

**DEC**  
**BANGLADESH: 1998 FLOOD APPEAL**

**AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION**

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**FINAL REPORT**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From July to September 1998, Bangladesh suffered the most extensive, deepest and longest lasting flooding of this century. An estimated one million homes were damaged, the main rice and other staple crops were lost due to flooding, and some 30 million persons in 6 million families were affected by the floods.

In mid-September 1998, three weeks after the Government of Bangladesh had approved external assistance to deal with a national emergency situation, the DEC launched a public appeal for aid to those affected by the floods. A sum of £ 3.8 million was raised and distributed to 11 of the DEC agencies best placed to respond to the disaster. The majority had a long-standing history of relief and rehabilitation activities in Bangladesh, working directly and /or through affiliation with local partners.

As a disaster prone country, vulnerable to recurrent flooding, cyclones and drought, Bangladesh has had considerable experience with disaster management. Government and non-governmental organisations have had significant disaster response experience over the past thirty years in Bangladesh, including famine in 1971, floods in 1974, 1987, 1988 and 1998 and cyclones of major proportions in 1971 and 1991.

An independent evaluation of the DEC activities was carried out in September-October 1999 with interviews of DEC agencies in Britain and Ireland, and visits to their offices and/or partners in Bangladesh. The evaluation team met with Government of Bangladesh and United Nations officials as well as with national NGOs, community leaders and beneficiaries. This report represents the findings and recommendations of an independent evaluation of the DEC "Bangladesh Flood Appeal" funded response to the 1998 flood.

The evaluation team was asked to review the effectiveness and efficiency of the DEC "Bangladesh Flood Appeal" funded disaster response, to assess the accountability of DEC agencies using public funds, to assess the value added of DEC funding, and to assess the level of coordination among DEC partners and agencies and other disaster response actors.

### **Accountability and Value Added**

*Do DEC funds provide additional funds to agencies and are these funds adequately reported and accounted for?*

DEC financing for the Bangladesh flood appeal has provided DEC agencies with additional funds to undertake relief and rehabilitation activities. The scale of the 1998 floods in Bangladesh were so massive and long lasting that the need for humanitarian assistance was far greater than the supply of assistance resources. While many agencies received financial support from their own donors, and used internal finances, they also had to turn to official agencies such as DfID and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The DEC financing has been additional to these funds and has permitted agencies to scale-up their relief and rehabilitation

activities. There was no evidence that any DEC agency, or donors, had substituted DEC funds for their own financing.

Moreover, some agencies had not been successful in accessing EC and/or DfID funds at the time of the DEC appeal. Therefore, the evaluation team concludes that DEC funds did permit agencies to access funds that were not otherwise available. DEC funds facilitated an estimated 25% additional activities by the participating agencies.

Scaling up has consisted of either a greater coverage of geographical areas or a larger number of activities provided in the rehabilitation phase.

DEC funds are accounted for by the participating agencies in a transparent and accountable manner. The reporting requirements are adequate and include:

- a statement of the agency's competencies and provisional plan of action to be submitted within 48 hours of a formal request to the broadcasters to support a national appeal;
- a more definitive plan of operation to be submitted within 4 weeks of the appeal launch; the agencies' share of funds raised by the appeal is based upon a predetermined distribution formula;
- a final narrative report due in the 7<sup>th</sup> month following the launch of an appeal, detailing actual operations and including an assessment of the agency's original statement of priority needs, and areas covered, the number of people assisted and a statement of funds received and expended.

### **Assessment Issues**

*How well did agencies and partners target vulnerable groups and households when they were assessing and selecting beneficiaries?*

Most assessment procedures reviewed by the mission were adequately thorough and careful. Again, this can be attributed to the quality of the contacts with affected communities, since assessments relied heavily on information from partners or staff working in the field.

Several agencies mention that coordination at the local level (involving both government and NGOs) was good enough to enable them to prevent duplication, and/or to target households missed by other schemes.

The most frequently cited criteria for targeting were: households suffering severe loss; landless or assetless households; female-headed households; the elderly and individuals with disabilities. There are indications the effectiveness of targeting declined in that order, with the last category being the most difficult to identify and reach.

Some agencies targeted beneficiaries who were already part of their regular programming, who would not necessarily meet the above criteria for relief and rehabilitation. Others offset this bias by delivering flood relief by area and selecting beneficiaries within those areas with the assistance of village leaders, or local relief committees.

The evaluation team did not have sufficient field exposure to determine whether there were instances of relief going to non-affected or undeserving households. Most agencies did extend their relief and rehabilitation work beyond established target groups and beneficiaries.

For example, one agency that initially concentrated efforts with its eight core partners, provided funds to a further 43 local agencies and used its own staff to work in four severely flooded thanas where it had no partners.

Few agencies relied on local government sources to determine beneficiaries. Many said they bypassed VGF (Vulnerable Group Feeding) card-holders, unless they were sure union authorities had distributed cards only to those genuinely in need.

Some agencies noted that partners tended to direct rehabilitation interventions to their own programme participants, even though their initial relief coverage was more extensive.

### **Who Benefits from Disaster Responses?**

This is a very difficult question to answer with certainty. The resources available to provide relief and rehabilitation could not meet the needs of those affected by the 1998 floods. Damages have been estimated at well over £ 1.5 billion while estimated relief financing from all sources amounted to an estimated £ 600 million. Many needs remain unmet.

Ideally appeal funds would go to those most in need, those most severely affected by the floods. However, assessment of need was imperfect in the context of the floods; homes were submerged and families had abandoned their homes. Many agencies were able to rely on communities themselves to identify the neediest. The evaluation team was told that most disaster relief went to communities affected by the floods, but not necessarily always to the most severely affected people within these communities.

There is some criticism that NGOs in general targeted their own group members disproportionately. Group members who were participating in the well-developed credit and savings programs are known to be among the poor, but not the poorest members of a given community. The most disadvantaged members of a community may not always have benefited from some NGOs disaster response.

Given the scope of this evaluation it is not possible to provide a definitive answer to the question. It would seem that the more effective efforts at appropriate targeting did include consulting local communities. Where the communities are well known to the partners, verification and monitoring that the disaster response was targeted to the most severely affected was more accurate.

*To what extent did beneficiaries participate in decisions regarding targeting and activities?*

Many of the agencies and their partners followed the participatory approaches used by their development programmes to shape the relief effort. There were quite varied interventions even within the programmes of single agencies, indicating they were reflecting local demands and assessments. Agencies without extensive community development experience were more inclined to deliver their programmes with less regard for community choices.

Examples of planned responses which were altered to meet beneficiary demands include removing unsuitable clothing from foreign relief packages and adding more food; including some cash, ORS, extra oil and women's sanitary napkins in relief packages.

The rehabilitation phase provided more scope for participatory inputs than the relief phase. The evaluation could not determine to what extent rehabilitation activities - for example housing - were determined by the recipients as opposed to the donors. Many agencies provided rehabilitation inputs as loans not grants, which was maybe based on their own needs or strategies.

## **Response issues**

*How well did the elements of relief activities (food, medical aid, shelter, water and sanitation, fodder, etc) match identified needs?*

The DEC agencies and their local partners all have considerable experience with flood relief in Bangladesh, and it was not difficult for them to determine what was required and develop the appropriate procedures for delivering it. The mission did not learn of instances where relief packages contained superfluous goods or were missing essential goods, though there was wide variation in proportions and contents.

Several agencies reported they were able to deliver services, such as medical aid, which they did not normally provide, by hiring temporary staff or getting outside assistance. Some assigned head office staff to strengthen local capacity or to help manage coordination and monitoring.

Throughout Bangladesh there was a widespread mobilisation of volunteer assistance during the 1998 floods. The DEC-funded organizations also benefited from this response, getting help from the public or from their own networks.

Some agencies reported the supplies of relief goods in the affected areas were more than adequate. This meant local officials and politicians were less likely to commandeer or divert supplies. The local availability of relief supplies did contrast with the overall shortage of relief materials in a national context.

With a few exceptions the DEC agencies reported they were able to procure what they planned to distribute and to handle the logistics of distribution. Shortages of non-grain seeds appeared to be

the principal procurement problem. Some complained there were cash flow problems caused by the banks' poor system for transferring funds to branch offices.

*To what extent was standardisation an issue?*

Although the basic list of requirements for both relief and rehabilitation were similar, there was no standardisation of the proportion of these in each overall package, nor was there much standardisation of the amount or design of the separate elements (e.g. in the size or content of food packages or the type and cost of houses). Different agencies did different things, based on organisational priorities, skills of their partners or policy decisions, given the available funds.

There is a continuing debate over whether rehabilitation disbursements should be grants or loans. There is a wide variation among the agencies on handling this choice. There is also variation on loan terms, and the disposition of funds made available from loan recovery.

*Did the response activities build on lessons learned from past flood disasters?*

There is general consensus that disaster relief was handled better for the 1998 flood than for the severe flooding ten years before in 1988. One crude indicator of this is the much lower fatality rate (1,376 in 1998 compared to about 6,000 in 1988).

There are some interesting comparisons to the findings of an ODI evaluation of the 1988 flood relief:

- the 1988 report noted the housing interventions varied widely in design, cost, etc. This is still the case in 1998.
- the 1988 report found the response was very top-down and there was little community-level participation. This appears to be less of an issue in 1998.
- the 1988 report criticised the continuity and effectiveness of local coordination efforts. In 1998, DEC agencies were quite positive about the adequacy of communications, preparedness, and government-NGO cooperation.

### **Effectiveness**

Agencies that implemented effective relief and rehabilitation activities demonstrated the following competencies:

- effective disaster preparedness, both of the agency and its partners through recurrent training, and disaster manuals; also a preparedness of communities through prior and recurrent training, facilitating mechanisms to foster cooperation and community action at the time of the floods;
- efforts to assess specific needs, and the degree of deprivation; this was especially difficult in a context where many were in need of humanitarian aid, living on rooftops or had had to abandon their homes for flood shelters;

- an ability to coordinate agency efforts with other actors, including government at central and local levels, UN organizations and other NGOs to ensure that duplication of effort was minimised and that relief and rehabilitation activities were directed towards the most severely affected communities.

### **Cost effectiveness**

There are several important examples of cost effective initiatives undertaken by the DEC agencies and partners. Three examples are cited here:

- the use of NGO partner agencies, to extend the reach of the disaster response was an initiative taken by the majority of DEC agencies, as a result of lessons learned in the 1988 flood; this allowed agencies to reach more people in need at lower costs than establishing their own programmes;
- a nutritional assessment carried out by one agency to assess the nature and extent of malnutrition, especially in children. This survey served to provide accurate and timely information that also allowed other agencies to develop appropriate food packages and targeting. With limited food resources to distribute, this rapid survey proved effective and informed several agencies' responses.
- the construction of flood shelters for humans and livestock; with relatively modest costs for construction, these shelters permitted families to access shelter and a place to save their livestock, an essential asset for rural poor families.

### **Organization and Management Issues**

*Did the 1998 experience build on, or improve, coordination mechanisms among organizations providing relief, at the local and national level?*

One good example of coordination was the sharing of the nutrition survey results, which led to modifications in plans and interventions for food relief. This led the agency itself to reduce its draw on the DEC funds.

Some thought the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) was late in declaring an emergency but there was little subsequent complaint about the government's role in coordinating the relief efforts. Compared to the 1988 floods (when there was no NGO Affairs Bureau) the government did not unduly delay NGO plans or withhold approval for specific activities; although, a few agencies complained that approvals for rehabilitation work through the NGO Bureau were delayed, compared to approvals that were provided for work in the relief phase.

Perhaps the most important lesson communities have learned from previous disasters is that they can influence what happens in a disaster effort delivered by government and non-government bodies. People have not only developed concepts of their right to be provided with relief and

rehabilitation but also of the value of doing something for themselves. The extent of public participation and volunteerism was very impressive in the 1998 flood disaster. The scale and intensity of the 1998 flood and the reduced loss of life relative to previous floods suggests that the people have highly developed capacities to cope under difficult circumstances. The general public has also learned the importance of safe drinking water, as demonstrated by the widespread use of tubewell water, even during the height of the flooding.

The Mission concludes that there was adequate coordination among government and non-governmental actors during the flood response. As a result of this coordination, duplication of relief and rehabilitation efforts was for the most part, kept at minimum levels. On the whole, those who most needed relief and rehabilitation efforts were provided for, although to varying extents.

One key coordination forum for DEC agencies was the Disaster Forum, a body that brought all the major actors together in the 1998 flood response. At the national level, the NGO association ADAB, and the government's NGO Affairs Bureau were also coordinating NGO activities. DEC agencies believe these were useful in directing activities to areas of need. Government efforts at relief and rehabilitation were coordinated through the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and its operational body posted at District level, the Disaster Management Bureau. Most observers believe that the newly established Disaster Management Committees at the local level, comprising government officials, NGO representatives and locally elected officials operated adequately to coordinate the disaster response.

At the local level, all relief and rehabilitation activities were centrally authorised by government, through the approval of the Master Role by the TNO (Thana Nirbahi Officer or chief local official) at thana level coordinating committees made up of government officials and NGO representatives. NGOs were able to monitor government relief efforts and to negotiate with officials where abuses were present. Several DEC agencies worked together at the local level to ensure effective coverage, sometimes in areas where no other organisations were working.

### **Future Coordination Issues**

Given the extensive experience of the DEC agencies collectively in disaster response in Bangladesh, there is an opportunity to document and exchange individual agency policy and implementation around specific activities, related to disaster preparedness and response. The following is a partial list of themes or issue areas that would benefit from further coordination among DEC agencies, by reviewing their experiences from the 1998 flood response:

- Disaster preparedness and management – collectively, DEC agencies in Bangladesh have a wide experience of disaster preparedness and management, including the capacity to build a response approach at community level. DEC agencies themselves, have varying degrees of capability and priority. Agencies could share this knowledge and develop mechanisms to strengthen partners' preparedness and organizational capacity for disaster responses.



- Targeting and coverage - agencies recognise the complexities surrounding appropriate targeting and ways to reach more of the most severely affected persons in a disaster; several initiatives and innovations by DEC agencies could be documented and reviewed.
- Housing - given the extensive damage to housing during the flood and the wide variety of housing rehabilitation offered by agencies, it would be useful to document these experiences with a view to developing guidelines of appropriate housing interventions specific to different geographical locations, different types of disaster and varying community preferences; standardisation is not desirable but some greater uniformity in practice for similar situations would be feasible.
- Loans, Grants, Local Disaster Funds, Emergency Replacement Funds - agencies had different policies and approaches to the use of grants or loans in the rehabilitation phase. Some loan funds are being used to develop future disaster funds for communities while others are being used to provide emergency credit funds for partner agencies. As this area of response is a new and somewhat uncharted ground for most DEC agencies, the donating public deserves further documentation and assessment by DEC agencies.

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## ACRONYMS

AAB	ActionAid Bangladesh
ADAB	Association of Development Agencies of Bangladesh
BDRCS	Bangladesh Red Crescent Society
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
BWDB	Bangladesh Water Development Board
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CCDB	Christian Council for Development in Bangladesh
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DDMC	District Disaster Management Committee
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DMB	Disaster Management Bureau
DfID	Department for International Development
DMU	Disaster Management Unit
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
GoB	Government of Bangladesh
HAI	HelpAge International
HKI-NSP	Helen Keller International-Nutritional Surveillance Project
ICDDR,B	International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease and Research, Bangladesh
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross Societies
MDMR	Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
ORS	Oral Rehydration Salts/ Solution
RIC	Resource Integration Centre
SCF	The Save the Children Fund
TDMC	Thana Disaster Management Committee
TNO	Thana Nirbahi Officer
VGf	Vulnerable Group Feeding
WFP	World Food Programme

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

As a disaster prone country, vulnerable to recurrent flooding, cyclones and drought, Bangladesh has had considerable experience with disaster management. Government and non-governmental organisations have had significant disaster response experience over the past thirty years, including famine in 1971, floods in 1974, 1987, 1988 and 1998 and cyclones of major proportions in 1971 and 1991.

The evaluation team has therefore come to expect a degree of professionalism, preparedness and coordination among the DEC agencies that may not be appropriate in other emergency contexts currently being confronted by these same agencies. Our standards for the Bangladesh evaluation have been set high.

Disasters are by their nature dynamic and this was also true of the 1998 Bangladesh floods. The 1998 flood was more extensive and longer lasting than any other in recent history. Although some agencies were alerting government and their UK-based head offices of the potential scale and damage from the flooding as early as mid-July, the Government and official agencies were slower to recognise the enormity of the floods. The Government of Bangladesh requested official external assistance at the end of August 1998, after some districts had been flooded for over seven weeks.

By the time of the DEC ‘Bangladesh Flood Appeal’ in mid-September 1998, many of the most vulnerable communities living alongside the major river systems in Bangladesh had been flooded for over two months.

The flood waters had begun to recede, albeit slowly, by the third week of September. Agencies in Dhaka began to receive funds from the DEC in mid-October, after initial search and rescue and feeding programmes had been completed. By this time, full and supplementary feeding, health and nutrition, while still priorities were waning in importance. The medium term priorities were to rebuild lost housing and to ensure that families had access to employment opportunities and an ability to grow and/or to buy food.

DEC agencies responded to the floods with a variety of activities, summarised in Table 1. Relief activities account for about a third of DEC financing, largely to cover feeding programmes in rural and urban areas. The majority of funds were used to finance programmes in the rehabilitation phase, with activities to ensure livelihoods for affected people including housing, work programs, cash grants and agricultural inputs.

**TABLE 1**  
**BANGLADESH FLOOD APPEAL 1998/99**  
**DEC AGENCY EXPENDITURES**  
**BREAKDOWN by ACTIVITIES**  
**(Figures expressed as a percentage of expenditures)**

AGENCY	Emergency Relief Phase			Rehabilitation Phase				Other	Logistics Admin		DEC Funding	
	Food	Health	Water	Cash For Work	Loan/IGA	Agriculture	Housing		7	12	£	%
ActionAid		3		6	47	1	27	16	2		230,431	6.06
Br. Red Cross	81								7	12	636,500	16.75
CAFOD				2		7	71	14	6		217,131	5.71
CARE			14		25		50		11		258,931	6.81
Christian Aid	26	13	3			44	13		2		323,000	8.50
Concern	89								11		127,831	3.36
HTA/HAI	50				23		19		8		110,230	2.90
OXFAM	22	2	4	22	13	6	21		8		1,174,200	30.90
SCF	4	5		57	25				8		407,715	10.73
Tearfund	54	6		25		10			5		157,700	4.15
World Vision						90			10		156,331	4.11
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>		<b>3,800,000</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: DEC Agency Reports

Notes:

- 1) BRCS logistics/admin costs breakdown as: 7% transport costs, 5% capacity building national society, 5% BDRCS admin. costs, 1.8% BRCS management costs
- 2) OXFAM food includes cash distribution, actual allocations not specified
- 3) SCF cash for work includes food/cash grants, particular allocations not specified

**TABLE 2****BANGLADESH FLOOD APPEAL 1998/99****AGENCY TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS AND DEC PROPORTION**

<b>AGENCY</b>	<b>TOTAL £</b>	<b>DEC £</b>	<b>DEC as %</b>
<b>ACTIONAID</b>	<b>582,000</b>	<b>230,431</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>BRITISH RED CROSS</b>	<b>4,876,716</b>	<b>636,500</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>CAFOD</b>	<b>338,394</b>	<b>217,131</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>CARE</b>	<b>10,166,865</b>	<b>258,931</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>CHRISTIAN AID</b>	<b>1,158,495 *</b>	<b>323,000</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>COCERN</b>	<b>438,500</b>	<b>127,831</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>HTA/HAI</b>	<b>150,718</b>	<b>110,230</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>OXFAM</b>	<b>3,141,546</b>	<b>1,174,200</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>SCF</b>	<b>413,540</b>	<b>407,715</b>	<b>98</b>
<b>TEARFUND</b>	<b>346,121</b>	<b>157,700</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>WORLD VISION</b>	<b>652,614</b>	<b>156,331</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,265,509</b>	<b>3,800,000</b>	<b>17</b>

Source: DEC Agency reports

Notes:\* does not include £ 728,736 food security grant approved but not received as at 10/1999.

## 2.0 METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

The DEC requires an independent evaluation of its 1998 Bangladesh Flood Appeal funds. The evaluation should assess the appropriateness and effectiveness of the activities financed by the appeal. This evaluation was undertaken in September-October 1999.

The terms of reference for the evaluation request the evaluators to review the following issue areas:

- The transparency and accountability of agencies undertaking relief and rehabilitation activities;
- The effectiveness of agencies in achieving the stated goals of their planned activities;
- Given the disaster prone nature of Bangladesh, to assess the extent of disaster preparedness by agencies and local communities;
- The coverage of relief activities, the assessment and identification of need and the appropriate target group;
- The extent to which lessons from previous disaster relief have been incorporated;
- The effectiveness of coordination efforts by agencies and with the Government of Bangladesh.

Any evaluation of a diverse set of activities, implemented by a large number of partner agencies, in a time period exceeding a year does indeed face a challenge to obtain verifiable evidence for an assessment of effectiveness and impact. One approach would have been to undertake an audit of individual agency activities, verifying that funds received were used for the stated purposes and using beneficiary testimony to verify the documentation. This was rejected on the grounds that such testimony would likely be of limited value, as beneficiaries could hardly be expected to remember which agency provided what assistance at what time.

Secondly, the issue of how to attribute DEC financing to specific activities had to be confronted. DEC funds allowed agencies to scale up their response efforts. An audit, per se, would tell us little.

The evaluation team, in consultation with the DEC, decided to address the terms of reference for the Bangladesh 1998 appeal through a review of existing documentary evidence, as provided by agencies to the DEC under current reporting requirements. The documentation review was complimented by a series of comprehensive interviews with DEC agencies, at head office in the UK, as well as in their Dhaka offices and field centers.

The purposes of the interviews were to:

- Seek agencies views regarding the key lessons learned in the 1998 flood response;
- Elicit additional information and documentation on preparedness, needs assessments, targeting and coverage of activities in light of the most severely affected communities and regions;
- Understand the rationale for, experience with and use of partner agencies to implement the majority of the response;
- Understand the rationale for the response of each agency to the floods;
- Review coordination and collaboration among DEC agencies, the larger NGO community in Bangladesh and with the Government of Bangladesh and UN agencies.

These interviews helped to produce additional documentation regarding lessons learned. The evaluation team met with representatives from the Government of Bangladesh directly responsible for disaster management, UN agencies and large national NGOs, that had been directly involved in the 1998 flood response. The team met with local representatives of official donors from DfID and the European Community , which had provided additional financing to many of the DEC agencies.

The team developed a field trip plan to visit a severely affected riverbasin area along the Jamuna river system. The visit to Jamalpur district was intended to allow the team to observe directly a number of flood proofing initiatives of DEC agencies, to meet a sample of partner agencies and to meet local officials and beneficiaries in this area.

Due to security problems at the local level this field trip was cancelled at the last moment, and an alternative trip to Chawhali thana in Sirajganj district, an equally flood prone *char* area (sandy strips of land, usually deposited along rivers as a result of upstream erosion), set up. Given the last moment arrangements, it was not possible to meet as many partners as originally planned. The other observations and interviews however were still possible, albeit in reduced form.

A briefing was held with representatives of the local DEC agencies and some partners at the outset of the Bangladesh part of the evaluation process and a debriefing with these same representatives at the end of the field-based work. A briefing for UK-based agencies was held to discuss the preliminary draft of the report.

The evaluation team consisted of five consultants. As team leader, Roger Young coordinated the evaluation process, conducted the interviews in the UK and participated with the interview and assessment team in Dhaka. Dr. Pat Diskett of the Cranfield Centre for Disaster Management provided a set of guidelines to the team on evaluation methodology in the context of relief and rehabilitation. (See Appendix A). Carol Eggen participated in the interviews in Dhaka and contributed to the assessment of lessons learned. Dale Posgate participated in the field review and contributed to the overall analysis. Aziz Siddique developed the sampling framework for the field-based review.

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide DEC and its constituents with a summary review of the appropriateness and effectiveness of the DEC funded response to the 1998 flood and to identify any strengths and weaknesses that could inform future DEC-funded initiatives.



Thus the evaluation focused on analysing the process and the results of the DEC-funded activities. Since each agency has provided narrative reports on their activities, the evaluation report will not describe these in any detail.

This analysis raises some issues about the response and its implementation and elicits lessons learned for the DEC and its constituents. The issues discussed below are some, but given the mission's scope, not all, of those that consistently arise in the disaster relief process. The issues raised are not meant to indicate that the DEC experience in the 1998 floods was especially problematic.

The analysis necessarily generalises from the experience of the several agencies and numerous partners involved, recognising there was considerable variance among these in the scope and quality of their activities. The issues fall under three headings, relating to "assessment", "response" and "organization and management".

### **3.0 IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF ASSESSMENT ISSUES**

#### **3.1 Targeting Areas**

The 1998 flood affected 51 out of 64 districts. Districts that were closer to the three major river basins were most seriously affected by the flood, both in pervasiveness and intensity. Within each district, villages in particular low-lying unions and wards were more severely affected.

DEC agencies worked in 49 districts but the pattern of their disaster response coverage was somewhat dependent on the organisation's history, constitutional framework, development mandate and field presence for regular programming in Bangladesh (see Figure 1 and Appendix B).

Agencies receiving DEC funds worked in a variety of ways to implement the 1998 flood relief and rehabilitation programme. Many DEC agencies worked through partner NGOs or local groups for the delivery of services during the 1998 flood. Agencies such as CARE and Oxfam, which have routinely been active in disaster management over the years, had pre-selected NGO partners with a field presence in disaster locations, such as the cyclone belt or the flood plains along particular river basins. Several agencies receiving DEC funds (BDRCS, CARE, Caritas) were able to utilise their own implementation capacity at extensively spread regional and district offices throughout the country. Several agencies implemented the 1998 flood programme through a combination of direct delivery through their own staff and support to NGO partners. The following is a summary of implementation systems:

- BDRCS - delivered through their District Committees, Squads, volunteers and own staff;
- Caritas (Cafod) and World Vision – mostly delivered through their own staff with a few partners;
- CARE, Concern, HEED (Tearfund) and Koinonia (Tearfund) - delivered both directly and through support to NGO partners and local groups;

- Oxfam, Christian Aid, SCF and ActionAid – disaster responses were delivered through NGO partners, (including their staff, volunteers and community groups) with their own staff used for monitoring and supervision;
- Resource Integration Centre (HAI) – delivered directly, as a partner NGO with CARE;
- Dhaka Ahsania Mission (Cafod) – delivered directly, through their community volunteers from literacy centres.

The Mission concludes that one of the most important lessons learned by DEC agencies has been the importance of partner organisations in extending the reach of their disaster response to a greater number of areas and a larger number of beneficiaries.

### **3.2 Targeting Beneficiaries**

There was considerable variation on the selection of beneficiaries for relief and rehabilitation services during the 1998 flood. All relief and rehabilitation issues were centrally authorised by government, through the approval of the Master Role by the Thana Nirbahi Officer (TNO) the senior local government official and the thana coordinating committee made up of government officials and representatives of NGOs at the thana level. Although all agencies had attempted to ensure distribution to the most affected, the most vulnerable and the poorest, there were a myriad of factors that influenced those selections. These included the influence of local government officials, familiarity with local communities from previous programming and the proximity of the community to road and river transportation.

The evaluation team concludes that good practices for accurate beneficiary selection include the following:

- Agencies that had worked on disaster preparedness were in the best position to effectively select beneficiaries because they were able to:
  - understand what needed to be done, in light of the scale of operation;
  - define the criteria to be used to select the “most” of any classification;
  - determine methods for selection;
  - implement and monitor selection.
- Agencies that had utilised lessons learned from the 1988 flood had developed flood vulnerability concepts and maps, based on the major river basins and their flood plains.
- Agencies that had pre-selected partner NGOs for disaster-based relief and rehabilitation had usually provided their partners with up-to-date training and guidelines in beneficiary selection.
- Agencies whose regular programming was based on well-developed, socio-political knowledge were able to provide their field staff and partner NGOs with the analytical capability needed for accurate beneficiary selection in rural Bangladesh.
- As beneficiary selection or self-selection became less obvious during the rehabilitation stages, agencies reported difficulty in the management of beneficiary

selection. Concern developed effective household needs assessments and trained their partner NGOs in short, but precise survey methods to control for beneficiary selection when the demands were great from all sides.

- Most agencies reported that they were less able to control beneficiary selection when partner NGOs were involved in distribution of disaster services because each NGO had their own client groups, served with specific programmes and located in specific areas. Although NGO partners also work with the poor in their regular programmes, the nature of a savings and credit programme does not mean that the poorest people are necessarily part of their groups. Nor does the provision of a regular development programme in one union of a district necessarily mean that a partner NGO has the local knowledge necessary to select beneficiaries in another, flood-affected union of the district.

#### **4.0 IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE ISSUES**

The DEC agencies and their local partners all have considerable experience with disaster assistance in Bangladesh and in principle, they knew what was to be done.

##### **4.1 Search and Rescue**

In deeply flooded areas, the accessibility of high land was critical to the survival of people and livestock. Traditional building practices in rural Bangladesh include the provision of earthen plinths for the house, as well as the homestead compound. The height of the plinth and the amount of earth to be raised varies, according to the homestead's location on the flood plain and the resources of the household.

In a regular monsoon flood, economically secure households will be able to remain in their home, even though during the peak of the flood they may have to live for a few days on raised bamboo plinths within the house. Households with cattle, straw and grain stores are particularly reluctant to leave their compound during a flood. Poorer households without high land or in cases of river erosion, without homesteads, often take refuge in the compound of wealthier relatives, school compounds, market places or on thin strips of high land alongside roads, railways or embankments.

In the deepest flooded areas, across the country, there was very little high land left for either rich or poor households. During the height of the flood, thousands of households along with their poultry and livestock, had to be moved from the tops of their house to flood shelters on high land. Only a few DEC agencies that had high levels of disaster preparedness were able to mobilise boats for search and rescue operations.

##### **4.2 Food Assistance**

Food distribution was a highly demanded and appropriate activity during both the relief and rehabilitation phases of the Bangladesh flood response. Seven of the 11 DEC agencies provided some form of food aid, accounting for 29% of the total DEC expenditures.

The actual food package or rations distributed depended on the phase of the flooding and the resources available to individual agencies. Beneficiaries may have received dry food, such as high protein biscuits, or cooked food, when and where people had no access to fuel to cook a meal, during the initial relief phase.

Later in the disaster, agencies began to distribute food packages consisting of some combination of rice, pulses, cooking oil, salt and in some cases cash to buy other items in the market.

The actual quantity of food items varied among the DEC agencies and reflected a policy decision on how many families to feed, given a certain quantity of food available. In discussing this with agencies, the Mission team is satisfied that individual agency decisions were well informed and reasonable in the circumstances.

### **4.3 Flood Shelters**

DEC agencies reported a variety of circumstances in which flood shelters were arranged. The most successful cases occurred when partner NGOs had been engaged in disaster preparedness with community participants. In flood-prone areas along vulnerable river basins, trained village committees were able to quickly locate suitable high land and NGO partners provided the labour costs (under cash-for-work programmes) to raise the land and create a flood shelter. Some village committees were so well prepared that they had maps of their locality to indicate the location of the most distressed households, either by the type of occupant (elderly widow, female-head) or by its location in relation to high land.

Village committees who could arrange for flood shelters with adequate space for livestock were able to convince rural households to move before the last moment. Built for the 1998 flood, Oxfam demonstrated that the value of cattle saved on a flood shelter of approximately 4 acres was as great as tk 4,000,000 (Stg 150,000) against a construction cost of only tk 700,000 (Stg 8,560).

The Mission concludes that the use of flood shelters, which provided enough space for families, parts of their house, their belongings and their livestock was highly effective in not only saving lives but also in retaining some degree of economic security of households in the post-flood period.

### **4.4 Sanitation and Clean Drinking Water**

Submersion of sanitary latrines and lack of access to toilets was a major problem during the prolonged flood of 1998. The health risks were more acute in congested urban areas than in rural areas where the concentration of faeces was reduced by larger bodies of water. Beneficiaries reported that the sanitary toilets provided for women and men at centralised locations, such as flood shelters and relief centres were greatly appreciated.

The provision of clean drinking water was a problem of major proportions. In Dhaka, CARE and the municipal water authority operated a large-scale programme to transport and distribute clean drinking water to residents in deeply flooded areas.

Tubewells are the common source of drinking water in the rural areas and over the past 10 years the general public has developed a high level of awareness about the need for clean drinking water. In the beginning of the flood, agencies promoted the practice of raising tubewells to prevent contamination from rising flood waters. As the flood progressed and tubewells became submerged, people waded through floodwaters or hired boats to obtain water from tubewells on high ground. One of the most essential services provided by flood shelters was access to clean drinking water and toilet facilities.

With the rural population almost entirely dependent on firewood for domestic use, there was no fuel accessible to purify water through boiling. In an attempt to provide clean water at household level, agencies distributed bleaching powder, buckets and plastic water containers, as part of the relief package. Agencies did not widely distribute water-purification tablets because beneficiaries reported such water to be distasteful and laboratory tests done at ICDDR,B indicated that the tablets available were of limited effectiveness. Finding that the scale of impure drinking water could not be addressed by purification measures, agencies promoted the wide-spread use of rehydration salts, distributing ORS packets with the relief supplies and mobilising thousands of volunteers in all parts of the country to prepare and package ORS. As the floodwaters receded, many agencies provided bleaching powder and technical advice on the cleaning and rehabilitation of tubewells.

Some agencies reported their concerns about the requirement for water consumption with some of the food items that were distributed, i.e. the flattened rice known as *cheera*. It was felt by some agencies that certain foodstuffs such as high protein biscuits, was a better alternative because they required less water for consumption.

#### **4.5 Health**

Based on the request of beneficiaries, a number of agencies used DEC funds to provide health services. The general public feared there would be major outbreaks of disease in congested areas where there had been an absence of potable water and sanitation facilities and a prolonged exposure to stagnant water. Several agencies delivered an inclusive health programme based on the linkages with water, sanitation, nutrition and health education, while other agencies provided a traditional health programme that was simply curative.

Curative treatment was provided mainly for diarrhoeal diseases, acute respiratory infections and skin conditions. Depending on the need, agencies provided curative treatment from stationary and mobile clinics. In deeply flooded areas, treatment was provided from boats. Paramedics making home visits from boats were more effective than the actual provision of treatment from a boat.

Treatment by paramedics who were local tended to be more effective than teams of medical doctors who were sent to rural areas. NGOs with experience in health programming tended to mobilise trained paramedics and provide them with treatment guidelines and standardised essential medicines. Paramedical health teams familiar with people's local conditions provided more effective treatment than teams of medical doctors sent in from outside the locality, and who tended to over-prescribe.

Several agencies reported the effective use of government health clinics for their referred patients, particularly because there was increased medical staff available during the flood. Agencies which reported that government health services were ineffective tended to lack previous working relationships with thana-based health centres or the capacity for follow-up home visits through their own paramedic staff.

Essential medicines were provided free of charge and in many cases, ORS was provided as part of the food ration. Inclusion of antibiotics in the food ration was not considered to be a good practice because such blanket coverage was both wasteful and risky when severe medical conditions were masked. An outbreak of measles was recognised and reported by one agency, which was then able to mobilise government immunisation services.

#### **4.6 Nutrition**

Several DEC agencies were particularly concerned with the nutritional status of children, pregnant women and lactating mothers during the 1998 flood. The minimum nutritional value for the food ration was also dependent on understanding the national nutritional status during the flood. Variations are known to occur during different flood stages, as well as in different geographic locations where vulnerable populations have been mapped against food scarcity. To gain an overall understanding of children's nutritional status, SCF conducted a rapid survey in selected areas of the country in September 1998.

This study, provided to NGO partners and other agencies, indicated that although vulnerable populations and areas showed a nutritional status diminished to 1996 levels, the nutritional status for children of the general population was not as severe as had been anticipated. The validity of SCF's rapid nutritional assessment was acceptable when cross-checked with the nation-wide nutritional survey carried out by Helen Keller International. To monitor the long-term effects on poor children of the loss of family assets and livelihoods in the flood, SCF has conducted follow-up nutritional surveys in December 1998 and in August 1999.

#### **4.7 Housing**

One of the major components of the 1998 flood rehabilitation programme was housing. Following life and food security, beneficiaries considered housing to be their next priority and the expenditure of DEC funds for housing reflects this response to beneficiary demand (food 29%; housing 19%).

Yet there is wide range of variation in the response of DEC agencies to the need for shelters and housing during the 1998 flood. Such variations appear to be reflections of:

- the type of beneficiaries who were being provided with housing;
- differing geographical areas (flood plains, flood banks, cyclone-prone) have different needs and require different housing interventions;
- different demands for shelter and housing in the relief and rehabilitation periods;
- the use of the participatory process with communities and householders in house design, construction and cash and kind contributions;

- the experience of agencies in disaster housing;
- the capacity of agencies to distribute and monitor inputs to housing;
- the development philosophy of agencies.

During the relief period, beneficiary families often brought pieces of their house with them to the flood shelters and were then provided with supplementary materials to build a temporary structure.

During the rehabilitation period, several agencies provided materials for beneficiaries to replace a house with basic upgrades such as reinforced cement concrete (RCC) pillars and a double roof (to prevent dislodging of tin sheets during a high wind) at a cost of approximately taka 6,000 (£ 75). Beneficiaries supplied all labour costs including the raising of the earthen plinth above flood levels. Another agency that provided cash for housing, asked for repayment of 50% of the fund, which was then utilised to repair the community's literacy centre, damaged in the flood.

Several agencies that have experience in housing have taken policy decisions that they will no longer distribute free houses, even to disaster victims. When faced with difficult economic choices, poor families often have to sell their houses and are some of those who again have to be supplied with housing during the next disaster. Even with agreements signed with the agency and monitored at Union Council level, beneficiaries have been reported to sell the materials from their freely obtained house. Although Caritas has a policy for free housing, in the next round of housing to be provided, most beneficiaries will be asked to pay 30% of costs and this money will be invested in some form of future disaster fund. Extremely poor families, such as female-heads of household will be exempted from payment. HEED provides houses at cost and beneficiaries are provided with a 5-year period for repayment on a monthly basis.

Several agencies with experience in low-cost housing constructed particular 'disaster-proof' houses that cost between tk 13,000 and tk 15,000 (£ 165 and £ 180). Such houses were specifically designed to:

- withstand decay from prolonged water immersion (in flood-prone areas);
- to secure a tin roof during high winds (in tornado-prone areas);
- require low maintenance and annual repair (for hard-core poor and female-headed households);
- be environmentally conservative (wood scarcity in Bangladesh).

Housing rehabilitation interventions consumed a great deal of money and past evaluations found there were grounds to criticise their implementation and effectiveness. There are some interesting comparisons to the findings of an ODA evaluation of the 1988 flood relief:

- the 1988 report noted the housing interventions varied widely in design, cost, etc. This is still the case in 1998;
- the 1988 report found the response was very top-down and there was little community-level participation. This appears to be less of an issue in 1998;

- the 1988 report criticised the continuity and effectiveness of local coordination efforts in housing. In 1998, DEC agencies were quite positive about the adequacy of communications, preparedness and government-NGO cooperation.

The evaluation team concludes there is scope for opening up a dialogue among DEC and other agencies - with input from beneficiaries - to share opinions on why and how they approach this intervention. While recognising local circumstances, budgets and agency skills help determine the differences in the choices made, there should be room to learn about what works best and what might be a better solution in future emergencies.

Some questions for consideration are:

- repair, replacement or improvement?
- portable vs permanent design?
- cash or materials?
- procure materials or engage in production?
- grants or loans? (and terms of loans)?
- ownership and legal title?
- high-cost units for a few, or low-cost units for many?

#### **4.8 Vegetable Seeds**

Vegetable seeds were provided by many agencies in the immediate post-flood period. Seed packets mostly consisted of 5 to 7 nutritious varieties that were quick-growing in muddy conditions and suitable for plantation on small homestead spaces. Vegetable seeds were distributed free of cost and often to women who were involved in post-flood child nutrition or 'cash for work' programmes. There was great demand for this input and several agencies reported difficulty in obtaining adequate quantity and quality of vegetable seeds.

The Mission concludes that the distribution of vegetable seeds was a highly appropriate and cost effective activity with high, short-term returns to beneficiaries.

#### **4.9 Agricultural Rehabilitation**

DEC funds were used to provide crop seeds in the late rehabilitation period. Agencies reported that beneficiaries for this input were small farmers, owning less than 1.5 acres. The combination of seeds often consisted of rice, wheat, potato and pulses. In some cases seeds were freely provided, while at other times beneficiaries paid a portion of their costs with the returned funds being deposited in disaster funds for community use.

DEC being flexible in the use of funds meant that one agency was able to use DEC funds to purchase badly needed vegetable seeds in time for the first planting after the floods. Funds promised from an official donor for the purchase of crop have yet to arrive near the end of 1999!

#### **4.10 Cash Grants, Interest Free Loans and Micro-Credit and Disaster Funds**

In the immediate post-flood period, there was a great need for beneficiaries to have capital both for consumption and to re-gain productive assets that were lost in the flood. In DEC-funded programmes there was wide variation in the way that beneficiaries were



provided with funds in the rehabilitation period. The use of loans in rehabilitation activities is a relatively new phenomenon in Bangladesh and it is not surprising that policies and practices of the DEC agencies with regard to the use of grants or loans (and the terms of loans) are not consistent.

In some cases, grants were provided for beneficiaries to purchase rickshaws, boats and livestock. In some cases interest free loans were provided for agricultural production under 'soft terms' that included a long period for repayment of principal. In general, there was a tendency to issue soft loans with subsidized principal and/or interest and grace periods, rather than to follow the terms of current micro-finance practices in Bangladesh.

In other cases, loans were provided under the same terms as regular micro finance programmes. The provision of loans to groups of landless and poor women is a primary activity for many NGOs who were involved with the 1998 flood. Many of the beneficiaries for the relief and rehabilitation programme were those groups who receive micro-credit as part of normal programming. In the present development work, funding agencies have encouraged most NGOs to strive for self-sufficiency in their micro-credit programmes, through the collection of interest on their loans. Because of the beneficiaries' massive loss of assets and income-earning capacity following the flood, ADAB placed a 3 month moratorium on the collection of loans. This resulted in a heavy loss for NGOs running micro-finance programmes and although large NGOs could afford not to collect interest payments for 3 months, many small NGOs found this loss of income placed their organisation in an economically vulnerable position.

In the months following the moratorium on micro-finance, large NGOs have subsequently received donor funds to re-finance their credit programmes. Several DEC agencies have also provided grants to their partner NGOs to allow them to resume their micro-credit programmes upon completion of flood relief and rehabilitation activities. In several cases, the capital and interest in soft loan programmes is being utilised to form disaster funds.

The mission concludes that DEC agencies need to document this experience and discuss if and how funds are best used in the form of grants, soft credit, micro-finance credit and disaster funds. This is not to propel the DEC agencies into the debate over the value of credit as a development tool but to give DEC a better ground for assessing proposals and their implementation. The following questions need to be considered by DEC agencies at headquarters and in Dhaka:

- are they satisfied that it is appropriate to disburse funds designated for relief and rehabilitation in the form of credit?
- does the use of funds for loans, as opposed to grants, conform with the expectations of the donating public and the tenor of its fund-raising for people in distress?
- if credit is a good idea, should there be some consensus to reduce the variance in terms that they are applying to the loans?
- should there be a consensus on how the money recovered from lending is utilised (for example, to capitalise emergency preparedness funds)?
- is there any concern that relief in the form of soft loans is undermining the integrity of their and others' micro-finance portfolios?

- is it appropriate (in terms of skills, resources and relationship with their beneficiaries) for partners who are not normally in the micro-finance business to operate a loan scheme on a short-term ad hoc basis?
- does the DEC require more detail in submitted proposals on terms of lending and the disposition of recovered funds? (Most proposals do indicate which activities will be based on loans rather than grants but few of them describe the terms or how the loan funds will be managed in the future).

#### **4.11 Cash for Work**

Immediately following the relief stage, agencies used DEC funds in cash for work programmes, as a means of providing beneficiaries with income for household consumption needs, as well as to regain productive assets. Beneficiaries' labour was utilised for a variety of repair work for schools grounds, roads and market places. In some instances, the cash for work programme was done by using earth cut and carried to raise building sites above flood levels. Beneficiaries are reported to have preferred 'cash for work' to 'food for work' because cash provided them with greater expenditure choices and avoided delays in having to monetise the wheat. Agencies reported that 'cash for work' programmes needed to be stringently monitored to avoid loss in the distribution process.

#### **4.12 Flood-Proofing**

As a result of the successful use of flood shelters during the 1998 flood, several DEC partners have supported village committees to undertake such construction for future disasters. Utilising the labour opportunities provided under cash-for-work programmes, village committees have arranged for raised earthen platforms to be constructed on such common property as school compounds and market places. In some communities along the vulnerable river basins, Oxfam, Concern and ActionAid, along with their NGO partners are working with poor households to re-locate on flood-proof land. Individual or clusters of households are being assisted to either purchase land or to obtain government *khas* land for the construction of high earthen platforms. Village people have eagerly contributed portions of the labour costs and the housing materials. Such constructions will provide life and property security in disasters of either deep flood inundation or river bank erosion.

The Mission concludes that in view of the recent flooding pattern in some river basins (1987, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1996 and 1998), flood-proofing for vulnerable households is a highly effective use of DEC funds, utilised in the rehabilitation period.

## **5. AN IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF ORGANISATION, MANAGEMENT AND SPECIAL ISSUES**

### **5.1 Disaster Preparedness and Management**

Agencies all reported that the key to effective disaster management lies in disaster preparedness. That being the case however, the degree and type of disaster preparedness in the 1998 flood varied greatly among agencies receiving DEC funding. This is to be

expected, considering that more than 50 core partners were involved and, with the exception of BDRCS mandated to serve during disaster, that all agencies operate development programmes in Bangladesh.

Agencies who had incorporated “lessons learned” from the 1988 flood and the 1991 cyclone had taken steps towards disaster preparedness. Agencies such as Oxfam and CARE had well-developed Disaster Preparedness Units. In other agencies, the preparation of Disaster Preparedness Units was a “work in progress”. Having made a policy decision to work with partner agencies, Concern had only selected their partners in May of 1998, while ActionAid were in the process of developing the response capacity of their partners when the floods began in July. Several agencies that had intended to be prepared after the disasters of 1988 and 1991 had been caught up with other organisational priorities and had neglected attention to routine training and up-dated disaster guidelines. Several organisations reported that at the time of the 1998 flood, their response capacity was diminished because of policy, management and administrative changes occurring either at their head office or in Dhaka.

Seen from a collective perspective, however, DEC agencies have a wealth of experience in disaster preparedness and management. The 1998 flood has provided further opportunities for agencies to sharpen their perspectives.

The evaluation team concludes that in varying degrees, the DEC agencies have knowledge and experience of the following issues related to disaster preparedness and management:

- the need for effective flood-warning systems and the wide dissemination of that information;
- regional collaboration in disaster management;
- the use of maps to target benefits to flood basins and flood plains;
- communication systems with remote disaster areas;
- the pre-selection, contracting and training of core NGO partners;
- the value of up-dated and widely accessible flood disaster guidelines;
- the preparation of vulnerable communities in disaster action planning;
- the use of cash-for-work programmes to develop community-based flood-proofing;
- the use of needs assessment and household survey in beneficiary selection;
- methods of negotiation with local power brokers to enhance the distribution of benefits to the poor and vulnerable;
- the mobilisation and effective use of volunteers, local committees and women elected members in disaster relief;
- the development of stores and disaster supplies in accessible locations;
- the value of centralised, data-bases to provide rapid accessibility to such information as local resources, shelters and information routes;
- the value of working in collaboration with government agencies such as the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Relief and the administration at District and Thana levels, as well as the NGO Bureau and the BWDB Flood Forecasting Centre in Dhaka;
- the value and use of networking with agencies specialised in disaster preparedness and management, such as the Disaster Forum and others;

- the use of informal committees under DEC agencies, such as Christian Aid who were able to collectively plan and accumulate knowledge leading to effective implementation.

## **5.2 Accountability, Management and Reporting**

DEC reporting requirements, which consist of the 48 Hour Plan of Action, the 4 Week Plan of Action and a 7<sup>th</sup> Month Declaration of Expenditure Report provide an adequate basis for a review of an agency's competence to undertake relief and rehabilitation activities in the context of a particular appeal and to control for, report and monitor financial expenditures and operational activities.

After reviewing these reports, the evaluation team concludes there is adequate accountability and transparency in the reporting of the DEC appeal funds to satisfy donors that the DEC funds were used to meet emergency and rehabilitation needs for Bangladesh flood disaster in 1998/1999.

Agencies told the Mission team that the DEC reporting requirements were clear, flexible and reasonable. The DEC funds reached agencies in the field relatively quickly, the first disbursement of funds by October 1998. This relative ease of disbursement allowed agencies to finance planned activities on schedule. In contrast, one agency reported that a planned purchase of high yielding vegetable seeds had to be scaled back because of conditions imposed by EC funding. These delays meant that purchase of seeds could only be made in late 1999, a full year after the required planting time to meet the 1998 flood impact.

## **5.3 Coordination and Collaboration**

Coordination of efforts is important in disaster responses to ensure that duplication of efforts is avoided and to extend scarce resources to those most severely affected by the disaster. Given the extensive and recurring nature of disasters in Bangladesh it is not surprising to find that there is an extensive organizational infrastructure for disaster coordination. Such organizations are composed of government agencies, NGOs, academics and donors and during the 1998 flood, most DEC agencies related to one or more of the following organizations at a national level:

- Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief and its associated body, the Bureau of Disaster Management - established in 1991, with officers posted to District level, the DMB is the operational body, responsible for all disaster management within government agencies. Currently funded and provided with technical assistance by UNDP;
- The NGO Affairs Bureau – the government department responsible for approving all NGO plans. During the 1998 flood, this government bureau was reported to have assisted NGOs to avoid duplication of services and reach areas of the country which was not covered by others;

- ADAB – an association for many NGOs, which at the time of disaster, acts as a forum for information exchange and as an advocacy body to present of NGO views to government;
- The Disaster Forum – an organization (originally established by Oxfam) which facilitates the exchange of knowledge of flood-specific disaster, with membership from government, academics, NGOs and donor agencies;
- NIRAPAD – a constituted disaster management body (originally established by CARE) which provides an exchange of information and training, mainly for CARE’s core disaster partners;
- Disaster Preparedness Information Service – established under the PRIP Trust, this body provides disaster situation reports and arranges information seminars;

The local level of coordination was seen to be more effective than in past flood situations, particularly the 1988 floods when the local committees did not exist (See ODI 1988 report of relief efforts). The local level coordination was more operational and included local level disaster management committees comprising administration, elected officials, NGOs, local elites, volunteers and community representatives.

The government’s strong presence at district and thana levels and the efforts of government officers to coordinate the delivery of disaster services at district and union levels was highly appreciated by agencies and NGO partners. With a strong government presence and with a general public that was more aware of its rights to receive humanitarian assistance, agencies found it easier to curb the misuse of relief goods and services by local, influential and wealthy persons.

Agencies reported that in 1998, the public’s response to disaster was greatly improved over the response in 1988. This is attributed to a greater general awareness, improved communications and the extensive government and non-government development programmes to the rural areas over the past 10 years.

The BDRCS reports that both middle and upper class people made extensive volunteer contributions, with shop-keepers eager to contribute food and housewives preparing and donating cooked meals from their homes. Students throughout the country have been mobilised to prepare dried food rations and ORS packets, often working throughout the night. Several agencies have utilised student volunteers at flood shelters, feeding centres and on water distribution teams. Student volunteers were well utilised by District Disaster Committees to collect up-to-date information of flood conditions in distant unions and villages.

Oxfam and its partners report that that poor people in *char* villages have mobilised resources and taken decisions to move whole communities to flood shelters. The Dhaka Ahsania Mission delivered the bulk of their flood programme through the mobilisation of poor people who had been students at their literacy centers. In Dhaka city, poor rickshaw-pullers have contributed towards disaster relief from their meager, daily earnings.

#### 5.4 Disabled and Aged Beneficiaries

Most agencies reported that during the 1998 flood disaster, the provision of relief and rehabilitation services for disabled beneficiaries was weak. Although the disabled and the elderly were recognised as requiring special attention during a flood disaster, very few particular initiatives were available to specifically target those beneficiaries.

Under the general cultural perceptions of Bangladeshi society, it is assumed that elderly persons are cared for by the extended family. An assessment recently done by HelpAge International and funded by ECHO (Field Report, Older People in Emergencies, July 1999) indicates that increasingly, this is no longer the case. With increased levels of poverty, a weakening of extended family norms and the chaos that occurred in the 1998 flood disaster, elderly people tended to be left behind in the rush.

Older men often stayed behind to protect property and assets when the family moved to a flood shelter. Although this was often by their own choice, they were nevertheless abandoned to rising floodwaters. In normal times, poor widowed women are often responsible to find their own food, either by begging or scavenging in the community. During the 1998 flood, wealthier neighbours and Union Council members were often the only ones who had the political influence required to include poor, elderly widows on the lists for food distribution.

Cases were reported where elderly people, confined to their houses for many days were compelled to drink flood water because they had neither the physical strength needed to reach tubewells, nor the economic means to hire a boat to obtain clean water. Emphasis placed on extra nutrition for small children, pregnant women and lactating mothers often meant that older people were neglected in such supplementary diet programmes. Cases were reported where elderly women refused to go to communal flood shelters because their religious beliefs could not be respected in un-segregated conditions.

The HAI assessment indicated that the vast majority of older people found the destruction of their livelihood, combined with their ongoing poverty to be the most difficult of all problems and the one from which so many others stemmed. There were almost no programmes specifically targeted to assist the elderly to recover from loss of their income-earning assets, such as cows, goats and poultry. With the enormous demand for income-earning opportunities from able-bodied persons, the elderly were almost always excluded from cash-for-work programmes. Even on a routine basis, the elderly are not eligible for membership in savings and credit groups. Certainly with scarce resources and high demand in the immediate post-flood period of 1998, their exclusion was widespread.

Agencies that had been able to target disabled and elderly beneficiaries had done so only by using a house-to-house survey and the development of a distressed persons list, on an intra-household basis. As part of their preparedness programme, the Resource Integration Centre suggested that community disaster committees would most suitably be responsible for identifying and listing such distressed persons.

## 5.4 Gender Issues

All agencies had attempted to consider gender issues in their response to the 1998 flood. Several agencies had well-developed policies on gender in disaster and had provided this material in their guidelines and training with partner NGOs.

To the extent that women could reach distribution centres, food rations and relief packages were provided directly to women, with the expectation that, as women are directly responsible for food preparation, there would be little chance of misuse. Some agencies provided women with extra supplies in the food ration, sanitary napkins and extra oil for pregnant women and lactating mothers. Within a flood-stricken household, poor women with only one sari are often obliged to remain in wet clothes for most of the day because there is no private space to dry off. The BDRCS provided women with a sari, included in their food ration.

The issue of women's security was understood to be a problem for women who were sleeping outdoors along embankments and on city streets. At flood centres run by some DEC agencies, particular care was taken to assure the security of women. Nevertheless, in both urban and rural areas, there were reports of women being molested when they were obliged to sleep in open spaces. In some areas, women refused to go to flood shelters because of reports of sexual violence. Domestic violence increased with reports of husbands beating their wives and children when food-supplies had run out in flood-stricken households.

Following the peak period of the flood, several agencies provided effective services at centres for malnourished children, pregnant women, the aged and the disabled. On a daily basis, patients were provided with access to clean water and sanitation facilities, a cooked meal, curative treatment, education in basic health and nutrition and vegetable seeds. Although most of these centres were run with non-DEC funds, this example is provided to illustrate 'good practices'.

In the rehabilitation phase, several DEC agencies targeted women with the majority of their assistance, with the expectation that women's earning would go directly to the household's consumption needs. Oxfam and its NGO partners targeted nearly all of its cash-for-work programmes towards women, even providing an earning opportunity for elderly women by engaging them for child care on the construction sites.

Several DEC agencies reported that they had included women on disaster committees, both at community and district levels. Women were then involved in decision-making, particularly concerning the type and packaging of foodstuffs and the type of work and wages that were suitable for women in cash-for-work programmes. The BDRCS have a fixed quota for women's participation on their committees, known as Squads. Several agencies, including CARE and Oxfam have successfully managed flood shelters and nutrition centres by engaging women who were elected members of the Union Council.

DEC agencies have undoubtedly all had the best intentions to provide women with effective response services and indeed, there were many good initiatives to target vulnerable women with effective programming. However there were also several examples of wasted opportunities. DEC agencies that appeared to have weak gender

thinking in their regular programming lacked the conceptual framework required for gender-specific design in the 1998 flood programming.

## **6.0 RECOMMENDATIONS**

The evaluation team recommends that flood disaster mapping is a primary component of effective targeting and that such mapping of river basins and flood plains be part of basic disaster preparedness.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies routinely include search and rescue operations in their disaster preparedness plans. NGO partners can facilitate this process with vulnerable communities. Action plans for vulnerable communities should include lists of government and non-government resources available at district and union levels and knowledge of vulnerable areas and households within the locality.

The evaluation team recommends that the most accurate form of beneficiary selection includes the following methods:

- the selection of most flood-affected persons based on a Needs Assessment, conducted on a house-to-house basis;
- within households, the use of Most Distressed Persons lists to target the elderly, the disabled and the most vulnerable of female-headed households;
- the mandatory setting of targets for the most flood affected households or distressed persons, usually 15 to 20 percent beyond the partner NGO's regular clientele;
- careful monitoring, including the deployment of agency staff to work with the NGO partners in the field.

The evaluation team recommends that flood shelters, with adequate space for livestock is a highly effective practice in retaining some degree of economic security of households in the immediate post-flood period.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies, through a working group, develop a Guideline for good practices of health in flood disaster. The Guideline would outline an inclusive programme, including water, sanitation, nutrition, health education and curative treatment (essential medicines, treatment standard, referral), as well as effective delivery systems.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies concerned with future flood relief and rehabilitation activities utilise the experience of DEC agencies in rapid nutritional assessment. The 1998 experience is relevant for planners to: a) determine the optimum size and type of food ration for the general population; b) develop feeding programmes for targeted households and populations in vulnerable areas; c) assess long-term needs for cash-for-work, income generation and livelihood programmes.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies, through a working group, study the issues surrounding housing with view to clarification for their future use. It is unlikely that a firm standardisation of disaster housing is a reasonable or preferred goal.



The evaluation team recommends that the DEC agencies at headquarters and in the field discuss the issues of grants, soft loans and micro-finance operations, with view to coming to some broad consensus on operational guidelines.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies promote community-based flood-proofing as an effective long-term rehabilitation measure, utilising cash-for-work and other income-earning initiatives.

The evaluation team recommends that in light of their collective capability, the DEC agencies review their disaster preparedness and management capacity and that annual budget provision be made to strengthen that capacity, according to the agency's priorities. In future, the 48 hour plans should provide evidence of up-graded disaster policy, guidelines and training of the agency and its core partners.

The evaluation team recommends the following modest improvements to the DEC reporting requirements:

- The 4 Week Plan of Action should contain more analysis and assessment of coverage in relation to the most seriously affected areas and target groups; currently these plans offer only modest statements of intent regarding how needs are being assessed and how activities relate to those most seriously affected;
- The financial reporting is inconsistent; most agencies follow the DfID format for the financial report but not all; some financial reports show variances against planned expenditures; some reports show expenses against specific procurements while others are aggregated; DEC should review and agree on a financial reporting format and ensure compliance for reasons of accountability and transparency;
- As demonstrated in Table 1, there is significant variation in the amounts agencies charge DEC for administrative expenses. In some cases these are direct expenses for travel, or salaries but they may also include an element of indirect overhead costs. DEC should establish a clearer policy on allowable administrative expenses. This would seem especially important in light of the use of public funds in the DEC appeals.
- The Final Narrative reports do provide the essential reporting of activities and expenditures. A section on lessons learned and issues addressed would be useful as would maps showing coverage in light of the most severely affected areas.
- DEC Secretariat should clarify communications regarding the second round of pooled funds so agencies can plan and bid on re-pooled funds in a timely manner and be clear about the available amounts and conditions for spending these funds.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies in Dhaka consider grouping themselves informally as a "DEC Forum", meeting twice a year for the exchange of knowledge on particularly pertinent issues and serving as a consultative body for head-office DEC agencies. It is suggested that Oxfam be requested to initiate the process in 1999, which could then followed by a "rotating Chair".

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies develop policy to serve the disabled and elderly population during a disaster. Agencies will need to know what is the likely percentage of disabled and elderly in an average population. Disaster action plans should include specified quotas. Based on such policy, guidelines should be outlined to identify and list such distressed persons in community planning, as well as disaster plans, to provide them with service in both the relief and rehabilitation phases.

The evaluation team recommends that DEC agencies develop up-to-date policy perspectives on Gender in Disaster and that their staff and NGO partners are exposed to these concepts through written guidelines and training. Fixing quotas for women as participants will ensure that gender perspectives are promoted when programmes are widely implemented by a number of different players.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **PART I**

## **Evaluation of DEC Agencies Response to the Bangladesh Floods 1998**

### **Indicators for Evaluation**

#### **1. Introductory notes**

Floods can cause widespread damage (in terms of their scope and severity). In Bangladesh, over the years, they have been a major cause of death, resulted in huge losses of property and, in some cases, loss of livelihoods. In Bangladesh, floods often accompany other natural phenomena, particularly sea surges and high winds associated with cyclones. Land erosion and land loss (particularly when rivers unpredictably change course) and landslides associated with flash floods are common secondary effects.

The country, because of its geography, experiences seasonal flooding. In a normal year about 20-30% of the available land becomes submerged. However during the catastrophic floods of 1998, 78% of districts (50 out of 64) were affected to various degrees leaving an estimated 25 million people (23% of the population) in need of assistance – a huge challenge for the government and aid agencies alike.

#### **2. Disasters, disaster management and expected response in Bangladesh**

Because of its disaster proneness, Bangladesh has had considerable experience in disaster relief which is internationally recognised. Aid agencies and the government have had ample opportunity to learn from these experiences and incorporate lessons learned into improved practice. It is therefore reasonable to expect a more professional and better-coordinated response in Bangladesh than perhaps has been seen in recent emergencies elsewhere.

Disasters are also dynamic i.e. while disasters may be triggered by one clear-cut event, more commonly they are a result of a combination of various emerging factors, processes (such as underlying poverty and increasing socio-economic vulnerability) and sequences. As a result, the situation on the ground is often quite complex, varies from place to place and changes quite rapidly.

In parallel, local risk factors and specific needs on the ground also change over time, as do relative priorities. Disaster responses therefore should be based on thorough assessments and reassessments. Responses need to be dynamic and reactive to take into account the changing environment but they should also be proactive and anticipatory, as many (but not all) disaster risks can be predicted.

Responses should also be heuristic; incorporating lessons learned along the way (during the response process) into the analysis and understanding of what is appropriate, relevant and good practice etc (i.e. adapting the programme in the light of increasing knowledge and understanding as well as in recognition of changing needs).

### **3. The DEC's requirements for this evaluation**

The DEC is interested in themes such as:

- Accountability and transparency to donors
- Good practice (standards and standardisation, approaches, and quality control)
- Appropriateness
- Effectiveness (outputs and outcomes)
- Impact of DEC funding and DEC funded interventions (effectiveness + efficiency) including strengths and weaknesses
- Specific (often cross-cutting) issues such as:
  - Assessment processes
  - Beneficiary involvement in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
  - Gender, vulnerability, targeting and coverage
  - Collaboration, coordination and duplication
  - Management, accounting and reporting

It is also concerned to explore:

- The relationship between DEC funded activities and local disaster preparedness plans
- Whether agencies activities served to strengthen or impede existing coping strategies
- Learning (institutional learning and capacity building) but also whether agencies activities reflect lessons learned from previous flood emergencies
- The added value of DEC funds

However, as noted above, the disaster response has to be evaluated in the context of frequent changes over time, which has implications for the selection of indicators.

### **4. Implications for indicators**

Indicators therefore need to give insights into those themes at different stages of the crisis and for different sectoral interventions i.e. they need to take into account:

#### ***4.1 Preparedness and Emergency Assessments***

- The operational context prior to this emergency, disaster preparedness culture and evidence of having learned lessons from previous experiences
- Mitigation and preparedness of recipient agencies (state of readiness) and the relation to assessment and response e.g. level of preparedness and training for carrying out rapid assessments
- The assessment process, data gathering methods and data use

#### ***4.2 Acute Emergency Response (Response phase 1)***

- The response during the acute stage of the crisis (different types of response and different approaches in various sectors)
- Scaling up (both of the response and of agency systems and structures)
- Coordination of activities and information exchange
- Lobbying and advocacy activities in support of emergency response
- Reassessment according to changing needs, redefinition of needs/priorities

#### **4.3 Response Phase 2 (Immediate rehabilitation and recovery)**

- Transition from emergency relief to rehabilitation and a more developmental approach
- Recovery/rehabilitation interventions across the sectors
- Coordination, collaboration and information exchange
- Capacity building
- Monitoring, evaluation and review (e.g. did acute emergency interventions support or undermine future activities in these areas?)

#### **4.4 Response Phase 3 (Longer term rehabilitation)**

- Transition from immediate rehabilitation and repairs to longer term vulnerability reduction
- Longer term rehabilitation and mitigation programmes
- Lobbying and advocacy in support of vulnerability reduction
- Capacity building

### **5. DEC member agencies, their activities and implications for the evaluation**

The types of response carried out by DEC member agencies include:

- Search and rescue activities
- Emergency food aid provision (cooked/uncooked)
- Food security and agricultural rehabilitation
- Water, sanitation and hygiene promotion
- Health and nutrition
- Shelter and infrastructure
- Provision of non-food items (household, clothing)
- Credit/cash for work and micro-enterprise
- Lobbying and advocacy

The types of programmes include:

- International agency led own operational programmes
- Support (financial) for the work of partners
- Semi-operational support for partners' work (staff, technical advice, equipment, money)

The types of approach range from:

- Low key expansion of development programmes (more of the same) to a fully fledged emergency response
- An agency managed response (owned and managed by the agency) to a more community-based response (owned and managed to some degree by local community based groups/committees with agency support) etc

Because of the size and scale of this emergency programme and the time allocated for this evaluation, it is unrealistic to attempt a comprehensive analysis of all agency activities, systems and processes. Selective indicators are needed which will give insights into the different approaches adopted by member agencies.

## **6. Emerging themes**

Preliminary discussions and analysis of member agency reports (48 plans, 4-week plans and final reports) have identified a number of issues and themes:

### **6.1 Preparedness and assessments**

- Investment (or lack of) in training own agency staff/maintaining capacity
- Quality of assessments (and capacity of rapidly recruited staff to do these)
- Learning from previous disasters incorporated into this flood emergency. (e.g. existence of written guidelines, training manuals, availability of previous evaluation reports)
- Awareness of international knowledge/experience relevant to Bangladesh.

### **6.2 Phase 1: Acute emergency response (August 1998 – early October)**

- Timeliness and relevance of interventions.
- Breadth of assessments (e.g. simply an expansion of normal development activities with regular beneficiaries versus a broader assessment of needs across all target groups);
- Understanding of vulnerability (including intra and inter household issues)
- Good programme management e.g. clear aims and objectives (iterative) and information management systems
- Experience and training of team leader and decision-makers;
- Scaling up from development to relief mode (more of the same or specific relief responses;)
- Coordination, collaboration and duplication
- Good practice, standards and cost effectiveness
- Quality of the proposal and the reality of interventions on the ground (does what is described in reports match what is visible on the ground?)

### **6.3 Phase 2: Rehabilitation (October 1998 – April 1999)**

- Reassessments/redefinition of priorities
- Relationships with beneficiaries
- Relationships with partners
- Continuing food security issues/increasing malnutrition during rehab phase 2/3
- Issues not adequately addressed
- Good practice and standards in housing rehabilitation (given widely varying approaches and costs), micro-credit (and relationship to others activities) and agricultural rehabilitation (in light of the agricultural cycle)

### **6.4 Phase 3: Longer term rehabilitation (April 1999 onwards)**

- Appropriateness of interventions in this phase given the emphasis on rapid spending of DEC raised money

### **6.5 Impact of DEC funds**

- Timeliness of appeal given that floods peaked in early September and subsided at end of September (i.e. money became available after acute emergency phases)
- Use of DEC funds/additionality in the light of timeliness
  - Programmes driven by the need to spend DEC funds rather than objective assessments of needs?
  - Programmes driven by need of development agencies to maintain the support of beneficiaries i.e. the need to have to been seen doing something in existing project areas
- Accounting and accountability
- Quality/appropriateness of DEC's reporting guidelines and requirements.

## **7. Evaluation requirements**

The key purpose of this evaluation is to assess the appropriateness, effectiveness and impact, including the strengths and weaknesses, of DEC funded projects. In order to do this, a wide range of indicators are needed giving insight into:

- The relevance of interventions in relation to changing needs
- The quality interventions across the sectors
- Different aid agency management styles and competencies
- Agencies ability to operate in a complex political environment

Draft checklists are attached.

## **APPENDIX A - PART II DRAFT CHECKLIST**

### **1. Preparedness and assessments**

Mortality rates are often used as indicators to measure the severity of the disaster and the effectiveness of the response. Flood specific mortality varies by country and by area. In Bangladesh, flood related mortality is usually caused initially by drowning (and in hurricanes, through injuries caused by flying tin sheets, which are a common roofing material). Deaths as a direct result of flooding are often followed by an increase in endemic diseases and rising malnutrition rates related to both increased infection, poor shelter/environmental health and reduced access to food. Aid agencies should be aware of these problems and should be prepared to intervene to save lives (in the short term) and protect lives and livelihoods (in the longer term). Questions arising include:

- **About DEC members, their partners and preparedness**
  - Did the DEC member agency have a preparedness or contingency plan?
  - Were the DEC members and their staff familiar with DEC appeals and procedures?
  - Did the partner communities and organisations have preparedness plans?
  - Were they already in partnership with a DEC member agency? Did they know about the DEC and reporting requirements?
  
- **Institutional learning and assessments**
  - Did the agency know which were the worst affected areas in previous disasters, in terms of mortality, areas flooded and damage to property (map)?
  - Does the agency/partner know which were the worst affected areas this time?
  - How were risks and needs assessed and when/by whom (how were staff and communities trained and supervised, were reports produced/available/shared?)
  - Do written training and operational guidelines exist within the agency concerning assessments and emergency response? Are they accessible to staff, comprehensive and gender sensitive?
  - Do staff have access to reports, evaluations and documents concerning previous emergencies both in Bangladesh and elsewhere?
  
- **Putting assessment information into practice**
  - Where did DEC agencies target most of their resources in relation to the worst/least-affected areas and in relation to each other (map)?
  - How soon did search and rescue start (if at all) – within 48 hours of initial reports?
  - How soon did emergency interventions start in relationship to rising floodwaters i.e. within 48 hours, after several weeks or as floods subsided?
  - How did they relate/co-ordinate with other agencies/governments activities in assessments and response? (Gaps, duplication, map?)
  - What were priorities and how were they decided?

### **2 Acute emergency relief (Phase 1)**



## 2.1 Provision of emergency health services

### ▪ Health information

In the immediate aftermath of an emergency, health information is needed to assess the scale of the problem, determine priorities and monitor the effectiveness of interventions:

- Does the agency concerned with health care provision have access to appropriate health information? Is it routinely collecting or accessing data on mortality (deaths), morbidity (illness) and malnutrition? Did it actively seek out death data?
- Was an emergency health information system set up (by GOB or agency)?

Note: Emergency relief programme under control in Bangladesh = mortality less than 0.5 deaths per/10,000/day (I would expect the range in Bangladesh to be 0.25-0.5 per 10,000/day).

### ▪ Morbidity and disease outbreaks

Epidemics of diarrhoeal disease are uncommon in the immediate aftermath of a flood but can't be ruled out. They are more common as flood waters start to subside. There is however, often an increase in the "normal" disease patterns during the floods and immediately afterwards (up to 12 weeks afterwards and in some cases, longer). Disease surveillance activities are therefore crucial to allow the early detection and management of problems:

- What data were agencies using routinely to gain information concerning health risks and illness episodes (were they using data)?  
Were their programme decisions based on "hard health and nutrition data", risk and needs assessments or on other factors?
- Did the agency make contingency plans/link with others to prepare for possible disease outbreaks?  
What preventive actions did the agency take (i.e. latrine repair, water purification, mosquito net distribution and impregnation etc)
- Control of common health problems include:
  - Were aid agencies aware of common health risks, did they mitigate/prepare/deal with them or liaise with others in this field?

Problems which aid agencies should have anticipated include:

- Non-specific diarrhoeal disease
- Malaria (seasonal but also increases after 6-8 weeks when/as waters subside)
- Acute respiratory infections (often kills more than other diseases combined and its severity is under-estimated)
- Hepatitis (4-8 weeks later as waters subside)
- Injuries (from clearing away the debris)
- Animal bites/animal related diseases (closer proximity to animals/better reporting)
- Increased access to basic health care

Affected populations will need increased access to health care.

- Was this made available in project area/was it accessible/acceptable?
- Did all vulnerable groups in area have equal access?

- Were services accessed by males/females equally (did the agency monitor clinic use from a gender perspective? Remember that women often have greater health needs, are often less likely to use clinics – especially if staffed by men - and therefore often more likely to die)
  - Was ORS widely available, was ORS distribution carried out and was appropriate information given on its use?
  - Were staff familiar with the consequences of floods and associated problems?
  - Was access to essential drugs adequate (antibiotics and anti-malarials especially)? Was health care free/affordable?
  - Was health information/advice given out at clinics?
  - Was there a home visiting/follow up/outreach programme?
- **Public health interventions and safe water**
    - Was priority given to ensuring access to clean, safe water e.g. 3 litres/person/day = drinking (acute emergency period) and then 12-25 litres/person/day (all purposes)
    - Was there regular monitoring of water quality for faecal coliforms (i.e. were damaged and repaired tube wells tested)
    - If no chlorination/water treatment was possible, were water purification tabs used and what advice was given on their use (i.e. were water containers also given)?
    - Was there a distribution of water collection containers/2 per family of 10-20 litres plus 1 x 20 litres/storage
    - Was there ?1 rehabilitated water point per 250 people (what was the situation prior to the floods)
    - Did agencies ensure access to soap (i.e. about 250 GMS/person/month)
    - Were emergency sanitation measures put in place?
    - How many latrines were rehabilitated per head population (How does this relate to the situation prior to the floods)
    - Was hygiene promotion linked to water/sanitation interventions
    - Were vector control activities carried out in anticipation of problems (e.g. drainage channels for stagnant water, refuse disposal, malaria prevention activities)
  - **Health Overview**
    - Did the lead DEC agency in the area have a health overview?
    - Were public health activities integrated with curative activities?
    - Were priorities modified according to changing needs and changing community demands/requirements?
    - Were health activities accompanied by information sharing, lobbying and advocacy work?

### **3. Emergency food interventions**

- **Food and nutrition (short term)**
  - Were emergency food packages to those in need started within 48 hours (cooked if no access to dry land/firewood?)
  - Were regular food distributions started within days – for home cooking if dry land

NB: In Bangladesh those who have lost everything and have no visible means of support need all their food requirements to be met and should receive 2,100/kcal/ per person per day target. For others, either part or full rations may be needed. If totally dependant on food aid, rations should be balanced and aim to provide 10-12% total energy requirements as protein with 17% fat.

- Were food distributions based on assessment of nutritional need (how/when)?
- How were the needy assessed/identified/reached? Was this process consultative and transparent/were staff trained?
- Were all people eligible, informed about selection criteria and informed about the food to be distributed and their entitlement?
- Were targeting criteria developed/used/discussed and documented?
- Were food distributions monitored to ensure targeting criteria were met, reached the most vulnerable and were results documented?
- Were foods used culturally acceptable and appropriate (what about the specific nutrition needs of vulnerable groups (e.g. were energy dense foods available for children)
- Were families assessed and assisted with food storage items in the home and fuel?
- Were logistics/control/quality control systems in place? Were they efficient and effective (i.e. was there a regular food distribution plan and were deliveries timely and distributed on schedule or were they ad hoc)?
- Was there an exit strategy i.e. aim is to save lives and strengthen food security in the short term and not undermine food security and livelihoods in the longer term?

▪ Nutritional recovery/rehabilitation

If emergency responses are timely, efficient and effective, they should prevent large scale problems of malnutrition from arising. If, after several weeks/months, there is a marked increase in the proportion (%) of moderately and severely malnourished children (< 5years) then the relief effort could be said to have failed to prevent nutritional problems from emerging.

In Bangladesh, there is a chronic problem of malnutrition but baseline data from Helen Keller International [HKI] could be used to assess whether malnutrition rates have increased as a result of the floods. In some areas it may be possible to use such data to assess if DEC agencies interventions have contributed to minimising nutritional problems. Note that a significant increase in the % of children with severe malnutrition (<70% wt/ht or < -3 Z scores) indicates a major failing of the relief programme.

- Were there reports of increasing malnutrition after the floods?
- Did the aid agency do its own nutritional assessment/consider food security as a priority/anticipate nutritional problems? Was it taken by surprise by rising malnutrition rates (failure to learn from other experiences)?
- Were selective feeding programmes set up for moderately malnourished (< 80% wt/ht or -2 Z scores) or severely malnourished (<70% wt/ht or -3 Z scores) individuals? If not, how were the malnourished dealt with?
- Were these programmes closely monitored, linked to/integrated with other interventions (general food distributions, health care, vitamin A distribution and disease control activities) and well managed. Were selective feeding programmes

- backed up by general family food rations (essential for nutritional recovery in families with no resources)
  - Did the selective feeding programmes achieve good coverage (did all those eligible attend/were they enrolled)
  - Were foods and regimes culturally appropriate and sensitive to needs/demands on mothers' time?
  - What was the average length of recovery (4-6 weeks?)
  - Were there clear entrance and exit criteria?
  - Were international standards followed/known/adhered to or did agencies follow their own criteria – how did these relate to similar programmes in the same area?
- Food security (longer term) and agricultural rehabilitation
    - How were needs assessment carried out (how, when, why?) and was there any beneficiary involvement?
    - How was food security defined and how were agricultural inputs identified?
    - How were beneficiaries identified, targeted and reached?
    - Were seeds and tools programmes timely (given the agricultural cycle, appropriate to the local situation, and relevant to needs
    - Were tools and seeds of an adequate quality and appropriate in the local context (Where were they sourced/local availability/costs) (If local purchase = ? pushed up local prices?)
    - What other agricultural support, monitoring, advice was given (were distributions documented, followed up and was relevant advice given)
    - Were there unmet needs (articulated by beneficiaries but not met by the agency)?

#### **4. Emergency shelter and rehabilitation of infrastructure**

Many houses and local buildings were either damaged or washed away in the floods. Reconstruction should be rapid (to provide at least temporary emergency shelters) and low cost (taking into account the local socio-economic context).

More permanent repairs and reconstruction should also take into account other disaster risks i.e. Bangladesh is both flood prone and cyclone prone, but also in an earthquake zone. In a flood, cheap but secure housing that can be relocated on a temporary basis to higher land has clear advantages over more substantial but less flexible structures. In addition, during cyclones, many injuries are caused by flying tin sheets – a common roofing material. These should either be avoided in vulnerable areas or very securely fixed (-difficult in the Bangladesh context – better to avoid as a roofing material).

- Did agencies take into account other disaster risks during their reconstruction programmes ?
- Were temporary shelters provided in areas of greatest need and was provision for sanitation, water, washing and cooking included?
- Were the special needs of women considered (short term and long term)?
- Were the needs/wishes/contributions of beneficiaries included in the project?
- Were houses constructed at low cost but of reasonable quality/what was the cost per house built/family assisted?
- How long did the rebuilding take (i.e. from identification of need and of beneficiaries to moving in) and how does this relate to other agencies activities (better/worse)?
- How happy are the beneficiaries with the housing?

- What was the policy on cost sharing (i.e. were families expected to contribute to rebuilding costs, bearing in mind their reduced access to money in the post disaster period).

## **5. Non-food items**

- (e.g. soap, water containers, water purification tablets, blankets, cooking utensils, mosquito nets etc)
- How did items delivered relate to clearly identified needs?
- What was the justification for items (look for gaps/missed opportunities and inappropriate use of donated items)
- Was the quality/variety of commodities commensurate with needs?
- Was quality control effective (were items of an acceptable quality/durable and what about beneficiary feedback)?
- Were they delivered in a timely fashion?
- How were beneficiaries identified and targeted in relation to the needs in the whole geographic area?
- Was post distribution monitoring carried out (how/when)?
- Were there any major unmet needs

## **6. Cash for work and micro-credit**

- How were projects designed (ownership/assessment/definition of needs)?
- What were project aims and objectives and how were they to be measured?
- How were they planned and managed (ownership/community involvement)?
- How were participants selected (self selected/chosen?)
- What about equal opportunities (equal access to projects for equal need)?
- What were the rates paid/how does this relate to the national context?
- Were there any Knock -On effects (e.g. reduced child care at home, lack of availability to visit health clinics etc) ?
- How do emergency micro-credit projects relate to the many development projects (terms and conditions, interest rates etc) – is there a risk that some longer term projects may be under-mined?
- How were projects monitored/evaluated to check that they were reaching the most needy, were effective and produced the required outcome?

## **7. Reconstruction, rehabilitation and mitigation**

- Reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure
  - How were rehab needs defined/was the community involved in identification of priorities?
  - Were interventions timely/appropriate?
  - Who benefits?
  - What technology was used (sustainability and ownership?)
  - Costs and materials (durable and cost-effective?)
- Mitigation of future crises and preparedness
  - Has there been a reassessment of needs for flood/cyclone shelters and embankments?
  - Has the early warning system been reassessed?

- What have agencies learned from this flood relief programme?
- Have lessons learned been written down/changed the way the agency operates/thinks?

#### **8. Agency management and staff training**

- Does the NGO follow the Code of Conduct?
- Does it have an open recruitment policy (employs women at different levels)?
- Does it have its own staff capacity building/training programme?
- How are its middle managers and decision-makers trained, kept up to date and supported?
- How are staff supervised and monitored internally?
- Is it technically sound (does it have good technical advice in the fields in which it is operating)?
- Does it have an ethos of internal lesson learning?
- Is it willing/prepared to learn from others/share experience from others?
- What sort of relationship does it have with local partners ?( Big brother)?
- How are partners supported/trained/monitored?
- Does it have a clear idea of its own capacity: strengths, weaknesses and limitations?

## APPENDIX A – PART III - DEFINITIONS

The field of evaluations is fraught with jargon. In this document, the following interpretations have been used:

### **Accountability**

Describing what was done, why it was done and its achievement i.e. classic question is “was the money well spent bearing in mind the purpose for which it was given?”

### **Efficiency**

Measures the output of an intervention in relation to the inputs, assessing both the amount (analytical/quantitative) and the quality (descriptive/qualitative) of the work. Efficiency refers to the delivery of interventions that are both appropriate and timely, at a reasonable cost. Aid is efficient if it uses the least costly resources necessary in order to achieve the desired objectives i.e. the philosophy of maximum achievements for minimum costs. It is necessary to compare alternative approaches aimed at achieving the same outputs and comparing costs i.e. considerable project monitoring and management information data are needed.

### **Effectiveness**

Measures the effects of aid or an intervention in relation to the identified needs of the affected population and set objectives i.e. Aid may only be effective if:

- Needs are accurately identified (the aid planned is appropriate to needs) or if
- Objectives are set, based on assessments of need, and those objectives are then met

It measures the extent to which the intervention or project achieves progress towards its purpose and assesses whether this is due to project outputs or perhaps other (often-unrelated) factors. In order to assess effectiveness, there is a need for baseline information concerning the situation prior to the disaster, a well documented needs assessment, a clear aim (or goal) and clear objectives for the delivery of assistance.

### **Impact**

Looks at the wider effects of the project and attempts to measure outcomes (lives saved, disease episodes averted, livelihoods protected). It refers to the effect of an intervention on the beneficiaries and their immediate surroundings in terms of socio-economics, health and nutrition, cultural, institutional and environmental factors etc.

Impact can be:

- Short term or long term
- Intentional or accidental
- Macro level or micro level
- Negative or positive

Impact studies attempt to address the question “what real difference has this project made to the intended beneficiary population”. Impact assessment includes a combination of measures of efficiency and effectiveness.

## APPENDIX B

### Suggested Methodology for Field-based Assessment

#### 1. Background

Bangladesh experienced its worst flood in living memory beginning in July 1998 that continued for more than two months. It is estimated that over twenty million people were affected by devastating floods and were faced with scarcity of food, loss of shelter and unemployment. Livelihoods were so disturbed that some have still not recovered (particularly those effected by the 1999 flood).

For organising relief and rehabilitation activities to flood victims, DEC agencies with funds raised by the DEC Bangladesh Flood Appeal, utilized around £ 3.4 million to deliver different services to the flood victims involving themselves directly or through their local partners.

DEC is committed to an independent evaluation of the expenditure of these appeal funds:

- to increase transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the donating public;
- to enhance good practice in emergencies, through individual and collective learning;
- to identify the added value of the DEC appeal funds in the overall context of the humanitarian response.

#### 2. Major Considerations of the Evaluation

- To assess the level of participation of the beneficiaries in planning, implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation of the agencies humanitarian programme;
- To investigate how beneficiaries are determined and facilitated;
- To determine that most vulnerable are reached with the interventions;
- To focus on the issue of geographical coverage;
- To assess the adequacy of management, accounting , reporting and monitoring procedures by both members and their local partners.

#### 3. Methodology

Considering the diversity of interventions, the number of implementing agencies involved and the area covered, a rapid method is suggested to capture the required information at field level from different level of stakeholders. It is anticipated that qualitative information on the process of involvement of beneficiaries in the relief and rehabilitation activities, the satisfaction level of participants, long and short term impact of the interventions, and above all the lessons learned could be captured by rapid assessment.

A review of the concerned literature of the organizations will acquaint the evaluation team with the activities undertaken by the organization involved and to capture the primary and secondary information for the study To collect financial information and the



list of participants, secondary information is required. Books of account of the concerned organization including Master Role Register needs to be examined.

Discussion with the implementing agency officials and Focus Group Discussion with beneficiaries using checklist will be the appropriate method for data collection.

### **3.1 Issues to be addressed by the study**

#### **3.1.1 Data collection from the organizations**

As mentioned above the following issues need to be discussed and information collected from the organizations received DEC fund for emergency response through group discussion and review of relevant papers and document.

#### **Management capacity of the organizations**

- Disaster preparedness (contingency plan, area identification, necessary logistics, training for staff and beneficiaries etc.)
- Relation between Government organization with DEC funded activities
- Implementation plan for disaster response
- Involvement of different stakeholders
- Field deployment (time, person)
- Community involvement in project operation
- Partner selection procedure
- Monitoring strategy (indicators, who conduct, how, frequency, reporting)
- Evaluation

#### **Financial Issues**

- Accounting registers
- Receipt and expenditure vouchers
- Bank statement
- Persons involved in financial activities
- % of amount spent in different activities
- % of amount spent as operational expenses
- Financial Monitoring

#### **Implementation Strategy**

- Need Assessment (how, who, where, when )
- Selection of participants (process, criteria, emphasis)
- Types of interventions (as relief and rehabilitation)
- Quantity and quality of services
- Quality control of services
- Direct or through partner
- Involvement of beneficiaries in implementation

### **Lessons learned & future plan**

- In terms of:
  - preparedness, management, implementation, finance
  - donor response, participation of stakeholders
  - partnership

#### **3.1.2 Data collection from participants level**

FGD with direct beneficiaries need to be conducted to capture the below information.

##### **a. Participants satisfaction**

- Selection of participants (efficiency, transparency, criteria)
- Services received (including quality and quantity)
- Meets priority
- Effectiveness of the delivered services
- Management system (efficiency, effectiveness, who, how)
- Long and short term impact of the interventions
- Overall impression of the participants (service, organization, management, controlling, impact)

#### **4. Sampling Framework**

Operational areas of 11 International organisations including around 35 local organisations having thousands of beneficiaries have been brought under sampling framework. Beneficiaries focussed sampling would be complex, time consuming and involvement of huge cost as the sampling universe is reasonably large. Considering diversity of interventions, nature of organisation including coverage of area the sampling will focussed on the representation of area, activity and organisation. Beneficiaries will also be covered through at least one FGD under different operational area that will reveal the impact of the intervention undertaken by the organizations. To make a representative sample for the evaluation study, stratification of organizations in terms of criteria of intervention based on major activities (based on financial involvement) will be done as Table 1

**Table 1: Stratification of organization based on activities & types of intervention**

Agency	Emergency relief				Rehabilitation			
	Food	Health	Water Sanitat.	Cash	IGA loan	Ag. Seed	Housing	Other
Action Aid		3%		6%	47%		27%	16%
CAFOD							71%	14%
BRCS	78%							
CARE			13%				76%	
CH' AID	26%	13%	3%			44%	13%	
CONCERN	89%							
HAI	50%				23%		19%	
OXFAM	22%	2%	4%	22%	13%	6%	21%	
SCF	4%	5%		57%	25%			
TEARFUND	54%	6%		25%		10%		
W'VISION						90%		

**Note:** The rest % of fund used for Logistics/ Personnel / Admin, which is not mentioned here.

The table shows that except BRCS, Concern and TEARFUND, all the organization have Rehabilitation activities while Action Aid, CAFOD and CARE didn't have any relief activities with the DEC fund. Sampling will also focussed on the representation of both relief and rehabilitation work.

Area discrimination is one of the major consideration of the study and the representation from different geographical location is needed to be reflected in sampling. Broadly Bangladesh is divided in four Geographical locations which remarked as four old divisions. The table 2 shows the coverage area of the organization involved in DEC fund based on the four geographical locations.

**Table 2: Area covered by the organization received DEC fund**

Name of organization	Dhaka	Rajshahi	Chittagong	Khulna
Action Aid	Dhaka city, Jamalpur, Netrakona,		ChittagongUrban ,	Bhola, Khulna, Patuakhali
British Red Cross	Jamalpur,Mymensingh, Dhaka city, Narayanganj, Narsingdi,Tangail, Kishoreganj,Netrakona, Dhaka,Manikganj, Munshiganj	Kurigram,Sirajganj, Lalmonirhat, Rangpur, Gaibandha,Bogra, Rajshahi city Naogaon, Joypurhat,Pabna, Nilaphamari, ChapaiNawabganj,	Sunamganj, Brahmanbaria, Feni,Chandpur, Sylhet	Madaripur,Shariatpur , Gopalganj, Rajbari, Kushtia
CAFOD	Dhaka, , Jamalpur, Gazipur, Munshiganj,	Sirajganj , Pabna	Comilla, Madaripur, Chandpur	Rajbari, Jessore
CARE	Narayanganj,	ChapaiNawabganj		
Christian Aid	Narshingdi,Kishoreganj, Manikganj,Narsingdi, Munsiganj, Tangail,	Natore,Sirajganj, Kurigram, Dinajpur	Comilla, Chandpur,	Madaripur,Gopalganj , Bagerhat, Rajbari, Faridpur
Concern Worldwide	Jamalpur,Netrakona, Mymensingh,Kishoreganj , Tangail, Gazipur, Dhaka	Lalmonirhat,Sirajganj, Rajshahi Pabna,	Chandpur,	Faridpur, Shariatpur, Barisal
Help the Aged	Munshiganj,Manikganj,			Perojpur,

	Narsingdi			
<b>OXFAM</b>	Dhaka , Jamalpur,	Kurigram,Sirajganj, Rangpur,Gaibandha, Bogra,Naogaon, Pabna, Thakurgaon,	Sylhet, Noakhali	Madaripur Kushtia, Barisal,
<b>SCF</b>	Jamalpur,Dhaka,	Lalmonirhat,Gaibandha		Shariatpur
<b>TEARFUND</b>	Jamalpur,Dhaka,Tangail Sherpur, Mymenshingh,	Kurigram,Rangpur Gaibandha,Bogra, Naogaon,Pabna Thakurgaon,Dinajpur Natore,	Sylhet, Brahmanbaria	Madaripur,Kushtia,B arisal, Shariatpur, , Jessore, Bagerhat,
<b>World Vision</b>	Netrakona,Munshiganj, Narayanganj,Sherpur Tangail, Gazipur	Bogra,Sirajganj Kurigram,	Comilla, , Chandpur	Madaripur,Gopalganj , Bagerhat, Perojpur, Faridpur, ,

The table shows that Narsingdi, Munsiganj, Narayanganj, Manikganj, Jamalpur, Dhaka, Netrakona and Tangail of Dhaka region, Kurigram, Rangpur, Gaibandha, Sirajganj, Bogra, Pabna C.Nawabganj of Rajshahi region, Comilla, Chandpur, Sylhet and Brhamanbaria of Chittagong region, Madaripur, Gopalganj, Shariatpur, Faridpur, Rajbari of Khulna region are the most common areas where the organizational intervention took place. From various information from GO and NGO level these are the largely affected area by 19998 flood. While Perojpur, Khulna city, Chittagong city, Barisal and Kustia are comparatively less affected.

As it is mentioned that statistically representative and valid sample of the participants are hard to determine considering huge time, cost and persons involvement. Based on flood severity, geographical location types of intervention a sampling for beneficiaries and the organization will help us to determine the impact of DEC fund. Sampling also be done considering the % of fund used for the intervention of that particular organization. The proposed sample frame is given in table 3.

**Table 3: Sampled organization, area and activity for study**

<b>Name of the Organization</b>	<b>Area of the intervention</b>	<b>Partner organization</b>	<b>Criteria of Intervention for which participants FGD will be conducted</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
<b>Action Aid</b>	Jamalpur	BPKS	IGA Loan	Rehabilitation
<b>BRCS</b>	Sirajganj		Food distribution	Relief
<b>CAFOD</b>	Sirajganj	DAM	House construction	Rehabilitation
<b>CARE</b>	Narayanganj	PONCHAYET, SKP	House and Dustbin Construction, Van Dist.	Do
<b>Christian Aid</b>	Narsingdi	GK/ Mauchak	Ag.Seed	Rehabilitation
<b>Concern Worldwide</b>	Shariatpur	Local Club	Food dist., Medical Assistance	Relief
<b>Help the Aged</b>	Narsingdi	RIC	IGA Loan to older people	Rehabilitation
<b>SCF</b>	Jamalpur	Pradipan	Cash / Interest free loan	Rehabilitation
<b>TEAR FUND</b>	Gaibandha	Koinonia	Food package	Relief
<b>World Vision</b>	Comilla		Ag. Rehabilitation	Rehabilitation
<b>OXFAM</b>	Gaibandha	GUK	Housing repair/ construction	Rehabilitation

## APPENDIX C - PERSONS MET FOR DISCUSSIONS

<b>ActionAid</b>	<b>UK</b>	Ms. Catherine Dyson Ms. Pippa Howell Ms. Annie Heaton
	<b>Dhaka</b>	Mr. Nava Raj Gyawali Mr. Kurshid Alam Mr. Sarwar Mustafa Mr. Iqramun Hossain Mr. Iqbal Rahman Ms. Rahnuma Afin Ms. Humiara Aziz
<b>British Red Cross UK</b>		Mr. Alastair Burnett Mr. David Peppiat
<b>IFRC</b>	<b>Dhaka</b>	Mr. Julian Francis Mr. Alan Biggs Mr. Md. Rafiqul Islam Babu Mr. Md. Nurul Amin Bagmer
<b>BDRCS</b>	<b>Dhaka</b>	Mr. Sk. Sharif Ahmed Mr. Mihir Kumar Das Mr. Afsar Uddin Mr. Md. Abdul Halim Mr. Nurul Amin Bagmer
<b>CAFOD</b>	<b>UK</b>	Mr. Matthew Carter Ms. Mary Lucas Ms. Jo Wells
<b>Caritas Bangladesh</b>		Mr. Bitu D'Costa Dr. Benedict Alo D'Rozario Mr. J. S. Hawlader Mr. James Malakar Mr. Benjamin Rasario Mr. John Biswas
<b>Dhaka Ahsania Mission</b>		Prof. Md. Nurul Islam Mr. Abdus Samad
<b>CARE UK</b>		Mr. Jay Goulden Ms. Fiona Hackett
<b>CARE Bangladesh</b>		Mr. Michael Rewald Mr. Abdul Latif Khan Mr. Carlos Ani
<b>Christian Aid UK</b>		Ms. Mary Convill Mr. Mathew Pickard
	<b>Dhaka</b>	Mr. Md. Aslam

<b>CCDB (partner)</b>		Mr. Susanta Adhikari
<b>Concern Worldwide</b>		Mr. Dominic MacSorley Ms. Aine Fay Mr. Siobhan Boyle
	<b>Dhaka</b>	Mr. Siddiquir Rahman Mr. Louis Rozario Mr. Ashutosh Dey Mr. Takeshi
<b>HelpAge International</b>		Ms. Carmen Lopez
<b>OXFAM</b>	<b>UK</b>	Ms. Fiona Gell Mr. James Darcy Dr. Sue Chowdhury Ms. Monica Gomez
	<b>Dhaka</b>	Ms. Tahera Yasmin Mr. Anamul Haque Mr. Farid Hossain Mr. Suman Islam Ms. Smiua Arya Ms. Rebecca Sultanna Ms. Anjuman Ara Begum Mr. Zurfiqul Haider
	<b>Chowhali Thana</b>	Mr. Md. Habib Ullah Bahar (Manab Mukti Shangstha)
<b>RIC</b>	<b>Dhaka</b>	Mr. Abul Haseeb Khan Mr. Mainul Islam
<b>SCF</b>	<b>UK</b>	Ms. Sylvia Stefanoni Ms. Vanessa Herringshaw Mr. Peter Hawkins
	<b>Dhaka</b>	Ms. Martine Billanou Mr. Zahid Hussain Dr. Md. Abdus Sabur
<b>Tearfund</b>		Mr. Bob Hansford Mr. Ian Wallace Ms. Tricia Anderson
<b>Koinania (Dhaka)</b>		Mr. Dennis Dilip Datta Mr. Robin Mondal Mr. Edward Chowdhury
<b>HEED Bangladesh</b>		Mr. Elgin Saha Mr. Mannan Chasi
<b>World Vision</b>	<b>UK</b>	Ms. Susan Barber Mr. Richard Rumsay

**Dhaka**      Mr. David Nath  
Mr. John Christian  
Mr. Theofal Hajong  
Mr. Albert Rozario  
Mr. Thanay Rema

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Mr. Zahid Haider and Ms. Farida Shahnaz  
Coordinators, Disaster Forum

## Appendix D

### Evaluation Debriefing by the DEC Evaluation Team to Dhaka-based Agencies

October 24 1999

Dhaka, Bangladesh

The meeting was held at the BRAC Centre in Dhaka and attended by each of the DEC Dhaka-based agencies and/or a representative of one of their main local partners.

The meeting was called by the evaluation team to debrief DEC agency and partner representatives on some of the key findings of the evaluation exercise and to confirm these findings with the participants.

Roger Young, the evaluation team leader, opened the meeting by thanking all the agencies and partner organizations for their cooperation in allowing the team to conduct its work.

The team had been able to meet with all of the DEC agencies and/or lead partner organizations in Dhaka and to interview the key representatives of these agencies. The field investigations had been shortened due to the political disruptions in the region that the team had planned to visit. A shorter, more focussed trip was undertaken to view some of the flood rehabilitation work for very badly affected populations near to the Jamuna River.

The meeting covered the following themes:

#### **Partner- led relief and rehabilitation responses and the importance of capacity building for effective responses in the future.**

- Given the recurrent nature of natural disasters in Bangladesh, and the increasing use of local partner agencies to conduct relief and rehabilitation activities, the evaluation team believes that all participating agencies in the DEC appeal process should be able to demonstrate that they have undertaken disaster preparedness training of their partners as a condition for future participation in the DEC appeal process;
- Agencies will have to decide whom to work with, based on experience and elements of trust; discussion followed on how to judge a partner's capacity in disaster responses in the future as any given natural disaster will have its own characteristics and requirements and thus the nature of the response will have to change; some agencies believe that their comparative advantage lies in a single



type of response such as immediate food aid for example, and therefore, their capacity building will reflect this strategic response to disasters;

### **Targeting and coverage of relief and rehabilitation responses**

- The evaluation team recognises that this is a very complex and sensitive matter particularly in a context where need far outstrips capacity and resources to respond adequately; nevertheless it is the view of the team that more effort should be directed in the future to discuss targeting and coverage issues among the DEC and partner agencies; standards for beneficiary identification should be agreed before the next response; efforts in this regard would also help to mitigate the time intensive nature of need assessment in the context of the actual disaster response;
- Agencies responded by referring to the hierarchy of needs which are identified in a disaster response and that one should distinguish needs in the relief and rehabilitation phases of the response as these will differ markedly; agencies should respond to those who are severely affected and not just the regular target group; agencies need to undertake ongoing vulnerability and capacity assessments of their target groups to prepare for future disaster responses; partner agencies often face pressures at the local community levels which can influence the patterns of response in a disaster and this issue needs to be explored further; agencies should exchange information and experience on this set of issues too.

### **Coordination of efforts in the 1998 flood response and consistency in the response efforts**

- The efforts of Government, official aid donors and the non-governmental sector were better coordinated in 1998 than in previous major disaster responses, although some conflict and competition among these sectors does remain; most DEC agencies and partners had told the evaluation team that local level coordination worked effectively and that NGOs were able to participate in local coordination activities;
- The evaluation team had noted some important policy and operational differences in the responses by agencies; these were less important with regard to relief activities; in the view of the evaluation team agencies had to decide on appropriate quantities and commodities based on available resources and logistical capabilities; differences among the agencies were modest and not significant;
- The evaluation team did find significant variation in the response to rehabilitation needs of communities. Housing is a major requirement of affected populations and DEC agencies allocated significant resources to meeting the housing needs of affected communities; however, the evaluators detected significant variation in the nature and cost of this response across different agencies; while acknowledging that some variation is necessary to account for regional

differences for example, the team concludes that more coordination and consistency among DEC agencies would be desirable in the future;

- Agencies replied that standardization while attractive in principle would be quite difficult in practice in the case of housing where costs vary across rural and urban settings, the nature of the rehabilitation will vary among communities; agencies agreed that coordination at the local level would be effective and desirable and that agencies should task a lead agency to develop some guidelines for housing rehabilitation for future flood responses within a range of costs to reflect regional differences and to take into account community capacities to contribute to their own housing rehabilitation; guidelines will also have to reflect whether to repair or to reconstruct depending on the circumstances of the particular community and its needs; communities would also have to be involved in designs as they do not want a single design imposed from outside; agencies should also think about longer term issues such as the availability of land and access to Government-owned khas land; UN Habitat could be a resource to agencies for housing related issues;
- Some national NGOs had given families very modest sums for housing rehabilitation (Taka 500 equivalent to £6); this is wholly inadequate and most families will use the funds for something else;
- The evaluation team found that some agencies had provided rehabilitation funds on grant basis while other agencies had loaned funds to beneficiaries for their rehabilitation needs; this is an important policy and operational difference and should be discussed further among agencies prior to the next natural disaster response; as microcredit has become a significant development tool and used increasingly among the response agencies in Bangladesh, the decision to grant or loan rehabilitation funds will be a significant matter in the future in Bangladesh;
- Agencies responded by noting that grants should be given to any beneficiary outside the normal target group of an agency; agencies should not be faced with trying to obtain repayment of loans from outside their normal target group; there was agreement that beneficiaries should contribute something to rehabilitation especially for large needs such as housing but that this contribution could vary depending on the context; some severely affected populations may only be able to contribute materials and labour while other communities could make a financial contribution;
- There was a broad consensus that this was a new area for many of the agencies and that more sharing of experience and policies would be beneficial;

There was discussion regarding the need for and desirability of a more structured coordination among the participating agencies. The evaluation team has concluded that the DEC agencies and their partners have considerable expertise, experience and capabilities which could be shared to benefit future disaster responses. Participants agreed but noted that any formalized coordination would not be well received; a more

informal meeting of DEC agencies and partners perhaps twice a year to review specific themes, policies and/or issues would be more productive.

## APPENDIX E - READINGS AND REFERENCES

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**BANGLADESH EVALUATION DRAFT FINAL REPORT - *Comments received from the DEC agencies - 15/11/99***

AGENCY	COMMENT
ActionAid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>General</b> The report raises several interesting issues, although it goes into little depth on most of them – probably inevitable given the coverage and timeframe. To be most useful, DEC agencies will need to revisit these issues and use them as indicators for further research and discussion. The report has a generalised feel, probably due to the lack of identification of individual agencies (probably a positive thing at this time, given that some agencies are still building their approach to experience-sharing and joint lesson-learning) but also due to the lack of beneficiary interviews/anecdotes (and disaggregated analysis at beneficiary level).</li> </ul> <p><b>Two important lessons/questions which strike me are:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Targeting</b> The tendency of long term agencies to find it easier to target their usual constituents before other needy people (may be pertinent to the situation in India now, that is what govt NGO allocations based on existing work areas is effectively encouraging). This could result in those who are slightly better off (ie, already benefiting from long term programmes) being targeted above those who are worst hit by the emergency.</li> <li>• <b>Coverage</b> The need for a coordinated mapping exercise re needs and interventions, possibly at Sub Ops Com level, to look at gaps as well as duplication. And for DEC agencies on the ground to look at coordination and coverage issues at an early stage. (Not that DEC agencies are wholly responsible for all emergency needs, but we have a duty to reasonably respond across the board as implied by our appeals.)</li> </ul> <p><b>Specific Comments</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Participation of Beneficiaries</b> Not particularly addressed, other than for targeting. It would be good if future evaluations took this more into account across the various phases of the interventions.</li> <li>▪ <b>Beneficiary Rights</b> Very interesting overview re new concept of rights and increased bottom-up approach, increased coping and awareness of health issues.</li> <li>▪ <b>Operational Coordination</b> Interesting to hear that operational coordination was considered effective. The word on the ground is that it's still poor in some areas. It would have been good to have a bit more depth with examples of good and poor practices.</li> <li>• <b>Page 2</b> Worth mentioning the value to agencies of the joint appeal, in terms of the cost of alternative fundraising activities/mechanisms.</li> <li>• <b>Page 3</b> The analysis on targeting issues is a little superficial, given the complexity of the subject. We need to look deeper within each social context to come to these conclusions. For instance, there are some cultures where the norm is to share equally and specific targeting needs a lot of conceptual work first – and others where relief may reach the neediest even if not given to them directly.</li> <li>• <b>Page 4</b> Interesting point re the local appropriateness of long term agencies versus pure relief programmes. We need to further discuss these implications within DEC agencies. Good point on page 4 re working with the poor, not the poorest (see targeting issue above).</li> <li>• <b>Page 5 Variation on Loan Terms</b> Again, a coordination issue and need to learn. Complex, given existing NGO loan arrangements. Assume if more coordination and agreement existed in long term programmes, there would be a more uniform response re emergency credit.</li> <li>• <b>Page 8 Use of Funds for Rehab Activities.</b> It's very good to highlight this point that in the DEC is still a grey area. There seems an obvious need to include recovery work in appeals (and we seem to be doing a bit better this time re India) and ensure clarity over use of funds. Very much agree re need to document, review and share policy and practice. This is an important point.</li> </ul>

<p><b>BRCS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>General</b> A valuable evaluation focussing particularly on broad and practical cross-cutting issues. Concise report appreciated as are the salient lessons which will also be useful to BCRCS development programmes.</li> <li>▪ <b>Speed of Response</b> DEC appeal slow to launch. Could the agencies have responded in more timely and efficient manner? Was the delay of the GoB the only reason for this? What were the consequences of this delayed response?</li> <li>▪ <b>Poor Targeting</b> The main criticism of the report (despite some good innovations/initiatives mentioned). It would be useful to have more examples/information about this and about how this affected the quality of our response.</li> <li>▪ <b>Cost of capacity building</b> It was encouraging to have the 5% we allocated to capacity building spoken about positively at the meeting and that the report separated this out from admin charges. However that our transport/admin charges compared particularly badly with those of other agencies – for the purpose of clarification please note the following points: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. BDRCS has a nationwide coverage which exceeds that of other agencies and inevitably incurs greater cost.</li> <li>ii. Logs/admin costs quoted by other agencies are as low as 2% and cannot reflect the real costs incurred which must have been subsidised by the agency or other sources.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ <b>Timing of Presentation Meeting</b> Having the meeting prior to the finalisation of the report was preferable.</li> <li>▪ <b>Follow up Workshop</b> We would strongly support the idea of the workshop to ensure that we work on implementing recommendations. Although we support that it be held in Bangladesh if we are considering the wider issues about appropriateness of using DEC funding other than for immediate relief – e.g. micro credit, grants/loans, DP etc, might it limit the scope of discussions? BRCS will follow the majority.</li> </ul>
<p><b>CAFOD</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>General</b> Generally it is a well considered and written report. It has succeeded in addressing almost all of the terms of reference and presented the analysis in a way that is both brief and readable. It should thus adequately fulfil the DEC’s need to be accountable to donors and partners in the UK. The sections on the gender and the elderly are most welcome and present some immediate lessons here and use this report to contribute to ongoing work on disaster preparedness/planning.</li> <li>▪ <b>Cost Effectiveness</b> There is very little on the area of cost effectiveness apart from the OXFAM demonstration that the value of livestock saved by a flood shelter was 17.5 times the cost of constructing the shelter. Also whether or not agencies’ activities served to strengthen or impede existing indigenous coping strategies, although tangentially mentioned in connection with issues raised for vulnerable groups. Why was it not possible for the evaluators to undertake more in-depth analysis of cost and benefits? Are there some recommendations that the mission team could make in relation to DEC monitoring and narrative/financial reporting?</li> <li>▪ <b>Bangladesh ‘DEC Forum’</b> This proposal seems rather heavy-handed in the light of the frequency of Bangladesh disasters in which the DEC is likely to call an appeal. It is to duplicate ADAB and be side-stepped by more ‘opportunistic’ networking of staff and local NGOs.</li> <li>▪ <b>Accountability &amp; Lesson Learning</b> A big caveat with the DEC evaluation process is that the need for ‘accountability’ sits uneasily with the desire for ‘learning’ – both in terms of methodology/field work and in terms of the most suitable product.</li> <li>▪ <b>Page 2 para 1/3</b> ‘scale up’ is not an appropriate term for adding activities although it might be correct for a greater geographic coverage using the same programme and delivery model. In this context however it is misleading in particular when applied to agencies working through partners and in partnership. ‘Extend’ or ‘expand’ are preferable.</li> </ul>

<p><b>CAFOD cont.</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> <p>▪ <b>Loans vs Grants</b> <i>(Page 4/page 5/page 8/4.7 housing)</i></p> <p>i. CAFOD/Caritas experience through evaluation of a Revolving Loan Fund for housing after 1988 floods, found that many beneficiaries appreciated the feeling that they had ‘earned’ their new houses, having – eventually – paid for them through a loan. Thus rehabilitation inputs as loans, in some instances, result from the previous experience of agencies receiving DEC funds and of policies derived from this experience.</p> <p>ii. There is an inherent tension between an NGO with poverty alleviation programmes operating in the field of micro-finance and aiming for financial self-sustainability and that same NGO being asked to consider offering the same beneficiaries grant funding following a disaster.</p> <p>The latter completely undermines the sustainability requirements of almost all the sources of micro-finance capital. In the Bangladesh context, it should be noted that almost all B’deshi NGOs operating with external funding sources have credit components as part of their development programmes - by the equivalent of Government decree and the ‘screening’ of all development programmes by the NGO Affairs Bureau. This situation is unique, at least in my experience. The provision of rehabilitation inputs as loans rather than grants may thus reflect the conditionalities attaching to the ongoing development programmes of these NGOs, rather than their own needs or strategies. These floods have certainly challenges the micro-finance ‘industry’ and guidelines in the context of natural disaster.</p> <p>DEC agencies should ‘Watch that space... and challenge the B’deshi NGOs and the micro-finance pundits if they fail to deliver on this.’ Any further assessment by DEC agencies should await the outcome of Mitch – in which loan/credit programmes were also a prominent feature of the development work of the NGO partners.</p> </li> <li> <p>▪ <b>Partners and Partnerships</b> <i>(page 6 - first bullet point under cost effectiveness)</i> Almost all the DEC agencies work in both development and relief – as do their partners. The majority of these agencies have, over the past 10 years, made a substantial switch to working through partnerships rather than being themselves operational in dev. and relief. These strategies do not result from the 1988 emergencies but from agencies own reflections on how to improve the way in which they work and build towards sustainable impact – both in development and relief.</p> <p>There needs to be a clearer distinction between DEC agencies with an operational presence in Bangladesh working with local partners, and the DEC agencies working in partnership from the UK (particularly on page 17 bullet points on how agencies work.</p> <p>In general, working in partnership involves diminishing the ‘big brother/heavy stick/conditionality’ approach in favour of the empowering approach. ‘This is what we (N) think. You (S) do your own reflections and we will accept what you decide’. In this respect, whilst northern agencies responsibility may well be to include ‘careful monitoring’ (recommendation p32) as part of general disaster planning and preparedness with southern partners, it would not necessarily be appropriate to second/deploy northern staff to undertake monitoring in the field – and in Bangladesh it just would not work. How many DEC agencies have fluent/literate Bangla speakers who are experienced disaster/emergency monitors on their staff, ready for deployment?</p> </li> </ul>
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<b>CAFOD cont</b>	<p>Throughout the report there is a tendency to use the word AGENCY too loosely. This needs tightening up so that ‘DEC Agencies’ – UK headquarters/offices of inter-nation NGO ‘families’ are clearly distinguished from ‘Agencies operating with DEC funds’ which are almost entirely Bangladeshi – registered NGOs. It particularly needs tightening in the section on recommendations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Standards &amp; SPHERE</b> (page 32) There should be some recognition of the fact that the majority of DEC agencies have been working for several years to develop standards, namely ‘SPHERE Minimum Standards in Disaster Response’. The evaluation team did not look in any great detail at how far agencies implemented their programmes in accordance with SPHERE, however some local partners expressed difficulty with this – any information the evaluation team has on this should be fed into the evaluation report.</li> <li>▪ <b>Evaluation Process</b> A caveat with the DEC evaluation process is the need for ‘accountability’ sits uneasily with the desire for ‘learning’ both in terms of methodology/field work and in terms of the most suitable product.</li> <li>▪ <b>Page 51 CAFOD Areas Covered</b> please add: Gazipur, Munshiganj, Chandpur, Gopalganj, Madaripur, Rajbari and Jessore.</li> </ul>
<b>CARE Int.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Re Follow up Workshop</b> - Care Bangladesh has been extremely positive re the proposal particularly if they focus on issues relating to loans/grants for rehabilitation.</li> <li>• <b>Missing Figure</b> The total for Care International is UKL 10,166,865.</li> </ul>
<b>Christian Aid</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Recommendations</b> On the whole I would support the recommendations made by the evaluation team. More sharing of information/experience within the DEC network would be a positive thing. A DEC forum might be useful in that regard although issues of funding, time commitments etc will arise.</li> <li>• <b>Standardisation</b> I am not convinced this is achievable or desirable. Whilst we can agree on broad minimum standards statement of intent, trying to standardise a relief package, house reconstruction, cash for work package etc is not desirable.</li> </ul>
<b>Concern W.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>General</b> Due to the wide coverage of the areas and activities the descriptions are often very general, but the recommendations are often very helpful and overall the evaluation is good with some good suggestions for the future.</li> </ul> <p>For our learning purposes it would be useful to give names when referring to ‘several agencies’ e.g. ‘several agencies had well-developed policies on gender in disaster’ p30 where we are unable to identify which agency to contact.</p> <p>In several areas the report suggests Relief &amp; Rehabilitation in the form of credit. As the DEC forms only a small, though nonetheless, significant part of our overall emergency funding, an agreement by all donors would have to be sought on this one – I think ECHO would not agree to their funds being continually recycled although I could be wrong</p> <p>The majority of findings appear to be desk research based with very little in the way of field visits – e.g. only 1 ½ days for OXFAM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Page 5</b> ‘Some agencies reported the supplies of relief goods in the affected areas were more than adequate.’ As far as Concern observed, the supply of relief goods was far short of the demand of the 35 Million flood victims.</li> <li>▪ <b>Page 7/29</b> As far as Concern is aware, Disaster Management Committees normally exist in many districts, but are not functioning. We request the evaluation team specify the names of those districts where DMCs were functioning during the 1998 flood response.</li> <li>• <b>Page 28</b> As far as Concern understands, NIRAPOD is formed solely for CARE partners</li> </ul>

<p><b>Concern W. cont</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Page 34</b> ‘Fixing quotas for women as participants will ensure that gender perspectives are promoted when programmes are widely implemented by a number of different players.’ Concern doesn’t understand this suggestion because most of the participants in Bangladesh NGOs are already women. The quota therefore doesn’t seem to make sense.</li> <li>▪ <b>Page 52</b> Concern is unclear what ‘sample’ means in Table 3. At a glance, samples appear to be the places the evaluation team visited. The work done by using the samples needs to be clarified.</li> <li>• <b>Proposal for Meeting of DEC Agencies</b> The idea of DEC agencies meeting would need additional discussion. What about agencies that didn’t participate in this appeal but may in the next?</li> </ul>
<p><b>HAI</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Happy to let comments made at the meeting stand. Glad to see the section on older people</li> </ul>
<p><b>OXFAM</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>General</b> The findings from this evaluation are presented in a largely positive light and this is reflected in the constructive and forward-looking tone of the report. A particular strength of the report is the focus on realistic and practical recommendations. If implemented, these could help DEC agencies and their partners to incorporate the learning from successful approaches adopted in last years flood response and to develop the necessary strategies to avoid a repeat of the failures and weaknesses in the response outlined in the report.</li> <li>• <b>Targeting</b> The section on geographical targeting does not examine whether certain geographical areas were more effectively targeted than others were. Assessments by Oxfam advisors at the time of the floods raised important questions about the apparent lack of focus on the needs of flood affected urban slum dwellers, particularly in and around Dhaka. This included urban populations displaced into school buildings or onto the roadsides. The impression gained from Oxfam assessments was that the majority of agencies (including Oxfam) appeared to focus relief efforts on the needs of rural populations, when conditions in the urban areas, which were also very severe, were not clearly addressed.</li> </ul> <p>The issue of targeting in relation to the elderly and disabled is an area that many agencies will need to address more explicitly in future relief and rehabilitation responses (not just in Bangladesh). Likewise, the more complex issue around partners targeting members disproportionately to non-members (whose needs are often greater than members) is an area of the report that is rightly highlighted and is addressed in the recommendations section.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Food Assistance</b> Considering that over one quarter of DEC funds went into funding various forms of food distribution, this section is very brief and does not incorporate information, if available, on the effectiveness of the food aid response. For example, were there delays in the food response and what were the consequences of this? The work carried out by Helen Keller during and after the immediate flood crises suggested that a very high proportion of people, particularly the poorest (landless and female headed households), were forced to take out unusually high loans for consumption and that these debts, some 15 months later, largely remain unpaid. A long-term impact of last year’s floods has been the increase in levels of indebtedness among the poorest which ultimately increases their vulnerability to further shocks and crises, such as floods and drought. This raises many questions around the effectiveness of the response in relation to protecting livelihoods and in particular, the question of how loans were disbursed to assist those re-building</li> <li>• <b>Health</b> There are a number of assumptions made in this section that need to be qualified. First, it is stated that home visits made by paramedics were more effective than treatment from a boat. It is important to state what this statement is based on and to recognise that given the enormous pressure paramedic staff were placed under at this time, home visits would not have been feasible to achieve adequate population coverage.</li> </ul>

<b>OXFAM cont.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Housing and Loans</b> There are very important issues around equity and transparency in relation to how loans were disbursed and housing repairs/construction supported during the rehabilitation phase. As discussed at the DEC briefing in London last month, the DEC could facilitate a workshop in Dhaka with the in-country DEC agencies to discuss ways to harmonise agency practices in these areas perhaps through the development of agreed guidelines. In addition, the issues around targeting of the elderly, disabled, group and non-group members should also be addressed.</li> </ul>
<b>SCF</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <b>Rights of Children</b> We believe there is room to increase the emphasis on the needs and rights of children, given that children make up more than half of the effected population. All agencies (and DEC evaluators) need to ensure that children participate in all the elements of the intervention cycle (assessment/planning/implementation/monitoring/evaluation) in the same way as other groups, such as women, are supported.</li> <li>▪ <b>Role of DEC</b> There currently does not appear to be a sufficiently strong rationale to support the expansion of the role of the DEC beyond its current fundraising focus.</li> </ul>
<b>Tearfund</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>General</b> Tearfund have no major comments on the draft report - we felt it was clearly written and accept the findings. We have also consulted our partners who are broadly happy with the contents. The feedback session by Roger Young to the DEC agencies was also very useful and thorough.</li> <li>• <b>ToR Formatting</b> It was rather difficult to follow how the key questions from the Terms of Reference matched up to the key findings and sections in the report. A clear match in sections would have made it easier to see the extent to which the key questions were answered.</li> <li>• <b>Follow Up</b> The main issue for us now is how to follow up on the recommendations.</li> </ul>
<b>World Vision</b>	No comment in addition to those raised at the presentation meeting
<b>OSC</b>	Within the limits of time and space, the report is good and constructive with some useful recommendations. The naming of agencies for good practice but not for weaker performances is good. Psychologically it is a much better way to bring the other agencies along than naming and shaming. My only criticism is a level of tokenism in the approach to gender issues.