

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds

Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000

Volume I

Peter Wiles

Mark Bradbury	Manuela Mece
Margie Buchanan-Smith	Nicola Norman
Steve Collins	Ana Prodanovic
John Cosgrave	Jane Shackman
Alistair Hallam	Fiona Watson



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**Independent Evaluation of Expenditure
of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds
Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000**

The evaluation consists of three volumes, of which this is the first.
Volume I: Main Findings of the Evaluation
Volume II: Sectoral Sections (including a section on War-Affected
Populations and Beneficiaries)
Volume III: Individual DEC Agency Summaries



Overseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge Road
London
SE1 7JD
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7922 0300
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7922 0399
Email: hpg@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odi.org.uk



52 Great Portland Street
London
W1N 5AH
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7580 6550
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7580 2854

Further details about this evaluation can be found on the DEC website at :

www.dec.org.uk

*Cover: Roma refugee children from Kosovo, now living in Sarajevo.
Photograph taken by Peter Wiles during the evaluation fieldwork, March 2000.*

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Glossary

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ODI)
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Albanian Red Cross
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMI	Body Mass Index
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CA	Christian Aid
CAD	Children's Aid Direct
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CDC	Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID
CICH	Institute for Child Health
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMO	Civil Military Operations (analogous to CIMIC)
Concern	Concern Worldwide
CoC	Code of Conduct
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn/Soya Blend
CSW	Centre for Social Work
DA	Diakonia Agape
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DEM	Deutschmark
DFA	Irish Government's Department for Foreign Affairs
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DPT	Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine
DFID	Department for International Development
DRA	Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
DRT	Disaster Response Team (Tearfund's direct implementation arm)
EC	European Commission
ECEN	East and Central Europe Network
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDA	Edinburgh Direct Aid
EHO	Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation
EMG	Emergency Management Group
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPC	Emergency Programme Coordinator (Oxfam)
EU	European Union
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
ExCom	Executive Committee (of DEC)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FYROM	Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAI	HelpAge International
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Handicap International
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HoD	Head of Delegation
HPN	Humanitarian Practice Network (formerly RRN – Relief and Rehabilitation Network), ODI
HR	Human Resources
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IACU	Inter-Agency Coordination Unit
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHE	International Health Exchange
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOCC	International Orthodox Christian Charities
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPH	Institute of Public Health
IRC	International Rescue Committee, a US NGO
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JEFF	Joint Evaluation Follow-Up Monitoring and Facilitation Network
JTF	Joint Task Force
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice
KERP	Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KRC	Kosovo Red Cross
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCIC	Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MEECA	Middle East, Europe and Central Asia Team (Christian Aid)
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Mont RC	Montenegrin Red Cross
MRC	Macedonian Red Cross
MRE	Meals, Ready to Eat
MRT	Mobile Rehabilitation Team (BRCS-funded programme in Kosovo)
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MTS	Mother Teresa Society
MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Serbian Interior Ministry)
NAO	National Audit Office

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGHA	Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOVIB	Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation
NFI	Non-food items
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPF	'Help the Children' a Roma NGO in Albania
NRCS	National Red Cross Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONS	Operating National Societies
OPD	Out-Patient's Department
OPV	Oral Poliovirus Vaccine
OSC	Operational Sub-Committee of DEC
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe
PJA	Period of Joint Action
PLO	Protection Liaison Officer
PNS	Participating National Societies (Red Cross)
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontières
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RedR	Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief
REACH	Rehabilitation for Elderly and Children
RC	Red Cross
ROCC	Regional Operation Control Center (a coordination structure in Bosnia)
RRN	Relief and Rehabilitation Network (ODI). Now known as HPN (Humanitarian Practice Network)
SBASHK	Kosovo Teaching Staff Union
SC	Save the Children
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNI	Shelter Now International
SRC	Serbian Red Cross
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCK	Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA)
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, HCR
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VUSH	Vellazëria Ungjillore (Albanian Evangelical Alliance)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

WV World Vision
WVI World Vision International
YRC Yugoslav Red Cross

Overall Conclusions and Findings

This independent evaluation of expenditure of DEC Kosovo appeal funds covers the period between April 1999 and January 2000. The report describes the operational and policy issues, complexities and challenges faced by the 12 DEC member agencies in responding to the Kosovo emergency. The DEC agencies found themselves in the unique situation of working in a crisis in which the UK government was a leading player in the military conflict and also, as with other NATO governments, a major donor to and participant in the humanitarian response. For the agencies, this raised difficult issues of impartiality and neutrality.

The Kosovo emergency was regional in nature and comprised three distinct but interlinked phases: the rapid flight of Kosovo Albanian refugees into neighbouring countries, the almost equally rapid return of the majority of those refugees to Kosovo and the subsequent flight of Kosovo Serbs and Roma from Kosovo, mainly into Serbia and Bosnia. The international humanitarian response met most of the basic needs of affected populations in terms of food, shelter and water supplies, in spite of the speed and scale of these population movements, the threat of a hard Balkan winter and, in some cases, the difficulties of access. There were very low rates of mortality and an absence of starvation and epidemics.

The evaluation notes that many factors contributed to this outcome, of which humanitarian aid may not have been the most important. However, international assistance did improve the conditions of the affected populations and the DEC agencies undoubtedly made a positive contribution.

In particular:

- The assistance given by the DEC agencies was broadly relevant and appropriate to people's needs.
- The evaluation found many examples of good practice by the DEC agencies.
- In a context of sometimes poor coordination by international agencies, the DEC agencies mostly supported efforts to coordinate assistance and avoid duplication.
- The evaluation expresses some concerns about programme quality, particularly in areas such as assessment, monitoring and evaluation and gender analysis.
- The evaluation found that the DEC agencies have not yet all incorporated internationally agreed guidelines and standards on humanitarian assistance into their operations.

Given the highly politicised and militarised context in which the agencies worked, the evaluation found that:

- DEC agencies avoided excessive alignment with NATO and governmental donors in their responses, but rarely had procedures to guide field staff in their relations with the military.
- DEC agencies resisted the over-concentration of assistance on refugees in the camps in Albania and Macedonia by also responding to the needs of refugees in host families and host families themselves.
- The major proportion of DEC funds was spent in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo. However an important strength of the DEC money was its availability for use throughout the region and some DEC agencies were able to increase their response to growing needs in Serbia after the NATO bombing ended.

- The evaluation notes that the Kosovo emergency raised some important policy issues for the DEC agencies related to preserving independence, neutrality and impartiality in complex political emergencies and lessons need to be learnt from these experiences.
- Also noted was the lack of public advocacy by individual DEC member agencies on some key humanitarian issues, notably the plight of the one million people who remained in Kosovo during the NATO bombing campaign and the continued use of cluster bombs by the British government.
- The Kosovo crisis highlights how issues of protection can be just as important as the provision of material relief assistance in war-induced emergencies. DEC agencies need to pay more attention to this.

The scale of this most successful of DEC appeals challenged both the agencies and the DEC secretariat and the evaluation report makes recommendations about the strengthening of the DEC mechanism in future appeals.

Executive Summary

Introduction

On 24 March 1999, NATO forces launched air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) after the Belgrade government refused to accept the terms of the Rambouillet peace agreement on the governance of the province of Kosovo. The war between NATO and FRY, following years of political repression, violence and forced displacement in Kosovo, precipitated a major humanitarian emergency, involving the largest and fastest movement of people in Europe since World War II. The international response that was launched mobilised political, military and humanitarian assets on an unprecedented scale.

The Disasters Emergency Committee in the UK (DEC) launched its Kosovo appeal on 6 April 1999. This appeal, the largest in the DEC's history, raised over £50 million. Twelve DEC member agencies participated: the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), CAFOD, CARE International UK, Children's Aid Direct (CAD), Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help the Aged/HelpAge International (HAI), Merlin, Oxfam GB, Save the Children (SC), Tearfund and World Vision UK.

The Evaluation

The DEC commissioned this independent evaluation of Phases I and II of expenditure of the appeal funds. It covers the period between 6 April 1999 and 31 January 2000, and expenditure of £37 million. The evaluation has three related but distinct purposes: accountability to fundraising partners and the British public; promoting learning among DEC agencies; and monitoring of agencies' compliance to DEC rules and guidelines.

The evaluation took place between January and June 2000 with the evaluation team visiting Albania, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Varying amounts of DEC funds were spent in each country or province. Over 400 interviews were conducted with DEC and other humanitarian agencies, relevant government departments and war-affected populations and beneficiaries. A series of meetings and workshops with DEC agencies in the UK and in the region were held. A database containing over 2,500 documents was compiled and reviewed.

The large scope of the evaluation, the limited time the team was able to devote to Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, and the fact that the refugee emergency (of March to June 1999) was long past, were factors limiting the depth of investigation. The evaluation recognises that the agencies' responses in a particular sector or place cannot be measured by DEC expenditure alone.

In comparison to other evaluations of the Kosovo emergency, this evaluation offers an INGO focus, multi-agency coverage, review of a longer time frame and broad geographical and sectoral scope.

The Context of the Kosovo Emergency

The Kosovo emergency occurred at the end of a decade of humanitarian crises in the Balkans, arising from the wars of secession in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(SFRY) and the impact of post-Cold War political, economic and social transformations in eastern Europe.

In 1989, the Serbian Parliament revoked the SFRY Constitution of 1974, thus reducing Kosovo's autonomy and imposing control from Belgrade. This provoked a policy of non-violent resistance from Kosovo Albanians. They set up a parallel government in 1992 including education and health systems. When Kosovo's status was marginalised further in the Dayton peace negotiations in November 1995, peaceful resistance turned into armed struggle in 1996 with the appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

By 1998 the flow of asylum seekers from Kosovo into the rest of Europe and the perceived threat to regional security provoked an international response. In September 1998, agreement was secured to establish the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), whose purpose was to monitor and mitigate violations of human rights while a political process was renewed. NATO first threatened air strikes in October 1998 in support of US diplomatic efforts to secure Belgrade's compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199.

In early 1999 a massacre of civilians in Racak, deteriorating security and a contraction of humanitarian access provoked renewed threats of NATO air strikes. Dialogue between FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership was resumed in February at Rambouillet. However, when Yugoslav delegates refused to sign the agreement, the talks collapsed. NATO carried out its threat and began air strikes against FRY. Yugoslavia's refusal to sign was partly due to the controversial Military Annex of the Rambouillet agreement which included conditions for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the presence of a NATO-led peace implementation force with substantial autonomy of movement throughout FRY.

NATO's military campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, lasted for 78 days. It was suspended on 10 June 1999 when the Yugoslav army and paramilitary units began withdrawing from Kosovo, following Belgrade's acceptance of various 'principles' to resolve the crisis, including a '*substantial NATO participation*' in an international security force in Kosovo 'under UN auspices'. Once the air strikes stopped, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 authorising the establishment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The NATO peace implementation force — Kosovo Force (KFOR) — entered Kosovo on 12 June. The legality of NATO's action against FRY has been subject to intense debate.

The Humanitarian Emergency

Although NATO air strikes were intended to end the violence in Kosovo, the immediate effect was the opposite. FRY security forces expelled Kosovo Albanians *en masse* from the province. The extent to which air strikes precipitated mass displacement or whether 'ethnic cleansing' was pre-planned is disputed. At the start of NATO's military campaign, UNHCR estimated there were up to 260,000 persons internally displaced (IDPs) inside Kosovo. Following the commencement of the air bombardment over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refuge in neighbouring countries. This refugee crisis and the return of these refugees to Kosovo after June became the focus of the international humanitarian response, and of this evaluation. Since NATO entered Kosovo in June 1999, more than 200,000 people — mainly Serbs, Krajina Serbs and Roma — have left the province, most fleeing to Serbia and

Montenegro. Meanwhile, several thousand Albanians from southern Serbia have sought refuge in Kosovo and Macedonia.

The countries that bore the brunt of the Kosovo crisis are among the poorest in Europe. The impact of the crisis and the capacity and readiness of these countries to assist varied, depending upon their political stance, their ethnic composition, the presence of refugees from other conflicts and the prevailing socio-economic situation.

Albania provided refuge for the largest number of refugees — over 470,000 — having recognised Kosovo as an independent entity in 1991 and supported the liberation struggle. Macedonia, which took in the second-largest number of Kosovo Albanian refugees, was a reluctant host. Concerned at the impact that the Kosovo Albanian refugees would have on the country's ethnic balance, and on trade and diplomatic relations with Serbia, the government initially closed its border with Kosovo, leaving 40,000 refugees stranded without shelter for a week. Eventually it was persuaded by NATO governments to open the borders. Some 80,000 refugees were transferred to 28 other countries via the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, and a smaller number by the Regional Transfer Programme, supported by NATO governments. This 'burden sharing' was controversial, potentially undermining the principle of first asylum, but was important in persuading Macedonia to open its border with Kosovo.

During the bombing some 100,000 people sought refuge in Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia, fleeing from Kosovo and from the bombing in other parts of FRY. Over one million people remained in Kosovo during the war. Of these it is estimated that half were displaced.

Impact of the War

Kosovo was FRY's poorest province, with a GDP per capita of less than US\$400 in 1995 and unemployment of over 35 per cent. The province was heavily indebted. In addition to mass displacement, the war between NATO and FRY compounded the physical and economic damage that Kosovo had already suffered in the violence since 1989. An estimated 120,000 houses were damaged, 50,000 beyond repair, and over 90 per cent of schools and health facilities were damaged or destroyed.

The suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced was the most visible consequence of the war, but the crisis has had broader regional impacts. Albania hosted a refugee population that was equivalent to 14 per cent of its own population, threatening to upset the progress that had been made in stabilising its economy since the 1997 civil disturbances. In Macedonia, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Romania, disruptions in trade and transport, foreign investment and tourism have all had an impact on balance of payments and structural reforms. Macedonia claims the crisis has cost them US\$1.5 billion in lost trade and commerce.

FRY was already in a state of deep economic shock since the break-up of SFRY. The war inflicted further economic damage and humanitarian stress: inflation is over 100 per cent, official unemployment is at 40 per cent, and there are an estimated 500,000 'social cases'. Bomb damage to infrastructure and industry caused pollution, unemployment and disrupted trade. Sanctions have inflicted a severe energy crisis affecting 75 per cent of households. Tensions between Montenegro and Serbia have increased since the war, encouraged by the West through the lifting of sanctions on Montenegro, and the imposition of a trade blockade on Montenegro by Serbia in March 2000.

The International Humanitarian Response

The refugee crisis in the wake of NATO air strikes precipitated a huge international humanitarian response. Particular features of this international response include:

- A general lack of readiness, but rapid scaling up by agencies to provide shelter, food and health services.
- The unprecedented scale of the international response in terms of the financial resources available, and the number of agencies involved — as of 1 December 1999, two hundred and eighty-five NGOs were registered in Pristina (Guest, 2000)
- The critical role played by local NGOs and other organisations, assisting refugees accommodated in private housing and collective centres in Albania, Macedonia and Serbia.
- Weak coordination of the international response, particularly during the refugee phase of the crisis.
- The involvement of a number of commercial companies in camp construction, de-mining and security services, sometimes competing with voluntary humanitarian organisations.
- A strongly bilateral approach, fuelled by NATO governments, which saw the humanitarian and strategic military concerns as interconnected.
- The involvement of NATO forces in the humanitarian response while also being a party to the conflict, creating a dilemma for NGOs that collaborated with them.
- The politicisation of the humanitarian response in what was described by NATO leaders as a war of ‘values’ and in which humanitarian aid became a tool serving agendas and strategies that were not purely humanitarian.

A year after the refugee crisis, greatest progress has been made in meeting emergency needs inside Kosovo but reconstruction requirements remain immense. The Serb, Roma and other people who fled Kosovo have little prospect of returning home and constitute a long-term problem. The political ‘end-state’ is also uncertain: no time-limit has been set for UNMIK, and UN Resolution 1244 does not define the legal status of the UN Administered Province of Kosovo. Kosovo’s future will depend upon establishment of a credible governance structure that meets the aspirations of Kosovo’s population and promotes sustainable recovery.

The DEC Kosovo Appeal

Preparedness and initial response

In the period before NATO bombing began, some observers and some DEC agencies had predicted a crisis and the general possibility of refugee outflows from Kosovo. But there were few predictions of the speed and scale of the refugee exodus that would be triggered by NATO bombing. Indeed, comparable refugee flows had only occurred twice in the past 10 years, during 1991 in the Kurdish-Iraq war and during 1994 out of Rwanda.

Although some analysts have pointed out that the terms of the Rambouillet Accords were bound to be unacceptable to the Yugoslav government, there was a sense that predicting and preparing for an emergency was tantamount to admitting that the talks would fail. International agencies faced other political constraints to preparedness and contingency planning, such as the Macedonian government’s refusal to establish refugee camps and their

restriction on agency registration, concerned that the presence of INGOs would attract refugees and that the agencies were only there to help Albanians. Thus, the international community, including DEC agencies, was not well prepared and the scale and speed of the refugee exodus into Albania and Macedonia took them by surprise. By contrast, some governments in the region directly affected by the crisis had warned of refugee outflows, and some local humanitarian agencies were prepared. These agencies played crucial roles in receiving refugees before the international aid effort geared up.

There are three broad aspects to preparedness relevant to DEC agencies — access to, and use of, political analysis; presence in the region; and organisational capacity — that enable agencies to respond quickly to crises wherever they happen. In terms of the first, some agencies had carried out assessments and scenario planning in 1998 and early 1999. But warnings were rarely translated into specific preparedness actions. Indeed, some agencies faced financial constraints in doing so, because of limited donor funds for such activity, a particular problem for smaller agencies.

Other factors that determined the DEC agencies' speed of response include:

- Good relationships with effective local partners.
- Organisational commitment to emergencies: for example, investment in a permanent emergency response team.
- Well-designed and stockpiled kits that facilitate rapid response to a sudden refugee crisis: for example health and water kits, or emergency management kits.
- Central emergency contingency stocks: regional stocks in the Balkans mattered less because of the relatively easy supply routes from elsewhere in Europe, and some regional stocks had been looted.
- Well-defined and recognised expertise in a particular niche sector, supported by appropriate skills and materials within the agency.
- Ability to find and employ skilled and experienced staff at short notice: this was a major constraint for many agencies, and a variety of recruitment approaches was used, ranging from extensive use of specialist registers to advertising on the internet and in trade journals.

Appropriateness

Within the overall humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis, little emphasis was put on assessments. While this might have been acceptable in the first few days of the emergency, it is contrary to good practice and to the Sphere Standards. Needs were sometimes assumed rather than real. The reasons for lack of attention to assessments included the pressure to spend money within a short time frame, the easy availability of funding and the lack of pressure from donors to undertake assessments. These factors discouraged assessments, targeting and monitoring compared with situations of more limited resources. In Serbia, assessment of the IDP population was hampered by the sensitive position of humanitarian agencies whose activities could have been interpreted as spying or intelligence gathering.

The performance of the DEC agencies in relation to assessment varied. Sometimes it was overlooked, although there are also examples of good practice and assessments which proved to the agency concerned that needs were already adequately met and further assistance was

not necessary. DEC agencies usually delivered appropriate assistance when they focused on sectors where they had expertise, or coordinated closely with other actors and filled gaps.

Beneficiaries interviewed by the evaluation team reflected a diversity of experience and situation. But beneficiary consultation does not seem to have been prioritised nor the diversities taken into account in programme design. For example, although standard kits were appropriate for a rapid response at the earliest stage of the refugee emergency, little attention was given subsequently to whether needs varied between refugee groups.

a) Food: malnutrition was not a major problem and there was generally an over-supply of food aid in Albania and Macedonia. The percentage of DEC funds spent on the provision of food appropriately fell from about 17 per cent of expenditure in Phase I to less than 3 per cent in Phase II.

b) Non-food items: many refugees fled with few possessions and many returnees to Kosovo faced the approaching winter with little in the way of material possessions, warm clothing or shelter. In these circumstances, the decision by all the DEC agencies to use some of their DEC funding for non-food items was generally appropriate.

c) Health: given the low risk of starvation or epidemics, the DEC agencies were correct to give health interventions a low priority.

d) Water and sanitation: in the emergency refugee phase in the camps in Albania and Macedonia, DEC funds were used in the water sector and the work was of a high standard and contained many examples of good practice. The main weakness was that water was not always part of an integrated public health approach. Where sanitation and public health education were the responsibility of other agencies in the camps, poor coordination weakened an integrated approach.

e) Shelter: given the scale of damage inside Kosovo and the onset of winter after the Albanian refugees returned, shelter was an appropriate intervention for the DEC agencies. Seven agencies used DEC funds for shelter programmes, not only in Kosovo, but also in Bosnia and Montenegro.

f) Mine action: the danger of mines and unexploded ordnance tended to be over-estimated, although fear of mines certainly slowed down the humanitarian response in the early days of the return. It was therefore appropriate that two DEC agencies funded mine action programmes.

g) Schools and education: a high proportion of schools were badly damaged during the war. It was therefore appropriate that five DEC agencies supported school rehabilitation, although rehabilitation is an area which, strictly speaking, does not fall within DEC spending guidelines.

h) Community services: DEC-funded community services supported disabled and women's groups from Kosovo before, during and after the war, although again, strictly speaking, the long-term nature of some of this work in Kosovo may mean it falls outside DEC guidelines for use of emergency appeal funds.

i) Psychosocial projects: this area of work is dogged by definition and conceptual problems. Although the label was used by the DEC agencies, much of the activity referred to

community service projects. The cultural appropriateness of psychosocial work seemed to be insufficiently addressed in practice.

j) Information services: Kosovo Albanian refugees often expressed the importance of getting information in situations where families had been separated and when relatives living outside the region were desperate for news. Information services particularly focused on refugees in the camps, for example the provision of mobile phones for tracing.

k) Agriculture: DEC agencies gave limited support for agriculture programmes in Kosovo after the refugee return. At the time of the evaluation it was too early to judge the impact of these programmes.

Some innovative interventions were introduced by DEC agencies: for example, the introduction of a voucher scheme in Montenegro instead of kits, in order to give beneficiaries a little more choice and dignity; and the use of mobile and satellite telephones for tracing purposes.

Coverage

During the NATO bombing, affected population groups that were not well covered by the international humanitarian response included:

- the population left inside Kosovo;
- refugees/IDPs in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro as the focus was on Albania and Macedonia;
- refugees in host families as opposed to those in camps; and
- host families, particularly in Albania.

After the return of the Kosovo Albanians to Kosovo, affected population groups that were not well covered included:

- minority groups (mainly Serbs and Roma) inside Kosovo;
- Roma (IDPs, refugees and residents) throughout the region; and
- ‘poor/social cases’ in resident populations who had less access to assistance than IDPs/refugees.

Over 60 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian refugees who fled to Albania and Macedonia were housed in private accommodation — a trend that should have been anticipated based on past experience in the region. Generally, refugees in host families were less well served by the international community, partly because the high visibility of refugee camps was a magnet to NATO forces, donors, NGOs and the media. Consequently, refugees in camps received a disproportionate level of assistance. As refugees in Macedonia did not obtain refugee status but were *Humanitarian Assisted Persons*, access to free health services for refugees in private accommodation was often problematic. To a large extent, DEC agencies resisted the aid bias towards refugees in camps with a number supporting assistance to refugees in host families.

Although the majority of DEC expenditure (nearly 80 per cent) in Phase I went to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, a number of agencies were careful to respond to the needs of refugees/IDPs, albeit at lower levels, in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. As humanitarian

needs grew in Serbia, with increased numbers of IDPs, some DEC agencies increased their programmes. In DEC Phase II, just over 70 per cent of the money went to Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia (all but 7 per cent of it to Kosovo) and the balance to Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia. An important strength of DEC money was its availability for use throughout the region.

Some DEC agencies have attempted to provide assistance to ethnic minorities within Kosovo, although usually proportionately less than inputs provided to Albanians. In terms of reaching the Serb population in Kosovo, the DEC agencies appear to have a mixed record, although there are clearly difficulties of security and access.

Roma IDPs are a particularly vulnerable group throughout the region, partly because of their poverty and the discrimination they suffer. Some DEC agencies have been aware of their special needs and have prioritised assistance to them.

The refugee/IDP population, particularly in Albania, was sometimes perceived as being 'better-off' than the local population. There was great pressure on local organisations to provide assistance to their 'own' poor. There were differing judgements, and therefore practice, among DEC agencies about whether DEC funds could be used to support local 'social cases'. However, the Sphere guidelines do call on agencies to take account of and, where appropriate, assist local host populations.

There was little disaggregated information or analysis about the situation of women in general and female-headed households in particular. Issues about registration of women for relief materials or issues of female property rights in Kosovo were generally overlooked by DEC agencies, with one exception, or not addressed. This runs counter to established humanitarian guidelines, such as the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards.

Targeting appears to have been determined by resources available, rather than empirical need and made more complex by the large number of agencies operating with different criteria. Within Kosovo, targeting is particularly difficult, partly because aid is often seen as a reward for suffering during the war and a right due from the international community, rather than a response to needs. Also, remittances play a large part in the Kosovo economy but are very hard to monitor when assessing humanitarian need.

Protection

From the beginning, the crisis in Kosovo has been articulated as a '*crisis of protection*' rather than as a conventional emergency that can be relieved by the provision of relief aid alone. Thus, human rights promotion and monitoring were central to how the international community sought to manage the conflict before NATO's military action which, in turn, was justified as a 'humanitarian war'. However, this selective response to human rights abuses in Kosovo, compared with the virtual silence by the same governments over abuses in Chechnya, lends weight to those who argue that NATO military action in Kosovo was as much to do with European and US concerns to contain the threat of regional instability.

The forced expulsion of over 800,000 civilians from Kosovo during the NATO military campaign was the biggest and most visible protection issue. DEC agencies contributed to refugee protection in many ways, including: supporting UNHCR's protection role through staff secondment; advocating on asylum and registration issues, particularly in Macedonia; enhancing security of refugees in camps; and targeting assistance to refugees outside camps.

The biggest gap in the international protection framework during the war was in Kosovo itself. All international humanitarian aid agencies and human rights observers withdrew from Kosovo, so even a minimal protection strategy of witnessing was not feasible. There was a collective failure of protection until ICRC re-negotiated humanitarian access on 24 May. A few DEC agencies took some limited action, for example one called for urgent humanitarian access in April, another for a cease-fire and negotiation. A possible response would have been to inform the Alliance governments, in particular the British, of the potential humanitarian consequences of NATO's military campaign. Importantly, however, several DEC agencies continued humanitarian work in Serbia and Montenegro, directly or through partners, throughout the NATO military campaign.

Since the return of Kosovo Albanian refugees, the most critical protection issues have revolved around the protection of non-Albanians in Kosovo from physical violence, intimidation and discrimination. DEC agencies have been less active on these issues than they were about refugee protection despite the context of weak state institutions that are unable to fulfil their role in terms of welfare, justice and policing. This is partly because of the presence of other institutions that are mandated and better able to provide protection than NGOs. However, it is disappointing that protection issues appear in few agency assessments and that actions are not evaluated internally in terms of impact on protection. Instead, the primary focus has tended to be on relief, physical rehabilitation and the restoration of social services. Collaboration with human rights organisations has also been weak.

Effectiveness and impact

Most agencies have focused on monitoring output indicators relating to material distribution. Health and shelter programmes, for example, were monitored for the number of items distributed and roofs built. As is common in humanitarian programmes, these indicators are regarded as proxies for impact monitoring, despite the inadequacies. The monitoring of output indicators has been variable among DEC agencies. In Serbia, external restrictions inevitably decreased the amount of monitoring possible.

Few evaluations undertaken by DEC member agencies or their related networks have looked at the impact of their programmes, instead focusing on organisational and management issues. This is surprising, given that the Kosovo refugee crisis was the biggest mass movement of people in Europe since World War II. At the very least, opportunities for learning have been missed. However some end of contract reports and internal evaluations were of high quality and made important contributions to assessing the effectiveness of programmes.

The effectiveness of the DEC agencies' work has been very varied. There are examples of good practice in the refugee camps, for example in the water sector, but the evaluation questions the quality and effectiveness of some rehabilitation work inside Kosovo. Some agencies seemed to concentrate on their 'bit', paying insufficient attention to that fact that the impact of their interventions could be reduced by the non-performance of others, for example in infrastructure projects. Although this is an inevitable risk in situations where numerous agencies are jostling for work and coordination is weak, it is important that agencies take a broader and more integrated view of their work. This was particularly important during the refugee phase of the emergency. In Albania and Kosovo, the divide between camp management (including sanitation and environmental health) and the water, health promotion and medical agencies, detracted from integrated public health interventions.

In the context of large amounts of money from the DEC appeal and from other donors, several agencies commented that the pressure to spend funds within a limited time frame meant that some factors that would have contributed to greater effectiveness were overlooked.

Given the weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation noted above, it is difficult for the evaluation to make any detailed statements about impact. It is also difficult to differentiate the impact of DEC funded activities from others by the same or other agencies.

DFID has claimed that *'the overall impact of humanitarian assistance is reflected in the simple facts that no refugees died from lack of food, warmth, or acquired illness'*. In the evaluation team's opinion, the humanitarian response was probably not the most important reason behind this positive outcome on refugee morbidity and mortality. Although international assistance undoubtedly improved the conditions of affected populations, several other factors served to mitigate a major catastrophe, including: the good pre-crisis health and nutritional status of the refugee population; the short duration of the emergency and quick return of the refugees; the fact that two-thirds of refugees stayed outside the camps and were supported by the local population; and the assets retained by refugees (savings and remittances) which enabled them to pay for food and accommodation.

Efficiency/cost-effectiveness

Expenditure data from DEC agencies suffer from inconsistent labelling, insufficient breakdown, a lack of sectoral information and varying levels of detail. Thus, it has proved very difficult to make comparisons across agencies.

Almost no agencies have made any attempt to calculate cost-effectiveness indicators. Only one agency explicitly calculated expenditure per beneficiary. Nor have agencies made internal comparisons, whether in the same country, across other countries in the Balkans or across other countries world-wide. But this is not unusual and there are methodological difficulties, for example to compare the unit cost of roofs for very different types and size of house. However, making comparisons could have helped agencies to identify problems early on and may have helped in monitoring bias and impartiality. The abundance of money available to the agencies may have undermined any incentive to look at cost effectiveness issues.

Nevertheless, most agencies appear to have reasonably well-established procurement systems and there is no evidence of conspicuous over-expenditure.

As a number of DEC agencies increasingly work through international networks, accountability needs to be protected as money may be passed onto sister agencies. It is also important that a more complicated funding hierarchy does not increase overhead and management costs.

Connectedness

a) Local populations: The impact of the emergency on local populations in the region was mixed. In Albania some people may have benefited through charging rents and some infrastructure, such as hospitals, were upgraded. But a common sentiment expressed by host families was a sense of abandonment by the international community once the refugees departed. Most agencies left Albania and Macedonia precipitately as soon as the refugees

started to return to Kosovo, although the majority of DEC agencies did not follow this trend and have continued to work in both these countries, albeit on a much reduced scale, with DEC funds and other resources.

Since the end of the war, several DEC agencies have continued to assist local organisations and populations in Serbia who are hosting large numbers of displaced people, in a situation of severe economic decline, high unemployment and the infrastructural and environmental damage caused by NATO bombing.

The population in Serbia was hosting IDPs and refugees in a difficult context of economic decline with rising levels of unemployment and poverty. The local population has also had to deal with damaged infrastructure as a result of NATO bombing with some long-term environmental, health and social consequences.

b) Local capacity building: NGOs in the Balkans have grown up only in the last 10 years and therefore the need for institutional support is still substantial. Most of the DEC agencies have to some degree worked with local partners. The advantages of this approach included local partners knowing the communities and being able to draw upon a large force of local volunteers, thus potentially ensuring wider coverage. Local partners were sometimes able to respond faster than international agencies in the initial stages of the emergency, and continued to provide most of the support for refugees in host families. By working with local partners, DEC agencies thus supported the building of local disaster response capacity.

There were also some difficulties of working with local partners not unique to the Balkans. For example, some partners had little or no experience of emergency work and most were unaware of Code of Conduct principles, Sphere or other technical guidelines. Local organisations with a political or religious basis could jeopardise the impartiality of humanitarian assistance.

Collaboration was most successful where a partner had existing emergency capacity, or where an INGO had a previous capacity-building relationship with its local partner. It was also important for the INGO to provide close support to, and monitoring of, a local partner's work. Several DEC agencies have successfully used the emergency experience to strengthen the continuity of their programmes through the development of their networks of local partners.

c) Relief to rehabilitation transition: DEC Phase II funds have been spent within a political framework that defines the context as being one of 'rehabilitation' rather than 'emergency'. The start of the reconstruction phase in Kosovo was signalled at an international level by the July 1999 donors' conference. Given donor support for salaries, pensions and other social welfare benefits, opportunities to support a relief-development transition are better in Kosovo than in most countries in crisis. But there are some major obstacles: the lack of clear political framework for the province; the existence of two political systems (for example, Belgrade continues to pay welfare benefits in Serb enclaves); the underlying political complexity which means that all interventions risk being appropriated by different parties within the majority community; lack of coherence among multi-lateral structures and between donors.

As the flood of donor funding begins to dry up in 2000, this may threaten the connectedness of humanitarian interventions. Despite this, DEC agencies are often an exception to this trend of poorly connected emergency operations, and have maintained a presence in Albania and Macedonia, and/ or continued to work with local partners and local government.

Coherence

Coordination difficulties and weaknesses during the refugee crisis period have been well documented elsewhere, particularly in the UNHCR evaluation. Factors that undermined coordination included: huge input and competition between bilateral donors, combined with their unwillingness to submit to UNHCR coordination; the weakness of key UN agencies; the large number of agencies involved in the response; the large number of camps in Albania; and intense media scrutiny and pressure for profile.

Despite this context, most DEC agencies showed a commitment to coordination and were generally supportive of UNHCR's coordinating role. The DEC's Operations Sub-Committee (OSC) put great emphasis on coordination in its feedback to agencies on their 48-hour and four-week plans of action. DEC agencies also avoided some of the excesses of rampant bilateralism, for example the pressure from donors who wanted 'their' national NGOs to work in 'their' camps, particularly in Albania. But DEC agencies asserted that a DEC field-based coordination mechanism would not have added value in this emergency.

There is an increasing trend for DEC agencies to work through international networks for implementation. This can be positive for coordination if it rationalises the operations of INGOs in the field. But it also means that agencies need to spend increasing amounts of time on internal rather than external coordination. And in the pressure of a major high profile international emergency, network partners tend to break ranks and go bilateral as some did in the Kosovo emergency.

In Kosovo, there has been good coordination of humanitarian mine action work. In contrast, DEC agencies felt that coordination of shelter and school rehabilitation work was problematic. In both Albania and Kosovo, humanitarian information centres appear to have played important roles and facilitated coordination within the NGO sector and with UN and other agencies. Lessons could be learnt from these examples and DEC agencies should consider support for such ventures in the future.

Given the scale and the profile of the Kosovo crisis, those DEC agencies with an advocacy remit appear to have carried out limited public advocacy work during the Kosovo crisis. This ranged from calls for UNHCR's lead role to be respected and supported, to calls for a cease-fire and urgent humanitarian access during the NATO bombing campaign. It seems that agencies were limited in their scope for advocacy, partly because of the potential risk to staff on the ground — especially in Serbia — if controversial public statements were made. Also, some agencies found it difficult to agree internally on positions on which to base advocacy work.

There are two humanitarian issues on which agencies might have been able to do more advocacy work: access to and protection for the population inside Kosovo during the NATO bombing; and the use of cluster bombs by NATO airforces. Lack of advocacy on the latter is particularly surprising as a number of DEC agencies have been active in the anti-landmine campaign, and British forces continued to use cluster bombs after the US had stopped following concerns about the danger to civilians. Indeed, unexploded cluster bombs now represent almost as much of a danger in Kosovo as landmines laid by the Serb security forces.

As the NATO bombing campaign was widely described and justified as a ‘humanitarian war’, it is surprising that the NGO sector has apparently done little to analyse or challenge this concept.

Although the DEC presented both written and oral evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee hearing on Kosovo in May 1999, there was very little discussion or common ground on advocacy work among DEC agencies. Some have argued that it would have been impossible for any agreement to have been reached by the DEC grouping.

Performance standards

a) Code of Conduct, Sphere Standards and People in Aid: Over the past decade the humanitarian community has introduced innovations to govern the provision of aid in complex emergencies, in efforts to improve both quality and accountability. The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response of the Sphere Project, are two such innovations.

The evaluation team found that awareness and application of the Code of Conduct principles and of Sphere Standards was poor within most DEC agencies, their international networks and local partners. Although all DEC agencies are signatories to the Code of Conduct and most have participated in the Sphere Project, there was no monitoring of adherence to the Code in the planning and implementation of their programmes. There was no requirement from the DEC to report against the Code.

Kosovo was the first emergency in which Sphere minimum standards in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health could be ‘field tested’. Some DEC agency staff questioned the relevance of Sphere Standards in a European setting. Somewhat contentiously, some aid agencies argued that maximum rather than minimum standards needed to be set, given the level of assistance provided in sectors such as shelter. However, the evaluation team felt that most of the Sphere Standards were applicable, particularly those relating to assessment, monitoring and information systems.

The humanitarian intervention in Albania and Macedonia met most of the Sphere health indicators, but the evaluation team found that sanitation standards were often poor and standards of food and non-food items varied greatly from agency to agency and even within the same agency. Weak coordination meant that overall monitoring of standards was poor, although one DEC agency applied and monitored Sphere Standards in the provision of water to refugee camps, and another fielded a ‘Standards Consultant’ in Albania to draw up guidelines for operationalising standards in food provision and camp management.

Although five of the 12 DEC agencies are signed up to the pilot People in Aid ‘Code of Best Practice’ in the Management and Support of Aid People, some senior staff in DEC agencies were unsure whether their agency was a signatory or not. It is not possible to say how well agencies conformed to the code.

b) Humanitarian Principles: The Code of Conduct emphasises the fundamental principle of impartiality. But this was challenged by the nature of the international intervention in Kosovo and by the disproportionate scale of the international response compared with resources allocated to emergencies elsewhere in the world. While donor governments gave US\$207 per

person through the 1999 UN appeal for Kosovo, those in Sierra Leone received US\$16, and those in the Democratic Republic of Congo little over US\$8. This indicates that at a global level the humanitarian system is not impartial, but selective and influenced by political factors as much as by humanitarian need. Most DEC agencies identified this as an 'uncomfortable' issue and noted how the Kosovo emergency had sometimes diverted their staff and resources from other emergencies elsewhere in the world.

Similarly, the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo and the massive support given to Kosovo Albanians as refugees and returnees, gave the impression of a selective and biased response by the international community within the region. In line with this trend, the largest proportion of DEC assistance in Phase I went to support refugees in Albania and Macedonia and in Phase II to relief and rehabilitation in Kosovo. However, several DEC agencies did increase their assistance outside Kosovo, particularly to Serbia, after the end of NATO bombing.

The last decade has seen increasing military involvement in humanitarian activities. Kosovo was the extreme. For NATO and donor governments humanitarian and political objectives were blurred, not least in the assertion by NATO governments that they were waging a '*humanitarian war*'. In the words of the British Secretary of State for International Development: '*our humanitarian and military objectives are completely intertwined*'. This was most apparent in the bilateralisation of aid provision, and in NATO's support for and participation in humanitarian activities. For example, refugee camps were funded by donors, constructed by military contingents and managed by NGOs of the same nationality. The institutionalisation of military and humanitarian collaboration was apparent in the employment of military liaison officers by some agencies, and the secondment of humanitarian advisers to the military. Military participation in humanitarian activities in terms of logistical support is now common and, of itself, is not a bad thing. The key issue for humanitarian agencies in deciding if and how to work with the military in the Kosovo crisis, was that NATO was a party to the war, and that their military action increased the incidence of humanitarian need.

In contrast to NATO leaders, the UN Secretary-General noted the importance of respecting the distinction between humanitarian and military activities, stating '*if these lines are blurred, there is a grave risk of irreparable damage to the principle of impartiality and humanitarian assistance*'. The DEC attempted to define an appropriate division of labour between the military and aid agencies in its written submission to the House of Commons International Development Committee. That distinction was harder to maintain in practice. Most DEC agencies collaborated with NATO forces in implementing their programmes, taking advantage of their logistics or security to deliver assistance. Some implemented projects jointly with the military. Although several DEC agency staff expressed unease about too close an association, pragmatism ruled, probably to a greater extent than in many other emergencies where maintaining neutrality may be essential for sustaining humanitarian access and securing donor funding. Only two DEC agencies had established policies to guide staff on working with the military in Kosovo.

That neutrality was compromised was apparent to DEC agency staff in Serbia who felt threatened seeing their organisations on CNN in the Albanian or Macedonian camps, when civilians in Serbia were also suffering.

The DEC

This appeal demonstrates the success of the DEC as a fund-raising mechanism, raising record amounts for the Kosovo Crisis. One of the most positive features of DEC Appeal funds is the flexibility of their application. Thus, funding gaps could be filled, and DEC money could be spent in Serbia where it was difficult to raise donor funds. In this sense DEC money was politically ‘neutral’. DEC funds also enabled some agencies to get up and running while raising money from donors.

Weaknesses that appeared during this very large appeal included the lack of forecasting of appeal income and therefore uncertainty about how much money would be available to the agencies. Some agencies found that this, together with a complicated phasing system, made planning difficult. The evaluation team also noted the limited capacity of the DEC secretariat, for example, to monitor agency reporting or to share information.

The DEC is a collective mechanism for raising public funds to meet ‘acute human suffering’, and DEC agencies are expected to spend appeal funds within six-months of their receipt, or return money to the pool for redistribution. In the case of the Kosovo appeal, however, substantial amounts of DEC expenditure have been committed to rehabilitation activities. With such large sums of funds available, agencies found the six-month rule restrictive, constraining community participation and preventing slower implementation through local partners where capacity was an issue.

The decision of the Executive Committee of the DEC to a phasing of expenditure was welcomed by the agencies as an *ad hoc* way of dealing with the scale of the appeal income, but was complicated because phases overlapped. In practice, however, it has meant expenditure has stretched over a period of 18 months. As generous donor funding in the early stages is now drying up, it would be unfortunate if the DEC rules encourage a similar short-termism as needs continue. Currently the DEC approach does little to broaden understanding of crises within the media and general public, and does little to counteract a view that these are one-off events in which the problems will be solved quickly by money.

The DEC planning and reporting system comprises a 48-hour plan of action, a four-week plan of action and then financial and narrative reports to be completed one month after the end of the six-month period. The evaluation team found a number of difficulties with this structure. For example, the four-week plan of action is intended to provide the baseline information for the evaluation. But agencies often made substantial changes to their DEC expenditure plans later, in response to changing circumstances in the field and/or to changing fundraising needs. This may sometimes be unavoidable, for example, in the case of the sudden and unexpectedly rapid return of refugees to Kosovo. But there is currently no standardisation of procedure about informing the DEC secretariat of changes of plan. Final reports submitted by agencies were of varying quality and did not always follow the DEC format, making it difficult to aggregate how DEC funds had been spent both geographically and sectorally.

The experience of this evaluation indicates that all the three functions — audit, control and lesson learning — do not sit well together. For example, the scale and range of the DEC-funded programmes in a major appeal can be huge. It is not possible to carry out effective evaluations of those programmes, unless the agency itself has its own well-established monitoring and evaluation system in place. In this evaluation, the work of the team was facilitated when the agency had carried out its own evaluation. But this was not the case for

all DEC agencies and monitoring and evaluation systems were often weak. The DEC evaluation cannot achieve sufficient detail to be a substitute for individual agency evaluations, and an external evaluation can be a weak vehicle for promoting institutional learning and for monitoring compliance within the DEC system.

For a full list of recommendations refer to Chapter 13.

Maps

Regional Map of the Balkans



Map of Kosovo



1. INTRODUCTION


1.1 Background

On 24 March 1999, NATO forces launched air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), after the Belgrade government refused to accept the terms of the Rambouillet peace agreement on the governance of the province of Kosovo. The war between NATO and FRY, following years of political repression, violence and forced displacement in Kosovo, precipitated a major humanitarian emergency, involving the largest and fastest movement of people in Europe since World War II. The international response that was launched mobilised political, military and humanitarian assets on an unprecedented scale.

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) launched its Kosovo appeal on 6 April 1999. It proved to be the largest and most successful appeal in the DEC's history, raising over £53.8 million. Figure 1 shows the scale of the appeal in relation to those for previous emergencies.

Figure 1: Millions of pounds raised by DEC appeals

Adjusted for Inflation to April 1999 pounds



Twelve DEC member agencies participated in the appeal: the British Red Cross Society (BRCS), CAFOD, CARE International UK, Children's Aid Direct (CAD), Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Help the Aged/HelpAge International (HAI), Merlin, Oxfam GB, Save the Children (SC), Tearfund and World Vision UK.¹

DEC rules require an independent evaluation of the expenditure of appeal funds to be initiated in the eighth month following an appeal launch. *'The key purpose of the evaluation*

¹ ActionAid, Christian Children's Fund and Médecins Sans Frontières did not participate in the appeal. MSF has since left the DEC.

is to provide an independent assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the DEC agencies' response to the Kosovo crisis'.²

The evaluation is intended to:

Provide a mechanism for DEC transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the British public.

Enable DEC agencies to extend individual and collective learning on good practice in response to humanitarian emergencies.

Provide an internal monitoring mechanism for the DEC to ensure that agencies have performed in accordance with DEC rules and guidelines.

1.2 Methodology

Because of the size of the British public's response to the DEC appeal, expenditure was spread over four phases.³ This evaluation covers Phases I and II of the DEC Kosovo Appeal expenditure, the period from 6 April 1999 to 31 January 2000 covering the spending of approximately £37 million. The work of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) evaluation team⁴ took place between January and July 2000, with the main field work taking place in March and April 2000.⁵

Evaluation approach

The multiple objectives of accountability, quality control and lesson learning were considered in designing the evaluation. In addition, the approach emphasised:

Involving the DEC agencies and keeping them well informed by means of workshops and preparatory visits to their headquarters and field offices.

Obtaining the views of beneficiaries and war-affected populations by assigning two team members almost full time to this aspect of the fieldwork, with support from other team members.

Adopting a regional approach, visiting all the countries and territories affected by the emergency where DEC funds were spent, in order to develop a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian needs and responses.

The main report, Volume I, generally follows the structure of the Terms of Reference (ToR). The team has given additional emphasis to a number of areas that were thought to be relevant and important, including protection (Chapter 6), advocacy (Chapter 10) and the functioning of the DEC system (Chapter 12). Some attention has also been given to human resource issues in Chapters 3, 6 and 11.

² DEC Terms of Reference for the Kosovo Appeal Evaluation (refer to Appendix 1).

³ Phase I, 6 April-4 October 1999; Phase II, 1 August 1999-31 January 2000; Phase Iib, 1 August 1999-30 March 2000; Phase III, 1 January 2000-31 June 2000. A Phase IV is expected to cover the expenditure of any final funds remaining in the appeal.

⁴ In association with Valid International. For a full list of team members refer to Appendix 2.

⁵ Details of the evaluation team's timetable and informants interviewed can be found in Appendices 3 and 4.

The definitions of terms such as coherence and connectedness used in the ToR and the chapter headings follow the generally recognised definitions in the Relief and Rehabilitation Network Good Practice Review, Number 7 (Hallam, 1998) and the guiding questions in the ToR.

Information sources

The evaluation team drew on many sources of information, enabling it to cross-check data and clarify any contradictory information. The team endeavoured to discuss and check findings with DEC agency staff as the evaluation progressed.

Agency and key informant interviews: the evaluation team conducted over 420 interviews. In addition to the DEC agencies, over 30 partner organisations and 11 government departments were interviewed. Over 30 interviews were conducted with multilateral agencies, donors and INGOs. The interviews were semi-structured, guided by a standard check-list of questions based on the criteria and themes outlined in the evaluation ToR (refer to Appendix 1). Sectoral check-lists were also used and a questionnaire on cost-effectiveness issues was sent to each agency. Following the fieldwork, additional time was spent identifying further documents which were required, cross-checking facts and clarifying financial reports. Agency feedback on the draft report was an integral part of the evaluation as an opportunity to clarify data and to fill gaps.

Interviews with beneficiaries and affected populations: over 100 interviews were conducted with people directly and indirectly affected by the crisis (refer to the Section 7 in Volume II). This included 15 interviews with Albanian and Macedonian families who hosted refugees, 12 interviews with refugee/IDP families and 77 interviews with people who had received assistance provided by DEC agencies in Kosovo. Interviews were conducted with individuals, families or in groups. For practical reasons, the interviewees were mostly identified by the DEC agencies or their partners.

*Documentation:*⁶ key DEC-related documents that were consulted by the evaluation team included the agencies' 48-hour and four-week plans of action, final reports, internal reviews, monitoring reports and end-of-contract reports written by key staff. Due to the DEC reporting line of the end of February 2000, the evaluation team did not see Phase II reports until well into the fieldwork, and in some cases not until after the fieldwork had been completed. The evaluation team also placed a particular emphasis on studying the findings of other evaluations such as the UNHCR and Red Cross Movement evaluations (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000; Suhrke et al., 2000).

Observation: emphasis was placed on visiting projects in the field, for purposes of verification and appraisal. A cross-section of DEC-funded projects were visited, so that at least one project by each agency was covered. The time spent with different agencies and in each country was guided by the amounts of DEC money spent and committed.

⁶ The evaluation database includes over 2,500 documents, including those inherited from the DEC Lesson Learning report.

Meetings and workshops with DEC agencies: prior to the fieldwork, meetings were held at DEC agency headquarters.⁷ Joint meetings were then held with DEC agencies during the preparatory visit and fieldwork in each country, to clarify the purpose of the evaluation and to finalise logistical arrangements. These meetings provided opportunities for agency staff to identify issues which they thought the team should take into account.⁸ Four workshops with DEC agency staff were also held:

Workshop 1: held in London prior to the fieldwork, to update DEC agency staff on the progress of the evaluation and to feedback and discuss issues which had come up during headquarters visits and the preparatory visit to the field.

Workshop 2: held in Pristina at the end of the fieldwork, to review the strengths and weaknesses of the emergency response and issues arising from the fieldwork with DEC agency staff.

Workshop 3: held in London after the fieldwork, to present the draft report to DEC agency staff.

Workshop 4: held in London with senior DEC agency staff and DEC Secretariat staff to discuss feedback from the agencies on the draft report and key issues arising.

Peer reviewers: a peer review team of regional and humanitarian experts briefed the evaluation team on regional and thematic issues at a workshop prior to the fieldwork. A second workshop was held after the fieldwork for discussion and comments on the draft report.

1.3 Limits to the Evaluation

There were, inevitably, some limits and constraints to the evaluation team's work:

- The large scope of the evaluation (12 agencies, £37 million, six countries and territories, 10 months of operation in very varied contexts involving many different sectors) meant compromises in terms of depth of investigation. The team was particularly aware that less time was available for fieldwork in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia, although this partly reflected the balance of allocation of DEC funds.
- The scale of the response tested the DEC and agency systems to the limits. This resulted in, among other factors, expenditure reports of very variable quality, with some only being received towards the end of the evaluation period.
- The refugee emergency (March to June 1999) was long since over by the time of the evaluation, making it difficult to obtain the views of beneficiaries linked to the work of any particular agency. Unfortunately the earlier DEC Lessons Learning Study (Hallam, 1999) had only been able to interview a few refugees before they returned to Kosovo.
- A high turnover of international agency staff, particularly in the field, made it difficult to interview key informants with first-hand experience.
- The focus of the evaluation was on the use of DEC funds. In many cases, however, DEC funds contributed to larger programmes using money from other sources. The evaluation

⁷ Time limitations for these preparatory visits meant that three initial HQ meetings were by telephone and the preparatory field visit was to Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia only.

⁸ Time constraints meant that these meetings were not held in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia.

team therefore looked at those larger programmes, sometimes drawing on the findings of other evaluations. As is common in such situations, it was often not possible to identify the final end use of DEC monies.

- The focus on the utilisation of DEC monies means that this evaluation does not give a full picture of all of the work of the DEC member agencies during the Kosovo emergency.
- The practices of member agencies in informing the DEC Secretariat of the changes in programme plans varied considerably. In several cases it remained unclear to the evaluators exactly which programmes were covered by DEC expenditure and intensifying the difficulties of focusing the evaluation study.
- Within the constraints of readability, it is not always possible to fully differentiate between agencies when findings are described in Volume I. The evaluation team was aware of the many differences between the 12 participating DEC member agencies, in particular their sizes, which again raises the difficulties of making collective assessments. Volumes II and III of this report provide the opportunity for more detailed and differentiated information on each of the agencies.

Some factors were less problematic for the team than expected, most notably the weather conditions, security, possible disruption caused by the first anniversary of the start of NATO bombing and the obtaining of visas for Serbia. In addition, logistic arrangements were generally smooth due to the great efforts of the ODI Administrator and host agency staff in the region.

Further discussion on the role of this DEC evaluation can be found in Chapter 12 on the DEC.

1.4 This Evaluation in Context

A significant number of other major evaluations have been undertaken following the 1999 Kosovo/Balkans emergency (refer to Appendix 9). This undoubtedly reflects the scale, the profile, the political interest and significance of this particular emergency. It may also reflect agencies' response to increasing pressure for public accountability.

This DEC evaluation may differ somewhat from some of the earlier evaluations:

- It has an INGO focus.
- It has multi-agency coverage.
- It has a broader time frame and geographical scope than many earlier evaluations which have tended to concentrate mainly on the refugee exodus into Albania and Macedonia and not looked at other countries and territories of the region, nor at the start of rehabilitation work in Kosovo itself.
- It has a broad sectoral scope, including areas such as psychosocial work. It also includes a focus on beneficiaries in contrast to a number of the major evaluations that have tended to concentrate on institutional issues.

1.5 About the Report

Volume I of the report stands alone and contains the full findings and conclusions of the evaluation. The Executive Summary in Volume I is designed to be read alone and gives a substantial overall summary of the evaluation's findings and conclusions. Volume II contains appendices on sectoral issues and on beneficiaries. Volume III contains a summary of each DEC agency's activities and comments on performance.

The size and structuring of the report is a reflection of the multiple objectives of the evaluation as described in Chapter 1 (section 1) above and discussed in Chapter 12 (section 9), as well as the scale and complexity of the Kosovo emergency and the DEC member agencies' work.

Recommendations can be found at the end of each chapter and these are brought together in Chapter 13.

Place names and maps used in this report do not imply any political judgements or statements. Generally, place names used have followed common usage by the agencies (for example, Kosovo instead of Kosova). Macedonia is used for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Serbia is used to denote that part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia excluding the Republic of Montenegro and the province of Kosovo; Bosnia is used to denote Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. CONTEXT OF THE KOSOVO EMERGENCY

2.1 Events Leading to the Emergency

The Kosovo emergency occurred at the end of a decade of humanitarian crises in the Balkans, arising from the wars of secession from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the impact of the debt crisis in the 1980s and the rigours of adapting the socialist economy to the requirements of the global market (Woodward, 1995). The post-Cold War transformation of east European states from socialist economies and single-party institutions to free market economies and democratic political institutions, and the role that Western aid interventions have played in this, forms part of the context of the Kosovo emergency and the international response.

As a province of Serbia, Kosovo⁹ had a significant degree of autonomy under the 1974 SFRY Constitution. When this was revoked in 1989 by the Serbian parliament, and approved by the other Yugoslav republics, protests by miners, students and other Kosovo Albanians led Belgrade to assume control over the province's police, courts, and social, economic and education polices. In July 1990, Kosovo Albanians proclaimed Kosovo's independence. A policy of non-violent resistance was adopted, with a parallel government elected in 1992 and parallel education and health systems financed through a 3 per cent tax on remittances from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora and domestic economic activity. By 1996 peaceful resistance had turned into an armed struggle. When the issue of Kosovo's status was not addressed in the November 1995 Dayton Peace negotiations to end the war in Bosnia, support for those proposing violence grew. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which first engaged in terrorist attacks on police in 1992, emerged in 1996 to lead the armed resistance and was assisted in its cause by weapons looted during civil disturbances in Albania in 1997. As late as March 1998, an American envoy for Kosovo accepted Belgrade's characterisation of the KLA as 'terrorists' and Western vacillation until September 1998 gave the impression of tacit support for Belgrade's counter-insurgency campaign.¹⁰

By 1998, Kosovo could no longer be ignored, as political violence and human rights abuses by the Yugoslav authorities against civilians increased the flow of asylum seekers in Europe.¹¹ In the spring of 1998, when action by Serbian internal security forces in western Kosovo forced 20,000 Kosovo Albanians to seek refuge in Albania, the threat to regional security drew an international response.¹² The Contact Group called for negotiations on Kosovo's autonomy and in March, the North Atlantic Council stated, '*NATO and the international community have a legitimate interest in developments in Kosovo, inter alia*

⁹ After 1989 called in Serbia by the province's pre-1968 name, Kosovo and Metohija (the latter referring to the 'church lands' of the western part).

¹⁰ US Special Envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, quoted in Pristina in February 1998 (Chomsky, 1999).

¹¹ Between 1990 and 1995, 350,000 Kosovo Albanians sought asylum in Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and other European countries — almost half the total that fled in 1999 (ICG, 1998). In 1996, when Germany signed an agreement with Yugoslavia to repatriate Kosovars, it had been asked by the Council of Europe to grant them 'temporary protection'.

¹² Between 1997 and 1998 the number of asylum seekers in Europe from FRY increased by 200 per cent, most from Kosovo (Suhrke et al, 2000).

because of their impact on the stability of the whole region which is of concern to the Alliance' (ICG, 1998).

Western European governments' concern about asylum seekers was apparent during the 1999 refugee crisis when Italy, for example, asked UNHCR to establish a '*first line of defence*' and spoke of '*humanitarian containment*' (Suhrke et al, 2000).

Failure to resolve the conflict through dialogue drew NATO increasingly along a path of military confrontation. As early as June 1998, NATO Defence Ministers threatened air strikes in support of US diplomatic efforts. In October, NATO tasked planners to draw up military options to secure Belgrade's compliance with UN Security Council resolution 1199. Adopted in September 1998, this had demanded a cease-fire, dialogue and an international presence to monitor the withdrawal of security forces to their pre-March 1998 levels. When agreement was secured on the establishment of an Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), a 2,300-strong international 'extraction force' for the KVM was also deployed in Macedonia. The declared purpose of the OSCE-KVM was to monitor and mitigate violations of human rights while a political process was renewed (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999).

A massacre of civilians in Racak in January 1999, deteriorating security and a contraction of humanitarian access provoked renewed threats of NATO air strikes. In February, shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Pristina was replaced by direct negotiations, under joint US and EU auspices, between FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership at Rambouillet in France. The first round of talks was over an agreement drawn up by American negotiators on substantial autonomy for the province for three years; the disarming of the KLA; the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces; and the presence of a 30,000 strong NATO-led 'enabling force' to maintain the cease-fire. A second round of talks in March collapsed when Yugoslav delegates refused to sign the agreement. Interpretations for the failure differ, but revolve around the Military Annex of the agreement covering conditions for the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and the presence of a NATO-led peace implementation force with substantial freedom of movement throughout FRY. Some have argued that the terms of the agreement were designed to be unacceptable to the Belgrade leadership (Pugh, 2000). The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee concluded that, '*NATO was guilty of a serious blunder in allowing a Status of Forces Agreement into the (Rambouillet) package which would never have been acceptable to the Yugoslav side, since it was a significant infringement of sovereignty*' (House of Commons, 2000).

On 24 March 1999, after an ultimatum from US envoy Richard Holbrooke to Slobodan Milosevic failed to persuade Belgrade to reduce its forces in Kosovo to the pre-March 1998 levels and accept the Rambouillet agreement, NATO began air strikes against FRY. The military campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, lasted for 78 days. It was suspended on 10 June when the Yugoslav army and internal security units began withdrawing from Kosovo. This followed the June 9 Kumanovo Agreement (the Military Technical Agreement) between military officers from NATO and Yugoslavia military officers by which Yugoslavia accepted various 'principles' to resolve the crisis, including a '*substantial NATO participation*' in an international security force in Kosovo '*under UN auspices*'.¹³ Once the

¹³ The agreement differs from that of Rambouillet by requiring the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo but limiting NATO's freedom of movement in Yugoslavia and placing Kosovo temporarily under UN administration.

air strikes stopped, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1244 authorising the establishment of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).¹⁴ The NATO peace implementation force — Kosovo Force (KFOR) — entered Kosovo from Macedonia on 12 June.

The legality of NATO's action against Yugoslavia has been subject to intense debate. War was never declared and a peace agreement was never signed, only the Military Technical Agreement. Some argue that the intervention was necessary to protect people's rights (Ignatieff, 2000). Others assert that NATO's unilateral action, conducted without UN Security Council Authorisation effectively undermined the UN Charter and other international statutes and legal frameworks (Coates, 2000).

2.2 The Humanitarian Crisis

Although NATO air strikes were intended to end the violence in Kosovo, the immediate effect was the opposite. Yugoslavia expelled Kosovo Albanians *en masse* from the province. The extent to which air strikes precipitated mass displacement or whether 'ethnic cleansing' was pre-planned is disputed.¹⁵ In response to the massive forced displacement, however, NATO's action was redefined by Alliance countries as 'humanitarian war' to end repression and the mass violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and to reverse the expulsions.

Population displacement

Over one million people were driven from their homes during the war. There were at least three large-scale movements of population, engendering different humanitarian needs and responses:

- The flight of Kosovo Albanian refugees, mainly to Albanian and Macedonia.
- The return of Kosovo Albanian refugees to Kosovo.
- The flight from and displacement within Kosovo of, mainly, Kosovo Serbs, former Krajina Serbs, Roma, Gorans and other non-Albanian minorities.

At the start of NATO's military campaign UNHCR estimated that there were up to 260,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kosovo and several thousand refugees in Albania and Macedonia. Following the commencement of the air bombardment, over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refuge in neighbouring countries (refer to Table 1). Since NATO entered Kosovo in June 1999, over 200,000 people, mainly Serbs, Krajina Serbs and Roma have left the province, most to Serbia and Montenegro. Several thousand Albanians from southern Serbia have also sought refuge in Kosovo and Macedonia.

¹⁴ This consists of four 'pillars': the UN-led interim administration UNHCR-led humanitarian affairs, EU-led reconstruction and OSCE-led institution building.

¹⁵ The organised expulsion of Kosovo Albanian civilians from Kosovo suggests that the so-called 'Operation Horseshoe' by the Yugoslavian army and paramilitary forces was planned in advance of the NATO bombings. The expulsions, aimed at defeating the KLA and keeping NATO occupied, made tactical military sense.

Table 1: Estimated numbers of refugees as a result of the Kosovo crisis


Location	Origin	Estimates: June 1999	Estimates: March 2000
Albania	Kosovo	444,200	-
Bosnia	Kosovo	21,000	-
	Sandzak*	22,000	-
	FRY**	800	-
Republika Srpska	FRY**	30,100	-
Macedonia	Kosovo	247,200	-
Montenegro	Kosovo	69,700	30,000
Serbia	Kosovo	-	199,600
Humanitarian Evacuation Programme	Kosovo	79,979	-

Source: UNHCR statistics

*Muslims seeking protection from NATO bombing campaign and general tension in the Sandzak area of Serbia.

**FRY Serbs, refugees from Croatia and returnees to Bosnia. This category includes refugees who fled as a result of Kosovo plus ‘old’ refugees/IDPs.

Figure 2: Refugee and IDP flows



A defining feature of the Kosovo emergency was the rapid movement of populations during and after NATO’s bombardment. As illustrated in Figure 2, within the first two weeks of NATO air strikes alone, some 250,000 people entered Albania with, at one time, 4,000 crossing the border each hour (Suhrke et al, 2000). Within a month of KFOR entering Kosovo, 650,000 refugees had returned. The need to protect remaining household assets, to

harvest crops and to reconstruct properties before winter, and a deterioration in camp security were incentives for this rapid return (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000).

The majority of the Kosovo Albanian refugees went to Albania and Macedonia and became the focus of international humanitarian efforts. A smaller number went to Montenegro and Bosnia, including families fleeing the bombing of Serbia. In Albania and Macedonia, some 60 per cent of refugees were accommodated with host families and relatives, with the remainder staying in camps and collective centres serviced by host governments and the international community. In Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia most refugees and displaced stayed with private families or in collective centres.

These countries which bore the brunt of the Kosovo crisis are among the poorest in Europe.¹⁶ The impact of the crisis and the capacity and readiness of these countries to assist varied, depending upon their political stance, their ethnic composition, the presence of refugees from other conflicts and the prevailing socio-economic situation.

Albania provided refuge for the largest number of refugees, many of whom initially came from western and central Kosovo, the most heavily contested areas and from where the KLA drew most support. In Albania, which had been hosting Kosovo refugees since 1998, they were welcomed by the population and a government that in 1991 had recognised Kosovo as an independent entity and had supported the liberation struggle. Albania did not commit forces in the war, but it supported NATO by making military bases available to them and facilitating their involvement in humanitarian activities.¹⁷

Macedonia, which took in the second-largest number of Kosovo Albanian refugees, was a reluctant host. Concerned at the impact that the Kosovo Albanian refugees would have on the country's ethnic balance, and on trade and diplomatic relations with Serbia, the government closed its border with Kosovo. For a week, 40,000 refugees were stranded at the border without shelter. A combination of diplomatic pressure, financial assistance, the deployment of NATO troops to construct refugee camps and an offer by Alliance countries to share the burden of refugees by arranging evacuations to third countries eventually secured government cooperation. Some 80,000 refugees were transferred to 28 other countries through the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, and a smaller number through the Regional Transfer Programme. Burden sharing was controversial, potentially undermining the principle of first asylum. However, UNHCR's evaluation concludes that it '*generally enhanced protection*' by enabling more refugees to enter (Suhrke et al, 2000). In August when the numbers of Kosovo Albanian refugees had declined to 20,000, new refugees arrived — Roma and Serbs from Kosovo and Albanians from Preshevo valley (over the eastern border of Kosovo in Serbia proper).¹⁸

Between 1998 and 1999, Montenegro had provided refuge for 30,000 displaced Kosovo Albanians and took in a further 85,000 IDPs during the bombings. Mostly Kosovo Albanians, they were settled in municipalities near the Albanian border. Although Montenegro did not

¹⁶ Albania, the poorest, is ranked 105 and Macedonia ranked 80 on the Human Development Index.

¹⁷ The Albanian army did fight off a Serb incursion into Albania in May with NATO support.

¹⁸ Macedonia also has a small refugee caseload from Bosnia.

take sides, it was hit on several occasions by NATO air strikes, including Podgorica airport.¹⁹ Only three expatriates stayed in Montenegro during the bombing campaign leaving offices to be run by local staff.²⁰ As the Kosovo Albanians returned to Kosovo in June, Serbs, Montenegrins and Roma from Kosovo started to arrive.

At the time of the Kosovo crisis, Bosnia was still recovering from three and a half years of crippling war that had left a large refugee and IDP caseload. Prior to March 1999, there were reportedly some 13,000 refugees from Kosovo in Bosnia. The division of Bosnia into two entities – the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska – determined where Kosovo refugees went. Kosovo Albanian refugees stayed in the Federation. Serbs fleeing the bombing in Serbia and from Kosovo after June 1999 went to the Republika Srpska, where the NATO bombings sparked demonstrations in Banja Luka, and where only seven humanitarian agencies reportedly kept their offices open.²¹ Up to 90 per cent of refugees were privately accommodated with 10 per cent placed in collective centres. One motivation for going to Bosnia was the belief that it was easier to travel from there to a third country.

Prior to the war in Kosovo FRY was hosting over 600,000 refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia (refer to Table 2) and IDPs, 95 per cent of whom were privately accommodated. The new IDPs from Kosovo after June were initially contained by the government within the southern half of the country, although by the autumn this unofficial policy was relaxed.

Table 2: Refugees and others of concern in FRY, 1998

<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Asylum seekers</i>	<i>Returned refugees</i>	<i>IDPs</i>	<i>Returned IDPs</i>	<i>Total population of concern</i>	<i>Total population</i>
502,000	6,000	1,900	225,000	110,000	844,900	

Source: UNHCR statistics

Civilians in Kosovo

Over one million people remained in the province during the war. Of these it is estimated that half were displaced (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999). The withdrawal of international humanitarian agencies on the eve of the bombing meant there were no international witnesses to the conditions of these people. The OSCE report 'As Seen, As Told' probably provides the most detailed description of violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Kosovo during this period (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999). As the Red Cross acknowledged, '*the absence of any international humanitarian agencies drew a veil over the plight of more than one million civilians*' (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). UN Security Council Resolution 1239 (1999) which invited

¹⁹ In total about 12–13 people were killed. Reported in interviews with ICRC, SC and IOCC in Podgorica, March 2000.

²⁰ Interview with IOCC, Podgorica, March 2000.

²¹ ADRA, ICRC, IRC, LWF, Oxfam, PSF, SC, UNICEF, ADRA. Interview with SC, Banja Luka, March 2000.

assistance to displaced persons in Kosovo, Montenegro and other parts of the FRY was largely unmet until after the cease-fire.

Impact of the war on Kosovo

Kosovo was the poorest territory in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and international economic sanctions on FRY, it is thought Kosovo's GDP had contracted by 50 per cent between 1990 and 1995, falling to less than US\$400 per capita (lower than Albania) (The World Bank, 1999). Economic activity, centred on mining, the production of raw materials, semi-finished products and agriculture, had stagnated. In 1995, unemployment was over 35 per cent and disproportionately high among ethnic Albanians. The province was also heavily indebted. In addition to mass displacement, the war between NATO and FRY compounded the physical and economic damage that Kosovo had already suffered in the violence since 1989. An estimated 120,000 houses were damaged, 50,000 beyond repair and over 90 per cent of schools and health facilities were damaged or destroyed (OCHA, 2000).

Regional impact of the war

The suffering of Kosovo Albanian refugees and displaced was the most visible consequence of the war, but the crisis had had broader regional impacts.

In Albania, the arrival of over 470,000 refugees (equivalent to 14 per cent of Albania's population) threatened to upset the progress that had been made in stabilising its economy since the 1997 civil disturbances, as the government diverted considerable resources to support the refugees. The impact on individual households, where over 60 per cent of refugees were initially accommodated, was partially mitigated by the relief assistance. In Macedonia, Bosnia, Bulgaria and Romania disruptions in trade and transport, foreign investment and tourism have all had an impact on balance of payments and structural reforms affecting those countries' longer-term development aims. Macedonia claims that the crisis has cost them US\$1.5 billion in lost trade and commerce.

Prior to the war, the crisis associated with the breakup of SFRY, which led to war and international sanctions, had left FRY in a state of deep economic shock. Stagnating production and hyper-inflation had eroded living standards. The war inflicted further economic damage and humanitarian stress, with over 100 per cent inflation, 40 per cent official unemployment and an estimated 500,000 social cases. Bomb damage to infrastructure and industry caused pollution, intensified unemployment and disrupted trade. Sanctions have inflicted a severe energy crisis affecting 75 per cent of households (OCHA, 2000). Fewer than ten international humanitarian agencies kept their offices open during the NATO bombing and those that did kept a low profile. Following the cease-fire and an assessment by the UN in May 1999, agencies again strengthened their presence.

In Montenegro, the election in 1997 of the pro-Western reformer, Milo Djukanovic, as president has created divisions between Montenegro and Serbia. These divisions have grown since the war. For refusing to participate in the war, Montenegro was rewarded by the West through the lifting of all but the 'outer wall' of sanctions. In March 2000, Serbia imposed a trade blockade on Montenegro.

2.3 The Humanitarian Response

The refugee crisis in the wake of NATO air strikes precipitated a huge international humanitarian response. Government aid departments, NATO military forces, UN agencies and international humanitarian agencies were mobilised to assist the refugees who poured out of Kosovo. Several features of this international response stand out.

Readiness of the humanitarian system

Years of warnings by political analysts and human rights organisations, the experience of a smaller refugee crisis in 1998 and contingency planning by UN agencies and NGOs appear to have done little to prepare the humanitarian system for the scale and speed of the refugee flows. Whether humanitarian agencies could have been better prepared is debatable. They were not privy to NATO plans. The apparent political investment in the success of Rambouillet deterred agencies from worst-case scenario planning and reluctant hosts, like Macedonia, made preparedness work politically sensitive. Nevertheless, the weight of political analysis and experience should have anticipated a crisis. Even the Commander of NATO forces, Wesley Clark, considered the consequences of NATO's action to be '*entirely predictable*' (Chomsky, 1999).

Despite a lack of readiness, the humanitarian system was able to scale up quickly to provide shelter, food and health services. In this respect, the prior presence of international agencies in Kosovo and neighbouring countries helped. This included several DEC agencies running operational programmes or working through partners (refer to Table 3). Some of the DEC agencies and their partners were among the first to assist refugees in Kukes and Blace as they arrived.

Scale of the response

The humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis was unprecedented in terms of the financial resources available and the number of agencies involved. Given the huge resources committed, the Kosovo emergency must represent one of the most expensive aid operations ever mounted on a cost-per-head basis. There were several reasons for this. Having defined the war as a '*humanitarian war*', NATO governments were forced to address its humanitarian consequences to maintain credibility, particularly in those countries where there was public unease over the air strikes. As NATO's campaign required logistical and political cooperation with Albania and Macedonia, it was also in the Alliance's interest to alleviate the impact of refugees on those countries. Governments were not only concerned to alleviate refugee needs, but also to contain asylum seekers — one reason the Italian government built 19 refugee camps in Albania (Suhrke et al, 2000).

In addition to government departments, UN agencies and NATO forces, the humanitarian arena was crowded with NGOs. In Albania alone there were reported to be 180 international NGOs during the refugee crisis (Suhrke et al, 2000). In Macedonia there were over 60, few of whom had previous knowledge of the country (Silkin, Kieffer & de Klerk, 2000). As of 1 December 1999, two hundred and eighty-five NGOs were registered in Pristina (Guest, 2000). The international attention on Kosovo meant that agencies were under enormous pressure to spend funds, leading to problems of quality control and wastage.

European context

In general, humanitarian agencies have more experience of emergencies in developing countries (particularly sub-Saharan Africa) than in Europe, although many have worked during the Croatia and Bosnia conflicts. Some operational guidelines are more relevant to a developing country context than to a European one. For example, in a European context there is little risk of starvation or epidemics of infectious diseases; the disease epidemiology means there is less risk of infections, but a large chronic disease burden; and vulnerable groups are more likely to be the elderly and the institutionalised, rather than young children and mothers. Agencies were therefore not necessarily well prepared to deal with a European emergency on the scale of Kosovo.

Local organisations

Throughout the Kosovo crisis, governments and local charities and religious organisations played a critical role. In Albania, Macedonia and Serbia they mostly focused on assisting refugees accommodated in private housing and collective centres. Their role in refugee camps was more restricted. In Kosovo, local organisations have also played central roles in relief and rehabilitation. The Mother Teresa Society (MTS) in particular, which was a significant NGO in the Kosovo Albanian parallel health system and has activists in most communities, has been prominent, assessing needs and delivering assistance.

Coordination

The scramble of agencies for space, resources and profile demanded good coordination. UNHCR, as the designated lead agency in the Kosovo crisis, has been heavily criticised for being unprepared, under-staffed and poorly coordinated. In its defence, others have pointed to the weakening of UNHCR prior to the crisis through donor policies and lack of funding (Pugh, 2000). The involvement of donor countries and NATO forces meant that UNHCR's role in the refugee crisis was circumscribed. For example, in Albania, the Emergency Management Group (EMG) established by the government and donors to coordinate the humanitarian response, while generally acknowledged as having performed well, also served to marginalise UNHCR.²²

Standards

Like Rwanda, the influx of multiple humanitarian agencies raised questions of standards of relief provision. The application of Sphere Standards was limited. More contentious was the greater standard and quantity of assistance provided to Kosovo Albanian refugees compared to refugee situations elsewhere in the world, raising questions over the selectivity and impartiality of the humanitarian system.

Commercialisation and humanitarianism

A number of private companies were contracted by donors for camp construction, de-mining and security services. In some cases this led to competition. For example, a major French company sought to exclude Oxfam from a water source because it was seen as a business

²² UNHCR is considered to have performed better in Kosovo, strengthened by staff seconded from OCHA.

rival. In a context where the objectives of the World Bank are to transform Kosovo from a 'socialist to a market-oriented economy', the humanitarian objectives of commercial organisations are questionable (The World Bank, 1999).

Bilateralism

From the perspective of NATO governments, humanitarian and strategic military concerns were interconnected. NATO governments not only provided vast resources for the aid effort, they also took a role in directing the humanitarian response, opening offices in the region, advising on site planning, establishing refugee camps, designing intervention strategies, providing logistics and assigning their military contingents to humanitarian duties. As the UNHCR evaluation remarks, 'The refugees, in a sense, became too important to be left to UNHCR' (Christian Aid, 1999). Different refugee camps were funded by different donors, secured by their troops and serviced by NGOs from those countries, chosen on the basis of nationality, rather than ability. While bilateralism may have increased available resources, it weakened coordination and undermined the efforts of multilateral institutions like UNHCR, and led to duplication, wastage and inefficiency.

NATO

A feature of the conflict was the involvement of the military in the humanitarian response. In Albania, a special force of NATO troops (AFOR) with a humanitarian mandate was created. In Macedonia, at UNHCR's request, NATO's forces were deployed to construct the first refugee camps. In Kosovo, KFOR provided logistical support and security for NGOs and delivered humanitarian assistance. For humanitarian agencies, the military's participation was a 'mixed blessing'. Ostensibly, the objective of the military's participation in humanitarian activities was to support the humanitarian operation. They provided useful assets, and the rapid construction of camps in Macedonia did help alleviate a crisis at the Blace border. However NATO was a warring party with an overtly political role. Agencies' collaboration with the military therefore raised difficult questions over principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Humanitarian principles

The Kosovo conflict was both an internal war and an international conflict. The Geneva conventions pertaining to internal and inter-state wars guide the actions of warring parties in war. Humanitarian agencies in war are traditionally guided by principles of non-partisanship and impartiality of the humanitarian system and of humanitarian agencies were tested.

First an array of international political, military and humanitarian assets were mobilised in response to the Kosovo crisis and, according to the UK Secretary of State for International Development, military and humanitarian objectives were 'completely intertwined'.²³ The reliance of aid agencies on donor countries who were parties to the war raised problems of *independence*. The dilemma was apparent in UNHCR's collaboration with NATO. Cooperation with one of the warring parties, whose use of force was unauthorised by the UN

²³ Statement by the Secretary of State for International Development to the House of Commons on 26 March 1999 and 27 May 1999.

Security Council, sat uneasily with UNHCR's non-political mandate. Yet, being dependent on funding by NATO countries, it pragmatically needed to cooperate in order to save lives.

Second, the scale of the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo emergency compared to other humanitarian crises, raised questions of the *selectivity* of the humanitarian system. For example, the donor response to the UN South-eastern Europe Humanitarian Operation was described by the UN as 'exemplary', with 78 per cent of the US\$929 million requirement met by donors (OCHA, 2000). This contrasts to other emergency appeals that are hard pushed to receive 50 per cent funding.

Third and linked, the initial withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo and the massive support given to Kosovo Albanians as refugees and returnees, gave the impression of a selective and biased response from which other 'victims' of war were excluded.

Finally, the Kosovo crisis raises questions about the politicisation of the humanitarian response. In Bosnia, Western politicians were criticised for using humanitarian aid as a '*fig leaf*' or substitute for political action. In Kosovo, a dilemma for humanitarian agencies in what was described as a war of 'values',²⁴ was that humanitarian aid became a tool which, as some have suggested, served agendas and strategies that were not purely humanitarian (Chomsky, 1999). This politicisation has been overt in the provision of rehabilitation and development assistance. Donors to the 'Stability Pact' in March 2000 made rehabilitation funds available to Montenegro, but not to Serbia until it fulfils certain conditions — a '*sustained effort to reform their societies and economies*' (Chairman's Conclusion, 2000).

2.4 Rehabilitation in Kosovo: An Uncertain Future

When the refugees returned to Kosovo, the international community's response combined emergency relief in the form of shelter, education, health and mine clearance, with reconstruction and development strategies. A year after the refugee crisis, emergency needs have been met but reconstruction requirements remain immense. The Serb, Roma and other people who fled Kosovo have little prospect of returning home and constitute a long-term problem.

Under UN resolution 1244, UNMIK was given responsibility for overseeing the establishment of 'substantial autonomy' for Kosovo within FRY and 'provisional democratic institutions' under an interim administration, 'pending a final settlement'. The UN resolution does not define the legal status of United Nations Administered Province of Kosovo and no time limit was set on the life of the interim administration. Kosovo's future will depend on the establishment of credible governance arrangements that can meet the aspirations of all Kosovars and promote a sustainable recovery.

Elsewhere in the region there are continued rehabilitation and development needs in the countries that bore the brunt of the refugee caseload. In Albania and Macedonia, some of the international agencies that arrived with the crisis have stayed to address the longer term rehabilitation and development needs. In Serbia and Macedonia, Albanian nationalistic aspirations continue to incite instability. In Montenegro, political tensions could spark further

²⁴ A claim made by Prime Minister Blair and President Clinton.

population movements. The crisis in Serbia is deepening with economic sanctions stoking a predatory shadow economy, and humanitarian needs likely to increase.

2.5 Constraints and Achievements

Humanitarian agencies faced many constraints responding to the refugee crisis:

- The speed and scale of the population movements meant that agencies were always on the back foot, and the fluidity of refugee movement in the region and within countries, between locations and camps and private accommodation, created problems for registration and assessing humanitarian need.
- Different groups of refugees and IDPs — Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, Roma, Gorani, Bosniacs, Krajina Serbs in Kosovo and Albanians from Serbia — were affected at different times and in different ways by the crisis.
- The remote northern region of Albania presented logistical and security challenges.
- The problem of poor coordination (see section 2.3 above).

Despite these constraints, the huge amount of resources available meant that overall the needs of refugees and the emergency rehabilitation and winterisation needs in Kosovo were generally met. There were no epidemics and mortality was significantly lower than most emergencies. During the refugee crisis, several other factors also served to mitigate a major catastrophe:

- The good pre-crisis health and nutritional status of the refugee population.
- The fact that two-thirds of refugees were supported by local populations, and that refugees/IDPs brought assets (savings or remittances) which enabled them to pay for food and accommodation.
- The short duration of the emergency and the quick return of the refugees which meant that host families were not burdened for an extended period, and refugee camps did not exist long enough to expose supply-line and public health problems.
- The return of the refugees to Kosovo in good time before winter.
- The generally good infrastructure in the region and proximity to Western Europe meant supply lines were relatively good.
- The availability of NATO logistics in the early stages of the crisis to construct refugee camps.
- The security ‘umbrella’ provided by NATO for aid agencies, particularly in parts of Albania and Kosovo.
- The political support for the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme that took refugees out of the region on a temporary basis.
- The strategic importance of Kosovo to NATO countries and the attention of the media and the public ensured funding for a large international response.

Given these factors and the relatively small size of Kosovo, the humanitarian operation had the opportunity to be exemplary. This report identifies many good aspects of the work of the 12 DEC agencies that were part of the international response. It also identifies areas for learning and improvement.

2.6 Lessons from Kosovo

The unique nature of the Kosovo emergency may make it difficult to apply lessons from Kosovo elsewhere. However, many issues and trends that have challenged humanitarian agencies over the past decade re-emerged in the Kosovo emergency. These included:²⁵

- The blurring of civilian and military roles: the Kosovo emergency has seen the further institutionalisation of civilian liaison officers (CIMICs) in the military, while some NGOs employed military liaison officers.
- A growing bilateralism in aid provision.
- A politicisation of humanitarian aid, with the integration of political, military and aid objectives.
- The need for improved coordination in large-scale humanitarian emergencies.
- A trend towards the integration of human rights and humanitarian action.
- A proliferation of relief agencies and calls for greater regulation and monitoring.
- The need for standardisation of assistance and improved accountability.

In particular, the Kosovo crisis raised critical issues that should continue to provoke debate among humanitarian agencies:

- How to protect rights of citizens from massive violation of their human rights by states.
- How to monitor and safeguard the universal values and independence of humanitarian action.
- How to ensure that the international humanitarian system responds proportionally to global humanitarian need.

²⁵ These include lessons identified by DEC agencies at a workshop in Pristina, 7 April 2000.

3. PREPAREDNESS AND INITIAL RESPONSE

The Kosovo emergency was characterised by large and rapid population movements.²⁶ This section examines the preparedness of the DEC agencies for the Kosovo emergency and their initial response to the refugee crisis.

3.1 Context

The Kosovo emergency was a long time in the making. Kosovo's political crisis pre-dates the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. As the historian Malcolm has noted, '*the Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo*' (Malcolm, 1998). Throughout the 1990s human rights organisations monitoring Kosovo provided warnings of a refugee crisis and as early as 1995 UNHCR and WFP drew up contingency plans in Albania and Macedonia for such an eventuality (International Development Committee, 1999). From 1996, as the KLA became more active, political analysts reported on Kosovo's increasing threat to regional security (ICG, 1998). The first mass flight of people from Kosovo occurred in the spring of 1998, when over 12,000 Kosovo Albanians fled to Tropoje and Bajram Cuuri in northern Albania. During 1998 and early 1999, as security deteriorated and NATO threatened air strikes against Serbia, international agencies, including some DEC ones, withdrew twice from Kosovo.

Although the weight of analysis pointed to a deepening of the crisis threatening regional security, donors and international relief agencies did not anticipate that NATO would carry out the threat of air strikes. To have done so would have indicated a lack of confidence in the Rambouillet talks. Neither did they predict that Serbia would respond by expelling civilians *en masse*, as most people displaced by the war up to that point had remained within Kosovo. There were also political constraints to undertaking preparedness and contingency planning in Macedonia, where the government restricted the registration of agencies, concerned that the presence of INGOs would attract refugees and that they would only help Albanians. As long as they maintained a policy against establishing camps, UNHCR was reluctant to prepare for a refugee crisis.²⁷

Nevertheless, governments of countries directly affected did warn about refugee outflows (Barutciski, 2000). Several humanitarian agencies in the region, such as El Hilal in Macedonia and the Association of Albanians in Sarajevo,²⁸ also predicted the crisis and were prepared for the refugee exodus. Their preparedness plans, based on supporting host families, reflected lessons learnt from previous experience of population displacements in the region. Furthermore, as the refugee crisis was not entirely unexpected by the commander of NATO (refer to Chapter 2), it appeared that the early warning and preparedness systems of donor

²⁶ Comparable refugee flows have occurred only twice during the past ten years, during 1994 in the Great Lakes area of Africa and during 1991 in the Kurdish-Iraqi war.

²⁷ Oxfam, for example, did undertake contingency planning in Macedonia, but was not supported by UNHCR who argued that if it did not have an office in Macedonia then it should not do such planning. In Albania there is still reported to be some reluctance to undertake contingency planning in anticipation of problems in Montenegro for fear it might '*stir up a fire*' (Interview with Albanian NGO forum, Tirana, March 2000).

²⁸ Both agencies had compiled lists of potential host families and in the case of El Hilal, had stockpiled food. These preparedness measures helped several DEC agencies access refugees with material distributions after March 1999.

governments and international relief agencies misread the situation. The International Development Committee in the House of Commons noted:

'We believe a very serious misjudgement was made when it was assumed that the bombing would not lead to the dramatic escalation in the displacement and expulsion of the Kosovo Albanian population. Although we accept that the UK government could not have established refugee camps before NATO actions started, for fear of giving tacit encouragement to expulsion of refugees, equipment and supplies could have been stockpiled so that the refugees could have been housed more speedily once the exodus occurred. We are confident that NATO has undertaken an assessment of the reasons for its failure to predict Milosevic's response' (House of Commons, 2000).

3.2 DEC Agencies

Overall, the DEC agencies were no better prepared in March 1999 than the rest of the international humanitarian community. Once the refugee crisis began, some were able to respond rapidly and were among the first international relief agencies to assist refugees as they came across the border. Others were still scaling up as the refugees began to return in June 1999.²⁹ Consequently, some materials purchased for the refugees had to be re-directed for use in Kosovo.

The evaluation team looked at three broad areas affecting the preparedness and timeliness of DEC agencies' response to the refugee crisis:

- Situational analysis, assessment and contingency planning.
- Established presence and experience in the region.
- Organisational commitment to emergency work and capacity for response.

3.3 Situational Analysis

Paucity of analysis has been a common criticism levelled at the preparedness of the humanitarian system. Over the past decade this has improved with the establishment of information networks such as IRIN, and individual humanitarian agencies have invested in improving their capacity for analysis. In the Balkans, there was a large amount of independent analysis available for agencies to draw upon. Several DEC agencies had a presence in Kosovo prior to the war and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the situation (refer to Table 3).

Concerned at the escalating violence in Kosovo and the flight of refugees to Albania 1998, several DEC agencies undertook emergency assessments and contingency planning. For example, BRCS undertook emergency assessments in the region in 1998 and early 1999 and engaged in scenario planning through the IFRC regional planning process. CARE commissioned an emergency assessment in Albania and Macedonia in July 1998. Oxfam sent emergency personnel into Kosovo to assess the situation in early 1999. In 1998, SC

²⁹ For example, HAI were not working until mid-May.

commissioned an emergency review in the region and in early 1999 predicted there would be mass population movement into Serbia. During the refugee exodus to Tropoje and Bajram Cuuri in May and June 1998, Tearfund supported its Albanian partner, VUSh, to provide training for their church volunteers in anticipation of future problems. Concern, who was new to the region, and HAI did not carry out any emergency assessments or contingency planning for Kosovo prior to the crisis.

Table 3: DEC agencies: presence in the region immediately prior to March 1999

Agency	Albania	Bosnia	Kosovo	Macedonia	Montenegro	Serbia
BRCS	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners
CAFOD	Through local partners	X	Through local partners	Through local partners	X	Through local partners
CARE Int'l UK	Some contact with local partners	✓	✓	X	X	✓
Children's Aid Direct	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
Christian Aid	Some contact with local partners	Through local partners	X	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners
Concern Worldwide	X	X	X	X	X	X
HelpAge Int'l	X	✓	X	X	X	X
Merlin	✓ (But left in late 1998)	X	X	X	X	X
Oxfam	✓	✓	✓	X (Only R&R flat and bank account)	X (Office 1993-1995)	✓
SC	✓	✓	✓	X	Office since 1994	✓
Tearfund	Through local partners	Through local partners	Through local partners	X	X (Except assessment mission in 1998)	Through local partners
World Vision	X	✓	✓	X	✓	X

Despite the assessments and contingency planning by some agencies, all the DEC agencies acknowledge that they, like the rest of the international community, were caught out by the scale and speed of the refugee exodus. Several reasons are given by the agencies for this:

- Although large-scale refugee crises had occurred before in the Balkans, notably of the Krajina Serbs in 1995, up until NATO's bombing most displacement in Kosovo had been internal.³⁰
- When NATO had threatened air strikes before, Milosevic had always backed down.³¹
- There was a general acceptance that the Rambouillet talks would succeed and that preparing for an emergency was tantamount to admitting that the talks were going to fail.
- Agencies were not privy to NATO's plans, but considered it unlikely that NATO would make the decision to start a bombing campaign. If it did, the expectation was that Milosevic would capitulate within a few days.
- There was little information available that could have predicted the speed and scale of the refugee exodus from Kosovo. UNHCR worst-case planning figures had predicted only 250,000 refugees.

In hindsight these assumptions proved to be wrong. It is possible to identify two reasons for this:

First, the situational analysis undertaken by agencies: One conclusion of IFRC's Balkan evaluation was the need to improve its early warning system with an '*enhanced professional capacity in political analysis*' (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). Such analysis needs to be broad based and independent. Aid agencies working in the region were informed about Kosovo, but were taken by surprise by NATO's decision to bomb. Although in 1998 ICG reported that '*Balkan observers are watching NATO closely*' (ICG, 1998), it appears that humanitarian agencies were not.³² This suggests a need among agencies for better analysis of the policies of Alliance governments.

The independent evaluation of UNHCR's response to the Kosovo crisis noted that '*failure to think outside the box for the worst case rendered the planning process irrelevant to the emergency*' (Suhrke et al, 2000).

Second, the gap between analysis and response: The early warnings and recommendations of some emergency assessments were not acted upon.³³ General recommendations to upgrade emergency response capacity in the region were unheeded by one agency.³⁴ As late as February 1999, Oxfam and SC appointed country managers to Serbia with little emergency

³⁰ UNHCR estimated 260,000 IDPs at start of the bombing and a much smaller number of Kosovo refugees in the region.

³¹ Similar NATO threats only four months earlier had seen Serbia accept the deployment of the OSCE-KVM.

³² The assessment commissioned by CARE did consider the scenario of NATO intervention.

³³ CARE did not act on the findings of the emergency assessment and contingency plan it had commissioned in July 1998 (Fennell, 1998).

³⁴ SC management reportedly made little response to recommendations contained within a 1998 review of emergency capacity in the Balkans.

experience and predominantly developmental backgrounds. The unwillingness of donors to fund preparedness activities also restricted agencies investing in planning for something that might not happen. The lack of funds was particularly significant for the smaller DEC agencies who did not have a well-established presence in the region.³⁵

Nevertheless, there are other areas where agencies could have been better prepared due to their previous experience in the region. For example, DEC agencies should have been alerted to the fact that significant numbers of refugees would stay in private accommodation in preference to refugee camps.

3.4 Prior Presence in Region

A pre-existing presence in Kosovo and in countries that hosted refugees was important in determining the relative speed and effectiveness of DEC agencies' initial response. Eleven of the agencies had a prior presence in the region, eight had worked in Kosovo and nine in Albania prior to the emergency, either directly or through partners (refer to Table 3).³⁶ CAD, for example, which already had offices in Kukes and Skopje was one of the first international organisations to assist refugees at the critical Kukes and Blace crossing points.³⁷

Prior partnerships with local organisations also enhanced the capacity of DEC agencies to respond throughout the region. Local NGOs and the Red Cross societies in Albania and Macedonia played a crucial role in receiving refugees before the international aid effort geared up and provided the bulk of assistance to refugees in host families. The same was true in Serbia after the cease-fire.³⁸ The choice of local partner was important and prior emergency experience and emergency response capacity of local partners influenced their effectiveness.³⁹ Agency experience clearly demonstrates that investment in building up capacity in partner agencies can pay off. Tearfund's support for its partner during the 1998 refugee crisis in Albania helped them respond to the larger crisis in 1999. The IFRC had access to extensive networks of ONSs in all the Balkan countries, many of whom had previous emergency experience. The Albanian Red Cross (ARC) had supported people during the civil disturbances in Albania in 1997, and had worked with IFRC and ICRC assisting Kosovar refugees in 1998.

The DEC's OSC was therefore correct to ask agencies about their local knowledge and capacity. However, while a presence in the region was undoubtedly important, it was not an

³⁵ For example, Merlin wanted to maintain a strategic presence in Albania after the end of their ECHO-funded programmes in 1998 but was unable to find sufficient funding to do so. In 2000, it is again facing the same problem.

³⁶ CAD were well positioned in Albania and had prepared a strategic toe-hold in Macedonia; Oxfam was strong in Albania, Serbia and Bosnia; SC in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro; CARE in Macedonia. Local staff from previous Oxfam, CAD, SC, CARE programmes in Kosovo facilitated emergency responses in Macedonia.

³⁷ In both countries, CAD assisted other agencies to start up operations.

³⁸ Christian Aid's long-term partnership with EHO in Serbia facilitated DEC-funded programmes by mid-April.

³⁹ A comparison between ACT/DA programmes in Albania and ACT/MCIC in Macedonia, illustrates the problems of local partners' response to emergencies. DA was inexperienced in emergencies and had a low capacity. Consequently, the expatriates from other international ACT partners overwhelmed them. MCIC, a more experienced agency, was better prepared, fared well and was more effective.

essential prerequisite. Concern, for example, who had no previous presence, demonstrated this by mounting a creditable response. Their organisational capacity for mounting an emergency response was critical in this respect.

3.5 Organisational Commitment and Capacity

Among the DEC agencies, the organisational commitment to emergency work varied. For example, at the time SC appeared to have had a weak commitment to responding to emergencies.⁴⁰ CARE had scaled down its emergency response capacity.⁴¹ Other agencies did demonstrate an organisational commitment to emergency work, with:

- permanent emergency response teams (Christian Aid, CAFOD, Merlin, Oxfam⁴² and Tearfund);
- strong emergency management capacity (Oxfam);
- pre-designed modular responses/kits (Concern, IFRC/ICRC and Oxfam); and
- central emergency stores (BRCS, CAD, Concern and Oxfam).

Previous investments made by agencies in emergency management systems, logistics and recruitment proved vital. It is recognised that the smaller DEC agencies do not have the financial resources to match the investments of larger agencies such as Oxfam in building up and sustaining emergency response capacity.⁴³

Management structure

Given the speed with which the refugee crisis evolved, a robust emergency management structure, emergency procedures and effective logistic systems proved vital for the ability of agencies to scale up. Oxfam performed well: its emergency management capacity at HQ was good. In addition to logisticians and engineers, they had a large number of emergency support personnel with specialised skills in administration, management, accounting and gender. In contrast, SC did not have managers with emergency experience in either its regional (Budapest) or London HQ. In Albania and Macedonia they relied on a series of managers who were only available on very short contracts. In Albania, line management was also complicated, being the first time that SC had to implement joint International Save the

⁴⁰ In March 1999, SC's emergency unit consisted of one adviser, it had no emergency staff on standby for rapid deployment, its recruitment procedures for emergency staff were under-developed and it had no standardised emergency response modules.

⁴¹ Prior to the emergency, CARE had run down its emergency capacity in the UK and its emergency procurement system in Europe.

⁴² Oxfam's strategic decision to invest in building up its emergency response capacity was vindicated by the speed and quality of its response in the refugee phase. In the words of one aid worker in Albania, '*Oxfam set the standard*' (Interview with IFRC, Tirana, March 2000).

⁴³ HAI for example has invested in building up its emergency response capability in UK, but at the time of the crisis its emergency desk was still very new and delayed their response during the refugee phase.

Children Alliance projects.⁴⁴

Standardised packages and kits

The Kosovo crisis could be dubbed the 'Crisis of the Kit'. In addition to the usual water and medical kits there were kits for most interventions: public institution hygiene packs; warm room kits; shelter kits; augmented roof kits; pre-school kits; primary school kits; primary school start-up kits; family kits; hygiene kits and baby parcels. The label 'kit' was sometimes inappropriate. In some shelter kits, for example, the various items were not packaged together and logistic difficulties meant that they were not delivered as kits.

There were two types of kits: those for beneficiary facilities such as health, water and shelter kits; and those for agencies to facilitate operations such as office kits. Agencies that had well conceived, pre-designed kits were potentially better prepared. For example, several DEC agencies responded effectively to the most pressing needs of refugees within days of their arrival using modular kits. In a large-scale refugee crisis like this one having prepared kits made sense. However, they may not be suitable for all types of emergencies and for all needs. In this emergency, having kits *per se* did not necessarily facilitate rapid implementation, nor were they always appropriate.⁴⁵

Central emergency stores

Prior to the emergency, there was little stockpiling of relief supplies in the region. The reasons for this were the history of looting of stocks in Albania,⁴⁶ political constraints preventing stockpiling in Macedonia, and the relatively easy supply routes into the region.⁴⁷ Limited donor funding for contingency stocks was also a factor, particularly after one million ECUs worth of UNHCR/ECHO contingency stores were looted in Albania in 1997.

In the Balkans, the presence of stocks locally was less important than the ability to move material swiftly into and out of the region and to have the capacity for effective local purchasing. Established central contingency stores, reliable pipelines, prior research into regional sources with adequate quality, purchasing procedures and banking arrangements were all important. Oxfam's stores in Bicester and Concern's stores in Rotterdam were important assets for the emergency response. On a smaller scale, the CAD warehouses in Reading also had a small stock of donated goods ready for immediate dispatch as soon as the emergency started. Its fast overland pipeline of only one week to Albania allowed it to implement donated aid programmes shortly after the crisis began.

⁴⁴ This joint operation of five sections came about partly as the result of lessons learnt in Bosnia, where there had been several different SC offices in many of the main cities. The impression is that because of the speed and scale of the Kosovo crisis, coupled with the absence of a strong SC presence in-country, this was a particularly difficult emergency for the SC Alliance to attempt to implement this new structure.

⁴⁵ World Vision's implementation of their shelter project was held up by late arrival of the kits. The complicated nature of the MCIC food parcels delayed the start of its complementary food distribution until 19 May 1999.

⁴⁶ In 1998, the Oxfam stocks in Albania were looted and were not replaced.

⁴⁷ ICRC stores were sited in Belgrade which made them difficult to access.

Niches and credibility


Having a recognised niche and expertise in a particular sector, helped agencies to become active and effective more quickly. While not ignoring the importance of integration, a recognised expertise facilitated access to resources and enhanced coordination. Oxfam in the water sector, CARE in camp management and food/non-food distribution and CAD in food/non-food distribution are examples of agencies that were able to capitalise on their expertise and credibility. Some other DEC agencies failed to grasp their niche roles during the early phases of operations.⁴⁸

Human resources

The availability of high-quality staff was one of the biggest factors affecting agencies' response to the emergency. Most agencies reported difficulties in recruiting experienced international staff, especially senior managers on long contracts, given the large demand for personnel. Some devoted considerable energy and imagination to addressing these constraints, making extensive use of their databases and specialist registers including RedR and IHE. Some advertised widely, including on the Internet and in trade journals, and devoted extra staff to recruitment.⁴⁹ Those agencies that were familiar with these channels were able to recruit faster. Other agencies were less effective and made inadequate efforts to recruit during the initial phase of the emergency.⁵⁰ Some agencies also had problems filling HQ-level positions and had to second staff from other desks.

RedR played a key role, supplying 95 people to different agencies during the crisis. Ten out of the 12 DEC agencies recruited staff through RedR. Many other members of RedR were recruited directly.

Figure 3: Recruitment by DEC agencies through RedR as percentage of DEC total



⁴⁸ SC did not take advantage of their pre-eminence in family tracing. In Albania it was not able to carry out an assessment for nearly a month after the beginning of the crisis. In Macedonia, SC could not place an experienced person on the ground during the first month of the crisis and CARE took on much of the tracing activities (Shearer, 1999). World Vision, often associated with camp management, got up and running in Albania too late in the day to find a camp to manage. HAI did not set up operations in Macedonia until May.

⁴⁹ Oxfam, for example, employed one person for finding and vetting staff for the Kosovo emergency, thus freeing up technical advisers from that task.

⁵⁰ For example, SC reportedly only recruited from a limited pool of people who were known to them, did not use RedR or the Internet.

BRCS used DEC funds to recruit delegates for ICRC and IFRC field operations. The quality of the delegates, several of whom were placed in senior positions, was noted by ICRC and IFRC informants.

Funding for preparedness

All DEC agencies reported that there was little funding available prior to the emergency for preparedness. For example, at the end of 1998 Merlin had wanted to maintain a strategic presence in Albania but could not get funding for this. When the emergency erupted in March 1999, valuable time and resources were wasted re-starting operations. This absence of funding for preparedness contrasts with the situation between March and July 1999, when agencies, including Merlin, had to turn down funding because they could not spend it in time. Given the speed at which events unfolded, the DEC funds arrived relatively late in comparison with other donor money. Since the emergency, agencies have again found it difficult to raise funds for preparedness work.

Preparedness during the crisis

During the bombing, several of the larger DEC agencies took measures to prepare for the possibility of an escalation in numbers of refugees in Albania from Macedonia and Montenegro. This was more difficult for the smaller agencies that lacked the resources and capacity to maintain the level of flexibility required. The DEC agencies were also taken by surprise at the spontaneous return of refugees to Kosovo. However, some preparations were made with the refugees, such as mines awareness work, and there were reports of DEC agencies working well together to provide services at way stations *en route* back to Kosovo.

In late 1999 and early 2000, most DEC agencies undertook preparedness exercises in readiness for a deterioration in the situation in Montenegro, Serbia and the south-east Kosovo/Serbia border area. This indicates some positive learning among the agencies.

3.6 Conclusions

The level of preparedness among DEC agencies for the Kosovo emergency varied greatly in terms of investment in analysis and management and logistics systems. There were several examples of good practice in the more practical aspects of preparedness, although only Oxfam adequately addressed all the important elements identified above. Others performed less well. SC, for example, given its size and history in the region, should have performed better. One staff member noted, '*As an organisation we were at least 10 days too late, and for a high quality emergency response we were several weeks too late*' (SC fax, 23 April 1999).⁵¹ The evaluation identified the following factors that influenced the readiness of agencies:

- The incorporation of political analysis in strategic and day-to-day management decisions.
- Well-formulated contingency plans coordinated with other agencies and including, where appropriate, identification of potential refugee camp sites, relief supplies and human

⁵¹ The team has noted that SC appear to have learnt from their problems regarding emergency preparedness and have taken many steps to address the deficiencies identified.

resources.

- Local knowledge, including contacts with local officials, access to skilled local staff and relationships with local contractors and hauliers.
- Existing relationships with local partners with emergency experience, which requires an assessment of emergency expertise of local partners in advance.

The evaluation also identified the following, which facilitated a rapid response:

- In-house emergency staff, experienced and skilled in emergencies and available for deployment at short notice. The staff should cover the agency's core technical specialisations as well as management and administrative functions.
- Efficient recruitment procedures, including access to specialised registers.
- An expertise in a particular niche sector, for which the agency has appropriate material stocks, skills as well as credibility within the wider humanitarian system.
- Central contingency stocks and appropriate logistic systems to move materials quickly and efficiently.
- Pre-designed and stockpiled kits for use by beneficiaries and support programmes.
- Experienced emergency managers.
- Material and financial resources.
- Ongoing procedures to review, maintain and upgrade these systems.

Only the largest agencies can afford to fulfil all of these criteria. Nevertheless smaller agencies should be aware of the gaps in their preparedness capacity and identify how these can best be addressed at short notice.

3.7 Recommendations

- (i) In complex political emergencies, effective preparedness and response plans depend on access to informed political analysis. Experience from the Kosovo crisis indicates that DEC agencies need to give more thought to how available independent political analysis can be used to inform decision-making. The DEC secretariat can play an important role, by facilitating information sharing and contingency planning among its member agencies.
- (ii) The report identifies a number of factors that contribute to strong preparedness capacity, such as in-house emergency staff available at short notice, well-defined expertise in a particular sector, efficient recruitment procedures and good logistics systems. An established presence within the region and existing relationships with local partners were also important elements affecting an agency's preparedness and timely response. Each DEC agency should review its performance in the Kosovo crisis against the factors identified in this evaluation, and take steps to strengthen its preparedness capacity. Smaller agencies, which cannot afford a stand-by emergency capacity, need to have procedures for accessing resources, of all kinds, at short notice.
- (iii) RedR plays an important role in supporting almost all DEC agencies, through training and especially through its specialist register of emergency personnel. The DEC should

explore with its members and with RedR how to support RedR's training programmes for future emergencies.

4. APPROPRIATENESS

This chapter looks at whether the actions undertaken by the DEC agencies were appropriate to the needs of the affected populations and to the operational context. The issue of protection is dealt with in Chapter 6.

4.1 Context

The agencies worked in very varying contexts. As defined in Chapter 2, there were at least three identifiable emergencies within the overall Balkans crisis:

- The flight of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo, mainly into Albania and Macedonia.
- The return of Kosovo Albanian refugees to Kosovo.
- The flight from and displacement within Kosovo of, mainly, Kosovo Serbs, former Krajina Serbs, Roma, Gorans and other non-Albanian minorities from Kosovo.

Within each of these phases there were very differing situations for affected populations, depending on whether they were in refugee camps, collective centres or private accommodation and, for returnees, whether they had homes to return to.

4.2 Needs Assessments

There appears to have been little emphasis put on needs assessments within the overall humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis.⁵² While the lack of such assessments might have been acceptable in the first few days of the emergency, Sphere Standards (The Sphere Project, 2000) stress the need for assessment and analysis. It is widely accepted as good practice and an important part of planning and implementing the humanitarian response.

There are several reasons for the lack of attention to assessment:

Pressure to spend money within a short time frame and the ready availability of funding detracted from the assessment, targeting and monitoring of the humanitarian intervention as a whole.⁵³ In many emergency situations, resources are scarce and agencies have no option but to make assessments in order to target those resources.

The absence of registration and the limited information available on the refugee populations in Albania and Macedonia detracted from agency ability to tailor programmes according to need. The lack of data by gender and age was noted (Williams, 2000).

There was a general absence of information or discussion about the importance of remittances to the Kosovo Albanian population.

- In Serbia, assessment of the IDP population was hampered by the sensitive position of humanitarian agencies whose activities could have been interpreted as spying or

⁵² The IFRC and ARC conducted no assessments and response was based upon numbers (IFRC interview, March 2000).

⁵³ 'Everyone was saying "Spend, Spend, Spend"...' (Oxfam interview, March 2000).

intelligence gathering.⁵⁴ In addition, transport was hampered by lack of fuel, damaged roads, floods and commandeered vehicles.

The performance of the DEC agencies in relation to assessment has been varied. There were some examples of good practice in assessment by DEC agencies. CAD used Knowledge, Attitude, Practice (KAP) techniques in Macedonia and Kosovo, as did Tearfund in Kukes. Oxfam undertook some gender-specific assessments looking at the needs of refugee women in camps (Oxfam, 1999a). In some cases, assessments made by local partners with limited experience of such work were of limited value.

In some cases DEC agencies resisted the pressure to get involved without proper assessments. Merlin resisted UNHCR money to implement a programme for exceptionally vulnerable individuals, and instead carried out its own nation-wide assessment and found relatively little indication of need. SC performed a general health assessment in Albania in April 1999 that concluded there were no health needs that it could reasonably meet.

4.3 Consultation with Beneficiaries

Those beneficiaries of DEC assistance interviewed by the evaluation team reflected a diversity of experience and situation. It was not apparent, however, that a priority was given to beneficiary consultation and that the diversities were taken into account in programme design. Generally, material distributions were standard 'kits' or 'parcels'. While this was appropriate for a rapid response at the earliest stage of the refugee emergency, little attention was given to whether needs varied between refugee groups.

In the refugee camps there appears to have been consultation through camp structures, refugee committees, and specific interventions such as Oxfam-supported 'tea tents' and CARE-supported Mother Child Centres. In Macedonia, SC report that it used 'focus group' discussions in camps to involve women in programme design. Consultation with refugees outside the camps is less evident during the refugee crisis, although World Vision had a refugee forum for the refugees it was assisting in Sarande, Albania. In Serbia the political situation restricted agencies' freedom to consult with IDPs.

4.4 Appropriateness of Assistance

Details of agency activities are provided in Volume III. It is not possible to provide a useful summary of activities by sector because of the lack of reporting consistency between agencies.

The general lack of assessments, combined with the high levels of assistance, makes it difficult to judge the appropriateness of the aid delivered by the agencies. Needs were sometimes assumed rather than real.

In addition, measuring appropriateness and impact from beneficiary feedback can be problematic (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). Beneficiaries may report that they liked the

⁵⁴ It was possible to minimise this distrust by building relationships with local structures such as the Red Cross, Commissariat for Refugees and Centres for Social Welfare.

aid but did they really need it?⁵⁵

DEC agencies usually delivered appropriate assistance when they focused on sectors where they had expertise, or coordinated closely with other actors and filled gaps.⁵⁶

The main focus of the agencies' assistance to refugees in host families was on material relief. In contrast, in the refugee camps, the provision of non-material relief, such as information and community services, was considered important. No DEC agencies seem to have provided legal advice centres for those refugees outside camps, although some local partners did do this.

Food

Malnutrition was not a major problem and there was generally an over-supply of food aid in Albania and Macedonia. Eight DEC agencies were involved in the provision of food in Phase I, accounting for about 17 per cent of expenditure. This fell to less than 3 per cent in Phase II. This reduction in the priority given to food aid was appropriate given that malnutrition was not a major issue and needs were being met by other agencies.

As is noted in Chapter 1 of Volume II, it is important to clarify the objectives of providing food aid. The implicit assumption in the Kosovo crisis was that it was some sort of supplement or short-term income transfer, but this was rarely spelled out.⁵⁷

In some cases inappropriate commodities were distributed because of lack of awareness of international guidelines or limited experience of emergency work. For example, a CAFOD partner in Belgrade, distributed milk powder to Roma IDPs living in conditions of poor hygiene, water and sanitation.⁵⁸

Non-food items

Many refugees fled with few possessions and the returnees to Kosovo often faced the approaching winter with little in the way of material possessions, warm clothing or shelter. In these circumstances, the decision by all the DEC agencies to use some of their DEC funding for non-food items generally appeared appropriate.

However, it was difficult for the evaluation team to ascertain whether the amount and choice of the non-food items distributed was appropriate. Recipients generally appreciated the

⁵⁵ Beneficiaries in Nachet collective centre near Prizren received two family kits per family, one from Caritas and one from SC. They preferred the Caritas kits because the items were Swiss-made.

⁵⁶ For example: Oxfam on water; CAD on distribution; CARE on camp management; SC on education, tracing and supporting the development of primary health care intervention. In Djakova, SC liaised closely with other actors, including local authorities, UNMIK, local and international NGOs.

⁵⁷ In Albania, some host families interviewed felt that 'cash for shelter' would have been more useful than food parcels.

⁵⁸ CAFOD staff also had concern about this practice and raised it with their partner. The partner, citing UNICEF reports, noted that breast feeding was reported to be on the decline in Serbia and that the practice of distributing milk powder was currently regarded as acceptable by some major international agencies. The evaluation team noted the complexities of the situation but disagreed and felt that the distribution of milk powder was unwise.

distributions. All DEC agencies, apart from Concern and Merlin, distributed hygiene kits using DEC funding. In this case, there is an impression of over-distribution in many areas.

Health

Given the low risk of starvation or epidemics, the DEC agencies were correct to give health interventions a low priority. Health needs in the Balkans are very different from those in developing countries. Appropriate kits had been designed after the Bosnian war, but the humanitarian intervention in the Kosovo crisis was generally slow to import and utilise such kits. Two DEC agencies provided medicines with DEC money. Save the Children's provision to its clinics was appropriate, while the kits provided in Macedonia to the central pharmacy operation were more suitable for diseases seen in developing countries. In the case of CA's provision of cholera kits to its partner Diaconia Agape in Albania, the low risk of cholera epidemics among the refugees would have made one or two kits more appropriate than 20.

Water and sanitation

In the emergency refugee phase in the camps in Albania and Macedonia, Oxfam was the major DEC player in this sector and also more generally within the international response. This work was of a high standard and contained many examples of good practice. The main weakness of the Oxfam work was that it was not always possible to make it part of an integrated public health programme, with sanitation and public health education often being the responsibilities of other agencies in the camps. This issue is discussed in Volume II, Section 5.

Water and sanitation work carried out by CA, through MCIC, and Oxfam has also been an appropriate response in Kosovo, although, as Section 4 in Volume II points out the standard of some of this work has often been disappointing. There has again been a lack of integration into public health programmes.

Shelter

UNMIK estimated that nearly one-third of houses in Kosovo had been moderately or severely damaged or completely destroyed. In some areas more than half the houses were uninhabitable. Given the scale of damage and the onset of winter, shelter was clearly a highly appropriate intervention for the DEC agencies, of which seven used DEC funds for shelter programmes, not only in Kosovo, but also in Bosnia and Montenegro.

Faced with a wide range of shelter options, DEC agencies chose a variety of approaches which were generally appropriate. While distributing plastic sheeting for short term use before the oncoming winter, timber roofing beams were provided which would be strong enough for tiles in the longer term.

Humanitarian mine action

From June 1999 to the end of March 2000, 100 people had been killed in Kosovo and 370 injured by mines and unexploded ordnance. In the early days of the return, fear of mines slowed down the humanitarian response, although the mine and UXO problem proved to be more limited than anticipated and less still than in Bosnia. Nevertheless, it was appropriate that CARE and World Vision funded mine action programmes. The knowledge that areas

were free from mines and booby traps allowed humanitarian work, such as the rehabilitation of housing, water supplies and land for agriculture, to go ahead.

Schools and education

Given the political importance of the parallel education system in Kosovo since 1989, it was not surprising that a high political priority was given to school and education rehabilitation after NATO bombing ended. A high proportion of schools was badly damaged during the war – over 45 per cent moderately or severely damaged or completely destroyed, according to a UNICEF assessment. It therefore appropriate that five DEC agencies supported school rehabilitation,⁵⁹ although this is an area which strictly does not fall within DEC spending guidelines (refer to Chapter 12). With the exception of BRCS project work, there was relatively little community participation in this work and the issue of future maintenance and sustainability is a concern.

Community services

Coined by UNHCR, community services refers to an approach rather than a sector, with the emphasis on self-help, community-based assistance rather than individual case management. It can therefore cover a range of activities, including educational work, child- or gender-focused activities and psychosocial assistance undertaken by DEC agencies. The emphasis placed on self-help, raises questions over international responsibilities for refugee assistance. Using UNHCR's definition, the most notable examples of community services was the support provided to refugees by local NGOs in Albania and Macedonia.

DEC-funded community services focused on refugees in camps. A positive aspect of Oxfam's community services work was its sustained support for disabled and women's groups from Kosovo before, during and after the war.⁶⁰ In the camps, it provided a means of engaging with refugee women and a basis for both information dissemination and gender policy work. On return to Kosovo this provided a bridge to a more developmental response, although this may fall outside DEC guidelines for use of emergency appeal funds. An irony is that such community-based, 'self-help' work was made feasible with extra resources available in this emergency. The challenge in future emergencies will be whether agencies can undertake similar work with fewer resources.

Psychosocial projects

This area of work appears fashionable with donors and is discussed in Chapter 9 in Volume II. It is an area dogged by definitional and conceptual problems. Although the title was used by the DEC agencies, much of the activity referred to community service projects. The cultural appropriateness of psychosocial work seemed to be insufficiently addressed in

⁵⁹ Oxfam, BRCS and SC had large school programmes. Concern rehabilitated two schools and a CA partner, Islamic Relief, winterised three schools. Care rehabilitated one school in Korce with DEC funds and CAD worked on schools, but not with DEC funds.

⁶⁰ This contrasted with some non-DEC agencies which reportedly abandoned former partners from Kosovo during the refugee crisis, but returned to work with them later. (Personal communication, Susan Woodward).

practice. There are important questions about the Western-style counselling approaches in what is seen as a non-counselling culture.

Information services

Kosovo Albanian refugees often expressed the importance of getting information in situations where families had been separated and when relatives living outside the region were desperate for news. It was therefore highly appropriate that the BRCS funded a BBC radio programme for tracing purposes in Albania. In Macedonia, SC used new technologies by providing mobile phones in the camps for tracing.⁶¹ Mother-and-child centres and 'tea tents' with TV and videos were also specially created 'spaces' for channelling information.

Less attention, however, was given to refugees outside the camps. Host families interviewed in Albania mentioned the important role that local TV had played in forming their response to the crisis. In Macedonia, host families noted the wide use of the media to communicate with refugees.

Agriculture

Agriculture was an important part of the pre-war economy and also contributes significantly to rural incomes in normal years through the sale of surplus products. Preliminary field data suggest that around 60 per cent of rural cash income was derived from the sale of crops and livestock/livestock products in 1997, with the balance coming largely from remittances (The World Bank, 1999); (FAO & WFP, 1999).

Support for the rehabilitation of agriculture therefore appears appropriate, although the economics of production have been severely affected by the closure of access to markets in the rest of the Serbia and high land prices.

DEC agencies gave limited support for agriculture programmes in Kosovo after the refugee return.⁶² At the time of the evaluation it was too early to judge the impact of these programmes.

4.5 Programmes Outside Areas of Competence

Pressure to spend money and to be visible, and competition between agencies⁶³ meant that there was pressure for agencies to work outside their normal areas of competence or normal modes of operation. The pressure was on to '*stake our claim and find something to do*'.⁶⁴ The BRCS schools programme, HAI's operational presence and Oxfam's support for the NOVIB educational programme were examples of this tendency. It is noteworthy that all these examples were in Kosovo, reflecting the particular dynamics of the humanitarian context

⁶¹ This service was repeated in the first three months of the refugees' return to Kosovo using satellite phones.

⁶² Christian Aid through support to MCIC and CARE.

⁶³ There is no evidence of competition between DEC agencies.

⁶⁴ Interview with DEC agency desk officer.

there. Such problems did not arise in Montenegro, Bosnia or Serbia where fewer agencies worked and there was little media interest.

4.6 Innovation

The evaluation team found a number of examples of innovative work by the DEC member agencies:

- Some agencies tried voucher schemes instead of handing out kits, in order to give beneficiaries a little more choice and dignity. For example: World Vision gave out vouchers for some beneficiaries in Berane, Montenegro (instead of food and hygiene parcels);⁶⁵ MedAir, a Tearfund partner, in Kosovo gave window and door vouchers accepted by four or five suppliers for people to go and choose their own windows and doors.
- CARE supported research for the Ombudsman project as an investment in longer term good humanitarian practice. It also fielded a humanitarian standards consultant in Albania.
- SC used mobile and satellite phones for tracing purposes. As a result, satellite phones are now a part of SC's standard tracing kits. The recruitment of a protection officer also appears innovative and UNHCR has now taken on the post.
- Oxfam put disabled-access latrines in its campsites.

Given the fact that funds for the Kosovo emergency were not a problem and humanitarian needs were mostly not of a life-threatening nature, there is a question of whether more innovative interventions from the DEC agencies may have been expected.

4.7 Conclusions

The lack of assessments and limited consultation with beneficiaries, combined in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo with high levels of assistance, often made it difficult to gauge appropriateness of the aid provided by the DEC agencies.

While much of the assistance was generally appropriate, the evaluation questions the relevance of the psychosocial programmes.

4.8 Recommendation

The general lack of assessments in the Kosovo crisis was a weakness. Paying attention to Sphere Standards, it is recommended that DEC agencies review their assessment skills and capacities, in order to give assessment a higher priority in future emergencies. When reviewing the 48-hour and four-week plans of action, it is recommended that the OSC look

⁶⁵ Recipients could get change, but could not buy alcohol or cigarettes.

for evidence that DEC member agencies are satisfactorily carrying out assessments and, as far as possible, consulting with beneficiaries.

5. COVERAGE

This chapter looks at the various populations affected by the Kosovo crisis and the extent to which needs were met. It also looks at the issue of ‘social cases’, those people identified by the local authorities as being poor or at risk in resident populations and at the responsiveness of agencies to gender and targeting issues.

5.1 Affected Populations

During the NATO bombing period much of the focus of assistance in the region was on Kosovo Albanian refugees in camps in Albania and Macedonia. Affected populations that were potentially less well covered by the international humanitarian response included:

- The population left inside Kosovo.
- Refugees in private accommodation, as opposed to those in camps and their host families.
- Refugees/IDPs in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro, as the focus of the humanitarian response was on Albania and Macedonia.

After the return of the Kosovo Albanians to Kosovo, affected groups included:

- Minority groups (mainly Serbs and Roma) inside Kosovo and Roma throughout the region.

In addition to the above groups, there were cross-cutting groups identified as vulnerable: for example, young children, women, elderly and disabled. As one would expect, there were considerable variations in background and wealth within these groups.

Population in Kosovo during the NATO bombing campaign

There was little information about humanitarian conditions of the population within Kosovo during this period until the UN Secretary-General’s Inter-Agency Needs Assessment mission took place in the second half of May 1999 (OCHA, 1999). This referred to the internally displaced Kosovo Albanians living in appallingly miserable conditions.

During the NATO bombing campaign, the Focus Humanitarian Initiative was the major, highly politicised attempt at an international humanitarian assistance programme to the population in Kosovo.⁶⁶ In the later stages of the campaign, the IRC started airdrops of food aid.

In mid-April, the Yugoslav Red Cross sent a convoy of relief goods to Kosovo. The ICRC restarted relief distributions as soon as it was able to re-establish its operation on 24 May. Also on 24 May, World Vision was able to send trucks with clothing, cooking stoves and other

⁶⁶ The Focus Humanitarian Initiative was launched by the Swiss, Greek and Russian governments, later joined by Austria (Minear, Van Baarda & Sommers, 2000).

relief supplies from Bulgaria to Pristina where the distributions were being carried out in cooperation with the YRC.⁶⁷

Refugees in private accommodation

Over 60 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian refugees who fled into Albania and Macedonia were housed in private accommodation. The likelihood that Kosovo refugees would stay in private accommodation in Albania should have been anticipated. In 1998, many of the refugees entering Tropoje were housed in private accommodation (Fennell, 1998). At that time, warnings were made about the capacity of families to provide for refugees in the long term and both NGOs and donors stressed the importance of providing assistance to host families as well as refugees. Some DEC member agencies did identify needs of refugees and host families early on, including BRCS,⁶⁸ Christian Aid and CAD in Albania.

Concrete evidence about conditions of refugees in host families, as opposed to those in camps, is sparse. A WHO survey of refugees with host families in Macedonia found that access to food was difficult (WHO, 1999).

Coverage of refugees in host families was problematic:

- The high visibility of refugee camps was a magnet to NATO forces, donors, NGOs and the media. Consequently, refugees in camps received a disproportionate level of assistance, given the fewer number of refugees, compared to those outside camps. This differential treatment of refugees goes against universal standards of refugee protection. *'Host family intervention was seen as low profile and certainly not seen to be a sexy caseload'* (Hallam, 1999).
- There is some evidence that only the poorest refugees who could not afford to stay in private accommodation stayed in camps.⁶⁹ If true, this would have justified some extra assistance to these refugees.
- In Albania, a breakdown in the joint ICRC/IFRC pipeline caused a delay in distributions to refugees in host families. Refugees were cared for by local people until international assistance kicked in.
- In Albania, lack of registration and the tendency of refugees to travel, meant that finding and identifying those in most need and monitoring of distributions was problematic. This led to inconsistent coverage. In Kukes town, for example, it was reported that assistance to host families was adequately covered, but not in rural villages.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ World Vision was able on 30 April 1999 to send in some material assistance to Kosovo from Montenegro to IDPs in Istok using local NGO runners with backpacks.

⁶⁸ BRCS supported IFRC operations in Albania and Macedonia which were the major providers of assistance to refugees in host families.

⁶⁹ Interview with IFRC, Tirana, March 2000.

⁷⁰ Interview with CAD, Tirana, March 2000.

- As refugees in Macedonia did not receive refugee status,⁷¹ but were *Humanitarian Assisted Persons*, access to free health services for refugees in private accommodation was often problematic.
- Several surveys of host families in Albania reported various problems among privately accommodated refugees, including lack of information about their entitlements, weak leadership structures and growing tensions among them.⁷²

For host families themselves, again evidence about gains and losses is sparse. For refugees in private accommodation and for host families, the major disparity may have been between urban and rural situations.

To a considerable extent the DEC agencies resisted the aid bias towards refugees in camps with a number supporting assistance to refugees in host families (refer to Section 7 in Volume 2). For example, this group was the major focus of the BRCS assistance through the IFRC and National Red Cross Societies.

Refugees/IDPs in Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro

While the majority of DEC expenditure (nearly 80 per cent) in DEC Phase 1 went to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, a number of agencies were careful to respond to the needs of refugees/IDPs, albeit at lower levels in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia (refer to Appendix 6).

As humanitarian needs grew in Serbia with increased numbers of IDPs, some DEC agencies increased their programmes. The commitment of DEC funds to Serbia rose from 12 per cent in Phase I to 21 per cent in Phase II.

A strength of DEC funds was their availability for use throughout the region, including Serbia. Many donors concentrated their funding on Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia.

Minority groups

The pre-conflict population of Kosovo was 83 per cent ethnic Albanian, 9 per cent ethnic Serb, 3 per cent Gorani/Bosniac Muslim, 2 per cent Roma and 3 per cent other (including Montenegrins, Croats and Turks).⁷³ In February 2000, the WFP/UNHCR survey of minorities estimated that 104,000 Serbs remained in the whole of Kosovo with 75,000 living in enclaves in the Albania areas (Lawrence & Borrel, 1999). Estimates for other communities included

⁷¹ There is no Macedonian Refugee Law to recognise refugee status. UNHCR is currently working with the government to try to draw up such a law (UNHCR, Skopje).

⁷² Refugees International, May/June 1999; Oxfam, July 1999.

⁷³ Data from UNHCR and based upon 1991 census data quoted in Joint WFP/UNHCR Food Needs Assessment of Minorities in Kosovo, November–December 1999 (Lawrence & Borrel, 1999).

around 30,000 Roma (although more may be present but unreported) and up to 35,000 Muslim Slavs.⁷⁴

Some DEC agencies have attempted to provide assistance to ethnic minorities within Kosovo. However, inputs have usually been proportionately lower than those towards Kosovo Albanians. There have been two approaches to supporting minority groups: direct or through advocacy/coordination. CAD has implemented programmes directly, registering 25,000 people from ethnic minorities in 52 separate communities and opening a sub-office in Gracinica, a Serbian enclave, in January 2000 in order to improve access.

SC adopted an advocacy-based approach to assist minority groups, appointing a Protection Liaison Officer who pioneered the formation of an inter-agency protection working group. UNHCR has since taken up and funded this post. The major problems with accessing minorities with assistance has been the relative absence of minority local distributing partners and the restricted travel preventing access to distribution points. The future plans to locate food and non-food distribution from the Centres for Social Welfare will increase these problems reducing the number of distribution points and increasing the necessity for minority groups to travel.

In terms of reaching the Serb populations in Kosovo, the DEC agencies appear to have a mixed record. Some have made considerable effort, including difficult and slow attempts to take on Serb workers. Others have seemed to go with the flow, bowing to the feelings of their 100 per cent Kosovo Albanian staff.

Roma IDPs are probably the most easily distinguishable vulnerable group within the region due to the following factors:

- Their poverty level/marginalisation before the crisis.
- They were less able to cope during/after the crisis. For example, Roma refugees in Macedonia have fared worse than Albanians because host Roma families are generally poorer and unable to provide generous assistance to other Roma. As a result, Roma are more likely to be paying for rent and services and having to sell their rations.
- They suffered most during the war. For example, in Serbia they did not have access to shelters from the bombing and poor-quality housing was easier to destroy.
- Their use by the Serbian authorities as a political tool. For example, allegations that they helped the Serbian military in 'cleaning-up' operations in Kosovo and attempts made by the Serbian Government to send them back to Kosovo. For example, in April - June 1999, buses were organised to return them to Kosovo.
- Discrimination from host communities including local Roma communities.

Some DEC agencies have been aware of special needs of the Roma and have targeted them. For example, a CAFOD partner in Serbia provided food, non-food and medical assistance as well as running workshops on psychosocial issues.

⁷⁴ In addition, there are estimated to be over 20,000 Turks, up to 12,000 Gorani, and some 500 Croats (UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe, 1999b; UNHCR & Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe, 1999a) .

A number of DEC agencies have worked with the Mother Teresa Society (MTS) as a partner, an important part of the parallel structures run in Kosovo prior to the war and therefore politically aligned. It is not clear that the agencies considered the bias that was inevitably involved in distributing through an organisation that had traditionally serviced the majority (Kosovo Albanian) population.

Local population: 'social cases'

The refugee/IDP population, particularly in Albania, was sometimes perceived as being 'better-off' than the local population. In Albania, refugees had free humanitarian aid (food and hygiene parcels) and free health care, which the local poor population did not. There was great pressure on local organisations to provide assistance to their 'own' poor. MCIC in Macedonia explicitly voiced the need to '*balance the refugee crisis with the social crisis*'.

There were differing judgements among DEC agencies about whether DEC funds could be used to support local 'social cases'. In some cases, local populations were included in distributions of material goods or rehabilitation programmes. For example, MCIC, Christian Aid small project fund in Albania, CARE and Oxfam in Albania.

Arguments for including 'social cases' in assistance programmes include:

- Justice: assistance should be given on the basis of need, regardless of grouping.
- Potential conflict mitigation: concerns in Macedonia about the delicate ethnic balance in the country being upset (perceived inequitable aid distribution might fuel ethnic tensions).
- Political expediency: assistance to local people can help to 'oil the wheels' of cooperation and acceptance of 'foreigners' within a community.

Arguments against including 'social cases' among the local population:

- Lack of continuity: DEC funds are short-term and 'social cases' need support in the long-term.
- Inappropriate forms of assistance: DEC funds are used for emergency types of assistance, for example, the distribution of parcels for defined periods of time. These are not useful in assisting the long-term poor and may be counter-productive. For example, they set up expectations which cannot be met and impede the development of alternative coping strategies.
- The 'social case' burden in the Balkans is huge and growing. Therefore, it would be necessary to target the most needy 'social cases'. Criteria for 'most needy' are very difficult to set.

The Sphere Standards call on agencies to take account of and, where appropriate, to assist local host populations. There is a need for clearer DEC guidelines on this issue.

Women and gender

The general lack of assessments has meant that there appeared to be little disaggregated information or analysis about the situation of women in general, and female-headed households in particular. For example, agencies did not seem to be aware of issues about registration of women for relief materials or consider the issue of female property rights in

Kosovo. It is not clear what rights many of the widows, whose houses have been rehabilitated by agencies, have to these.

A reason cited for this lack of attention to gender issues, which goes against the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards, was culture: Albanian and Roma culture is patriarchal and an emergency is not a good time, it was stated, to start to challenge cultural norms. However, humanitarian standards clearly state that, cultural traditions notwithstanding, agency programmes must be analysed in terms of impact on women and must respond to their needs.

The League of Albanian women in Macedonia reported some of the major problems for women refugees as being:

- Physical: lack of minimum conditions such as water in camps which meant women could rarely take a shower.
- Health: lack of health-care facilities. For example, pregnant Kosovar Albanian women were not accepted in hospitals and were only allowed to give birth in Tetovo hospital.
- Lack of access to aid: poor registration, with female heads of household having greater difficulty in going to collect rations, particularly at the beginning of the crisis when lists were not well prepared.

Williams (1999) refers to wider issues of the rights and protection of women refugees.

Oxfam put considerable effort into both analysing and responding to the needs of women throughout the region (Williams, 2000; Oxfam, 1999a)

5.2 Targeting

Targeting strategies included:

- All those in a specified group (for example, all refugees) ignoring differences in need and existence of poorer people within host population.
- Geographical targeting (for example, all shelter in a defined area in Kosovo).
- Targeting based on need.

Targeting in Kosovo is particularly difficult for several reasons:

- There is no general popular support in Kosovo for the targeting of assistance. The population often sees aid as recompense for suffering during the war and a right due from the international community, rather than as a response to needs.
- In the current economic circumstances of Kosovo, the apparent possession of capital is no guarantee of income and the capital may not be for disposal as it may actually belong to an absent family member.
- Remittances play a large part in the Kosovo economy. The WFP estimates that about 245 million DEM a month comes into Kosovo in remittances.
- The complexity of the family structures.

Linked with the lack of assessments (refer to Chapter 4) and monitoring (refer to Chapter 7), targeting appears to have been determined by resources available, rather than by empirical need and made more complex by the large number of agencies operating with different

criteria.⁷⁵

In the food sector, DEC agencies targeted the neediest groups (refugees in host families, Roma and social cases, rather than refugees in camps) and Bosnia and FRY as well as Albania and Macedonia.

5.3 Conclusions

There is little evidence that significant groups of people in need suffered major hardship by being ignored during the Kosovo crisis, with the possible exception of some of the Kosovo Albanian population that remained in Kosovo during the NATO bombing. The Roma in the region have been and remain among the most disadvantaged. The level of assistance given to the Kosovo Albanians, both as refugees in neighbouring countries and on return, was generally far higher than that given to refugees and IDPs in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia.

The international humanitarian community, including the DEC member agencies, were mainly unable to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to the population in Kosovo during NATO bombing.

DEC agencies resisted the pressures to concentrate assistance on refugees in camps and provided significant amounts of aid to the majority who lived in private accommodation.

Some DEC agencies were able to respond to humanitarian need in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia and, in particular, were able to increase their assistance to IDPs in Serbia as the numbers increased after June 1999.

Agencies have found it difficult to respond to minority group needs in Kosovo and, with some exceptions, more efforts could have been made in this area.

There were differing judgements by DEC agencies about whether DEC funds could be used for supporting 'social cases'.

With the exception of Oxfam, there was a serious lack of gender analysis and assessment.

5.4 Recommendations

- (i) Gender analysis was weak in assessments and programme design by almost all agencies. This needs to be strengthened which may require additional skills. Opportunities for learning between DEC agencies should be explored. Again, this is an issue that the OSC should monitor and draw the agencies' specific attention to when reviewing 48-hour and four-week plans of action.
- (ii) In complex political emergencies affecting multiple locations and population groups on both sides of the conflict, DEC agencies need to strengthen their systems for monitoring

⁷⁵ Concern have gone so far as to say that it will not participate in the reconstruction of Phase III houses because it is impossible to target assistance at the truly needy.

whether their programmes are responding to needs in a balanced and impartial way. At a minimum, better monitoring of expenditure and delivery of aid resources to different population groups would help.

- (iii) The Kosovo crisis offers an important opportunity for the humanitarian system to learn lessons about assisting large numbers of refugees in private accommodation and with host families. DEC agencies and the DEC secretariat should explore ways of facilitating lesson learning on this topic with other agencies, such as UNHCR and IFRC in order to ensure that these lessons are not lost.

6. PROTECTION

6.1 Introduction

There is growing recognition that humanitarian responses to war-induced emergencies should not only be concerned with providing life-saving assistance, but also with ensuring the physical protection of people and the practical realisation of their rights as defined in international human rights and humanitarian law. The Valid Lesson Learning Study identified protection as an issue in the refugee crisis (Hallam, 1999). Although not specified in the evaluation ToR, the evaluation team considered it important to assess the extent to which DEC agencies incorporated protection strategies in their response to the Kosovo crisis. For the purpose of the evaluation, protection is defined as strategies to enhance the physical security of persons and groups under threat, and the practical realisation of their rights under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law (Paul, 1999).

6.2 A Crisis of Protection

The international response to the crisis in Kosovo served to define the emergency as a ‘crisis of protection’, the direct consequence of violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Prior to NATO’s military action, human rights promotion and monitoring were central to the way the international community sought to manage the conflict. Alliance countries then justified military action as a ‘humanitarian war’ to protect the rights of Kosovo Albanians. Their concern with human rights in Kosovo sits uneasily with their virtual silence over the war in Chechnya. This apparent selective response to human rights issues lends weight to those who argue that NATO military action in Kosovo was as much to do with European and US concerns to contain the threat of regional instability, as it was with the protection of human rights.⁷⁶ Furthermore, despite the Alliance’s stated commitment to human rights, the international community has failed to protect minority groups in Kosovo fully from discrimination, intimidation and violence. Over 200,000 people have left Kosovo since NATO entered the province.

6.3 Protection Issues During the NATO Bombing Campaign

During the war there were broadly three civilian population groups at risk: civilians expelled from Kosovo; civilians displaced within Kosovo, and civilians at risk from NATO air strikes in Kosovo and other areas of FRY.

Refugee protection

The forced expulsion of over 800,000 civilians from Kosovo was the biggest and most visible protection issue during the three-month NATO military campaign. In addition to the relief provision, DEC agencies contributed to refugee protection in several ways including:⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Some have argued that NATO military action had more to do with the US asserting its geopolitical interests. For example, see (Gowan, 2000).

⁷⁷ See Section 8 in Volume II for more information.

- Supporting UNHCR's protection role through staff secondment.
- Advocating on asylum and registration issues, particularly in Macedonia.
- Enhancing security of refugees in camps.
- Targeting assistance to refugees outside camps.
- Providing tracing services for separated families and children.
- Targeting assistance to, and advocating for the needs of, women and older refugees.
- Supporting minority groups, such as the Roma.

Civilians in Kosovo

The biggest gap in the protection framework during the war was in Kosovo itself. NATO's decision to use air strikes against Serbia forced all international humanitarian aid agencies and human rights observers to withdraw from Kosovo. As a result the minimal protection strategy of witnessing was not feasible. There were few independent witnesses to the expulsion of civilians and little assistance for the estimated 500,000 displaced Kosovo Albanians and other civilians in Kosovo during the war.⁷⁸ The massive international focus on the protection needs of Kosovo refugees further served to deflect attention away from on-going violations of international humanitarian and human rights law inside Kosovo. Aid agencies' decisions to withdraw from Kosovo were based on their assessments of security and ability to continue working. The effect of humanitarian agencies, including DEC agencies, withdrawing *en mass* was that 'humanitarian space' collapsed. In the words of ICRC, there was '*a collective failure of protection*'.^{79, 80}

By 24 May 1999, ICRC successfully re-negotiated humanitarian access to Kosovo.⁸¹ The publicised meeting of the President of the ICRC and President Milosevic in April 1999 sent a strong message of independent humanitarian concern.⁸² Of the DEC agencies, World Vision sent some assistance to civilians in Kosovo in April and May. SC in April called for urgent humanitarian access (Save the Children, 1999) and a staff member participated in a UN assessment mission in May. Christian Aid also called for a cease-fire and negotiation. While agencies' room for manoeuvre was clearly restricted by security considerations,⁸³ there is a question as to whether more could have been done or said by the DEC agencies about protection in Kosovo.

⁷⁸ The Humanitarian Law Center from Belgrade and some local journalists remained in Kosovo, but the only international witnesses were journalists.

⁷⁹ Interview, ICRC, Geneva, March 2000.

⁸⁰ After withdrawing from Kosovo, the OSCE-KVM and international human rights organisations did monitor conditions there by interviewing refugees. The OSCE report *As Seen, As Told* provides detailed information on violations of humanitarian and human rights law in Kosovo in this period, although clearly primarily based on the experience of Kosovo Albanian refugees (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999).

⁸¹ BRCS, as members of the Red Cross Movement, were supportive of ICRC's access, negotiations and position on the Kosovo crisis, although this was not publicly expressed.

⁸² A UN Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission visited Serbia in May. A joint Swiss, Greek and Russian government effort — the Focus Humanitarian Initiative — also managed to get relief supplies to Pristina on 13 May, although arguably it was protection from abuses rather than food that was required.

⁸³ Agencies working in Serbia were concerned about the impact of public statements on the security of staff.

Civilians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Importantly, throughout the NATO campaign, several DEC agencies (BRCS, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, SC and World Vision) continued humanitarian work in Serbia and Montenegro either directly or through partners. The work, which was undertaken by local staff after most expatriates withdrew, consisted of distributing relief supplies to displaced and war-affected civilians. However the Red Cross did undertake protection work, gathering information on displacements and arrests and intervening with Yugoslav authorities on behalf of detainees and prisoners of war. Also Christian Aid's partner, EHO, disseminated information on the humanitarian impact of the bombing through postcards and bulletins.

6.4 Protection in Post-War Kosovo

Since the return of Kosovo Albanian refugees, the most critical protection issues in Kosovo have revolved around the protection of non-Albanians from physical violence, intimidation and discrimination in employment and access to humanitarian aid. Other protection issues include: the plight of missing Kosovo Albanians; the detention of Kosovo Albanians in Serbia; intra-Kosovo Albanian political violence and intimidation; organised criminal violence; gender-based violence; general property rights and property rights of women in particular.

Broadly, DEC agencies have been less active about protection issues in Kosovo than they have been about refugee protection. Reasons for this include: first, the presence of other institutions mandated and better able to provide protection than NGOs; and second, the presence of other organisations experienced in monitoring and reporting on human rights issues. The weakness of state institutions for welfare, justice and policing is also a constraint to protection work. However, it is this protection gap in the absence of the state that provides a rationale for NGOs to be pro-active on protection issues. Some examples of protection activities and strategies adopted by DEC agencies in their work are illustrated in Table 8 (for further details refer to Section 8 in Volume II).

Table 4: Examples of DEC agency protection activities in Kosovo

Protection strategies	DEC agency activities in Kosovo
Coordination and leadership	SC seconded a Protection Liaison Officer to UNHCR who chaired the Inter-Agency Working Group on Protection. BRCS provided delegates for ICRC in Kosovo with protection responsibilities.
Legal protection	BRCS has worked on issues of detainees. SC has advocated on social and legal policy to increase protection of children's rights and establishment of a juvenile justice system.
Human rights education	SC has disseminated information on children's rights.
Access	Various measures by BRCS, CAD, SC, CARE and Oxfam to ensure minority access to relief and other services.
Advocacy	Advocacy by CAD on the issue of minority access to Centres for Social Work.
Gender	Oxfam and Concern have focused attention on women's needs
Discrimination in employment	CARE, Oxfam and CAD have hired staff from minorities
'Extremely vulnerable persons'	HAI and Oxfam have assisted older people and disabled and have advocated for their needs to be addressed.

6.5 Conclusions

Adopting a protection approach does not require relief agencies to become human rights organisations. It does, however, require them to develop field-based strategies to prevent or mitigate violations of human rights and humanitarian or refugee law. This may involve assessing who is politically vulnerable and why and how the actions of agencies support and have an impact on people's rights. The following observations are made about the response of DEC agencies to the Kosovo crisis:

- Some DEC agencies articulated protection as an objective in their DEC proposals,⁸⁴ and most developed activities and strategies to address different protection needs at different times and in different places. However, protection was not always a conscious strategy.
- During the bombing, DEC agencies were pro-active in enhancing refugee protection, in particular by ensuring refugees outside camps were assisted. It was also important that several DEC agencies continued working in Serbia and Montenegro during the NATO military campaign. However, during the war there was a protection gap in Kosovo, that few DEC agencies responded to. In the view of the evaluation team, a minimal response, individually or collectively, could have been to inform the Alliance governments, in particular the British, of the potential humanitarian consequence of NATO's military campaign. Refer to Chapter 10 for further discussion of advocacy work done by DEC agencies.
- Since entering Kosovo, the primary focus of DEC agencies, like other aid agencies, has been on relief, physical rehabilitation and the restoration of social services. Where relief has been linked to protection it has mainly revolved around ensuring people's access to relief and welfare assistance. Vulnerability, however, is largely defined in terms of material or economic well-being without linking this to social status. Protection issues appear in few agency assessments and actions are not evaluated in terms of impact on protection.
- Child-protection activities featured strongly in the general international response, and was a focus of some DEC agencies such as SC and CAD. The emphasis on child protection appears to have been disproportionate to their needs compared to other groups.
- Despite the high profile given to human rights in Kosovo, DEC agencies' collaboration with human rights organisations has been weak.
- In a divided society national staff undertook protection work at some personal risk. A lack of training in protection work increased these risks.
- With large resources available, meeting the needs of vulnerable groups, such as disabled access in refugee camps was feasible. The challenge to agencies will be to meet such needs in emergencies when there are fewer resources.

⁸⁴ For example: for the BRCS, protection was central to ICRC/IFRC's regional response; SC describe child protection as their core expertise in the region; Oxfam defines protection as an objective in their regional strategy (Oxfam, 1999c); HAI identified protection of older people in Kosovo as a need; CAD include child protection in their mission statement.

- DEC agencies have utilised KFOR security to gain access to minority communities. Working with the military on protection issues is complex. Collaborative action may, for example, compromise an agency's neutrality and may weaken other non-partisan protection strategies. However, choosing not to assist people in order to sustain a perception of neutrality could also do harm to those in need. Guidelines on working with the military would help field staff deal with such dilemmas.

6.6 Recommendation

In war-induced emergencies increasing prominence is given to the protection of vulnerable groups in addition to life-saving assistance. In such contexts, DEC agencies should give greater attention to protection objectives when designing and implementing their humanitarian response. This should be reflected better in the DEC reporting framework.

7. EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT

This chapter looks at the monitoring and evaluation carried out by DEC member agencies and the effectiveness and impact of the programmes.

7.1 Monitoring

The monitoring of process and the extent to which DEC agencies can account for the materials they used or delivered has been variable. Several examples of good practice exist. The common features of good practice in monitoring non-food item (NFI) distribution are presented in Box 1.

Box 1: Determinants of good practice in monitoring the distribution of non-food items

- Commitment of sufficient human resources and funding.⁸⁵
- Structured sampling frames for collection of data concerning delivery of materials and some attempts at assessing coverage.
- The use of several sources and methods (triangulation) for constructing beneficiary lists and a computerised system for cross-checking lists from different sources.⁸⁶
- Structured data collection instruments (questionnaires) including information on needs, end use of materials and actual quantities delivered.
- Local knowledge and experience in the areas in which they were working.⁸⁷

As often occurs in humanitarian programmes, the monitoring of impact was problematic. In general agencies monitored process indicators (for example, number of items distributed, roofs built, etc.) relating to material distribution, health or shelter programmes. Most agencies appeared to consider these indicators sufficient as proxies for impact and few looked further.⁸⁸ The delivery of materials to a population, many of whom already had access to support from external remittances and savings is insufficient evidence that an intervention achieved humanitarian impact.

Although most agencies made some attempts to assess impact, few used a combination of methods or used monitoring techniques such as Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice (KAP) techniques. MedAir conducted focus group meetings with beneficiaries partly to review its past work.

⁸⁵ For example, in rural Pristina where CAD is the lead agency for food and NFI distribution it employs 28 full-time field monitors. In their sub-office for minority groups it employs a further seven local monitors and five international staff.

⁸⁶ In Kukes, CAD tried to use distribution lists from several sources including the municipality, prefecture, ARC, schools and banks.

⁸⁷ CAD have been present in Albania since 1991 and in Kosovo since 1995 implementing food and non-food distributions

⁸⁸ For example, HAI in Kosovo and Macedonia did not perform any systematic analysis of the results of their material distributions nor did they expect their partners to do so. Their report states that *'the distributions made to those beneficiaries ... must result in the improvement of living standards for all of these people, therefore the impact that these distributions have made is noteworthy'* (HelpAge International, 2000).

Of the agencies involved in shelter, only Concern knew how many of the houses that it had roofed were actually occupied during the winter.

Monitoring was frequently carried out by partner organisations. There were examples of good practice among local partners. For example, EHO in Serbia employed an independent team from the Novi Sad University to interview beneficiaries about their satisfaction and the end use of items. Based on results from this evaluation it changed the contents of both food and hygiene parcels. However self-monitoring was inappropriate for partners that had little experience in the area of emergency intervention.⁸⁹

In Serbia, external restriction decreased the amount of monitoring possible. Oxfam responded by implementing frequent smaller monitoring visits to build-up gradually a picture of the progress of programmes.

7.2 Evaluations

Given that the Kosovo refugee crisis was the biggest mass movement of people in Europe since World War II, there have been few detailed evaluations by DEC agencies on the impact of their work during this period.

Where evaluations have been done, they have tended to look at organisational and management issues in terms of lesson learning.⁹⁰ Few have looked at the impact of their programmes. There have also been few evaluations of or by partner organisations⁹¹ (refer to Appendix 8).

Among the DEC agencies, only a livelihood study by CARE and IFRC/ICRC evaluations has sought to talk to refugee-affected people (CARE International, 2000; Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). At the very least, some opportunities for learning have been missed. For example, Oxfam advocated for disabled refugees to be included in the humanitarian evacuation programme, but have done no assessment of the impact of this, even though contact is retained with the former refugees.

In some cases, end-of-contract reports and internal evaluation reports have been of high quality and have made important contributions to assessing the effectiveness of programmes. Some of Oxfam's reports included formal evaluation against Sphere indicators.⁹²

7.3 Effectiveness

Effectiveness of the DEC agencies' work has varied. Oxfam's water supply work in the refugee camps was a positive example, monitored against Sphere indicators. Early on in the

⁸⁹ For example, SNI's work in Macedonia, or some of MCIC's work in Kosovo.

⁹⁰ For example, SC conducted reviews of their preparedness and immediate emergency response in Albania and Kosovo and of their head office systems and has made changes as a result.

⁹¹ Tearfund are planning a major evaluation of their Balkans programme.

⁹² For example, the Evaluation of Kavaja and Rushbull Camps using Sphere Standards (Ferron, S. & Ceni, D.).

emergency, Oxfam worked to develop indicators to assess impact in hygiene promotion programmes (Bibby, 1999) but was unable to do much dissemination before the refugees returned to Kosovo.

There are questions about the effectiveness of the agencies' rehabilitation work. Some agencies seemed to concentrate on their 'bit', apparently not taking into account that the impact of their interventions could be reduced by the non-performance of others. Oxfam built an excellent septic tank for a 'jerry-built' school at Gusovac. SC renovated some schools that had low quality toilets and no school furniture.

In situations where numerous agencies are jostling for work, it may prove more difficult for agencies to take a broader and more integrated view of their work.

Impact can also be diminished if an agency is not aware of the importance of taking an integrated approach, for example in public health.⁹³ Despite Oxfam's integrated approach to public health (implementing water, sanitation and hygiene promotion activities together), health and sanitation inputs occurred late in its large-scale rehabilitation project in Lushne. It is too early to determine whether these measures will overcome the danger of increasing public health problems in some villages.⁹⁴

Of the 10 DEC agencies that distributed hygiene kits during the emergency, only Oxfam, CAD and Tearfund routinely accompanied these distributions with other public health interventions.

In the refugee camps in Albania and Kosovo, the divide between camp management (including sanitation and environmental health) and the water, health promotion and medical agencies, detracted from integrated public health interventions.

Several agencies commented that the pressure to spend funds within a limited time frame led to lower overall effectiveness.

7.4 Conclusions

The standard of monitoring and the lack of programme evaluations gave rise for concern. The lack of evaluations by the DEC agencies also raises questions about the role of the DEC evaluation, an issue that is discussed in Chapter 12. The danger of a plethora of evaluations and evaluation fatigue in major emergencies also needs to be recognised.

The effectiveness of the DEC agencies' work varied and in some cases was compromised by lack of monitoring and follow-up to check that other elements affecting successful outcomes were in place.

⁹³ Refer to section 3.6 for discussion on integrated public health interventions.

⁹⁴ In some villages the project has rehabilitated water to 'sectors', blocks of six to eight flats built during the communist regime. These flats have flushed toilets, for which the sanitation systems are broken. At present, due to the lack of water in the flats, little volume flows down the toilets and relatively little raw sewage escapes into the open. If the project succeeds in delivering water, this situation will change and the amount of raw sewage in the open will grow, increasing the public health risks.

Given the weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation noted above, it is difficult for the evaluation to make any detailed statements about impact. It is also sometimes difficult to differentiate the impact of DEC funded activities from others by the same or other agencies.

'The overall impact of humanitarian assistance is reflected in the simple facts that no refugees died from lack of food, warmth, or acquired illness' (DFID, 2000). In the team's opinion, the humanitarian response was probably not the most important reason behind this positive outcome on refugee morbidity and mortality. In many of the camps and in Kosovo after the return of refugees, sanitation and environmental hygiene were sometimes very poor. In an emergency context as is often found in Africa, epidemics and extensive loss of life would have probably occurred (refer to Section 3 in Volume II).

International assistance did improve the conditions of affected populations and the DEC agencies contributed to this.

7.5 Recommendation

The DEC agencies need to improve the standards of their monitoring and evaluation systems. The DEC Secretariat should support some collective work in this area, as part of work on developing future DEC evaluations (see Chapter 12).

8. COST EFFICIENCY

This chapter looks at issues of cost comparisons and controls as well as overhead costs.

8.1 Findings

It has proved difficult to classify DEC agency expenditure by sector due to a lack of sectoral information, insufficient breakdowns, inconsistent labelling and varying levels of detail provided by the agencies. Some expenditure data related to overall projects, some just to DEC expenditure. As a result, it has been problematic to make comparisons from the data provided by the agencies.

Almost no agencies have made any attempt to calculate cost efficiency or cost-effectiveness indicators. The BRCS explicitly calculated expenditure per beneficiary, but was the only agency to do so.

Agencies have not made internal comparisons, whether in the same country, across other countries in the Balkans or across other countries worldwide. This is not unusual and there are methodological difficulties involved in doing so. However, making comparisons could have helped agencies to identify problems earlier. Concern and MedAir both paid 20 DEM per square metre for roofing in Peje at the same time as Tearfund were paying 12 DEM per square metre in nearby Gjakova.

Methodological problems in trying to make cost-effectiveness calculations are illustrated by trying to compare the unit costs of shelter work done in Kosovo. The unit cost of a roof varies enormously from £533 to £4,260 but little can be said about cost-effectiveness, given that different agencies repaired different size houses, in different condition and in areas with different transport constraints. In addition, some agencies provided labour to vulnerable families, some provided tiles, while others provided just timber and plastic sheeting.

The evaluation found large differences in the cost per calorie of food rations purchased by the DEC member agencies and their partners (refer to section 1.7 in Volume II).

Controlling costs

A more limited approach to cost analysis is to look at costs and see where these could have been cut. This has also proved difficult with the lack of data available, but some conclusions are possible.

Most agencies appeared to have reasonably well-established procurement systems and systems for monitoring costs on a regular basis. There was no evidence of conspicuous over-expenditure. However, between Phase II and Phase IIb, Tearfund was able to cut the cost of the roofs in Kosovo from £4,051 per house to £1,372 per house for a variety of reasons.

Local vs. international purchase

In some situations, local purchase can be more appropriate and cheaper than importation.⁹⁵ MCIC in Macedonia stated that one of its three emergency objectives was ‘*to support the economy in Macedonia through local purchase*’.

In Serbia, external purchase was probably better due to the following factors:

- Concern about the consistency and quality of goods provided by local producers.
- Hard currency transfers cannot be made into Serbia because of sanctions.
- All officials have ‘dual’ activities, so the risk of corruption/confusion with suppliers is greater.

However, these factors could be offset by the danger of delivery delays because of import procedures⁹⁶ and the fact that local manufacturers and workers do not benefit. Principle 6 of the Code of Conduct includes the statement that, ‘*where possible, we will strengthen these (local) capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies*’.

Modes of operation

There appears to be an increased trend for agencies to work through international networks. (for example BRCS, CAFOD, CARE, Christian Aid, SC, WV and, increasingly, Oxfam). Some network arrangements can be quite complicated and can increase accountability problems — one agency that was funded by another agency with DEC funds was surprised that the evaluation team wanted to talk to them. There is a danger that each layer of a network or funding hierarchy may increase overhead and management costs.⁹⁷

8.2 Conclusions

It seems likely that the abundance of money available to the agencies weakened what incentive there might have been to look at cost-effectiveness issues.

Most agencies appeared to have reasonably well-established procurement systems and systems for monitoring costs on a regular basis. There was no evidence of conspicuous over-expenditure.

An increasing tendency for DEC member agencies to work within networks may lead to higher overhead and management costs.

⁹⁵ Section 1.7 in Volume II shows that local purchases of foodstuffs are not always cheaper.

⁹⁶ For example, importation of winter clothing by BRCS was delayed until January/February 2000.

⁹⁷ In the case of the Oxfam funded NOVIB education rehabilitation project in Kosovo, overhead costs on the DEC-funded section amount to 22 per cent spread across three organisations and locations in Kosovo, Sarajevo, Holland and the UK (refer to section 5.3 in Volume II).

8.3 Recommendation

Most DEC agencies are understandably wary about coming together to procure items. They fear extra bureaucracy and delays. However, there may be a case for agencies — particularly smaller agencies — to have collective stand-by arrangements for the provision of commonly used items such as household kits.⁹⁸ This should be explored by the DEC agencies. There may also be scope for more information sharing between agencies (for example, transport routes, hauliers and sources, etc.). This should be considered once the DEC Secretariat has been strengthened.

⁹⁸ For example, BRCS was able to make considerable savings by bulk purchasing kits for the ICRC/IFRC joint logistics pipeline.

9. CONNECTEDNESS

This chapter covers the impact of the crisis and the aid effort on local populations, and the ways in which agencies have worked with local partners. It also looks at the context of a shift from relief to rehabilitation.

9.1 Impact on and Support for Local Populations⁹⁹

Impact of the refugee emergency on local populations was mixed. In Albania, for example, there is some evidence that the local population gained through charging rents. In some cases, infrastructure such as hospitals was upgraded although the investment has tended to be in physical structures and capital items, rather than the ‘soft’ area of staff training and capacity building.¹⁰⁰

The population in Serbia saw a 78-day NATO onslaught on infrastructure which gave a further twist to its economic decline, with rising levels of unemployment and poverty, while hosting IDPs and refugees. The bombing of Novi Sad oil refinery and Pancevo industrial complex, for example, has left long-term environmental, health and social consequences.

BRCS supported an ICRC programme to provide stand-by generators to hospitals in Serbia which faced the winter of 1999/2000 with expectations of extended power shortages.¹⁰¹

A common sentiment expressed by host families, particularly in Albania, was a sense of abandonment by the international community once the refugees departed. There was an expectation of economic investment in return for the support that Albania had provided for the refugees. Some agencies in Albania and Macedonia left precipitately as soon as the refugees started to return to Kosovo: *‘NGOs are lining up in Kukes and Blace like cars on a formula-one grid, waiting for NATO to raise the flag’* (Oxfam, 1999b).

However, DEC agencies probably did better in this respect. The majority have continued to work in Albania and Macedonia, partly with DEC funds, and with other resources. Refer to Chapter 5 for discussion of assistance to ‘social cases’ in local populations.

By itself, community-based rehabilitation and development will do little to alleviate the long-term structural problems in these countries or offset other impacts of the war, such as Macedonia’s loss of trade with Serbia and access to electrical power from Kosovo. Oxfam is the only DEC agency, however, to advocate on issues around the ‘Stability Pact’, which has implications on the future recovery and development of countries in the region.

⁹⁹ More detail about the situation of local populations can be found in Section 8 of Volume II.

¹⁰⁰ Skhodra district in northern Albania (population 400,000) has received almost US\$7,000,000 of assistance since the emergency (interview with District Director of Public Health, March 2000). Most of this has been in materials and construction. When the evaluators visited the polyclinic they found an extremely impressive building that had obviously been completely renovated. There were, however, extremely few patients and few doctors, with most of the new consulting rooms locked.

¹⁰¹ In fact, power shortages were less severe than expected due to energy import agreements with friendly countries and a less severe winter than usual.

INGOs have proliferated in Kosovo but there seems to have been little monitoring of the impact of their presence. For example, INGOs are one of the main sources of employment, but there have been only very limited attempts at coordination of salary scales. Agencies have been employing highly over-qualified people as drivers, watchmen and in other similar roles.

9.2 Strengthening of Local Capacity/Working with Local Partners

NGOs in the Balkans have grown up only in the last 10 years and therefore the need for institutional support is still substantial. Most of the DEC agencies have to some degree worked with local partners. Principle 6 of the Code of Conduct states, *inter alia*, 'We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities ... Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate with local government structures where appropriate.'

DEC agencies used a variety of approaches in the Kosovo crisis. These included:

- Direct implementation: Oxfam's water project; much of CARE's work.
- Funding local partners: CAFOD, Christian Aid and Tearfund.
- Funding international partners: World Vision funded MAG for mine clearance.
- Funding local network partners: Christian Aid funded Diakonia Agapes in Albania.
- Funding international network partners: CAFOD funded CRS; BRCS supported ICRC/IFRC programmes.
- Programme Implementation through contractors: CARE carried out its mine clearance project through MineTech.

In Albania and Macedonia, most of the support for refugees in host families was implemented through local partners, while the refugee camps were the preserve of the INGOs.

The strengths of working with and through local partners were seen to be:

- Local partners 'knew the communities', could draw on a large force of local volunteers and required less expatriate involvement, thus offering the potential of wider coverage. Knowledge of local communities and local organisations facilitated better targeting.¹⁰²
- Local partners were sometimes able to respond far faster than international agencies in the initial stages of the emergency.¹⁰³
- By implementing through local partners, DEC supported the building of local disaster response capacity. Prior to the crisis, IFRC had provided support to local Red Cross societies and Tearfund had provided training for local partners.
- In Macedonia, support provided to MCIC by Christian Aid was used to support chronic

¹⁰² For example, the Association of Albanians in Sarajevo started to compile lists of potential host families for Kosovo Albanian refugees in 1998.

¹⁰³ For example: the Albanian Red Cross in Elbasan; El Hilal in Macedonia.

‘social cases’ in order to ‘*balance the refugee crisis with the social crisis*’.¹⁰⁴ Humanitarian aid was, therefore, being used to address chronic structural problems and also to avoid tensions developing between population groups.

There were also challenges of working with local partners:

- Some partners had little or no experience of emergency work and most were unaware of the Code of Conduct principles, Sphere or other technical guidelines. The appropriateness of some assistance packages was questionable.¹⁰⁵ In Serbia, Oxfam partners were not collecting health data in collective centres, despite a concern with health issues. While Roma NGOs played an important mediatory role in meeting needs of Roma refugees, problems arose from inexperience.
- The use of local partners increased the potential for duplication and required tighter, better coordination. El Hilal, for example, used its own distribution lists.
- Where part of the motivation of local organisations was political or religious, this could jeopardise the impartiality of humanitarian assistance.¹⁰⁶
- Working with local partners had the potential to reinforce political and ethnic divisions and discrimination. Albanians in Macedonia, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the work of some Macedonian NGOs.
- Reliance on local NGOs can affect coverage. In Serbia, several DEC agencies support Roma IDPs. However, this was mainly around Belgrade and Central Serbia where Roma NGOs were more vocal, and less in the south of the country.

The features of successful attempts at collaboration included:

- The partner’s previous emergency experience and some capacity, such as El Hilal, EHO and MTS.
- Previous capacity-building relationships with partners. For example, Oxfam with WRV; SC with MTS; IFRC with National Red Cross societies. This involvement can include staff training, disseminating information about existing guidelines, support visits and evaluation of a partner’s capacity.
- Close support for and monitoring of partner’s work. The ACT evaluation (Silkin & Bouman, 1999) notes how problems can arise if expatriate support for a local NGO in an emergency is not handled well, although the NGO in question, Diakonia Agapes, welcomed the expatriate inputs provided by Christian Aid. MCIC in Macedonia resisted an influx of expatriates.

¹⁰⁴ Interview, MCIC, Macedonia, March 2000.

¹⁰⁵ MCIC in Macedonia, a CAFOD partner in Serbia.

¹⁰⁶ Concerns were expressed, for example, about MTS in Kosovo and El Hilal in Macedonia, although many informants noted the importance and effectiveness of the work of these organisations.

Local partners reported a number of ways in which they had benefited from the crisis. These included:

- Experience in organising large emergency operations.
- More volunteers.
- Increase in material resources (for example, ARC gained six Fiat vans for transport of volunteers from DEC funding through BRCS) and computer equipment.
- More experience in writing proposals and reporting.

Several DEC agencies attempted to use the emergency as an opportunity to strengthen the continuity of their programmes through the development of their networks of local partners. (Oxfam in Albania; SC in Serbia). The experiences of these agencies appears to have been largely positive.

During the refugee emergency some INGOs who previously worked in Kosovo neglected their Kosovo partners. In this respect, the record of the DEC agencies is better. Oxfam, for example, worked with the same disabled and women's groups before, during and after the refugee emergency, while SC maintained its relationship with MTS.

9.3 The Longer Term Context – from Relief to Rehabilitation

DEC Phase II funds have been spent within a political framework that defines the context as being one of 'rehabilitation' rather than 'emergency'.¹⁰⁷

The plentiful resources available during the Kosovo crisis, have led to high local expectations about what the international community will deliver. Concerns are being raised about whether this is creating a 'dependency syndrome' at a time when, after the flood, funds are already beginning to dry up.

Given donor support for salaries, pensions and other social welfare benefits, opportunities to support a relief to development transition are better in Kosovo than in most countries in crisis. However, agencies face obstacles to support the transition:

- The lack of clear political framework for the province.
- The existence of two political systems. For example, Belgrade continues to pay welfare benefits in Serb enclaves.
- The underlying political complexity means that all interventions risk being appropriated by different parties within the majority community.
- Lack of coherence among multilateral structures and between donors.
- Local NGOs have proliferated in Kosovo. As in other 'transitional' countries, in Kosovo they are perceived by some as representing 'civil society' in a more democratic context. To what extent are these agencies supporting democratic, multi-ethnic solutions for the

¹⁰⁷ Internationally, the start of the reconstruction phase in Kosovo was signalled by the Donors Conference in July 1999. DFID closed its emergency offices in the region on 30 April 2000.

future? Agencies appear not to be considering these issues when doing capacity building with local partners.

In the DEC context there is a lack of clarity and variation in practice over the use of DEC funds for rehabilitation work. This issue is discussed in Chapter 12.

Timing of funding

Poor continuity of funding can undermine the connectedness of humanitarian interventions and funds seem to be less available in 2000.

DEC agencies were under pressure to spend the money available to them during Phase I or return the unspent amounts to the DEC 'pot'. Substantial funds have been available in Phase II, but the restrictions of timing on the use of DEC money has been of little added value in promoting connectedness.

However, some DEC agencies have provided examples of exceptions to this trend of poorly connected emergency operations, through maintaining continuity or presence and through working with local partners and local government.

9.4 Conclusions

A number of the DEC agencies saw the importance of continuing to work in Albania and Macedonia. This compared favourably with some other INGOs that left those countries as soon as the refugees returned to Kosovo.

The DEC member agencies have wide and varied experience of working with local partners. In some instances, partners' lack of experience of emergency work, limited capacities and unawareness of international humanitarian standards were weaknesses, underlining the importance of support to those agencies with training and capacity building.

The shift of work from relief towards rehabilitation in Kosovo underlines the importance for the DEC to develop and clarify its expenditure rules, in order that the early stages of rehabilitation work can be facilitated and member agencies' transition to longer term funding can be made easier.

9.5 Recommendations

- (i) The DEC should clarify in its appeal publicity that money will be spent on emergency needs *and* on immediate rehabilitation needs — helping people to get back on their feet.
- (ii) The DEC should modify the six-month rule for expenditure in order to provide more flexibility.
- (iii) The DEC should consider the use of up to 5 per cent of funds for preparedness and capacity building work by member agencies for future emergencies.

Refer to section 12.12 for more details of these recommendations.

10. COHERENCE

This section looks first at coordination issues and then at the extent to which the DEC agencies complemented their emergency responses with advocacy work.

10.1 Overall Coordination

Coordination difficulties of the international response in Albania and Macedonia during the refugee crisis period have been well-documented, in particular UNHCR's poor performance (Hallam, 1999; Suhrke et al, 2000). Amongst other areas, the importance of sharing assessments and coordinating responses was exemplified in Kukes, Albania during April. Many agencies assessed hygiene needs but assessment reports were not shared, resulting in the over-distribution of hygiene kits (Herson, 1999).

In Kosovo, UNMACC was recognised as having done a good job in coordinating humanitarian mine action work, but DEC agencies felt that coordination of shelter and school rehabilitation work had been problematic. In Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia coordination has been to some extent less problematic, partly due to the lower numbers of agencies participating in the responses.¹⁰⁸

Many factors undermined coordination:

- Huge inputs from NATO and bilateral donors, combined with their unwillingness to submit to UNHCR coordination.¹⁰⁹
- Weakness of UNHCR and UNMIK (Grunewald & De Geoffroy, 1999).
- Marginalisation of UNHCR by bilateral donors and NATO?¹¹⁰
- Under-funding of UNMIK.¹¹¹
- The high number of agencies that quickly became involved in the response.
- The large number of camps in Albania.
- Intense media scrutiny and pressure for profile.

Commentators have stressed the challenges of coordination when over 250 NGOs were present. There was an onus on agencies to support improved coordination. In this context, it appears that most DEC agencies showed a commitment to coordination and were generally

¹⁰⁸ In April 2000 there were approximately 36 international NGOs in Serbia and 50–60 NGOs in Montenegro (ICVA Belgrade). However, DEC agencies did point to coordination problems in Serbia, reportedly caused by poor leadership by UN agencies and the difficulties and sensitivities of relationships between state structures and NGOs.

¹⁰⁹ The Sphere Standards assume that *'There is a shared commitment among all those involved in humanitarian assistance to achieve the minimum standards, and to co-ordinate their response'* (The Sphere Project, 1998).

¹¹⁰ The top six EU contributors to the Kosovo emergency together allocated US\$278.8 million in public (non-military) humanitarian assistance in the March–June 1999 period; of this, UNHCR was allocated only US\$9.8 million, or 3.5 per cent, directly, although halfway through the emergency it received ECHO funding (Suhrke et al, 2000).

¹¹¹ UNMIK was 50 per cent funded during 1999 and, at the time of the evaluation, there were less than 11 per cent of pledges for 2000 fulfilled.

supportive of UNHCR's coordinating role and responsibility. Some examples of positive efforts to support coordination included:

- Tearfund seconded a water and sanitation engineer to UNHCR in Albania.
- BRCS provided a coordination delegate to ICRC in Pristina in response to the large number of National Red Cross societies setting up programmes in Kosovo.
- Oxfam lobbied publicly for more support to UNHCR although, unfortunately, this was mis-interpreted by some of the media and parts of UNHCR as an attack. Oxfam took a lead in contingency planning in Bosnia.
- CARE and CAD took on an 'Area of Responsibility' (AoR) in Kosovo.
- HAI took on the Cerentolovski old people's home at the suggestion of UNHCR.
- SC seconded a protection officer to UNHCR in Kosovo and was a lead agency in coordinating community services and education in Bosnia.

There was pressure for agencies from bilateral donors wanting 'their' national NGOs to work in 'their' camps, particularly in Albania. Tearfund was chosen by DFID in Elbasan because it was British, and Oxfam worked very closely with the British Army in Stenkovic in Macedonia and Korce in Albania. CARE managed the US-funded Camp Hope in Albania. However, the DEC agencies generally avoided the excesses of rampant bilateralism which were shown by some other INGOs. BRCS declined strong DFID offers to take on camp management of a British-run camp in Albania. In some cases, DEC agencies liaised between international agencies and local authorities.

More generally, DEC agencies also worked through their networks. BRCS resisted pressures to act bilaterally and supported the joint ICRC/IFRC operation in Phase I, although in Phase II it decided to become directly operational in Kosovo within the framework of ICRC programmes. Christian Aid worked through the ACT network, but also became operational in Kosovo.

The DEC's OSC put great emphasis on the importance of coordination in its feedback to the agencies on their 48-hour and four-week plans of action.

Inter-agency coordination is a costly activity in terms of senior staff time and has to be prioritised within agencies. Agencies may have to coordinate on a wide variety of axes:

- Geographical: district or prefecture coordination meetings.
- Sectoral: for example, shelter meetings.
- Donor: for example, EU, USAID, ECHO or other meetings.
- Philosophical: for example, advocacy groups.
- Network: for example, coordination between PNSs.
- Topic: special working groups on taxation, etc.

The increasing trend for agencies to work through their international networks is positive in coordination terms in one sense, as it can rationalise the operations of INGOs in the field. On the other hand, however, it also means that agencies may need to spend increasing amounts

of valuable time on internal, rather than, external coordination. Also, as has been noted above, in the pressure of a major high-profile international emergency, network partners tend to break ranks and go bilateral.

In Albania and Kosovo, humanitarian information centres appear to have played important roles and facilitated coordination within the NGO sector and with UN and other agencies. Lessons could be learnt from these examples. The DEC agencies should consider support for such ventures in the future (money, staff, materials, publications, etc.), leading to more on-the-spot dissemination of technical standards and lessons learnt to practitioners in the field.¹¹²

10.2 Coordination between DEC Agencies

Agencies had some informal contact in the field. The major example of cooperation which took place was in Kukes 2 camp where the following agencies played complementary roles:

- CARE: camp management.
- Oxfam: installed water supply and training of trainers in hygiene promotion for MSF and CARE workers.
- Tearfund: installed pit-latrines with support from Oxfam materials and provided solid waste collection.
- CAD: baby washing, nappies and baby food.
- SC: summer school activities.

This unplanned coordination of work by the DEC agencies raises the possible question of whether there would be merit in pursuing integrated collaboration in the future.

On the whole, coordination and contact between DEC agencies in the field was limited and there was general agreement by the agencies that a DEC coordination mechanism in the field in this emergency would not have added value.

10.3 Advocacy Work

The Terms of Reference (refer to Appendix 1) for this evaluation refer to advocacy activities, asking whether agencies undertook such work to '*complement their immediate relief actions*'. This section therefore outlines some of the public advocacy work undertaken by DEC agencies and raises some issues about the needs and opportunities for advocacy work during the Kosovo crisis.

As advocacy is only given a brief mention in the ToR and because of the limited team resources available, this report does not attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of advocacy work undertaken by DEC agencies, nor does it look at the related areas of media and public communications work.

¹¹² ALNAP is considering establishing a Learning Support Office in the early stage of an emergency, to strengthen on-the-ground learning.

It should also be noted that not all DEC agencies undertake public advocacy work.¹¹³ Furthermore, for those that do, it can often be undertaken within broader alliances and groupings, depending on the subject matter.

The following are some of the main advocacy issues which were raised by DEC agencies:

- CAFOD expressed deep concern about the humanitarian impact of the NATO bombing, warning of the dangers of the withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo.¹¹⁴
- Christian Aid called for a cease-fire and continued negotiation.¹¹⁵
- Oxfam called for all parties to take a coherent approach to the humanitarian refugee crisis in Macedonia, that UNHCR's lead role be respected and supported and for UNHCR to appoint quality staff. It also called for NATO's logistical capabilities to be harnessed with greater effect.¹¹⁶ Since the war, Oxfam has concentrated on advocacy work around the South Eastern Europe Stability Pact.¹¹⁷ Recognising the imbalance between funding for the Balkans and for other emergencies in the world, Oxfam started a 'forgotten emergencies' appeal with its private donors in August 1999.¹¹⁸
- Save the Children called for urgent humanitarian access to Kosovo at the end of April 1999 and a SC staff member was the only NGO member of a UN assessment mission to Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro in May 1999.

Given the scale and the profile of the Kosovo crisis, those DEC agencies with an advocacy remit appeared to carry out limited public advocacy work during the Kosovo crisis. It seems that agencies were limited in their scope for advocacy by a number of factors:

- Agencies with staff on the ground had to weigh up the security risk to them from any public statements. This particularly related to staff in Serbia who worked under very difficult conditions, sometimes of harassment and surveillance.
- Internally some agencies found it difficult to find positions on which to base advocacy work.
- The overall intensity of media coverage and political activity surrounding the crisis may have made it doubtful that advocacy work would stand a chance of receiving any attention.

There appear to be two humanitarian issues on which agencies might have been able to carry out advocacy work:

¹¹³ For example, this is not within the principles and approach of the BRCS, although advocacy is often carried out by the ICRC and IFRC.

¹¹⁴ In March 2000, CAFOD called for a review of sanctions against Serbia.

¹¹⁵ Policy statement on Kosovo, April 1999.

¹¹⁶ In 1998, Oxfam had called for UN approved action to enforce a cease-fire in Kosovo as the 'least worst option'.

¹¹⁷ Oxfam has published a number of policy and briefing documents on this topic.

¹¹⁸ This initiative became a public campaign in May 2000 with the publication of 'An End to Forgotten Emergencies' briefing paper.

- a) *Access to and protection for the population inside Kosovo during the NATO bombing.*
The Director of Save the Children, representing the DEC, pointed out the importance of access to and protection of the population inside Kosovo during the bombing at the House of Commons International Development Committee hearing on Kosovo in May 1999:

Anne Clwyd MP: Have you, as a (DEC) group, been pressing the Government on this point?

Mr Aaronson: Not yet ... To be perfectly honest I think it quite difficult for all of us in this country because this country has played such a leading role, which most people I think would regard as an honourable role, in pursuing the war. I think that puts us all in quite a difficult position. We might as well be honest and face up to it. I think it has taken us a while to try to work out for ourselves what does this really mean and are there aspects to this which if we took a couple of steps back we might say: 'Well, we are not actually totally happy' (International Development Committee, 1999).

- b) *The use of cluster bombs by NATO airforces.*¹¹⁹

Given that a number of DEC agencies have been active in the anti-landmine campaign, it was surprising that none raised the issue of the use of cluster bombs. These weapons are not covered by the 1999 Ottawa treaty, but now represent almost as much of a danger in Kosovo as landmines laid by the Serb security forces.¹²⁰ This became a particularly British issue, as British forces continued to use cluster bombs after the US had stopped, following concerns about the danger to civilians. Cluster bombs have killed 50 people since June 1999 and injured more than 150.¹²¹ (for more information, see Section 6 in Volume II).

There was very little discussion or cooperation between, or common ground on advocacy work found by the DEC agencies.¹²² Some agencies argued that it would have been impossible for any agreement to have been reached by the DEC grouping. The DEC itself presented both written and oral evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee hearing on Kosovo in May 1999.¹²³

Mention should be made of advocacy work undertaken by DEC agencies in the field. There are a number of examples of good practice:

- Oxfam lobbied other agencies and the UN on standards and including gender and disability issues in the Macedonian camps.
- In Tirana, INGOs including CAD, CARE and Oxfam lobbied the UN Secretary-General on issues including the role of the UN agencies in coordination and the need to include the NGOs in consultations.
- Save the Children, in conjunction with UNICEF, lobbied successfully for UNMIK to ban the construction of large institutions for abandoned or separated children.

¹¹⁹ Both humanitarian mine action projects funded with DEC money have cleared unexploded cluster bombs.

¹²⁰ CAFOD had a small reference to NATO's use of cluster bombs in a Landmines Update, August 1999.

¹²¹ Report by UK Working Group on Landmines quoted in The Guardian, 8/8/00.

¹²² Reportedly Merlin did call a meeting of DEC agencies to establish a common position, but this failed.

¹²³ The DEC Memorandum noted the importance of upholding international standards in relation to people's rights to humanitarian assistance, protection and return to their countries of origin.

Some local NGOs also undertook advocacy activities, notably MCIC in Macedonia and EHO in Serbia. MCIC conducted a public information campaign entitled '*Whole is when there is everything!*' aimed at encouraging inter-ethnic tolerance.¹²⁴

In the broader context of the Kosovo crisis and the fact that the NATO bombing campaign was widely described as a 'humanitarian war', it is perhaps surprising that the NGO sector has apparently done little to analyse this concept or to contest it.

10.4 Conclusions

Both the DEC agencies and the DEC's OSC exhibited a commitment to supporting humanitarian coordination structures. Those agencies working within their international networks had to commit considerable time to internal coordination issues.

The low level of advocacy work by the agencies during the Kosovo crisis was perhaps surprising. The evaluation team felt that there were issues on which the DEC agencies could have worked on in an advocacy capacity.

10.5 Recommendations

- (i) In the Kosovo crisis, humanitarian information centres appeared to play a positive role in information sharing, coordination, advocacy and standard setting. In future emergencies DEC agencies should consider support for such centres for the dissemination of technical standards, lessons learnt, etc.
- (ii) The DEC Secretariat should play a more active role in the UK in facilitating the exchange of analysis and policy dialogue between agencies, with the objective of strengthening individual agency advocacy work, and identifying opportunities for collaboration between two or a small grouping of DEC agencies.

¹²⁴ This slogan came from a children's competition. The campaign included t-shirts in seven languages and was independently evaluated (MCIC, 2000b; MCIC, 2000a).

11. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

11.1 Introduction

Over the past decade the humanitarian community has introduced innovations to govern the provision of aid in complex emergencies (Leader, 1999). Three such innovations are:

- The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (IFRC, 1996).
- The Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response of the Sphere Project (The Sphere Project, 1998; The Sphere Project, 2000)
- The People in Aid Code of Best Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel (Davidson, 1998).

All DEC agencies are signatories to the Code of Conduct, most have participated in the Sphere Project and several are signatories to the People in Aid Code. The evaluation examined how they were applied by the DEC agencies during the Kosovo emergency.

Box 2: The Code of Conduct

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first
2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
5. We shall respect culture and custom
6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid
8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects

Generally, the evaluation team found that awareness of the Code of Conduct and its principles, the Sphere Standards and the People in Aid Code was poor, and little attention was given to their application. The regional head of one DEC agency remarked, ‘*we have signed up to Code of Conduct and to Sphere, but what does that mean?*’ Many local partners had never heard of either the Code or the Sphere Standards, and where DEC agencies worked through local or international networks, other agencies in the network did not necessarily share the same commitment to standards. There was very little monitoring of adherence to the Code and standards in agencies’ planning and implementation of programmes and no requirement from the DEC to report against them.

11.2 Sphere Minimum Standards

Kosovo was the first emergency in which Sphere minimum standards in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and health could be 'field tested'. As a relatively new innovation it is perhaps not surprising that agencies did little to operationalise them during this emergency. An exception was Oxfam, who applied and monitored the Sphere Standards in the provision of water to refugee camps. CARE also fielded a 'Standards Consultant' in Albania to draw up guidelines for operationalising standards for camp and collective centre management and secondary distribution, and the supported research on the Ombudsman Project (Kelly, 1999).

Some DEC agency staff questioned the relevance of Sphere Standards in a European setting. However, the evaluation team felt that ensuring the application of minimum standards is an appropriate objective, and that those relating to assessment, monitoring and information systems are particularly important.¹²⁵ The humanitarian intervention in Albania and Macedonia met most of the Sphere health indicators, but operations were constrained by the failure to collect demographic data to the standards required. Sanitation often did not meet the Sphere Standards, and standards of food and non-food items varied greatly from agency to agency and even within the same agency. Most refugees stayed in private accommodation. Although Sphere Standards (under shelter and site planning) apply to this scenario, these were not referred to by agencies assisting those refugees. Weak coordination meant that overall monitoring of standards was poor. Without this there was no way of determining whether assistance did or did not meet acceptable standards. More contentiously, some aid agencies argued that maximum rather than minimum standards needed to be set, given the level of assistance provided in sectors such as shelter.

Some weaknesses with Sphere Standards were noted by DEC agency field staff, such as the lack of indicators relating to the needs of the disabled and older refugees. HAI are currently in discussions about including their 'best practice' guidelines on assisting older people in emergencies in Sphere Standards.

11.3 People in Aid Code

Five DEC agencies are signatories of the People in Aid Code. Some senior staff were unaware whether their organisation was a signatory or not. The People in Aid Secretariat reported that it had received a substantial number of complaints from aid workers returning from Kosovo. These included, inadequate inductions, debriefings and medicals, overwork and recruitment of inexperienced staff. It was not possible to link these concerns directly to DEC agencies. However, a few issues regarding staff management in DEC agencies were noted.

- The pressure to recruit staff quickly meant that induction processes were often minimal or non-existent. This meant that staff were inadequately briefed on issues such as Sphere Standards.
- In general, the security arrangements of DEC agencies for staff appeared adequate. A

¹²⁵ The Sphere mortality indicators were an exception, being inappropriately high for the good epidemiological profile and nutritional status of the population.

report of a safety and security workshop in Kosovo in November 1999 indicated there was room for improvement in agency security procedures (Van Brabant, 1999). However, no major security issues were brought to the attention of the evaluation team. Both CARE and World Vision employed full-time security officers. Oxfam had comprehensive security guidelines and deployed a security adviser during the initial return to Kosovo.

- In Kosovo, nepotism and ethnic tension means that agencies have faced particular constraints in implementing equal opportunity policies when recruiting national staff. It was noted, however, that many agencies have been slow to prioritise the recruitment of staff from minorities.

11.4 Impartiality and Humanitarian Need

The nature of the international intervention in Kosovo challenged humanitarian agencies' adherence to the principles of non-partisanship, impartiality and independence which are integral to the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct, and humanitarian action more generally.¹²⁶

The Code of Conduct emphasises the fundamental principle of impartiality. That is, assistance will be prioritised on the basis of need alone independent of other considerations, and that relief programmes will reflect '*considerations of proportionality*'. The scale of the international response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999 raises questions about the selectivity of the international disaster response system on a global level and within the region affected by the emergency.

One aid worker who worked in Albania during the crisis writes: '*The response to the Kosovo crisis saw more money, more agencies and more media interest than any previous humanitarian operation*' (Porter, 2000). The DEC Kosovo appeal was the most successful appeal ever. The British government alone allocated £110 million for humanitarian aid. At a workshop in Pristina with DEC agencies, participants noted one consequence of this was an over-supply of aid and duplication of services.¹²⁷ Although the vast resources committed to the Kosovo emergency sits uneasily within a context of a global decline in aid budgets, the more important issue is whether the response was disproportionate compared to humanitarian needs elsewhere in the world.

In 1999, ECHO spent more money on humanitarian assistance in Kosovo than in the rest of the world put together (Oxfam, 2000). While donor governments gave US\$207 per person through the 1999 UN appeal for Kosovo, those in Sierra Leone received US\$16, and those in the Democratic Republic of Congo little over US\$8 (Oxfam, 2000). The cost of Camp Hope in Albania for 3,000 refugees for two months was equivalent to the 1999 UN appeal for Angola (Porter, 2000). In Africa for the past 20 years, refugees have often had to survive on lower than basic food requirements. Kosovo refugees in some cases were receiving Turkish delight in complimentary food packages. In the emergency, 80,000 refugees were flown to other countries in Europe, something that would never be conceived of in an African crisis.

¹²⁶ The Code of Conduct incorporates the fundamental principles of the Red Cross — humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, universality, voluntary service and unity. Historically for the ICRC, these principles have served to legitimise their intervention in wars and position themselves with regard to the warring parties (Leader, 1999).

¹²⁷ Workshop, Pristina, 7 April 2000.

This disproportionate response was also apparent in donor investment in human rights protection and monitoring in Kosovo.

The lack of investment in needs assessment, noted elsewhere in the report (refer to Chapter 4), meant that the humanitarian response was not based solely on the assessment of need. The apparent disproportionate response to Kosovo indicates that at a global level the humanitarian system is not impartial, but selective and influenced by political factors as much as by humanitarian need.

This was also evident in the region. The withdrawal of humanitarian agencies from Kosovo and the massive support given to Kosovo Albanians as refugees and returnees, gave the impression of a selective and biased response by the international community. While the warring parties closed down humanitarian space in Serbia, there was an imbalance in the assistance given to refugees compared to Serbia and Montenegro; apparent not only in terms of quantity, but also the type of assistance.¹²⁸ In late 1999, there were 36 INGOs in Serbia and 50-60 in Montenegro compared to over 300 in Kosovo. Kosovo receives more humanitarian aid per capita than the rest of FRY.¹²⁹ This raises a question as to whether the casualties of the war were being treated equally according to need, or whether some were considered more deserving than others.¹³⁰ The latter would imply a discrimination that undermines the universality of humanitarian principles.

11.5 DEC Agencies and Impartiality

To what extent was the response of DEC agencies proportionate?

At the beginning of the Kosovo Appeal, the DEC-OSC noted that the scale of the response from members and the wider community ‘may exceed the immediate needs of the affected population’ (DEC, 1999a). The appeal was not capped. Global inequities of relief assistance were identified by DEC agency staff as an ‘*uncomfortable*’ issue.¹³¹ Several noted that the Kosovo emergency had consumed people and resources from other parts of the world. One aid worker expressed shock at seeing ‘*250 NGOs in a place the size of Wales*’. It appears, however, that only Oxfam took the step of cutting its Kosovo programme by 30 per cent, in order to focus on other emergencies. It has also used the case of Kosovo to draw attention to other ‘forgotten emergencies’ (Oxfam, 2000).

¹²⁸ International assistance to IDPs and refugees in Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia has been limited mainly to the provision of minimal relief, while a range of non-material assistance has been provided to Kosovo Albanians. In one case reported to the evaluation team, OFDA decreed to an international NGO that seeds should be allocated to the Kosovo Serbs based on the size of the population, rather than on need.

¹²⁹ The UN funding requirements for 2000 are indicative, with US\$199million requested for FRY and US\$249million requested for Kosovo (OCHA, 2000).

¹³⁰ DFID noted with regards to Serbia ‘*There is no humanitarian crisis there*’. There have been no DFID visits to Serbia to assess the situation, and none is planned. (Interview, DFID, London, March 2000).

¹³¹ Workshop, Pristina, 7 April 2000.

Like the international response generally, the largest proportion of DEC assistance in Phase I went to support refugees in Albania and Macedonia and in Phase II to relief and rehabilitation in Kosovo. The DEC agencies did no better than other agencies in assisting inside Kosovo during the bombing, although several did continue working in Serbia, Montenegro and the Republika Srpska on a reduced scale. How DEC funds were spent was correct in terms of how money was raised from the public — the media coverage was about Kosovo Albanian refugees. It is difficult, however, to conclude whether or not DEC funds were allocated proportional to needs in the region.

First, the ready availability of resources and lack of pressure from donors meant there was little requirement to prove needs.

Second, needs in Serbia and Kosovo differed and there were no comparative needs assessment.

Third, comparative expenditure was generally not monitored and reported on. Subsequent to the cease-fire, however, several agencies did increase their assistance outside Kosovo programmes, particularly to Serbia.¹³²

11.6 Military Humanitarianism and Neutrality

The international intervention in Kosovo challenged the humanitarian principle of neutrality. For NATO and donor governments there was a blurring of humanitarian and political objectives. The British Secretary of State for International Development made this clear when she stated: *'It is clear that our humanitarian and military objectives are completely intertwined' and further '...in this conflict our humanitarian and military objectives are completely entangled'*.¹³³ NATO's General Jackson's also stated: *'We're all going down the same road. We are not rivals or competitors. There's a single mission with military and humanitarian dimensions'* (Humanitarianism and War Project & Humanitarian Law Consultancy, 1999). These objectives were entangled in the assertion by NATO governments that they were waging a 'humanitarian war'.

The blurring of humanitarian and political objectives was apparent in two ways: in the bilateralism of aid provision, and in NATO's support for and participation in humanitarian activities. Bilateralism was evident in operational actions of donor aid departments and the preference of donors to channel funds through NGOs. It was most marked in the refugee camps which were funded by donors, constructed by military contingents and managed by NGOs of the same nationality. Erseke camp near Korce, for example, was constructed by UK KFOR troops. Oxfam GB, Merlin and CARE UK which worked in the camp were offered DFID funding (Porter, 2000).

The military's participation in humanitarian activities and support to humanitarian operations reflected a trend stretching back over the past decade. In the Kosovo emergency they brought additional logistical resources, built refugee camps faster than NGOs, and provided a security

¹³² BRCS, CAFOD, Christian Aid and Oxfam all made substantial commitments to needs in Serbia.

¹³³ Statements to the House of Commons 26 March 1999 and 27 May 1999.

umbrella that enabled agencies to work in Albania and deliver assistance to minority enclaves in Kosovo. The institutionalisation of the collaboration between military and humanitarian agencies was evident in the employment of military liaison officers by some agencies.¹³⁴ In Kosovo it is also apparent in the KFOR brigade areas which coincide with UNHCR designated AoRs, and in some municipalities KFOR chairs humanitarian coordination meetings.

Military participation in humanitarian activities is now common and of itself is not wrong. There are obviously risks to collaborating with military forces: of being coopted by military objectives, of becoming dependent on the military for access and thereby disempowering any alternatives (Pugh, 2000). The key issue in the Kosovo crisis, however, was that NATO was a party to the war and its military action increased the incidence of humanitarian need. The establishment of refugee camps, particularly in Albania, had a military as well as a humanitarian utility. While NATO professed to be on a '*humanitarian mission*',¹³⁵ it also had political objectives:

KFOR and UNMIK are partners in an international effort to restore Kosovo and help the local population to transform the province into a free and democratic society open to all (<http://kforonline.com>).

Agencies therefore needed to weigh up cooperating with the military to the benefit of refugees, over the potential loss of neutrality and impartiality.

In contrast to NATO leaders, the UN Secretary General noted the importance of respecting the distinction between humanitarian and military action, stating '*if these lines are blurred, there is a grave risk of irreparable damage to the principle of impartiality and humanitarian assistance*'. The UNHCR's evaluation also notes that its decision to work with NATO during the bombing was a '*deviation from the traditional norm that humanitarians be impartial and neutral*' (Suhrke et al, 2000).

In a written submission to the House of Commons International Development Committee report on Kosovo the DEC sought to draw a division of labour between the military and aid agencies, arguing that '*military support should only be in logistics, infrastructure and security while humanitarian agencies should be responsible for refugee camps and programmes*' (International Development Committee, 1999). However, this distinction between humanitarian and military duties was difficult to maintain, especially in the glare of the international media. That neutrality was perceived to be compromised was apparent to DEC agency staff in Serbia who felt threatened seeing their organisations on CNN in the Albanian or Macedonian camps, in a situation where civilians in Serbia were also suffering.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ CARE in Albania. In Pristina, UNMIK humanitarian Pillar I has a Special Civilian Military Officer attached to it.

¹³⁵ Interview, KFOR, Pristina, April 2000.

¹³⁶ Interview with Oxfam. Serbia, April 2000.

11.7 DEC Agencies and Neutrality

In this highly politicised and militarised environment how feasible was it for DEC agencies to sustain their neutrality and independence?

DEC agencies' views on the war differed, and within agencies there was often no consensus (see section 10.3). During the NATO air strikes, DEC agencies made little comment on NATO's involvement in relief activities, and did little to articulate their independence from NATO.¹³⁷ NATO government statements on humanitarian and military objectives and the concept of a 'humanitarian war' went by largely uncontested at the time. However, by continuing to work in areas of FRY subject to NATO air strikes (outside Kosovo) some DEC agencies did help sustain a measure of neutrality and independence, and have pursued this more actively in Kosovo working with all groups. One advantage of international agency networks and alliances is that they enable different sections to work with different parties.

During the refugee crisis, there is evidence that some DEC agencies also resisted pressures from donors to respond in particular places. For example, both Merlin and CARE resisted pressure from OFDA and the US ambassador respectively to operate a 24-hour health service in Camp Hope, on the grounds that there was no need. It was noted that DEC funds meant that some agencies did not have to take money from the British government, which according to one agency '*kept us honest*'.¹³⁸

Most DEC agencies collaborated with NATO forces in implementing their programmes, taking advantage of their logistics or security to deliver assistance. Some implemented projects jointly with the military. Although several DEC agency staff expressed unease about too close an association, at a practical level 'pragmatism' was the order of the day. Others were excited by their contact with an efficient military machine: '*I asked for ten people and they turned up in the morning and did whatever was needed.*'¹³⁹

Pragmatism, however, would not be considered sufficient justification to collaborate with warring parties in other situations. Maintaining neutrality would be essential for sustaining humanitarian access and to secure donor funding. In other contexts agencies have drawn up codes and policies to sustain the independence of humanitarian action (Leader, 1999). In the Kosovo emergency there was less incentive for this. In Kosovo, only Oxfam and the Red Cross had policies to guide staff on working with the military. CARE has subsequently commissioned a discussion paper on civil-military cooperation.

11.8 Conclusions

Awareness, application and monitoring of the Code of Conduct and Sphere Standards was poor.

¹³⁷ This contrasted to MSF, the most vocal critics of NATO's participation.

¹³⁸ Interview with CARE, London, March 2000.

¹³⁹ Interview with senior NGO manager, Skopje.

Given the entwining of political, military and humanitarian objectives in the Kosovo crisis, the DEC agencies could not escape being seen as partial. Collectively, they did not question the term ‘humanitarian war’ or point out the consequences of NATO air strikes.

Limited assessments meant it was difficult to judge if assistance was proportional to need and there was little monitoring of operations to ensure impartiality. The provision (in some cases over-provision) of assistance without adequate assessments of need undermines the principle of impartiality, as well as being inefficient.

However, agencies were able in the field to avoid some of the excesses of bilateralism, for example, by assisting refugees outside the camps, and to sustain a neutral position by providing assistance in Serbia and Montenegro.

Despite precedents of military involvement in humanitarian activities (for example, Bosnia) and a significant amount of policy dialogue, the issue was scarcely raised by DEC agencies during the emergency. Despite the collaboration, there remains a clear ‘culture gap’ between the military and NGOs.¹⁴⁰ Agencies’ practice of working with the military varied and most lacked policies or guidelines for field staff.

DEC appeal funds can help to sustain the independence of DEC agencies.

The impact of the huge response to Kosovo and of the aid ‘circus’ on efforts to strengthen and professionalise the humanitarian system will need to be monitored by the DEC. At the same time Kosovo provides a marker against which donor responses to other emergencies can be judged.

11.9 Recommendations

- (i) The DEC should require as a condition of membership that agencies support the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards.
- (ii) The DEC should require member agencies to be signatories to the People in Aid Code.
- (iii) The DEC should give more emphasis to human resource issues in future evaluations.
- (iv) The DEC should require agencies to monitor their performance in relation to the Code of Conduct, Sphere indicators and the People in Aid Code. Indicators for monitoring application of the People in Aid Code should be developed. The Lessons Learning model of real time monitoring should be developed further to monitor their application.

¹⁴⁰ One NATO officer interviewed reported that he knew nothing about NGOs before coming to Kosovo. Another described the military as ‘*a rather a right wing organisation*’ and the NGOs as ‘*anti-military tree huggers*’.

- (v) The DEC should monitor the impact of the huge international response to Kosovo emergency on future emergencies.
- (vi) Agencies should develop guidelines for cooperation with the military.

12. THE DEC

12.1 Context

The Disasters Emergency Committee was founded in 1963 and the Kosovo appeal is the 43rd appeal it has mounted. In 1996, the DEC was restructured, *inter alia* widening the membership from five to 15 and introducing a range of governance regulations, including the requirement for an independent evaluation after each appeal (Borton, Hallam & Landa, 1996b; Borton, Hallam & Landa, 1996a; Borton, Hallam & Landa, 1996c). This evaluation is the fourth since this requirement was introduced.¹⁴¹

The DEC underwent an organisational review in 1999 (Hailey, Elliot & May, 1999), the recommendations of which are being implemented in 2000.

The DEC's objective as formulated in its Memorandum of Association is as follows:

To support UK charitable sector NGOs ('agencies') in their task of alleviating acute human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the effects of a major disaster, by:

- a) providing an accredited national forum for joint fundraising by UK charitable voluntary sector NGOs ('agencies') in order to maximise the funds raised and facilitate immediate commitment from participating agencies;*
- b) creating a focal point for the response of the public, the broadcasters and others to such disasters;*
- c) facilitating agency cooperation, coordination and communication;*
- d) ensuring that funds are used in an effective, timely, fully accountable way.*

The Kosovo appeal has been the largest DEC appeal ever, as shown in Figure 1. It tested the DEC systems and guidelines, in some cases to their limit.

12.2 Overall Strengths and Weaknesses of the DEC Kosovo Appeal

The participating agencies noted the following positive points:

- The appeal provided the agencies with substantial funds which were highly flexible in their application.
- It enabled some agencies to get up and running while raising money from donors and also to leverage money from donors.
- It enabled funding gaps to be filled.
- DEC money is politically 'neutral' and so could be spent, for example, in Serbia where it was difficult to raise donor funds.

Overall, flexibility was seen by the agencies as the key positive characteristic of DEC money.

¹⁴¹ Earlier evaluations have been undertaken for Sudan, Hurricane Mitch (Central America) and Bangladesh.

Weaknesses most often noted were:

- Lack of forecasting of appeal income and therefore uncertainty about how money would be available to the agencies, disrupted planning.
- A complicated phasing system with overlapping dates.
- Limitations caused by the six-month rule, even though the phasing extended the overall period of expenditure from six to eighteen months.
- Too much money (agencies, particularly local partners, being stretched to spend).
- Unclear guidelines in terms of reporting and expenditure.

From the evaluation team's point of view, additional important issues arising were:

- Poor quality of the DEC planning and reporting framework.
- Poor quality of many of the plans and reports submitted by the agencies (and lateness).
- Limited capacity of the DEC Secretariat, for example to monitor agency reporting or to share information.
- Questions about the concept of the evaluation and the 'back-loaded' model.¹⁴²
- Confusion in some agency field staff's minds about what the DEC is — some see it as another donor like ECHO, rather than as a collective framework of the agencies themselves.

12.3 Guidelines for Expenditure

As stated in its objectives, the DEC is a collective mechanism for raising public funds to meet '*acute human suffering*'. The appeal advertising speaks about urgent need. However, in the case of the Kosovo appeal, substantial amounts of DEC expenditure in this emergency fell outside the acute suffering criterion and have been committed to rehabilitation activities and, in some cases, in assistance to populations not directly affected by the crisis.¹⁴³

The Operational Sub-Committee of the DEC was concerned about this 'leakage' and, while continually reminding agencies that funds were for those directly affected by the war, acknowledged that it was probably impracticable rigidly to enforce this guideline.¹⁴⁴

Agencies interpreted the 'rules' differently and while some agencies, such as Oxfam and CARE, undertook projects in Albania after the refugees had returned home, World Vision did not spend DEC money in Albania because it thought such expenditure would be outside the DEC guidelines.

¹⁴² The back-loaded model '*places the onus of judgement on member agencies themselves as to whether or not they are able to utilise funds in a way that will stand up to evaluation. Awareness that their work will be evaluated should deter from 'opting-in' those unsure of their capacity*' (DEC, 1999b).

¹⁴³ For example, a number of agencies work with populations in Albania, Macedonia and FRY not directly affected by the emergency.

¹⁴⁴ OSC comments on Phase II 'four-week plans of action' re-submissions, 18 November 1999.

The DEC Secretariat sometimes interpreted the guidelines inconsistently. In the case of assistance to schools, Christian Aid was told that this was not an appropriate use of funds¹⁴⁵ but BRCS, CARE, Oxfam and Save the Children did commit money to schools. World Vision was told that money could not be used for psychosocial projects, whereas other agencies used that heading without challenge.¹⁴⁶

The DEC generally rules out in all appeals support to state education, religious buildings or teaching programmes and other development programmes.¹⁴⁷

There are a variety of other areas where some guidance for agencies could be useful:

- Treatment of contingency funds — if required, these need to be incorporated into the relevant expenditure headings.
- Loans.
- Treatment of capital items.

12.4 The Six-Month Expenditure Rule

The DEC rules see the six-month rule as an important part of the ‘contract’ with the British public which emphasises that money donated will be spent quickly for emergency needs. It is also intended to prevent agencies salting money away in their reserves. Agencies that cannot spend their shares of DEC funds are encouraged to return unspent funds to the pool for redistribution rather than forcing themselves to spend money too quickly.

The phasing of the Kosovo appeal disbursements partially circumvented this rule. In several cases, agencies were allowed no-cost extensions from Phase II to IIb which effectively gave them a two-month extension.

The norm is that for each phase, however, the money has to be spent within six months.¹⁴⁸ Agencies found this rule restrictive when moving into more rehabilitation-type work. Those agencies working with local partners pointed out that the time frame can be a constraint when the speed of implementation is limited by capacity. Tearfund withdrew the projects to support the Novi Sad Christian Centre as the funding was for more than six months. MedAir did not execute the Bread of Life project (for Serb refugees to make bedsheets for collective centres in Kosovo) due to time constraints and logistical difficulties. Oxfam reported that time constraints meant it was not possible in Albania to go through a full community participation process.

¹⁴⁵ OSC comments on 48-hour plans of action, 2 April 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Source: World Vision UK headquarters interview. Reportedly the OSC has advised against the use of DEC funds for psychosocial projects, but there is no record of such a statement or of the exchange with World Vision.

¹⁴⁷ Written communication from the DEC Executive Secretary.

¹⁴⁸ Legal advice to the DEC is that agencies participating in an appeal have a legal entitlement to their share of the pool for six months only. After that they have an entitlement to what is disbursed to them by decision of the Executive Committee. If an agency does not return unspent funds, or delays their return, or spends funds beyond the six-month period without leave, the DEC would be entitled to seek legal redress. (Written communication from the DEC Executive Secretary).

For the Kosovo appeal, the expenditure stretched over a period of 18 months and the ‘acute suffering’ guideline was restrictive and inappropriate. Humanitarian standards indicate that agencies should be aware of connectedness issues and should avoid ‘fire brigade’ type interventions, given that needs can extend well beyond the six-month period.

In Kosovo, the evaluation team already saw evidence that donor funding was beginning to dry up. Given the flexibility of DEC money, it seems unfortunate that the DEC six-month rule also follows this short-term approach.

The current DEC structure works to raise money when there is substantial public, and by definition, media interest in an emergency. The DEC appeal approach therefore does little to broaden understanding of crises and perpetuates a view that these are one-off events in which the problems will be solved quickly by money. Given that the DEC is now becoming a substantial financial player in the humanitarian scene, discussion around the six-month rule may provide an opportunity to discuss with the broadcasters the possibility of ‘deepening’ the DEC message.¹⁴⁹

12.5 Phasing

The phasing of expenditure was agreed by the Executive Committee of the DEC as a way of regulating the huge amount of money raised by the appeal. It also saw phasing as a way of providing flexibility to meet humanitarian needs, whether the refugees stayed in neighbouring countries or returned to Kosovo.

Agencies welcomed the phasing of the Kosovo appeal expenditure as an *ad hoc* way of dealing with the scale of the appeal income, while still retaining the six-month rule structure. However, they found the actual system which was implemented to be complicated and confusing. In future any such phasing should not involve overlaps.

In addition, agencies felt that the DEC Secretariat was slow to forecast income and this made planning difficult.

In the case of Phase II, for expenditure between August 1999 and January 2000, approval for the money was only given in mid-September, giving a more limited time for implementation.

Agencies also noted that disbursements of DEC funds were made on the basis of their percentage shares and with no link to what the agencies had requested.¹⁵⁰

12.6 Dealing with Large Appeals

The agencies receiving the largest shares of the Kosovo appeal funds acknowledge that there were difficulties in absorbing such large amounts of money. In fact, quite early on, the OSC was aware of *‘the risk that the scale of the response from both member agencies and the*

¹⁴⁹ The importance of the media coverage afforded to DEC appeals is substantial, given that a recent report on the coverage of global affairs on British television underlined the diminishing coverage during the 1990s (Stone, 2000).

¹⁵⁰ This issue is now being looked at with the proposed introduction of a Disbursement Protocol.

wider international actors may exceed the immediate needs of the affected population'.¹⁵¹ It is therefore perhaps surprising that the Executive Committee took the relatively unusual step on 15 April 1999 of extending the period of joint action (PJA) from the normal two to four weeks. Factors behind that decision included concerns about the forthcoming winter period and a wish to see the agencies continue their public collaboration.

12.7 Planning and Reporting

The DEC planning and reporting system comprises a 48-hour plan of action, a four-week plan of action and then financial and narrative reports to be completed one month after the end of the six-month period.

The evaluation team found a number of difficulties with this structure:

- (i) While the 48-hour plan provided an important mechanism whereby agencies opted-in to the appeal, they were of little value for the evaluation because they were drawn up before any detailed response plans had been formulated.
- (ii) The four-week plan of action is intended to provide the baseline information for the evaluation (DEC, 1999b). Although sometimes quite detailed, agencies often made substantial changes to their DEC expenditure plans later in response to changing circumstances in the field and/or to changing fundraising needs. In the case of Kosovo the sudden and unexpectedly rapid return of refugees to Kosovo in June 1999 was one such instance when agency plans had to change rapidly.¹⁵²
- (iii) However the practices of agencies in informing the DEC Secretariat of these changes varied considerably. In at least two cases it remained unclear to the evaluators exactly which programmes were covered by DEC expenditure.
- (iv) There need to be standard procedures about informing the DEC Secretariat of changes of plan. An interim report at the 12-week mark, as implemented for the 1999 Orissa appeal, would help to record changes and might help the Secretariat to forecast better the level of funds unspent and likely to be returned.
- (v) There were a number of problems with the final reports:
 - Some agency reports were good, but others were of very varying quality and did not always follow the DEC format.
 - It was sometimes very difficult to work out exactly what DEC money had been spent on, making it difficult, if not impossible, to establish accurately how DEC funds had been spent both geographically and sectorally.
 - For the purposes of this evaluation, Phase II reports were late. This was partly because the one month deadline for reporting is too short for many programmes, particularly those executed by partners or large programmes covering a number of countries.

¹⁵¹ OSC comments on 48-hour plans of action, 2 April 1999.

¹⁵² Informants noted that donors such as ECHO were unusually flexible in this situation.

Final reports were not looked at in any systematic way by the DEC Secretariat, even for conformity with the format. Although the OSC does make initial comments on the 48-hour and four-week plans, it does not look at the final reports. In current practice, the reports were therefore only used by the evaluation team.


Interestingly, none of the Plans of Action or final reports is seen by other DEC agencies. While the circulation of large amounts of paper or large electronic files might not be useful, the availability of documents on a DEC intranet database might facilitate the sharing of information.

There needs to be clarification as to the purposes of the plans and reports. There should be capacity in the DEC Secretariat to do the basic checking of the final reports. The formats should be revised.

12.8 Agency Capacity and Allocation of Funds

The basis on which the DEC allocates money as a share of the cake is a fairly crude estimate of agency income (refer to Figure 4).

Figure 4: Allocations from DEC for the 12 agencies



It is not fine tuned for each emergency. There is a large differential between the percentages of the agencies, with three¹⁵³ taking nearly two-thirds of appeal income and four agencies¹⁵⁴ taking less than 6 per cent. The 1999 organisational review proposed that no one agency should receive more than 25 per cent of the overall appeal total.

The allocation of funds is a difficult and sensitive issue. The team felt that there should be some facility available to the DEC to recognise the particular capacity of an agency within a region. For example, in the case of Kosovo, Children's Aid Direct appears to be an agency whose prior position in the region should have made it eligible for additional funds.

¹⁵³ BRCS, Oxfam and SC.

¹⁵⁴ Children's Aid Direct, Concern, Help the Aged, Merlin.

Factors which any new allocation system could take into account include:

a pre-existing presence in the area.

previous relationships with local partners which have a proven capacity for emergency response.

12.9 Role of the DEC Evaluation

The primary objectives of the independent evaluation are:

- (i) *To ensure transparency and accountability in the use of funds provided by the British public.*
- (ii) *To encourage member agencies to learn individually and collectively from their experiences in responding to major disasters (DEC, 1999b).*
- (iii) *To encourage the development of good practice and the attainment of acceptable standards among member agencies (Section 1 of DEC Handbook).*
- (iv) *Management control, to provide a basis for disciplining poor performers (inherent in the evaluation given the references in the DEC handbook to sanctioning those criticised by the evaluation).*

The independent evaluation is also intended to play a key role in the so-called 'back-loaded' model of funding which the DEC adopted in 1996. The knowledge that an independent and publicly available evaluation will be carried out is meant to ensure that agencies abide by DEC rules and do not, for example, commit themselves to spending more money than they effectively can.

In effect the evaluation has audit, disciplinary and lesson-learning functions. The experience of this evaluation indicates that all these functions cannot be discharged and do not sit well together.

The evaluation team found the following difficulties:

- The scale and range of the DEC-funded programmes in a major appeal can be huge. It is not possible to carry out effective evaluations of those programmes, unless the agency itself has its own well-established monitoring and evaluation system in place. In this evaluation, the work of the team was facilitated when the agency had carried out its own evaluation, as for example in the case of the British Red Cross and, to an extent, Christian Aid (Silkin & Bouman, 1999; UNHCR, 1999).
- There are methodological difficulties about what is being evaluated. While the emphasis is on the use of DEC funds, these are often used as contributions to larger programmes or in support of larger programmes. In those cases, the programme document for the whole programme should be baseline against which the evaluation is carried out. The shortcomings of the DEC four-week plan of action has already been mentioned in Chapter 12.
- The DEC evaluation cannot achieve sufficient detail to be a substitute for individual agency evaluations. It is not clear that an external evaluation is the best vehicle for promoting institutional learning and providing discipline within the DEC system.

- This evaluation has highlighted generally weak monitoring and evaluation systems. It is possible that the DEC evaluation is weakening rather than strengthening those systems, by removing the need for agencies to carry out their own evaluations.
- Agency transparency varied. Some were excellent in facilitating access to internal reports and key former staff members. A small number questioned the need for this access and in at least one case appeared to conceal agency difficulties.

This evaluation was preceded by a lesson-learning exercise, commissioned by the DEC and carried out by Valid International (Hallam, 1999). The documents from this exercise were important reference documents for the evaluation team, particularly because the lessons-learning team was able to interview a range of agency staff and other informants while the emergency was still under way. However, it is perhaps questionable whether it makes sense to carry out a lesson-learning exercise before the main evaluation. It is also noted that there was a long delay before the final report could be circulated. Unfortunately the timing of the lesson-learning exercise in June 1999 at the time that the refugees were going home meant that no substantial interviewing of beneficiaries could take place.

Several agency staff said that they would welcome more detailed feedback on their agency's performance from the evaluation team than could be included in the report and wonder whether separate de-briefings by the evaluation team might be possible. The agency summaries in Volume III are intended to provide some of this feedback.

12.10 Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the findings of an evaluation of one appeal. They need to be considered along with the findings of evaluations of previous appeals and in conjunction with the DEC's organisational review. A number of them will also require discussion and negotiation with other DEC stakeholders, especially the DEC's media partners:

- (i) The DEC should clarify in its appeal publicity that money will be spent on emergency needs *and* on immediate rehabilitation needs — helping people to get back on their feet. This will require a carefully designed media strategy, but should be seen as an opportunity to convey to other DEC stakeholders (including the public and the media) the true nature of many emergencies, particularly complex political emergencies that are rarely short-term six-month events.
- (ii) While the formula may vary from emergency to emergency, the DEC should modify the six-month rule to say that the bulk of the funds should be spent within six months, but a certain percentage could be carried forward for a period of expenditure of up to twelve months. This might vary between 20 per cent and 40 per cent depending on the nature of the emergency.
- (iii) In addition the DEC should consider the use of up to 5 per cent of funds for preparedness and capacity-building work by member agencies for future emergencies. Some of this 'development' fund could also be used for research, learning and training initiatives in the humanitarian field that would improve the quality of member agencies' response capacities. This would require discussion and agreement with other DEC stakeholders, such as the media.

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- (iv) If funds are disbursed in phases, these should not overlap. The DEC Secretariat should improve its information flow to member agencies regarding phasing and anticipated income in order to facilitate agency planning.
 - (v) Drawing on the extensive experience of member agencies, and the pattern of donations from recent appeals, the Secretariat should improve its ability to forecast appeal income in order to facilitate appeal and agency planning, and to inform decisions about the length of the period of joint action.
 - (vi) The planning and reporting framework needs to be reviewed. This review should be done in conjunction with discussions about the role of the independent evaluations, drawing on the experience of this and recent appeal evaluations. A 12-week report should be instituted which, *inter alia*, would register any major changes of plan made by agencies and give the DEC Secretariat a forecast of expenditure and unspent funds.
 - (vii) Rules for agencies to notify the Secretariat of changes of plan from the four-week plan of action should be drawn up, and should require agencies to provide notification in writing.
 - (viii) The DEC Secretariat should have the resources available to provide more substantial support to the OSC and to the agencies than is now available. It should consider the appointment of a 'desk officer' post to *inter alia* monitor agency reporting; collate, analyse and disseminate information from outside sources on the emergency; facilitate information sharing, meetings and policy discussion between member agencies.
 - (ix) A number of recommendations in this report relate to the development of standards and good practice within the agencies and the DEC should consider the appointment of a humanitarian standards and learning post to stimulate sharing of lessons and training, both internally and externally with other humanitarian players. This would be a fixed term contract against specific terms of reference and could be responsible for promoting learning from appeal evaluations among member agencies.
 - (x) The DEC should review the role of the independent evaluation in the light of the experience of this and previous evaluations. In particular, this review should look at how best to tackle the different objectives of accountability, disciplinary control and lesson-learning. It should look at the interaction between the evaluation and agencies' own monitoring and evaluation procedures. It should also look at how best the evaluation process can be implemented in the early days of an emergency and whether or not there should be a lesson learning exercise at that stage. There are a number of options which the DEC could consider. Two are presented here for further consideration:
 - a. Development of an accredited monitoring and evaluation system to be used by each agency. In such a system the DEC would set certain standards and exercise a quality-control function, for example by reviewing terms of reference and approving the independence of the proposed evaluation team for each agency. The DEC evaluation could then be an overall meta-evaluation, drawing on the agency evaluations, investigating problem areas or key issues and drawing out overall lessons.
 - b. Identifying more clearly the outputs required from the evaluation team, to enable the multiple objectives to be met. For example, a number of separate and 'layered' reports could be prepared, developing the precedent set by this evaluation. Thus, an overview report with an accessible executive summary could be used to fulfil the accountability objective. A more detailed lesson-learning report could be prepared

for the member agencies, part of which would be disaggregated by agency. The impact of the latter would be strengthened by the evaluation team presenting their findings on a bilateral basis to each agency. This option would inevitably require much more time and resources than the current evaluation model.

- (xi) The DEC should look at whether some system of assessment can be introduced which will fine tune the distribution of funds to agencies according to their capacities for the particular emergency. This should be part of the DEC organisational review.
- (xii) The DEC should clarify the rules for funding projects from DEC appeal funds. They should specify any activities which are ruled out for funding and clarify and disseminate guidelines for the treatment of contingency funds in accounts, and the disposal of capital items.
- (xiii) The DEC should update its basic data on its member agencies on a regular basis, including up to date annual reports and updated list of relevant policy statements. This could provide a useful reference source for future evaluators.
- (xiv) In order to encourage learning from this evaluation and also in order to gauge the evaluation's longer term usefulness, it is suggested that each DEC agency should prepare a short report between six and twelve months after the evaluation has been published. This note would describe the follow-up steps taken in response to the findings and recommendations of this report. The DEC's OSC could prepare a simple guidance note on the format for these reports and they would be shared between the agencies.
- (xv) There should be a clear and time-limited process put in place within the DEC to take forward the above recommendations.

13. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a full list of recommendations from the preceding chapters. A clear timetable should be put in place to review and (where they are accepted) to implement these recommendations. See also recommendation 32 below. This process should be put in place by the DEC Secretariat, in consultation with member agencies.

Preparedness

1. In complex political emergencies, effective preparedness and response plans depend on access to informed political analysis. Experience of the Kosovo crisis indicates that DEC agencies need to give more thought to how available independent political analysis can be used to inform decision-making. The DEC secretariat can play an important role, by facilitating information sharing and contingency planning among its member agencies. See also recommendation 12 below.
2. The report identifies a number of factors that contribute to strong preparedness capacity, such as in-house emergency staff available at short notice, well-defined expertise in a particular sector, efficient recruitment procedures and good logistics systems. An established presence within the region and existing relationships with local partners were also important elements affecting an agency's preparedness and timely response. Each DEC agency should review its performance in the Kosovo crisis against the factors identified in this evaluation, and take steps to strengthen its preparedness capacity. Smaller agencies, which cannot afford a stand-by emergency capacity, need to have procedures for accessing resources, of all kinds, at short notice.
3. RedR plays an important role in supporting almost all DEC agencies, through training and especially through its specialist register of emergency personnel. The DEC should explore with its members and with RedR how to support RedR's training programmes for future emergencies.

Appropriateness

4. The general lack of assessments in the Kosovo crisis was a weakness. Paying attention to Sphere Standards, it is recommended that DEC agencies review their assessment skills and capacities, in order to give assessment a higher priority in future emergencies. When reviewing 48-hour and four-week plans of action, it is recommended that DEC's OSC look for evidence that DEC member agencies are satisfactorily carrying out assessments and, as far as possible, consulting with beneficiaries.

Coverage

5. Gender analysis was weak in assessments and programme design by almost all agencies. This needs to be strengthened which may require additional skills. Opportunities for learning between DEC agencies should be explored. Again, this is an issue that DEC's OSC should monitor and draw agencies' specific attention to when reviewing 48-hour and four-week plans of action.
6. In complex political emergencies affecting multiple locations and population groups on both sides of the conflict, DEC agencies need to strengthen their systems for monitoring whether their programmes are responding to needs in a balanced and impartial way. At a

minimum, better monitoring of expenditure and delivery of aid resources to different population groups would help.

7. The Kosovo crisis offers an important opportunity for the humanitarian system to learn lessons about assisting large numbers of refugees in private accommodation and with host families. DEC agencies and/or the DEC Secretariat should explore ways of facilitating lesson learning on this topic with other agencies, such as UNHCR and IFRC in order to ensure that these lessons are not lost.

Protection

8. In war-induced emergencies increasing prominence is given to the protection of vulnerable groups in addition to life-saving assistance. In such contexts, DEC agencies should give greater attention to protection objectives when designing and implementing their humanitarian response. This should be reflected better in the DEC reporting framework.

Monitoring and reporting

9. The DEC agencies need to improve the standards of their monitoring and evaluation systems. The DEC secretariat should support some collective work in this area, as part of work on developing future DEC evaluations (see recommendations 26 and 27 below).

Cost efficiency

10. Most DEC agencies are understandably wary about coming together to procure items. They fear extra bureaucracy and delays. However, there may be a case for agencies — particularly smaller agencies — to have collective stand-by arrangements for provision of commonly used items such as household kits. This should be explored by DEC agencies. There may also be scope for more information sharing between agencies (transport routes, hauliers, sources, etc). This should be considered once the DEC Secretariat is strengthened.

Coherence

11. In the Kosovo crisis, humanitarian information centres appeared to play a positive role in information sharing, coordination, advocacy and standard setting. In future emergencies DEC agencies should consider support for such centres for the dissemination of technical standards, lessons learnt, etc.
12. The DEC secretariat should play a more active role in the UK in facilitating the exchange of analysis and policy dialogue between agencies, with the objective of strengthening individual agency advocacy work, and identifying opportunities for collaboration between two or a small grouping of DEC agencies.

Performance standards and humanitarian principles

13. It is recommended that the DEC require, as a condition of membership, that agencies support the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards.
14. Currently, there is low awareness of the Sphere Standards and Code of Conduct, particularly in the field. This needs to be changed, with agencies making greater efforts to disseminate the Code and Sphere Standards internally within the agency and with

partners. It is recommended that the DEC require agencies to monitor their performance in relation to both the Code and Sphere. Real-time monitoring, either through the model of the DEC Kosovo Lesson Learning Study, or through early fieldwork by the independent evaluation team, should be developed to support this.

15. All DEC agencies should develop guidelines for working with the military, to help field staff through the dilemmas they may face on the ground, and to ensure consistency of approach.
16. DEC agencies should continue to monitor the consequences of the huge response to the Kosovo emergency, in terms of its impact on allocations of humanitarian aid to future emergencies, in the interests of promoting impartiality at the global level.
17. The DEC, as a body, should give more emphasis to human resource issues. It should consider requiring agencies to be signatories to the People in Aid code as a condition for membership. It should also include human resource issues in future evaluations, developing appropriate indicators.
18. As a number of recommendations relate to the development of standards and good practice within the agencies, the DEC should consider the appointment of a '*humanitarian standards and learning post*' to stimulate sharing of lessons and training, both internally and externally with other humanitarian players. This would be a fixed term contract against specific terms of reference and could be responsible for promoting learning from appeal evaluations amongst member agencies, and for promoting broader humanitarian policy dialogue.

The DEC appeal and expenditure

19. The DEC should clarify in its appeal publicity that money will be spent on emergency needs *and* on immediate rehabilitation needs, helping people to get back on their feet. This is important to improve connectedness. It will require a carefully designed media strategy, but should be seen as an opportunity to convey to other DEC stakeholders (including the public and the media) the true nature of many emergencies, particularly complex political emergencies that are rarely short-term six-month events.
20. The current six-month rule has been broken in practice in the Kosovo crisis and therefore needs to be addressed. While the formula may vary from emergency to emergency, the DEC should modify this rule to say that the bulk of the funds should be spent within six months, but a certain percentage could be carried forward for a period of expenditure of up to 12 months. This might vary between 20 per cent and 40 per cent depending on the nature of the emergency. Thus, during large-scale emergency responses that have received a substantial immediate donor response, agencies could retain some DEC funding for a later stage when donor interest has declined yet needs persist. Again, this should improve connectedness.
21. In addition the DEC should consider the use of up to five per cent of funds for preparedness and capacity-building work by member agencies for future emergencies. Some of this 'development' fund should also be used for research, learning and training initiatives that would improve the quality of member agencies' response capacities. This, and the recommendation above, would require discussion and agreement with other DEC stakeholders, such as the media.

22. If funds are disbursed in phases, these should not overlap. The DEC Secretariat should improve its information flow to member agencies regarding phasing and anticipated income in order to facilitate agency planning.
23. Drawing on the extensive experience of member agencies, and the pattern of donations from recent appeals, the secretariat should improve its ability to forecast appeal income in order to facilitate appeal and agency planning, and to inform decisions about the length of the period of joint action.
24. The planning and reporting framework needs to be reviewed. A 12-week report should be instituted which, *inter alia*, would register any major changes of plan made by agencies and give the DEC secretariat a forecast of expenditure and unspent funds. In addition, rules for agencies to notify the secretariat of changes of plan from the four week plan of action should be drawn up, and should require agencies to provide notification in writing. See also recommendations 25, 26 and 27 below.
25. The quality of financial reporting needs to be improved, and the links between financial and narrative reporting. Specific suggestions are included in Appendix 10. Some basic information on unit costs within the DEC reporting system would increase levels of accountability and measurements of cost efficiency.
26. The DEC should review the role of the independent evaluation in the light of the experience of this and previous evaluations. In particular, this review should look at how best the different objectives of accountability, disciplinary control and lesson learning should be tackled. It should look at the interaction between the evaluation and agencies' own monitoring and evaluation procedures. It should also look at how best the evaluation process can be initiated in the early days of an emergency and whether or not there should be a separate lesson learning exercise at that stage.
27. There are a number of options which the DEC should consider. Two are presented here:
 - (i) Development and adoption of an accredited monitoring and evaluation system to be used by each agency. In such a system the DEC would set certain standards and exercise a quality control function, for example by reviewing terms of reference and approving the independence of the proposed evaluation team. The DEC evaluation would then be an overall meta-evaluation, drawing on the agency evaluations, investigating problem or key issue areas and drawing out overall lessons.
 - (ii) Improving the current model by identifying more clearly the outputs required from the evaluation team, to enable the multiple objectives to be met. Developing the precedent set by this evaluation, a number of separate reports would be prepared. For example, an overview report with an accessible executive summary would be used to fulfil the accountability objective; a second more detailed lesson-learning report would be prepared for the member agencies, part of which would be disaggregated by agency. The impact of the latter would be strengthened by the evaluation team presenting their findings on a bilateral basis to each agency. This option would probably require more time and resources than the current evaluation model.
28. The DEC should look at whether some system of assessment can be introduced which will fine tune the distribution of funds to agencies according to their capacities for the particular emergency. This should be part of the DEC organisational review.

29. The DEC should clarify the rules for funding projects from DEC appeal funds. They should specify any activities which are ruled out for funding and clarify and disseminate guidelines for the treatment of contingency funds in accounts, and the disposal of capital items.
30. The DEC should update its basic data on its member agencies on a regular basis, including up to date annual reports and updated list of relevant policy statements. This would provide a useful reference source for future evaluators.
31. The DEC secretariat should be given additional resources to provide more substantial support to the OSC and to the agencies than is now available. It should consider the appointment of a *desk officer* post to *inter alia* monitor agency reporting, collate analyse and disseminate information from outside sources on the emergency, facilitate information sharing, meetings and policy discussion between member agencies.
32. In order to encourage learning from this evaluation and also in order to gauge the evaluation's longer term usefulness, each DEC agency should prepare a short report between six and twelve months after the evaluation has been published. This note would describe the follow-up steps taken in response to the findings and recommendations of all three volumes of this evaluation. The DEC's OSC should prepare a simple guidance note on the format for these reports and they would be shared between the agencies.

Some of these recommendations need to be considered along with the findings of evaluations of previous appeals and in conjunction with the DEC's organisational review.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Terms of Reference

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds Terms of Reference Approved: 22 July 1999

1. Background

DEC agencies have been present in the Balkans for much of the past decade, including in Kosovo, where assistance has been provided against a background of conflict between Serb and Albanian. The commencement of the NATO bombing of Serbia on 24 March 1999, following the breakdown of negotiations with President Milosevic, forced many agencies to suspend programmes and withdraw staff from both Serbia and Kosovo.

The bombing of Serbia and the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians resulted in further conflict and displacement in Kosovo. Within just a few weeks, over one million ethnic Albanians were forced to flee their homes, many seeking refuge in neighbouring Albania and Macedonia, as well as in the Yugoslav Republics of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conflict has also seen many ethnic Serbs displaced from their homes in Kosovo and the rest of FRY.

The international community was unprepared for the scale of the exodus from Kosovo and conditions for the refugees were initially extremely difficult. The possibility that violence would spread to other areas, the involvement of the Western military, and the plight of the refugees, all in a European context, led to massive media interest in the emergency. Against this background, the DEC launched what would become its most successful appeal ever, so far raising over £40 million in pooled funds. A considerable proportion of the initial expenditure of pooled funds, though by no means all, has been channelled to meet the needs of the refugees in Albania and Macedonia. As these refugees have returned to Kosovo, the agencies have re-established programmes in Kosovo to support their reintegration and the rehabilitation of the province.

The refugees have encountered a wide variety of conditions in their countries of asylum: tightly controlled refugee camps; immediate transport to third countries; accommodation with host families; informal camps constructed in civic buildings. Providing assistance to those in need has been complicated by the dispersion of refugees to many sites, the difficulties of obtaining information on those residing with host families, and the weak transport and communication infrastructure in some of the areas hosting refugees. The response has been characterised by the involvement of hundreds of INGOs, a number of whom had no prior experience in emergency work, nor experience of work in the Balkans. Other important factors in the response have been the presence of NATO troops, acting in a humanitarian role, and the availability of very high levels of funding from bilateral donors.

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) is an umbrella charitable organisation which launches and coordinates a National Appeal in the UK in response to a major disaster overseas. It brings together a unique alliance of aid, corporate, public and broadcasting services to rally compassion and ensure that funds raised go to bring effective and timely relief.

The DEC Kosovo Appeal was launched on 6 April 1999. To date, the appeal has generated over £40m. pooled funds, which have been disbursed amongst the 12 DEC agencies that participated in the appeal (*see Appendix 1 for summary of disbursements*). These funds have supported activities in: medicine and health care; water and sanitation; clothing and household items; pre-school activities; education; family tracing, amongst other sectors.

DEC agencies have been active throughout the region, working in camps, in host communities and with all those affected by the Kosovo crisis.

DEC rules require an independent evaluation of the expenditure of appeal funds to be initiated in the eighth month following an appeal launch. This provides an important mechanism for DEC transparency and accountability to fundraising partners and the British public. Evaluation also enables DEC agencies to extend individual and collective learning on good practice in response to humanitarian emergencies. Once the evaluation process is completed, the final report will be made public.

2. Key purpose of the evaluation

The evaluation should provide an independent assessment of the effectiveness and impact of the DEC agencies' response to the Kosovo crisis:

Appropriateness

- Were the actions undertaken appropriate in the context of the needs of the affected population and the context in which the agencies were operating? Was sufficient attention given to the identification of clear objectives and activities that would ensure objectives would be met?
- Was the assistance appropriate in relation to the customs and practices of the affected population?
- To what extent were potential and actual beneficiaries consulted as to their perceived needs and priorities? What was the level of beneficiary involvement in project design, implementation and monitoring? How effective and appropriate were these processes in ensuring relevant and timely project delivery in support of the most needy and vulnerable?
- Was the assistance provided in a timely manner?

Efficiency

- Were resources used efficiently? For instance, were more expensive forms of response (such as air transport) used longer than was necessary? Would greater investment in preparedness measures have resulted in more effective and less costly responses?

Impact

- What direct and indirect evidence is available that the action taken contributed to the reduction of mortality, morbidity and suffering and that the affected population was assisted in maintaining or resuming basic dignity and livelihoods?
- What systems or indicators did the agencies use to evaluate the effectiveness of their work?

Coverage

- Was DEC assistance provided to all major population groups facing life-threatening situations?
- What efforts were made to ensure that particular populations, vulnerable groups and areas were not overlooked?
- Were beneficiaries correctly and fairly identified and targeted?

Connectedness

- Was the assistance provided in a way that took account of the longer-term context?
- Did the assistance seek to strengthen the capacity of local agencies and personnel?

Coherence

- What steps were taken by participating agencies to ensure their responses were coordinated with each other and with other agencies?
- Were other actions, such as advocacy work, undertaken by the member agencies to complement their immediate relief actions?

These criteria take into account 'standard' evaluation questions, and also reflect the DEC's objective, the NGO/Red Cross Code of Conduct and those disaster response objectives of DEC member agencies which are broadly shared. Thus, objectives such as achieving a coordinated response, ensuring that relief activities take account of longer-term considerations and that the capacity of local organisations and personnel is strengthened during the response, are explicitly included in the criteria.

Following the field visits the evaluation team should be in a position to comment on the adequacy of management, accounting, monitoring and reporting processes of the DEC agencies and their field level partners. They should also be able to comment on the key constraints that affected the DEC supported programs, and how the different DEC agencies dealt with them.

3. Specific issues for consideration

- What was the added value of DEC appeal funds in the context of the overall humanitarian response? Did DEC funds facilitate a quick response?

- Was there disproportionate attention given to refugees in camps compared to those staying with host families? What more could have been done to support host communities? Since the return of the refugees to Kosovo has a disproportionate level of assistance been focussed on the returning refugees compared to other vulnerable groups both in Kosovo and the other provinces and countries affected?
- Was gender considered in the agencies' emergency assessments? Did relief provision include special components for women and, if so, were these systematically monitored?
- How did the involvement of NATO troops in supporting humanitarian action affect the coordination and delivery of assistance?
- The DEC's mandate is concerned with bringing immediate relief to those in need. However, this appeal, together with funding from bilateral donors, has raised potentially more than can be spent meeting 'immediate' needs. Does this require a re-wording of the DEC mandate? Has the volume of aid funds made available in this response led to a pressure to spend out of proportion with agency capacity or of the needs on the ground? Have standards been too high?
- What was the level of cooperation in the field? Could more have been done to help improve the effectiveness of DEC agencies' response in terms of joint logistics, communications packages, and inter-agency information flows?

4. Method

Participating DEC agencies will be required to submit the following material (in both hard copy and electronic format) to the Secretariat *before* the evaluation team commences its work:

- A summary chronology.
- Key documents on the agency's response to the emergency and their use of DEC funds, including the 48-hour plan of action; the 4-week plan of action; and the final report of expenditure.
- Names, contact details and roles during the response of key agency personnel in the head office and in the relevant field offices.

The Secretariat will prepare a package of materials on each participating agency to be given to the evaluation team. The evaluation team will begin with a review of documentation.

A member of the evaluation team will visit the head office of each agency to undertake preliminary interviews and collect and review supplementary documentation. Evaluators should be allowed full access to relevant files. The schedule of the fieldwork will be discussed during these visits. This is likely to be a difficult issue given that many operations will already have closed down by the time the evaluation team is ready to begin fieldwork. The consultant's schedule, accommodation and transport arrangements will be finalised and communicated to all agencies at least one week prior to the team's visit.

In the field, the evaluation team will seek to spend a period with each agency that is roughly proportional to the share of DEC pooled funds received by each agency. During their work the evaluators will fill out the chronology of decisions and actions so as to understand the context and the level of information that was available to the agency in deciding on a particular action. During their time with each agency the team will interview key personnel remaining in-country (contacting others prior to the field visits or on their return) and undertake visits to selected project sites/areas. It is recognised that many of the sites will have closed down by the time the evaluators reach the field. The evaluators will have to make extensive use of agency reports where site visits would prove pointless. It should be noted that in the case of agencies that are part of larger organisations, UK assistance might not be distinguishable from that of global counterparts.

As well as interviewing the agency's project officers and key officials in coordinating agencies (eg. OCHA, UNHCR and the host government) and partner agencies, a sample of beneficiaries will be selected and interviewed by the evaluators. These interviews will be conducted without agency personnel being present, using interpreters hired directly by the evaluation team. The beneficiaries will be questioned on their views of the assistance provided, the way they were selected and assistance was provided, and their overall views of the agency. Interviews with individuals may be complemented by discussions with groups of beneficiaries. So as to assess the agency's targeting and beneficiary selection methods, the evaluation team will also interview a selection of potential beneficiaries who did not receive assistance. Given the fact that many of the camps will be closed by the time the evaluators visit, related beneficiaries will be interviewed in Kosovo.

It is expected that the evaluation team will use gender-aware and participatory approaches to seek the views of beneficiaries and, where appropriate, non-beneficiaries. Inclusive techniques will be expected of the evaluators, to seek active participation in the evaluation by members of local emergency committees, staff of implementing partner agencies and member agencies, representatives of local and central governments.

Agencies 'Final Expenditure Reports' will be examined to assess direct and indirect project costs, and, in conjunction with beneficiary/team assessment of direct and indirect benefits, to compare the cost-effectiveness of different approaches.

The evaluation will be undertaken with due reference to the Red Cross/Red Crescent NGO Code of Conduct, which all agencies have signed. Reference should also be made to the Sphere Standards.

Before leaving the country members of the team will indicate their broad findings to the Country Representative and senior staff of each agency and note their comments.

There is currently an on-going DEC lesson-learning study taking place in respect of the Balkans emergency. Two data collectors have spent time in the region conducting interviews and collecting key documents. The principal focus of the lesson-learning study has been the issue of coordination. The evaluation team will be able to draw upon the findings and documentation collected by the lesson-learning team.

A workshop should be held in London to disseminate a draft report of the evaluation and the report should be circulated one week prior to this workshop to allow for preliminary comment.

5. The Report

The evaluation report should consist of:

- Executive summary and recommendations (not more than six pages).
- Main text, to include emergency context, evaluation methodology, appeal management, commentary and analysis addressing evaluation purpose and outputs, conclusions (not more than thirty pages).
- Appendices, to include evaluation terms of reference, maps, sample framework, summary of agency activities, sub-team report(s), end notes (where appropriate) and bibliography.

6. Evaluation team and timeframe

Given the speed with which many of the DEC-funded programmes in the region have closed, as refugees return to Kosovo, it is anticipated that there will be a core team of three people, with others drawn in as necessary. The Team Leader should be a generalist with a proven background in emergency evaluations. The appropriate balance of professional and analytical skills amongst the remaining team members should be determined following a preliminary examination of agency activities. It is likely, however, that expertise in water and sanitation and public health will be required. At least one person from the region should be included in the team that makes the field visits. All team members should be gender aware, a gender balance within field teams being desirable.

Consultants or independent evaluation teams short-listed in the tendering process should seek DEC approval for any proposed changes to the composition of the team originally submitted.

The evaluation timeframe should allow for circulation of a first draft, for comment by DEC agencies, in early May 2000 followed by presentation of the draft report to member agencies by end of May for completion by 10 June 2000.

7. Tenders and Evaluation Management

Tenders should be submitted to the DEC Secretariat by the closing date of 23 August 1999. A maximum five page summary should be submitted with appendices of team member CVs and an indication of availability. The DEC may wish to see substantive pieces work or to take up references of short-listed consultants.

The final decision on tenders will be taken by the DEC Executive Committee, following short-listing and interviews. Key factors will include:

- Provisional framework, methodology, team balance, local experiences, distinctive competencies, timeframe and budget, an appreciation of key constraints and comments on the above terms of reference.
- Professionalism of the bid, team experience (professional and analytical), degree of parity with the terms of reference, likelihood of achieving the DEC timetable, realism, not just competitiveness, in the cost submission.

Tenders will be accepted from ‘freelance’ as well as from company, PVO or academic teams.

Administration and overall coordination, including monitoring progress, lies with the DEC Secretariat. The evaluation Team Leader must, from the commencement of the evaluation, submit a weekly report on actual against anticipated progress. The Steering Committee will via the Secretariat undertake to respond to weekly submissions as necessary. In addition, the Team Leader should alert the Secretariat immediately if serious problems or delays are encountered. Approval for any significant changes to the evaluation timetable will be referred to the DEC Operations sub-committee.

It is anticipated that the selection process will be completed by mid-June.

9. Further information

For further information please contact:

Jamie McCaul
Executive Secretary
DEC
52, Great Portland Street
London, W1N 5AH
Tel: 44 + (0)171 580 6550
Fax: 44 +(0)171 580 2854
Email: decuk@compuserve.com,

or visit the DEC’s website: www.dec.org.uk.

APPENDIX 2: Team Members

Appendix 2.1 Core Team and Advisers

Name	Title	Organisation	Sectors
Mark Bradbury	Social Specialist	Independent Consultant, UK	Protection; Beneficiary Perspectives; Community Services
Margie Buchanan-Smith	Coordinator	Overseas Development Institute, UK	Management; Liaison with DEC; Overview
Brent Burkholder	Epidemiology Advisor	Centers for Disease Control, US	Health
Dr. Steve Collins	Public Health Specialist	Valid International, UK	Health; Distribution of non-food relief items
John Cosgrave	Watsan/Engineering Specialist	InterWorks Europe, Ireland	Water and Sanitation; Humanitarian Mine Action; Shelter; Education and Rehabilitation.
Alistair Hallam	Cost Efficiency Advisor	Valid International UK	Cost-efficiency
Debora Kleyn	Research Assistant	Overseas Development Institute, UK	Research and Documentation
Manuela Mece	Regional Specialist	Independent Consultant, Albania	Albania/Kosovo/Macedonia: Beneficiary Perspectives; Local NGOs
Nicola Norman	Administrator	Overseas Development Institute, UK	Administration, Logistics and Documentation
Ana Prodanovic	Regional Specialist	Independent Consultant, Serbia	Serbia: Beneficiary Perspectives; Local NGOs
Jane Shackman	Psychosocial Advisor	Independent Consultant, UK	Psychosocial
Fiona Watson	Nutrition Specialist	NutritionWorks, UK	Food and Nutrition; Agriculture
Peter Wiles	Team Leader	Independent Consultant, UK	All including advocacy, DEC, Institutional Issues, Human Resources

Appendix 2.2 Peer Reviewers

Name	Organisation
Prof. Raymond Apthorpe	Independent Consultant, Australian National University
Judith Large	Independent Consultant, UK
Nicholas Leader	Overseas Development Institute, UK
Joanna Macrae	Overseas Development Institute, UK
Michael Pugh	Dept. of Politics, University of Plymouth, UK
Vanessa Pupavac	School of Politics, University of Nottingham, UK
Susan Woodward	Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, UK

APPENDIX 3: Itineraries
Appendix 3.1 Team Itinerary: Preparatory Trip and Fieldwork

Date	Team Member							
	P. Wiles (Team Leader)	M. Bradbury (Social Specialist)	S. Collins (Public Health Specialist)	F. Watson (Nutrition Specialist)	J. Cosgrave (WatSan/ Engineering Specialist)	J. Shackman (Psychosocial Advisor)	M. Mece (Regional Specialist)	A. Prodanovic (Regional Specialist)
Preliminary Trip								
31/1/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-
1/2/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	-	-	-	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
2/2/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-	-	-	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
3/2/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-	-	-	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
4/2/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	-	-	-	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
5/2/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	-	-	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
6/2/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	-	-	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-
7/2/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	-	-	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-
8/2/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	-	-	-	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-
Fieldwork								
11/3/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-
12/3/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-
13/3/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-
14/3/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	-

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic
15/3/00	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Albania <i>Elbasan</i>	Albania <i>Shkoder</i>	Albania <i>Elbasan</i>	Albania <i>Shkoder</i>	-	Albania <i>Elbasan</i>	-
16/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Elbasan</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Lushne</i>	-	Albania <i>Elbasan</i>	-
17/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i>	Albania <i>Tirana</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Tirana, Korce</i>	-	Albania <i>Korce</i>	-
18/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i>	Albania <i>Korce, Pogradec</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i>	-
19/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i> Macedonia <i>Gostivar, Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i> Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar, Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i> Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Albania <i>Korce</i> Macedonia <i>Gostivar, Skopje</i>	-
20/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar</i>	-
21/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Tetovo, Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar, Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Tetovo, Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Gostivar, Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Tetovo, Skopje</i>	-
22/3/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i> Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
23/3/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
24/3/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
25/3/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
26/3/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-
27/3/00	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Kosovo <i>Peje</i>	Kosovo <i>N. Mitrovica</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren</i>	Kosovo <i>Peje/Djakova</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren</i>	-
28/3/00	Bosnia <i>Sarajevo</i>	Kosovo <i>Peje, Junik, Decan, Rastavica, Djakova</i>	Kosovo <i>Djakova</i>	Bosnia <i>Sarajevo</i>	Kosovo <i>Ferezaj</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Kosovo <i>Peje, Junik, Decan, Rastavica, Djakova,</i>	-
29/3/00	Bosnia <i>Sarajevo</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren, Valezhe, Krushe, Vogel</i>	Kosovo <i>Djakova/Prizren</i>	Bosnia <i>Sarajevo</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Prizren, Valezhe, Krushe, Vogel</i>	-

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic
30/3/00	Bosnia <i>Tuzla</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren</i>	Albania <i>Kukes</i>	Bosnia <i>Tuzla</i>	Albania <i>Kukes</i>	-	Albania <i>Kukes</i>	-
31/3/00	Bosnia <i>Sarajevo</i> <i>Banja Luka</i>	Kosovo <i>Prizren,</i> <i>Nebrogoshte,</i> <i>Mushnekova</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Bosnia <i>Sarajevo</i> <i>Banja Luka</i>	Kosovo <i>Djakova</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Prizren,</i> <i>Nebrogoshte,</i> <i>Mushnekova</i>	-
1/4/00	Montenegro <i>Podgorica</i>	Kosovo <i>Ferezaj</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Montenegro <i>Podgorica</i>	Kosovo <i>Djakova, Peje</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Peje</i>	-
2/4/00	Montenegro <i>Podgorica</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Montenegro <i>Podgorica</i>	Kosovo <i>Peje</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Peje</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>
3/4/00	Montenegro <i>Berane</i> <i>Podgorica</i>	Kosovo <i>Gjilan</i> <i>Viti</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Montenegro <i>Berane</i> <i>Podgorica</i>	Kosovo <i>Peje</i> <i>Djakova</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Djakova</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>
4/4/00	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Kosovo <i>Lipljan, Kamenice,</i> <i>Donja Gushterica</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i> <i>Smederevo</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina, Klina</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade,</i> <i>Smederevo</i>
5/4/00	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Kosovo <i>Mitrovica</i> <i>Vustrri</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Kosovo <i>Mitrovica,</i> <i>Vustrri</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>
6/4/00	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Serbia <i>Novi Sad</i>	Serbia <i>Belgrade</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Serbia <i>Novi Sad</i>
7/4/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	-	Kosovo <i>Pristina</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>
8/4/00	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	-	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>	Macedonia <i>Skopje</i>

Appendix 3.2 Team Itinerary: UK, Ireland and Switzerland

Date	Team Member										
	P. Wiles (Team Leader)	M. Bradbury (Social Specialist)	S. Collins (Public Health Specialist)	F. Watson (Nutrition Specialist)	J. Cosgrave (WatSan/ Engineering Specialist)	J. Shackman (Psychosocial Advisor)	Hallam (Cost Efficiency Advisor)	M. Mece (Regional Specialist)	A. Prodanovic (Regional Specialist)	M. Buchanan-Smith (Coordinator)	
22/12/99	London <i>Planning Meeting I</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London <i>Planning Meeting I</i>	
10/1/00	London <i>Planning Meeting II</i>	London <i>Planning Meeting II</i>	London <i>Planning Meeting II</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	London <i>Planning Meeting II</i>	
18/1/00	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	
19/1/00– 28/1/00	Preliminary agency meetings	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
31/1/00– 8/2/00	Peter Wiles, Mark Bradbury and Manuela Mece: Preparatory Trip to the Region (See separate itinerary)										
27/1/00	London <i>DEC Secretariat</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London <i>DEC Secretariat</i>	
10/2/00	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	
14/2/00	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	-	-	London <i>M. Vickers Briefing/Team Meeting</i>	
15/2/00	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	-	-	London <i>Peer Review Workshop I</i>	
16/2/00	Milton Keynes <i>World Vision</i>	London <i>Preparing F.W. Itinerary</i>	London <i>Preparing F.W. Itinerary</i>	Milton Keynes <i>World Vision</i>	Milton Keynes <i>World Vision</i>	-	-	-	-	London <i>Preparing F.W. Itinerary</i>	
17/2/00	London <i>BRCB</i>	London <i>BRCB</i>	-	London <i>BRCB</i>	London <i>BRCB</i>	-	-	-	-	-	
18/2/00	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	-	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	Hallam	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic	M. Buchanan-Smith
21/2/00	Oxford <i>Oxfam</i>	Oxford <i>Oxfam</i>	-	-	Oxford <i>Oxfam</i>	-		-	-	-
22/2/00	London <i>Christian Aid</i>	-	-	London <i>Christian Aid</i>	London <i>Christian Aid</i>	-		-	-	-
23/2/00	London <i>CAFOD</i>	London <i>DFID</i>	-	London <i>CAFOD</i>	-	-	-	-	-	London <i>DFID</i>
	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>	-	-	London <i>Team Meeting</i>
24/2/00	Dublin <i>Concern</i>	-	-	-	Dublin <i>Concern</i>	-	-	-	-	-
25/2/00	-	-	-	-	London <i>RedR</i>	-	-	-	-	-
		Teddington <i>Tearfund</i>	-	-	Teddington <i>Tearfund</i>	-	-	-	-	-
28/2/00	Oxford <i>Oxfam</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Reading <i>CAD</i>	-	Reading <i>CAD</i>	-	-	Reading <i>CAD; Mitigation International</i>	-	-	-	-
29/2/00	London <i>Merlin</i>		London <i>Merlin</i>	-	Manchester <i>MAG</i>	-	-	-	-	-
	-	London <i>HAI</i>	London <i>HAI</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1/3/00	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>	-	London <i>DEC Agency Workshop I</i>
2/3/00	Geneva <i>ICRC</i>	London <i>Finalising F.W. itinerary</i>	Geneva <i>ICRC</i>	-	London <i>Finalising F.W. itinerary</i>	-	-	London <i>Finalising F.W. itinerary</i>	-	-
3/3/00	Geneva <i>IFRC/UNHCR</i>	London <i>Finalising F.W. itinerary</i>	Geneva <i>IFRC/UNHCR</i>	-	-	-	-	London <i>Finalising F.W. itinerary</i>	-	-

	P. Wiles	M. Bradbury	S. Collins	F. Watson	J. Cosgrave	J. Shackman	Hallam	M. Mece	A. Prodanovic	M. Buchanan-Smith
6/3/00	London CARE	London CARE	-	London CARE	-	-	-	-	-	-
7/3/00	London Security Brief	London Security Brief	London Security Brief	London Security Brief	London Security Brief	London Security Brief	-	-	-	-
	London SC	-	London SC	-	-	London SC	-	-	-	-
11/3/00 - 8/4/00	London Finalising F.W. itinerary	London Finalising F.W. itinerary	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fieldwork (see separate itinerary – Appendix 3.1)										
4/4/00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London DEC ExCom
10/4/00	London Team Meeting	London Team Meeting	London Team Meeting	London Team Meeting	London Team Meeting	London Team Meeting	London Team Meeting	-	-	London Team Meeting
Writing up and editing										
11/4/00 - 30/6/00	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	-	-	London Peer Review Workshop II
10/5/00	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	London Peer Review Workshop II	-	-	London Peer Review Workshop II
Draft Report to be circulated to agencies for comments										
22/5/00	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II
24/5/00	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II	London DEC Agency Workshop II
20/6/00	London DEC Agency Workshop III	London DEC Agency Workshop III	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London DEC Agency Workshop III
20/7/00	London Teleconference with OSC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	London Teleconference with OSC
24/7/00	Second Draft to be circulated to agencies for final comments									
18/8/00	Final Report to be submitted									

APPENDIX 4: Table of Interviewees

(NB Excludes beneficiary and host families interviewees)

1. UK/Ireland

Organisation	Name	Title
BRCS (London)	Paul Anticoni	Head of International Aid Department
	Chris Hurford	Desk Office for Central Europe and the Balkans
	Jason Parker	Desk Assistant for Central Europe and the Balkans
	Richard Blewitt	Head of International Programme Advisory & Development Dept.
	John Mitchell	Humanitarian Policy Advisor
	Leanne Taylor	Head of International Personnel
	Lois Austin	Former - PNS Coordinator ICRC Kosovo
CAD (Reading)	Anne Walsh	Director of Programmes
	Steven Bell	Programme Support Manager
	Wube Woldemariam	Emergency and Support Coordinator
	Nigel Scott	Finance Director
	Sarah Thomas	Personnel Manager
	Gaynor Jones	Volunteers Manager
	Nicola Donnelly	Overseas Personnel Department
	Dave Paddick	Operations Manager
CAFOD (London)	Matthew Carter	Emergencies Coordinator
	Andrew Wilson	Eastern European Office
CARE (London)	Will Day	Director
	Ariel Wosner	Balkans Programme Officer
	Howard Standen	Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator/Policy Analyst
Christian Aid (London)	Alison Kelly	Head of MEECA Team
	Antony Mahony	Senior Programme Officer, Eastern Europe
	Sarah Packwood	Kosovo Emergency Programme Officer
	June Wyer	Head of Programme Funding & Support team
	Neil Garvey	Emergency Capacity Building Officer
	Tim Boyes-Watson	Head of Finance Team
Concern (Dublin)	Dominic McSorley	Regional Manager (Asia, Central America & Eastern Europe)
	Isabelle Kidney	Overseas Dept
	Howard Dalzell	Head of Evaluation Planning & Monitoring
	Connell Foley	Leader of Operational Team in the Balkans
DEC (London)	Jamie McCaul	Executive Secretary
	Kate Robertson	Evaluations Consultant
DFID/CHAD (London)	Matthew Baugh	Head of Section Five, Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept.
	Sarah Maguire	Legal Specialist, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Dept.
	Debi Duncan	Conflict Prevention Specialist, Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Dept.
HAI (London)	Lesley-Anne Knight	Emergencies Manager
	Nadia Saim	Emergencies Assistant
	Jane Skobe	Communications
	Adam Platt	Director of Programmes
	Sangetta Patel	Head of Personnel
	Sylvia Beals	Head of Policy
MAG (Manchester)	Richard Moyes	Project Coordinator
Merlin (London)	Cassie Knight	Information Officer
	Alex Brans	Desk Officer for the Balkans
	Tim Healing	Epidemiologist, working in Albania April 1999
	Bruce Lawrence	Medical Director

Oxfam (Oxford)	Paul Smith-Lomas	Director, Humanitarian Department
	Heather Hughes	Programme Assistant, EE/FSU
	Paul Sherlock	Technical Team Coordinator
	Woldu Mahary	Technical Advisor, EE/FSU
	Adam Leach	Regional Director, EE/FSU/ME
	Phil Bloomer	Team Leader, Policy Department
	Lizzie Selwood	Regional Policy and Advocacy Adviser
	Maurice Herson	Humanitarian Coordinator (EE/FSU/LAC)
	Diane Crocombe	AMEE Team Manager, International Funding Unit
Oxfam (Wiltshire)	Charlotte Warren	Health Advisor, EE
RedR (London)	Jerome Oberreit	Recruitment and Placement Manager
Save the Children (London)	Joanna Clark	Regional Programme Development Officer, C./E. Europe
	Judy Lister	Regional Director UK-Europe
	Peter Poore	Senior Health Advisor
	Mike Gaouette	Head of Emergencies Unit (former Programme Director, Macedonia)
	Lola Gostelow	Emergencies Advisor (previously Nutrition Advisor)
	Anna Taylor	Nutrition Advisor
	Michelle Stratford	Press Officer
	Christine Nylander	Senior Personnel Officer
	Rob Garnett	Ex-SC country representative, Serbia
	Ian Russell	Ex-SC coordinator, Albania
Tearfund (Teddington)	Steve Penny	Team Leader, Disaster Response Team
	James Thurlow	Operations Officer, Balkans
	Nick Roberts	Accountant, Disaster Response Team
	Seamus Anderson	Project Officer, Mediterranean and Central Asia desk
	David Talbot	Human Resources, Disaster Response Team
	Joy Kemp	Ex-Director of Programmes, Albania. Mitigation Int'l
	Steve Kemp	Mitigation International
UNHCR	Peta Snadison	External Evaluator
	Susanne Jaspars	Former CARE Albania employee
World Vision (Milton Keynes)	Sue Birchmore	Regional Manager
	Kevin Flanagan	Deputy Regional Manager

2. Switzerland (all interviews took place in Geneva)

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
ACT	Miriam Lutz	Coordinator (by telephone)
Henri Dunant Institute	Martin Griffiths	Director (former UN Regional Coordinator)
ICRC	Victoria Gardener	External Resources Division
	Arnold Blaettler	Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
	Pierre Kraehenbuehl	Head of Task Force for Balkans Operations
	Feena May	Formerly Head of Balkans Logistics Cell
	Ariane Curdy	Nutritionist
	Scott Gardener	Relief Coordinator
	Karen Coudert	Nutritionist
IFRC	Bernard Chomilier	Head of Logistics Department
	Mark Wilson	Desk Officer for FRY and Bosnia
	Penny Elghady	Desk Officer for Central and Southern Europe
	Martin Faller	Deputy Director Europe Department
UNHCR	Mohamed Dualeh	Emergency Unit: Health
	Rita Bhatia	Emergency Unit: Nutrition
	Jo Hegenauer	Former Senior Programme Officer FRY

3. Albania

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
AEP (Tirana)	Robert Baker	Administrator
Albanian Govt (Skhodra)	Dr Astrit Beci	Director of Health in Skhodra prefecture
ANGOF (Tirana)	Artan Spahiu	Director
ARC (Tirana)	Pandora Ketri	Secretary General
ARC (Elbasan)	Griselda Pepa	Secretary
	Ylli Myftari	Administrator
	Endri Stoja	Volunteer
	Nasuf Myftari	Member
CAD (Kukes)	Guy Steward	Programme Coordinator
	Shkelzeni Popa	Logistics Manager
CAD (Pogradec)	Genti	Translator
CAD (Tirana)	Lefteri Selman	Teacher Trainer
CAFOD Albania (Tirana)	Shkelqim Bozgo	Executive Director
	Anne Hadcroft	Emergency Coordinator
CARE (Korce)	David Majagira	Programme Coordinator
	Diana Coci	Project Officer
	Ada Permeti	Emergency Programme Assistant
	Andrea Duro	Engineer
	Vasilika Qijgazi	Compliance Officer
CARE (Tirana)	Charlie Earle	Programme Manager
DFID	Tony Conlay	Head of Office
Diaconia Agapes	Penny Deligiannis	Director
Humanitarian Info. Centre	Aurela Hoxha	Director
ICRC	Ariane Tombet	Head of Delegation
	Pierre-Andre Junod	Detention Delegate
IFRC (Tirana)	Frank Kennedy	Head of Delegation
	Gorkhmaz Husseynov	Logistics Coordinator
Kukes TV (Kukes)	Nermin Spahiu	Announcer/Producer
Local Partners Project (Korce)	Elerleta Kastrati	Project Officer
Merlin (Tirana)	Ray Dolphin	Country Manager
	Lucy Heaven	Accountant, Ex-Oxfam Administrator
MoH (Skhodra)	Gjovalin Grevhpja	District Director of Public Health
MoH (Pogradec)	Eli Cani	Chief of Micro Biology Dept, Institute of Public Health
Mitigation Int. (Tirana)	Alma Gugushi	-
	Amita Paza	-
	Patrice Servais	-
MoE (Kukes)	Faria Zeneli	School Director
Municipality Skhodra	Esmá Boksi	Administrator
Municipality (Kukes)	Saphet Suln	Mayor
Oxfam (Tirana)	Luli Gjeka	Programme Representative
	Raphael Mutiku	Technical Team Leader
	Arnita Venolresh	Senior Community Programme Advisor
Oxfam (Lushne)	Arben	Office Manager
	Alketa Grepcka	Health Promoter
	Irma Pashkja	Health Promoter
	Murray Wilson	Programme Manager
Oxfam (Skhodra)	Steve Edwards	Programme Coordinator
	Janet Symes	Programme Manager
Oxfam (Korce)	Ella	Health Promoter
Prefecture (Elbasan)	Nikolla Bica	Health Advisor of Prefecture

SC	Sigmun Karlstrom	Director
Tearfund (Kukes)	Stanley Bute	Project Coordinator
	Sarah Casey	Health Promotion Coordinator
	Afrim Korbi	Office Manager
	Bashkim Muca	Director of Cultural Palace/Chairman of District Council
UNHCR	Marion Hoffman	Representative
	Philippos Papaphilippou	Senior Programme Officer
	Terry Pitzner	Community Services Coordinator
UNICEF (Tirana)	Lenin Guzman	Project Officer
VUsh (Tirana)	Ina Kumi	Coordinator
	Cori Crawford	Crisis Centre Coordinator
Water Centre (Debresse)	Shiop Suliman	Head
WFP (Tirana)	Ismat Fahmi	Country Director
	Jerry Bailey	Head of Programming Unit
WHO (Tirana)	Luca Scali	-
Women for Global Action Association (Tirana)	Linolita Prifti	Oxfam Local Partner
	Raimonda Prifti	Oxfam Local Partner
World Vision (Tirana)	Chalon Lee	Country Representative
	Julian Srodecki	Programme Officer

4. Bosnia

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
Association of Albanians in Bosnia (Sarajevo)	Suada Axhanela	President
	Muharrem Zejnullahu	Member
CARE (Sarajevo)	Emil Bobovnik	Regional Manager
Hi Neighbour (Sarajevo)	Nada Uletilovic	Secretary
	Dragan Culic	Financial Manager
ICVA	Robert Possnett	Regional Director
LWF (Tuzla)	Bernhard Staub	Director, BiH and Croatia
	Semina Selimovic	Project Manager
Oxfam (Sarajevo)	Jane Gronow	Regional Representative for Eastern Europe
	Mia Vukojevic	BiH Programme Representative
	Alistair McArthur	Emergency Programme Coordinator
	Christina Rackley	Eastern Europe Funding Coordinator
	Vesna Ciprus	Deputy Regional Representative for Eastern Europe
Republika Srpska RC	Korda Drago	Humanitarian Coordinator
SC (Sarajevo)	Patricia Strong	Programme Director BiH
SC (Banja Luka)	Olivera Damjanovic	Programme Manager
	Dusko Pejic	Programme Support/Logistician Officer
WHO (Sarajevo)	Adriaan Korver	Head of Office

5. Kosovo

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
ACT (Pristina)	Thorkild Hoyer	Director
ADRA (Pristina)	Tanja Radoeaj	Psychologist
BRCS (Pristina)	Colin Mackay	Project Manager
	Mark Coxon	Construction Manager
	Martin Holl	Construction Delegate

British KFOR (Pristina)	Major Catherine Buchanan	Liaison Officer
CAD (Pristina)	Chrissie Gale	Country Director [former Programme Manager in Kosovo for SC)
CARE (Pristina)	Chris Sykes	Programme Coordinator
	Liz Sime	Assistant Mission Director – Programme Support
	Cassie Mcilvaine	Programme Coordinator/CARE Firewood Programme
CARE (Prizren)	Andrea Rothweiler	Area Coordinator
CARE (Ferezaj)	Fatmir Selimi	Operations Manager/Agromonist (also in Libljan)
	Andrew Taylor	Agriculture Programme Manager
Chayupe Primary School (Vustrri)	Idrisi Feret	School Director
Christian Aid (Rahovac)	Esat Paqarizi	Engineer
	Alan Strachen	Programme Manager
	Zamir Bugari	Translator
Centre for Social Work (Lipljan)	Mehdi	Director
Concern (Pristina)	Susan Fraser	Country Rep.
	Barry Lorton	Shelter Coordinator
	Paula Connelly	Finance Administrator
Concern (Peje)	Elvana Islaimi	Architect
	Kenan Kasniqi	Engineer
	Mary Walsh	Social Programme Coordinator
	Iliriana and Nasibe	Social Team
	Erzen	Artist, Social Team
CordAid (Djakova)	Tones Meijer	Shelter Coordinator
CRS (Prizren)	Fred Cocozzelli	Food Monitor
	Jonathan Campbell	Project Coordinator
CRS (Pristina)	Kathleen Moynihan	Zonal Director
CRS (Dragash)	Gjoni Lumezi	Food Monitor
DFID/CHAD (Pristina)	Anthony Welch	Head of Office
	Robert Stevens	Health Advisor
DRA (Pristina)	Harry Lamé	Team Leader
ECHO	Patricia Penntier	-
	Ylber Morina	-
Elena Gjkika Women's Group (Klina)	Lala Grabanica	Coordinator
	Nysret Sulaj	Coordinator
Finnish KFOR (Lipljan)	Major Vessa Ranki	CIMIC Officer
Handikos (Lipljan)	-	Coordinator
Handikos (Prizren)	Ali Darshe	Regional Coordinator
	Refki Kryazu	Leader of Prizren Group
	Nuria Vetio	Disabled Women's Council
	Floria Horte	Disabled Women's Council
HAI (Pristina)	Chris Gregory	Director
	Nuria Gonzales	Programme Manager
ICRC (Pristina)	Rene Boeckli	PNS Coordinator
	Damian Noble	Relief Coordinator
IFRC (Pristina)	Kris Hurlburt	Psychosocial Programme Coordinator
Institute of Public Health (Mitrovica)	Dr Qamile Ramadani	Director
Institute of Public Health (Djakova)	Dr Sinan	Head
International NGO Council (Pristina)	Paul Currion	Information Officer, Humanitarian Information Centre

Islamic Relief Worldwide (Pristina)	Abdullah Gani	Finance Officer
	Martin Prior	Head of Mission
Kosovo Rehabilitation Centre for Torture Victims	Feride Rushiti	Coordinator
Leidshak Collective Centre (Mitrovica)	Various	-
Lejgenda Women's Association (Viti)	Habiba Benasira	Coordinator
	Hajera Pira	Coordinator
	Abida	Centre Coordinator
Liria Women's Association (Gjilan)	Activists	-
MAG (Pristina)	Don McDonald	Programme Manager
MCIC (Djakova)	Alex Krazalovski	Programme Coordinator
	Ismet Isufi	Agricultural Project Officer
MedAir (Peje)	Sylvain Bonjour	Project Director, Balkans
MineTech (Pristina)	Andrew Jackson	Deputy Manager
	Vic Thackway	Manager
MTS (Djakova)	Fatmir Bosniak	Head of Djakova Branch
	Sadik Polloshka	President
	Murat Memaj	-
MTS (Decan)		
MTS (Pristina)	Morat Nemiah	Head of Decan Branch
MTS (Prizren)	Jak Mita	Vice President
Municipality (Djakova)	Pjeter	President
Novib (Pristina)	Dr Pal Leka	Director of Health and Social Policy Department
ODI	Van de Lest	Finance Officer and Acting PM
OSCE-UNMIK	Belaj Besiana	Translator for Fieldwork
	Hans Bochove	NGO/Civil Society Support Officer
OSCE (Prizren)	Richard Chambers	Programme Officer/NGO/Civil Society Development Democratisation
Collective Centre (S. Mitrovica)	Mark Manley	Human Rights Officer
Oxfam (Pristina)	Leo MacGillivray	Programme Representative
	Dukagjin Kelmendi	Disability Programme Officer (also Prizren)
	Pranvera Reqica	Programme Manager (also Viti)
	Jeton Cana	Programme Manager
	Jane Cocking	Regional Emergency Coordinator (and Acting Programme Representative)
	Gary Mitchell	Head of Internal Audit
	Colin Reynolds	Technical Team Coordinator
	Ben Taylor	Information and Funding Officer
	Baton Begolli	Solid Waste and Trucking Manager
Oxfam (Prizren)	Jeton Albana	WatSan Team
	George Barreras	WatSan Engineer
	Orhan Beseni	Technical Assistant
	Agron Fehmiu	Engineer/Technical
	Muxaxhiri Goranci	WatSan Team
	Astrid Vokshi	WatSan Team
	Ardiana Perjuci	Disability Programme Assistant
	Jeton Muhaxhim	Health Promoter
Oxfam (Mitrovica)	Jordi Cardona Castro	Programme Manager
	Merita Shehu	Health Coordinator

	Modeste Mirindi Mahebara	WatSan Engineer
Oxfam (Mitrovica)	Ivan Podanovic	Coordinator
SBASHK (Pristina)	Agim Hyseni	President of SBASHK
	Albina Duraku	Social Welfare (Kosovo), Child Tracing (Macedonia)
SC (Pristina)	Jesper Frovin Jensen	Senior Programme Manager (also Prizren)
	Jon Johnson	Country Representative
	Ariana Mustafa	Child Protection Officer
	Florije Pajaziti	Education Programme Coordinator
SC (Peje)	Nora Tarku	Education Project Officer
	Ardian Gojani	Education Project Officer
SC (Djakova)	Viosa Mullatohim	Pre-school officer
	Bardhyl Koshi	Recreation Officer
	Gerrard Young	Health Coordinator
	Reshat Mati	Assistant Health Coordinator
	Mohamed Abdi	Project Manager
SC (Prizren)	Linda Deda	Stores and Distribution Officer [also field officer for MTS]
	Ahmed Kryeziu	School Engineer
SC (Decani)	Luaras Oseku	Shelter Coordinator
	Francis Lakas	Ex-SC School PC
	Frank Selch	Project Administrator
SNI (Pristina)	Sam Rutherford	Country Director
Tearfund (Pristina)	Paul Stambrook	Project Coordinator
	Emma Strathon	-
	Sadiq Gashi	Project Assistant
Tearfund (Djakova)	Lendita Lleshi	Public Health Education
	Paul Stanbrook	Logistics Coordinator
	Anthony Land	Deputy Head of Officer OPS
UNHCR	Bill Tall	Coordinator
UNHCR (Prizren)	Melissa Brymer	Centre for Crisis Psychology
UNICEF (Pristina)	Patrick Channer	Deputy Programme Manager
UNMACC (Pristina)	John Flanagan	Programme Manager
	Habibia	School Director
UNMIK (Rahovac)	Behar Vuchetirna	School Director
	Mavouchu Gupta	Teacher
UNMIK (Xerxe)	Masar Lila	School Secretary
	Darlene Bisson	Regional Programme Advisor
WFP (Pristina)	Letty Coffin	Programme Manager
World Vision (Pristina)	David Finley	Country Director
	Jim Hooper	Agricultural Project Manager
	Liesbeth Speelman	Community Services Manager

6. Macedonia

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
American Assemblies of God (Skopje)	Craig Mattison	Area Director, Eastern Europe
CAD (Skopje)	Sarah Butterworth	Programme Manager
	Ron Langford	Director
	Clare Street	Health Programme Manager
CARE (Skopje)	Milica Kokotovic	Country Rep
	Daniella Kostovska	Project Officer
	Jolene Olive	Programme Officer
	Benjamin May	Drama Worker

CARE (Skopje)	Carol Sharman	Programme Manager
	Julie Stapleton	Finance Officer
Collective Centre (Radusa)	Etem Rmadani	Camp Manager
CRS	Nick Ford	Country Representative
	Kevin Tobin	Director, Kosovo Support Services
DFID	Tony Winton	Head of Office
El Hilal (Skopje)	Abdurauf Pruthi	President
El Hilal (Gostivar)	Selim Salih	Local Director
El Hilal (Tetevo)	Fatmir Tresi	President
Emergency Committee (Krusevo)	Arif	Head
	Irfan	Member
ICRC (Skopje)	Francoise Stamm	Head of Delegation
IFRC	William Harper	Head of Delegation
	Alfred Hasenhohrl	Relief Coordinator
	Suzana Tuneva	Senior Programme Officer
League of Albanian Women in Macedonia (Tetevo)	Myquereme Rusi	President
	Xhani Kreshova	Member
	Gjynere Nebiu	Professor of Pedagogy
	Drita Selmani	Member
Macedonian RC (Tetevo)	Qathip Besimi	Branch Secretary
Macedonian RC (Tetevo)	Janevska Todorka	Desk Officer
MCIC (Skopje)	Vladimir Lazovski	Project Officer
	Aleksandar Krzalovski	Project Officer
	Dimce Mitreski	Project Officer
Mesecina (Tetevo)	Shakir Melori	President
	Elesoran Selvidon	Coordinator of Women's Club
	Islam Shakir	-
Mesecina (Gostivar)	Muhamed Toci	Programme Coordinator
	Memedali Rahmani	President
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy	Boge Cadinovski	Advisor to the Minister
MRC (Skopje)	Janevska Todorka	Desk Officer
	Vlado Dimovski	Camp Manager, Dare Bumbol Collective Centre for Roma
	Katerina Petrushevska	Social Worker, Dare Bumbol Collective Centre for Roma
Municipality (Gostivar)	Jamin Nuredini	Mayor
	Zudi Xhelili	Council Chairman
Municipality (Vrutok)	E. Ismaili	Municipal Secretary
Oxfam (Skopje)	Zola Dowell	Programme Representative
	Richard Lawrence	WatSan Engineer
	Yohannes Hagos	Programme Manager
	Turgaj Mazllami	Hygiene Promoter, Stanovic II/Cegrane Camps
Oxfam (Skopje)	Vendela Fortune	Disability Advisor
	Alan Jenkinson	QIPS PC
	Richard Lorenz	QIPs Manager
	Tulaj, Sunag & Gordona	Community Services
Oxfam (Gostivar)	Feriz Sinani	Senior Construction Supervisor
	Yllza Ademi	Project Assistant
SC (Skopje)	Teuta Demjaha	Senior Health Advisor
	Ted Bilsborrow	Relief Coordinator
SNI (Skopje)	Terry Aislabie	Acting Director
	Marilyn Brayton	Finance Director, Balkans

SNI (Tetevo)	Stacey Whitman	Project Worker
UNICEF (Skopje)	Dr Pinu	UNICEF Health Officer
	Mai Bente Snipstad	Centre for Crisis Psychology
UNHCR (Skopje)	Agostino Mulas	Senior Programme Officer
	Andrew Jones	QIPS Manager
	Brad Woodruff	Medical Coordinator
UNHCR (Cegrane)	Andrew Jones	Former Camp Manager for CARE
WFP (Skopje)	Dale Skoric	Head of Office
	Monique Thorman	Programme Officer

7. Montenegro

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
ICRC (Podgorica)	Agathe Stricker	Head of Sub-delegation
IFRC (Podgorica)	Scott Simmonds	Head of Sub-delegation
IOCC (Podgorica)	Matthew Parry	Country Representative
SC (Podgorica)	Gordon Ivanovic	Programme Director
World Vision (Berane)	Judy-Leigh Moore	Programme Manager
	Judy-Ann Slobig	Community Services Manager
	Bojan Djakovic	Administrator and Computer Teacher, Community Centre

8. Serbia

Organisation	Name	Title/Dept
Bread of Life	Jasmina Tosic	
CARE (Belgrade)	Anthony McEvoy	Project Manager
EHO (Novi Sad)	Karoyl Beres	Director
	Anna Bu	Programme Coordinator
CAFOD partners (Belgrade)	Various	Various
ICRC	Peter Stocker	Head of Delegation
	Serge Marmy	Deputy Head of Delegation
	John Roche	Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator
ICVA	Ann Pestic	-
IFRC (Belgrade)	Sten Swedlund	Head of Delegation
	Bogdan Dumitru	Programme Coordinator
	Bo Andren	Logistics Delegate
IOCC (Belgrade)	Ivan Bojanic	Head of Office
Oxfam (Belgrade)	Marina Skuric-Prodanovic	Programme Representative
	Slobodanka Torbica	Deputy Emergency Programme Coordinator
	Robert Schneider	Emergency Programme Coordinator
Oxfam (Smederevo)		Radinac Collective Centre
		Community Service Project officer
		Engineer
SC (Belgrade)	Karlo Puskarica	Acting Country Representative
	Nenad Bosiljcic	Logistics Officer
UNHCR	Gert Westerven	Assistant Representative (Protection)
UNOCHA (Belgrade)	Robert Painter	Head of OCHA
WFP (Belgrade)	Viney Jain	Deputy Senior Emergency Coordinator
WHO (Belgrade)	Jukka Pukkila	Head of Office
	Melite Vujnovic	Health Information Officer
Yugoslav Red Cross	Dr Rade Dubajic	Secretary General
	Dragan Knezevic	Cooperation and Dissemination

APPENDIX 5: Kosovo Crisis Timeline to 31 January 2000

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1968		Kosovo Albanians demonstrate for recognition as a separate republic. Serbian concessions include establishment of an Albanian language university.	
1968–74		Amendments to Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions give further autonomy to Kosovo (and Vojvodina).	
1974		Yugoslavia's third constitution adopted defining Kosovo and Vojvodina virtually as sovereign republics but without the right to secede from the Federation (ICG, 1998).	
1980	Yugoslav President Tito dies in May.		
1981		Widespread demonstrations in Kosovo calling <i>inter alia</i> for a 'Kosovo Republic'.	
1985	Enver Hoxha, Albanian leader since 1944 dies.		
1987		Leader of League of Communists of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, says in April at a Serb demonstration in Kosovo ' <i>No one shall beat these people!</i> '	
1989		Changes to the 1974 Serbian constitution by the Serbian parliament and approved by constituent parts of the Federation strip Kosovo of its autonomy. Commemoration of 600 th anniversary of battle of Kosovo at Kosovo Polje attended by estimated one million Serbs.	
1990			
January		Demonstrations and riots in Kosovo result in state of emergency being declared and Yugoslav security forces sent in.	
July		Kosovo Albanian parliamentary delegates led by Ibrahim Rugova declare independence and set up a shadow government.	
1991			
June	Slovenia & Croatia declare independence.		
August	Fighting escalates between Croatia and Yugoslavia.		
Sept.	Macedonia declares independence.	EU conference on Yugoslavia, included explicit discussion on special status for Kosovo.	
1992			
March	Fighting spreads to Bosnia Albanian elections end 47 years of communist rule.		

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
April	Siege of Sarajevo starts	The republics of Montenegro and Serbia (including the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina) declared the formation of a new Yugoslavia. A new constitution is adopted but the status of Vojvodina and Kosovo remains unchanged in the current Yugoslav state.	
May	International sanctions against Montenegro and Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia admitted to UN	Parallel Kosovo Albanian parliament elected. KLA starts small-scale attacks on police.	
August	London Conference on former Yugoslavia.		
Sept		Establishment in Geneva of International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) – one working group to look at national minorities including Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Kosovo.	
Dec		US President George Bush warns Milosevic that any action towards Kosovo would be taken seriously, but not mentioning military force.	
1993			
January	Presentation of Vance-Owen Peace Plan.		
April	FYROM admitted to UN.		
May	Bosnia Serbs reject Vance Owen peace plan. ICTY established.		
1994			
Feb	Mortar shell kills 68 in Sarajevo market.		
1995			
May	NATO starts air strikes against Bosnian Serbs but ends them after UN peacekeepers taken hostage. Croatia expels ethnic Serbs from W Slavonia UN protected area.		

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
July	Bosnian Serb forces enter Srebrenic and Zepa 'safe areas' – estimated 8,000 Bosnian Muslims killed.		
August	Croatia expels ethnic Serbs from Krajina.	Serbian authorities start settlement of Croatian Serbs in Kosovo.	
October	Cease-fire in Bosnia.		
Dec.	Dayton Peace Agreement signed in Paris.	Kosovo not referred to in Dayton Peace Agreement.	
1996			
		KLA emerges more openly for the first time as militant Kosovo Albanians increasingly question Rugova's 'passive resistance' strategy.	
1997			
January		KLA suspected of car bombing Serb rector of Pristina university. KLA leader killed.	
Feb–March	Albanian disturbances following collapse of Pyramid schemes	Flow of arms and ammunitions to the KLA and Kosovo following the opening of the stores in Albania.	
March		Four people injured by car bomb in central Pristina, Kosovo.	
1998			
		Size of FRY security forces increases in Kosovo	
Feb		Serb security force operations in Drenica area and other offensives during the Spring against KLA.	
April		The Contact Group for Former Yugoslavia (US, GB, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) agree to re-impose some sanctions on Yugoslavia that had been lifted.	
May		End May/June 12,000 refugees from security force operations in Kosovo entered Tropoje in Albania.	
June		NATO makes first threat of military action against Serbia.	
July		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kosovo Albanians inaugurate their outlawed parliament – legislators dispersed by Serbian police. • Serb offensive against KLA. 	
August		UN calls for cease fir after village of Junik is over run by Serb offensive.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1998			
Sept		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Security Council (without China) approves resolution 1199 highlighting an impending humanitarian catastrophe, demanding a cessation of hostilities and international monitors for withdrawal of security forces to pre-March 1998 levels. • UNHCR announces that there are as many as 200,000 IDPs in Kosovo. 60,000 are in the open without shelter. • Agreement to a Kosovo Verification Mission by the OSCE. 	
13 Oct		NATO approves activation order authorising Secretary General to start air strikes within 96 hours.	
16 Oct		NATO extends deadline for the FRY to come into compliance with terms of accord on Kosovo, giving Milosevic until 27 October to honour the agreement.	
24 Oct		UN Security Council resolution 1203 passed which endorses the OSCE agreement and demands full cooperation from both sides.	
27 Oct		4,000 special police troops depart Pristina thus bringing Serb compliance with the terms of agreement it had reached.	
Nov		KVM headed by Ambassador William Walker begins to arrive and functions	
Dec		Ceasefire starts to break down.	
1999			
15 Jan		45 ethnic Albanians are discovered massacred at Racak.	
16 Jan		FRY refuses to allow the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to investigate.	
17 Jan		UNHCR notes that 20,000 people have fled their homes since last December, 5,000 of whom are from Racak alone.	
29 Jan		The six nation contact group gives Serbs and ethnic Albanians an ultimatum to attend peace talks in France starting 6 February.	
30 Jan		The North Atlantic Council agrees that the NATO Secretary general may authorise air strikes against targets on Yugoslav territory.	
6 Feb		Talks begin at Chateau Rambouillet.	
23 Feb		Breakdown in Rambouillet talks.	
10 Mar		Ambassador Holbrooke and Hill travel to Belgrade to persuade Milosevic to accept interim political accord.	
15 Mar		Talks continue in Paris. Ethnic Albanian delegation signs interim agreement.	
18 Mar		Serb delegation refuse to sign and peace talks are suspended.	
19 Mar		Kosovo Verification Mission withdraws.	
21 Mar		Holbrooke sent to Belgrade to give Milosevic a final warning.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
23 Mar		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Serb National Assembly passes Resolutions responding to the Rambouillet proposals. • UN agencies and INGOs evacuate from Kosovo. 	
24 Mar		NATO air strikes begin at 1900 GMT.	
25 Mar		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Massive outflows of refugees from Kosovo, mainly to Albania and Macedonia (see Table 2 for sequence of refugee flows). • 65,000 refugees trapped at Blace on the Macedonian border in appalling conditions. 	
29 Mar		ICRC withdraws from Kosovo.	
30 Mar			DEC's OSC Conference call to discuss appeal launch. Feeling in favour but recommendation to EXCOM awaits further information.
31 Mar			EXCOM decision to launch DEC appeal for Kosovo and affected populations in the Balkans.
1 April			EXCOM conference call. Feedback from OSC on 48 hour plans – concerns about coordination, agencies new to the region and response will exceed immediate needs.
4 April		Agreement with Macedonian authorities to admit refugees to NATO built refugee camps with Western countries agreeing to take 91,000 refugees in a Humanitarian Evacuation Programme.	Easter holiday weekend in Western Europe.
5 April			DEC EXCOM conference call.
6 April			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEC Kosovo appeal launched. • Phase I until 4 October 1999.
9 April			Estimated appeal income £9.7m
15 April			DEC EXCOM conference call – decision to extend Period of Joint Action till 26 April.
18 April		UNHCR estimates that half a million Kosovo Albanians have fled.	
22 April		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO Summit decision on Kosovo reaffirms Five Points and adds conditions for suspending bombing. • NATO intensifies air campaign. 	
23 April		ICRC President meets Milosevic to obtain assurances for ICRC to work in Kosovo.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
26 April			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEC EXCOM meeting – agreed on £15 disbursement within six-month appeal launch date. • Period of Joint Action ends.
29 April		FRY files a suit at the International Court of Justice against 10 NATO countries.	
30 April			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimated appeal income £20.4m.
7 May		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moderate Albanian leader is found dead in Kosovo. • NATO planes hit Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (accidentally). 	
9 May		UNHCR announces that it is facing a financial crisis in its Kosovo Emergency operation.	
14 May		First ICRC exploratory mission to Kosovo since withdrawal on 29 March.	
16 May		UN Secretary General's Inter-Agency needs assessment mission to FRY starts (ending 27 May)	
17 May		Greece calls for a cease fire to ' <i>give diplomacy a chance</i> '.	
23 May		NATO begins a bombing campaign of the Yugoslav electricity grid, causing major disruption to power and water supplies.	
24 May		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Head of UN fact finding mission states he has seen 'revolting' signs of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. • ICRC reopens office in Pristina. 	
27 May		Milosevic and four other Serbian leaders are indicted by the UN war crimes tribunal for crimes against humanity.	
28 May			DEC's OSC comments on Phase I four-week plans of action.
31 May			Estimated appeal income £37.9m.
3 June		FRY accepts terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin which specifies withdrawal of all Serbian and Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and 'substantial NATO participation' in an international security presence.	DEC EXCOM meeting. It was agreed that to distribute remaining funds according to agencies needs in a new sixth month. Phase II expenditure package and to ask agencies for new plans of action by 15 July.
8 June		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The West and Russia reach a landmark agreement on draft UN Resolution at G8 talks on troops withdrawal. • UNHCR estimate that 780,000 refugees and IDPs have been displaced to countries surrounding Kosovo and over 81,000 have left the region on the HEP. 	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
9 June		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATO Secretary general calls for a suspension of NATO bombing after evidence that Serb forces are withdrawing from northern Kosovo • Military Technical Agreement signed. • UN Resolution 1244 is adopted, setting up the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. 	
10 June		NATO air strikes suspended after 78 days	
12 June		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Russian troops enter Pristina, three and a half hours before NATO troops enter Kosovo and install themselves at the airport. • British, French and US KFOR troops enter to begin taking control of withdrawing Serb forces. 	
13 June		Serb troops begin pulling out of Pristina.	
14 June		First UN and INGO workers start to return to Kosovo.	
15 June		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • OSCE reports that 2,000 Kosovo Albanians have arrived back in Kosovo. • ICRC reports that 33, 000 Serbs have left Kosovo. 	DEC: JMC to ExCOM: <i>'returned funds from Phase become part of Phase II distribution and any 'left over' is bid for'.</i>
20 June		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In accordance with the Military Technical Agreement on 9 June, Serb forces completely withdrawal from Kosovo. • More than 100, 000 refugees have already returned to Kosovo despite UNHCR pleas not to go. 	
21 June		KLA and NATO sign military undertaking.	
22 June		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UNHCR estimates that 214,050 refugees have returned to Kosovo so far. • NATO and UNHCR announce that organised repatriation will begin next week. 	
27 June		Roma in Kosovo start to flee due to 'revenge attacks' by ethnic Albanians.	
28 June		23, 000 NATO troops in Kosovo.	
29 June		UN deploys first team of the international police force in Kosovo.	
30 June			Estimated appeal income £44.1m.
2 July		Bernard Kouchner appointed head of the UN Mission in Kosovo.	
13 July		UN agencies announce that organised repatriation of refugees outside of the Balkans will begin on 15 July.	
15 July		Bernard Kouchner arrives in Kosovo.	
16 July		WFP estimates that 146, 000 Serbs have left Kosovo for Serbia.	
21 July		UNHCR estimates that the number of IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro is 170, 000.	
23 July		UNHCR estimates that 720, 700 refugees have returned to date to Kosovo.	
28 July		Donors conference in Brussels. US\$2.082 billion in aid pledged for Kosovo.	

Date	Regional Events	Kosovo-related Events	DEC Events
1999			
31 July			Estimated appeal income £46.8m.
1 Aug			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEC Phase II begins: 1/8/99–31/1/00. • DEC Phase IIb begins: 1/8/99–30/3/00.
4 Aug		UNHCR estimates that 80 per cent of the over 850, 000 ethnic Albanians who fled Kosovo during the war have returned to Kosovo.	
6 Aug			DEC's OSC comments on Phase II four-week plans of action
Nov		UNHCR estimates 200,000 minorities, mainly Serbs and Roma, have fled Kosov since the end of the NATO bombing.	3 Nov DEC: EXCOM meeting: £27m disbursed in Phase II – because of returns between £1m and £2.5m will be available. Agencies asked to submit plans and budgets by 1 October. A decision needs to be made on whether remaining funds will be distributed in the usual way or whether agencies should be asked to submit a proposal for all or some of the money on a basis of need and the ability to spend effectively.
18 Nov			DEC's OSC: comments on Phase II four-week plans of action (resubmissions)
2000			
1 Jan			Phase III begins: 1/1/00–31/6/00.
31 Jan			DEC Phase II ends.

APPENDIX 6: DEC Agencies: DEC-Funded Programme Distribution by Country (Phases I And II)

DEC Agency	Albania	Bosnia	Kosovo	Macedonia	Montenegro	Serbia
BRCS	✓	X	✓	✓	✓	✓
CAFOD	X	X	✓	✓	X	✓
CARE Int'l UK	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
CAD	✓	X	✓	✓	X	X
Christian Aid	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
Concern	✓	X	✓	X	X	X
HAI	X	X	✓	✓	X	X
Merlin	✓	X	X	X	X	X
Oxfam	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	✓
SC	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Tearfund	✓	✓	✓	✓	X	X
World Vision	✓	X	✓	X	✓	X

Figure 5: Geographical allocation of DEC funds: Phase I




Figure 6: Geographical allocation of DEC funds: Phase II





Figure 7: Allocation of DEC funds: Phases I and II



APPENDIX 7: DEC Agencies: Types of Refugee Situation Assisted using DEC funds during the NATO Bombing Period

DEC Agency	Camps	Collective Centres	Private Accommodation	IDPs
BRCS	✓	✓	✓	✓
CAFOD	X	X	X	✓
CARE	✓	✓	X	X
CAD	✓	✓	✓	x
Christian Aid	X	✓	✓	✓
Concern	X	✓	✓	X
HAI	X	X	✓	X
Merlin	✓	✓	✓	X
Oxfam	✓	✓	✓	✓
SC	✓	✓	✓	✓
Tearfund	✓	✓	✓	X
World Vision	X	✓	✓	✓

APPENDIX 8: Overview of DEC Agency Evaluations of the Kosovo Crisis and Post-Emergency Responses

Agency	Evaluations and Lesson Learning Studies carried out (Internal and External)	Changes that are being made to Emergency Response Systems	Comments
BRCS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evaluation of the joint ICRC/IFRC response to the Balkans Crisis (March 2000). • BRCS Internal Review (March 2000). 	None known of.	-
CAFOD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal lesson learning review (September 1999). • Post DEC Evaluation internal review (mid 2000). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate Task Team reviewing general emergency response systems. • Three additional emergency officers recruited. 	CAFOD Albania - <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal lesson learning review in August 1999. • Emergency Preparedness workshop in Feb 2000.
CARE Int'l UK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carried out a Lessons Learning Review of its response to the Kosovo crisis in January. The report has been internally discussed and is not yet published. • Undertaken an impact study on livelihood security among families who hosted refugees in Elbasan, Albania. • Undertaking an internal review of aid-military relations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Currently reviewing its emergency policies. 	CARE UK has made use of DEC Funds for specific research: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Humanitarian Ombudsman Project. • Recruiting a Standards Consultant in Albania to review application of Sphere Standards. • An assessment of systems for social protection in Kosovo.
Children's Aid Direct	None known of.	None known of.	-
Christian Aid	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ACT mid-term evaluation, August 1999. • ACT final evaluation Jan 1999 • Christian Aid internal evaluation March 2000. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Have created a Strategy Working Group and a manual has been prepared involving all units. 	-
Concern World-wide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carry out internal lessons learning exercise after every emergency operation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultant carried out emergency response capacity assessment after the Balkans. Recommended changes still under review. • Considering having a programme with a watching brief 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment reflects emergency work world-wide, not just the Balkans.
HelpAge Int'l	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No evaluation or lesson learning studies carried out. • HAI case study material from the refugee crisis has been used in the 'Ageing and Development Report' (1999). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency response procedures have been reviewed. • In April published 'Guidelines for Best Practice' for assisting older people in disasters and humanitarian crises. 	-
Merlin	None known of.	None known of.	-
Oxfam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No formal lessons learning or evaluation but internal reports reflect on lessons learned and some come close to auto-evaluation. 	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In future plan to send public health teams rather than water teams.

SC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of emergency response (Hallam); management review. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extensive changes – strengthening emergency dept; clarified regional responsibility; improved emergency response capacity. 	-
Tearfund	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DRT carried out an internal lessons learning exercise. Are planning an evaluation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are considering how better to integrate DRT with partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Carried out scenario planning for further crises in region.
World Vision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lesson learning report. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have now set up permanent emergency response teams. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One emergency team by world regions.

APPENDIX 9: Other Balkans Evaluations

Date	Author/Organisation	Title
23 Aug 1999	Silkin,T. and Bouman,D.	One, two, many but not yet whole. Mid-term evaluation. Emergency Appeal EUKC91 of ACT in Macedonia and Albania.
Nov. 1999	Humanitarianism and War Project and the Humanitarian Law Consultancy	The Interaction of NATO-related Military Forces with Humanitarian Actors in the Kosovo Crisis. Discussion note prepared for Netherland's Foreign Minister's workshop.
29 Nov 1999	Valid International	Disasters Emergency Committee. Kosovo Crisis: Lesson Learning Study.
Dec 1999	Médécins Sans Frontières	MSF Response in Macedonia to the Kosovo Refugee Crisis. A new Humanitarian Order?
1999	ETC UK	Main Report: Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Crisis in Kosova. March to May 1999.
31 Jan 2000	Telford,J. (contracted by DFID)	Coordination in the 1999 Kosovo Refugee Emergency. The Emergency Group (EMG) Albania
Feb 2000	Suhrke, A., Barutciski, M., Sandison,P. and Garlock,R.	The Kosovo Refugee Crisis. An independent evaluation of UNHCR's emergency preparedness and response.
May 2000	Anema,F., Stone,M. and Wissink,H.	The Balkans Evaluation: an examination of the role of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement's response to the Balkan's Crisis. Lessons and recommendations for future crisis situations.
May 2000	World Food Programme	Summary Evaluation Report on Kosovo regional emergency operation. Food Assistance to Kosovar internally displaced persons and refugees in the FRY, Albania and FYRoM.
26 May 2000	National Audit Office	DFID Emergency Aid: the Kosovo Crisis.
1 June 2000	Ministry of Defence	Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis.
2000	CARE International	The Kosovo Crisis – What can we learn? (second draft).
2000	The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs,	Evaluation of the Kosovo crisis.
2000	Minear,L., Van Baarda,T. and Sommers,M.	Occasional Paper # 36. NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis.

APPENDIX 10: DEC Reporting Framework – Some Proposals

1. The DEC narrative report format (draft DEC Handbook, Chapter 4) is good and should be retained.
2. Where agencies use a narrative format different from the DEC's, they should be required to include all of the headings covered in the DEC format, if necessary as an annexe to a report originally prepared for other uses/donors.
3. The DEC should require that financial reports are submitted with the expenditures for separate projects clearly identified. As agency accounts are normally maintained on a project basis with a separate account for each project, this should present no great difficulty for the agencies.
4. Agencies should be required to give a global statement of their expenditure broken into in-country, regional, and international expenditures, replacing the current requirement to split costs into in-country and off-shore costs at the detailed budget level.
5. The division of expenditure into sector headings is currently unclear and leads to inconsistencies in reporting. DEC should clarify the reporting requirements for agencies, including:
 - Requiring that agencies should use the sub-headings that best fit the activities that they are doing, but that those sub-headings should be presented in the framework of the DEC standard Financial Reporting Headings.
 - Agencies should be expected to report on an appropriate level of detail consistent with the agencies own internal financial controls.
 - All major capital items (costing more than £5,000, with a useful life of more than three years) should be listed, together with the agency's plans for their disposal at the end of the project.
 - Some basic information on unit costs within the DEC reporting system would increase accountability as well as providing information for the agencies' financial management needs.
6. These proposals on reporting will need to be cross-checked against decisions that the DEC may make about monitoring and evaluating appeals as a result of the recommendations in the main report.

APPENDIX 11: Background Documents

During the evaluation, over 2,500 documents have been collected and catalogued (including those inherited from the Lesson Learning Study). These documents are available at ODI for research purposes. Some of them are listed below.

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Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds

Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000

Volume II

Peter Wiles

Mark Bradbury	Manuela Mece
Margie Buchanan-Smith	Nicola Norman
Steve Collins	Ana Prodanovic
John Cosgrave	Jane Shackman
Alistair Hallam	Fiona Watson



Overseas Development Institute

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**Independent Evaluation of Expenditure
of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds
Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000**

The evaluation consists of three volumes, of which this is the second.
Volume I: Main Findings of the Evaluation
Volume II: Sectoral Sections (including a section on War-Affected
Populations and Beneficiaries)
Volume III: Individual DEC Agency Summaries



Overseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge Road
London
SE1 7JD
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7922 0300
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7922 0399
Email: hpg@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odi.org.uk



52 Great Portland Street
London
W1N 5AH
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7580 6550
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7580 2854

Further details about this evaluation can be found on the DEC website at :

www.dec.org.uk

*Cover: Destroyed Market Street in Djakova
Photograph taken by Mark Bradbury during the evaluation fieldwork, March 2000.*

Preface

This volume of the DEC Kosovo evaluation contains sections on sectoral topics, such as food and nutrition, shelter and psychosocial assistance. It also looks at the experiences of war-affected populations and beneficiaries.

This volume should be read in conjunction with Volumes I and III of the report.

Volume I contains the main findings of the evaluation, together with overall conclusions and an executive summary.

Volume III contains summaries of the agencies' DEC funded activities. Each agency section also looks at key issues relating to performance which the evaluation team felt merited comment.

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Glossary

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ODI)
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Albanian Red Cross
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMI	Body Mass Index
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CA	Christian Aid
CAD	Children's Aid Direct
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CDC	Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID
CICH	Institute for Child Health
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMO	Civil Military Operations (analogous to CIMIC)
Concern	Concern Worldwide
CoC	Code of Conduct
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn/Soya Blend
CSW	Centre for Social Work
DA	Diakonia Agape
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DEM	Deutschmark
DFA	Irish Government's Department for Foreign Affairs
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DPT	Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine
DFID	Department for International Development
DRA	Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
DRT	Disaster Response Team (Tearfund's direct implementation arm)
EC	European Commission
ECEN	East and Central Europe Network
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDA	Edinburgh Direct Aid
EHO	Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation
EMG	Emergency Management Group
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPC	Emergency Programme Coordinator (Oxfam)
EU	European Union
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
ExCom	Executive Committee (of DEC)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FYROM	Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAI	HelpAge International
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Handicap International
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HoD	Head of Delegation
HPN	Humanitarian Practice Network (formerly RRN – Relief and Rehabilitation Network), ODI
HR	Human Resources
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IACU	Inter-Agency Coordination Unit
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHE	International Health Exchange
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOCC	International Orthodox Christian Charities
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPH	Institute of Public Health
IRC	International Rescue Committee, a US NGO
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JEFF	Joint Evaluation Follow-Up Monitoring and Facilitation Network
JTF	Joint Task Force
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice
KERP	Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KRC	Kosovo Red Cross
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCIC	Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MEECA	Middle East, Europe and Central Asia Team (Christian Aid)
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Mont RC	Montenegrin Red Cross
MRC	Macedonian Red Cross
MRE	Meals, Ready to Eat
MRT	Mobile Rehabilitation Team (BRCS-funded programme in Kosovo)
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MTS	Mother Teresa Society
MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Serbian Interior Ministry)
NAO	National Audit Office

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGHA	Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOVIB	Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation
NFI	Non-food items
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPF	'Help the Children' a Roma NGO in Albania
NRCS	National Red Cross Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONS	Operating National Societies
OPD	Out-Patient's Department
OPV	Oral Poliovirus Vaccine
OSC	Operational Sub-Committee of DEC
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe
PJA	Period of Joint Action
PLO	Protection Liaison Officer
PNS	Participating National Societies (Red Cross)
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontières
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RedR	Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief
REACH	Rehabilitation for Elderly and Children
RC	Red Cross
ROCC	Regional Operation Control Center (a coordination structure in Bosnia)
RRN	Relief and Rehabilitation Network (ODI). Now known as HPN (Humanitarian Practice Network)
SBASHK	Kosovo Teaching Staff Union
SC	Save the Children
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNI	Shelter Now International
SRC	Serbian Red Cross
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCK	Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA)
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, HCR
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VUSH	Vellazeria Ungjillore (Albanian Evangelical Alliance)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

WV World Vision
WVI World Vision International
YRC Yugoslav Red Cross

SECTION 1: FOOD AND NUTRITION

1.1 Introduction

A number of key questions will be addressed in this section with respect to the overall food and nutrition response and to the use of DEC funds. The discussion mainly applies to Phase I (the initial refugee outflux) as most DEC-funded food programmes were implemented during this period. The key questions are:

- What were the objectives of food aid in the context of the Kosovo crisis?
- Was the quantity and quality of food aid delivered appropriate?
- Who were the vulnerable groups and were they adequately covered?
- Was the food aid distributed cost-effective?
- What was the impact of the food aid (positive and negative)?
- Were international guidelines and standards adhered to?
- What was the impact of the crisis on the food security of host populations?

1.2 General Findings

There was no starvation or malnutrition as a result of the Kosovo crisis. The nutritional status of Kosovar children surveyed after the return of the refugees in July 1999 (Action Against Hunger, 1999) was generally good and was not significantly different from the nutritional status of Kosovar children surveyed in December 1998 (Action Against Hunger, Mercy Corps International & UNICEF, 1998). On the contrary, obesity among adults was of greater concern and in July 1999 over one-third of mothers with young children were overweight¹.

A major reason for the absence of malnutrition during the Kosovo crisis was the relatively good pre-crisis nutritional and health status of the Kosovar population. Compared to an African refugee population, for example, the Kosovar refugee population was generally bigger, fatter and healthier. Furthermore, the countries to which they fled were generally better off and refugees had better access to essential services than their fellow refugees in parts of Africa. Those who had fled with cash (and many had) could afford to buy food and other basic items from local markets. Many continued to receive remittances from extended family members abroad, and (in Albania at least) the refugees were warmly welcomed and supported by their hosts. As WFP noted '*...the coping mechanisms available to many of the affected groups ... played a decisive role in avoiding hunger and malnutrition*' (WFP, 2000).

Although, the risk of malnutrition was low, agencies competed with each other to provide aid to the refugees and food aid was sent in abundance. Much of this was unsolicited donations and some of limited appropriateness (for example, a plane-load of chocolate croissants sent to Albania from Switzerland). There was no shortage of funds for official food aid either. For example, in the Revised 1999 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the South-eastern Europe Humanitarian Operation (United Nations, 1999), WFP appealed for US\$171 million

¹ Overweight refers to a Body Mass Index (BMI=weight/height²) of 25 and over.

to fund their food aid operation. Donors exceeded the appeal amount and donated US\$172 million.

This generosity is in sharp contrast to the response to protracted emergencies in Africa where funds are frequently not available for basic food aid items. For example, during 1998 WFP experienced resource problems in the Great Lakes Region that had '*significant consequences for WFP's beneficiaries*'. A lack of vegetable oil in the latter half of 1998 meant that '*refugees and displaced people who were most reliant on food aid, and whose coping mechanisms were weakest, (became over-reliant) ... on cereals in the diet, with consequent nutritional impact, particularly on children and women*' (WFP, 1998).

Another example is the warning made by WFP² that it urgently needed US\$100 million in donations in order to maintain food relief to war-torn Angola, where malnutrition levels are high and rising (ACC/SCN, 1999). The agency launched a US\$158 million appeal at the start of the year to distribute some 17,000 tonnes of food a month to 1.2 million IDPs, but by May 2000 had received less than 60 per cent of the amount. Without more funds, WFP will have to reduce food distribution in August 2000. The lack of response is despite a UN report at the end of April 2000 which concluded that some 3.7 million Angolans had been directly affected by the war and faced a worsening humanitarian situation.

1.3 Use of DEC Funds

Eight of the twelve DEC member agencies chose to spend DEC money on food aid programmes during Phase I (refer to Table 1). Expenditure on food items alone³ represented about 17 per cent of Phase I funds and was equivalent to approximately £2.3 million. In Phase II the number of agencies involved with food programmes had fallen to three, and less than 3 per cent of Phase II funds were spent on food items. Table 2 summarises the food programmes supported with DEC funds.

Given that malnutrition was not an imminent problem, that there was a glut of food aid and that DEC funds could be used flexibly, it was appropriate for agencies to concentrate on areas other than food aid, especially in Phase II when the priorities were to ensure security and weatherproofed shelter for returnees to Kosovo.

² WFP warns food aid to Angolans in jeopardy without more funds. Source: Agence France-Presse (AFP), 5 May 2000.

³ This figure does not include funds required for delivery of food aid (for example, transport, administration costs etc.) except in the case of Christian Aid where all funds donated to CRS have been included.

Table 1: Percentage of DEC funds spent on food aid

Agency	Phase I DEC expenditure (£)		Percentage of total spent on food	Phase II DEC expenditure (£)		Percentage of total spent on food
	Food	Total		Food	Total	
BRCS	123,721	1,570,158	7.9	0	3,126,146	0
CAFOD	**743,726	811,500	91.6	358,404	1,061,182	33.7
CAD	0	291,503	0	0	148,268	0
CARE	85,129	982,333	8.7	0	1,285,617	0
CA	485,002	1,577,754	30.7	77,005	2,013,708	3.8
Concern	56,290	594,000	9.5	0	831,600	0
HAI	0	249,000	0	0	406,528	0
Merlin	0	192,496	0	-	-	-
Oxfam	0	3,212,155	0	0	8,248,438	0
SC	*543,008	3,036,384	17.9	*122,364	4,693,280	2.6
Tearfund	77,357	417,100	18.5	0	529,296	0
WV	202,943	548,999	37	0	941,128	0
Total	2,317,176	13,483,382	17.2	557,773	23,285,191	2.4

* Includes food and hygiene items

** Expenditure on CRS programme assumed to be 80 per cent of DEC contribution

Table 2: Food aid programmes supported with DEC funds

Agency	Country	Partner*	Type of assistance	Beneficiaries
BRCS	Albania	ARC	Food parcels.	Refugees in host families.
	FRY	National Societies.	Food parcels.	IDPs, Social cases.
CAFOD	Kosovo	CRS	Bulk food and food parcels.	Vulnerable groups.
	Serbia	CAFOD partner.	Food parcels.	Roma families.
CARE	Macedonia		Complementary foods (fresh veg., jam, eggs, meat paste).	Refugees in camps.
CA	Macedonia	MCIC	Food parcels, Baby food parcels.	Refugees in host families, Social cases.
	Bosnia	LWF	Food parcels.	Refugees in collective centres.
	Serbia	IOCC	Food parcels.	IDPs, Refugees in collective centres.
	Serbia	EHO	Food parcels.	Refugees in host families, War-affected residents.
Concern	Albania		Food rations.	Refugees in camps and in host families, IDPs.
SC	Serbia Bosnia		Food parcels.	Refugee children.
Tearfund	Albania	Agrinas	Daily hot meals.	Refugees in collective centres.
	Macedonia	SNI	Food parcels.	Refugees in host families.
World Vision	Albania		Food ration.	Refugees in empty houses and collective centres.
	Monte-negro		Daily hot meals.	IDPs in host families and collective centres.

* Partner organisations frequently worked through a number of local partners who were involved in distribution of food aid.

The church agencies⁴ spent the highest proportion of their budgets on food. This may partly reflect the church's traditional role as a provider of food and shelter to those in need, and the existence often at grass roots networks for distribution. Where local partners set the agenda for DEC agencies, it is imperative that they have the experience and knowledge of emergencies to take informed decisions about programme priorities. The issue of support for partner agencies is dealt with in Volume I.

1.4 Objectives of Food Aid

The objectives of food aid in the context of the Kosovo crisis were rarely explicitly stated in the documentation of the DEC agencies. The purposes outlined by Sphere are shown in Box 1. The period of a potentially increased risk of starvation and death came in the immediate aftermath of the refugee outflux. However, as it became clear that the refugees were generally healthy and had some access to other resources, the risk lessened. Ironically, the initial outflux was the period when fewest international agencies were up and running.

Whilst in the very initial stages of the emergency the objectives of food aid were nutritional, it was quickly clear that food aid did not serve a primarily nutritional purpose. Rather, the implicit purpose of food aid appears to have been to provide some sort of supplement or short-term income transfer. Certainly WFP emphasised the non-nutritional objectives of food aid in an assessment of food aid needs for Kosovo carried out in July 1999.⁵

This has implications for measuring the impact of food aid in that the value of the food aid to the beneficiary, in economic terms, is as important as the nutritional value. The cost-effectiveness of food aid (i.e. the cost of supplying food aid in relation to its value to the beneficiary) becomes an important impact indicator.

Box 1: Purposes of food aid according to Sphere

(The Sphere Project, 1998)

- | |
|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Sustain life by ensuring adequate availability and access to food by people affected by disaster.2. Provide sufficient food resources to eliminate the need for survival strategies, which may result in long-term negative consequences to human dignity, household viability, livelihood security and the environment.3. Provide a short-term income transfer or substitution to people to allow household resources to be invested for recovery. |
|--|

⁴ CAFOD, Christian Aid, Tearfund and World Vision.

⁵ The objectives of food aid for returnees to Kosovo: (1) To reduce the risk of hunger and malnutrition; (2) To prevent further depletion of food stocks and cash savings; (3) To replace lost crop and livestock production; (4) To improve living standards by reducing expenditure on staple food items and increasing expenditure on vegetables and/or non-food items, including clothing and wood for winter heating; (5) To promote recovery of the private trading sector, by increasing purchasing power and effective demand (WFP, 1999).

1.5 Quantity and Quality of Food Aid

Needs assessments

As the refugees began to stream out of Kosovo in late March 1999, it was essential for food aid to be supplied which would meet all nutrient needs. An initial planning figure of 2,100kcal per person per day is recommended (WFP & UNHCR, 1997). Sphere Standards stress, however, that an initial assessment should be carried out as soon as possible in order to make recommendations '*about the need for external assistance and the options available*'. The standards set by Sphere for carrying out such an initial assessment are high and are probably rarely met in an emergency.

The Kosovo emergency was no exception and very little assessment or analysis of the food situation of the refugees in the period from March to June 1999 appears to have been carried out. However, this is not unusual in the initial stages of a refugee crisis and as in many other situations, decisions on the quantity and quality of food rations appear to have been based on the resources available (i.e. supply-driven rather than needs-driven). As there was no shortage of funds, rations tended to be generous both in terms of the calorie content and the range of items included.

Basic food rations

WFP was the lead UN agency on food aid for the Kosovo crisis, providing food aid to all those in need, including refugees, IDPs, other affected populations and 'social cases'. Whilst WFP had overall responsibility for coordinating the food aid operation, UNHCR agreed MoUs with other agencies who took responsibility for certain beneficiary groups. For example, the Red Cross covered refugees in host families in Albania, while in Kosovo CRS cover the AoR of Prizren and CARE cover the AoRs of Ferizaj, Kacanik and Lipljan. These agencies were responsible for ensuring that a basic ration was provided to beneficiaries. The basic recommended WFP ration for the Balkans region is shown in Table 3.

Table 3: WFP-recommended basic ration for the Balkans

Food item	Quantity per Person per Month
Wheat flour	12kg
Pulses	1kg
Vegetable oil	1l
Sugar	1kg

WFP also distributed additional products when available (150g of canned fish or meat per month, 150g of cheese per month, 150g of salt per month). In some camps and collective centres, rations were provided in the form of cooked meals while dry rations were given out to refugees in host families and in camps and collective centres where there were cooking facilities.

Complementary rations

In addition to the basic ration, complementary foods, either in the form of fresh foods or as complementary food parcels to families or children, were provided. UNHCR had the responsibility of providing guidelines on complementary foods and had introduced a

proposed supplement to the existing food provision for Albania in early May 1999 and for Macedonia in September 1999. This is shown in Table 4 and mainly consisted of fresh vegetables as a means of ensuring a good intake of vitamins and minerals.

Certain provisos were stipulated including NOT distributing fresh meat, baby foods, infant formula or chocolate (see notes after table). Many NGOs did not provide the suggested complementary foods, however, and instead developed their own complementary food parcels.

Table 4: UNHCR-recommended complementary ration

Food item	Quantity per person per month
Fresh vegetables/fruit	2kg
Onions	2kg
Potatoes	2kg
Canned fish/meat	1kg
Pasta	1kg
Tomato sauce	0.5kg
Jam	0.4kg

Source: UNHCR, 1999a

Notes:

- Fresh meat (for example, chicken) should not be provided to the refugees due to the lack of appropriate storage equipment.
- Baby foods (weaning foods) should not be provided through food distribution but through health and mother and child facilities. Infant formula and baby bottles should only be provided through health facilities in conjunction with individual counselling. All baby food products should be re-labelled with non-brand label in the appropriate language.
- Some items should not be distributed as part of the complementary ration: chocolate, infant formula (for infants aged less than six months).

Differences in the quantity and quality of rations

Annex 1.1 illustrates the wide variety of different rations distributed using DEC funds. The basic rations provided by WFP (not DEC-funded) and Red Cross (part DEC-funded) were different. For example in Albania, WFP provided a four-item ration of 1,940kcal, while the Red Cross recommended ration provided an eight-item ration of 2,782kcal. Complementary rations provided by the NGOs also showed great variation in the number of items included, calorific values, the cost and value to the beneficiary. Refer to Table 5.

This lack of consistency meant that beneficiaries might get an expensive parcel with lots of items or a much simpler parcel depending on which agency was distributing in a particular area. A lack of consistency to this degree can lead to conflict between beneficiaries and should be avoided.

Problems will also be experienced when there is inconsistency in supply and when expectations cannot be met. The more complex the food parcel, the more difficult it will be to ensure consistency of supply. For example, CARE was responsible for providing complementary foods to refugees in Stankovic II camp in Macedonia. On one occasion CARE was able to obtain fresh meat which was distributed to camp inhabitants. This turned

out to be counter-productive as camp inhabitants complained and conducted ‘*orderly protests*’ when they did not continue to receive fresh meat every month⁶.

Expensive food parcels containing many items can also lead to wastefulness. For example, each MCIC food parcel of eighteen items cost over £10 to procure and distribute. As this was a complementary ration, the extra calories provided (over 1,000kcal per person per day) together with the calories provided by the basic ration, were in excess of what is normally considered an appropriate energy intake for a healthy person⁷. The small quantities of luxury items, such as chocolate, Turkish delight and paté were of limited nutritional value (they contain few vitamins or minerals) but added to the expense. Similarly, high cost and elaborate parcels were bought and distributed using DEC funding by, among others, SC and Bosnia.

Whilst the psychological value of providing an elaborate complementary parcel is acknowledged, the high cost is wasteful and the money could perhaps have been better spent elsewhere.

1.6 Coverage of Vulnerable Groups

As Table 2 illustrates, the majority of DEC-funded food aid programmes were targeted at the more vulnerable groups both in terms of the type of beneficiary (refugees in host families, Roma and ‘social cases’ rather than refugees in camps) and in the countries covered (Bosnia and FRY in addition to Albania and Macedonia). Problems arose, however, in relation to targeting strategies, monitoring and reporting of food aid distribution.

Targeting

All refugees and IDPs from Kosovo were eligible to receive food aid rations in the countries to which they had fled regardless of whether they had access to their own resources or not. DEC-funded food parcels were targeted largely at these refugees and IDPs during Phase I. There were only few reports of beneficiaries totally missing out on food aid rations⁸. A greater potential problem was duplication. For example, agencies operating in the north-east of Macedonia reported that the Macedonian Red Cross (the official government agency) maintained its own list of beneficiaries separately from organisations such as El Hilal (a partner agency of MCIC) and other local organisations. These agencies acknowledged that it was possible for beneficiaries to be listed on more than one register and thus to receive food aid parcels twice⁹. Duplication may have led to some wastage through over-distribution but this is unlikely to have been extensive as food aid needs were not great.

⁶ Reported in an interview with a CARE camp manager.

⁷ A male involved in light physical activity requires about 2,500kcal per per day (WHO, 1985).

⁸ There was a suggestion that a few refugees/IDPs may not have registered or had gone to remote places which were not easily accessible and that they had therefore not received food aid (for example, reported in interview with El Hilal, Tetovo branch). No substantiated cases were documented, however.

⁹ For example, Mesecina (a Roma organisation) in Gostivar reported that each NGO had its own list of refugees in host families. Refugees went to different organisations to register and it was their choice where they went. It was therefore possible for a refugee to register twice. The agency noted that there may have been limited double distribution, however, as the demand for aid was not overwhelming because so much support was given to the refugees by the local Albanian community. The MRC, Gostivar ‘*wasn’t interested*’ in what the other NGOs were doing and thought there could have been

The blanket targeting of all refugees and IDPs did not distinguish between 'poorer' and 'richer' refugees and IDPs. However, this was probably not damaging as the 'poorer' refugees and IDPs received a full ration, there being no major shortages of food aid. A greater problem was that the 'poor' in the local population did not automatically receive food aid, although some may have been more needy than the refugee/IDP population. Some agencies used DEC funds to distribute food rations to the local poor (see Table 2). This turned out to be problematic and led to incidences of ill-feeling¹⁰.

Monitoring and reporting

A major contributory factor to the lack of consistency in ration scales and potential problems in coverage was the poor quality of monitoring and reporting on food aid distribution. Although inter-agency food coordination meetings were usually held at regular intervals in areas where food aid was being distributed, agencies who were receiving funding bilaterally did not necessarily provide reports to the food coordinating body operating in the area. Thus there was little centralisation of information and uniformity in approach.

Some attempts were made to improve food distribution monitoring. For example, French food monitors were employed to monitor Red Cross food distribution in Albania, but in general the level of monitoring and reporting remained poor.

1.7 Cost-effectiveness of Different Rations

The cost-effectiveness of food aid in the Kosovo context can be assessed by comparing the value of a ration to the beneficiary with the cost of the ration to the agency. 'Value' can only be measured in cash terms as it is impossible to assess the psychological 'value' to the beneficiary. Although the data are incomplete, Table 4 shows that there were substantial differences in the cost-effectiveness of different rations.

There were cases where the cost of purchasing and transporting the ration to the beneficiary was greater in cash terms than the value for the beneficiary. This was true both for the basic ration (for example, BRCS-procured monthly food parcel ration in Albania) and for complementary rations (for example, the cost to Christian Aid of the EHO ration in Serbia).

double distribution as seven NGOs were all distributing to the same target group. El Hilal Tetovo branch reported the same thing.

¹⁰ For example, MCIC in Macedonia reported incidences of problems with targeting of their food and hygiene parcels. These problems were mostly due to the social pressure on local partners to support one family rather than another or to share aid equally between all citizens. In the Debar region, a local partner Mesecina (a Roma organisation) was physically threatened for including particular beneficiaries on their beneficiary lists. Mesecina then requested to be 'released' from further distributions. The Kratovo branch of the Organisation of Women of Macedonia was unable to resist pressure from the local population and could not follow beneficiary selection criteria. Members of the Zletovo branch of the Union of Women's Organisations of Macedonia were physically attacked.

Table 5: Summary of costs and values of different DEC-funded rations

Agency (local partner)	Country of distribution	No. of items in ration	Kcals (per person per day)	Cost of purchase (£)	Value to the beneficiary per month (£)
BRCS (ARC)	Albania	8	2,782	5.95	5.24
World Vision	Albania	10	2,016	-	7.31
CA (MCIC)	Macedonia	18	1,070	10.03	-
Tearfund (SNI)	Macedonia	11	1,836	-	-
CAFOD (CRS)	Kosovo	6	2,172	-	6.03
SC	Bosnia	10	306	3.10	-
CA (LWF)	Bosnia	14	1,260	12.16	-
CAFOD	Serbia	6	539	3.68	4.83
CA (EHO)	Serbia	6	889	2.15*	1.82
CA (IOCC)	Montenegro	13	601	-	2.83

* EHO received humanitarian aid from Dortmund, the twin town of Novi Sad so the purchase price per parcel was reduced.

There were also large differences in the cost per calorie of different rations. For example, BRCS purchased food parcels for Albania at a cost of approximately £0.21 per 100kcal. At the other extreme, SC purchased food parcels for children in the Republika Srpska at a cost of about £1 per 100kcal and Christian Aid supported MCIC to purchase food parcels in Macedonia at a cost of about £0.94 per 100kcal.

Local purchase of foods was not necessarily cheaper. In the above examples, BRCS purchased food outside the region while SC and MCIC purchased food locally. However, positive aspects of local purchase could sometimes be speed with less likelihood of transport and importation delays, as well as support to the local economy.

Sale of food aid

It is now generally recognised that the sale of food aid can act as a positive coping strategy, especially in situations where beneficiaries are not receiving food aid items sufficient in vitamins and minerals, or where other basic services or goods are of a higher priority. In these cases, the sale of basic commodities provides cash to buy different types of (micronutrient-rich) food or other items such as fuel or medicines. The sale of food aid only becomes a problem when it is being carried out on a mass scale (and may involve corruption) or is having a marked effect on local prices.

There is very little documentation on the sale of food aid during the Kosovo crisis. The Macedonian authorities have accused international agencies of bringing in too much flour for Kosovo, which found its way to the market in Macedonia, so reducing the price of flour for local producers. As a result, the Macedonian authorities threatened to stop imports through Macedonia to Kosovo. However, the large food aid agencies believe that evidence for these accusations is weak¹¹.

At a local level, there were numerous anecdotes of food aid items being sold on the market in both Albania and Macedonia. These were generally the least favoured food aid products such

¹¹ Reported in interviews with CRS and WFP offices in the region.

as tinned fish, pasta and beans¹². The impact of these local sales on food prices is difficult to assess and no conclusions can be drawn. A bigger problem may have been the mere presence of the refugees with cash assets which placed a greater demand upon food markets thereby pushing up food prices¹³. Again little information exists and no conclusions can be drawn.

1.8 Impact of Food Aid

It is extremely difficult to assess the impact of food aid, especially the impact of the DEC-funded food aid, with any accuracy. Only general points can be made (refer to Box 2).

Box 2: Positive and negative impact of food aid

Positive impact	Negative impact
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Helped to alleviate hunger. • Acted as an income transfer, allowing beneficiaries to spend money on other items (for example, buy fruit and vegetation from local markets). • Made beneficiaries happier. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caused friction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. • Set up expectations for high quality rations. • Sale of food items may have affected local food prices. • Potential negative impact of distributing inappropriate food items (for example, impact of distribution of infant formula, bottles etc. on breastfeeding practices).

Adherence to international guidelines and standards

Despite the existence of well-defined and long-established guidelines relating to nutrition and food aid in emergencies, there were incidences where guidelines were openly ignored. Perhaps the most worrying example of this was the case of infant formula. Infant formula was widely donated and distributed during the Kosovo crisis, despite the existence of a number of guidelines and codes expressly advising against the provision of infant formula in emergency situations. A research project conducted in July 1999, found that *'contravention of the Code (on Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes) was widespread and directly linked to the international aid intervention'* (McGrath, 1999). Fortunately, no DEC funds were spent on infant formula, although baby bottles and teats were distributed by MCIC in Macedonia.

Other examples of non-adherence to guidelines that apply to DEC-funded projects include:

- Failure to meet Sphere minimum standards of assessment and analysis. The failure to carry out needs assessments meant that food aid was largely supply-driven and not necessarily needs-driven.
- Items included in complementary food rations which UNHCR had explicitly stated should not be included (for example, fresh milk, chocolates etc.).
- Inclusion of milk powder in rations (see Box 3). The distribution of milk powder did not necessarily have an adverse impact on the beneficiary population. But the issue is that

¹² For example, reported in interviews with ARC Albania, and results of a survey conducted in June 1999 in Macedonia (MCIC, 1999b).

¹³ For example, the price of 1kg of beef was reported to have been 500 lek in Elbasan, Albania before the crisis and increased to 600 lek in April 1999 due to the presence of refugees. At the same time the price of basic commodities contained in food aid parcels (such as flour, beans etc.) fell because refugees were selling. Interview with ARC Elbasan.

why, in the case of Kosovo, can guidelines be so widely flouted when in other emergencies they are not?

The non-application of guidelines was not necessarily deliberate but often occurred as a result of non-awareness of guidelines. Again this raises the issue of whether adequate technical support was provided in the field, especially to local partners who may have had limited experience of emergencies.

Box 3: Policies on distribution of milk powder and experience during the Kosovo crisis

There are various policies on the distribution and use of artificial milks¹⁴ in emergencies. These include:

- The Use of Artificial Milks in Relief Actions, ICRC (1985).
- Policy of the UNHCR Related to the Acceptance, Distribution and Use of Milk Products in Feeding Programmes in Refugee Settings, UNHCR (1989).
- Guidelines for the Use of Milk Powder in all WFP-assisted Projects and Operations, WFP (1992).

All these policies state, in similar language, that artificial milk:

- should not be included as an item for general distribution (dry rations) nor as a take away supplement, and
- should only be distributed to populations in which milk forms an essential part of the traditional diet (for example, nomadic populations) and then only under controlled and hygienic conditions (usually from special feeding centres).

However, there are numerous examples of milk powder being included in DEC-funded 'take home' food parcels and given out to populations without any information about the potential dangers. See Annex 1.1 for examples.

Impact of the crisis on the food security of host populations

In general, the impact of the crisis on the food security of host populations appears to have been minimal. Crop and food assessment missions to Albania and Macedonia¹⁵ in June 1999 both concluded that the impact of the crisis on agricultural production, food prices, the local economy and overall food security in Albania and Macedonia appeared to have been small. Retail prices for basic foods, including those districts with the highest concentration of refugees, showed a considerable degree of stability.

However, food security (due to low incomes rather than an absolute lack of food) was found to be a problem for poor households in Albania, particularly those in the north and north-east mountainous regions.¹⁶ The FAO/WFP mission attributed this mainly to the general economic and development difficulties that the country experienced throughout the 1990s, rather than to the extraordinary circumstances created by the crisis.

1.9 Conclusions

- Only 17 per cent of DEC funds was spent on food aid in Phase I and less than 3 per cent in Phase II. It was appropriate for agencies to concentrate on areas other than food aid,

¹⁴ Artificial milks are defined as any non-fresh milk such as powdered including infant formula, evaporated, condensed or otherwise modified milk.

¹⁵ FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Albania. June 1999. FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Macedonia. June 1999.

¹⁶ Unemployment is 15–20 per cent and in the rural areas nearly one-third of the population lives in deep poverty. Overall, 15–20 per cent of the population depend on the social assistance programme (FAO & WFP, 1999).

given that malnutrition was not an imminent problem, that there was a glut of food aid and that DEC funds could be used flexibly.

- The implicit purpose of food aid appears to have been to provide a supplement or short-term income transfer. Therefore, cost-effectiveness of food aid (i.e. the cost of supplying food aid in relation to its value to the beneficiary) is an important impact indicator.
- Very little assessment or analysis of the food situation of the refugees in the period March–June 1999 was carried out. This is not unusual in large-scale refugee crises but meant that decisions on the quantity and quality of food rations were largely supply-driven rather than needs-driven.
- There was enormous variation in rations in terms of the number of items included, calorific values, the cost and value to the beneficiary. A lack of consistency in ration scales can lead to conflict between beneficiaries. Consistency in supply is more difficult to attain with non-basic items and can lead to heightened beneficiary expectations which cannot be met.
- High cost parcels (around £10 per parcel) containing ‘luxury’ items of limited nutritional value were distributed using DEC funds. Money could have been better spent elsewhere.
- The majority of DEC-funded food aid programmes were targeted at the more vulnerable groups both in terms of the type of beneficiary and in the countries covered.
- There were problems in targeting. Although there were few reports of refugees/IDPs totally missing out on food aid rations, there was potential for duplication and thus wastage. Where the ‘needy’ in the local population were included in the distribution, incidences of ill-feeling arose.
- Poor monitoring and reporting of food aid distribution increased the potential for a lack of uniformity in approach.
- There were large differences in the cost-effectiveness of different rations. Local purchase of food was not necessarily cheaper than international purchase.
- Despite the existence of well-defined and long-established guidelines relating to nutrition and food aid in emergencies, there were incidences where guidelines were ignored. Adequate technical support should be provided in the field, especially to local partners who may have limited experience of emergencies.
- The impact of the crisis on the food security of host populations in Albania and Macedonia appears to have been minimal.

Annex 1.1: Food and Nutrition Tables

Ration scales, costs and values using DEC funds¹⁷

NB: All the figures presented in this section should be considered as estimates only.

Exchange Rates Used:

Albania:	69 lek = 1 DEM
Macedonia:	31.2 dinars = 1 DEM
Serbia:	15 dinar = 1 DEM (October 1999)
	20 dinar = 1 DEM (December 1999)
	22 dinar = 1 DEM (January 2000)
	3.17 DEM = £1

Food prices

Table 6: Food prices: Albania (April to June 1999)

Food item	Quantity	Price (lek)
Wheat flour	1kg	30
Beans	1kg	180
Vegetable oil	1l	100
Sugar	1kg	55
Pasta	1kg	30
Tinned chicken	1kg	625
Rice	1kg	50-60
Salt	1kg	20
Yeast	1kg	60
Tinned beef	1kg	300
Milk powder	1kg	150
UHT milk	1l	160
Tinned fish	1kg	320
Onions	1kg	60
Potatoes	1kg	60

Source: Personal communication from evaluation team regional specialist.

Table 7: Food prices: Macedonia (September 1999)

Food item	Quantity	Price (denar)
Bread	750g	20
Oil	1l	60
Sugar	1kg	35.5
Beans	1kg	116.67
Pasta	1kg	40.33
Milk	1l	26
Potatoes	1kg	20
Meat	1kg	250
Cabbage	1kg	20
Eggs	(each)	4.67

Source: Cited in MCIC Review No. 20 September-October 1999 (MCIC, 1999a).

¹⁷ All examples of rations given in this annex were procured using DEC funding with the exception of the WFP rations which have been included for comparison.

Table 8: Food prices: Kosovo (July 1999)

Food item	Quantity	Price (DEM)
Wheat flour	1kg	0.68
Bread	1kg	0.43
Vegetable oil	1l	1.94
Sugar	1kg	1.20
Beans	1kg	2.89
Pasta	1kg	2.00
Milk (in box)	1l	1.06
Rice	1kg	1.75
Fresh cheese (greek)	1kg	5.09
Potato	1kg	0.79
Cucumber	1kg	0.91
Tinned chicken	1kg	2.00
Salt	1kg	1.00

Source: WFP office in Kosovo (food price monitoring unit).

Table 9: Food prices: Serbia

Food item	Quantity	Price ** August 1999	Price*** January 2000*	Price**** March 2000*
Bread	30g	90	270	270
Flour	8kg	46.4	52	96
Oil	4l	46	140	140
Sugar	4kg	32.4	80	80
Beans	1kg	30	50	50
Pasta	0.5kg	-	-	10
Milk	30l	111	315	510
Powdered milk	400g	-	-	62.5
Rice	1kg	-	-	32
Potatoes	8kg	40	120	120
Tinned fish	125g	-	-	32
Meat (chicken)	16kg	576	960	960
Onions	4kg	20	60	60
Seasonal veg	28kg	196	490	560
Seasonal fruits	20kg	140	500	460
Eggs	40	68	140	140
Jam	1kg	-	-	62
Chocolate bar	100g	-	-	28
Margarine	250g	-	-	17
High protein biscuits	600g	-	-	61

Source: Humanitarian Risk Analysis No.9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 20 March 2000 (OCHA, 2000) and personal communication from evaluation team regional specialist.

* Grey market prices.

Exchange rate: ** 15 dinar = 1 DEM (October 1999)

*** 20 dinar = 1 DEM (December 1999)

**** 22 dinar = 1 DEM (March 2000)

Table 10: Food prices: Albania*WFP basic ration to refugees in camps and host families (non-DEC funds) April-June 1999**

Food item	Per person per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (lek)
Wheat flour	12kg	42,000	360
Pulses	1kg	3,350	180
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	100
Sugar	1kg	4,000	55
Total per month	-	58,200	1,055 (£4.82)
Total per day	-	1,940	35

Source: WFP office in Tirana.

International purchase or donation.

Cost of transport: 17 cents per ton per kilometre from Durres to Kukes

13 cents per ton per kilometre from Durres to Fier/Korce

* Same ration was distributed to refugees in host families and in camp, and to IDPS by Concern using DEC funds.

Table 11: ICRC/IFRC-recommended food parcel to refugees in host families (1999)*Procured by BRCS with DEC Funds (Spring 1999)*

Food item	Per person per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (lek)
Wheat flour	12kg	2,000	360
Pulses	2kg	6,700	360
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	100
Sugar	1kg	4,000	55
Pasta	3kg	11,100	90
Rice	3kg	10,800	165
Salt	0.5kg	-	10
Yeast	0.1kg	-	6
Total per month	-	83,450	1,146 (£5.24)
Total per day	-	2,782	38

Source: BRCS.

International purchase or donation.

Cost to BRCS per parcel = £5.95 Cost per MRE = £0.60.

Table 12: World Vision food ration to refugees staying in empty houses in Sarande town (1999)

Food item	Per person per day		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (lek)
Pulses	30g	100.5	5.4
Vegetable oil	30g	265.5	3
Sugar	7g	28	3.8
Pasta	200g	740	6
Rice	200g	720	11
UHT milk	100g	60	16
Tinned fish	14g	29	4.5
Tomato paste	40g	33	?
Onions	20g	8	1.2
Potatoes/other veg.	40g	32	2.4
Total per day	-	2,016	53.3
Total per month	-	60,480	1,599 (£7.31)

Source: World Vision final Phase I report.

Table 13: Macedonia: MCIC food parcel to refugees in host families and 'social cases', (May–October 1999)

Food item	Per person per month			
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (denar)	Cost to MCIC (denar)
Wheat flour	1kg	3,500		60
Pulses	0.5kg	1,675	58	28
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	60	45
Sugar	0.5kg	2,000	18	38
Pasta	1kg	3,700	40	66
Rice	1kg	3,600	-	20
Honey	0.1kg	304	-	30
Chocolate	0.2kg	1,010	-	54
Turkish delight	0.2kg	772	-	25
Biscuits	0.2kg	728	-	30
Goulash tin	0.4kg	376	-	92
Gjuvec*	2kg	1,180	-	80
Beef pate	0.3kg	957	-	80
Sausage**	0.5kg	1,560	-	70
Sardine tins	0.625kg	1,300	-	115
Chicken pate	0.3kg	603	-	72
Tea	0.1kg	-	-	35
Coffee	0.1kg	-	-	52
Total per month	-	32,115	-	992 (£10.03)
Total per day	-	1,070	-	33

Source: MCIC, Skopje

Local purchase: Cost per parcel = 992 + 50 (for box) = 1042 denar + 12.8 transport costs per parcel = 1054.8 denar

Equivalent to £10.03 per parcel and £10.66 per parcel plus packing and delivery

* Mixed meat and vegetable stew

** Vacuum packed

Table 14: MCIC baby parcel (May–October 1999)

Food item	Per baby per month			
	Quantity	Kcals	Value	Cost to MCIC (denar)
Milk powder	900g	-	-	256
Cereals (children)	800g	-	-	176
Tea (baby)	300g	-	-	100
Plastic bottle	1	-	-	102
Regular nipple	1	-	-	27.5
Fake nipple	1	-	-	27.5
Total per month	-	-	-	689 (£7.00)
Total per day	-	-	-	23

Source: MCIC, Skopje.

Local purchase: Total Cost per parcel = 715.3 dinars [689 + 13.5 (for box) + 12.8 (transport)]

Equivalent to £7.00 per parcel and £7.23 per parcel plus packing and delivery.

Costs quoted in Christian Aid Phase I report are £1.98 or £4.50 per parcel. This discrepancy may be because the milk powder was donated for free and so not included in Christian Aid report.

Table 15: MRC food parcel to refugees in host families

Food item	Per person per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (denar)
Wheat flour	12kg	42,000	-
Pulses	2kg	6,700	233
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	60
Sugar	0.5kg	2,000	17.75
Rice	1kg	3,600	-
Salt	0.2kg	-	-
Tinned meat/fish	0.5kg	1,100	-
CSB (for kids)	3kg	11,400	-
Total per month	-	75,650	-
Total per day	-	2,522	-

Source: MRC in Gostivar

Table 16: SNI food parcel to refugees in host families in Tetovo (April–June 1999)

Food item	Per person per day		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (denar)
Flour	10kg	35,000	-
Beans	0.5kg	1,675	58.3
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	60
Sugar	0.5kg	2,000	17.75
Pasta	0.5kg	1,850	20.17
Rice	1kg	3,600	-
Cheese	0.5kg	1,775	-
Canned meat	0.15kg	330	-
Salt	0.1kg	-	-
Coffee	0.1kg	-	-
Tea	0.1kg	-	-
Total per month	-	55,080	-
Total per day	-	1,836	-

Source: Tearfund Phase I final report

Table 17: Kosovo: CRS food parcel for vulnerable groups (June 1999–March 2000)

Food item	Seven-day family packs for three people		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (DEM)
Wheat flour	5kg	17,500	3.40
Pulses	1kg	3,350	2.89
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	1.94
Sugar	1kg	4,000	1.20
Salt	0.5kg	-	0.50
Yeast	0.1kg	-	?
Baby food	0.75kg	488	?
Total per week for 3 people	-	34,188	-
Total per day for 3 people	-	4,884	-
Estimate per person per day	-	1,628	-

Source: Cited in CAFOD Phase I report

Table 18: CRS bulk food ration for vulnerable groups (June 1999–March 2000)

Food item	Per person per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value
Wheat flour	12kg	42,000	8.16
Beans	2kg	6,700	5.78
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	1.94
Sugar	1kg	4,000	1.20
Salt	0.3kg	-	0.30
Rice	1kg	3,600	1.75
Total per month	-	65,150	19.13 (£6.03)
Total per day	-	2,172	0.64

Source: Cited in CAFOD Phase I report.

Table 19: Bosnia: SC food parcel for child refugees in the Republika Srpska

Food item	One-off parcel meant to last three months			
	Quantity	Kcals	Value	Cost (DEM)
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	-	1.76
Sugar	1kg	4,000	-	0.98
Pasta	0.5kg	1,850	-	0.78
Rice	1kg	3,600	-	1.44
Canned meat	0.15kg	330	-	1.38
Canned fish	0.15kg	459	-	1.58
Biscuits	0.5kg	1,820	-	2.35
Milk powder	1kg	5,000	-	5.4
Powdered chocolate	0.5kg	1,650	-	4.32
Powdered vitamin drink	1kg	-	-	9.6
Total per 3 months	-	27,559	-	29.59
Total per month	-	9,186	-	9.8 (£3.10)
Total per day	-	306	-	0.33 (£0.10)

Source: SC Banja Luka Office.

Local purchase: Cost per parcel = 29.59 + 1.5 (for box) = 31.09 DEM + 1.3 transport costs per parcel = 32.39 DEM. Equivalent to £9.33 per parcel and £10.22 per parcel plus packing and delivery.

Table 20: LWF food parcel for refugees in collective centres

Food item	Per person per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (DEM)
Flour	2kg	6,600	-
Beans	1kg	3,350	-
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	-
Sugar	1kg	4,000	-
Pasta	1kg	3,700	-
Rice	1kg	3,600	-
Salt	1kg	-	-
Milk powder	0.5kg	2,500	-
Canned meat	0.75kg	1,650	-
Fruit syrup	1l	500	-
Coffee	200g	-	-
Jam	850g	2,363	-
Mixed veg	1kg	590	-
Tomato paste	0.75g	615	-
Total per month	-	37,787	-
Total per day	-	1,260	-

Source: LWF, Tuzla office. Cost per parcel = £12.16

Table 21: Serbia: WFP basic ration to social cases and refugees throughout Serbia
Current (non-DEC funds)

Food item	Per person per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (dinar)*
Wheat flour	12kg	42,000	144
Pulses	1kg	3,350	50
Vegetable oil	1l	8,850	35
Sugar	1kg	4,000	20
Total per month	-	58,200	249 (£3.57)
Total per day	-	1,940	6.1

Source: WFP office in Belgrade

Based on March 2000 prices with exchange rate of: 22 dinar = 1 DEM

WFP also distributes canned protein when available:

Canned fish	150g	0.375 *
Cheese	150g	0.390 *
Salt	150g	0.023 *

* Value based on WFP purchase figures within Serbia

Table 22: CAFOD partner food parcels to Roma in Belgrade

Food item	Per person per month			
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (dinar)*	Cost to CAFOD partner (US\$)
Wheat flour	1kg	3,300	12	0.50
Rice	0.5kg	1,800	16	0.50
Vegetable oil	0.5l	4,425	17.5	0.57
Sugar	1kg	4,000	20	0.60
Tinned meat/fish	1kg	2,140	256	2.30
Powdered milk	0.1kg	500	15.6	0.41
Total per month	-	16,165	337.1 (£4.83)	5.88 (£3.68)
Total per day	-	539		0.20

Source: CAFOD Phase I and II final reports.

Local purchase.

* Based on March 2000 prices with exchange rate of: 22 dinar = 1 DEM.

Table 23: EHO family food parcels for IDPs, refugees and local residents in Vojvodina

Food item	Per family per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value(dinar)*
Wheat flour	8kg	28,000	96
Rice	2kg	7,200	64
Vegetable oil	4l	35,400	140
Margarine	1kg	9,000	68
Sugar	4kg	16,000	80
Pasta	3kg	11,100	60
Total per 2-5 people per month	-	106,700	508 (£7.28)
Total per person per month**	-	26,675	127 (£1.82)
Total per person per day	-	889	-

Source: Christian Aid report.

* Based on March 2000 prices with exchange rate of: 22 dinar = 1 DEM.

** Assuming a family of four people.

Cost is £8.60 per parcel or £2.15 per person. (EHO received humanitarian aid from Dortmund, twin town of Novi Sad, consisting of sugar, vegetable oil, rice, pasta and milk powder, so the purchase price per parcel was reduced). All other items were locally purchased.

Table 24: EHO children's supplementary food parcel in Vojvodina

Food item	Per child per month		
	Quantity	Kcals	Value (dinar)
Milk powder	2kg	10,000	312.5
High protein biscuits	0.8kg	2,912	81.3
Jam or chocolate cream	0.9kg	2,502	55.8
Chocolate bar	0.1kg	505	28
Sugar	4kg	16,000	80
Total per month	-	31,919	557.6 (£8.00)
Total per day	-	1,064	

Source: Christian Aid report.

Cost is £1.98 per parcel. (EHO received humanitarian aid from Dortmund, twin town of Novi Sad, consisting of sugar, vegetable oil, rice, pasta and milk powder, so the purchase price per parcel was reduced). All other items were locally purchased.

IOCC family food parcel: cost = US\$18.5, value = US\$25-35.

Table 25: Montenegro: IOCC family food parcels to IDPs and refugees February-March 2000

Family food parcels for 2-5 people for 1 month			
Food item	Quantity	Kcals	Value DEM
Flour	3kg	10,500	-
Rice	2kg	7,200	-
Sugar	2kg	8,000	-
Beans	1.5kg	5,025	-
Margarine	900g	8,100	-
Oil	3l	26,550	-
Spice 'vegeta'	0.25kg	-	-
Tea	0.3kg	-	-
Yeast	0.77kg	-	-
Chocolate	0.3g	1,515	-
Instant soup (no meat)	0.235kg	155	-
Tinned sardines	1.25kg	2,600	-
Fruit jam	0.9kg	2,502	-
Total per 2-5 people per month	-	72,147	-
Total per person per month*	-	18,037	-
Total per day	-	601	-

Source: IOCC Montenegro.

Market value of a family food parcel:

In January 2000 = 35.88 DEM (£11.3)

In April 2000 = 57.97 DEM.

* Assuming a family of four people.

Table 26: World Vision soup kitchen weekly menu (September 1999)

Day	Main dish
Monday	Goulash with mashed potatoes
Tuesday	Beans with sausage
Wednesday	Chicken hotpot
Thursday	Mixed vegetables
Friday	Cabbage with meat
Saturday	Peas with meat
Sunday	Macaroni meat

SECTION 2: HEALTH

2.1 Mortality and Morbidity

Between April and July 1999, morbidity and mortality rates in Albania and Macedonia remained below the threshold that signifies an emergency.¹⁸ Data for this period are not available from Kosovo or the rest of the Balkans. Since the return of the refugees to Kosovo a comprehensive health study undertaken among the Albania population indicates similar low levels of mortality. By contrast, the utilisation of the health system in the camps¹⁹ and in Kosovo since the return has been high.²⁰ This represents a considerable change from the low usage before the crisis.²¹

2.2 Surveillance

The ability to monitor the occurrence of communicable diseases is a Sphere standard. In Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, cooperation between civil structures (MoH/UNMIK), WHO and CDC led to the rapid establishment of health surveillance systems. The system used syndrome-based case definitions rather than those based on diagnosis, thus increasing sensitivity at the expense of specificity. Although prone to false alarms, such systems were appropriate given the constraints. Problems with registration and the collection of basic demographic data (population, deaths and births) undermined the ability of these systems to provide an objective picture of health status. They did, however, demonstrate trends, alerting agencies to potential problems.

The DEC agencies appeared to have cooperated with these systems where applicable. In Albania, where the emergency surveillance system attempted to integrate with the local health-care system, data collection from outlying clinics was a problem (WHO & Instituti Shendetit Publik, 1999). Merlin provides an example of good practice, facilitating the collection and transport of health data back to the central offices in Tirana as part of its work with local structures.

¹⁸ Reported mortality rates from the WHO/CDC/MoH surveillance systems in Albania and Macedonia and from the CDC cluster survey in Kosovo have been around 0.1/10,000/day, comparable to those reported from Kosovo before 1999 and far below the threshold of >1/10,000/day, the key Sphere indicator for an emergency.

¹⁹ In Albania, the total number of consultations reported by the surveillance system was very high (248,456), given the number of refugees in Albania (approximately 442,000) (WHO & Instituti Shendetit Publik, 1999).

²⁰ In a November 1999 survey, health houses (35 per cent), ambulantas (31 per cent) and hospital OPDs (20 per cent) were the most frequently used health facilities, with a usage rate of approximately 5.6 visits to health care facilities/person/year. Approximately 60 per cent of those visits were first visits, the rest follow-up visits. This represents a high use of services. There has been an over-reliance on health houses/polyclinics compared to ambulantas, the intended primary facilities (Spiegel & Salama, 1999).

²¹ The majority of the Albanian population used the parallel structures for which no data are available. The utilisation of state preventative services such as vaccination of Albanians in Kosovo was reported as low, with Albanians suspicious that the vaccines made in Serbia were poisoned. The consensus was that vaccination coverage pre-war was in the region of 70 – 75 per cent (Meeus, 1999). Consequently, the incidence of measles in Kosovo children was one of the highest in Europe, 47/100,000 in 1997 (WHO & Instituti Shendetit Publik, 1999).


2.3 Non-communicable Disease

The pattern of disease during the crisis was seen in developed countries. Non-communicable diseases (such as cardiovascular, neoplasm, diabetes, rheumatic and mental illness) were more common than communicable diseases (see Figure 1). This pattern was similar to the spectrum of diseases seen during the Bosnian war and required a different range of drugs to those used during emergencies in developing countries. Appropriate kits had been designed after the Bosnian war (chronic disease and mental illness kits), but the humanitarian intervention in general was slow to import and utilise such kits.

Save the Children and Christian Aid (via Diaconia Agape) were the only two DEC agencies who used DEC money to provide medicine.²² SC delivered some basic kits, more suitable for the spectrum of diseases seen in 'under-developed' countries, to the central Macedonian pharmacy operated by PSF. The impression is that these drugs were useful in fostering good will with the Macedonian government, thereby increasing SC's humanitarian space. The drugs themselves were not particularly appropriate for the diseases suffered by the refugees. Additional drugs used in the SC clinics were appropriate and well-designed for their target population.

Diaconia Agape imported 20 cholera kits at a basic cost of £20,630 without transport into Albania. Cholera has a very low level of endemissity in Albania: the last epidemic occurred in 1994 with 626 confirmed cases and 25 deaths (UNICEF, 1998). In Kosovo, cholera is not a risk and there have been no reported cases for years. Consequently, in Albania there was only a low risk of cholera epidemics among the refugees. This risk warranted the importation of one or two cholera kits but, in the opinion of the evaluation team, 20 cholera kits was an excessive use of resources.


Figure 1: Morbidity reports from all the Macedonian refugee camps during May 1999 (n = 57332)



Source: WHO

²² Merlin also used £77.91.

Figure 2: Consultations in Albanian camps
(n = 248,456)



Source: Crisis Surveillance System

2.4 Communicable Disease

There were no major epidemics²³ during the crisis and only the occasional outbreak of diarrhoeal disease and hepatitis A. Figure 3 shows the spectrum of communicable diseases presenting to health facilities in Macedonian camps between early April and mid June 1999.

Environmental and population characteristics were probably more important factors behind the absence of epidemic disease than the humanitarian intervention. The important environmental and population factors were:

- The pathogens responsible for serious epidemic diseases such as cholera and shigella dysenteriae were not common in Kosovo, Macedonia or Northern Albania.²⁴ Consequently there was no reservoir to provide a source for potential epidemic.
- Immunisation rates among refugee children were reasonably high before the exodus.²⁵

²³ The greatly increased rates of Hepatitis A reported from the Mitrovica area gives great cause for concern

²⁴ a. Data from the FRY appear unreliable with the incidence for Shigella absent and cholera not mentioned in the FRY Health Data Yearbook for 1997 (Institute of Public Health of Serbia, 1999). The two Institutes of Public Health visited in Mitrovica and Djakova did not mention either as a problem.

b. In 1994, a cholera epidemic occurred in Albania with 626 confirmed cases and 25 deaths, but this was largely confined to the southern areas of the country (UNICEF, 1998).

c. During the crisis there were some suspected cases of Shigella dysentery, but most suspected cases were negative and those that did prove positive were not Shigella dysenteriae.


d. Viral diarrhoeal disease was one of the most likely epidemic threats, especially among young children.

²⁵ In 1996, estimates were that 92.6 per cent of children in Kosovo between 1-2 years were vaccinated against TB, around 75 per cent against DPT and OPV and 85.1 per cent in the 2-3 year age group were vaccinated against measles (Institute of Public Health (Serbia), Institute of Public Health (Montenegro) & UNICEF, 1997). Although these rates were the poorest

- The refugee population had a well-developed sense of personal hygiene.
- The population was well-nourished and micro-nutrient deficiencies, in particular vitamin A, were uncommon.
- High prevalence of acquired immunity to Hepatitis A, a serious potentially epidemic disease.
- The camps were relatively short lived, occurring in spring before ambient temperatures were at their highest.

Figure 3: Proportional morbidity for communicable diseases.

(All ages, Kosovar refugees in Macedonian camps, 8 April–12 June 1999)



Source: WHO

2.5 The Humanitarian Intervention

Given the favourable epidemiological, cultural and environmental factors, the low mortality rates are unsurprising. Even with all the positive factors listed above, several outbreaks did occur in the refugee camps, host communities and in Kosovo since the return of refugees. Diseases such as Hepatitis A and diarrhoea, associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, have been especially problematic:

- There has been a serious outbreak of hepatitis in Kosovo since the war. In the six municipalities covered by the IPH in Mitrovica the number of cases has increased from

for the FRY and are very low for Europe, the majority of children were vaccinated and there was reasonable 'herd immunity' to the major childhood communicable disease threats.

Agencies were relatively prompt in vaccinating children in the Albanian and Macedonian camps and mass measles immunisation campaigns were conducted in all the Macedonian camps, in Kukes and elsewhere in Albania. There were problems with coverage: in Albania coverage was reportedly 65 per cent (from Lesson Learning Study interview with HIC). In Macedonia continued movement of refugees and inadequate continuing vaccination activities resulted in low coverage, with rates of 75 per cent (verbal) and 57 per cent (cards) despite the reasonable initial coverage of the mass vaccination campaign (Woodruff et al., 2000).

under 50/year before the war to over 300/month after the return last autumn.²⁶ Hepatitis A increased both inside and outside camps.²⁷

- There were reports of an outbreak of tularaemia in Kosovo^{28,29}.
- Some outbreaks of diarrhoea

There are no data to support the commonly held sentiment that *'The overall impact of humanitarian assistance is reflected in the simple facts that no refugees died from lack of food, warmth, or acquired illness'* (DFID, 2000).

In the opinion of the evaluation team, the humanitarian intervention as a whole can only take very limited credit for the low mortality and morbidity. The quality of the sanitation and environmental health interventions would probably not have been sufficient to prevent large scale breakdowns of public health epidemics and, as a result, excess loss of life, had the crisis occurred in a more usual emergency context.

2.6 Integrated Public Health Interventions

Improving the health status of any population during emergencies requires integrated approaches to public health. The diverse sectors influencing health (curative, preventative, health/hygiene promotion, water, sanitation and environmental health) combined with a consideration of gender and community needs must work together. Synergy between sectors adds value to the intervention as a whole, effecting greater improvements than achievable by inputs in any one sector. In the absence of an integrated approach, inputs into one sector can have negative effects on overall health status.³⁰

The impression gained is that the humanitarian interventions in both the camps of Albania and Macedonia and later upon return to Kosovo, often failed to deliver an integrated package of public health interventions. Curative health and water supply were usually adequate. Sanitation and environmental hygiene interventions were frequently problematic, and

²⁶ Interview with Dr Qamile Ramadani, Director of Mitrovica IPH and Regional Public Health Advisor for WHO.

²⁷ Hepatitis A is a viral infection of the liver, transmitted by the faecal-oral route, associated with poor standards of sanitation and hygiene with a peak incidence in late summer. Endemic in the Balkans, particularly in Albania where 90 per cent of the adult population has been exposed to the disease (UNICEF, 1998) with an annual incidence of 94–156/100,000/year (Healing, 1998). Incidence rates in the rest of Balkans were lower but probably under-reported. For example Kosovo 27/1000,000/year (Institute of Public Health of Serbia, 1999).

²⁸ UNMIK 19 April 1999 (UNMIK, 1999).

²⁹ Tularaemia is a bacterial disease spread from small animals such as rats through direct contact or via ticks, water, food or aerosol. In Kosovo it is probably associated with increased exposure to rats due to poor environmental hygiene.

³⁰ For example, in Albanian villages, there are blocks of flats that were built under the communist regime for dissidents. These had piped water and flush toilets. Now the piped water no longer works and the waste pipes for the toilets are often broken and the cesspits inadequately maintained and emptied. At present, some raw sewage leaks into the streets, but as there is little water to flush the toilets, the amount of leakage is relatively small. Oxfam have used some of the ECHO funding, diverted from the emergency to rehabilitate the water supply. At present, the programme is part way to completion and Oxfam have only recently started some health inputs. They have not yet addressed the sanitation problems, which are more complex and harder to correct in a sustainable way. If the programme goes ahead the amount of water available for flushing the toilets will increase and hence so will the amount of raw sewage in the streets. This is likely to produce a negative impact on public health.

health/hygiene promotion (including the distribution of hygiene items), although common, was poorly integrated into operations as a whole.³¹

In the refugee camps, the divide between camp management (often including sanitation and environmental health) on the one side and the water, health promotion and medical agencies on the other, posed serious problems. There were ad hoc systems for allocating roles to agencies, with pressure from bilaterals and competition for camp management positions between the agencies. This often meant that agencies managing camps had neither the experience nor capacity to fulfil the sanitation and environmental health roles.^{32,33} Often these camp management agencies fought to retain control over sanitation and environmental hygiene activities even if they had no experience or capacity.

There are no reports of this applying to DEC agencies and the impression is that cooperation between DEC agencies in the field was frequently good. At its best, as in Kukes 2 camp, this cooperation between DEC agencies was impressive. A coordinated integrated intervention from a number of DEC agencies rapidly improved a camp that had previously posed serious public health risks to those inside³⁴ and to the surrounding villages³⁵ (refer to Box 4). This raises the possibility that there might be scope for DEC agencies to explore some mechanisms such as interagency MoUs to improve their collective ability to deliver integrated programmes in future.

³¹ For example, a negative impact of this failure to integrate gender analysis was that *'In most camps, some women report that they are afraid to use the toilets at night, usually because of the filthy conditions and not being able to see. Women who use toilets at night often say that they go in pairs. It is our impression that most women and children will not be using the toilets after dark'* (Clifton, 1999).

³² For example, *'In retrospect it is clear that we should have insisted upon covering both water and sanitation in the camps in which we worked. We could also re-evaluate our stance with respect to camp management. Most of the frustration we experienced resulted from the impotence inherent in our position as just one NGO amongst several involved in a camp. A camp management role would have enabled us to take action. In camps such as Librazhd and Kavaje we were, in effect, subordinate to agencies with far less experience or competence'* (Loveless, 1999).

³³ In all cases where Oxfam implemented water programmes they also implemented hygiene/health promotion activities. Despite capacity and a will to undertake sanitation programmes, Oxfam had very little involvement in sanitation (both latrine provision and waste disposal) in both Albania and Macedonia. This division between water/hygiene and sanitation/waste disposal meant that Oxfam's programmes even when implemented professionally sometimes failed to meet the objective of preventing diarrhoeal disease (Ferron, 1999).

³⁴ For example, before the DEC agencies came in, the sanitation system of the camp was based on chemical porta-loos. The camp population was not accustomed to using these toilets and they became very unhygienic and a public health risk.

³⁵ Under the Italian management the camp had taken water from the nearby village, leaving them low on water.

Box 4: Case-study of Kukes 2: An integrated response through a cooperative DEC package

The Italians left Kukes 2 camp with only one day's notice with a water supply that compromised that of the town and a sanitation system based on porta-loos which because of cultural factors were a health hazard. When they left *'the sanitation situation in Kukes 2 was appalling, with the population of 5,000 refugees having access to only 20 latrines'* (Oxfam, 1999a). CARE took over camp management and within two weeks:

- Oxfam was providing a viable solution for the water (Oxfam, 1999a).
- Tearfund was installing pit-latrines with support from Oxfam for materials and providing solid waste collection (Tearfund, 1999).
- Oxfam was implementing a training of trainers in hygiene promotion activities for MSF and CARE workers (Ferron, Sakaj & Bean, 1999).
- CAD was operating a baby washing system and supplying pampers and baby food to mothers (Ferron, Sakaj & Bean, 1999).

There appeared to be several determinants of successful integration of public health:

- Multi-sectoral implementation;³⁶
- Information sharing;^{37,38}
- Advocacy;
- Policy level interventions;
- Filling gaps;³⁹
- Technical support to other agencies.⁴⁰

2.7 Recommendation

There is a potential opportunity for the DEC agencies to develop some sort of framework agreements (possibly of an MoU type), created before the heat of emergencies that help them to deliver integrated public health interventions.⁴¹

³⁶ The BRCS, through the joint operation of the ICRC and IFRC/National Societies had the capacity to actually implement an integrated programme containing a full range of public health interventions. Oxfam's strategic approach to public health in emergencies has changed over the past few years. The agency now attempts to implement integrated public health packages including water and sanitation provision and health/hygiene promotion including environmental health and vector control, with a gender perspective integrated throughout. This is reflected in some of their DEC proposals.

³⁷ An example of good practice was the positioning of an Oxfam employee in the Mitrovica Institute of Public Health to liaise between the international humanitarian community and the civil preventative health services. Both sides agree that this was a positive step and helped to achieve rapid multi-sectoral responses to a number of disease outbreaks (most notably Hepatitis A in several villages).

³⁸ Oxfam, together with the Ministry of Health and other INGOs in Albania, are developing a manual on hygiene promotion and the specifications of a hygiene promotion kit to go with it.

³⁹ A good example is SC's health programme in Djakova, where through their close interaction with all the actors involved, SC was able to fill in gaps in health coverage as and when they occurred.

⁴⁰ Both Oxfam and Tearfund supplied technical expertise to other agencies.

⁴¹ Oxfam have in the past aspired to cover all sectors but has found that this is unrealistic as it has neither the expertise nor capacity. The example of Kukes 2 demonstrates the synergy achievable when DEC agencies (possibly because of their more similar NGO cultures) co-operate. Rather than any single agency attempting to do this, there is scope for agencies to

2.8 Rehabilitation

In Kosovo the public services have been allowed to disintegrate for several years. The majority of the Albanian population received health-care through a parallel system that addressed curative needs but not the infrastructural aspects of public health. Since the war, due to confusion and under-funding, UNMIK has not addressed the large-scale sanitation and environmental health problems.⁴² Oxfam has tried to address some of these problems, however it recognises that the large-scale of the work is not suitable for NGOs.^{43,44}

2.9 Coverage in Health

Approximately 60–70 per cent of refugees in Albania (WHO, 1999) and Macedonia⁴⁵ stayed with host families. In Albania, although data are patchy, it appears that refugees in host families attended health-care services less frequently.⁴⁶ This could reflect more limited access to health-care. Alternatively, this could reflect over-provision or over-use of health facilities in the camps. Merlin resisted pressure from OFDA to provide inappropriately high-levels of care in Camp Hope.

The precarious public health status in Albania required that service providers to refugees considered the potential negative effects on the residents.⁴⁷ There are examples where DEC agencies were instrumental in ensuring that this happened.⁴⁸

investigate some sort of loose mechanism to promote co-operation towards providing an integrated package of public health interventions.

⁴² For example, HAI emergency inputs into the Cerentolosvski Centre have upgraded many aspects. They are however relatively powerless to achieve a lasting solution for the disposal of solid waste. Prior utilities and rubbish removal were free but now the rubbish collection is run as a private business with the proviso that it does not charge state institutions. Consequently, they do not collect from the centre. Similar problems in the collection of solid waste exist across Kosovo.

⁴³ The solid waste problem in Kosovo is a huge infrastructural one. This is not a problem that can be solved with a one-off measure and clean-up campaigns will have to continue until a civil society exists in Kosovo (Minster, 1999).

⁴⁴ For example, in Mitrovica municipality Oxfam has rehabilitated Reka Valley pumping station. However, Oxfam did not have the capacity to ensure that all the requirements for success in this project were met and many problems remain. Electricity was unreliable and therefore the pump action unreliable. A major commercial water company, Vivendi, was supposed to be rehabilitating the pipes in town but has not fulfilled their obligations and there is still much leakage in the system, making the water supply unreliable and preventing the municipal water board charging for water. This meant that operation and maintenance costs could not be met. The project is therefore likely to remain dependent on external funding for some time.

⁴⁵ Source: CDC (unpublished).

⁴⁶ Although the 'Crisis' surveillance system covered both camp and host facilities most of the notifications came from NGOs working in camps (71 per cent). In the six districts where the real number of local health facilities involved was known and evaluated, the coverage of the system was close to 100 per cent. As most of the refugees were hosted in Albanian families, it would have been expected that they would have attended Albanian health facilities more often. It is therefore likely that the small number of consultations reported in the Albanian health facilities meant the refugees in host families had less access to health care services. These data are relatively unreliable (WHO, 1999).

⁴⁷ For example the infant mortality rate for 1990–5 was 43.2 per 100,000 (UNICEF, 1998). In 1997, the incidence of measles was 47/100,000, one of the highest in Europe and there have been epidemics of other vaccine preventable diseases, such as polio and diseases associated with poor water and sanitation, in the past few years. Despite this poor picture, government

2.10 Standards and Impartiality

All the DEC agencies, apart from Merlin and Concern, distributed hygiene kits. Although the people who received these kits invariably appreciated them, the evaluation team has reservations over the quantities of items distributed and the poor integration of these distributions with other public health interventions. The Sphere standards specify that people should have ‘soap for personal hygiene’ and that babies should have ‘baby soap, baby powder, baby oil’. The key indicator is 250g soap/person/month. Most of the hygiene kits far exceeded the Sphere standards. For example, the Oxfam hygiene kits in Serbia contained 14 separate items each month. Among other things, the monthly kit included the following soaps: shaving gel, body soap, baby soap, dish-washing soap, clothes soap, hair shampoo and baby shampoo. This represents between 3.5–4kg of soap/person/month, far greater than the Sphere standard.

Agencies often ordered hygiene kits before performing appropriate needs assessment and distributed them in non-targeted blanket distributions. In addition, most agencies did not appear to ensure that other complementary public health interventions were provided. Of the ten agencies distributing hygiene kits, only Oxfam, CAD and Tearfund routinely accompanied these distributions with other public health interventions.

spending on health has decreased from 4.2 per cent in 1993 to three per cent in 1997 and a further reduction was also planned for 1998 (UNICEF, 1998).

⁴⁸ The Kukes 2 camp water supply, constructed by the Italians, had a direct connection to the town supply. The Italians used to pump out of the mains when the pressure was low, which represents a direct health threat to the entire town. This has now been stopped.

SECTION 3: SHELTER


3.1 Background

Even before the NATO bombing, the destruction of housing was a tactic used against Kosovo Albanians suspected of supporting the KLA. Typically, after the international observers had been discouraged from going to or remaining in an area, people would be advised to flee for their lives by the Serbs and their houses would then be burned.

Therefore shelter programmes were already underway in Kosovo before the NATO bombing. The EU commissioned IMG to survey the extent of damage to houses and this survey was completed by February 1999 by which time more than 50 per cent of housing had been damaged in four districts (IMG, 2000; UNHCR, 2000a).

Figure 4: Proportion of houses uninhabitable by February 1999

Note: 'Uninhabitable' in UNHCR Category 3,4 or 5.



Based on IMG/UNHCR data.


The destruction of houses increased dramatically once the last international observers left Kosovo. However, the previous experience of this destruction meant that UNHCR and the donors already had tools such as the rapid village assessment form for recording the damage, and there were already categories established for the degree of damage (refer to Box 5).

Box 5: The UNHCR damage categories for housing

Category 1	Very little/no damage.
Category 2	Broken windows, roof tiles, door locks and hinges; electricity and water cut-off — repairable.
Category 3	Up to 30 per cent roof damage, light shelling or bullet impact on walls, partial fire damage — repairable.
Category 4	Over 30 per cent roof damage, severe fire damage, doors, windows and all piping and wiring destroyed — repairable.
Category 5	Destroyed; beyond repair — requires reconstruction.

Figure 5: Number of houses damaged in Kosovo

The unsurveyed houses are assumed to be undamaged.



Based on UNMIK Data and Kosovo Atlas – 1st edition.

UNHCR carried out a Rapid Village Assessment in which several of the DEC agencies participated. This found that in the 456 villages surveyed, 40 per cent of houses were completely destroyed (Category 5) and that another 14 per cent were severely damaged (Category 4) (UNHCR, 1999c; UNHCR, 1999b). As this survey concentrated on the most damaged areas it over-estimated the total level of damage.

Even though the early figures for damage (on which DEC agencies based their plans) were over-estimates, almost one-third of the housing stock in the country was unusable at the time of the return of the refugees. Even returnees to houses in Category 2 needed assistance as their houses may have been looted of all their possessions including bedding and stoves for the winter.

3.2 DEC Agency Response

Shelter for the winter was a priority and many DEC agencies and their partners became involved.⁴⁹ The choice of shelter as a sector for intervention by DEC agencies was generally appropriate, as the oncoming winter was probably the biggest threat to life faced by the returnees to Kosovo.

Agencies implementing shelter programmes had a number of choices to make: regarding the geographical area in which they worked, the type of beneficiary that they assisted, the type of assistance that they provided and the way in which they provided that assistance.

⁴⁹ The following agencies carried out shelter programmes in Kosovo with DEC funding: Tearfund (directly and through Shelter Now International and MedAir), SC, Concern, CAFOD (through Islamic Relief Worldwide), World Vision and Christian Aid (directly through ACT/UMCOR). World Vision also carried out a shelter programme for refugees from Kosovo in Montenegro. Oxfam did shelter work for Bosnian Serb refugees in Drvar in Bosnia. Other DEC members (such as Care and CAD) did shelter with other funds but not with DEC funds.

Based on the experience from before NATO bombing, the initial focus of UNHCR and the major donors was on providing warm room kits and dry roof kits (roof repair for Category 3 houses). However it soon became apparent that these kits were not adequate as one-sixth of the housing stock needing completely new roofs. UNHCR and USAID later introduced an augmented roof kit for dealing with these.

Agencies had a wide range of options for shelter. These can be typified as warm rooms, warm roof (partial roof repair with plastic), plastic roofs on a full timber frame or permanent (tiled) roofs. All of the DEC agencies providing warm room kits also provided roof construction of some type or other⁵⁰.

The dry roof kits were intended to repair a roof to keep one room dry. The kits were really only suitable for houses in Category 3 with very little damage and were later replaced with the augmented roof kits.

Warm room kits were essentially intended to make one room suitable for use in the winter. Most kits included some form of windows and door to seal one room in the house together with a stove for heating the space. Additional items might include ceiling or floor insulation, ceiling or floor-boards, cement for plastering walls, bedding kits or carpet.⁵¹

Table 27: DEC agency assistance for shelter

Agency	Assistance	Comments
Christian Aid	Timber and tiles for a roof together with a warm room kit.	This project was under the overall management of UMCOR until January 2000 and managed by Christian Aid Staff.
Concern	Timber and plastic roofs with a warm room kit. Preparatory work for tiling roofs of 100 extremely vulnerable families.	All Category 3 and 4 houses each with a warm room kit and a further 342 warm room kits, some for second rooms, some for other houses. (Also used OFDA, Concern, and DFA funding).
Edinburgh Direct Aid (funded by CA)	Timber and plastic with warm roof kits.	Not visited. Planned to roof smaller houses only.
Islamic Relief (funded by CAFOD)	Timber and plastic roofs. Warm rooms from another project.	91 roofs for Category 4 houses where families agreed to host people with Category 5 houses. Also used UNHCR materials.
MedAir (funded by Tearfund)	Timber and plastic and warm room kits with tiles for vulnerable families in the follow-up.	MedAir began work on emergency shelter in Kosovo in November 1998, nearly six months before the bombing.
SC	Warm room kits with less than 5 per cent also getting roofs.	In many cases those needing roofs got them from other agencies.
Shelter Now International	Timber and tile for some roofs with plastic for others. Warm room kits.	Funded by Tearfund.
Tearfund DRT	Permanent timber and tile roofs with a warm room kit.	Tearfund selected this approach after testing possible plastic roofing materials before starting.
World Vision	Timber and plastic roofs with a warm room kit. Extra warm room kits for families agreeing to host others.	Kits for Category 2 to 4, with kits also for Category 5 with a concrete ceiling or intermediate floor (not visited by evaluation team).

⁵⁰ However, SC only provided roofs for less than 4 per cent of the houses to which they gave warm room kits.

⁵¹ Carpet is not a luxury in a cold winter when people normally sit on the floor. Most of the shelter beneficiaries visited had no furniture except for one or two tables.

One of the biggest choices faced by agencies was whether to use plastic sheeting or roof-tiles for the roofs they built. This had an impact on efficiency and on cost. Tearfund decided to provide permanent roofs only as this was more efficient than doing it twice. Christian Aid also only did tiled roofs. Fitting tiles to start with saved about £150 in labour cost⁵² plus the cost of the reinforced plastic. However, Tearfund found that tiled roofs were about twice as expensive as plastic covered roofs. Concern, on the other hand, decided to concentrate on plastic sheeting in order to cover the maximum number of roofs.

MedAir remarked that the decision to use plastic was donor-led, as the donors had lots of plastic and no tiles in their stocks. The evaluation team considers both approaches to have been valid in the circumstances. Most of the DEC agencies appear to have compromised between the two positions by building timber roofs strong enough to take tiles in the future, but roofing them with plastic in the short-term.

3.3 Assistance for Construction

Agencies provided varying amounts of assistance to beneficiaries to build their roofs. This varied from agencies who built all of the roofs (as was a requirement for Concern under its contract with OFDA for urban shelter in Peje) to agencies who provided labour assistance to vulnerables. Even where agencies provided no labour or funds for families to construct the roof, they did provide assistance where families or vulnerable individuals were unable to do the roofs themselves.

However, in the Christian Aid programme, two cases were seen where vulnerable individuals had been unable to complete their roofs themselves.⁵³ While these cases were not typical of the Christian Aid shelter programme, they do illustrate the importance of carefully assessing the needs of vulnerable people in programme execution. The evaluation team feels that these cases reflected a weakness in programme monitoring. Christian Aid notes that the situation, in one of the cases, arose from lack of continuity of key staff in the programme manager position at that time.⁵⁴

Allowing beneficiaries to build the roofs themselves reduced the cost significantly. Rural Kosovars typically build their own houses and usually had no problem in fitting roofs, but those in towns or on the edges of towns were less likely to have these skills.

⁵² An average 100m² house cost about 500DEM to tile.

⁵³ A disabled man in Dragobil, who had both legs amputated (upper thigh) got timber and tiles from Christian Aid, but without any assistance to use them. A neighbour had come to fix part of his roof, but he still had some timber and tiles in his yard as he could not finish his roof. Christian Aid said that the village handyman had agreed to provide labour, but this had not happened. In the second case, Ryva and her daughter-in-law in the same village had also received timber and tiles from Christian Aid, but having no men in the household or money to pay for labour, were not able to use the material to roof their house (Beneficiary interviews; Christian Aid headquarters information).

⁵⁴ Christian Aid notes that *'this staffing concern has long been recognised as a weakness from our earliest reviews'*.

3.4 Great Expectations

Beneficiary expectations were extremely high. MedAir's focus groups revealed that beneficiaries expected that their whole villages would be rebuilt. Islamic Relief decided not to do any further shelter work in the year 2000 partly because expectations were so high. Other interviewees also commented on the high level of beneficiary expectations. Expectations were high partly because:

Within Kosovo the international community has consistently over-estimated its powers of performance, creating expectations on the part of Kosovars which have been inevitably disappointed (on winterisation, documentation, utilities, and law and order, among others) (ICG, 1999).

In villages there is a clear expectation that all the Category 5 houses will be rebuilt this year. However, on 14 April 2000, UNMIK stated that:

This year, grants will be available to rebuild or repair up to 17,000 houses, with the possibility of another 5,000 to be included (UNMIK, 2000a).

On the basis of UNMIK's own planning document, half of these would be Category 5, or 17 per cent to 22 per cent of the total. The summary of the UNMIK plan refers to rebuilding 25 per cent of the Category 5 caseload in 2000, but in the text it refers to rebuilding 50 per cent (UNMIK, 2000b). Those with Category 5 houses who were interviewed during the evaluation fieldwork were not aware of the plan to only rebuild some of the damaged homes.

During the assessments for the Christian Aid shelter project in July and August 1999, beneficiary expectations were raised as they thought they may eventually receive floor boards, bathrooms, sand, electricity etc and that assistance with labour costs might also be provided.⁵⁵ In the event, the project's objectives were scaled down for financial reasons and a more limited package was provided.

Many beneficiaries were reluctant to accept temporary shelter kits as they feared that they would thereby lose out on permanent rebuilding. This became such a problem that KFOR started issuing bulletins on the radio and in villages saying that those who accepted temporary shelter kits would not lose out on reconstruction.

In Kosovo, as everywhere else, there are rich and poor. However, it is very difficult to identify the level of need at village level because the economy of an individual household is tied into the larger family economy. Much local economic activity is marginal at best, and families are heavily dependent on remittances from relations working abroad. This makes identification of proportionate access to resources very difficult.

The initial aid programmes, with blanket distribution of food and assistance to every Category 3 or 4 beneficiary regardless of circumstance, may have led people to believe that the humanitarian assistance should be delivered to everyone. This was a point of view that was re-iterated time and time again. Ryarsha Shala in Podceste village said: *'I am not able to say if others deserve tiles or not, but we are all equal here'*. Those in the villages responsible for drawing up assistance lists pointed out the difficulty of selecting who should get

⁵⁵ Monitoring report of 7 December 1999 in Christian Aid DEC Phase II report. Christian Aid is certain that no such promises were made.

assistance. As Arif in Krusevo said *'Who am I to remove a family from the list? Who am I to decide who should not get food?'*

3.5 The Category 5 Question

Housing in Kosovo is complex. Families in Kosovo are multi-generational, with the head of the family living in a house with his wife, unmarried daughters and at least one son with his own wives and children. Because of the number of people that one house may accommodate, houses are generally large. Many houses were well over 200m² in floor area. One son would always remain with the father, but his brothers might move out as they built their own houses. When these modern houses were burned, the fire typically destroyed any internal finishes, doors, windows and the roof, but the shell of the building remained intact, resulting in Category 4 damage.

Houses had normally been built from savings from work abroad rather than with mortgages or bank loans and typically would be built over a period of years as the owner got the money to do some more.⁵⁶

Those who were less well-off generally had older houses. Older houses typically have wooden rather than concrete intermediate floors and have walls of rubble built masonry set in a weak mortar. When these buildings were burned the floors burn and collapse sometimes pulling the walls down with them. Once the roof is gone, the mortar in the wall is exposed to the elements and further damage follows. These houses were typically classed as Category 5 damage.

Beneficiaries with Category 4 houses got the greatest assistance from DEC agencies. Those with Category 5 houses got assistance indirectly through being hosted by part of their own or other families. This led to the contradiction where most of the international assistance for housing went to the better-off part of the community. Some agencies recognised this, but the priority was to get as many people housed as possible.

In order to meet the needs of Category 5 beneficiaries, Concern suggested repairs in about 40 cases that would allow a roof to be fitted under the shelter programme. MedAir tried to house Category 5 beneficiaries in other buildings. Agencies such as Christian Aid and MedAir also provided pre-fabricated buildings for Category 5 beneficiaries, in some cases by forming alliances with other organisations. Some of the pre-fabricated houses are very small. In any case the number of beneficiaries was only a small fraction of those served with roof kits.

3.6 Programme Standards

All the shelter programmes appeared to meet the basic Sphere standards (indicators given in Box 6) with the exception of insulation. Although many agencies supplied floor insulation,

⁵⁶ The fact there were a significant number of unfinished houses dotting the countryside has complicated the whole shelter issue. Some of the houses which were occupied by beneficiaries were houses that had never been finished. Some beneficiaries may be trying to take advantage of the international community to have their houses built.

only a few supplied ceiling insulation.⁵⁷ Heat loss through the ceiling is usually more than through the floor, although people are more sensitive to floor temperature because they often sit on it in Kosovo. Houses in Kosovo typically have little or no insulation, apart from that provided by solid timber boarding. The DEC agencies generally missed an opportunity to provide better-insulated warm rooms, relying instead on a higher usage of wood-burning stoves.

Condensation problems were seen in several of the houses visited and World Vision⁵⁸ noted that beneficiaries complained about condensation on their single skin plastic ceilings. Providing a double skin plastic ceiling (with an airspace between the skins, or providing ceiling boards or insulation) would have reduced this problem.

Box 6: Key Indicators for shelter from the Sphere standards: Version 1

- The covered area available per person averages 3.5–4.5m².
- In warm, humid climates, shelters allow optimal ventilation and provide protection from direct sunlight.
- In hot, dry climates, shelter material is heavy enough to ensure high thermal capacity. If only plastic sheeting or tents are available, provision of a double-skinned roof or an insulating layer is considered.
- In cold climates, shelter material and construction ensures optimal insulation. A temperature that is comfortable to the occupants is achieved by means of insulated shelter combined with sufficient clothing, blankets, bedding, space heating and calorific intake.
- If plastic sheeting is provided for shelter, it meets the specifications defined by MSF and UNHCR.

All the beneficiaries that were questioned about leaks in their plastic roofs confirmed that their roofs did leak. All of the holes seen in roofs were consistent with bird damage.

Several agencies gave beneficiaries the option of having a hipped roof (a roof that slopes down to the wall on all four sides) or a gable roof (a roof with only two sloping sides and a triangular piece of wall on the other two). Beneficiaries preferred gable roofs as they gave more storage space and did not throw water into their neighbours' yard. However, although beneficiaries opted for gable roofs, in many cases the gables had either never existed or had collapsed when the roof was burnt. This led to Concern and Tearfund putting up roofs that were open at the end. This problem was particularly critical with plastic roofs as they are much more susceptible to damage if the ends are left open. Even though the beneficiary had opted for a gable roof, it would have been good practice to temporarily close the gables with plastic. This would have also led to a more comfortable environment inside the house and prevented rain from entering via the gables.

⁵⁷ It is not possible to list which agencies supplied what, as the type of insulation supplied is not clear from the reports of the agencies.

⁵⁸ Report on WV Phase II Shelter Programme by Gordon Brown.

3.7 Shelter Kits

There were major problems with the shelter kits. World Vision complained that UNHCR had not clearly communicated the reality of the shelter kits to the beneficiaries, with the result that there was discontent with the temporary kits. IRW reported that in extreme cases their staff were threatened by beneficiaries unhappy with the material they were receiving. As one NGO manager commented, the *'UNHCR kits were rubbish. Just plastic and bits of wood'*. The word 'kit' is a misnomer, because they were not so much kits as a standard list of items. It was very rare for UNHCR or OFDA to have all the kit components in stock at any one time. Concern and World Vision both reported problems obtaining the staples that should have come with the staplers in the UNHCR kits. World Vision distributed many warm roof kits without timber as none was available.

Most of the agencies that recognised the weakness of the kits augmented them. This was hardest for agencies like World Vision, which had taken on large shelter programme commitments for UNHCR and OFDA and had difficulty in meeting the real needs of beneficiaries.

3.8 Coordination

Coordination was a problem in the shelter sector. In interviews, a number of NGOs were criticised for their lack of coordination, but none of those criticised were DEC agencies. There is evidence that DEC agencies made a determined effort to coordinate with other players in the shelter sector. Concern and World Vision were among the DEC agencies asked by UNHCR to act as focal points for shelter coordination shortly after the refugee return. Several DEC agencies also participated in the Rapid Village Assessment that established the initial scale of the shelter programme.

One issue with coordination was the huge variance in standards in the level of service supplied by different agencies. This problem is continuing, with MedAir reporting that one village has turned down its assistance in the year 2000 in the hope of having every house rebuilt by some other agency.

Despite problems with coordination, the level of cooperation seen between different agencies was positive. Even when Concern was displaced from one village by an agency offering permanent roofs, it still gave the new agency all the assessment information and roof designs that it had already done.

3.9 Management Issues

World Vision, IRW and Concern all used DEC money for a general shelter programme funded by other donors as well as the DEC, but only Concern had clearly identified the other funding used.

Concern identified that 28 per cent of the houses it roofed were not subsequently occupied by the householders. At the time of the evaluation, it was the only agency that had a clear picture

of how effective its programme had been in terms of occupancy of the improved building.⁵⁹ The fact that other agencies were not generally able to supply this information when asked, suggests that their monitoring of programmes was weak.

Other examples of poor agency monitoring included IRW's inability to say exactly how many roofs the 91 roof kits it distributed had been used for, and the fact that the agencies building houses in Peje did not realise that they were paying at least one-third over the odds for the cost of roofing contractors.⁶⁰

Several agencies reported difficulty in getting the right sort of personnel for the shelter programme. Concern reported that it had difficulty in recruiting its shelter specialist and that even RedR was unable to help immediately.

3.10 Continuing Work

In 2000, all of the DEC agencies involved in shelter work have been faced with the choice of whether to continue or not. It is interesting to note that several agencies have decided that they will no longer work in shelter.

Tearfund has decided that it will rebuild less than 100 houses for vulnerable Category 5 beneficiaries, but that this will end its involvement. Concern is finishing the rehabilitation of a twelve-apartment block for Category 5 beneficiaries, but will do no further work in shelter as '*effective targeting is very difficult, if not impossible*'. IRW says that further shelter work is for building companies and not NGOs. MedAir will rebuild homes for vulnerable Category 5 beneficiaries as MedAir feels that these have been unfairly treated.

3.11 Outcomes

The Kosovo winter of 1999/2000 was relatively mild and there was no widespread loss of life from hypothermia. The majority of those from Category 3 to 5 houses seem to have spent the winter in some sort of winterised accommodation. Only 6,600 people were living in collective shelters.⁶¹

The shelter programmes were implemented late. Programmes were still distributing materials in January. Hadji Baruci got his materials from MedAir on 24 December and built his (quite large) roof with his son by the new year. The family had been living in a tent and cooking in their potato bunker until then. The worst-affected programmes were those like World Vision's, which used DEC funding to supplement materials supplied by UNHCR or OFDA. Material supplies were often very late.

⁵⁹ MedAir were, at the time of the evaluation fieldwork, carrying out a survey that would answer this question among others.

⁶⁰ MedAir discovered this from later focus group discussions with beneficiaries (interview with MedAir Kosovo, April 2000). Concern and Medair were both paying 20DEM/m² for roofing contractors, a price which was later described as '*at least 5 DEM over the normal rate*' by MedAir. In their follow-up shelter programme which put tiled roofs on the houses of vulnerable beneficiaries, Concern gave families the option of either using a Concern contractor to do the tiling, or taking the funds and doing it with their own contractor.

⁶¹ This was just about one-third of the 19,100 places in collective centres identified by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2000b).


Concern got around this problem for its OFDA-funded shelter programme in Peje by using DEC funds to buy materials while waiting for the OFDA timber to be delivered. Buying timber directly meant that Concern was able to buy the sizes of timber needed and reduce the waste inherent in using a standard size for everyone.

Despite the problems, the shelter interventions were a humanitarian success and the DEC agencies played a very active part in this sector.

SECTION 4: WATER AND SANITATION

4.1 Background


Figure 6: Mortality cases among refugees in eastern Ethiopia, 1988–9



Source: *MMWR Volume 41, July 1992.*

Diarrhoeal disease and other water and sanitation related diseases are common killers in refugee emergencies. As the health sector (Section 2) has already highlighted, morbidity and mortality were very low among Kosovo refugees. This was largely because the refugees were in good condition, the absence of pathogens and a good awareness of hygiene. However it was also due in part to the interventions in water and sanitation by DEC agencies. When refugee needs go unmet, either from their own resources, those of their hosts or the international community, then tragedies like those of Eastern Ethiopia in the late 1980s (refer to Figure 6) can be repeated.

Figure 7: Refugees and IDPs



Even though the Kosovo refugees were in good condition when they arrived, the speed of their flight put enormous pressures on the ability to receive them. The sudden arrival of 250,000 people into Albania in two weeks give very little time to set up the supply of 3,750t of water a day or to dispose of the 250t of excrement that was produced.

The loads on water and sanitation systems were broadly dispersed through the generosity with which host families accepted refugees and because some refugees could afford to rent their own accommodation. This had a major impact in that only one-third of the refugees required water and sanitation services in camps or collective centres. Concentrations of people in poor conditions as can happen in camps and collective centres are a public health risk and their water and sanitation requirements need particular attention.

The speed at which diseases of poor sanitation can spread in crowded unsanitary conditions means that interventions in this sector need to be fast to be effective.

4.2 The DEC Agencies' Initial Responses

Oxfam has been by far the biggest player in water and sanitation. Other agencies have also played a relatively minor part, but this was relatively minor when compared with Oxfam's predominant role⁶². Some of these agencies will be mentioned to illustrate particular points, but most of the comments refer to Oxfam.

Oxfam has a very strong record and reputation in emergency water supply, stemming from a long history of work in this area. It developed a set of pre-packaged water kits, has promoted training in emergency water supply through RedR and through academic institutions, and has a stock of emergency water equipment and emergency service personnel on permanent standby.

Oxfam's work in water supply in the Kosovo crisis contained many examples of good practice⁶³. One simple example of good practice was the construction of latrines accessible to the disabled. These were nothing very remarkable — just a double-sized latrine cubicle — but they were made at relatively low cost proving that it is possible to provide sanitation access for the disabled in an emergency at a reasonable cost.

Water supply met the minimum Sphere Standards indicators, at least in terms of the amount supplied and the level of service. Sanitation did not meet these standards. Water, sanitation, and health education are often regarded as the three arms of the health triangle. Supplying water on its own is not enough; without adequate sanitation and health education, it will not

⁶² BRCS supplied water tankers for the Red Cross in Yugoslavia, as well as providing toilets at the schools it is rebuilding. CAD did emergency water and sanitation in schools in Macedonia, but not with DEC funds. Concern did toilets at the few schools it rehabilitated in Peja and also did some water and sanitation work in the camps it managed in Albania (with equipment from Oxfam). Christian Aid funded part of a large water project by MCIC in Macedonia. Tearfund was another significant player. Tearfund provided water and sanitation advice at the Fushë Labinot site in Elbasan as well as a latrine and public health programme in Kukes. Care and World Vision's de-mining partners cleared access to water points for Oxfam and other agencies working in the water sector.

⁶³ For example, sharing equipment with other agencies, measuring its own work against the Sphere standards and auditing the gender dimension of its work.

remove the risk of epidemics of enteric disease. Oxfam's own internal reporting recognised this weakness (Porter, 1999).

Fortunately, the return of the refugees before the period of peak water stress in August and September meant that many camp systems in Albania were not put to the test.

4.3 Preparedness

Planning

Oxfam participated in contingency planning for water and sanitation in Albania (Luff, 1996; UNHCR, 1998) and later in planning in Bosnia for any possible escalation of the crisis. Oxfam maintains emergency stocks in Bicester and these were airlifted to the region. Oxfam's willingness to commit resources for contingency planning and preparedness stands in stark contrast with other agencies that did not commit anything from general income for preparedness.⁶⁴

Structure

Oxfam has the largest emergency department of any of the DEC agencies. This has several dozen emergency response personnel from a variety of specialities of which water and sanitation specialists are very strongly represented.

Kits

There can be no doubt that Oxfam's pre-packaged water kits are a very rapid, efficient way in which to deal with emergency water needs. Oxfam not only used them itself but also gave equipment to other agencies (such as Concern) for them to erect. In Macedonia, the availability of tap water from a combination of Oxfam and military systems meant that the distribution of bottled mineral water was no longer necessary.

Human resources

Speed of response depends not only on physical resources but also on human ones. The RedR register was originally dominated by water and sanitation engineers and it is not surprising that Oxfam was by far the largest recruiter through the RedR register of all the DEC agencies. Oxfam recruited not only engineers but also administrators, logisticians and other personnel through RedR. As well as recruiting through RedR, Oxfam has some of the most experienced emergency water supply staff in the world in-house.

In water and sanitation, Oxfam also recruited engineers with no emergency experience and paired them with experienced engineers to increase the total pool of experienced engineers for the next emergency. Oxfam also employed probably the most knowledgeable person on water resources in Albania.

⁶⁴ BRCS, Concern and Tearfund all undertook various preparedness measures, but not in the water sector. World Vision has taken a number of preparedness measures for future crises.

4.4 Rehabilitation Phase Water Projects

A clear distinction needs to be made between water and sanitation work in the initial emergency response and the work after the return of the refugees to Kosovo. In the first case most of the work was very clearly in a refugee emergency, whereas some of the later work is much closer to development situation.

Most of the post-emergency water projects involved the rehabilitation of existing schemes. The existing schemes had failed in many cases because of an earlier lack of maintenance. Both Oxfam and MCIC focused on repairing the physical infrastructure. The DEC six-month rule placed agencies under pressure to execute water and sanitation projects quickly during the rehabilitation phase, rather than allowing them to fully involve the community first. The evaluation team therefore had a concern about whether structures exist to guarantee future repairs and maintenance.

This concern arose in the case of MCIC's water supply rehabilitation projects in Macedonia (funded by Christian Aid), given the apparent lack of community participation and contribution. One of the projects replaced an earlier system that had fallen to bits. However MCIC has reported that agreements about management have been made with municipality public communal enterprises, and MCIC is developing a three-year institutional capacity-building programme for these enterprises with a Dutch NGO. Contributions from the villagers and from the communes are planned.

Integration is also a problem for Oxfam in Kosovo. Water, sanitation and health education do not seem to be that well integrated despite the lessons learned from Albania. The technical management structure of the three programmes is not fully integrated.

Despite the quality problems, good work was being done. Oxfam also provided toilets and showers at a number of sites, including private homes, which refugees used for washing. This was an excellent initiative and should have been more widely copied to balance the focus of agencies on water and sanitation in the camps.

4.5 Quality Problems

A number of quality problems were encountered with the work in the rehabilitation phase. The water work executed in the post-emergency phase was of low quality. While the concrete reservoir at the Recane seemed to be well made by MCIC's contractor, there were a number of quality problems with the pipework. Water had undercut the small capture weir at the spring and some sections of pipe were not properly supported. While not grave problems, they may indicate a lack of monitoring and quality control.

Many quality problems were seen with Oxfam's work after the refugees returned, even though the staff were skilled. This suggests that Oxfam has a problem with quality control in the rehabilitation phase.

In Macedonia, Oxfam was building school toilets that would be accessible to the disabled. This is an excellent idea. However, the toilets that Oxfam are building at Rahovac school are not accessible to the disabled at all.

4.6 The Sphere Standards


As water and sanitation are such critical areas in an emergency response they are well covered by the Sphere Standards. In Albania, where Oxfam dealt with water supplied for half the refugees in camps, water supplies generally met the basic Sphere standards. However the same was not true for sanitation. Oxfam concentrated on water needs but was not a significant player in the sanitation field. To have taken on all sanitation needs would probably have been beyond Oxfam's capacities. In many camps, other agencies had staked a claim to do sanitation work. Oxfam tried to offer advice, support and equipment (when available) on sanitation and hygiene to other agencies.

There are a number of reasons why performance against the sanitation standards was unsatisfactory:

- The standards for sanitation are probably too high. To have latrines within 50ms of a dwelling is an enormous constraint on any camp layout. It is obviously much easier to put a tap within 500m of everyone⁶⁵ than a latrine within 50m.
- Pit latrines were not technically viable in many of the refugee sites (pit latrines are normally the fastest technology to install).
- The requirement to have a tap within 500m and latrines within 50m seems to run counter to the need to have hand-washing facilities close by the latrines (also a Sphere requirement).

Figure 8: Compliance with Sphere Standards

Refugee Camps in Albania



Source: Oxfam

One problem with sanitation, which was not resolved, was that sewage from the camps was discharged untreated into watercourses in Albania and Macedonia. Oxfam was examining alternatives to this practice at the end of the refugee phase.

⁶⁵ ODFA suggests that there should be a tap within 100m of every dwelling (USAID, 1999). Engineering in Emergencies suggests that there should be a water point within 150m (Davis & Lambert, 1995).

Water and sanitation work was not coordinated in Albania except in Kukes. The failure to meet the Sphere Standards across Albania may indicate weaknesses in coordination.

4.7 Outcomes

The initial water supply work, executed largely by Oxfam, emphasised again the advantages that come from specialisation and investing in preparedness for specific crises and preparedness for a rapid response. While the effect on the lives of refugees is impossible to measure, it is probable that Oxfam's water and sanitation intervention saved lives. However, as mentioned above, questions arose for the evaluation team about the permanent water infrastructure work being carried out by MCIC and Oxfam, in terms of sustainability and quality. At the time of the evaluation fieldwork, none of the three villages under the Christian Aid funded water project had yet received water. In spite of the above-mentioned issues, MCIC's performance appears to have been good.

The water supply work being carried out by these agencies is effectively development work within a rehabilitation context and needs longer-term time-scales than can fit with the DEC system.

SECTION 5: SCHOOL AND EDUCATION REHABILITATION

5.1 The Politics of Education

The revocation of Autonomous Republic Status for Kosovo by the Albanian dominated Kosovo Assembly in 1989 led to a great many changes. Milosevic responded to the Kosovo Albanian political protest strikes by bringing in a law through which those who absented themselves from work for a few days were automatically dismissed (Human Rights Watch, 2000a).⁶⁶ With the re-integration of Kosovo into Serbia, Serbo-Croat then became the language of instruction in Kosovo schools, as well as the language of all official business in Kosovo, displacing Albanian. The end result was a two-tier school system — an official system which taught in Serbo-Croat and a parallel system which taught in Albanian.⁶⁷

Kosovo Albanian teachers first worked for free, but were then paid for by the 3 per cent levy on Kosovo Albanians working abroad. Teachers' salaries rose during the whole parallel period from 17 DEM at the start to 150 DEM⁶⁸ before the bombing⁶⁹. UNMIK is now paying salaries and all of the teachers interviewed had received their salaries for the previous month.

The ability to manage a parallel education system was seen as a badge of pride and ethnic identity by Kosovo Albanians.⁷⁰ The very political nature of education in Kosovo, and even in the whole of the Balkans should have meant that agencies took a very politically aware approach to schools. Unfortunately, this was not always the case.⁷¹

The political importance of education is underlined by the relationship between UNMIK and SBASHK, the Albanian Teachers' Union. UNMIK has tried to use SBASHK as a channel of communication to the broader Kosovo public. It wanted SBASHK to tell Category 5 (refer to Box 5 in Section 4) beneficiaries that their houses would be rebuilt in 2000. However SBASHK refused, saying that it would be better to tell people that they were on their own so

⁶⁶ Interview with SBASHK, Kosovo. April 2000.

⁶⁷ ICG's Kosovo Spring report (ICG, 1998) has a more detailed account of the development of the parallel education system.

⁶⁸ Visit to Rastovica School. April 2000.

⁶⁹ The political nature of the parallel education is illustrated by the following example: one DEC agency staff member attended an evaluator's meeting with a School Director. It was a great surprise for the staff member to learn from the Director that teachers had been paid (albeit poorly) during the previous decade. Her own mother was a teacher, but she thought until then that her mother did all her teaching as a patriotic sacrifice.

⁷⁰ Interview with Oxfam, Kosovo. March 2000.

⁷¹ BRCS supported the renovation of one school in Rahovac. For a decade this school had Kosovo Serb children on one floor and Kosovo Albanian children on another. BRCS has supported the renovation of the school that now teaches only Albanian children. No one was able to say exactly how the educational needs of the few remaining Serb children in the town are now met. It was thought that they now had another school. In another example, Oxfam assisted the Anton Zako Caip primary school in Vustrri. On the way to the school one passes through the Roma Quarter which was almost completely destroyed. Previously, some Roma Children had attended the school, while others attended the state school. There are now no Roma children in the school.

that those who could rebuild themselves would do so rather than waiting for the international community.⁷²

5.2 Work in the School Sector


Schools were badly damaged in the war, an indicator of their political importance. Indeed, the huge political importance of the education system meant that the re-opening of schools was a priority at all levels. It was a priority for UNMIK and the agencies in the drive for 'normalisation'. It was also a political priority for the Kosovo Albanians. In many cases this involved reclaiming buildings that had not been used as schools during the previous decade, or schools that had been used by the state rather than the parallel system.

Almost half of the schools in the country were damaged (UNICEF, 1999) and many agencies were willing to work in this sector.⁷³ A wide variety of approaches was apparent in the school sector. These ranged from winterising schools with plastic all the way to the complete rebuilding of schools.

Figure 9: UNICEF assessment of primary schools

Estimate of unsurveyed from UNICEF

(Note: much data not verified by UNICEF or agencies)



As in the case of shelter, doing a complete job is more efficient in the long run, but this is done at the cost of limiting the response to immediate needs. BRCS concentrated on building permanent roofs, based on its experience with shelter in Bosnia. Oxfam, SC and Concern also concentrated on permanent repairs, although Oxfam's KERP project also carried out some winterisation in 1999.

UNICEF stated that schools should be renovated to their pre-war state. IRW noted that although this did not make a lot of sense, there was a push to get them done before the winter.

⁷² Interview with SBASHK Kosovo.

⁷³ Oxfam, BRCS and SC took the lead, but IRW winterised and Concern rehabilitated a small number of schools. CARE renovated one school in Albania with DEC funds, CAD is rehabilitating schools with UNICEF funds and CRS (Cafod's main partner) is rehabilitating schools with various non-DEC funds. By April 2000, 15 per cent of all schools being rehabilitated in Kosovo were being rehabilitated by DEC agencies or their close partners (another 11 per cent were being rehabilitated by the ACT and Red Cross networks outside of the work of DEC members of these networks) (UNHCR, 1999d).

Several agencies noted that much school rehabilitation was of poor quality. None of those interviewed named any DEC agencies in this context. Partly because of this, UNMIK has introduced new, high standards for school rehabilitation. DRA estimate that building schools to the new UNMIK standards would cost three times as much as the schools that DRA is building now. This is because the schools are three times as big, not with classrooms, but with a large range of ancillary rooms. The NGOs working on the rehabilitation of schools have worked together to present an alternative plan to UNMIK. However, their coordination only occurred as a reaction to the UNMIK proposal. It would clearly have been better if the agencies had coordinated pro-actively earlier on.


Oxfam and BRCS acknowledge that they were improving the schools they were working on. While this is a more efficient use of resources overall, it does raise questions about how far their work goes beyond rehabilitation towards development. Oxfam and BRCS were continuing with school rehabilitation in 2000, even though the need for emergency school places seems to have been met in 1999. SC is also continuing with the renovation of two schools which was delayed by slow mine clearance by ACT.

5.3 NOVIB’s Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project (KERP)

Oxfam gave £3 million of DEC funds to NOVIB’s Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project (KERP). The overall project is budgeted at about £10m and includes support for teacher training as well as school reconstruction. NOVIB has set up an office in Pristina to manage this large project. A number of agencies are involved in this project, including Oxfam, NOVIB, DRA and SBASHK, the Kosovo teachers’ union. At the time of the evaluation fieldwork, no school had yet been completed under this project. The evaluation team had a number of concerns about this project relating to the size of the grant and the experience of NOVIB and SBASHK. These issues are dealt with in the Oxfam agency summary in Volume III. Figure 10 shows the calculation of overhead figures alongside major project expenditure headings. This shows how the overheads for multi-agency projects can mount up, although it should be noted that these calculations are made on the basis of the DEC-funded section, not the overall project.

Figure 10: NOVIB’s Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project

Breakdown of DEC expenditure (Including all reported overhead)



Much of the school rehabilitation that was carried out by other agencies focused only on the hardware aspects. KERP stands out from other projects as it also includes software aspects including teacher training,⁷⁴ although it has not yet dealt with maintenance issues.

In spite of some concerns (refer to Oxfam summary, Volume III) there appeared to be no major problems with the KERP project at the time of the evaluation fieldwork.

5.4 The BRCS Schools Rehabilitation Project

The evaluation team were initially sceptical about the BRCS being involved in school reconstruction because of its lack of experience in this area and because it had not been operational for some time. BRCS staff openly acknowledged the weaknesses in this respect, but the school reconstruction programme was very strong. The work seen was of good quality and it had a very professional approach. The programme also won high praise from the school directors⁷⁵.

BRCS took a more rounded approach than SC and supplied benches to the schools it has renovated. SC instead waited for UNICEF to supply the desks. UNICEF has not done so, with the result that children are crowded four to a desk. While this is not SC's direct responsibility, it is important that it follows through, for example by putting a great deal of pressure on UNICEF to resolve the issue.

Both BRCS's and SC's DEC-funded school programmes are not yet finished, even though the expenditure period is now over. This raises questions of what the six-month rule means in practice.

5.5 Health and Safety

Asbestos roofs are fitted on many schools in Kosovo. Although asbestos fibres are potentially carcinogenic, intact asbestos cement roofs pose very little threat as they release very few fibres into the direct environment of the pupils. Schools with walls of asbestos panels are far more dangerous. Some areas of Kosovo have naturally occurring asbestos. Nevertheless, DRA is removing asbestos roofs wherever it is renovating even though there is no good engineering or health reason for doing so. At a Rahovac school assisted by BRCS, the asbestos-cement roof has been removed and bits of the asbestos cement sheets are stacked in the yard.⁷⁶ Breaking off asbestos cement roofs and stacking the debris in the school yard poses a far greater risk to health than being in a school with an asbestos-cement roof.

SC began work on Irzniq school while mine clearance was underway in the area around the school. The school was used as a base by the Serbian police and as it was on the front lines,

⁷⁴ However, the report for the DEC-funded period shows that very little has been spent on software aspects.

⁷⁵ 'Super' was how the Director of Xerxe school described the work of BRCS. In contrast SC was heavily criticised by the Director of Rastovica school. While many of the complaints made against SC were unfair, some of the complaints about the low quality of the building work were justified.

⁷⁶ Field visit to Rahovac school. March 2000.

the land around the school was mined. The school building itself had been cleared, except for the library.⁷⁷ Although SC had trained all the contractors' staff in mine awareness, it seems extraordinary that it began work in these circumstances only to suspend it later until mine clearance was finished.

5.6 Gender: Forgotten Again?

Oxfam's original revised four-week plan for Kosovo stated that: '*Special attention will have to be paid to women teachers. In the absence (disappearance) of male cadres they will be asked to take on roles not traditionally theirs. In addition to upgrading skills they may also need support to help the women to overcome their own and men's reluctance*'. However, the final report makes no reference to women teachers.

Although more than half of the teachers in the schools visited by the evaluation team in Kosovo were women, only one of the five school directors met was female. Gender was not an issue that any of the agencies dealing with education seem to have addressed in a concrete way in their school programmes.⁷⁸

5.7 Separate Development in Albania?

In Korce, CARE supported the rehabilitation of Naim Frasheri school. During the Communist era, the Roma⁷⁹ were integrated into the same schools as everyone else. The end of central control has seen the creation of a Roma ghetto in Korce, as Roma have moved into the old housing in a poorer quarter of the town. Ninety-five per cent of the pupils attending the Naim Frasheri School are Roma. There are also ethnic Albanian children in the catchment area, but they usually prefer to go to other schools⁸⁰ as the Roma are considered '*backward and too lazy to learn*'⁸¹.

Is it appropriate to assist in the development of a 'separate' education service for Roma children in this way, or would it have been more appropriate for CARE to have tried to encourage the development of schools with both Roma and non-Roma pupils?

Some aspects of CARE's renovation were of very good quality (for example, the heating system) but other aspects were not: the windows were single-glazed and poorly made; doors were of low quality. There was a huge gap between this school renovation in Albania and the work seen in Kosovo.

⁷⁷ Visit to Irzniq schools. April 2000.

⁷⁸ NOVIB reports that it has chosen an 'infiltration' strategy with regard to gender. Gender training with SBASHK is planned (NOVIB reaction to draft evaluation report, 31 May 2000).

⁷⁹ Roma here is used to signify all the groups that are indicated by others as Roma. The groups in question may self-identify as Roma, Egyptians or Ashkaeli and do not mix among themselves.

⁸⁰ Interview with the school director.

⁸¹ Information from a regional expert on how Roma are perceived.

5.8 The Future?

Many village schools in Kosovo had originally been built by the communities themselves. Schools and mosques were the only examples of community-built infrastructure in many villages. However, there has been very little community participation in the reconstruction of schools. BRCS insisted on community participation in the schools that it is rebuilding. IRW looked for no community contribution. SC asked that communities clean up the school sites as their contribution to the work, but in practice had to employ villagers to do the work in the cases where they refused to make this contribution.⁸² SC point out that it was under a great deal of pressure from UNMIK, UNICEF and the municipality to get the schools completed quickly.

DRA did not ask for any community labour contribution: '*when you have to rehabilitate a school to a tight timetable you have to use contractors*'. Providing the community with turnkey community infrastructure without any contribution on their part must raise the question of whether some of the DEC agencies are undermining what little community initiative there is in the villages.

Funding for school maintenance has been a problem since 1981. Many schools have had almost no maintenance for ten or fifteen years.⁸³ The damage to schools in some cases was due to lack of maintenance. BRCS supplied maintenance kits and maintenance lists, but had done no work on sustainable maintenance structures. Maintenance is now a big issue on the Steering Committee for the NOVIB project. However it is of concern that NOVIB has started a £10 million project without clearly considering issues of sustainability from the start.⁸⁴

Maintenance is still clearly a problem. Some of the schools visited were not clean, nor does anyone seem concerned about this lack of cleanliness. This does not bode well for the future.

There must also be concern that the turnkey project approach taken by some agencies will lead to even greater difficulty in trying to mobilise communities to build or pay for their own community infrastructure in the future.

⁸² Interview with SC Decani. April 2000.

⁸³ Interview with DRA, Pristina. April 2000.

⁸⁴ NOVIB sees school maintenance as the government's responsibility (NOVIB submission to the evaluation team, 31 May 2000).

5.9 Outcome

The DEC agencies have made a significant contribution to the rehabilitation of schools in Kosovo. However, there must be some questions as to whether interventions in the education sector are an appropriate use of DEC funds.⁸⁵ While the programme has been a success in physical terms in the short term, there are issues about longer-term sustainability and the access to education for minorities in Kosovo.

⁸⁵ Under current rules.

SECTION 6: HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION

6.1 Background

Humanitarian mine action refers not only to physical removal of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)⁸⁶ but also to campaigning and advocacy against the use of landmines.

Every month, there are about 2,000 deaths and injuries caused by mines and UXO worldwide.⁸⁷ Between June 1999 and the end of March 2000, one hundred people in Kosovo were killed and another 370 injured by mines and UXO (UNMACC, 2000).

Under Article 3 of the military technical agreement (NATO, 1999a) which ended the air campaign, FRY and Serb forces were obliged to report all minefield locations. They supplied maps of 624 minefields⁸⁸, but acknowledged that these were incomplete. The MUP and paramilitaries normally kept no record of the mines that they laid. Towards the end of the Serb military were making rapid fields, not all of which were recorded.⁸⁹

In addition to the minefields laid by FRY and Serb forces, there were large amounts of unexploded cluster-bomb bomblets from munitions dropped by NATO. A cluster bomb is a canister that releases a large number of bomblets at a pre-set altitude to cover a wide area with lethal weapons. The bomblets float to the ground on a parachute brake.

The main types of cluster bombs used by NATO⁹⁰ in Kosovo were combined effect munitions. These weapons included a shaped charge for penetrating armour and an anti-personnel shrapnel effect. The US BLU/97 bomblet used in the US CBU-87/B also has a zirconium ring for an incendiary effect. These weapons were originally designed as an alternative to battlefield nuclear weapons against concentrations of enemy forces. While cluster bombs are not anti-personnel mines, their indiscriminate nature, high failure rates and their sensitivity to disturbance make them similar in effect to the now-banned anti-personnel mines.

The failure rate for cluster bomblets is often given as five per cent. UNMACC have found an 8 per cent failure rate for US and 12 per cent for UK cluster bomblets.⁹¹ Refer to Section 6.8 for more information on cluster bombs.

⁸⁶ UXO are explosive devices like shells or grenades that have not exploded. In some cases they will have failed to go off after firing, in others they have been prepared for use but not fired. UXO are a major threat to children and the curious.

⁸⁷ This is an estimate only as the true figure is not known (Horwood, 2000).

⁸⁸ Some of these 'mine-fields' had as few as three mines.

⁸⁹ Interview with UNMACC Kosovo, April 2000.

⁹⁰ FRY forces were apparently firing cluster munitions into Albania at the same time as the Belgrade Government was condemning their use by NATO (Wiebe, 1999).

⁹¹ At a US DoD press briefing, spokesman Kenneth H. Bacon gave the dud rate as approximately five per cent for the CBU-87 (US Department of Defense, 1999). The MoD lessons learned study (MoD, 2000) refers to the manufacturer's stated failure rate of 5 per cent even though the authors are presumably aware of the actual rate found by UK EoD officers on the ground (12 per cent).

Table 28: Cluster bombs and bomblets⁹²

Country	Bomb	Type	Number	Bomblets	Dud rate	UXO
USA	CBU-87/B	CEM	1,100	202	8%	17,776
UK	RBL-755	CEM	532	147	12%	9,384
Total			1,632			27,160
Dropped over Kosovo			1,392	Kosovo UXO		23,166
Cleared to end March						2,820
Estimated un-cleared bomblets on 1 April 2000						20,346

Cluster bombs were responsible for about one-third of the civilian deaths in the air campaign despite making up only six per cent of the munitions dropped by NATO (Guardian Staff and Agencies, 1999). They continue to kill. The exact number of those who have died as a result of contact with cluster-bomb sub-munitions since the air campaign ended is not known, but estimates range from one-third to 40 per cent⁹³. The seriousness with which UNMACC take the cluster bomb issue can be seen from its setting the clearing of all bomblets in Kosovo as a target for 2000 (UNMIK, 2000c). Initially NATO began by clearing cluster-bomb sub-munitions, but after a number of accidents, including the death of two British KFOR troops (Butcher, 1999a; Butcher, 1999b), NATO now limits itself to marking the sites.

NATO announced that it would only be clearing mines that obstructed its mission, i.e. clearing main routes and near NATO bases. There was a clear need for humanitarian mine action in Kosovo.

6.2 DEC Agency Responses

World Vision contracted MAG, a UK NGO, to provide mine clearance services for the World Vision Projects. MAG set up a mine action programme by training four mine action teams in Kosovo. The first team was in action in early September with another two teams operational by the third week of September. The fourth team never became operational because of a labour dispute.

CARE contracted MineTech, a Zimbabwean commercial firm, to provide mine-clearing services for its programmes. MineTech was operational within 72 hours of its arrival in Kosovo in late June or early July, but were not DEC-funded until September.

Although other DEC agencies were not directly involved in landmine and UXO clearance in Kosovo most of them had participated in the international campaign to ban anti-personnel mines. The question of advocacy is raised in Section 7.8.

⁹² Sources: (MoD, 2000; Pike, 1999; Robertson, 1999; UNMACC, 2000).

⁹³ In September, the Daily Telegraph reported that '*it is officially admitted that at least a third of these (mine and UXO casualties) have been victims of the cluster bomb*' (Deedes, 1999). The WHO report on mine and unexploded ordnance-related injuries and deaths in Kosovo between 13 June and 12 July 1999, calculated that unexploded ordnances, including unexploded NATO cluster bombs, accounted for 40 per cent of all casualties (UNMIK, 2000a).

Machines can be used to clear scrub or to establish the edges of minefields, but the actual removal of individual mines is done by hand⁹⁴. MineTech also brought in teams of mine detecting dogs. These allow much faster clearing, especially along roads and urban areas.


MAG did not bring in dog teams, instead focusing on building local capacity. Because training mine dogs and their handlers is a long process, dog teams normally rely on expatriate staff. Even though MAG estimates the cost of a dog team at just under £10,000 a month, this is still less than the mine action teams have cost MAG. Using dog teams would have allowed MAG to clear at least twice as much, for less than twice the cost. MAG is currently looking for a donor to cover the cost of dog teams to support its operation in 2000.⁹⁵

Neither MAG nor MineTech used machines in 1999, but MAG has recently acquired a MINECAT with DFID funding. MAG and MineTech adopted two different approaches. MAG trained its mine clearance teams from scratch⁹⁶, whereas MineTech brought in trained de-miners from Zimbabwe.⁹⁷ This meant that MineTech became operational almost immediately, whereas it took MAG two months to get up and running.⁹⁸ Unfortunately, the start of work for MAG's teams was at the end of the autumn when a lot of de-mining activity was stopping for the winter. This led to a relatively low level of clearance by MAG. However, in the long run, the building of a local mine clearance capacity could be more efficient.

Figure 11: Speed of mine clearance teams

Based on data from Chris Horwood (2000).

Relative speed averaged across speed for category A, B, and C terrain.



⁹⁴ Machines fitted with flails, as DFID has just funded for MAG, can also clear mines by detonating them, but there is no agreement on the percentage of mines that such machines will leave in the ground.

⁹⁵ Interview with MAG Kosovo.

⁹⁶ MAG also brought in a Cambodian team for a DFID contract at the start.

⁹⁷ Interview with MineTech Kosovo. March 2000.

⁹⁸ Interview with World Vision HQ. February 2000.

MAG also had problems mobilising due to the shortage of specialist mine-clearing and protection equipment on the market. It is now trying to develop a small stock of such equipment so as to be better able to respond to future crises.

The DEC six-month rule mitigates against MAG's approaches of developing local resources. Originally the mine problem in Kosovo was thought to be similar to that of Bosnia where booby-trapping and nuisance mining was common. It was thought that mine clearing could continue for many years. MAG's approach was valid in this context. However, because the mine problem is not as extensive as in Bosnia, MAG now recognises that there is a limited future for de-miners and is already starting to offer its de-miners training in skills that will allow them to find other work later.

The over-estimation of the mine problem made agencies reluctant to move off the tarmac at the start. This slowed down the provision of humanitarian assistance outside of the urban areas.

6.3 Prioritisation

Both World Vision and CARE wanted their own mine clearance capacity so that they would not have to wait in line for mine clearance for their projects. The experience of SC, who are still waiting for Irzniq school to be cleared, demonstrated the usefulness to agencies of having a mine clearance team on call. However, it is questionable if key life-saving resources like mine-clearance should be primarily controlled by one particular agency. The priority tasks for that agency might not be the priority tasks of the beneficiary community as a whole. Although both MAG and MineTech were made available by World Vision and CARE for priority tasks assigned by UNMACC or even by donors such as USAID, this naturally took second place to their own priorities.

CARE had to appoint its own Mine and Mine Awareness coordinator so that it could coordinate internal mine action and awareness requests. This was to allow the internal prioritisation of mine clearance requests from different CARE projects.

6.4 Efficiency and Effectiveness

Efficiency and effectiveness are very difficult to measure in Humanitarian Mine Action. Mine clearance is an attempt to prove a negative, i.e. that no mines remain in an area, and this is time-consuming and costly to establish. The actual rate of clearance of devices depends on the number of devices laid in an area and the pattern of laying. Similarly, even areas cleared are not much of an indication of activity in this case, when the agencies spend a lot of time clearing areas for distribution. MAG has to spread itself thinly to cover all the World Vision operations.

Clearance rates for devices and areas cleared were relatively low. They were particularly low for MAG as its teams started so soon before the winter. However, crude indicators like these tell very little. What matters most is the relevance of the clearance work to the socio-economic life of the community. Confirming that there are no mines near a particular water source and that it is safe to use is of far greater benefit to the community than removing 1,000 mines from a marked minefield on a mountain top that nobody ever visits.


Much of the early work of MAG and MineTech could be described as *'peace of mind clearance'* rather than mine clearance. MAG and MineTech checked areas for World Vision and CARE to reassure them that they were safe for their staff to work in. This naturally takes time and results in far lower rates of clearance of devices than if teams are tasked on the basis of the known mine threat.

Neither MAG nor MineTech now work in Gjakova, the area that has seen the heaviest mine casualties since the return of refugees. However, there are a large number of other agencies working in Gjakova and there are plenty of tasks in the areas where MAG and MineTech are working.

6.5 A Non-lesson from Bosnia

Figure 12: Mine casualties in Kosovo as percentage of world total

Kosovo data from UNMACC, world total estimated by ICRC



Bosnia has about 400,000 mines. The total number for Kosovo is not known, but is believed to be much less. In Bosnia, mines were a far bigger problem as the war lasted for a long time and front lines had moved a great deal. Most of the mines in Kosovo appear to have been laid along the border strip with Albania and Macedonia. There was a general consensus amongst those interviewed that the initial mine threat in Kosovo had been over-estimated⁹⁹.

Kosovo is still attracting a lot of resources for mine clearance, even though the problem is not as severe as in countries like Afghanistan or Angola. Kosovo currently accounts for less than one per cent of all estimated mine casualties worldwide. There were less than ten casualties a

⁹⁹ This is an example of how some lessons from Bosnia were inappropriate in Kosovo. Another example was BRCS's proposed approach to school reconstruction using mobile teams and the general expectation that refugees would not return home immediately (many Bosnian refugees still have not returned).

month in the winter, although this figure was expected to rise for a while in spring 2000 as agriculture restarted¹⁰⁰.

There were seventeen organisations working on de-mining in 1999. Fifteen organisations are continuing work in 2000. At the moment there are donor resources for de-mining in Kosovo and it seems sensible to try and deal with the problem as quickly as possible. UNMACC rate both MineTech and MAG highly. MineTech is rated so highly by UNMACC that it has contracted it to provide services.

6.6 Programme Standards

Mine clearing activities are well coordinated by UNMACC, and the DEC-funded mine agencies have participated fully in the coordination mechanism. Uniform standards were imposed on the mine clearing agencies by UNMACC. This was not a problem for MAG and MineTech as the standards imposed are similar to the standards that they normally apply in their work.

Neither of the DEC-funded mine agencies have suffered any casualties either during clearance or on the land that they have cleared. KFOR has had two fatalities and two serious injuries in its clearance operations; other agencies have had five casualties in their clearance operations.

UNMACC have an effective quality control system based on ISO 9000 principles, where there is a lot of emphasis on the quality control procedures used by the agencies as much as on spot-checking. MineTech gave examples of its focus on total quality. This approach to quality is heartening in a sector where even minor errors costs lives. It is an approach that could usefully be adopted in other sectors.

6.7 The De-miners

MAG has encountered labour problems during the mine clearance work. It recruited from demobilised KLA fighters, partly as a way of offering employment to them. However, this meant that KLA authority structures persisted leading to de-miners in one team refusing to work unless they were paid a substantial increase. MAG refused to do so as the pay-rates had not only been agreed with the de-miners prior to employment, but had also been agreed between the mine agencies. This left MAG with three teams instead of four. If MAG had given in, it would have led to labour disputes across the whole sector.

Because MAG has recruited largely from the KLA, it had no women de-miners (but had one female medic). By contrast there were women in the Cambodian de-mining Team that MAG used in Peje for the DFID contract.¹⁰¹ The MineTech team is exclusively male. MAG notes that women offer a number of advantages in mine clearance as in general they are less likely to take unnecessary risks.

¹⁰⁰ Worse, mines are now being laid in Kosovo against minorities (BBC, 2000)

¹⁰¹ This team also included some Cambodian mine amputees. This is appropriate as these can serve as positive role models for mine victims in Kosovo.

6.8 The Cluster Bomb Issue...

An area weapon

Cluster bombs are an area weapon. During the efforts to force the Bosnian Serbs to stop attacking ‘Safe Areas’ in the Bosnian war in 1995, the US commander vetoed the use of Cluster Bombs partly because ‘*the fragmentation pattern was too large to sufficiently limit collateral damage*’ (Beale, 2000).

The UK cluster bombs was originally designed to be dropped from low altitude, but after the Gulf War¹⁰² the MoD issued a contract for the fitting of the BL-755 with a fuse to allow it to be dropped from above 10,000ft. This variant is known as the RBL-755. However, dropping from higher altitudes increases the risk of bombs falling off target.¹⁰³ Cluster bombs may also have been dropped from higher altitudes than their optimum release height (Deedes, 1999; Jones & Newton, 1999).¹⁰⁴

Box 7: Civilian casualties of cluster bombs

April 29, 1999	A 61-year-old woman, Paska Juncaj, died after being hit on the back of the head by a bomblet from a cluster bomb in a village near the airport, according to eye-witnesses. One villager said: ‘ <i>She was running from her village with her son, and just dropped down dead on the spot</i> ’. Three other people were injured, one seriously, and two houses virtually destroyed in the attack on Wednesday (Davies, 1999).
May 7, 1999	Cluster bombs intended for Nis Airfield killed 14 civilians and wounded 28 in Nis town. The CBU-87/B had opened immediately after release, scattering bomblets over a wide area (Guardian Staff and Agencies, 1999; NATO, 1999b). Mary Robinson, Head of UNHCR visited Nis on the following day and commented that ‘ <i>It was not so much that civilians were being targeted, but that the bombing was so wide in its range it was inevitable they would be hit</i> ’ (Coulter, 1999). President Clinton issued an order suspending further use of cluster bombs by US forces. The UK continued to drop them (Guardian Staff and Agencies, 1999). ¹⁰⁵

Attractive to children

It is often remarked that cluster-bomb sub munitions are attractive to children because of the small size, intriguing shape and bright colours.

¹⁰² The US DoD’s Gulf War Air Power Summary Report notes that ‘*air attacks on Iraqi armor with cluster munitions or unguided bombs proved to be largely ineffective. Iraqi revetted armor was simply less vulnerable to these munitions, particularly at the bombing altitudes used by the coalition*’ (Keaney & Cohen, 1993).

¹⁰³ UNMACC notes that British Military EOD personnel could only locate 40 per cent of CBU strikes in their AoR. They found that CBUs were spread far wider than the target information would suggest, giving them 176 areas to mark instead of 76 (Interview with UNMACC Kosovo. April 2000).

¹⁰⁴ NATO applied a minimum ceiling of 15,000 feet during most of the air campaign (MoD, 2000). While this is safer for crews, it makes it more likely that mistakes will be made. In response to questions about attacks on a civilian convoy in April, Jamie Shea said of the investigation into the incident ‘*We are doing our best on the basis of photographic material at 15,000 feet so clearly it’s difficult to ascertain that with clarity ...*’ (NATO, 1999c). If it is hard to tell what has happened afterwards, how much harder is it for aircrew to tell what is happening at the time from 4.5km up?

¹⁰⁵ The MoD lessons learned report (MoD, 2000) refers to this incident and correctly states that the CBU-87/B was withdrawn from use and later returned to service. However, it neglects to mention that no further cluster bombs were used by the US military during the rest of the conflict.

Box 8: Child casualties from cluster bombs

April 24 1999	Five Albanian Kosovo brothers were killed and at least two other children injured when one of the boys tried to pry open an unexploded cluster bomblet that looked like a toy in Doganovic, about 30 miles south of Pristina. The five Hoxha boys (aged 3, 9, 13, 14 and 15) were buried in the local cemetery within hours. A <i>Los Angeles Times</i> reporter found evidence that the bomb was a CBU-87. Two more children, aged 2 and 14 suffered shrapnel injuries even though they were at least 20 meters from their five cousins (Wiebe, 1999).
July 1999	Bekim Malaj, aged 11, and his friends knew they were fooling around with bombs but they thought it was safe as it was a 'dud'. The 'dud' started blowing fire and hit Bekim in the face partially blinding him. He started running and it blew up. The young man who opened the bomb was torn apart and two others died along with him. Seven survivors were hospitalized, including two in a critical condition (Eggen, 1999).
Sep 20 1999	Four children died when a cluster bomb left over from NATO's bombardment of Yugoslavia exploded in a field in eastern Kosovo. Two more children were wounded by the explosion near the town of Mogila on Monday afternoon (Guardian Staff and Agencies, 1999).
Oct 17 1999	Two children were killed and another seriously injured in a field in Mala Krusa 10 km north of Prizren. Apparently one of the victims touched a bomblet (KFOR, 1999).
Oct 21 1999	Burim, his cousin and two friends were herding the family's cows when they ran into an area marked as a cluster strike site. <i>'It was yellow, my friends poked it with a stick. Then I had my eyes on one of the cows and I stepped on it'</i> . Burim did not yet know that his left leg had had to be amputated below his left knee. His cousin was stabilised in a nearby tent yesterday while his two friends were released after treatment. NATO officials said another child had been injured by cluster munitions earlier in the week (Bird, 1999).
Mar 15 2000	UNMIK Police today reported a cluster bomb explosion in a village called Pozhar, south-east of Decani, which apparently killed two boys aged 12 and 17 (UNMIK, 2000a).

Not a new problem

Cluster bombs are not a new problem. They have killed in Laos, in the Gulf and in the Balkans. Several anti-arms campaigners have campaigned (Wiebe & Peachey, 1999) against them because they are indistinguishable in effect from anti-personnel mine. Worse they are often associated with multiple casualties unlike the common landmine which rarely kills or injures more than one person at a time. Their attraction for children is not new either¹⁰⁶.

More than half of the munitions dropped by the RAF were cluster bombs (532 out of 1,011). It was not a secret that cluster bombs were being used. The Telegraph had carried a story on this on 7 April (Butcher, 1999c) and the Guardian on 8 April (Ward & Norton-Taylor, 1999). The MoD openly referred to the use of cluster bombs in its briefings from at least 7 April (MoD, 1999).

The horrors of cluster bombs — their indiscriminate nature, the high failure rate and the particular risk they pose to children were known — and were re-emphasised during the

¹⁰⁶ *'Toy-size bombs designed to kill tanks and soldiers [also] appear as white lawn darts, green baseballs, orange-striped soda cans,'* one report from Kuwait reported almost a year after the war ended. These attractively arrayed and intriguing unexploded submunitions *'proved deadly to children'*. Kuwaiti doctors stated that some 60 per cent of the victims of UXO injuries were children aged fifteen and under (Human Rights Watch, 2000b).

Kosovo campaign by HRW and MCC. The UK was seven times more likely to use cluster bombs in its strikes than other NATO countries and it continued to use cluster bombs even after the US stopped. The fact that none of the DEC agencies advocated against their use is raised in Chapter 10, Volume I.

6.9 Outcomes

The direct humanitarian mine action supported by CARE and World Vision was appropriate. Even though few devices were removed, the knowledge that areas were free from mines and booby traps allowed other humanitarian work such as the rehabilitation of housing, water supplies and land for agriculture to go ahead.

SECTION 7: WAR AFFECTED POPULATIONS AND BENEFICIARIES

7.1 Introduction

The war in Kosovo caused the displacement of over one million people. In addition to over 500,000 already internally displaced in Kosovo (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999a) during NATO's air bombardment, more than 800,000 Kosovo Albanians sought refuge in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition some 22,000 Muslims from the Sandzak region of Serbia, and over 30,000 Serbs and Serb refugees from Croatia moved from Former Yugoslavia to Bosnia-Herzegovina (refer to Table 29). Since NATO forces entered Kosovo, over 200,000 Serbs and Roma from Kosovo have left the province for Serbia and Montenegro, while several thousand Albanians from southern Serbia have sought refuge in Kosovo and Macedonia. The infrastructural and economic damage inflicted by the war has affected civilians throughout the FRY, while the mass refugee movements have had a significant impact on host countries in the region.

Table 29: Refugees from Kosovo

Refugees from Kosovo	As of June 1999*	Current Estimates
Albania	444,200	-
FYROM	247,200	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	21,700	-
Montenegro	69,700	**30,000
Humanitarian Evacuation Programme	79,979	-
Serbia	-	***199,600
Total	862,979	229,600

*UNHCR, Geneva, 15 October 1999; ** UNHCR Belgrade, January 2000; *** UNHCR Belgrade, November 1999.

The evaluation team interviewed people who were directly or indirectly affected by the war, including beneficiaries of assistance provided by the DEC agencies.¹⁰⁷ The purpose of these interviews was: to understand the experience of people affected by the crisis; to record their own responses and to assess how sensitive agencies were to the needs of affected populations; and whether they involved them in the design and management of the emergency operations. Information on the short-term and long-term social and economic impacts of emergency operations was also recorded. People interviewed included:

- Former Kosovo refugees, now returned to Kosovo;
- Kosovo refugees/IDPs in Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Serbia;
- Albanian and Macedonian families who hosted Kosovo refugees;
- Refugees from Serbia in Bosnia and Macedonia;
- Serb, Roma, Gorani and Catholic minorities in Kosovo;
- Refugees from Krajina in Kosovo;
- Elderly and disabled in Kosovo;
- Municipal authorities in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo;
- Local humanitarian organisations and activists;
- Local employees of aid agencies.

¹⁰⁷ The names of interviewees have been changed.

It is clear that assistance provided by DEC member agencies, in some form or other, did reach a broad cross-section of the populations affected by the war.

Part 1 of this section focuses primarily on Kosovo Albanian refugees and families in Albania and Macedonia who hosted refugees. Part 2 looks at communities in Kosovo.¹⁰⁸

PART 1: REFUGEE EXODUS

7.2 The Diversity of Refugee Experience

The multi-ethnic nature of the region (see Box 9) means that people from different cultural communities have often been affected by the war in very different ways. It was apparent from interviews that their responses to the emergency also differed. The beneficiaries of DEC agency assistance reflected this diversity of experience. The way refugees were assisted in host countries depended on a number of variables, including:

- whether they were accommodated in camps, collective centres or host families;
- whether they were in an urban or rural location;
- the particular region of the host country they stayed in;
- the existence of kinship or friendship ties;
- gender;
- the quality of support from local authorities;
- their ethnicity and acceptability in the host country;
- whether they left Kosovo with assets;
- the availability of assistance from relatives abroad.

Cultural factors were also important. Although violence in wars is often targeted to weaken or destroy social institutions, among Kosovo Albanians it seems that the war strengthened some social bonds. Extended families preferred to move and stay together as much as possible, even though this created extra demands on host populations. In contrast, Serb families moved as smaller nuclear families. In Kosovo and neighbouring countries the different 'Roma',¹⁰⁹ communities were accepted and received differently depending on their integration with local populations. In Kosovo, the Gorani, Catholic and Bosniak communities were relatively untouched by Serb military during the war, but since the war ended they have faced discrimination and intimidation from the Albanian Kosovo majority.

¹⁰⁸ 148 interviews were conducted with war affected populations and beneficiaries: 15 with host families in Albania and Macedonia; 12 with refugees/IDPs families; 77 with beneficiaries in Kosovo, 33 with partner organisations; and 11 with local authorities. As each interview involved more than one person, the total number of people consulted was over 300. Information in this section is drawn mainly from interviews in Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo where the majority of interviews were conducted. The evaluation team did not interview people resident in Serbia who were affected by NATO bombing as no DEC funds were used to assist these particular war affected people.

¹⁰⁹ For the purpose of this report all Roma and Gypsy groups are referred to as Roma.

Box 9: Pre-war populations in Kosovo

Albanian: Made up 83 per cent of the population at the 1991 census.

Serb: Made up 10 per cent of the population in the 1991 census.

Gypsy/Roma: Estimated to have made up 2 per cent of the pre-war population. Referred to by outsiders as Roma/Rom or Gypsy, they comprise several groups which identify themselves separately and which have integrated differently with other communities. This includes: Romany-speaking 'ethnic Roma'; Albanian-speaking Ashkaelia; Egyptians, who attained recognition of their separate in the 1980s; Serbo-Croat-speaking Cergari of the Orthodox faith; Catholic Roma.

Gorani: Muslim Slavs living mainly in the Dragash area of southern Kosovo and north-west Macedonia.

Catholic Kosovo Albanians.

Turks: Turkish-speaking.

Bosniak: Serbo-Croat-speaking Slavs, of Muslim faith.

Croats (Janjevci): from Croatia.

Krajina Serbs: Serb refugees from Krajina, Croatia.

Cerkezi: Muslims, small community originating from Russia.

Source: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999a, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999b.

Within ethnic groups there has been a diversity of experience. At the same time as over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians were expelled or fled from Kosovo during the NATO campaign, over one million civilians stayed in Kosovo. Some hid in their houses, some moved to other parts of Kosovo, while others spent several months hiding in the mountains. Those who stayed received no external assistance during the war. In general, the central, western and northern areas of Kosovo suffered the fiercest fighting between the Serb military and the KLA and rural communities were worse affected than the urban centres. For example, many villages along the Albanian border were cleared and destroyed, while Prizren and Gjakova were less damaged.

People's reasons for leaving are also complex. Not all Kosovo Albanians left because of the Serb military. One family interviewed, who were from Peje, claimed to have left under intimidation by the KLA, because the husband had not fought for them and because they suspected his Bosnian wife of being a Serb.¹¹⁰ Some families have also not returned to because they hope to get to a third country.

The length of time people have been displaced varies greatly. The majority of Kosovo Albanians were refugees for only the three months of the war, but a significant number have been displaced inside the province for much longer. Many Serb and Roma have now been displaced for longer than most Kosovo Albanians. While the acute needs of Kosovo Albanian refugees received much international attention, the chronic needs of displaced Serbs and Romas have received less attention. Despite the large numbers of displaced Kosovo Serb and Roma in Serbia, one donor informant noted with regards to Serbia '*There is no humanitarian crisis there*'.¹¹¹

The independent evaluation of UNHCR performance during the Kosovo refugee crisis acknowledges that the two main 'saving graces' were the hosting by families and the

¹¹⁰ Interviewed in Bosnia, March 2000.

¹¹¹ Interview, DFID, London, March 2000.

refugees' ability to pay for rent and food (Suhrke et al., 2000). It also notes that this situation was unsustainable. In other words, the third 'saving grace' was the short duration of the crisis.

Box 10: Interview with displaced Kosovo Albanian Family, Gjakova

Ahmed comes from a village of 25 families near the Albanian border. The KLA was active on the border and the village was totally destroyed by the Serb forces to create a security zone. All the houses are Category 5 (refer to Box 5), so they cannot go back yet. On 25 March 1999, 20 people were killed in one room. Ahmed escaped with his family that day and went to Krume in Albania. Initially they stayed in a collective centre until an Albanian family took them in. There were ten Kosovos and five from the Albanian family all in one house. Later people from other villages joined them making it 30 people in the one house. When the border was shelled they moved to Durres. In Krume they paid no rent, but in Durres they rented a private apartment. In Krume they received assistance from the Red Cross. In Durres there were different agencies.

Ahmed now stays in the Brick Factory camp, which houses 60 families and 147 children according to a SC survey. The Salvation Army ran the camp to start with. Since then there have been Catholic, Muslim and Christian Evangelical NGOs working in the camp, which has caused friction. Ahmed does not go to school and does not work. His family receives his father's pension: he worked in Germany and died there 15 years ago.

Box 11: Interview with former Kosovo Albanian refugees in Prizren

Diella and her family left Prizren on 13 April entering Albania through Morini. They did not wait for the organised transport but paid 50 DEM to travel by minibus to Tirana.

On arrival they contacted a family whose name they had been given in Prizren. The family of five had a three bedroom house. Diella's family stayed there for one month. At the beginning no aid was provided to the refugees and they relied on their hosts. They contributed a little to buy food, but during their stay their hosts received no aid from the agencies. After one month Diella moved into rented accommodation with her sister's family while her mother, father and brother went to a camp in Ndroq, outside Tirana. Ndroq camp was managed by ACT, and Danish and Polish NGOs. The hygienic conditions in the camp were very poor.

Diella and her sister, with three children, mother-in-law and husband stayed for six weeks in a small apartment paying 250 DEM per month. During this time they received aid from ARC only once (two parcels). In the area where she stayed aid was distributed by an Italian NGO that provided food and hygienic items, fresh milk, powdered milk and some chocolate once a week. Some 'Arabs' also distributed 'abundant food and very good things'. The Italians and Arabs did not use ARC's lists. In Diella's opinion the international agencies lacked coordination. When they needed health assistance they went to the local clinic and got a free check-up and medicines. There were cases when refugees sold food aid in order to buy fruit or entertainment, or to go to coffee bars. They took the aid that they didn't use back to Prizren. They did not wait for organised transport to return but paid for a minibus from Tirana to Prizren.

The Albanians were poor but their hospitality was good. Even when Diella and her sister's family paid rent they considered it normal because it was very little money.

Coping strategies

It is well recognised that people in the face of crisis are not passive, but deploy a range of coping strategies, including the decision to move. Most Kosovo Albanian refugees were expelled from Kosovo and therefore had no choice but to leave (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999). It is apparent, however, that as refugees they were not passive

but utilised various strategies in response to their situation (see refugee interviews below). These included:

- staying together as an extended family unit (particularly Albanian families);
- dividing the family between a refugee camp and private accommodation;
- hiding valuables (cash or jewellery) in their compounds before they left Kosovo;
- moving around Albania;
- staying in private accommodation;
- travelling outside the region;
- maintaining communication with relatives outside the region;
- maintaining communication with relatives and friends inside Kosovo;
- selling or exchanging food aid for other needed items;
- finding paid work.

Box 12: Interviews with former Kosovo Albanian refugees

(i) R is disabled. Five days before NATO started bombing he was still working [with Handikos], distributing wheel chairs and hygiene kits. When the bombing started he stayed at home for four days, before moving to another area for three days. Then it became too dangerous. After the Serb police came to his house he travelled with his sister and her two daughters to Albania. They lost their documents at the border. They spent two nights in Kukes and then three months in Tirana. Three days after the NATO bombing ended he returned to Kosovo.

In Tirana he worked with the Protestant Church of Nazareth and began the registration of disabled refugees. He stayed with his family in private accommodation and did not consider that the rent of 220 DEM per month to be high. The owner stayed in the house and shared their aid. R had a cousin in Austria and a friend in Struga who also helped. A Swedish doctor sent him 1,000 Swiss Francs. The most important assistance was from his relatives, because it took a month for them to register as refugees. They received hygiene parcels but this was not enough.

(ii) N is disabled and the sole supporter of her family. She used to work as a 'professional smuggler', bringing in textiles from Turkey. She paid an agent to get her out of Kosovo 7-8 months before the NATO bombings, during the 1998 offensive. She went through Hungary and Austria to Switzerland, travelling without her wheelchair. In Switzerland she stayed first in a refugee shelter, then later with her brother. It was good in Switzerland as she received the physiotherapy that she needed.

In many emergencies, coping strategies can be sub-optimal, resulting in a depletion of assets and increased vulnerability. In the case of Kosovo, the scale of the international response possibly mitigated this, enabling refugees to preserve their assets. However, there has been little assessment of the strategies employed by Kosovo refugees during the crisis, perhaps because the massive international response overshadowed the strategies that refugees employed to help themselves.¹¹² The main examples where agencies supported refugees' own strategies were in the facilitation of communication through tracing, the provision of mobile phones and support for refugees in private accommodation.

¹¹² There has been some research on coping strategies in Kosovo before during and after the war (Ogden, 2000).

7.3 Refugees in Private Accommodation

A unique feature of the Kosovo refugee crisis was the role that communities in neighbouring countries played in hosting refugees. Although this has occurred in other refugee crises, the scale in response to the Kosovo emergency was unprecedented. Although there are no exact figures, in part due to inadequate registration, it is estimated that by June 1999 over 60 per cent of the refugees in Albania (300,000) and Macedonia (152,000) were staying in private accommodation (Suhrke et al., 2000). In Bosnia, the majority of Albanian refugees were also housed with host families, and in Serbia and Montenegro over 90 per cent of the refugees have been accommodated privately (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). In comparison, the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme from Macedonia saw 92,000 refugees temporarily hosted in 29 countries (Suhrke et al., 2000).

In many ways the Alliance was *'let off the hook'*, since a disproportionate amount of international military and humanitarian resources went into the refugee camps where there were fewer refugees. The evaluation of the EMG in Albania acknowledges this, noting:

The crisis was managed and absorbed by both the refugees themselves (paying for their subsistence...) and generous host families, communities and authorities (Telford, 1999).

Several surveys and assessments have been made of Kosovo refugees and host families.¹¹³ However, there has been no comprehensive and systematic attempt to record the phenomenon. The UNHCR evaluation (Suhrke et al, 2000) notably skirts over the issue, although the phenomenon raises important issues regarding refugee protection.

Protection

First, there is the question of responsibility for privately accommodated refugees. Formal responsibility for refugee protection lies first with the host government. The Albanian and Macedonian governments, however, adopted different positions. Albania's policy was to welcome all Kosovo Albanian refugees, while Macedonia sought to restrict their entry. At a local level, refugees were subject to the varied attitudes and motivations of the authorities.¹¹⁴ UNHCR had little systematic knowledge of refugees outside the camps and few resources with which to monitor their protection needs (Suhrke et al, 2000). In Albania and Macedonia, the Red Cross took overall responsibility for refugees in private families, including their registration.

Specific problems faced by groups like the Roma are dealt with in Section 7.5. Problems faced by Kosovo Albanian refugees included:

- non-registration of privately hosted refugees;
- insecurity, particularly in Albania;

¹¹³ MSF surveyed refugees in host families in Kukes in 1999; Refugees International interviewed over 300 refugees in host families in 5 Albanian cities in May/June 1999; WHO surveyed refugees in host families in Macedonia; MCIC surveyed 223 refugees in May 1999 and host families in Macedonia in June 1999; Oxfam surveyed refugees outside camps in Shkoder in July 1999; CARE surveyed 175 host families in Elbasan in August 1999; ICRC interviewed host families in Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro in 1999.

¹¹⁴ This problem was noted by NGOs in Albania and Serbia.

- harassment of women outside camps;¹¹⁵
- in Macedonia, 90 per cent of disabled refugees were living outside the camps, according to WHO;
- in Macedonia, women refugees in host families were not registered in their own name, but that of their nearest male relative, thus breaching international refugee norms (Williams, 1999). Restricted access to medical facilities in Macedonia, meant that Albanian women could only giving birth in Tetova hospital;
- weak leadership structures amongst refugees outside camps was a constraint to representing their needs (Wolf, 1999a).

Coverage

The likelihood that Kosovo refugees would stay in private accommodation in Albania should have been anticipated. In 1998, many of the refugees entering Tropoje were housed privately (Fennell, 1998). At that time warnings were given about the capacity of local families to provide long term support, and NGOs and donors stressed the importance of providing assistance to host families as well as refugees. Some agencies did identify the needs of refugees and host families early on, for example the Red Cross, Christian and CAD in Albania. However, the coverage of refugees in host families was problematic.

The high visibility of refugee camps was a magnet to NATO forces, donors, NGOs and the media. Consequently, they received a disproportionate level of assistance, given the smaller number of refugees. This differential treatment infringes universal standards of refugee protection. But as one aid worker noted: *'host family intervention was seen as low profile and certainly not seen to be a sexy caseload'*.¹¹⁶

There is some evidence that only the poorest refugees who could not afford to stay in private accommodation went to the camps.¹¹⁷ If true, this would have justified some extra assistance to refugees in camps, but the evidence is equivocal.

In Albania, a breakdown in the Red Cross pipeline caused a delay in distributions to refugees in host families. Refugees were cared for by local populations until other assistance became available (see section 7.4). Lack of registration and the tendency of refugees to move also meant that finding and identifying those in most need and monitoring distributions was problematic, leading to inconsistent coverage. In Kukes town, for example, it was reported that assistance to host families was adequately covered, but not in rural villages.¹¹⁸

In Macedonia, a WHO survey of refugees in host families found their access to food was problematic (World Health Organisation, 1999). As refugees in Macedonia were not given refugee status, but were counted as *'humanitarian assisted persons'*, those in private accommodation were not officially entitled to free health services. Other problems faced by privately accommodated refugees included lack of information about their entitlements, weak

¹¹⁵ Oxfam gender assessment in Kukes April/May 1999.

¹¹⁶ Quoted in the Valid international Lesson Learning Study notes.

¹¹⁷ IFRC interview Tirana, March 2000.

¹¹⁸ Interview with CAD, Tirana, March 2000.

leadership structures and growing tensions amongst the refugees themselves.¹¹⁹ For aid agencies the large number of refugee living outside camps also made it harder to prepare for and control the repatriation process.

Standards

While standards exist for camp regimes, there are no clear standards for privately accommodated refugees. Sphere guidelines for shelter and site planning briefly refer to host families in relation to assessments and clothing, to ensure that aid interventions minimise any negative effect on host populations.

7.4 The Role of Host Families in Albania and Macedonia

The Albanian and Macedonian communities have been praised for their generosity in accommodating Kosovo Albanian refugees.¹²⁰ This praise has been tempered by evidence that some refugees were paying rent. In recognition of this, the description of refugees staying with 'host families' was later changed to refugees in 'private accommodation'. One aid worker in Macedonia commented to the evaluation team that '*In Albania the hosting in family was a business deal. Macedonian Albanians are more religious*'.¹²¹

Precise figures on the numbers of refugees paying rent do not exist. A survey by MSF in Kukes estimated that 60 per cent of refugee families were paying rent of on average 250 DEM per month. A survey by Refugees International of 300 refugee families in 5 other cities reached a similar conclusion (Wolf, 1999b). It noted that the highest percentage of rent payers was in Tirana and the lowest in Korce, and assumed that the amount paid in rural communities was lower. An ICRC survey of 50 families in Albania concluded that over time host families did begin to receive rent from their guests of up to 250 DEM per month (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). In contrast, a survey by CARE of 175 host families in Elbasan, found only one household that acknowledged taking rent from refugees.¹²² Reportedly, where guests and host families were related the hosts could not charge rent.

The evidence from the evaluation team is equivocal. None of the host families interviewed acknowledged taking rent from the refugees who stayed with them. Several former refugees, however, stated that they paid some rent, mostly for empty apartments and amounts of less than 250 DEM per month.

The evaluation team concurs with the conclusions of the ICRC evaluation, that the initial motivation of families in Albania towards Kosovo Albanian refugees was a combination of hospitality, moral duty and political solidarity (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). This was

¹¹⁹ Refugees International, May/June 1999. Oxfam, July 1999.

¹²⁰ In Macedonia, it was Macedonian Albanians who hosted Kosovo Albanians.

¹²¹ Interviewed in Skopje, February 2000.

¹²² It was noted that the families thought they might not get government assistance if they acknowledged receiving rent.

also the case among families hosting refugees in Serbia and Montenegro. Financial gain was not a motivation at the beginning, but may have become an issue over time as the costs of hospitality became more burdensome. The Albanian translator for the evaluation team reached a similar conclusion:

One result of this interview, and of the interviews in Skhodra ... has been that the translator has completely changed her view of the assistance provided to the Kosovars. Previously she thought that those providing assistance were doing so for mixed motives. Now she recognises that, for many, the motive was primarily humanitarian. [She] did not take any refugees herself, but did wash their clothes and bring food to them.¹²³

A culture of hospitality

Familial relations were not a motivating factor behind the hospitality shown to refugees in Albania. Although some host families asserted that Kosovo Albanians were ‘*of the same blood*’, none of those interviewed acknowledged any direct kinship ties with their guests. Only one mentioned a prior friendship.¹²⁴ Due to different political histories familial ties are strongest between Kosovo Albanians and Macedonian Albanians. In answer to the question why they took in refugees, most replied ‘*savap*’ (a ‘good deed’).

In Albania there is a strong culture of hospitality. This is laid down in the ‘*Kanun*’, Albanian Traditional Law which is strongest in northern Albania. Most commonly associated with blood feuds, the *Kanun* prescribes a comprehensive set of behavioural norms, including the obligation to provide for kinsmen in distress (see Box 13). Being implicit in society’s values the *Kanun* was not mentioned by host families interviewed.

Box 13: The Code of Leke Dukagjini, Chapter 18, Social Honour

The house of the Albanian belongs to God and the guest (article 602).
 The guest must be honoured with bread and salt and the heart (article 608).
 At any time of the day or night, one must be ready to receive a guest with bread and salt and an open heart, with a fire, a log of wood, and a bed (article 609).
 Every guest must be given the food eaten in the house. A special guest must be given coffee, raki, and food in addition to that eaten ordinarily (articles 611, 612).
 When a guest enters your house, he is free of any obligations to you while he is there (article 619).

Source: Shtjefen Gjecov (trans. Leonard Fox.) New York. Gjonlekaj Publishing Company in 1989.

Political solidarity

In Albania there was strong public sympathy for Kosovo Albanians, and the government said it would not refuse any refugee. In Macedonia the political dynamic was more complex. While the government was reticent to accept any Albanian refugees, the Albanian population

¹²³ Interview, 16 March 2000.

¹²⁴ The CARE survey in Elbasan similarly noted that only 8 per cent of Kosovar refugees were related to their Albanian host family.

and its political representatives were strongly sympathetic. In March 1998, the leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians in Macedonia announced, *'If there is trouble, Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and of course Albania will stand as one...'* (ICG, 1998). In Macedonia there was an added element of religious duty among some Macedonian Albanian host families interviewed.

Support provided by host families and communities

In the first days of the crisis, before international aid agencies arrived, Kosovo Albanians were warmly welcomed in Albania and by Albanian communities in Macedonia. The response was immediate and widespread. At a local level three sources of support were available: private families, local authorities and local NGOs.

In Albania, local and national government organised the transportation of refugees by bus, minibus and military truck from the border to other regions of the country, where they were placed in collective centres. From there host families collected guests. In some areas, village councils took names of volunteers willing to accept guests (refer to Box 15). In Skhodra it was reported that when the local TV appealed for help for 4,000 refugees all were accommodated the same night. A similar response occurred in communities in western Macedonia.

Host families provided more than accommodation. They collected refugees from the camps and collective centres and helped them to register for assistance or access to health care. In Albania all utilities, according to government order, were to be provided free.¹²⁵ In Albania and Macedonia some of the refugee children attended local school, and after the war some host families helped the refugees with transport back to Kosovo.

Most families spoke positively about being hosts, expressing pride in what they had done. Many have remained in contact with their guests, and some have visited them in Kosovo. In one case villagers went to Kosovo to *'drink coffee'* and attend a funeral of one of the refugees who had stayed with them.¹²⁶

Not all the families, however, said that they were prepared to repeat the experience. The main difficulties expressed were cultural, despite sharing the same language and similar traditions (refer to Box 15). The fact that extended families wanted to be accommodated together made living conditions cramped, and in some cases created potential hygiene problems. In some cases host families moved out to stay with relatives in order to create space. In other cases, refugees were accommodated in the empty houses of relatives abroad.

In only one case, did a rural family complain that they had built up a debt of 40,000 Leke assisting the refugees. To pay it off the family had to sell two cows.¹²⁷ Some hosts did complain about the impact of refugee children on their furniture.

¹²⁵ Interview with Skhodra municipality, March 2000.

¹²⁶ Interview, Devoll, Albania, March 2000.

¹²⁷ Interview, Kamenica, Albania, March 2000.

In Albania, the guests were often wealthier than their hosts. International assistance was therefore an important source of support for both refugees and host families with whom they shared their food. Some host families reported that their guests did receive some assistance from relatives abroad. Although most said they refused to take offers of payment, some acknowledged that the refugees did contribute to 'living expenses' and some guests assisted with housework. Some host families felt that 'cash for shelter' would have been more useful than food parcels.

In Macedonia, host families interviewed in the towns were at least as wealthy as their guests, if not richer. In one case, the father of the family insisted on paying for all his guests' needs, and refused to allow them to take any international aid.¹²⁸ In Gostivar, the response of the community as a whole was particularly striking (refer to Box 18).

¹²⁸ Interviewed in Gostivar, March 2000.

Box 14: Host family interview, Lushne, Albania

Lili lives in a small apartment with his wife and three children. They have two rooms, about 15 to 20m², and a kitchen. Lili is a carpenter, the house is neat, clean and in a good repair. The eldest daughter, 17, is learning English. The neighbour from downstairs obviously respects Lili and his generosity towards the refugees.

When the municipality announced that refugees had arrived and needed accommodation, Lili and his wife went to the square to see if they could offer assistance. They found no-one left there. Lili returned the following morning and found a woman with four children who had slept overnight in her car, which she had driven from Gjakova. Lili invited them to stay, but the woman explained that she had other relatives who had come in other vehicles belonging to neighbours. Lili invited these as well and the total family of 11 came to stay. Through messages on the television, the woman found her husband and his nephew in another town. Lili went there to collect them so that all 13 stayed in his apartment. As a result of the television advertisement, another family of 13 turned up and were put up by the downstairs neighbour for one night. Lili offered to arrange a second house for part of the family, but they refused as they did not want to be split up. Lili's three children slept at their uncle's house, which his eldest daughter complained about. Lili and his wife used one room, and the Kosovos used the other two. Lili noted that there were naturally some minor differences of opinion among people sharing a house, but refugees were educated people, and Lili and his wife were acutely aware of their duties as hosts and of the harsh alternative facing their guests.

The refugees received a lot of support from the international community. There was no food distribution to the refugees for the first two weeks, but they later received some basic food (but no bread). The food packages improved over time. The host families only got food from the Red Cross and an Islamic Organisation, although the family did get the Host Family Allowance in June. Lili's family gave the Red Cross parcel to the refugees as they left so that they would have some food for the road.

The refugees were well off. They had a brother working in America who offered to pay for their accommodation. Lili refused, saying that they were guests. He also pointed out that his rent was low and was not a problem to pay. The refugees contributed to their keep through housework.

The refugees left after three months on 25 June. Some small repairs were needed to the apartment, but not many. The following January, Lili and his neighbour received a phone call inviting them to visit the family they had accommodated in Kosovo. They stayed there for three days and travelled to Pristina and Peja. They have been invited back for the following May.

Lili says that Lushne has a reputation for being very welcoming, which his family are obviously proud of. In support of this, he said that most of the divided refugee families in Lushne had the other part of their family come to Lushne rather than vice versa. The political and economic situation in Kosovo is not good. Although Kosovo Albanians have lots of remittances from abroad, there is no work. Albania may be poor but there is some work. Lili's neighbour argued that the international community and Europe owe a debt to Albania for the way Albanians behaved during the crisis. He says that the best way to correct this would be to allow Albanian host families the right to travel in Europe.

Box 15: Host family interview, Kamenica, Korce, Albania

Kamenica is a relatively poor rural village outside Korce, where Oxfam is repairing the water system. Rosetta runs a store with her husband. Three of her sons are working in Greece. The village is Muslim. There used to be Orthodox Christians but they moved to Korce or Tirana.

The Kosovo Albanians arrived in the village after Easter (around 20 April 1999). The family that stayed with Rosetta was very poor. In Kosovo they lived off social welfare. They came from near Kacanik. There were twelve in the family, six in Macedonia and six in Albania, and three of those in Macedonia were disabled children confined to wheelchairs. Half of the family arrived first. The father stayed in Albania for two and half months after which he was joined by his wife and children from Macedonia. When they arrived the family moved to the camp as it was not feasible for the disabled children to stay in the village.

Their arrival was well organised. The families were dropped by bus in the village. The Kryplac (village leader) asked who was willing to host families and put their names on the list. Rosetta felt sorry for this family because they had a one-year old child who was sick. One of their sons was also fighting for the KLA. She housed them in the empty house of a relative. It had three rooms, but despite this they preferred to sleep in one room because they were frightened at first. When they arrived the families insisted on staying together. This was very difficult but it was impossible to split them up. They all ate together off one plate as in the old Albanian tradition. She said '*it took us time to get used to each other*'.

The refugees received assistance. Rosetta did not seek any for herself as she had her shop and did not need it. In the first two weeks there was no external aid so the villagers helped out. The aid for the refugees came from the Red Cross. The police also helped with the distribution. Sometimes there was aid for the host families. Rosetta got some compensation — 5,000 Leke for the whole period of their stay. Where others stayed for three months the hosts got closer to 20,000 Leke.

Rosetta has not maintained contact with them. They exchanged addresses but she knows everything in Kosovo was destroyed. She felt sympathy for them because her own family has been refugees — her children are abroad in Greece illegally. However, her family's land is too small to farm — she has one horse for transport and one cow. Only one of her children attended high school. According to what the refugees told them it seemed that they were wealthier than the Albanians.

Box 16: Host family interview, Tirana

Myzejen is a paediatric nurse in a polyclinic in Tirana. Her family runs a small café bar, which they bought just before the refugee crisis. Her husband and son are unemployed. During the refugee crisis she was appointed by the government to work in the Swimming Pool Camp in Tirana. She was expecting to get paid, but for two months' work she received only US\$50. At the Polyclinic she earns US\$70 per month. While at the camp, no-one organised her work. When the staff complained to the government about lack of pay, they were told to raise their own money from NGOs. She did not do this as she has always worked for the government and did not understand how to approach an NGO.

Her family accommodated a family of 13 Kosovo Albanians in the two rooms they have since converted into a café bar and provided them with furniture to use. Her husband and a friend had met two young Kosovars in a bar. They were working in Macedonia and had heard that their family had left Kosovo for Albania by tractor. Myzejen's husband helped them to trace their families through other refugees and found them in a camp in Vlora. The refugees stayed from the second week of April until the first week of June, after which they left for Kosovo, collecting their tractor in Kukes where they had left it.

During the first week of their stay Myzejen cooked for them, helped them to register and went to the distribution points with them. Her friends gave clothes for the children. Relatives of the refugees in Germany also brought money for them. They received enough food aid for the adults, but bought food and powdered milk for the children, the youngest of whom was only 3 months. Myzejen also brought some children's food from the Swimming Pool Camp.

Myzejen explained that the family came from a rural village in Kosovo, near Drenica and knew nothing about raising children. The youngest child was rachitic. As a nurse she spent some time teaching the women better nutrition. She also bought them some medicines, for which she was not compensated. When the refugees knew they were going back they began to sell their food parcels in the camps. Parcels [or the ration] typically included: sweets, sugar, rice, tin of beans (not used), soup (not used), 2 blankets, milk powder, macaroni and wheat flour.

Refugees outside the camps did not have easy access to health-care. In the Swimming Pool Camp there were the government, IMC and the Greek Army ambulance and Kosovo doctors providing 24-hour coverage. At the beginning people were in shock and an Albanian and Kosova psychologist provided counselling. Myzejen heard that there was counselling support for the host families, but she did not get any. Although refugees in camps got more supplies and medical help, conditions for women with children were considered poor, especially as the tents were hot.

The refugees' husbands continued to work in Macedonia and visited them twice. They paid nothing towards the costs of their stay, and Myzejen has had no contact since they left. The family baked bread in the apartment and destroyed the stove and she had to throw away her furniture after they left. She did receive some compensation (1,100 LEK per person) but gave it to the refugees to hire a taxi to take them to Kukes.

The cultural differences with this Kosovo family were strongly felt. Their language was provincial and difficult for Myzejen to understand. There is a big difference between rural and urban wealth. More rural people were in camps than in rented accommodation. Those with money rented for themselves. When asked why she helped them, Myzejen said '*savap*' (a good deed). She was non-committal about whether she would do the same again, although she said she had seen worse cases than her's. When asked what assistance would be most useful to her she said money.

Box 17: Response to Kosovo refugee crisis in Gostivar, Macedonia¹²⁹

Gostivar in western Macedonia has a predominantly Albanian population and like Tetova is a centre of Albanian nationalism. There are close familial ties between Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo since the time of Yugoslavia.

Albanian communities in Macedonia were well prepared for the crisis, which the mayor described as the biggest crisis to hit Gostivar since World War II. Macedonia has been assisting refugees from Bosnia since 1991, so some local capacity existed within the municipalities and within local NGOs like El Hilal, the League of Albanian Women, Roma NGOs and MCIC.

The first refugees arrived prior to the NATO air strikes; some came as early January 1999 when NATO began to patrol the border. There was another influx on 18 March, but they did not arrive in large numbers until 10 April, which gave some time for local people to get organised. Initially the refugees came on their own accord. However, after the local TV broadcast what was happening, local families went to the border with buses, taxis and cars to collect them. Some of the buses were organised by the Albanian Democratic Party. The municipal chairman noted:

One hundred buses came one day. We sent them to ten mosques, three in Gostivar and the rest outside the town. By 10am the following day every one of these refugees was in a host family.

El Hilal was able to mobilise a large number of volunteers who signed up at the mosques. For a couple of months the mosques prepared three meals a day which could be eaten there or taken home. Some of the food was contributed by local people. One man gave his whole supply of potatoes. In the first few weeks local bakers provided bread free of charge. One grocer was reported to have given his entire stock to refugees and his shop has been closed since. A photographic shop spent over 20,000 DEM providing passport photos for free so that refugees could obtain the refugee Green Cards. The photographers went to mosques and villages to provide the service.

Food parcels were distributed by various local organisations - MRC, El Hilal, the League of Albanian Women and Mesecina. Some refugees got fresh milk everyday from El Hilal. There was a free clinic for refugees supported by UNICEF, which they could access with their green cards. Albanian doctors in the state system also treated refugees at government facilities.

In the opinion of local people, refugees in host families were better off than in camps. Many people in Gostivar have worked abroad and have good houses and facilities. In some cases refugees were housed in the empty houses of emigrants. In Cegrane, sanitary conditions were poor until the water system was working. Some refugees moved between the camp and the town.

Had the crisis lasted longer the situation might have deteriorated. The Mayor of Gostivar noted:

We were very lucky that it ended so quickly, otherwise I don't know what we would have done. The local population has lots of economic problems. We could not have survived without the support from International NGOs. When we lost hope as to how we could help the NGOs came and helped.

¹²⁹ Compiled from several interviews with local government, NGOs and host families in Gostivar, March 2000.

Box 18: Interview with local partner, El Hilal, Gostivar¹³⁰

El Hilal was well prepared for the crisis in the Gostivar municipality. Before the refugees arrived and before the bombing started it had prepared a register of all the local people with space in their houses and all the local accommodation available. It also stockpiled large quantities of food donated by its volunteers. This enabled El Hilal to act quickly when the refugees came.

Initially the refugees went to the mosque to be registered, allocated to a household and given an El Hilal registration card. In the mosque they were provided with a 24-hour service of food and drink. The international organisations came on the scene much later. El Hilal claimed it had to provide its own aid for approximately 25 days until international aid arrived.

According to El Hilal the refugees were better off in host families, and were generally keen to be housed in this way rather than in camps. The method of deciding whether they stayed in a camp or with host families was simply that the first refugees to arrive were allocated among host families. Once there was no more room in the municipality, new refugees went into the camps. El Hilal asserts there was more space in host families in other municipalities but the government did not want the refugees spread out over the whole country. El Hilal noted that in Gostivar there was more political will to help the refugees.

Refugee choice

While concerns over the lack of international attention paid to refugees in private accommodation were probably legitimate, it should not be forgotten that most of them chose to stay outside the camps. A choice that was not based on whether they would be better cared for by the international community, but other reasons:

- A lack of camp facilities at the start left refugees with little choice but to accept private accommodation. Many of those staying with host families arrived 10-14 days before the camps were established. There is some evidence from Albania that once camps were set up some refugees in private accommodation moved into them. However, it is also the case that refugees commonly moved in and out of the camps. Furthermore, some family members stayed in the camps to have the chance of being sent to a third country.
- Many refugees disliked living in tented camps, which were crowded, hot and restricted their freedom of movement. Conditions were generally considered better in the host families. In Macedonia, camps were described as places of '*containment rather than shelter*'.¹³¹ Refugees with money preferred to rent private accommodation in towns, at least while their money lasted.¹³²
- For some more vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or disabled, private homes probably provided a more comfortable and protective environment. While several host families reported that refugees were initially frightened when they arrived, only one host

¹³⁰ El Hilal is a partner of MCIC.

¹³¹ HAI, draft report, April 1999.

¹³² Host family interview, Skhodra, March 2000.

family interviewed reported psychological problems among its guests and in this case the woman had a long history of illness.¹³³

International assistance for privately accommodated refugees

The refugees in private accommodation were less well-provided for than refugees in camps, in terms of material assistance, access to care, information and protection. However, the evidence from this evaluation suggests that privately accommodated refugees did not suffer unduly in the short term.

In the view of host families, the amount of food received by the refugees was sufficient and in some cases more than was needed (refer also to Section 1). In several cases they reported that the refugees did not collect their entitlements. One host who had 40 refugees staying in his compound said that he had to organise a cart to deliver the 26 food aid boxes to the house.¹³⁴ Another reported that a refugee family took a lorry load of food back to Kosovo. The main complaint was the type of food provided - pastas and tinned foods were not popular. However, unwanted or excess food was often exchanged for fresh milk, eggs or meat. The distribution of non-food assistance, hygiene packages and clothes was more erratic.

International assistance for host families

Over the seven-week period of the crisis, concerns grew about the impact of the refugee influx on host communities. There were reports of rising tension between host families and refugees and also that refugees were beginning to move from host families to camps (Oxfam, 1999b). In June, one survey reported that refugees were leaving private accommodation because they could not pay; *'when they run out of money, they are out of housing'* (Wolf, 1999). This situation was later contradicted by CARE's assessment in Elbasan (CARE International, 1999).

Among donors there was particular concern about the political impact of the refugee influx in Macedonia. In April, the World Bank warned about a possible increase in political and social tension and allocated US\$1 million for a community-based assistance programme for refugees and host families in Macedonia. The food parcels provided by ARC, MRC, MCIC and others to host families was, in part, intended to alleviate these tensions by reducing the burden on the local community. Concerns about the capacity of refugees and host families to cope through the winter led UNHCR to initiate a cash grant project worth US\$8 million for host families in Albania, and a similar one for US\$10 million in Macedonia. This was intended to give host families the equivalent of US\$10 per month per refugee, backdated to 1 April. Most payments were not received until June, after the repatriation started. In Macedonia, Swiss Disaster Relief also made cash grants of 200 DEM per host family through MCIC, and a Greek NGO gave 100 DEM per family. The Danish Refugee Council also carried out repairs to some host family houses. Subsequent to the refugees' return several agencies have been involved in short-term community projects in the affected areas.

¹³³ Host family interview, Devoll, Albania, March 2000.

¹³⁴ Host family Interview, Elbasan, March 2000.

In Albania, all families acknowledged receiving some food aid for themselves and compensation payments from ‘the government’. This was paid in June against lists provided by the municipality. While all families welcomed the payments, they asserted it did not cover the real costs of hosting the refugees. However, only two people complained that they were worse off as a result of being hosts. In Albania, one woman who hosted refugees said she gave her compensation to the refugees to pay for their transport back to Kosovo (see Box 16). Several host families reported not taking the aid to which they were entitled to, a point confirmed by some aid agencies.¹³⁵ The survey undertaken by CARE in Elbasan indicated that host families did not suffer a serious decline in household livelihood security as a result of hosting Kosovo refugees (CARE International, 1999).

7.5 Other Refugees

Once KFOR entered Kosovo, the focus of the international humanitarian response switched to Kosovo and the return of Kosovo Albanians. People who have become refugees since then — whether Albanians from Prosevo in Serbia, Serbs from Kosovo, or Roma from Kosovo — have received a much lower level of international support, both in quantity and quality.

In Macedonia those arriving since June 1999 have been accommodated in collective centres, access to which has been restricted. Families who moved from camps to collective centres complained that the conditions were worse. The policy of the government seems to be to avoid making the refugees too comfortable, a policy that UNHCR seems to concur with. Unlike the Kosovo Albanians, however, the future for these refugees is bleak. They cannot return to their home country. Some of the welfare safety nets they relied on before the war, such as state pensions, have been lost.

Roma refugees

The Roma are probably the most politically vulnerable of all the communities from Kosovo. Like other communities, their experiences have varied depending on their particular relationship with those they lived among. However, the Kosovo Albanians have accused the Roma population collectively of collaboration with the Yugoslav and Serb forces. While some Roma have stayed in Kosovo, many have left since the end of the war because of intimidation.

There is evidence to suggest that Roma refugees in Macedonia have fared worse than the Kosovo Albanians. During the initial emergency, Roma who stayed in camps suffered intimidation and violence from Kosovo Albanian refugees. Most Roma therefore lived outside the camps in collective centres or private accommodation (refer to Box 20). Not all Roma are poor, although many lacked the assets of the Kosovo Albanians. Also because resident Roma are poorer than their Albanian neighbours, Roma refugees were more likely to have to pay for accommodation.

¹³⁵ Interview with CAD, Macedonia, March 2000.

Box 19: Interview with Roma family in collective centre, Macedonia

The family is from Pristina where the father worked in the Sports Centre. They stayed in Pristina throughout the bombing. When their Albanian neighbours returned in June 1999, things became difficult for them. The father was beaten by the neighbours and fled to a village where he had an aunt. However, all the Roma had left and he was threatened again. The KLA then kidnapped him and he was badly beaten and sexually harassed by 2 KLA women. On his release, he returned to Pristina with his family. The KLA poured petrol inside the house and told the family to leave. They moved to Kosovo Polje (in Kosovo) where they stayed for 2 months in a collective centre with 7,000 other people. However, they continued to be harassed so they walked with 460 other people to Macedonia.

They arrived in Stankovic camp on 28 September and left when the camp was closed on 10 December (during this period only Roma were in the camp). Their third baby was born in Stankovic on 10 November. The mother used the Mother Child Centre and received nappies, UHT milk and biscuits for the children. At times, however, goods were not available, and the family suspected that girls working in the centre were stealing and complained.

In all countries there is evidence of social exclusion and prejudice.¹³⁶ Governments are opposed to supporting income generation activities for Roma out of fear that they will stay. They have limited access to health services and education. In Macedonia, the quality of food for Roma in collective centres was poor. In Serbia, Roma from Kosovo face restriction on travelling to northern Serbia.¹³⁷ They have tended to settle in marginal areas, often in old abandoned buildings, on the outskirts of town or near to rubbish sites where they draw some living from recycling. There is no health surveillance and lack of access to education also means no vaccination.

Discrimination against Roma is also apparent in some international aid programmes. In Berane in Montenegro, the evaluation team found Roma living in overcrowded, unhygienic collective centres, while Serb IDPs have either been re-housed or moved into private accommodation. The level of service provided in the Roma collective centres would probably be unacceptable to Serb refugees.¹³⁸ Although several agencies provide specific assistance to Roma and support Roma NGOs, it was reported to the team that only ICRC in Former Yugoslavia employs a Roma field worker.

¹³⁶ A situation similar to Britain.

¹³⁷ Interview with CAFOD partner, Belgrade. April 2000.

¹³⁸ The team also found a disparity between collective centres housing displaced Serbs and Roma in North Mitrovica.

Box 20: Interview with Roma family, Tetova, Macedonia

M comes from Urosevac. He left Kosovo in March with his family. Five of his family are in Macedonia, another four went to Germany illegally. He no longer has a home in Kosovo. He received a paper in November 1999 notifying him that his house had been destroyed (Category 4). Three of his brothers and a son also had their houses in Urosevac destroyed. He used to be on a pension of 50 DEM a month, but he no longer receives this. *M* went to Kosovo three times to check if he could return. As a result he lost his green card, so now he does not receive any assistance. Another daughter also does not have a card. She used to live in Gjakove but now cannot return. The son-in-law also lost his house and car. He used to work as a cleaner, but cannot return now because he was threatened.

M feels he has done no harm to Albanians but they burnt his house. Nobody forced him to leave. He ran because of the confusion. He was most afraid of the bombing. Also the UCK tried to force his son to join them, so he left. The rural people are the main problem if he tries to return. The urban people know him well, but the Serbs fired at the houses of the Albanians in the villages so they do not understand why the Roma should continue to have a house.

M is staying in a house rented by his daughter and son-in-law who have been in Macedonia for several years. Another of his sons killed his wife and is in jail in Belgrade, so *M* now has to take care of the three grandchildren. The house is rented for 100 DEM per month. The son in Germany sends some money to help, they sell some of their food aid to pay rent, and the son-in-law can earn 5–10 DEM/day from labouring in construction work, but it is only seasonal employment.

Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia

There were, and still are, significant differences between the experiences of Kosovo refugees and displaced people in Albania and Macedonia and those in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia. These three countries already had an existing refugee caseload from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. The hospitality they have shown to refugees has worn thin as the economic burden has taken its toll.

Serbs and Roma displaced from Kosovo are unlikely to return and will therefore require longer-term assistance. However, the international community has provided less humanitarian support to refugees and the IDPs in these countries than it did in Albania and Macedonia. While there are some long-term refugee camps in Montenegro, the majority of IDPs and refugees are in private accommodation and collective centres making them less visible than the refugees were in Albania and Macedonia. In northern Montenegro, Kosovo Albanian IDPs face problems being accepted by the local pro-Serb community. Kosovo Albanian children were unable to enter the school system because they did not speak Serbo-Croat and separate schools have had to be set up.

7.6 DEC Agencies' Support to Refugees

The main focus of the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo refugee crisis was on supporting refugees in camps and collective centres. Although comparative data is not available, less support was given to the greater number of refugees accommodated outside camps and collective centres. By contrast, all DEC agencies have devoted considerable resources to refugees and IDPs outside camps and to host communities in the countries where they have been active (see Tables 30 and 31).¹³⁹ Some DEC agencies, such as the Red Cross,

¹³⁹ Comparative data is not available to give figures.

CAD and Christian Aid, who were supporting work with local partners and communities, were alert to their needs early on. Others, such as HAI, who joined the response later in Macedonia, deliberately targeted refugees in host families.

Table 30: Phase I: DEC agency support for privately accommodated refugees and host families

(Assistance part or wholly DEC-funded)

Agency	Albania		Macedonia	
	Partner	Activity	Partner	Activity
BRCS	ARC	Placing of delegates. For refugees in host families, procurement and distribution of: MREs; family food parcels; baby hygiene parcels; hygiene parcels; blankets; sleeping bags.	MRC	Placing of Delegates. Refugees in host families. Distribution of: baby hygiene parcels.
CAD	Direct	Donated aid (DEC 45,146). Hygiene kits to refugees and host (DFID funded). Hygiene kits and linen to 25,000 refugees and 25,000 host families Materials to schools (OFDA-funded).	MRC El Hilal	Donated aid.
CARE	NPF (Help the Children)	School rehabilitation.		
Christian Aid	Diakonia Agape	Purchase and distribution of clothing parcels; tents; water purification tablets; cholera kits; MREs, for 25,000 refugees in host families and host families.	MCIC	Food/hygiene parcels (part DEC-funded) for refugees, host families and 'social cases'.
Concern	Direct	Food		
HAI			MRC UNHCR ADRA, CAD, MercyCorps WV, Mac. Pensioners Association	Relief (hygiene kits and bedding) for older refugees and host families.
Merlin	Direct WHO / IPH (not DEC)	Health centres: 2 clinics in Korce & Pogradec pharmacy. Assessment of TB control and hospital labs.		
Oxfam			Direct	Water and sanitation.
SC			El Hilal MRC/El Hilal PSF SC (Mac)	Mother/child clothing and hygiene kits. Complementary food. Drugs and support to Gostivar & Tetova hospital. Drugs to central pharmacy. General support to SC Macedonia.
Tearfund	Medair VUSh	Relief distribution.	SNI	Food and NFI.

Table 31: Phase II: DEC agencies support for refugee affected areas

Agency	Albania		Macedonia	
	Partner	Activity	Partner	Activity
BRCS	ARC	Procurement and distribution of educational kits; recreational kits for School children in resident population	MRC	Procurement and distribution of educational kits; recreational kits for school children in resident population.
CAD	Direct	Emergency support to education structures NE (ECHO funded) Play grounds (DFID funded)	Direct Direct Direct	Action van. School rehabilitation project. Health (safe motherhood).
CARE			Direct	Permaculture project in site of former refugee camp (EC funded).
Christian Aid			MCIC	Improvement of water supply in three affected villages.
Merlin	WHO/ IPH	Rehabilitation of 3 TB Labs Tirana, Skhodra, Korce (ECHO/ WHO funded)		
Oxfam	Direct	Water & sanitation	Direct	Water and sanitation.
SC	SC Alliance	One staff member seconded to education programmes	El Hilal	Health kits.
Tearfund	Direct Mitigation international	Solid Waste disposal, Kukes Counselling training with church partner		

Assessment of needs

In the camps, refugees appear to have been consulted through camp structures, refugee committees and specific interventions. For example, in Macedonia Oxfam supported ‘tea tents’; CARE supported Mother and Child Centres and SC reported that they utilised focus group discussions in the camps to involve women in programme design.¹⁴⁰ Consultation with refugees outside the camps was less evident although CAD appears to be an exception. In Serbia, the political situation restricts agencies’ freedom to consult with IDPs.

Appropriateness

The main focus of the assistance was on material relief. In the camps, however, the provision of non-material assistance, such as community services and information services, was considered important. Similarly, psychosocial support was largely a camp-based response, although there is no evidence that refugees inside camps suffered more or less trauma than those outside. No DEC agencies provided legal advice centres for those refugees outside camps, although some local partners did so.

Those beneficiaries of DEC assistance interviewed by the evaluation team reflected the diversity of experience noted. It was not apparent, however, that all agencies took these differences into account in their programme design. Standardised ‘kits’ or ‘parcels’ did not

¹⁴⁰ Interview with SC, London, March 2000.

reflect whether needs varied between refugee groups.

Supporting local capacity

In Albania and Macedonia, most of the support for refugees in host families provided by DEC agencies was implemented through local partners (see Tables 30 and 31).¹⁴¹ Refugee camps on the other hand, as one Albanian NGO complained, were the preserves of international NGOs.¹⁴² As in all complex political emergencies, there were advantages and risks of working with local partners.

The local knowledge of partners was important, some came from and knew the communities being assisted. They could draw on a large force of local volunteers and they required less expatriate involvement. This potentially ensured better coverage.¹⁴³

One problem was that some partners had little or no experience of emergency work. Local partners were mostly unaware of the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct, Sphere Guidelines and other international standards. The appropriateness of some locally developed assistance packages was questionable, for example, the MCIC food packages in Macedonia (see Section 1).

There were examples of inconsistency between donor agency policy and local agency activity. For example, although Oxfam's policy is not to support psychosocial work, in Albania it supported local partners that do. In Serbia, the evaluation team noted that its partners were not collecting health data in collective centres, despite Oxfam's concern with health issues.

The evaluation team noted a number of factors relating to local partners that might affect programme implementation:

- Working with several local partners increased the risk of duplication and required tighter coordination. El Hilal, for example, used its own distribution lists, different from the MRC's.
- Where part of the motivation of local organisations is political or religious this can jeopardise the impartiality of humanitarian assistance.
- Working with local partners runs the risk of reinforcing political and ethnic divisions and discrimination. Some Albanians in Macedonia, for example, expressed dissatisfaction with the work of Macedonian NGOs. CARE's rehabilitation of the Naim Frasheri school for Roma in Korce in Albania potentially reinforces policies of separate education for Roma.

¹⁴¹ For example, in Albania Oxfam worked through Women Realities and Visions and Women for Global Action Association. In Macedonia, CAD worked through El Hilal, SC worked through MTS, Christian Aid through MCIC, and through them the League of Albanian Women, and Roma NGOs like Mesecina. In Macedonia, Tearfund worked through SNI. In Serbia, Oxfam worked through local women's organisations and Roma organisations.

¹⁴² Interview with ANGOV, Tirana, March 2000.

¹⁴³ Christian Aid's partner, MCIC worked with 19 local NGOs.

- Reliance on local NGOs can limit coverage. In Serbia, several DEC agencies support Roma IDPs. However, this was mainly around Belgrade and in Central Serbia, where Roma NGOs are more vocal.
- In Macedonia, support provided to MCIC by Christian Aid was used to assist chronic 'social cases' in order to '*balance the refugee crisis with the social crisis*'.¹⁴⁴ Some humanitarian aid was, therefore, being used to address chronic structural problems.
- By working through local partners, DEC agencies can, arguably, claim to have strengthened local disaster response capacity. Prior to the crisis, IFRC had provided support to local Red Cross partners and Tearfund had provided training for local partners. However, it is only since the refugee crisis ended, that most agencies have begun to invest in strengthening local capacity.

Monitoring

Given that the Kosovo crisis involved the biggest mass movement of people in Europe since World War II, to date there have been surprisingly few detailed assessments or evaluations by DEC agencies on the impact of their work during this period. There have been some good end-of-contract reports¹⁴⁵, and CARE and IFRC/ICRC have both produced studies in which refugee-affected populations were consulted. However, most DEC agency evaluations have tended to look at organisational and management issues. Consequently, some opportunities for learning have been missed. For example, although Oxfam lobbied for disabled refugees to be included in the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, they have not assessed the impact of this, even though they retain contact with the former refugees.

Connectedness

A common sentiment expressed by host families, particularly in Albania, was a sense of abandonment by the international community once the refugees had departed. There was an expectation of economic investment in return for the support that Albania had provided. The majority of DEC agencies have continued to work in Albania and Macedonia, but on a much-reduced scale. In the view of the evaluation team several agencies have had problems re-focusing their programmes from emergency to longer-term development programmes.

Furthermore, the amount of resources invested is small compared to the size of the initial humanitarian response to support the refugees. Community-based rehabilitation and development can do little to alleviate the long-term structural problems in these countries. Nor can it offset other impacts of the war, such as Macedonia's loss of trade with Serbia and access to power from Kosovo. Oxfam was alone among the DEC agencies to advocate on issues relating to the 'Stability Pact' which has important implications for the future development of countries in the region.

¹⁴⁴ Interview, MCIC, Macedonia, March 2000. In Macedonia, some 3 per cent of GDP is spent on welfare for social cases.

¹⁴⁵ A notable one is the report of the Oxfam emergency coordinator in Albania (Porter, 1999b).

During the refugee emergency some INGOs that had previously worked in Kosovo neglected their Kosovo partners. In this respect the record of the DEC agencies was generally good. Oxfam, for example, worked with the same disabled and women's groups before, during and after the emergency, and SC also maintained its relationship with MTS.

7.7 Impact of the Refugee Crisis in Albania and Macedonia

The Kosovo refugee crisis has had a broad economic and political impact on neighbouring countries. This is beyond the scope of this report. Several issues, however, stand out from interviews with local people, local authorities and organisations in Albania and Macedonia:

- The refugee crisis does not appear to have led to a serious decline in livelihood security at a household level in the communities that accommodated refugees. The short-term nature of the crisis and the large-scale assistance provided probably served to mitigate this. The economic needs of households arise from longer-term structural problems.
- 'Do No Harm' analysis has become common usage amongst aid agencies in emergencies, but does not appear to have been applied in response to the Kosovo crisis. This may be because the political environment did not encourage it. One area where it could have been used was to assess the impact of the aid intervention on the 'parallel' or 'mafia' economies in the region. In Albania, the emergency was a positive boost to the national economy and provided many people with much needed job opportunities. Some Albanian host families reported there was some corruption at distribution sites. In the opinion of one aid worker, the intervention overall may have served to strengthen the mafia economy in Albania, although hard data on this is lacking.¹⁴⁶
- The emergency and the international response that followed have served to strengthen several local NGOs. Both positive and negative outcomes may accrue from this in terms of welfare provision and social protection.
- The international aid intervention may have served to create further divisions between religious communities. Since the end of Communism in Albania there has been a revival of religion, with both Islamic and Christian sects actively seeking to expand their influence. The number of new mosques in Albania and Kosovo are noticeable. In Korce, in southern Albania, it was reported that since the end of socialism, Orthodox families have left rural villages and moved to Korce town, where there is a new Orthodox Church and where the Greek Consular is a powerful authority. In this area, Albanian families hosting refugees remarked that their guests were 'very religious'. In villages that were still mixed it was noted that Kosovo Albanians were not accommodated by Orthodox families. In another part of Albania it was reported that Kosovo Catholic refugees were not allowed into one Muslim run camp while some former refugees interviewed in Kosovo noted that they had been paid to attend the mosque. However, commenting on religion, one villager remarked:

¹⁴⁶ Interview, Tirana, March 2000.

*We don't know what the Kosovars thought, but we have no problem with religion. Yesterday was Bayram and we all celebrated. We also all celebrate orthodox festivals.*¹⁴⁷

In Macedonia, the religious element in the response of the Albanian community was much clearer, with mosques used as distribution points. In Albania the Evangelical Churches claimed to be able to draw on more volunteers than the Red Cross, while El Hilal in Macedonia made a similar claim.¹⁴⁸ One partner organisation of a DEC agency in Albania stated '*The evangelical community [in Albania] is larger than before 24 March by a factor of five or six*', and that the strong response of the Christian community means that '*Kosovars think Albanians are Christians*'.¹⁴⁹

- Finally, it was noted in interviews that several host families have maintained a relationship with their former guests. One impact of the refugee crisis has been to erode the borders that existed between Albanians in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. In the long-term this may prove the longest lasting impact of the refugee emergency on the region.

PART 2: KOSOVO REFUGEE RETURN

7.8 Return, Rehabilitation and Development

NATO troops entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999 following the signing of a technical agreement with Yugoslav forces. By the end of June over half of the Kosovo Albanian refugees had returned to Kosovo from Albania and Macedonia. Within a week of the first NATO troops entering, most DEC agencies were in the process of establishing a presence in Kosovo.¹⁵⁰

The principles (5–8) of the Red Cross and Red Crescent/NGO Code of Conduct (refer to Box 2 in Volume I) commit relief organisations to consult with beneficiaries and support local capacity. This reflects a widespread call for relief aid to be more developmental in its aims and application.¹⁵¹ Drawing on interviews with local people and organisations and

¹⁴⁷ Interview Disnice, March 2000.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with VUSh/AEP, Tirana; El Hilal, Gostivar, March 2000.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with VUSh/AEP, Tirana, March 2000.

¹⁵⁰ Only Merlin did not establish a presence in Kosovo.

¹⁵¹ In complex emergencies the traditional model of relief as providing temporary succour to people in acute stress is considered by many to be outmoded. It is considered more appropriate to use aid to support peoples' own capacities to cope and to address structural problems.

international agencies, this part examines how DEC agencies have applied these principles in Kosovo.¹⁵²

Prioritisation of need

The Code of Conduct asserts that aid priorities will be based on assessed need. However, other factors also determined the DEC agencies' response in Kosovo. Arriving in Kosovo, agencies were faced with various constraints: insecurity¹⁵³, the spontaneous mass return of refugees, damaged infrastructure, weak UN leadership and coordination, impending winter and logistical bottlenecks. The one thing they did not lack was funding. This was both positive and negative. According to agency staff one of the biggest constraints to proper assessment was the imperative to spend. As one aid worker noted, in July (1999) there was no pressure on agencies to undertake proper consultation:

*Everyone was saying 'Spend, Spend, Spend! I was pretty horrified ... At the start, engineers could just go out and look at something and agree to do it.'*¹⁵⁴

Prioritisation of needs was therefore often resource driven.

Prioritisation of location

Decisions to work in certain areas and sectors do not seem to have been based on assessment of need alone, at least initially. Agency staff spoke of some INGOs '*cherry picking*' locations, particularly in the western parts of the province, which affected their choice of location. CARE was designated an AoR by UNHCR that was not its first choice. CAD was designated 52 minority communities to work with based on its previous work in Kosovo. SC and Oxfam also chose their location on this basis. Some DEC agencies came into Kosovo 'cold' and chose their area of operation on the basis of a rapid assessment. HAI, after consultation with UNHCR, located itself strategically at the Cerentolovski Centre old people's home in Pristina.

Unlike some other INGOs, DEC agencies resisted donor pressure to work in the same areas as national forces. However, their choice of locations, was often the result of negotiation with other agencies; in some cases agreements with communities were over-turned by other agencies arriving on the scene. Over time agencies have been able to undertake more rigorous needs assessments to target locations and sectors. SC for example, is now moving its operation from Prizren to Malisheve on its assessment that the area is more needy.

Diversity of approaches

Over the past decade a feature of the international disaster response system has been the increasing array of NGOs working in protracted political emergencies, a theatre formally the

¹⁵² This section focuses on Kosovo where 68 per cent of DEC Phase II funds were spent, and where, in contrast to Serbia and Montenegro, DEC agencies supported rehabilitation.

¹⁵³ Security was not brought under control until late August.

¹⁵⁴ Interviewed in Pristina, March 2000.

preserve of specialist organisations like the ICRC. Kosovo may represent a pinnacle in this trend, with 285 NGOs registered in Pristina at the end of 1999 (Guest, 2000).

Characteristically, these NGOs bring differing mandates and methodologies to their work. One example is the 16 de-mining agencies who approached their work differently. MAG, contracted by World Vision, used KLA soldiers for de-mining. Mine-Tech, contracted by CARE, brought its own team. NPA used local women as de-miners. The strong coordinating role of UNMACC has been essential to ensure standards. Elsewhere, weaker coordination had a direct impact on the operating environment for NGOs and also on beneficiaries, as is apparent in the tensions over coordination that almost all DEC agencies complained of, and the *'broken promises'* that the aid recipients complained of.

The DEC agencies reflect a diversity of operational approaches. Some chose direct implementation, others to work through local partners, some work with nascent authority structures, others with local NGOs. While this diversity of approaches, involving different forms of community consultation and mobilisation, may ensure a variety of needs and problems are addressed, the approaches reflect not so much a process of beneficiary consultation and analysis, but agency choice and self-ascribed mandates.

In a 'stateless' context like Kosovo, if strong coordination is lacking, it is easy for aid to become manipulated and exacerbate tensions. Although one KFOR military officer noted that *'food and aid is power in this country'*¹⁵⁵, information on the impact of aid on the so-called mafia economy and internal politics of Kosovo is difficult to obtain.¹⁵⁶ The two interviews below, however, illustrate problems of coverage and targeting at a village level that can arise from supply-driven aid, weak coordination and inadequate assessments.

Box 21: Interview with villagers of Perlepnice, Gjilan

In this village the women's group *Iliria*, an Oxfam local partner, distributed 60 winter jackets and 50 pairs of boots. The village had more than 300 houses. Of these 68 are heavily damaged, including those of Serb and Roma who left after the war. The main income of the villagers is agriculture and the population also receives a lot of remittances from their relatives abroad. People with burned houses live mainly on aid, but this is being reduced and directed towards Albanians arriving from Presevo and Bujanovc in Serbia. A Dutch NGO is assisting these displaced people distributing cooked meals to those families registered by MTS.

In addition to clothes from Oxfam, the village has received clothes from the American Rescue Committee for young children. UNICEF has distributed 50 winter jackets and 60 boots, and 'Arabs' have also distributed second hand clothes. The clothes were not distributed through MTS.

One of the youngsters who was present at the interview stated loudly that bringing clothes to this village does no good, but only irritates people and creates conflicts. Relatives working abroad could easily provide clothes. He said that the biggest need was reconstruction.

¹⁵⁵ Interviewed Pristina, April 2000.

¹⁵⁶ One interviewee reported that many of the 180,000 roofing kits distributed by UNHCR are unaccounted for.

Box 22: Group discussion with school principal, MTS representative and ten villagers in Gerqin village

The evaluators' comments are in [brackets].

The village was heavily damaged from the war, but the school was spared. Nevertheless, *Samaritan's Purse* have painted the walls and repaired the floor. Of the 270 houses in the village 46 are burned completely. *Samaritan's Purse* supplied plastic roofs, plastic windows and poor quality doors in the autumn but it was a waste of money and time. This spring they will bring tiles for the roofs. *Danish People's Aid* brought roofs, windows, wooden beams, logs, cement and paid for the construction. It did not consult the MTS or village council when they selected whom to help.

SC distributed clothes, barrels with household kits, educational kits, Lego toys and school bags through MTS. The principal said, and the others agreed, that a computer would have been more useful for the school children than Lego toys. The winter clothes were only for the poorest, who were selected by MTS and cross-checked by SC monitors. The MTS activist complained that the whole village was poor and needed clothes.

BRCS also provided some technical and educational kits for the school in July 1999, although the principal and others said they would have preferred some furniture for the school [even though they already had this] and lab kits.

UNMIK provided 3 food parcels (including biscuits, chocolate, candies, tinned meat and MREs) and one pair of trousers for each family, distributed through MTS.

The *Salvation Army* supplied every house with stoves but people complained that they were locally produced and did not seem very good.

Many families in the village live on aid from MTS. Until January 2000, every family was an MTS beneficiary. The number was then reduced by 30 per cent. However, MTS and the village council decided to reduce the amount per family instead so everyone got something. Another 30 per cent reduction was due to take place by the end of April. The MTS activist is against this measure.

The main problem is mines. The village is near the border with Albania which is mined on both sides. The *Italian army* are de-mining the area.

The village does not have a clinic. Until March, *MSF* brought a doctor once per week. Doctors from Gjakova hospital vaccinated the children, supported by SC.

The Prefecture did not keep his promise to bring 16 cows for the village. MCI brought each family maize, potato and wheat seeds and fertilizers, which only covered only 30 per cent of their needs.

7.9 Definitions of Vulnerability

The problems of targeting illustrated in these interviews above arise from limited assessments and assumptions about vulnerability. Politically there has been little pressure from donors or aid agencies to undertake assessments and refine targeting. WFP's targeting criteria, for example, were sufficiently broad to cover 90 per cent of the population (see Section 1).

The evaluation team came across several examples of poor targeting by NGOs; most were not DEC agencies. One woman household head, for example, reported that she had received potato seeds and fertiliser as well as some animal food, even though she had no animals.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁷ Interview Coskove, Klina.

An example where assumptions about vulnerability led to inappropriate targeting was in a cattle feed project in Dragash, southern Kosovo, implemented by MCIC, a Christian Aid partner. Cattle were taken as an indicator of wealth, and it was assumed that farmers with more cattle were richer and so families with only one cow were prioritised. Villagers, however, explained to the evaluation team that those with only one cow had other sources of income, while those with more than one cow were poorer and dependent on their cattle.¹⁵⁸

The international community's promise to get returning refugees in shelter before winter, meant that shelter reconstruction was prioritised above all else. While clearly important, one consequence was that war damage to homes became one of the main indicators of need.¹⁵⁹ The situation was more complex than this, however. According to farmers in one village, the needy were those families:

*who have lost cattle, whose income is less than 50 DEM; who have lost a parent in the family, or who are ill; who have less than 0.5 hectares. A damaged house is only one and not the main criterion.*¹⁶⁰

They concluded that the poorest family in the village was one whose son had been paralysed by a grenade, but also noted that the biggest farmer in the village had suffered and should therefore be assisted. These observations are important, highlighting first, that the presence or absence or health of a son is an important indicator of vulnerability and, second, that in war, poor and rich alike can be vulnerable, a characteristic which often distinguishes political emergencies from natural disasters.¹⁶¹

The evaluation team found that most DEC agencies were cognisant of the complexities of targeting. For example, Tearfund staff noted that the decision not to assist people with Category 5 damaged housing meant that poorer families were discriminated against, explaining: *'By and large we put the roofs on for the richer people as their houses had the better superstructure ... The Shelter programme helped the richer people'*.¹⁶² They also questioned some aid agencies' assumptions that people would share their refurbished houses with others, as it assumed a certain homogeneity within communities that did not take into account class differences. They therefore sought to rehabilitate houses across different social classes.¹⁶³

For most aid agencies, however, the emphasis on material assistance means that vulnerability is still largely defined in terms of economic or material well-being, rather than political or

¹⁵⁸ Interview, Kresevo, March 2000.

¹⁵⁹ This has not been the case in Serbia.

¹⁶⁰ Artar Village, Ferezai, April 2000.

¹⁶¹ A point made in studies of famine in Africa.

¹⁶² Poorer families often live in older traditional houses which were easier to burn. In rural areas, traditional housing is more common, but traditional Albanian areas of towns were also targets of the Yugoslav military and para-militaries. Interview with Tearfund, Prizren, March 2000.

¹⁶³ Interview. Tearfund, April 2000.

social status. Clearly for some excluded or repressed groups material assistance alone is insufficient. The standardisation of ‘packages’ and ‘kits’, while ensuring equity and technical appropriateness can also serve to homogenise needs and de-politicise vulnerability. In Kosovo, as in other political emergencies, the vulnerability of most ‘categories’ of people — older people, children, women, the disabled, farmers and displaced — is as much politically determined as materially, economically or biologically. For minorities, transport and freedom of movement are critical. Interviews by the evaluation team with older people from minorities, for example, indicated that while appreciative of the assistance they had received, they were also stressed by their loss of contact with relatives and their isolation.¹⁶⁴

7.10 Beneficiary Perceptions of Aid

Some interviewees noted a communication gap between aid agencies and local populations.¹⁶⁵ NGOs are often very poor at explaining the purpose of aid to those they are assisting. The need to do this is important in an environment where aid can be seen as partial. However, the rush to spend and implement projects has limited the amount of beneficiary consultation. CRS, for example, noted that it had only recently started holding focus group meetings in villages to explain the purpose of aid and targeting, because food aid is being reduced.¹⁶⁶ On the basis of these consultations the agency acknowledged the limitations of its understanding, noting *‘Villages are dominated by family based networks that we don’t understand’*.

For a population used to a state system, the purpose of humanitarian aid provided by INGOs and targeting is not always apparent or well understood. The interview in Gerqin village (see Box 22 above) illustrates this. Community leaders preferred to reduce the amount of assistance per family, rather than the number of beneficiaries. The evaluation team came across several examples where resources were redistributed in communities. For many Kosovo Albanians, remittances from relatives are critical, but information about this may not be revealed for fear that they would not be entitled to assistance.

Some communities used aid to reward those who supported the struggle (see Box 23). For example, one woman interviewed in Klina, whose husband disappeared in the war, received construction materials even though her house was not war damaged, due to her connections with MTS.

¹⁶⁴ Interviews in Lipljan, Gracanica, April 2000.

¹⁶⁵ Interview, OSCE, Prizren, March 2000.

¹⁶⁶ Interviewed in Prizren, March 2000.

Box 23: Evaluators' comments on a visit to a farming village near Ferizaj

It was clear that before the war this village was relatively prosperous, as a centre for sunflower seed production for the oil press in Ferizaj (now packaging imported oil only as, like many semi-state enterprises, it is subject to an ownership dispute). Sunflower seeds pay much better than winter wheat.

In the case of both of the farmers interviewed, it was clear that they would have been able to buy seeds with their own resources. They received assistance not because they were needy, but because their houses were burnt down. This reflects a general view of international assistance as being intended to reward those who suffered most during the 'struggle' rather than being intended to prevent suffering.

Several agencies noted that the massive international response to the refugee crisis and the pledges made by donors had created unrealistic expectations in the population. Several agency staff expressed concerns about creating 'relief dependency'. A staff member of one DEC partner agency noted, for example: '*We have people coming and saying you have done my house, but what about the other two*'.¹⁶⁷ Another agency complained that the population was fully employed in reconstruction until the international community intervened.¹⁶⁸ One KFOR military officer observed that there is an absence of an 'ethos of self-sufficiency', because '*there are too many NGOs doing too many things*'.¹⁶⁹

The largesse of the international community may have had an impact on local initiative. However, the local expectations also reflect the fact that many families have been relying on external remittances for over a decade. They also reflect a particular experience of state welfare. Under Tito and the communist regime the right to food was intrinsic to the system. The memory of starvation in World War II made a citizen's right to food a fundamental plank of legitimate governance.¹⁷⁰ The free market economy in which NGOs and where 'self-help' and 'sustainability' are fundamental precepts, is very different and there is a potential clash of values.

7.11 Participation and Capacity Building

It was apparent to the evaluation team that the degree of community involvement in projects varied between agencies. In school rehabilitation, for example, the BRCS was more successful at involving communities in cleaning the premises before rehabilitation than SC. On the other hand some agencies' expectations of community contributions were perhaps too high. The evaluation team noted examples where Christian Aid-funded shelter projects appeared to neglect the special needs of vulnerable beneficiaries, raising a question over the adequacy of monitoring and assessment (see Chapter 3.3).

¹⁶⁷ Interview, Islamic Relief, Kosovo, April 2000.

¹⁶⁸ Interview CRS, Kosovo, March 2000.

¹⁶⁹ Interviewed in Pristina, April 2000.

¹⁷⁰ Personal communication, Judith Large.

An important aspect of participation is the agencies' different approaches taken to working with local organisations and structures. Of the DEC agencies, Oxfam, SC, CAFOD and Christian Aid have been consistent in working with local organisations, arguing that it is possible and necessary to support the development of institutions during an emergency.¹⁷¹ Oxfam, in particular, built continuity into its response in Kosovo and Macedonia by working with some of the same women and disabled groups throughout. CARE, in contrast, has argued that it was not feasible to work with local partners during the emergency.¹⁷²

Organisational capacity can be an important component of participation; where assistance is made conditional on participation, it can determine access to resources. It was noted in collective centres in northern Mitrovica with Krajina Serbs that the absence of a representative affected the level of assistance received. MTS, however, is the clearest example of this. As the largest local NGO in Kosovo, MTS is an important conduit for international aid. However, it is predominantly a Kosovo Albanian organisation and communities with MTS activists are more likely to be assured of assistance. Roma who are not represented in MTS complain about discrimination.¹⁷³ While SC has chosen to work closely with MTS, using its criteria and lists, others have found them problematic to work through.¹⁷⁴

A further example is Oxfam's support for women's groups and the disabled. One of the objectives was to 'make visible' their needs. To the extent of creating alternative channels for the delivery of assistance, Oxfam appear to have succeeded in addressing some aspects of their vulnerability, although what impact this has on other areas of their lives is less clear.

A constraint on agencies working with local institutions has been the instability of political structures. When the war ended, the KLA quickly assumed authority over local political structures. The international community considered these unrepresentative and UNMIK set about dismantling them in order to create new democratic institutions. There have also been local political struggles. Junik, for example, has declared itself a municipality separate from Gjakova. Consequently, there have been no stable political institutions to work with.

7.12 Impact

The social impact of sectoral interventions is dealt with in other sections. As important as the impact of individual projects, however, has been the cumulative impact on people and institutions of the presence of large numbers of international welfare agencies in Kosovo. The following observations can be made.

¹⁷¹ Interview, SC Kosovo, March 2000.

¹⁷² Although it does this elsewhere for example, Somalia and Southern Sudan, CARE is also alone among the DEC agencies to have undertaken some forward looking research assessment on social protection institutions in Kosovo (Gregson, 1999).

¹⁷³ Interviews with OSCE and UNHCR, Prizren, March 2000.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with CARE, Ferizaj, April 2000.

Pre-war, the Kosovo Albanians supported a parallel educational and health system through a 3 per cent tax on their incomes at home and abroad. Now teachers draw salaries and stipends from UNMIK and communities no longer contribute. The teachers' union SBASHK lamented that the voluntary ethic had disappeared.¹⁷⁵ Activists in local organisations like Handikos and MTS who worked before the war on a semi-voluntary basis are now receiving stipends from international organisations such as Oxfam and SC. Some argue that the reservoir of talent and skills from the pre-war parallel system has been neglected by UNMIK in favour of '*a foreign-driven emergency relief operation that has undermined Kosovo's indigenous capacity to recover*' (Guest, 2000).

In Kosovo the welfare system is politicised. In the past decade there were two competing systems, one supported by the Yugoslav government, the other by the Kosovo Albanian parallel system. Today there are several. One is managed by UNMIK which has taken over some of the functions of the former state. Another is the remnants of the welfare system supported by Belgrade. These two systems are in competition. Belgrade continues payments of social welfare benefits to Serbs in Kosovo in order, it is alleged, to maintain the Serb population there. A KFOR military officer observed: '*If you do not vote for Belgrade you get no aid*'.¹⁷⁶ Serb schools have been kept closed because the Belgrade government refuses to allow teachers to attend them. On the other hand, it is noticeable that the salaries paid by UNMIK to teachers in Kosovo are three times the average salary in Serbia.¹⁷⁷

A third system is that run by international and local NGOs and funded by various donors. This is only partially coordinated and integrated with the UNMIK-run system. In fact, one INGO representative described the NGO sector as the '*new parallel system*'. In this system the average salary (600 DEM per month) for locally recruited NGO staff in Kosovo is almost 8 times the average salary in Serbia. One consequence of this is that the NGO sector is draining skills and resources from public institutions and services.¹⁷⁸ In Kosovo there has not only been the breakdown of an old system, but the emergence of an alternative system fashioned through new 'democratic' institutions, including NGOs.

Prior to the war the Kosovo Albanian parallel system was united, although not without problems. The current NGO-supported welfare system is fragmented; some describe it as 'decentralised'. Before the war CRS worked with MTS alone. It now works with several organisations. Another example is the local NGO Handikos. The number of Handikos centres has increased since the war and are becoming increasingly independent of the centre.¹⁷⁹ Oxfam's capacity building programme for Handikos supports this by helping them to access

¹⁷⁵ Interviewed in Pristina, April 2000.

¹⁷⁶ Interviewed Pristina, April 2000. The same officer was offered their opinion that MTS and YRC were not impartial, but political organisations.

¹⁷⁷ UNMIK pays salaries of 200-280 DEM per month in Kosovo, the average salary in Serbia is 84 DEM (OCHA, 2000). OCHA also reports that 800,000 people in Serbia earn less than 20 DEM per month. A rural farmer in Kosovo said an income of less than 50 DEM was an indicator of poverty in Kosovo.

¹⁷⁸ One NGO reported that their night watchman was a former university professor.

¹⁷⁹ Oxfam, interviewed in Pristina, March 2000.

local donors. Furthermore, Oxfam's work to support disabled people's needs and rights is considered part of a process of '*democratisation of society*' (Oxfam Disability Team, 2000). A similar example is apparent with women's organisations. A one-year US\$10 million USAID grant for the Kosovo Women's Initiative has, not surprisingly, led to a proliferation of women's organisations. Rather than uniting people, aid provided through multiple institutions appears to be creating divisions.

This process of fragmentation stands in contrast to the centralising tendencies of UNMIK. Not surprisingly, tension has emerged between NGOs and UNMIK. NGOs are reportedly reluctant to work through the Centres for Social Work (CSW). While their arguments against using CSW may be justified, their track record is also questionable. The number of '*broken promises*' by agencies (including some DEC-funded agencies) reported by beneficiaries and other interviewees is an indication of how insecure an NGO-supported welfare system can be.

SECTION 8: PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

8.1 Introduction

War-induced emergencies differ from natural disasters in being *crises of protection*. Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda all provided lessons for humanitarian agencies and politicians on the short-comings of providing material relief alone in response to war-induced suffering, where people's inability to meet their economic, nutritional or health needs are a consequence of political violence. Increasingly it is recognised that humanitarian action in response to such emergencies should not only seek to provide life-saving assistance, but involve measures to protect people's physical, economic, social and political rights as defined in international human rights and humanitarian law (Darcy, 1997). The interest in protection also reflects an international context in which the principal of sovereignty is no longer absolute, human rights have gained importance in defining international relations, and aid organisations and increasingly human rights agencies have flourished in war zones.

The protection of civilians in war has always been central to the philosophy of the ICRC and IFRC, and protecting refugees of war is the foundation of UNHCR's mandate. More recently non-governmental relief agencies such as MSF have sought to integrate protection and relief assistance. Others have been more cautious, concerned at the implications of linking human rights and relief. Human rights monitoring, reporting and education, however, are only partial responses to human rights violations and are often inadequate in the absence of practical field-based protection strategies.

Although protection was not specified in the evaluation ToR, the Valid Lesson Learning Study did identify protection as an issue in the Kosovo crisis (Hallam, 1999), and the work of DEC agencies in this area was therefore examined.¹⁸⁰ The aim was to assess: whether DEC agencies considered protection strategies in designing their response; what protection strategies they developed; and what lessons or best practice had been learned. For the purpose of the evaluation, protection is defined as: *strategies to enhance the physical security of persons and groups under threat, and the practical realisation of their rights under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law* (Paul, 1999).

A few DEC agencies did articulate protection as an objective in their DEC proposals, although for some it is also part of their agency mission statements.¹⁸¹ During the crisis most did develop and employ protection measures at different times and in different places, but for some this was not a conscious strategy.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Although protection issues were clearly important throughout the region, the evaluation team was only able to focus on Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo.

¹⁸¹ Protection was central to ICRC/IFRC work and their regional response. SC describe child protection as their core expertise in the region. Oxfam defines protection as an objective in their regional strategy (Oxfam, 1999c). HAI identified protection of older people in Kosovo in their proposal. For CAD child protection is part of their mission statement.

¹⁸² Interview with Tearfund, Teddington, March 2000.

8.2 Protection, Human Rights and the Kosovo Crisis

Human rights and protection issues have been central to the Kosovo crisis. The language of rights has been widely used by all parties to the war in support of their political objectives. The (Western) international community has invested heavily in human rights monitoring and promotion in Kosovo before and since the war, through the OSCE-KVM and other organisations.¹⁸³ In 1998 ICG noted:

Since human rights violations are the one subject on which the international community is unanimous and vocal, human rights monitoring is given extremely high priority and attention in Kosovo (ICG, March 1998: 8).

According to the OSCE:

...broad international recognition that the Kosovo crisis was in large part a human rights crisis, served to legitimize the OSCE-KVM's mandate (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999).

Displacement of populations within and from Kosovo was not a by-product of war but a military strategy. When displacement intensified after the commencement of NATO air strikes, Alliance countries justified the military campaign as a 'humanitarian war' to protect the rights of Kosovo Albanians. After years of criticism by humanitarian agencies, human rights organisations and policy analysts, donor governments adopted the language of human rights. In Kosovo, DFID for the first time has sought to integrate human rights in its humanitarian response (DFID, 2000).¹⁸⁴

The Kosovo crisis, however, has thrown up as many questions as answers over the commitment of Alliance governments to human rights promotion and protection. It has been alleged that individuals in the KVM were both monitoring human rights and scoping military targets.¹⁸⁵ While NATO countries used protection as a justification for air strikes, over 500,000 civilians were left unprotected in Kosovo, and the bombing also exacerbated humanitarian conditions in Serbia. NATO's humanitarian activities in Albania and Macedonia, by overshadowing UNHCR, may have served to weaken its international protection role (Pugh, 2000).¹⁸⁶ The Alliance's stand on human rights in Kosovo sits uneasily with its silence over the war in Chechnya.

A strong argument can be made that the Alliance's concern for human rights in Kosovo has been more to do with regional security and containment or US political interests, rather than

¹⁸³ In 1998, for example, the US contributed US\$1 million to the ICTY to investigate the violence in Drenica. Some 12 per cent (US\$30.7 million) of the 2000 UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for Kosovo is request by UN agencies for Human Rights Protection and Promotion of Solutions, a considerable amount compared to most UN appeals.

¹⁸⁴ In Kosovo, this has supported media work, legal advice centres and work to stop trafficking of people.

¹⁸⁵ Suspicions about this may have been behind the detention of CARE International staff in Serbia.

¹⁸⁶ The lack of a UN Security Resolution defining UNHCR's responsibilities at that time effectively sanctioned NATO's authority as the regional power.

protection.¹⁸⁷ Former ICTY Prosecutor, Justice Louise Arbour, notes in her introduction to the 1999 OSCE report on Kosovo:

Unlike the situation in Bosnia ... there was a much greater fear that an explosion of ethnic violence in Kosovo could not be contained, and that it might rapidly spread to engulf the whole of the Balkan region (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999).

Interestingly, the largest human rights funding request in the 2000 UN Consolidated Appeal for Kosovo comes from IOM for the repatriation of refugees, including 30,000 from the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme.¹⁸⁸

Despite the Alliances' stated commitment to protecting human rights, over 200,000 Serbs and Roma have left Kosovo since NATO entered the Province. The Alliance has been criticised for failing to stop attacks on minorities and failing to invest sufficiently in strengthening legal systems and a democratic policing system. In Bosnia, donor pressure for minority return has been interpreted as a policy to strengthen the Dayton Agreement and to weaken the Republic of Srpska. In Kosovo there is no such pressure for minority return. The failure to protect minorities seriously undermines the possibility of this and reinforces a culture of impunity.

Human rights monitoring reports of UNHCR, the OSCE and human rights groups, may be starting to have some influence. In March 2000, on the anniversary of the start of the NATO bombing, the NATO Secretary General warned Kosovo Albanians that they risked losing international support if they did not address the problem of ethnic hatred. High Commissioner Ogata also stated:

*This is not an inter-ethnic Kosovo that we see here today and this is not what the international community was committed to.*¹⁸⁹

8.3 Protection Issues during the NATO Bombing Campaign

During the war there were broadly three civilian population groups at risk: civilians expelled from Kosovo; civilians displaced within Kosovo; and civilians at risk from NATO bombing in Kosovo and other areas of FRY.

Refugee protection

The forced expulsion of over 800,000 civilians from Kosovo by Yugoslav military and Serb paramilitary forces was clearly the biggest and most visible protection issue during the three-month NATO air campaign. Kosovo Albanians were targeted on the basis of their ethnicity, with other groups such as Turks, Gorani, Catholics and Roma mostly spared.¹⁹⁰ Although

¹⁸⁷ Some argue NATO's military action had more to do with US geopolitical security concerns (Gowan, 2000).

¹⁸⁸ UNHCR's much smaller budget is mainly for legal and protection issues.

¹⁸⁹ Reported in Kosovo Humanitarian Update issue No 24 (UNMIK, 2000d).

¹⁹⁰ Minority groups did face violence and intimidation and pressure to join Yugoslav forces.

many refugees fled of their own accord, the systematic nature of expulsions indicates that the operation was largely pre-planned and part of a military strategy.

During the war the primary focus of DEC agencies was on the refugee crisis, which raised a number of protection issues: the role and performance of UNHCR, the rights of asylum, the protection of privately accommodated refugees, the physical protection of refugees and the protection of minorities. Table 32 provides examples of how DEC agencies responded to some of these protection issues.

Table 32: Protection issues and responses of DEC agencies

Protection Issues	Responses of DEC Agencies
<i>UNHCR:</i> It is acknowledged that UNHCR's performance was weak during the crisis. However, the involvement of NATO forces in humanitarian activities and the bilateralism of donor countries served to further weaken some aspects of UNHCR's coordinating role in refugee protection.	Although DEC agencies were critical of UNHCR performance, they were generally supportive of their leadership role and advocated for more donor support for them. Tearfund provided practical support by seconding a logistician to UNHCR in Albania. DEC agencies generally resisted bilateral pressures.
<i>Asylum:</i> The initial refusal by the Macedonian government to grant unconditional asylum for more than 20,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees created an initial protection crisis, with refugees stranded for several days at Blace border post.	Several DEC agencies (for example, CAD, SC, Oxfam, Red Cross) were active in Blace, ensuring refugees had access to food and water, while UNHCR and diplomats negotiated their right to asylum in Macedonia.
<i>Registration:</i> Registration is a key protection instrument for refugees, to ensure legal protection and access to assistance and services. In Albania and Macedonia the registration process was problematic. In Albania, few refugees were registered. In Macedonia, refugees were registered as <i>humanitarian assisted persons</i> , rather than being given leave to remain. For refugees outside the camps this affected their access to services, such as health-care. In both countries, UNHCR had little knowledge of refugees outside the camps and few resources to monitor their protection needs (Suhrke et al, 2000).	In Albania and Macedonia, the Red Cross took overall responsibility for refugees in private accommodation, including their registration. In Macedonia, DEC agency's local partners like MCIC, El Hilal, the League of Albanian Women, and Roma NGO Mesecina assisted in ensuring refugees outside camps were registered.
<i>Refugee camps:</i> Refugee camps were potentially targets for insecurity, robbery and gender based violence and trafficking. UNHCR protection officers did not have a continuous presence in the camps.	CARE-managed camps maintained a 24-hour presence in camps and advocated for greater visibility of UNHCR. They took measures to improve camp security, through the hiring of security in Albania, better fencing and siting of amenities.
<i>Refugees outside camps:</i> More refugees were accommodated outside the camps than in camps. They lacked access to official protection channels and received proportionately less assistance.	DEC agencies provided significant assistance to refugees outside the camps, some directly and some through local partners. The Red Cross took a lead in assisting privately accommodated refugees in Albania and Macedonia. In Albania, the BRCS provided a head of delegation to coordinate this work. CAD in Albania gave particular attention to rural villages, while CARE ran a 'search and find' programme for refugees deemed to have missed out. In May, Oxfam publicly lobbied for recognition of the particular needs of privately accommodated refugees. BRCS used DEC funds to support a radio tracing and

	information service for six months through the BBC, World Service and Radio Tirana.
<i>Separated families</i>	The ICRC/IFRC established a tracing structure which enabled them to intercede with the Yugoslav authorities on behalf of members of refugee families left behind or detained. SC provided a tracing service for refugees using mobile phones.
<i>Minorities:</i> Roma refugees faced physical violence in Macedonian camps and have faced discrimination in other countries.	Local partners like Mesecina in Macedonia (supported through MCIC) monitored the situation of the Roma. Since Kosovo Albanian refugees were repatriated, DEC agencies have been more actively engaged in assisting and advocating on behalf of Roma refugees. In Bosnia, SC have assisted unregistered Roma refugees from whom UNHCR was withholding aid.
<i>Extremely vulnerable persons:</i> Specific needs of old people and disabled were missed in the general response.	DEC agencies took a lead in ensuring the needs of certain categories were addressed. For example, Oxfam supported the disabled in refugee camps in Macedonia and HAI supported the needs of older refugees outside camps in Macedonia.
<i>Gender:</i> There were many examples of gender inequity. In Macedonia, women refugees in host families were initially registered in the name of their nearest male relative, thus breaching international refugee norms (Williams, 1999). Women in refugee camps were not involved in camp management. Women were vulnerable to gender based violence, and some refugee camps were targets for prostitution.	Oxfam was the most active of the DEC agencies on gender issues. They included Gender Emergency Support Persons in their emergency teams and undertook several gender specific assessments in Albania and Macedonia which, among other issues, identified concerns about gender-based violence. Oxfam identified problems with the registration of refugee women in Macedonia and advocated for a change. It supported gender-based information and assistance activities in camps in Macedonia. CARE also supported Mother and Child Centres in the camps which served as information and distribution sites for women. Concerned about gender issues in Albanian refugee camps, CAFOD's emergency coordinators were both women. Through the MCIC, Christian Aid supported the League of Albanian Women in Macedonia who advocated on gender issues.
<i>Children:</i> Refugee children were perceived as particularly vulnerable. Protection of refugee girls from trafficking was a particular concern.	There was no shortage of agencies with programmes to support children in the refugee camps. ¹⁹¹ Tracing of separated children, support for 'child friendly spaces' in camps and a child rights and advocacy centre are examples of some protection activities supported by SC in Macedonia. Coverage of such needs among refugee children outside the camps, however, was much weaker.

Civilians in Kosovo

The biggest gap in the protection framework during the war was in Kosovo itself. An important protection strategy is the act of witnessing and physical presence to prevent human

¹⁹¹ In fact in the general response to the emergency there may have been a disproportionate emphasis on children's vulnerability compared to other groups such as older people. Numbers of unaccompanied children, for example, was lower than child-focused agencies expected. Interview with SC Prizren, March 2000.

rights abuse. Theoretically this was the purpose of the KVM.¹⁹² The decision by NATO to use air strikes forced international humanitarian aid agencies and human rights observers to withdraw from Kosovo, leaving an estimated 500,000 displaced Kosovo Albanians and other civilians unprotected. As a result, during the NATO air strikes there were few independent witnesses to the expulsion of civilians and very little humanitarian assistance. The Humanitarian Law Center from Belgrade and some local journalists did remain in Kosovo, but the only international witnesses were journalists.¹⁹³

Agencies' decisions to withdraw from Kosovo were based on their assessments of security and their ability to continue working. Some point out that NATO prevented humanitarian action from the air, while the Serbs prevented it from the ground. However by withdrawing en masse, humanitarian agencies, including DEC agencies, effectively failed to sustain 'humanitarian space'. In the words of ICRC the 'black hole' in Kosovo was 'a collective failure of protection'.¹⁹⁴

It has been reported that some of the international agencies that evacuated Kosovo failed to give due consideration to the safety of local staff and partners left behind.¹⁹⁵ No concerns were expressed about this with regards to DEC agencies, several of whom continued employing local staff and working with local partners as refugees. In comparison to the refugee exodus, however, DEC agencies gave little attention to protection needs within Kosovo during this period. The massive international focus on the refugee crisis served to deflect attention from the on-going violations of international humanitarian and human rights law there.

There were exceptions. ICRC, which withdrew on 29 March 1999 amid concerns that it lacked the confidence of all sides, retained diplomatic links and by 24 May had successfully renegotiated humanitarian access to Kosovo.¹⁹⁶ The widely publicised meeting of the ICRC President and President Milosevic in April 1999 laid the grounds for this and sent a strong message of independent humanitarian concern.¹⁹⁷ In April and May, World Vision sent some assistance to civilians in Kosovo. No other DEC agencies made proposals to assist inside Kosovo. In April, SC called for urgent humanitarian access (Save the Children, 1999) and a staff member participated in a UN assessment mission in May. Christian Aid also called for a cease-fire and continued negotiation. No other DEC agency considered it necessary to inform the Alliance governments of the humanitarian fallout from the military campaign. Oxfam's position, for example, was that the military campaign was a 'least worse option'.

¹⁹² As noted, the KVM may have been working to other agendas and it has been criticised for focusing more on information collection than preventative deployment.

¹⁹³ Personal communication, Diane Paul.

¹⁹⁴ Interview, ICRC, Geneva, March 2000.

¹⁹⁵ Personal communication, Diane Paul. The issue was much debated after the Rwandan genocide.

¹⁹⁶ BRCS, as members of the Red Cross Movement, were supportive of ICRC's access negotiations and position on the Kosovo crisis, although this was not publicly expressed.

¹⁹⁷ A UN Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission visited Serbia in May. A joint Swiss, Greek and Russian government effort — the Focus Humanitarian Initiative — also managed to get relief supplies to Pristina on 13 May, although arguably it was protection from abuses rather than food aid that was needed.

Civilians in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Throughout the NATO air campaign several DEC agencies¹⁹⁸ continued humanitarian work in Serbia, Vojvodina and Montenegro directly or through partners. The work, which was undertaken by local staff after most expatriates withdrew, mostly consisted of distributing relief supplies to displaced and war-affected civilians. The Red Cross, however, adopted a specific protection role gathering information on forced displacement and arrests and intervening with Yugoslav authorities on behalf of detainees and prisoners of war. Christian Aid's partner EHO disseminated information on the humanitarian impact of the bombing through postcards and bulletins.

8.4 Protection in Post-war Kosovo

Since the end of the war, and in the aftermath of the return of Kosovo Albanian refugees, the most pressing protection issues in Kosovo have revolved around the protection of non-Albanians from physical violence, intimidation, and discrimination in employment and humanitarian aid (see Box 25). During the evaluation fieldwork, the team learned of two Serbs killed near Lipljan and a 70-year old Serb woman beaten near to death in Prizren. The team was also told by one Gorani villager in Dragash, *'If it continues like this we will have to leave'*. In Bosnia, the evaluation team interviewed one mixed Kosovo Albanian-Bosnian family who claimed to have been intimidated to leave Kosovo. In March 2000, the situation of Serb minorities in various areas of Kosovo was reported to be deteriorating.¹⁹⁹ In some cases restrictions on access to services in Kosovo are also imposed by the Belgrade government, who have prevented Serb teachers from working and Serb medical staff from working in a UN constructed hospital. Ethnic-based violence and discrimination and restrictions on freedom of movement have a direct impact on the health and livelihoods of minorities (Lawrence & King, 2000; Salama et al., 2000).

Other protection issues include: the plight of several thousand missing Kosovo Albanians, the detention of over one thousand Kosovo Albanians in Serbia,²⁰⁰ intra-Kosovo Albanian political violence and intimidation, organised criminal violence, gender based violence, general property rights and property rights of women in particular.

¹⁹⁸ CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, SC, Red Cross and World Vision.

¹⁹⁹ Relief Web, March 2000.

²⁰⁰ The technical military agreement that ended the war made no provision for the return of detainees.

Box 24: Protection problems faced by minorities in Kosovo

- Physical violence and murder
- Intimidation
- Forced eviction
- Limited freedom of movement
- Restricted access to social services
- Restricted access to markets
- Discrimination and limited access to employment
- Discrimination in relief assistance
- Destruction of property

Broadly, DEC agencies have been less animated about protection issues in Kosovo than they were during the refugee crisis. Like other aid agencies in Kosovo, their primary focus has been relief assistance, physical rehabilitation and the restoration of social services. Where this has been linked to protection it has been about ensuring peoples' access to welfare assistance. In this respect, protection needs can vary between municipalities depending, for example, on the ethnic composition of the population. DEC agencies have given little attention to legal issues or strengthening institutions for protection, although the Red Cross works on detention issues and SC has worked on juvenile justice. This contrasts to Bosnia, for example, where several of the same agencies support legal aid centres. This is a pressing issue in Kosovo, given the vacuum in the legal system, the weak institutions of law and order, and the weak representation of minorities in political institutions and policy-making bodies.

A lack of INGO activity in human rights and protection has (ironically) drawn criticism from one donor, which argues that NGOs' responses has been largely relief driven and financially driven.²⁰¹ NGOs have been criticised for overlooking discrimination in relief assistance and discriminatory employment practices.²⁰² They have also been criticised for '*taking the path of least resistance*', handing out materials without considering access issues. One UNHCR official noted: '*Destruction is not where the country's problem lies but oppression. And the oppressed have become the oppressors*'.²⁰³

One reasons why NGOs may have been inactive on protection issues in Kosovo is the presence of other organisations who are better able to provide physical protection (KFOR and UNMIK police) or more experienced in monitoring and reporting, and with a specific protection mandate (UNHCR, OSCE and ICRC). There are also several international human rights organisations present in Kosovo (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) as well as local organisations like the Humanitarian Law Centre, and organisations like IWPR who will also report on human rights issues. Given that human rights protection are foremost a state responsibility, the absence of a state is a constraint to any protection work. However, it

²⁰¹ Interview with DFID, London, March, 2000.

²⁰² Interview, OSCE, Prizren, March, 2000.

²⁰³ Interviewed, March 2000.

is this protection gap in the absence of a state, which provides a rationale for NGOs to address protection issues.

Despite these general criticisms, the evaluation team found that several DEC agencies have incorporated protection activities and strategies in their work in Kosovo, although only a few are consciously articulated as such (see Table 3). Some of the examples listed were not funded through the DEC appeal. Several DEC agencies are also members of an Inter-Agency Working Group on Protection.

Table 33: Protection issues and responses of DEC agencies

Protection issues	Responses of DEC agencies
<i>Coordination and leadership:</i> ²⁰⁴ Weak coordination can expose aid agencies and humanitarian resources to manipulation, so that aid can exacerbate tension and violence.	SC used DEC funds to recruit a Protection Liaison Officer (PLO), who was to be seconded to UNHCR. ²⁰⁵ The PLO chaired the Inter-Agency Working Group on Protection. The PLO was in place for three months only and SC have had difficulty filling the post. BRCS provided Delegates for ICRC in Kosovo with protection responsibilities.
<i>Legal protection:</i> The weakness of the legal system is a key protection issue in Kosovo. This affects all groups.	SC's specific protection mandate relates to the implementation of the CRC, and SC's protection activities in Kosovo revolve around advocating for the reform of social and legal policy to increase protection of children's rights. SC has been working advocating on the establishment of a juvenile justice system. The Red Cross mission undertakes prison visits, and works on detention issues.
<i>Human rights education.</i>	SC distributes materials on the CRC. Oxfam supports disability rights education among disabled.
<i>Analysis:</i> Good analysis is essential to protection, including determining specific populations at risk, and specific problems they face, from where threats to protection originate and actors and strategies that can address these (Paul, 1999).	CARE used DEC funds to commission research on local systems of social protection in Kosovo. CAD has undertaken a baseline survey in 52 minority communities where it has responsibility.
<i>Access:</i> Discrimination in humanitarian assistance has been one of the main complaints of non-Albanian groups in Kosovo. ²⁰⁶ Serbs have left Pristina because of lack of access to education. Serb and Roma are not represented in MTS structures for relief provision. Distribution systems in Serb areas are dominated by the Yugoslav Red Cross, whose independence is questioned. Kosovo Albanian staff had problems of accessing non-Albanian communities; some chose not to. A KFOR officer	DEC agencies have adopted various strategies. In Prizren, SC for a period supported a playroom and telephone service in the Orthodox Monastery which provides sanctuary for Serbs and Albanian 'collaborators'. SC informed UNICEF of Gorani villages that had missed out on distributions of educational materials. SC also attended specific meetings with minorities organised by the OSCE. Christian Aid's partner MCIC assists Gorani communities in south-west Kosovo.

²⁰⁴ Identified as a cornerstone of field level protection strategies (Paul, 1999).

²⁰⁵ The need for the post was identified in March 1999, and was linked to the UNHCR Reach Out initiative to strengthen support for the international refugee protection system. The post was originally intended to be based in Albania.

²⁰⁶ Discrimination within the Albanian community is also an issue, but the evaluation team was unable to obtain sufficient information on this other than relating to recruitment practices.

<p>noted that not all NGOs were impartial in their assistance. The US discriminates in its provision of assistance, making it proportional on population size, rather than to need. Difficulties of access for minorities may increase as UNMIK transfers responsibility for distribution to the Centres for Social Work (CSW).</p>	<p>CAD opened a sub-office in Gracanica and recruited Serb staff in order to improve access to the communities it works with. It also provides it with a physical presence for witness.</p> <p>CARE has prioritised certain agricultural inputs for Serb farmers, partially to counter their lack of market access.</p> <p>Several other DEC agencies support relief and rehabilitation work in minority enclaves. Several agencies have used KFOR security to access minority communities.</p>
<p><i>Advocacy:</i></p>	<p>Oxfam have issued various briefing papers on Kosovo in which protection needs are identified.</p> <p>SC have issued a joint statement with ICRC, UNICEF and UNHCR on vulnerable children. CAD is advocating with UNMIK on the issue of CSWs.</p>
<p><i>Discrimination in employment:</i> Minority access to employment with INGOs is extremely limited. Agency hiring practices can be discriminatory. For example, the requirement for English discriminates against Roma and others. Very few agencies employ translators.</p>	<p>CARE, Oxfam and CAD have hired Serb staff. No DEC agencies have hired Roma staff. SC decided against hiring a Roma driver due to opposition from its other staff.</p>
<p><i>'Extremely vulnerable persons':</i> OSCE reports identify old people as one of the targets of human rights abuse by Serb forces. Similarly a large number of Serb and other minorities killed and abused since refugees returned have been old people.</p>	<p>HAI advocate for needs of the elderly in Kosovo from all communities, issuing cold weather warnings and offering assistance for the needs of older people. A majority of the old people in the residential home they support are Serb, and HAI have improved security at the centre for their protection.</p> <p>Oxfam prioritise support to disabled groups whom they worked with since before the war.</p>
<p><i>Gender:</i> According to some sources gender-based violence has increased in Kosovo since the war.²⁰⁷ Inheritance rights discriminate against women, a particular problem in shelter provision for women-headed households.</p>	<p>Oxfam, and to some extent Concern, have emphasised gender needs in their work.</p>
<p><i>Children:</i></p>	<p>'Safe Areas' for children were a specific protection activity run by SC in the first few months after the refugees returned to provide children with secure areas to play. A 'Toys for Guns' project was intended to protect children from being accidentally shot by KFOR. SC has also advocated on the protection of abandoned children in Pristina hospital.</p>

8.5 Findings

There is often a misconception that adopting a protection approach requires relief agencies to become human rights monitors. Human rights monitoring and reporting are only one response to violations of human rights, humanitarian or refugee law. The challenge is to develop strategies to prevent or mitigate such violations. Adopting a protection approach can require agencies to thinking differently about who is vulnerable and why, and the impact of

²⁰⁷ Interview with Lajenda Women's Association, Vitina. April 2000.

assistance strategies on people's rights. The following observations are made on DEC agencies' response to the Kosovo crisis:

- Taking protection in its broadest definition, all DEC agencies have undertaken what can be considered as protection work, although only a few articulated it as a strategy in their emergency response. Broadly, those agencies who adopt a rights based approach to their work (humanitarian law, child rights, women's rights, disabled rights and old people's rights) were more articulate and active on protection issues.
- DEC agencies helped to fill a gap in refugee protection by targeting assistance to refugees outside refugee camps. It was also important that several DEC agencies continued working in FRY during the NATO military campaign. The Humanitarian Charter and Sphere minimum standards, commit its signatories to support the international protection mandates of UNHCR and ICRC. DEC agencies, though critical of its performance, were supportive of UNHCR's leadership role.
- In contrast, DEC agencies took little action to address the protection needs of civilians in Kosovo during the NATO air campaign. As humanitarian agencies, more might have been done to point out the humanitarian consequences of the NATO air strikes to Alliance governments.
- SC, Oxfam and HAI designated DEC Phase II funds for protection activities in Kosovo.²⁰⁸ The evaluation team considers SC's recruitment of a Protection Liaison Officer an example of good practice, which utilised DEC funds to bring additionality to the overall relief response. Some of the important protection issues in Kosovo, however, such as ensuring minority rights or property rights, require a long-term commitment, which the short term nature of DEC funding does not normally allow for.
- Protection issues appear in only a few agencies assessments and actions are not evaluated against their impact on protection. Vulnerability is largely defined in terms of material or economic well-being, without linking this to social status. While the provision of assistance and shelter can in themselves be a protection strategy, the important point is to recognise people's ability to access assistance, which can be determined by many factors.
- Some agencies which do articulate protection as an objective of their response, were weak in implementing it. HAI, for example, note that '*Given that such a large number of remainees [in Kosovo] are older people, the issue of protection is of grave concern*' (HelpAge International, 2000). However, in providing assistance HAI have tended to treat all old people as equally vulnerable, rather than linking their vulnerability to ethnicity. Similarly, SC approaches child protection irrespective of ethnicity, for example, giving no more priority to minority children's access to education than others. SC's main local partner is MTS which does not distribute to Serb or Roma villages.
- There are several human rights organisations operating in Kosovo, but collaboration between relief and human rights organisations was reported to be weak.
- Consulting with national staff and partners on protection issues is important, but in a divided society relying on staff from the majority community to undertake protection

²⁰⁸ Protection is an objective of the integrated ICRC/IFRC regional programme supported by the BRCS.

work with minorities is probably an unrealistic expectation. Even where staff are willing, it can place them in danger from elements within the minority and majority communities.

- Lack of training in protection for field staff meant that understanding within some organisations of protection issues was mixed. SC's policies on protection, for example, did not seem to filter out of Pristina.²⁰⁹ Although field staff were expected to undertake protection-related work, their job descriptions did not always define these responsibilities.²¹⁰
- As with other aspects of agencies' response, monitoring the impact of protection work has been poor. For example, the impact of the SC 'Safe Areas' and 'Toys for Guns' activities has not been evaluated. More generally, a lack of monitoring means that agencies are unable to assess whether their assistance in helping or harming.
- Protection is not cheap and can require additional resources or pro-active measures. HAI's reliance on other agencies to refer old people to them meant that some old people probably missed out; advocacy is sometime insufficient. SC's decision to stop providing phone services to people sheltering in Prizren Monastery, because the demand of those outside had declined, may have neglected the special needs of those inside. With the large amount of resources available, meeting the protection needs of vulnerable groups, such as disabled access in refugee camps was feasible. The challenge to agencies will be to meet such needs in emergencies when resources are fewer.
- Working with the military on protection issues is complex. In Kosovo, KFOR define its role as providing '*special attention to the protection of minorities*'²¹¹ and DEC agencies have used their security cover to access and assist minorities. Such collaboration has risks. The objectives of the military may differ from those of the humanitarian agency or change over time; in Albania protection of refugees was only part of NATO's aim.²¹² Collaboration with the military can compromise the perception of an agency's neutrality, or weaken other non-partisan strategies. However, deciding not to assist people in order to sustain a perception of neutrality could have negative consequences for those in need. Agencies therefore need to establish clear guidelines on working with the military.

²⁰⁹ SC interviewed, Prizren, March 2000.

²¹⁰ SC interview, Gjakova, March 2000.

²¹¹ www.Kforonline.

²¹² One US soldier in Albania stated: '*Our number one priority is to protect self. Number two is to protect the contractors. Number 3 is to protect the NGOs and then the refugees*' (Kelly & Kleyn, 1999).

SECTION 9: PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSISTANCE

9.1 Introduction

Psychosocial assistance to people designated as ‘*traumatised by war*’ has become popular in emergency and humanitarian work, particularly since the Bosnia and Rwanda crises. UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO promote it widely and UN agencies are currently setting up programmes in Kosovo. The term ‘psychosocial’ at first appeared to be quite popular with some DEC agencies, which were maybe reflecting the general interest in this area of work, but the evaluation team discovered that there was some confusion surrounding the term, no consensus about what psychosocial activities actually were and no guidelines for best practice.

Trauma work is a new industry. It is big business and psychosocial programmes are the new currency. It is an area of work that makes certain assumptions, begs many questions, needs definition and calls out for better regulation. It is hoped that this evaluation gives DEC agencies an opportunity to further consider these issues before psychosocial programmes slip further onto their agendas.

In order to get a broader understanding of what psychosocial meant, how it was being used and the kind of work being carried out, a small number of other agencies engaged in psychosocial work and DEC agencies who were doing non-DEC-funded psychosocial work were also interviewed.

In many agency’s Plans of Action for Phases I and II, there were references to giving psychosocial support, but these were often non-specific activities which did not materialise. The following agencies did carry out psychosocial activities, full details of which are in Tables 34 and 35:

Phase I

- CAFOD, Serbia: workshops for women to address trauma (DEC-funded); psychosocial helpline (not DEC-funded).
- CARE, Macedonia: drama therapy, Cegrane Camp.
- Christian Aid, Albania: Small Projects Fund assistance to two counselling services.
- Concern, Albania: psychosocial support to refugees: educational materials for primary school children.
- Concern, Kosovo: support to women to address emotional and psychological needs.
- SC, Serbia and Albania: psychosocial support (although SC say that it does not have psychosocial projects).
- Tearfund, Albania: training in trauma counselling for refugees in Albania, proposal.

Phase II

- CAD, Macedonia: community services (Action Van).
- CAFOD, Serbia: workshops for women to address trauma (DEC-funded); psychosocial helpline (not DEC-funded).
- CARE, Macedonia: drama therapy, Cegrane Camp.
- Concern, Kosovo: psychosocial training and support programme for teachers (not DEC-funded).

- Oxfam, Albania, BiH and Kosovo: support for local partners, some of whom were doing psychosocial work. Oxfam does not do psychosocial work itself.
- SC, Serbia and Montenegro: psychosocial support.
- Tearfund, Albania: training in trauma counselling for refugees in Albania.
- World Vision, Kosovo: training for Community Services Facilitators in psychosocial support. Not DEC-funded as WV were told that the DEC did not fund psychosocial activities.
- World Vision, Montenegro: creative activities for trauma healing. Again, not DEC-funded as World Vision were told that the DEC did not fund psychosocial activities.

9.2 What Definition and Whose Definition?

‘Psychosocial’ has been used in the international humanitarian aid and development world to describe assistance to beneficiaries which addresses both the individual psychological and the social spheres, and recognises the interplay between the two, each influencing the other. The psychological sphere includes the internal, emotional and thought processes of an individual. The social sphere includes the destruction of social services, altered family and community relationships because of death, separation and losses, economic devastation, and the impact on social values and customary practices.

It should be noted that in recent years there has been an increased emphasis given to the psychological, the feelings and reactions of individuals. This approach has its roots in contemporary western psychological theory and practice, with the independent individual at the centre, in relative isolation from a particular social context. This construct is at odds with that of many other non-western cultures where individual identity is inextricably linked to notions of community and dependency.

‘Psychosocial’ was a commonly used and popular term with DEC agencies. However, there were problems of definition and no common agreement or understanding of what a psychosocial programme or intervention actually meant. There was inconsistency of use between agencies and within agencies.

It was a difficult area to evaluate, as there are no clear existing guidelines on (i) exactly what psychosocial means (ii) what activities/programmes are included under this heading (iii) how their effectiveness should be measured and evaluated or (iv) what constitutes best practice.

In addition our evaluation was problematic because of limited data (no direct beneficiary evaluation or feedback on psychosocial programmes) and little data from national staff implementing such programmes or from national NGO staff and other professionals (for example, teachers) who received related training.

Psychosocial programmes appear to have been implemented because of and in response to the *‘traumas that Kosovars have experienced’*. The word ‘trauma’ had similar definitional problems as psychosocial. Its use was widespread and casual. *‘Everyone is traumatised’* was frequently heard. This seems to have been used to describe the violence and atrocities that people had suffered – death, witnessing violence, destruction of homes, fleeing. It has the effect, possibly unintended, of portraying people as passive victims of events, rather than active survivors. It suggests that people need specialised, psychological help. It did not describe people’s reactions to these events or their positive efforts to deal with and come to

terms with their experiences: *'Few people were traumatised in the real sense of the word, it was not used accurately'*.²¹³

Some agencies chose not to use the word: *'They do not like the word traumatised, as it means someone is ill'*.²¹⁴

Some agencies assumed that because of their experiences, people would need counselling or special psychological help (even if they would not be the agency to provide it). Others felt the priority was to help people return to as normal a life as possible, through social and other activities. Psychosocial was used to describe both these approaches.

Similar programmes, such as women's groups or activities for children, were variously described as psychosocial, social, education, community activities or community development. Psychosocial work seemed to range from these broadly community-based activities, to trauma counselling by psychologists, to providing training in counselling skills.

Agencies recognised that it was important to meet people's social and emotional needs, as well as material, physical and medical ones. It was not always clear why a separate programme was needed to achieve this. Agencies also recognised that many people may want to talk about their difficult and painful experiences and to receive acknowledgement of what they have suffered. Again it was not clear if or why this was a separate psychosocial activity.

Some DEC agencies at head office level were clear that they did not carry out psychosocial work and did not use the term (for example SC and Oxfam). It was therefore surprising how often the word crept into reports. Oxfam-funded local partners who did do psychosocial work with women and children; Oxfam said that this was actually *'emotional support'*. The question must be asked: what is the difference?

Other agencies said they did psychosocial work, but did not like to use the term. One said:

*Although psychosocial appears in the proposal and in the reports, in the field we avoid the word 'psychosocial', we see it rather as community services, and take a preventative approach. We don't use the word 'trauma' and try to ensure the staff don't use it either, but they tend to, as it's in very common use here.*²¹⁵

Another agency said that some psychosocial activities if not used well, *'such as the expression of trauma, or forcing children to paint, could be harmful'*.²¹⁶

Given this confusion, surely psychosocial and trauma need to be better defined if they are going to remain in use?

In implementing programmes in the field, staff seemed to distance themselves and move further away from the concepts of psychosocial and trauma. They talked more of providing

²¹³ Interview with World Vision, March 2000.

²¹⁴ Interview with SC worker, March 2000.

²¹⁵ Interview with World Vision, March 2000.

²¹⁶ Interview with CAD, March 2000.

activities and support to help normalise people's reactions and experiences and help them re-establish normal lives. Some projects were renamed:

*The Drama Therapy project became the Swallow Drama Project. Words like 'trauma', 'therapy', 'psycho' - I wouldn't want to be associated with. I steer clear of those terms. Can we not use this word 'therapy'?*²¹⁷

National staff (closer to the beneficiaries) also seemed unclear what psychosocial meant, and put a different emphasis on it: less of the psychological and more of the social.

*You can't divide a psychosocial case from a social case (Save the Children). Psychosocial is a medical term, but we deal with the social aspect of it. A person has experienced violence in war and our aim is to help her overcome the stress.*²¹⁸

Psychosocial was not a word used by beneficiaries to describe either the assistance they needed or the assistance they received (with one exception).

Whilst promoting psychosocial programmes, there was no agreed definition available from UN Agencies or WHO. It is important to note that UN agencies in general promote a community-based approach. In terms of mental health issues, WHO talked of a 'Kosovo Syndrome' but there was no definition.

DFID made a decision not to fund psychosocial programmes in Kosovo. Instead it supported social development projects. It felt that psychosocial projects were often inappropriate; agencies might have the correct jargon but not the relevant experience, and best practice has not yet been identified (but this still assumes that there is specialised work called psychosocial).

9.3 Normal Reactions to Abnormal Events?

People were identified as traumatised and in need of psychosocial assistance because of what they had experienced and witnessed. They were described as upset, bewildered, irritable, wanting to talk/not wanting to talk, unable to sleep, as indicators that they were traumatised. These are in fact normal reactions to abnormal, horrific and distressing events, and labelling people as 'traumatised' pathologises their reactions. These symptoms were mainly observed when people were first displaced out of Kosovo and immediately after they returned there. Such symptoms tended to abate over time; they were not seen in everyone, but broad generalisations and assumptions were made.

There was particular concern expressed about children who had been subjected to or witnessed violence and atrocities. Teachers and others identified children who were aggressive or who were withdrawn and would not play or mix with others. At first their drawings, talk and songs were about war.

²¹⁷ Interview with CARE, March 2000.

²¹⁸ Interview with Oxfam/Lejgenda Women's Association, March 2000.

They painted fires and roads in dark colours. But after a time the colours lightened and then they started drawing flowers and flags.

Children were frequently seen to make good and often quick recovery. Research has shown that children generally do well if their parents or carers are coping, if a safe and normal environment can be created for them and if they can express their feelings and receive support. Children are often resilient and some staff were surprised by this:

*I saw that all the children, even those with severe problems, did well. I'd felt the experiences they'd had would leave them with a dark stain for ever, but I see that it doesn't.*²¹⁹

The question remains as to what best helps adults and children who have experienced displacement, violence and wars, and we must listen to their views. Some agencies recognised that the most helpful thing that staff could do was to reassure beneficiaries that their reactions were normal and understandable. World Vision commented that training helped staff to understand beneficiaries' reactions better, to be supportive, sympathetic and reassuring, and not to assume that people needed specialised help.

9.4 Why did Agencies have Psychosocial Programmes?

There is some suggestion that it was partly donor driven: one agency did not set out to do psychosocial work but used the budget line '*because it was there*'. In practice this work was regarded as '*community development, not psychosocial*' (CAD, who finally coded it under education/recreation).

*Our funding people said that if we used words like 'therapy' that donors could understand, they would see that beneficiaries were getting concrete things.*²²⁰

*The term psychosocial was inherited. I don't know why it was called psychosocial, I don't like the term. What does it mean?*²²¹

At the same time some agencies felt that people, '*including children, had been through traumatic experiences and needed help in dealing with it*'.²²²

Others said it was popular in Bosnia and assumed it would be necessary in Kosovo too.

There was some uncertainty as to whether people would need specialised trauma counselling or whether community-based activities would be equally effective: psychosocial programmes and activities were in some ways seen to span this continuum.

²¹⁹ Interview with League of Albanian Women, March 2000.

²²⁰ Interview with CARE, March 2000.

²²¹ Interview with CARE, March 2000.

²²² Interview with CARE, March 2000.

9.5 What Psychosocial Activities took Place?

DEC agencies themselves put more emphasis on social and community initiatives, where people could meet, talk and engage in activities in a supportive atmosphere. In the camps, agencies established safe areas for women in particular, for example, baby and carer centres (CAD); mother and child centres (CARE); tea tents (Oxfam, who also provided one for men).

In Kosovo there was more provision for women than men as they were seen as more vulnerable and 'traumatised'. This assumption did not appear to have been rigorously tested or validated, although clearly there were more women-headed households because husbands had died or were missing.

The establishment and support of women's groups was popular, where women could talk and do activities such as sewing, embroidery and drama. Agencies said that traditionally women would not usually have engaged in such activities on their own, but now did so because of changed circumstances.

Community-based activities, play, drama, art, other recreation and safe areas were provided for children, as ways of meeting their social and emotional needs, trying to normalise their lives and helping them come to terms with their painful experiences. SC had a significant number of such programmes. CAD activities included multi-ethnic and cross-cultural work, communication skills, self-awareness and environmental and global awareness:

*The focus of the work is broad, it is not therapy ... the activities are a channel through which children can express themselves and become empowered.*²²³

Further questions need to be raised about what constitutes a psychosocial activity, who decides it is necessary and whether it is culturally appropriate.

Training for staff in psychosocial work was the other main component of psychosocial programmes.

9.6 Training for Staff

*Training would have helped staff understand and cope better with the distress and the children we were helping.*²²⁴

Four agencies provided psychosocial training programmes for their own staff and/or for other NGO staff, professionals and care-providers:

- Tearfund/Mitigation International (DEC funds): supporting the Albanian Response to Refugees; training in psychosocial counselling skills.
- Concern (DEC funds for admin/support costs only): training in crisis counselling.
- World Vision (not DEC funds): training for community services facilitators in psychosocial support.
- CARE (not DEC funds): psychosocial training and support programme for teachers.

²²³ Interview with CAD, March 2000.

²²⁴ Interview with SC, March 2000.

All these agencies said they used a community-based model rather than a medical or individual one and this seemed appropriate.

SC recognised that staff on the Family Contact and Tracing Service (Macedonia) would have benefited from training: *'This was a very emotionally demanding job as staff members were listening to hundreds of distressing stories and events during the war being recounted'*.

Topics covered in training courses included: common and normal reactions to experiences of violence; effects of loss and displacement; crisis; stress; dealing with anger; communication skills; listening skills; group work; basic counselling skills; how to help yourself and others; understanding and help for children; women and violence (the most difficult topic to address).

Staff could find the nature of their work emotionally demanding and draining. National staff from Kosovo had sometimes suffered similar experiences to the beneficiaries. Staff appeared to find training helpful in (i) understanding people's reactions to violence, conflict and displacement (ii) understanding better their own feelings and reactions to the events they themselves had experienced (iii) drawing up some boundaries for themselves and (iv) finding and trying out different and appropriate ways of working and offering support. Staff confidence increased as a result of participating in training courses.

In one case, needs for training were identified by a local group (VUSh, Albania/Mitigation International) The proposal was then reviewed by an external consultant (in the UK) which is good practice.

Two agencies noted the importance of continuity and follow-up sessions, to continue to build on skills and to develop training to meet identified needs. Training programmes did subsequently change. Concern changed from 'trauma counselling' to crisis counselling, and the third course will look at setting up and running support groups. Tearfund/Mitigation International developed training from psychosocial counselling skills to core communication skills and conflict resolution.

Agencies used trainers with relevant experience, mainly from UK and USA, but only one agency, CARE, selected experienced professionals from the region (Slovenia and Croatia). The training programme material that the evaluation team saw looked quite psychological and westernised, although it was reported that trainers tried to adapt them to make them more culturally appropriate. A question mark must remain over the cultural relevance and applicability of the models and materials used and no agency gave concrete examples of how these had been adapted in practice. Training was participatory rather than didactic which maximised opportunities for learning.

It is important that training is integrated into existing structures whenever possible, to ensure sustainability and development. CARE recognised this in its training programme for teachers:

The methodology of trying to address the needs of children through the education system was felt to be the best way, better than sending in mobile clinics, or short-term projects where people whiz in and out.

One agency cited just such an example, where two trainers flew in and out and *'delivered training from a western feminist stance, "we're divorced and feminist' they said; it was like they'd come from outer space'*. In that instance, at least the women participants were amused

by them, rather than de-skilled or feeling they had to learn inappropriate methods. Other examples of inappropriate training were given. In one participants were instructed in how to use 'biofeedback machines' to reduce stress. One wry comment was '*who on earth can afford or get hold of a biofeedback machine in post-war Kosovo?*'

In general, staff seemed to find training helpful, including those who went on training courses provided by other agencies such as UNICEF. But calling training courses 'trauma' or 'psychosocial' counselling raises questions, as it suggests that supporting people who are in understandable distress is a specialised mental health activity.

9.7 What Helps?

DEC agencies identified that social and community activities seemed particularly helpful:

*We work on the assumption that people's reactions are normal, and that social and community activities rather than an individual approach can help.*²²⁵

People wanted material distribution and other practical help and the chance to meet in safe places.

*The best psychosocial treatment for women were the gatherings in the centre.*²²⁶

*The best way to rehabilitate traumatised is within the community, not to separate them. Women will hesitate to go to clinics because they will be viewed as ill. We therefore need to find ways not to offend them.*²²⁷

Sewing courses were very popular:

*It was therapy after the war. The sewing provides new skills which can be utilised in the household, an opportunity for socialising, and provide women with diplomas which will help them to get employment in the textile factory.*²²⁸

They described a 22 year old woman who lost her husband in the war and was separated from her children: '*Her husband's family then rejected her. Participating in the sewing course helped her deal with it*'.

*We hoped that the groups (Women and Children) helped people. What else helped? Give them hope for the future. Reassure them you don't have to see horrible things anymore. Tell them that the prisoners (men) will be free and then we'll have a big party. Discuss with them any other things, help them to try and forget and think about something else.*²²⁹

²²⁵ Interview with World Vision, March 2000.

²²⁶ Interview with Oxfam/Elena Gjika Women's Association, March 2000.

²²⁷ Interview with Oxfam/Liria Women's Association, March 2000.

²²⁸ Interview with Oxfam/Liria Women's Association, March 2000.

²²⁹ Interview with Tearfund, March 2000.

Agencies also recognised that many people wanted to talk about their experiences, but not to a specialist:

*In one meeting one woman spoke for two hours. There is a need to talk. They feel better to get it all out. . . the centre provides a neutral space for women. At home women have not space to express their feelings. They have too many obligations.*²³⁰

Workers reassured women that their fears and symptoms were normal reactions.

*They teach people not to feel bad. Albanian people keep the trauma inside, and do not speak about their problem – men should always be strong. If they suppress it they end up feeling they are useless. People who ignore their emotions are like a bomb getting ready to go off ... there are things that are acceptable to talk about and others are not. You get to know which is which ... There is nothing wrong with teaching people this, that it is alright to grieve.*²³¹

As regards children, agencies such as SC, CARE and the League of Albanian Women found that several features were helpful: play, singing, a supportive and welcoming atmosphere, the opportunity to do normal things, safe spaces, patience, drama and other activities.

*The main purpose was to bring them back to normality. It helped them forget the war. They needed someone to listen and share their experiences ... at first they sung songs about the war. Later they recorded happy songs ... Children were initially talking about the war, instead of playing games. Initially their paintings were about burning houses, now they are drawing schools, birds, the sun.*²³²

*We saw the children's reactions to what they had experienced as normal, and with patience and kindness and the opportunity to express their feelings and ideas through drama they could get over those experiences; children have an amazing ability to cope.*²³³

It seems important to also note what helps staff. They are working in difficult and emotionally demanding circumstances. Sufficient time to talk about their own feelings and the demands of the job appeared important: 'On reflection, we could have had more talking time for staff, such as debriefing sessions' (CAD). One agency did have debriefing sessions for all staff after a plane crash in which two staff members were killed, and this was appreciated. Another agency noted that debriefing was acceptable, whereas counselling was not, a point to be heeded.

Staff also found training courses helpful. This included staff who had attended training run by other agencies (for example, UNICEF). It helped them to better understand the normal reactions of others, and sometimes themselves, to horrific events. Training gave staff more confidence in understanding, offering support and working with beneficiaries. But we question whether it needs to be called trauma/psychosocial counselling training, which suggests that offering people support is a specialised activity.

²³⁰ Interview with Oxfam/Lejgenda Women's Association, March 2000.

²³¹ Interview with Mitigation International, March 2000.

²³² Interview with SC, March 2000.

²³³ Interview with CARE, March 2000.

9.8 Need for More Specialised Psychological Help?

Regarding those people who had more serious psychological problems, DEC agencies (including those with psychosocial programmes) said they would refer them on to other agencies who did more specialised work. International Medical Corps, MSF (Belgium and Holland), Centre for Protection of Women (Pristina), and the Institute for Mental Health and Recovery (Pristina) were cited. One worker who had been in Stankovec II camp, Macedonia recalled only one woman with severe psychological problems:

*She attempted suicide. I myself supported her and talked with her afterwards, and I got support and consultation from a psychologist to help me do this.*²³⁴

In reality, given the high level of ‘traumatisation’ reported by agencies, referral on for more specialised psychological help was extremely low: ‘Referrals were much lower than expected’ (World Vision, Concern). In each area and for each agency interviewed, they recalled referring on only two or three people at most. This suggests that social support and community activities were in themselves helping people to cope with the effects and aftermath of conflict and displacement, without the need for more specialised psychological services and approaches. These services are likely to be needed by only a small minority of people.

*Psychological cases were treated with medicines. But they recovered quite well in a hospitable environment. There was a lot of entertainment in the camps. As a GP I had not been aware of this non-drug treatment, but it was recommended by NGOs. The Kosovars liked it.*²³⁵

9.9 What Did Beneficiaries Want?

Beneficiary interviews showed that they primarily appreciated food aid, shelter, security, medical assistance, clothes and the generosity of host families. Although agency interviews suggested that beneficiaries needed and appreciated psychosocial or psychological help, those interviewed did not identify this as specific help they wanted, received or requested, with one exception: one woman attending the Women’s Roma Club (Mesecina Roma Organisation) said she came because she had psychosocial problems. She had been hospitalised for some months and was still under medication (but no diagnosis or explanation was given of why these problems had arisen). Some women interviewed appreciated the opportunity to meet together and engage in social activities, such as sewing.

It is natural, understandable and to be expected that beneficiaries were distressed, angry or preoccupied by their recent experiences and that some wanted to talk with international and national staff about what had happened and how they felt. As well as gaining personal relief, perhaps some hoped that those bearing witness would carry the message to the wider world. There was no indication that people wanted to talk to mental health specialists about their problems and experiences, and some indication that they did not: ‘It was originally planned that the psychiatrist and psychotherapist would hold individual consultations, but this had to

²³⁴ Interview with Oxfam, March 2000.

²³⁵ Interview with doctor who had worked in Albanian refugee camp, March 2000.

be re-thought'. One of the reasons was because women thought there must be something wrong with them to have an individual consultation (CAFOD, Serbia).

Beneficiary feedback raises some questions as to who decides on the help needed and offered. It appears that psychosocial programmes were to a large extent decided upon by outsiders (albeit in collaboration with their local partners), rather than by beneficiaries.

9.10 Existing Coping Strategies

Good practice dictates that it is important to find out about and build on existing coping mechanisms and strategies. Indeed the DEC Central American Hurricane (Mitch) Evaluation stated:

Specialists in humanitarian emergencies have long pointed out the importance of the immediate self-help actions and strategies adopted by affected populations themselves, as a key to their successful recovery. . .these coping mechanisms may be individual or collective, short-term or long-term, conscious or unconscious, often reflecting the best efforts of ordinary people caught up in extraordinary situations to maximise their own survival (Espacios Consultores, 2000).

It was difficult to see evidence of where this had happened in Kosovo. There seemed to have been relatively little enquiry into people's previous and existing coping strategies, or attempts to support or build on these. Agencies did mention the importance of the extended family, but there were no concrete examples given of where these strengths had been used. (It is hoped that this did exist, but the evaluation team was not given examples). Helping families to communicate and keep in contact by the supply of telephones was undoubtedly important, especially in the early stages of the crisis.

9.11 Conclusions and Recommendations

Agencies and programmes come with their own assumptions, and it seems that grieving, suffering and distressed people in Kosovo have been relabelled and pathologised by some agencies as 'traumatised', needing psychosocial programmes to help them.

Kosovars prioritise the rebuilding of their communities and their social and economic world, rather than identify a need for psychological help or trauma counselling. In the field, DEC agencies in general seem to have recognised that, and many of their programmes have addressed people's social needs. The question must therefore be raised as to why they have continued to use the terms psychosocial and traumatised (words that imply some specialised mental health activity is taking place) and what precisely they mean by them. To some extent, it is simply good practice for all staff working on humanitarian and emergency programmes to take into account people's emotional needs as well as social and material ones.

If DEC agencies are to continue using 'psychosocial' to describe their programmes, the following recommendations are made:

- There seems to be a need for a fuller discussion amongst agencies to reach a clear understanding and consensus about the definition and meaning of the word 'psychosocial'. At the very least each agency ought to be able to define more clearly what they themselves mean by psychosocial activities as distinct from social or community based activities.

- Needs assessments in this area of work could be improved. What do beneficiaries want and prioritise? More consultation and dialogue with beneficiaries is needed so they know and can influence what is being offered.
- More inquiry is needed into previous and existing coping strategies. What are culturally appropriate ways of helping people in distress, both during and after conflict? Who do people traditionally turn to for support and help? How can those people be supported? Recognition and acknowledgement of what they have suffered is important; people may want to talk about their experiences, but not necessarily to a specialist such as a psychologist or a counsellor.
- The concept of counselling needs to be examined more rigorously, as a service for beneficiaries or as training courses for workers. How appropriate and applicable is western-style counselling? How could it be further adapted to any particular cultural setting? How could it be developed to build on existing coping strategies rather than undermining them?
- There is a lack of any agreed performance standards in the area of psychosocial work. Guidelines and performance standards for best practice in psychosocial work need to be developed.
- Care needs to be taken in programme design and implementation that beneficiaries are not portrayed as passive victims rather than active survivors.
- More rigorous tools for evaluating the effectiveness and impact of psychosocial activities and programmes need to be developed. Who decides the appropriate goals and outputs?
- Training for staff can help them better understand the possible effects of conflict, violence and displacement, but naming such training ‘psychosocial or trauma counselling’ should be re-thought. The current labelling implies that it is a specialised mental health activity, but perhaps such training needs a less technical name, such as ‘Support and Skills for Staff’.
- Debriefing or discussion sessions for staff can help them deal with the stresses of the work.
- If agencies do not undertake psychosocial work themselves, but support local organisations that do, attention needs to be paid to how they assess and deal with issues of appropriateness, standards, monitoring and evaluation (i.e. if it is not their own area of work or expertise).

Annex 9.1 Further Notes on Psychosocial Assistance

Preparedness

- Some agencies had worked in and knew the area well (CAD had worked in Albania since 1991 and Kosovo since 1996). Mitigation International (funded by Tearfund) had been in Albania since 1988 and had good links with the church umbrella group VUSh: it had asked Mitigation International for assistance in organising a response to Kosovo refugees. It then asked for training for church care-providers who were assisting refugees.
- Only one agency (CARE) talked of preparedness in terms of having done psychosocial/drama work previously, in Bosnia (the Pax programme which brings communities together through drama). However, the project manager for the Drama Project in Macedonia had worked with Kosovar refugees in the UK.
- Another agency said it hadn't been involved in psychosocial work before *'but knew someone who had'*.
- Concern chose Dublin Rape Crisis Centre to run the crisis counselling training, because it had previous experience of working in Bosnia

Appropriateness

- Are psychosocial programmes donor-driven or beneficiary-led? Agencies stated that they developed programmes in response to the needs of the beneficiaries: *'Everything has to come from the women and what they want'* (Concern), whilst also accepting that they were introducing new ideas and ways of working: *'The idea of a women's group came from us, but they decided what they wanted to do with it'* (Tearfund). A CAFOD partner established workshops to meet the psychosocial needs of Roma women, but for various reasons some women did not attend. The workshops were originally to have been led by a psychiatrist and a psychotherapist but the women preferred to run them themselves and this change was incorporated into the programme.
- Cultural appropriateness of psychosocial work seemed to be insufficiently addressed in practice. Agencies were well aware and talked of the need to take culture into account (for example, importance of extended family and community, role of women), but gave few specific and concrete examples of how culture had influenced their psychosocial work. *'By setting up a Women's Group, we've already changed the culture of the village, men now allow women to meet'* (Tearfund). *'This approach of participation and empowerment for children is new and is not always immediately welcomed or understood'* (CAD).
- In particular questions need to be raised about the role of counselling and counselling training in what was seen as a non-counselling culture. There was general awareness that these were new ideas for Kosovars, where personal expression of feelings was mainly done within the extended family. *'It is not a talk-culture about personal problems'* (World Vision). Tearfund were cautious about the value and importance of *'western short-term individualistic approaches to trauma'*.
- Whilst it is important that people have all the opportunities possible to recover from their experiences, how appropriate and applicable is western-style counselling? How could it

be further adapted to this cultural setting? How can it be developed to build on existing coping strategies, rather than undermine them?

- One example was given where beneficiaries wanted an activity that the agency felt was inappropriate: young women refugees in Stankovec II camp wanted to put on a Beauty Contest. Views were given by Oxfam and UNHCR as to why this might not be appropriate and a culture show was put on instead.
- Some assumptions were made that Kosovar needs would be the same as Bosnians, but without sufficient assessment. One UNICEF staff member felt psychosocial programmes had worked well in Bosnia because there were more developed psychological services there, but much less appropriate in Kosovo.
- It was difficult to assess how much consultation with beneficiaries took place about psychosocial assistance, activities and targeting. Agencies working with local partners (for example, Concern with Women's Forum; Tearfund/ Mitigation International with VUSh; Oxfam with Women's Groups) learnt about beneficiary needs through their partners. No examples were given of direct consultation with beneficiaries (although it is hoped that there were some).
- Some changes to programmes were made to meet changing needs (Tearfund and Concern both made changes to their training programmes).

Coverage

- The main groups targeted were women and children; there seemed to be a lot of assumptions that they were the most vulnerable, 'traumatised' and in need of psychosocial help, on the basis of what they had experienced.
- Some needs assessments were done: *'The social team worked with a local women's NGO, and really got to know people and their needs during the distribution phase. We targeted female headed households, disabled and older women – but it was difficult to involve them'* (Concern). Concern had also identified a wider group, including victims and witnesses of violence and abuse, families with missing relatives and the homeless.
- CAD did a needs assessment in each area using an assessment form (not seen). Tearfund, for its Public Health Education programme in Kosovo, targeted the poorest village in the area, also taking into account the number of children and elderly in the family. In Albania, VUSh (MI/Tearfund) members carried out needs assessment by visiting several churches and refugee sites, both camps, community centres and host families. MI further identified vulnerable groups during the training courses: women who lost their men, elderly, unaccompanied minors, aid workers and border officials, but did not go on to target them.
- Lejgender Women's Association (Oxfam) prioritised areas where there had been the highest levels of violence, numbers of people killed, children lost, and looked at the interests of women and girls.
- Programmes that worked with children either *'worked with all the kids who came along'* (CARE) or worked with those who were most vulnerable, troubled, aggressive or withdrawn. The needs of children evoked particular concern.
- Men were more or less ignored as a target group, although the ICRC Head of Delegation thought the most vulnerable group were young men aged 18–21 years and other agencies echoed this (exposure to guns, involvement in fighting and lack of employment). One worker from Lejgenda (Oxfam funded) also saw the need to do work with men, *'because*

violence against women is increasing ... men see their wives and daughters taken. Men have also experienced violence. Albanian traditions are strong and it is hard for them to accept violence against their families. There are many examples of where women activists have gone to people's houses and it has been men who feel the need to express their feelings. It is easier for women to forget because they are busy, they have a role and routine. Men are unemployed and have more time'.

- It is worth noting that IOM's demobilisation programme for KLA soldiers provided not counselling but financial grants to help them set up in business.
- The elderly were acknowledged to be vulnerable, but were not targeted.
- In Kosovo, it was acknowledged that the needs of minority groups (Roma, Serbs) were not being met and agencies hoped to address this in the future.
- Agencies felt there was some duplication.
- If assistance is to be driven by needs rather than by categories, what is the criteria for vulnerability? Better criteria could be developed. Those coping least well and most vulnerable may not attend social activities provided and be less visible. Describing what has happened to people is not an assessment of their vulnerability. Knowing a particular community well gives the best chance of assessing vulnerability and need.

Effectiveness and impact

- Agencies appeared to find it difficult to measure and evaluate the effectiveness and impact of psychosocial programmes. Some agencies said they were weak in this area.
- The impact of social or psychosocial interventions would generally be seen over a longer period of time, but then it becomes difficult to assess whether any improvements were due to a natural process of recovery or other factors.
- Evaluation of training programmes was carried out through evaluation forms for the participants and verbal feedback (Tearfund, Concern, World Vision).
- Evaluation of how beneficiaries were affected was quite impressionistic on occasions, *'they seemed happier, they smile when I arrive'*. Some agencies relied on a combination of verbal and written feedback: *'we give the children forms to fill in to say what they enjoyed and learnt'* (CARE, CAD); *'expat staff write a monthly report, they record stories of what they see and how people in the community seem to have reacted to the training'* (World Vision). In Albania, Oxfam monitored the number of people coming to one Centre, and the number of people returning.
- One agency (World Vision) was having both an internal and an external evaluation done (although only one was intended).
- Good practice in evaluation of psychosocial programmes needs to be developed. See for example (Loughry & Ager, 1999).

Connectedness

- It is important to work within existing structures, rather than create parallel ones which are unlikely to be sustainable. Programmes need to strengthen local capacity. SC were doing this in terms of social policies regarding children; CARE by training and working with teachers within the education system. CAD (Macedonia) was trying to work with the Union of Art Teachers.

- Some agencies had changed programmes to meet emerging, often longer-term needs. For example, Concern moved from training in trauma/crisis counselling to setting up and working with women's support groups. Tearfund moved from training in psychosocial/trauma-focused work, to conflict management and resolution. There was more thought of future income generation possibilities, rather than providing only social activities.
- There is a difference of opinion as to whether psychosocial work is emergency or longer-term work. Some argue that specific psychological assistance should be available immediately after an emergency (unsupported by evidence). Others argue that people's recovery is dependent on the rebuilding of their social, economic and community world.

Coherence

- There was duplication and overlap in general in the psychosocial field: *'There are some 70 organisations working in Kosovo carrying out a wide variety of programmes on mental health, from counselling services to art therapy programmes'* (Office of the DSRSG for Humanitarian Affairs, 2000). It was suggested that immediately after the crisis there were even more.
- DEC agencies tried to find out what similar or more specialised psychosocial services there were in their geographical area. In general international staff knew where to refer on to if people needed more specialised psychological help; national staff were less sure. Referrals to these more specialised services were very low.
- UNICEF/UNMIK had established a system to monitor and regulate psychosocial projects for children in schools. SC was aware of this, no other agency mentioned it.
- In Albania, Tearfund linked with the Department of Psychology at the University, UNHCR and other NGOs, and with networks of mental health and education services. Their training staff was lent out to other agencies.

Performance standards

- There is a lack of any agreed performance standards in the area of psychosocial work. If psychosocial programmes are to continue to exist, performance standards need to be developed.

Annex 9.2 DEC Kosovo Evaluation: Tables of Psychosocial Activities

Table 34: Phase I DEC Kosovo evaluation: Psychosocial activities

DEC Agency	Planned activities (from plans of action)	What took place	Comments
CAFOD (Serbia)	CAFOD partner: Trauma counselling and psychosocial helpline; Trauma counselling for internally displaced Roma from Kosovo.	Workshops for women to address trauma (women did not want individual consultations with psychiatrists/psychotherapist).	Not DEC-funded. Originally facilitated by psychiatrist/ psychotherapist. Covered wide variety of topics.
CARE (Macedonia)	Drama therapy, Cegrane camp	Drama workshops for children	Renamed Swallow Drama Project to get away from the idea of trauma and therapy.
Christian Aid (Albania)	Small projects fund, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> counselling service for women who had been raped; training and support of counsellors to work with refugees. 	Financial assistance given to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Linear; Mission Church. 	
Concern (Albania)	Psychosocial support to refugees.	Assisted with educational materials for Kosovar and Albanian school pupils.	Other components of programme not carried out due to rapid return of refugees to Kosovo.
Concern (Kosovo)	Support to women, to address emotional and psychological needs.	Training course in trauma counselling planned, carried out in Phase II.	
Save the Children (Serbia)	Psychosocial support to local partners; psychosocial support to foster families (phone, direct contact, leaflet).	Some local partners provided psychosocial assistance and support.	SC did not appear to implement 'psychosocial' support or projects as separate or distinct from their other work.
Save the Children (Albania)	Psychosocial assistance and support. Community Psychosocial Training and Support Unit (PTSU).		As above.
Tearfund (Albania)	Trauma counselling for refugees in Albania.	Processing proposal, carried out in Phase II.	

Table 35: Phase II DEC Kosovo evaluation: Psychosocial activities

DEC Agency	Planned activities (DEC plan of action)	What took place	Comments
CAD (Macedonia)	Action Van - mobile sports, recreation and play facility for rural schools and communities in FYRoM.	Action Van.	In proposal as 'community services', finally coded as 'education/ recreation'. Worked with local committees as well as refugees. Joint funded DFID.
CAFOD (Serbia)	CAFOD partner – trauma counselling and psychosocial helpline CAFOD partner - trauma counselling for internally displaced Roma from Kosovo.	Workshops for women to address trauma/other issues.	Not DEC-funded. Workshops facilitated by Roma women (replaced psychiatrist and psychotherapist). Low attendance. Covered wide variety of topics.
CARE (Macedonia)	Drama therapy, Cegrane camp.	Drama workshops for children.	
CARE (Kosovo)	Psychosocial training and support programme for teachers		Not DEC-funded.
CONCERN (Kosovo)	The Social Project (psychosocial approach) – training of local activists in trauma counselling.	Training in crisis counselling for Concern and other NGO staff (Dublin Rape Crisis Centre), 2 x 5 days.	Focus of training changed.
Oxfam (Albania)	Support for local partners – psychosocial stress, debriefing and medical counselling through three local partners in Tirana.	Worked through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Women for Global Action Association; • Women Realities and Visions, who did psychosocial work (dance therapy, information exchange/provision, safe space for women to talk); • Centre for women and girls. Integrated package of activities, including practical help. Counselling.	Psychosocial interventions secondary to the material distributions. People seemed to have mostly wanted help with practical problems.
Oxfam (Kosovo)	Support for local partners.	KERP: a series of trauma workshops for teachers held in seven regions of Kosovo. Support for Women's Groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lejgenda Women's Association, Viti: psychosocial work with women in five villages and psychosocial work with children. • Liria Women's Associations, Gjilan. Provide support for those affected by trauma. Some staff trained in psychosocial work. Sewing courses. 	No details available of this programme. Oxfam says that its psychosocial work is ' <i>emotional support</i> '.

Oxfam (BiH)	Support for local partners.	Work through partner organisations who provided community services for Kosovo affected refugees, including psychosocial counselling.	
Oxfam (Macedonia)	Community and Disability Services, Stankovec II.	Community services, emphasised a social approach.	
Save the Children (Serbia)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for local partners: psychosocial support to some. • Psychosocial support to foster families (phone, direct contact, leaflet). 	Some local partners provided psychosocial assistance to children at risk and psychosocial counselling.	Aim of programme to provide child-friendly partners for future work.
Save the Children (Montenegro)	Psychosocial support to IDPs.	Three children's and youngsters' centres in southern part of Montenegro.	
Tearfund (Albania)	Trauma counselling for refugees in Albania. Worked through Mitigation International/VUSh, strengthening the Albanian response to refugees and beyond.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Psychosocial counselling training for care-givers. • Training in core communication skills. 	
Tearfund (Kosovo)	Public Health Education, Gjakova.	Responded to need by having a psychosocial element to its programme in one village <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • women's group • children's group 	
World Vision (Kosovo)	Psychosocial support	Training for community services facilitators in psychosocial support.	Not DEC-funded – were told DEC did not fund psychosocial programmes.
World Vision (Montenegro, Albania)	Psychosocial programme: CATH (Creative Activities for Trauma Healing).		Not DEC-funded (as above).
World Vision (Kosovo)	MAG	Training that MAG did included one session on 'psychosocial aspects of traumatic experiences during the war with special reference to children' (run by WV).	DEC-funded.

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Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds

Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000

Volume III

Peter Wiles

Mark Bradbury	Manuela Mece
Margie Buchanan-Smith	Nicola Norman
Steve Collins	Ana Prodanovic
John Cosgrave	Jane Shackman
Alistair Hallam	Fiona Watson



Overseas Development Institute

In association with

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August 2000

**Independent Evaluation of Expenditure
of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds
Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000**

The evaluation consists of three volumes, of which this is the third.
Volume I: Main Findings of the Evaluation
Volume II: Sectoral Sections (including a section on War-Affected
Populations and Beneficiaries)
Volume III: Individual DEC Agency Summaries



Overseas Development Institute

111 Westminster Bridge Road
London
SE1 7JD
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7922 0300
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7922 0399
Email: hpg@odi.org.uk
Website: www.odi.org.uk



52 Great Portland Street
London
W1N 5AH
Tel: +44 (0) 20 7580 6550
Fax: +44 (0) 20 7580 2854

Further details about this evaluation can be found on the DEC website at :

www.dec.org.uk

*Cover: Waiting for a house to be re-built in Kosovo
Photograph taken by John Cosgrave during the Evaluation Fieldwork, March 2000*

Preface

This volume of the DEC Kosovo Evaluation contains summaries of each agency's DEC funded activities. Each agency section also looks at key issues relating to performance which the evaluation team felt merited comment.

This volume should be read in conjunction with Volumes I and II of the Report.

Volume I contains the main findings of the evaluation, together with overall conclusions and an executive summary.

Volume II contains sections on sectoral topics, such as food and nutrition, shelter and psychosocial assistance. It also looks at the experiences of war-affected populations and beneficiaries.

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Glossary

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ODI)
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Albanian Red Cross
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMI	Body Mass Index
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CA	Christian Aid
CAD	Children's Aid Direct
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CDC	Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID
CICH	Institute for Child Health
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMO	Civil Military Operations (analogous to CIMIC)
Concern	Concern Worldwide
CoC	Code of Conduct
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn/Soya Blend
CSW	Centre for Social Work
DA	Diakonia Agape
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DEM	Deutschmark
DFA	Irish Government's Department for Foreign Affairs
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DPT	Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine
DFID	Department for International Development
DRA	Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
DRT	Disaster Response Team (Tearfund's direct implementation arm)
EC	European Commission
ECEN	East and Central Europe Network
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDA	Edinburgh Direct Aid
EHO	Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation
EMG	Emergency Management Group
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPC	Emergency Programme Coordinator (Oxfam)
EU	European Union
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
ExCom	Executive Committee (of DEC)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FYROM	Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAI	HelpAge International
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Handicap International
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HoD	Head of Delegation
HPN	Humanitarian Practice Network (formerly RRN – Relief and Rehabilitation Network), ODI
HR	Human Resources
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IACU	Inter-Agency Coordination Unit
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHE	International Health Exchange
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOCC	International Orthodox Christian Charities
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPH	Institute of Public Health
IRC	International Rescue Committee, a US NGO
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JEFF	Joint Evaluation Follow-Up Monitoring and Facilitation Network
JTF	Joint Task Force
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice
KERP	Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KRC	Kosovo Red Cross
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCIC	Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MEECA	Middle East, Europe and Central Asia Team (Christian Aid)
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Mont RC	Montenegrin Red Cross
MRC	Macedonian Red Cross
MRE	Meals, Ready to Eat
MRT	Mobile Rehabilitation Team (BRCS-funded programme in Kosovo)
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MTS	Mother Teresa Society
MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Serbian Interior Ministry)
NAO	National Audit Office

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGHA	Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOVIB	Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation
NFI	Non-food items
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPF	'Help the Children' a Roma NGO in Albania
NRCS	National Red Cross Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONS	Operating National Societies
OPD	Out-Patient's Department
OPV	Oral Poliovirus Vaccine
OSC	Operational Sub-Committee of DEC
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe
PJA	Period of Joint Action
PLO	Protection Liaison Officer
PNS	Participating National Societies (Red Cross)
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontières
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RedR	Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief
REACH	Rehabilitation for Elderly and Children
RC	Red Cross
ROCC	Regional Operation Control Center (a coordination structure in Bosnia)
RRN	Relief and Rehabilitation Network (ODI). Now known as HPN (Humanitarian Practice Network)
SBASHK	Kosovo Teaching Staff Union
SC	Save the Children
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNI	Shelter Now International
SRC	Serbian Red Cross
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCK	Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA)
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, HCR
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VUSH	Vellazëria Ungjillore (Albanian Evangelical Alliance)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

WV World Vision
WVI World Vision International
YRC Yugoslav Red Cross

SECTION 1: SUMMARY OF BRCS'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

1.1 Mission

The British Red Cross Society has a mission to be the leading provider of emergency help to people in need, anywhere in the world. Its staff and volunteers abide by the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality.

1.2 Context

The National Red Cross Societies have been active in Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and FRY (Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro) since the early 1990s. Each National Red Cross Society has established networks of branches and volunteers, though there are variations in quality, coverage and effectiveness. Given their nationwide reaches, the Red Cross Societies have played important roles in the response to the Kosovo crisis, although like other agencies their preparedness and capacities to respond were severely tested.

The NRCS have been involved in distributing relief assistance to refugees and affected people during the 1990s following the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, the 1997 emergency in Albania and the developing conflict in Kosovo itself. Prior to the NATO bombings, both the ICRC and IFRC had delegations in Belgrade, Tirana and Skopje, and sub-delegations in Pristina and Podgorica.

1.3 How the BRCS Works

The BRCS did not have an independent operational presence in the region before the crisis. As is normal procedure, it provided support in terms of cash, delegates and materials to the ICRC and IFRC operations. Its overall strategy was rather to address development and relief issues simultaneously, through support to the IFRC, ICRC and the National Societies in the region. The BRCS has placed particular emphasis on institutional capacity building of the National Societies and before the Kosovo crisis was spending approximately £5-6 million in the region.

1.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

The Kosovo crisis prompted the ICRC and IFRC to take the unprecedented step of mounting a joint humanitarian operation to implement the Seville agreement which had been approved by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement in 1997 (ICRC & IFRC, 1997). An integrated regional Red Cross appeal was launched on 7 April 1999, to cover the period from April to June, requesting 150 million Swiss francs (approximately £62 million) for a beneficiary planning figure of 220,000. On 26 July 1999, there was a revised appeal for the period July to December for 325 million Swiss francs (approximately £134 million). Funds were allocated to Albania, Macedonia, FRY and Bosnia.

A Joint Steering Committee and a Joint Logistics Cell were set up in Geneva, and the ICRC and IFRC combined operational mechanisms in the fields of logistics, information and reporting. While the ICRC was the lead agency in countries party to the conflict (Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro), the IFRC took the lead in Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia.

The Red Cross joint operation expanded rapidly in the first month of the crisis. By May, the RC relief caseload stood at around 468,000 (including 260,000 in Albania and 148,000 in Macedonia), while the international Red Cross delegate presence in Tirana and Skopje increased from about 6 to 80 and from 4 to over 60 respectively.

In the first six-month phase, the Red Cross response concentrated on support to refugees, IDPs and people directly affected by the crisis (host families and ‘social cases’, particularly those in institutions). Assistance included:

- Emergency assistance (food, hygiene, shelter, water and sanitation equipment and logistics);
- Emergency medical supplies (field hospitals, support to local health facilities and essential medical supplies);
- Protection of the civilian population (message and tracing services, access to prisoners of war and provision of information to the vulnerable);
- Strengthening National RC structures.

An evaluation of the international RC response to the Balkans crisis was carried out and the report published in April 2000 (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000).

1.5 What BRCS Did

The BRCS received 16.78 per cent of the DEC appeal funds. It responded quickly to the crisis, in cash terms, pledging £50,000 to the IFRC and £232,000 to the ICRC on 27 March 1999 and a further £2,282,000 (donated by DFID) to the joint appeal within 3 weeks of its launch. Within the first 10 days of April, the BRCS had also provided material and logistical support to the joint RC operation by procuring and dispatching basic goods to Albania (blankets, sleeping bags, MREs, hygiene parcels and food parcels).

The initial strategy of the BRCS was to support the joint RC operation ‘*rather than undermine them through bilateral uncoordinated actions*’. The BRCS did not, therefore, set up any bilateral operational programmes, but channelled its funds and resources through the joint Red Cross operation.¹ After the return of the refugees to Kosovo, the BRCS modified its strategy. Whilst continuing to support the Red Cross joint operation through provision of goods and BRCS delegates, the BRCS decided to concentrate upon clear sectoral and geographic foci (rehabilitation, children and winterisation, especially in FRY and Kosovo) and to become more directly operational in Kosovo. This strategic change was prompted by a desire for higher visibility whilst allowing the BRCS to monitor and report directly to the donor (there is a delegated project manager in the field). In order to remain within the coordinated RC response, however, the BRCS opted to operate an ICRC delegated project in Kosovo.²

¹ In the UK, the BRCS supported an information service and reception centres for Balkan refugees.

² A delegated project is defined as one which forms part of ICRC’s operational planning and priorities and which ICRC would conduct even in the absence of a PNS. This means that the BRCS can utilise ICRC’s financial, logistics and field services.

The BRCS had three lines of funding for financing the Kosovo crisis (BRCS own funds, allocations from DFID and ECHO, and DEC funds) and has been a major contributor to the joint Red Cross appeals.

1.6 Summary of BRCS's DEC-funded Activities

BRCS DEC PHASE I				REGIONAL	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp.(£)	Explanatory notes
Food Hygiene Non-food	IFRC/ ICRC	ALBANIA Kukes Elbasan Durrës Tirana Fier Shkoder	Procurement and distribution of: - 42,240 MREs - 122,574 baby hygiene parcels - 34,000 blankets - 3,624 sleeping bags Beneficiaries: Refugees	25,337 1,070,943 82,059 29,880	Many of these goods arrived late. In ARC's disaster preparedness stock: - 3,430 MREs - 15,858 baby hygiene parcels - 3,221 blankets - 3,624 sleeping bags
Transport	IFRC/ ICRC	ALBANIA Tirana Durrës	Transport of donation of: - 8 Fiat minibuses [6 of the minibuses went to the ARC while the other 2 went to support IFRC operations in Durrës and Vasto (in Italy)].	15,201	FIAT minibuses were sent after consultation with the IFRC. Not being standard Toyotas (ARC runs a Toyota garage), there may be difficulty in getting spare parts.
Hygiene	IFRC/ ICRC	MACEDONIA Locations throughout Macedonia	Distribution of: - baby hygiene parcels Beneficiaries: - Refugees in host families	Part of Albania consignment	
Food Hygiene Non-food	IFRC/ ICRC	SERBIA, MONTE- NEGRO & KOSOVO Locations throughout FRY	Distribution of: - 42,017 food parcels - 409 baby hygiene parcels - 3,948 kitchen sets - 50 MT sugar Beneficiaries: - IDPs - 'social cases' (soup kitchens)	98,384 3,185 47,207 12,129	Although these goods arrived in June/July 1999, they were only distributed between September and March.
Community services		REGIONAL	BBC World Service transmissions of ICRC lists of tracing requests	23,244	
Management support			11 BRCS delegates seconded to help run RC operation	111,131	
Transport Admin support			Charter plane to Italy Admin charges	20,667 30,791	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,570,158	

DEC PHASE II				REGIONAL	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Education Social	IFRC/ ICRC	ALBANIA Kukes Elbasan Durrës Tirana Fier Shkoder	Procurement and distribution of: - 328 educational kits - 156 recreational kits Beneficiaries: - Students/school children in resident population	284,912	Recreational and educational kits were received in September and distributed in October 1999. Because most of the refugees had left they were distributed to children's kindergartens, schools, special schools, social institutions, student hostels and collective centres for remaining refugees.
		MACEDONIA Locations throughout Macedonia	Procurement and distribution of: - 330 educational kits - 156 recreational kits Beneficiaries: - Students/school children in resident population		
	KOSOVO Gjakova Rahovec Glogovc Malisheva Suhareke	Procurement and distribution of: - 1,682 student kits - 566 teacher kits - 287 recreation kits - 500 mine leaflets Beneficiaries: - Elementary schools			
Rehabilitation			Rehabilitation of 35 schools: - MRT assessment team kit - Rehab team flights/logs base - Construction material and equipment - Desks and chairs Beneficiaries: - School children aged 5-14 years	1,702,419	Original target of 58 schools reduced because of price increases and other agencies doing school reconstruction. By the end of Phase II, only 13 Category B and 16 Category C schools were renovated. Project will continue until late August 2000.
Winterisation	IFRC/ ICRC	SERBIA & MONTE- NEGRO Various municipalities	Distribution of: - 82,000 winter jackets and shoes Beneficiaries: - Refugee children aged 0-14 years	845,211	Because of problems with purchase, gift certificates, customs clearance etc, the goods only arrived in Nov/Dec 1999 and final clearance was not until 11 Feb 2000.
Water/ sanitation			Procurement and transport of: - 6 Generators Beneficiaries: - National Blood Institute, Belgrade; ICRC Belgrade; ICRC Pristina; Psychiatric Hospital, Nis 2 in stock, Belgrade & Zagreb	67,074	Water tankers remain in stock in Belgrade. Landing craft currently in Arnhem, Netherlands, awaiting a response from ICRC on whether they have any needs for its use. Due to problems and delays with the paper work for importation, there is no longer a need for a boat in the region.
			Procurement and transport of: - 4 water tankers - Landing craft and training of operative	27,646 47,737	
Management/ Admin. Support			10 BRCS delegates seconded to ICRC and IFRC operations	86,035	
			BRCS/ICRC admin charges	65,312	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				3,126,146	

Total DEC Income:	£7,192,123	
Expenditure Phase I:	£1,570,158	Returns (Phase I) November 1999: £2,295,934
Expenditure Phase II:	£3,126,146	Returns (Phase II) made April 2000 (inc. £42,548 tax returns): £199,885
Total Expenditure:	£4,696,304	

1.7 Key Issues

'Value added' of channelling DEC funds through a major agency operation

The integrated RC appeals (for an initial £62 million followed by £134 million) dwarfed the DEC appeal, and the joint RC operation was a major contributor of humanitarian assistance in the region. The BRCS channelled Phase I DEC funds through this giant joint operation. What was the 'value added' of using DEC funds in this way? Did the DEC funds make a significant contribution to the joint RC operation?

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of the DEC-funded material aid as the goods went into a larger pot and even trying to track the final destination of goods was difficult. In certain strategic areas, however, the DEC funds did appear to 'add value' to the overall operation. These areas included provision of high calibre delegates, logistical support and support to information services. Examples of good practice and problem areas are given below.

Working through the ICRC/IFRC

On balance, it was better that the BRCS channelled DEC funds through the joint Red Cross appeal rather than setting up bilateral projects, particularly in the initial stages of the emergency when things were somewhat chaotic. Furthermore, as noted below, the DEC funds 'added value' in certain strategic areas. As this was the first joint Red Cross emergency operation, however, problems were encountered which also affected the impact of DEC funds. Despite the problems, the external evaluation (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000) of the RC joint operation came down firmly in favour of future joint operations. If the recommendations from the evaluation are addressed, it is hoped that future joint operations will be better.

The BRCS has also noted that its capacity to respond was slow and that it experienced problems in becoming operational during Phase II as the support systems had 'gone to sleep' over the years and needed to be woken up³. This has stimulated the BRCS to review its emergency response capabilities.

Working through the National Red Cross Societies

The Albanian Red Cross was disbanded in 1968 but since 1990 has been re-established and was, in the circumstances, considered by the IFRC and ICRC to be a small, well-trained organisation. The Macedonian Red Cross was viewed by the IFRC as a less effective

³ Interview with BRCS London, February 2000.

organisation. The Yugoslav Red Cross comprises of the Serbian Red Cross and the Montenegrin Red Cross. The Serbian Red Cross was further subdivided into the Vojvodina Red Cross and the official Kosovo and Metohija Red Cross (Kosmet RC). During the 1990s the Kosovo Albanians established a parallel non-recognised Kosova Red Cross.

The Yugoslav Red Cross has been accused by some donors of being close to the Milosevic Government and of diversion of aid. As a result, its activities have been intensively monitored and investigated. The view of most international humanitarian organisations, both UN and NGO, is that the YRC remains the most important nation-wide organisation in Serbia for reaching vulnerable populations (UN Humanitarian Coordinator FRY, 2000).

In Kosovo, the presence of two Red Cross bodies remains a problem closely linked to the ultimate political future of the province. In that situation the ICRC remains the channel for international Red Cross assistance.

Examples of good practice

The BRCS has generally been lauded by the ICRC and IFRC for having '*played by the rules*' and deciding to support the joint operation, rather than acting bilaterally.⁴ The positive aspects for the joint RC operation were:

Speedy response: DEC funds were pledged in April

Within the first 10 days of April, the BRCS had responded by dispatching basic goods to Albania (blankets, sleeping bags, MREs, hygiene parcels and food parcels).

Positioning of high calibre delegates

DEC funds paid for 11 delegates including four in senior posts (two HoDs) and a strategically placed liaison delegate in Albania. The mobilisation of experienced delegates was recognised as an important contribution by the external evaluators of the RC joint operation.

Logistical support

The BRCS has strong logistical capacity and DEC funds were used to bolster this capacity. This was particularly useful as the IFRC logistical capacity was limited, while IFRC and ICRC logistical systems were incompatible.

Good coordination and maintenance of standards

Channelling funds through the joint operation facilitated programme coordination although the lack of coordination of some PNS was a particular problem⁵. It also allowed RC standards to be applied. For example, the BRCS purchased Red Cross recommended food parcels and baby kits using DEC funds rather than developing its own parcels (as some PNS did).

⁴ This was contrasted with the actions of a number of other Participating National Red Cross Societies (PNS) which acted bilaterally, outside the umbrella of the joint ICRC/IFRC operation.

⁵ By Nov 1999 there were 18 PNS, 90 delegates and 40 projects, of which about 50 per cent were delegated projects in Kosovo. Interview with BRCS London, February 2000.

Examples of problem areas

The recent RC evaluation has highlighted a number of problem areas in the joint RC response (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). Some of these constraints are applicable to the DEC funds and include:

Failure to meet the needs of refugees in host families in Albania during May

The RC signed an agreement with WFP, UNHCR and the authorities in Albania to address the relief needs of refugees in host families. The IFRC pipeline to Albania proved to be problematic, however. The pipeline was originally designed for 100,000 beneficiaries whereas the number of beneficiaries in host families exceeded 300,000. This, together with bottlenecks in the logistics pipeline via Ancona, resulted in a failure to deliver food parcels and other relief items in early May. The WFP had to come to the rescue of the RC and start to supply food.

Late arrival of assistance

There were various examples of DEC-funded goods procured and sent by the BRCS through the joint logistics pipeline arriving late. These included:

- September 1999: arrival of educational and recreational kits destined for refugees in Albania and Macedonia;
- May 1999: arrival of MREs for newly arrived refugees in Albania;
- February 2000: arrival of winter jackets and shoes sent to Serbia for refugee children;
- Landing craft (for Serbia) still in the Netherlands in May 2000 due to problems and delays with the paper work for importation. There is no longer a need for a boat in the region.

These timings reflect a number of difficulties, including overloaded logistical systems and, in the case of Serbia, the difficulties of getting customs clearances.

Lack of direct monitoring and reporting

As the BRCS did not have an operational presence, it could not carry out independent monitoring and reporting. As a result, it has been extremely difficult to track the final destination of goods and to assess their impact.

1.8 School Reconstruction

Over half of Phase II funds were allocated for the reconstruction of 35 schools in Kosovo. The decision was taken on the basis of an assessment mission, though BRCS had limited experience of reconstruction work. Was it wise for BRCS to opt for school reconstruction when it has limited expertise in this area? Examples of good practice and of problem areas in relation to the BRCS school reconstruction programme are listed below:

Examples of good practice

Correct identification of an essential area

The assessment mission correctly identified school reconstruction as a priority area.

Professionalism of the BRCS

The evaluation team was impressed by the professional approach adopted by the BRCS. The school reconstruction programme was professional, not just in technical terms, but in terms of

having a clear plan and on maintaining good relations with school directors and local authorities.

Examples of problem areas

Difficulty in getting suitably qualified staff

The BRCS did not have staff on its database with technical expertise in construction and difficulties were experienced in getting suitably qualified staff through other channels. Eventually the BRCS had to advertise in building trade magazines and take on construction delegates who had no previous RC experience and who received limited briefing. This was contrary to BRCS procedures. The initial rapid assessment team was replaced by two three-month operational teams, a less than ideal turnover for this reconstruction project.

Area covered by other agencies

Although the BRCS had identified school reconstruction as an area of need, a number of other agencies were involved in school reconstruction work in Kosovo and the proposed number of schools for reconstruction had to be decreased.

Slow delivery

By the end of Phase II, 13 Category B and 16 Category C schools had been renovated, slower than originally planned, partly due to the impact of winter on external work.

The option taken by the BRCS to have an operational presence in Kosovo and to opt for an area in which it has little previous experience, has been met with mixed success. Clearly school reconstruction is a niche area which other agencies have also recognised and addressed. The BRCS appear to have adopted a professional approach, however, and although the impact has been slower and coverage has been less than originally planned, the quality of the final work is good.

SECTION 2: SUMMARY OF CAFOD'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

2.1 Mission

CAFOD's mission is to promote human development and social justice in witness to Christian faith and Gospel values. To fulfil this mission CAFOD raises funds from within the Catholic community and beyond so that it can:

- empower people in need regardless of their race, gender, religion or politics to bring about change through development and relief programmes overseas;
- raise public awareness of poverty and injustice, increasing understanding of the worldwide inter-dependence of rich and poor, and creating the will to change unjust structures and lifestyles;
- act as an advocate for the poor, articulating a clear analysis of the underlying causes of poverty and challenging governments and international bodies to adopt policies which incorporate the principles of social justice.

2.2 Context

CAFOD began working with local partners in Eastern Europe in 1989, following the earthquake in Armenia. Since then, the Eastern Europe programme has expanded to cover Albania and the former Yugoslavia. CAFOD established CAFOD Albania, a local NGO, in 1993. In the former Yugoslavia, CAFOD has supported projects of Caritas and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia as well as two secular agencies in Serbia. During 1998, CAFOD funded the Caritas network to provide assistance to IDPs in Kosovo.

2.3 How CAFOD Works

CAFOD is a non-operational development and relief agency and is a member of Caritas and CIDSE, the worldwide networks of Catholic aid agencies. CAFOD works by supporting partner organisations whether secular, ecumenical or church-related, as well as those of other faiths. It has been CAFOD's practice to offer partners support in a variety of ways over a number of years, reflecting the multiple dimensions to programme quality. This support is based on an appreciation of the principles by which a partner organisation functions.

Among other aspects, this support includes:

- how the partner facilitates project design by and with the community;
- how project proposals are subsequently developed and monitored by the partner organisation;
- the process of reflection-action-reflection that the partner follows before, during and after project implementation.

CAFOD also has an Emergencies Section that provides operational support to programme staff in London and technical support to partners in the field. The Section has staff expertise in health and nutrition, shelter, water and sanitation and emergency programme management.

2.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

CAFOD received 5.4 per cent of DEC funds. Nearly all the DEC funds were spent in Serbia and Kosovo. In Phase I, over 90 per cent of DEC funds were spent on food-related programmes (a large portion was channelled through CRS). In Phase II, there was greater concentration on rehabilitation and shelter projects and a higher proportion of non-food material aid was distributed.

While CAFOD has not had an operational presence in the Balkans during the Kosovo crisis, it has a senior staff member and assistant based in Italy who provide support to partner programmes. CAFOD Emergency and Programme staff have also monitored and supported emergency projects since the crisis began, through dialogue with partners and visits to the region. An Emergencies Coordinator, based in Albania, was also appointed to support the (non-DEC funded) emergency programmes for Kosovo refugees managed by CAFOD Albania.

2.5 Summary of CAFOD's DEC-Funded Activities

CAFOD DEC PHASE I					
Sector	Partner Agency	Country & Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Food	CRS	KOSOVO Prizren AOR 7 municipalities	Procurement and distribution of: - MRE food rations Beneficiaries: - 'vulnerable groups' (at home, in collective centres and in institutions)	699,518	Started distribution on 14 June. Covers both majority (Albanian) and minority groups. CRS uses local partners (e.g. Red Cross, MTS and village councils) to do the distribution. CRS Kosovo offices are supported by CRS Macedonian office
Food Non-food aid Health Psycho-social	CAFOD partner in Serbia	SERBIA In and around Belgrade	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - medicines - blankets - women's workshops Beneficiaries: - Roma families in paper settlements	111,982	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				811,500	

CAFOD DEC PHASE II					
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
Shelter	IRW	KOSOVO Pristina Obilic	Augmented roof project: - Provision of dry, warm room packages Beneficiaries: - 273 families with homes in damage categories 4-5	65,762	
Rehabilitation	IRW	KOSOVO Podujeva	Rehabilitation of 3 schools Beneficiaries: - 840 school children aged 5-14 years	129,746	
Food Non-food aid Health Psycho-social	CAFOD partner in Serbia	SERBIA In and around Belgrade	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - medicines - 2,000 blankets - 150 wood burning stoves - Women's workshops Beneficiaries: - Roma families in paper settlements	239,858	
Non-food aid	CAFOD partner in Serbia	SERBIA Throughout Serbia	Distribution of: - winter jackets - winter boots Beneficiaries: - IDPs in collective centres	275,554	
Non-food aid	CRS	SERBIA In and around Belgrade	Procurement and distribution of: - firewood Beneficiaries: - Roma families in paper settlements	80,046	
			Phase I shortfall on CRS Emergency Assistance	300,482	
			Net exchange rate loss	1,260	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,092,708	

Total DEC Income: £2,272,200

Expenditure Phase I: £ 811,500

(Returns November 1999: £335,475)

Expenditure Phase II: £1,092,708

Total Expenditure: £1,904,208

Outstanding DEC funds in May 1999: £32,517

2.6 Key Issues

Emphasis on food aid

CAFOD spent a higher proportion of DEC Phase I funds on supporting food aid programmes than other DEC agencies.⁶ In DEC Phase I this amounted to over 90 per cent of the funds, mainly to CRS. The CRS programme aimed to pre-position supplies for refugees about to return to Kosovo. This enabled a rapid response at the time, based on an analysis that food availability for returnees was unclear. In retrospect, given the influx of food into the Balkans that followed, CAFOD acknowledges that it might have responded differently.

In Phase II about 34 per cent of DEC funds were used for food aid, reflecting requests made to CAFOD by its partners. Concentration on food aid had advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages

Food is a basic need and an essential component of aid in most emergencies. In the Kosovo crisis, the distribution of basic food items provided an important contribution to the humanitarian operation.

Channelling funds through CRS

CRS is a large relief and development organisation that specialises in food and nutrition. It was a major provider of food items (wheat flour, beans, oil, sugar and salt) in the Kosovo region. These basic items were the most appropriate forms of food aid and were more cost-effective than providing elaborate food parcels (refer to Section 1, Volume II).

'Value added' of channelling DEC funds through CRS

CRS noted that the DEC funds had particular advantages for the CRS Kosovo programme⁷. These included:

- Flexibility;
- Filled in gaps. For example, DEC funds could be used in Serb enclaves where Food for Peace food cannot be used according to Regulation 11;
- Available to fill in pipeline gaps – especially at the beginning when customs problems disrupted the pipeline.

Disadvantages

Abundance of food aid

There was no shortage of food aid sent to the Balkans during the Kosovo crisis. An opportunity was therefore missed to use DEC funds, with their potential flexibility in a more innovative way.

Inappropriate types of food aid

Donations channelled through less experienced food aid providers resulted in inappropriate forms of food aid being distributed. For example, one CAFOD partner's food parcel

⁶ CAFOD's portfolio of projects in the Balkans emergency included support to partners' non-food projects which were not funded with DEC money.

⁷ Interview with CRS Kosovo. March 2000.

contained milk powder. Several international guidelines stress that milk powder is an inappropriate type of food aid for an emergency situation, especially where hygienic conditions are poor (as in the Roma communities where these food parcels were distributed).

Implications of working with local partners

(i) Strengths of working with local partners

Established working relationship

CAFOD had well established working relationships with partners in the region, stretching back over several years.

Access to local knowledge

Local partners tend to know the local context (including potential local suppliers, distribution mechanisms and transport possibilities) and are well placed to 'hear' the views of local communities and beneficiary groups.

Linking relief and development

Local partners are likely to continue working in the region after an emergency and can link relief work to longer-term work. For example, a CAFOD partner in Serbia intends to continue working with the Roma.

(ii) Constraints of working with local partners

Lack of monitoring and evaluation

Considerable time and effort may be required to support partners in order to ensure that their own programme monitoring and evaluation is satisfactory. The funding agency also has to fulfil its own monitoring and evaluation requirements. CAFOD HQ noted that it was '*incredibly stressed last year and unable to carry out sufficient monitoring.*'⁸

Limited experience/knowledge of relief and rehabilitation work

Whilst CRS had considerable experience of working in relief and rehabilitation, some of CAFOD's other local partners had very limited experience. This lack of experience, particularly with regard to awareness of international guidelines and the Sphere standards, led to incidences of inappropriate aid being delivered. For example, one CAFOD partner in Serbia gave out food parcels containing milk powder to Roma families living in conditions of appalling hygiene.⁹ CAFOD had faxed guidelines on nutritional standards during emergencies to one of its partners in Serbia. These were more appropriate for developing countries — for example, emphasis on treatment of malnutrition — and so of limited use in the circumstances.

⁸ Reported in interview with CAFOD HQ staff. Staff monitoring visits were made to Serbia and Kosovo.

⁹ CAFOD staff also had concern about this practice and raised it with their partner. The partner, citing UNICEF reports, noted that breast feeding was reported to be on the decline in Serbia and that the practice of distributing milk powder was currently regarded as acceptable by some major international agencies. The evaluation team noted the complexities of the situation but disagreed and felt that the distribution of milk powder was unwise.

The fact that the guidelines were in English may also have been a problem. CAFOD has since appointed a health and nutrition advisor who visited its partner in March 2000.¹⁰

One of CAFOD's partners in Serbia reported that it was '*too busy*' to participate in the inter-sectoral coordination meetings (of UNHCR and WHO) and that coordination with Oxfam and CRS on programmes had been relatively recent.¹¹ This was a pity, as more experienced agencies in the field may have been able to provide them with essential information and support. However, it should be noted that local NGOs in Serbia also need to be cautious about attendance at meetings at which government representatives are present. This can be an obstacle to attending some coordination meetings.

Where funding is channelled to small, inexperienced local partners, it is imperative that adequate support, monitoring and evaluation of activities should be carried out. In cases where the local partner embarks on projects in an area outside its traditional area of competence, this is even more imperative.

¹⁰ Information in CAFOD's DEC Plans of Action and an interview with one of their partners in Serbia raised concerns about their distribution of antibiotics. However, subsequently the assurance has been given that antibiotics are always prescribed and given out by a qualified doctor.

¹¹ Interview with one of the CAFOD partners in Belgrade.

SECTION 3: SUMMARY OF CARE INTERNATIONAL UK'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

3.1 Mission

CARE International's mission is to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world: *'Drawing strength from our global diversity, resources and experience, we promote innovative solutions and are advocates for global responsibility'*.

3.2 Context

Care International has had a presence in the Balkans since 1992, running programmes in Bosnia, Croatia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, including Serbia, Vojvodino, Montenegro and Kosovo. Prior to March 1999, CARE had a sub-office in Pristina, from where it supported Serb refugees from Krajina and displaced Kosovo Albanian populations. Prior to 1999 CARE had no offices in Albania or Macedonia, although it did support work there and in 1998 commissioned an emergency assessment in those countries.

3.3 How CARE International UK Works

CARE International is an association of ten national CARE organisations and is one of the largest relief and development organisations in the world. CARE worldwide supports relief and long-term development programmes, implementing them both directly and through partner organisations. CARE International UK works in 32 countries across the globe with a growing focus on urban poverty.

3.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Eight national CARE organisations participated in CARE International's response to the Kosovo emergency. CARE Canada took the lead in Albania and Bosnia; CARE Australia in Former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and initially in Kosovo; and CARE USA in Macedonia from June 1999 and in Kosovo from September 1999. CARE UK had no operational responsibilities during the emergency, but channelled DEC funds to CARE International.

3.5 What CARE International UK Did

CARE UK received 6.5 per cent of the DEC Phase I and II Kosovo appeal funds, amounting to £2,725,800. These DEC funds were allocated to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, with over 60 per cent spent in Kosovo.

In response to the refugee exodus CARE established refugee assistance programmes in Albania and Macedonia. Supported by contracts worth £11.7 million, CARE managed 7 refugee camps housing over 100,000 refugees. In Kosovo, CARE is one of the three largest NGOs with 50 international and 450 local staff. A budget of £15.6 million supports a portfolio of programmes in shelter provision and repair; health; food and non-food distribution; agricultural rehabilitation; mine awareness training and de-mining; and firewood provision (CARE International, 2000a).

3.6 Summary of CARE's DEC-funded Activities

CARE DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Camp Management Food & non-food distribution	UNHCR WFP	Elbasan Kukes Durrës (Spitalle) Rahzbull Korce Fier (Camp Hope)	Management of 5 refugee camps, collective centres and 4 way stations; secondary food distribution; mobile 'find and help' distribution to individuals missed by mainstream aid. Beneficiaries: over 35,000 refugees. DEC funds supported: - Food: purchase of bread for newly arrived refugees in camps and collective centres. - Hygiene materials. - Transport, storage, (includes purchase of 3 7.5 mt trucks and 6 rubbish halls £54,075) and office costs. - Personnel & personnel support costs: includes 50% country director; 30 per cent NATO liaison officer; salary for standards consultant; cost of a security coordinator.	7,213 847 114,511 74,738
Education		Korce	Renovation of Naim Frasheri school, Korce. A rehabilitation project in a refugee affected area, agreed with DEC. Beneficiaries: 500 children (95% Roma)	94,530
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				291,839

CARE DEC PHASE I				FYR MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Camp Management Relief Social services	UNHCR WFP INGOs	Stankovic II Cegrane	Camp management; upgrading of camp infrastructure; storage; distribution of food and non-food relief supplies; social services (including drama therapy); information. Beneficiaries: 68,000 refugees. DEC funds supported: - Procurement of complementary foods and non-food relief supplies. - Office supplies and communications - Personnel salaries and their support costs, including 3 Mother and Child Centre programme managers, part funding of senior managers, and 14 locally engaged staff.	481,576 18,947 91,305
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				591,828

Summary of CARE International UK's DEC-Funded Activities

CARE DEC PHASE I				KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Research	Ombudsman project	Kosovo	Research for modelling Humanitarian Ombudsman, undertaken in Kosovo after the return of refugees. Expenses and fees for two expatriate researchers.	14,948
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				14,948

CARE DEC PHASE I					UK
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Management support				6,761	Costs of UK monitoring, hire of UK Balkans assistant, and recruitment costs.
CARE UK				76,957	8.5% management fee.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				973,045	Less £9,288 from other donors.

CARE DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Agriculture	MTS FAO	Urosevac/ Ferizaj, Kacanik Lipljan	- Distribution of NPK fertiliser	108,269	
			- Distribution of urea fertiliser with particular emphasis on minority farmers. Beneficiaries: 3,687 households.	12,007	
			- Distribution of 800 MT cattle feed. Beneficiaries 3,585 households.	144,090	
			- Warehouse and logistics	30,225	
			- Personnel and personnel support	17,340	
Mine clearance	Mine Tech	Urosevac/ Ferizaj, Kacanik Lipljan	- Level 1 survey etc. - Clearance of mines - Mine awareness Beneficiaries: 11,000 houses and 13 schools surveyed and 167 villages visited.	909,060	Projected expenditure to 29 February.
Monitoring/evaluation				888	Costs of UK monitoring visit.
REACH Assessment			Assessment of state and non-state systems of social protection and welfare.	3,501	Costs of consultant and CARE UK staff time.
CARE UK				102,051	Management fee 8.5%, including projected expenditure to 29 February.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,302,655	

Total DEC income Phase I & II:	£2,725,800
Expenditure Phase I:	£973,045
Expenditure Phase II:	£1,302,655
Total Expenditure:	£2,277,496

In Phase II there is an underspend of £449,645, of which £373,509 will be rolled over to Phase IIb and £76,136 returned to DEC (CARE International, 2000b)

3.7 Key Issues

Additionality of DEC funds

DEC funds represented 10 per cent of the £27.3 million funds available to CARE during the refugee and return phase of the Kosovo crisis. CARE used little of the DEC funds for overheads as donors like OFDA were generous with these. The flexibility and rapid release of DEC funds enabled CARE to:

- transfer DEC funds allocated for Albania to Macedonia;
- to fill essential gaps in programmes that other donors would not fund, such as mine clearance in Kosovo;
- support innovative activities such as the salary of a Standards Consultant in Albania, research for the Humanitarian Ombudsman project and the REACH assessment in Kosovo.

Preparedness

CARE should have been better prepared for the crisis, having commissioned an 'Emergency Assessment and Contingency Plan' for Albania and Macedonia in 1998 following the increase in hostilities in Kosovo (Fennell, 1998). The assessment alerted CARE to a pending disaster and recommended further assessments in Kosovo and Montenegro, the pre-positioning of supplies and the establishment of a presence in Macedonia. The report's recommendations were not implemented due to organisational and funding constraints, and in part due to the uncertainty of investing in an initiative that might not bring returns.¹² In the words of one CARE UK staff member, '*The alert was there but there were no resources*'. In addition, the winding down of CARE UK's emergency unit and CARE International's procurement capacity in Europe weakened CARE's capacity for rapid response.

The main lesson CARE UK has drawn from this is the need to better link analysis and response with lobbying within the CARE International structure.¹³ CARE is undertaking preparedness activities in several areas of the Balkans. In Albania, for example, it is providing emergency and preparedness training for local NGOs, concentrating on those areas which could be affected by a refugee influx from Montenegro, Macedonia or Kosovo.¹⁴

¹² Interview with CARE UK, London, March 2000.

¹³ Interview with CARE UK, London, March 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with CARE, Tirana, March 2000

Examples of good practice

The appropriateness and professionalism of CARE's response is apparent in several areas.

Preparedness

The commissioning of an 'Emergency Assessment and Contingency Plan' for Albania and Macedonia in 1998 was a good initiative, although it was not heeded.

Timeliness

In the view of CARE staff, the lack of emergency preparedness delayed the speed of CARE's response to the refugee outflow. However, CARE staff who evacuated from Kosovo were able to rapidly establish a presence in Macedonia and CARE was able to draw on its huge international capacity. By 1 April CARE had teams established in Serbia, Macedonia and Albania.

CARE, like other agencies, was taken by surprise at the suddenness and speed of the refugees' return to Kosovo, but responded quickly with the establishment of 'way stations' in Albania to assist returning refugees, and a mines awareness campaign in camps. CARE was equally quick in returning to Kosovo, re-entering the territory three days after NATO troops. By 25 June, two weeks after the cease-fire, CARE staff were distributing relief. Preparations were underway before the return. Forward planning for a programme in Kosovo was made easier once it had negotiated an Area of Responsibility (AoR) with UNHCR. Consultations with refugees in camps was used to design the agricultural programme in Kosovo.

Agency Competence

CARE utilised its considerable experience in camp management, food distribution, food security and mine clearance. CARE's camp management was considered effective and professional by collaborating agencies in Macedonia and Albania. The evaluation team found the quality of work in agriculture and mine clearance to be professionally implemented.

Assessment, monitoring, evaluation

Some good practice was evident in relation to needs assessments, monitoring and evaluations. This was apparent in the refugee camps, where refugees were consulted through camp structures, regular meetings and 'information desks' where refugees could go to seek information. Women were consulted through social services, such as the Mother and Child Centres supported by CARE.

Refugees were consulted in the Macedonian camps to design CARE's agricultural programme in Kosovo. Needs assessments in Kosovo have involved a number of groups — community groups, MTS, UN appointed civil administrations — although the level of consultation with women is unclear.¹⁵ Following the distribution of seeds and fertiliser in November, CARE undertook a post-distribution assessment of 5 per cent of households in 20 per cent of the villages in its AoR.

CARE has undertaken a livelihood security baseline survey (not DEC funded) among host families in Albania (CARE International, 1999). CARE International has also undertaken a lesson learning review of its response to the emergency. This review had not been made

¹⁵ Some women were present at the CARE seed distribution witnessed during the evaluation.

public at the time of the evaluation fieldwork, but a paper raising the general learning issues from the Kosovo crisis has been prepared (CARE International, 2000c).

Policy work

CARE used DEC funds to support research and assessments. This built on CARE UK's policy work on the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project, the Sphere Project, and its work on 'social protection' in Bosnia. The research to test and design a model Humanitarian Ombudsman has been considered a useful initiative.¹⁶ However, no links were made between these two initiatives and CARE UK's dissemination of the research has been poor.¹⁷

Protection

Although CARE did not articulate 'protection' needs in its proposals, awareness of protection needs is apparent in its work. For example:

- CARE maintained a 24-hour presence in refugee camps, employed security officers and lobbied UNHCR to increase their presence in the camps.¹⁸
- In Kosovo, CARE has developed strategies to address access constraints faced by minority farmers and other vulnerable groups. These include: recruiting national staff without local connections to avoid influencing beneficiary selection; employing Serbs to work in Serb villages; direct distributions by CARE; and positive discrimination in the allocation of some resources — for example, the distribution of urea fertiliser to Serb farmers to top dress winter wheat to increase their yields. This was considered necessary to increase their food security, given their limited access to markets.¹⁹ CARE opened an office in north Mitrovica to improve coverage. It notes: '*While such cantonisation of operations is not ideal, it is the only way of providing significant services without endangering our staff, given the current climate*' (CARE International, 2000a).
- CARE is a member of the Protection Working Group in Pristina, which meets to address issues related to protection, human rights and UNMIK policies.
- The REACH assessment funded by DEC funds has been used to inform work on social protection issues.

Coherence

CARE International in Kosovo is an example of the trend towards multi-national confederated programmes, with eight national CARE members participating. While generating huge resources, this way of working led to pressures of bilateralism which affected CARE's ability to ensure programme quality (CARE International, 2000a). The majority of CARE's funding came from donor governments, and with governments keen to channel resources to areas

¹⁶ Given the proposed establishment of a human rights Ombudsman for Kosovo, OSCE staff expressed interest in the Ombudsman research (Interview, OSCE, March 2000, Prizren.)

¹⁷ Interview with BRCS, March 2000, London.

¹⁸ Interview with CARE, April 2000, Serbia.

¹⁹ Blanket distribution of food may serve to weaken links between Serb and Albanian communities, by removing the need for Albanians to trade with Serb farmers who had wheat stocks. Although it may also have made Serbs more of a target.

where their military contingents were operating, this risked affecting CARE's independence and the '*Balkanisation of CARE Kosovo*' (CARE International, 2000a). The arrest of CARE employees in Serbia on spying charges also affected perceptions of CARE International's independence. Additional strains were caused by different administrative systems among the different CARE organisations. The appointment of a Balkans Coordinator helped ensure overall coherence and CARE International's own lesson-learning review (CARE International, 2000c) has sought to address some of these problems. To its credit, CARE UK is not accused of bilateralism. DEC funds removed the necessity of taking UK government funding and helped maintain its independence. One senior staff member noted: '*DEC funds kept us honest*'.²⁰

Standards

CARE used DEC funds to employ a consultant in Albania to evaluate standards in refugee assistance, including camp management (Kelly, 2000). The end product was practical guidelines for implementing standards, including Sphere Standards, in the management of refugee camps and collective centres and secondary food distribution.²¹ While there are Sphere Standards for refugee assistance, there are no guidelines on camp management, a largely political job.

Connectedness

In Albania and Macedonia, CARE continued working as the refugee crisis receded, cleaning campsites and initiating quick impact rehabilitation and longer term development activities. The latter include school rehabilitation and training with local NGOs in Albania and a permaculture farm in Macedonia. Lack of donor funding affected the choice of programming in Macedonia.²² Showing forethought, CARE held a strategic planning exercise in Albania in July 1999 and in Kosovo as early as September 1999, to set the direction for the following 18 months.

Examples of problem areas

Standards

In the Kosovo emergency 'maximum standards' was as big an issue as minimum standards. CARE notes in its DEC Phase I report '*the high expectations of refugees from a European society, which resulted in demands for greater provisions and more sophisticated camp infrastructure.*' In Albania, CARE arranged for refugees who complained about the quality of bread to consult with local bakers. In Macedonia, complementary foods provided by CARE included fresh chicken, and cereals, milk and fruit juice for children. CARE spent over £6,000 of DEC funds on Albanian newspapers for refugees in Macedonia alone. CARE's claim that the delivery of fresh food ensured a high nutritional status was maintained (DEC Phase II report) is exaggerated, given the general good health of the population and availability of foodstuffs. This level of assistance exceeded standards of assistance received by refugees

²⁰ Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

²¹ Some CARE staff who had worked in Albania reported that the OFDA Field Operations Guide was a more useful field tool than Sphere guidelines (Interview with CARE Kosovo, March 2000).

²² Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

elsewhere. The necessity of some of the assistance provided and whether this level of assistance for refugees could have been sustained in the long-term is questionable.

Aid-military relations

As a major actor in refugee camp management, CARE was in direct contact with NATO forces, which raised issues of neutrality and impartiality. US Marines, for example, provided security in Camp Hope during the construction phase. In Albania, DEC funds were used to part-fund a CARE NATO liaison officer. Some CARE staff argue that the liaison officer made relations with the military more efficient. Others expressed concern at what they saw as militarisation of humanitarianism and military competition for humanitarian resources. In Korce one CARE office did draw up ‘ground rules’ for the distribution of relief assistance.²³ However, as with other agencies, lack of guidelines on aid-military relations was a weakness in the response and is recognised as such by the organisation.

Advocacy

CARE undertook advocacy in-country at an individual project or programme level, but seems to have steered away from addressing some broader issues.

CARE UK expressed uneasiness with British government statements during the emergency that ‘*British and military objectives are intertwined*’ and considered the possibility of not taking British government money.²⁴ However, the availability of DEC funds meant the need did not arise and CARE took no public position on it.

CARE UK — which is a signature to the campaign against land mines and utilised DEC funds for a de-mining and UXO clearance programme in Kosovo — made no statement on NATO’s use of cluster bombs (see Section 6, Volume II). CARE UK argues that it does not have the ‘policy competence’ to advocate on this issue, even though it has lobbied the US government on its failure to sign the convention on landmines.²⁵

CARE UK’s ability to take an advocacy position may be constrained by being a member of a larger confederation. CARE International’s sub-contracting relationship with donor governments may also limit the space for taking an independent position.

Furthermore, in a politically-charged environment like the Kosovo emergency, CARE International’s sub-contracting relationship with donor governments limits its space for taking an independent position.

Connectedness

CARE recognises that the biggest challenge in Kosovo is the ‘*transition from relief to development*’ and that this will be determined by the broader economic and political framework (CARE International, 2000a). The current ‘stateless’ situation impacts on CARE’s work, for example in agriculture.

²³ Susanne Jaspars, May 2000, London.

²⁴ Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

²⁵ Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

Given the legal uncertainties over land ownership and the ownership of former state agricultural enterprises, problems of high land prices and restricted markets, CARE's aim to re-establish subsistence agriculture in Kosovo appears unrealistic. While there is awareness of these issues, CARE's ability to influence them is limited. One action it has taken is to cut seed distributions to Kosovo Albanian farmers to 30–40 per cent of their needs, in order to '*avoid creating dependency*', a policy supported by the FAO.²⁶ However, while aid, in some instances, may be replacing a reliance on remittances, reducing aid does not necessarily solve the problem as agriculture has always been subsidised by the state and through remittances. The reduction of CARE's subsidy could therefore lead to social problems and is something which CARE's household livelihood assessments should monitor.

Use of DEC funds

CARE asserts that the flexibility and speed of disbursement allowed for a 'truly rapid response' to the refugee crisis in Albania (CARE International, 2000d). However, a third of the DEC funds it allocated to Albania were not spent until October on the rehabilitation of Naim Frasheri school in Korce. CARE's stated rationale for this project was: to rehabilitate infrastructure affected by the influx of refugees; to support countries that host refugees; to prevent the movement of Albanians to Kosovo; and contribute to the '*general stability of the region*' (CARE International, 2000d). With DEC approval, the Phase I deadline was extended to allow the tendering process to be completed and Phase I money to be 'committed' by 15th October. Work was expected to be completed by December 1999 but had not been finalised at the time of the evaluation fieldwork in March 2000.

The project raises several issues on the use of DEC funds. The need of the Roma community is beyond doubt, although the advisability of encouraging separate education is questionable. The notion that this project could contribute to regional stability appears an exaggerated expectation. The standard of work was judged by the team to be below that of other school rehabilitations in Kosovo. Furthermore, there is little evidence that this school was especially affected by the refugee crisis, raising a question about the validity of using DEC money for this project.

²⁶ Interview with CARE, Ferezaj, March 2000.

SECTION 4: SUMMARY OF CHILDREN'S AID DIRECT'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

4.1 Mission

Children's Aid Direct seeks to make an immediate and lasting improvement to the lives of children and their carers who are affected by conflict, poverty or disaster. *'We aim to give practical help, responding to children's needs for Protection, Nutrition, Healthcare, Education and Recreation. We do this in innovative ways by empowering our beneficiaries and enabling our donors and volunteers to be involved in working for children.'*

4.2 Context

CAD had a well-established presence in the Balkans:

- Albania: since 1991 implementing food and non-food distributions, supporting education, health including structural rehabilitation and agriculture;
- Bosnia: 1993 – 1998;
- Kosovo: since 1995 (food and non-food distributions to refugees and rehabilitating water and sanitation systems);
- Macedonia: CAD opened an office and bank account in late 1998 as a preparedness measure against growing instability in the region.

4.3 How CAD Works

CAD usually implements programmes directly but in Macedonia the fact that it was not registered meant that it implemented initially through El Hilal. CAD does not have a separate emergency unit and implements both emergency and longer-term programmes through country office teams. CAD has a core expertise in distribution, especially of donated goods.

4.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

This was the first DEC appeal in which CAD participated. It received 1 per cent of DEC funds, £291,502 in Phase I and £148,268 in Phase II. In addition, in response to the crisis it has implemented projects to a value of over £9 million since March 1999.

CAD's pre-existing presence, experience and contacts in Albania and Kosovo made them well placed to implement emergency programmes. It was quick to scale up activities in Albania and soon provided a focus of support for other international agencies. In Macedonia its nascent office also stood it in good stead and it was one of the first agencies active at the Blace crossing. Upon the return to Kosovo, UNHCR chose CAD as the lead agency for food and non-food distribution based upon its previous good track record in the province.

4.5 Summary of Children's Aid Direct's DEC-funded Activities²⁷

CAD DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Non-food distribution		Kukes district Has district	Distribution of donated goods to 85,000 beneficiaries Distribution of children clothes and towels to 2 baby washing centres for three months	45,146 5537	Under-spend of 1,206 transferred to Kosovo
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				50,683	
<i>Non-DEC Funded</i>			<i>Food parcels, Hygiene kit distribution, kitchen kits, baby care centres in camps, educational materials.</i>	<i>2,054,250</i>	<i>Funds committed by other donors including DFID, OFDA, ECHO, UNHCR</i>

CAD DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Non-Food Distribution	El Hilal	Gostivar, Tetovo, Debar	Distribution of donated goods to refugees and host families	45,146	Distribution of donated aid to IDPs, refugees and host families in Albania
Community activities			Recreational equipment	1206	Transferred from under-spend in Kukes
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				46,352	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Distribution of: family hygiene kits, linen, kitchen kits, hygiene kits, children's underwear, school materials and equipment Emergency Rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities in schools</i>	<i>1,102,500</i>	<i>DFID, OFDA, UNICEF</i>

CAD DEC PHASE I				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Non-Food Distribution	MTS	Rural Pristina	Distribution of donated goods	45,146	Distribution of donated aid to IDPs, refugees and host families in Albania
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				45,146	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Distribution of food & non-food items in Rural Pristina</i>	<i>889,600</i>	<i>UNHCR</i>

²⁷ Because CAD received a small amount of money from the DEC but mounted some substantial programmes, the latter are also shown in the summary tables.

CAD DEC PHASE I					SUPPORT COSTS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Procurement of aid items				135,440	DEC funds used to facilitate all CAD operations by covering core costs (office equipment, vehicles, staff salaries and support).
Admin				13,881	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				149,321	

CAD DEC PHASE II					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
<i>NO SPECIFIC DEC FUNDING USED</i>					
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Emergency support to education facilities, Rehabilitation of Playgrounds, Rehabilitation of schools, health and hygiene promotion</i>	929,000	<i>ECHO, DFID UNHCR/IRC</i>

CAD DEC PHASE II					MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Psycho-social		Macedonia	Action Van - play and recreational activities and training to children by visiting different locations regularly.	19,095	DEC Additional DFID funding £30,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				19,095	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Rehabilitation of and capacity building of schools and clinics health and hygiene promotion</i>	863,755	<i>UNICEF, ECHO, DFID</i>

CAD DEC PHASE II				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Donated aid	MTS Direct distribution to minority groups.	Pristina Rural, Kosovo Polje, Obiliq, Lipjjan municipalities	59,243 Albanian beneficiaries in 111 communities 33,800 people from minority groups in 52 communities	18,055	DEC funds covered transportation and packaging of donated items also delivered during CAD's food and non-food distributions.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				18,055	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Food and non-food distribution; 3,500 shelter kits; 50,000 school kits; Mines awareness in rural villages; Emergency Rehabilitation of water and sanitation in schools 10 schools rehabilitated – 8 with water; health promotion.</i>	3,037,600	<i>ECHO, DFID, UNICEF</i>

CAD DEC PHASE II				SUPPORT COSTS	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Food and non-food distributions		Support costs	- 4x4 wheel drive and forklift truck - communication equipment - Staffing costs - Office costs	111,118	Initial budget of £75,000 with £36,118 over-spend
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				111,118	

Total DEC Income: £ 439,771

Expenditure Phase I: £291,503

Expenditure Phase II: £148,268

Total Expenditure: £ 439,771

4.6 Key Issues

CAD received the second lowest amount of DEC funds. By contrast, its overall expenditure of £9 million during the evaluation period was one of the highest for any DEC agency. Facilitated by CAD's long history and well-established presence in the region, its programmes appeared to be of high quality and contained many examples of good practice. The impression is that CAD was better placed to spend DEC funds more effectively than some of the larger DEC agencies. The contrast between the small amount of DEC funding CAD received and its high capacity to spend money effectively offers an example of where the DEC apportioning of funds should take into account an agency's capacity in the specific emergency area.

Examples of good practice

Preparedness and timeliness

In comparison with most other agencies CAD were relatively well prepared at the start of the March 1999 crisis. It had offices in Tirana²⁸, Kukes²⁹, Skopje³⁰ and Pristina³¹ and an extensive knowledge of the area, including good contacts with haulier companies. Right at the start of the war it was able to divert a consignment of ECHO-funded food, originally bound for Kosovo, to Albania. This allowed them to begin distribution very shortly after the arrival of the refugees. Subsequently its overland pipeline performed well,³² delivering an

²⁸ Office since 1991.

²⁹ CAD were the only international agency with a permanent presence in Kukes before the crisis.

³⁰ As a preparedness measure, CAD had established an office and a bank account in Skopje in late 1998. Government restrictions had prevented them registering at that time.

³¹ Office since 1997.

³² CAD used hauliers from the Balkans. As many of these trucks would normally have been returning empty, CAD obtained reasonable low rates of approximately £2,650 for every 110 cubic metres to Pristina.

uninterrupted flow of non-food items at very competitive rates.³³ In both Albania and Macedonia, CAD quickly built up an experienced local team, in Macedonia extracting former local staff members from the Blace camp within a few days of the refugees entering no-man's land. CAD was therefore able to respond quickly and was one of the first agencies in both Albania and Macedonia to implement operational relief programmes.

Appropriateness, assessments and monitoring

The CAD programmes demonstrated several examples of good practice in both monitoring and assessment. It devoted considerable resources to these activities,³⁴ used systematic sampling frames³⁵ and a variety of methods and sources of data.³⁶ In Kosovo, CAD organised in-depth background assessments at the beginning of its programmes covering 50 villages with individual and community level questionnaires, interviews and group discussions. These assessments directed future programmes. In its school rehabilitation programmes in Macedonia, CAD implemented integrated reconstruction interventions, including structural rehabilitation and water and sanitation work. It collected baseline information concerning hygiene behaviours to guide implementation and is now repeating these surveys to assess impact.³⁷

Coverage

CAD has worked with all ethnic groups during the crisis. In January 2000, it set up an office in Gracinica, a Serbian enclave within rural Pristina, to deliver food and non-food items to 52 minority communities in its AoR. This office employed Serb staff. In Macedonia, it had safe motherhood programmes targeting Roma and the DEC-funded Action Van had a special circus club for Roma children. CAD has also developed links and work with a local NGO representing Serb refugees.

CAD programmes with refugees mainly targeted those living in host communities, with a focus on difficult and under-served areas.³⁸ CAD has always accompanied its distributions to refugees with assistance to host populations.

³³ The average time from the UK to the CAD warehouse in country was 7 days, comparable to the time taken to transport goods using a DFID-funded charter.

³⁴ In the rural Pristina AoR, CAD employed 28 full-time field monitors. This does not count the logisticians, distribution managers and information managers based at the central office. In addition, it has opened a second office serving 52 minority communities that is staffed by 7 local staff and 5 international staff. Almost all of these staff are involved in assessment and monitoring exercises.

³⁵ CAD aimed for a 5 per cent sample in their monitoring activities, carrying out both distribution monitoring and 'end use' monitoring, visiting families who had received goods to see what they had done with them.

³⁶ In Albania, where CAD targeted distributions based on other local authority/Red Cross distribution lists, CAD developed an elaborate computerised system for cross checking lists from several sources to look for double registration.

³⁷ CAD assessed basic knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) data before starting public health programmes in Macedonia. They are in the process of re-assessing KAP data in their project sites, thereby allowing them to assess some measures of impact.

³⁸ In North Albania, CAD was one of the few agencies delivering assistance to remote rural areas.

Connectedness

CAD continues to work in the same areas of Albania and Kosovo where it had a pre-existing presence. During the crisis in Albania, it tasked two expatriate project managers to continue its longer term programmes. Although this was not always possible, after July 1999, CAD resumed its pre-crisis support to the local health and educational infrastructure, working closely with local authorities. CAD's previous experience in Albania also helped make them sensitive to issues surrounding clans and it took active steps to try to ensure a balance between clans among their local staff.³⁹

In Macedonia, CAD is transforming its relief programmes into longer-term programmes, working closely with local authorities to rehabilitate schools and clinics.

Coherence/integration

CAD appears to have coordinated closely with other agencies and local authorities in all its programmes. In both Albania and Macedonia, CAD assisted other agencies to establish programmes offering logistic support and advice.⁴⁰ In Kosovo, on the strength of its past work, CAD was appointed as UNHCR's implementing partner for food and non-food in rural Pristina.

CAD have adopted an integrated approach to relief, combining food, non-food and structural rehabilitation with efforts to ensure that the systems to manage schools and health facilities were adequate. In particular, its efforts to work with communities in order to facilitate solutions appear to have resulted in well-integrated, appropriate programmes.⁴¹

Problem areas

Over-distribution of resources not based on assessed need

On occasion CAD appears not to have distributed according to identified need. In the baby centres in Kukes, it distributed a new towel every time a baby attended one of the centres, often every other day. This represented an over-distribution of resources.

Human resources and management

Despite its regional preparedness, CAD had certain difficulties scaling up to address the emergency. It appears that initially in Albania administration and financial systems were poorly set up. Later there was also confusion over line-management. In Kosovo, inter-agency competition for staff, the absence of salary scales and poaching of staff, particularly by the multilaterals and donors has resulted in many of CAD's experienced local staff leaving the organisation.

³⁹ For example CAD advertised for posts widely using TV and radio and ensured that a staff member from Tirana was present at all interviews in Kukes.

⁴⁰ For example, CAD facilitated assessment by HAI. Offered logistical and personnel support by seconding a member of staff, providing transport, office and warehouse space and allowing a deposit of money into CAD account.

⁴¹ For example, in Kosovo, in addition to providing food and non-food support, CAD rehabilitated 10 primary schools, improved the water and sanitation facilities in eight of these schools, addressed behavioural aspects of health and hygiene promotion and distributed 50,000 school kits.

Standards

Although CAD supports the principles of Sphere, the standards are not in all field offices and CAD has not taken steps to ensure that programmes meet the Sphere key indicators.

Reporting

This was the first DEC appeal that CAD has opted into. Its report to the DEC was reasonable and clearly identified all sources of funding and provided an adequate narrative account of the projects undertaken. However it did not differentiate between expenditure in different countries.

SECTION 5: SUMMARY OF CHRISTIAN AID'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

5.1 Mission

Christian Aid (CA) believes in strengthening people to find solutions to the problems they face. It works in over 60 countries helping people, regardless of religion or race, to improve their own lives and tackle the causes of poverty and injustice.

5.2 Context

Christian Aid has been working throughout the Balkans since the early 1990s with various partners including the Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation (EHO), Diakonia Agape (DA), International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation (MCIC) and United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). The types of programmes implemented by Christian Aid range from income generation to agriculture and food security, women and youth programmes. In Bosnia, Christian Aid implemented a large housing rehabilitation programme, and in Kosovo the rehabilitation of homes.

5.3 How Christian Aid Works

Christian Aid is part of the Action by Churches Together (ACT), a worldwide network of churches and related agencies responding to emergencies based in Geneva. Christian Aid works through local partners (both church and secular groups) in the field and has an Emergency Unit at its HQ in London.

5.4 Overall Response to Emergency

Christian Aid received 8.5 per cent of DEC appeal funds and DEC funding represented the major part of Christian Aid's total funding during the Kosovo crisis (68 per cent in Phase I and 77 per cent in Phase II).

ACT launched an appeal for the Kosovo crisis in March 1999. This was subsequently revised in April. In July, a second appeal for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the Balkans was launched. A decision was also taken for ACT to have an operational presence in the region and a network of 5 agencies, who were already active in the region, was established. The 5 agencies were the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Dan Church Aid, MCIC, NCA and United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). After the return of the majority of refugees to Kosovo, ACT set up offices in Kosovo from which to manage and coordinate its humanitarian response. A mid-term evaluation of the first appeal was carried out in August 1999 (Silkin & Bouman, 1999). A second evaluation of ACT was carried out in January 2000 (Silkin et al, 2000).

5.5 What Christian Aid Did

Christian Aid responded immediately to ACT's appeals and invitation to join the ACT programme. During the crisis, Christian Aid worked through the ACT network and through local partners including:

- DA in Albania;

- LWF in Bosnia;
- MCIC in Macedonia;
- EHO in Vojvodina;
- IOCC in Montenegro and Serbia.

In Albania, Christian Aid was semi-operational within the ACT network and seconded staff to support the ACT/DA programme.

After the return of the refugees to Kosovo, Christian Aid initially became semi-operational and then fully operational in Kosovo. Christian Aid staff managed the ACT/UMCOR programme in Rahovec which was subsequently taken over completely by Christian Aid. This adoption of an operational role by Christian Aid was partly stimulated by a desire for higher visibility as an implementing agency within ACT and because of the shortage of appropriate partners in the region.

The objectives of Christian Aid's Emergency Crisis Programme in the Balkans were:

- The provision of basic relief to refugees/IDPs in refugee camps and host families;
- The provision of psycho-social support;⁴²
- Support to local host families and their communities;
- The promotion of inter-ethnic cooperation and dialogue.

⁴² Four Week Plan p.9; DEC Phase I Kosovo programme – narrative and financial report p.7.

5.6 Summary of Christian Aid's DEC-funded Activities

Christian Aid DEC PHASE I					
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Food Non-food Health Shelter	DA	ALBANIA Shkodra Gjirocaster 'Way stations' (on return to Kosovo)	Purchase and distribution of: - 5,500 clothing parcels - 150 tents - 400,000 water purification tablets - 20,000 ORS - 20 cholera kits - 6,000 MREs PLUS transport and admin. Beneficiaries: - 25,000 refugees in host families and host families	322,730	Distribution delayed until 20 May. Cholera kits, ORS and water purification tablets were donated to hospitals in Tirana and Elbasan when an epidemic failed to materialise and after the return of refugees to Kosovo.
Community services		Tirana Shkoder Gjirocastra Saranda Elbasan Durrës	One-off grants for 26 small Albanian community projects (maximum grant = £5,000).	100,000	
Management support			Assist in establishing the ACT/Albania management and coordination structure		DEC funds of £35,000 for support to ACT/Albania were never used and were returned to DEC
Food Hygiene	MCIC	MACEDONIA Skopje Tetovo Kumanovo Gostivar Debar Struga	Procurement and distribution of: - 4,740 food parcels - 10,000 baby food parcels - 10,000 baby hygiene parcels Beneficiaries: - refugees in host families - 'social cases'	294,000	MCIC used 19 local NGOs to do the distribution. This was part of a larger programme distributing food and hygiene parcels to refugees, host families and 'social cases' (about 50,000 beneficiaries) of which the DEC contributed 9% of total funds. The programme ran from May to October 1999.
Food Hygiene Non-food	LWF	BOSNIA Tuzla Canton Zenica Canton	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene kits - clothes parcels - bedding sets - other relief supplies PLUS staff, management costs Material items for Croatia Beneficiaries:		

			- 3,000 Kosovar refugees living in collective centres and shelters in Bosnia	275,320	
Non-food	IOCC/ Christian Aid	Bosanki Petrovac camp	Distribution of: - clothes - blankets - nappies	5,819	Goods delivered in June/July. Only about half of the budget was actually spent.
Food Hygiene Non-food	IOCC	SERBIA 31 municipalities in Central Serbia (urban and rural)	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - household items Beneficiaries: - IDPs and refugees living in 180 collective centres Staff, management costs	414,043	IOCC used 16 local NGOs (main local NGO used was <i>Philanthropy</i> , the humanitarian arm of the Serbian Orthodox Church) to do the distribution.
Food Hygiene Community services	EHO	Novi Sad and 45 parishes within Vojvodina	Distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - small cash grants Beneficiaries: - refugees - resident war-affected families	88,000	EHO worked with 5 partner organisations.
Admin. support			Christian Aid admin. charge in London	39,336	
TOTAL PHASE I EXPENDITURE				1,539,248	

Christian Aid DEC PHASE II					
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Wat/san	MCIC	MACEDONIA Debrese (Gostivar) Recane (Vrutok) Srbica (Oslomej)	Improvement of water supply in 3 villages.	333,655	Villages' water and sanitation systems had suffered due to extra demand by refugees. MCIC worked directly with Village Committees.
Food Hygiene Non-food	IOCC	SERBIA 48 municipalities in Central Serbia (urban and rural)	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - institutional cleaning kits - children's jogging suits Beneficiaries: - IDPs/refugees in private accommodation and collective centres	187,554	IOCC used 13 local partners for the distribution. IOCC targeted municipalities where it has previously established effective distribution partnerships.

Shelter	Christian Aid & UMCOR	KOSOVO Mitrovica Rahovec	Weatherproofing/roofing of 482 houses: - timber roof - clay roof tiles & ridge caps - windows (3 sizes) - doors (interior & exterior) - lime, cement, re-bar and blocks PLUS procurement of transport (4 Landrover defenders, 2 Bedford trucks and vehicle communication equipment). Beneficiaries: - Returnees in 4 target villages with Category 2, 3 or 4 damage.	934,167	Funds were not available to rehabilitate the houses according to initial assessments. Beneficiary expectations were raised because of this. However, Christian Aid maintains that no unfulfilled promises were made.
Agriculture	MCIC	KOSOVO 7 villages in: Gjakovica Orahovac Prizren 36 villages in: Dragash	Chickens for individual farmers. Distribution of: - 5,100 egg layers - 85 tons chicken concentrate - Salaries for mechanics and parts to repair 100 tractors and 3 combines Distribution to villagers of: - 300 sets of farm tools - 13 tons of fertiliser - 50 vineyard tools Distribution to livestock owners of: - 706 tons of livestock food Restoration of milk: - production in one milk factory	118,625	DEC Phase I funds contributed about 48% of funds for the project described here. Around 50,000 people received assistance. The most needy were targeted e.g. those with fewer livestock. Project assistance to a dairy was in the form of a loan which should be repaid in the form of milk products to be distributed to social institutions.
Shelter	EDA	Drenica	- Dry room/roofing of 672 houses - Temporary winter shelter for 400 vulnerable families Beneficiaries: - Returnees in target villages (houses with Category 4 damage)	357,500	
Admin. support	Christian Aid		8 grants for travel; programme support; 70% of senior programme officer's salary; salary of Kosovo programme officer; cost of closing out Albania programme; Kosovo field officer costs.	79,582	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				2,011,083	

Total DEC Income:	£3,585,332
Expenditure Phase I:	£1,539,248
Expenditure Phase II:	£2,011,083
Total Expenditure:	£3,550,331

5.7 Key Issues

Experience of Christian Aid as an operational organisation

Christian Aid chose to have a semi-operational presence in Albania (supporting the DA/ACT operation) and a fully operational presence in Kosovo (implementing a shelter programme). This experience has been a major 'learning area' for Christian Aid and there have been benefits and problems with the operational approach.

Examples of good practice

Delivery of appropriate and effective aid

The permanent rehabilitation of houses in the shelter programme in Kosovo was a more appropriate and effective form of aid than the warm room kits and plastic sheeting supplied under other programmes.

Examples of problem areas

*Logistical constraints in Christian Aid shelter programme in Kosovo*⁴³

- Delays in procurement and delivery of construction materials due to poor communication between field offices and suppliers.
- Absence of effective telecommunication system leading to poor coordination and communication.
- Lack of participation of field offices in initial procurement of materials and the need to place emergency order of materials resulting in purchase of inaccurate lengths of timber.

Beneficiaries' raised expectations

As described in Chapter 3 of Volume II, assessments for the shelter programme in Kosovo raised beneficiary expectations about the standards of house rehabilitation which were not met, although Christian Aid is certain that no unfulfilled promises were made. There was also some confusion about whether Christian Aid would provide assistance with labour.

⁴³ UMCOR was the organisation with management responsibility for this programme, until Christian Aid took it over on 1/1/00.

High turnover of Christian Aid international staff

There were 3-4 Christian Aid managers in less than a year for the shelter programme in Kosovo. This led to disconnectedness, especially for beneficiaries who may have received different information from different managers.

Overstretching of staff in London

The demands of running a large, operational programme overstretched staff at HQ in London.

Christian Aid's experience at working operationally in a large-scale emergency has been mixed. Christian Aid report that this was a major '*learning area*'.⁴⁴ As a result of Kosovo, however, Christian Aid has now created a Strategy Working Group and a manual has been prepared involving all units. Furthermore, new personnel in ACT and Christian Aid may change and improve the approach in the future.

Implications of working with local partners

Christian Aid has largely worked through local partners during the Kosovo crisis, although it has also been semi-operational in Albania and Kosovo. There are advantages and disadvantages of adopting this approach.

(i) Strengths of working with local partners

Established working relationship

Christian Aid had well established working relationships with partners in the region, stretching back over 7 years.

Access to local knowledge

Local partners know the local context (including potential local suppliers, distribution mechanisms and transport possibilities) and are well placed to 'hear' the views of local communities and beneficiary groups.

Linking relief and development

Local partners are likely to continue working in the region after an emergency and can link relief work to longer-term work. For example, MCIC took developmental approach to its relief programme.

(ii) Constraints of working with local partners

Lack of monitoring and evaluation

Christian Aid admit that an observed weakness was the '*paucity of regular monitoring and reporting of progress*'.⁴⁵ Partners were not evaluated and monitoring was only done through monitoring visits.

⁴⁴ Reported in an interview with Christian Aid London. Christian Aid has noted that the shelter rehabilitation programme was under the overall management by UMCOR until 1/1/00.

⁴⁵ Cited from Phase I report.

Long chain of partnerships

Some partners work with their own partners. There is, therefore, a long chain from donor to beneficiary. For example, MCIC in Macedonia has a collective membership of 11 NGOs. Some of these are umbrella organisations themselves, so MCIC is an '*umbrella of umbrellas*'. Monitoring and reporting is thus more problematic when there are many agencies involved, some of whom do not have direct contact with Christian Aid.

On the positive side, MCIC's networks represented different ethnic and vulnerable groups including Albanian, Roma and women.

Limited experience/knowledge of relief and rehabilitation work

While some of Christian Aid's partners had considerable experience of working in relief and rehabilitation in the Balkans, others had more limited experience, for example, DA and MCIC. These partners required technical support (especially information on existing guidelines and Sphere standards). It appeared that this kind of support was limited leaving partners to work out their own standards on the ground. For example, MCIC established the contents of its food parcel in Macedonia, that were way above normal standards and contained milk powder which is not normally included in a general distribution.

While working with local partners in a large-scale emergency has its benefits, there are clearly drawbacks and it is imperative that adequate support, monitoring and evaluation of partners' activities should be carried out. This includes technical support and increasing partners' awareness of performance standards.

SECTION 6: SUMMARY OF CONCERN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

6.1 Mission

Concern Worldwide works to eliminate extreme poverty in the least developed countries of the world.⁴⁶ Its emergency, development and advocacy work contributes towards the eradication of poverty through building peoples' capacities to assert their basic rights to food, shelter, health and education.

6.2 Context

Concern had no operational programme in the Balkans prior to the crisis in 1999.

6.3 How Concern Works

Concern is head-quartered in Dublin, with offices in Belfast, London, Glasgow and an affiliate organisation in New York. It normally implements directly, but may do so in association with local partners or groups. Concern currently works in about 20 countries worldwide, mostly in Africa and Asia.

Concern does not have an Emergency Desk but does have an Emergency Response Unit, comprising a Rapid Deployment Team and Emergency Stores which is managed by the regional manager concerned with the emergency. Emergency response has always formed a strong part of the organisational ethos. About half of Concern's programmes are emergency programmes. It maintains small emergency stocks in Amsterdam. Because Concern has a relatively small and tightly-knit management team this approach has worked to date and it worked well in Kosovo. Concern is reviewing its emergency preparedness and response capacity.

6.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Concern participates in the DEC through Concern Northern Ireland. As the allocation of DEC funds is based on the amount of UK public fundraising spent on emergencies, DEC funding is a smaller proportion of Concern's income than it is for the UK-based agencies. For Kosovo, Concern received 1.98 per cent of DEC funds, £297,000 for Phase I and £534,600 for Phase II.

Concern sent a small experienced team into Albania in early April 1999 who carried out an assessment and then started the programme.

In Kosovo, Concern set up in Peje partly because this area was very poorly served by other NGOs when Concern entered Kosovo⁴⁷ and also because it had supported refugees from Peje in its work in Albania. Concern also considered opening an office in Mitrovica as it is its general policy to work at two different sites to spread the risk in unstable situations. Concern

⁴⁶ Although the Balkans is not one of the least developed areas of the world, Concern justifies its intervention as being intended to prevent refugees falling into extreme poverty.

⁴⁷ There were only three NGOs there then, as opposed to 50 to 75 in February 2000 (Interview with Concern, February 2000).

carried out an assessment in Mitrovica during which the Concern team were attacked. However, having fully considered the scale of the acute needs in Kosovo, and the limits on personnel and management resources, Concern decided to concentrate on Peje.

At the time of the evaluation visit, Concern was scaling back its programme in Kosovo and was planning assessment visits to Montenegro and Serbia in recognition that humanitarian needs were largely met in Kosovo.

6.5 Summary of Concern's DEC-funded Activities

CONCERN DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Camp management		Kukes	Camp management. Relief distribution including plastic, blankets, and household items for refugees and host families.	287,973	Charter flight with relief items arrived on 16April.
		Fazja		3,968	Chicken Farm and Fazja Camps.
Food Distribution		Kukes	Food for centres and host families, for both refugees and Albanians displaced by Serb shelling.	34,145	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				170,674	18,599 beneficiaries at peak.

CONCERN PHASE I				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	Concern	Peje (Urban and Rural)	Putting timber frame with plastic roofing on houses. Also providing warm rooms.	277,020	56 roofs completed and 116 under construction by start of Phase II funding.
Social Programme	Concern, Women's Forum, Dublin Rape Crisis Centre	Peje	Support for extremely vulnerable families with blankets, household items and livestock to vulnerables. Counseling for women.	48,570	MTS assisted with distributions and with a winter fair to sell handcrafts.
Clothing	Concern and MTS	Peje	Distribution of 40 containers of winter clothing to beneficiaries in Kosovo.	66,453	300t of clothing was collected from the public in Ireland.
Youth programme	Concern	Peje	Providing temporary youth centers in villages.	3,154	Used tents as centres.
School Rehab	Concern	Lubeniq and Rausiq	Rehabilitation of two village schools. Schools were repaired and ready for opening in Oct.	28,129	Concern also distributed school supplies.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				423,326	

CONCERN PHASE I					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Various		Albania	Camp Management and food distribution.	170,674	
		Kosovo	Shelter, reconstruction, and relief.	423,326	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				594,000	46% of total programme cost from DEC funds

CONCERN DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief	Concern and MTS	Pristina Peje Gjakova	Distribution of winter clothing to beneficiaries in Kosovo.	Not shown for individual programmes	Continuation of Phase I programme
Shelter	Concern	Peje (Rural and Urban)	Putting timber frame with plastic roofing on 633 houses. Also providing warm rooms and assessing extremely vulnerable families for permanent roofing	Not shown for individual programmes	Continuation of Phase I Project. 699 houses roofed in all.
School Recons- truction	Concern	Raushiq Lubeniq Loxha.	Completion of rehabilitation of two village schools begun in Phase I. A third school was completed.	Not shown for individual programmes	Third school completed at request of UNICEF after first agency ran out of funds.
Youth Prog- ramme	Concern	Peje	Providing temporary youth centers in villages. Rehabilitating and managing a hall in Peje for activities.	Not shown for individual programmes	Youth centres were closed after schools re-opened.
Social Prog- ramme	Concern and Women's Forum	Rural Peje	Referrals to specialist agencies, skill training, income generation activities. Capacity building of Women's Forum.	Not shown for individual programmes	Social programme also worked closely with shelter project to identify vulnerable.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				237,600	22% of total cost of projects

Total DEC Income:	£831,600	
Expenditure Phase I:	£297,000	Returns (Phase I) Nil
Expenditure Phase II:	£534,600	Returns (Phase II) Nil
Total Expenditure:	£831,600	Plus £1,669,327 from other sources.

Note: Concern's project report treated the first tranche of Phase II funding as a tranche of Phase I funding. This doubled its reported Phase II funding to £594,000 and reduced its reported Phase II funding to £237,600. DEC funds have been allocated on a pro rata basis to Phase I expenditures, as the actual DEC component of each project's funding was not stated.

No details of the allocation of funds, DEC or overall, have been received for Phase II expenditures.

6.6 Key Issues

No Prior Presence in the Region

Concern did not have a prior operational programme in the Balkans. The Balkans is not a priority area and the Kosovo programme is being wound down. However, Concern was concerned that the refugees were vulnerable at the start of the crisis and there was a risk that people could be pushed into situations of extreme poverty. Also, like other DEC agencies, Concern's mandate included responding to major humanitarian crises. Its supporters expected Concern to respond.

Concern was not the only DEC agency without a prior operational programme in the Balkans but it was the only agency with no prior involvement either operationally or as a funder. The DEC Secretariat rightly questioned Concern's wish to become involved in the Kosovo Crisis response.

Concern was aware of its lack of knowledge in the Balkans but argued that local knowledge is only one of the four factors needed for success in emergency operations:

- Financial resources;
- Volume capacity (the speed at which an organisations can build its capacity);
- Skills (held by your human resources);
- Local knowledge.

Concern lacked local knowledge, but believed that it could add value through its experience of providing services to refugees and through its experienced staff. Concern put a lot of effort into learning as much as possible about the Balkans as quickly as possible. It arranged for presentations to senior management by experts on the regions and was careful to listen to agencies like CAD with good regional experience.⁴⁸

Concern left Albania after the bulk of refugees returned to Kosovo, as the acute humanitarian needs had been met. Concern's programme had been focused on the refugees and when they went, the reason for the work also went. One interviewee⁴⁹ noted that while some NGOs had been criticised for leaving Albania after the refugees left, this was perfectly reasonable if the refugee crisis was the purpose of their work in Albania and they were not interested in development work in Albania. Concern handed over its continuing programmes to the Red Cross when leaving Albania.

Concern demonstrated that it was possible to do good quality work in a region where an agency has no previous experience, provided that the agency is aware of this and is willing to learn.

⁴⁸ Concern listened to CAD when they proposed a baby washing room in the camps. This allowed women to meet and to discuss their particular problems. It was a new idea for Concern, but CAD had a great deal of regional experience.

⁴⁹ Interview with CARE Albania, March 2000.

Examples of good practice

Examples of good practice in Concern's well managed⁵⁰ programme included:

Good Personnel Management

Concern sent a very experienced manager to the region to manage the start of the programme in Kosovo. This manager not only brought vital skills with him but also gave the team space to do a proper assessment by resisting pressure from headquarters to start work immediately. The quality of both national and international staff met by the evaluation team was impressive. Good personnel practice applied to local staff. These were assigned outside their own areas so that they did not come under undue pressure from beneficiaries.

Putting the beneficiaries first

The German Red Cross (which did not coordinate with other shelter agencies) moved into a village where Concern had already begun work on roofs. The GRC was going to do permanent roofs instead of the plastic covered ones that Concern had started on. Concern not only left the GRC to do the work, but also gave it the social assessments and roof designs that Concern had already done. Concern also finished the work at Loxha school that another NGO had started but was unable to finish.

Beneficiaries also had real choices: either taking a cash payment or using a Concern contractor when replacing roofing plastic roofs with tiles. They also had the choice between having a hipped or gable roof.

The Concern staff knew the individual circumstances of the beneficiaries visited and the interventions seen were appropriate.

Good technical management

Concern designed each roof in the shelter programme individually. Treating each roof individually took a little more organisation than giving everyone a standard kit, but this led to large savings in wood as the timber lengths were chosen to fit and there was less waste from off-cuts. Concern used an external consulting engineer to review the technical aspects of the shelter project and to prepare a detailed specification of the engineering works to be carried out. Concern advised 40 Category 5⁵¹ beneficiaries what repairs they needed to make to their houses to qualify for a roof as a Category 4 house. All of this was backed up by good monitoring. Concern was the only DEC agency able to say exactly how many of the houses it roofed that were not occupied during the winter.

Principled programming

Fundamental principles lie at the heart of Concern programming and are reflected in internal reports (Boyle & Foley, 2000) and in comments by interviewees. Concern has been turning down offers of funding because it believes that the reconstruction of Category 5 housing should be done by construction companies, rather than NGOs (Frazer, 2000). Concern is phasing out its programme in Kosovo because it does not believe that the current needs there justify its presence.

⁵⁰ Concern demonstrated a coherent programme, appropriate delegation and good monitoring.

⁵¹ Refer to Box 5 in Volume II.

Problem areas

Sealing of roof spaces

Although most householders, when given the choice opted for gable rather than hipped roofs, they did not have the resources to close the gables themselves⁵². This meant that rain entered through the open gables. Plastic roofs with open gables like this were much more vulnerable to storm damage. It would have been better to close the gables temporarily with plastic (with a small vent near the apex for condensation) to avoid the problems seen with closed roof spaces.⁵³

Reporting

Although the Concern reports were well written they do not conform to the DEC standard format, nor do the reports contain all of the information in the DEC format. Financial reports for Phase II do not distinguish DEC from non-DEC expenditures by project or identify the costs of the different projects. This was a question of reporting as the information was available on request.⁵⁴

Overpaying roofing contractors

Concern was one of the agencies paying 20 DEM per square metre for roofing contractors in Peje. This was 5 DEM over the going rate.⁵⁵ The agencies in Peje⁵⁶ may have been the victims of a pricing ring among the roofing contractors.

⁵² Visits to Concern Urban and Rural Shelter Beneficiaries in Peje.

⁵³ Visit to shelter beneficiaries near Decani, April 2000.

⁵⁴ It appears that Concern was working from an older set of DEC reporting guidelines (e-mail from Dominic MacSorley 21/6/00).

⁵⁵ Interview with MedAir Kosovo, April 2000.

⁵⁶ Including Concern and MedAir.

SECTION 7: SUMMARY OF HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

7.1 Mission

HelpAge International (HAI) campaigns on behalf of the world's older population and provides expertise and grants to older people's organisations in 70 developing countries - assisting them to help the most disadvantaged lead independent lives. It is involved in direct programme implementation, research, advocacy, strengthening local organisations and contributing to the formulation of national strategies and legislation on ageing.

7.2 Context

Help the Aged, the DEC member agency, is a founder member of HelpAge International (HAI) and its international work is carried out through HAI. HAI has managed programmes in Croatia and Bosnia since 1991. It is also a member of the East and Central Europe Network (ECEN) that links age-care organisations in Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Prior to 1999, HAI had no presence in Macedonia or in Kosovo.

7.3 How HelpAge International Works

HAI is a global network of not-for-profit organisations that works with and for disadvantaged older people worldwide, to achieve a lasting improvement in the quality of their lives and works with over 200 member/partner organisations in 70 countries. HAI's normal practice is to support national age-care organisations to implement projects and to advocate for the rights of older people, although the UK Secretariat does manage operational programmes in several countries. Where it has no local partners, HAI may decide to become operational and 'lead by example', in order to ensure that needs are met and to influence the practice of others.

HAI's emergency response capacity is small: the World Wide Emergency Desk was formed in the UK Secretariat three years ago. Based on its own research with older people, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, HAI has defined best practice guidelines for assisting older people in emergencies (HelpAge International, 1999a; HelpAge International & UNHCR, 2000).

7.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

HAI received 1.6 per cent of DEC Kosovo appeal funds. The DEC funds have constituted almost 100 per cent of HAI's income for the emergency, and without them HAI would not have responded. All DEC Phase II funds have been spent in Kosovo and over half has been expended on the rehabilitation of the Cerentolovski Centre.

HAI's principal strategy from the start was to integrate its response with that of other agencies, providing advice and support on the specific needs and capabilities of older people, rather than to establish a separate programme. This approach was affirmed by an initial needs assessment in Macedonia (HelpAge International, 1999b). HAI did, however, establish a

small operational presence in Macedonia and Kosovo, noting: '*Kosovo was and will be exceptional ... it is not our preference or strength to be operational.*'⁵⁷

HAI's response drew on existing capacity in the region. The HAI Croatia Director was seconded to set up a programme in Macedonia before a representative was locally recruited. The current Director and Programme Assistant in Kosovo have previously worked in Croatia. In Macedonia, HAI shared office facilities with Children's Aid Direct. In Kosovo its offices are in the Cerentolovski Centre, the residential home for older people in Pristina.

7.5 What HelpAge International Did

HAI's response to the Kosovo emergency has focused on Macedonia and Kosovo. A proposed assessment in Albania did not take place due to the refugees returning home. HAI's response has combined relief assistance, protection, advocacy and policy work.

From mid-May to September 1999, HAI provided emergency assistance to older Kosovo refugees in Macedonia staying in private accommodation. In addition, HAI advocated with other agencies to ensure that the needs of older refugees in host communities and in the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme were met, to ensure they had access to the Macedonian health system and that suitable drugs were available. HAI continued to work with UNHCR in Macedonia after most refugees had returned to Kosovo, supporting the return of older refugees, and secured accommodation for eight older people in the Cerentolovski Centre in Pristina.

Since mid-July 1999, HAI has been operational in Kosovo, funding, equipping and managing the rehabilitation of the Cerentolovski Centre. In November, HAI in collaboration with the UN Civil Administration Secretariat for Health distributed a Cold Weather Warning and referral forms to all aid agencies and KFOR contingents throughout Kosovo, alerting them to the needs of older people. During the winter, clothing and hygiene materials were provided to older people in 9 municipalities referred to them by other agencies, including KFOR, the Centre for Social Work, INGOs, Yugoslav Red Cross and local NGOs. As of March 2000, 1,850 older people in 55 village, towns, cities have been assisted by HAI's programme in Kosovo. Advocacy work has taken two forms: lobbying for support from UNMIK for the residential centre, a former state-run institution, and advocating that the needs of older people are not neglected in other agencies' programmes.

⁵⁷ Interview, HAI headquarters, London, March 2000.

7.6 Summary of HelpAge International's DEC-funded Activities

HELPAGE DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Relief	Macedonian Red Cross UNHCR ADRA CAD Mercy Corps World Vision Macedonian Pensioners' Assoc.	Skopje	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of hygiene kits (£107,000) and bedding (£116,000) to older refugees in private accommodation. - Advice and support to other organisations on the needs of older refugees. - Worked with UNHCR, HAI and MRC to assist the repatriation of abandoned old and infirm to Kosovo. Beneficiaries: - 5,392 older refugees and 1,467 host families.	299,665
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				299,665

HELPAGE DEC PHASE II				KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Relief and rehabilitation	UNHCR ADRA CAD Mercy Corps World Vision ACTED Handikos Finish KFOR Centre for Social Welfare (Lipljan) Mercy Corps	Pristina, Lipljan, Gracanica, Obiliq, Fushe, Kosovo, Glllogovc, Mitrovica, Shtimlje, Kamanica, Gjilan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Renovation and re-equipped the Cerentolovski Centre, residential home for old people (£207,807) - Donation of an ambulance to the Centre. - Provision of winter clothing and household and personal hygiene kits to older people referred by other agencies (£92,529). - Production and distribution of cold weather warning leaflet with UNMIK health department. - Advocacy for the needs older people, including: placement of older people in the Cetentolovski Centre; securing pensions from UNMIK for residents at the Centre; securing stipends and salaries from UNMIK for workers at the Centre. Beneficiaries: 1,850.	406,528
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				406,528

Total DEC Income:	£697,200
Expenditure Phase I:	£299,665
Expenditure Phase II:	£406,528
Total Expenditure:	£706,183 ⁵⁸

⁵⁸ The additional funds over and above DEC monies came from HAI sources.

7.7 Key Issues

In the context of the massive international response to the Kosovo emergency, HAI's initial strategy to integrate its work with other agencies rather than establishing an independent programme was innovative. This distinctive approach reflected HAI's focus on a specific vulnerable group – older people – and a limited institutional capacity to manage a large operational programme. The DEC's OSC was supportive of this approach. In Kosovo, HAI has continued with this approach, maintaining a small team of staff and supporting other agencies to assist older people. It has not sought to use DEC funds to leverage additional funding.

Examples of good practice

Working with local partners

HAI's approach of working with local partners like the MRC in Macedonia and Centres for Social Work (CSW) in Kosovo has been positive. It avoids creating parallel structures, increases coverage and ensures longer-term continuity.

Protection

HAI's mandate is older people. In Kosovo, however, older people are vulnerable not just because of their age, but their 'nationality'. Albanian older people were targeted by Serb military during the war and since the end of the war older Serbs and Roma have been subjected to intimidation and violence (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999a; OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999b). Cohesiveness in extended Albanian families also means that older Albanians may have better home care than older Serbs. HAI's needs assessments in Kosovo identified intimidation and violence against minorities as a key issue, and is one of the few DEC agencies to articulate the need for protection, noting:

Given that such a large number of remainees [in Kosovo] are older people, the issue of protection is of grave concern to HelpAge International.

HAI assists older people of all groups. In the Cerentolovski Centre, which is the only residential facility in Kosovo for older people unable to look after themselves, some 55 per cent of residents are Serbs. HAI has increased protection of minorities there by upgrading the security of the Centre. Elsewhere, HAI has distributed assistance to older people in minority communities through KFOR.

Advocacy

A central aspect of HAI's work has been to act as an advocate for older people's rights. In Kosovo, HAI has successfully lobbied UNMIK to secure stipends and salaries for staff and pensions for the residents of the Cerentolovski Centre.

Standards

For the 1999 UN International Year of Older Persons, HAI undertook research and drew up best practice guidelines for assisting older people in emergencies (HelpAge International & UNHCR, 2000).⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Funded by ECHO and UNHCR.

HAI is in discussion on how to incorporate these in the Sphere Standards. The work coincided with the Kosovo refugee crisis. Although HAI may have missed the opportunity to undertake further research in Macedonia and Kosovo, it has used its experience there in its advocacy work (Zwi, 1999). A commitment to reflecting on such experiences and utilising it in advocacy work helps organisational learning and improves the effectiveness of the humanitarian system.

In addition, lessons from the operational limitations and challenges to the HAI Kosovo programme have been absorbed by the UK Secretariat, leading to improved emergency procedures in assessments, documentation, beneficiary participation and monitoring.

Cost Efficiency

HAI's policy to maintain a limited operational programme, to procure goods locally, to use local contractors and engineers and to share offices in Macedonia and Kosovo has kept overheads low.⁶⁰

Examples of problem areas

Timeliness of response

HAI was not monitoring the situation in Kosovo before the crisis and was therefore unprepared for the emergency. HAI acknowledges that its response to the refugee crisis was relatively slow. Its Macedonia office became operational on 17th May, seven weeks after the commencement of the NATO air campaign. Registration problems in Macedonia delayed the procurement of supplies so that HAI's bedding and hygiene kits were only ready for distribution by the week of 12th June, as NATO entered Kosovo. The Macedonian Red Cross was still compiling a list of older refugees with host families as refugees started to return home (Bush, 1999). Hygiene parcels for older refugees continued to be distributed up to December.

In Kosovo, although the Cold Weather Warning was issued in November, the first referral forms were not returned until January, by which time the winter had started.

Assessments

HAI's best practice guidelines for assisting older people in emergencies, emphasise the importance of assessments and, in particular, consultation with older people. In practice HAI's assessment work in the Kosovo emergency has been weak.

While HAI's initial assessment mission to Macedonia probably correctly concluded that HAI should focus on the needs of those older refugees in private accommodation who were less well supported than refugees in camps, there is no evidence that HAI consulted with refugees in private accommodation (HelpAge International, 1999b).

In Kosovo, HAI's strategy of working through other agencies means that it has not invested in its own capacity to do assessments and monitoring, relying instead on collaborating agencies. This strategy, while in keeping with HAI's overall approach, has risks:

⁶⁰ A high portion (74 per cent) of HAI's expenditure in Macedonia was on material assistance.

- The referral forms HAI issued provide no criteria for assessing vulnerability or guidelines for distribution partners.
- The lack of systematic independent assessments by HAI means some old people were possibly missed out or wrongly included. In a Serb village visited during the evaluation fieldwork, HAI materials had been delivered to one person referred by the Centre for Social Work (CSW) in Lipljan, but HAI staff were unaware if there were other older people in the village. In a Roma village visited by the evaluation team, HAI items had been distributed to two older people referred to by the CSW, while others not on the CSW list got nothing. All of the 28 older people referred to HAI by the CSW are former ‘social cases’ who used to receive State welfare benefits, and no new names have been added since the war ended.⁶¹ While HAI’s offers to assist anyone in need over 50 years, the CSW’s criteria for a ‘social case’ was people over 60/70 years who were unable to work. Consequently, some old people, who according to HAI’s criteria are in need, may have been left out.⁶²
- HAI’s own lack of assessments means that its staff may not consult adequately with older people about their needs. In two Serb homes visited, isolation and lack of information from relatives was of great concern to the old people. While HAI may not be able to respond to all articulated needs of older people, developing an understanding of those needs is basic ‘good practice’ according to its own guidelines.

Monitoring

Similarly, HAI delegated distribution and monitoring functions to partners. In Macedonia, distributions were based on lists compiled by the MRC, who reportedly built transparency into the distributions by telling the people what they were meant to get. In Kosovo, HAI distributed through a variety of organisations. HAI produced clear statistics on quantities of materials distributed, the referring agency, the recipients and their nationality. However, a lack of post-distribution and end-use monitoring makes it difficult to substantiate HAI’s claim that ‘*the winterisation materials have made a significant impact on the lives of the many beneficiaries*’ (HelpAge International, 2000). Old people visited by the evaluation team in Kosovo had not been visited by HAI since the first distribution four months earlier. While recipients expressed their appreciation of the assistance, the lack of follow up meant that there was no opportunity to learn about other needs.

Integration of activities

HAI’s emphasis on hygiene for older people through the provision of hygiene kits has not been linked to other activities such as hygiene promotion. The argument that there was no need for an integrated hygiene promotion strategy in Macedonia — because host families were not poor, had running water and toilets and good hygiene awareness⁶³ — was not necessarily sound for Kosovo where many utilities had been damaged by the war.

⁶¹ Interview with Centre for Social Work, Lipljan, April 2000.

⁶² The social welfare system is due to be re-assessed by UNMIK in May 2000.

⁶³ Interview with HelpAge headquarters, London, March 2000.

At the Cerentolovski Centre, HAI have made substantial infrastructural improvements to sanitation facilities. It has not, however, undertaken formal monitoring of residents in the Centre, although it does have plans to recruit a consultant to assess standards of care at the centre, and to provide staff training.

Coverage

An advantage for a small agency of collaborating with other agencies is to increase the coverage of its work. This has only been partially realised. In Macedonia, HAI's target was 15,000 older refugees living outside the camps. HAI assistance reached 5,392 older refugees and 1,467 host families (HelpAge International, 1999c), just over one-third of HAI's target and one-quarter of older refugees in private accommodation.⁶⁴ In Kosovo HAI's target is all people of pensionable age (age 55 for men, age 50 for women) and above.⁶⁵ As of March 2000, 1,850 people have received assistance from HAI in Kosovo (HelpAge International Kosovo, 2000), out of a potential older population of over 260,000.⁶⁶ HAI's ability to extend coverage has been limited by its own capacity for outreach work and a dependency on other agencies.

Protection

Although HAI identified the protection needs of older people from minorities in Kosovo, it is interesting to note that 77 per cent of its beneficiaries have been Albanian, 18.16 per cent Serb, 2.70 per cent Roma and 2.10 per cent others (HelpAge International Kosovo, 2000). It might be expected that a higher percentage would be Serbs, given that a large number of Serbs remaining in Kosovo are older people, along with the additional problems faced by minorities. Again, a reliance on others and a limited investment in assessment and monitoring makes it difficult to ascertain whether these statistics are an accurate reflection of need.

Advocacy

HAI's target group in Kosovo is all people of pensionable age and above. HAI's reliance on other agencies to refer the needs of older people to them has produced referrals from 13 aid agencies out of the several hundred agencies running relief programmes in Kosovo. HAI conclude that this limited response is the fault of other agencies⁶⁷, and may require HAI to place more pressure on agency managers to highlight the availability of HAI's support. However, HAI perhaps assumes a level of awareness about older people among other agencies that may not exist. The evaluation team's discussions with other agencies indicated that their field staff have not been pro-active about older peoples' needs, focusing on their own sectoral concerns and had little knowledge of HAI's work. In addition HAI's referral forms give no guidance on what type of items HAI was able to provide. This indicates a need for better explanation and communication from HAI.

⁶⁴ Based on WHO's estimate that 14 per cent of Kosovo's population is older than 50 and UNHCR's estimate that 60 per cent of the 250,000 Kosovo refugees in Macedonia were living outside the camps, there may have been up to 21,000 older refugees living in private accommodation.

⁶⁵ HAI's initial needs assessment in Kosovo covered most of the province (Gregory, 1999), and HAI asserts that its assistance is '*offered to the whole province of Kosovo, limited by only needs and logistics.*' (HelpAge International, 2000).

⁶⁶ Using WHO's estimate.

⁶⁷ Interview with HAI, Pristina. March 2000.

The evaluation team found a lack of coherence between HAI's policy work at a headquarter and field level. The HAI team in Kosovo, for example, received the best practice guidelines on assisting older people in emergencies only a week before they were published in UK.⁶⁸ These could have supported HAI's advocacy work in Kosovo. Furthermore, HAI's research for best practice guidelines concluded that older people have needs other than material assistance, a point stressed in its DEC four-week Plan of Action. To date, HAI's outreach work in Kosovo has focused on the distribution of material assistance.

Connectedness

In its four-week Plan of Action, HAI noted its intention to address the needs of older people on a longer-term basis. HAI's work in the Cerentolovski Centre has focused mainly on physical rehabilitation, with lobbying for financial support. While HAI has distributed assistance through local organisations, it has not provided support to strengthen skills and knowledge in the care for older people. Its work alongside the CSW in Lipljan municipality has not been replicated elsewhere in Kosovo. HAI expressed unease with the performance of Kosovo NGOs and, because of this, chose not to work with the Mother Theresa Society.⁶⁹ Such concerns are not uncommon among agencies, but the limited engagement with local organisations is surprising given HAI's usual approach.

The absence of formal agreements of cooperation with collaborating agencies is an oversight. Partner agreements that include guidelines on targeting, distribution and standards of provision should be standard practice, and are particularly important where there are any doubts about the performance of partners.

HAI is correctly concerned with the long-term sustainability of the Cerentolovski Centre in the absence of a functioning state to support it. Ultimately the protection and welfare system for older people will depend on the political future of Kosovo and future welfare policy. At the end of January, HAI secured additional funds from the DEC to extend its support for the Centre for six months. Given the uncertain environment in Kosovo, it is unlikely that sustainable support for the Centre can be put in place within this time frame. HAI will therefore need to consider how to continue support for the Centre beyond the six months.

⁶⁸ Interview with HAI, Pristina, March 2000.

⁶⁹ Interview with HAI, Pristina, March 2000.

SECTION 8: SUMMARY OF MERLIN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

8.1 Mission

Merlin believes that access to healthcare is a fundamental human right. To uphold this right, as an humanitarian organisation, it provides medical relief to people suffering as a result of conflict, natural disaster or epidemic disease anywhere in the world.

8.2 Context

Merlin first commenced humanitarian operations in 1993 organising a convoy of medical supplies to Bosnia. Subsequently Merlin discontinued its presence in the region apart from a medical programme during 1998 in Albania, distributing medical supplies with technical support to 27 laboratories. Despite a strategic desire to remain in Albania, an absence of funding forced Merlin to leave Albania during the second half of 1998. Merlin re-established its base in Tirana on the 3 April 1999.

8.3 How Merlin Works

Merlin is an humanitarian organisation, providing medical relief in the first phase of international emergencies, when the local infrastructure has broken down and people are at their most vulnerable. Its field teams are comprised predominantly of volunteers. Merlin always works within existing local health structures. Where appropriate, it also tries to work with other aid organisations to provide the most effective assistance. The priority is emergency relief .

8.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Merlin received 1.46 per cent of the total DEC funding for Phase I and II, but returned its Phase II funding because further feasibility assessments indicated that the proposed Phase II project was not achievable in the time frame given. Merlin adopted a strategic response to the emergency, attempting to fill gaps in service provision rather than compete with other agencies in well-covered areas and sectors. Consequently, much of its activities revolved around assessment and emergency preparedness (primarily in case of further large influxes of refugees from Macedonia).

In particular, Merlin tried to work with local authorities to minimise the negative impacts of the crisis on the local health infrastructure. Due to capacity restrictions it was not able to operate emergency programmes in both Kosovo and Albania and consequently took a strategic decision not to return immediately to Kosovo but instead to continue programmes in Albania. Merlin would like to keep a strategic presence in Albania in the future but current funding constraints mean that this may not be possible. Merlin used the DEC funds to cover core costs and therefore the DEC funds are related to all the projects it implemented.

8.5 Summary of Merlin's DEC-funded Activities⁷⁰

MERLIN DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Assessment		Nationwide	Rapid needs assessment.		
Health: Curative & preventative		Fier	Out-patient clinic – catchment 3,500, approx. 200 consultations/week Vaccination – 400 children (measles, DPT)		Outpatient clinic for Camp Hope: originally intended for 20,000, never contained more than 5,000.
Support to health structures		Korce and Pogradec	Structural rehabilitation; Donation of drugs & medical supplies; Clinics – 2 collective centres; Pogradec hospital pharmacy		Programme started on 9 April. Support to Albanian health structures that were treating refugee patients and clinics in 2 collective centres.
Public health assessments		Tirana	Assessment of EVI in Albanian institutions.		Identified 60 EVIs from Kosovo in Albanian hospitals who require special assistance for repatriation.
	WHO/MoH	Nationwide	Assessment - TB control/ laboratory facilities Assessment - Hospital and laboratories		Formed basis for later laboratory intervention (see below).
Public health surveillance	MoH/WHO/CDC/	Pogradec	Collected epidemiological data for CRISIS system.		
Mental health	Alternativa	Tirana	A one-off programme to reconstruct their building. They did not develop a long-term relationship.		Previous contact with Alternativa during the 1997 and 1998 programme.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				192,495	Funds used to cover core costs
<i>Curative health</i>		<i>Fier, Korce Pogradec</i>	<i>Supply of essential drugs and equipment</i>	<i>140,000</i>	<i>DFID</i>
<i>Curative health</i>		<i>Fier camp</i>	<i>Refugee camp dispensaries</i>	<i>157,875</i>	<i>UNHCR</i>
				<i>743,750</i>	<i>OFDA</i>
<i>TB laboratories</i>	<i>MoH</i>	<i>Tirana Korce Skhodra</i>	<i>Supply of laboratory equipment to regional TB laboratories</i>	<i>125,000</i>	<i>WHO</i>
<i>Hospital laboratories rehabilitation</i>	<i>MoH</i>	<i>Tirana Korce Girokaster Permet Tepelene Saranda Skhodra</i>	<i>Supply of laboratory equipment and rehabilitation</i>	<i>(Remainder of the £743,750 OFDA budget)</i>	<i>OFDA</i>
TOTAL NON-DEC FUNDS				1,166,625	

⁷⁰ In the light of the very small amount of DEC money used, this table also shows a summary of non-DEC funded programmes.

Total DEC Income:	£613,200	
Expenditure Phase I:	£192,495	£26,505 outstanding
Expenditure Phase II:	£0	Returned £394,200
Total Expenditure:	£192,495	

8.6 Key Issues

Merlin devoted much effort and many resources to assessment. This emphasis on assessment contrasts with the general environment in the Balkans, where the presence of funding rather than assessed humanitarian need drove programmes. As the resources Merlin put into assessments did not always provide returns in the form of operational programmes, Merlin appears relatively cost-inefficient. The evaluation team considers this unavoidable and identifies Merlin's emphasis on assessment as an important example of good practice.

Examples of good practice

Preparedness

Although Merlin had insufficient funding to maintain an operational presence in Albania at the end of 1998, it kept up contacts with ex-local employees and other operational agencies in Albania. These contacts facilitated Merlin's initial response, allowing it to become operational a week after arriving in the country on 9 April 1999. They also facilitated Merlin's access to basic medical supplies within Albania, at a time when other agencies were facing shortages of essential drugs.

From April to July 1999, Merlin attempted to maintain a strategic preparedness capacity in the east of Albania, in order to be able to respond to additional refugee influxes from Macedonia. This created some dilemmas for the organisation over the balance between committing limited resources to operational programmes, thereby giving the agency a larger operational presence, and reserving capacity in case of future emergencies. The impression is that Merlin managed this balance relatively appropriately; however keeping some capacity in reserve meant that they could not take on all the contracts that it would have liked. For all agencies, there is a minimum level of overhead required to become operational. For a small agency with a small programme, the ratio of overhead/programme is already higher than for a larger agency. Holding back capacity in reserve further decreases the overall cost-efficiency.

Appropriateness, assessments and monitoring

Merlin's programmes appear largely appropriate. It attempted to avoid parallel health structures where possible and instead strengthened local health infrastructure to cope with refugee referrals.⁷¹ As the Albanian health facilities supplied the majority of the health care to refugees, this emphasis was appropriate. Merlin also focused on sectors such as reproductive health that had been under-emphasised by the humanitarian response as a whole. This again appears to have been addressing weaknesses in the humanitarian response. In the light of the

⁷¹ Merlin implemented programmes in the American Camp Hope, in the Fier district. The camp was on an inappropriate site and its huge infrastructural inputs were frequently misguided and contrary to Sphere Standards. Merlin attempted to engage constructively with the camp contractors, tasking an engineer to work with them to improve design. Merlin also resisted the wishes of OFDA for a 24-hour in-patient unit and instead organised effective transfer and support of the local hospital.

high possibility that there would be additional refugees from Macedonia, Merlin's insistence on maintaining reserve capacity was probably appropriate. In the event, this did not materialise and the decision had a negative impact on Merlin's cost-effectiveness.

Merlin placed an emphasis on assessment and appeared to implement its programmes based upon a reasonable comprehension of the situation in Albania.⁷² The tactics of implementing so much assessment was in part forced upon them because other medical agencies had already filled obvious core niches in health. However, Merlin resisted pressure from donors and UNHCR to implement programmes that it felt had not been adequately researched.⁷³ Ultimately its emphasis on assessment paid off and Merlin appeared to find interventions that met real needs.

Merlin's support to the 'Crisis' health information system in their areas of operation, ensuring the effective collection of data from local clinics, appeared appropriate.

Merlin's emphasis on assessment has further resulted in it appearing relatively cost-inefficient, implementing relatively few activities amidst lots of assessment and emergency preparedness. Given the high competition for profile and the donor pressure to engage in programmes, this cost-inefficiency appears to have been an unavoidable consequence of Merlin's attempts to maintain a realistic emergency preparedness and implement relevant programmes.

Coverage

Merlin implemented programmes in the refugee camps and host health facilities, achieving a reasonable balance of assistance to refugees and Albanians. Merlin worked solely in Albania and had no programmes with ethnic minorities.

Connectedness and Coherence

In July 1999, Merlin did not have sufficient surplus capacity to implement large-scale programmes in both Albania and Kosovo, so decided to complete programmes already started in Albania. Merlin coordinated well with agencies and local authorities and attempted to add value by fitting its interventions around the edges of other actors, addressing needs that had been missed. Merlin now runs several projects to re-equip selected Albanian hospitals with essential, yet relatively simple and sustainable, laboratory equipment. The local health officials interviewed during this evaluation appeared happy that these projects had provided a longer-term benefit to the Albanian health infrastructure.⁷⁴

⁷² Its initial intervention consisted predominantly of conducting assessments in three regions of Albania.

⁷³ In the case of an offer from UNHCR of £250,000 to conduct a programme with EVIs throughout Albania, Merlin first insisted on conducting a needs assessment (funded internally) to establish whether the programme was necessary. The result was that they discovered only 60 EVI and funded its own assessment.

⁷⁴ For example, the TB assessments and the laboratory assessments.

Problem areas

Human resources

Merlin employs a large number of expatriate staff relative to the number of its local employees.⁷⁵ There is an impression that this high expatriate presence does not fit completely with the agency's strategy of working with local authorities and providing a strategic preparedness capacity.

Internal funding

An absence of funding for preparedness undermined Merlin's strategic design to maintain a continuity of presence in Albania. In 1998, Merlin had wanted to continue implementing programmes in northern Albania and maintain a strategic emergency presence but an absence of funding forced them to close operations in Albania in late 1998. Consequently, when the 1999 refugee influx started, Merlin had no operational capacity in the country. This reduced the speed with which it was able to implement programmes and, by the time Merlin was operational, other agencies had filled in most of Merlin's core areas of competence. In 2000, it again faces the same problem; the huge resources seen in the country during 1999 have disappeared and Merlin faces difficulty funding its presence beyond the summer.

Monitoring and evaluation

In contrast to its focus and expertise in assessment, Merlin does not have specific guidelines for monitoring programmes and, by its own admission, has a relatively weak internal evaluation process. It has not internally evaluated any of its projects in Albania.

⁷⁵ At times in Albania, Merlin had 15 expatriates to implement a relatively small portfolio of programmes. At present it has four expatriate and seven local staff.

SECTION 9: SUMMARY OF OXFAM GB'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

9.1 Mission

Oxfam GB works with others to overcome poverty and suffering. It is a development, relief and campaigning organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world.

9.2 Context

Oxfam has developed a regional programme in the Balkans, being active in Bosnia, Serbia, and Albania since 1993. Oxfam had an office in Montenegro from 1993 to 1995 and opened an office in Kosovo in 1995 following an assessment in 1994. This was under the Oxfam office in Belgrade. Oxfam has not previously had an office in Macedonia, but had twice sent managers, including the emergency coordinator, to contact UNHCR and try to buy into contingency planning there.⁷⁶ Oxfam's work in the region was underpinned by a regional management centre in Sarajevo. Overall programming during the crisis was guided by regional strategic plans which were revised at intervals. During the Kosovo crisis, Oxfam continued with its existing development programmes, trying to ensure that these were not prejudiced by the emergency effort.

9.3 How Oxfam Works

In development situations and emergencies, Oxfam works both directly — implementing projects itself — and through partners. Relationships with partners can vary from a funding-only role to a full institutional development role with funding, advice and training. Oxfam is part of the Oxfam International group whose members include Oxfams in America, Canada, Quebec, Belgium, Ireland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, as well as Community Aid Abroad, Novib and Intermon.

Able management of the Albania programme assisted in this difficult task, as did the allocation of management resources to the emergency team to make sure that its core work with poor communities in Albania was not sidelined.

9.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Oxfam received the largest proportion of DEC appeal funds: 30.55 per cent. It has the largest emergency response system of any of the DEC agencies, managed by the Emergency Department at the Oxford headquarters. The department can call on specialist emergency support personnel for an immediate response to emergencies. Oxfam maintains large stocks of emergency water equipment, tents and clothing etc. and these can be airlifted around the world. Oxfam has a well-established expertise in emergency water supply and has supported the development of the RedR register that allows the speedy recruitment of engineers and other relief staff in an emergency. Oxfam used these strengths to get significant resources into Albania and Macedonia by early April 1999.

⁷⁶ Oxfam was heavily involved in contingency in Albania for more than three years prior to the crisis.

9.5 Summary of Oxfam's DEC-funded Activities

OXFAM DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and public health	Oxfam		Immediate provision of water, sanitation, and health promotion.		DEC funds as a per cent of cost
		Tirana Area	14,050 beneficiaries	273,884	57%
		Kukes area	42,600 beneficiaries	232,198	42%
		Shkodra area	11,645 beneficiaries	111,283	42%
		Korce area	7,762 beneficiaries	99,653	45%
		WatSan total	76,087 beneficiaries	717,018	47%
Hygiene items and services to the disabled		WGAA, WRV and others.	Distribution of hygiene kits and social support for 8,027 refugees and 843 host families	86,899	69.4%
Programme support	Oxfam		Programme support costs	170,910	61.5%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				974,828	50.2%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and hygiene promotion	Oxfam	Stankovic 1 & 2 refugee camps	Airlift of emergency water equipment, construction of emergency water and sanitation systems in refugee camps. Over 40,000 beneficiaries	298,829	% of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 38.0%
		Cegrane Camp	Over 42,500 beneficiaries	138,926	32.3%
		All camps after June	Over 70,000 beneficiaries (duplicates some of those above)	60,398	23.5%
Community services in camps	Oxfam	Refuge camps and local support groups	Provision of social equipment and facilities. Centres for women. Over 40,000 beneficiaries (including duplicates)	29,854	60.0%
Disability services	Oxfam	Refugee camps	Distribution of orthopaedic equipment. 698 beneficiaries.	40,683	30.0%
Disability network	Handicap	Tetovo	Not known	2,726	25.0%
WatSan and HP in Host Communities	Oxfam	Gostivar and Struga	Rehabilitation of water systems and Hygiene Promotion in communities hosting refugees. Over 12,055 beneficiaries.	48,230	39.0%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				619,646	32.0%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and hygiene promotion	Oxfam	Country-wide	Emergency water supply installations for hospitals, collective centres and towns. Distribution of hygiene materials. 200,000 beneficiaries	1,067,628	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 56%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,067,628	

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					BOSNIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan	Oxfam	On border with Serbia.	Identification of emergency sites for up to 100,000 together with planning and preparedness refugees. No beneficiaries as yet	105,587	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 100%
Relief distribution	Local partners		Distribution of hygiene and household items to 4,500 refugee families.	121,665	100%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				227,252	100%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					SERBIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief Distribution	Oxfam, Local NGOs, Yugoslav Red Cross	Central and Southern Serbia	Distribution of Hygiene kits and blankets to 10,000 beneficiaries. Distribution of disability items to 3,000 disabled. Distribution of household items to 1,800 beneficiaries.	224,712	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 100%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				224,712	62.9%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					REGIONAL AND HQ COSTS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Regional and Head Office running cost	Oxfam	Sarajevo and Oxford	The costs of supporting the emergency programme from Oxford's head office in Oxford and the regional office in Sarajevo	182,146	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds = 100%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				182,146	

OXFAM DEC PHASE I				SUMMARY	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
WatSan		Albania	WatSan and health promotion	974,826	
		Macedonia	WatSan, Community and Disabled	619,646	
		Kosovo	Emergency Water Supply	1,067,628	
Relief goods		Bosnia	Relief Goods and WatSan Preparedness	227,252	
		Serbia	Relief Goods distribution, incl. disabled	224,712	
Support		Support Offices	Running Costs	182,146	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				3,296,210	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and Public health	Oxfam	Lushne Kukes Korce Shkodra	Rehabilitation/replacement of old water systems ranging from small schemes serving a single village to schemes serving several village over a broad area. Health promotion is part of the overall approach.	126,859	Money used for costs not covered by a large grant (£2.8M) from ECHO.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				126,859	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Water Supply, Maintenance and Hygiene Promotion	Oxfam	Stankovic 2 refugee camp	Water supply and Hygiene promotion for the approx. 2,750 Roma refugees remaining in Stankovic 2 camp until it closed on 10 December 1999.	201,664	Refugees from Stankovic 2 were moved to collective centres throughout Macedonia.
Community Services		Stankovic 2 refugee camp	Provision of soup and hot drinks in social areas. Adult literacy, tailoring and hairdressing courses.	40,615	Concentrating on Roma people.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				242,279	About 2,750 beneficiaries

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Disability	Oxfam/Handikos	Countrywide	Centres and networking facilities with disabled. (Handikos also worked with Oxfam in the camps in Macedonia in Phase I)	180,869	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan
Gender	Oxfam	Countrywide	Provide centres for women.	30,383	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan
	Oxfam/UNH CR/ Women's groups	Countrywide	Start-up funds for initiatives by women's groups. (Part of a larger US\$10 million project funded by USAID)	34,901	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan

Summary of Oxfam GB's DEC-Funded Activities

Relief	Oxfam/ Handikos/ Local NGOs	Countrywide		38,816	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan
Education Rehabilitation Programme	Novib, SBASHK, DRA, Education International.	Throughout Kosovo	Pay a one-time £30 allowance to 26,000 teachers. Purchase desks, school-bags, notebooks, and teachers equipment. Repairing village schools.	3,000,000	Oxfam gave a grant to Novib, as part of a larger Novib managed programme.
Public and Environmental Health Programme	Oxfam	Pristina	To guarantee a minimum pumping capacity in urban areas not served by others. Well cleaning and rehabilitation. Rehabilitation of small-scale rural water supplies. Solid waste disposal. Health Promotion and education.	263,072	
		Mitrovica		151,205	
		Prizren		202,882	Amount on report £202,822 corrected by S. Ridley e-mail.
		Ferezaj		134,678	Originally for Viti
		Rest of Kosovo	Concentrating on solid waste and sewage disposal	335,849	
Programme Support	Oxfam	All Kosovo	Overhead costs	597,799	Not shown in the original 4-week plan.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				4,970,454	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II					BOSNIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan	Oxfam	Near Yugoslav border.	Building up contingency stocks of water equipment and planning for any possible refugee influx from Montenegro or Serbia.	70,194	This is preparedness work for potential emergencies in this unstable region.
Relief Distribution	Local partners	Refugee impacted areas	Distribution of Hygiene, Household and other non-food-items for the winter	275,974	
Returnee assistance	Local partners	Drvar	Reconstruction of homes for vulnerable Bosnian Serbs who have returned to Drvar. Grants for agriculture and job creation.	562,948	
Capacity Building	Six local organisations	Republika Srpska	Organisational development training. Support for community service provision.	0	Included in 4-week plan but funded from other funds
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				909,116	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II					SERBIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Multi-sector: WatSan Health Relief	Oxfam and local partners	Throughout Serbia	Rehabilitate WatSan for Collective Centres and host families. Supporting immunisation. Hygiene education, distribution of hygiene kits and household items.	1,696,939	DEC funds paid for 75% of this project against a planned level of 50%.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,696,840	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				REGIONAL AND HQ COSTS	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Support	Oxfam	Oxford	Cost of support by Head Office for Emergency operation in Balkans	179,026	100% of this project funded by DEC
		Sarajevo	Cost of support by Regional Office for Emergency operation in Balkans	170,826	100b of this project funded by DEC
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				349,852	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
WatSan		Albania	Part of larger ECHO water project	126,859	
		Macedonia	WatSan, Community and Disabled	242,279	
		Kosovo	Emergency Water Supply, Gender	4,970,455	
Relief goods		Bosnia	Relief Goods and WatSan Preparedness	909,116	
		Serbia	Relief Goods distribution, incl. disabled	1,649,939	
Support		Support Offices	Running Costs	349,852	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				8,248,500	

Phase	Paid by DEC	Reported Expenditure	Returned	Balance
DEC Phase I	4,582,500	3,296,210	1,000,000	286,290 ⁷⁷
DEC Phase II	8,248,500	8,248,500	313,290	(313,290)
Total received	12,831,000	11,544,710	1,313,290	(27,000)

⁷⁷ DEC Figures show these funds as having been returned in the Phase II period. This illustrates a general problem that it is often not clear to the DEC Secretariat to which phase the returns relate to. The amount returned is £27,000 more than the accounts suggest. Perhaps this represents interest earned on the DEC funds.

9.6 Key Issues

Best practice

There are many examples of good practice in the work that Oxfam has done that could be emulated by others. Oxfam's emergency programme in Albania was generally regarded as an effective and professional response. Oxfam reports that *'The Macedonian Government held up Oxfam as the model NGO for the way their response here to the Kosova crisis has recognised the capabilities and needs of Macedonia'*.⁷⁸ Oxfam showed a very wide range of best practice in the first stages of the emergency. Some examples of best practice identified by the evaluation team include:

Transparency

Oxfam was by far the most transparent of the DEC agencies, supplying the evaluators with internal critical reports without being asked and supplying all information (even detailing individual expenditures) when requested. Oxfam staff also frankly discussed problems in the implementation of their projects.

Good emergency management

Oxfam set up relatively autonomous offices in Albania in Kukes, Skodra and Korce. This decentralisation reduced the load on the Tirana office, while making Oxfam's response faster and more appropriate. Finance and administration staff were sent to the field at an early stage to support the emergency response. Oxfam made good use of national human resources in Albania, including the employment of the leading expert on Albanian hydrology. Oxfam also used resources within the refugee community, using the staff of NGO partners who had worked with Oxfam in the camps. Oxfam also used a relatively flexible financial system to ensure that staff on the ground could respond to needs. Emergency teams were provided with their own management structure so that existing programmes and partners could still be supported without all resources being diverted to the emergency.

Preparedness

Despite the concern that Oxfam was *'slow out of the blocks'* voiced by some staff (Porter, 1999), Oxfam was very fast off the ground. The first international water team was in Tirana on 29 March, more than a week before the launch of the DEC appeal. Oxfam was able to draw on its emergency stocks in the UK and on its in-house emergency service personnel. RedR reported that, of the DEC agencies participating in the appeal, Oxfam was the fastest to mobilise personnel from the RedR database.

Oxfam not only responded quickly but had also committed resources to preparedness before the crisis. Oxfam had been involved in contingency planning in Albania for more than three years prior to the influx. The international staff evacuated from Kosovo just before the air-strikes, was given the job of planning for the contingency of a refugee influx into Macedonia and for a return to Kosovo.

Oxfam continued to show its commitment to preparedness during the crisis by building the emergency response capacity of the local partners it worked with in Kosovo. Oxfam's policy

⁷⁸ HM Ambassador to Macedonia, quoted in Oxfam - Macedonia Debrief Report - Fergus Boyle

of recruiting staff with little emergency experience to work alongside experienced emergency staff allowed it to increase the pool of experienced staff for the next emergency.

Promoting good practice

Oxfam measured its own work against the Sphere Standards and also disseminated these through the other agencies. Even in the areas where Oxfam was not directly responsible, Oxfam pressured other agencies to adhere to standards. This was not always successful, but success included the proper design of a number of camps. In water supply work in Kosovo, Oxfam has been trying to develop as many standard drawings and designs as possible and then sharing these with others. In the camps Oxfam promoted the concept of providing services that were accessible to the disabled and demonstrated that it was possible to provide latrines accessible to the disabled at reasonable cost. Oxfam has continually promoted coordination mechanisms and advocated greater support of UNHCR.

Equity

Oxfam spending in Serbia has increased dramatically in response to the growing humanitarian needs there.⁷⁹ Oxfam reduced its original budget for Kosovo in recognition that too many emergency resources were flowing there instead of to other needy areas of the world. The pattern of Oxfam's DEC spending between Phase I and Phase II shows its commitment to other countries in the Balkans and how this has changed between the phases to reflect humanitarian need.

Problem areas

Whereas Oxfam's work in Phase I in response to the refugee emergency showed many examples of best practice, Oxfam's work in Phase II, including its own operational work, was more problematic in terms of quality. The degree of seriousness of these problems varied, but the frequency with which such faults were found in the Phase II projects suggests that there was a basic problem of quality control.⁸⁰

Disabled access

While access by people with disabilities to education is an Oxfam priority, the toilets being built at Rahovac were not accessible to the disabled at all. The number of toilets provided at the schools seems to have no relation to the number of students. Typically the same number of WCs were provided for boys as for girls. Urinals (which are cheaper and more space-efficient) were not used for boys. Toilets for the disabled were locked.⁸¹ In one school one disabled child had one toilet reserved for her use with only five toilets for the other 1,300 pupils.

⁷⁹ Oxfam's total budget for 2000 is larger for Serbia than for Kosovo (Interview with Oxfam in Pristina)

⁸⁰ Oxfam has taken steps to remedy this problem area by forming an expanded programme support team which will clear the design and appropriateness of all water and sanitation projects and undertake quality control checks.

⁸¹ While the locked toilet doors were strictly out of Oxfam's control, it was not evident that there was adequate staff awareness to ensure that the issue was raised with the school authorities.

Poor quality work

Oxfam installed a toilet and a shower for an elderly woman who hosted refugees in Macedonia. However, Oxfam did not provide a tap for anal cleansing (as is the norm in this area) even though her toilet was equipped for one. Moreover, the soak-away for her septic tank was not properly installed so effluent was leaking out in front of her house. At Zdunje School, the connection from the septic tank to the soak-away was faulty and the septic tank was leaking into the surrounding soil. In Anton Zako Caip primary school in Vustrri, Oxfam installed a water pump, but failed to mount it correctly so that it was just hanging off the pipe work.

On a broader scale, despite previous poor experience with large scale piped-water infrastructure projects, Oxfam is carrying out the Lushnje scheme in Albania without any guarantee that the system will be sustainable (Cosgrave, 2000).

Dangerous work

In Vustrri, Oxfam placed a 6,000 litre water bladder on top of what can only be described as a gerry-built structure of hollow clay blocks and planks. The structure is a danger to the water-users. The bladder was not safely secured and the tapstand area was not properly drained.

Integration problems

Oxfam was the most transparent of the DEC agencies and the fastest to openly identify problems in its work. Unfortunately, in Kosovo, this awareness did not seem to translate into changes in strategy. Water, sanitation and public health education were poorly integrated⁸², although the evaluation team acknowledges the difficulties of dealing with issues which were not always directly within the agency's control.

At the collective centre in Malishevo, Oxfam installed an emergency water and sanitation system. The work was of a reasonable quality, but Oxfam failed to notice that sanitary provision (by another NGO) was totally inadequate with only three bathrooms (with one shower and one toilet each) for forty families. The Anton Zako Caip school in Vustrri got cleaning materials from Oxfam and wheelbarrows for removing rubbish from the school. However, all the rubbish has been dumped in the school grounds but Oxfam health promotion staff seemed unconcerned by this.

9.7 The Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project (KERP)

Oxfam gave a grant of £3 million to NOVIB (the Dutch member of the Oxfam International network) for KERP.⁸³ In principal this funding arrangement is no different from that made by other DEC agencies — for example, by the BRCS to the ICRC and IFRC. In this case, the evaluation team did have a concern about the size of the grant⁸⁴ in relation to NOVIB's apparent lack of experience of managing large operational projects and its lack of any prior involvement in Kosovo. The team also had a concern about the capacity of SBASHK, the

⁸² Water, sanitation and public health were not integrated at management level. A typical example was seen at Shkoroshnek village, where wells were being rehabilitated without any visit from the public health promoters. Best practice would be for health promotion work to be far more closely integrated into the physical work of well repair with visits before, during and after the work in order to gain the maximum impact.

⁸³ For more information about this project see Section 5, Volume II on school and education rehabilitation.

⁸⁴ In DEC Phase II, only three DEC agencies received more than £3million in all.

teachers' union, to handle such activities as the large scale purchase of school desks and equipment. This very large grant is far more than many of the other DEC agencies received.

To a certain extent, the evaluation team was reassured by explanations and clarifications received from Oxfam and NOVIB. These included: the involvement of DRA in the project, with its specific focus on the execution of reconstruction projects and its previous experience in the region; and the capacity building work that has been undertaken in support of SBASHK.

The team was also reassured by the fact that a mid-term review of the project was being carried out in mid-2000 that would ensure that if any major problems were identified within the project, these would be rectified.

In spite of these reassurances, the team remains unsure whether the potential risks in the project warranted Oxfam making such a substantial one-off grant with DEC funds.

An additional concern with this project was the question of overheads, given the involvement of a number of different partner agencies. This issue is dealt with in more detail in Volume II.

SECTION 10: SUMMARY OF SAVE THE CHILDREN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

10.1 Mission

Save the Children (SC) works for the benefit of children on the basis of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. During emergencies, it aims to *'respond to children's and families' immediate needs in an emergency while giving priority to long-term recovery and development. We emphasise long-lasting, sustainable solutions.'*

10.2 Context

SC-UK programme in FRY began with the opening of a country office in Belgrade in 1993. Programmes in the region expanded with the opening of a project office in Montenegro in 1994 and an office in Bosnia in 1996. SC also started a small programme in Kosovo in 1996 that was expanded with the opening of a larger office in Kosovo in the summer of 1998 in response to the worsening situation.

During this period, SC implemented emergency programmes in Bosnia and Serbia and by 1998 had offices in Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia (with Norway) and Kosovo (summer 1998) with a regional office in Bulgaria. In Albania and Macedonia, SC started from scratch in April 1999. (N.B. SC Denmark had a small project Skhodra).

10.3 How Save the Children UK Works

Save the Children UK is one of the 26 members of the International Save the Children Alliance. Five of these were active in the Balkans during 1999 — SC Sweden, Norway, Denmark, US and UK. In Albania and Kosovo these different sections worked together for the first time under a unified 'Alliance' management structure. The UK regional director, supported by the regional programme officer (both based in the London) headed the executive management and a Kosovo steering group consisting of the Regional Directors of the five active alliance countries provided strategic direction. The following sections are now active: Albania (US and Norway); Macedonia (US & UK with a north-south split with UK taking South); Bosnia (UK); Serbia (UK); and Kosovo (all five sections).

SC implements both direct and indirect programmes, aiming to increase indirect implementation and increase the capacity of local partners as programmes develop. At the time of the crisis, Save the Children UK had a very small emergency unit based in London with only one full time emergency advisor. It has since expanded this unit.

10.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

SC received 17.7 per cent of DEC funds — £3,036,384 and £3,768,705 in Phases I and II — and is the second largest recipient of DEC funding. The DEC has been the largest funder of SC during the crisis.

The type and quality of SC's response to the 1999 emergency varied. In Serbia, where SC had good connections and a substantial capacity, the agency remained active throughout the war and successfully implemented large-scale programmes. At the other end of the spectrum,

in Albania, where SC had almost no prior presence, the initial programmes appeared to be of poor quality. In Kosovo, the evaluation team's impression is that the programmes have been mixed. Finding sufficient numbers of suitable staff has continually proved to be a major constraint to operations.

10.5 Summary of Save the Children's DEC-funded Activities

SC DEC PHASE I					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Material assistance programme		9 locations in Albania	1006 clothing/hygiene kits	201,000	No report available. Figures differ in narrative report and Phase I financial report to DEC
NFI		Fier Korce Kukes	Distribution of primary & pre-school and toy kits		\$63,652 in Phase I report. SC administrator in Tirana informed evaluation team only \$22,288 financed by DEC, the rest by OFDA. The kits funded by the DEC transported to Kosovo in July
Primary & pre school education		Fier Kavaja Korce	Pre- and primary school activities 6,371 children 287 teachers		8 camps, including Camps Hope, UAE, Kukes 2, Cap Anamur camps. 5 collective centres
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				392,469	From Phase I report. Does not include £125,625 spent on the family kit programme?
<i>Total other funding</i>			<i>Distribution of primary & pre/school kits</i>	<i>21,680</i>	<i>OFDA</i>

SC DEC PHASE I					MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
NFI Material assistance programme	El Hilal	Tetovo, Kicevo Stankovic 2 Neprostena Tetovo Radusa	800 mother and child clothing/hygiene kits +/- 70 part kits nappies Clothes and shoes		Nappy supplies in Macedonia ran out and SC supplied 6 trucks from the UK with nappies. Trucks later formed part of SC's input into the repatriation of refugees and were later used in Kosovo
Complimentary food	MRC		Baby food to host families in Gostivar and Kisevo vegetable & fruit		
Telephone communication programme			100 mobile phones donated free, together with \$100,000 of air-time		
Non-formal education					

Community services			Stankovic I/II, Cegrane		
Health			Clinic at Radusa - also M&C health		
			Support to the hospital in Gostivar		
			Training for host families in health care through MCH		
	PSF El Hilal, MRC		Drugs to Macedonia central pharmacy Drugs to partners in Tetova and Gostivar municipalities and Gostivar hospital		PSF operated the central pharmacy in Macedonia
	El Hilal		Mother/child kits host families through a local NGO. Purchased baby food locally		
Community development	SC Macedonia		Support to local SC partner to implement sports programmes	5370.97	SC Macedonia working with Serbian Macedonians
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				816,350	
<i>Total other funding</i>				<i>100,000</i>	<i>DFID</i>
				<i>60,000</i>	<i>SC Norway</i>

SC DEC PHASE I					KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes	
Protection				4,168		
Health		Decan	Protection of children against vaccine-preventable diseases	8,744	Planned activities such as safe motherhood and reproductive health service, child nutrition monitoring Develop new health authorities management capacity	
		Pristina	Influencing health policy via participation on various policy committees.		Task for EPI, family doctors training	
Education	ACT	Decan	Rehabilitate the structure of 12 schools	12,530	First school opened in November	
		Country wide	Assessment of education system		Recommended education specialist for SC Kosovo.	
Material assistance programme			Items purchased and distribution plans drawn up. Distribution ongoing at end of Phase I	313,289		
Tracing		Pristina Djakova Peje Prizren Decan	84,446 calls to reunite families separated by the war Tracing parents of 69 separated children	62,586		

Shelter			Planned for 500 houses. 323 houses for rehabilitation identified, all materials ordered and 75% delivered to site.	4,090	
Social policy		Pristina	Providing carers and attempting to trace the parents of 20 abandoned babies	2,565	Provided route for SC to influence social policy on children
Safe places for children		Djakova Peje Decan Prizren	36 safe areas set up	8,998	
Social policy				2,507	No report available
Support costs				211,450	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				630,932	

SC DEC PHASE I					SERBIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (DM)	Explanatory notes
Material assistance programme	70% YRC 25% local NGOs (52) 5% direct	82 municipalities	To IDPs living in private accommodation		
			19,600 hygiene packs	215,600	
			13,000 pairs of shoes	271,400	
			10,000 winter boots	128,375	
			10,000 winter jackets	295,000	20% distributed by Jan 2000
			10,000 set of underwear	118,400	
			10,000 medical packages	127,000	
			School materials	301,139	
			10,000 mattresses and blankets	351,000	
			4,000 school bags	38,000	
4,000 disposable nappies	40,000				
Compliment-ary food		82 municipalities	19,600 complimentary food parcels	1,300,000	
			18,000 kg canned meat	126,000	
Health materials		Country-wide	9 types of epilepsy and anti-psychotic drugs to 7 psychiatric institutions 300 community cases	174,726	Specific request from Serbian ministry of labour, veterans and social welfare
Local partners project			Variety of 'social' interventions.	323,124	Attempting to build group of partners with child focus. Emphasis on working with Roma
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				3,809,764	

SC DEC PHASE I					BOSNIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Assessment	'Be my friend'		Assessment of 157 families		
Material assistance programme			1,000 hygiene kits – refugee children in host families. Once a month for 4 months Winterisation good - Roma 1,000 winter clothing kits - one off distribution 150 nappies		Money for Roma winterisation came late.
Food			1,000 complementary food parcels for children		
Recreation education	'Be my friend', Club of Albanians, Our children Zenica				Lead agency for education and community sectors (in Regional Operations Coordination Centre - ROCC); focus on host families; Roma (often semi derelict/ dismantled accommodation)
Information dissemination			Targeting refugees in private accommodation about the availability and location of material assistance		
<i>Rep Srpska</i>					
Health materials	PSF	5 hospitals	Funded supply of 6 essential drugs for children		Purchased by PSF in France, PSF did monitoring.
NFI	Rep. Srpska RC		Hygiene parcels for 5,578 children. 1,500 nappies 5,000 toys		Targeted refugee children in host families with locally purchased products & Roma refugees in Banja Luka.
			95 food parcels and jerry cans		To Roma in Banja Luka.
Community recreation	Hi Neighbour EVA, Golden Autumn Youth theatre	10 towns	4,000 refugee children plus 5,000 resident children.		Lead agency for education and community sectors (in ROCC). Projects concentrated on social/educational activities.
Information dissemination			15,000 information pamphlets – information on registration, accessing humanitarian assistance		
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				197,204	3,335 carried over to Phase II⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Figure taken from actuals in Phase I narrative report. Figures in consolidated financial report for Phase I = £91,925

SC DEC PHASE I <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>					MONTENEGRO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
Material assistance				98,127	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				98,127	

SC DEC PHASE II <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Education		Tirana	1 SC-UK staff member to Alliance	109,123	Data from evaluation spread sheet
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				109,123	

SC DEC PHASE II <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>					MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Programme support		Tirana	Logistics support to Kosovo	157,348	Data from evaluation spread sheet
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				157,348	

SC DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Protection			60,000 booklets on the rights of the child	15,124	
Health		Djakova Decan	Supported vaccination activities in- coverage 90%	144,970	Failure to recruit country health coordinator undermined SC's ability to influence health policy
		Pristina	Influencing health policy via participation on various policy committees.		
Education	ACT		Rehabilitate the structure of 12 schools in Decan	423,129	DEC 48% of total SC rehabilitated school structures, ACT related water and sanitation.
			Materials to schools covering: - 40,000 primary school - - 10,200 pre-school children - 16,000 additional children - 13,822 school bags for other agencies		661 primary school supply kits 328 primary school set-up kits 340 pre-school set up kits 87 pre-school supplies kits
Material assistance programme	MTS		- 30,000 winter clothing for children - 20,000 family kits	499,701 754,557 1,345,977	
Tracing		Pristina Peje Prizren Djakova	- 84,446 calls to reunite families separated by the war - Tracing parents of 69 separated children	122,481	DEC covered 94% Same activities covered in both Phase I and II reports
Shelter			- 533 warm rooms 4,000 beneficiaries	448,882	

Social welfare			- 22 babies placed in foster/adoption or parents traced	13,349	
Safe areas for children	KFOR, HI, NPA, ACT	Prizren Peje/Decan Djakova	- 36 safe areas created 10,000 children have benefited - Toys for guns exchange	71,580	DEC covered 44% 30,000 toys distributed 5,000 toy guns collected
Social policy			Support to health policy	9,274	
Support costs				359,298	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				2,954,064	

SC DEC PHASE II <i>DUPLICATES PHASE I REPORT</i>				SERBIA	
Sector		Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE			924,575⁸⁶		

SC DEC PHASE II <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>				BOSNIA	
Sector		Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE			220,268⁸⁷		

SC DEC PHASE II					MONTENEGRO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Material assistance programme	Montenegro Red Cross	South of country	Family kit distribution (children clothing, baby parcels, bed linen, blankets & toys) 12,750 IDP children 2,250 local vulnerable children		Staff salaries, purchase of 1 vehicle to support project
Non-formal education/recreation		Podgorica, Ulcinj, Tivat	Three children's and youngsters' centres: sewing, English, computers, media workshops, art.		Southern part of Montenegro
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				625,000⁸⁸	

Total DEC Income: £7,729.664

Expenditure Phase I: £ 3,036,384

Expenditure Phase II: £ 4,693,280

Total Expenditure: £7,729.664

⁸⁶ Figure from actuals in Phase II financial report.

⁸⁷ Figure from actuals in Phase II financial report.

⁸⁸ Figure taken from Phase II narrative report, actuals from Phase II compiled financial report = £526,028.

10.6 Key Issues

Appropriateness

The appropriateness of SC programmes varied. The impression is that the programmes implemented by SC from established operational bases were more appropriate than those in Albania and Macedonia.

The SC shelter (warm room) programme in Kosovo was appropriate, as the oncoming winter was probably the biggest threat to life faced by the returnees to Kosovo. SC also appeared to have coordinated reasonably well with other agencies to ensure that houses with SC warm rooms also received roofs when necessary. Accompanying this programme with family kits and winter clothes made sense.

The SC material distribution programmes were variable. The design and packaging of the family kits used in Macedonia and Albania (some later transported to Kosovo) were inappropriate. The kits came in cardboard boxes that fell to pieces if they became wet. The kits were not palletised and could not be loaded on to the cargo plane as planned because their size and weights were incorrect. These problems resulted in the air carriers leaving many on the tarmac. A number of kits arrived damaged and disordered. They also contained glass jars of baby food that broke frequently, further damaging other contents. The kits used in Kosovo appear to have been much more appropriate. SC reverted to a tried and tested design for family kits that it had used in Kosovo in 1998. The kits came in strong, large plastic barrels that the evaluation team witnessed being used for storage several months after the initial distribution. The contents appeared useful and most of the beneficiaries interviewed appreciated them.

The SC tracing programme made an imaginative use of cellular phones to provide a useful and highly appreciated service to refugees and returnees. The education and safe area programmes appeared appropriate, combining implementation with policy work. There were however, some problems over the standardisation of schools and their futures once reopened. It is unclear whether SC intended them to be pre-school classes, safe areas or sports areas. This made their future uncertain.⁸⁹ Standards of supervision between them varied, with some having several teachers per 40 children and some having trained teachers while others had untrained teachers. It appeared there are no safe areas for minorities.

SC health interventions in Kosovo were broadly appropriate. The combination of 'hands on' support to infrastructure, combined with policy-level intervention on central planning committees, produced a synergy. This added value to both individual elements. Unfortunately, SC's difficulties in recruiting suitably qualified health coordinators to represent the agencies at a central level, somewhat undermined this strategy. In Djakova, the flexible coordinated nature of the SC approach in health was impressive. Programmes appear to have addressed well identified needs in a coherent manner and local health officials interviewed were highly appreciative.

Assessment and monitoring

The quality of SC assessment, targeting and monitoring was variable. In Albania, the evaluation team saw no evidence of assessments or monitoring reports for the family kits that

⁸⁹ Although there is some attempt to link this to national policy to make pre-school formally part of the education system.

SC distributed in April and May.⁹⁰ There is no evidence of any impact from these kits. In Macedonia, SC and several other DEC agencies relied upon El Hilal distribution mechanisms. They do not appear to have independently verified El Hilal targeting or distribution. In Serbia, SC attempted to monitor the YRC distribution of non-food items, however there is an impression that there were insufficient people allocated to this monitoring.

In Kosovo, SC adopted different monitoring and assessment strategies. In Djakova, it allowed MTS to target and distribute non-food items according to pre-agreed criteria and then employed several monitoring teams to check distributions. In Prizren, SC and MTS worked together more closely, distributing items together. SC carried out little additional monitoring. In the future, SC are planning a combination of the two tactics, working more closely with MTS on planning and distributing but also carrying out more independent monitoring. The team feels that this move to increase monitoring capacity is appropriate. In Kosovo SC did not monitor the impact of the toys for guns or the safe area programmes.

Coverage

Throughout the region, SC programmes appeared to have covered a range of beneficiaries. SC worked solely with Albanians in Albania and Macedonia, and with only very few Serbs and Roma in Kosovo. SC worked with all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Montenegro, and with Serbs and Roma in Serbia. SC focused on refugees in camps in Albania and on those living in private accommodation in Macedonia and Serbia.

Most reports state that SC targeting was based upon socio-economic vulnerability criteria. The reality in Kosovo was that MTS usually employed a geographically-based system of targeting. MTS prioritised villages according to the amount of destruction they suffered during the war and villages at the top of the list of priorities appear to have received blanket distributions of family kits and winter clothes. MTS reported that targeting using socio-economic criteria had the potential to create tensions and conflict within villages. For this reason, the MTS field officer in Prizren usually preferred to give something to everybody within the village.

During the evaluation team's visit there was an impression that targeting was not always very good. In two of the sites visited near Prizren, people had received barrels from SC and CRS. The MTS activist came from one of these villages. The village in question was prosperous and untouched during the war

Standards

SC sees Sphere as more of an organisational culture than a rulebook to follow. In theory, all programmes are vetted with Sphere in mind. The checking of proposals by HQ technical advisors and managers provided another 'Sphere check'. There is a Sphere handbook in each office and, in principle, all expatriates have orientation in Sphere as part of their briefing. In practice, problems with recruitment meant that during the early phases of the emergency briefings were often insufficient. National staff do not appear to have been adequately exposed to Sphere.

⁹⁰ SC ordered and transported the kits before its UK team arrived in the region. Although this might have been acceptable in order to have start-up material at the beginning of programmes, problems with the design, packaging and transport of these kits nullified this potential advantage.

Although project proposals mentioned Sphere Standards and indicators, SC does not appear to have evaluated or monitored according to these indicators. It has not assessed the degree to which its programmes conform to the Code of Conduct.

Examples of good practice

Connectedness

SC programmes usually appeared well connected both in terms of SC's continuity of presence and its connections with local actors.⁹¹ SC implemented creditable emergency responses in Montenegro and Serbia entirely with local staff. These successes were the results of its commitment towards developing local staff capacity. In Kosovo, SC also appeared to have a realistic attitude to working with MTS, attempting to work with them and not regarding them merely as local contractors. There is, however, little evidence that it has given MTS much support to build its capacity. In Serbia, SC used 10 per cent of its DEC funds, divided between 52 local NGOs, in an imaginative attempt to develop child-focused local partners.

Coherence

SC coordinated well with other agencies and local authorities. In Peje and Djakova where HCR leadership was weak, it was one of the leading NGOs in improving coordination. It was also alert in its responses to gaps in service provision unfilled by other agencies. The close coordination with officials, local NGOs and other NGOs in Djakova, appears to be one of the factors determining the success of the programmes there. The agency also had an integrated approach in Kosovo, providing returnees with a range of interventions including warm rooms, family kits and clothing. To increase synergy, SC coordinated well with other agencies to provide other support (roofing, water etc). This added value above the sum of the individual items and reduced duplication.

SC's appointment of a protection officer with a specific aim to liaise with other actors and promote a coherent response to protection issues appears to have been positive. Although this is an example of good practice, again SC had problems filling the post after the first three months.

In Bosnia, SC played an important role as lead agency for education and community sectors.

Advocacy

SC was one of the most active agencies in international advocacy. It was the only DEC agency to call publicly for humanitarian access to the population in Kosovo during the NATO bombing. In addition, it lobbied hard to improve child feeding practices, supporting this with scientific research to highlight problems. This work appears impressive and SC was successful in raising infant feeding onto the international agenda and improving the way the problem was addressed.

SC was active at a local policy level, supporting this advocacy with its practical work in the field. Its failure to recruit a health programme manager for four months undermined this strategy.

⁹¹ The programmes in Albania and to an extent in Macedonia are an exception to this general rule.

Evaluation lesson learning

SC evaluation and lesson learning since the emergency appears to have been very good. It has conducted two reviews/evaluations of its response and have made many changes in response to the findings. It has strengthened its emergency department, clarified regional responsibility and improved emergency capacity in region. In addition it has completed an in-depth emergency response strategy/contingency plan for the region.

Problem areas

Preparedness

SC's ability to implement an emergency programme varied depending on whether it had a pre-existing presence in a country. In Albania and Macedonia, SC did not have a prior presence and its initial response was poor. Particularly in Albania, SC was slow to arrive, struggled to find a niche and had difficulties in scaling up. It had problems finding useful roles, recruiting experienced expatriate staff and was slow to develop adequate logistics and management systems.⁹² By contrast in Serbia, Montenegro⁹³ and Bosnia, where SC-UK had pre-existing programmes, it was able to implement appropriate programmes quickly and efficiently.

There were several factors behind SC's poor performance when coming into Albania and Macedonia. These problems related to both a weakness in SC's overall ability to implement emergency programmes from scratch and to problems specific to the Balkans. The SC strategy for the Balkans was predominantly developmental and it had run down its emergency capacity.⁹⁴ SC's institutional capacity to respond to emergencies was also limited without an emergency unit and with only one emergency advisor who had no authority or capacity to take autonomous action. It had neither an in-house pool of experienced emergency staff on standby, nor an effective register of emergency personnel. Its emergency systems and modular responses were under-developed.

SC has reacted positively to the problems experienced in the Balkans. The agency commissioned two external reviews and has implemented many changes. It has strengthened the emergency department, widened its recruitment of staff, deployed regional sectoral advisors and formalised a regional contingency plan.

⁹² Quote '*SC-UK continues to deploy personnel in emergency situations ill-equipped with radio and other communications facilities, first-aid kits, stationary, vehicles to adequate specifications and other essentials*' (Turner, 1999).

⁹³ For example, from August 1998, SC expanded its Montenegro office when more than 30,000 IDPs from Kosovo arrived in the country. SC also developed a Federal level preparedness plan, part of which was to rely on SC-US in Sarajevo for material assistance rather than place contingency stocks in Montenegro. In March 1999, all SC international staff left leaving two national programme managers to run the office. The national staff were able to start material distributions to IDPs ten days after the bombing began with materials from SC-US in Sarajevo. DEC fund were used to pay back money borrowed from SC-US.

⁹⁴ SC appears not to have acted on recommendations from an emergency preparedness visit to the region in April 1998. Even in Serbia, where SC responded fast and effectively to the 1999 crisis, emergency capacity had been run down.

Reporting and Transparency

SC's reporting to the DEC has been very poor. The agency did not submit any Phase I reports for Macedonia and Montenegro; its Phase I report for Albania consisted of only three sides of paper and did not differentiate between DEC and non-DEC funded projects. There were no Phase II reports from Albania or Macedonia. The Phase II reports from Bosnia/Republica Srpska and Serbia were re-writes of the activities documented in Phase I reports. Many of the reports sent to the DEC were field reports covering all SC programmes and did not differentiate the programmes funded by the DEC. These reports contained very different formats and included varying degrees of detail. Many of the internal reports from the field were not dated or signed.

Because of the poor reporting, it has been very difficult for the evaluation team to obtain a clear picture of SC-UK programmes in some countries. For example, in Albania during 1999 the narrative report submitted to the DEC contains reference to \$225,828 of expenditure and describes programmes similar to those proposed in the 48-hour plan. The 4-week plan contains reference to different activities and the compiled financial spreadsheet reports different expenditures. The evaluation team received conflicting information during interviews in its attempt to establish the content of the Albanian programmes funded by the DEC.

Management

SC had several management problems in the Balkans. These particularly occurred in the countries where SC started from scratch. Initially it found enough experienced expatriate managers. However, these people could only stay for a few weeks and subsequently SC had problems recruiting experienced managers who could stay for longer. As a result there were problems of continuity. In Albania, the implementation of a unified management structure for the five alliance sections compounded these problems. The impression is that SC's attempts to introduce this new management structure in Albania were a mistake. The emergency was large and fast moving and SC faced many constraints. It may have been better to institute such a profound new structure in a less intense crisis and one where SC had more of a grounding in the country. The evaluation team appreciates, however, the motives behind this change: to coordinate alliance members and avoid the problems of duplication seen in Bosnia.

Human Resources

SC's recruitment of expatriate emergency staff appeared weak. It had frequent problems finding appropriate staff, experienced emergency managers who could stay for more than a few weeks and skilled technical staff. These difficulties even applied to core sectors such as tracing. The impression is that SC recruitment was reactive and unimaginative. It did not access REDR, did not advertise positions on its web site and did not have well developed staff registers. In its Macedonia health programmes, SC eased its recruitment problems by making extensive use of GPs without experience of emergencies. This appeared appropriate given the spectrum of diseases encountered in the Balkans.

The development of local staff capacity appears generally to have been strong. SC in Kosovo did not, however, recruit any non-Albanian staff. In one case it did not recruit a qualified Roma driver because its local staff objected.

SECTION 11: SUMMARY OF TEARFUND'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

11.1 Mission

Tearfund is an evangelical Christian relief and development charity working in partnership to bring help and hope to communities in need around the world. Its purpose is to serve Jesus Christ by enabling those who share evangelical Christian beliefs to bring good news to the poor. In partnership with other evangelical Christian groups and churches around the world, Tearfund proclaims and demonstrates the gospel.

11.2 Context

Tearfund had previously worked with a local partner in Albania trying to build the emergency capacity of the churches there, and with MedAir in meeting the needs of the 1998 Kosovo refugees. Tearfund's operational arm, the Disaster Response Team, had not previously worked in the region.

11.3 How Tearfund Works

Tearfund works both directly, through its own Disaster Response Team and also through local and international partners. In 1999 Tearfund supported over 500 projects in nearly 100 countries. At present, about one-third of Tearfund's money is spent through the Disaster Response Team with the rest through partners.

11.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Tearfund received 4.68 per cent of DEC appeal funds, £702,000 in Phase I and £1,263,600 in Phase II (£401,500 of Phase I money was returned). Tearfund sent an assessment team to Albania at the end of March 1999. The Disaster Response Team began operations in Albania dealing with sanitation and camp management.

Tearfund was slower than the other DEC agencies to mobilise in Kosovo but it both executed its own shelter programme there and supported the shelter programmes of two international partners. Unlike the other smaller DEC agencies which left Albania with the refugees, Tearfund remained working in Kukes to clean up after the refugees in Kukes and won high praise from the local authority for doing so.⁹⁵

Sadly, two Tearfund international staff were killed during the relief operation in an air accident at Pristina Airport.

⁹⁵ Interview with Mayor of Kukes, March 2000.

11.5 Summary of Tearfund's DEC-funded Activities

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and Public health	Tearfund DRT	Kukes	Provision of more than 500 latrines. Collection and disposal of sewage and solid waste. Public health education focused on women.		69% funded by the DEC. About 1/3 of the budget was spent on vehicle, radios and computers
		Elbasan	Technical advice on provision of water at Fushe Labionot site and public health education	242,268	
Relief	VUSh (Local church association)	Tirana	Supporting local partner by seconding relief coordinator to VUSh during the crisis. VUSh concentrated on working with refugees in host families.	27,002	Tearfund had an earlier project to build VUSh's emergency response capacity.
Distribution and Field Kitchens	MedAir (International NGO)	Kukes and Tirana	Mobile kitchens providing over 110,000 hot meals. Distributing eating kits, household kits and hygiene kits.	62,500	MedAir is a Swiss based NGO that was already working in Albania.
Refugee shelter	Agrinas	Erseke	Providing four winterised collective shelters for 500 refugees.	25,000	Not all the original grant was used, but the surplus is now being used for rehabilitation.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				356,770	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I				BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Water	Novi Most International	Novi Most	Installing water supply for old refugee centre now housing Kosovar refugees. Project due to start after end of Phase I.	9,000	Project not completed in Phase I and never reported on by Tearfund
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				9,000	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp.(£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief	Shelter Now International	Tetovo	Purchase and distribution of food and non-food-items for 5,000 Kosovar refugees living with host families	60,330	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				60,330	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I					TOTALS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief WatSan Collective Centres	Tearfund MedAir VUSh Agrinas	Albania	Relief Distribution, Water and Sanitation, Collective centre outfitting and management. Supporting Coordination	356,770	
Water supply	Novi Most Int.	Bosnia	Water supply to refugee centre	9,000	
Food and NFI	SNI	Macedonia	Distribution to refugees in Host Families	60,330	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				426,100	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	DRT	Gjakova Decani	Full replacement roofs and other repairs: 364 houses in all repaired for the winter.	200,000	Also had small public health programme.
	SNI	Junik	Repairs for 478 houses in all categories	199,333	This area was very heavily destroyed in the war
	MedAir	Peje Decani	Full replacement roofs: 501 houses re-roofed and 91 other houses repaired. Over 1,000 warm rooms built	99,605	The shelter project was substituted for a MedAir project with Bread of Life in Belgrade.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				498,938	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE II					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp.(£)	Explanatory Notes
Psycho-social	Mitigation International	Albania	Training the staff of local churches in Albania in counselling skills	30,358	Continues a longer programme of building local church capacity in Albania
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				30,358	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE II					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	DRT, SNI, MedAir	Kosovo	Repair of houses to allow use for the winter.	498,938	
Psycho-social	Mitigation Int.	Albania	Training counsellors for local churches	30,358	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				529,296	

Total DEC Income:	£1,965,600
Expenditure Phase I:	£417,100
Expenditure Phase II:	£529,296
Total returns:	£401,500
Total Expenditure and returns:	£1,347,896
Expenditure on Phase I in Phase II:	£50,900 (included £9,000 for the Novi Most project)
Expenditure on Phase II in Phase Iib:	£312,800
Unreturned Balance:	£295,904 (see discussion on reporting below)

11.6 Key Issues

Examples of Good Practice

There are many examples of good practice by Tearfund and its partners. These included:

A Very Professional Approach

Tearfund and some of its partners took a very professional approach to the work in hand. Tearfund tested different roofing designs to test their resistance to snow loading before deciding against plastic and in favour of tiles. In the solid waste project in Kukes, Tearfund took leachate samples for testing, to check that the land-fill site was working as planned. T-shirts used to promote the public health message in Kukes made no mention of Tearfund, an unusual example of agencies putting the message ahead of self-promotion.

A Commitment to Collaboration

Tearfund seconded its water engineer to UNHCR until their Water and Sanitation coordinator arrived. Tearfund worked together with HCC and Malteser to house far more people than Tearfund could have done on its own (this was a DEC-Funded Phase IIB project). This cooperation was particularly impressive given that neither humanist HCC nor Catholic Malteser are the sort of organisations that Tearfund would normally work with.

Project Monitoring and Listening to Beneficiaries

Tearfund monitored the affects of its public health programme in Kukes. MedAir held focus group discussions with its beneficiaries to evaluate its programmes in previous years and to plan for the future.

An Integrated Approach

Tearfund's approach to solid waste was a good example of an integrated approach. Tearfund not only provided funds for improving the dump site, it also trained the pickers (who scavenge the dump for saleable items) so that they were aware of how to minimise the health risks in its work. Tearfund supported incinerators at the health facilities so that needles would be less of a problem on the dump and also attacked solid waste through an innovative campaign.

Support for Preparedness

Tearfund invested resources before the crisis in developing capacity within VUSh, one of its partners in Albania, to respond to any crisis. Tearfund has also invested in scenario planning so that it would be better prepared for any new crises following on from the changes in Kosovo.

Focus on the Poor

More than any other agency visited, Tearfund was very aware that shelter assistance in 1999 had missed out those in Category 5 houses, who were often the poorest. Tearfund's 2000 programme seeks to redress that by rebuilding Category five houses. As Kosovo is not the poorest part of the world, Tearfund, like Concern, will be scaling down its programme this year, with direct implementation due to come to an end.

Problem Areas

Despite the general high quality of the Tearfund projects seen, there were a number of problem areas:

Insufficient Support for Some Partners

Tearfund works both directly through the DRT and partners. Partners can range from very experienced and professional partners like MedAir to local partners like VUSh, which have a low level of preparedness. Tearfund acknowledged that it still has to learn how to better manage the interface between working through partners and its own direct operations. Tearfund funded SNI to assist refugees in Macedonia, but the SNI frankly acknowledged that this was a new experience for it and that it had to learn on the job. SNI would have been better placed to help if Tearfund had supplied an experienced relief worker (possibly from Tearfund's own DRT) to guide the SNI staff through the initial stages.

Tearfund needs to consider whether its normal mandate of only working with like-minded partners is always the best way of reaching the poor. In Kosovo, using non-traditional partners allowed Tearfund to execute an effective shelter programme.

Reporting

Tearfund narrative reports were among the best reports submitted by the agencies. They were clear, relatively short and easy to understand. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the financial reports. While they were internally consistent, they did not match the figures provided to the evaluation team by the DEC Secretariat.

PHASE I	Income from DEC	Expenditure or transfers of DEC funds	
DEC grants in Phase I	702,000		
Expenditure reported by Tearfund		417,100	Includes Agrinas project for which about £8,000 remained unspent
Novi Most project		9,000	Work not reported on in either Phase I or 2 reports, but confirmed as spent in Tearfund email.
Retained by Tearfund for Phase II		41,900	The DEC Secretariat refused permission for such transfers for CA
Returned to DEC		234,000	DEC records show this together with £167,500 below
BALANCE	NIL		

PHASE II			
Advanced by DEC Phase II	1,263,600		DEC records
Retained from Phase I	41,900		See Phase I expenditure above
Advanced by DEC Phase IIb	187,200		DEC records
Returned to DEC Phase II		167,500	Shown by DEC as a Phase I return
Expenditure reported by Tearfund for Phase II		529,296	From Tearfund report
Expenditure reported by Tearfund for Phase IIb		500,000	From Tearfund report
BALANCE	295,904		Not reflected in DEC records

While there are no suspicions of any wrong-doing, it would be best practice for Tearfund to ensure that its financial reports are reconciled with the records of the DEC Secretariat. However, it is acknowledged that this problem was not unique to Tearfund. Other agencies also provided financial reports that did not reconcile with the data from the DEC Secretariat.

Personnel Management

A number of interviewees commented that some Tearfund staff were ‘burned-out’ in the emergency phase due to the stress they were under. Tearfund is aware of this problem and are taking steps to prevent it from happening in future.

Cost of Housing

Tearfund funded shelter work by its own DRT, MedAir and SNI in Kosovo. While none of the housing projects are directly comparable, the DRT’s initial housing project was far more expensive than those of its partners. The danger of such comparisons is that they do not always compare like with like, as the costs quoted by NGOs for a specific project may not include the core and overhead costs.

Tearfund have given a reasonable explanation of why these costs were so high in the first phase and why they were so much better in the second phase. However, the evaluation team still considers the costs to have been high when considering the shelter interventions of other partners. On a positive note, Tearfund seems to have learned from its experience and its later housing in Phase IIb⁹⁶ was marginally cheaper than the housing provided by SNI or MedAir in Phase II.

⁹⁶ Phase IIb activities were not formally covered by this evaluation, but the intertwining of Tearfund’s Phase II and Phase IIb operations meant that they should be considered to get a better picture of the Phase IIb work.

SECTION 12: SUMMARY OF WORLD VISION'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

12.1 Mission

World Vision is a Christian relief and development agency. *'Our commitment to the world's poor arises from our desire to follow the teachings of the Bible and the example of Jesus Christ. We are supported by and work with a wide range of churches and individuals from different traditions but we are not affiliated to any particular denomination. We also work closely with members of other faiths and non-religious organisations in many parts of the world and our assistance is always given without any form of discrimination'*.

12.2 Context

World Vision has good knowledge of population and culture from work in Kosovo since 1998 and Bosnia from 1994/95. The Kosovo crisis was unusual for World Vision in that there are relatively few crisis countries now where World Vision does not have development programmes in place before the crisis.

World Vision had no programmes in either Albania or Macedonia before the crisis. It now has a programme in Albania and plans to remain there.

12.3 How World Vision Works

World Vision has about 90 national offices worldwide. Some are independent (with their own trustees etc.), but Romania is the only independent programme in Eastern Europe. The Balkans Programmes are managed by the Middle East and Eastern Europe office in Vienna. World Vision works directly but may also fund local partners. At the time of the Kosovo crisis, World Vision drew emergency staff from its programmes and offices around the world.⁹⁷

12.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

World Vision received 3.66 per cent of the DEC appeal funds, £549,000 in Phase I and £988,200 in Phase II. World Vision's initial response to the emergency was concentrated in Montenegro. It took some time for World Vision to set up in Albania. The Phase I programme concentrated on meeting immediate needs of displaced in Montenegro and of the refugees in Albania. During the NATO bombing World Vision sent food into Kosovo. One consignment was back-packed in for distribution among the displaced; the other went by truck for distribution by the Yugoslav Red Cross.

World Vision recognised that its response in Albania was slow, but its staff accompanied NATO back into Kosovo. World Vision has a large programme in Kosovo, for which shelter and agriculture are very large components.

⁹⁷ WV has now set up emergency teams for each of its three main geographical regions.

12.5 Summary of World Vision's DEC-funded Activities

WV DEC PHASE I					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	World Vision	Sarande	Renovating and equipping a disused fish factory as a collective centre. Also assisting 260 refugees in empty houses in Sarande.	72,480	Refugees returned to Kosovo before project was completed.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				72,480	

WV DEC PHASE I					MONTENEGRO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief	World Vision	Berane	Provision of food kitchens, food, and non-food items to displaced		Provided monthly food voucher to refugees
Public health	Institute of Public health	Berane	Printing a training booklet on basic health for use by care workers with the displaced. Clearing up rubbish dump on edge of camp. Mobilising children to collect rubbish. Distributed hygiene kits		Also provided vehicles for health care workers and built a clinic at the site.
Shelter		Berane	Construction of 30 cottages for displaced. Cottages were ready before the first snow.	460,050	Beneficiaries complain that they were not consulted about design.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				460,050	

WV DEC PHASE I					UK COSTS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Overhead	Self	UK	Headquarters Admin Costs	16,470	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				16,470	

WV DEC PHASE I					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter and relief	Self	Albania	Fish Factory Conversion	72,480	
	Self	Montenegro	Cottages and relief food	460,050	
Overhead	Self	UK	Headquarters Admin Costs	16,470	3% of the sub total.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				549,000	

WV DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Mine Action	Mines Advisory Group	Various	Checking area for mines and booby traps	614,913	Includes £55,535 for MAG's UK overhead.

Shelter	World Vision	Mitrovica	Supplementary materials for shelter kits from UNHCR and USAID.	192,600	To supplement inadequate UNHCR and USAID shelter kits.
		Various	Shelter material for about half the WV staff. Allocation of grants decided by staff committee.	36,276	To allow staff to begin repairs on damaged homes
Support	World Vision	Various	Purchase of trucks and generators	97,340	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				941,129	

WV DEC PHASE II				OFFSHORE OVERHEAD	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Support	World Vision	UK	World Vision Administration	33,047	
		Not given	World Vision Recruitment services	3,401	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				36,448	Does not include £55,535 for MAG's UK support.

WV DEC PHASE II				SUMMARY	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Mine action and shelter	MAG and World Vision	Kosovo	Mine clearance, shelter kits and support services.	941,129	
Support	World Vision	Offshore	Admin and personnel service costs.	36,448	Just over 3% of sub-total.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				977,577	

Total DEC Income:	£1,537,200
Expenditure Phase I:	£549,000
Expenditure Phase II:	£ 988,200
Total Expenditure:	£1,537,200

12.6 Key Issues

Good Practice

World Vision demonstrated a number of examples of good practice:

Learning lessons

As a result of slow mobilisation in a number of crises, including Kosovo, World Vision has now set up Emergency Response Teams of 7 to 8 people, able to deploy at a moment's notice. Before deciding on its approach to emergency preparedness, World Vision analysed its emergency response over the previous three years.

Personnel Management

World Vision has allocated funding for developing the capacity of its own staff in the field. It has already canvassed all departments to identify training needs. The grants for staff to repair their houses were another example of best practice. These were decided by a staff committee drawn exclusively from local staff. World Vision also employed a full-time security officer to visit all sites in Kosovo and advise WV on security. This is particularly important given that World Vision is working in Mitrovica.

Winterisation

Although the Sarande Fish Factory was never needed, it was best practice for World Vision to begin developing this as a winterised structure so that it would be ready for the Balkans winter.

Problem Areas

Despite these good points, there were a number of issues of concern in the World Vision programme:

Overhead Costs

The draft DEC handbook allows agencies to charge 7.5 per cent of their actual costs for administrative costs.⁹⁸ World Vision only charges 3 per cent for its UK overhead costs but MAG charged about 10 per cent of its total programme cost⁹⁹ for UK overhead.

In all about 45 per cent of World Vision's Phase II funding went on capital items and overhead.¹⁰⁰ The whole advantage of DEC funds is that they are flexible and can be used for the costs that other donors do not cover, such as overhead and capital items. However, such a large proportion of the funds going on these items seems disproportionate.

⁹⁸ Confusingly, the Handbook allows funding agencies to add 8.5 per cent of their overseas programme cost for the calculation of the total cost of their overseas programmes for the capacity indicator calculation.

⁹⁹ It was only 7 per cent of the original budget, but expenditure was significantly less than originally estimated, partly because only three Mine Action Teams were fielded instead of four.

¹⁰⁰ The shelter materials for WV staff is treated as an overhead cost because this was intended in part to improve the retention of staff at a time when World Vision was having problems retaining staff. It was essentially a type of staff bonus, and not directly related to the DEC funded programme activities.

Insufficient own resources to properly supplement inadequate kits from the donors

World Vision took on a very large shelter commitment but despite the best efforts of its staff, it proved difficult to meet all the needs for roofing timber.¹⁰¹ Many agencies commented on the inadequacy of the roofing kits provided by the major donors. Supplementing inadequate donor provision is one of the features that separate NGOs from contractors. It might have been better for World Vision to limit its roofing programme to the level where it could meet these additional needs from its own resources.

Cottages in Montenegro

World Vision constructed cottages in Berane for Serb IDPs from Kosovo. This work will continue in Phase III with cottages for Roma IDPs. The cottages are intended to last five to ten years and are expensive compared with shelter work in Kosovo. But it seems likely that these IDPs will not be returning home in the near future and, indeed, there is an argument that permanent accommodation would have been more appropriate. However the unit cost would have been even higher and this approach might not have been acceptable to the local authorities and UNHCR, although the cottages are next door to much better permanent accommodation for earlier Serb refugees from the Krajina and Bosnia.

Again on the grounds of cost, the cottages do not have individual bathrooms — there are communal blocks. The beneficiaries were not consulted about the design of the accommodation and it was noted that many came from urban or town situations in Kosovo.¹⁰²

The cottages, which are of timber construction, have been built very close to each other and there seems no doubt there is potential fire risk.

This project underlines the dilemmas of providing shelter for long-term IDPs in the region.

Discrimination against the Roma?

World Vision is providing special classes for children (both displaced and local) at a community centre in Berane. However only one Roma child has been registered, even though there are many Roma IDPs. The evaluation team was told that this was because '*Roma children were not interested*' and that '*Roma children can only attend if they are clean*' (Watson, 2000). This raises the question of the impartiality of this project, but should be seen in the light of World Vision's wider commitment to working with the Roma in Montenegro and issues such as language, which inhibit school attendance.

Recovery of Capital Assets from Mine Action programme

Under the terms of its contract, MAG was obliged to return all the vehicles, radios and computers purchased for the Mine Clearance Programme to World Vision at the end of the six month project. World Vision agreed an extension to the end of June 2000 to allow MAG to implement an ECHO-funded mine action project, but are insisting that the assets be handed over then for use on other (unspecified) World Vision projects in Kosovo.^{103,104} MAG

¹⁰¹ World Vision Shelter Report

¹⁰² WV has pointed out that the deadlines of oncoming winter and DEC expenditure within six months made consultation impracticable.

¹⁰³ Interview with MAG Kosovo, April 2000.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with World Vision Kosovo, March 2000.

understood from World Vision that such a recovery of capital assets from partners was a DEC requirement.¹⁰⁵ The UN's mine coordination center is concerned that the removal of capital assets from MAG will severely restrict mine action in Mitrovica, as MAG is the only mine action agency now working there.¹⁰⁶ When the evaluation team queried World Vision about this matter, it was told that the plan had changed and MAG would be able to retain the assets for use in mine action¹⁰⁷. However, it subsequently emerged that MAG were informed that it would still have to surrender the assets at the end of June.¹⁰⁸ A further query from the evaluation team yielded the information that World Vision intended to recover the capital equipment, but stated that if that happened World Vision would make sure that the recovery of any assets did not unduly reduce MAG's capacity.

MAG entered into the agreement with World Vision fully aware of the requirement to return the assets at the end of the project, but may have expected that the project would continue. World Vision is completely free to impose such conditions on the partners it funds as it see fit.

MAG did very little clearance during the first six-month project. It took some months to train the teams and they were not working long before winter set in, further limiting the work that could be done. CARE's approach to Mine Action (bringing in a contractor) was much more effective in the short term, but World Vision's approach (using MAG to build local mine action capacity) could be more cost-effective in the long run. World Vision gave this as the reason for deciding to use an NGO rather than a contractor. However, recovering the capital assets from MAG now, at a stage when donors are starting to lose interest making it very difficult for MAG to find funding to cover such capital items, threatens the continued existence of the mine action capacity that has been developed by MAG.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Interview and later telecon with MAG UK.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with UNMACC Kosovo, April 2000.

¹⁰⁷ E-mail from World Vision, UK

¹⁰⁸ Telecon with MAG, UKSS

¹⁰⁹ World Vision has informed the evaluation team that the question of assets has been settled to the satisfaction of both parties (e-mail 23/6/00).

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Please also refer to Appendix 11 in Volume 1 for a list of background documents.

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