and strengthening the logistic capacity of the humanitarian community in East Timor.
- g) Effectiveness and efficiency of **airlifts/airdrop** (helicopter operation).
- h) Efficiency of **targeted distribution** of food aid by implementing partners and EMOP assisted activity (general relief, vulnerable group feeding, FFW).
- i) Extent of **beneficiary participation**, particularly women, in arranging the final delivery and distribution of food aid.
- j) **Administration** Effectiveness of local and/or regional **purchasing** arrangements, if any, of food and non-food items (in terms of costs, ensuring a steady and timely supply, appropriateness).
- k) Experience with WFP's planned involvement in **commercial importation and wholesale of cereals**.
- l) Adequacy of **ITSH** (internal transport subsidy) rate; ITSH reimbursement procedures and reimbursement rate.
- m) Role of the **contingency** provision within the **Indonesia EMOP 6006**, which allowed for the distribution of rice and blended food to victims of civil strife in East Timor.
- n) Assess the implications for logistics staffing and resources within the **phasing down and exit strategies** to be considered.
- o) Effectiveness of the **communication/-systems** between the Dili Office and sub-offices or outposted staff.
- p) Formulate findings, conclusions, recommendations and possible lessons learned as to guide similar WFP interventions in the future, and contribute to strengthening the orientation of forthcoming PRRO.

Moreover, the expert will

- Provide the team leader a written contribution to the mission's Aide Memoire which will be used to present early findings and conclusions at the in-country debriefing.



- Participate in and contribute to the debriefing at both WFP Dili Office and WFP Headquarters in Rome.
- Submit to the team leader, not later than two weeks after the team's departure from Dili, a more detailed report, developing and documenting the technical aspects of her/his contribution to the mission's work

Individual TOR: OEDE Evaluation Officer

The responsible OEDE Evaluation Officer managing this evaluation will:

- a) provide general support and guidance as required to the mission members;
- b) act as liaison between the mission members and the WFP Dili Office, reviewing the mission's progress, evaluation methods applied and ensure compliance with the intended thrust of the evaluation;
- c) contribute to the preparation of the mission's Aide Memoire;
- d) use the evaluation of East Timor EMOP 6177 as a case study to finalise the draft OEDE guidelines for managing evaluations of WFP-assisted (complex) emergency operations.



ANNEX 2 ITINERARY AND WORKPLAN

<i>Monday</i>	<i>Tuesday</i>	<i>Wednesday</i>	<i>Thursday</i>	<i>Friday</i>	<i>Saturday</i>	<i>Sunday</i>
	January 16, 2001 Mission Leader arrives in Rome	January 17 Briefings at WFP	January 18 Briefings at WFP	January 19 Mission Leader departs		January 28 Team arrives in Jakarta
29 Briefings	30 Briefings	31 January Mission arrives in Dili	1 February Meetings with CO	2 February Meetings with CO Field trip to Bacau	3	4
5 February Depart early for Oecussi . Field work	6 February Oecussi. Field work	7 Team A Oecussi debrief, 11 am heli to Same , initial meeting/ activities	8 T-A Same Field work	9 T-A Same debrief, depart in afternoon for Dili by road (stop Alieu?)	10 Dili Teams A and B debrief internally and then together	11 Dili Writing
		7 Team B Oecussi debrief, 11 am heli to Suai , initial meeting/ activities	8 T-B Suai Field work	9 T-B Suai debrief, depart in afternoon for Dili by road (stop Ainaro)		
12 T-A Drive to Bacau , initial meeting/ activities	13 T-A Bacau Field work	14 T-A Bacau debrief, depart for Emera at midday, initial meeting	15 Dili	16 Emera Day trip	17 Teams A and B debrief internally and then together	18 Writing
12 T-B Drive to Maliana , initial meeting/ activities	13 T-B Maliana Field work	14 T-B Maliana debrief, depart for Emera at midday Initial meeting				
19 February Writing Present Aide Memoire	20 February Debriefing with WFP Dili	21 February PRRO workshop	22 February PRRO workshop	23 February Debrief Food C Ctee PRRO workshop	24 February PRRO workshop	25 February Start to draft eval report for WFP Exec Board
26 February Mission departs Dili	27 February Mission arrives in Rome	28 February Prepare for debriefing	1 March Debriefing Mission leaves Rome			



ANNEX 3

METHOD

Key issue	Information required	Method of obtaining/assessing
1. Speed and adequacy of initial response by WFP	Records and reports provided to team; recollections of early events	Prepare calendars of events in Dili and each district visited; interview key informants (KI) incl. past staff (by email)
2. Assessment and reassessment of food aid needs of at-risk population groups	Assessments and surveys of food needs and nutrition by FAO/WFP, WFP SO, INGOs; VAM	Consider adequacy of assessments/surveys, utility of information and validity of recommendations; KI
3. Targeting of food aid to the civil strife affected population groups	VAM; WFP standards; VGF manual; distribution records; distributions;	Test underlying assumptions and application of standards (including gender) and indicators; interview KIs, beneficiaries and non-benef's
4. Delivery, distribution and monitoring	WFP, donor and INGO records of food pipeline up to final distribution point (FDP); readiness for returnees and approp of ration; WFP and IP distribution monitoring systems; evidence of results/impact monitoring	Assess appropriateness of food and other inputs provided; assess efficiency of delivery; test monitoring by tracking distrib up to FDP; interview KIs and beneficiaries including returnees
5. Role of food aid within the new socio-economic environment and in transition from emergency to recovery	Socio-economic context at different phases of operation; records of uses of food and evolution in use; UNTAET and ETTA policy, unofficial views	Interview KI incl. ETTA; consider appropriateness of delivery/targeting mechanisms used by WFP and partners; inspect activities on field visits (FFW etc); is there an exit strategy?
6. Programme resourcing, management and coordination	Budgets, staffing levels, records and reports, arrangements made within WFP and with other actors; participation of ET	Interview KI (incl past staff, other agencies/organizations, UNTAET, ETTA; consult East Timorese during field visits

Programme in each District

We recognise that WFP and its partners may make arrangements ahead of our visit and the evaluation team appreciates this and the difficulty of changing programmes. Nevertheless we need the opportunity to 'workshop' site visits and timing in our initial meeting and this may result in us requesting some changes and/or additions.

Ideally we will have two and a half days in each District. In some cases this will be the full evaluation team, in other half only. We will encourage full participation from WFP staff and partners. The actual programme will depend on local arrangements and conditions, and whether we arrive in the morning or afternoon. Note that in each District the team will divide into two sub-teams between the initial meeting and the debriefing to undertake different tasks. Thus we will need 2 vehicles and 2 translators (please). In brief we envisage five key components for each visit:



1. Initial meeting with key actors including at least WFP, implementing partner(s) and representative(s) of district administration (although we could see the latter separately). We see the initial meeting as a combined briefing and planning session. It will include an exercise to develop a calendar of events (on a flipchart) concerning key events, food distributions, activities undertaken, etc. since September/October 1999. (It would be helpful if an effort could be made to start on this in advance of our arrival and we will endeavour to send you a format to assist in this task.)
2. Visit key officials and informants (individual interviews or focus group discussions as appropriate). This should include the DA and the agriculturalist, staff of partner agencies and organizations involved in food distributions/activities, CNRT, a women's group if present, a youth group, church leaders, possibly traders, WFP's warehouse manager, etc.
3. Two 'hamlet' visits one of which should be well away from the sub-office and ideally on the periphery of the area served. These may incorporate inspection of activities (eg school feeding) but this is not a requirement. In part the idea is to try to gauge if 'distance decay' has been a factor in the provision of food aid. Of course we are coming at exactly the wrong time of the year to readily access such locations.
4. Inspect activities related to food distributions (including obviously FFW activities). We hope to see the full range of activities supported by WFP at some time during our field work but do not necessarily have to cover all activities in each District.
5. Debriefing with WFP, partners, officials to test our conclusions and perhaps develop some recommendations and lessons.

Site selection criteria

The selection criteria for choosing sites and activities to visit/see in each District follow.

Essentially we wish to contrast:

- a) livelihoods of different beneficiaries (urban/rural, type of agricultural production) and their relative poverty/wealth;
- b) distance from final distribution point (FDP) of beneficiaries;
- c) relative concentration of food aid in location;
- d) level of destruction or disruption incurred by beneficiaries;
- e) types of targeting mechanisms/supported activities.



ANNEX 4

LIST OF PERSONS MET

WFP, Rome headquarters

- *Kazuaki Sato, Senior Emergency Officer, Asia Bureau*
- *A Van Rynbach, Deputy Regional Director, Asia Bureau*
- *Carlo Scaramella, Senior Programme Adviser, Office of the Humanitarian Adviser*
- *Franco Strippoli, Senior Humanitarian Adviser, Office of the Humanitarian Adviser*
- *David Kaatrud, Chief, Logistics Branch*
- *Thomas Keusters, Chief Logistics Officer*
- *Peter Iskander, Senior Logistics Officer*
- *Peter Scott-Bowden, Emergency Officer*
- *Gretchen Bloom, Senior Programme Adviser (Gender), Policy Service, Strategy and Policy Division*
- *Michelle Barrett, Resources Officer, Resource Mobilisation Service, Resources and External Relations*
- *Valerie Newsome Guarnieri, Senior Policy Analyst, Strategy and Policy Division*
- *GianLuca Bruni, TC/IT and Emergency Officer, Information Systems, Finance Services*
- *Laurent Bukera, CTS*
- *Jeff Marzilli, Chief, VAM Unit*
- *David Bulman, Senior Emergency Officer, OAE*
- *Margaret Malu, Internal Auditor*

WFP, Indonesia Country Office

- *Philip Clarke, WFP Representative*
- *Bishow Parajuli, Deputy Country Director*
- *William Barclay, Emergency Officer*
- *Piet Vochten*
- *Lenard Milich*

WFP East Timor

- *Majed Fassih, Senior Emergencies Officer*
- *Jean-Pierre de Margerie, Deputy SEO*
- *Sophie Chotard, Reports/Info. Officer*
- *Allison Tuffs, Programme Officer*
- *Yasu Misawa, Programme Officer*
- *Emma Togba, Programme Officer*
- *Myint Thar, head of Sub-Office, Northern Region*
- *Aloys B. Sema, head of Sub-Office, Western Region*
- *Vittorino, Security Guard WFP Sub-Store*
- *Fora Rakotondrandriatiaro*
- *Nuno*



Other UN agencies / financial institutions

- *Finn Reske-Nielsen, UNDP Representative, East Timor*
- *Robert White, Deputy Regional Representative, UNHCR, Indonesia*
- *Dr. Alex Andjaparidze, WHO, Head of Office, East Timor*
- *Samhari Baswedan, UNICEF, Project Officer, East Timor*
- *Hugo Oosterkamp, Former OCHA Coordinator, Los Palos, East Timor*
- *Joseph Dome, FAO / TCOR Relief Operations Coordinator, East Timor*
- *Sarah Cliffe, World Bank, Chief of Mission, East-Timor*

International organizations and NGOs

- *Philippe Guinand, Dep Head of Delegation, ICRC, Indonesia*
- *Iyang D. Sukandar, Secretary General, Indonesian Red Cross Society*
- *Michael J. Frank, Country Representative, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Indonesia*
- *Jamieson Davies, CRS, Country Representative, East Timor*
- *Lo Kim Dzung, CRS, Dili*
- *Isaac Ximenes, CRS, Monitoring Officer, Baucau*
- *Jamie Davies, CRS*
- *Graham Strong, Relief Operations Manager, World Vision Indonesia*
- *Dineen Tupa, World Vision, Country Director, East Timor*
- *David Junus, Commodity Manager, World Vision*
- *Sebhat Haileyesus, Commodity Officer, World Vision*
- *Mario Nduna, Branch Manager, World Vision, Ermera*
- *Waleed Pauf, CARE representative, East Timor*
- *Patrice Charpentier, CARE Logistics Officer*
- *Goran Todorovic, CARE, Food Program Coordinator*
- *Lucielo C. Ramirez, Director, CARITAS Australia, East Timor*
- *Ros Harper, CARITAS (Australia), Oecussi Program Coordinator*
- *Geodino Lapina, CARITAS Australia, Logistics Officer*
- *Jim Findlay, CARITAS Australia Logistics Officer*
- *Meredith Hansen, International Medical Corps (IMC), Nurse, Oecussi*
- *Benjamin Grandjean, Medecins sans Frontieres (Belgium), Baucau*
- *Manwell da Costa, OIKOS, TB Clinic Supervisor*
- *Anna Voss, Timor Aid Representative, Same*
- *Joey Davide, Jesuit Refugee Service*
- *Stephanie Heck, Action Contre la Faim (ACF)*
- *Reg Bragonier, doctor, Health Net, Maliana*
- *Los Palos, AFMET clinic, Head nurse*
- *Monika Metzger, Medicos do Mundo, Los Palos, nurse*

Donors

- *Herbie Smith, USAID, Indonesia*
- *Others that are not recorded*



UNTAET/PKF/ETTA

- *Capt. Renato P. Ambrocio, UNTAET Port Captain, Dili Port*
- *Donald Gillies, UNTAET Chief Transport Officer*
- *Tanka Gautam, UNTAET Roads Supervisor*
- *Capt. Francisco Sousa, UNTAET Military Affairs Liaison Officer, Same*
- *Filomeno Tilman, UNTAET District Administrator, Same*
- *Senait Eskarak, UNTAET, Education Officer, Same*
- *Domingos Savio, UNTAET, Education Officer, Same*
- *Katherine Farrelly, UNTAET, District Field Officer, Hatuodo*
- *Justa, Nutritionist, UNTAET District Hospital, Same*
- *Mona Pistrui, UNTAET District Field Officer, Viqueque*
- *Kuntu Mugagga, UNTAET DFO Lolotoe Sub-District*
- *Irene Camarimes, Development Officer, ETTA, Dili District*
- *Captain Alan Biddle, CMA Rep Maliana*
- *Stephen Lukudu, Civil Affairs Officer, Bobonaro District*
- *Gianni Deligia, District Administrator*
- *Niazi Sharafat, District Agriculture Office*
- *B Sar, DFO Maliana Sub-District*
- *Manolito Novales, District Field Officer (DFO), Hatolia Sub-District*
- *Jill Stewart, Acting DFO Atabai Sub-District*
- *Godfrey Namusonge, DFO, Ermera and Railako Sub-Districts*
- *Jill Engen, DFO Balibo Sub-District*
- *Lule Barbara, DFO Hatolia Sub-District*
- *Neal, DFO Sub-District*
- *Rindew W. Leessma, ETTA/DFO ARSABE*
- *Joni Barrameda, DFO Cailaco*
- *Jose Madeira, District V. Ermera*
- *Diana Baker, DFO, Ermera and Railako Sub-Districts*
- *Rebecca Surtees, Development Office, Dili District*
- *Doyato Salsimba, District Agriculture Affairs Officer*
- *Three CivPol, one East Timorese police, Bobonaro*
- *Anatoly Kalinykov, WSS Officer for Bobonaro District*
- *Tegan Malony, CEP Focal Point*
- *Trina Supit, Senior Education Officer, ETTA*
- *Francisco Osler, Education Division, ETTA*
- *Bodil Knudsen, Education Division, ETTA*

Local officials/leaders

- *Representatives of the villages of Bocos, Cabana, Citrana, Passabe, and Nibin*
- *Mr. Gil, Chef de Suco Fahenian*
- *Ms. Justa, Local clinic, head nurse*
- *Representatives and Chefs de Suco of the villages of Fahinehan, Leolima, and Koplaki*
- *Paulino, Chef de Suco Beicala*
- *Antonio Suarez, Chef de Suco, Leolima*
- *Representatives of the villages of Etepiti, Tutuala, Chai, Luri, and Malahara*



ANNEX 5 - SCHEDULE OF COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTED UNDER EMOPS 6175/6177 (IN TONS)

Com'dty	EDF	HDR	HPB	SALT	FISH	OIL	PUL'S	CSB	MAIZE	RICE	TOTAL
First Arrival	28 Sep	21 Sep	27 Sep	26 Jan	22 Apr	14 Oct 99	14 Oct 99	6 Feb 00	11 Nov 99	Sep 99	
Month											
Sept 99	-	2.500	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	181.100	183.600
Oct	-	28.610	22.140	-	-	7.690	7.000	-	-	2177.850	2243.290
Nov	-	9.570	1.080	-	-	58.099	159.150	-	0.470	5937.056	6165.425
Dec	.026	6.724	-	-	-	71.038	335.198	-	452.720	2169.708	3035.414
Jan 00	-	3.327	0.050	-	5.440*	44.770	111.145	-	1177.912	1100.257	2442.901
Feb	.189	7.620	0.012	11.369	0.041*	122.048	286.005	1.000	1820.636	617.382	2866.302
Mar	-	9.420	0.130	8.980	-	41.070	171.670	0.650	915.500	467.020	1614.440
April	-	5.240	0.050	7.559	5.542	37.470	120.111	1.200	501.050	805.910	1484.132
May	-	18.981	4.680	9.935	56.400	42.145	124.445	46.675	168.998	1220.173	1692.432
June	.857	5.528	-	15.001	41.464	53.329	151.407	124.075	764.284	1575.032	2730.977
July	5.678	2.738	0.090	10.749	4.502	55.932	134.227	46.723	903.205	746.920	1910.764
August	2.163	4.007	0.015	7.939	2.911	37.830	96.596	32.981	860.884	844.972	1890.298
Sept	-	12.620	1.640	7.980	6.640	73.830	106.980	109.060	739.200	453.270	1511.220
Subtotal At Sept	8.913	116.885	29.887	79.512	122.940	645.251	1803.934	362.364	8304.859	18296.65	29771.195
Oct	-	0.215	0.060	5.086	5.402	37.986	75.068	48.579	797.650	579.153	1549.199
Nov	-	1.340	1.020	3.510	3.990	54.550	98.090	21.500	633.500	872.310	1689.810
Dec	-	1.505	0.285	2.899	6.665	55.575	110.534	79.929	848.940	919.387	2025.719
TOTAL	8.913	119.945	31.252	91.007	138.997	793.362	2087.626	512.372	10584.949	20667.50	35035.923

Note: Origin of this fish unknown as first vessel "Arktis Ace" did not arrive in Dili until 22 April 2000 according to CTS



**SCHEDULE OF COMMODITIES DISTRIBUTED BY DISTRICT UNDER
EMOPS 6175/ 6177 FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1999
TO SEPTEMBER 2000**

District	Tons
Aileu	2,249
Ainaro	627
Ambeno	2,844
Baucau	3,349
Bobonaro	4,560
Covalima	3,304
Dili *	4,616
Ermera	2,346
Lautem	600
Liquica	2,696
Manatuto	645
Manufahi	1,635
Viqueque	300
TOTAL	29,771

Note: No figure for Dili was indicated in WFP reports and the figure indicated above is the balance remaining when all districts are entered and subtracted from the total.



SCHEDULE OF WFP COMMODITY ARRIVALS IN EAST TIMOR FOR EMOPS 6175/6177

Com'dty	EDF	HDR	HPB	SALT	FISH	OIL	PUL'S	CSB	MAIZE	RICE	TOTAL
	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.	n.m.t.
Month											
Sept 99	10.800	298.770	36.750							4912.800	5259.120
Oct	-	-	-	-	-	386.036	422.500	-	-	7936.200	8744.736
Nov	-	-	-	-	-	179.580	294.650	-	1098.360	-	1572.590
Dec	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3883.650	317.000	4200.650
Jan 00	-	-	-	91.000	-	-	-	-	-	-	91.000
Feb	-	-	-	-	-	-	733.750	417.125	-	-	1150.875
Mar	-	-	-	-	-	-	259.000	-	-	1750.500	2009.500
Apr	-	-	-	-	704.106	1217.598	506.150	540.175	-	-	2968.029
May	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7853.200	5434.450	13287.650
June	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000.250	2889.400	4889.650
July	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aug	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sept	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Oct	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nov	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dec	-	-	-	-	-	-	296.100	-	-	-	296.100
TOTALS	10.800	298.770	36.750	91.000	704.106	1783.214	2512.150	957.300	14835.460	23240.35	44469.900