

- Roundtable Report -

**“Community-Based Reintegration
and Rehabilitation
in Post-Conflict Settings”**

Prepared by

USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives

and

UNDP/Emergency Response Division

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 30 and 31, 2000, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives¹ and UNDP’s Emergency Response Division² co-sponsored a Roundtable entitled, *Community-Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Settings*. The purpose of the Roundtable was to bring together field-based practitioners to explore important issues and to review the use of community-based approaches in post-conflict settings.

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During the Roundtable discussions, participants noted the inherent conflict between establishing an overall programmatic framework at the outset—developing a vision, time frame, and exit strategy—and enabling the community to have complete ownership over the process. Participants discussed the concept of community ownership in which “control” of the process is not in the hands of international organizations, but rather in the hands of the local population who direct their own recovery process by deciding on appropriate projects, directing resources, establishing relationships, and determining the timing of the process.

International organizations, on the other hand, have substantial structural requirements and limitations that often impact their ability to formulate and implement community-based programs. They must link the length of their engagement to their mandates and funding limits, and are often under significant pressure to produce tangible results in short timeframes. While international organizations and local populations may share the same goals, the two perspectives are sometimes in conflict. In order to address these constraints, participants outlined the following recommendations:

- **Allow for flexibility within community-based programs.** Participants noted that flexibility is crucial to allow for changes in the political and economic context, as well as the different needs of each community.
- **Define the objectives of community engagement.** Participants discussed the need to define the ultimate objectives of a community-based approach—whether it is reconciliation and political empowerment, or community engagement and project development.
- **Plan for longer-term engagement with communities.** Participants felt that international organizations generally do not allow for sufficient time to engage with local communities. Development specialists should be on staff from the early stages of relief operations to improve relations and hand-off between emergency relief and development actors.

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¹ USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was established in 1994 to help local partners advance peace and democracy in priority conflict-prone countries. OTI bridges the gap between emergency humanitarian assistance and long-term development assistance by conducting fast and flexible interventions designed to address immediate post-conflict needs and critical threats to democratic reform.

² UNDP’s Emergency Response Division (ERD) is the in-house mechanism set up to provide a quicker and more effective response in UNDP’s Country Offices in Countries in Special Development Situations (CSDS) through the provision of services.

- **Plan for consistent funding and program approaches to post-conflict community programming.** Approaches to engaging local populations in programs that affect their communities often have little similarity. To remedy this, participants called for a more coherent and continuous commitment to using local structures, supporting local capacities, and building on them through advocacy development, training, and capacity building.
- **Recognize the influence of international organizations on the community.** Participants noted that the conscious or unconscious influence from international organizations often subtly dictates the direction of community change.
- **Understand local cultures.** Participants agreed that there is a need for international actors to possess a better understanding of the local cultures in which they work. Participants suggested that international organizations conduct a conflict analysis to include an examination of specific, local issues and relationships prior to, or at the early stage of project design. It was also suggested that practitioners develop a greater understanding of regional politics and influences, as well as a deeper recognition of the root causes of the conflict.
- **Promote better donor coordination.** Participants expressed a desire to create a common, country- or region-wide vision that can help to direct resources, diminish the funding and programmatic gaps, and influence the central/local government.

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UNDP/ERD and USAID/OTI have attempted to capture the wide-ranging discussions that took place over the course of the Roundtable, and hope that this document will contribute to increased community involvement in post-conflict reintegration and rehabilitation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Although attention to post-conflict issues has grown over the past five years, much of the discussion has related to policy issues and theoretical perspectives. Field-based practitioners rarely have had an opportunity to share experiences and engage in productive discussions about field realities and the challenges of implementing community-based programs. While development actors have spent decades researching, experimenting with and developing best practices for these types of programs, the subject has received little attention in the newer, post-conflict arena. Thus, the Roundtable, *Community-Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Settings*, a collaboration between USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and UNDP’s Emergency Response Division (ERD), was designed to bring together practitioners to explore field-level issues, and to review community participation as an important element in post-conflict programming. The Roundtable was held in Washington, DC on October 30 -31, 2000 and involved seventy participants (see List of Participants, Annex 1).

II. ROUNDTABLE OBJECTIVES AND BACKGROUND

The objectives of the Roundtable were to:

- exchange ideas and experiences on community-based, participatory approaches;
- increase understanding of useful/successful approaches and practices;
- learn lessons and examine failings/worst practices;
- identify weaknesses, gaps, and obstacles to community-based approaches;
- strengthen networks and linkages between practitioners and organizations engaged in post-conflict, community-based programming;
- outline next steps as defined by the Roundtable discussions.

The Roundtable was designed to maximize discussion opportunities. Consequently, it had a minimal number of speakers and presentations, and primarily consisted of breakout sessions (see Agenda, Annex 2). Four countries—Guatemala, Kosovo, Philippines, and Rwanda—were used as case studies to offer a common foundation for discussion, though discussion was not limited to these countries. A panel of practitioners from these countries presented the conditions and programs in their regions (see Case Studies, Annex 3). The four breakout sessions addressed a spectrum of subjects practitioners face in developing and implementing programs in post-conflict environments:

- “Beginning Community Engagement”
- “Designing A Program Strategy or Framework”
- “Linking Local Involvement to the National Level”
- “Letting Go”

The final session focused on gathering the highlights of the Roundtable and eliciting next steps.

III. OPENING REMARKS

After introductory remarks by Chris Phillips, Director of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Omar Bakhet, Director of UNDP’s Emergency Response Division (ERD), Dr. John Paul Lederach from the Conflict Transformation Program at Eastern Mennonite University gave the keynote speech. The following is a summary of his address.

Dr. Lederach focused his talk on moving from transition to conflict transformation, since transformation, he said, is the way to sustain a change process. The process must be rooted in the soil in which the change will take place and thus requires an understanding of the context and of participation. Locate the soil and the resources that can sustain change, he advised, and create a catalyst for it out of the context.

An essential element in this effort is to move from a focus on program content, to a relationship-centric focus where the “who” matters more than the “what.” Keep people at the center, he said. Since a critical mass is necessary for a social movement to evolve, one of the prime tasks is to locate those individuals who have the capacity for change, which requires international actors to think strategically about who is involved.

Finding those individuals is akin to developing the “critical yeast,” said Dr. Lederach. As in bread, it is the smallest ingredient that gives it the capacity to grow. Thus, the focus in a transition should be on the set of people who have the potential to have a significant impact and on the resources they need to grow over time. The role of international actors is to help cultivate both. One need not worry about generating a broad public interest in transformation; instead, focus on these critical yeast individuals. Such an effort is like siphoning fuel into a gas tank where one need only initiate the movement and the rest will follow. Again, this requires a simple plan that is based on an understanding of the complexities involved.

Creating such change requires international actors to shift from being crisis-driven to crisis-responsive, Dr. Lederach maintained. This, in turn, necessitates a change to longer time frames in order to envision long-term change. In so doing, it is important to not be captivated by project mentality, but to instead be adaptable to adjustments in program design, monitoring, and evaluation. Shift away from focusing on the content to focusing on sustaining the process and quality therein, Dr. Lederach advised. In this type of change and relationship-centered effort, a small amount of resources can have the greatest impact. Throughout the process, it is crucial to have a vision of complexity and an understanding of simplicity.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE FOUR BREAKOUT SESSIONS

Breakout Session One: “Beginning Community Engagement”

This session examined how transition actors appraise, assess, and analyze existing conditions in order to determine the most critical issues facing the community. Participants considered such topics as:

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- utilizing various methods and experiences when introducing oneself to the community;
- gaining full community participation from the very beginning;
- learning about the underlying issues that face the community and the ways in which conflict has affected them;
- recognizing the need for quick impact in transition settings.

The following issues and recommendations emerged during the first breakout session.

- 1. An accurate understanding of local community conditions and issues is essential to designing a program that both meets needs and is appropriate.**

Recommendations:

- Conduct a complete conflict analysis of the community to examine the root causes of the conflict, and the ways in which the conflict has affected the society.
- Identify and build on the natural social structures that exist, rather than establish new ones.
- Donors should maintain a field presence outside the capital to ensure that regional actors are represented.
- Donors should refrain from making long-term commitments to the community, especially when donor resources are short-term or unpredictable.

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- 2. The local community should be encouraged to direct the process of community engagement. Donors should be flexible in all phases of community engagement in complex and fluid environments, and recognize the inherent conflict between respecting/retaining cultural norms and changing the social fabric in a culture recently consumed by violence. Often there is a slow process of change in conflict-ridden societies.**

Recommendations:

- Advocate for sustainable commitment to conflict-affected populations, and look at the long-term vision as well as the short-term needs of the community in the initial phase of engagement.
- Improve communication, collaboration, and relations between the relief and development actors.

- Include community involvement throughout the entire spectrum of engagement, beginning with the first phase of humanitarian assistance, so they can take root when the transition phase begins.
- 3. While community development can have a positive effect, it can also raise the expectations of the population and change the structure of governance, both positively and negatively.**

Recommendations:

- A one-size-fits-all approach to program design may not suit in all cases, since different constituencies from the community require different approaches to development.
- Using local staff during the start-up phase and throughout the program to develop a common vision can help guard against some of the negative impacts of international assistance.
- Local ownership (by both national staff and the community) of the program and process is critical to its success and ultimate hand-off to local communities.
- 4. International actors may impose a western bias on the community and are dependent on local staff for guidance, vision development, problem solving, and hand-off of the program. However, selecting staff can often be problematic when international organizations create a western and class bias by selecting local staff whose language and skills represent western norms.**

Recommendations:

- Increase awareness of inherent cultural biases, and ensure that the local staff is representative of the community.
- Be mindful of political biases of local staff as they factor into reconciliation components of the program.
- Engage the community in the selection of the staff, training staff, and reaching out to other segments of the population.
- Work through local organizations to avoid individual staff biases in sensitive areas.

Breakout Session Two: “Designing A Program Strategy or Framework”

This session examined how transition practitioners conceptualize and develop a program. It included such topics as:

- identifying change agents and community counterparts;
- deciding on geographic locations;
- establishing flexible time frames and elements of the activity design process;
- considering indicators or goal posts;
- broadening the level of participation;
- including input from local authorities.

The following issues emerged during the course of the discussions.

5. **The lack of significant international media attention on a region directly affects the political imperatives and subsequently the amount of resources available for programming. When the “CNN factor” is low, the ability to design the best, most appropriate programs may decrease. At the other extreme, a high profile environment can put pressure on international organizations to spend quickly and show immediate results. Communities, however, may not be able to mobilize in such a short period of time.**

Recommendations:

- Develop approaches for transition work in both low-resource conditions, as well as in high-resource situations.
 - Work to educate donors, and the public, on the conditions in post-conflict countries that have not drawn the attention of the media.
 - Communicate with donors and policy-makers on the nature, problems, and accomplishments of a program in order to reduce their expectations for quick results.
6. **To avoid conflicting agendas, donors should develop a national strategy that includes a broad spectrum of geographic as well as constituent communities.**

Recommendations:

- Conduct joint planning assessments with donors, UN agencies, and NGOs, as well as with grassroots and national level actors.
 - Seek the involvement of local NGOs, local authorities, academics and research organizations, and other local experts. Do not rely on the political elite in the design of the program, instead, solicit the opinions of a broad representation of the community. Such inclusiveness helps to minimize marginalizing different groups and prevent cleavages among groups.
7. **The design phase should consider the multi-ethnic and/or religious nature of the society and incorporate dispute resolution mechanisms, cross-group reconciliation, consensus, and empowerment into the program. The multi-faceted, conflict context can provide opportunities for increasing the awareness of communities and leaders, which in turn impacts the longer-term prospects for development.**

Recommendations:

- Sensitivity is required especially when the community has experienced atrocities.
- The fact that it may take years for a community to begin to advocate on its own in order to influence the government or for authorities to understand the purpose and the basis of its approach, necessitates an extended perspective during the design phase.

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- 8. Neutrality is often affected by international peacekeepers. While an international presence may itself negate a pretense of neutrality, the addition of military troops can threaten the notion further by blurring the distinction between peacekeepers and humanitarian and development actors. In Kosovo, Somalia, and Rwanda, peacekeepers posed problems for the humanitarian and development communities by making undue promises or preventing government access to the local population, participants said.**

Recommendations:

- Peacekeepers and international donors should maintain open communication and should educate the other on the organization’s mandate and mission.

Breakout Session Three: “Linking Local Involvement to the National Level”

This session explored the need for, and the process of, connecting community based activities at the local level to the regional and national level, in an attempt to avoid simply creating localized “islands of success”. The discussion included topics such as:

- establishing and working with a national post-conflict reconstruction strategy;
- supporting the country’s overall peace process through community-based initiatives;
- linking relief to development activities at the community and national level;
- understanding the bigger national picture (economically and politically);
- collaborating with other organizations, national and international, working throughout the country;
- working with national civil society organizations.

The following issues emerged in the course of this session’s discussions.

- 9. In planning community-based activities, international organizations must make an early and conscious effort in the initial planning process to foresee and, eventually, actualize linkages between the local and national level.**

Recommendations:

- Do not assume that linkages between the local and national level will occur as a natural progression of the community participation progress, especially in countries with a weak or absent government at the local, regional, and/or national level.
- Conduct an analysis of political and economic realities on the ground before designing a program.
- Design programs to take into account the level of trauma and dependency existing within the community as a result of the conflict and its aftermath, especially since these considerations may slow the process of linking community activities to a regional or national program.

10. Community development should not create “islands of success” that are contained at the local community level. Programs should strive to bridge regions, and involve the government at all levels to ensure maximum impact and sustainability.

Recommendations:

- International assistance should not be overly focused on one region to the exclusion of others.
- In linking local programs to the national level, programs should not focus assistance on specific line ministries within the government. To do so may create or exacerbate tensions within the government.

11. Different actors may focus their initiatives on different levels of engagement within the country: local, regional and national level. However, there needs to be a common vision and strategy among the actors to ensure that there are synergies and linkages between the different programs, and the different levels within the country. In doing so, national organizations should be encouraged to be involved on the community level to ensure sustained linkages, and community members should be encouraged to voice their concerns at the national level.

Recommendations:

- Strong donor coordination can help to create these linkages by funding activities that exist as components of a larger harmonized framework.
- International actors should encourage a dialogue that is constructive, not one that creates further challenges among local, regional and national authorities.
- International actors should help to empower representatives at the community level to draw the attention of the government to their needs.
- Similarly, international actors should assist the national level with mobilizing resources to address recovery needs identified at the community level. This mutually beneficial process creates linkages between the local and national level through capacity building and collaborative efforts.
- Regional or national authorities should be encouraged to visit local communities involved in community-based processes to observe the participation element, and to carry away ideas that can strengthen the local-national linkage.
- Media should be seen as a tool to access wider populations, and can be used for advocacy efforts by publicizing successes made at the community and national level in the recovery process.
- Local NGOs can create space to monitor government policy, raise awareness for government involvement, and empower local communities to be advocates of their needs.

Breakout Session Four: “Letting go”

This session looked at how international actors devolve from their role as catalysts and eventually hand-off their program to others. Given the concept of community ownership, “Letting go” implies the transition of the program’s implementation from international actors to the local community. Nevertheless, it is often difficult to ensure that the programs endure once the international actor has departed. Still, it is important to establish from the beginning the requisite strategic changes and conditions necessary for transition such as changing the mindset of government authorities, and establishing political, financial, and institutional sustainability. Specifically the discussion included such topics as:

- dealing with institutional time limits;
- the conflict between an end date and an end state;
- recognizing appropriate timing;
- relinquishing all decision making to others;
- accepting programmatic changes as needed;
- handing off to other development partners;
- establishing close linkages with local organizations to carry forth;
- promoting long-term sustainability.

12. The final phase of the project should incorporate a hand-off strategy and should be viewed more as a transition, rather than as an exit.

Recommendations:

- Consider who will continue activities after the international organization has departed.
- Incorporate capacity building and support to local NGOs during project design and implementation.
- Recognize that pre-establishing a program framework inhibits the flexibility required to allow the community to gain full ownership of the process—there is no quick fix to conflict and no ready toolbox for reconciliation.
- Ensure that the local community participates in the design, implementation, and transition phases. Empowering the community to assume the project involves building in local capacity. Community ownership for a program is important for leveraging additional funds in the long run.
- Recognize that tension exists between designing a process and strategy, and maintaining a flexible approach and timeframe.
- Good intentions do not always translate into good outcomes. In designing programs, build in a strong monitoring and evaluation system to measure impact, and maintain the flexibility to change course as needed.

13. Important questions to ask include: To “Whom” do we transition and more importantly “How” do we ensure sustainability? The answers to the first question covered a full range of actors, including the private sector, local organizations,

missions, other donors, local government and the community itself. However, identification of prospective partners to maintain the process is critical in terms of sustainability, as is avoiding dependency on the international organization as the “driving force” behind the process.

Recommendations:

- Identifying an “end point” becomes easier when the local actors have been involved in setting priorities throughout the program. The more detached the community is from local ownership of the project, the more difficult it is for the local community to sustain it.
- Build into the program capacity building skills of the community, so that the project eventually belongs to the community, not to international organisations.
- Assist communities to form foundations or NGOs, complete with funding, as another mechanism.
- Create an exit strategy from the start. In other cases, it may be difficult to know when pre-established criteria have been met.
- Conduct an end point analysis to ensure the community or organization is prepared to assume the program and that the conditions are ripe for transition.

14. The international community needs to consciously include the “letting go” process in the design and strategy process. The transition phase and mechanisms may involve negotiations between donors and the national government on how to conduct the hand-off.

Recommendations:

- Involve all actors, including private and civil sectors, at the table from the beginning. Together they should share economic analysis for sustainability, draw on lessons from development, and in general prepare the community, partners, and government for the exit of the international organization.
- Leave in place what has been put in place, such as staff and relationships, in order to build on the credibility and experiences of the program.

15. To ensure continuity, programs need to operate as a business that attracts enough resources, is cost effective, and produces tangible results. The programs should also be designed in a way that incorporates capacity building to enable partners to mobilize their own resources once the international donors have left.

Recommendations:

- Various funding options need to be explored, including involving the local authorities in generating internal revenue so that the region is not overly dependent on international funding.
- Advocacy organizations need to create their own income, and involve the community in resource mobilization at the local and national levels.

- Consider establishing an escrow tax generated from international organizations for matching purposes to plan and finance the gap between international funding sources. Communities would form advisory boards for managing the funds during this period, thereby increasing their ownership over the programs.

V. SUMMARY OF NEXT STEPS

In discussing the Roundtable results, participants raised a number of suggestions on potential “next steps” for consideration by the two organizing agencies, UNDP/ERD and USAID/OTI, and the international community. These “next steps” are defined as institutional, procedural and operational actions.

Institutional actions:

- Conduct an institutional self-examination of the internal procedures in post-conflict programs and report the results.
- Examine and reduce internal organization barriers between transition and development offices, and mainstream a common approach to community-based mechanisms that can be adapted to post-conflict and more “typical” development situations. This will help to ensure continuity of approach and funding.
- Examine potential UNDP/ERD and USAID/OTI collaboration in a field-based pilot initiative to incorporate the points raised during the Roundtable.

Procedural actions:

- Track critical change elements over a long period of time and then incorporate the findings into future programming.
- Demonstrate and document successes in the field.
- Establish a single, though flexible, process for post-conflict reintegration and use it as a road map. This process should incorporate community development into transition programs.

Operational actions:

- Conduct a similar Roundtable at strategic intervals to examine what has been learned to date and new innovations in post-conflict reintegration and rehabilitation.
- Publicize the discussions from this and other such meetings to encourage others to consider the points, issues, and best practices garnered during the Roundtable.
- Build up thematic expertise through inter-agency working groups, including UNDP, USAID, UNHCR, and the World Bank.
- Prepare a manual with extensive field input on all phases of international programming in post-conflict arenas from entry to exit, which could be used as a basis for programming and in dialogue with governments.

In conclusion, the Directors of UNDP/ERD and USAID/OTI made the following specific suggestions for follow-up to the Roundtable:

- USAID/OTI and UNDP/ERD will prepare a Training Manual that would be made available on their respective websites and provided to field offices. This manual would serve to mainstream lessons learned and best practices in the development and implementation of community-based programs;
- USAID/OTI and UNDP/ERD could design and implement a joint community-based rehabilitation and reintegration program in a specific country (proposed: Serbia) to test the assumptions set forth in the course of the Roundtable discussions.

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ANNEX II. ROUNDTABLE AGENDA

October 30

- 1230 Registration [*Location: Reception Gallery*]
- 1300 Opening & welcome: Chris Phillips, USAID/OTI & Omar Bakhet,
UNDP/ERD [*Location: Drawing Room*]
- 1345 Speaker: John Paul Lederach, Eastern Mennonite University
- 1430 Panel of country representatives:
Guatemala: Patricia O'Connor, UNDP
Kosovo: Ray Jennings, OTI
Philippines: Paul Randolph, OTI
Rwanda: Innocent Ntabana, UNDP
- 1600 Break
Optional video: *Today's Possibilities; Tomorrow's Realities*
[*Location: Reception Gallery*]
- 1615 1st Breakout session—Choice of two sessions [*Location: Breakout Rooms*]
- 1. Beginning community engagement.** This group will examine the way in which we appraise, assess, and analyze the conditions and determine the most critical issues facing the community as we consider engaging. It might include discussion on the methodologies and experiences in introducing ourselves to the community, gaining full community participation from the very beginning, learning about the underlying issues that face the community and the way the conflict has affected them, and dealing with the need for speed pressures.
- OR**
- 2. Designing a program strategy or framework.** This group will look at how we develop and lay out our program. It might include such discussions as identifying change agents and community counterparts, deciding on geographic locations, establishing flexible time frames, activity design process, considering indicators or goal posts, incorporating extreme flexibility, broadening the level of participation, and incorporating the input of local authorities.
- 1800 Reception [*Location: Reception Gallery and Loggia*]

October 31

- 0800 Breakfast [*Location: Dining Room*]
- 0900 Report back from 1st breakout session and discussion
[*Location: Drawing Room*]
- 1030 2nd Breakout session—Choice of two sessions [*Location: Breakout Rooms*]
- 1. Linking local involvement to the national level.** This group will explore the need for and process of connecting village-level activities across the region so as to avoid only creating isolated areas of success. Discussions could include establishing and working with a national post-conflict strategy, supporting the overall peace process, linking with relief and development efforts in the same communities, understanding the bigger national picture, collaborating with other post-conflict organizations, and working with national civil society organizations.
- OR**
- 2. Letting go.** This group looks at how we devolve from our role as prime motivators and eventually leave the scene. It might examine such issues as dealing with institutional time limitations, the conflict between an end date and an end state, recognizing appropriate timing, relinquishing all decision making to others, accepting programmatic changes as needed, handing off to development partners, establishing close linkages with local organizations to carry forth, and promoting long-term sustainability.
- 1200 Lunch by country: Guatemala, Kosovo, Philippines, Rwanda
[*Location: Dining Room*]
- 1300 Report back from 2nd breakout session and discussion
[*Location: Drawing Room*]
- 1430 Break [*Location: Reception Gallery*]
- 1445 Roundtable results [*Location: Drawing Room*]
Part 1: Speakers:
Sam Barnes, UNDP
Abdou Salam Drabo, World Bank
Richard McCall, USAID
Part 2: Next steps
- 1600 Wrap up, closure: Chris Phillips, USAID/OTI & Omar Bakhet, UNDP/ERD
- 1630 Depart

ANNEX III. CASE STUDIES

UNDP Program Profile: Guatemala

Background:

Guatemala is undergoing a threefold transition. After 36 years of internal civil conflict, the country has formally moved from war to peace and is embarking on a multifaceted and daunting process of national reconciliation and formal recognition of society’s multicultural and multilingual nature; it is moving from authoritarianism to participatory democracy; and, it is trying to make the transition from a closed, state-centered economy to a free market economy, which promotes broad-based economic growth and integration into the process of globalization. These parallel transition processes will drive Guatemala’s social, political and economic agenda for the coming years.

The Firm and Lasting Peace Accord was signed in December, 1996, formally ending one of the hemisphere’s most devastating wars as measured by its human, material and moral costs. Studies of the political violence in Guatemala estimate that the number of arbitrary executions and forced disappearances affected more than 200,000 men, women and children. Of the sample of 42,275 cases documented by the Historical Clarification Commission, 83% of the victims were Mayan and 17% were Ladino,³ indicating the war’s strong bias against indigenous peoples. According to the report, “*Guatemala: Never Again*”⁴ the violence caused the internal displacement of more than 1,000,000 Guatemalans, forced another 100,000 into exile in other countries and left 200,000 orphaned children. The armed conflict has inflicted deep wounds on individuals, families and society as a whole.

During the long process, begun in 1987, to search for a political solution to the internal conflict, the intensity of armed conflict diminished considerably, however, violence, impunity and the militarization of society prevailed during the negotiations of the Accords and into the initial years of their implementation. Making the Peace Accords a reality and achieving true national reconciliation will be a long and complex process. The immediate key tasks that will facilitate Guatemala’s full transition to reconciliation and the observance of the rule of law in a democratic State include: furthering the demilitarization process of both the State and society; strengthening the judicial system; opening up of greater opportunities for effective participation; decentralization of state institutions and decision-making; ensuring reparations for victims of human rights violations;⁵ and completing the process of reincorporation of ex-combatants and uprooted populations.

³ *Guatemala. Memory of Silence. Tz’iniNa ‘Tab’al*. Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999, p. 17.

⁴ *Guatemala: Never Again*. Recovery of the Historical Memory Project (REHMI). Office for Human Rights of the Archbishop of Guatemala.

⁵ *Guatemala. Memory of Silence. Tz’iniNa ‘Tab’al*. Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification, 1999, p. 45.

Major Issues Confronted and Approaches Used:

The Guatemalan peace process can be conceptualized as a long-term process, which is currently in its third phase. In each of these phases, UNDP has confronted a series of major issues and has developed specific approaches. These are briefly described below.

Phase One: Negotiating the Peace Accords

During the first phase (1987-1996), the URNG and the Government negotiated a series of accords leading up to the signing of the Firm and Lasting Agreement in December 1996. During this period, the major focus of the UN generally, and UNDP specifically, was to ensure the signing of the peace agreements and to promote credibility of the peace process – both among specific groups such as the uprooted populations and more broadly in the general population. The UNDP participated in Inter Agency Projects designed to assist uprooted populations and lay the groundwork for the eventual repatriation of tens of thousands of refugees living in Mexico (PRODERE and CIREFCA). UNDP facilitated trust and confidence-building measures, initiated through informal sessions with the parties, and carried out in parallel to the formal negotiations dialogue between the URNG and the government. As a way of helping the uprooted populations acquire a greater voice in the peace process, UNDP developed institutional strengthening projects for NGOs. The UNDP also assumed a facilitative role in coordinating the early efforts of the international community to provide political and project support to the peace process. And, finally, UNDP supported the initial implementation of the Accord on the Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict (signed in June 1994), including the establishment of inter-institutional coordination mechanisms.

Phase Two: Early Implementation of the Accords

The second phase of the Peace Process (1997-1999) begins with the signing of the Firm and Lasting Peace Agreement with the political party that brought the negotiations to their successful conclusion. This Agreement brought into effect a number of previous agreements signed by the URNG and the government. The Peace Accords encompass political, military, legislative, social, economic, agrarian, cultural and ethnic issues, representing a comprehensive plan for equitable national development and restructuring of States institutions, especially the military, justice sector, the land fund and tax administration. The initial plan for the implementation of the Accords provided a four-year timetable to achieve some 440 commitments. The critical initial task in this phase was the demobilization of ex-combatants and their incorporation into the political and economic mainstream. Acting as the coordinator for the four key donors in demobilization, the UNDP facilitated an integrated response from the international community for the establishment of a successful 60 day demobilization process for the URNG and the Ambulatory Military Police. Following the immediate demobilization, the UNDP continued to provide a coordinating function in the provision of a comprehensive package of social services, personal documentation, vocational training, family reunification and legal assistance.

A second major set of issues confronted by the UNDP related to the establishment of institutional mechanisms required for the implementation of the peace agenda. UNDP provided support for the creation of the URNG's civilian foundation, the Guillermo Toriello Foundation (FGT), as well as the government's peace secretariat, SEPAZ. The UNDP has participated actively as a consultative member of the Technical Commission for Resettlement,

facilitating a coordinated response from the government and the communities themselves to the multi-faceted needs related to resettlement of uprooted populations. UNDP also supported the work of various commissions that were formed to develop proposals for policy reforms and other support to the implementation of the accords.

The third set of issues during this phase of the peace process related to the internal organization of the UNDP to best support the peace process. UNDP reorganized itself into the same four theme groups used by the government as a conceptual framework for the complex and far reaching accords. These included: peace and reconciliation; integrated human development; sustainable productive development and modernization of the state. In each of these areas, UNDP developed a multi-faceted approach of supporting community-based projects, with a focus on those communities and municipalities seriously affected by violence and/or where resettlement programs were carried out. Reconciliation has been an explicit goal of these programs. The UNDP also supported the efforts of national civil society organizations in the promotion of public policy reforms in a number of key areas (military reform, access to land, bilingual education, etc.) as well as in the development of formal strategies to address the multicultural and multilingual nature of society. And, finally, the UNDP has provided support to variety of government initiatives in justice reform, fiscal reform, expansion of social services and land titling.

Phase Three: Shoring Up the Peace Process

The third, and current phase of the Guatemalan Peace Process began in late 1999 with national elections that placed a new political party in office and introduced a radical change in governance. Although the Accords represent State commitments to many national and international analysts, the first change of government has represented a challenge to the peace process. President Portillo and some of his key cabinet members strongly endorse the peace accords as a State policy, yet in the second tier of government, the peace process is in the doldrums. Over the past nine months, the country has witnessed tangible contradictions in the peace process. On the one hand, civilian-military dialogue is energetic and focused on the establishment of democratic controls and a new role for the military in a participatory, democratic society. A process to generate a fiscal pact brought together representatives of civil society, the business sector and government to achieve consensus on a package of basic fiscal reforms to finance the peace agenda. Although the process is ongoing, it represents a historic broad-based negotiation of public policy reforms.

On the other hand, the troublesome signs in the countryside of resurfacing para-military structures and increased human rights abuses suggest that some of the root causes of the conflict itself have yet to disappear. Indeed, the peace process was dealt a devastating blow in the Spring of 1999 when Guatemalan voters (over four-fifths of whom stayed away from the polls) rejected a package of constitutional reforms which were intended to solidify and institutionalize the structural reforms contained in the peace accords. Guatemala has yet to regain the momentum lost as a result of this serious setback to the process. In addition, the peace process has yet to bring identifiable economic benefits to the nearly 60% of the population who live below the poverty line. Many rural peasant organizations are demanding greater attention to the socio-economic agenda and indigenous rights as described in the accords.

In the face of these mixed signs about the peace process over the past year, UNDP has adopted a three-pronged approach. On the one hand, UNDP has stepped up its efforts to facilitate dialogue among national actors to continue to define priorities and improve implementation mechanisms. UNDP continues to coordinate the efforts of the international community in shoring up the peace process. Donor fatigue is a real threat, especially in the face of increasing concerns about human rights abuses and the failure of the government to generate sufficient domestic financing for the Peace Agenda. And, finally, UNDP continues to work at the community level, facilitating projects geared at reconciliation, decentralization, local participation and improved access to basic services.

USAID/OTI Program Profile: Kosovo

Background:

During late summer 1998, Yugoslav aggression toward Kosovars reached new heights, prompting the first in a series of threats of NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia. Threats, intimidation, and systematic violence against civilians continued throughout the winter and spring of 1999. When the peace negotiations at Rambouillet failed, the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia began in March 1999. The airstrikes lasted through mid-June 1999 when Serb authorities signed Resolution 1244, allowing a NATO and UN presence to protect and govern Kosovo. In late June, overwhelming numbers of Kosovar refugees, accompanied by NATO forces and other international organizations flooded back to the province to begin rebuilding a peaceful and democratic Kosovo.

Program Description:

USAID/OTI began its engagement in Kosovo in late 1998, initially as part of the Yugoslavia program. During the bombing campaign, OTI established the Kosovo program-in-exile in Macedonia and actively supported Kosovar refugees and Macedonian host communities from March to June 1999.

In June 1999, USAID/OTI re-entered Kosovo and began experimental, participatory programming to support the development of democracy in Kosovo, while at the same time directly addressing Kosovars' emergency post-war needs. The program was designed to maximize the number of Kosovars participating in setting priorities and making decisions about the future development of the province. The program encourages citizens to recognize the value of basic political participation, supports the development of moderate and local democratic leadership and a professional and independent media, and helps local communities secure resources to address their needs.

To achieve these goals, OTI borrowed from its experience in Haiti and helped Kosovars create “Community Improvement Councils” (CICs). By organizing town hall style meetings, OTI encouraged the development of representative CICs, composed of 12 – 15 members each who reflected the political, social, and intellectual diversity of the local population.

During the first fifteen months of programming, USAID/OTI created 240 CICs through which over \$8 million of assistance was directed. These funds were used to rebuild schools, health clinics, roads, bridges, electrical and water systems, wastewater systems, and windows, doors and roofs for over 500 homes. In every case, the CICs represented their communities and identified the reconstruction projects that would bring the greatest benefit to the residents. The CICs, acting in the absence of any elected local government, constituted the only democratic and representative bodies in Kosovo.

OTI/Kosovo also provided equipment and other resources to media outlets to ensure that independent and professional radio, television, and print organizations were available throughout Kosovo. OTI further supported local civic groups and non-governmental organizations. As media outlets, especially regional radio stations, became popular supporters

of local interests, USAID/OTI funded news and special feature programs that highlighted the work of community activists and the CICs.

In Kosovo, USAID/OTI's program emphasized participation as a means and an end in itself. As elections for Kosovo's first formal democratically elected government take place in October 2000, OTI hopes that these patterns of basic participation will ensure that vital links between new government authorities and citizens develop and endure. Kosovars, in general, have felt that their ability to bring resources to their own communities to build a school, repair a water system, or a clinic, is more important than the program's overarching goal of encouraging participation. Yet, while working to identify community needs, locate local resources and develop a system of collecting in-kind contributions, local communities have developed an understanding and appreciation of accountability, transparency and the responsibilities of democratic representation. Gradually too, Kosovars learned about the role that media play in a developing democracy. Many CICs have begun to act independently, holding town hall meetings, lobbying other groups and donors, collecting local contributions and arranging for skilled labor to complete additional projects in their community.

OTI's program has been praised by the State Department and colleagues at the World Bank and UNDP, however, there have been many lessons learned in the process. OTI found that engaging women and youth in the representative process remains a challenge. The program has been constantly re-adjusted to keep pace with the dynamic political situation and constantly works to encourage the CICs to become independent and sustainable. Despite efforts to encourage CICs to look at issues that will impact Kosovo's democratic development, they remain more focused on their projects, and less eager to embrace the concept of civic participation as a goal unto itself. OTI's work with media and other donors, however, has succeeded in raising awareness of the CICs as platforms for participatory development and has been a critical force in leveraging the program's impact. As new elected authorities emerge after the elections in October 2000, OTI anticipates that the councils will become less formal and more fluid. They will have to begin to interact with the new local and provincial authorities to make their needs known and to draw attention and resources to their communities' concerns. As OTI closes its program in September 2001, OTI's primary challenge will be to identify hand-off partners who will continue to assist Kosovo's transition to democratic and economic stability.

USAID/OTI Program Profile: Philippines

Background:

On September 2, 1996 the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed a Peace Agreement that brought an end to the twenty-five year armed struggle between the GRP and the largest Muslim rebel group in the southern Philippines. The September 1996 peace agreement was the third agreement signed in twenty years to try to end the low intensity conflict that had inhibited the economic and social development of the island of Mindanao. It was envisioned that if the 1996 Peace Agreement with the MNLF could be adequately implemented by the GRP, other smaller rebel movements would also join the peace process. The situation in Mindanao, however, continues to be marked by high levels of uncertainty.

In February 2000, a new “Mindanao crisis” emerged when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) launched a significant military offensives against the MILF, the largest remaining Muslim rebel organisation operating in Mindanao. The MILF did not participate in the 1996 Peace Agreement, but have closely monitored the implementation of the agreement and had entered into official Peace Negotiations with the GRP in October 1999. Fighting between the AFP and the MILF has resulted in 186,000 displaced persons, while fighting between the AFP and Abu Sayyaf units, a fringe Islamic terrorist group, has resulted in an additional 80,000 displaced persons.

Despite the difficult security environment in Mindanao, evidence indicates that the majority of MNLF ex-combatants are not only holding firm in their commitment to the 1996 Peace Agreement, but have also been serving as a buffer between MILF and GRP forces. Several villages have been spared fighting due to arrangements brokered by MNLF commanders. The Government of the Philippines is now focusing its efforts on rehabilitation, reconstruction and socio-economic development in communities affected by the armed conflict, including those in former MILF-areas of influence.

Program Description:

OTI’s program to support the 1996 Peace Agreement began in 1997 by encouraging the Government of the Philippine’s investment in neglected, Muslim areas and re-integrating ex-combatants from the MNLF back into local communities. OTI believed that if the framework outlined in the Peace Agreement was implemented, conditions for longer-term economic development and growth could be achieved. One of the challenges to preserving the 1996 Peace Agreement was to ensure that the GRP lived up to its pledges to provide the “Mini-Marshall Plan” to MNLF former combatants.

To facilitate the re-integration of ex-combatants, OTI designed a community-based assistance program to provide post-harvest and production machinery, micro-infrastructure projects, and community-based capacity building training to former MNLF villages. To ensure that there is maximum participation of the village group in the design process, and in order to model transparent decision-making processes, OTI staff work intensively with community groups in

rural villages. Once OTI determines that the village is committed to the project and has resources to contribute, they work with the village group to prioritize their needs. From the time OTI makes the first contact with a community group, it takes an average of six weeks for a community-based project to be developed and approved. Throughout the process, OTI facilitates discussions with village members to ensure that the project will benefit the entire community group and that it will also be supported with resources provided by the Government of the Philippines. Through these joint efforts between former MNLF fighters and the Government, OTI helps build communication and trust.

In Phase I, from 1997 to March 1999, OTI assisted 4,000 ex-combatants and their families by providing agricultural production inputs and training to initiate economic activity within the MNLF areas. In Phase II of the program, from April 1999 to March 2001, OTI has been helping ex-combatant villages become more productive and profitable. The goals of Phase II are to: 1) Improve the livelihood of the MNLF former combatant community by promoting self-help among community-based former combatant groups. 2) Facilitate linkages between GRP offices and the MNLF communities in order to begin the process of breaking down the negative perception that the government will not deliver on the peace. 3) Provide support to civil society groups that are advocating a peaceful resolution to the conflict and promote ethnic and religious tolerance.

From June 1999 to September 2000, OTI assisted 378 villages (approximately 16,900 families), and 9,900 MNLF ex-combatants, approximately twenty-five percent of the total number of MNLF ex-combatants. OTI staff have developed 420 approved Transition Assistance Grants (TAGs), with 315 delivered to date. Over the past 16 months, projects were implemented in 7 provinces, 89 municipalities and 324 barangays. As part of the design, all village-based TAGs require counterpart matching to assist in building linkages between the MNLF groups and the various GRP offices. To date, the breakdown of counterpart funding for the 378 village-based projects are GRP (47%), OTI (36%), and Village Groups (16%). The total estimated cost of the 378 projects is \$2,711,021. The average cost of a village-based project has been \$7,172, with USAID's contribution averaging \$2,600.

In the spring of 2000, OTI was forced to respond to changing circumstances in Mindanao. A second Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which had never finalized peace negotiations with the government, renewed fighting. The violence was exacerbated by the kidnapping of foreign tourists by the Abu Sayyaf (a fringe Islamic terrorist group) and a series of bombings within civilian centers across Mindanao and Manila. These events contributed to a breakdown in trust and an increase in tension between Christian and Muslim populations in Mindanao. In June, OTI developed a program of special reconciliation grants that provide support to civil society groups promoting tolerance, understanding, and the use of negotiations to resolve conflict. OTI plans to phase out its program in Mindanao in March 2001. Until then, OTI is working to ensure that MNLF community relationships forged with local, provincial, and national governments will be sustained.

OTI has brought the foundations of development to the grass roots of the MNLF and disadvantaged Muslim community. The program has facilitated linkages between the Government of the Philippines (local, provincial, and national) and the former MNLF combatants and their families. In so doing, OTI addresses the root causes of the conflict—the lack of government services delivered to Muslim areas. Over the last 16 months this linkage

has evolved from the provision of pledged technical assistance to tangible delivery of support (agriculture machinery, construction aggregates, and road renovations). During the first four months, the average percentage of GRP contribution per village project was 28%. The GRP matching contribution has averaged 51% over the last four months. In early 2000, the Philippine Department of Agriculture joined in partnership with OTI and provided \$575,000 in one-for-one matching grants for agriculture equipment to OTI-supported village groups. OTI micro-infrastructure, post-harvest, and agricultural production not only leveraged reluctant GRP offices, but also lay the groundwork for future sustainable development in rural Muslim communities. OTI has demonstrated that with active involvement, strong partnerships can be forged with members of the former combatant community and the Government of the Philippines.

UNDP Program Profile: Rwanda

Background:

Between April and July 1994, up to one million Rwandans were killed by the war and genocide, two million others fled the country and hundreds of thousands were internally displaced. At the close of the fighting, most of the country’s physical, socio-economic and administrative infrastructure--houses, roads, schools, health care facilities, and government buildings / institutions--lay in ruins.

As the new government took power, some 800,000 “old caseload” refugees returned to their homeland after absence for many years. In the years following the genocide, various events resulted in further displacement of huge numbers of people within and across Rwanda’s border. In brief, between 1994 and 1999, some 70% of all Rwandans were either internally or externally displaced and over 3 millions people repatriated.

Apart from the massive loss of lives, the 1994 crisis in Rwanda left the country with a number of socio-economic challenges:

Increased poverty

Today, 66% of Rwandan household live below the poverty line. The structural aspects leading to poverty that this country was facing before 1994 were exacerbated more by the human/physical destruction and an increased number of vulnerable populations. As a result, based on the 1994 statistics, Rwanda was ranked 174 in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 1997 compared with 152 a year earlier.

Resettlement and reintegration

Following the movements of repatriation and displacement of about 70% of Rwandans, approximately 3 millions were in need of resettlement in 1996. Major issues such as housing, land distribution, environment, social services, social relations needed to be addressed.

Food security

The tragic events of 1994 exacerbated Rwanda’s food insecurity creating critical short term humanitarian needs and inflicting longer term effects by way of the near total destruction of the rural sector (ranging from large losses in adult male labour to destruction of livestock and rural support services). As an example, the agricultural production levels in 1994 fell to 60% of the already depressed 1990s level.

Environment

Since the early 1990s, Rwanda’s historical trend in environment degradation was increased by the effects of war, population displacement and spontaneous settlement of returnees.

Justice and reconciliation.

The crisis in which the country passed through opened deep wounds in a nation whose children are destined to live together, thus creating a pressing need for national healing and reconciliation with a view to building a new society. The pillar of a real reconciliation in post genocide situation, was a fair justice. In Rwanda, the justice issues related to genocide are

numerous: pursuing justice for the victims/survivors, a huge number of genocide suspects (130,000), insufficient quality and quantity of judicial personnel, need to expedite the trial process, etc.

Economic / social services and infrastructure

The massive physical and human destruction of 1994 have severely affected the economic / social services and infrastructure. Soon after 1994, basic social and economic infrastructure capable of enabling the population to stabilise and undertake activities leading to a sustainable socio-economic development were lacking. These included mainly potable water, health care facilities, roads, education and support for establishment of a sustainable economic base.

Women and Child-headed households

Women in Rwanda constitute approximately 54% of the total population and 60% of the labour force. They face substantial constraints with limited rights to education, health, property and full participation in Rwanda's social, economic and political life. In the immediate aftermath of war and genocide, the number of women and child-headed households rose to 34%. In addition, many women survivors of the genocide still suffered from severe trauma having been victims of violence or rape.

HIV/AIDS

The high and seemingly rising prevalence rates in Rwanda, currently estimated at 11% of the population, threaten the socio-economic development of Rwandans. If we consider the fact that unstable population is vulnerable to HIV/AIDS, as it was the case of about 70% of the population in 1994 - 1997, this suggests that Rwanda could face a severe impact of the pandemic in the forthcoming years. Many families have already experienced the pandemic impact.

The current country context inherited structural aspects of the 1990s, which were later exacerbated by the war and genocide of 1994. The gloomy picture described above have substantially improved in the course of the last five years, thanks to the government commitment and the assistance of the international community.

UNDP approach to community based reintegration in Rwanda:

The UNDP post-conflict intervention in Rwanda can be divided into two major phases:

Phase I: late 1994 to 1996.

At the end of the fighting in 1996, the international community focussed largely on immediate humanitarian and reintegration assistance, because of the enormity of immediate needs.

In September 1994, the Rwanda UNDP office received authorisation to re-direct the traditional country programme emphasis from poverty alleviation and development planning to more urgent priorities of restoring the state's administrative capacity, re-establishing the judicial system and re-integrating refugees and internally displaced. During that period, UNDP, like all other international organizations, focussed on short-term challenges.

The country office assisted the government of Rwanda to set up a Roundtable mechanism aimed at raising substantive funds in support of the resettlement and reintegration needs of war affected populations. In this context, a trust fund was established in 1995.

Phase II: 1997 onward.

Reintegration and Rehabilitation for sustainable human development and poverty alleviation was one of the two major areas of concentration for the Country Cooperation Framework. This area had three objectives:

- 1) Ensuring social and economic reintegration of returnees;
- 2) Promoting job creation and income opportunities through development of small and medium enterprises;
- 3) Promoting poverty alleviation and reducing environment degradation.

Based on the lessons learned from the previous phase, the need for a more structured coordination had arisen. In this context, the on-going reintegration activities were consolidated through the establishment of a Joint Reintegration and Programming Unit (UNHCR/UNDP) and the implementation of the Area Rehabilitation and Development Plans (ARDP) to ensure that issues of shelter, sanitation, health, schools, infrastructure and economic recovery were addressed in an integrated approach within the community. A significant number of community development projects were initiated based on the findings and proposals of ARDP's both by UN system and other partners.

Since 1998, the Government of Rwanda embarked in a decentralization and community development process. The newly elected decentralized structures, Community Development Committees (CDC) are becoming the major partners in implementing reintegration and community development projects. In this regard, UNDP supported the set up and capacity building of those CDC's and is currently funding three important projects in partnership with the CDC's.

Since 1995, about 100 millions USD were used in reintegration and community development projects mainly in the areas of shelter, social infrastructure, water and sanitation, schools, health facilities, agriculture and sustainable livelihood, environment restoration and income generating activities.

ANNEX IV. ROUNDTABLE PAPER

“Post-Conflict Community Participation: Using a Development Approach in a Chaotic Environment”

As international attention to sustaining peace in post-conflict societies has increased, so has the interest in community participation as a critical component of long-term stability. While we in the post-conflict community have largely embraced the concept of using the participatory approach, the application and implications of its use in our operational context are yet to be fully examined. How do we translate what is essentially an evolved, development process requiring patience and time into an insecure, fast-moving, and traumatized environment? This paper attempts to stimulate thought and self-examination on this issue through first reviewing the value and background of the participatory approach, then by contrasting development and post-conflict environments, and finally by exploring the use of this approach with respect to the speed, instability, and social and economic devastation found in post-conflict settings.

The underlying philosophy of the participatory approach is that local participation empowers the population to understand and articulate its problems, develop a solution, and organize the resources necessary to see it through. Outsiders serve as catalysts by encouraging local members to be the primary decision-makers in the design and implementation of activities in their community, thereby developing their own capacity to eventually do without external assistance and become stronger voices for their own needs in society. Thereby, the understanding goes, the community not only develops an increased ability to improve its condition, but gains stronger decision-making and consensus-building skills that contribute to better problem-solving amongst diverse members and a greater voice in the larger political structure.

The participatory approach is not a new invention, as we in the post-conflict community would sometimes like to believe. In fact, the development community first began experimenting with participatory methodologies over twenty years ago, through the application of social anthropology, farming systems research, participatory action research, and others. Since then, a great deal of inquiry has added to and refined the approach, producing such common practices as the rapid rural appraisal, the participatory rural appraisal, and matrix scoring. While the process is well established in the development community, it is still evolving in the comparatively young post-conflict community. This is, in part, due to the fact that major differences between a typical development environment and one recovering from violent conflict limit the transferability of the approach as a whole. In order to understand the limitations, it is important that we look at these distinctions.

Post-conflict conditions differ from traditional development in three primary ways. First, development activities tend to occur at a slower pace, where time can be used to the program's advantage. Conditions following a war do not usually accommodate such deliberation, as the pressures to address humanitarian issues and establish a context in which peace can prevail are intense. The media, funding parameters, the extensive needs of the

population, donors, constituents, and our own organizational protocols all demand that we respond quickly and demonstrate the positive effect we are having on the situation.

A second differentiation between post-conflict conditions and development conditions is security. As opposed to a more “normal” development environment, countries recovering from extreme violence are politically and socially unstable, experiencing both continued retributions from the conflict itself and rising crime rates. Moreover, the common lack of an authoritative structure such as local and national government, leaves tremendous gaps in police and judicial systems that otherwise might stem rampant lawlessness. Working under conditions of instability can also potentially limit geographic access to certain areas, the amount of time available for working in communities due to imposed curfews, and access to certain individuals. At the same time, the concurrent existence of a peace process may provide specific programming targets to help direct our efforts in support of long term stability.

The third primary difference is the fact that while development actors work largely under conditions of poverty, those working in post-conflict settings have the additional weight of social and economic disorder. Communities recovering from violent conflict often suffer from serious infrastructure damage, psychological trauma, severe mistrust, and social divisions within the community. Added to this context may be the burden of large numbers of internally displaced families, a condition that may continue for an extended period of time. Furthermore, communities may not only be the host to displaced persons, but also to recently demobilized soldiers with their own conditions and needs. Finally, the fact that livelihoods are often destroyed during the conflict and unemployment usually skyrockets affects nearly all members of the community. Thus, in working in war-torn communities, we face the difficult task of attempting to gather this troubled, dispersed, and disunited membership into a representational and viable decision making body.

Given this context, let us examine some of the specific issues we in the post-conflict community face in using participatory approaches under these conditions by looking at all three of the above elements.

Fast-paced

Within the tremendous time constraints built by political pressures, humanitarian conditions, media exposure, constituent and donor desires, and the overall interest in preventing a return to violence, we are forced to move very rapidly in a post-conflict setting. The fast-paced, emergency environment necessarily limits the time and details that might otherwise be incorporated into conducting an initial appraisal of community needs. We might be more pressed into accepting traditional or established leadership without ensuring that the entire community is represented in our assessment. Thus, as we work with the community, we are often forced to deal with the dissonance between the pressure for a rapid response and the slower process of eliciting extensive community involvement.

Similarly, as we design our strategies, we are tasked with creating quality, comprehensive programs inclusive of budget, objectives, timeframes, staffing, reporting format, and the like for our own organizational accountability that simultaneously allows the participants to direct the process. We are thus challenged by the conflicting desire to be organized, directed, accountable, and responsive to administrative requirements and the desire to leave the process

open-ended. While we as outsiders sense this need for speed, the pressure to move quickly may not be felt by the community itself, which is struggling with its own issues and may be slow to coalesce and engage. As a result, at times we find ourselves working with a community that does not move quickly enough to meet our needs of a fast response. This forces us to look closely at our principles.

As we do so, we also realize that community healing from the violence and destruction of today's conflicts simply requires an enormous amount of time. Our programs, based in part on organizational goals, administrative requirements, funding cycles, and political vicissitude usually have short agendas, often lasting no more than two years. Although the full process of community healing does not require our unending attention, we are challenged to examine how we can integrate a long-term perspective into our programming and transition out of our role as catalysts and implementers with a goal end state rather than end date.

Instability

The unstable and dangerous environment that typically follows a violent conflict limits our ability to move freely, causes undue stress on the general population as well as staff, and poses barriers in relationships. The latter may become evident in our interaction with authorities of the old regime or with rebel groups, for example. The social barriers may also be apparent when we try to develop a diverse and representative staff, encourage full participation in a mixed community, or when the international community as a whole is questioned for its motives.

Along the same lines, in this unstable environment our attempt to build grassroots capacity to make decisions and advocate for community needs can be threatening to local authorities and the elite. Whether or not such leaders are true representatives of the communities, their own inevitable role in the conflict (victim, perpetrator, refugee, leader, or fighter, e.g.) taints them with a certain image or position that influences the community's perception of them. When threatened by an increased capacity and vocalization at the grassroots, such authoritative figures may respond by pressuring or coercing community members.

While a participatory approach in a post-conflict environment poses substantial challenges, it also offers an opportunity to contribute to the overall peace and stability. Beyond developing self-reliance and capacity, substantial local engagement multiplied throughout the region can have a profound effect on the larger peace process, particularly if the communities integrate the root causes of the conflict into their decision-making. It is important, thus, that we connect our programs with those of others in the region so as to avoid creating an isolated example of successful community democracy, stability, or empowerment and to increase our impact.

Social and Economic Disorder

By eliciting full community involvement, post-conflict programs may encourage deeper healing by fostering the process of rebuilding trust and aiding the recovery from psychological and social trauma. Yet, divisions within society are often so severe following such violence that they are difficult to overcome, especially within our timeframe. In addition, our efforts to promote inclusion may encounter age-old, traditional divisions, biases, or cultural exclusions

such as gender, clan, and class or the emergence of new ones such as former combatants, the now large numbers of women-headed households, or internally displaced persons.

In addition to local divisions within society, social and economic disruption is frequently compounded by the often sudden and overwhelming increase in presence of the international community itself. In the immediate post-conflict context, foreigners tend to arrive *en force*, replete with media, large decision-making bodies, peacekeepers, and numerous NGOs accompanied by financial backing. Their presence not only creates a larger social distinction between expatriates and locals, it also changes the economic balance by the higher lifestyle demands, the amount of goods and services required to sustain them and conduct their programs, and the influx of large sums of money. As members of the international community, we play a part in this and face the negative impact of our presence even as we try to empower the local population.

In closely examining the way in which we use an essentially involved and slow process in the semi-chaotic setting of communities recovering from conflict, we are apt to discover some unique techniques specific to our conditions. Moreover, we will grow more aware of our objectives and actions, and hence contribute to the long process of continual refinement of the participatory approach in post-conflict environments. In so doing, we may be better able to address community participation in war-torn communities with a clear eye toward sincerely fostering the roots of stability and peace.

This paper was written by Kimberly A. Maynard for the October 30 and 31, 2000 roundtable on behalf of UNDP’s Emergency Response Division and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.