

Learning Review of the cooperation between the Government of the Philippines and humanitarian actors in their response to Typhoon Yolanda

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List of acronyms

AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CFW	Confederation of Filipino Workers
CMCoord	Civil-Military Coordination
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DA	Department of Agriculture
DBM	Department of Budget and Management
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DOH	Department of Health
DOST	Department of Science and Technology
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department of the European Commission
FAiTH	Foreign Assistance Transparency Hub
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GHD	Good Humanitarian Donorship
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LDRRMC	Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
LGU	Local Government Unit
MIRA	Multi Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment
MPDO	Municipal Planning and Development Office
MSWDO	Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office
NDCC	National Disaster Coordinating Council
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NEDA	National Economic and Development Authority
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
OSS	One-Stop Shop

PCA	Philippine Coconut Authority
PDRRMO	Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction Management Office
PDEA	Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
PNP	Philippine National Police
PRC	Philippine Red Cross
SAR	Search and Rescue
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

1. Executive summary

Typhoon Yolanda (internationally known as Haiyan), the strongest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines, made landfall in Central Philippines on 8 November 2013. A total of 16 million people were affected. Given the scale of the disaster and the humanitarian impact, President Aquino issued Presidential Proclamation No 682 on 11 November 2013, indicating that the country would accept international assistance. As a result, domestic authorities and international responders mounted a massive emergency operation. This review was carried out from 6 to 16 May 2014 by the Disaster Response Dialogue to capture lessons from the ongoing humanitarian response in terms of cooperation between the Government of the Philippines and international responders.

Trust and attitudes

The response operation was facilitated by a remarkably high level of mutual trust among international responders and Philippines authorities. However, some difficulties were raised, including frequent turnover of international responders and the replacement of known interlocutors with new surge personnel unfamiliar with the context. To address this in future operations, international organisations and donors should consider whether it is possible to maintain an operational role for permanent country delegation staff and seeking out surge staff with previous relationships in the country.

Coordination

At national level, the degree of cooperation between the government and humanitarian actors in the cluster system was seen as very positive – both in terms of preparedness prior to the disaster and during the operation. However, governmental officials did not appear to exercise the same level of leadership in sub-national humanitarian clusters due in part to a lack of prior preparation or use of the mechanisms in the affected regions. Also, the gap between the government's understanding of clusters and the implementation of the system by the IASC has contributed to some level of confusion. The large number of cluster meetings stretched already scarce government resources in the operation. In light of the scale of the response, several government officials at the national level expressed the difficulty to properly monitor the humanitarian assistance.

The civil-military coordination during the response was very successful. This is due to the fact that personnel with previous disaster response experiences and connections with major players expedited interagency and transnational relief efforts.

On the whole, the impression gained by this review is that the Philippines' experiment of importing the cluster concept into national procedures, and of clearly integrating national and international efforts in this way, did contribute to improving coordination and mutual trust in the response to Typhoon Yolanda, though some operational refinements are still needed for it to function as intended at the field level.

Facilitation and regulation

Entry of personnel, goods and equipment was remarkably rapid thanks in large part to “one-stop shops” (OSS) established for this purpose bringing together representatives of relevant departments for rapid processing. Moreover, in-country regulatory issues that have plagued large operations in other countries, such as issues of taxation of international relief responders and difficulties in NGO registration, were avoided in Haiyan thanks to significant flexibility by relevant officials.

On the other hand, some concerns were raised concerning how thoroughly existing governmental mechanisms were able to supervise of the quality of international relief items and interventions. , Some quality problems were indeed reported, though they were not as overwhelming in number as has been in the case in some prior disasters of this magnitude in other parts of the world.

Other governments should certainly draw on this experience and consider establishing mechanisms like the OSS for rapidly processing incoming relief consignments.

It is also recommended that the Philippines Government consider gathering and codifying the OSS and other ad-hoc facilitation procedures used in Haiyan, as part of its review of the 2010 disaster management act. This review may also consider how to ensure full oversight of incoming aid while maintaining the capacity to act rapidly. The Philippines Red Cross and IFRC are completing a more thorough study of existing Philippine legislation and procedures that may be of use in this regard.

Transparency of funding

Significant resources were available globally for the emergency phase through the Strategic Response Plan (\$462 million received to date) and with more than \$300 million received outside the scope of the SRP.

The government introduced the Foreign Assistance Transparency Hub (FAiTH) to track the financing support. FAiTH was established very quickly and is a valuable contribution to greater transparency. Like OCHA’s Financial Tracking System, a limitation of FAiTH is that it does not allow to monitor how funding has been used.

Emergency preparedness for managing international disaster response

Poorer municipalities, which are the most vulnerable to disasters, often have insufficient resources for preparedness activities and therefore also lack preparedness for managing international assistance. There are some good examples of international support to emergency preparedness at local level, however, it remains relatively ad hoc. Emergency preparedness support from international actors would benefit from more systematic efforts, in cooperation with NDRRMC at national and local level. This should also be a priority of donors and the international community in other countries facing major disaster risks.

2. Introduction

This learning review, conducted between 6 and 16 May 2014 in close cooperation with the Government of the Philippines, was prepared by the Disaster Response Dialogue, a platform convened by OCHA, the Swiss Government (SDC), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in 2011. The Disaster Response Dialogue brings together governments and humanitarian organizations involved in international disaster response to improve trust and mutual cooperation. It offers a facilitated space in which issues of concern can be identified and discussed openly and honestly, leading to practical solutions. Along with its four conveners, an Advisory Group of permanent Mission representatives in Geneva provides strategic guidance to the dialogue. Further information on the dialogue can be found here: www.drdinitiative.org

Following a first meeting in 2011, the Disaster Response Dialogue is organising a global conference in Manila on 11-12 September 2014, hosted by the Government of the Philippines, with a view to agreeing on concrete actions for improving cooperation between governments and humanitarian organisations. It is expected that the findings and recommendations that emerge from this learning review will contribute to the discussions at that conference.

3. Methodology

The primary purpose of this learning review is to capture lessons from the ongoing humanitarian response in terms of the cooperation between the Government of the Philippines and international responders. It does not review the effectiveness of the response itself which is covered by a range of other recent or planned evaluation processes. However, it is well documented that good coordination of all actors contributes to more timely and effective humanitarian responses.

The findings and recommendations are based on key informant interviews with over 130 senior government officials and senior staffs from humanitarian organisations at local and national levels (see annex I), as well as a review of existing data and relevant documents (see annex II). It is worth noting that many of our findings and recommendations are consistent with earlier studies and evaluations conducted in the Philippines. When this is the case, references to earlier work are mentioned in the report. As part of the review, the team visited Region VI (Roxas, Estancia, Concepcion, and Iloilo), Region VII (Cebu) and Region VIII (Tacloban, Borongan and Guiuan).

The learning review was guided by the following questions:

Preparedness

- How effective were emergency preparedness measures, as understood in the comprehensive National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan?
- How extensive and clear were existing and ad hoc procedures for the facilitation and oversight of the international disaster relief (entry of relief personnel, goods and equipment, visa, customs, clearance, tax exemption, etc.)?

Coordination and Facilitation

- How effectively were the relevant governmental departments able to exercise a leadership role with regard to the international operation, particularly regarding the facilitation of the entry and deployment of international relief?
- What was the particular experience of the government in coordinating in-coming assistance from other governments?
- How effective was the coordination between the government and humanitarian actors, both at capital and field levels and what are the key elements that made it work?
- What was the degree of cooperation between the government and humanitarian actors in the particular areas of needs identification, prioritisation and emergency appeals?

Quality control and Coverage

- How well was the government able to oversee the quality and appropriateness of international relief efforts and correct any problems?
- Were there significant gaps in terms of unmet needs or particular areas/populations that have been excluded? Was there duplication of efforts? If so, what are the reasons?
- What were the efforts to ensure transparency and accountability of resource allocations? How were financial flows monitored, from the initial financial contributions to the point of delivery?
- To what extent do financial resources contribute to building up local response mechanisms?

The preliminary findings and recommendations were presented and discussed on 16th May at a debriefing session co-hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Office of Civil Defense, and the Department of Social Welfare and Development. It was attended by the Philippines National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) members as well as humanitarian cluster co-lead representatives.

4. Context

Typhoon Yolanda (internationally known as Haiyan), the strongest typhoon ever to hit the Philippines, made landfall in Central Philippines on Friday, 8 November 2013, with winds of up to 230 km/h and gusts reaching 315 km/h. It made initial landfall in Guiuan (Eastern Samar), cutting across Samar, Leyte, Cebu, Bantayan, Panay and northern Palawan, before heading out to sea, west of the Philippines.

The humanitarian impact of the typhoon was massive, due to the deadly combination of powerful winds, heavy rain and tsunami-like storm surges which wiped out a number of coastal towns and cities, most notably Tacloban and communities along the coast south of Tacloban on Eastern Leyte. Access to the worst-affected communities proved near impossible in the first week following the disaster. Interviewees consistently highlighted that they had never seen this scale of disaster in their lifespan. Despite many steps taken in advance to prepare, many communities were overwhelmed by the scale of Typhoon Yolanda.

In addition to its own massive destruction, Typhoon Yolanda was remarkable for arriving on the heels of a quick succession of major disasters, with Tropical Storm Sendong in Region X at the end of 2011, Typhoon Pablo in Regions XI and XIII in Dec 2012, Tropical Storm Labuyo in Region III in August 2013, the Zamboanga Crisis in September 2013, and the Bohol Earthquake in October 2013. Even before Yolanda struck, therefore, there was significant stress on national and regional capacity, and there had been very limited time between disasters for preparedness activities.

According to a NDRRMC report of 13 December 2013, a total of 3.4 million families (16 million people) were directly affected by Typhoon Haiyan in 12,122 barangays (villages/wards) across 44 provinces in 591 municipalities and 57 cities. Given the scope of the disaster and the corresponding intervention required, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Proclamation No 682 on 11 November 2013, declaring a state of national calamity, and indicated that the country would accept international assistance. As a result, a massive emergency operation by the authorities and international partners took place, focusing initially on food relief, health and shelter, as well as the provision of clean water where needed.

On 12 November 2013, the UN launched a \$301 million “flash appeal”, covering an initial period of six months, to respond to the typhoon. In mid-December, this was followed by a one-year “Strategic Response Plan” requesting \$788 million (of which 59% has been funded to date). This was intended to support the Government’s strategic plan, amounting to some \$8.17 billion over four years to guide the recovery and reconstruction in the affected areas. 30% of the funding received for the Strategic Response Plan, \$462 million, was allocated to food security and agriculture, 16.1% to emergency shelter, 13.3% to WASH, 10.7% to health 6.9% to early recovery and livelihood, etc.

As of 18 June 2014, total funding to the emergency reached to \$820 million including all contributions – cash, in-kind, bilateral and multilateral – for the response. 24.3% of the funding came from private (individuals and organizations), 14.7% from the UK, 10.8% from the USA, 10.6% from

allocation of unearmarked funding by UN agencies, 7.8% from Canada and 7.5 % from Japan, etc. In addition, the Asian Development Bank provides \$23 million grants.

The learning review, which focuses on the international response to Typhoon Yolanda, took place at a time when immediate humanitarian needs are diminishing, thanks to the combined efforts of government authorities and humanitarian actors. Both national and international actors were planning the transition to longer-term recovery and development as a matter of priority, to ensure that the needs of affected populations are supported beyond the emergency response.

5. Findings and Recommendations

5.1. Trust and attitudes

5.1.1 Findings

International discussions held in the context of the Disaster Response Dialogue over the last few years have highlighted that while procedures, systems and regulations are important for successful international cooperation, intangibles such as mutual trust, collaborative attitudes, and personal relationships may be even more critical.

In the context of Typhoon Yolanda, many interviewees reported a remarkably cooperative spirit, both among international responders and domestic authorities. For example:

- It was pointed out that the attitude of Philippine authorities toward international disaster cooperation has become progressively more open over the course of recent disasters.
- In the context of this review (as in other lessons learned), officials often demonstrated a sincere gratitude and appreciation for international support efforts.
- One provincial official pronounced his cooperation with international responders after Yolanda “the best thing that ever happened – it showed that any task can be accomplished if we work together. With open hearts, you can achieve.”
- A number of officials also emphasized their respect for the independence of humanitarian organizations, stating that they would not want to “put a political colour” on the aid by insisting that it be funnelled through their offices.
- Officials have likewise demonstrated their willingness to engage in real dialogue with humanitarian organizations on politically sensitive issues (like the question of the “no build zones” declared along coastal areas) and to generously lend their time to international evaluation processes (as they have done for the current and a number of other lessons learning processes).

For their part, many international responders interviewed for this report:

- emphasized their respect for the work of domestic authorities and civil society to meet humanitarian needs caused by Yolanda.
- stated their intention to work in accordance with domestic leadership; and many demonstrated this in the preparedness and response phases by reaching out to authorities.
- expressed their gratitude for steps taken by officials to facilitate their efforts and to provide facilities, such as use of meeting/living space, use of trucks, etc.

Of course, some negative notes were also reported. For example:

- Some local officials reportedly perceived foreign responders as “high paid consultants using the disaster to make money” or otherwise acting in self-serving ways.
- It was pointed out that, in some cases, personnel from local delegations with whom officials had developed relationships were not given a major role in their own agencies’ response operations, so that officials had to deal with unknown individuals who were unfamiliar with local approaches. Likewise, authorities expressed that the frequent turnover of short tenure international responders made relationship-building difficult.
- Some local civil society members saw international actors as uniquely intent on delivering items and uninterested in consulting with the communities about their own views.
- A number of responders (as well as domestic interviewees) also perceived a strong potential for local government unit (LGU) officials to manipulate beneficiary lists for political reasons.
- Some responders felt that the government was taking a back seat and allowing international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to do its work. Conversely, a number of interviewees stated that media reporting, implying that all assistance was international, was very unfair to the significant efforts being undertaken by government agencies and local civil society and served to demoralise staff.

However, while not immune from the kinds of tensions experienced in large operations in other parts of the world, there appears to have been a comparatively high level of mutual trust in this operation and interviews gave the impression that this mutual trust was an important asset in the response.

5.1.2 Recommendations

Globally:

- Other governments should draw on the experience of Philippines authorities, whose increasingly open attitude to working together with international partners strengthened the joint response to Typhoon Yolanda.
- Humanitarians should continue to cultivate a respectful and cooperative attitude and approach with all relevant authorities.

- Because trust is personal and local knowledge is a key asset, international organizations and donors should consider for the advantages of using permanent country delegation staff in major relief operations and, where possible, to deploy surge staff with previous knowledge and relationships in the country.

5.2. Coordination

5.2.1 Findings

Pre-positioning

The advantages of pre-positioning of relief assets and personnel was mentioned by respondents both at national and local levels. The pre-deployment of a five member of the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team one day before the Typhoon struck was seen as positive. Some suggested that an even more robust pre-positioning could have been envisaged, such as already starting the movement of international logistics support (e.g. aircraft), supplies and search and rescue (SAR) teams prior to landfall, but without putting assets/personnel directly in the likely path of the typhoon.

Needs assessment

While it was reported that information about needs was freely shared between domestic and international responders, needs assessments were largely carried out separately, with some degree of repetition. Barangay and municipal authorities developed lists, which were generally then “validated” by separate needs assessments by international actors. Some officials expressed concerns over the publication of inter-agency needs assessments without cross-checking with relevant government authorities. The IASC Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) conducted in November 2013 successfully informed the international relief operations, but with relatively limited input from the government.

Targeting

There was a strong feeling articulated by respondents in Region VI and especially Region VII that the needs in their regions were rather forgotten by the international community in comparison to the overwhelming response to Region VIII, though they recognized that the largest proportion of damage was felt in the latter region. In particular, attention was largely focused on Tacloban and areas immediately adjacent. Remote locations, particularly island barangays that were difficult to access, were also underserved.

In all three regions surveyed, there were reports that some foreign and local NGOs had arranged their assistance directly with barangay captains without coordination with municipal or provincial authorities, leading to duplications of service in some barangays and others left unserved. While many respondents, including several government officials, saw it important as an aspect of

humanitarian independence that humanitarian organizations distribute their aid directly and take responsibility for their own beneficiary selection, it was nevertheless asserted that all reasonable efforts should be made to coordinate with relevant authorities.

Cluster coordination¹

Pursuant to Circular No. 5-2007 of 2007, the Philippines National Disaster Coordinating Council (since replaced by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council) established a system of “clusters” for preparing and responding to disasters in the Philippines. This system was based upon, and was designed to incorporate, the international humanitarian cluster approach adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee in 2005. The circular identifies domestic and international co-leads (since modified on several occasions) and mandates that clusters should be established at the national, regional and provincial levels.

National clusters

At the national level, the degree of cooperation between the government and humanitarian actors in the cluster system was generally seen as strong, contributing substantially both in the preparedness and response phases for Yolanda. The clusters built joint understanding, personal relationships and cemented understanding of the (rather elaborate) national disaster risk management systems described in the Philippines disaster risk management act (Republic Act 10121 of 2010), and associated documents. The national clusters also reportedly served as an effective means of sharing information and engaging in potentially sensitive dialogues (e.g. around concerns about whether government-supplied bunkhouses for displaced persons met international standards).

There were differences among clusters as to the success in cementing governmental-humanitarian links. This is partly due to the number of counterparts involved: for some clusters, like health, food security and protection, the relationship was facilitated by the presence of a single and similarly focussed government counterpart, whereas it is more difficult for some others that have multiple government counterparts. Even with a dedicated cluster, it was reported that early planning and decision making for “early recovery and livelihoods” proved challenging both for the government and international responders.

Sub-national clusters

Operational coordination hubs were newly established by OCHA after the typhoon in Regions VI, VII and VIII. In Region VI, this was centred around the incident command centre located at the Cadiz Provincial Governor’s Hall in Roxas. In Region VII, it was located in Cebu City and interfaced with the “Paglig-on (Resilience) Task Force,” established by the Governor to coordinate the provincial response in Cebu. In Region VIII, three operational coordination hubs were located in Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan.

¹ See Save the Children (2013) report which identifies consistent cluster coordination challenges in previous disaster responses in the Philippines

Sub-national humanitarian clusters were established at the operational level at each of these hubs². The amount and success of government interface in the operation of these clusters and inter-cluster coordination was different in each of these locations, affected by varying issues such as capacities of local government staff, their level of trauma from the typhoon, lack of facilities and data support, etc. In many cases, it was reported that local government staffs were not previously knowledgeable of the humanitarian cluster system and not in a position to confidently and competently lead the clusters when first established, although they became aware and mostly supportive of the cluster system after OCHA training several months later and through their own experience during the response.

Ormoc and Roxas were both good examples of co-locating government and humanitarian actors in the same office space. This was credited for supporting especially strong coordination between all responders and with a positive impact on operations.

Sub-national clusters were reportedly not primarily used to have strategic discussions, but mainly for information sharing and to avoid some duplication. Some concerns were raised about the level of information sharing between the Paglig-on Task Force and clusters in Region VII. The importance of strong cooperation between government and humanitarians through the cluster approach was highlighted, for instance to ensure national laws are known and abided by, or waivers provided as deemed appropriate, thus ensuring no harm in the longer term (e.g. licencing of chainsaws to control possible use later in illegal logging).

There was confusion from some as to whether governmental “clusters” were expected to function separately from the humanitarian clusters in which international actors participated. Most government officials noted that they saw the value in engaging in the cluster system as a way to access information, and on occasion to address particular concerns. However, an issue that was raised repeatedly and at all levels was the large number of meetings, often requiring the same scarce government resources to attend.

Circular No. 5-2007 appears to contemplate that clusters at national, regional and provincial levels are to be permanent structures. However, it appears that not much preparatory work had been done to establish regional clusters in the Visayas. It is unclear whether it is practicable to maintain clusters in each region /province as a preparedness tool on a permanent basis, although this has been very successful in Manila, inasmuch as international agency co-leads do not have permanent representatives in each region.

Moreover, as implemented in the Yolanda response, cluster hubs were located close to the centre of operations, and were not always accessible to regional and/or provincial officials from the government who expected to take part in them (for example in Region VIII in Eastern Samar, clusters were based in Guiuan Municipality which became de facto the centre for coordination in the Province. The travel distance from the provincial capital made it difficult for provincial authorities to

² See OCHA Philippines (2014) for outcomes from five sub-national cluster setup workshops held in January 2014

engage in cluster coordination, which was primarily done with municipal participation). This difference between the government's understanding of clusters and the implementation of the system by the IASC has contributed to some level of confusion, as there was insufficient mutual understanding on how both approaches should interact with each other. Additional confusion was also reported as to the expected relationship of humanitarian clusters with the new rehabilitation clusters recently announced by OPARR. However, there is less confusion now that OPARR is present on the ground, but confusion still existed in the field at the time of this review.

Nevertheless, on the whole, the impression gained by this review is that the Philippines' experiment of importing the cluster concept into national procedures, and of clearly integrating national and international efforts in this way, was successful in improving coordination and mutual trust in the response to Typhoon Yolanda. In light of this, other governments may wish to consider a similar step. Within the Philippines, it would be desirable to consider whether to further solidify the approach during the planned review of Act 10121 (where clusters are not currently mentioned).

Governmental leadership

Numerous individual examples of strong governmental leadership over the international response were voiced by stakeholders, including local, provincial, regional and national officials. As noted above, however, this leadership was not always expressed through the cluster system and there was significant variation, particularly between various LGUs, as to the degree of leadership exercised.

Although the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan lists DSWD as the lead agency for "well-established disaster response operations" under the theme of response, the structure of national authority for disaster risk management is oriented to a committee approach. This means that there are multiple focal agencies for international actors at the national level.

With regard to leadership between the levels of government, under Section 15 of Republic Act 10121 on DRRM, the lead role for responding to a disaster is set at progressively higher levels of government depending on how many jurisdictions are affected (e.g. more than one barangay, more than one municipality, more than one province). In the event that a disaster affects more than one region, the lead is assigned to the NDRRMC. The section also states that the "NDRRMC and intermediary Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMCs) shall always act as support to LGUs which have the primary responsibility as first disaster responders." Thus, despite the NDRRMC lead role in a national emergency like Yolanda, the lower LDRRMCs and their respective LGUs, retained important roles, the beginning and end of which were not always clear to international responders. This raised frustration for some of them as to where to report and to whom to turn with issues. It also raised particular frustration for mayors and municipal authorities, who often felt left out. Some mayors and municipal personnel nevertheless exercised strong coordination roles, which were much appreciated by international responders.

Monitoring

Several government officials at the national level cited the difficulty to properly monitor humanitarian assistance. In some municipalities, mayors were able to gather systematic information from international responders about their programmes and plans. Others however, reported that they lacked the capacity, particularly in transport, IT and communications, to keep track adequately, particularly after being impacted themselves by Yolanda. Some of them relied heavily on NGOs for data collection. Even the DSWD, which had the strongest overall oversight function, indicated that it did not necessarily have a full picture of international programming and particularly of the amount of international assistance provided (as discussed further below). International organisations were recognized for their capacity in terms of conducting assessment processes and generating data with relevant methodology and equipment, which provided very useful information in a context where much local data was lost as a result of the typhoon. Sharing of data and information between partners, particularly governments, needs to account for limited computer/internet resources, especially after a typhoon.

Civil Military Coordination³

The Armed Forces of the Philippines, together with those from 21 other countries, provided significant assistance in the first two months of the response, consisting of various air, naval, medical, engineering and communications capacity. At the peak of the operation, thousands of foreign military personnel were deployed to the disaster area and worked closely with the humanitarian community. OCHA set up its largest sustained CMCoord operation. Many humanitarian and military leaders noted that the civil military coordination during the Yolanda response was some of the best they had seen. Key lessons learned from previous disasters improved the speed and quality of overall interagency coordination. A key point noted was that personnel with previous disaster response experience who had personal connections with other major players in the relief efforts considerably expedited interagency and transnational relief efforts. The informal professional networks among relief workers built during common training and exercising facilitated the trust needed for effective and efficient cooperation particularly early in the response phase.

5.2.2 Recommendations

Nationally:

- Within the Philippines, there needs to be more education and planning at the regional and provincial level about how to use clusters as a coordination tool, targeting the most disaster-prone areas. Alternatively, government officials experienced in cluster coordination could be deployed to support coordination at local level when emergencies occur.

³ See Center for Excellence (2014) “lessons from civil-military disaster management and humanitarian response to Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)” which closely corresponds with recommendations from the After Action Review on this aspect of the response; see also IASC (2014) “Operational Peer Review”.

- There is also a need to clarify the expected relationship between the humanitarian clusters and the new rehabilitation clusters initiated by the OPARR for LGUs and international partners in Yolanda-affected regions. LGUs should be supported to include protocols for coordinating international and civil society responders in disaster settings in their contingency planning.
- There is a need to review current Philippines Government policy on the cluster approach, analyse and align it in all phases of DRRM (including mitigation, preparedness and rehabilitation, not just response) at all levels (national, regional, provincial and municipal).
- The sunset review of Republic Act 10121 should consider further institutionalisation of the humanitarian cluster system, thereby removing some current confusion on cluster co-lead arrangements, and increasing awareness on the use of the cluster system at regional, provincial and municipal levels. In addition, it could also consider triggers for the provision of humanitarian assistance in situations of sudden-onset, large scale emergencies.

Globally:

- More significant pre-positioning should be considered on a no regret basis from both national and international actors in similar situations of impending large-scale disaster.
- Drawing on the Philippine experience, other governments should consider institutionalising a robust coordination mechanism, like the clusters, which thoroughly integrates international and domestic actors in major disaster response operations. Depending on local circumstances, these might be activated only in the event of a disaster or remain permanently in existence for purposes of joint planning and preparedness activities.
- Operational centres combining co-location of temporary office space and coordination meetings for both domestic and international responders, like the ones in Roxas City and Ormoc, should be replicated in the Philippines and elsewhere.

5.3. Facilitation and regulation

5.3.1 Findings

Entry of personnel, goods and equipment

International responders generally reported very smooth entry procedures for their personnel. There was some unevenness as to whether diplomatic-style visas were provided (including to NGOs) or entry was allowed visa-free as “tourists” for a shorter period, but this did not appear to cause substantial problems. A few individual cases of delay were also noted for nationals of certain

countries not normally eligible for visa-free entry. Overall, however, the procedure was remarkably light.

Likewise, thanks in large part to the “one-stop shops” (OSS) established at the Manila Ninoy Aquino and Mactan airports in Manila and Cebu City pursuant to NDRRMC Memorandum Order No. 707-2013 and Customs Memorandum Order No 8-2013, the entry of relief goods and equipment and the provision of duty and tax exemptions was generally reported to be extremely rapid, notwithstanding a very large volume of incoming shipments.⁴ In a few cases (in particular from bilateral donors), delays were caused by the lack of required documents (the number of which was not greatly reduced under the OSS procedure, although processing was much more rapid), leading in turn to fees for demurrage and storage (due to private entities). Even with the waiver of the main duties and taxes, moreover, some minor fees (for import processing and container security) were still due from importers. Upon objection to these from some, customs officers in Cebu reported covering the fees from their own pockets.

While most shipments were speeded through, there were some cases of refusal. In the midst of the response operation, used clothing was not allowed to be shipped, and a number of shipments failing to heed this decision were seized. Some shipments of foreign medications were also found not to be compliant with domestic law and not allowed to be imported. In general, however, controls were loose, with reportedly no inspections at the Cebu OSS (though the Manila OSS continued with its normal practices for inspection).

OSS operators in Cebu reported that full guidance for the operation of the OSS was not available until several weeks into the operation, leading to some improvisation. It is noteworthy that taxes and duties waived on behalf of bilateral partners and humanitarian organizations were systematically charged against the budget of DSWD (or, in some cases, other line agencies with responsibility for regulation of a particular item, e.g. the Department of Health for medications). DSWD also reported having to cover demurrage and storage fees incurred on international goods that were consigned to it.

Although Customs Memorandum Order 8-2013 provided that only organizations registered by DSWD would be eligible for tax exemptions, a decision was made by the Secretary of DSWD to waive this requirement for the first two months, in order to avoid imposing any barrier to incoming relief. Several interviewees felt that a slightly higher level of control over incoming goods should be exercised in future disasters.

As in many other past emergencies around the world, some bilateral partners were quite insistent with regard to offers of certain types of support that domestic authorities did not feel were needed.

⁴ The Bureau of Customs reported that the volume of relief flights and ships received in Cebu during the disaster response, including some 710 aerial shipment and 33 ships, was extraordinary, approaching ten times normal volumes. The OSS reportedly cleared most of shipments within several hours.

Regulation in-country

Existing laws and regulations in the Philippines do not clearly assign a single agency or official with overall responsibility to supervise the quality of international relief and rehabilitation efforts, though various national departments have authorities within their sectors (e.g. for controlling food safety) and the various DRRMCs may be said to have supervisory functions over operations in their jurisdictions. It was not immediately clear to interviewees which, if any, level of government would be competent to receive complaints about the quality of international projects from citizens, though, in practice, some complaints were made to municipal authorities.

With regard to foreign medical teams, “peacetime” procedures contemplated for the recognition of foreign medical qualifications set out in Joint Administrative Order 2009-0030 (“Revised Policies and Guidelines in the Conduct of Foreign Surgical and Medical Missions in the Country”) were relaxed to facilitate quick entry and operation a significant number of teams from different parts of the world. Reportedly, over 150 foreign teams entered the country. While most were considered to provide vital support, the team also heard reports of a number providing substandard care, coordinating poorly with authorities and the Health Cluster, and lacking self-sufficiency in terms of personal supplies and necessary equipment and medications. These types of teams were seen as a burden on their host communities.

In general, interviewees indicated that the international relief items provided were thought to be of good quality. However, some problems of inappropriate relief goods were reported by the participants, such as rice that bore an unpleasant odour, the delivery of inappropriate used clothing, and organizations that gave incomplete help, such as providing only some of the necessary materials to construct fishing boats or homes.

As in other big disasters, some organizations without previous experience in emergencies (such as tourism agencies, community and church groups) sent personnel to the field. Such organizations were found not to be knowledgeable about the Sphere Handbook standards leading, for instance, to construction of shelters that were much too small and inadequately consulted with beneficiaries (this was also raised in the context of government-provided bunkhouses for some displaced persons and there was a difference of opinion on the degree to which the sphere standards should be followed – particularly with regard to the space provided). Complaints were raised by some authorities about cash for work (CFW) programmes undertaken by some international responders, which they found to be higher than the prevailing local wage (and therefore impacting on local labour markets). On the other hand, ILO raised concerns with the government and other organisations about the payment of CFW without insurances.

On the whole, the impression provided was that incompetent and substandard assistance was provided by only a minority of international responders after Typhoon Yolanda and that it did not create the same degree of harm or indignation that it has in other recent large-scale operations.

Review opportunity

As mentioned above a “sunset” review of the Philippines’ national disaster risk management act was already contemplated for this period when it was adopted in 2010. In addition, in light of the experience of Hurricane Yolanda, authorities were undertaking an “executive review” of other procedures, circulars, etc. related to disaster response.

In this connection, and following on the specific endorsement in the Implement Rules and Regulations of the 2010 Act of the “Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international disaster relief and initial recovery assistance” (IDRL Guidelines) of 2007,⁵ the Philippines Red Cross and IFRC launched a project last year to assist the authorities to thoroughly examine existing laws and procedures for international response. A detailed report of the findings of that review is currently being finalized. It should also be mentioned that a bill is already pending in the Philippines’ House of Representatives to integrate many of the recommendations of the IDRL Guidelines into a new act.

5.3.2 Recommendations

Nationally:

- In the context of the sunset review, the executive review, and the discussion about the currently pending legislation, Philippine authorities should consider codifying key aspects of the various ad hoc procedures developed to facilitate the entry and operation of international relief personnel, goods and equipment - potentially in a single legal instrument like the bill currently pending in the House of Representatives, and consider also filling any existing gaps in regulation. It is recommended that this instrument ensure that duties and taxes of relief consignments by eligible organizations be foregone rather than charged against governmental departments unless consigned to them.
- Philippine authorities should consider developing somewhat more detailed guidelines on the operation of the OSS for use in future disasters, including a rapid evaluation process for organizations not yet registered with DSWD.
- Philippines authorities should consider developing clearer mechanisms – potentially through the clusters – for ongoing monitoring of the quality of international assistance to guard against egregious cases of substandard aid. In particular, consideration should be given to stronger oversight procedures for foreign medical teams, potentially included pre-screening using criteria currently being developed by the WHO at the global level.

⁵ The IDRL Guidelines are designed to assist states to develop domestic rules and procedures for managing incoming disaster assistance. They were based on research and consultations undertaken by the IFRC over a period of 6 years. They were adopted by the state parties to the Geneva Conventions at the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in 2007.

Globally:

- Other countries should draw on the Philippines' successful use of "one-stop shop" (OSS) methodology to speed the clearance and provision of duty and tax exemptions for relief goods and equipment.

5.4. Transparency of funding

5.4.1 Findings

Several interviewees noted that significant resources were available globally for the emergency phase, despite the fact that the Strategic Response Plan (SRP) requesting US\$ 788 million had received only US\$462 (59%) to date. It is worth noting that this coverage is well above most other ongoing UN appeals. In addition, more than US\$ 300 million were received outside the scope of the SRP. Looking at sector-specific funding, there are significant differences, some clusters being well covered, while others such as early recovery having received very little. IFRC Appeal of US\$ 141 million and direct funding to NGOs are not captured in the above figure, which makes the overall aid effort difficult to monitor in financial terms.

The Government of the Philippines has introduced the Foreign Assistance Transparency Hub (FAiTH), which aims to track the financial support, both in cash and in kind, that other governments and individual donors have donated. It does not track donations that go directly to humanitarian organisations. FAiTH was established very quickly and was running 10 days after the disaster through the use of cloud sourcing.

This innovative approach came in the context of a strong push for transparency from the President. It is also an advocacy tool to highlight how much funding has been actually received compared to what has been pledged. An important limitation of this tool, like other financial tracking mechanisms, is the fact that it does not allow to monitor how funding has been used. It is interesting to note that many of the comments posted on the FAiTH website ask questions about how funds have been used.

Another major limitation noted on the FAiTH website is that it mainly tracks only assistance that is "coursed through government agencies like the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), as coursed through the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas' (CFO) LINKAPIL Program ." Whereas humanitarian organizations are invited to provided their information to the site, there is currently no mechanism to require this and it is not systematically tabulated there. For

its part, UN OCHA maintains web information on pledges through its Financial Tracking Service, but this site also lacks information about actual spending.

Analysing the information provided by FAiTH, it is worth noting that most financial contributions from Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) donors tend to go in support of the international community, whereas non-GHD donors tend to support the government more directly, although this is often through in kind assistance.

While FAiTH covers only international funding, a new portal will be developed to track disbursements of the Calamity Fund, which is government's relief and rehabilitation fund managed by the Department of Budget and Management.

There is currently limited information on how much the government has spent itself on relief and rehabilitation. Interviewees during the field visits highlighted concern in terms of the time required for national rehabilitation funds to be made available at local level. The recent Open Data Philippines initiative which will enable full transparency on government's spending available on a web portal will be a major step towards more transparency. It is also noteworthy that the Audit Commission is currently undertaking an audit that reportedly includes international donations. While the report had not yet been published as of the dates of the mission, it had already featured prominently in press reports, which indicated public (and political) concerns about "where all the money has gone."

5.4.2 Recommendations

Nationally:

- International responders should consider contributing information about their spending on relief and recovery programmes to the FAiTH website.
- Philippines authorities should further publicize the FAiTH website, in particular among regional, provincial and municipal authorities, and seek methods to ensure that the information is available to those without regular computer access.
- In the context of the various review processes, consideration should be given to procedures for more systematically gathering information about actual spending in relief and recovery programmes by international responders, bearing in mind the importance of respecting the humanitarian principle of independence and the interest in avoiding unnecessary administrative burdens on them.

Globally:

- Other countries should draw on the Philippines' remarkable initiative to develop the Foreign Aid Transparency Hub "FAiTH" website.

5.5. Emergency preparedness for managing international disaster response

5.5.1 Findings

In light of the important role that local authorities are expected to play, both in terms of domestic response and in coordinating international efforts at the local level, their preparedness is an important issue. During the field visits, many interviewees highlighted important gaps in this area. While this is not directly in the scope of this review, it is worth highlighting some of these important points which have also been noted by earlier studies⁶. Poorer municipalities in particular, which are the most vulnerable to disasters, have insufficient resources for many functions and even though a percentage of their budgets are mandated for use for preparedness and response (5% of their local revenues is split between 30% for response and 70% for preparedness) that amount is quite modest. The NDRRMC noted that out of the 3,000 estimated staff needed to fulfil their mandate at all levels, there are currently only 450 persons. As noted by some governmental officials, there are good policies in place, but the government lacks resources to implement them at local level.

In the face of this, however, there were also good examples of international support for emergency preparedness at local level. For instance, UNDP was involved with local governments to look at the preparedness of LGUs and came up with a series of good practices. In addition, UNDP assists provinces to develop a small booklet on preparedness. OCHA for its part is involved in contingency planning, simulations and after action reviews amongst other things. However, emergency preparedness support is relatively ad hoc and fragmented and would benefit from more systematic, planned efforts, in cooperation with NDRRMC at national and local level. This stronger alignment could be envisaged in support of the NDRRM Plan which has a specific section on preparedness.

A consistent message was that the change of leaders after elections often causes change in senior managers and removes important DRRM corporate knowledge and capacity. In particular, Barangay elections were held on October 28th 2013 and cities, municipalities and provincial elections on May 13th 2013. New leaders were in place at local level in many cases. The recent NDRRMC memo which addresses the establishment of primary DRRM staff within LGUs and their retention with changeout of Local Chief Executives was highlighted as a very positive improvement by local authorities.

Of course, emergency preparedness is a critical goal in its own right, but it is also directly related to how local authorities interact with and manage international responders. In this sense, it was suggested that even emergency humanitarian appeal funds (such as the Flash Appeals or the CAP) could include aspects of emergency preparedness.

The following general ideas about building local preparedness were suggested to the team and could be considered further⁷:

⁶ See Save the Children (2013) and Harkey (2014)

⁷ Some of these are included amongst further recommendations in the two above reports (cited in footnote 6)

- Try to standardise DRRM capacity of LGUs across the whole country, maybe focussing first on higher risk regions, through capacity building (staffing, training, equipment, Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) audits [Seal of Good Local Governance]).
- supplemental DRRM funding to poorer LGUs.
- partnerships between regions, provinces and municipalities from elsewhere in the country to share practices and assist each other in preparedness and emergency response.
- Use upcoming provincial level summits (like Local Chief Executive Summits at regional level in 2013) to maximise effect across the 81 provinces in the country, with opportunities to inform on existing national and international response mechanisms.

5.5.2 Recommendations

Nationally:

- As part of humanitarian response, support to LGUs to strengthen their emergency preparedness, including on how to manage international assistance, should be more systematically provided.

Globally:

- As recommended for the Philippines, donors and the international community should look to more systematically supporting domestic preparedness, including but certainly not limited to building domestic officials' capacity to play their expected roles in coordinating and overseeing international relief.
- Through the appeal systems such as the CAP or Flash appeals, the international community should consider support for strengthening the capacity of local governments to prepare for and coordinate international responders.

6. Annexes

Annex I: list of interviewees

Region VI	
<p><u>Roxas Provincial Administrator’s office</u> Attorney Jose Oñas Villanueva, Provincial Administrator Esperedion “Speed” Peleaz, PDDRMO Officer Chrissy Mae Erada, PDDRMO Staff</p> <p><u>Inter-cluster Coordination Meeting</u> Hector Fallasco, UNFPA Kenga Shandralingam, OCHA Jean Luc Tonget, OCHA Josh Hallwright, OCHA Brigit Vaes, Shelter Cluster Sandra Hart, Food Security Cluster Kyaw Oo Maung, Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster Arshad Rashid, CCCM Cluster Sam Mawunganidze, UNICEF</p> <p><u>Civil Society Meeting</u> Yheleen Veso, World Vision Jun Yapau, World Vision Ligaya Munez, World Vision Jethro Almaquer, Save the Children Wilson Balingut, Task Force Buligaway Gonzalo Staeradno, Save the Children</p> <p><u>Estancia’s Mayor’s office</u> Rene Cordero, Mayor Cathy De Los Santos, MSWDO Eugene Tentativa, MPDO Allen Chuatro, Mayor’s office R Boy Yumol, Mayor’s office Joey del Rosario, Mayor’s office Jerry Barrios, Mayor’s office Johnmat Jacinto, Mayor’s office</p>	<p><u>Concepcion Mayor’s Office</u> Delvy Balasbas, Private Secretary Mary Depaloba, MSWDO</p> <p><u>Concepcion</u> Roberta Cappieri, Concern Worldwide Mary Ann Anderson, Concern Worldwide Sheen McCann, Concern Worldwide Jimmy O’Connor, Concern Worldwide</p> <p><u>RDRRMC – Iloilo</u> Rosario Cabrera, OCD Gilbert Vacdekama, PRC Jorge Ebay, University of the Philippines Visayas Rex Patambang, DILG Giselle Grave Gerial, DILG Cpt Capitanea Julie, 301 BDE Sgt Jude C. Idioco, PA MOOI St PLC PCSLAPT Josephus Longon, PNP Ryan Vilmo J Dumpit, DOST PWSF Ryan Salazar, PNP PO3 Wilbert J. Galila, PNP Erniel M. Paniez, OCHA Judith Tanata-Barred, DSWD Zenaida Mabagat, OCD Ma. Aletha A Nogra, OCD Anine Calderon, OCD FSI Louee F. Barrentos, G Cap, PPCRD P03 Harold N. Astillo, PPCRD</p>
Region VII	
<u>Individual interviews</u>	<u>Meeting on the Cebu One-Stop Shop</u>

<p>Denise Avelino, Germany Red Cross Steve Barton, Shelter Cluster Antonia Salamat, World Vision Marco Abrazado, PRC Syed Shahnawaz Ali, Islamic Relief Patrick Galli, SDC</p>	<p>Roy Gonzaga, Bureau of Customs Atty. Paul Alcazaren, Bureau of Customs Marujah Prejida, PRC Josephine Belotindos, DSWD Anansia Aviso, DSWD PS1 Marylou Coizen, PNP Allen Cabaron, OCD LCDR Mark Enriquez, Central Command Maj Rolando Acido, Central Command Eng. Ver Neil Balaba, OCD IA IV David Maramba, PDEA</p>
Region VIII	
<p><u>OCHA Tacloban office</u> Kasper Engborg, Head of Office</p> <p><u>Tacloban City</u> Mayor Alfred S. Romualdez, City Mayor</p> <p><u>Government Line Agencies, Region VIII</u> Rey M. Gozon, OCD Adela S. Collanto, OCD Erwin J Abonales, PCA Lilibeth C. Andrade, DOH Leonido Dobia, DOH Ewan Peter Daniel Merida, DOH Brenda J Pepito, DA Rufino E. Mengote, DOST Hiyas B. Martillo, NEDA Benjie P. Pelen, DSWD Aurora M. Lago, DPWH</p> <p><u>Municipal Mayor representatives</u> Palo Tanauan Tolosa</p>	<p><u>Cluster Co-Leads</u> Masanobu Horie, WFP – Food Security and Agriculture Chris Clark, WFP – Logistics Nicole Hahn, UNICEF – WASH Jim O’Brien, WHO – Health Xavier Gewot, IFRC – Shelter Amador Catacutan, UNFPA – Reproductive Health Sandra P. Gani, UNFPA – Gender Based Violence Jeremie Toussaint, UNDP – Early Recovery and Livelihoods Wan Sephonpanich, IOM – CCCM Maulid Warfa, Chief of Field Operation Tacloban</p> <p><u>East Samar Governor’s Office</u> Atty Christopher R. Coles, Chief of Staff Levi Nicart, PDRRMO</p> <p><u>East Samar humanitarian organisations</u> Renee Lambert, CRS Ajab R. Macapagat, World Vision Loc Hoang, All Hands Volunteers Ernesto C. Casiple, OXFAM, Deputy Programme Manager Corine Verdoold, ZOA Country Director Leonor Crisostomo, Terre des Hommes Country Director Helene Plennevaux, ICRC Head of sub-delegation Brad Mellicker, Head of IOM office Guiuan</p>

	<p>Laurence deBarros-Duchene, MSF, Head of Mission</p> <p>Meciek Perzynski, People In Need, Country Director</p> <p><u>Guiuan Mayor's Office</u></p> <p>Recti Melquiades, Secretary to Executive Council</p>
Manila	
<p>Ivo Sieber – Ambassador of Switzerland</p> <p>James Shepherd-Barron – National Shelter Cluster co-lead</p> <p>Anne Orquiza and COL Bruce Murray – Australian Embassy</p> <p>Anne Landouzy Sanders – National Protection Cluster co-lead, UNHCR</p> <p>David Carden – Head of Office, OCHA</p> <p>Lawrence Jeff Johnson – Director, ILO</p> <p>Ruth Honculada-Georget – National Livelihoods Cluster co-lead, ILO</p> <p>Vicente Selles Zaragoza – General Coordinator, aacid</p> <p>Carlos Gallego – Senior Program Manager, aacid</p> <p>Rajendra Aryal – FAO Representative a.i.</p> <p>Aristeo A. Portugal – Assistant FAO Representative (Programme)</p> <p>Vilma B. Cabrera – Assistant Secretary, DSWD</p> <p>Maricel C. Deloria, DSWD</p> <p>Isa Mara-Ann S. Borda, DSWD</p> <p>Christine A. Sumog-oy, DSWD</p> <p>Atty. Lesley Y. Cordero – Undersecretary, OPARR</p> <p>Alexander P. Pama – Executive Director NDRRMC/OCD</p> <p>Romeo F. Fajardo – Deputy Administrator, OCD</p> <p>Ramon J.P. Paje – Secretary, DENR</p>	<p>Austere A. Panadero – Undersecretary, DILG</p> <p>Silvestre Z. Barrameda – Head, Institutional Partnership Unit, DILG</p> <p>Rosemarie G. Edillon – Assistant Director-General, NEDA</p> <p>Atty. Cesar Corpuz – Bureau of Customs</p> <p>Ms. Maria Teresita Juliet Malco - Assistant Operations Officer, Bureau of Customs</p> <p>Sebastien Bourgoin – Deputy Head of Delegation, Haiyan Operation, ICRC</p> <p>Maurice Dewulf – Country Director, UNDP</p> <p>Ross Hardy – Recovery and DRR Specialist, UNDP</p> <p>Amelia Supetran – Team Leader, Environment and Energy Unit, UNDP</p> <p>Gianne Gairan – Digital Media Officer, DBM</p> <p>Ivygail I. Ong – Project Officer, DBM</p> <p>Nikolai M. Castro – DBM</p> <p>Enrique T. Ona – Secretary, DOH</p> <p>Arlynn Aquino – ECHO</p> <p>Marcel Fortier – IFRC</p> <p>Donna McSkimming – IFRC</p> <p>Manja Bayang – Legal consultant, IFRC</p> <p>Edward Olney, Country Director, Save the Children</p> <p>Adelina Sevilla Alvarez, Lead Convenor, DRRNetPhils</p>

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