

EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL ACTION

FINAL REPORT

COMBINED EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, 2016- 2020, AND DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

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ABSTRACT

The combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2012-2016, and DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is drawn on evidence from desk research, data analysis, interviews, field missions, focus groups and workshops, to provide a retrospective assessment and propose strategic recommendations.

The Horn of Africa evaluation was focused on two thematic areas, (i) cash as a modality and (ii) forced displacement. Cross-cutting issues such as coordination, resilience and the Nexus were also covered. The evaluation concludes that, overall, the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa over 2016-2020 were relevant, coherent, and added value. Evidence was somewhat more mixed regarding effectiveness and efficiency.

The evaluation DG ECHO's partnership with the ICRC found that the partnership was mutually beneficial and brought added value to both organisations' responses to humanitarian crises. There was a good alignment and complementarity between ICRC and DG ECHO's strategic priorities and objectives, as well as their mandates, competences and resources. Through their specific roles, both partners contributed to an efficient and effective humanitarian response. The joint advocacy efforts also contributed to improving the protection of civilians and compliance with IHL in several countries.

PART A: EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, 2016-2020

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BNA	Basic Needs Assessment
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DG DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DG INTPA	Directorate General for International Partnerships
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDDRISI IGAD	Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative
EDF	European Development Fund
EiE	Education in Emergency
ERM	Emergency Response Mechanism
EU	European Union
EUCAP	Civilian mission for capacity building in maritime security-SOMALIA
EUMSS	European Union Maritime Security Strategy
EUNAVFOR	EU naval force operation
EUTF	EU Trust Fund for Africa
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FTS	Financial Tracking System
HDIFSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GAM	Global acute malnutrition
HAR	Humanitarian Aid Regulation
HDI	Human Development Index
HDPN	Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HoA	Horn of Africa
IAF	Integrated Analysis Framework
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally displaced persons
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee

KII	Key Informant Interview
KOI	Key Outcome Indicator
KRI	Key Risk Indicator
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MENA	Middle East North Africa
MPCT	Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the Executive Summary of Part A of the Final report for the Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa (HoA) in the 2016-2020 period, and the European Commission's Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO)' partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The evaluation was launched by DG ECHO in January 2021 and finalised in 2022. The work was undertaken by ICF with inputs from experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance and evaluation, and local researchers.

Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The purpose of this assignment was twofold: to assess the EU's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa over the period 2016-2020 (Part A); and to assess DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) over the period 2016-2020 (Part B).

The aim of Part A of the evaluation was to provide a retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's funded activities in countries in the HoA region over the period 2016-2020 with a focus on two thematic areas, (i) cash as a modality and (ii) forced displacement. Cross-cutting issues such as coordination, resilience and the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus were also covered. Special attention was given to the opportunities for cross-border approaches in the region to optimise cross-fertilisation between countries and complementary actions.¹

In addition, this evaluation identified potential learning elements relevant for future interventions in the region, which led to three key strategic recommendations.

Methodological approach

The evaluation was designed to respond to a specific set of evaluation questions, as articulated in the Terms of Reference (ToR). A variety of research tools and sources of information were used to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base for this evaluation covering a wide range of stakeholders. This included documentation review, data analysis, key informant interviews (KII), field missions and workshops. In total, the evaluation team reviewed approximately 85 documents and projects documentation (SingleForm and FichOps) for 70 actions. ICF also conducted a survey of DG ECHO framework partners operating in the HoA region (which received 121 responses), undertook 20 KIIs and carried out project site visits and field missions in Somalia and Uganda, while the field mission to Ethiopia was undertaken remotely.

Overview of the Context

Climatic shocks, political dynamics, conflict and economic disruptions continued to drive the humanitarian needs in the HoA. Despite the region's strategic and geographical potential, a range of factors, with prevailing conflict as a key driver, continued to generate an unstable regional environment. In brief, the main contextual developments in the region over the period 2016-2020 were:

- Climatic shocks: the HoA has suffered from frequent natural disasters, including extreme weather events such as droughts and floods. Both the frequency and intensity of natural hazards have increased over the last decades, leaving little time between episodes for affected populations to recover. Epidemics have further impacted vulnerable populations.

¹ The evaluation in part A therefore included DG ECHO's funded activities in countries in the HoA region over the period 2016-2020 that relate to (i) multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) (i.e. using cash and/or vouchers as a modality for part or all the activities); (ii) forced displacement (i.e. actions targeting IDPs, refugees, returnees and host communities); (iii) finding durable solutions to displacement crisis in line with the framework of the Resilience-Humanitarian Development-Peace Nexus

- Conflict and political dynamics: Political factors and the lack of good governance across the wider region played a crucial role in sustaining and aggravating the complex humanitarian crises in the HoA, contributing to increased forced displacements in the greater HoA region. Furthermore, the lack of strong regional governance structures in the HoA and sustainable collaboration between the countries did not benefit the region.
- Economic disruptions and weak social services: During the evaluation period, the HoA saw fast and sustained economic growth. However, variations existed between the countries and within, with an unequal distribution of benefits across the population. In 2020, COVID-19 led to the disruption of economically important service sectors (such as tourism), caused supply chain problems, and led to an increase of vulnerability to poverty. Due to economic challenges, poor governance and weak institutions, critical and basic infrastructure as well as basic services (such as health services) were either inexistent or poor in certain parts of the HoA, thereby undermining the coping capacity of vulnerable populations.

These factors led to an increase of the humanitarian needs in the HoA from high in 2016 to very high or extreme by 2020, according to the Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF).

In the evaluation period, DG ECHO responded to those needs with a total of €1bn of funding (10% of the total humanitarian aid funding in the HoA in the period) that reached approximately 133.5 million beneficiaries, making it the third biggest donor in the HoA after the US and the UK in 2016-2020. When looking at DG ECHO's funding by sector, most of the funding was allocated to the Food security and livelihoods (FSL) sector (37%) followed by water sanitation and hygiene (WASH) (10%), Protection² (9%), Nutrition (8%) and Health (8%). The multi-purpose cash transfer (MPCT) sector received up to 7% of the total funding. In-kind assistance continuously decreased over the evaluation period, while cash and vouchers became a more standard modality for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Key findings and conclusions

The evaluation assessed the relevance, coherence, added value, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability of DG ECHO's interventions in the HoA region between 2016-2020.

Relevance

The funding prioritisation and allocation was informed by an assessment of the most acute humanitarian needs in the region by sector. At regional level, the main focus was on life-saving assistance, relating broadly to food security, forced displacement and healthcare. At the same time, DG ECHO continued to emphasise the need to support ongoing efforts to seek long-term solutions to recurrent issues in terms of forced displacement and food insecurity.

DG ECHO and its framework and implementing partners generally adequately assessed, identified and understood the differentiated needs of the most vulnerable in the design and implementation of EU-funded actions, including in their response to forced displacement, taking into account country-level specificities. A range of methods and strategies were used to identify and address needs, which were generally viewed to be appropriate, and tailored to the needs of beneficiaries. Some progress was made in implementing the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)³ in Uganda, but limited progress was made in Ethiopia. DG ECHO also

² Centrality of protection was however ensured through mainstreaming.

³ The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) was developed following the 2016 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. The CRRF aims to increase support to refugees and their host countries, including by improving cooperation between humanitarian actors, development actors and host governments to develop more sustainable, durable solutions. DG ECHO prioritised actions that aligned with the Framework.

considered the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in its priorities and objectives as well as in its needs assessments throughout the evaluation period.

Despite the presence of regional Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs)⁴ for the HoA throughout the evaluation period, evidence reviewed suggests that the approach taken to delivery of actions in the region was mostly country-based, with a few exceptions. DG ECHO's strategy and funded actions were context adapted and addressed relevant aspects in the region, however the need for a more joined-up approach was generally recognised. DG ECHO sought to enable framework and implementing partners to deliver timely and flexible responses, supporting them with solutions such as the crisis modifier⁵. Partners recognised DG ECHO's flexibility as a donor and made use of the tools offered to allow this, however several suggestions were made by partners for ways in which DG ECHO could improve in terms of timeliness and flexibility.

Coherence

Overall, needs were identified and prioritised across the HoA in alignment with DG ECHO's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR). Overall, DG ECHO's HIPs for the HoA were aligned with the framework set out in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Moreover, the DG ECHO-funded humanitarian responses in the HoA implemented by partners remained aligned with humanitarian principles, although a few challenges were encountered. DG ECHO also played a key role in promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) through its advocacy efforts.

Overall, the DG ECHO response in the HoA was aligned with relevant thematic/sector priorities, and these priorities were taken into account when designing HIPs. However, in some cases it was difficult for framework partners to ensure alignment with DG ECHO's thematic/sectoral policies and priorities; especially in cash and protection. This was mostly due to contextual (e.g., association of malnutrition with cultural taboos), practical (e.g., difficult in terms of transport and distribution of in-kind assistance) and technical implementation (e.g., difficulties in monitoring ECHO's WASH indicators) issues.

In the context of the triple Nexus⁶ and coordination instruments, DG ECHO took measures to contribute to the coordination with EU's resilience, development and peace actions. DG ECHO referred in its HIPs that activities supported would be required to demonstrate a clear bridging with ongoing resilience or development programmes that were in the spirit of the nexus. DG ECHO introduced internal changes and used markers alongside assessments of proposals to promote nexus opportunities and possible synergies/complementarities with programmes funded by development and peace actors. When selecting which actions to fund, DG ECHO verified complementarity with initiatives of other donors and continued monitoring this complementarity throughout the action duration.

At project level, DG ECHO encouraged framework partners to participate in the various cluster coordination meetings of relevant sectors. DG ECHO also played a key role in developing and sharing best practices with relevant actors as part of its leading role in few clusters. At donor level, DG ECHO regularly met with other donors and was able to provide strategic coordination with other donors. This included information sharing and discussions on common issues such as protection, cash, access via the various Humanitarian Donor Coordination fora.

⁴ DG ECHO prepares and publishes 'Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs)', which provide more detailed information on the operational priorities identified within each country/region of operation.

⁵ "Crisis Modifiers refer to the integration of a flexible, early action component within a DG ECHO-funded action, to address, in a timely manner, immediate and lifesaving needs resulting from a rapid-onset crisis or a deteriorated situation. Please see DG ECHO Guidance Note - Disaster Preparedness, 2021.

⁶ Triple Nexus refers to the promotion of interlinkages between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors

EU Added value

The added value of DG ECHO's intervention in the HoA was significant and wide-ranging. Firstly, it was one of the largest humanitarian donors in the region, with its funding during the evaluation period representing 10% of the total humanitarian flows to the region. Secondly, DG ECHO funding was highly additional. For the vast majority of framework partners (94%), the lack of DG ECHO funding would have either resulted in the project not going ahead at all or in the reduction of the project's scope, scale or timeline. Finally, DG ECHO added considerable value to the existing humanitarian aid architecture in the HoA via its (i) technical expertise and field presence; (ii) comprehensive geographical and sectoral coverage (and particularly by filling gaps not covered by other actors); (iii) extensive partnership network; and (iv) flexibility and rapid response tools such as crisis modifiers. Moreover, DG ECHO was actively engaged in promoting a coordinated humanitarian response in the region and was widely acknowledged by partners as a leading actor on forced displacement and cash transfers.

Effectiveness

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of DG ECHO's funded interventions in the region due to (i) data constraints, (ii) the inherent time lag in reporting of results and outcomes and (iii) the lack of time and resources to evaluate impact using theory based or quasi-experimental approaches. A mixed picture emerges on the basis of available evidence:

- While DG ECHO funded actions contributed to saving lives and alleviating suffering, many of the funded actions partially achieved their expected results. 36% of the DG ECHO funded actions achieved all their targets for Key Result Indicators (KRIs), while another 36% achieved some (but not all) KRI's targets. However, the level of achievement of Key Objective Indicators (KOIs) was rather high – the KOI targets were generally achieved or exceeded for the projects selected for in-depth review.⁷
- Overall, the achievement of results and outcomes was hampered by several constraints, such as partner's lack of preparedness, security issues, partner's lack of capacity and expertise, delays in procurement, lack of basic infrastructure in affected areas, covid-19 restrictions etc.
- DG ECHO drove the use of cash as a modality in the region. Cash helped meet beneficiaries' priority needs (e.g., food, education), but transfers were not always sufficient either in terms of fully meeting their needs (shelter, healthcare) or in terms of the number of beneficiaries covered.
- DG ECHO played a role in establishing shock responsive social safety nets in Somalia. DG ECHO worked with the EU Delegation's SAGAL programme⁸ as well as the World Bank's Baxnaano safety net programme⁹, which covered 1.2 million people or 200,000 households who receive USD20/ month, on developing a shock responsiveness component within these programmes. .

⁷ Results are immediate outputs of the actions, while outcomes are the consequences of achieving those results. DG ECHO funded interventions have one specific objective and several expected results. The expected achievements in terms of specific objective are set by defining target values for one or more Key Objective Indicators. Similarly, the expected achievements in terms of results are set by defining target values for one or more Key Result Indicators.

⁸ A Social Transfer programme implemented in coordination with Federal Government of Somalia, which provided regular cash-based Social Transfers to beneficiaries of the programme and built government systems for sustainable delivery of social protection.

⁹The main objective of the project is to provide cash transfers to targeted poor and vulnerable households and establish the main elements of a national shock-responsive safety net system. See more information at: <https://baxnaano.so/about-baxnaano/>

- Finally, DG ECHO made a contribution to promoting durable solutions for forced displacement in the region, although a lot remains to be done and with progress, rather naturally, varying by country.

Advocacy was a key element of the HIPs during the evaluation period. However, only a limited number of DG ECHO funded actions were found to undertake advocacy activities. Overall, advocacy work was limited by budgets available and the short time span of DG ECHO's actions. Nonetheless, some examples of success could be found in relation to advocacy on respect for humanitarian principles, IHL as well as promotion of humanitarian space. Advocacy was also directly implemented by DG ECHO depending on the country context, although much of it occurred behind the scenes and was not documented. The evaluation was only able to form a somewhat fragmented and incomplete picture of DG ECHO's activities as well as accomplishments in this area (based primarily on key informant interviews). As such, it was hard to conclude whether DG ECHO's advocacy efforts were effective or not, in spite of some examples of successes.

Efficiency

Cost effectiveness was considered by DG ECHO and its partners in the design of objectives, funding priorities and actions, and both took steps to ensure this would be achieved by funded actions. Whilst overall, cost effectiveness was achieved in DG ECHO's response throughout the evaluation period, several areas for improvement were identified regarding the cost effectiveness of funded actions, such as increasing harmonisation across DG ECHO's framework and implementing partners, for example through joint needs analysis and joint strategies; reducing the bureaucratic and administrative burdens associated with programming, contract variations (or 'top-up' funding) and proposal format; and returning to the Grand Bargain principles of common reporting and multi-year financing. There is wide consensus that the total funding provided by donors is insufficient to meet the collective humanitarian needs in the region, though it was recognised that DG ECHO's contribution was important. Nonetheless, the evidence regarding the extent to which budget allocations provided by DG ECHO were sufficient to enable actions to achieve their objectives was inconclusive.

Sustainability

DG ECHO promoted sustainability of interventions in its HoA strategy by supporting self-reliance of programme beneficiaries, finding innovative and durable solutions to protracted situations and emphasising the importance and opportunities of linking humanitarian interventions to other interventions and cooperating with development stakeholders in the region. On a country level, DG ECHO's approach to sustainability in HoA was mostly ensured through working with other actors and, when possible by, sharing expertise as well as promoting exit strategies. DG ECHO encouraged designing and implementing cash responses as part of DG ECHO's shock responsiveness approach and to create links with longer term interventions, and considered sustainability from project inception.

Recommendations

Three key strategic recommendations have emerged from this evaluation.

1. DG ECHO should consider adopting a multi-annual regional 'umbrella' framework / strategy with national and regional HIPs where appropriate

A regional, multi-country 'umbrella' framework could accommodate different approaches, depending on what, based on needs assessments, would make most sense. Regional approaches would be based on the pooling of resources from different countries to address

cross-cutting issues. The regional 'umbrella' framework would allow DG ECHO to address both cross-cutting issues affecting multiple countries, as well as country-specific needs.

Moreover, a multi-annual regional framework could also accommodate responses that do not fit within the 'annual' programming approach of the HIPs and the typical project cycles of 12-18 months, for example certain elements of multi-country or country specific responses to protracted crises, where relevant.

A multi-annual regional framework would also allow to develop and implement a more consistent and long-term approach to the nexus with development, and to elaborate a feasible exit strategy for DG ECHO.

2. DG ECHO should invest further efforts to focus the use of cash on where it can be most effective

It is recommended that DG ECHO:

Continues its efforts to examine and identify, through studies and expert involvement, those contexts in which the use of cash would be most appropriate (also considering the practical limitations) and effective, including with a view of establishing the nexus with development and, where relevant, an exit strategy.

As part of the above, be more realistic around the sector outcomes that can be achieved through MPCT, especially when the amount and duration of the assistance is limited, which is often the case due to funding or other constraints. This also calls for giving greater consideration to how cash can best be combined with sectoral programming in the different contexts, to maximise the complementarity and synergies between the different actions, and further increase effectiveness.

3. DG ECHO should consider adopting advocacy strategies

It is recommended that DG ECHO develops an overall advocacy strategy as part of its HIPs, which although potentially part of a regional approach (see Recommendation 1 above) should include a tailored advocacy plan for each country (or sub-country areas where relevant), based on the needs assessments as well as considerations on the feasibility of undertaking advocacy in each context.

The advocacy plans should set out:

- Advocacy objectives and priorities for the country
- The type of messaging, activities, etc., that are planned by DG ECHO (in as far as these can be publicly communicated) and those DG ECHO would like framework partners to implement as part of their DG ECHO funded actions
- Guidance for speaking on specific issues with one voice.

Partners could be requested to set out their advocacy strategy and/or planned advocacy activities in their proposals and describe how these align with DG ECHO's strategy and specific national plan. Overall, DG ECHO should promote advocacy, where this is feasible, as a valid and concrete component of the overall humanitarian response, to which funding can be allocated.

The advocacy strategy and national plans should be drafted in close consultation with other relevant stakeholders, including other Commission services such as Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), and DG ECHO partners to ensure that there is overall consensus on the objectives, priorities and messaging. A share of the financial resources available could be earmarked for advocacy activities within the funded actions.

The development of the overall advocacy strategy could be supported by a thematic evaluation of DG ECHO's advocacy efforts over the past 4-5 years, with a forward-looking element to provide the basis for a strategy.

RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE

Ci-après figure le résumé analytique de la partie A du rapport final de l'évaluation combinée des interventions humanitaires de l'Union européenne dans la Corne de l'Afrique au cours de la période 2016-2020, et du partenariat de la Direction générale de la protection civile et des opérations d'aide humanitaire (DG ECHO) de la Commission européenne avec le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR). L'évaluation a été lancée par la DG ECHO en janvier 2021 et s'est achevée en 2022. Ce travail a été entrepris par ICF, avec des contributions d'experts dans les domaines de l'assistance humanitaire et de l'évaluation, ainsi que des chercheurs locaux.

Objectifs et portée de l'évaluation

L'objectif de cette mission était double : évaluer les interventions humanitaires de l'UE dans la Corne de l'Afrique sur la période 2016-2020 (partie A) ; et évaluer le partenariat de la DG ECHO avec le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) sur la période 2016-2020 (partie B).

L'objectif de la partie A de l'évaluation était de fournir une évaluation rétrospective des activités financées par la DG ECHO dans les pays de la région de la Corne de l'Afrique sur la période 2016-2020 en se concentrant sur deux domaines thématiques : i) l'argent en espèces comme modalité et ii) les déplacements forcés. Des questions transversales telles que la coordination, la résilience et le nexus humanitaire-développement-paix ont également été abordées. Une attention particulière a été accordée aux possibilités d'adopter des approches transfrontalières dans la région afin d'optimiser la fertilisation croisée entre les pays et les actions complémentaires.¹⁰

En outre, cette évaluation a permis d'identifier des éléments d'apprentissage potentiels pertinents pour de futures interventions dans la région, ce qui a conduit à trois recommandations stratégiques clés.

Approche méthodologique

L'évaluation a été conçue pour répondre à une série de questions d'évaluation spécifiques, telles que formulées dans le cadre de référence. Divers outils de recherche et sources d'information ont permis de constituer une base de données riche et complète pour cette évaluation, couvrant un large éventail de parties prenantes. Cette démarche comprenait l'examen de la documentation, l'analyse des données, des entretiens avec des informateurs clés, des missions sur le terrain et des ateliers. Au total, l'équipe d'évaluation a examiné environ 85 documents et la documentation des projets (SingleForm et FichOps) pour 70 actions. ICF a également réalisé une enquête auprès des partenaires cadres de la DG ECHO opérant dans la région de la Corne de l'Afrique (qui a généré 121 réponses), a mené 20 entretiens avec des informateurs clés et a effectué des visites de sites de projets et des missions de terrain en Somalie et en Ouganda, tandis que la mission de terrain en Éthiopie a été réalisée à distance.

Vue d'ensemble du contexte

Les besoins humanitaires dans la Corne de l'Afrique ont continué à être déterminés par les chocs climatiques, les dynamiques politiques, les conflits et les perturbations économiques. Malgré le potentiel stratégique et géographique de la région, une série de facteurs, dont le conflit actuel est le principal moteur, ont continué à générer un environnement régional instable. En résumé, les principales évolutions contextuelles de la région sur la période 2016-2020 ont été les suivantes :

¹⁰ L'évaluation de la partie A a donc inclus les activités financées par la DG ECHO dans les pays de la région de la Corne de l'Afrique au cours de la période 2016-2020 qui concernent i) les transferts monétaires à usage multiple (c'est-à-dire utilisant des espèces et/ou des bons comme modalité pour une partie ou la totalité des activités) ; ii) les déplacements forcés (c'est-à-dire les actions ciblant les personnes déplacées, les réfugiés, les rapatriés et les communautés d'accueil) ; iii) la recherche de solutions durables aux crises de déplacement conformément au cadre du triple nexus résilience-développement humanitaire-paix.

- Chocs climatiques : la Corne de l'Afrique a subi de nombreuses catastrophes naturelles, notamment des événements climatiques extrêmes tels que des sécheresses et des inondations. La fréquence et l'intensité des catastrophes naturelles ont augmenté au cours des dernières décennies, laissant peu de répit aux populations touchées entre deux épisodes. Les épidémies ont eu des répercussions supplémentaires sur les populations vulnérables.
- Conflits et dynamique politique : les facteurs politiques et le manque de bonne gouvernance dans l'ensemble de la région ont largement contribué à entretenir et à aggraver les crises humanitaires complexes dans la Corne de l'Afrique, entraînant une augmentation des déplacements forcés dans la Corne de l'Afrique au sens large. En outre, l'absence de structures de gouvernance régionale solides dans la Corne de l'Afrique et de collaboration durable entre les pays a desservi la région.
- Perturbations économiques et faiblesse des services sociaux : au cours de la période d'évaluation, la Corne de l'Afrique a connu une croissance économique rapide et soutenue. Cependant, on observe des disparités entre les pays et au sein même de ceux-ci, avec une répartition inégale des avantages au sein de la population. En 2020, la pandémie de Covid-19 a perturbé des secteurs de services économiquement importants (comme le tourisme), a causé des problèmes de chaîne logistique et a accru la vulnérabilité à la pauvreté. En raison des défis économiques, de la mauvaise gouvernance et de la faiblesse des institutions, les infrastructures essentielles et de base ainsi que les services de base (tels que les services de santé) étaient soit inexistantes, soit médiocres dans certaines parties de la Corne de l'Afrique, nuisant ainsi à la capacité des populations vulnérables à y faire face.

Ces facteurs ont conduit à une augmentation des besoins humanitaires dans la Corne de l'Afrique, qui sont passés d'un niveau élevé en 2016 à un niveau très élevé ou extrême en 2020, selon le cadre d'analyse intégré (CAI).

Au cours de la période d'évaluation, la DG ECHO a répondu à ces besoins avec un financement total de 1 milliard d'euros (10 % du financement total de l'aide humanitaire dans la Corne de l'Afrique au cours de la période) qui a touché environ 133,5 millions de bénéficiaires, ce qui en fait le troisième plus grand bailleur de fonds dans la Corne de l'Afrique après les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni en 2016-20. Si l'on examine le financement de la DG ECHO par secteur, la plupart des fonds ont été alloués au secteur de la sécurité alimentaire et des moyens de subsistance (37 %), suivi par l'eau, l'assainissement et l'hygiène (WASH) (10 %), la protection¹¹ (9 %), la nutrition (8 %) et la santé (8 %). Le secteur des transferts monétaires à usage multiple a reçu jusqu'à 7 % du financement total. L'aide en nature n'a cessé de diminuer au cours de la période d'évaluation, tandis que l'argent en espèces et les bons se sont imposés comme une modalité plus courante de fourniture de l'aide humanitaire.

Principales constatations et conclusions

L'évaluation a porté sur la pertinence, la cohérence, la valeur ajoutée, l'efficacité, l'efficience et la durabilité des interventions de la DG ECHO dans la région de la Corne de l'Afrique entre 2016 et 2020.

Pertinence

La définition des priorités et l'allocation des fonds ont été fondées sur une évaluation des besoins humanitaires les plus urgents dans la région, par secteur. Au niveau régional, l'accent a été mis sur l'aide vitale, qui a trait essentiellement à la sécurité alimentaire, aux déplacements forcés et

¹¹ La centralité de la protection a toutefois été assurée par l'intégration.

aux soins de santé. La DG ECHO a par ailleurs continué à insister sur la nécessité de soutenir les efforts en cours pour trouver des solutions à long terme aux problèmes récurrents en termes de déplacements forcés et d'insécurité alimentaire.

Globalement, la DG ECHO, ses partenaires cadres et ses partenaires de mise en œuvre ont évalué, identifié et compris de manière adéquate les besoins différenciés des plus vulnérables lors de la conception et de la mise en œuvre des actions financées par l'UE, y compris dans leur réponse aux déplacements forcés, en tenant compte des spécificités nationales. Différentes méthodes et stratégies ont été utilisées pour définir les besoins et y répondre, et elles ont généralement été jugées appropriées et adaptées aux besoins des bénéficiaires. Des progrès ont été réalisés dans la mise en œuvre du Cadre d'action global pour les réfugiés¹² en Ouganda, mais les progrès ont été limités en Éthiopie. La DG ECHO a également tenu compte des besoins des populations de réfugiés les plus vulnérables dans ses priorités et objectifs ainsi que dans ses évaluations des besoins tout au long de la période d'évaluation.

Malgré la présence de plans de mise en œuvre humanitaire (HIP)¹³ régionaux pour la Corne de l'Afrique tout au long de la période d'évaluation, les éléments examinés suggèrent que l'approche adoptée pour la mise en œuvre des actions dans la région était principalement basée sur les pays, à quelques exceptions près. La stratégie et les actions financées par la DG ECHO ont été adaptées au contexte et ont abordé les aspects pertinents dans la région, mais la nécessité d'une approche plus concertée a été généralement reconnue. La DG ECHO entendait permettre aux partenaires cadres et de mise en œuvre d'apporter des réponses rapides et flexibles, en les soutenant avec des solutions telles que le modificateur de crise¹⁴. Les partenaires ont reconnu la flexibilité de la DG ECHO en tant que bailleur de fonds et ont utilisé les outils proposés à cet effet. Cependant, les partenaires ont fait plusieurs suggestions sur la manière dont la DG ECHO pourrait s'améliorer en termes de rapidité et de flexibilité.

Cohérence

De manière générale, les besoins ont été identifiés et classés par ordre de priorité dans l'ensemble de la Corne de l'Afrique, conformément à la mission de la DG ECHO, tel qu'il est défini dans le règlement concernant l'aide humanitaire. Dans l'ensemble, les HIP de la DG ECHO pour la Corne de l'Afrique étaient conformes au cadre défini dans le Consensus européen sur l'aide humanitaire. En outre, les réponses humanitaires financées par la DG ECHO dans la Corne de l'Afrique et mises en œuvre par les partenaires sont restées alignées sur les principes humanitaires, malgré quelques difficultés rencontrées. La DG ECHO a également joué un rôle clé dans la promotion du respect du droit international humanitaire (DIH) grâce à ses activités de plaidoyer.

La réponse de la DG ECHO dans la Corne de l'Afrique était globalement alignée sur les priorités thématiques/sectorielles pertinentes, et ces priorités ont été prises en compte lors de la conception des HIP. Cependant, dans certains cas, il a été difficile pour les partenaires cadres de s'aligner sur les politiques et priorités thématiques/sectorielles de la DG ECHO, notamment en matière d'argent en espèces et de protection. Cela était principalement dû à des problèmes contextuels (par exemple, l'association de la malnutrition à des tabous culturels), pratiques (par

¹² Le Cadre d'action global pour les réfugiés a été instauré par la Déclaration de New York pour les réfugiés et les migrants de 2016. Le Cadre d'action global pour les réfugiés vise à accroître le soutien aux réfugiés et à leurs pays d'accueil, notamment en améliorant la coopération entre les acteurs humanitaires, les acteurs du développement et les gouvernements d'accueil afin de développer des solutions plus durables. La DG ECHO a donné la priorité aux actions alignées sur le Cadre.

¹³ La DG ECHO prépare et publie des « plans de mise en œuvre humanitaire » qui fournissent des informations plus détaillées sur les priorités opérationnelles identifiées dans chaque pays/région où elle intervient.

¹⁴ Le modificateur de crise désigne, dans le cadre d'une action financée par la DG ECHO, l'intégration d'un volet d'action rapide et flexible pour répondre, en temps utile, aux besoins immédiats et vitaux qui sont le résultat d'une crise à déclenchement soudain ou d'une situation dégradée. Voir la Note d'orientation de la DG ECHO – Préparation aux catastrophes, 2021.

exemple, des difficultés en termes de transport et de distribution de l'aide en nature) et de mise en œuvre technique (par exemple, des difficultés dans le suivi des indicateurs WASH de la DG ECHO).

Dans le cadre du triple nexus¹⁵ et des instruments de coordination, la DG ECHO a pris des mesures pour promouvoir une coordination avec les actions de l'UE en matière de résilience, de développement et de paix. La DG ECHO a indiqué dans ses HIP que les activités bénéficiant d'un soutien devraient démontrer l'existence d'un lien clair avec les programmes de résilience ou de développement en cours qui correspondent à l'esprit du nexus. La DG ECHO a introduit des changements internes et a utilisé des marqueurs parallèlement aux évaluations des propositions afin de promouvoir les possibilités de nexus et les synergies/complémentarités possibles avec les programmes financés par les acteurs du développement et de la paix. Lors de la sélection des actions à financer, la DG ECHO a vérifié la complémentarité avec les initiatives d'autres bailleurs de fonds et a continué à contrôler cette complémentarité pendant toute la durée de l'action.

Au niveau des projets, la DG ECHO a encouragé les partenaires cadres à participer aux différentes réunions de coordination des clusters des secteurs concernés. Dans son rôle de leader au sein de quelques clusters, la DG ECHO a également joué un rôle clé dans l'élaboration et le partage des bonnes pratiques avec les acteurs concernés. Au niveau des bailleurs de fonds, la DG ECHO a régulièrement rencontré les autres bailleurs de fonds et a assuré une coordination stratégique avec ceux-ci. Il s'agissait notamment de partager des informations et de discuter de questions communes telles que la protection, l'argent en espèces, l'accès via les différents forums de coordination des bailleurs de fonds humanitaires.

Valeur ajoutée

La valeur ajoutée de l'intervention de la DG ECHO dans la Corne de l'Afrique a été significative et vaste. Tout d'abord, DG ECHO est l'un des plus grands bailleurs de fonds humanitaires de la région, son financement durant la période d'évaluation représentant 10 % du total des flux humanitaires vers la région. Ensuite, le financement de la DG ECHO était très complémentaire. Pour la grande majorité des partenaires cadres (94 %), l'absence de financement de la DG ECHO aurait entraîné soit l'abandon du projet, soit la réduction de sa portée, de son ampleur ou de son calendrier. Enfin, la DG ECHO a apporté une valeur ajoutée considérable à l'architecture de l'aide humanitaire existante dans la Corne de l'Afrique grâce à i) son expertise technique et sa présence sur le terrain ; ii) sa couverture géographique et sectorielle complète (qui permet notamment de combler les lacunes non couvertes par d'autres acteurs) ; iii) son vaste réseau de partenariat ; et iv) sa flexibilité et ses outils de réponse rapide tels que les modificateurs de crise. En outre, la DG ECHO s'est activement engagée dans la promotion d'une réponse humanitaire coordonnée dans la région et a été largement reconnue par les partenaires comme un acteur de premier plan en matière de déplacements forcés et de transferts d'argent.

Efficacité

Il est difficile de tirer des conclusions définitives sur l'efficacité des interventions financées par la DG ECHO dans la région en raison i) des contraintes liées aux données, ii) du décalage inhérent à la communication des résultats et des effets et iii) du manque de temps et de ressources pour évaluer l'impact en utilisant des approches théoriques ou quasi-expérimentales. Les données disponibles font apparaître un tableau mitigé :

- Si les actions financées par la DG ECHO ont contribué à sauver des vies et à atténuer les souffrances, nombre d'entre elles n'ont que partiellement atteint les résultats escomptés. 36 % des actions financées par la DG ECHO ont atteint tous leurs objectifs en matière

¹⁵ Le triple nexus désigne la promotion des liens entre les secteurs de l'aide humanitaire, du développement et de la paix.

d'indicateurs clés de résultats (KRI), tandis que 36 % ont atteint certains de ces objectifs (mais pas tous). Toutefois, le niveau de réalisation des indicateurs clés d'objectif (KOI) était plutôt élevé : les KOI ciblés ont généralement été atteints ou dépassés pour les projets sélectionnés pour une analyse approfondie.¹⁶

- Dans l'ensemble, la réalisation des résultats et des effets a été compromise par plusieurs contraintes, telles que le manque de préparation des partenaires, les problèmes de sécurité, le manque de capacité et d'expertise des partenaires, les retards dans la passation des marchés, le manque d'infrastructures de base dans les zones touchées, les restrictions dues à la pandémie de Covid-19, etc.
- La DG ECHO a encouragé l'utilisation de l'argent en espèces comme modalité dans la région. Les dons en espèces ont permis de répondre aux besoins prioritaires des bénéficiaires (par exemple, la nourriture, l'éducation), mais les transferts n'ont pas toujours été suffisants, que ce soit en termes de satisfaction totale des besoins (abris, soins de santé) ou en termes de nombre de bénéficiaires couverts.
- La DG ECHO a joué un rôle dans la mise en place d'une protection sociale réactive aux chocs en Somalie. La DG ECHO a travaillé avec le programme SAGAL¹⁷ de la délégation de l'UE ainsi qu'avec le programme national de filet de sécurité Baxnaano de la Banque mondiale¹⁸, qui couvrait 1,2 million de personnes ou 200 000 ménages recevant 20 USD par mois, afin de développer une composante de réactivité aux chocs au sein de ces programmes.
- Enfin, la DG ECHO a contribué à la promotion de solutions durables pour les déplacements forcés dans la région, même s'il reste beaucoup à faire et que les progrès varient, assez naturellement, selon les pays.

Le plaidoyer a été un élément clé des HIP au cours de la période d'évaluation. Toutefois, seules quelques actions financées par la DG ECHO semblent entreprendre des activités de plaidoyer. Dans l'ensemble, le travail de plaidoyer a été limité par les budgets disponibles et la courte durée des actions de la DG ECHO. Quelques exemples de réussite ont néanmoins été relevés en matière de plaidoyer sur le respect des principes humanitaires, du droit international humanitaire et de la promotion de l'espace humanitaire. Le plaidoyer a également été directement mis en œuvre par la DG ECHO en fonction du contexte national, bien qu'une grande partie de celui-ci se soit déroulée de manière officieuse et n'ait pas été documentée. L'évaluation n'a pu dresser qu'un tableau quelque peu fragmenté et incomplet des activités et des réalisations de la DG ECHO dans ce domaine (sur la base principalement d'entretiens avec des informateurs clés). Ainsi, il a été difficile de conclure si les efforts de plaidoyer de la DG ECHO étaient efficaces ou non, malgré quelques exemples de réussite.

Efficiences

Le rapport coût-efficacité a été pris en compte par la DG ECHO et ses partenaires lors de la conception des objectifs, des priorités de financement et des actions, et les deux parties ont pris des mesures pour s'assurer de l'efficacité des actions financées. Si, dans l'ensemble, le rapport

¹⁶ Les résultats sont les produits immédiats des actions, tandis que les effets sont les conséquences de l'obtention de ces résultats. Les interventions financées par la DG ECHO ont un objectif spécifique et plusieurs résultats escomptés. Les réalisations attendues en termes d'objectif spécifique sont fixées en définissant des valeurs cibles pour un ou plusieurs indicateurs clés d'objectif. De la même manière, les réalisations attendues en termes de résultats sont fixées en définissant des valeurs cibles pour un ou plusieurs indicateurs clés de résultat.

¹⁷ Un programme de transfert social mis en œuvre en coordination avec le gouvernement fédéral de la Somalie, qui a fourni des transferts sociaux réguliers en espèces aux bénéficiaires du programme et a mis en place des systèmes gouvernementaux pour la fourniture durable de la protection sociale.

¹⁸ L'objectif principal du projet est de fournir des transferts en espèces à des ménages pauvres et vulnérables ciblés et d'établir les principaux éléments d'un système national de filet de sécurité réactif aux chocs. Pour un complément d'information, voir : <https://baxnaano.so/about-baxnaano/>

coût-efficacité de la réponse de la DG ECHO a été positif tout au long de la période d'évaluation, plusieurs points d'attention ont été mis en évidence en ce qui concerne le rapport coût-efficacité des actions financées, comme le renforcement de l'harmonisation entre les partenaires cadres et les partenaires de mise en œuvre de la DG ECHO, par exemple par le biais d'une analyse conjointe des besoins et de stratégies communes ; la réduction des charges bureaucratiques et administratives associées à la programmation, aux variations de contrat (ou au financement complémentaire) et au format des propositions ; et le retour aux principes du Grand Bargain, à savoir l'établissement de rapports communs et le financement pluriannuel. Tout le monde s'accorde à dire que le financement total fourni par les bailleurs de fonds est insuffisant pour répondre aux besoins humanitaires collectifs dans la région, tout en reconnaissant l'importance de la contribution de la DG ECHO. Néanmoins, il n'a pas été possible de déterminer de manière concluante dans quelle mesure les allocations budgétaires fournies par la DG ECHO étaient suffisantes pour permettre aux actions d'atteindre leurs objectifs.

Durabilité

La DG ECHO a encouragé la durabilité des interventions dans sa stratégie pour la Corne de l'Afrique en soutenant l'autonomie des bénéficiaires, en trouvant des solutions innovantes et durables aux situations prolongées et en soulignant l'importance et les possibilités de relier les interventions humanitaires à d'autres interventions et de coopérer avec les acteurs du développement dans la région. Au niveau national, l'approche de la DG ECHO en matière de durabilité dans le domaine de l'aide humanitaire a été principalement mise en œuvre en collaborant avec d'autres acteurs et, lorsque cela était possible, en partageant son expertise et en promouvant des stratégies de sortie. La DG ECHO a encouragé la conception et la mise en œuvre de transferts d'espèces dans le cadre de l'approche de réactivité aux chocs de la DG ECHO et la création de liens avec des interventions à plus long terme, et a envisagé la durabilité dès le début du projet.

Recommandations

Trois recommandations stratégiques clés sont ressorties de cette évaluation.

1. La DG ECHO devrait envisager l'adoption d'un cadre/stratégie régional(e) pluriannuel(le) de type « parapluie » avec des HIP nationaux et régionaux, le cas échéant.

Un cadre « parapluie » régional et plurinational pourrait intégrer différentes approches, en fonction de ce qui serait le plus judicieux, après évaluation des besoins. Les approches régionales seraient fondées sur la mise en commun des ressources de différents pays pour traiter des questions transversales. Le cadre régional « parapluie » permettrait à la DG ECHO d'aborder à la fois des questions transversales touchant plusieurs pays et des besoins spécifiques à chaque pays.

En outre, un cadre régional pluriannuel pourrait également accueillir des réponses qui ne correspondent pas à l'approche de programmation « annuelle » des HIP et aux cycles de projet typiques de 12 à 18 mois, par exemple certains éléments de réponses plurinational ou spécifiques à des crises prolongées, le cas échéant.

Un cadre régional pluriannuel permettrait également de concevoir et de mettre en œuvre une approche plus cohérente et à long terme du lien avec le développement, et d'élaborer une stratégie de sortie réalisable pour la DG ECHO.

2. La DG ECHO devrait déployer des efforts supplémentaires pour concentrer l'utilisation de l'argent en espèces là où il peut être le plus efficace.

Il est recommandé que la DG ECHO :

- Poursuive ses efforts pour examiner et identifier, grâce à des études et la consultation d'experts, les contextes dans lesquels l'utilisation d'argent en espèces serait la plus appropriée (en tenant compte également des limites pratiques) et la plus efficace, notamment en vue d'établir le lien avec le développement et, le cas échéant, une stratégie de sortie.
- À cet égard, il convient d'être plus réaliste quant aux effets sectoriels qui peuvent être atteints grâce aux transferts monétaires à usage multiple, en particulier lorsque le montant et la durée de l'assistance sont limités, ce qui est souvent le cas en raison de contraintes financières ou autres. Il convient également d'accorder une plus grande attention à la manière dont l'argent en espèces peut être combiné au mieux avec la programmation sectorielle dans les différents contextes, afin de maximiser la complémentarité et les synergies entre les différentes actions et de gagner encore en efficacité.

3. La DG ECHO devrait envisager d'adopter des stratégies de plaidoyer

Il est recommandé que la DG ECHO développe une stratégie globale de plaidoyer dans le cadre de ses HIP, qui, bien que faisant potentiellement partie d'une approche régionale (voir la recommandation 1 ci-dessus), devrait inclure un plan de plaidoyer sur mesure pour chaque pays (ou zone de sous-pays, le cas échéant), basé sur les évaluations des besoins ainsi que sur des considérations sur la faisabilité des actions de plaidoyer dans chaque contexte.

Les plans de plaidoyer doivent présenter :

- les objectifs et priorités de plaidoyer pour le pays ;
- le type de messages, d'activités, etc., qui sont prévus par la DG ECHO (dans la mesure où ils peuvent être communiqués publiquement) et ceux que la DG ECHO souhaite que les partenaires cadres mettent en œuvre dans le cadre de leurs actions financées par la DG ECHO ;
- des orientations pour s'exprimer d'une seule voix sur des questions spécifiques.

Les partenaires pourraient être invités à exposer leur stratégie de plaidoyer et/ou les activités de plaidoyer prévues dans leurs propositions et à décrire comment celles-ci s'alignent sur la stratégie de la DG ECHO et le plan national spécifique. Dans l'ensemble, la DG ECHO devrait promouvoir le plaidoyer, lorsque cela est possible, comme une composante valable et concrète de la réponse humanitaire globale, à laquelle des fonds peuvent être alloués.

La stratégie de plaidoyer et les plans nationaux doivent être rédigés en étroite consultation avec les autres parties prenantes concernées, y compris les autres services de la Commission tels que la Direction générale des partenariats internationaux (DG INTPA), et les partenaires de la DG ECHO, afin de garantir un consensus global sur les objectifs, les priorités et les messages. Une partie des ressources financières disponibles pourrait être réservée à des activités de plaidoyer dans le cadre des actions financées.

Le développement de la stratégie globale de plaidoyer pourrait être étayé par une évaluation thématique des efforts de plaidoyer de la DG ECHO au cours des 4-5 dernières années, assortie d'un élément prospectif destiné à servir de base à une stratégie.

1 Introduction

This is Part A of the Final report for the *Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2016-2020, and DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*. The evaluation was launched by DG ECHO in January 2021. The work was undertaken by ICF with inputs from experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance and evaluation.

1.1 Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The purpose of this assignment was twofold: to assess the EU's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa (HoA) over the period 2016-2020; and to assess DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) over the period 2016-2020.

Part A, focusing on the EU's humanitarian interventions in the HoA covers two thematic areas, (i) cash as a modality and (ii) forced displacement. Cross-cutting issues such as coordination, resilience and the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus were also covered. Special attention was given to the opportunities for cross border approaches in the region to optimise cross fertilization between countries and complementary actions.

The evaluation in part A therefore included DG ECHO's funded activities in countries in the HoA region over the period 2016-2020 that relate to (i) multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) (i.e. using cash and/or vouchers as a modality for part or all the activities); (ii) forced displacement (i.e. actions targeting IDPs, refugees, returnees and host communities); (iii) finding durable solutions to displacement crisis in line with the framework of the Resilience-Humanitarian Development-Peace Nexus.

1.2 Theory of change

This section presents the ToC for DG ECHO's interventions addressing forced displacement in the HoA. It has been developed on the basis of desk research, scoping interviews and a workshop involving relevant DG ECHO staff, humanitarian experts advising the ICF team and the core evaluation team.


As depicted in ToC below, the ToC is described through a causal chain consisting of the following building blocks (from left to right):

- Inputs – the human, financial and institutional resources¹⁹ that go into the partnership;
- The outputs and expected effects (results and impacts) of the partnership²⁰;
- The contextual conditions or external factors that influence the causal pathways and which are fully or partially beyond DG ECHO's control; and,
- The underlying assumptions about the causal links i.e. the variables or factors that need to be in place for change to occur at different levels (e.g. for "results" to lead to "impacts").

¹⁹ Institutional inputs include technical and logistical capabilities

²⁰ Inputs are used to deliver specific outputs >> Outputs produce certain effects (direct results and intermediate outcomes) >> Effects contribute to impacts


Figure 1. ToC of DG ECHO interventions focusing on forced displacement in the HoA



1.3 Methodological approach

The evaluation was designed to respond to a specific set of evaluation issues and questions, as articulated in the Terms of Reference (ToR). A variety of research tools and sources of information were used to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base for this evaluation covering a wide range of stakeholders (see Overview of the methodology). Overall, for Part A of the evaluation, the evaluation team has reviewed approximately 85 documents, documentations (SingleForm and FichOps) for 70 actions. ICF also conducted a survey of DG ECHO framework partners operating in the HoA region (121 responses). In addition, ICF has undertaken 20 key informant interviews (KIIs) and conducted project site visits and field missions in Somalia and Uganda, while the field mission to Ethiopia was undertaken remotely. This section summarises the methodology utilised.

Figure 2. Overview of the methodology



1.3.1 Documentation review

As part of the desk review, the evaluation team looked at a range of secondary sources of evidence. The majority of documents were publicly available and found online while some were provided by DG ECHO. Documents reviewed provides an overview of the evidence base and brief description of the quality of the information collected and the limitations/gaps identified.

Table 1. Documents reviewed

Secondary source of information	Description	Quality of the data collected
Financial Decisions	6 Financial Decisions and 6 annexes reviewed	Detailed information documenting humanitarian needs over time was included, including country-specific analyses and assessments of needs by beneficiary type (e.g. refugees, IDPs, host communities etc.).

Secondary source of information	Description	Quality of the data collected
		<p>Documents included an assessment of the most acute humanitarian needs and priority areas by sector across the region and in individual countries.</p> <p>DG ECHO's key strategies and priorities were set out, including ensuring actions were adapted to their context, prioritising preferred modalities and enabling flexibility.</p> <p>Detailed lists of key principles/ guidelines actions were expected to follow, and the expectations set by DG ECHO for framework partners was clearly explained</p> <p>The priority placed on ensuring a sustainable, principled response and continuously improving coordination amongst humanitarian development and national actors was clear</p> <p>Analyses of the presence of other donors in each country within the region and, to some extent, potential complementarity with DG ECHO was included in all documents.</p> <p>Some references were made to the added value of DG ECHO's response.</p>
<p>Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF)</p>	<p>26 IAF and 3 Country profiles reviewed</p>	<p>Detailed assessments of the humanitarian needs provided by the IAF, identifying strong humanitarian needs in most countries within the region.</p> <p>The level of detail and quality of data in IAFs varies to some extent by country and year.</p>
<p>Project documentation</p>	<p>70 SingleForms, 70 FichOps</p>	<p>Quality of the project documentation depends on the implementing partner.</p> <p>Exit strategies in project documentation are often unclear and rather limited.</p> <p>Needs assessments include hard facts and needs identified are consistent across the various partners. Both primary and secondary data is collected and used by the framework partners to define the needs.</p> <p>Project data includes strong evidence on the relevance of the intervention addressing the most important needs.</p> <p>The majority²¹ of project documentation includes information on the involvement of the beneficiaries in the needs assessment and on the involvement of the community in the design of the action (i.e. setting targeting criteria and vulnerability criteria).</p>

²¹ 54 out of 70 projects includes information on the involvement of beneficiaries in the needs assessment; 48 out of 70 projects includes information on the community involvement in the design of the action.

Secondary source of information	Description	Quality of the data collected
		The great majority ²² of project designs put a feedback or accountability mechanism for the community in place.
Other reports (strategic documents, policies, evaluation reports, mission reports, grey literature)	50 documents	Overall, the documents provide useful insights into the existing socio-political context in each of the countries of interest in the HoA. The documents reviewed were particularly useful for the Relevance section, as they describe the populations in need of humanitarian aid and civil protection, as well as the evolving crises across the region.
HOPE/EVA databases	Databases reviewed and analysed	<p>Overall the quality of the data collected was very high, and allowed us to conduct an in-depth analysis of the financial and characteristic information of DG ECHO funded actions in HoA as well as global actions during the evaluation period</p> <p>The HOPE/EVA databases provided information on the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Total humanitarian funding to actions in HoA funded by DG ECHO • DG ECHO funding to actions in HoA • Country coverage of actions in HoA (funding, number of actions) • Sectoral coverage of actions in HoA (funding, number of actions) • Transfer modality coverage of actions in HoA (funding, number of actions) • Framework partners operating in HoA (funding, number of actions) • Number of beneficiaries reached by each action • Type of beneficiaries reached by each action • Duration of actions • Direct support costs per action • KRIs and KOIs achieved per action • Gender-Age and Resilience markers

1.3.2 Survey

As part of the desk phase, a survey was conducted to gather information from DG ECHO framework partners operating in the HoA. HoA survey below presents the steps undertaken in the organisation and administration of the surveys, and an analysis of the quality of the data collected.

²² 56 out of 70 projects includes information on an accountability or feedback mechanism for the community related to the intervention.

Table 2. HoA survey

HoA framework partners	
Survey period	13 th – 30 th July 2021
Distribution method	Individualised organisation emails to partners sent by ICF, based on a list of contact within partner organisations provided by DG ECHO. In total, 392 of the 564 email addresses provided by DG ECHO were valid. Furthermore, 74 alternative email addresses were identified and sent the survey.
Number of responses	121
Response rate	Not possible to calculate a robust response rate as a snowballing approach was used to identify potential respondents. Based on the fact that the survey was successfully sent to approximately 466 email addresses, the approximate response rate is 26%.
Survey analysis	The survey was analysed quantitatively using descriptive statistics. Cross tabulations were generated with ICF survey software (Qualtrics). ICF conducted data cleaning on these outputs and created graphs and tables to present the findings. For open-ended questions, all responses were collated and analysed qualitatively, with a summary of the main themes included provided.
Quality of the data and limitations	High quality – the number of responses was high and there was a mixture of responses from International NGOs (70%), UN system (25%) and International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (5%). It was therefore possible to disaggregate responses by type of organisation and identify differences between the type of respondents.

1.3.3 Consultation

Consultation started from day one of the evaluation with a workshop with DG ECHO staff to discuss the Theory of Change (ToC) followed by six scoping interviews with DG ECHO HQ and field staff. A second round of key informant interviews (KIIs) was undertaken as part of field phase with the following stakeholders:

Stakeholder category	Organisation	Number
DG ECHO	ECHO HQ	7
DG ECHO field	ECHO Field	7
Framework partner	IOM, UNHCR, WFP, IRC	6
Member State/ third country donors	The Swedish International Development Agency	2
	The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office	
Other European Union Institutions	EEAS	2

A third round of interviews was undertaken as part of the field missions organised and conducted remotely and in person in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Two case studies were conducted to explore DG ECHO interventions in the HoA. The case studies were conducted in three countries

namely, Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia. Additional remote interviews were conducted with UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM (UN) and People in Need (NGO). Two thematic areas were explored:

1. Cash: The operationalisation of multi-purpose cash transfers; and,
2. Forced displacement: The triple nexus in practice.

Due to a mix of circumstances, mostly related COVID-19 and security issues making physical access very difficult, the field missions needed to heavily rely on remote interviews and assistance from beyond the core research team which impacted on the completeness and quality of the case studies

1.3.4 Overall validity of findings

Complementary research methods were used to enhance the reliability and validity of the data collected and to provide the basis for cross-verification, corroboration and triangulation of the evaluation results. The vested interests of different stakeholder groups were taken into account to address potential bias and to ensure objectivity.

Overall, based on the review of the methods and tools, it is considered that the evaluation results are valid, as in the vast majority of cases, they are confirmed by multiple sources of evidence. However, as with any evaluation, there were limitations to the methodologies and research tools applied as discussed above. Given these methodological caveats and limitations, caution was exercised when interpreting data and producing findings.

1.4 The structure of the report

The report is structured as follows:

- Section 2: provide an overview of the context;
- Section 3: presents the evaluation findings to all the evaluation questions in the following order: relevance, coherence, EU added value, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. For each evaluation question, a short table summarising the judgement criteria and key conclusions.

2 Context and rationale for the EU humanitarian aid intervention in the HoA region

The objective of this section is to present an overview of the context and rationale for the EU humanitarian aid intervention in the HoA region. It starts with a presentation of the environment in which the EU intervention takes place followed by a summary of the key humanitarian needs and DG ECHO's response in the region over the evaluation period 2016-2020. Each section starts with a regional analysis, followed by a description of relevant country specificities for Ethiopia, Uganda, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Eritrea. Throughout this analysis, limited evidence is presented for Eritrea due to limited access to the country and the unavailability of data.

2.1 The context surrounding EU interventions

2.1.1 Regional

Climatic shocks, political dynamics and conflict, and economic disruptions continued to drive the humanitarian needs in the HoA. Despite the region's strategic and geographical potential, a range of factors, with prevailing conflict as a key driver, continued to generate an unstable regional environment. The following sub-section summarises the main contextual developments in the region over the period 2016-2020, and their effects on the humanitarian situation.

Climatic shocks: Drought, flooding and pests

The HoA has suffered from frequent natural disasters, including droughts, flooding, earthquakes, epidemics and extreme weather events. The naturally occurring El Niño weather phenomenon, sometimes followed by a La Niña episode, has increased in intensity and frequency over the years as a result of human-induced climate change. **Both the frequency and intensity of natural hazards have increased over the last decades, leaving little time between episodes for affected populations to recover.** In a region where pastoralism provides critical means of survival, prolonged and severe droughts are disastrous. Livelihoods are affected coping mechanisms eroded which leads to food insecurity and undernutrition, and in many cases to forced displacements, which in turn often leads to increased tensions between displaced populations and host communities.²³

In **2016**, the region experienced late and below average rainfall resulting in consecutive episodes of severe drought following El Niño. In **2017**, consecutive failed rainy seasons and a weak La Niña led to a devastating drought across the region, mainly affecting Eastern Ethiopia, central and southern Somalia, and most of Kenya, which continued to persist until 2019. **Drought-related displacements put pressures on border areas and neighbouring countries.** Somalian refugees fled to Kenya, while Ethiopians mostly moved up north to Djibouti. Towards the end of **2019**, the region suffered from flash floods and landslides, due to exceptionally heavy Deyr rains, strong unseasonal rains and the passage of tropical storm Pawan.²⁴ In **2019-2020**, the region was struck hard by the Desert Locust plague, ravaging crops and jeopardising livelihoods. The locust swarms were considered the worst upsurge in 25 years in Ethiopia and Somalia and the worst infestations in Kenya in 70 years.²⁵

Conflict and political dynamics

Political factors and the lack of good governance across the wider region play a crucial role in the complex humanitarian crisis in the HoA. The HoA is located in a crucial geostrategic position attracting foreign players for decades, which has influenced local politics. The geopolitical dynamics and local politics create a complex political landscape, which is characterised by often strong tensions between the opposition groups and the ruling party, either few or repeated elections organised,, contested borders, ethnic tensions, regional power imbalances, and terrorism. **Corruption, instrumentalisation of ethnicity and marginalisation of certain communities remain among the key causes of the conflicts in the regions.**²⁶ The instrumentalisation of humanitarian aid for political gains remains a key risk and is strongly influenced by intercommunal and ethnic tensions.²⁷

Conflict and political insecurity have contributed to increased forced displacement in the greater HoA region. In **2016**, Uganda was already suffering from internal displacement due to post-election violence. Continued political instability following the start of the civil war in South Sudan led to a sudden influx of refugees to Uganda and Ethiopia in **2017**, putting additional pressures on both countries and the wider region. In **2018**, the influx of South Sudanese refugees to Uganda continued with additional refugees coming in from DRC, which eventually led to the closure of borders in 2020. In **2019**, refugees from South Sudan also continued to seek refuge in Ethiopia. In the same year, a governance crisis in Eritrea, in combination with long-term structural needs due to underdevelopment, forced Eritreans to move to Ethiopia placing additional pressure on the ethnic balance.

²³ Reliefweb. 2017. Lesson learned? An urgent call for action in response to the drought crisis in the Horn of Africa.

²⁴ Reliefweb. 2019. Horn of Africa – heavy Deyr rains (DG ECHO, UN OCHA, IFRC) (ECHO Daily Flash of 13 December 2019).

²⁵ Reliefweb. 2021. Desert Locust upsurge may be declining but remaining swarms require vigilance in East Africa and Yemen.

²⁶ The International Crisis Group. 2020. The Horn; Peace and Conflict in Africa, Then and Now.

²⁷ ECHO. 2021. HIP Horn of Africa.

History of internal conflict in Ethiopia since 2017 is completely missing. It is like if the first conflict in the country started in 2020...

In **2020**, the political conflict between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray's Liberation Front led to an increase in targeted attacks and displacements along ethnic lines. The conflict put at stake the stability of the entire region. The territorial tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia also led to various military confrontations at the border Somali-region claimed by Ethiopia. Due to Somalia's internal political issues focus shifted away from the border-dispute. Long-standing interclan fighting and the armed conflict between the Government, regional security forces, , and Al Shabaab, entrenched the country in a deep humanitarian crisis. The Somali Federal Government, the Federal Member States and self-declared independent Somaliland have also struggled to come to a political agreement. Continued displacement of Somali refugees to Kenya, as a results of conflict and insecurity, led to increased tensions between both countries, despite a moment of increased stability in 2018 thanks to the military successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) against Al-Shabaab.²⁸ Kenya itself has been dealing with incidents of unrest and violence following the annulled elections of 2017²⁹ resulting in recurrent conflict and ethnical tensions up until today.

The lack of strong regional governance structures in the HoA and sustainable collaboration between the countries have not benefitted the region. Shifting political alliances and growing tensions between different countries in the region have obstructed the development of sustainable regional solutions. A regional approach to socio-political issues is crucial to ensure security as shown again in the more recent tensions around the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, which became part of the larger geopolitical playing field in the Horn.³⁰

Economic disruptions and weak social services

Until the COVID-19 pandemic, the HoA had seen fast and sustained economic growth. However, variations existed between the countries and within. Despite the economic slowdown in **2017**, caused by drought, electoral uncertainty and insecurity issues, the region recovered over the course of **2018**. In **2019**, all countries in the region experienced economic growth, but while Ethiopia experienced a growth of 9%, Somalia only saw an 2.9% increase in GDP, showing the difference between countries in the region.³¹ In **2020**, COVID-19 led to the disruption of economically important service sectors, such as tourism, and caused supply chain problems. Vulnerability to poverty has increased due to, among others, widespread firm closures and slowdown of economic activity, especially in the informal sector. Agricultural products are the main commodity in the region, with Ethiopia and Uganda leading in coffee export and Kenya in tea, which makes the economy also vulnerable to climate shocks.³²

Despite economic growth, benefits have not been evenly distributed which led to increased wealth inequality, disadvantaging vulnerable populations, mostly rural and pastoralist communities, as well as refugees, IDPs and host communities. Only Kenya and Uganda have shown relative inclusive growth patterns, indicating that growth likely reduced poverty- and inequality.³³

²⁸ Reliefweb. 2018. The number of refugees returning voluntarily from Kenya to Somalia has fallen sharply over the past three years - from over 7,500 in 2018 to less than 200 in 2020, according to UNHCR - coinciding with rising violence, displacement and drought within Somalia.

²⁹ Reliefweb. 2017. Kenya 2017 General and Presidential Elections.

³⁰ Reliefweb. 2020. Toward a New Regional Approach to Water Security and Governance in the Horn of Africa.

³¹ IMF. 2019. GDP Growth.

³² FAO. 2021. The impact of disasters and crises on agriculture and food security.

³³ UNCTAD. 2021. Economic Development in Africa Report 2021.

Due to poor governance and weak institutions, critical and basic infrastructures are either inexistent or poor in certain parts of the region, thereby preventing access to basic services and goods. The region is marked by an opaque management of land and natural resources (i.e. the lack of clear management and security of land and other resources facilitates state expropriation and spoliation by militias) and a high level of poverty and unemployment. Access to basic social services is often inadequate, especially in Somalia, Eritrea and the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) in Kenya.

Poor urban and rural infrastructure and the lack of basic health services undermine the coping capacity of the region. Health systems in the region are generally weak and under-resourced. The region is prone to recurrent epidemic outbreaks (cholera, polio, yellow fever, viral haemorrhagic fevers, measles, meningitis, leishmaniasis, etc.). The region faces high transmission risks due to low vaccination rates, undernutrition, forced displacements and overcrowded refugee camps and poor sanitation. Epidemics outbreaks in the region, like Ebola in 2018 and Covid-19 in 2020, put additional pressure on the health infrastructure in particular, and the weak socio-economic system in general. **Beyond the health impacts of the pandemic, Covid-19 also resulted in widespread loss of income and worsened economic situations.**

2.1.2 Country-specific context

2.1.2.1 Ethiopia

Ethiopia, landlocked on the HoA, is the biggest and most populous country in the region and is a key political and economic state in the HoA. It struggles to find a political model balancing its strong nationalism with demands for ethnic autonomy. Political unrest and instability heightened with general elections in 2015, with more protests and demonstrations in 2016, violently oppressed by security forces, followed by the Government declaring a state of emergency in October 2016, which lasted until August 2017. The constantly deepening crisis led, in 2018, to nearly 2.9 million new displacements, the highest number of new internal displacements associated with conflict worldwide in that year, and representing four times the figure for 2017.³⁴ The peaceful power transfer led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sparked optimism among the Ethiopian people and the international community. Nevertheless, a deadly civil war between Tigray military forces and the government which started in 2020, is putting high pressure on the Ethiopian regime, with shifting frontlines from Tigray to bordering areas of Amhara and Afar in the north of the country. The region is spiralling into a humanitarian catastrophe, with mounting evidence of ethnic-based massacres.

Ethiopia has suffered from successive natural disasters, including flooding, locust infestation and droughts, which mostly affects eastern and western Ethiopia, as well as southern pastoral areas. In 2015, North (high lands of Tigray and Amhara) and Central (Oromia and SNNPR) Ethiopia suffered from the worst drought in decades affecting nearly 10 million people and lasting until the end of 2016.³⁵ El Niño was followed by an La Niña episode from 2016-2017 affecting pastoralist areas. The 2017 rainy season performed better than the year before, however, not leading to significant improvements in the most affected areas, mainly putting pressure on Eastern parts of the country leading to food insecurity and displacement. In 2019, Ethiopia suffered from heavy rainfall and extreme flooding.³⁶

High levels of conflict in combination with severe drought and the shocks of the epidemics, such as cholera, and the COVID-19 pandemic have had macroeconomic impacts, from which the country is only slowly recovering.

³⁴ IDMC. 2019. Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID)

³⁵ Reliefweb. 2016. Eastern Africa Growing Season 2016

³⁶ OCHA. 2019. Greater Horn of Africa Region: Humanitarian Snapshot (October 2019).

2.1.2.2 Uganda

In 2016, the influx of South Sudan refugees increased immensely following the restart of the war in South Sudan in early July and continued over the entire evaluation period. More refugees, from DRC, entered the country in 2018. Despite the closure of the border to South Sudanese refugees in 2020, refugees continued to enter, which led to increased tensions with the host communities. Incoming refugees put additional pressure on the country dealing with conflict between the opposition party Forum for Democratic Change and the Government leading to post-election violence causing internal displacement. The ongoing influx of new arrivals has made it difficult for Uganda to adopt a progressive approach. Conflict between the refugees and the local population built on growing tension between the Government authorities and local populations, following decades of political marginalisation, exacerbated by issues about access to resources, land allocation, and aid resources.³⁷

In 2016, Uganda was affected by various outbreaks of epidemics, including Cholera and Yellow Fever.³⁸ Another Cholera outbreak followed in 2018.³⁹ Uganda was spared from the devastating effects of the Desert Locust Infestation of 2019 and was less affected compared to other countries in the region in 2020. However, in 2020, COVID-19 increased the vulnerability of the population, with detrimental impacts on the refugee population with limited access to health and WASH facilities. Lockdown measures also reduced the already limited access to income.

2.1.2.3 Somalia

In Somalia, conflicts and political dynamics remain at the centre of the crisis. Structural drivers of conflict include ethnic clan politics, political exclusion and discrimination and competition over resources. In addition, terrorist attacks from Al Shabaab and armed clan militias remain up until today. AMISOM, stationed in Somalia since the 1990s, booked initial military successes against Al-Shabab but international funding has decreased over the years and no exit plan is in place. With the start of the Tigray war in Ethiopia, some Ethiopian troops started to withdraw from Somalia in 2020. This has left the country more vulnerable to armed conflict and attacks.

Since the 1990s the internal political tensions between Somalia and self-declared independent Somaliland have put the stability of the region at stake. In 2018, tensions increased over a territorial dispute. In 2020, the Federal Government and Somaliland resumed dialogue, meeting in Djibouti, with the diplomatic support from Ethiopia, who, as a neighbouring country, was primarily interested in a peaceful solution. The impasse until 2020 caused disputes over territory, the management of resources, and security cooperation.⁴⁰

Somalia is disaster-prone with extreme climatic conditions. Natural hazards often led to the loss of crops, livelihoods and livestock, impacting the weak economy.⁴¹ The 2016 and 2017 rainy season underperformed in many parts of the country suffering from consecutive drought which continued over the course of the evaluation period. Regional drought put Somalia on the brink of famine in 2017, which was averted in 2018. In 2019 Somalia witnessed the worst harvest since 1995 as a result of the dry conditions. In 2020, Somalia also suffered from the worst Desert Locust Infestation in 25 years and the impacts of the COVID-19 outbreak, all taking place against the background of widespread poverty. Due to the severe insecurity, the Somalis are unable to

³⁷ Reliefweb. 2018. Contested Refuge: The political economy and conflict dynamics in Uganda's Bidi Bidi refugee Settlement.

³⁸ Reliefweb. 2016. Uganda: Yellow Fever Outbreak - Apr 2016.

³⁹ Reliefweb. 2018. Uganda: R Cholera Outbreak – Feb 2018.

⁴⁰ The International Crisis Group. 2020. Somalia-Somaliland: A Halting Embrace of Dialogue.

⁴¹ OCHA Somalia. 2017. Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018.

support themselves economically, leading to inter-community conflict and increased violence.⁴² The sporadic terrorist attacks and continued drought have negative macro-economic impacts.⁴³

2.1.2.4 Kenya

In Kenya, the 2017 elections cycle led to ethnic-based clashes between security forces and the opposition continuing into 2018 when tensions eased between the Government and the opposition. However, the lack of electoral reform caused dissatisfaction among the population and led to tensions between ethnic groups. Military forces continued to counter Al-Shabaab within its own borders over the evaluation period, especially in the north-eastern part of the country. In 2020, tension between Kenya and Somalia escalated following a spill-over of a national dispute in Somalia, threatening the territorial integrity of Kenya. Tensions between Kenya and Somalia have been increasing for over more than a decade, as Kenya hosts the largest number of Somali refugees.

In 2016, the Kenyan Government announced its intention to end hosting Somali refugees following the drought-caused food and nutrition crisis, leading to increased tension between the host communities and the refugee population. Official returns peaked in 2017 but slowed down again in 2018 due to unfavourable food and security situation in Somalia. The situation escalated in 2019 with the announcement of the closure of the Dadaab refugee camp. Donor fatigue, following years of humanitarian assistance to Somali refugees, has also been a major factor in the management and closure of Dadaab.⁴⁴

Following the 2016 drought, the Kenyan Government declared a natural disaster in 2017 due to the continued impact of the drought on individuals in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands in particular. Consecutive failed rainy seasons led to crop failure in Kenya in 2019.⁴⁵ In 2020, Kenya suffered from the worst Desert Locust upsurge in 70 years. Heavy rains causing rivers to overflow and triggering floods and mud slides affected the country still recovering from the droughts. The situation further diluted the already poor financial support from international donors, particularly affecting the humanitarian sector and largely the refugees.

Natural disasters, political instability and violent conflict, following the Supreme Court's annulment of the results of the Presidential Elections, have slowed down economic growth and reduced foreign investment. In 2020, the socio-economic situation exacerbated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

2.1.2.5 Djibouti

Djibouti, bordered by Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and near Yemen, has become a transit route of migratory flows from the HoA, mainly from Somalia, but also from South Sudan, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea and more recently from Yemen. However, relative to other countries in the region, especially Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya, inflows of refugees over the evaluation period remained rather limited. However, population movements, in combination with poor WASH conditions, increased the risk of disease outbreaks.⁴⁶

Due to its hot and dry climate and poor rainfall, agricultural production is limited, and the country relies heavily on the import of food and other commodities, which translates in high vulnerability to climate shocks and variations in international market prices.⁴⁷ Due to its low resilience to external shocks and its poorly diversified economy, the majority of the population lives in poverty, especially rural communities. Food and nutrition insecurity affects all rural pastoral and some

⁴² Reliefweb. 2021. ECHO Factsheet Somalia.

⁴³ Reliefweb. 2018. Horn of Africa: Humanitarian Outlook (January-June 2018).

⁴⁴ Reliefweb. 2020. A look at global changes in refugee policies through the lens of Dadaab.

⁴⁵ OCHA. 2019. Greater Horn of Africa Region: Humanitarian Snapshot (October 2019).

⁴⁶ OCHA. 2019. Djibouti.

⁴⁷ Reliefweb. 2021. WFP, Djibouti Country Brief, December 2021.

urban areas. Limited local response capacities have increased the country's dependency on humanitarian and development assistance.

Following the COVID-19 outbreak, in particular the situation of migrants has deteriorated due to competition with host communities over the use of scarce resources.

2.1.2.6 Eritrea

Eritrea remains one of the most closed countries in Africa with limited access and humanitarian space. The country is almost fully closed to the external world and subject to international sanctions. The oppressive regime and low living standards and livelihoods have caused forced displacement of Eritreans into Ethiopia for a long time. In 2019 a governance crisis was noted alongside long-term structural needs due to under-development, particularly in drought-prone rural areas. Many households were thought to be affected by food insecurity.

A peace agreement in 2018 marked the end of a 20-year border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea after years of conflict, which started after Eritrea's independence. This also led to the lifting of international sanctions by the UN.⁴⁸ With the outbreak of the Tigray war in 2020, Eritrean forces supported the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) against the TPLF, resulting in a tripartite alliance among Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somali. Controversially, 106,000 Eritrean refugees are currently living in Tigray, who are reportedly at risk of violence, forced recruitment into Eritrean forces and forceful returns to Eritrea.

2.2 Key overview of main humanitarian needs

This section provides an overview of the humanitarian needs in the region. It also zooms in on country-specific needs. It focuses on the drivers of the crisis and the needs of the most vulnerable populations. The current situation in the HoA stems from many decades of massive population displacement driven by (i) armed conflict and political dynamics in the region, (ii) climate related disasters (floods, drought, locust plague) and (iii) economic shocks. The HoA region has been confronted with a series of multiple intertwined crises, both protracted and acute.

2.2.1 Regional

In 2016, DG ECHO's Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) identified strong humanitarian needs in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda , which increased to high, very high or extreme by 2020. According to the IAF, 9 million people were in immediate need of humanitarian assistance in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda in 2016. This increased to 23m in 2017. In 2018, the IAF identified extreme humanitarian needs as well as very high vulnerability of the affected population in Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda, with high needs and vulnerability in Kenya and Djibouti. The needs for Uganda decreased to 'high' in 2019 but remained the same for other nations. At this point, 20m people were estimated to be in immediate need. The extreme humanitarian needs in Somalia and Ethiopia and high needs in Uganda persisted into 2020, with very high vulnerability in all countries in the region.

Acute and protracted crises, combined with the region's limited coping capacity and access to basic social services, led to an increase in people movements and internal displacement. The **2016 HIP** for the HoA reported that 1.7m refugees were seeking refuge in **Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda**, whereas 2m people were internally displaced in **Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia**. In **2017, Uganda and Ethiopia** saw a sudden influx of refugees, mainly from South Sudan. By **2018**, it was reported that the region hosted 2.7m refugees and 3.2m IDPs. The influx of refugees to **Uganda** continued with refugees fleeing the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, stretching resources and coping capacities. In **2020 Uganda** closed its borders but asylum seekers and refugees from South Sudan and DRC continued to flee there. Continued political turmoil and tensions in **Ethiopia**, worsened by this influx, led to 1.5m people being newly

⁴⁸ OCHA. 2019. Eritrea.

displaced within the country in **2018**. By **2020** the situation worsened, with evidence of ethnically based massacres related to the conflict between the Ethiopian Government and Tigray’s Liberation Front. In **Kenya**, despite the Government’s **2019** announcement of its intention to close the Dadaab refugee camp, one of the main refugee-hosting facilities in the country, the protracted refugee situation led to reduced humanitarian funding in **2020**, limiting its ability to meet basic needs for refugees.

Refugees and IDPs provides an overview of the total number of refugees and asylum seekers, and IDPs in the region compared to the total population in 2020.

Table 3. Refugees and IDPs

	Total population (2020, thousand)	IDPs (2020, thousand)	Asylum seekers and refugees in the country (2020, thousand)
Somalia	15 893 219	2 968 000	11 235
Ethiopia	114 963 583	2 693 000	800 464
Kenya	53 771 300	204 000	452 941
Uganda	45 741 000	34 000	1 421 133
Eritrea	3 213 97 (2013)	10 000 (2014)	201
Djibouti	988 002	N/A	21 208

Source: The World Bank, IDMC.

Several priority needs were identified across the HoA relating broadly to food security, forced displacement and healthcare. Based on the initial project and documentation review, OCHA’s analysis and DG ECHO annual HIPs, Most acute humanitarian needs in the region for the period 2016-2020 summarises the major needs and the number of people affected in the region for the period 2016-2020. It also describes the main drivers of the humanitarian crises.

Table 4. Most acute humanitarian needs in the region for the period 2016-2020

Year	Drivers of crises	Impacts	Humanitarian needs
2016	<p>Climate shocks: Droughts and flooding following El Niño in 2015</p> <p>Epidemics: Regular exposure to epidemic outbreaks (Cholera, Meningitis, Measles, Yellow Fever, Hep. E.)</p> <p>Security: Deterioration of security situation (Somalia, Kenya)</p>	<p>High levels of food insecurity, undernutrition, forced displacements, increased local tensions and conflicts over scarce resources and livelihood opportunities, affected livestock by epidemic outbreaks.</p>	<p>13m people in need of assistance due to food insecurity.</p> <p>1.7m refugees seek refuge in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.</p> <p>2m people are internally displaced in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia.</p>
2017	<p>Climate shocks: Droughts following one of the strongest el Niño events (Somalia, Ethiopia and ASALS⁴⁹ in Kenya).</p>	<p>High levels of food insecurity, undernutrition, famine early warnings, South Sudanese refugee influx in Uganda/Ethiopia,</p>	<p>23m people in urgent need of food assistance</p>

⁴⁹ Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALS)

PART A : EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, 2016-2020

Year	Drivers of crises	Impacts	Humanitarian needs
	Security: Across the region, the security situation has deteriorated, notably in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, respectively due to continued armed conflict, long-standing and recurrent conflicts	regional and internal displacements with continued movements from Somalia to Kenya and Ethiopia.	740k IDPs reported in Somalia and 358k IDPs in Ethiopia (drought-driven) Relief, rehabilitation and development needs Basic social services
2018	Climate shocks: La Niña phenomena leading to increased rainfall Security: Influx of refugees fleeing DRC and South Sudan into Uganda, political turmoil	Slightly improved food security and nutrition situation although remaining critical and the risks persist, increased forced displacement.	2.7m refugees and 3.2m people are internally displaced 25m people are in immediate need of humanitarian assistance (refugees, IDPs and drought-affected) In need of protection, emergency food assistance, prevention and treatment of malnutrition as well as projects addressing water supply, livestock protection.
2019	Climate shocks: Droughts followed by heavy Deyr rains, Tropical Storm PAWAN's passage, cyclones, Desert Locust plague Security: Recurrent conflicts caused by competition of limited resources and the increase in refugees, as well as political tensions.	Displacements, severe food insecurity and famine early warnings, livelihood crisis, killing of livestock, damaging infrastructure and croplands, undermined coping capacities, growing inter-communal tensions.	Food and livelihood assistance, shelter, WASH support 4m children suffering from malnutrition Pastoral and agro-pastoral populations in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, mainly food assistance and nutrition. Stretched resources for refugees and IDPs
2020	Climate shocks: Desert Locust upsurge, Security: Continued influx of refugees fleeing DRC and South Sudan into Uganda, political turmoil due to presidential elections, conflict in Ethiopia between government and military forces affecting the region	Deteriorated food security, humanitarian situation exacerbated by the onset of COVID-19, slowing the humanitarian response and increasing needs, increased internally displaced populations due to security issues and climate shocks, nevertheless reduced humanitarian funding in Kenya due to protracted refugee crisis.	Vulnerable households in need of food and nutrition assistance 1.2 million refugees and asylum seekers in the region Need to enhance health and WASH response, especially in refugee hosting districts to respond to Covid-19 outbreak.

Year	Drivers of crises	Impacts	Humanitarian needs
	Economic: Under sourced health system and economic shocks caused by Covid-19.		

Source: HIPs 2016-2020

2.2.2 Country-specific needs

2.2.2.1 Ethiopia

In 2016, Ethiopia was the largest refugee-hosting country in Africa and suffered widespread food insecurity and growing undernutrition. In 2017 there was a significant influx of refugees (mainly from South Sudan), which made Ethiopia the second largest recipient of refugees in Africa. The continuous influx of refugees placed pressure on the ethnic balance in Gambella, whilst aggravating food insecurity and the nutrition crisis. Long-lasting conflicts driven by a multiple intertwined causes, such as volatile influxes of refugees coming in, competition for scarce resources and the presence of various ethnic groups, affected several regions in Ethiopia. UNHCR reported 1 020 000 IDPs in 2017 as a result of inter-ethnic or resource-based conflicts, or due to natural disasters. A combination of the protracted drought and flooding in 2018 led to displacement and short-term food insecurity which worsened in 2019. Resources were further pressured by an additional influx of refugees from South Sudan and Eritrea in 2019. Inter-ethnic conflict and violence continued to be one of the main drivers of displacement in the country and beyond. In 2020, the crisis in the Tigray region led to an increase in targeted attacks and displacements along ethnic lines. This was compounded with high risk of COVID-19 due to living conditions in the growing IDP population as well as the impact of the locust invasion. Three major humanitarian crises were affecting the region by 2020: conflict, climate shocks and disease, resulting in 9 million people needing emergency assistance.

2.2.2.2 Uganda

In 2016, Uganda was suffering from acute food insecurity and increasing under-nutrition, large scale internal displacement due to post-election violence, flooding, landslides and several epidemics. It was noted in the region for having a progressive approach to hosting refugees. However, in 2017, the rapid influx of refugees (mainly from South Sudan), placed significant pressure on refugee settlement capacity. This worsened in 2018 due to an Ebola outbreak. By 2019, 1.6m people (mainly refugees) were in IPC Phase 3, aggravated in 2020 due to the impact of COVID-19 and funding cuts.

2.2.2.3 Somalia

In 2016, Somalia was found to be facing protracted and emerging humanitarian crises including food insecurity, crop failures, malnutrition, displacement, a severe drought, floods, armed conflict, political instability, and a deteriorating security situation. Forced evictions, particularly in urban centres, was noted as a critical issue. The Kenyan Government announcement of its intention to end hosting Somali refugees added to this crisis. By 2017, 5m people were in food insecurity stress. This fell to 3.2m in 2018 and by 2019 famine had been averted, though the number of people in need of food assistance remained at 2.5 million. This complex crisis continued to some extent into 2020, due to the locust infestation, COVID-19 and forecasted flooding.

2.2.2.4 Kenya

In 2016, Kenya was suffering from recurrent food and nutrition crises, causing high levels of vulnerability heightened by a highly aid-dependent refugee population. It noted its intention to return Somali refugees, with rate of returns peaking in 2017. By 2018, around 2.4m people were facing food insecurity, mainly in ASALs. The locust infestation resulted in increased food insecurity

in 2020 which, alongside the impact of COVID-19, the protracted refugee situation, and heavy rains, threatened lives and livelihoods of millions of people. In 2020 it was noted that Kenya received poor financial support from international donors.

2.2.25 Djibouti

High rates of food insecurity (over 30,000 people facing IPC phase 3-5 by 2020) and malnutrition (above emergency in 2016) were reported in most parts of the country, caused mainly by droughts, poor employment opportunities and access to services. These issues persisted throughout the evaluation period in all rural and some urban areas. An acute and protracted refugee crisis (with the refugee population fully dependent on aid) and lack of willingness of local authorities to respond to needs were noted throughout the evaluation period. In 2020, continuous conflict and drought-related displacements from neighbouring countries added to pressures on social services. Humanitarian assistance was largely underfunded.

2.2.26 Eritrea

Lack of access and unavailability of data make it impossible for DG ECHO to assess the needs in Eritrea. In 2016, Eritrea hosted about 3 500 refugees, mainly of Somali origin, which are most likely in need of food and shelter. Eritreans suffer from indefinite military service, harsh oppression and violation of human rights, as well as the lack of economic opportunities.

2.3 DG ECHO priorities in the Horn of Africa

When choosing funding priorities, DG ECHO took into account the specific context of the HoA Region, often complementing IAF assessments with comprehensive analyses of local coping capacity and whether or to what extent humanitarian appeals were funded or underfunded. **Due to limited funding available and the high number of people in need across the region, needs-based targeting has been key to ensure that priority was given to the most acute needs and the most vulnerable populations.** For example, given the strong needs identified in 2016 it was stated that, depending on funding available, DG ECHO would prioritise life-saving operations addressing the most urgent needs of the most vulnerable populations. Special attention was paid to migration flows and forced displacement, advocacy and international humanitarian law and access, particularly related to the voluntary, informed and coordinated returns of IDPs and refugees and monitoring of new arrivals.

2.3.1 Regional

2.3.1.1 Sectoral priorities

The HIPs between 2016-2020 identified the most acute humanitarian needs in the region by sector and established DG ECHO's strategy to prioritise their assistance in these areas. **At a regional level, the main focus is on life-saving assistance, relating broadly to food security, forced displacement and healthcare.** At the same time, DG ECHO continued to emphasize the need to **support on-going efforts to seek long-term solutions to recurrent issues** in terms of forced displacement and food insecurity. **Generally, an integrated, multi-sector approach was encouraged in project implementation to ensure integrated responses to the needs of the most vulnerable.** DG ECHO priorities in the HoA from 2016-2020 below summarises DG ECHO's prioritisation of most acute humanitarian needs by sector, what these consisted of, and the year they were identified in HIPs as a priority.

Table 5. DG ECHO priorities in the HoA from 2016-2020

Sector	Focus of needs	Years identified
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The legal protection of individuals against any violation of international humanitarian law and/or Refugee Law for Countries of Asylum, particularly the most vulnerable including individuals affected by conflict, IDPs/refugees (e.g. in camps, ensuring returns are voluntary and informed), children and women (e.g. against gender-based violence, in line with DG ECHO's 2013 Gender Policy). Increasing patterns of negative coping mechanisms were noted in 2019 and 2020 due to armed conflicts, and required support addressing. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2016 - 2020
Camp coordination and management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coordination and management of refugee camps including adequate registration, targeting of beneficiaries, opening camps if needed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2016
Shelter and NFIs	Shelter and non-food-items (NFIs) for individuals in refugee/IDP camps or settlements, individuals affected by natural disasters and/or the newly displaced.	2016 - 2020
Food Assistance, Food Security and Livelihoods	Access to food and water, means to improving animal/ livestock health, safety nets programmes and livelihood protections for individuals affected by the food and livelihood crises/ recurrent stress on livelihoods and food insecurity caused by shocks in the region and insufficient food assistance responses (e.g. through cash-based transfers)	2016 - 2020
Nutrition	Capacity to mitigate risks of excessive mortality and morbidity associated with critical rates of under-nutrition and micro-nutrient deficiency within the region (e.g. by scaling up the Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition or CMAM approach), particularly for children, pregnant and lactating women and in ASALs, in Somalia and in the Somali region of Ethiopia	2016 - 2020
Health	Capacity of local health systems to handle health issues (e.g. through improved vaccination coverage) including health conditions in IDP/refugee camps, population movements, the risk of disease transmission/epidemic outbreaks (and reluctance to recognise their occurrence), undernutrition and infant and maternal mortality, particularly in disaster-affected areas	2016 - 2020
WASH	Access to reliable, regular safe drinking water, WASH facilities, hygiene conditions and effective epidemic/water-borne disease alert and preparedness/response mechanisms, particularly in ASALs and IDP/refugee camps and settlements	2016 - 2020
Disaster Risk Reduction and Preparedness Resilience and Self-reliance	<p>Mainstreamed/ institutionalised disaster risk reduction and preparedness as well as regional capacity to manage risks, including through the incorporation of disaster risk reduction and resilience within the development agenda (e.g. through the development of a joint humanitarian-development framework) alongside ad-hoc interventions e.g. early warning systems, surge models, community approaches.</p> <p>Self-reliance for the refugee/IDP populations and their host communities in HOA</p>	<p>2016 - 2020</p> <p>(self-reliance only in 2017)</p>
Coordination and advocacy	Systematic and timely needs assessments, collection of data, and analysis to inform humanitarian coordination and communication of the complex local situation	2016 - 2020

Sector	Focus of needs	Years identified
Safety and security	Coordinated safety and security awareness for humanitarian actors in the context of volatile and deteriorating operational environments	2016 - 2020
Logistics	Humanitarian access to the region	2016 - 2020
Education in Emergencies (EiE)	Access to quality education (particularly for girls’), particularly for displaced children and children of refugee hosting communities (in 2017)	2017 - 2020

DG ECHO’s priorities in the HOA remained relatively stable over the evaluation period, although **addressing the needs of IDPs, asylum seekers and refugees was increasingly prioritised**, in particular addressing the needs of the most vulnerable throughout their displacement. In addition to providing life-saving assistance, prioritising Shelter and NFI’s, food assistance, and health, the protection of refugees and asylum seekers was prioritised. Closely monitoring new arrivals as well as coordinating voluntary returns of IDPs and refugees became increasingly important over the evaluation period. In 2017 the focus on specific response modalities for protracted refugees and IDPs was increased to go beyond care and maintenance and seek to enhance self-reliance. In this context, EiE also became a priority sector as of 2017, specifically focusing on displaced children and children of refugee hosting communities.

Due to worsened drought in 2018 and the lack of the DRM institutionalisation leading to poor disaster management, there was an increased focus on disaster risk reduction and preparedness as well as enhancing regional capacity to manage risks. To respond to the new humanitarian needs caused by the locust infestation that led to drastic deterioration of an already severe humanitarian situation, DG ECHO prioritised immediate food pre-positioning and food assistance as well as livelihood support, seeds (for farmers) and fodder distribution (to protect livestock), using whenever possible cash-based interventions.

Geographic prioritisation was based on the ability to access the most vulnerable populations in the different countries in across the region. For example, limited access to Eritrea and the unavailability of data restricted DG ECHO’s ability to assess humanitarian needs in the country, and therefore develop a response. Somalia has been one of DG ECHO’s priorities over the evaluation period due to continued conflict, and related displacements, severe drought, regular floods and other challenges, such as lack of basic social services. Nevertheless, access issues have sometimes prevented to prioritise and reach the most vulnerable people in need.

23.1.2 Overarching objectives for DG ECHO response

Over the evaluation period DG ECHO required that **all actions supported had to be context-adapted**, and thus based on independent and contextualised needs assessments. The operational context should always be considered by partners. For example, several HIPs note that within the Shelter and NFI sector it was essential for partners to consider the reality on the ground, including the environment, land tenure and protection concerns, when developing responses. Prevailing risk scenarios were also highlighted as an element of contextual data to be considered by partners when developing contingency plans.

In general, DG ECHO supports the most effective and efficient modality to provide assistance. However, HIPs in **2017** and **2019** referred to **Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer (MPCT) and unconditional cash transfers**, based on market analysis, as a preferred modality for addressing the needs of the most vulnerable. In 2020 DG ECHO had established a **basic needs approach (BNA)**, which embraced a mix of modalities including cash, vouchers and services. Nonetheless,

where possible and in line with local contextual factors, **cash** transfers were still the preferred modality due to its potential for enabling efficiency, accountability, and scalability.

Next, the **flexibility of solutions** supported by DG ECHO is also considered a priority. For example, throughout the evaluation period DG ECHO referred to the use of the **Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM)** and its role in enhancing capacity to respond to new emergencies. The 2017 HIP prioritised responses to new emergencies and mechanisms to mobilise resources to do so (e.g. encouraging partners to introduce flexibility through use of the **Crisis Modifier** tool) and analyse disaster risks. In areas characterised by large-scale people movements, the scale-up of rapid response capacities was prioritised. Given the volatility of the situation in the HoA, in 2018 DG ECHO stated its expectation for partners to maintain a flexible approach and to remain responsive to crises within a crisis.

Finally, the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) was developed following the 2016 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. **The CRRF aims to increase support to refugees and their host countries**, including by improving cooperation between humanitarian actors, development actors and host governments to develop more sustainable, durable solutions. DG ECHO prioritised actions that aligned with the Framework.

The following part provides a more detailed view of the humanitarian response priorities included in DG ECHO's strategy throughout the evaluation period for each country within the HoA.

2.3.2 Country-specific priorities

2.3.2.1 Ethiopia

- Priorities for interventions identified in 2016 included emergency preparedness and response and refugee assistance, including through use of the ERM mechanism, IDP-focussed interventions, projects linked to humanitarian coordination, vaccination campaigns and the provision of life-saving support. In addition, a common priority concern is the protection of unaccompanied minors among the refugee population hosted in the country, which is at that moment the largest refugee hosting country in Africa. The refugee population in the camps is highly dependent on food assistance, next to the food and nutrition insecure local population.
- The Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) remains in charge of all refugee affairs, however, the Ethiopian government is dependent on financing from the international community to address the needs of the refugees.
- By 2017, responses to the influx of new refugees that sought complementarities with the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) were prioritised. While it is the government's responsibility to address the needs of the IDPs, as of 2018, DG ECHO started to prioritise assistance to relocated IDPs in exceptional cases based on their needs and vulnerability across sectors (e.g., enhancing access to safe water for drinking, hygiene and livestock in IDP settlements, and providing NFIs for IDP camps or settlements).
- In 2020 DG ECHO allocated funding to focus on immediate food assistance and livelihood support, nutrition supplies, health and nutrition centres and treatment for malnutrition, prioritising areas affected by locusts and/or COVID-19.
- As a result of the crisis in Tigray at the end of 2020, DG sought to respond to protection needs and provide life-saving assistance (e.g. access to medical services, treatment for malnutrition, etc.).
- Key needs (by sector) included: food, livelihood support, water, sanitation and hygiene, health, nutrition, shelter and NFIs, protection and coordination.

23.2.2 Uganda

- In 2016, the key focus of DG ECHO's support in Uganda was the life-saving activities and protection of the refugee population, including preparing for the influx of refugees and epidemics. Disaster risk reduction was deemed to no longer add value. In 2017, priority was placed on new influxes of refugees rather than the protracted situation. By 2020, Crisis Modifiers were used to enable partners to implement capacity building-oriented disaster preparedness projects.
- Key needs (by sector) included: nutrition, shelter and NFIs, protection, health, coordination, food, livelihood support, water, sanitation and hygiene.

23.2.3 Somalia

- In 2016, DG ECHO noted it would use its funding to continue to focus on life-saving programmes for populations affected by crises, prioritised geographically, whilst considering recovery and resilience building. Building flexible response funds to allow timely responses to fresh crises remained a key focus.
- In 2017, the 1.1m IDPs were identified as a priority group for assistance. In 2020, DG ECHO noted in its strategy to prioritise actions focussed on the provision of life-saving activities for displaced populations affected by acute crises or exposed to epidemics, stating these should be based on common, pre-established vulnerability criteria but also take into account operational context of Somalia. By 2020 priority areas included populations affected by the locust infestation and/or COVID-19.
- Key needs (by sector) included: food, livelihood support, water, sanitation and hygiene, health, nutrition, shelter and NFIs, disaster risk reduction/preparedness, protection, coordination

23.2.4 Kenya

- DG ECHO prioritised support to Kenya in 2016 around assistance to IDPs and disaster risk reduction to contribute to resilience building, with a focus on areas with limited access to basic services. In refugee situations, interventions focussed on cost-effective solutions/opportunities for economic integration were prioritised alongside more sustainable solutions involving development actors and solutions considering protection.
- In 2017, DG ECHO also prioritised support to sustainable repatriation of refugees from the Dadaab camps based on compliance with international refugee law and the Tripartite Agreement signed between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR
- By 2020 focus was placed on emergency and basic life-saving programmes for those living in ASALs and for refugees and asylum seekers living in camps who faced conditions that made them dependent on aid despite the endorsement of the CRRF.
- Key needs (by sector) included: food, livelihood support, health, nutrition, disaster risk reduction/preparedness, coordination, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter and NFIs and protection.

23.2.5 Djibouti

- In 2016 funding mainly focussed on refugees, including care and maintenance as well as finding more durable solutions including voluntary return and increased self-reliance. Support for basic services to refugees remained the key focus throughout the evaluation period. Priorities remained supporting the newly arrived and protracted refugee populations with core humanitarian needs including WASH, food assistance and protection.

- By 2020 the recommended focus was the Education in Emergencies sector due to additional funding available for refugee response. The 2016 IAF recommended multi-sectoral approaches including coordination, health, nutrition, food security and livelihoods.
- Key needs (by sector) included: food, livelihood support, water, sanitation and hygiene, health, nutrition, disaster risk reduction/preparedness and coordination.

2.3.2.6 Eritrea

- Key needs (by sector) included: water, sanitation and hygiene, health and nutrition.


2.4 DG ECHO response in the Horn of Africa

DG ECHO’s humanitarian response in the HoA is driven by the most acute humanitarian needs but depends on available resources, and the operational context. The description of the DG ECHO response in the HoA in this section is uses data from the HOPE and EVA databases from DGECHO and the financial Tracking Service (FTS) from UN OCHA.

2.4.1 Regional

The analysis of FTS data reveals DG ECHO as third biggest donor in the HoA after the USA and the UK. With a total of €1b funding, **DG ECHO contributed towards almost 10% of the total humanitarian aid funding in the HoA between 2016-2020** (see Main humanitarian aid donors in HoA 2016-20). This emphasises the importance of DG ECHO as donor in the region.


Figure 3. Main humanitarian aid donors in HoA 2016-20



Source: UN OCHA FTS. ICF Analysis. Data extracted on 19/08/21. Exchange rate conversion: 1 EUR = 1.22 USD (based on the average exchange rate between 01/01/2010 - 31/12/2020) based on data from ECB: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html. Accessed 19/08/21. N = € 10,571,839,301 = total humanitarian aid to HoA region between 2016-20.

The high proportion of funding is relative to the strong humanitarian needs that were identified by the Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) in the region, which increased from high in 2016 to very high or extreme by 2020. **In total, DG ECHO funded projects in HoA reached 133,474,489 beneficiaries**, including both man and women, as well as beneficiaries across all age groups (see Number of beneficiaries reached by beneficiary type by DG ECHO funded projects in HoA). Number of beneficiaries reached by beneficiary type by DG ECHO funded projects in HoA).


Figure 4. Number of beneficiaries reached by beneficiary type by DG ECHO funded projects in HoA



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Total beneficiaries. % represents % of total beneficiaries: N = Total number of beneficiaries = 133,474,489

When looking at the evolution of DG ECHO funding to the HoA over the evaluation period a **strong increase of funding is shown from 2016 to 2017** (Evolution of DG ECHO funding to HoA), which coincides with the worsened humanitarian situation in the HoA following the protracted drought and the worsening refugee crisis across the region due to the continuing forced displacement of Somalis and the influx of refugees from South Sudan seeking refuge in Uganda and Ethiopia. **A decrease in funding can be noted from 2018 onwards** with 2020 recording the lowest amount of funding over the evaluation period.

Figure 5. Evolution of DG ECHO funding to HoA




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (DG ECHO funding), HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (Number of projects). ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number.

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Note: these values are based on consumption year. To estimate the number of projects per year in cases where there were projects containing multiple contracts in different years, the year of the first contract was used. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

The observed decrease in funding after 2017 shows to be a global trend (see Evolution of total humanitarian aid funding to HoA 2010-20 (€)). Despite the downward trend from 2018 to 2020, funding still remained almost double compared to 2015.

Figure 6. Evolution of total humanitarian aid funding to HoA 2010-20 (€)




Source: UN OCHA FTS. ICF Analysis. Data extracted on 17/08/21. Exchange rate conversion: 1 EUR = 1.22 USD (based on the average exchange rate between 01/01/2010 - 31/12/2020) based on data from ECB: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html. Accessed 19/08/21.

When looking at the number of DG ECHO funded projects related to forced displacement relative to the total number of funded projects, analysis shows that **more than 95% of the total funding over the evaluation period was used to address the needs of forcibly displaced and the host communities** (see Number of projects and DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement).

Figure 7. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement

Total DG ECHO funding directed towards projects related to forced displacement = €1,010,740,847

PART A : EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, 2016-2020




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (DG ECHO funding), HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (Number of projects). ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number.

Note: these values are based on consumption year. To estimate the number of projects per year in cases where there were projects containing multiple contracts in different years, the year of the first contract was used. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

When looking at DG ECHO funding by sector, **most of the funding was allocated to the FSL sector**, up to € 396m, accounting for 37% of the total amount of DG ECHO funding (see DG ECHO funding by sector). This corresponds to the high number of people in need of food assistance in the region. After FSL, the highest funded sectors included WASH (10%), Protection (9%), Nutrition (8%) and Health (8%).

Figure 8. DG ECHO funding by sector




Source: EVA data extracted on 21/07/21. (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Sheet: sectors matched Variable: Sector amount. N = DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

The MPCT sector received up to € 73m, or 7% of the total funding. Looking at the evolution of DG ECHO funding in the HoA by transfer modality, Annual DG ECHO funding in HoA by transfer modality (2016-20) Annual DG ECHO funding in HoA by transfer modality (2016-20) reveals that **in kind assistance has continuously decreased over the evaluation period, from € 92min in 2106 to**

€ 10m in 2020. The analysis also shows that cash and vouchers became a more standard modality for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In 2016, funding delivered through in-kind assistance was more than twice the funding delivered through cash & vouchers. This ratio reversed over the years.

Figure 9. Annual DG ECHO funding in HoA by transfer modality (2016-20)




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

Comparing the number of single sector projects to the number of multi-sector projects clearly shows that **more than 70% of funded projects address more than one sector** (see Number of single and multi-sector projects by country). This indicates that DG ECHO has been successful in encouraging an integrated, multi-sector approach in project implementation to ensure integrated responses to the needs of the most vulnerable.


Figure 10. Number of single and multi-sector projects by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Multi-sector. Total number of single sector projects = 80, and total number of multi-sector projects = 203. Values in the figure above sum to 287 as one project was conducted across multiple countries and has thus been counted in each country (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019).

When looking at DG ECHO funding to its main partners **the World Food Programme (WFP) received the highest amount of funding over the evaluation period**, accounting for 28% of DG ECHO's funding to its 59 framework partners in the HoA (see DG ECHO funding to main partners). WFP is followed by UNHCR, DG ECHO's main partner in delivering assistance in refugee crises, who received 7% of the total funding.


Figure 11. DG ECHO funding to main partners



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA. Main partners is defined as the top 10 partners receiving DG ECHO funding.

Last, when looking at DG ECHO funding by project duration, DG ECHO funding by project duration group shows that the biggest proportion of DG ECHO funding is allocated to projects with a duration of 12-18 months. 20% of total funding was allocated to projects that are 18 months or more.

Figure 12. DG ECHO funding by project duration group




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

2.4.2 DG ECHO response per country

Looking at DG ECHO response per country, **Ethiopia shows to be the highest recipient in the region** (see DG ECHO funding to HoA by country). Ethiopia is closely followed by Somalia, which received a total of € 362m. Uganda is the third biggest recipient in the region.

Figure 13. DG ECHO funding to HoA by country




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount.

Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

The amount of funding allocated to each country is proportionate to the number beneficiaries reached by the funded projects, with the highest number of beneficiaries reached in Ethiopia, followed by Somalia and Uganda (see Number of beneficiaries reached by projects in HoA by country).

Figure 14. Number of beneficiaries reached by projects in HoA by country




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Total beneficiaries. Total number of beneficiaries =133,474,489

Evolution of number of projects per HoA country shows the evolution of the number of projects per country. Overall, all countries showed a decrease in the number of projects funded by DG ECHO and reflects the decrease of funding allocated to the region. The number of DG ECHO funded projects in Kenya and, in particular, Somalia showed a strong drop in 2019 compared to

2018 reflecting the donor fatigue following the protracted refugee crisis. As of 2017 no projects were funded by DG ECHO in Eritrea.

Figure 15. Evolution of number of projects per HoA country




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number. Total number of projects = 283.

Note: These values are based on contracting year. The total number of projects in this graph (287) exceeds the actual number of projects within the scope of the evaluation (283) as one project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019), and has therefore been counted multiple times.

Finally, when looking at the proportion of total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers per country, more than 40% of the funding in Somalia and Kenya was delivered through these two modalities. Only 10% of the total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers was used in Ethiopia. .

Figure 16. Proportion of total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers per country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

3 Evaluation Findings

This section presents the findings from our research, based on a different source of information (see Section Methodological approach). Each evaluation question starts with a summary of key findings per judgement criteria as well as an assessment of the strength of evidence, using a colour code system following ranking:

Ranking of evidence	
Strong	<p>High quality body of evidence, large or medium in size, highly or moderately consistent, and contextually relevant.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality – includes evidence includes high quality studies and evaluations and/or good quality soft data • Size – large or medium • Consistency – similar messages emerge from different pieces of evidence. There might be some areas of dissonance / divergence
Medium	<p>Moderate quality studies, medium size evidence body, moderate level of consistency. Studies may or may not be contextually relevant</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality –good quality soft data • Size –medium • Consistency – similar messages emerge from different pieces of evidence. There might be some areas of dissonance / divergence
Weak	<p>The evidence is limited to a single source of questionable quality (i.e. there is an obvious risk of bias) or, is mainly anecdotal in nature, or there are many sources of evidence but the information they provide is highly contradictory and it is not possible to distinguish their quality.</p>

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 EQ1. *To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded actions, including cash-based, take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people?*

Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC1.1 The most vulnerable are adequately identified, and their (up to date) needs, vulnerabilities and capacities adequately understood		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO adequately understood the differentiated humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable populations. HIPs between 2016-2020 adequately identified and prioritised assistance to the most acute humanitarian needs using IAF analyses from quantitative and qualitative assessments. • DG ECHO’s framework and local implementing partners also considered the needs of the most vulnerable in the design and implementation of funded actions. Framework partners and implementing partners throughout the evaluation period conducted independent, localised needs assessments to identify the up-to-date needs. In practice, partners also took

		<p>action to better understand, or refine processes for understanding, such needs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO and its framework and local implementing partners adequately identified, and targeted support to, the most vulnerable, though there were some exceptions.
<p>JC1.2 In its response to forced displacement, DG ECHO and its partners showed an understanding of the differentiated needs of IDPs, refugees, returnees and host communities.</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence suggests DG ECHO understood the specific needs of IDPs, refugees, returnees, and host communities in its response • DG ECHO's partners took steps to understand differentiated needs in their response to forced displacement
<p>JC1.3 DG ECHO's chosen strategy (BNA, integrated approach to addressing the priority needs of different groups) was appropriate</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO and its partners' strategies for identifying priority needs, including the BNA, were appropriate. Framework and implementing partners' processes were also fair and transparent. • DG ECHO and its partners' chosen modalities for delivering support were generally appropriate since these were perceived to be evidence-driven and effective in reaching the most vulnerable groups in practice Feedback from case studies and stakeholder consultation provided strong evidence that cash support was delivered appropriately.
<p>JC1.4 In the design and implementation of funded actions DG ECHO took into consideration country level specificities</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country-level specificities were considered in the design and implementation of funded actions by DG ECHO. When choosing funding priorities, DG ECHO took into account the specific context of the country and region

DG ECHO adequately identified and understood the differentiated humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable populations (JC1.1). HIPs between 2016-2020 identified and prioritised assistance to the most acute humanitarian needs in the region by sector, beneficiary type and country by conducting in-depth country-level assessments using the Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF). Evidence from the desk research showed that IAF analyses were complemented in HIPs with various additional assessments, including of the number of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and returnees in each country, local coping capacity and the extent to which appeals were able to be funded.⁵⁰ DG ECHO also demonstrated its awareness differentiated needs by noting that natural disasters and human-made crises, such as those affecting the region during the evaluation period, were not gender neutral and would thus require interventions tailored to differentiated needs of beneficiary groups.⁵¹

Evidence from the stakeholder consultation confirmed that efforts were made by DG ECHO to assess and adequately understand the up-to-date needs of beneficiary groups. EU staff consulted raised that IAF analyses were based on objective, data-based assessments (e.g., global data

⁵⁰ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

⁵¹ Gender in Humanitarian Aid: Different Needs, Adapted Assistance Available [here](#).

collections such as INFORM) as well as qualitative assessments from DG ECHO's field presence and humanitarian expertise to enhance its robustness, since data are not always available or accurate. Indeed, EU staff and framework partners consulted stated that field experts in specific sectors (e.g., gender and protection) reviewed and identified the needs of beneficiary groups. For example, in Djibouti, a team from DG ECHO was present on the ground to identify needs, despite the onset of Covid-19 in 2020.⁵² Qualitative assessments of humanitarian coordination, partners' implementation capacity, the relative stability of the humanitarian situation and the presence of other donors, were similarly considered when assessing overall needs.

Evidence from the stakeholder consultation found this combination of DG ECHO's close presence and extensive data collection to be a strength, enabling its good understanding of needs and vulnerabilities. In fact, stakeholders consulted generally agreed that DG ECHO correctly identified the most urgent humanitarian needs within its HIPs, strategies, and priorities and that its priorities were consistent with relevant needs. For example, DG ECHO identified highly relevant needs associated with protection, medical and psychosocial support to migrants and survivors of GBV in Djibouti, within the Obock region, within a highly vulnerable group of beneficiaries. Most of the respondents to the multi-modal survey also agreed or somewhat agreed (92.6%) that DG ECHO's HIPs correctly identified the most urgent humanitarian needs in the region.⁵³ Nonetheless, two framework partners⁵⁴ consulted raised that there was room for improvement in how DG ECHO prioritised needs. It was noted that some valid needs such as those relating to the protracted refugee crisis in Ethiopia, were deprioritised. It was suggested that DG ECHO consult with framework partners further when developing HIPs to address such gaps.

DG ECHO's framework and local implementing partners also took into account the needs of the most vulnerable in the design and implementation of funded actions (JC1.1). Framework partners and implementing partners throughout the evaluation period conducted independent, localised needs assessments to identify the up-to-date needs of the most vulnerable, and target the support provided. Only two of the 70 actions reviewed did not include a reference to a needs assessment having been conducted prior to the implementation of the action.⁵⁵ In addition, of the 52 actions reviewed that contained a cash component, 39 were assessed by the research team to have been designed and implemented in a way that was explicitly sensitive to the different needs of targeted populations, for example whether the response provided sufficient supply and transfer values to cover basic consumption needs. This judgement was based on analysis of project data available regarding project implementation, uptake of support, implementation and uptake of support, market assessments, site visits and analysis of recommendations made by communities and agencies such as the inter-agency cash working group, for example.⁵⁶ Stakeholder consultation highlighted that a wide range of methods were applied by framework and implementing partners to understand needs and monitor their evolution, including: vulnerability screening during registration, quantitative data collection, vulnerability analysis of target populations and cooperation with local administrative structures, committees and humanitarian actors. Of the 70 actions reviewed, 56 were found to have involved beneficiaries in the development of needs assessments, emphasising that this was a common practice.⁵⁷

In practice, framework and implementing partners also took action to better understand, or refine processes for understanding, such needs. EU staff, framework partners, key informant interviewees and field interviewees consulted all provided examples of approaches to doing so, which included developing and implementing: warning systems to provide information on

⁵² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 9

⁵³ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N= 122

⁵⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 7 and 8

⁵⁵ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

⁵⁶ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

⁵⁷ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

developing crises and sectoral and overall needs, food security working groups, analytical tools such as IPC that model oncoming crises and provide predictive information, regular surveys assessing local communities' basic needs, regular visits to the field to assess and report on emerging/priority needs and engaging in humanitarian cluster coordination meetings.

DG ECHO and its framework and local implementing partners adequately identified, and targeted support to, the most vulnerable (JC1.1). Evidence from the desk review showed that, in its HIPs, DG ECHO established its general intention to prioritise assistance through needs-based, and in cases such as Somalia, geographic targeting. Nonetheless, as stated in Section 2.3 above, due to limited funding available, and the high number of people in need across the region, needs-based targeting was key throughout the evaluation period to ensure that priority was given to the most acute needs and the most vulnerable populations. Guidelines provided by DG ECHO for applying for HIP funding highlighted the importance of ensuring the most vulnerable benefit from funded actions, requiring applicants to set out in detail how this would be done.⁵⁸ One stakeholder interviewed noted DG ECHO's role in leading discussions around targeting: "Discussions led by DG ECHO around the targeting of groups: even though women are vulnerable there are layers of vulnerability within each broader group".⁵⁹

Key informant interviews highlighted the various ways in which framework and implementing partners identified the most vulnerable, including by:

- Following internal policies and practices. Of the 68 actions reviewed as part of the project mapping, 61 were found to explicitly refer in Single Forms or FichOps to DG ECHO and framework partners' own guidelines and support specifically targeting women and children.⁶⁰ This included organisational policies on targeting women to receive unconditional cash transfers, child safeguarding guidelines and strategies for gender and child protection mainstreaming. For example:⁶¹
 - Age, Gender and Diversity policies during selection and targeting of beneficiaries, which gave priority to weakest members of the community and ensured persons with specific needs were supported
 - Standard operating procedures on cash transfers that required 40% of Village Relieve Committee members, tasked with selecting beneficiaries, to be women⁶²
- Adopting a lifecycle approach to targeting i.e., focussing on pregnant women, the young and elderly⁶³
- Similarly to methods adopted to identify needs, using a range of data sources and inputs including vulnerability analysis of target population, internal assessments conducted by local implementing partners, coordination with local administration and community members, analysis of local contexts and secondary data analysis to identify targeting criteria and the neediest persons
-
- Of the 70 actions reviewed, 51 explicitly referred to involving the community in designing actions, including in setting targeting criteria and identifying vulnerability criteria.⁶⁴ Evidence from case studies and stakeholder consultation confirm that community-based targeting was often employed to identify the most vulnerable. Engaging communities in

⁵⁸ DG ECHO. DG ECHO Partners' Website. Available [here](#).

⁵⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 13

⁶⁰ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

⁶¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 20 and field interview no. 3

⁶² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 21

⁶³ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 1a

⁶⁴ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

the process of defining main vulnerabilities and providing lists of eligible beneficiaries was found to be effective since it drew on intimate local knowledge and understanding of vulnerabilities, established strong community entry points and reduced risks of disputes arising from the selection process. However, concerns around protection and risks of exclusion were also raised in the stakeholder consultation. For example, evidence from the cash case study found that in Somalia, there were widely held concerns that community-based targeting resulted in the exclusion of people from minority clans or who were not ethnic Somalis, often the most vulnerable groups due to exclusion from income earning opportunities. Evidence from the stakeholder consultation also, however, highlighted efforts made by framework and implementing partners to ensure accuracy of community-based targeting and minimise such risks, including verifying lists of beneficiaries with home visits and providing training to community members on selection criteria of beneficiaries.

-
- **In its response to forced displacement specifically, evidence suggests DG ECHO understood the needs of IDPs, asylum seekers and refugees, returnees, and host communities (JC1.2).** Framework partners consulted overall agreed that DG ECHO's strategies and priorities regarding forced displacement were relevant and aligned with the needs of forcibly displaced persons in general. There was more limited evidence from consultations regarding the extent to which needs were differentiated across IDPs, refugees, asylum seekers, returnees and host communities in DG ECHO's strategies. However, most respondents to the multi modal survey agreed (59%) or somewhat agreed (31.1%) that DG ECHO's response to forced displacement in the region showed sufficient understanding of the differentiated needs of refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities.⁶⁵ Also, as stated in Section 2.3 above, addressing the needs of refugees and asylum seekers was increasingly prioritised in the HIPs throughout the evaluation period, suggesting differentiated needs were identified for these groups. Closely monitoring new arrivals as well as coordinating voluntary returns of IDPs and refugees also became increasingly important over time.
-
- **DG ECHO's partners took steps to understand differentiated needs in their response to forced displacement (JC1.1).** Examples of actions taken to identify relevant and differentiated needs in responses to forced displacement, identified through consultations, including with framework partners, include: deploying vulnerability assessment experts at migrant response centres, conducting regular group discussions at refugee registration centres, conducting protection monitoring with IDPs to identify sectoral needs, drawing on surveys and secondary data, and conducting a baseline survey following an influx of new refugees to understand their needs. In terms of targeting, framework partners consulted raised that, while a blanket approach was adopted to supporting refugees, particularly those residing in camps, beneficiaries with specific needs were identified within those groups as well. One interviewee noted the increasing requirement to focus sectoral responses on the most vulnerable refugees through needs assessments, due to lack of funding.⁶⁶

Country-level specificities were considered in the design and implementation of funded actions by DG ECHO (JC1.4). Evidence from the desk review showed that when choosing funding priorities, DG ECHO took into account the specific context of the country and region, often complementing IAF assessments with comprehensive analyses of local coping capacity and whether, or to what extent, humanitarian appeals were funded or underfunded. Also, beneficiary

⁶⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N= 122

⁶⁶ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no.8

groups that were prioritised for assistance, and methods of prioritisation varied depending on the country within the region. For example, as elaborated in Section 2.3 above, geographic prioritisation was implemented where the ability to access and assess the most vulnerable populations across the region was limited, such as in Somalia. Given Kenya's relatively strong economy and relatively high number of refugees, funded actions focussed support to refugees, particularly undocumented and unregistered refugees. In Somalia, funded actions centred around support to IDPs due to high levels of internal displacement in the country.⁶⁷ In Uganda, DG ECHO's support mainly covered response to the refugee crisis, including host communities. However, stakeholder consultations raised that adherence to the policy guidance requirement around supporting 30% of the host community varied depending on the service provided. For example, whereas health, education and wash support included host beneficiaries, household assistance such as food and NFI were provided only to refugees. This was in part because some types of support (e.g., health centres) were integrated into the wider community system than others, that are more household based such as food and NFI.⁶⁸

DG ECHO and its partners' strategies for identifying priority needs were appropriate (JC1.3). DG ECHO's processes for identifying needs and targeting support were generally deemed to be appropriate. Stakeholder consultation and case study evidence also pointed to the fact that framework and implementing partners' processes were also considered as fair and transparent. The community approaches to identifying needs and selection criteria were pointed out as enablers of this, as detailed above, alongside setup of inclusive, community-elected committees and complaints mechanisms for beneficiaries and community members.

The BNA approach has been operational in Uganda since 2019. A basic needs framework approach is a well-coordinated complete response, using cash where possible, benefiting from sector specific expertise to ensure quality and strengthen an overall coherent and coordinated response.⁶⁹ Stakeholder consultation showed that this approach was generally deemed an appropriate strategy since it led to improved collaboration, coordination and referral mechanisms amongst framework and implementing partners. However, challenges in implementing this approach, regarding limited budgets and high levels of demand and need were raised within the stakeholder consultation.

DG ECHO and its partners' chosen modalities for delivering support were generally appropriate (JC1.3). Assessments of what would be the most appropriate delivery modality were explicitly mentioned in 47 of the 70 actions reviewed.⁷⁰ This broadly consisted of setting out the rationale for the chosen modality, such as whether certain modalities were recommended in emergency situations or whether they could enable immediate needs, including those of specific beneficiary groups (e.g. refugees), to be met.⁷¹ Assessments were based on a range of data, including project evaluation data, consultations with communities, framework partners' experience and analyses of security and logistical challenges.⁷²

Regarding cash specifically, in 2017 and 2019, the HIPs stated that unconditional MPCT, based on market analysis, were the preferred implementation modality for addressing the needs of vulnerable populations.⁷³ Cash was selected based on evidence that, amongst other benefits, it enabled beneficiaries to fulfil their needs whilst prioritising these themselves.⁷⁴ Feedback from case studies and stakeholder consultation provided strong evidence that cash support was

⁶⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no.1

⁶⁸ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 2c

⁶⁹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

⁷⁰ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects). In a minority of these 47 actions the analysis was noted to be limited.

⁷¹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects).

⁷² ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects). In a minority of these 47 actions the analysis was noted to be limited.

⁷³ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

⁷⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

delivered appropriately. DG ECHO required funding applicants to explain their rationale for using cash, including the modality. Several examples were provided of cases in which framework partners accurately assessed the appropriateness and feasibility of the use of cash before rolling it out. Partners reportedly considered a range of factors including: target community preferences, availability of infrastructure and phone network coverage, existence of transfer agency, safety and availability of markets. For example, one EU staff member consulted stated that in the recent emergency response to the Tigray crisis in Ethiopia, one framework partner put on hold its cash-based intervention due to a lack of market capacity, risks of inflation and reduced safety of access.⁷⁵

Nonetheless, challenges with the implementation of cash support were also reported, as described further in EQ14. For example, one EU staff member reported that in Kenya, the Central bank imposed restrictions on distribution of cash to individuals without identity cards, restricting access for certain vulnerable groups, including refugees.⁷⁶ In addition, evidence from the stakeholder consultation and case studies highlighted constraints relating to cash as a modality across countries in the region, relating to: poor financial literacy, individuals being absent on cash distribution days, distance to cash distribution offices limiting accessibility, forgery, cash diversion and, in the case of Uganda specifically,⁷⁷ children not being legally allowed to receive cash. Some evidence was provided in interviews regarding partners' efforts to address such challenges. For example, in Tigray implementing partners negotiated with key suppliers to move cash distribution points closer to beneficiaries where banks are not nearby. Further, some challenges relating to physical cash distribution were avoided by the use of electronic cash, though this in itself was associated with drawbacks (e.g., beneficiaries not remembering pin numbers).

In practice, there is evidence that vulnerable groups were reached by actions, further adding to evidence of the appropriateness of chosen strategies. Most of the respondents to the multi-modal survey agreed that DG-ECHO funded actions contributed fully (34.4%) or to a large extent (47.5%) to the alleviation of human suffering via meeting basic needs.⁷⁸ Evidence from stakeholder consultation also confirmed that funding went to the most vulnerable, for example refugees and asylum seekers overall, the growing number of IDPs, individuals 'at risk' regarding protection, vulnerable women and children, pregnant mothers, marginalised groups such as minorities and individuals with disabilities and chronic diseases and the elderly, depending on local context and the type of shock experienced. Further, of the 283 projects included within ICF's portfolio analysis, 39% were given a 2 on their Gender-Age Marker, while 41% were assigned a 1, as seen in Percentage of DG ECHO funded actions integrating women and girls, and resilience below. This means that most projects met at least two or three of the four criteria used to assess how strongly gender and age considerations are integrated into their actions, with only 1% was meeting none of the criteria (i.e. achieving a mark of 0) and a fairly large percentage of the projects meeting all four criteria (i.e. achieving a mark of 2). However, some FGDs and KIIs consulted highlighted that at times needs remained unaddressed, due to inadequate funding and the high levels of need.


⁷⁵ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 4a

⁷⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 1

⁷⁷ ICF. 2021. Cash case study

⁷⁸ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N= 122

Figure 17. Percentage of DG ECHO funded actions integrating women and girls, and resilience



Source: HOPE data extracted on 07/07/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Gender Age Marker; Resilience Marker; Variable: Desk officer mark (FR RM). N = Number of projects = 283. The category N/A includes projects which were marked as N/A or left blank.

3.1.2 EQ2. To what extent were the needs of the most vulnerable population, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people taken into account in the design and implementation of the refugee response strategy in Ethiopia and Uganda (Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework - CRRF)?

Table 6. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC2.1 DG ECHO needs assessments take into consideration the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in Uganda and Ethiopia		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The CRRF is an UN-led initiative at global level and was initially a preliminary step taken towards the adoption of the 'global compact on refugees' (GRC), which is still applied as a framework for GCR. Uganda championed the CRRF throughout the evaluation period with some success, and efforts towards the adoption of sectoral response plans around the CRRF were noted. In Ethiopia, limited progress was made. There is some evidence that DG ECHO's needs assessments considered the differentiated needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in Uganda and Ethiopia. In both countries, the design and implementation of DG ECHO funded actions was driven by comprehensive needs assessments that accurately identified needs.
JC2.2 The priorities and objectives identified in the HIPs for the HoA took into consideration the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in Ethiopia and Uganda		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is some evidence, mainly from the HIPs, that DG ECHO considered the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in Ethiopia and Uganda in its priorities and objectives

JC2.3 The DG ECHO funded actions in Ethiopia and Uganda had appropriate systems in place to assess the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations

- There is some evidence that DG ECHO and its partners made efforts to ensure the systems in place to assess the needs of vulnerable refugee populations were appropriate, for example by reviewing the efficacy of targeting and tailoring modalities to suit beneficiary needs.

The CRRF is an UN-led initiative at a global level and was initially a preliminary step taken towards the adoption of a 'global compact on refugees' (GRC) but is currently still included as part of the GRC. This promoted the idea that refugees should be included in communities from the outset, since enabling their access to education and labour markets would result in their contribution to the economy, encouraging self-reliance and reducing the risks associated with protracted displacement. The CRRF centred on developing an open-door policy for asylum seekers meaning that the need for registration of asylum seekers alongside durable solutions, integration, and possible movement to a third country was required. Throughout 2017 and 2018, it was rolled out in different refugee situations across several countries, including Uganda and Ethiopia. In parallel to the development of the CRRF, the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) was created, which in the HoA was heavily drawn upon to support refugees. The literature reviewed stated that the regional roll out of the CRRF was viewed as a unique opportunity to leverage EU policy in a multi-donor context, and guide nexus programming.⁷⁹

The evidence reviewed suggests that Uganda championed the CRRF throughout the evaluation period with some success, and efforts towards the adoption of sectoral response plans around the CRRF were noted. However, stakeholder consultation highlighted that Uganda already had a favourable environment for refugees. Good foundations for the delivery of the Framework were present, given the good practice demonstrated through the Ugandan Refugee Engagement Forum, which was a key channel for the refugee voice in the CRRF coordination structure.⁸⁰ In Uganda, the CRRF fed into the national development plan, meaning refugees were integrated into national planning and statistics that inform sectoral plans on jobs, education and health, for example.⁸¹ Evidence from the cash case study showed that the CRRF enabled the introduction of measures allowing refugees to settle in an area, to move around the territory, to work, and gives access to basic social structures. It also highlighted the integration of the CRRF in national plans including the national refugee response plan, settlement transformative agenda, and ReHoPE strategy. Nonetheless, the size of the refugee influx into Uganda since 2016 created tensions between refugees and host communities, straining local capacity for integration as well as DG ECHO's ability to meet refugee's needs to some extent.⁸²

In Ethiopia, limited progress was made in implementing the CRRF throughout the evaluation period. EU staff consulted stated that the roll-out of the CRRF in Ethiopia had been completely stalled following the dismantling of the CRRF coordination unit by the ARRA.⁸³

There is some evidence that DG ECHO considered the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in Ethiopia and Uganda in its priorities and objectives (JC2.2). In its HIPs throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO noted its intention to prioritise funding actions that aligned with the framework, including those that increased registration and integration of refugee children.⁸⁴ Regarding Uganda, DG ECHO's HIP in 2016 stated that the key focus of its support would be on

⁷⁹ Altai Consulting (2018). EUTF Monitoring and Learning System Q1 HOA. Available [here](#).; ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 2d

⁸⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no.D2

⁸¹ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no.2f

⁸² ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO Missions Reports

⁸³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no.4, DG ECHO Staff Comments

⁸⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

life-saving activities and the protection of the refugee population, including preparing for the influx of refugees and possible related epidemics.⁸⁵ However, in practice, by 2019 DG ECHO identified that pledges related to the CRRF that were made by countries within the HoA had not yet materialised into concrete improvements for refugees overall.⁸⁶

There is also some evidence that DG ECHO’s needs assessments considered the differentiated needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in Uganda and Ethiopia (JC2.1). As noted in EQ1, needs assessments conducted by DG ECHO across the region were detailed and often disaggregated by type of beneficiary, including refugees, IDPs and host communities.⁸⁷ Evidence from the stakeholder consultation and case studies highlighted that in both Uganda and Ethiopia, the design and implementation of DG ECHO funded actions was driven by comprehensive needs assessments, drawing on tools such as government nutrition monitors, cluster assessments or IOM’s Displacement Tracking Monitoring, as well as through discussion with refugees, local governments and host communities.⁸⁸ Donor visits were conducted where possible, though in some cases (e.g. the Tigray region) access was limited. Where this occurred, case study evidence showed that implementing partners drew upon third party monitors to assess needs.⁸⁹ Generally, evidence from the stakeholder consultation suggests that such assessments accurately identified the needs of the most vulnerable in Ethiopia and Uganda. However, one interviewee highlighted that in Tigray needs assessments were “at times overdone, and it is important to balance urgent response with profiling needs”.⁹⁰ Also, case study evidence showed that high levels of need in Ethiopia and Uganda meant that some vulnerable people or areas may have been neglected in assessments.

There is some evidence that DG ECHO and its partners made efforts to ensure the systems in place to assess the needs of vulnerable refugee populations were appropriate (JC2.3). For example, DG ECHO reviewed the efficacy of targeting of vulnerable populations through several field missions: in Ethiopia, a mission report found that sufficient independent beneficiary targeting was done, however some essential practices including risk assessments were not conducted for one of the MPCT funded actions.⁹¹ Further, set out in EQ1, in Uganda the BNA was implemented to enable access to a range of services, based on differentiated needs. This suggests that DG ECHO and its partners attempted to ensure systems to assess such needs were appropriate.

3.1.3 EQ3. To what extent was a clear and context-adapted regional strategy designed and applied in the HoA?

Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC3.1 DG ECHO’s strategy and funded actions, including cash, in the HoA were comprehensive and context-adapted		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is some evidence that suggests that DG ECHO’s strategy and funded actions were context adapted, and flexible in adjusting to changes in context. Its strategy was to allocate EU humanitarian assistance according to specific country needs, based on

⁸⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

⁸⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

⁸⁷ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

⁸⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 6

⁸⁹ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 4c

⁹⁰ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 4c

⁹¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO Missions Reports

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
		comprehensive analysis of operational context per country.
JC3.2 DG ECHO's needs and other assessments comprehensively address all relevant aspects in the region (e.g. sectors, vulnerable groups, gender, etc.)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO's needs and other assessments addressed relevant aspects in the region, requiring funded actions to be based on assessments within each country.
JC3.3 DG ECHO's process for identifying needs and the most relevant type of response at regional level is fit for purpose		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence gathered throughout the evaluation points to the fact that, despite some examples of regional responses to specific crises, a regional strategy was not adopted in the HoA. Therefore, it is not possible to assess DG ECHO's process for identifying needs and the most relevant type of response at regional level. • The need for a more joined up strategy was generally recognised, though it was also raised that that the extent to which a regional strategy is appropriate is context, and crisis, dependent

Evidence gathered throughout the evaluation points to the fact that a fully joined-up regional strategy was not adopted in the HoA, and therefore it was not possible to assess DG ECHO's process for identifying needs and the most relevant type of response at regional level (JC3.3).

HIPs throughout the evaluation period are presented as regional HIPs, covering needs for all countries together. EU staff interviewed noted that the introduction of a regional HIP for the HoA demonstrated attempts to develop regional coherence and a regional, or common approach towards identifying the main humanitarian needs. However, HIPs throughout the evaluation period consisted mostly of the addition of the individual needs within each country in the region, rather than the needs and trends across the region as a whole. In addition, the 2020 HIP covered Uganda within the Upper Nile Basin region, potentially suggesting a shift towards a new regional grouping. In practice, responses were mainly delivered at the country level, though some examples of occasions in which regional responses to specific crises were raised. For example, evidence from the stakeholder consultation showed that DG ECHO had adopted a regional approach or dimension to tackle the problem with desert locust infestations in 2019, and the refugee crises that affected the region throughout the evaluation period, as well as the drought in 2011, though the latter was outside of the scope of this evaluation.

The need for a more joined up strategy was generally recognised. For example, in one report reviewed, DG ECHO noted that in the HoA there was a need to both adapt solutions to rapidly changing national environments, and tie these to one another due to the effect these have across borders.⁹² Framework partners surveyed mostly agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO should have adopted a more regional strategy.⁹³ Feedback from the stakeholder consultation highlighted that, in Somalia for example a regional strategy or policy may have been effective in supporting the management of refugees, but was not sufficiently strong or well-managed to do so⁹⁴. In Ethiopia, a regional approach could have been effective in enabling flood management since dam management in Ethiopia directly influences flooding in Somalia.

⁹² EUTF Monitoring and Learning System Q1 Horn of Africa - QUARTERLY REPORT – Q1 2018. Available [here](#).

⁹³ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

⁹⁴ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 3a

Despite this, findings indicate that DG ECHO's needs and other assessments addressed relevant aspects in the region (JC3.2). As set out in EQ1, DG ECHO's HIPs assessed relevant needs across each country using the IAF, which were generally perceived as accurate and appropriate by framework and implementing partners. DG ECHO also required funded actions to be based on independent and contextualised needs assessments within each country, noting the need for an improved understanding of the local context and challenges to inform resilience strategies.⁹⁵ In Kenya, for example, needs assessments steered the focus of DG ECHO-funded actions towards support to refugees, particularly in the Dadaab camp where such analysis identified that little other support was provided.⁹⁶

Findings also provide some evidence that suggests DG ECHO's HIPs and funded actions were context adapted (3.1). As noted in EQ1, throughout the evaluation period DG ECHO expressed its intention to allocate EU humanitarian assistance according to specific country needs within the region, particularly given the variety of country profiles and specific crises experienced.⁹⁷ These would be assessed using indicators of vulnerability and economic and social development trends.⁹⁸ HIPs throughout the evaluation period also evidenced DG ECHO's strategy to prioritise actions based on comprehensive analysis and consideration of the operational context within each country in the HoA.⁹⁹

In practice, framework partners surveyed mostly agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO showed sufficient flexibility in adjusting its approach to changes in context.¹⁰⁰ Analysis of the proportion of DG ECHO funding to the HoA throughout the evaluation period also suggests the implementation of a context-adapted strategy across countries in the region. For example, DG ECHO funding by type of partner (i.e. international organisation, NGO or the UN) varied across countries, as shown in Figure 18 below as well as the split of funding towards cash and vouchers and across sectors (see A1.1).¹⁰¹ Analysis of the use of modality (cash, voucher, in-kind) across countries in the region reviewed as part of the desk research confirmed the presence of country variation across the region, suggesting context adaptation¹⁰².

Findings from the case studies further evidenced that DG ECHO's funded actions were implemented in a manner that was flexible and adapted to the country context in practice. For example, in Ethiopia, implementing partners negotiated with cash distribution agents to move closer to where affected populations are located, due to potential security risks.¹⁰³ In Somalia, following reports of beneficiaries facing difficulties accessing WFP distribution sites, food vouchers were replaced with electronic money.

⁹⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO HIPs

⁹⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 1

⁹⁷ Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change 2011. Available [here](#).

⁹⁸ Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change 2011. Available [here](#).

⁹⁹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO HIPs


¹⁰⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁰¹ ICF. 2021. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases

¹⁰² Use of modality PPT HoA 2017-2021. GHOA.

¹⁰³ ICF. 2021. Cash case study

Figure 18. Proportion of DG ECHO funding to types of partners per country



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA.¹⁰⁴

Consultations with EU staff highlighted that the extent to which a regional strategy is appropriate is context dependent (JC3.3). Some types of crises affect multiple regions, and therefore call for a regional response and coordination. For example, refugee crises are inherently a regional issue and have been known to lead to effective and efficient responses when tackled from a regional perspective (e.g., by enabling funding to be easily repurposed across countries in line with need, which is particularly pertinent given challenges associated with monitoring of refugee influxes). Sudden-onset environmental crises, including floods and desert locust infestations were also suggested to warrant a regional perspective, partly due to the fact that these issues affect several countries but also due to the volatility of the situation and need for rapid response. One interviewee stated that the Southern Africa and Indian Ocean HIP provided a good example of the implementation of a ‘cross-cutting’ regional strategy, focussed on specific themes or crises.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, one interviewee stated implementing a regional funding line would be challenging, since DG ECHO’s partnership’s structures are not currently set up in a manner that would facilitate ownership and accountability for actions funded and delivered regionally.¹⁰⁶ For example, when it adopted a regional funding approach in the region following the 2011 drought or the 2019 desert locust infestation, the interviewee recalled that DG ECHO and its partners encountered challenges in implementation, due to limited coordination between partners across countries and country-level specificities, resulting in a lack of ownership and accountability for the effectiveness of implementation in specific countries. This resulted in inefficiencies and reduced motivation. Perhaps indicative of the challenges, it appears that other national donors, including DFID and USAID, have not adopted a regional strategy in the Horn of Africa, though DFID does have a regional resilience network and framework for the Horn of Africa and some international organisations such as IOM and UNHCR were found to have a regional strategy covering (part of) the Horn of Africa. Another interviewee stated: “A regional approach is not an objective in itself. It should serve a purpose.”¹⁰⁷ Concerns regarding efficiency implications of a regional approach were also raised by EU staff consulted: where crises were not inherently regional adding management layers to deliver multi-country actions and conducting needs assessments may be less efficient.

¹⁰⁴ Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

¹⁰⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 2

¹⁰⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 2

¹⁰⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 3

3.1.4 EQ4. To what extent were EU-funded actions, including cash responses, rapid, timely and sufficiently flexible to allow partners to have a relevant response, including to new crises?

Table 7. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC4.1 DG ECHO's funding mechanisms are flexible enough to facilitate a rapid and timely response		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO's strategies and priorities placed importance on the timeliness and flexibility of funding mechanisms and funded actions. • Throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO aimed to enable and emphasise the importance of flexibility in its responses, and it and its partners took steps to enable timely responses. • DG ECHO was generally perceived to be a comparatively flexible donor, which enabled an effective and rapid response to a variety of needs. However, some areas for improvement were identified in terms of DG ECHO's timeliness and flexibility.
JC4.2 The use of solutions allowing for flexibility of funded actions was maximised by DG ECHO and its partners		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solutions allowing for flexibility of funded actions, including cash (and the crisis modifier tool), as well as the emergency response mechanism, were drawn upon by DG ECHO and its partners, enabling funded actions to provide a relevant response • Solutions allowing for flexibility may require expanding upon, and may not have been 'maximised' as such.

DG ECHO's strategies and priorities placed importance on the timeliness and flexibility of funding mechanisms and funded actions (JC4.1). The EU has stressed that DG ECHO's funds should be *rapidly* dispersed on the basis of an initial assessment of the situation on the ground, following the onset of a natural disaster.¹⁰⁸ Some of the 10 principles of Cash Transfer noted by DG ECHO are that such responses should be effective and efficient in responding to pressing needs.¹⁰⁹ Also, within its 2017 HIP for the region, DG ECHO emphasised the need for timely needs assessments in relation to improving humanitarian coordination.¹¹⁰ Evidence from the stakeholder consultation and case studies conducted showed that DG ECHO and its partners took several practical steps to enable timely responses, including implementing warning systems throughout the region to provide information on developing crises and associated needs, as well as encouraging the use of cash where appropriate. Its timely and effective communication and coordination were noted by many stakeholders consulted as strengths, enabling improved action results. Generally, framework and implementing partners recognised the timeliness of DG ECHO's response to pressing needs.

Throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO sought to enable and emphasise the importance of flexibility in its responses. Where it was deemed necessary, DG ECHO supported the flexibility of its partners through the provision of additional funding and modifying the HIP budgets to address specific emerging crises/challenges.¹¹¹ Given the

¹⁰⁸ Humanitarian Aid 2020. Available [here](#).

¹⁰⁹ DG ECHO (2013) Cash and vouchers. Available [here](#).

¹¹⁰ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO HIPs

¹¹¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO HIPs

volatility of the situation within the HoA, DG ECHO set an expectation for its framework partners to maintain a flexible approach and remain responsive to crises, even where these occurred within a crisis.¹¹² To support this, it developed and encouraged framework partners to introduce in their actions the Emergency Response Mechanism (ERM) and Crisis Modifier tools, to enhance and maximise the flexibility of solutions by increasing capacity to respond to new emergencies and adapt or scale up actions based on rapid assessments.¹¹³

Evidence from the case studies and stakeholder consultation confirmed that DG ECHO was generally perceived to be a comparatively flexible donor, which was appreciated by its partners. This included flexibility of the HIP funding instrument as well as the process for identifying or prioritising needs and choice of transfer modality. For example, the case study on cash found that in the Halaboqad IDP camp, Galkayo, WFP was able to reallocate funds to rehabilitate a school that was suddenly destroyed by strong winds. Feedback from the stakeholder consultation also suggested that framework partners considered that the flexibility of DG ECHO's funding instruments enabled an effective and rapid response to a variety of needs. The following enablers to DG ECHO's flexibility were highlighted through consultations:

- The move to multi-purpose cash,
- Allowances made to implementing partners to fine tune their needs assessments during implementation,
- The strong, supportive relationships between framework and implementing partners and DG ECHO and its field staff, and
- DG ECHO field staff's strong understanding of the local context.
-
- Nonetheless, some stakeholders consulted did not perceive DG ECHO to be as flexible or timely a donor as others. For example, one stakeholder noted that DG ECHO's response to natural disasters, in particular droughts, was not timely.¹¹⁴ A few other stakeholders interviewed noted that timeliness of responses was hampered by complexities and bureaucracies surrounding the process of submitting proposals for funding, or modifications. This meant that often partners submitting responses to calls for proposals in January would have to wait until mid-April to receive a signed contract. Particularly where implementing partners are smaller NGOs, this limited their ability to work since this would be 'at risk', resulting in a lack of support for crisis affected populations.¹¹⁵ On modifications, the cash case study reported one occasion where it took three months for DG ECHO to approve an additional 18.5m EUR to the Somalia response. The case studies and stakeholders consulted also raised challenges around flexibility in modifying actions, again relating to the bureaucratic processes required.

Solutions allowing for flexibility of funded actions were drawn upon by DG ECHO and its partners, enabling funded actions to provide a relevant response (JC4.2). Of the 70 action proposals reviewed, 54 included some reference to, or evidence of flexibility.¹¹⁶ In some cases, this consisted of a simple reference to the fact that flexibility would be encouraged due to the operational context in which the action would be delivered. In others, how flexibility would be enabled was explained in detail. Examples of this included having mobile clinics and providing cash-based responses to afford added flexibility to beneficiaries.¹¹⁷ One EU staff member noted

¹¹² ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹¹³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no.D1

¹¹⁴ ICF. 2020. Field interview no. 2c

¹¹⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 2

¹¹⁶ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

¹¹⁷ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

that the use of cash was maximised for the provision of food in Kenya, since contextual conditions including local government policy limited the use of cash outside of food.¹¹⁸ In the action proposals reviewed as part of the project mapping, partners often stated they would use the crisis modifier tool as a way of enabling flexibility.¹¹⁹

Evidence further suggests that where flexibility and timeliness were enabled through the solutions used, funded actions delivered a relevant response. For example, stakeholders interviewed noted that, based on public health indicators, the emergency response to the refugee influx in Uganda was timely and effective.¹²⁰ In Somalia, the cash delivery mechanism (i.e. mobile phones) was found to be effective, quick and safe.¹²¹ Most respondents to the survey of framework partners agreed that DG ECHO’s use of cash transfers was appropriate, and most also considered these contributed to a large extent to meeting beneficiaries’ basic needs.¹²²

However, some stakeholders suggested that solutions allowing for flexibility may not have been ‘maximised’. Two framework partners noted not having yet made use of crisis modifiers despite being aware of this, in part due to a lack of necessity and in part due to initial scepticism surrounding a new tool that would result in additional administrative burden.¹²³ Other stakeholders consulted highlighted that the emergency response toolbox and mechanisms should be strengthened and expanded upon, increasing the number and scale of available funds. One stated that the availability of several rapid response mechanisms across donors created inefficiencies due to a lack of coordination.¹²⁴

3.2 Coherence

3.2.1 EQ5. To what extent was DG ECHO’s response in the HoA aligned with DG ECHO’s mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR)?

Table 8. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC5.1 The priorities identified in each country are not in contradiction of DG ECHO’s mandate		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Several priority needs were identified across the HoA in alignment with the HAR Ensuring that humanitarian responses remained principled was a key priority for DG ECHO throughout the evaluation period Respect for IHL was also highlighted as a priority.

During the evaluation several priority needs were identified across the HoA in alignment with the HAR, relating broadly to food security, forced displacement and healthcare, whilst a multi-sector approach was encouraged in project implementation.

¹¹⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 2

¹¹⁹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

¹²⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D2

¹²¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO Missions Reports


¹²² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹²³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 9 and 10

¹²⁴ ICF. 2021. Field interview no. 4c

Between 2016-2020, DG ECHO used the findings of its IAF to identify the level of humanitarian need in the HoA,¹²⁵ in alignment with Article 1 of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR) in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda in 2016, which increased to high, very high or extreme by 2020.¹²⁶ Several priority needs were identified across the HoA, relating broadly to food security, forced displacement and healthcare (see Number of projects per sector covered), whilst a multi-sector approach was encouraged in project implementation. The use of cash seems to have facilitated a better response and helped in meeting the basic needs of beneficiaries (99% of surveyed framework partners agreed or somewhat agreed) through a multi-sectoral approach.¹²⁷ Before 2017, DG ECHO funded multi-sectoral action but was fragmented in several geographical areas. In 2019 there was a regional shift towards a more integrated approach covering five sectors: education, health, protection, multipurpose cash, and WASH.¹²⁸

Figure 19. Number of projects per sector covered¹²⁹



Source: ICF. 2021. HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 Projects can include multiple sectors (and are therefore ‘double-counted’)

DG ECHO’s humanitarian responses in HoA remained principled and Framework partners were encouraged to align their projects with humanitarian principles (please also refer to EQ7 which focuses on the practical implementation of the principles)

Ensuring that humanitarian responses remain principled was a key priority for DG ECHO throughout the evaluation period.¹³⁰ In the 2016 HIP, DG ECHO highlighted its intention to advocate at the regional and international level for the respect of humanitarian principles, such as the provision of neutral, impartial and independent action as per Article 4 of the HAR and other principle referenced in the HAR.¹³¹ For example, in 2020, it was noted that “the humanitarian response in Ethiopia will be delivered through complex collaboration between the government and humanitarian partners, which in the context of ethnic conflict and the politicised IDP

¹²⁵ The IAF is developed by analysing several sources of information regarding each country, including results of the INFORM country profiles, which summarizes key indicators on hazards, vulnerability and country coping capacity, as well as the Crisis Index, Human Development Index, Multidimensional Poverty Index, Gini Index, Gender Inequality Index and GDP (World Bank), alongside past DG ECHO funding trends, situation analysis of key needs and needs assessments.

¹²⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹²⁷ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹²⁸ ICF. 2021. Case study: [multi-purpose cash].

¹²⁹ ICF. 2021. HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21.

¹³⁰ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO Missions Reports]

¹³¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

problematic, has raised concerns about forced returns and non-adherence to humanitarian principles”.¹³² (please refer to EQ7 for more information on the implementation level).

DG ECHO also played a key role in promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) through its advocacy efforts (please also refer to EQ13 which assesses the effectiveness of advocacy and communication)

Respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) was highlighted as a priority, including to enable the preservation of humanitarian space. When considering which framework partners to select, DG ECHO took into account, alongside their on-the-ground presence, their implementation capacity and knowledge of the country/region, as well as their ability to disseminate and advocate humanitarian law and principles.^{133 134} In the 2020 HIP it was emphasised that all funded interventions would be guided by humanitarian principles, particularly in areas of active conflict. DG ECHO also required that funded actions be built on sound protection and conflict sensitivity analysis, to ensure that no further harm would be caused to affected communities. Actions were required to follow the principles outlined in the Kampala Convention, the IDP Guiding Principles and National and International Refugee Law.¹³⁵ The majority of DG ECHO’s framework partners (75.4%) agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO placed a key role in promoting respect for IHL through its advocacy efforts.¹³⁶

3.2.2 EQ6. To what extent was DG ECHO’s response in the HoA aligned with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid?

Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC6.1 DG ECHO’s HIPs for the HoA are aligned with the principles, good practices and framework set out in European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall, DG ECHO’s HIPs for the HoA were aligned with the principles, good practices and framework set out in European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid
JC6.2 DG ECHO’s funded actions in the HoA are aligned with the common objectives, and good practices identified in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Framework partners ensured alignment with the common objectives, and good practices identified in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid including abiding by Humanitarian principles and recognising the different needs, capacities and contributions of women, girls, boys and men.

During the evaluation period DG ECHO’s HIPs for the HoA were aligned with the principles, good practices and framework set out in European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (JC6.1).

The Consensus reaffirms the fundamental principles of humanitarian aid and states common principles and good practice of EU humanitarian aid which focus on adhering to: principles of

¹³² ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹³³ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹³⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹³⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹³⁶ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence; international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law; and principles of donor best practice.¹³⁷ In that context,

DG ECHO is abiding to the common principles stated in the Consensus by firmly committing to upholding and promoting the fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. This principled approach is essential to the acceptance and ability of the EU, and humanitarian actors in general, to operate on the ground in often complex political and security contexts. Between 2016-2018, the HIPs reviewed mentioned intentions to “follow the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence and, in line with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, adhere to the ‘do no harm’ approach, considering threats to, and capacities of affected populations” (see more details on the HIPs under previous EQ5 and on implementation level in EQ7). The perception of the EU and its commitment to these fundamental principles in humanitarian action are linked to behaviour and engagement on the ground of all EU actors.¹³⁸

Moreover, in agreeing this European Consensus, all EU donors commit themselves to the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Principles and undertake to work together, and with others, to seek to apply donor best practice. This includes the allocation of humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.¹³⁹ Accordingly, DG ECHO worked on aligning its response in HoA with the basic need approach (90.2% of surveyed framework partners agreed or somewhat agreed). Moreover, DG ECHO's partners agreed or somewhat agreed (92.6%) that HIPs correctly identified the most urgent humanitarian needs in the region.

The Consensus also highlighted that the EU is committed to ensure coherence and complementarity in its response to crises, making the most effective use of the various instruments mobilised. To which DG ECHO responded by ensuring coherence and complementarity with other actors responses in HoA as explained in EQ9& EQ10.

DG ECHO's funded actions in the HoA were aligned with the common objectives, and good practices identified in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid

Data collected shows that framework partners valued that DG ECHO response in HoA was guided by humanitarian principles (100% of surveyed framework partners) and was aligned with good practices and framework set out in European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid.¹⁴⁰¹⁴¹

At the level of implementation, DG ECHO's funded actions in the HoA were equally aligned with the common objectives, and good practices identified in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (**JC 6.2**). DG ECHO country offices in HoA continuously advocated for adherence to humanitarian principles and alignment with European Consensus and seized every opportunity to remind the framework partners of the fundamental humanitarian principles.^{142 143} (please refer to EQ7 for more information on the implementation level). Moreover, the Consensus highlights the importance of integrating gender considerations into humanitarian aid, correspondingly DG ECHO focused on ensuring the gender consideration has been highlighted in any funded action (please also refer to EQ1).

¹³⁷ European Commission. Factsheet on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Available [here](#).

¹³⁸ European Commission. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Available [here](#).

¹³⁹ European Commission. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Available [here](#).

¹⁴⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁴¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 6

¹⁴² ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO Mission reports]

¹⁴³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 5

3.2.3 EQ7. To what extent did DG ECHO ensure that contextual factors in the HoA did not reduce responses’ alignment with the humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence)

Table 9. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC7.1 At proposal stage, the actions have been designed to adhere to the humanitarian principles and the selection of actions identified and addressed any possible concerns beforehand		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO ensured funding actions that align with the humanitarian principles and actively encouraged its framework partners to consider the humanitarian principles in the design and delivery of actions. • Framework partners were able to abide by humanitarian principles with some shortcomings that existed in specific contexts
JC7.2 Any tensions between humanitarian principles and practicalities of delivering the funded activities were successfully resolved		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At country level; DG ECHO worked on addressing any emerging tensions and resolving challenges. • The case of Ethiopia raised some concerns about the operational model of partnering with government and imposes challenges on adhering to humanitarian principles.

- **Overall, DG ECHO ensured alignment of its responses in HoA with the humanitarian principles, although a few challenges were encountered.**

Between 2016- 2020, DG ECHO ensured funding actions that align with the humanitarian principles and actively encouraged its framework partners to consider the humanitarian principles in the design and delivery of actions. At proposal stage, the actions selected by DG ECHO were the ones adhering to the humanitarian principles (**JC 7.1**), for instance, 37% of the project sample mapped made explicit reference to humanitarian principles.¹⁴⁴ Additionally, DG ECHO flagged issues in proposal which did not align with the principles whenever needed, this was valued by framework partners who has been surveyed and mention in their open ended answers (23%) that they appreciated the feedback provided by DG ECHO on proposals and the effort the DG ECHO made to remind them the importance of respect of humanitarian principles in all the phases of the project cycle¹⁴⁵ Framework partners (97% of surveyed) valued DG ECHO’s continuous efforts to support the respect for the humanitarian principles and actively encouraging consideration of humanitarian principles in the design and delivery of actions.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, DG ECHO kept monitoring funded actions during implementation and advocated adherence to humanitarian principles as well as reached out to framework partners whenever there were some concerns regarding breaching principles.¹⁴⁷ All of the surveyed DG ECHO’s framework partners in HoA agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO’s response in HoA was guided by humanitarian principles (see Framework Partner’s Agreement on the statement of “DG

¹⁴⁴ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects).


¹⁴⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁴⁶ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁴⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 5

ECHO’s response was guided by humanitarian principles”).¹⁴⁸ When asked to elaborate more in open ended questions, framework partners (35%) highlighted stated in their response to open ended question that DG ECHO's actions upheld the humanitarian principle of impartiality by ensuring that actions are not biased toward specific groups or related to vested interests, in addition to not being influenced by governments or other local power-holders.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, framework partners (28%) stated in their response to open ended questions that DG ECHO upheld the principle of humanity by adopting a needs-based approach towards funding humanitarian actions, the foundations of which are presented in the annual HIPs.¹⁵⁰ Framework partners also indicated that DG ECHO played a role in advocating for framework partners and other donors to uphold humanitarian principles in their actions.¹⁵¹ One respondent stated that DG ECHO's feedback on proposals and reaching directly to framework partners has reinforced this effort, by flagging areas which did not align with the principles and making an active effort to change these.¹⁵²

Figure 20. Framework Partner’s Agreement on the statement of “DG ECHO’s response was guided by humanitarian principles”



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 4: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please tick one box for each row.

Some challenges were faced at country level due to a variety of political and security reasons. The HIPs and the technical annexes over the evaluation period noted that special attention would be paid to the humanitarian principles as well as: the risk of instrumentalization of aid, the centrality of protection, accountability towards affected populations (AAP) and Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA).¹⁵³ Moreover, framework partners worked on ensuring alignment of actions with humanitarian principles. However, minor challenges were reported (see Framework Partner’s facing challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of actions with Humanitarian Principles).¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁴⁹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended question)

¹⁵⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended question)


¹⁵¹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended question)

¹⁵² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁵³ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁵⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

Figure 21. Framework Partner's facing challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of actions with Humanitarian Principles



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 6: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment to your action(s) with the following Humanitarian Principles?

At country level; DG ECHO actively worked on addressing any emerging tensions and resolving challenges.

In **Ethiopia**, some of the challenges faced as the government controlled access to the population in need and was found to be pressuring humanitarian actors to align their assistance with its objectives.^{155 156 157} Framework partners therefore expressed that the principle of independence was at great risk of being compromised, as the delivery of humanitarian aid could only be achieved by coordinating actions with the government, which was insisting on prioritising certain locations over others.¹⁵⁸ One of the framework partners explained in their open-ended response that often the interaction with local authorities and bureaucracy would not be very helpful in ensuring the quickest possible delivery of the humanitarian response, especially as political needs often do not match with humanitarian principles and priorities.¹⁵⁹ The issue of political interference by a government not only 'directly' affected the principle of independence, but 'indirectly' also the other principles of neutrality, impartiality and humanity, as it is very difficult in such circumstances to undertake a proper needs assessment and reach those most in need.¹⁶⁰ A few framework partners stated in their open responses to the survey that it was hard to maintain full neutrality when the national government constantly interfered with some of the key

¹⁵⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁵⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁵⁷ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO Mission reports]

¹⁵⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁵⁹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁶⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

components of the programme implementation such as geographical and beneficiary targeting.¹⁶¹ The situation was further exacerbated by difficulties to access areas which were controlled by armed groups; as explained by few of the framework partners in their open ended response to survey highlighting that it is challenging to maintain humanity as some of the most need population are sometimes not accessible for security reasons.¹⁶²

In **Kenya**, multiple framework partner indicated in their open-ended response survey that they had encountered some challenges as a result of DG ECHO's strict requirement to provide assistance to registered refugees only (which is often a government-imposed condition). Whilst they would always strive to register all refugees, in some cases this was not possible, and the requirement was considered to hinder their ability to fulfil their protection mandate, thus compromising impartially.¹⁶³ Furthermore it was noted that funding streams and priorities were not necessarily aligned between DG ECHO and the EU Delegation; although proper needs assessments were done, there was sometimes disagreement on what to assist or not assist in particular situations.¹⁶⁴ Also, internal disagreements sometimes occurred between DG ECHO’s regional and country offices in relation to funding priorities.¹⁶⁵

Framework partners interviewed highlighted DG ECHO’s overall challenge to prioritise needs in a context where insufficient funding is available to properly cover all needs identified. For example, in order to adhere to neutrality, and due to concerns around the extent to which they were truly voluntary, DG ECHO stopped funding measures to support the return of refugees to Somalia from Kenya. Framework partners however considered that notwithstanding whether or not these refugees returned or not, they still required support and that the partners should have been enabled to make the choice themselves.¹⁶⁶

3.2.4 EQ8. To what extent was DG ECHO’s response in the HoA aligned with DG ECHO’s relevant thematic/ sector priorities?

Table 10. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC8.1 DG ECHO’s thematic/ sector priorities were taken into consideration in the design of the HIPs in the HoA		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall, DG ECHO response in HoA was aligned with relevant thematic/ sector priorities, and these priorities were taken into account when designing HIPs.
JC8.2 DG ECHO’s partners are aware of DG ECHO’s thematic/ sector policies and follow related guidelines		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> When designing the HIPs for HoA, framework partners were consulted in relation to DG ECHO’s thematic/ sector priorities, which were also taken into consideration in the design Overall, framework partners were aware of DG ECHO’s thematic/ sector guidelines and made sure to align their projects with it. However, on cash and protection it was somewhat more difficult to ensure

¹⁶¹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁶² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁶³ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁶⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview No.4

¹⁶⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview No.4

¹⁶⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview No.8

		alignment. For cash, the thematic guidelines available were rather generic, and it was challenging for framework partners to (understand how to) align with them. In the area of protection, framework and implementing partners were often financed for implementing the 'legal aspects' of protection, which meant that they could not fully align with all protection priorities.
JC8.3 Any deviations or inconsistencies with DG ECHO's relevant thematic/ sector priorities were justified		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A majority of framework partners were able to follow DG ECHO's relevant thematic/ sector guidelines when implementing funded actions, except for some cases where at country level where specific contextual challenges hindered the alignment
JC8.4 DG ECHO has promoted the use of cash transfers, where relevant and appropriate		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO promoted the use of cash transfers and involved framework partners in the decision to move forward the cash agenda. However, some of challenges were faced in following these guidelines when implementing the actions.

Overall, DG ECHO response in HoA was aligned with relevant thematic/ sector priorities, and these priorities were taken into account when designing HIPs.

At a **regional** level several priority needs were identified across the HoA, relating broadly to food security, forced displacement and healthcare. Generally, an integrated, multi-sector approach was encouraged in project implementation to ensure integrated responses to the needs of the most vulnerable.¹⁶⁷ The HoA HIPs reviewed showed that DG ECHO's thematic/ sector priorities were taken into consideration in their design (**JC 8.1**). All HIPs between 2016-2020 identified the most acute humanitarian needs in the region by sector and established DG ECHO's strategy to prioritise their assistance in these areas.¹⁶⁸

DG ECHO's framework partners were aware of DG ECHO's thematic/ sector priorities, and followed related guidelines with minor challenges

When designing the HIPs, framework partners were consulted in relation to DG ECHO's thematic/ sector priorities.¹⁶⁹ This allowed them to align their actions with these thematic sector policies (**JC8.2**).¹⁷⁰¹⁷¹ In the sample of projects mapped, a majority of actions (70%) explicitly referred to DG ECHO's thematic/sectoral guidelines ranging from health (including COVID-19) to protection. Also, most of the surveyed framework partners indicated that they were able to follow DG ECHO's thematic/sector policies with some challenges faced especially in cash guidelines (16%). In some sectors framework partners seemed to be unaware of the thematic/sector policies including shelter and settlements sector (48%) and Education and Emergencies (41%) (see Challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policy – total (%)).¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁶⁸ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]


¹⁶⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁷⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁷¹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁷² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

Figure 22. Challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policy – total (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122. Question 7: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policies?

**However, in some cases it was more difficult for framework partners to ensure alignment with DG ECHO's thematic/sectoral policies and priorities (JC 8.3); especially in cash and protection.¹⁷³
¹⁷⁴ This was mostly due to practical implementation issues.**

With regard to **food assistance**, multiple framework partners highlighted in their open ended response to survey that providing such assistance in kind was difficult in terms of transport and distribution, especially in the context of HoA. The shift to cash assistance, as explained further below, solved many of the issues encountered.^{175 176 177}

Moreover, the targeting of the most vulnerable groups was one of the challenges highlighted in **nutrition** sector, especially with regard to targeting children under 5 years old, in remote communities where malnutrition is associated with cultural taboos. The effectiveness of actions related to nutrition was also hindered by the lack of available supplies in countries where nutritious food is scarce everywhere.¹⁷⁸

In some cases cultural barriers prevented **protection** assistance from being fully delivered, especially in project targeting disadvantaged communities such as women and children. Moreover, one framework partner expressed in their response to the survey that it becomes difficult for them to align with protection priorities especially that they are often only financed for the 'legal' components of protection work (registration, reception, documentation, referrals, GBV) while they see their protection role to cover a wider area (protection through sectoral responses).

¹⁷³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁷⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁷⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁷⁶ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122 (open ended questions)

¹⁷⁷ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

¹⁷⁸ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

Some framework partners expressed that in the **health** sector DG ECHO guidelines require them to internationally procure drugs, this sometimes become challenging to align with especially in countries where European Union Delegation is supporting the national drugs supply chain.


While in WASH actions, partners expressed that main challenges were in relation monitoring ECHO's indicators, as these were not always clear or specific, and partners on the ground did not know how to monitor or calculate them.

Similarly, difficulties were highlighted in relation to meeting the target of 50% girls and boys in **education** projects, as it is not possible in all contexts. Finally, a few framework partners also highlighted in their open ended response to the survey the lack of clarity surrounding DG ECHO's priorities for shelter programming and failing to provide parameters on cost effectiveness which play a big role in funding decision but seem to change from one year to the next.¹⁷⁹

DG ECHO has consistently promoted the use of cash transfers in HOA, in consultation with framework partners. However, some challenges were faced to implement the funded actions in line with DG ECHO’s priorities and guidelines.

In the HIPs reviewed, DG ECHO established that it would prioritise those needs which could be most effectively and efficiently supported, whilst giving preference to MPCT and unconditional cash transfers¹⁸⁰ where such interventions in HoA were relevant and appropriate (**JC8.4**). Over 34% of DG ECHO beneficiaries in HoA were reached by cash transfer and vouchers.¹⁸¹ The roll-out of cash however varied greatly between the HoA countries, reaching 44% of DG ECHO’s funding in Somalia and 42% in Kenya, whilst corresponding to 10% in Ethiopia and 3% in Djibouti while in Eritrea there was no use of cash (see Proportion of total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers per country).

Figure 23. Proportion of total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers per country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.¹⁸²

At a regional level, framework partners were consulted in DG ECHO’s decision to move forward the cash agenda in the HoA region. Indeed, the majority of DG ECHO framework partners surveyed (70%) agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO engaged with partners in moving forward the cash agenda in the HoA region,¹⁸³ which helped to make sure that it was only implemented where feasible, and that the most relevant modalities were used, taking into

¹⁷⁹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁸⁰ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁸¹ ICF. 2021. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases

¹⁸² Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

¹⁸³ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

account the specificities of each country. For instance, in **Uganda**, the types of cash assistance used were unconditional MPCT, one-off NFI, commodity vouchers (WASH) and cash-for-work (shelter and latrines). Transfers methods were, in order of importance: mobile bank (cash distribution from a truck), mobile money (phone), and card (debit card presented to a banking agent). Moreover, food assistance to refugees was supported with cash to make it easier to access remote areas.¹⁸⁴ In **Ethiopia** DG ECHO has been pushing the cash agenda for more than 10 years and were first to accept the cash-based response to food insecurity. They convinced national partners and set up a pilot project (in north Shewa). Humanitarian cash was also introduced in social safety net programming, but the result was less satisfactory because of the limitations of the Government-linked bank that is mandated to manage transfers of this kind.¹⁸⁵

However, as the cash guidelines between 2016- 2020 were rather generic, it was challenging for framework partners to (understand how to) align with them. This issue was addressed later, with the issuances of the updated and expanded guidelines by DG ECHO in 2020.¹⁸⁶ Other difficulties noted related to the limited harmonisation of approaches between different cash actors and the lack of interoperability between the different agencies, e.g. in terms of data/tools and analysis etc.¹⁸⁷ For example, market assessments are quite broad in scope and not clearly defined as a basis for Cash/voucher interventions, and framework partners sometimes lacked common data for determination of need within the competitive environment. Other challenges were caused more of a technical nature, such as challenges in cash distribution to some beneficiaries and the feedback mechanism. For instance, in Uganda feedback and complaints mechanisms were telephone-bases and refugees, especially women, had relatively low mobile phone ownership and network coverage in settlements was insufficient.¹⁸⁸

3.2.5 EQ9. In the context of the triple Nexus and coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to contribute to the coordination with EU's resilience, development and peace actions?

Table 11. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC9.1 The HIPs for the HoA make explicit reference to the Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO referred in its HIPs that activities supported would be required to demonstrate a clear bridging with ongoing resilience or development programmes that were in the spirit of the Nexus
JC9.2 DG ECHO introduced changes to internal procedures to promote the link between DG ECHO’s funded actions and other EU’s development and peace actions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO introduced internal changes and used markers alongside assessments of proposals that promote nexus opportunities and possible synergies/ complementarities with programmes funded by development and peace actors.
JC9.3 DG ECHO sought synergies with the Humanitarian-		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Whilst there is some evidence that DG ECHO sought to ensure synergies with development and peace

¹⁸⁴ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

¹⁸⁵ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

¹⁸⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

¹⁸⁷ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

¹⁸⁸ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

Development-Peace nexus when selecting actions for funding, including cash transfers	initiatives, however, majority of key informant interviews have expressed that more could however be done in relation to the triple nexus
JC9.4 DG ECHO took into consideration existing DG INTPA initiatives in the HoA when selecting actions for funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG ECHO and DG INTPA were consulted last year on the revised EU HoA strategy (which is updated every 10 years) to ensure good coherence between EU political, development and humanitarian actions. Likewise, DG ECHO consults DG INTPA on its HIPs

- **Generally, DG ECHO sought to ensure synergies with development and peace initiatives. It included reference to the nexus in its HIPs and introduced markers to facilitate complementarities.**

In terms of the humanitarian-development nexus, DG ECHO aim to assist developing countries in strengthening their capacities in the area of provided support to population in need as a result of forced displacement, with a view of gradually handing over to the development actors. The HoA HIPs make explicit reference to the triple nexus (**JC 9.1**). In its HIPs DG ECHO highlighted the importance of continuously improving coordination and alignment amongst humanitarian, development and national actors, as well as seeking nexus opportunities and promoting opportunities for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) where possible and in particular in response to protracted situations (2017-2019 HIPs).¹⁸⁹ The 2016 HIP indicated that all activities supported that year would be required to demonstrate a clear bridging with ongoing resilience or development programmes that were in the spirit of the triple nexus.¹⁹⁰ In **2017**, Uganda was identified as a pilot country as one of six pilot countries following the adoption of the 2017 Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.¹⁹¹ This enabled DG ECHO to support a response to the situation of forced displacement whilst increasing the effectiveness of the EU's contribution to the roll out of Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRFF).¹⁹² DG ECHO and **DG INTPA** were consulted last year on the **EU revised HoA strategy** (which is updated every 10 years) to ensure good **coherence between EU political, development and humanitarian actions**. Likewise, DG ECHO consulted EEAS on its HIPs.¹⁹³

Moreover, throughout the evaluation period, the HIPs referred to DG ECHO's intention to align its response with other EU-funded actions and funds (**JC 9.2**) including the European Development Fund (EDF), the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) HoA portfolio and the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP).¹⁹⁴ The triple nexus approach involved all such instruments, alongside assessments of proposals that would take into account nexus opportunities and possible synergies/ complementarities with programmes funded by development and peace actors.

The EUTF was referred to on several occasions, including its role in funding the resilience building programme in Ethiopia as well as other actions in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Uganda, and for the implementation of the CRFF.¹⁹⁵ An example of such coordination occurred in 2017 and 2018, where it was noted that no specific resilience actions would be financially supported, due to DG

¹⁸⁹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁹⁰ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁹¹ Action plan EU response to forced displacement in the framework of the comprehensive refugee response framework in Uganda. Available [here](#).

¹⁹² ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁹³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 11

¹⁹⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁹⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

ECHO's contribution to the resilience pillar of the EUTF in countries where the latter had taken over. In addition, due to the significant investment of the EU Delegation in the nutrition sector and its support of local authorities' disaster risk reduction efforts in ASALs, support to actions in these sectors would be scaled down and an exit strategy implemented. Since 2019, a dedicated standalone Disaster Preparedness Budget Line (DPBL) was developed to support resilience and targeted disaster risk reduction actions.¹⁹⁶

- **At project level, DG ECHO also worked on ensuring synergies with development and peace initiatives**

DG ECHO followed the **European Council recommendations** for a coordinated development cooperation approach to forced displacement.¹⁹⁷ During the evaluation period, DG ECHO sought to support the trip nexus when selecting actions for funding, including cash transfers (**JC 9.3**); this was done by asking framework partners to provide a summary of how the proposed actions will contribute to the triple nexus (see also Relevance section). A majority of DG ECHO framework partners agreed or somewhat agreed (68%) that DG ECHO's humanitarian response in HoA promoted synergies with development and peace initiatives in the region.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, framework partners on the ground confirmed that DG ECHO had promoted the creation of synergies by encouraging partners to focus on **durable solution** and implementing exit strategies.¹⁹⁹ DG ECHO also took into consideration existing DG INTPA initiatives in the HoA when selecting actions for funding (**JC.9.4**). In Ethiopia, DG ECHO asked EU development partners to join actions resembling development cooperation EU and contributed to cash-for-work for vulnerable families. For example, DG ECHO approached DG INTPA for extending cash projects, however, some of these projects were not always supported by DG INTPA.²⁰⁰

In **Ethiopia**, DG ECHO was the initiator of the RESET resilience programmes and thus had significantly contributed to the increased level of cooperation between humanitarian and development actors, including DG INTPA.²⁰¹ For instance, the RESET II project (implemented by the Wolaita consortium) which is a joint programme between ECHO and INTPA. In **Kenya**, since the 2011 drought, ECHO pioneered the Community-based Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM) model which was articulated under the scaling-up of community-level WASH and nutrition interventions. With SHARE, a joint initiative by DG INTPA (initially DEVCO) and DG ECHO, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education (MoE), framework partners focused efforts to develop, implement, and monitor community-based strategies to improve practices and increase demand for nutrition-specific and sensitive services.²⁰² Several INGOs are still applying this approach having developed further into a National Guideline for Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition. Another example is DG ECHO response to the influx of new refugees in 2017, that sought complementarities with the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) were prioritised.²⁰³

In **Somalia** and within the Education in Emergencies (EiE) sector, DG ECHO's framework is aligned with DG INTPA's multi-year projects, with complementarities through strong child protection and displacement foci, and with those of other international actors.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

¹⁹⁷ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

¹⁹⁸ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

¹⁹⁹ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

²⁰⁰ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

²⁰¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁰² ICF. 2021. Scoping interview

²⁰³ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁰⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

In 2018, **Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda** pledged to apply the CRRF, with a regional CRRF applied to the Somali refugee situation, involving Somalia's neighbouring countries. The ways in which this was applied varied across countries. For example, in **Uganda** the aim of CRRF actions in 2018 were to develop a more predictable and sustainable approach to managing refugees, accelerating the implementation of its Refugee and Host Population Empowerment Programme (ReHoPE). In **Somalia**, instead, the main aim was to support durable solutions and the reintegration of Somali refugees. In 2019 DG ECHO noted that pledges in particular in Djibouti and Ethiopia had not yet materialised into concrete improvements for refugees. For example, in **Ethiopia**, despite government pledges, progress on the implementation of the new Refugee Proclamation (passed in early 2019) was limited.²⁰⁵

A majority of key informant interviewees considered that more could be done in relation to the triple nexus. DG ECHO staff voiced that work on the nexus required increased communication and exchanges between DG ECHO and DG INTPA, to take stock of what had been done so far and what lessons could be drawn from this, as well as the development of joint priorities and approaches.²⁰⁶ In addition, both Commission Directorates General should develop a better understanding of their respective internal programming and funding procedures, and how these impact on collaboration between them. Some framework partners also highlighted the lack of collaboration between DG ECHO and DG INTPA and indicated that this meant that they had to invest more resources in making the necessary linkages themselves.²⁰⁷ Some DG ECHO staff and framework partners noted that there were no real collaborative processes, despite putting such considerations on paper, as often staff were too busy to work jointly in practice.²⁰⁸

In **Uganda**, the nexus requires coordinated programming, and this was difficult to achieve on the ground, despite there being some political will. For instance, in the policy of "blanket food assistance" for refugees, a move from categorical targeting to vulnerability-based targeting was suggested, but this has become a resource-based issue. Now on arrival refugees get hot meals at reception centres and once registered they get a plot of land and an NFI kit which provides the minimum requirements to set up a household. It is recognised that livelihoods are important for generating income, so that households don't have to be integrated into a social protection scheme. But by the same token, not all refugees can be a farmer.²⁰⁹

In **Somalia**, fault lines exist between development and humanitarian assistance, making joint programming towards a nexus complicated at operational level. However, there is a potential at the EU level to work together for bridging programmes to create resilience. DG ECHO seeks to establish links with SP programmes through Baxnaano and the Sagal programme, putting funds into this to explore how the SNP can help the humanitarian effort. Targeting is one area. Sagal works in 18 Districts and has a shock responsive component in three Districts. There is a technical committee in each district, that makes the case for allocation of shock responsive resources. Generally, the trigger for release is multi-hazard, without there being a threat trigger.²¹⁰

Overall, challenges to implementing the nexus included: limited development funding, lack of interest in developing durable solutions from some stakeholders, lack of coordination/communication, lack of joint strategic thinking.²¹¹

²⁰⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁰⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

²⁰⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

²⁰⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

²⁰⁹ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²¹⁰ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²¹¹ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

3.2.6 EQ10. To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with the response of other donors?

Table 12. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC10.1 DG ECHO took into consideration other donors’ responses in the HoA when selecting actions for funding		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • When selecting which actions to fund, DG ECHO verified complementary with initiatives of other donors. It continued monitoring this complementarity through reporting from framework partners
JC10.2 DG ECHO is actively involved in coordination structures in the HoA (where they exist)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At project level; DG ECHO encouraged framework partners to participate in the various cluster coordination meetings of relevant sectors. This ensured that framework partners and donors avoided duplication of efforts and worked hand in hand to address the most pressing needs. DG ECHO also played a key role in developing and sharing best practice with relevant actors as part of its leading role in few clusters.
JC10.3 The coordination between DG ECHO funded activities in the HoA and other donor initiatives has improved during the evaluation period		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At donor level, DG ECHO regularly met with other donors to liaise interventions and was able to provide strategic coordination with other donors. This included information sharing and discussions on common issues such as protection, cash, access via the Humanitarian Donor Coordination Forum.

DG ECHO interventions in HoA strongly supported coordination with other actors and were overall complementary with other initiatives.

When selecting actions for funding, DG ECHO systematically took into consideration other donors’ responses in the HoA (**JC 10.1**). In the sample of 70 project mapped, 98% of actions were complementary to other initiatives funded and implemented by other humanitarian actors based on information provided in the Singleforms, and over the half of the actions were complementary with other EU funding programmes. 12 actions were complementarity with regional initiatives and coordination platforms e.g. KAMPALA initiative (health), IMPACT (refugees). a majority of framework partners responding to the survey (87%) agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO’s response complemented the actions of other donors in the region, in the sense that it helped to fill gaps and avoid overlaps.²¹²

All HIPs reviewed referred to humanitarian funds made available by national and international actors, including the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) when designing budgets. For example, when the Kenyan Flash Appeal in 2017 concerning the drought, launched by the UN, was only 27% funded, DG ECHO increased the HIP budget by 5 million euro to, scale up the response in Kenya.²¹³ In 2018, the HIP referred the Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRISI) launched by IGAD, funded by the Africa Development Bank, the World Bank and the EU, which aimed to end drought emergencies in the region by building sustainable livelihoods. DG ECHO noted that first phase of this completed in 2019 with significant

²¹² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²¹³ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO 2017 HIP for HoA]

achievements but that there is much to be done and acknowledged the need for synergies.²¹⁴ In Kenya, DG ECHO worked with the Kenya comprehensive refugee programme' with a view to bring more transparency and complementarity into programming.²¹⁵ In Uganda, good complementarity was achieved between DG ECHO funding and EUTF funding.²¹⁶

DG ECHO was actively involved in coordination structures in the HoA (JC 10.2) and acknowledged that engagement at local level and working with local know-how are essential parts of this coordination as listed below:

Coordination amongst humanitarian and development actors was maintained during the evaluation period.

During the evaluation period, DG ECHO was actively involved in coordination structures in the HoA where they existed (**JC 10.2**). DG ECHO acknowledged that engagement at local level and working with local know-how are essential parts of this coordination. The majority of DG ECHO framework partners agreed or somewhat agreed (76%) that DG ECHO played a key role in developing and sharing best practice with relevant actors and taking an active role in leading working groups.²¹⁷ The HIPs reviewed highlighted the importance of continuously improving coordination and alignment amongst humanitarian and development actors (see EQ9). DG ECHO regularly met with other donors to liaise interventions and was able to provide strategic coordination with other donors. This included information sharing and discussions on common issues such as protection, cash, access via the Humanitarian Donor Coordination Forum.²¹⁸ DG ECHO staff highlighted the DG ECHO's effort to maintain good relationships with the main donors in the region, especially in relation to cash and the development of shock responsive safety net systems which are strong areas of collaboration.²¹⁹ DG ECHO developed a strong relationship with DFID in Somalia, and the two agencies discussed and shared information on common issues such as protection, cash, and access via the Humanitarian Donor Coordination Forum. For instance, progress has been made in terms of aligning DG ECHO and DFID's positions on cash issues, and particularly on transfer values; they agreed on a common rate for Somalian regions, which is widely referred to as the ECHO-DFID rate.²²⁰ In 2016, DG ECHO highlighted in its HIPs that resilience strategies would require a joint humanitarian-development framework that would enable improved common understanding and analysis of the local context and challenges, as well as joint programming for multi-sectoral responses. In 2017, Uganda was identified as a pilot country for the triple nexus, which enabled DG ECHO to support a response to the situation of forced displacement whilst increasing the effectiveness of the EU's contribution to the roll out of CRFF.²²¹

Similarly, DG ECHO ensured coordination with other EU actors during the evaluation period.

the HIPs reviewed show that DG ECHO continuously coordinated and aligned its actions with other EU funding programmes (see also EQ9). Coordination with other EU actors took a variety of forms, depending on the level in which this coordination is happening. For instance coordination between DG ECHO and EEAS sometime takes place at a **strategic level** i.e. how to coordinate programming and EEAS provides DG ECHO with orientations on the political situation in the various countries. Also when there is a country visit from DG ECHO's Commissioner, the EEAS contributes to these visits and likewise, DG ECHO contributes to High Representative's visits, for

²¹⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²¹⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO Mission reports]

²¹⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO Mission reports]

²¹⁷ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²¹⁸ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²¹⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 4

²²⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 12

²²¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

example in terms of preparation of briefings, etc. At an **operational level**, when DGINTPA is preparing its multi-year country programming, it works together with DG ECHO and DG INTPA to identify priorities. In Ethiopia, the EEAS cooperated with DG ECHO on the humanitarian air bridge to Mekelle and worked with authorities to remove hurdles and to avoid delays in providing aid.²²²

Humanitarian coordination was also maintained by DG ECHO during the evaluation period.

DG ECHO encouraged efforts to enhance humanitarian coordination throughout the evaluation period, including through its support to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Transformative Agenda and its requirement for proposals to demonstrate sound coordination and complementarity with other initiatives. In 2016, DG ECHO supported actions aimed at facilitating the humanitarian community's capacity to deliver assistance, including in remote areas.²²³ In 2017, the HIP recognised the importance of systematic and timely needs assessments in relation to improving humanitarian coordination. The 2020 HIP included a requirement to continue to strengthen coordination to better shape the overall EU response across the region. Nonetheless, the success of coordination amongst humanitarian donors, including the US, EU and Member States, varied across countries within the region. For example, in Somalia it was noted that coordination amongst 'traditional' donors (e.g. EU, US) worked well but that more advocacy was required to convince non-traditional and/or Islamic donors of the advantage/s of integration and improved humanitarian coordination.²²⁴

At **operational level**, in Ethiopia, efforts to coordinate efforts between humanitarian actors has improved during the evaluation period and were intensified since the Tigray conflict. This is, for example, manifested in DG ECHO's support to the cluster system and promoting the use of corrective action to improve coordination. The Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team is an example of coordination platform where ECHO has a strong influence.²²⁵ In Uganda, good foundations were built with the Refugee Engagement Forum, created as one main channel for the refugee voice in the CRRF coordination structure. Implementation of the Inter-agency Country Refugee Response Plan, which is the guiding document for coordinated humanitarian response in relation to CRRF, was started in 2018. After two years, the plan was extended into 2021. Sectoral working groups in Uganda are coordinated through the Refugee Coordination Mechanism, with ECHO active at technical level.²²⁶ In Somalia, coordination is ensured through the Donor Group on Social Protection, and humanitarian donor group exchanges.²²⁷

Furthermore, DG ECHO ensured coordination with national/local actors in HoA.

In 2016, DG ECHO highlighted in the HIP that joint work between humanitarian and development actors was necessary to improve the sustainability of solutions, alongside increased engagement with national actors to improve resilience and preparedness. For example, in Kenya it was noted that disaster preparedness and response actions should consider integration with the existing scalable Hunger Safety Net Programmes, developed by the Government of Kenya in cooperation with the international community, to avoid duplication. In Somalia, DG ECHO worked with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs on targeting beneficiaries, and with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) on safety nets. Together with WFP and UNICEF, the DG ECHO is also providing support to building ministerial capacities. Discussions on programme design and transfer values in relation to safety nets are ongoing. The EU delegation and DG ECHO have co-

²²² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews

²²³ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²²⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²²⁵ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²²⁶ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²²⁷ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

chaired the donor working group (on cash) from 2017 onwards, also DG ECHO is progressively leaving the lead to the EUDEL.²²⁸

Finally, evidence suggests that there was coordination between DG ECHO funded activities in the HoA and other donor initiatives (JC. 10.3), although it was not possible to determine whether this improved during the evaluation period.

In the project sample mapped, 89% of the actions reviewed referred to their involvement in clusters ranging from child protection and education coordination to health, WASH, and FSL.²²⁹ In addition, 81% of the actions included joint needs assessments, joined visits, and joint reporting with other humanitarian actors.²³⁰ The majority of DG ECHO framework partners (90%) agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO encouraged their organisation to cooperate and coordinate with relevant government institutions, humanitarian and development actors.²³¹ 81% agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO played an important role in making sure that relevant humanitarian actors in HoA worked together in sharing analyses of the humanitarian situation and needs.²³² This included DG ECHO encouraging or facilitating agencies programming cash to apply a harmonised approach with regard to transfer size (68% of framework partners agreed or somewhat agreed).²³³ Finally, 69% of the framework partners surveyed also agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO encouraged or facilitated agencies programming cash to apply a harmonised approach with regard to cash distribution (e.g. modality and frequency).²³⁴

3.3 Added value

3.3.1 EQ11. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO's actions in the region during the evaluation period?

Table 13. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC11.1 Actions financed by DG ECHO in the HoA have a clear added value compared to what could have been achieved by individual member states acting alone		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO’s is one of the largest humanitarian donors in the region. Apart from providing significant funding to the region on an annual basis, DG ECHO adds value to the existing humanitarian aid architecture in HoA via its technical expertise and field presence; comprehensive geographical and sectoral coverage (and particularly filling gaps not covered by others); extensive partnership network; and rapid response tools such as crisis modifiers. Moreover, DG ECHO is actively engaged in promoting a coordinated humanitarian response in the region.
JC11.2 Actions financed by DG ECHO, including cash-based, are recognised by other humanitarian stakeholders as		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO’s is widely acknowledged by partners as a leading actor on forced displacement and cash transfers in the region. Dg ECHO’s leadership role in these areas is reinforced by consistency of its funding and use of cash, by initiating and furthering discussions

²²⁸ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²²⁹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping= 70 actions

²³⁰ ICF. 2021. Project mapping= 70 actions

²³¹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²³² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²³³ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122


²³⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

having a clear added value in the sector		on key issues and by effectively collaborating with other actors.
JC11.3 In absence of DG ECHO funding, a majority of actions would not have gone ahead or would have only gone ahead on a smaller scale or different scope		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> For the vast majority (94%), the lack of DG ECHO funding would have either (a) resulted in the project not going ahead; (b) changes in scope, scale or delays OR (b) partners would have abandoned or delayed other activities to be able to implement this action. Partners interviewed reiterated this

The added value of DG ECHO’s intervention in the HoA region is significant and wide-ranging (JC 11.1). The main elements of DG ECHO’s added value comprise:

Scale and consistency of its funding. DG ECHO is a major humanitarian actor in the HoA region, contributing 10% of the total humanitarian flows to the region over the period 2016-2020 (Main humanitarian aid donors in HoA 2016-20), although in the second half of the evaluation period (2018-2020), DG ECHO’s funding to the region declined in both absolute and relative terms (Evolution of total humanitarian aid funding to HoA 2010-20 (€ billion)). The US government was by far, the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to the region during the evaluation period, contributing 45% of the total humanitarian aid. The US humanitarian assistance, however, does not cover all the countries in the region, most notably Uganda where USAID activities are focused on supporting the country’s development efforts²³⁵.


Figure 24. Main humanitarian aid donors in HoA 2016-20, billion



Source: UN OCHA FTS. ICF Analysis. Data extracted on 19/08/21. Exchange rate conversion: 1 EUR = 1.22 USD (based on the average exchange rate between 01/01/2010 - 31/12/2020) based on data from ECB: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html. Accessed 19/08/21. N = € 10,571,839,301 = total humanitarian aid to HoA region between 2016-20.

²³⁵ USAID website: <https://www.usaid.gov/uganda> [accessed 10 March 2022]

Figure 25. Evolution of total humanitarian aid funding to HoA 2010-20 (€ billion)



Source: UN OCHA FTS. ICF Analysis. Data extracted on 17/08/21. Exchange rate conversion: 1 EUR = 1.22 USD (based on the average exchange rate between 01/01/2010 - 31/12/2020) based on data from ECB: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html. Accessed 19/08/21.

Some EU Member States also provided significant amounts of bilateral aid to the region during this period, most notably the UK, Germany, Sweden and Denmark. However, as further evidenced below, DG ECHO's added value extends well beyond its funding.

Wider geographical coverage. DG ECHO's geographical coverage is wider than that of any of the Member States acting individually. While some MS provide bilateral assistance to some countries in the HoA (e.g. Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, and Netherland), DG ECHO's humanitarian aid and field presence covers all countries in the HoA region. This means that DG ECHO can more effectively address both country-specific as well as interlinked issues that affect the wider HoA region (e.g. forced displacement). Moreover, DG ECHO is viewed as a separate entity from the individual Member States, which often allows it to bridge historic sensitivities and be perceived as more politically neutral. This enhances the EU's ability to provide funding where an individual Member State's presence and funding might prove difficult or contentious, especially in fragile states and in areas where access might be constrained.

Gap filling. Stakeholder interviews have highlighted the key role played by DG ECHO in filling gaps in sectoral assistance e.g. protection (Ethiopia and Somalia) and inclusive education (Uganda). One partner explained how DG ECHO-supported construction of boreholes and WASH infrastructures in Somalia prevented water crisis in many locations.²³⁶

Partnership network. In delivering humanitarian aid to the region, DG ECHO has leveraged the resources, expertise and capacities of its wide and extensive partnership network comprising UN agencies, ICRC/IFRC and international NGOs. Besides, local NGOs are often involved in DG ECHO funded actions as implementing partners. This is a key element of DG ECHO's added value vis-à-vis national Member States who traditionally fund UN core budgets or the NGOs of their own country. Stakeholders interviewed for the evaluation also highlighted DG ECHO's partnership network as an element of its added value, adding that it enables DG ECHO to cover many sectors.


Field presence and technical expertise. Given its local presence through the field network, DG ECHO is in a position to base its humanitarian response on field-based knowledge of humanitarian needs, situation and context. It also allows DG ECHO to undertake regular field visits of funded actions to get a first-hand impression of their progress and effectiveness. 57% of the partners who responded to the online survey, highlighted DG ECHO's field presence as a key element of its

²³⁶ ICF.2021. Key Informant Interview No. 23

added value. Interviewed partners additionally, also specifically mentioned the added value of the support offered by DG ECHO's Technical Assistance experts.²³⁷

Communication and coordination. Several stakeholders appreciated the role played by DG ECHO in their country contexts (notably, Somalia and Ethiopia which were the focus of fieldwork) in maintaining active communication and effective coordination with its implementing partners, as well as more broadly with other humanitarian and development partners. This is seen both a strength as well as a distinguishing feature of DG ECHO's approach.

Partners' views on DG ECHO's added value



DG ECHO's tools. Partners appreciated DG ECHO's flexibility and ability to provide the “fastest response during shocks such as fresh conflicts in the region, natural calamities such as floods and droughts”²³⁸ through crisis modifier and shock responses tools.

DG ECHO's approach. 69% of the partners who responded to the survey were of the opinion that DG ECHO's approach (specifically its focus on the Basic Needs Approach) constituted a key element of its added value.²³⁹

Moreover, the vast majority of the framework partners recognise DG ECHO as a leading actor on forced displacement and cash transfers (JC 11.2):

- 83% of the framework partners who responded to the survey agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement that *DG ECHO is a leading humanitarian actor on forced displacement in the region;*

²³⁷ ICF. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²³⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no.21

²³⁹ ICF. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

- 80% of those who responded to the survey agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement that *DG ECHO is a leading actor in mainstreaming and scaling up the use of humanitarian cash transfers in the region.*²⁴⁰

Interviews conducted in Ethiopia and Somalia suggest that DG ECHO's leadership in these areas was reinforced by:

- Its understanding of the regional dynamics which puts it *"at a vantage position to be a leading actor"*²⁴¹ on forced displacement.
- By effectively coordinating its response with all relevant stakeholders. For example, in Somalia DG ECHO is leading the Human Donor Coordination Forum, and active on the Cash Working Group as well as the Donor Cash Forum. It also encouraged and funded the formation of Cash Alliance^{242,243}. DG ECHO also supported the World Bank and the EU Delegation in designing shock responsive safety nets in the country and coordinated with the Ministry of Human Affairs and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on important issues such as targeting, programme design and transfer values.²⁴⁴
- By providing funding to address forced displacement and by employing multipurpose cash transfers as a response modality on a consistent basis.
- By initiating and leading actions as well as discussions on forced displacement and cash programming. Case study research shows that DG ECHO has been pushing the cash agenda in Ethiopia for over ten years and was the first to adopt a cash based response to food insecurity. DG ECHO first introduced cash as a modality in Uganda in 2014 (as part of a wider cash programme covering countries hosting refugees from DRC) and pushed it further in 2017 when there was an increased influx of refugees.
- By collecting feedback from partners on lessons learned and suggestions for improvement.

Partners' views on DG ECHO's leadership role

"ECHO has a strong opinion on forced displacement as this is evidenced by their financial support to such programs. ECHO staff also conduct meetings with partners and are often keen to hearing from implementing partners on how to best support people affected by forced displacement"
Partner implementing a DG ECHO funded action in Ethiopia, Group Interview No. 1

"ECHO led a lot of discussions on shock responsive safety nets and invested in capacity. In 2019, ECHO was really driving these discussions."

A donor active in Somalia, Key Informant Interview No. 24

"The introduction of multipurpose cash transfers has raised the bar for other donors following the realisation of the positive impacts and results achieved. Majority of the other donors are still implementing in kind support."

Partner implementing a DG ECHO funded action in Somalia, Group Interview No. 6

²⁴⁰ ICF. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²⁴¹ ICF.2021. Key Informant Interview No. 18

²⁴² In response to surging food security needs due to the ongoing drought, and pre-famine conditions, five organizations joined together to form the Cash Alliance (CA) with an aim of providing cash support for Somali households affected by drought. The Cash Alliance is composed of the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Danish Refugee Council, Save the Children, Concern Worldwide, and Cooperazione Internazionale. It is currently called the Cash Consortium.

²⁴³ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

²⁴⁴ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

Finally, DG ECHO funding to the HoA region was highly additional in terms of the impact it had on the existence, design or functioning of the humanitarian actions implemented by partners (JC 11.3). According to the feedback provided by framework partners in their responses to the survey:²⁴⁵

- For the vast majority, the lack of DG ECHO funding would have either (a) resulted in changes in scope, scale or delays OR (b) partners would have abandoned or delayed other activities to be able to implement this action.
- 25% of the framework partners stated that the humanitarian action implemented by their organisation in the HoA (with DG ECHO funding) would not have gone ahead at all in the absence of DG ECHO funding;
- Only 6% said that the DG ECHO funded action would have gone ahead unchanged.

Table 14. Question: What would have been the likely consequence(s) for your action if your organisation had not received DG ECHO funding? Total and by type of organisation (%)

	Total	The UN System	International Organisation	International NGO
<i>The action would have gone ahead unchanged with funding from an alternative source(s)</i>	6%	19%	17%	0%
<i>The action would have gone ahead, but with a reduced scale or a different scope</i>	45%	61%	17%	41%
<i>The action would have gone ahead, but with a delay</i>	14%	13%	17%	14%
<i>We would have abandoned or delayed other activities to be able to implement this action</i>	18%	26%	0%	16%
<i>Other (please specify)</i>	11%	10%	0%	13%
<i>The action would not have gone ahead at all</i>	25%	3%	50%	32%


Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 20: What would have been the likely consequence(s) for your action if your organisation had not received DG ECHO funding?

Notwithstanding an element of bias in additionality claims based on self-assessment by funding recipients, these claims are plausible considering that DG ECHO funding accounts for 10% of the overall humanitarian funding in the region. Moreover, in the interviews, partners

²⁴⁵ ICF. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

explained that the same results could not have been achieved by funding from other donors as they lack the resources and response mechanisms that DG ECHO has.

Partners’ views on additionality of DG ECHO funding



3.4 Effectiveness

3.4.1 EQ12. To what extent were DG ECHO’s objectives achieved in the HoA?

Table 15. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	Conclusions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JC12.1 DG ECHO actions were implemented as planned with existing obstacles mitigated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO funded actions partially achieved their stated objectives. 38% of the DG ECHO funded actions achieved all their KRIs, while 79% achieved at least one KRIs²⁴⁶. However, the level of achievement of KOIs²⁴⁷ is rather high – the KOIs were generally achieved or exceeded. The delivery of outputs and results was hampered by several constraints such as rapid escalation of conflict, security and access issues, the covid pandemic and associated restrictions, lack of capacity and expertise among Implementing Partners and delays in procurement. DG ECHO actions contributed to alleviating human suffering and saving lives, although it is not possible to form a full picture of achievements in the time and resources available for the evaluation and due to data constraints. DG ECHO drove the use of cash as a modality in the region. Cash helped meet beneficiaries’ priority needs but overall effectiveness was limited by transfer values being insufficient to cover all needs, short duration of actions and - inadequate coverage of beneficiaries.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JC12.2 DG ECHO funded actions contributed to the achievement of objectives defined in the HAR, in the Humanitarian Consensus and in the HIPs 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JC12.3 Improvements in beneficiaries’ access to basic needs and livelihoods can be objectively observed as a result of receiving DG ECHO support, including cash 	


²⁴⁶ 4% achieved no KRIs while for 17% of the projects, no information is available

²⁴⁷ For the 70 projects selected for in-depth reviews

- A key achievement of DG ECHO was its role in establishing shock responsive social safety nets in Somalia.
- DG ECHO also made a significant contribution to promoting durable solutions in the region, although this remains work in progress.

During the period 2016-2020, DG ECHO funding of €1.1bn supported the implementation of 283 actions which reached approximately 133 million beneficiaries (to note that the number of persons assisted will be less due to multiple counting of beneficiaries across actions). Almost half of these beneficiaries were concentrated in Ethiopia (which received 39% of DG ECHO funding), while another half were spread across Somalia, Uganda and Kenya (which collectively received 60% of the funding) as shown in Figure 26.


Figure 26. Number of beneficiaries reached by projects in HoA by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Total beneficiaries. Total number of beneficiaries = 133,474,489

A wide range of sector support was provided by DG ECHO, including access to shelter, protection, food and basic services such as healthcare, nutritional assistance, safe water, sanitation, and education, see Figure 27. While during the early period of the evaluation, FSL accounted for a significant share of DG ECHO funding (59% in 2016 and 47% in 2017), it had reduced to 20% by the end of the evaluative period (although FSL still remained the largest sector of intervention). On the other hand, multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) and education in emergencies grew in importance. DG ECHO’s support was flexible in that funding was available for integrated responses as well as stand-alone sectoral support, as shown in Figure 28.

Figure 27. DG ECHO funding by sector, 2016- 2020, € millions




Source: EVA data extracted on 21/07/21. (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Sheet: sectors matched Variable: Sector amount. N = DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Table 16. Annual DG ECHO funding by sector (€ million), 2016-2020

Sector	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total
Coordination	15,00	18,00	7,00	6,00	3,00	49,00
DRR/DP	5,00	5,00	12,00	13,00	19,00	54,00
EiE	5,00	7,00	8,00	21,00	18,00	59,00
FSL	138,00	139,00	58,00	32,00	29,00	396,00
Health	10,00	13,00	20,00	19,00	19,00	81,00
MPCT	0,00	6,00	24,00	22,00	22,00	74,00
Nutrition	19,00	17,00	16,00	18,00	19,00	89,00
Protection and Child protection	15,00	39,00	14,00	15,00	14,00	97,00
Shelter and settlements	3,00	12,00	16,00	3,00	8,00	42,00
Support to operations	1,00	1,00	8,00	1,00	0	10,00
WASH	21,00	37,00	22,00	15,00	13,00	108,00
Total	232,00	294,00	205,00	165,00	163,00	1.059,00

Source: EVA data extracted on 21/07/21. (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Sheet: sectors matched Variable: Sector amount.

Figure 28. Number of single and multi-sector projects by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Multi-sector. Total number of single sector projects = 80, and total number of multi-sector projects = 203. Values in the figure above sum to 287 as one project was conducted across multiple countries and has thus been counted in each country (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019).

DG ECHO funded actions have partially achieved their stated objectives. Almost 40% of the DG ECHO funded actions achieved all their KRIs, while a similar percentage achieved some (but not all) their KRIs (**JC 12.1**). A deeper look at the KOIs of 70 projects selected for in-depth reviews shows that the vast majority of these KOIs have been achieved or exceeded.

Figure 29. Number of projects achieving all KRIs






Figure 30. Number of projects achieving at least one KRI



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: Key Results Indicators. KRI target achieved: N = Number of actions = 283, however information was not available for 48 actions.

Figure 31. Proportion of projects achieving all KRIs by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: Key Results Indicators. KRI target achieved: N = Number of actions per country that included information on KRIs = 11 (Djibouti), 37 (Kenya), 35 (Uganda), 72 (Ethiopia), 80 (Somalia). No information was available for Eritrea.

The implementation of humanitarian interventions in several countries was severely hampered by difficulties on the ground. This impacted on the extent to which the interventions achieved the planned outputs, results and outcomes. A range of challenges and constraints were encountered by framework partners in the delivery of humanitarian aid to the HoA region. The most significant and commonly cited issues are summarised below:

- Lack of preparedness to changing context.** In Ethiopia for example, changes in the political context and the upsurge of conflicts involving the government hindered the effective targeting of interventions. While the response was mainly focused on natural disasters, the humanitarian community was caught unprepared by the upsurging of the new conflict. Humanitarian partners lacked the capacity and reacted very slowly to the new priorities triggered by the conflict and, for a long time, the interventions implemented did not sufficiently capture the new emerging needs (in particular those of IDPs). Challenges were also experienced in collecting data on the ground to be able to inform strategic thinking at DG ECHO level.
- Tensions in complying with humanitarian principles.** Tensions were encountered with the respect of humanitarian principles in Ethiopia. The government, which was involved in the armed conflict, pressured some partners in the targeting process. These partners were pressured by the government to prioritise those beneficiaries that agreed to return to their place of origin rather than the most vulnerable individuals.
- Security issues in the targeted areas** often hampered the smooth implementation of actions. Due to disruption in transportation, hostility including attacks on aid workers, roadblocks, movement restriction or lack of access to affected areas, activities often had to be put on hold by partners. The volatile security situation was particularly a concern for actions implemented in Ethiopia (e.g. West Wollega and Kamashi zones, Tigray region), Somalia and Eritrea.
- Impact of COVID-19 pandemic and the associated lockdown and restrictions.** These included border closures, restriction on travel and business, closure of schools, social distancing measures etc. All these restrictions either led to postponement or slowing

down of activities. Moreover, in some cases, the pandemic created staffing shortages as partner staff got infected or came into contact with other infected persons.

- **Lack of capacity and skilled personnel.** Several framework partners reported facing difficulties and delays in recruiting staff due to a general shortage of qualified and experienced workforce in certain sectors such as healthcare or areas of expertise (e.g. livestock specialists in Somalia, education specialist in Kakuma, Kenya); difficulties in finding suitably qualified professional for projects in Somalia and Ethiopia.
- **Delays in procurement and transportation of material** needed for project implementation due to shortage of supplies and suppliers within the country ; or delivery delays due to various reasons (transportation/ logistical challenges related to COVID-19 or security concerns, shortage of hard currency within the country, government procedures and documentation etc.).
- **Lack of basic infrastructure.** Several framework partners reported that the implementation of their actions was hampered by basic infrastructure such as schools, health and water/sanitation (WASH) being non-existent or unsafe in areas covered by the intervention (e.g. Kismayo, IDP settlements in Somalia).
- **Challenges in implementation of cash transfers.** There were a range of practical impediments such as issues with the selection of Financial Service Providers (FSPs), initial reluctance of a Framework partner in Somalia to promote cash, low mobile phone ownership, delays in handling beneficiary complaints and difficulties to open beneficiary bank accounts. While transfer through bank account is ideal for financial inclusion and efficiency, a few actions reported issues relating to poor capacity of local service providers to quickly open bank accounts or lengthy process of beneficiaries' registration by the bank and opening of bank account.
- **Cultural and religious factors.** These include socio-cultural beliefs preventing the participation of girls or women in project activities. One partner reported that in some communities girls could not afford to buy menstrual pads and opted to stay at home during menstruation, which led to missed lessons, poor learning outcomes and eventually school dropout. Other barriers to education included parental preference for informal religious education (Madrasa) and cultural practices such as forced early marriage and child labour. In another case, prevalence of negative beliefs and misconceptions regarding TT2 vaccination prevented beneficiaries from getting themselves vaccinated.
- **Other external factors** included outbreak of disease or conflict or climatic factors (e.g. drought, delayed rain) which contributed to worsening the humanitarian situation and caused a spike in the number of affected people or triggered further forced displacement.

Notwithstanding the above issues, DG ECHO funded actions contributed towards the overall objectives of alleviating suffering and saving lives. Vast majority of the framework partners who responded to the survey (80%), believe that DG ECHO funded actions contributed "fully" or "to a large extent" to the following:

- Alleviation of human suffering (e.g. via meeting basic needs, providing protection services etc.)
- Protection of human lives

The stakeholders interviewed as part of the fieldwork confirmed that the same results would not have been achieved in absence of DG ECHO.

It is however, difficult to form a full picture of DG ECHO's achievements in the region. The KRI and KOI data cannot be aggregated across funded actions in a sensible way as many of the indicators are either sector-specific or bespoke to a particular action. This makes it

difficult to get a comprehensive picture of what was achieved in the region beyond the number of beneficiaries reached.

Given the limited time and resources for the evaluation, it focused on two specific aspects.

As agreed in the Inception phase, the evaluation focused on assessing the effectiveness of cash transfers and the role of DG ECHO in establishing durable solutions for forced displacement in the region.

The evaluation finds that DG ECHO supported the drive towards a more cash-based intervention in the region, where appropriate²⁴⁸. 21% of DG ECHO funding to HoA took the form of cash; while another 6% of DG ECHO funding took the form of vouchers (Figure 32 and Figure 33). Overall, cash and vouchers were used to a lesser extent in HoA (27% of total DG ECHO funding) as compared to DG ECHO's global portfolio (36%). Within the region, the use of cash was uneven. It was mostly used in Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. Somalia was one of the pioneering countries in the region with respect to the use of cash. To support cash programming in the country, DG ECHO funded the formation of the Cash Consortium and worked together with relevant UN agencies to further elaborate the cash programme²⁴⁹. Moreover, Somalia and Kenya are at the vanguard of mobile money with their hawala and mpesa systems, which was an enabling factor facilitating the use of cash in these countries.

In Uganda, the cash agenda was pushed further by DG ECHO in 2017, when there was a heavy influx of refugees. As part of the WFP's cash food assistance programme for refugees in the Great Lakes region, DG ECHO accepted to fund cash assistance for refugees from the DRC in Uganda.²⁵⁰ In Ethiopia, DG ECHO has been pushing the cash agenda for more than ten years and were the first to adopt a cash-based response to food insecurity. DG ECHO was also influential in setting the donor cash agenda as a member of the Donor Cash Forum. However, the lack of well-developed mobile phone banking in Ethiopia was a major obstacle to the use of cash, especially in remote areas. Moreover, the use of cash is controlled by the government. For example, humanitarian actors programming cash have to use a government approved (affiliated) bank, which reportedly are badly run and offer poor customer service.

Figure 32. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality, 2016-2020





Figure 33. Proportion of total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers per country



²⁴⁸ To ensure effectiveness, DG ECHO requires partners to conduct an assessment of the feasibility and appropriateness of the transfer modality before starting

²⁴⁹ Case study on multi-purpose cash

²⁵⁰ ICF. 2021. Case study on multi-purpose cash

Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847. Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

While cash has been very effective in addressing the priority needs of beneficiaries, the overall effectiveness of cash as a modality was limited by (a) the transfer value; (b) short duration of actions and (c) insufficient coverage of beneficiary population²⁵¹. Generally, cash transfers were designed to enable people to buy food. In some cases, cash was also given to support food and other consumption needs. Cash transfers helped beneficiaries to meet priority needs (food supplies, debt repayment, education), but they were not always sufficient either in terms of fully meeting their needs (e.g. shelter or medical bills) in terms of the number of beneficiaries covered. The country specific findings are as follows²⁵²:

- **Ethiopia:** Overall, beneficiaries preferred cash because it gave them choice, and more bargaining power than that provided by food transfers. Whilst many outcome indicator targets were not fully achieved, most projects did reach the anticipated number of beneficiaries. Improving conditions to increase dietary scores requires support until the situation changes²⁵³, which is often longer than the three-month duration of MPC assistance. Multi-purpose cash offered more opportunities for improving resilience than other forms of assistance. An example was Jiga in the Somali region, where refugees were able to use cash set up small businesses and to grow food. Dedicated cash transfers were less suitable for resilience building than MPC because in case of former, cash can only be used for a single purpose (although on the flip side, it is possible that the effect of MPC assistance on food security is diluted as people can use cash for other urgent needs such as WASH, shelter, healthcare etc.). The adequacy of transfers was jeopardised when the number of IDPs increased, and budgets were insufficient to cover the needs of all vulnerable households. The solution was to identify locations that received the least support from other sources and within these locations, the most vulnerable groups of beneficiaries were prioritized for support.
- **Somalia:** the amount of cash assistance was not sufficient to address the different needs of the beneficiaries, considering their circumstances. Beneficiaries received cash transfers for food. While the transfer value was sufficient for addressing their basic needs, it was insufficient to cover other needs such as shelter and medical treatment bills. However, some women (who participated in the Focus Group Discussion) reported being able to save around USD 3.00 per month into a revolving community fund. Evidence on effectiveness is lacking as the monitoring tools in place are not able to identify the effect that different transfer modalities have on beneficiaries' food security. DG ECHO commissioned a study on needs analysis and a review of the MEB methodology, and what the transfer should be, and at the time of writing this report, were waiting for the results of this to plan a way forward. The general opinion was that the transfer values were too low. The budget allocated by the donor was not sufficient to cover longer timelines and the large communities affected by the local shocks. Resource limitations meant that only a small proportion of extremely vulnerable persons benefited from MPCT. Some respondents reported bribery attempts from individuals wanting to be enrolled as beneficiaries.

²⁵¹ According to some researchers (notably F.Grunewald) cash is not more effective for dealing with food insecurity than food, but often more cost-effective. This is because at a programme level, more food insecure people can be reached with the same budget using cash instead of food.

²⁵² ICF. 2021. Case study on multi-purpose cash

²⁵³ DG ECHO indicator on food assistance is 2100 kcal/person/day, while WFP uses both dietary score and Coping Strategies Index (CSI). Support needs to be provided until there is improvement in the situation, which can be ascertained by monitoring acute malnutrition rates, CSI as well as Food Consumption Score (FCS).

- **Uganda:** upon arrival, refugees were registered and entitled to three months of food assistance in kind. Thereafter, beneficiaries received cash for food. The effectiveness of the assistance was monitored (Food Security and Nutrition Assessments), which included food consumption scores and dietary diversity and CSI. In 2020, following Covid-19 restrictions and reduction of food assistance, the food security situation deteriorated with all refugee settlements in Uganda moving to IPC Phase 3 (from IPC Phase 2+)²⁵⁴ and thus, in need of urgent food assistance. By late 2020, due to Covid-19 induced increase of beneficiary numbers, the amount of MPC²⁵⁵ for food was reduced from 70% of basic need to 60%.

Box: Limitations in the use of monitoring data (KOI and KRIs) in assessing effectiveness

Cash was mainly used for food assistance and livelihood (which accounted for 37% of DG ECHO funding and 50% of the total funding), followed by WASH and shelter.

The evaluation team therefore, examined the KRIs and KOIs for MPCT projects in the sector. In total, there are 26 projects within scope in 4 countries (there were no MPCT projects in Djibouti nor in Eritrea in 2016-2020). Of the 26 projects in scope:

None had reported on pre-defined KRIs, which made an aggregated analysis impossible;

Ten reported on pre-defined KOIs but only nine provided data on achieved (interim or final) results for at least one of the relevant KOIs. These included four projects in Ethiopia, two projects in Uganda and a further three projects in Somalia.

In conclusion, the analysis at KOI level was possible but only for:

Nine out of 26 projects in scope (about 35%) for the KOI "Average Coping Strategies Index (CSI) score for the target population"

Six out of 26 projects in scope (about 23%) for the KOI "% of the target population with acceptable Food Consumption Score (FCS)"

However, comparisons between the baseline situation and what was achieved (for CSI) was not particularly insightful since in many cases the baseline was set at zero. The team also compared targets versus actual achievement. The available data shows that while projects in Ethiopia and Uganda exceeded their targets, achievement fell short of expectations in Somalia.

Additionally, the evaluation team also examined the KOIs and KRIs which received 28% of all ECHO funding for the HOA and is an extensive user of cash as a modality. However, the indicators were not correctly applied in WFP projects: (a) it was not clear whether the indicators referred to proportion of individuals or households and (b) coping strategy indices and food diversity ranges were listed somewhat indiscriminately.

A major achievement of DG ECHO has been the use of cash to support the establishment of shock responsive safety nets in Somalia. Humanitarian donors are increasingly using existing systems to vertically scale up (by topping up the transfers to households) or expand safety nets horizontally (increasing the number of households covered). The idea is to help households cope with shocks rather than fund the entire safety net system, with humanitarian funding thus only covering the shock responsive component. In Somalia, DG ECHO worked with the World Bank on developing a shock responsiveness component within the Baxnaano safety net programme²⁵⁶ which covers 1.2 million people or 200,000 households, which receive USD20/ month. When

²⁵⁴ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of standardised tools used to classify the severity of food insecurity using a five-phase scale, that is, Minimal (IPC Phase 1), Stressed (IPC Phase 2), Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe or Famine (IPC Phase 5). Further information available [here](#)

²⁵⁵ MPC was based on the MEB, estimating households' own ability to cover 35 percent basic food needs.

²⁵⁶ <https://baxnaano.so/about-baxnaano/>

there is an identified risk or need which could be due to flooding or security issues, the value of monthly transfers is increased on a temporary basis. DG ECHO and DFID have funding agreements with WFP to provide top-ups to households through existing systems. Social safety nets, including the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in Kenya were already functioning in 2011-12, however they played a much greater role in 2016-17.

In Ethiopia however, the results of integrating humanitarian cash in the existing social safety net (PSNP), were less satisfactory because of the limitations of the Government-linked bank that was mandated to manage transfers of this kind. Safety nets in Uganda were limited to a pension for people above 70 years of age. Conditional safety nets (food for work) existed in rural Karamoja, while in the West Nile region, safety nets with external funding targeted women and children, using nutrition as an entry point. In Kenya, the National Safety Net Programme (NSNP) includes cash transfers through a “hunger safety net” in the northern part of the country. DG ECHO funded short-term food assistance (cash) in ASAL counties affected by locusts. Safety nets used nutrition among criteria for inclusion.

DG ECHO has achieved moderate success in building resilience to shocks and developing durable solutions. Resilience building and durable solutions involve linking short-term humanitarian responses with longer-term development work. As such resilience building and durable solutions do not entirely fall within the remit of DG ECHO. It requires cooperation and coordination with other actors, most notably development and peace building actors. Overall, this is a slow moving area in the HoA and remains work-in-progress. However, a number of examples can be found to demonstrate that DG ECHO made some advances in this area. For example in Ethiopia, DG ECHO initiated the resilience programme and contributed to increasing the level of cooperation between humanitarian and development actors, including INTPA (see also section 4.2 on coordination). In Uganda, partners stressed that DG ECHO's BNA has facilitated linkages between humanitarian assistance and national social protection systems, by identifying and addressing priority sectors, with synergies and referrals between consortia²⁵⁷. The discussion is at a nascent stage in terms of linking humanitarian beneficiaries to Uganda Social Protection systems, but progress is slow for reasons outside DG ECHO's control and data protection issues are a concern²⁵⁸. DG ECHO also supported the CRRF which contributed to the resilience building by ensuring rights of refugees and migrants to work, and to access public services such as health and education (see also the section on sustainability). Finally, according to stakeholders, DG ECHO plays a big role in DRR in the country. Somalia launched a “Durable Solutions Initiative” in 2015, a framework including the government, donors, UN agencies and NGOs. As regards the specific role of DG ECHO, partners explained how DG ECHO has successfully implemented several durable solutions such as²⁵⁹:

- Successfully securing land for IDPs (in Galkaio, Garowe, Bosaso and Qardho) through coordination with the government,
- Supporting large numbers of vulnerable groups through provision of vocational skills trainings to improve their capacity and empower them,
- Contributing to the development of policies concerning vulnerable groups and IDPs through supporting the local government in IDP profiling and technical expertise.
- Installing sustainable community infrastructures and WASH facilities across various districts,

²⁵⁷ DG ECHO tops up the blanket WFP transfer for people who are particularly vulnerable. People are referred to receive the top up by a range of agencies

²⁵⁸ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

²⁵⁹ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

Supporting and facilitating the safe returning of IDPs to their original homelands and supporting them with relief and cash assistance.

3.4.2 EQ13. How successful was DG ECHO through its advocacy and communication measures in the HoA in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practice, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO’s interventions?

Table 17. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC13.1 There is evidence to demonstrate that DG ECHO advocacy activities contributed to influencing other actors present in the region		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examples can be found to demonstrate that DG ECHO activities contributed to influencing other actors present in the region, but overall evidence is fragmented and incomplete as much of the advocacy work goes on behind the scenes and is not documented.
JC13.2 Particularly successful approaches were identified in relation to advocacy with regard to the respect of humanitarian principles, IHL as well as the promotion of humanitarian access and space		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some examples can be found of successes in relation to advocacy on respect for humanitarian principles, IHL as well as promotion of humanitarian space. Advocacy work undertaken by partners is limited by budgets available and short time span of DG ECHO actions.

Throughout the period covered by the evaluation, DG ECHO highlighted the important role of advocacy and communication as key drivers for change. Advocacy was, therefore, a key element of the HIPs during the evaluation period.

Many of the funded actions (52 out of 70 reviewed actions) included some form of awareness raising, communication or advocacy activity. A closer examination, however, shows that most actions focussed on awareness raising and communication actions.²⁶⁰ Only 19 actions specifically undertaking advocacy actions could be identified. Some partners interviewed explained that it was difficult to undertake meaningful advocacy work in the context of short term actions and with the budgets available.

The main topics for advocacy were as follows:

- Protection: on issues such as SGBV, people with special needs, child protection and harmful traditional practice;
- IHL and humanitarian principles, promote respect for civilians - including those seeking and providing medical services - and facilitate access to people in need;
- Protection of new arrivals through registration and documentation;
- Setting up of independent beneficiary targeting and registration processes which were community-led;
- advocacy to pilot/ use unconditional, MPCT (in Gambella, Ethiopia, ARRA's position on restricting the cash grant could not be changed);
- the creation of a humanitarian corridor for provision of humanitarian assistance to deal with COVID-19;

²⁶⁰ Communication refers rather to comms activities mainly towards an EU general public audience, while advocacy is rather directed at governments, authorities, stakeholders in the countries of implementation.

- Children's education issues e.g. advocacy around children's voices; advocacy with the Government of Uganda to lift the ceiling on teachers on the Ministry of Education and Sports payroll;
- Disability issues;
- Women's participation.

Notable examples of advocacy activities extracted from project documentation are provided below (JC 13.1):²⁶¹

- *ECHO/-HF/BUD/2019/91034 - Collaborative Cash Delivery - Responding to Displacement Crises in Ethiopia implemented by WV-DE.* Usually, the government tries to control the beneficiary targeting process, but through its advocacy efforts the consortium successfully managed to convince the government not to intervene. The consortium was thus able to proceed with independent targeting and registration processes which were community-led.
- *ECHO/-AF/BUD/2020/91012 – Access Protection Empowerment Accountability and Leadership (APEAL) for refugees and host communities in Western Uganda .* CARE UK organised meetings with government offices and donors (Office of the Prime Minister, UNHCR, district governments, Ministry of Health, ALIGHT, Uganda Police, Danish Refugee Council, Lutheran World Federation, Medical Teams International, Finish Church Aid, AWYAD, ADRA, KTC, and GLOG etc.) to advocate for an improvement in standards of child protection, SGBV, disability and inclusion and psychosocial response at national level.
- *ECHO/-HF/BUD/2019/91011 - Multi-sector Integrated Emergency Response in Somalia, 2019 .* DRC DK delivered advocacy messages on various topics such as trends on protection risks, coordination gaps, funding and other barriers to an effective response.
- *ECHO/-HF/BUD/2019/91009 - Coordinated Implementation of Multipurpose Cash Assistance to Support Somali Households Affected by Crisis.* Concern Worldwide advocated for the use of cash assistance. Several face-to-face meetings were organised with government agencies as well as humanitarian and development actors to disseminate the learning from the cash pilot and advocate for its adoption at national level as part of the Shock Responsive Safety Net national strategy.
- *ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91038 - Protection Monitoring and WASH Response for IDPs and Refugees in Ethiopia implemented.* In the framework of this project, DRC DK organised several high-level meetings and produced various papers and briefs on restarting registration of refugees; advocacy to provide additional support and assistance following the influx and population build-up at the Pamdong site in December 2019; advocacy for ensuring COVID-19 preparedness and assistance in March 2020. The advocacy messages were coordinated and targeted to all key high -level stakeholders.
- *ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91005 - Improving access to quality education for South Sudanese refugee children in Bidibidi and Omugo Refugee Settlements, Yumbe and Arua Districts, Uganda implemented by FinnChurchAid.* This action involved advocacy on disability issues and inclusive education practices. The action also supported the relaying of advocacy messages developed by the children to the public
- *ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91050 - Protection and Assistance to refugees in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in Kenya.* UNHCR CH organised advocacy meetings and dialogues with the Ministry of Health for health partners and camp management agencies advocacy meetings and dialogue at the Dadaab and Nairobi levels. These meetings and dialogues

²⁶¹ ICF, 2020. In-depth review of 70 projects

contributed to improved advocacy and information sharing with regards to the rights and obligations of asylum seekers and refugees residing in the camps. Overall, the action contributed to the commencement of a unified registration system. In addition, all new arrivals in Kakuma camp were registered using the biometrics system. Significant steps were also made in the handover of registration to the government.

- **Overall, the advocacy efforts of framework partners are not well described in project documentation.** The project documentation provides a rather fragmented picture of the activities undertaken, and there is generally some confusion between communication measures and advocacy actions. There is lack of adequate information on the results and outcomes of advocacy actions, good practices and lessons learned.

Advocacy undertaken by DG ECHO in the region varied across countries, depending on country context. There is no advocacy strategy at a regional or country level and much of the advocacy work is driven by individual personalities on the ground, goes on 'behind the scenes, and is neither highly visible nor documented. As a result, the evaluation was only able to form a somewhat fragmented and incomplete picture of DG ECHO's activities as well as accomplishments in this area (based primarily on key informant interviews). Nonetheless, the evaluation found several examples of successful advocacy work:

In **Somalia**, advocacy work was generally limited by lack of DG ECHO staff presence. Nevertheless, some stakeholders interviewed were of the opinion that DG ECHO played an important role in driving the agenda on humanitarian issues within the donor community e.g. DG ECHO had been a leading player in advocating for the establishment of a Shock Responsive safety net system. DG ECHO participated in Humanitarian Coordination committee meetings and influenced discourses on issues such as the linking of humanitarian caseload to longer term safety nets like Baxnaano. Considering that the annual humanitarian caseload was over three million people in Somalia²⁶², there were questions around the feasibility of taking them off annual programmes by linking them up to a longer-term programme.²⁶³ According to another stakeholder, DG ECHO worked through the Humanitarian Donor Group on advocating for the roll out of the Kampala Convention. It also played a big role in clear messaging around humanitarian needs and is leading calls to other humanitarian actors (OCHA, FCO) to prepare better analysis of needs.²⁶⁴

DG ECHO's involvement in the 'National Preparedness dialogue' in **Uganda**, advocating for it to be a national level discussion involving actors from different implementing partners, different government departments. DG ECHO also led the debate on moving from categorical to vulnerability targeting²⁶⁵. This has resulted in the Uganda caseload being divided into three typologies: North, Centre and South²⁶⁶.

Stakeholders in **Ethiopia** expressed mixed views as regards the environment for advocacy and DG ECHO's role in advocacy. Some partners were of the view that it a difficult context, while others did not note any particular challenges to advocacy. In a similar vein, some saw DG ECHO as a 'leader among the donor-community in pushing the protection agenda',²⁶⁷ while others saw it as

²⁶² According to the Humanitarian Response Plans, people in need have ranged from 4.2 million (2019) to 6.7 million (2017) while the number of people targeted have ranged from 3 million (2020) to 5.5 million (2017)

²⁶³ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Multi-purpose cash].

²⁶⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview No. 24

²⁶⁵ The main reason for moving from categorical to vulnerability targeting is to reduce the size of the case load. EC staff reported that a significant number of refugees were able to support themselves without cash transfers, but because they were categorised as refugees, they got the cash anyway. A shift to vulnerability targeting would free up resources to be allocated to the most in need.

²⁶⁶ ICF 2021. Field Interview No. 2d

²⁶⁷ ICF. 2021. Field Interview No.4c

an organisation that was “more keen on lecturing rather than solving problems”, and “vocal in a confrontational manner”²⁶⁸.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, a few positive examples can be found: DG ECHO successfully advocated for needs-based targeting of IDPs in the South West region. Without DG ECHO’s efforts, the targeting would have been biased. DG ECHO had also been advocating for the basic humanitarian principles, IHL and the principle of ‘Do No Harm’ to be respected in Ethiopia. An operational guidance²⁶⁹ was produced for partners in the context of providing humanitarian assistance in Gedeo/Guji with ECHO funding. One of the partners interviewed explained how they – together with DG ECHO – have been advocating for the return of Gedeo/Guji IDPs to their place of origin and its voluntary nature. The operating context, however, was very challenging due to a fast developing environment, the multiplicity of interlocutors involved and contradicting information collected or instructions provided. Moreover, the framework partners experienced some level of access restriction, pressure to shift assistance in the places of return and denied permission to deliver certain humanitarian assistance.

3.5 Efficiency

3.5.1 EQ14. To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response?

Table 18. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC14.1 DG ECHO’s budget allocations were based on ECHO objectives and actions of other donors		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There is some evidence that DG ECHO’s budget allocations were based on its objectives and the actions of other donors. HIPs throughout the evaluation period assessed the actions and capacity of other local and international donors when assigning budgets and modifications.
JC14.2 DG ECHO took appropriate actions to ensure cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO considered, and took steps to ensure, cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle. HIPs throughout the evaluation period set out priorities around resilience and innovative transfer modalities, including cash, to improve cost effectiveness.
JC14.3 DG ECHO partners took appropriate actions to ensure cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO’s partners took actions to ensure cost effectiveness throughout the project cycle In practice, there is some evidence to suggest that the actions taken by DG ECHO and its partners enabled cost effectiveness to be achieved, based on data gathered regarding cost per beneficiary and direct support Some areas for improvement were identified regarding cost effectiveness of DG ECHO-funded actions, including the use, and under-use of cash and administrative burdens surrounding funding.

There is some evidence that DG ECHO’s budget allocations were based on its objectives and the actions of other donors (JC14.1) and that this was a conscious effort to improve the cost-

²⁶⁸ ICF. 2021. Field Interview No.4b

²⁶⁹ DG ECHO (2018) Operational Guidance for ECHO partners operating in Gedeo/Guji, September 2018

effectiveness of the funding allocated. For example, the HIPs throughout the evaluation period examined the actions and capacity of other local and international donors when setting or justifying DG ECHO’s priorities and budget allocations.²⁷⁰ As summarised in Examples of references to responses of other donors/actors from DG ECHO HIPs between 2016-2020, the HIPs included an assessment of the local and national actors’ willingness and/or ability to respond to the crises identified, alongside the presence and type of international development donors as well as humanitarian stakeholders on the ground. Such assessments informed the analyses of where DG ECHO’s role and funding would centre, enabling HIPs to identify priorities that would be able to harness synergies with other actors whilst avoiding duplication of efforts, in an effort to enhance cost-effectiveness of DG ECHO-funded actions. For example, in Djibouti, the HIPs reviewed noted limited responses from local/national actors and, despite the presence of several development donors, no functioning cluster system and weak coordination. As such, DG ECHO identified that there was scope to influence work with the EU Delegation and other actors, including on the development of an exit strategy, allocating its budget accordingly. In addition, when assigning modifications to budgets, references were made within HIPs to in-country partners’ capacity to respond to the increasing needs.²⁷¹

Table 19. Examples of references to responses of other donors/actors from DG ECHO HIPs between 2016-2020

Country	Analysis of presence of other donors/actors	Role of DG ECHO in relation to other donors/actors
Djibouti	<p>Limited response from local/national authorities, reliant on external support to address humanitarian needs</p> <p>No functioning cluster system and weak coordination amongst actors</p> <p>Several development donors including the EU Delegation, China and Turkey</p>	<p>Scope to influence and work with the EU Delegation and other actors, which had already begun to some extent in 2016, including the development of an exit strategy for D ECHO based on resilience building and handover to development donors</p> <p>Complementarity between the 11th EDG and DG ECHO’s strategy in terms of its focus on governance and food security</p>
Eritrea	<p>Lack of international humanitarian stakeholders on the ground – mainly ICRC and UN agencies but few NGOs</p> <p>Limited government capacity/ willingness to respond to humanitarian needs</p>	<p>There are few emergency donors active</p>
Ethiopia	<p>Despite limited local capacity, national government plays a key role in humanitarian programmes (e.g. the Humanitarian Response Plan, Productive Safety Net Programme, Disaster Risk Management Commission, Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs) to address needs, supported by international donors.</p>	<p>DG ECHO established the ERM in part due to the lack of capacity of both local government offices and local NGOs.</p> <p>The Humanitarian Response Plan excludes all relief targeting refugees. These are considered</p>

²⁷⁰ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁷¹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

Country	Analysis of presence of other donors/actors	Role of DG ECHO in relation to other donors/actors
	<p>The presence of humanitarian donors is stable, and there are several development donors (e.g. DFID, USAID, EU) active.</p> <p>There are 9 clusters active and report to the Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team – including DG ECHO. The cluster system was weak but upgraded in 2016.</p>	<p>under a programme coordinated by the UNHCR.</p>
Somalia	<p>National capacity is very limited, with 3 agencies mandated for disaster management all with limited capacity, for example. Authorities are found not to act against forced evictions of IDPs.</p> <p>There are many NGOs operating in the area but with fragmented capacity.</p> <p>Support provided by the diaspora in the form of remittances but requires stronger coordination</p> <p>Several international donors are present and coordinate well within the framework informal humanitarian donors group (which DG ECHO co-chairs), however there was a lack of funding available and ability to access populations in need noted in 2016, which continued to decrease in 2020.</p>	<p>DG ECHO has been continuously operational in Somalia since 1993.</p> <p>DG ECHO played a role in reviewing the National Development Plan.</p> <p>DG ECHO focussed on resilience building to support planned recovery programmes following the 2018 drought, tackling underlying causes and addressing protracted displacement with more durable solutions, in line with the actions of most international donors</p> <p>Clusters were found to be a general challenge with coordination constraints between Nairobi and Somalia. In 2020 DG ECHO noted it would remain actively engaged for its effective coordination.</p> <p>In 2016 opportunities for better linkages between DG ECHO and the EU Delegation to improve joint analysis were found.</p> <p>Within EiE, DG ECHO’s framework is aligned with other international actors, including DEVCOs multi-year projects, with complementarities through strong child protection and displacement foci.</p>
Uganda	<p>Refugee response is coordinated by national Government in collaboration with the UNHCR.</p> <p>There are limited humanitarian donors active in the country, mainly the US, EU and DFID (UK). Lack of funding is a major issue and the humanitarian response was reportedly decreasing in 2020.</p>	<p>The EC is the second largest humanitarian donor, after the US</p> <p>DG ECHO collaborated with the EU Delegation in response to the South Sudanese refugee influx in northern Uganda.</p> <p>Coordination is government led and works well but could better integrate NGOs.</p>

Country	Analysis of presence of other donors/actors	Role of DG ECHO in relation to other donors/actors
Kenya	<p>The national Government is empowered to deliver/coordinate solutions to humanitarian needs. However, in 2017 the Department of Refugee Affairs was dissolved. The legislative environment for refugees remained restrictive in 2019.</p> <p>Several international donors are active including WFP, USAID, SDC and DFID. However, humanitarian funding for ASALs was decreasing in 2018. Donors were also fatigued regarding the protracted crisis</p>	<p>DG ECHO worked alongside the EUTF in supporting the Kalobeyei settlement setup.</p> <p>EUTF funding was provided to support the roll-out of the CRRF.</p> <p>Progress was noted in 2016 in DG ECHO’s work with the EU Delegation in linking the humanitarian and development agendas.</p>

DG ECHO considered, and took actions to ensure, cost-effectiveness throughout the project cycle (JC14.2). The documentation reviewed highlighted DG ECHO’s intention to invest in resilience to improve cost-effectiveness since, as stated by a 2012 DG ECHO report setting out the EU approach to resilience "investing in resilience is cost effective" since it addresses root causes of recurrent crises rather than just their consequences.²⁷² DG ECHO also intended to prioritise funding based on financial sustainability.²⁷³ HIPs throughout the evaluation period highlighted DG ECHO’s strategy of prioritising innovative transfer modalities based on their capacity to improve efficiency and optimise cost-effectiveness.²⁷⁴ In the HIPs, the main references to considerations of economy, efficiency and cost-effectiveness regard the strategic shift from traditional food in-kind distribution to large scale cash-based transfers, to meet the basic needs of host and displaced populations.²⁷⁵ Despite placing priority on MPCT and unconditional cash transfers after 2018, DG ECHO stressed that ultimately it would support the most effective and efficient modality of providing assistance.²⁷⁶ Evidence from the cash case study also showed that cost-effectiveness and efficiency concerns were reflected in DG ECHO’s ambition to move to vulnerability-based targeting from a blanket approach, as well as in its support for improved coordination and data sharing amongst implementing partners.

DG ECHO also took steps to ensure that cost effectiveness was achieved in practice. For example, DG ECHO required its framework partners to undertake comparative cost effectiveness analyses of alternative technical solutions where relevant.²⁷⁷ Evidence from the stakeholder consultation showed that DG ECHO compared funding proposals on the basis of cost and effectiveness, whilst bearing in mind differences in the type of support (e.g. local context, sector) and the impact this might have on the importance of quality: “Sometimes soft programmes are challenging to measure in terms of efficiency. DG ECHO do as much as possible to consider cost effectiveness”.²⁷⁸ DG ECHO was also known to conduct monitoring visits to assess the cost-effectiveness of actions on a regular basis. Nonetheless, only 18 of the 70 actions reviewed through project mapping explicitly showed evidence of DG ECHO having considered economy, efficiency, and cost effectiveness in selecting framework partners and monitoring actions.²⁷⁹ It is important to note, however, that cost effectiveness is considered by DG ECHO throughout the

²⁷² DG ECHO (2012). The EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from food security Crises. Available [here](#).

²⁷³ ICRC/ Red Cross EU Office (2018). Recommendations from the Red Cross EU Office and the ICRC. Available [here](#).

²⁷⁴ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁷⁵ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁷⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁷⁷ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

²⁷⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 1

²⁷⁹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects).

selection of funded projects, since it is one of the main selection criteria in the HIPs against which every project is reviewed at the funding stage. Assessments regarding cost effectiveness are then saved in the respective Dashboard.

DG ECHO's partners took actions to ensure cost effectiveness throughout the project cycle (JC14.3). In fact, in 58 out of the 70 actions reviewed as part of the Partnership project mapping conducted, framework partners showed evidence of having considered cost and timeliness in action design.²⁸⁰ Evidence from the stakeholder consultation also confirmed this. Examples of actions that were taken to enable cost effectiveness to be achieved included:

- Building partnerships with other organisations (including local NGOs) and ensuring synergies with these,
- Implementing cost-effective and/or sustainable solutions (e.g., solar systems for WASH support), using cash to do so where appropriate,
- Using mobile money transfers,
- Working at scale to benefit from economies of scale, conducting joint procurement where possible with other actors,
- Ensuring required technology is procured from the most cost-effective vendors,
- Ensuring high quality recruitment, in line with policy (e.g., high quality trainers are recruited to deliver training support),
- Conducting high quality monitoring and evaluation internally, and
- Reducing overheads (e.g., by sharing offices).
-
- **In practice, there is some evidence to suggest that the actions taken by DG ECHO and its partners were cost effective, and therefore may be considered to be appropriate (JC14.2, 14.3).** Data gathered regarding cost per beneficiary and direct support, when triangulated with the findings regarding the effectiveness of funded actions (set out in Section 3.4), provide an indication of this, since most actions fell within the lower categories of cost per beneficiary and overall actions were found to be generally cost-effective in achieving their aims and objectives.
-
- However, while being encouraging indicative evidence for cost effectiveness when combined with the evidence on effectiveness generally, the data should be interpreted with caution given the limited available evidence of relevant benchmarks for the cost of similar actions, as well as the fact that the cost of actions are dependent on many factors, such as the economy in which aid is delivered, the circumstances under which aid has to be delivered, and the sector of the intervention. Nonetheless, evidence from HOPE/EVA databases throughout the evaluation period indicates that, as shown in Cost per beneficiary⁴ below, most actions delivered achieved a cost per beneficiary of €40 or under, with the largest group of actions being within the lowest cost category: 'less than €20'. The number of actions in each cost per beneficiary grouping generally decreases as costs increase. There is a slight increase in the number of actions in the highest category, though this is likely due to the type of support being provided by actions, as some sectors may require higher costs than others (e.g. healthcare versus food).²⁸¹
-
- It was also found that of the 272 funded actions in the HoA during the evaluation period, the majority (161) allocated between 90-100% of their total costs to direct support costs, with only 8 actions allocating less than 50% to direct support.²⁸² One framework partner


²⁸⁰ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects).

²⁸¹ ICF. 2021. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases

²⁸² ICF. 2021. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases

consulted also estimated that 65-70% of its budget went directly to beneficiaries and services provided to them.

Figure 34. Cost per beneficiary²⁸³



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2

However, the multi-model survey showed that only 50% of respondents agreed or somewhat agreed that activities carried out with DG ECHO's support in the HoA were more efficient and/or cost effective compared to other activities carried out by the respondents' organisation in other similar settings.²⁸⁴ The largest proportion (30%) somewhat agreed while the same proportion of respondents agreed (20%) as those that disagreed or somewhat disagreed. The largest proportion of respondents disagreeing or somewhat disagreeing were from the UN system (29%) whereas the largest agreeing or somewhat agreeing were from international NGOs (58%).²⁸⁵ Those who agreed noted this was due to DG ECHO's strict value for money and needs analyses as well as the flexibility permitted by DG ECHO to its implementing partners.

Some areas for improvement were identified regarding cost effectiveness, and actions taken to enable this by DG ECHO and its partners. Firstly, despite DG ECHO's strategy to prioritise cash due to its potential for cost-effectiveness, throughout the evaluation period examples were provided of where cash actions were underutilised or problematic. For example, in Kenya the central bank imposed restrictions on the provision of cash without a fiscal code, which many target beneficiaries (e.g. refugees) lacked.²⁸⁶ In Somalia, cash alliance partners were found not to collaborate or share resources sufficiently to achieve efficiency-gaining improvements in implementation.²⁸⁷ Evidence from the cash case study suggested that the cost effectiveness potential of cash was not maximised in the region since it remained relatively sectoral, where a multisectoral approach would be more appropriate. Also, evidence from the stakeholder consultation showed the delivery of cash was disjointed between actors, and lacking in ownership as well as a strategic approach setting out how DG ECHO intended to use cash in each type of crisis.²⁸⁸ This meant that some efficiency-gaining opportunities around cash were missed (e.g., developing a single platform/financial service provider to minimize bank costs, harmonising cash delivery systems across implementing partners).²⁸⁹

²⁸³ HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis).

²⁸⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²⁸⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

²⁸⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 1

²⁸⁷ ICF. 2021. Analysis of DG ECHO Missions Reports

²⁸⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 1, 2

²⁸⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 1

Indeed, despite the strong evidence for the efficiency and effectiveness of cash generally in humanitarian aid, the same proportion of DG ECHO funding (21%) went to actions using cash as in-kind transfer modalities over the evaluation period, which is a lower proportion than that allocated to cash in total global DG ECHO funding in the same period (54% versus 10% in-kind).²⁹⁰ This is likely partly due to such challenges, alongside others regarding feasibility of cash in the context of the HoA.

Other suggestions from the stakeholder consultation for ways in which funded actions could improve their cost effectiveness included:

- Increasing harmonisation across DG ECHO’s framework and implementing partners, including through joint needs analysis and joint strategies²⁹¹
- Reducing the bureaucratic and administrative burdens associated with programming, contract variations (or ‘top-up’ funding) and proposal format²⁹²
- Returning to the Grand Bargain principles of common reporting, multi-year financing and adoption of the 8+3 reporting format by all donors.²⁹³
-

3.5.2 EQ15. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to the HoA HIPs appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?

Table 20. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC15.1 DG ECHO’s budget for the region was allocated on the basis of an understanding of the amount of funding needed to achieve project objectives		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence regarding the extent to which budget allocations were in line with the funding needed to achieve project objectives is inconclusive
JC15.2 DG ECHO balanced cost in relation to effectiveness and timeliness in making strategic choices about its portfolio of assistance		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some indicative evidence suggests that DG ECHO balanced cost in relation to effectiveness and timeliness in making strategic choices about its portfolio of assistance

Some indicative evidence suggests that DG ECHO balanced cost in relation to effectiveness and timeliness in making strategic choices about its portfolio of assistance (JC15.2). Overall, there is wide consensus that the total funding provided by donors was insufficient to meet the collective humanitarian needs in the region. Data from UN OCHA FTS²⁹⁴ shows that the calls for funding consistently exceeded what donors were able to allocate. For example, between 2016 and 2020 only between 50-63% of the tracked global appeal was covered each year, with the remainder being considered unmet requirements. Feedback from the stakeholder consultation also substantiated this. One interviewee²⁹⁵ noted that the humanitarian response as a whole only covers 20-50% of needs, and another²⁹⁶ stated that funding was never sufficient to dress all the different needs considering the context they live in.

²⁹⁰ ICF. 2021. Data extracted from HOPE/EVA databases

²⁹¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 2

²⁹² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 6, Field Interview no. 3a, Cash case study

²⁹³ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 3a

²⁹⁴ UN OCHA FTS. Trends in response plan/ appeal requirements. Available [here](#)

²⁹⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 16

²⁹⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 22

Nonetheless, based on data from the UN OCHA FTS²⁹⁷, DG ECHO was the third largest aid donor to the HoA between 2016-2020, contributing 10% of funds. The top two largest donors were the US (contributing 45%) and the UK (contributing 10%, just over DG ECHO's amount). Evidence from the stakeholder consultation and case studies also suggests that DG ECHO's contribution throughout the evaluation period was important. For example, in Somalia DG ECHO covers about 10% of the humanitarian needs within the country (though this represents around \$1m per year, relative to \$65m provided by UNHCR).²⁹⁸

Further, when assigning modifications, DG ECHO conducted assessments of local in-country partners' capacity to respond to increasing needs, suggesting the additional effectiveness of providing DG ECHO funding was considered against costs. Modifications were made to HIP budgets where additional funding was deemed necessary (and available), such as where additional crises suddenly take place, or are more severe than originally anticipated.²⁹⁹ These processes suggest DG ECHO balances cost in relation to effectiveness when making such decisions.

There is inconclusive evidence regarding the extent to which budget allocations were in line with the funding needed to achieve project objectives (JC15.1). On the specific action level, evidence from the stakeholder consultations raised that DG ECHO's funding was sufficient to enable beneficiaries to be reached and objectives to be realised: "There is broad underfunding, but in terms of funding what they said they would implement, budgets are sufficient."³⁰⁰

Just over half (56%) of the framework partners surveyed agreed that the budget allocated was appropriate and proportional.³⁰¹ Most respondents from the UN system disagreed, whereas most from international organisations agreed.³⁰² Evidence from the cash case study showed that in Ethiopia the size of cash transfers distributed, recommended by the cash working group, was insufficient to cover needs of larger households. The same was true in Somalia, where the target number of beneficiaries were reached but transfer sizes were too small to cover priority needs. In Kenya, one stakeholder interviewed considered the budget not to be at all appropriate or sufficient to meet existing needs.³⁰³ Some FGDs interviewed raised that in the case of cash transfers, whereas funding was sufficient for food or education needs, it would often not cover other expenses such as household bills, water, shelter, and medicine. This was exacerbated where additional crises (e.g. floods) caused inflation to rise, eroding purchasing power. Robust systems for determining minimum expenditure baskets or reviewing cash transfer sizes were called for by stakeholders interviewed.³⁰⁴ Another stakeholder noted that a degree of misunderstanding of budget requirements by DG ECHO was evidenced by the number of contract variations or top-up funding requested, but not necessarily related to genuinely unexpected events.³⁰⁵ However, the stakeholder was apparently unaware of the fact that DG ECHO at times introduce top-ups where they were initially unable to access funding and subsequently identify additional funding streams. As noted in EQ14, this also led to inefficiencies related to the administrative burdens associated with requests for variations.

²⁹⁷ UN OCHA FTS. ICF Analysis. Data extracted on 19/08/21. Exchange rate conversion: 1 EUR = 1.22 USD (based on the average exchange rate between 01/01/2010 - 31/12/2020) based on data from ECB. Available here https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/policy_and_exchange_rates/euro_reference_exchange_rates/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html

²⁹⁸ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 3a, 3d

²⁹⁹ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

³⁰⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 7

³⁰¹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122


³⁰² DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

³⁰³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D3

³⁰⁴ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 2, 4

³⁰⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. 4

Figure 35. Appropriateness and proportionality of the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO – total and by type of



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 16: Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO appropriate and proportionate to what the action(s) were meant to achieve?

3.6 Sustainability

3.6.1 EQ.16 To what extent did DG ECHO actions promote sustained outcomes by linking to longer term nexus actions e.g. safety nets

Table 21. Key conclusions

Judgement criteria	S	Key conclusions
JC16.1 DG ECHO contributed to enhance the sustainability of funded actions by linking beneficiaries to other programmes and actions as appropriate		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO promoted sustainability of interventions in its <i>strategy (HIP)</i> by supporting self-reliance of programme beneficiaries, finding innovative and durable solutions to protracted situations and emphasising the importance and opportunities of linking humanitarian interventions to other interventions and cooperating with development stakeholders in the region. DG ECHO engaged with other donors and actors to foster synergies and support the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. At strategic level, DG ECHO articulated the importance of synergies with local counterparts and with UN agencies.
JC16.2 Cash responses are designed and implemented as part of DG ECHO’s shock responsiveness approach		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> More than 70 percent of surveyed FP “agreed” or “somewhat agreed” that the cash response in the HoA was designed and implemented as part of DG ECHO’s shock-responsiveness approach. Ethiopia PSNP allowed scope for integrating shock response in acute food crises. DG ECHO contributed to design and implementation of shock-responsive safety nets in Somalia.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Built-in Crisis Modifiers for DG ECHO actions could be activated at short notice. Amounts were small limiting the effect on severe deterioration of crises. Applications to the emergency response mechanism (ERM) allowed additional funds to be released within weeks.
<p>JC16.3 DG ECHO has encouraged its partners to create links with longer term interventions and considered sustainability and hand over from project inception</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some structures were put in place to foster nexus opportunities and longer-term interventions in the region. The EDF is the main EU instrument to provide external development assistance. IGAD coordinates actions concerning Somali refugees, as well as regional drought management. In 2017, Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya signed the CRRF. The HIP (2019) encouraged a multi-sectoral approach, with protection at its core. Sustainability was pursued by seeking community involvement from the start, with managing committees taking responsibility for the continuity of WASH and livelihood actions. Interventions in health and protection sought to liaise with the health system and with local NGOs, including capacity building to enhance sustainability.
<p>JC16.4 DG ECHO’s partners have been able to implement exit strategies, e.g., handing over activities to other stakeholders / linking them to development funding or national systems, etc</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall, majority of project mapped included and reported implementing exit strategy, which consisted of coordination with national and local governments and committees and building capacities of local communities and beneficiaries to eventually hand over the activities to them. Examples of exit strategies in some sectors: Exit strategies for WASH relied on community ownership and maintenance, and government administration. Adherence to “do-no-harm” principles prevented disputes and conflict. The extent to which cash interventions were linked to social systems, and more particularly safety nets, largely depended on the availability and maturity of safety nets in country. IGAD insisted on twin-tracking relief and development action in the Karamoja region
<p>JC16.5 DG ECHO’s partners effectively leverage presence, capacity, and funding of other actors (national actors, peacebuilding actors, international development</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Exit strategies mostly involved linkages with development and/or peace initiatives, coordination with national and local governments and committees, and building capacities and resilience of local communities and beneficiaries to eventually take over the activities.

partners) to implement exit strategies.


- “Joint Resilience Action” between UN agencies (2018-2022) in Somalia, some with ECHO funding, targets the same households.

DG ECHO contributed to enhance the sustainability of funded actions by linking beneficiaries to other programmes and actions as appropriate (JC16.1)

DG ECHO promoted sustainability of interventions in its HIPs by supporting **self-reliance** of programme beneficiaries, finding innovative and **durable solutions** to protracted situations, and emphasising the importance and opportunities of **linking humanitarian interventions** to other **interventions** and **cooperating with development stakeholders** in the region.³⁰⁶ In 2018, the HIP specifically mentioned that concomitant initiatives **within the EU and with other donors** were highly relevant to better link humanitarian and development strategies, to mitigate the impact of natural disasters, protect assets, promote resilience, and eventually build social protection mechanisms.³⁰⁷ Moreover, DG ECHO engaged with other donors and actors (see also EQ9) to **foster synergies** and **support the nexus**. In 2019 HIP, DG ECHO articulated the importance of synergies with **local counterparts** and with **UN agencies**, such as in Uganda in the context of the Integrated Refugee Response Plan and in Ethiopia with the Humanitarian Disaster Resilience Plan. However, the latter excludes refugees. The Administration of Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) is the Ethiopian Government’s counterpart of UNHCR.³⁰⁸

Analysis of data from the HOPE database found that **59%** of the 2016-2020 funding in HoA had a duration of **more than 12 months**, and **22%** of more than **18 months** (see Proportion of actions within project duration groups). Continuity of actions was evidenced in actions sampled, of which 56% were follow-up actions.³⁰⁹

Figure 36. Proportion of actions within project duration groups



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number. Total number of actions = 283.

In Somalia, the “Durable Solutions Initiative” was launched in 2015, including a collective framework for government, UN, donors, and NGOs in support of the National Development Plan. In Kenya, the National Disaster Operation Centre, and the Refugee Affairs Secretariat are national coordination bodies. Framework partner agreed or somewhat agreed (74%) that an important

³⁰⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

³⁰⁷ DG ECHO. 2018. Humanitarian Implementation Plan.

³⁰⁸ DG ECHO. 2019. Humanitarian Implementation Plan.

³⁰⁹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

role in making sure that humanitarian and development actors coordinated their efforts to develop durable solutions for the forcibly displaced.³¹⁰ Additionally, the majority of framework partners agreed or somewhat agreed (81%) that DG ECHO has contributed to the broader goal of resilience building in the HoA region.³¹¹

On a country level, DG ECHO's approach to sustainability in HoA was mostly ensured through working with other actors and sharing expertise as well as, having exit strategies which includes graduating people onto other programmes.

In **Ethiopia**, continuity with interventions depended on the context. There was a roadmap on recovery and reintegration. Examples were municipal water rehabilitation for displaced and host populations, cash-for-rent, and integrated programming. Covid-19 added urgency to the need to strengthen national health systems (and WASH services). The Government agreed that NGOs offering nutrition support would appropriately rehabilitate health structures to improve healthcare and management of acute undernutrition. Ethiopia's reluctance to accept external (iNGO) assistance to education complicated absorption of (short-term) EiE beneficiaries into the country system.³¹² The "Durable Solutions Working Group," co-chaired by the Government was set up in 2014 and in 2019 DG ECHO took part as a member of the donor resilience group (HRDG) which was involved in DSWG's work on legislative, policy and operational measures, aiming to align all actors on forced displacement. Nevertheless, the internal conflicts in the southern regions in 2017, and in the northwest in 2020, caused a rapid increase in the number of IDPs and negatively affected the Initiative. On other hand, operationalising the Nexus requires that development actors maintain a presence during crises to support resilience and transition to development at an early stage.³¹³ However, implementing partners pointed out that development actors were risk averse, which caused geographical barriers to collaboration in conflict-affected regions. Development donors suggested that a post-conflict context could create a suitable environment for structural rehabilitation projects.³¹⁴

In **Somalia**, the "Durable Solutions Initiative" was launched in 2015, including a collective framework for government, UN, donors, and NGOs in support of the National Development Plan. In Kenya, the National Disaster Operation Centre, and the Refugee Affairs Secretariat are national coordination bodies. Moreover, stabilisation, recovery and resilience building were addressed with EUTF funding (REINTEG Consortia) since 2016. Post-drought resilience building linked humanitarian action to development in 2019. EUTF also supported the transition from emergency cash to shock-responsive safety nets with its inclusive local economic development programme (ILED).³¹⁵ The development of mobile cash transfers and biometric identity verification facilitated future inclusion of cash beneficiaries in safety nets.³¹⁶

In **Uganda**, DG ECHO supported the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) which contributed to the resilience building by ensuring rights of refugees and migrants to work, and to access public services such as health and education. In **Djibouti**, WFP and UNHCR received EU Delegation support for actions related to CRRF. As most of the DG ECHO funded actions in Djibouti were in 2016-17, its involvement in the CRRF process in this country was negligible.³¹⁷ Moreover, in parts of **Uganda** and **Kenya**, DG ECHO's implementing partners were able to link

³¹⁰ ICF. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122.

³¹¹ ICF. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122.

³¹² ICF. KII. 2021. UNICEF. Ethiopia.

³¹³ General Secretariat of the Council. 9417/17. 2017. Annex: Operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus. Council conclusions.

³¹⁴ ICF. 2021. Case study: [Triple Nexus and Durable Solution].

³¹⁵ DG ECHO.2019. Humanitarian Implementation Plan.

³¹⁶ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 1

³¹⁷ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects).

emergency assistance to development initiatives, such as improved access to public services. Options for linking refugee beneficiaries to national safety nets were limited.³¹⁸

On other hand, cash responses are designed and implemented as part of DG ECHO's shock responsiveness approach (JC16.2)

During the evaluation period DG ECHO pushed towards using cash as a tool to facilitate the nexus and building links with social protection (shock responsiveness) and reinforced that in its 2021 DG ECHO "thematic policy on cash transfers".³¹⁹ The majority of DG ECHO framework partners (71.3%) agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO has sought to connect humanitarian cash transfers with the emerging safety nets and in particular its shock response component, and 59% agreed or somewhat agreed that DG ECHO supported cash transfer programmes explored and developed synergies with national safety net programmes.³²⁰

Crisis Modifiers (additional cash) were built into DG ECHO actions and could be activated at short notice with minimal administrative procedures. They were found useful and flexible, but the effect on severe crisis deterioration was limited as cash amounts were small (10% of the action budget). Applications to the emergency response mechanism (ERM), managed by a leading framework partner, allowed additional funds to be released within weeks. Some interviewed IP noted that there were many applicants for ERM funds, reducing the chances of a bid being successful.³²¹

In **Somalia**, local stakeholders estimated that 10 percent of the population was covered by safety nets in 2020. DG ECHO worked with development donors to design a shock responsive component.³²²

Social safety nets, as described earlier under effectiveness (see section 3.4.1) included the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in **Ethiopia** and the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) in **Kenya**.³²³ Links with nexus aimed at transitioning from the provision of additional services to their integration into the national system,³²⁴ with varying degrees of success. Safety nets in **Uganda** were limited to a pension for people above 70 years of age and conditional safety nets.³²⁵

DG ECHO has encouraged its partners to create links with longer term interventions and considered sustainability and hand over from project inception (JC16.3)

Some **structures** were put in place to foster **nexus opportunities** and longer-term interventions in the region. DG ECHO made efforts to align funded actions with each other, and with those of development partners to some extent. In its 2019 HIP, DG ECHO encouraged a multi-sectoral approach, with protection at its core. In all the countries of the region, the European Development Fund (EDF) is the main EU instrument to provide external development assistance. As part of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, development-related actions within the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for the Horn of Africa have been designed to focus on the developmental needs of populations in protracted displacement.³²⁶ The Nairobi Declaration and Plan of Action of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional application for the Somali refugee situation. In 2011, IGAD launched the

³¹⁸ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 3

³¹⁹ DG ECHO. 2021. DG ECHO Thematic Policy Document No 3 ,Cash Transfer. Available Online: [Cash Transfers \(europa.eu\)](#) (draft).

³²⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of framework partners. N=122

³²¹ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 4.d

³²² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D1

³²³ ICF. 2021. Interviews

³²⁴ ICF. 2021. Interviews

³²⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D2

³²⁶ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) to "end drought emergencies in the Horn of Africa" by building sustainable livelihoods. The first phase of the 15-year strategy ended in 2017. The second phase continued with investment in drought Early Warning Systems, leading to early action and increased focus of development programmes in the most drought-vulnerable areas. These often coincide with areas of highest IDP and refugee concentrations. The current major IDDRSI funders include the Africa Development Bank, World Bank, and the EU.³²⁷ Moreover, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya have all committed to the CRRF, which aims to facilitate the transition to local integration and durable solutions.

In **Ethiopia**, development actors have established a long-term collaboration with the Government. As an example of resilience building, "RESET II", with EUTF funding, tackled root causes, while ensuring that areas falling back due to a crisis received food security and nutritional assistance for six months. The programme involved eight regions and worked across the country (north-east and south). DG ECHO worked jointly with DEVCO (now INTPA) until 2018/19, when the programme was phased out.³²⁸

In **Uganda**, the CRRF was reported to guide nexus programming and represented a framework to facilitate collaboration between DG ECHO and DG INTPA.³²⁹ DG ECHO re-opened the **Uganda** office in 2017, in response to an influx of South Sudanese refugees, and focused actions on refugees and host populations. Karamoja, was cited as a "fortuitous" example, with refugees settling in an area where the host population had received developmental assistance during a period of drought (2016). However, MPCT food assistance for refugees was limited to eight months and intended linkages with long-term initiatives through the CRRF were resource-dependent for sustainability.³³⁰

In **Kenya**, sustainability was pursued by seeking community involvement from the start, with managing committees taking responsibility for the continuity of WASH and livelihood actions. Interventions in health and protection sought to liaise with the health system and with local NGOs, including capacity building to enhance sustainability.³³¹ In ASAL regions of **Kenya**, food assistance was used as an entry point for resilience action (linkage with hunger safety net).

DG ECHO's partners have been able to implement exit strategies, e.g., handing over activities to other stakeholders / linking them to development funding or national systems, etc (JC16.4)

DG ECHO **encouraged its framework partners** to create links with longer term interventions and to consider sustainability and hand over from project inception. The focus on disaster preparedness aimed at strengthening resilience, especially concerning recurrent weather events such as droughts.³³² In the sample of actions mapped, the majority included and reported implementing exit strategy (60%), which consisted of coordination with national and local governments and committees and building capacities of local communities and beneficiaries to eventually hand over the activities to them. 79% of the mapped actions included processes or mechanisms to enhance the sustainability of the activities, such as the establishment of thematic Committees (Health centre committees in hospitals, GBV committees, etc) comprised of elected, well-respected community representatives who serve as the bridge between the community and the partner, and whose main role is to ensure community participation and ownership of interventions.

The evaluation identified successful examples of linkages of **beneficiaries to other interventions**. In Somalia, a flood and water management task force has been set up including humanitarian and

³²⁷ IGAD Secretariat Djibouti. 2019. The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative IDDRSI.

³²⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D2

³²⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D1

³³⁰ ICF. 2021. Cash case study.

³³¹ DG ECHO. 2016. Mission Report. Kenya.

³³² ICF.2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs 2016-2020].

development donors and stakeholders. Exit strategies for WASH relied on community ownership and maintenance, and government administration. Adherence to “do-no-harm” principles reportedly prevented disputes and conflict.³³³ Throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO has been advocating the establishment and/or expansion of **safety nets**, supporting ongoing initiatives, such as PSNP in Ethiopia, Baxnaano and Sagal in Somalia. DG ECHO field staff pursued the intention to link a shock-responsive component to these safety nets, working with the development donors financing these initiatives.³³⁴ The EUTF recognised the importance of cross-border action in the Karamoja region (Kenya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda) and provided financing to IGAD (IDDRSI), including for Early Warning Systems. IGAD insisted on twin-tracking relief and development action in the Karamoja region. The extreme poverty of host populations in areas hosting large numbers of forcibly displaced persons complicated the implementation of exit strategies.

DG ECHO's partners effectively leverage presence, capacity, and funding of other actors (national actors, peacebuilding actors, international development partners) to implement exit strategies. (JC16.5)

Exit strategies mostly involved **linkages with development and/or peace initiatives, coordination with national and local governments** and committees, and building capacities and resilience of local communities and beneficiaries to eventually take over the activities. However, in practice exit strategies were often **constrained by the local context** (e.g., inability to absorb beneficiaries in the public sector, lack of infrastructure, lack of interest in finding durable solutions for forcibly displaced people).

The majority of actions mapped followed the key exit scenarios provided by DG ECHO in the HIPs reviewed as follow:

- Delivering humanitarian interventions aimed at strengthening resilience³³⁵ of communities and creating synergies with self-reliance strategies, thus reducing humanitarian needs and thus the need for support.
- Working with national/regional organisations and authorities to deliver interventions and develop local capacity to respond and integrate resilience into national strategies and programmes.
- Increasing self-reliance amongst refugee, IDP and returnee populations harnessing LRRD opportunities including through cooperation with development stakeholders such as DG INTPA (formerly DG DEVCO) and EU Delegations to work towards increased sustainability.

Through funded actions, coordination and advocacy, DG ECHO has been successful in implementing several **durable solutions**. For instance, in Somalia:

- Successfully secured land for IDPs through coordination with the Somali government,
- Supported large numbers of vulnerable groups through provision of vocational skills trainings to improve their capacity and empower them,
- Installed sustainable community infrastructures and WASH facilities across various districts,

³³³ ICF.2021. Case study on forced displacement.

³³⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no. D1

³³⁵ Contributing to resilience as part of humanitarian interventions was required by the 2012 and 2017 Commission Communications on Resilience

4 Conclusion and recommendations

This section presents the main conclusions of the evaluation per evaluation criteria as well as prospective strategic and operational recommendations to support DG ECHO future intervention in HoA.

4.1 Conclusions

Relevance

DG ECHO and its framework and implementing partners generally adequately assessed, identify and understand the differentiated needs of the most vulnerable in the design and implementation of EU-funded actions, including in its response to forced displacement, taking into account country-level specificities. A range of methods and strategies were used to identify and address needs, which were generally viewed to be appropriate, and tailored to the needs of beneficiaries. Some progress has been made in implementing the CRRF in Uganda, but limited progress was made in Ethiopia. DG ECHO considered the needs of the most vulnerable refugee populations in its priorities and objectives as well as in its needs assessments throughout the evaluation period.

Despite the presence of regional HIPs for the Horn of Africa throughout the evaluation period, evidence reviewed suggests that the approach taken to delivery of actions in the region was mostly national, with a few exceptions. DG ECHO's strategy and funded actions were context adapted and addressed relevant aspects in the region, however the need for a more joined up-approach was generally recognised. Despite this, the extent to which a regional strategy is appropriate, is context and crisis dependent. DG ECHO placed importance on timeliness and flexibility and aimed to enable framework and implementing partners to deliver timely and flexible responses, supporting them with solutions such as the crisis modifier. Partners recognised DG ECHO's flexibility as a donor and made use of the tools offered to allow this, however several suggestions were made for ways in which DG ECHO could improve in its timeliness and flexibility.

Coherence

Several priority needs were identified across the HoA in alignment with DG ECHO's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR). Overall, DG ECHO's HIPs for the HoA were aligned with the principles, good practices and framework set out in European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Moreover, DG ECHO's humanitarian responses in HoA remained principled and framework partners were encouraged to align their projects with humanitarian principles, although a few challenges were encountered. DG ECHO also played a key role in promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) through its advocacy efforts.

Overall, DG ECHO response in HoA was aligned with relevant thematic/ sector priorities, and these priorities were taken into account when designing HIPs. However, in some cases it was more difficult for framework partners to ensure alignment with DG ECHO's thematic/sectoral policies and priorities; especially in cash and protection. This was mostly due to contextual, practical and technical implementation issues.

In the context of the triple Nexus and coordination instruments, measures were taken by DG ECHO to contribute to the coordination with EU's resilience, development and peace actions. DG ECHO referred in its HIPs that activities supported would be required to demonstrate a clear bridging with ongoing resilience or development programmes that were in the spirit of the nexus. DG ECHO introduced internal changes and used markers alongside assessments of proposals to promote nexus opportunities and possible synergies/ complementarities with programmes funded by development and peace actors. When selecting which actions to fund, DG ECHO verified complementary with initiatives of other donors and continued monitoring this complementarity through reporting from framework partners.

At project level; DG ECHO encouraged framework partners to participate in the various cluster coordination meetings of relevant sectors. This ensured that framework partners and donors avoided duplication of efforts and worked hand in hand to address the most pressing needs. DG ECHO also played a key role in developing and sharing best practice with relevant actors as part of its leading role in few clusters. At donor level, DG ECHO regularly met with other donors to liaise interventions and was able to provide strategic coordination with other donors. This included information sharing and discussions on common issues such as protection, cash, access via the Humanitarian Donor Coordination Forum.

Added value

The added value of DG ECHO's intervention in the HoA was significant and wide-ranging. Firstly, it was one of the largest humanitarian donors in the region. During the evaluation period, DG ECHO's funding represented 10% of the total humanitarian flows to the region. Secondly, DG ECHO funding was highly additional. For the vast majority of framework partners (94%), the lack of DG ECHO funding would have either resulted in the project not going ahead at all or only with changes in scope, scale or the timetable. Finally, DG ECHO added considerable value to the existing humanitarian aid architecture in HoA via its (i) technical expertise and field presence; (ii) comprehensive geographical and sectoral coverage (and particularly by filling gaps not covered by other actors); (iii) extensive partnership network; and (iv) flexibility and rapid response tools such as crisis modifiers. Moreover, DG ECHO was actively engaged in promoting a coordinated humanitarian response in the region and is widely acknowledged by partners as a leading actor on forced displacement and cash transfers.

Effectiveness

It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of DG ECHO's in the region due to (i) data constraints, (ii) the inherent time lag in reporting of results and outcomes and (iii) the lack of time and resources to evaluate impact using theory based or quasi-experimental approaches. A mixed picture emerges on the basis of available evidence:

- While DG ECHO funded actions contributed to saving lives and alleviating suffering, many of the funded actions partially achieved their stated objectives. 36% of the DG ECHO funded actions achieved all their Key Result Indicators (KRIs), while another 36% achieved some (but not all) their KRIs. However, the level of achievement of Key Outcome Indicators (KOIs) was rather high – the KOIs were generally achieved or exceeded for the projects selected for in-depth review. Overall, the achievement of results and outcomes was hampered by several constraints, such as lack of preparedness, security issues, lack of capacity and expertise, delays in procurement, lack of basic infrastructure in affected areas, covid-19 restrictions etc.
- DG ECHO drove the use of cash as a modality in the region. Cash helped meet beneficiaries' priority needs (e.g. food, education), but transfers were not always sufficient either in terms of fully meeting their needs (shelter, healthcare) or in terms of the number of beneficiaries covered.
- DG ECHO played a role in establishing shock responsive social safety nets in Somalia. DG ECHO worked with the EUD's SAGAL programme and the World Bank on developing a shock responsiveness component within the Baxnaano safety net programme which covered 1.2 million people or 200,000 households, who receive USD20/ month.
- Finally, DG ECHO made a contribution to promoting durable solutions in the region, although this remains work in progress and the progress, rather naturally, varies by country. For example in Ethiopia, DG ECHO initiated the resilience programme and contributed to increasing the level of cooperation between humanitarian and development actors, including INTPA. In Uganda, the Basic Needs Approach (BNA) helped link humanitarian effort with social protection systems, by identifying and addressing priority sectors, and promoting synergies and referrals between consortia.

Advocacy was a key element of the HIPs during the evaluation period. However, only a limited number of DG ECHO funded actions were found to undertake advocacy activities. Most DG ECHO funded actions focussed on awareness raising and communication actions. Overall, advocacy work undertaken by partners was limited by budgets available and short time span of DG ECHO actions. Nonetheless, some examples of successes can be found in relation to advocacy on respect for humanitarian principles, IHL as well as promotion of humanitarian space.

Advocacy was also directly implemented by DG ECHO depending on the country context, although much of it occurred behind the scenes and was not documented. The evaluation was only able to form a somewhat fragmented and incomplete picture of DG ECHO's activities as well as accomplishments in this area (based primarily on key informant interviews) As such, it difficult hard to conclude whether DG ECHO's advocacy efforts were effective or not. Some examples of successes were noted, for example, in Somalia DG ECHO was seen to play a big role in clear messaging around humanitarian needs and was leading calls to other humanitarian actors (OCHA, FCO) to prepare a better analysis of needs. In Uganda, DG ECHO has influenced the approach to targeting (shift from category based to vulnerability based, which will result in humanitarian aid going to those most in need). And although Ethiopia constitutes a challenging context for advocacy, stakeholders noted DG ECHO's role in promoting needs based targeting.

Efficiency

Cost effectiveness was considered by DG ECHO and its partners in the design of objectives, funding priorities and actions, and both took steps to ensure this would be achieved by funded actions. Whilst overall, cost effectiveness was achieved in DG ECHO's response throughout the evaluation period, several areas for improvement were identified regarding the cost effectiveness of funded actions. There is wide consensus that the total funding provided by donors is insufficient to meet the collective humanitarian needs in the region, though it was recognised that DG ECHO's contribution was important. Nonetheless, the evidence regarding the extent to which budget allocations provided by DG ECHO were sufficient to enable actions to achieve their objectives was inconclusive.

Sustainability

DG ECHO promoted sustainability of interventions in its HoA strategy by supporting self-reliance of programme beneficiaries, finding innovative and durable solutions to protracted situations and emphasising the importance and opportunities of linking humanitarian interventions to other interventions and cooperating with development stakeholders in the region. On a country level, DG ECHO's approach to sustainability in HoA was mostly ensured through working with other actors and sharing expertise as well as having exit strategies which included graduating people from emergency support into other rehabilitation and development programmes. DG ECHO encouraged designing and implementing cash responses as part of DG ECHO's shock responsiveness approach and to create links with longer term interventions, and considered sustainability and handover from project inception.

4.2 Recommendations

1. DG ECHO should consider adopting a multi-annual regional 'umbrella' framework / strategy with national and regional HIPs where appropriate

The evaluation found that a fully, joined-up regional strategy was not realised in the HoA. Whilst the HIPs throughout the evaluation period were presented as regional, and covered the needs for all countries included, to arrive at a greater level of regional coherence and a common approach, the needs and priorities included were mostly at the level of individual

countries. In addition, the 2020 HIP was inconsistent with previous programming as it covered Uganda within the Upper Nile Basin region, potentially suggesting a shift towards a new regional grouping. At the level of the funded actions, with some exceptions, responses were delivered at country level. There are however some examples of regional approaches taken by DG ECHO, for example in relation to the desert locust infestations and the refugee crises that affected multiple countries.

A regional, multi-country ‘umbrella’ framework could accommodate different approaches, depending on what, based on needs assessments, would make most sense, as shown below. Regional approaches would be based on the pooling of resources from different countries to address cross-cutting issues.

<p>Multi-annual, regional (multi-country) actions</p> <p>E.g. (protracted) refugee situations affecting multiple countries, health</p>	<p>Multi-annual, national actions</p> <p>E.g. (protracted) IDP situations, education, cash in some cases</p>
<p>12-18 months, regional (multi-country) actions</p> <p>E.g. environmental crises such as desert locust infestation and floods affecting multiple countries</p>	<p>12-18 months, national actions</p> <p>E.g. food assistance, cash in some cases</p>

The regional ‘umbrella’ framework would allow DG ECHO to address both cross-cutting issues affecting multiple countries, as well as country-specific needs. Moreover, a multi-annual regional framework could also accommodate responses that do not fit within the ‘annual’ programming approach of the HIPs and the typical project cycles of 12-18 months, for example certain elements of multi-country or country specific responses to protracted crises, where relevant.

The development of the regional ‘umbrella’ framework would require detailed consideration as to which issues would best fit at regional and national levels, carefully examining and weighing the needs and benefits of each, and revisiting these choices (and where necessary, revising them) on a regular (e.g. annual) basis. The presence of enabling structures (e.g. partnerships with organisations that operate regionally, regional monitoring systems) should also be reviewed to ensure that actions delivered can de facto be delivered regionally, and have the potential to be effective and efficient.

The adoption of a multi-annual strategic framework may not require fundamental changes to DG ECHO’s programming structures and procedures. Multi-country actions could potentially be funded by pooling resources made available in the national allocations based on needs assessments. Multi-annual funding options may however require some adaptation, and lessons could be drawn from the current piloting of longer-term humanitarian actions by DG ECHO. The main legal instrument, the HAR, would not require changes and may even be strengthened. For example, increasingly donors and implementing agencies such as the UN family (e.g. UNHCR, IOM) are adopting multi-annual strategies, which at the same time link emergency support to longer-term solutions, thus also seeking to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus. By enhancing the consistency with these international organisations, Article 10(2) of the HAR would be strengthened.

A multi-annual regional framework would also allow to develop and implement a more consistent and long-term approach to the nexus to development, and to elaborate a feasible exit strategy for DG ECHO.



2. DG ECHO should invest further efforts to focus the use of cash on where it can be most effective

Throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO strongly drove the introduction and use as cash of a modality in the region. 21% of DG ECHO funding to HoA took the form of cash, mostly in Somalia, Kenya and Uganda, while another 6% of DG ECHO funding took the form of vouchers. The evaluation found that overall, cash helped meet the priority needs, and the move towards more cash-based interventions was appropriate, but overall effectiveness was limited by transfer values being insufficient to cover all needs, the short duration of the actions, and the inadequate coverage of beneficiaries. The MPC contribution was often too small to contribute to outcomes across other sectors, as it was usually calculated as a contribution to the MEP, which represents the minimum needed for households to survive and be kept from destitution. Moreover, there were several practical impediments, related to issues with the selection of FSPs, (initial) partner reluctance and problems with getting cash to beneficiaries (e.g. insufficient capacity of local partners, issues with bank accounts, mobile phone services, and complaint handling). The evaluation also showed that cash alone is not the answer, and that non-cash support to other sectors, in particular protection, remains essential. Finally, the evaluation noted some (initial) positive developments where cash was used to support the resilience of beneficiaries and in efforts to obtain their inclusion into social protection systems where these existed.

On the basis of the above, it is recommended that DG ECHO:

Continues its efforts to examine and identify, through studies and expert involvement, those contexts in which the use of cash would be most appropriate (also considering the practical limitations) and effective, including with a view of establishing the nexus to development and, where relevant, an exit strategy.

As part of the above, be more realistic around the sector outcomes that can be achieved through MPC assistance, especially when the amount and duration of the assistance is limited, which is often the case due to funding or other constraints. This also calls for giving greater consideration to how cash can best be combined with sectoral programming in the different contexts, to maximise the complementarity and synergies between the different actions, and further increase effectiveness.

3. DG ECHO should consider adopting advocacy strategies

The evaluation found several examples demonstrating that that DG ECHO's activities successfully contributed to influencing other actors present in the region, but overall evidence is fragmented and incomplete as much of the advocacy work is not (and possibly cannot) be documented. In addition, advocacy undertaken by DG ECHO in the region varied greatly across countries, depending on the country context. The advocacy work appeared to be mostly driven by individual personalities on the ground, rather than built on a clear strategic approach. Also, advocacy work undertaken by partners was found to be limited by the budgets available and the short time span of DG ECHO actions, which made it difficult for the partners to engage in larger-scale, longer-term activities. Partners were sometimes also reluctant to undertake

advocacy activities given the difficult context and the risk of being excluded from working in country (e.g. in Ethiopia).

It is recommended that DG ECHO develops an overall advocacy strategy as part of its HIPs, which although potentially part of a regional approach (see Recommendation 1 above) should include a tailored advocacy plan for each country (or sub-country areas where relevant), based on the needs assessments as well as considerations on the feasibility of undertaking advocacy in each context.

The advocacy plans should set out:

- Advocacy objectives and priorities for the country
- The type of messaging, activities, etc., that are planned by DG ECHO (in as far as these can be publicly communicated) and those DG ECHO would like framework partners to implement as part of their DG ECHO funded actions
- Guidance for speaking on specific issues with one voice.

Partners could be requested to set out their advocacy strategy and/or planned advocacy activities in their proposals, and describe how these align with DG ECHO's strategy and specific national plan. Overall, DG ECHO should promote advocacy, where this is feasible, as a valid and concrete component of the overall humanitarian response, to which funding can be allocated.

The advocacy strategy and national plans should be drafted in close consultation with other relevant stakeholders, including other Commission services such as INTPA, and DG ECHO partners to ensure that there is overall consensus on the objectives, priorities and messaging. A share of the financial resources available could be earmarked for advocacy activities within the funded actions.

The development of the overall advocacy strategy could be supported by a thematic evaluation of DG ECHO's advocacy efforts over the past 4-5 years, with a forward-looking element to provide the basis for a strategy.

PART B: EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

LIST OF ACRONYMS

DG	Directorate-General
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
DG INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
DG NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSG	Donor Support Group
EcoSec	Economic Security
EEAS	European External Action Service
EHI	Essential House Items
EiE	Education in Emergencies
EU	European Union
FPA	Framework Partnership Agreement
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
FSL	Food security and livelihoods
HAR	Humanitarian Aid Regulation
HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HoA	Horn of Africa
HQ	Headquarters
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IHL	International humanitarian law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
JC	Judgment Criteria
KII	Key Informant Interviews
KOI	Key Objective Indicator
KRI	Key Result Indicator
LRRD	Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MPCT	Multi-purpose Cash Transfers
NAME	Near and Middle East
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PPP	Programmatic Partnership Pilot
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the Executive Summary of Part B of the *Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2016-2020, and DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*. The evaluation was undertaken over 2021 and the start of 2022. The work was undertaken by ICF with inputs from experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance and evaluation.

Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The evaluation assessed DG ECHO's partnership with the ICRC over the period 2016-2020. This report therefore presents an analysis of the operationalisation of the partnership, with a particular focus on its relevance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness.

Overview of the partnership

The ICRC is a neutral and independent organisation established in 1863 with the objective of ensuring protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict and situations of violence and promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Since its establishment in 1992, DG ECHO has been cooperating with the ICRC and contributing to funding its operations. Over the evaluation period, DG ECHO was among the top five ICRC's donors contributing to funding over 120 humanitarian actions implemented by the ICRC in more than 40 countries.

DG ECHO's partnership with ICRC is regulated by an open-ended Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA) signed in 2014 and its accompanying annexes. The FPA and its annexes set out, inter alia, the general rights and obligations of both parties as well as the conditions applicable to all ICRC's humanitarian actions funded by DG ECHO. In 2018, DG ECHO launched its first multi-year Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot (hereafter Grand Bargain PPP) with the ICRC, focussing on six countries in the Middle East region.

The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) (43%) and Africa (35%) received the highest share of funding for ICRC actions commissioned under the FPA. All funding provided by DG ECHO to the ICRC under the Grand Bargain PPP was delivered to countries in the Middle East. Therefore, at an aggregate level, almost two-thirds (59%) of DG ECHO funds to the ICRC were directed towards actions in the MENA region. Under the Grand Bargain PPP, Syria was the largest beneficiary country of ICRC's actions, receiving €93 million in funding, followed by Yemen and Palestine who received €27 million and €24 million respectively.

Methodology

The methodological approach was informed by research tools specifically developed and tailored for the purpose of this evaluation to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base and respond to a specific set of evaluation issues and questions, as articulated in the Terms of Reference (ToR). Overall, for Part B of the evaluation, ICF carried out:

- **Desk research of existing documentation, literature and data** (52 documents);
- A **mapping of 31 projects**, with analysis of all Single Forms and FichOps (62 in total);
- A **portfolio analysis** based on data contained in HOPE/EVA databases;
- **Two multi-modal surveys** targeting DG ECHO and ICRC staff;
- A total of **47 interviews** semi structured interviews with DG ECHO Headquarters staff, DG ECHO Field staff and Thematic experts, ICRC Staff at HQ and field level, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement members, DG INTPA, EEAS, FPI and DG HOME officials, as well as other ICRC donors;
- **Two case studies** through remote fieldwork in Colombia and in the Middle East region.

Key findings and conclusions

Relevance

The partnership was mutually beneficial and brought added value to DG ECHO and the ICRC's responses to humanitarian crises. For example, through the partnership, DG ECHO benefited from ICRC's access to hard-to-reach areas and their reliability and experience in delivering humanitarian aid. ICRC for its part, benefited from greater funding predictability and flexibility, as well as from DG ECHO's technical expertise and knowledge of humanitarian issues. Moreover, **the partners' mandates, competences and resources were highly complementary, which benefited both partners in addressing humanitarian needs.** This was particularly true with regard to the promotion of IHL – identified as a key area of cooperation between ICRC and DG ECHO – as well as when it came to the financial and human resources that both partners brought to address humanitarian needs. On the other hand, **the evaluation also evidenced some differences in the way DG ECHO and the ICRC interpret the moment when humanitarian action ends and longer-term development interventions start,** which in some contexts led to discrepancies between the partners' approaches to a few protracted crises and the operationalisation of the Nexus.

The partnership remained relevant in the face of evolving humanitarian needs and changes in the humanitarian architecture both at global and country level (e.g. shrinking humanitarian space, climate change, increase number of non-state armed groups, Covid-19 pandemic etc.). At country level, the partnership was able to adapt to changes in needs on the ground, including new challenges and constraints posed by the Covid-19 pandemic (e.g. through budget reallocations, increased funding, changes to the types of activities funded etc.).

Coherence

The objectives of the partnership were generally well-understood by DG ECHO and ICRC staff, although with somewhat different levels of understanding within both organisations. Additionally, the evaluation found that, overall, ICRC and DG ECHO staff were **well-aware of and respected each other roles and mandates and were committed to the partnership.**

There was a good degree of alignment and complementarity between ICRC and DG ECHO's strategic priorities and objectives. At operational level, the partnership was also generally well-aligned with each partner's objectives and priorities at sectoral, regional and country level. A few minor differences in terms of strategic and operational priorities (mostly at country level) were also identified, which however were considered as "natural" given the specific mandate of each organisation, and not considered to have had a negative impact on the partnership overall.

The partnership was also generally coherent with DG ECHO and ICRC internal corporate policies and instruments (e.g. Humanitarian Aid Regulation, European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Seville Agreement, both partners' approaches to needs assessments etc.). However, some minor inconsistencies were also identified regarding DG ECHO's visibility guidelines and its monitoring and reporting requirements, as well as with the European Commission's Financial Regulation.

Efficiency

There was **regular, open and honest dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC at different levels.** Strategic level communication and coordination were facilitated by regular meetings and events organised by the two partners. At field level, exchanges between DG ECHO and ICRC officers mostly happened informally, and to a limited extent through participation in Humanitarian Country Teams meetings and other platforms. Improvements in communication and coordination could be brought through **more regular bilateral dialogue** between DG ECHO and ICRC, particularly in headquarters, and through more **structured communication between DG ECHO and ICRC's equivalent desks.**

While **there was room to collectively reflect on actions that enabled or impeded the partnership**, more should be done at strategic level to create opportunities for stocktaking exercises and collection/discussion of strategic lessons learned.

The partnership provided ICRC with greater funding flexibility and predictability, particularly in the context of the Grand Bargain PPP. The Grand Bargain PPP also provided flexibility in the operations at regional level through the possibility of funds transfer between countries, particularly through the ICRC's request to support underfunded operations, which is perfectly in line with the commitments to the Grand Bargain. However, the partnership only **partially produced a reduction in administrative costs during the evaluation period.**

Although the **quality of the actions implemented by ICRC using DG ECHO funding was high**, the limited availability of disaggregated data related to the demographics of the targeted beneficiaries in ICRC's proposal and reports did not allow to generate any meaningful conclusions on whether the partnership ensured accountability to affected populations and on how European aid funds were spent. However, it is important to note that limited reporting requirements on disaggregated numbers of beneficiaries and DG ECHO quality markers are foreseen in the partnership's contractual agreements.

Effectiveness

The **advocacy priorities of DG ECHO and ICRC were aligned and complementary at both global and country level**, particularly on IHL and protection. While mechanisms to identify opportunities for joint advocacy existed both at strategic level and at field level, DG ECHO and ICRC did not exploit such opportunities in a systematic way. **Joint advocacy efforts (e.g. through "mobilisation/ sensitisation") were carried out during the evaluation period through different means** (e.g. roundtables, high-level missions, awareness raising campaigns, etc.), and **contributed to improving the protection of civilians and compliance with IHL** in several countries (e.g. Mali, Palestine, Ukraine, Ethiopia, etc.).

The DG ECHO-ICRC partnership contributed to improved effectiveness of their humanitarian response, particularly in terms of impacts on target beneficiaries. The peculiarity of each partner's role, mandate and operational capacity ensured that the same results would not have been achieved in absence of the partnership. Both partners benefited from each other's strengths and unique features (e.g. ICRC's mandate and ability to deliver humanitarian assistance in certain areas/ contexts on one side, and DG ECHO's funding flexibility and predictability on the other) to enhance the effectiveness of their activities.

The joint DG ECHO-ICRC communication and visibility actions achieved notable results in Europe, while limited efforts were done to ensure visibility in the field (as foreseen in DG ECHO-ICRC contractual agreements). Collaboration between the communication offices of both partners was excellent, and opportunities for joint communication actions were proactively identified and acted upon, resulting in a **series of successful communication campaigns in Europe to promote the work funded by DG ECHO in third countries.** More should be done by both partners in terms of analysis of the impact and outreach of the visibility and communication activities.

Strategic recommendations

Strategic recommendations

- 1. In future multi-annual agreements (such as the Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot), DG ECHO should promote the adoption of a more inclusive and efficiency-driven programmatic approach**

- DG ECHO should promote the adoption of an inclusive programming approach which integrates the perspectives of all the relevant DG ECHO and ICRC headquarter and field units when designing and outlining the strategic elements, operational objectives and mechanisms (including, for example, monitoring and reporting) of the project, thus creating a horizontal design process rather than adopting a top-down approach. DG ECHO should also ensure that relevant field officers are consulted in the case of shifts in funding (e.g. between countries), which might guarantee a higher level of alignment with the priorities and budget allocations in all countries involved;
- DG ECHO should ensure that the flexibility brought by a multi-annual funding approach and simplified grant management (i.e. one regional contract) is translated into operational efficiency. Ideally, DG ECHO should promote the adoption of a similar structure at regional level – i.e. through the introduction of regional management or coordination positions with specific responsibilities over the implementation of the regional programme. Also, DG ECHO could consider adapting its reporting requirements to the multi-annual nature of the project, particularly by reducing intermediate reporting requirements. Lastly, DG ECHO should engage with ICRC to discuss the introduction of general objectives indicators, which could be partially measured at intermediate stage and constitute the main focus of the final report (thus reporting on the impacts of the project).

2. DG ECHO should engage with the ICRC to develop more opportunities to increase mutual learning at strategic level and improve information sharing, particularly in order to:

- Introduce at least one stocktaking meeting every two years, during which the lessons learned both at strategic (headquarters) and operational (field) level should be captured and discussed in an objective and unbiased way;
- Improve the level of detail of information provided in proposals and reports by ICRC, particularly to meet DG ECHO's requirements and ensure that impacts of actions (e.g. on target population) are properly recorded and communicated. For example, DG ECHO could encourage ICRC to better and more consistently present the outputs of their actions, as well as the achieved outcomes and impacts on beneficiaries, and consistently populate relevant indicators. Furthermore, ICRC could be encouraged to consistently report on DG ECHO's gender and age quality markers;
- Jointly collect and analyse data on the outcomes and, when possible, impacts of joint communication activities. The ICRC could be encouraged by DG ECHO to collect data on outcomes and impacts of the communication activities, as they directly implement them and collect related monitoring data. This could happen, for example through the use of qualitative data collection methods, which can be used to gather feedback from participants in the different types of events organised. Furthermore, DG ECHO could make use of the regular evaluations of its communication and visibility (e.g. the ones carried out in 2007 and 2015³³⁶) to assess the outcomes and impacts of the joint communication activities carried out with the ICRC;
- Better align, at planning stage, the joint communication activities with the requirements outlined in the FPA, particularly by including additional information on the general content of the activity (aside for the title of the event/ activity and the geographical

³³⁶ The Evaluation Partnership Limited, Evaluation of Communication, Information and Visibility Actions in Humanitarian Aid, 2007. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2007/communication.pdf> and Transtec, EY, Evaluation of DG ECHO's Approach to Communication under the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP), 2015. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2015/approach_communication_en.pdf

location), on how the visibility of the European Commission will be ensured, and on the budget allocated to each planned activity.

3. DG ECHO should reinforce ongoing dialogue and cooperation with ICRC on the operationalisation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus

- DG ECHO should develop more opportunities for bilateral discussions and cooperation on the operationalisation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus with ICRC;
- DG ECHO should promote dialogue between ICRC and other relevant Commission services (i.e. DG INTPA, DG NEAR) on the implementation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. Tripartite collaboration with relevant Commission Services should be actively sought after (where relevant and possible) and regularly discussed at strategic and operational level.

RÉSUMÉ ANALYTIQUE

Ci-après, figure le résumé analytique de la partie B de l'*Évaluation combinée des interventions humanitaires de l'Union européenne dans la Corne de l'Afrique, 2016-2020, et du partenariat de la DG ECHO avec le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR)*. Cette évaluation a été menée dans le courant de 2021 et au début de 2022. Ce travail a été entrepris par ICF, avec des contributions d'experts dans les domaines de l'assistance humanitaire et de l'évaluation.

Objectifs et portée de l'évaluation

L'évaluation a examiné le partenariat de la DG ECHO avec le CICR sur la période 2016-2020. Ce rapport présente donc une analyse de l'opérationnalisation du partenariat, qui s'intéresse tout particulièrement à sa pertinence, sa cohérence, son efficacité et son efficacité.

Vue d'ensemble du partenariat

Le CICR est une institution neutre et indépendante établie en 1863. Elle a pour but de protéger et d'aider les victimes de conflits armés et d'autres situations de violence, ainsi que de promouvoir le respect du droit international humanitaire (DIH).

Depuis sa création en 1992, la DG ECHO coopère avec le CICR et contribue au financement de ses opérations. Au cours de la période d'évaluation, la DG ECHO figurait parmi les cinq principaux donateurs du CICR, contribuant au financement de plus de 120 actions humanitaires mises en œuvre par le CICR dans plus de 40 pays.

Le partenariat de la DG ECHO avec le CICR est régi par un contrat-cadre de partenariat (CCP) à durée indéterminée signé en 2014 et par ses annexes. Ce CCP et ses annexes stipulent notamment les droits et obligations généraux des deux parties ainsi que les conditions applicables à toutes les actions humanitaires du CICR financées par la DG ECHO. En 2018, la DG ECHO a lancé son premier partenariat programmatique pilote pluriannuel « Grand Bargain » (ci-après le « PPP Grand Bargain ») avec le CICR, axé sur six pays de la région du Moyen-Orient.

La région du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord (MOAN) (43 %) et l'Afrique (35 %) ont reçu la part la plus importante du financement des actions du CICR dans le cadre du CCP. Tous les fonds fournis par la DG ECHO au CICR dans le cadre du PPP Grand Bargain ont été distribués aux pays du Moyen-Orient. Ainsi, au niveau global, près des deux tiers (59 %) des fonds de la DG ECHO destinés au CICR ont été consacrés à des actions dans la région MOAN. Dans le cadre du PPP Grand Bargain, la Syrie a été le principal pays bénéficiaire des actions du CICR, avec une enveloppe de 93 millions d'euros, suivie du Yémen et de la Palestine, qui ont reçu respectivement 27 et 24 millions d'euros.

Méthodologie

L'approche méthodologique s'est appuyée sur des outils de recherche spécifiquement conçus et adaptés à l'objectif de cette évaluation, afin de constituer une base de données riche et complète et de répondre à un ensemble spécifique de problèmes et de questions d'évaluation, tels que définis dans le cadre de référence. Dans l'ensemble, pour la partie B de l'évaluation, ICF a mené :

- **une recherche documentaire portant sur la documentation, la littérature et les données existantes** (52 documents) ;
- **une cartographie de 31 projets**, avec une analyse de tous les formulaires (SingleForm) et fiches opérationnelles (FichOps) (62 en tout) ;
- **une analyse de portefeuille** axée sur les données contenues dans les bases de données HOPE/EVA ;
- **deux enquêtes multimodales** ciblant le personnel de la DG ECHO et du CICR ;

- un total de **47 entretiens** semi-structurés avec le personnel du siège de la DG ECHO, le personnel de terrain et les experts thématiques de la DG ECHO, le personnel du CICR au siège et sur le terrain, les membres du Mouvement international de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge, les fonctionnaires de la DG INTPA, du SEAE, du FPI et de la DG HOME, ainsi que d'autres donateurs du CICR ;
- deux **études de cas** réalisées grâce à un travail de terrain à distance en Colombie et dans la région du Moyen-Orient.

Principales constatations et conclusions

Pertinence

Le partenariat a été mutuellement bénéfique et a apporté une valeur ajoutée aux réponses de la DG ECHO et du CICR aux crises humanitaires. Par exemple, grâce à ce partenariat, la DG ECHO a tiré parti de l'accès du CICR aux zones les plus isolées, ainsi que de sa crédibilité et de son expérience en matière d'aide humanitaire. Le CICR a, quant à lui, bénéficié d'une plus grande prévisibilité et flexibilité du financement, ainsi que de l'expertise technique et de la connaissance des enjeux humanitaires de la DG ECHO. En outre, **les missions, les compétences et les ressources des partenaires étaient très complémentaires, permettant ainsi aux deux partenaires de répondre aux besoins humanitaires.** Cela était particulièrement vrai en ce qui concerne la promotion du DIH (reconnu comme un domaine clé de la coopération entre le CICR et la DG ECHO) ainsi qu'en ce qui concerne les ressources financières et humaines mobilisées par les deux partenaires pour répondre aux besoins humanitaires. D'autre part, **l'évaluation a également mis en évidence certaines différences dans la manière dont la DG ECHO et le CICR interprètent le moment où l'action humanitaire prend fin et où les interventions de développement à plus long terme débutent**, ce qui, dans certains contextes, a conduit à des divergences entre les approches des partenaires à l'égard de quelques crises prolongées et l'opérationnalisation du nexus.

Le partenariat est resté pertinent malgré l'évolution des besoins humanitaires et les changements de l'architecture humanitaire tant au niveau mondial que national (par exemple, le rétrécissement des possibilités humanitaires, le changement climatique, l'augmentation du nombre de groupes armés non étatiques, la pandémie de Covid-19, etc.). Au niveau national, le partenariat a été en mesure de s'adapter à l'évolution des besoins sur le terrain, y compris aux nouveaux défis et contraintes posés par la pandémie de Covid-19 (par exemple, par des réaffectations budgétaires, une augmentation du financement, des changements dans les types d'activités financées, etc.).

Cohérence

Les objectifs du partenariat étaient généralement bien compris par le personnel de la DG ECHO et du CICR, même si les niveaux de compréhension étaient quelque peu différents au sein des deux organisations. En outre, l'évaluation a révélé que, dans l'ensemble, les membres du personnel du CICR et de la DG ECHO étaient **bien conscients de leurs rôles et missions respectifs, les respectaient et étaient dévoués au partenariat.**

Les priorités et les objectifs stratégiques du CICR et de la DG ECHO étaient bien alignés et complémentaires. Au niveau opérationnel, le partenariat était aussi généralement bien aligné sur les objectifs et les priorités de chaque partenaire au niveau sectoriel, régional et national. Quelques différences mineures en termes de priorités stratégiques et opérationnelles (principalement au niveau national) ont également été relevées, mais étaient considérées comme « naturelles », compte tenu de la mission spécifique de chaque organisation et n'ont pas eu d'impact négatif sur le partenariat dans son ensemble.

Le partenariat était également globalement cohérent avec les politiques et instruments internes de la DG ECHO et du CICR (par exemple, le règlement sur l'aide humanitaire, le consensus européen sur l'aide humanitaire, l'Accord de Séville, les approches des deux partenaires en matière d'évaluation des besoins, etc.). Toutefois, quelques incohérences mineures ont également été constatées en ce qui concerne les lignes directrices de la DG ECHO en matière de visibilité et ses exigences en matière de suivi et de rapports, ainsi qu'avec le règlement financier de la Commission européenne.

Efficiences

Le dialogue entre la DG ECHO et le CICR a été régulier, ouvert et honnête à différents niveaux. La communication et la coordination au niveau stratégique ont été facilitées par des réunions et des événements réguliers organisés par les deux partenaires. Sur le terrain, les échanges entre les agents de la DG ECHO et du CICR se sont surtout déroulés de manière informelle et, dans une moindre mesure, par le biais de la participation aux réunions des équipes humanitaires nationales et à d'autres plateformes. La communication et la coordination pourraient être améliorées par un **dialogue bilatéral plus régulier** entre la DG ECHO et le CICR, notamment au niveau du siège, et par une **communication plus structurée entre la DG ECHO et les bureaux équivalents du CICR.**

Bien qu'une **réflexion collective sur les actions qui ont facilité ou entravé le partenariat ait été possible**, il convient de faire davantage au niveau stratégique pour multiplier les occasions de faire le point et de recueillir/discuter des enseignements stratégiques.

Ce partenariat a permis au CICR de bénéficier d'une plus grande souplesse et d'une meilleure prévisibilité en matière de financement, notamment dans le cadre du PPP Grand Bargain. Le PPP Grand Bargain a également offert une certaine flexibilité dans les opérations au niveau régional grâce à la possibilité de transfert de fonds entre les pays, notamment par la demande du CICR de soutenir des opérations sous-financées, ce qui est parfaitement conforme aux engagements du Grand Bargain. Cependant, le partenariat n'a **abouti que partiellement à une réduction des coûts administratifs au cours de la période d'évaluation.**

Bien que la **qualité des actions mises en œuvre par le CICR grâce au financement de la DG ECHO ait été remarquable**, la disponibilité limitée de données désagrégées relatives à la démographie des bénéficiaires ciblés dans la proposition et les rapports du CICR n'a pas permis de tirer de conclusions pertinentes sur la question de savoir si le partenariat a assuré la responsabilité envers les populations affectées et sur la manière dont les fonds d'aide européens ont été dépensés. Toutefois, il est important de noter que les accords contractuels du partenariat prévoient des exigences limitées en matière de rapports sur le nombre désagrégé de bénéficiaires et les marqueurs de qualité de la DG ECHO.

Efficacité

Les priorités de la DG ECHO et du CICR en matière de plaidoyer étaient alignées et complémentaires, tant au niveau mondial que national, notamment en ce qui concerne le DIH et la protection. Alors que des mécanismes permettant d'identifier les opportunités de plaidoyers conjoints existaient tant au niveau stratégique que sur le terrain, la DG ECHO et le CICR n'ont pas exploité ces opportunités de manière systématique. **Des efforts conjoints de plaidoyer (par exemple au travers de la « mobilisation / sensibilisation ») ont été menés au cours de la période d'évaluation par différents moyens** (par exemple des tables rondes, des missions de haut niveau, des campagnes de sensibilisation, etc.) et ont **contribué à améliorer la protection des civils et le respect du DIH** dans plusieurs pays (par exemple au Mali, en Palestine, en Ukraine, en Éthiopie, etc.).

Le partenariat DG ECHO-CICR a contribué à améliorer l'efficacité de leur réponse humanitaire, notamment en termes d'impact sur les bénéficiaires ciblés. La particularité du rôle, de la mission

et de la capacité opérationnelle de chaque partenaire a assuré des résultats qui n'auraient pas été atteints en l'absence de partenariat. Les deux partenaires ont tiré parti des forces et des caractéristiques uniques de chacun (par exemple, la mission du CICR et sa capacité à fournir une aide humanitaire dans certaines zones / contextes d'une part, et la flexibilité et la prévisibilité du financement de la DG ECHO d'autre part) pour améliorer l'efficacité de leurs activités.

Les actions conjointes de communication et de visibilité de la DG ECHO et du CICR ont obtenu des résultats appréciables en Europe, tandis que des efforts limités ont été déployés pour assurer la visibilité sur le terrain (comme le prévoient les accords contractuels entre la DG ECHO et le CICR). La collaboration entre les bureaux de communication des deux partenaires a été excellente, et les possibilités de mener des actions de communication conjointes ont été identifiées de manière proactive et bien exploitées, ce qui a donné lieu à une **série de campagnes de communication réussies en Europe pour promouvoir le travail financé par la DG ECHO dans les pays tiers.** Les deux partenaires devraient approfondir l'analyse de l'impact et de la portée des activités de visibilité et de communication.

Recommandations stratégiques

Recommandations stratégiques

1. Dans les futurs accords pluriannuels (tels que le partenariat programmatique pilote Grand Bargain), la DG ECHO devrait promouvoir l'adoption d'une approche programmatique plus inclusive et axée sur l'efficacité.

- La DG ECHO devrait promouvoir l'adoption d'une approche de programmation inclusive qui intègre les perspectives de toutes les unités concernées de la DG ECHO et du CICR, tant au siège que sur le terrain, lors de la conception et de la définition des éléments stratégiques, des objectifs opérationnels et des mécanismes (y compris, par exemple, le suivi et l'établissement de rapports) du projet, instaurant ainsi un processus de conception horizontal plutôt qu'une approche descendante. La DG ECHO devrait également veiller à ce que les agents de terrain concernés soient consultés en cas de changement de financement (par exemple entre les pays), ce qui pourrait garantir un meilleur alignement sur les priorités et les dotations budgétaires dans tous les pays concernés ;
- La DG ECHO devrait veiller à ce que la flexibilité offerte par une approche de financement pluriannuelle et une gestion simplifiée des subventions (c'est-à-dire un seul contrat régional) se traduise par une efficacité opérationnelle. Idéalement, la DG ECHO devrait promouvoir l'adoption d'une structure similaire au niveau régional, c'est-à-dire par l'introduction de postes de gestion ou de coordination régionale avec des responsabilités spécifiques en matière de mise en œuvre du programme régional. La DG ECHO pourrait également envisager d'adapter ses exigences en matière de production de rapports à la nature pluriannuelle du projet, notamment en réduisant les exigences de rapports intermédiaires. Enfin, la DG ECHO devrait discuter avec le CICR de l'introduction d'indicateurs d'objectifs généraux, qui pourraient être partiellement mesurés à l'étape intermédiaire et constituer le sujet principal du rapport final (rendant ainsi compte des résultats du projet).

2. La DG ECHO devrait discuter avec le CICR afin de multiplier les occasions de renforcer l'apprentissage mutuel au niveau stratégique et d'améliorer le partage d'informations, notamment afin :

- d'instaurer au moins une réunion de bilan tous les deux ans, au cours de laquelle les enseignements tirés tant au niveau stratégique (au siège) qu'opérationnel (sur le terrain) doivent être recensés et discutés de manière objective et impartiale ;
- d'améliorer le niveau de détail des informations fournies par le CICR dans les propositions et les rapports, notamment pour répondre aux exigences de la DG ECHO et garantir que les effets des actions (par exemple sur la population cible) sont correctement enregistrés et communiqués. Par exemple, la DG ECHO pourrait encourager le CICR à présenter de manière plus claire et plus cohérente les résultats de ses actions, ainsi que les effets obtenus et l'impact sur les bénéficiaires, et à renseigner systématiquement les indicateurs pertinents. En outre, le CICR pourrait être encouragé à rendre compte de manière cohérente des marqueurs de qualité de la DG ECHO en matière de genre et d'âge ;
- de collecter et d'analyser conjointement les données sur les effets et, si possible, les impacts des activités de communication conjointes. La DG ECHO pourrait encourager le CICR à collecter des données sur les effets et les impacts des activités de communication, puisqu'il les met directement en œuvre et collecte les données de suivi correspondantes. Cela pourrait se faire, par exemple, en employant des méthodes de collecte de données qualitatives, qui peuvent être utilisées pour recueillir les retours des participants aux différents types d'événements organisés. En outre, la DG ECHO pourrait utiliser les évaluations régulières de sa communication et de sa visibilité (par exemple, celles réalisées en 2007 et 2015³³⁷) afin d'évaluer les effets et les impacts des activités de communication conjointes menées avec le CICR ;
- de mieux aligner, dès le stade de la planification, les activités de communication conjointes sur les exigences définies dans le CCP, notamment en incluant des informations supplémentaires sur le contenu général de l'activité (hormis le titre de l'événement/activité et le lieu géographique), sur la manière dont la visibilité de la Commission européenne sera assurée et sur le budget alloué à chaque activité prévue.

3. La DG ECHO devrait renforcer le dialogue et la coopération en cours avec le CICR sur l'opérationnalisation du nexus humanitaire-développement.

- La DG ECHO devrait multiplier les occasions de discussions bilatérales et de coopération sur l'opérationnalisation du nexus humanitaire-développement avec le CICR ;
- La DG ECHO devrait promouvoir le dialogue entre le CICR et les autres services concernés de la Commission (c'est-à-dire la DG INTPA, la DG NEAR) sur la mise en œuvre du nexus humanitaire-développement. La collaboration tripartite avec les services compétents de la Commission devrait être activement encouragée (selon la pertinence et les possibilités) et régulièrement abordée au niveau stratégique et opérationnel.

³³⁷ The Evaluation Partnership Limited, Evaluation of Communication, Information and Visibility Actions in Humanitarian Aid, 2007. Disponible à l'adresse <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2007/communication.pdf> et Transtec, EY, Evaluation of DG ECHO's Approach to Communication under the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP), 2015. Disponible à l'adresse https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2015/approach_communication_en.pdf

1 Introduction

This is Part B of the final report for the *Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2016-2020, and DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*. The evaluation was undertaken over 2021 and the start of 2022. The work was undertaken by ICF with inputs from experts in the fields of humanitarian assistance and evaluation.

1.1 Objectives and scope of the evaluation

The evaluation assessed DG ECHO's partnership with the ICRC over the period 2016-2020. This report therefore presents an analysis of the operationalisation of the partnership, with a particular focus on its relevance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness.

1.2 Theory of change

This section presents the Theory of change (ToC) for DG ECHO-ICRC partnership. The ToC was developed on the basis of desk research, scoping interviews and a workshop with relevant DG ECHO staff, ICRC representatives and the evaluation team including external experts advising the ICF team carried out during the Desk phase.

As depicted in Figure 37 below, the ToC is described through a causal chain consisting of the following building blocks (from left to right):

- Inputs – the human, financial and institutional resources³³⁸ that go into the partnership;
- The outputs and expected effects (results and impacts) of the partnership;³³⁹
- The contextual conditions or external factors that influence the causal pathways and which are fully or partially beyond DG ECHO and ICRC's control;
- The underlying assumptions about the causal links i.e. the variables or factors that need to be in place for change to occur at different levels (e.g. for "results" to lead to "impacts").

As described in the ToC, the objectives of DG ECHO and the ICRC partnership include:

- To develop a strategic partnership to ensure effective, efficient and rapid delivery of humanitarian assistance;
- To promote and strengthen compliance with International Humanitarian Law and universal humanitarian principles;
- To raise awareness of humanitarian issues among decision-makers and the general public in order to foster the overall effectiveness of, and support to, humanitarian assistance.


In the framework of the partnership, the objective of the Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot (Grand Bargain PPP) is to:

- Bring more efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of the assistance, including for instance joined-up approach with development actors, enhanced emergency response capacity and innovative approaches to addressing humanitarian needs.

³³⁸ Institutional inputs include technical and logistical capabilities.

³³⁹ Inputs are used to deliver specific outputs >> Outputs produce certain effects (direct results and intermediate outcomes) >> Effects contribute to impacts.


Figure 37. Theory of change DG ECHO-ICRC partnership



1.3 Methodological approach and validity of the evaluation results

The evaluation was designed to respond to a specific set of evaluation issues and questions, as articulated in the Terms of Reference (ToR). A variety of research tools and sources of information were used to build a rich and comprehensive evidence base for this evaluation covering a wide range of stakeholders (see Figure 38). Overall, for Part B of the evaluation, ICF has reviewed approximately 52 documents and documentations (Single Form and FichOps) for 31 actions. ICF also conducted multi-modal surveys of DG ECHO staff in relation to their partnership with ICRC and of ICRC staff in relation to their partnership with DG ECHO. In addition, ICF has undertaken semi structured key informant interviews (KIIs) and conducted remote fieldwork in Colombia and in the Middle East region. This section summarises the methodology used.

Figure 38. Overview of the methodology



1.3.1 Documentation review

As part of the desk review, the evaluation team looked at a range of secondary sources of evidence. The majority of documents were publicly available and found online, while some were provided by DG ECHO and the ICRC. Table 22 provide an overview of the evidence base and brief description of the quality of the information collected and the limitations/gaps identified.

Table 22. Documentation review

Secondary source of information	Progress to date	Strength of the data collected
Project documentation	31 Single Forms, 31 FichOps	Medium quality. The quality of the information provided in the Single Forms varied from one action to another. Overall, limited information was provided for some of ICRC’s protection activities (number of beneficiaries targeted and reached). Information on lessons learned, joint communication activities (in the EU), and resilience was not provided in any of the Single Forms reviewed. The quality of the information provided in the FichOps also varied from one action to another but overall, it included a good level of information on

Secondary source of information	Progress to date	Strength of the data collected
		the assessment of progress and results from ICRC funded actions.
Document review	Review of a large sample of secondary sources	Strong quality. The documents reviewed were either directly provided by DG ECHO and ICRC or identified through a 'snowball' search, based on ICRC and DG ECHO websites, internet searches, and recommendations by the stakeholders consulted. The evaluation team is confident to have captured the most relevant documents.
Portfolio analysis	Analysis of data contained in HOPE/EVA databases	Strong quality. The portfolio analysis allowed us to conduct an in-depth analysis of the financial information of ICRC funded actions during the evaluation period/ More specifically, the HOPE/EVA databases provided information on: 1) Total humanitarian funding to ICRC actions funded by DG ECHO; 2) DG ECHO funding to ICRC actions; 3) Country coverage of ICRC actions (funding, number of actions); 4) Sectoral coverage of ICRC actions (funding, number of actions); 5) KRIs and KOIs achieved per action.

1.3.2 Surveys

As part of the desk research, two surveys were conducted:

- Survey of DG ECHO staff in relation to their partnership with ICRC;
- Survey of ICRC staff in relation to their partnership with DG ECHO.

Table 2 below presents the steps undertaken in the organisation and administration of the surveys, and an analysis of the quality of the data collected.

Table 23. Multi-modal surveys

	DG ECHO Staff	ICRC Staff
Survey period	12 th – 30 th July	2 nd – 16 th August
Distribution method	DG ECHO distribution channels	ICRC distribution channels
Number of responses	36	18
Response rate	40%	60%
Survey analysis	The two surveys were analysed quantitatively using descriptive statistics. Cross tabulations were outputted via ICF survey software (Qualtrics). ICF conducted data cleaning on these outputs and created graphs and tables to present the findings. For open-ended questions, all responses were collated and analysed qualitatively, with a summary of the main themes included provided. The same method was used for both surveys.	
Strength of the data and limitations	Strong quality. The response rate was high and there was a mixture of responses from DG ECHO staff in Headquarters (HQ) (22%), regional offices (17%) and	Medium quality. Although the response rate was relatively high at 60%, the absolute number of responses was quite low at only 18 (19 if partial responses are

	DG ECHO Staff	ICRC Staff
	country and sub-country offices (61%). It was therefore possible to disaggregate responses by type of DG ECHO staff and identify differences between these respondents.	included). Furthermore, the large majority of respondents (84%, 16 respondents) were part of ICRC delegation. Only 11% (2 respondents) were part of the regional delegation, and 5% (1 respondent) from ICRC HQ. No responses were received from sub-delegation or field office. Therefore, it was very difficult to stratify responses by staff type, and thus be able to make any inferences about different viewpoints within ICRC. Moreover, due to specific changes requested by ICRC, not all of the questions correspond to those in the DG ECHO staff survey. Therefore, there are some judgement criteria for which it was not possible to collect information from ICRC through the survey.

1.3.3 Consultation

Consultation started from day one of the evaluation with a workshop with DG ECHO staff and ICRC staff to discuss the ToC and Evaluation Framework followed by three scoping interviews with DG ECHO HQ staff, one interview with DG ECHO field staff, two interviews with ICRC HQ staff and one interview with ICRC field staff. A series of KIIs were also undertaken during the field phase and as part of the case studies. Table 24 provides an overview of the stakeholders consulted in each phase as well as an analysis the strength of the evidence collected as part of the stakeholder consultation.

Table 24. Overview of stakeholders consulted

Stakeholder group	Scoping interviews	KIIs (field phase)	Field interviews (case studies)	Validation workshop
DG ECHO HQ, DG ECHO Field staff and Thematic experts	4	6	7	2
ICRC Staff at HQ and field level	3	9	8	2
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement		2		
DG INTPA, EEAS, FPI and DG HOME officials		2		
Other donors		1	2	
TOTAL	7	19	17	4

Strength of the data and data limitations	Strong quality. The information gathered allowed for the refinement of the evaluation framework, the ToC and the scope of the case studies.	Strong quality. The sample of stakeholders interviewed was representative of DG ECHO's main stakeholder groups relevant for the partnership (i.e. DG ECHO staff; ICRC staff; other donors; other Commissions services; other components of the Movement).	Strong quality. The sample of stakeholders interviewed was representative of DG ECHO's main stakeholder groups relevant for the partnership (i.e. DG staff at various levels; ICRC staff at various levels; and other donors). The main limitation of the case studies was the fact that due to the Covid-19 restrictions, the two case studies were carried out through a fully remote approach.	Strong quality. The set-up of the workshop allowed the evaluation team to collect very good feedback on the key findings of the evaluation and potential recommendations.
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Source: ICF

As part of the field phase, two case studies were organised and conducted remotely in Colombia and the Middle East region. Two thematic areas were explored:

4. The Triple Nexus in Colombia;
5. The Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East region.
6. Further information on the methodological approach and limitations for the case studies is provided in the case studies report.

1.3.4 Overall validity of findings

Complementary research methods were used to enhance the reliability and validity of the data collected and to provide the basis for cross-verification, corroboration and triangulation of the evaluation results. The vested interests of different stakeholder groups were taken into account to address potential bias and to ensure objectivity. However, as with any evaluation, there were limitations to the methodologies and research tools applied. For example, in the context of the field missions, the Covid-19 emergency did not allow to perform field case studies, and a fully remote approach was agreed with the DG ECHO Steering Group. As a consequence, activities such as the observation of the context in which the work of the two partners took place were not implemented.

Overall, based on the review of the methods and tools presented below, it is considered that the evaluation results are valid, as in the vast majority of cases they are confirmed by multiple sources of evidence.

1.4 The structure of the report

The report is structured as follows:

- Section 2 provides an overview of the context underpinning the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership;
- Section 3 presents the evaluation findings to all the evaluation questions in the following order: relevance, coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency. For each evaluation question, a short table summarising the judgement criteria and key findings is provided;

- Section 4 provides the conclusions and strategic recommendations of the evaluation.

2 Context underpinning DG ECHO and the ICRC partnership

The objective of this section is to present an overview of DG ECHO and the ICRC partnership.

2.1 Overview of the partnership

The ICRC is a **neutral and independent organisation** established in 1863 with the objective of ensuring protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict and situations of violence and promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The organisation's mandate derives from the **Geneva Conventions of 1949** and their Additional Protocols as well as the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and the International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. The ICRC is present in more than a hundred countries³⁴⁰ and its activities in the field are structured around four main areas: assistance; protection; prevention and cooperation with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Since its establishment in 1992, DG ECHO has been cooperating with the ICRC and contributing to funding its operations.³⁴¹ **Over the evaluation period, DG ECHO was among the top five ICRC's donors** contributing to funding over 120 humanitarian actions implemented by the ICRC in more than 40 countries.

DG ECHO's partnership with ICRC is currently regulated by an open-ended **Framework Partnership Agreement (FPA)** signed in 2014 and its accompanying annexes.³⁴² The FPA and its annexes regulate, among other things, the general rights and obligations of both parties as well as the general conditions applicable to all ICRC's humanitarian actions funded by DG ECHO (from the proposal to the final report). In 2015, DG ECHO and ICRC signed a specific agreement to further simplify proposal drafting and reporting and to regulate the exchange of information and the visibility requirement for DG ECHO funding. In 2018, DG ECHO launched its first multi-year pilot Grand Bargain PPP with ICRC, focussing on six countries in the Middle East region.

ICRC's special role as guardian of IHL based on the Geneva Conventions as well as the way in which ICRC programmes its activities³⁴³ have been reflected in the contractual relationship with DG ECHO. For example, ICRC has been granted the possibility to derogate from visibility requirements in the field and a higher degree of flexibility with regard to proposal and Single Form requirements (e.g. due to confidentiality reasons related to the target groups). There is also no traditional monitoring of ICRC actions by DG ECHO staff but rather joint visits.

The current DG ECHO-ICRC FPA was reviewed in 2021 in compliance with the new Commission Financial Regulation adopted in 2018 and will be adopted in 2022.

The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) (43%) and Africa (35%) received the highest share of funding for ICRC actions commissioned under the FPA. All of the funding provided by DG ECHO to the ICRC under the Grand Bargain PPP was delivered to countries in the Middle East. Therefore, considering the combined lines of funding, almost two-thirds (59%) of DG ECHO funds were directed towards actions in the MENA region. Under the Grand Bargain PPP, Syria was the largest beneficiary receiving €93 million in funding, followed by Yemen and Palestine who received €27 million and €24 million respectively.


³⁴⁰ ICRC Annual Report 2019, Facts and Figures. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/ar2019_facts_and_figures.pdf.

³⁴¹ URD, Evaluation of the partnership between DG ECHO (the department in charge of humanitarian issues within the European Commission) and the International Committee of the Red Cross, 2006. Available at http://www.urd.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/echo_cicr_fr.pdf

³⁴² Framework Partnership Agreement with ICRC. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/humanitarian-partners_en.


³⁴³ The ICRC has its fundraising and reporting functions centralised at its headquarters in Geneva. ICRC does not submit specific projects to be (partially) funded by DG ECHO. Rather, the information provided in the Single Form is based on ICRC "Emergency Appeal" which defines ICRC's strategy and objectives to achieve in a given country.

Figure 39. DG ECHO funding to ICRC under FPA by region




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 115 ICRC actions = €468,104,601. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Figure 40. DG ECHO funding to ICRC under Grand Bargain PPP.



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 116 ICRC actions = €643,415,555. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. This excludes the Grand Bargain (ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001), an action covering six countries, for which data was obtained from DG ECHO detailing the distribution of funds across recipient states.

Figure 41. DG ECHO funding to ICRC under Grand Bargain PPP by country



Source: Data provided by DG ECHO on Grand Bargain PPP funding. ICF analysis. N = €175,000,000 = total DG ECHO funding under Grand Bargain PPP.

3 Evaluation Findings

This section presents the findings from our research, based on the different sources of information (Section 1.3). Each evaluation question starts with a summary of key findings per judgement criteria as well as an assessment of the strength of evidence, using a colour code system following ranking:

Ranking of evidence	
Strong	<p>High quality body of evidence, large or medium in size, highly or moderately consistent, and contextually relevant.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality – includes evidence includes high quality studies and evaluations and/or good quality soft data • Size – large or medium • Consistency – similar messages emerge from different pieces of evidence. There might be some areas of dissonance / divergence
Medium	<p>Moderate quality studies, medium size evidence body, moderate level of consistency. Studies may or may not be contextually relevant</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Quality –good quality soft data • Size –medium • Consistency – similar messages emerge from different pieces of evidence. There might be some areas of dissonance / divergence
Weak	<p>The evidence is limited to a single source of questionable quality (i.e. there is an obvious risk of bias) or, is mainly anecdotal in nature, or there are many sources of evidence but the information they provide is highly contradictory and it is not possible to distinguish their quality.</p>

3.1 Relevance

3.1.1 Does the partnership remain relevant in the face of an evolving global context?

Table 25. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
The partnership was mutually beneficial: each partner got added value out of their taking part in the partnership (JC 1.2)	S	<p>Evidence collected shows that the partnership was mutually beneficial and brought added value to DG ECHO and ICRC' responses to humanitarian needs.</p> <p>Under the partnership, DG ECHO primarily benefitted from ICRC's access to hard-to reach-areas, ICRC's role in promoting IHL, and their expertise and their reliability in delivering humanitarian aid.</p> <p>ICRC mostly benefited from the partnership in terms of a strengthening of their efforts to promote IHL, DG ECHO's strong technical expertise, and funding predictability and flexibility.</p>

<p>DG ECHO and ICRC were highly complementary in nature in terms of their mandates, core competencies and resources they bring to address humanitarian needs (JC 1.3)</p>	<p>S</p> <p>DG ECHO and ICRC’s mandates, competences and resources are highly complementary in nature, which benefited both partners in addressing humanitarian needs.</p> <p>The complementarity of mandates and roles was especially noticeable when it comes to the promotion of IHL and the humanitarian principles, which was identified as a key area of cooperation between ICRC and DG ECHO.</p> <p>Both organisations were also highly complementary in the resources they brought to address humanitarian needs.</p> <p>On the other hand, evidence shows some misalignment with regard to the partners’ understanding of the “grey zone” between humanitarian aid and development (especially in the context of protracted crises and with regard to the operationalisation of the Nexus).</p>
<p>The evolving humanitarian needs in certain contexts were best met via a partnership approach (JC 1.1.)</p>	<p>S</p> <p>Overall, the partnership remained (and is expected to remain) relevant in the face of evolving humanitarian needs and changes in the humanitarian architecture (e.g. shrinking humanitarian space, climate change, increase number of non-state armed groups etc.)</p> <p>This was the case both at global level, where the partnership remained relevant in the face of changes in the humanitarian landscape, as well as at country level, where ICRC and DG ECHO showed flexibility in responding to changes in needs (e.g. in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic).</p> <p>Nevertheless, some stakeholders expressed concerns about the relevance of the partnership in the face of the increased number of protracted conflicts (and with regard to the Nexus) due to some misalignments in ICRC and DG ECHO’s approach to those contexts, as discussed above.</p>


Evidence collected shows that the partnership brought added value to DG ECHO and ICRC’ responses to humanitarian needs (JC 1.2). The partnership helped ICRC achieving its mandate³⁴⁴ and allowed DG ECHO to better realise the objectives of its relevant HIPs.³⁴⁵ Most DG ECHO (83%) and ICRC staff (95%) consulted as part of the online surveys agreed that the partnership was mutually beneficial and that each partner got added value out of their taking part in the partnership (see Figure 42).

³⁴⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N= 19, 79%; and DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N=36, 92%.

³⁴⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N= 19, 95%; and DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N=36, 83%.

Figure 42. Share of ICRC staff and DG ECHO staff who believe that the partnership is mutually beneficial: each partner gets added value out of their taking part in the partnership

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N =19; n = 1 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation);



and DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices).

ICRC has a specialised mandate based on the Geneva Conventions (see also JC 1.3) which means that in some conflict settings, it is one of the few DG ECHO framework partners (and sometimes the only one) with access to hard-to-reach areas to deliver humanitarian assistance.³⁴⁶ Most DG ECHO staff consulted agreed that the partnership with ICRC was greatly beneficial for delivering humanitarian aid in difficult situations.³⁴⁷ The documentation review and project mapping confirmed that the partnership with ICRC enhanced the relevance of DG ECHO's responses in conflict settings, as it allowed for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in areas that DG ECHO would have not been able to access otherwise. For example, ICRC was indispensable for DG ECHO to deliver humanitarian assistance and protection in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Similarly, in South Sudan, the partnership with ICRC was essential as it was one of the few humanitarian actors that worked in areas which were almost impossible to access. ICRC is also one of the main partners of DG ECHO in Colombia. Their access capacities and operational presence in the country are also a key pillar for DG ECHO's response strategy in Colombia, as confirmed by the case study, especially in the context of increasing humanitarian needs caused by internal conflicts and the impact of the Venezuelan crisis. Similarly, in Ukraine, ICRC is one of the few organisations that has access to some of the most isolated communities along the contact line.

Furthermore, through the partnership, DG ECHO also benefitted from ICRC's role in promoting IHL – which strengthened the relevance of their own advocacy efforts (see JC 1.3)³⁴⁸ as well as from ICRC's expertise³⁴⁹ and reliability in the delivery of humanitarian aid.³⁵⁰

For ICRC, the partnership with DG ECHO was also beneficial to strengthen its advocacy efforts on IHL.³⁵¹ ICRC saw DG ECHO as a key partner in promoting IHL, the humanitarian principles and preserving the humanitarian space. Moreover, through the partnership, ICRC also benefitted from DG ECHO's strong technical expertise and knowledge of humanitarian issues in the countries

³⁴⁶ European Commission. The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf.

³⁴⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 01, 07, 08, 09, 15, Scoping Interview no 05 and Filed Interviews no 08 and 09; and DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36, 72%.

³⁴⁸ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36, 92%; and ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 07, 08, Scoping interview 05 and Field Interviews no 08 and 09.

³⁴⁹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36, 83%.

³⁵⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36, 81%.

³⁵¹ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18, 78%.

where they operate.³⁵² In some cases, DG ECHO's advice and recommendations (especially in the context of joint visits to ICRC's actions) translated into changes in ICRC's operating procedures and programme design (e.g. the establishment of a mandatory distribution tracking mechanism as well as ICRC's programme design in Ukraine).³⁵³ Funding predictability³⁵⁴ and flexibility (see also JC 1.1 below)³⁵⁵ were also among the benefits brought by the partnership to ICRC (see also JC 7.2 under section 3.4.2).

DG ECHO and ICRC's mandates, competences and resources were highly complementary which also benefited both partners in addressing humanitarian needs (JC 1.3). Nevertheless, evidence shows some misalignments with regard to the partners' understanding of when humanitarian action ends and other longer-term development interventions start (especially in the context of protracted crises).

When it comes to the partners' mandates, ICRC aims to ensure protection and assistance to victims of armed conflict and situations of violence and to promote respect for IHL.³⁵⁶ DG ECHO is mandated among other things, to provide needs-based humanitarian assistance to the people hit by man-made and natural disasters with particular attention to the most vulnerable populations.³⁵⁷ DG ECHO humanitarian aid activities also comprise high-level policy work and advocacy for the respect of IHL.³⁵⁸ DG ECHO does not intervene directly on the ground, it delivers humanitarian aid through the funding provided to its partners – including ICRC – and ICRC carries out its mandate through actions supported financially by its donors – including DG ECHO –. Both ICRC and DG ECHO provide humanitarian assistance based on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

DG ECHO and ICRC were highly complementary in the provision of humanitarian aid to populations affected by conflict and violence. Most ICRC (84%) and DG ECHO staff (94%) consulted through the surveys considered that the two organisations are highly complementary in terms of their mandates, core competencies and the resources they bring to address humanitarian needs.³⁵⁹ This was also confirmed by the interviewees, most of whom agreed that DG ECHO and ICRC's mandates are highly complementary.³⁶⁰

This complementarity was especially noticeable when it came to the promotion of IHL and the humanitarian principles, which was identified as a key area of cooperation between ICRC and DG ECHO. ICRC's role in promoting IHL was formally entrusted to it by the international community.³⁶¹ ICRC's activities related to the promotion of IHL consisted mostly of encouraging States to ratify the Geneva Conventions;³⁶² promoting the implementation of IHL at national level (e.g. through confidential dialogues); and disseminating IHL (e.g. through training, seminars, courses, events and other types of advocacy activities).³⁶³ Ensuring respect for IHL by state and

³⁵² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 03, 12, 13, 17 and Field Interview no 14.

³⁵³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 12 and 17.

³⁵⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18, 77%; and ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 12 and 17 and Field Interview no 14.

³⁵⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18, 67%.

³⁵⁶ ICRC. ICRC's mandate and mission. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/mandate-and-mission>.

³⁵⁷ DG ECHO. Humanitarian Aid. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid_en

³⁵⁸ EU guidelines on the promotion of compliance with international humanitarian law. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:ah0004>.

³⁵⁹ DG ECHO. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36; and DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N = 19.

³⁶⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 02, 05, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17 and Scoping interviews 01 and 04.

³⁶¹ ICRC. 1998. The International Committee of the Red Cross as guardian of international humanitarian law. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm>

³⁶² ICRC. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols>

³⁶³ ICRC. 1998. The International Committee of the Red Cross as guardian of international humanitarian law. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm>

non-state actors is also key priority for DG ECHO. Some examples of DG ECHO's actions to promote IHL include advocacy activities (both globally and in certain conflicts); funding partners' IHL-related activities; providing funding to the dissemination of IHL; funding activities aimed at increasing the capacities of humanitarian workers in advocating for IHL; and implementing information campaigns on the protection of humanitarian workers.³⁶⁴

ICRC is expressly mentioned as a key EU partner in the EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL.³⁶⁵ Most DG ECHO staff consulted as part of the evaluation agreed that ICRC has influenced DG ECHO's activities in promoting compliance with IHL³⁶⁶ and fostered DG ECHO's advocacy objectives.³⁶⁷ The stakeholder consultation also confirmed that DG ECHO and ICRC were strongly aligned in their advocacy priorities both at country and global level.³⁶⁸

Over the evaluation period, DG ECHO funded a number of ICRC activities to promote IHL in several countries. Figure 43 provides some examples of DG ECHO's financial support to ICRC in monitoring and promoting compliance with IHL. Additionally, in some instances, ICRC and DG ECHO have also joined efforts to pursue common advocacy objectives (e.g. through participation in roundtables, high-level missions, awareness raising campaigns etc.) (see Section 3.4.1).

³⁶⁴ DG ECHO. International Humanitarian Law. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/international-humanitarian-law_en.


³⁶⁵ EU guidelines on the promotion of compliance with international humanitarian law. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:ah0004>.

³⁶⁶ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N= 36, 86%.

³⁶⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 07 and 08, Scoping interview no 05 and Filed Interviews no 08 and 09.

³⁶⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 02, 03, 09, 11, 12, 13, 15; DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff (N=36) and ICRC staff (N=18), 83% of ICRC staff and 75% DG ECHO staff believe that there is a strong or very strong alignment between DG ECHO and ICRC advocacy priorities at country level; 80% of DG ECHO staff and 39% of ICRC staff believe that there is a strong or very strong alignment between DG ECHO and ICRC advocacy p[priorities at global level (the low percentage for ICRC staff is explained by the fact that this question was only answered by ICRC field staff).

Figure 43. Examples of DG ECHO's financial support to ICRC in monitoring and promoting compliance with IHL.



Source: ICF based on Project Mapping and Council of the European Union Reports on the EU guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL 2018-2020.³⁶⁹

Even though the partnership is strongly anchored in its shared commitment to the humanitarian principles, and both partners prioritised addressing acute humanitarian needs, **some misalignments were identified in relation to the way DG ECHO and ICRC interpret the moment when humanitarian action ends, and longer-term development interventions start**, particularly in the context of protracted crises, and with regard the operationalisation of the Nexus.³⁷⁰ Despite the fact that in protracted settings both ICRC and DG ECHO recognise the importance of implementing actions that address urgent needs while also contributing to longer-term goals, there are some differences in the way both partners understand this “grey zone” between humanitarian assistance and development.

Within the European Commission there is clear division between humanitarian aid and development that is reflected in its organisational structure with clear a separation between DG ECHO (humanitarian aid) and DG INTPA (development) as well as DG NEAR (for aspects related to neighbourhood and enlargement policies) and the Service for Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) (for issues related to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy including peace, security and conflict prevention). The way these Commission Services programme and channel their funding streams is also considerably different. For example, DG ECHO's allocation of humanitarian funding is strictly based on the assessment of humanitarian needs in different countries/regions and crises³⁷¹ and channelled in full respect of the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. The result of the needs assessment is translated into the HIPs

³⁶⁹ See Council of the European Union Reports on the EU guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law 2018-2021. Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/51415/ihl-report-en-2021.pdf>; <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45181/20200723-ihl-report-web.pdf>; <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/ihl-report-eu-guidelines-2019/>; <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/default/files/ihl-2018-report-april-en.pdf>.

³⁷⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 04, 05, 07, 08, 11, 12, 14, 15 and Scoping Interviews no 01, 04, 05, 08; Desk research.

³⁷¹ DG ECHO carries out its needs assessment based on: internationally recognised indices; and the continuous evaluation of the situation on the ground by the Commission humanitarian experts. See: DG ECHO. Needs Assessment Factsheet. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessment_en.

which provide detailed information on the priorities identified for a given year. DG ECHO funding is provided for a maximum period of 24 months.³⁷² DG INTPA on the other hand, provides funding to governments of partner countries, international organisations and NGOs and for the implementation of projects that support the EU external action objectives and contribute to achieving development results. Funds managed by DG INTPA are usually granted through call for proposals that state the specific topic and country for the project implementation, and which are usually spread over multiple years.³⁷³

As stated in the Humanitarian Aid Regulation (HAR), EU humanitarian aid (coordinated by DG ECHO) seeks to provide assistance, relief and protection to people affected by man-made or natural disasters or similar emergencies with a focus on the most vulnerable populations.³⁷⁴ In this context, DG ECHO understands humanitarian aid as the emergency assistance provided to save lives and alleviate suffering during and in the aftermath of emergencies. Short-term reconstruction and rehabilitation work can also fall within this definition of humanitarian aid where they address urgent needs, facilitate the delivery of aid and/or reduce existing risks. On the other hand, longer-term programmes and the provision of aid to respond to more structural and systemic needs – especially in the context of protracted crises – are considered to fall under development assistance (instead of humanitarian aid) and therefore falling outside DG ECHO's mandate.³⁷⁵

The European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid nevertheless,³⁷⁶ recognises the importance of recovery and reconstruction in the aftermath of conflicts and the need to promote the links between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). In this context, DG ECHO is also committed to strengthening the links between humanitarian and development interventions and – where relevant – peace actions through a Nexus approach (Triple Nexus).³⁷⁷ DG ECHO's contribution to the Nexus is done, *inter alia*, by requiring its partners to apply a Resilience Marker³⁷⁸ that seeks to ensure that funded actions reduce risks and strengthen people's coping capacities in order to minimise humanitarian needs.³⁷⁹ DG ECHO sees resilience as the interface between humanitarian aid and development, and thus places it at the heart of its responses to recurrent and protracted crises.³⁸⁰ Moreover, when providing funding, DG ECHO also takes into account partners' coordination and cooperation with national authorities and development actors (including with actions funded by other relevant Commission services), and where relevant, the existence and quality of exit strategies.

ICRC for its part does not strictly differentiate between the traditional concepts of relief, early recovery and development, as this distinction is not foreseen under IHL.³⁸¹ For ICRC, humanitarian action is meant to address any needs deriving from conflicts and other situations of violence,

³⁷² DG ECHO also gives partners the possibility to combine funds under two subsequent HIPs in a single contract (for a maximum of 48 months).

³⁷³ DG INTPA. Grants. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/grants_en.

³⁷⁴ Article 1 of the Humanitarian Aid Regulation.

³⁷⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews; and Desk research.

³⁷⁶ European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/media/publications/consensus_en.pdf

³⁷⁷ DG ECHO. Strategic Plan 2020-2024. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/echo_sp_2020_2024_en.pdf.

³⁷⁸ DG ECHO. 2014. Resilience Marker, General Guidance. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/resilience_marker_guidance_en.pdf.

³⁷⁹ DG ECHO. Resilience and Humanitarian-development-peace Nexus. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/resilience-and-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus_en

³⁸⁰ DG ECHO. Resilience and Humanitarian-development-peace Nexus. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/resilience-and-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus_en; European Commission. 2013. Commission Staff Working Document SWD (2013) 227 final. Action Plan for Resilience in Crises Prone Countries. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/com_2013_227_ap_crisis_prone_countries_en.pdf

³⁸¹ ICRC. 2016. Protracted conflict and humanitarian action: some recent ICRC experiences. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/protracted_conflict_and_humanitarian_action_icrc_report_lr_29.08.16.pdf.

regardless of whether they are urgent needs or more structural needs. Compared to DG ECHO, ICRC thus takes a longer view and approach to humanitarian responses to conflicts. The top 10 ICRC operations (in terms of field expenditure) are in countries where they have been present for over 30 years. When responding to needs in protracted conflicts, ICRC implements a “combined approach” that seeks to respond not only to immediate needs but also to more systemic and long-term needs linked to the cumulative impact of conflicts (e.g. through rehabilitation of public infrastructure, strengthening water infrastructure, micro-finance programs, livestock vaccination and veterinary training, activities for the development of law and standards etc.).³⁸² While for ICRC these longer-term activities are still considered to be “humanitarian” as – as explained above – they address needs created by conflicts and are implemented in full respect of the humanitarian principles, in some contexts, DG ECHO has seen some of these activities as going beyond strict humanitarian action (getting into development) and therefore falling outside its mandate.³⁸³

These differences in understanding of the grey zone between humanitarian aid and development has led to some discrepancies in the partners’ approaches to some protracted crises and, to some extent, also to the operationalisation of the Nexus in some contexts. In Iraq, for example, ICRC and DG ECHO had a rather different reading of the situation. While ICRC was trying to work on long-term programming, DG ECHO considered that the emergency and conflict in Iraq had ended and wanted to prepare the ground to exit the country and hand over the delivery of assistance to development actors and national programmes. In Palestine, there were also differences in priorities and approaches to the Nexus (see also Section 3.2). Nevertheless, there also some examples of protracted conflicts where DG ECHO and ICRC pursued similar objectives and the partnership enhanced their responses to needs. This was for instance the case in Colombia, where the partnership with ICRC facilitated the mobilisation of DG ECHO’s funding to the country after the peace agreement. ICRC’s situational analysis in Colombia was key to determine the persistence of internal conflicts in the country – despite the peace agreement – and the need to continue investing in the protection of civilians. In Ukraine, ICRC and DG ECHO were also highly aligned in their approach to addressing protracted needs and DG ECHO funded some of ICRC’s longer-term programmes in the country (e.g. restoration of water supplies, rehabilitation of civil infrastructure and provision of livelihood support).

In light of the above, several stakeholders interviewed³⁸⁴ highlighted the importance of continuing existing discussions on the partners’ respective approaches to protracted crises and the operationalisation of the Nexus, in order to define common priorities. This includes reinforcing communication and cooperation with other relevant Commission services (i.e. DG INTPA, DG NEAR and FPI). The latter became evident in the context of the Grand Bargain PPP where both partners recognised the existence of missed opportunities to operationalise the Nexus due to the lack of dialogue and engagement with DG INTPA and DG NEAR (e.g. in Yemen and Jordan).

Regarding the peace component of the Nexus, although DG ECHO is committed to enhancing the links between humanitarian aid and peace building, it recognises the challenges that this may pose to the delivery of principled humanitarian aid and is not systematically requiring its partners (including ICRC) to create/reinforce links with peace actors. ICRC for its part, does not have a mandate on peacebuilding, although some of its activities can be seen as indirectly contributing to building peace (e.g. promoting respect for IHL, humanitarian dialogue with parties to a conflict,

³⁸² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews; and ICRC. Protracted conflict and humanitarian action: some recent ICRC experiences. 2016. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/protracted_conflict_and_humanitarian_action_icrc_report_lr_29.08.16.pdf; and ICRC. Nexus thinking in humanitarian policy: How does everything fit together on the ground. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nexus-thinking-humanitarian-policy-how-does-everything-fit-together-ground>.


³⁸³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 04, 05, 07, 11, 12, 15; ICF. 2021. Scoping Interviews 01, 02, 08.

³⁸⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 10, 11, 12; Scoping Interview no 01.

discussions around humanitarian access, work with detainees, restoration of family links, capacity building etc.).

When it comes to the resources that both organisations bring to address humanitarian needs, ICRC and DG ECHO were highly complementary. ICRC has developed a multi-donor funding strategy that allows them a certain flexibility to adapt their actions to emerging humanitarian needs and enables a rapid response capacity. ICRC's Donors include the States party to the Geneva Conventions (governments), national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the European Commission – including DG ECHO – and other public and private sources.³⁸⁵ All ICRC's actions are funded by more than one donor and therefore, DG ECHO's contributions were complementary to the funding provided by other donors. As shown in Figure 44, over the evaluation period, DG ECHO contributed to 8% of the total ICRC's budget (see also Section 3.2.1 for further information on how DG ECHO funding to ICRC actions was distributed by sector and geography).

Figure 44. Composition of ICRC's budget (%) between 2016 and 2020



Source: ICF based on ICRC Annual Reports 2016-2020, <https://www.icrc.org/en/annual-report>.

The portfolio analysis showed that DG ECHO contributed to an average of 25% of the budget for ICRC's actions commissioned between 2016 and 2020. DG ECHO's share of the total cost of ICRC's actions varied greatly from one action to another (from 9% to some of the actions in Nigeria to 92% for some of the actions in South Sudan).³⁸⁶ Moreover, DG ECHO is a member of ICRC's Donor Support Group (DSG), a privileged platform for ICRC to discuss issues of mutual interest with its main donors. Some of the issues discussed within the DSG include: ICRC's management and human resources policies; operational concerns; policy issues; thematic issues (e.g. displacement, children and woman, IHL, security concerns etc.); and topics related to financing and reporting. Through its participation in ICRC's DSG, DG ECHO has had the chance to discuss policy issues of mutual interest and to seek opportunities for strengthening existing complementarities between the two partners. Between June 2018 and June 2019, DG ECHO held the chairmanship of the DSG which focused on two priority areas: the "Digital transformation as part of humanitarian action" and "How to preserve IHL and the humanitarian principles in a counter-terrorism environment".

Furthermore, **DG ECHO and ICRC were also complementary in terms of the human resources they brought under the partnership.** As discussed above, both DG ECHO and ICRC benefited from each other's knowledge and humanitarian expertise in different contexts (see also JC 1.2 and JC 3.5).

Additionally, the partnership also enhanced DG ECHO and ICRC's capacities to respond to evolving humanitarian needs. **Evidence shows that overall, the partnership remained (and will remain) relevant in the face of evolving humanitarian needs and changes in the humanitarian architecture (e.g. shrinking humanitarian space, climate change, increase number of non-state**

³⁸⁵ ICRC. The ICRC's funding and spending. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/faq/icrcs-funding-and-spending>.

³⁸⁶ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

armed groups etc.) (JC 1.1). Nevertheless, there were some concerns around the relevance of the partnership in the face of a growing number of protracted crises, due to above-described differences in the way DG ECHO and ICRC understand the “grey zone” between humanitarian aid and development (see JC 1.3).

Figure 45 summarises some of the main global changes in humanitarian needs and the humanitarian architecture over the evaluation period as identified in the literature and through the stakeholder consultation.

Figure 45. Main changes in humanitarian needs and humanitarian architecture over the evaluation period



Source: ICF based on Desk research and Key Informants Interviews.

The humanitarian consequences of **climate change** are among the main challenges faced by the humanitarian community in recent years. Climate change has created new humanitarian needs and exacerbated existing ones and is also among the root causes of conflict and displacement.³⁸⁷ Over the years, there has also been an **increase in the number of protracted crises** which created new challenges for humanitarian action (e.g. Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria, South Sudan, DRC). In protracted settings, humanitarian needs tend to change rapidly (e.g. changes in intensity of the conflict, new actors involved in the conflict, changes in geographical areas affected etc.)³⁸⁸ demanding a high adaptative capacity from humanitarian actors. Moreover, in responding to protracted crises, humanitarian actors and donors are also faced with the challenge to address immediate needs while contributing to longer-term goals. In this context, the **Triple Nexus** has also gained a prominent place in the humanitarian agenda requiring humanitarian actors to reflect on how to strengthen the links between humanitarian, development and peace interventions.

In addition to the above, in recent years, the increase **in the number of non-state armed groups** taking part in conflicts has also added an extra layer of complexity to the delivery of humanitarian aid (e.g. in Colombia). **Greater humanitarian access constrains** and increase difficulties in negotiating humanitarian access were also among the main challenges faced by the humanitarian community (over the evaluation period (e.g. in Nigeria, Yemen and Syria). In 2020, **the Covid-19 pandemic** exacerbated existing humanitarian needs especially of the most vulnerable groups (e.g. people living in conflict zones, detainees, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs) and created

³⁸⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews; and European Commission. 2021. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. EU's humanitarian action: new challenges, same principles. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0110&from=en>.

³⁸⁸ ICRC. 2016. Protracted Conflict and Humanitarian action: some ICRC experiences. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/document/file_list/protracted_conflict_and_humanitarian_action_icrc_report_lr_29.08.16.pdf.

additional challenges in the delivery of humanitarian aid (e.g. due to travel restrictions and restrictions of movements).³⁸⁹

Evidence collected shows that overall, the partnership remained relevant in the face of the above-mentioned global challenges and changes in the humanitarian landscape.³⁹⁰ Some of the reasons why the partnership remained well-suited to respond to those global challenges include: ICRC's unique competences in negotiating humanitarian access; the fact that ICRC is often one of the few actors (if not the only actor) in contact with all parties to a conflict (including non-state armed groups); the complementarity of DG ECHO and ICRC's risk and situational analysis; DG ECHO's and ICRC's flexibility (e.g. in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic); and both partners commitment to addressing the consequences of climate and environmental crises (see also Section 3.2.1).³⁹¹

Here too, some DG ECHO and ICRC staff consulted expressed some concerns around the relevance of the partnership in the face of a growing number of protracted crises (and an increasing importance of the Triple Nexus).³⁹² This is mostly due to the fact that DG ECHO and ICRC are not always aligned in their understanding of the grey zone between humanitarian aid and development, as discussed above (see JC 1.3).

At country level, the project mapping also shows some flexibility of the actions funded under the partnership to adapt to changes in humanitarian needs, both in terms of the funding provided by DG ECHO and the type of activities funded, as well as with regard to ICRC's capacity to adapt their actions and modus operandi to changes on the ground (e.g. changes in humanitarian needs, changes in the intensity and nature of the conflict, security and logistical constraints, climate challenges etc.).

Most modification requests submitted by ICRC were accepted by DG ECHO, thus allowing to better respond to changes in needs on the ground.³⁹³ For example in the face of the additional challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic to humanitarian action, the project mapping and documentation review showed that ICRC's actions funded under the partnership were flexible enough to minimise the negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the delivery of humanitarian aid (e.g. through budget reallocations, increased funding, changes to the types of activities funded etc.) and to address the new needs created by the pandemic. For instance, ICRC was able to adapt its actions to address emerging health needs arising from the Covid-19 pandemic; to provide training in first aid and Covid-19 to relevant stakeholders (e.g. weapon bearers, volunteers, Civil Society Organisations and faith-based organisations); and to adapt its modus operandi to the limitations imposed by the Covid-19 restrictions (e.g. by distributing cash aid electronically, maintaining an online dialogue with arms carriers and other relevant actors etc.).³⁹⁴ Table 26 below presents additional examples of how ICRC's funded actions managed to adapt to evolving humanitarian needs in different contexts.

Table 26. Evidence of the flexibility of ICRC's funded actions to adapt to changes in Humanitarian needs

Country	Evidence of flexibility
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³⁸⁹ ICRC. Coronavirus: Covid-19 pandemic. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/what-we-do/covid-19-pandemic>.

³⁹⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 01, 05, 08, 09, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17.

³⁹¹ In 2020, ICRC had contact with 75% of the total number of armed groups identified globally most of which were located in Africa and the Near and Middle East region. See, ICRC engagement with non-state armed groups position paper. 2021. https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/170371/icrc_engagement_with_non-state_armed_groups_position_paper.pdf

³⁹² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 07, 12 and 15, Scoping Interview no 01 and Field Interview no 05; Desk research.

³⁹³ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

³⁹⁴ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

Ukraine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ICRC's actions in Ukraine were adapted to respond to additional humanitarian needs created by the low temperatures in winter. • In 2016, ICRC with the support of DG ECHO, was able to review its strategy in the country to better reflect the new reality of the conflict. For example, while assistance continued to be provided close to the frontline, ICRC started a phase out to support IDPs living in urban areas instead. • ICRC shifted its actions from food in-kind to cash wherever there was good access to markets.
Iraq	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016, ICRC submitted a modification request to address the needs that a potential new displacement of population forecasted could create (due to Mosul military operation) as well as to better ensure the protection of detainees (due to persistence of fighting likely leading to more arrests). DG ECHO granted the request and ICRC was able to adapt its activities to this new humanitarian context in the country.
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016, the budget allocated for food voucher was diverted to food in-kind, as a result of the urgent needs in areas where markets were not functioning, and security did not allow for voucher programmes.
Yemen	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016, through a modification request granted by DG ECHO, ICRC modified its intervention in Yemen to respond to the cholera outbreak and an increased deterioration of the humanitarian situation.
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016 and 2017, DG ECHO agreed to increase the budget allocated to ICRC's actions in the country to respond to additional needs created by the clashes in Juba. • With DG ECHO support, ICRC was able to maintain its operations in key areas of the country and to position itself for timely response to evolving humanitarian needs.
Syria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2016, ICRC submitted a modification request for additional funds to respond to the deterioration of the situation in Aleppo and DG ECHO granted the request thus allowing ICRC to respond to emerging needs. • In 2017, due to the swift deterioration of the situation in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, thousands of people fled those areas and arrived in Hassakeh or Deir Ezzor city. In response to these new displacements, ICRC scaled up its operation in the country, particularly targeting the newly displaced IDPs.
Burkina Faso	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In 2019 ICRC requested an additional allocation of expenditure that was partially granted by DG ECHO to respond to the food security of the increasing number of people internally displaced due to the conflict, especially in the Sahel, North and East provinces.

Project mapping

The three-year Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East region also aimed, among other things, to provide ICRC with multi-year funding and greater flexibility to use the funds across different country envelopes. It foresaw less earmarking and provided more flexibility, which allowed shifting funds between different countries (15% of the country envelope could be moved among countries without prior agreement with DG ECHO) so as to react to changes in needs and

operational circumstances. Findings from the case study on the Grand Bargain PPP show that this additional flexibility allowed ICRC to be more agile and flexible to respond in a timely manner to the needs of the affected populations. For example, ICRC was able to shift funding from Yemen to Palestine, to address the unmet needs that followed an emergency in Palestine in 2018.

3.2 Coherence

3.2.1 EQ2. To what extent was the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership coherent with the missions, strategies and policies of each organisation?

Table 27. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
The objectives of the partnership were clearly defined, and both partners understand them the same way (JC2.1)	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Whilst the objectives of the partnership are not explicitly stated anywhere as such, those can be implied from the preamble of the FPA. The objectives of the partnership were generally well-understood by DG ECHO and ICRC staff although with different levels of understanding within both organisations.
Each party was aware of and respected their respective role and mandate (JC 2.3)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Overall, ICRC and DG ECHO were well-aware of and respected each other roles and mandates. Nevertheless, despite a general understanding of ICRC's mandate within DG ECHO, their level of understanding was considered to be somewhat better at field level than at HQ level (especially with regard to ICRC's protection work)
There was shared commitment to the partnership throughout all levels of the organisations (JC 2.4)	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence collected showed that overall, there is a shared commitment to the partnership by both partners.
The partnership was aligned with each partner's mandate and objectives (JC 2.2)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <u>At strategic level</u>, there was a good degree of alignment and complementarity between ICRC and DG ECHO's strategic objectives and priorities for the evaluation period thus facilitating the operationalisation of the partnership and its alignment with both partners' strategic objectives. A few minor differences in terms of priorities were identified, which however were considered as "natural" given the specific mandate of each organisation, and not considered to have a negative impact on the partnership. Overall, the partnership contributed to both partners' <u>operational priorities</u> per sector and at regional and country level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The funding provided by DG ECHO to ICRC's actions over the evaluation period prioritised <u>sectors</u> that also received the highest share of ICRC field

		<p>expenditure. Only minor differences in priority sectors were observed;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - There were some differences in priority <u>regions</u> (in terms of funding). These differences can be explained by the different mandates of the two organisations, with DG ECHO for example also covering responses to natural disasters (while this is outside ICRC's mandate) and mostly funding ICRC actions in conflict settings. In addition, ICRC is granted funding under the Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East region between 2018-2020. - DG ECHO's funding provided to ICRC was generally in line with ICRC's top operations between 2016-2020 and with the <u>countries</u> receiving the highest share of DG ECHO's global funding for the same period (e.g. Syria and South Sudan). - The degree of alignment of <u>in-country objectives and priorities</u> varied considerably from one country to another. With very few exceptions, differences in in-country priorities have a negative impact on the implementation of the partnership.
<p>The partnership was aligned with relevant internal corporate policies and instruments (JC 2.5)</p>	<p>S</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The partnership was generally coherent with DG ECHO and ICRC internal corporate policies and instruments. Nevertheless, some misalignments were identified with regard to DG ECHO's visibility guidelines and its monitoring and reporting requirements, as well as with the European Commission's Financial Regulation (i.e. the need to add a sanction clause in the FPA).

32.1.1 Understanding of the objectives of the partnership, their respective mandates and commitment to the partnership

The objectives of the partnership were mostly well-understood by DG ECHO and ICRC staff although with different levels of understanding within both organisations (JC2.1).

Whilst the objectives of the partnership are not explicitly stated anywhere as such, the preamble of the FPA indicates that under the partnership, ICRC and DG ECHO are committed to: ensuring effective, efficient and rapid delivery of humanitarian assistance; raising awareness of humanitarian issues among decision-makers and the general public in order to foster the overall effectiveness of, and support to, humanitarian assistance; promoting and strengthening compliance with IHL and the humanitarian principles; and promoting and consolidating DG ECHO and ICRC strategic partnership and cooperation in the delivery of humanitarian aid. These elements are thus also presented as the objectives of the partnership in the ToC in Section 1.2.

A majority of DG ECHO (69%)³⁹⁵ and ICRC staff (68%)³⁹⁶ consulted through the surveys agreed that the objectives of the partnership were well-understood at all levels in DG ECHO. Nevertheless, the degree of understanding of the partnership objectives within DG ECHO varied depending on the position, role, and level of interaction with ICRC among other factors. For example, some DG ECHO staff consulted stated that while the overall objectives of the partnership in terms of

³⁹⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey. N = 36.

³⁹⁶ DG ECHO. 2021. ICRC Staff Survey. N =19.

donor/framework partner relationship were well understood, some other more strategic objectives were not always clear to some DG ECHOES staff at HQ level. This seems mostly due to a few misunderstandings on the way ICRC operates (especially regarding protection and ICRC's confidentiality requirements).³⁹⁷ With regard to the level of understanding of the partnership objectives within ICRC, ICRC staff who responded to the survey were divided as to whether the objectives of the partnership with DG ECHO were well understood at all levels in ICRC (58% agreed with that statement and 42% disagreed).³⁹⁸

As stated in the preamble of the FPA,³⁹⁹ the partnership is based on the respect of DG ECHO and ICRC's roles and mandates and the recognition of the specificity of each other's contribution to the humanitarian action. **Evidence collected suggests that ICRC and DG ECHO were well-aware and respected each other roles and mandates (JC 2.3) and that there was a shared commitment to the partnership in both organisations (JC 2.4).** Nonetheless, there were different perceptions of the level of understanding of each other's mandates as well as the level of commitment to the partnership among DG ECHO and ICRC staff, as further detailed below.

ICRC staff were well-aware and respected DG ECHO's mandate and role. Virtually all DG ECHO staff (95%)⁴⁰⁰ consulted through the survey found that ICRC staff they dealt with had a good understanding of DG ECHO's mandate. This was also confirmed by the interviewees, most of whom agreed that ICRC staff had a good understanding of (and respect for) DG ECHO's mandate.⁴⁰¹ Similarly, evidence collected also shows that DG ECHO staff were generally well-aware and respect ICRC's mandate and role. Most ICRC staff who responded to the survey (89%)⁴⁰² agreed that DG ECHO staff had a good understanding of their mandate. This was also confirmed by DG ECHO and ICRC staff interviewed and through the case studies.⁴⁰³ One example of DG ECHO's good understanding of ICRC's modus operandi as well as its respect for ICRC's role and mandate is the fact that in the FPA,⁴⁰⁴ ICRC has been granted with a possibility to derogate field visibility and communication obligations, to preserve their role as a neutral, independent and impartial humanitarian actor, as well as to ensure the safety and security of its field staff. ICRC made use of this derogation for all actions reviewed as part of the project mapping. Nevertheless, despite a general understanding of ICRC's mandate within DG ECHO, the level of understanding was perceived to be somewhat higher at field level than at HQ level. This is mostly true when it comes to ICRC's protection work and confidentiality requirements, which were perceived to be not always understood among DG ECHO HQ staff, which in turn also led to some frustration especially when it came to ICRC reporting in this sector (see also Section 3.3.1).

In line with the above, **while there was an overall shared commitment to the partnership by both ICRC and DG ECHO, stakeholders had different views on the degree of commitment across different levels of both organisations** with a perception of somewhat higher commitment at field level.⁴⁰⁵ An example of the partners' commitment to the partnership was the implementation of the Grand Bargain PPP, which showed the willingness of DG ECHO and ICRC to engage beyond a mere donor/partner relationship. DG ECHO's substantial involvement in the refinement of ICRC's proposals as well as the high level of engagement between ICRC and DG ECHO in the context of

³⁹⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09, 15.

³⁹⁸ DG ECHO. 2021. ICRC Staff Survey. N =19.

³⁹⁹ Paragraph 9 of the FPA. Available at: <https://www.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/io/framework-partnership-agreement/the-icrc-fpa>.

⁴⁰⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. ICRC Staff Survey. N =19.

⁴⁰¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 07, 09, 12, 13, 17.

⁴⁰² DG ECHO. 2021. ICRC Staff Survey. N =19.

⁴⁰³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 01, 04, 07, 09, 12, 13, 15; ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP.

⁴⁰⁴ Article 8.1 of the FPA.

⁴⁰⁵ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N= 36; While most DG ECHO staff in country and sub-country offices (86%) and the majority of staff in regional offices (67%) agree that there is a shared commitment to the partnership at all levels within DG ECHO, DG ECHO staff in the headquarters were divided on this issue (50% agree or strongly agree); and ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 02, 08, 09, 13, 15.

joint visits to ICRC's actions and joint communication in Europe are also examples of the partners' commitment to the partnership at different levels (see also JC 3.7 and JC 5.4).

3.2.1.2 Alignment with each partner's mandate, objectives, and internal corporate policies and instruments

Evidence collected also shows that **there was good alignment and complementarity between ICRC and DG ECHO's strategic priorities and objectives** with only minor differences that did not negatively impact the operationalisation of the partnership. **At operational level, the partnership also contributed to both partners' priorities per sector and at regional and country level.**

Although some differences in operational priorities were identified (mostly at country level), those – with very few exceptions – did not have negative impact on the partnership (JC 2.2). It is important to note that DG ECHO and ICRC are neither required nor expected to be fully aligned in their strategic and operational priorities and therefore, identified differences in objectives were considered as natural and expected in most cases.

At strategic level, there was a good degree of alignment and complementarity between ICRC and DG ECHO's strategic objectives and priorities for the evaluation period thus facilitating the operationalisation of the partnership and its alignment with both partners' strategic objectives.⁴⁰⁶ A majority of DG ECHO and ICRC staff who responded to the surveys found that the alignment between ICRC's priorities and DG ECHO's priorities was either better⁴⁰⁷ or about the same⁴⁰⁸ as compared to other partners/donors. The review of ICRC and DG ECHO strategies for the evaluation period provided some examples of synergies between ICRC and DG ECHO's Strategic objectives and priorities, including:⁴⁰⁹

- Enhancing the effectiveness of humanitarian responses;
- Improving their ability to inform policy debates on key humanitarian issues, including on the promotion of respect for IHL;
- Reinforcing the prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV);
- Addressing the needs of the most vulnerable displaced people (i.e. IDPS, refugees and asylum seekers);
- Ensuring needs-based humanitarian responses;
- Strengthening resilience and reinforcing disaster risk reduction capacities;
- Increasing the sustainability of their humanitarian responses.

These common strategic priorities are also in line with the objectives of the partnership as stated in the preamble of the FPA (i.e. ensuring effective humanitarian assistance; raising awareness of humanitarian issues among decision-makers; and promoting IHL and the humanitarian principles).

Additionally, both DG ECHO and ICRC have acknowledged the importance of reflecting on the implications of **digital technologies in humanitarian work**. This is one of ICRC's priorities in their latest Strategy and DG ECHO has also recently started to explore the use of new technologies and digital solutions to increase the cost-effectiveness of humanitarian aid actions.⁴¹⁰ The issue of digital transformation as part of humanitarian action was also one of the priorities areas discussed in ICRC' DSG during DG ECHO's chairmanship (see also JC 1.3). The integration of **environmental**

⁴⁰⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 02, 05, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17; Scoping Interviews no 01 and 04; ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions); and Desk research.

⁴⁰⁷ DG ECHO. 2021, Survey of ICRC staff. N=18, 67%; DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N=36, 45%.

⁴⁰⁸ DG ECHO. 2021, Survey of ICRC staff. N=18, 23%; DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N=36, 42%.

⁴⁰⁹ DG ECHO. Strategic Plan 2016-2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/strategic-plan-2016-2020-humanitarian-aid-and-civil-protection_en; DG ECHO Strategic Plan 2020-2024. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/echo_sp_2020_2024_en.pdf; ICRC. Strategy 2015-2018. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4203-icrc-strategy-2015-2018-adopted-icrc-assembly-18-june-2014>; and ICRC. Strategy 2019-2022. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/4354-icrc-strategy-2019-2022>.

⁴¹⁰ DG ECHO. Digitalisation. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/digitalisation_en.

considerations in humanitarian aid operations was also a priority for both partners. With its experience in climate conflict vulnerability, ICRC has influenced DG ECHO's policies on environmental issues while DG ECHO has also helped ICRC becoming greener in its operations driven by the EU Green Deal.⁴¹¹

Ensuring the **protection** of the populations affected by crisis is also at the core of the provision of humanitarian aid for both DG ECHO and ICRC. Although DG ECHO and ICRC use slightly different definitions of protection – with DG ECHO using a narrower concept that focuses on protection needs in humanitarian crisis situations only – both partners' protection policies are generally aligned. The partners' respective protection activities are based on the principles of humanity, impartiality and non-discrimination and recognise the importance of needs-based interventions that put beneficiaries at the centre of protection activities. Adherence to the do-not harm principle in protection activities is also key for both ICRC and DG ECHO. Moreover, they demonstrate similar objectives in their protection actions including: preventing, reducing and responding to risks and consequences of violence; reducing protection vulnerabilities; and enhancing the safety, physical integrity and dignity of populations affected by conflict and violence.⁴¹² DG ECHO's Thematic Policy document on Humanitarian Protection also relies on several ICRC's definitions, instruments and documents to provide guidance on protection actions in humanitarian crisis (e.g. with regard to responses types & modalities, protection approaches, professional standards for protection work etc.).⁴¹³ Most DG ECHO staff consulted through the survey (83%) also found that the partnership with ICRC has, to some extent, influenced DG ECHO's protection policies.⁴¹⁴

The general objectives and principles guiding DG ECHO and ICRC's policies in the **health, cash and vouchers, WASH, food assistance and nutrition** sectors were also generally aligned with no significant discrepancies identified. Table 6 provides an overview on the degree of complementarity and alignment between DG ECHO and ICRC's main sectorial policies.

Table 28. Mapping of complementarities between DG ECHO and ICRC main sectorial policies

Sectorial policies	Compl ement arity	Mapping of complementarities
Health policies ⁴¹⁵	■	<p>Both DG ECHO and ICRC health policies have the overall objective to reduce morbidity and mortality.</p> <p>Both partners health interventions pay specific attention to the delivery of medical assistance adhering with standards and norms of international practice as well as ensuring continuity of care in disrupted essential health services.</p> <p>Both partners highlight the importance of health interventions as part of an integrated approach to addressing humanitarian needs that takes into account</p>

⁴¹¹ ICF. 2021. Key informant interview no 02 and Scoping interview no 01.

⁴¹² ICRC. Protection Policy. Available at: <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/icrc-protection-policy>; and DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 8, Humanitarian Protection, Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/default/files/policy_guidelines_humanitarian_protection_en.pdf.

⁴¹³ DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 8, Humanitarian Protection, Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/default/files/policy_guidelines_humanitarian_protection_en.pdf.

⁴¹⁴ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N=36; 33% (to a great extent), 31% (to a limited extent), 19% to a little extent).

⁴¹⁵ ICR. Health Activities, Caring for people affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4232.pdf>; and DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 7, Health General Guidelines. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectorial/health_thematic_policy_document_en.pdf.

	<p>several contextual factors and needs in other sectors (e.g. protection, food security, nutrition, WASH and shelter).</p> <p>The provision of health services to victims of SGBV is also at the core of both DG ECHO and ICRC' health policies. Following the Covid-19 pandemic, addressing the needs created by the pandemic as well as enhancing epidemic preparedness and response also became a priority for both partners.</p> <p>On the other hand, while health in detention is one of ICRC's priorities, this is less of a priority for DG ECHO which has nevertheless funded some ICRC's actions in this area.</p>
<p>Cash and vouchers policies⁴¹⁶</p>	<p>■ Both organisations take into consideration similar factors when deciding on the implementation of cash-based programs (versus in-kind programs) (e.g. the need to carry out a market assessment, needs and risks assessments, the need to coordinate cash interventions with existing actions, the involvement of beneficiaries, the need to consider risks associated with corruption, the importance of monitoring and evaluation, the need to take into account cost-effectiveness considerations etc.).</p> <p>Both DG ECHO and ICRC use similar options of cash-based transfers (e.g. unconditional cash transfers, conditional cash transfers, vouchers, cash-for-work etc.).</p> <p>Both partners also recognise the relevance of cash-based programs in different scenarios including in the initial stages of a disaster, during conflict, in protracted crisis and in a recovery/transition period. Most ICRC staff consulted through the survey (89%) found that DG ECHO has, to some extent, increased ICRC's use of cash-based responses.⁴¹⁷</p>
<p>WASH policies⁴¹⁸</p>	<p>■ The timely access to drinking water and the prevention of water-related diseases are priorities for both DG ECHO and ICRC.</p> <p>Both partners also highlight the importance of involving the affected communities in the design of WASH interventions to ensure community ownership of the actions.</p> <p>ICRC includes places of detention as one of its priorities under its WASH activities while these are not expressly mentioned in DG ECHO's WASH thematic policy document; however DG ECHO recognises the importance of this issue and has funded a number of ICRC's WASH actions in detention facilities.</p>

⁴¹⁶ ICRC. Cash and Vouchers assistance: economic security. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4408_002_ECOSEC-Cash-voucher_web_1.pdf; ICRC. Guidelines for cash transfers programming. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_mouvement-guidelines.pdf; and DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 3, Cash and Vouchers, Increasing efficiency and effectiveness across all sectors. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/them_policy_doc_cashandvouchers_en.pdf.

⁴¹⁷ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N= 18. 17% (to a great extent), 50% (to a limited extent) and 22% (to a little extent).

⁴¹⁸ ICRC. Water and water: ICRC response. Available at: <https://shop.icrc.org/water-and-war-icrc-response.html>; ICRC. Water and Habitat, ensuring Decent Living Conditions. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4049.pdf>; and DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 2, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/WASH_policy_doc_en.pdf.

<p>Nutrition policies⁴¹⁹</p>	<p>■ Both partners use a similar definition of malnutrition and prioritise preventing and treating malnutrition in vulnerable groups and especially in mothers and children under five.</p> <p>Both DG ECHO and ICRC recognise the importance of a multi-sectoral approach in addressing malnutrition (e.g. health, WASH and shelter) as well as the relevance of linking nutrition actions with development programmes.</p> <p>On the other hand, ICRC prioritises nutrition in places of detention while this is not a priority for DG ECHO.</p>
<p>Food Assistance policies⁴²⁰</p>	<p>■ DG ECHO and ICRC's food security policies pursue some common objectives including: ensuring that dietary needs are met to save and preserve life; protecting and enhancing livelihoods; and increasing resilience and local capacities.</p> <p>Although DG ECHO and ICRC have slightly different approaches to needs assessments for humanitarian food assistance, those are not incompatible. While ICRC relies on a multidisciplinary analysis of needs, vulnerabilities and capacities, DG ECHO's needs assessments focus on an analysis of the situational context, on information on food security and on ad hoc perspectives on the immediate emergency situation (based on specific humanitarian food and nutrition data).</p> <p>Both partners integrate nutritional and livelihoods perspectives into their food security needs assessments. DG ECHO and ICRC policies on food security refer to similar food response options to address different aspects related to food insecurity (e.g. distribution of food, cash, cash-for-work, food-for work, vouchers, distribution of agricultural supplies and equipment, training, raising awareness on nutrition practices, on-the job-learning, veterinary care, restocking, capacity building and support etc.).</p> <p>Both partners recognise the importance of monitoring and evaluating food aid interventions.</p>

- Very coherent
- Generally coherent
- Minor inconsistencies
- Significant inconsistencies
- No data available

ICF. Based on Desk research; Key Informant Interviews; Surveys of DG ECHO and ICRC staff; and Project Mapping.

Some minor differences in the strategic objectives – particularly in relation to specific thematic areas – were also identified. For example, while EiE was a priority for DG ECHO over the evaluation period, it was less so for ICRC. However, in the 2019-2022 ICRC Strategy, ICRC recognises the importance of facilitating access to education among other services that are not

⁴¹⁹ ICRC. Nutrition, Economic Security. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4410_002_ECOSSEC-Nutrition_web.pdf; ICRC. Nutrition Manual for Humanitarian action. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0820.pdf; and DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 4, Nutrition, Addressing Undernutrition in Emergencies. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/nutrition_thematic_policy_document_en.pdf.

⁴²⁰ ICRC. Economic Security. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/economic-security-delegate.pdf; ICRC. Ecosec Handbook - Assessing Economic Security. Available at: <https://shop.icrc.org/ecosec-handbook-assessing-economic-security-pdf-en>; DG ECHO. Thematic Policy Document n° 1, Humanitarian Food Assistance, From Food Aid to Food Assistance. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/food_assistance/them_policy_doc_foodassistance_en.pdf.

necessarily a key part of its current responses. While ICRC prioritised improving the living conditions of **detainees** and **restoring family links** of separated and missing persons, those aspects were not among DG ECHO's strategic priorities for the evaluation period. On the other hand, some of the funding provided by DG ECHO to ICRC between 2016-2020 was devoted to ICRC's work with detainees and activities aiming to restore family links.⁴²¹ Moreover, even though **building resilience** was a priority for both ICRC and DG ECHO, ICRC's definition and approach to resilience is slightly different from DG ECHO's definition and the resilience markers used in Single Forms (see Table 29).

Table 29. ICRC's and DG ECHO's approach to resilience

	Definition of resilience	Criteria to measure resilience
ICRC	"The ability of individuals, communities, institutions and systems to anticipate, absorb, adapt, respond to and/or recover from shocks and stressors derived from conflict/violence and hazards without compromising their long-term prospects". ⁴²²	ICRC uses the following criteria to measure resilience and set resilience objectives as part of its programmes (mostly in the context of ICRC's EcoSec Programme ⁴²³): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absorptive function: the ability of the community to absorb the impact of any event using predetermined coping responses and persistence. • Adaptive function: making proactive and informed choices about alternative livelihood strategies based on changing conditions. • Transformative function: governance, policies and regulations, infrastructure, community networks, and more formal social protection mechanisms that are part of the wider system in which communities are embedded.⁴²⁴
DG ECHO	"The ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks." ⁴²⁵	The Resilience marker includes the following criteria to measure the level of resilience of an intervention: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of vulnerability, hazards and threats; • Verifying that the project is risk informed; • Ensuring that the project strengthens local capacities to cope with shocks and stresses; and • That it contains a strategy to reduce future humanitarian needs.⁴²⁶

ICF. Desk research.

At operational level, evidence collected shows that the partnership was generally well-aligned with each partner's objectives and priorities at sectoral, regional and country level. However,

⁴²¹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

⁴²² ICRC. 2019. ECOSEC Executive Brief on Resilience. Available at:

⁴²³ ICRC. Economic Security. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/what-we-do/ensuring-economic-security>.

⁴²⁴ ICRC. ECOSEC Executive Brief on Resilience. 2019.


⁴²⁵ DG ECHO. 2014. Resilience Marker, General Guidance. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/resilience_marker_guidance_en.pdf.

⁴²⁶ DG ECHO. 2014. Resilience Marker, General Guidance. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/resilience_marker_guidance_en.pdf.

some divergencies in terms of prioritisation of certain interventions/sectors (especially at country level) were also identified.

At sectoral level, the funding provided by DG ECHO to ICRC's actions over the evaluation period prioritised the FSL (39%), protection (34%) and health (17%) sectors. FSL and health (together with WASH) are encompassed under ICRC's Assistance Programme which also represented the highest share of ICRC's field expenditure over the evaluation period (66% of ICRC's total field expenditure) (see Figure 46). Similarly, protection activities (which include both ICRC's prevention and protection activities) received 34% of DG ECHO's funding between 2016-2020 which is in line with the share of ICRC's field expenditure devoted to those activities (27%) during the same period. In the same vein, between 2016-2020, 25% of DG ECHO global funding went to MPCT⁴²⁷ followed by FSL (19%), health (12%) and protection (12%). This is also generally in line with the funding allocated to ICRC in the different sectors during the same period (see Figure 46).

Figure 46. Breakdown of DG ECHO funding for ICRC actions by sector and breakdown of ICRC's field expenditure and DG ECHO's global funding per sector




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Sector contracted amount; ICRC Annual reports 2016-2020. ICF Analysis.

Evidence collected also shows some **differences in the regions prioritised for funding under the partnership and ICRC and DG ECHO's priority regions** (in terms of funding) over the evaluation period. The highest share of ICRC's field expenditure between 2016-2020 was in African countries (41% of the total field expenditure) while the highest share of DG ECHO's global funding was for Europe⁴²⁸ (34% of DG ECHO global funding) followed by the MENA region (30% of DG ECHO global funding). Under the partnership, more than half of DG ECHO's funding for ICRC's actions went to the MENA region (59%) (see Figure 47).

⁴²⁷ MPCT are embedded in different ICRC's actions under the Assistance Program rather than counted as a separate sector.

⁴²⁸ This includes funding provided to humanitarian actions implemented in Turkey.

Figure 47. Breakdown of DG ECHO funding for ICRC actions by region and breakdown of ICRC's




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 116 ICRC actions = €643,415,555. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. This excludes the Grand Bargain (ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001), an action covering six countries, for which data was obtained from DG ECHO detailing the distribution of funds across recipient states.; and ICRC Annual Reports 2016-2020. ICF Analysis.

The high share of DG ECHO's funding provided to the MENA region is mostly justified by the additional funding provided to ICRC under the Grand Bargain PPP between 2018-2020 (€175.3 million). Other minor differences in funding under the partnership and DG ECHO and ICRC's priority regions are also justified by the fact that, for DG ECHO, the biggest added value of the partnership with ICRC is in conflict settings (see also JC 1.2 in Section 3.1) most of which are located in Africa and the MENA region and the fact that DG ECHO also covers natural disasters which are outside ICRC's mandate.

DG ECHO's funding provided to ICRC was generally in line with ICRC's top operations between 2016-2020. During that period, Syria was ICRC's largest operation in terms of field expenditure (10% of the total field expenditure) followed by South Sudan and Iraq (7% of the total field expenditure each). Nigeria and Yemen represented each 5% of ICRC's field expenditure between 2016-2020. Similarly, Syria, South Sudan and Yemen were also among the top five countries receiving the highest share of DG ECHO global funding over the evaluation period.⁴²⁹ As shown in Figure 48, this is mostly in line with the funding provided by DG ECHO to ICRC's actions over the evaluation period.

⁴²⁹ EVA data extracted on 17/08/21.

Figure 48. Top ten countries receiving DG ECHO funding for ICRC actions




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 116 ICRC actions = €643,415,555. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. This excludes the Grand Bargain (ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001), an action covering six countries, for which data was obtained from DG ECHO detailing the distribution of funds across recipient states.

When it comes to in-country priorities, the degree of alignment between DG ECHO and ICRC objectives and with the actions funded under the partnership varied considerably from one country to another. Nevertheless, existing differences in in-country priorities were seen as normal and expected and overall, did not have a negative impact on the well-functioning of the partnership.

For instance, as shown in Figure 49, in Syria, South Sudan, Ukraine and Nigeria DG ECHO and ICRC's in-country priorities as well as the funding provided under the partnership were mostly aligned over the evaluation period (see also Annex 8).

Figure 49. Examples of alignment of the partnership with DG ECHO and ICRC main priorities in Syria and South Sudan between 2016-2020.



Source: ICF based on relevant DG ECHO HIPS for 2016-2020; ICRC Annual Reports and Annual Appeals 2016-2020; Project Mapping; Portfolio analysis; and Key Informant Interviews.

Note: for a full mapping of priorities see Annex 8.


In **Syria**, both partners prioritised emergency response interventions (i.e. covering the most basic food, health and WASH needs) and protection activities – including the promotion of IHL–. Those were also the main sectors funded under the partnership. FSL activities (with a focus on covering basic food needs) received 46% of the total DG ECHO funding and protection activities (including the promotion of IHL and ICRC’s work with detainees) represented 35% of the total DG ECHO funding to ICRC’s action in Syria over the evaluation period. Similarly, in **South Sudan**, FSL interventions (especially activities aiming to address basic food needs and malnutrition) were the main priority for both DG ECHO and ICRC. This was also the main sector receiving DG ECHO’s funding for ICRC’s actions in the country over the evaluation period (60%). In line with DG ECHO’s priority to support the needs of EiE, in 2019 and 2020, some ICRC’s activities to facilitate access to education were also funded under the partnership. In **Ukraine**, both DG ECHO and ICRC prioritised addressing the urgent needs of conflict-affected populations along the contact line and Non-Government Control Areas (NGCAs) outside the contact line (i.e. food needs, hygiene needs, adequate shelter, access to clean water etc.). Those populations were also the main beneficiaries of ICRC’s funded actions over the evaluation period. The rehabilitation of accommodations to enhance housing conditions of conflict-affected populations was also a priority for both partners and also among the main ICRC’s actions funded under the partnership. Even though in **Nigeria**, ICRC was slightly more focused on protection aspects than DG ECHO (which mostly prioritised FSL interventions) overall, both partners agreed on the need to take a multi-sectoral approach to address acute needs of conflict-affected populations (i.e. IDPs, refugees, host communities, and residents) especially in hard-to-reach areas in the north-east. Those were also the main target beneficiaries of ICRC’s actions receiving funding under the partnership. For both DG ECHO and ICRC, covering emergency food needs was one of the main priorities over the evaluation period

(82% of funding provided to Nigeria under the partnership went to FSL interventions). Enhancing humanitarian access and promoting IHL was also a key priority for both partners especially after the worsening of the security situation in the north-east since 2018.

Other examples of countries where ICRC and DG ECHO were generally well-aligned in terms of priorities and actions funded under the partnership included **Ethiopia, Colombia, Burkina Faso and Jordan**.⁴³⁰

On the other hand, evidence collected also provided some examples of disagreements in the implementation of the partnership in certain contexts (see Figure 50).

Figure 50. Examples of alignments and mis-alignments in DG ECHO and ICRC's priorities in Iraq and Palestine



Source: ICF based on relevant DG ECHO HIPS for 2016-2020; ICRC Annual Reports and Annual Appeals 2016-2020; Desk Research; Project Mapping; and Key Informant Interviews.

For example, ICRC and DG ECHO faced some challenges to find compromises for the implementation of the Grand Bargain PPP in **Iraq** due to divergent priorities in the country. These differences were exacerbated by the fact that under the Grand Bargain PPP, ICRC's actions did not follow DG ECHO's HIPs, but they were rather based on agreements with DG ECHO at HQ level. Up to 2016, the partners were relatively well-aligned in terms of priorities in Iraq. However, since 2018, DG ECHO's priority has been to exit the country and transition from humanitarian aid to more durable solutions. ICRC on the other hand, has taken a longer-term perspective on the conflict and the delivery of humanitarian aid and prioritised the implementation of long-term humanitarian programs. For example, while DG ECHO prioritised the provision of assistance to displaced populations in camps, ICRC was more focused on helping returnees rebuilding their lives through livelihood support. Nevertheless, despite existing differences, DG ECHO and ICRC also had some common priorities in the country and managed to find compromises under the partnership (e.g. improving detention conditions, restoring family links, promoting IHL). Similarly, in **Palestine**, ICRC was very much focused on improving the treatment of detainees held by both Israeli and Palestinian authorities while this was not a priority for DG ECHO. One of DG ECHO's priorities in Palestine was EiE which was not so much of a priority for ICRC. However, DG ECHO and ICRC were also aligned in some other areas in the country (e.g. building resilience to conflict, promotion of IHL and priorities in the health sector).

⁴³⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews and case studies.

Despite existing differences, ICRC and DG ECHO generally managed to find a compromise in terms of in-country priorities and to identify common areas of interest to be funded under the partnership that could contribute to the achievement of both partners' mandates.

In addition to the above, the assessment of DG ECHO and ICRC's main internal corporate policies and instruments revealed some minor inconsistencies with the partnership (JC 2.5). For example, there were some misalignments between the partnership and the European Commission Financial Regulation (mostly related to the absence of a sanction clause in the FPA) as well as with DG ECHO's visibility and reporting requirements (see Table 30). On the other hand, the partnership was fully in line with the Humanitarian principles, the HAR, the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL, the Seville Agreement and both partners' approaches to needs assessments (see Table 30).

Table 30. Assessment of partnership alignment/misalignment with ICRC and DG ECHO internal policies and instruments

Sectoral policies	Degree of alignment	Assessment of alignment/mis-alignment
Humanitarian principles ⁴³¹	■	The partnership was aligned with the Humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Both ICRC and the EU humanitarian aid are guided by the humanitarian principles. This is expressly stated in the FPA as well as in all DG ECHO's HIPs and ICRC's proposals submitted for funding under the partnership.
HAR ⁴³²	■	The partnership was aligned with the Humanitarian Aid Regulation including the objectives for EU humanitarian aid established in Article 2 of the Regulation.
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid ⁴³³	■	The partnership was aligned with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. The importance of the cooperation with ICRC in the delivery of EU humanitarian aid is expressly mentioned in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid which recognises the relevance of ICRC in delivering humanitarian assistance and protection particularly in conflict contexts. The partnership was also aligned with the EU's obligation to advocate for the respect of IHL, IHRL and Refugee Law as stated in Article 2.2. of the Consensus.
Seville Agreement ⁴³⁴	■	The Seville Agreement regulates the international activities of the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (i.e. ICRC, IFRC and national Red Cross Societies). There is no evidence of misalignment between the Seville Agreement and the partnership.
EU Guidelines on promoting	■	The EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL state that the EU is committed to the effective implementation of IHL and expressly

⁴³¹ As proclaimed by the 20th International Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference, Vienna, 1965 and included in the Preamble of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (1986).

⁴³² Humanitarian Aid Regulation. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:31996R1257&from=EN>.

⁴³³ European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. Available at: [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42008X0130\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:42008X0130(01)&from=EN).

⁴³⁴ Seville Agreement. Available at: https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Seville-Agreement_EN.pdf.

compliance with IHL ⁴³⁵		refers to the cooperation with ICRC on this regard. The FPA also makes express reference to both ICRC's and DG ECHO's commitment to improving compliance with IHL.
DG ECHO Monitoring, Reporting and Evaluation policies	■	<p>The monitoring of funded actions is one of the main pillars of DG ECHO's control mechanism and a key activity in the implementation of the action. All partners are required to report on how funds have been used via the Single Form. The FPA and its Annexes also require ICRC to submit as part of the proposal a monitoring and evaluation plan (Section 8 of the Single Form). Additionally, the FPA also states that DG ECHO should be able to organise visits to action locations and offices as part of their monitoring of ICRC's actions.</p> <p>Nevertheless, findings from the documentation review and project mapping show that despite the fact that ICRC has in place monitoring framework to examine its performance and results,⁴³⁶ due to confidentiality reasons, some information on ICRC's actions (particularly in the protection sector) as disaggregated numbers of beneficiaries at sub-regional level or post-monitoring reports, were not shared with DG ECHO (or any other donor). Additionally, ICRC's monitoring efforts concentrate primarily on output indicators, and less outcome indicators,⁴³⁷ while DG ECHO has been increasingly requiring its partners to report on both output and results indicators (see also JC 3.7 and JC 5.4).</p>
ICRC Confidentiality Approach	■	<p>ICRC's confidentiality rules prohibit sharing information that could undermine the security of people, including in the context of a confidential bilateral dialogue with the authorities concerned. This includes sharing this type of information with its donors. This confidential approach allows ICRC to fulfil its mandate (including creating a space for dialogue with the relevant actors).⁴³⁸</p> <p>Evidence collected through the documentation review, the project mapping and the stakeholder consultation show that DG ECHO generally understands the limited information provided by the ICRC on protection actions (e.g. dialogue with all parties to a conflict, work with detainees) as being intrinsically linked to their mandate. Nevertheless, DG ECHO would also like the ICRC to share additional information on actions in sectors that are not affected by confidentiality requirements (see Section 3.3).</p>
European Commission	■	The EU can impose restrictive measures (sanctions) on certain persons, entities and bodies, as well as in some cases to the trade in certain goods and services to attain the objectives of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Actions funded by the EU has to comply with these restrictive measures. Unlike the FPA with the

⁴³⁵ EU Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:ah0004&from=EN>.

⁴³⁶ ICRC. 2008. Programme/project management: The results-based approach. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-001-0951.pdf>.

⁴³⁷ ICRC. Analysis and Evidence Strategy 2019-2022, Better data, Stronger analysis, Smarter decisions. Available at: <https://shop.icrc.org/analysis-and-evidence-strategy-2019-2022-better-data-stronger-analysis-smarter-decisions-pdf-en.html>.

⁴³⁸ ICRC. 2012. ICRC's confidential approach Specific means employed by the ICRC to ensure respect for the law by State and non-State authorities, Policy document. Available at: <https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc-887-confidentiality.pdf>.

<p>Financial Regulation⁴³⁹</p>		<p>UN and other humanitarian partners, the current FPA with ICRC does not contain a sanction clause that regulates the delivery of humanitarian aid in sanction countries. The documentation review and the key informant interviews suggest that in order to be aligned with the 2018 EC Financial Regulation, the FPA would need to be revised. Negotiations between DG ECHO (and other relevant Commission services) and ICRC on a sanction clause were ongoing at the time of writing.</p> <p>The EC Financial Regulation also requires organisations under indirect management to be pillar-assessed.⁴⁴⁰This means assessing that the organisation's internal rules and procedures provide an equivalent level of protection of the financial interests of the EU as when the Commission directly implements the EU Budget. Even though ICRC has already been pillar-assessed, after the revision of the EC Financial Regulation, it will need to upgrade its pillar assessment. At the time of writing, ICRC was preparing for this assessment which was expected to be finalised in 2021.⁴⁴¹</p>
<p>DG ECHO visibility and communication guidelines⁴⁴²</p>	<p>■</p>	<p>DG ECHO field visibility requirements establish the mandatory and prominent display of the European Union emblem with a text stating that that the action has received funding from the EU. The EU emblem with accompanying text also needs to be used when producing visibility and communications material for dissemination beyond the beneficiary country.⁴⁴³ Article 8.2 of the FPA allows for ICRC's derogation of visibility requirements where those could jeopardize its humanitarian access, the safety and security of its staff or undermine the perception of ICRC's neutrality, independence and impartiality. This derogation is regulated in Article 10 of Annex II General Conditions. ICRC has applied this derogation in all its actions funded by DG ECHO. On the other hand, joint communication campaigns were effectively organised in Europe (see findings under Section 3.4.3).</p>
<p>DG ECHO and ICRC Approach to needs assessment</p>	<p>■</p>	<p>As stated in the FPA, DG ECHO funded actions are based on the affected people's need and on an impartial and independent needs assessment. Although DG ECHO and ICRC have different approaches to needs assessments, those were not incompatible.</p> <p>DG ECHO's assessment of humanitarian needs is done through the use of international indices, specifically: the INFORM Risk Index and the INFORM Severity Index.⁴⁴⁴ This is complemented by the assessment carried out by DG ECHO's experts including field staff. Additionally, DG ECHO has a special needs assessment procedure for</p>

⁴³⁹ EU Financial Regulation. 2018. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/financial-regulation_en.

⁴⁴⁰ Commission Decision of 17 April 2019 on establishing new terms of reference for the pillar assessment methodology to be used under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2019.191.01.0002.01.ENG

⁴⁴¹ Documentation review.

⁴⁴² DG ECHO. Field Visibility. Available at: <https://www.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/visibility/field-visibility>.

⁴⁴³ DG ECHO. Field Visibility. Available at: <https://www.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/visibility/field-visibility>.

⁴⁴⁴ European Commission. DRMKC – INFORM. INFORM severity. Available at: <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/INFORM-Severitys>

forgotten crisis that aims to identify crisis where humanitarian needs are not sufficiently covered by international responses.⁴⁴⁵

ICRC is independent in its needs assessment. All ICRC's needs assessments are based on the analysis of vulnerabilities and capacities. The process followed by ICRC to carry out the needs assessment consists of the preparation for the assessment (before the field visits), collection of information during the field visit (i.e. through observations, interviews etc.) and the analysis and reporting of the information collected. The methodology used for the needs assessments as well as the type of data collected and analysis carried out (i.e. number of locations visited, type of interview carried out, number of people interviewed, degree of reliance on secondary sources etc.) depends on the type of assessment.⁴⁴⁶⁴⁴⁷

- Very coherent
- Generally coherent
- Minor inconsistencies
- Significant inconsistencies
- No data available to date

Source: ICF based on documentation review, project mapping and survey responses.

3.3 Efficiency

3.3.1 EQ3. Were there appropriate mechanisms and structures in place to facilitate communication, coordination and collaboration within the partnership?

Table 31. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
There was regular dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC at different levels: political, strategic and operational; formal and informal (JC3.1)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC happened regularly and at different levels: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At HQ level, a strategic policy dialogue day between the two partners was organised twice a year, while ICRC hosts two policy forums in which DG ECHO participates. - At field level, dialogue and exchanges of information between DG ECHO and ICRC officers happened mostly through informal ways, as well as through participation in humanitarian country teams meetings and other platforms (e.g. meetings organised by the UN).
There were effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest (JC3.2)		
There was timely and efficient information sharing (JC3.3)		

⁴⁴⁵ DG ECHO. Needs assessment. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en

⁴⁴⁶ ICRC. Guiding Principles on assessments. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/publication/p118009.htm>

⁴⁴⁷ The ICRC has three types of needs assessments: Rapid assessments: conducted after a major upheaval; Detailed assessment: that can be carried out after a rapid assessment if more information is required; when ICRC is considering operating in a new area; and when a situation is hanging gradually and further information is required; Continual assessments: undertaken when the ICRC is already operational in an area. It implies regularly updating the information, and seeking relevant feedback from beneficiaries.

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
Opportunities for collaboration were identified and acted upon (JC3.4)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The partnership provided a space for open and honest dialogue, particularly in the field. However, some information considered as sensitive by ICRC is only shared informally (e.g. on protection, security, influx of refugees, etc.). • The level of operational collaboration in the field was appreciated by both partners. Desk monitoring activities, field monitoring visits as well as regular meetings between the ICRC action team and the DG ECHO field (and HQ) officers (e.g. held in the context of report submissions) allowed for closer cooperation and more proactive collaboration between the partners.
Knowledge and resources of each partner were effectively leveraged (JC3.5)	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Knowledge and resources of each partner were effectively leveraged, particularly in the field. ICRC field delegations appreciated the knowledge of DG ECHO on particular humanitarian challenges (e.g. compared to other donors), as well as its widespread field presence, which helped ICRC in gaining access and opportunities for dialogue with other donors and the international community (e.g. in Ethiopia). Similarly, ICRC's access to hard-to-reach areas and beneficiaries is unique and contributes to the achievement of DG ECHO's objectives.
Any overlaps / duplication in humanitarian response were minimised (JC3.6)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Field monitoring visits between ICRC Delegates and DG ECHO staff allowed for closer and more proactive cooperation between the two partners, and helped to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication in humanitarian response at country level. During the Covid-19 pandemic, monitoring visits were, in number of cases, organised remotely (e.g. in Ukraine) to overcome challenges posed by travel restrictions.
Information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms were institutionalised i.e. not dependent on specific individuals (JC3.7)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and exchange of information, particularly in the field, happened mostly on a bilateral informal basis and was subject to the willingness of field officers to cooperate.

Throughout the years, the partners have created and maintained structured mechanisms to facilitate communication, coordination and collaboration, both at strategic (HQ) and field level. However, although there was **regular dialogue** between DG ECHO and ICRC at different levels (JC 3.1), as well as **effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest** (JC 3.2), the evaluation found some misalignment between DG ECHO and ICRC's **perceptions towards the timeliness and efficiency of information sharing** (JC 3.3).

Strategic level communication and coordination between DG ECHO and ICRC were facilitated by a series of **regular meetings and events organised by the two partners**. Each year, two strategic policy dialogue days are organised by the Commission (one strategic dialogue meeting with

relevant EU services and one high level dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC only), three policy forums organised by the ICRC for the Donor Support Group (DSG) as well as a series of bilateral exchanges, including high level meetings between DG ECHO's Commissioner and ICRC's President.

Overall, strategic communication was considered by both partners as one of the richest (e.g. compared to those with other donors/ partners) in terms of the variety of themes covered and depth of the conversation on humanitarian matters.⁴⁴⁸ Conversely, **in the field**, although regular formal meetings are organised in all countries with a presence of both partners, several stakeholders consulted found that dialogue and exchanges of information between DG ECHO and ICRC officers **mostly happened informally**, and to a limited extent through participation in Humanitarian Country Teams meetings and other platforms (e.g. meetings organised by the UN, etc.).⁴⁴⁹ Nevertheless, informal exchanges in the field are seen as particularly productive for information and analysis sharing, as well as for building mutual trust.

As presented in Figure 51, a large majority of stakeholders consulted agreed that **the partnership provided a space for open and honest dialogue** (83% of DG ECHO staff and 89% of ICRC staff responding to the survey) and that **there were effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest (JC3.2)** (61% of DG ECHO staff and 67% of ICRC staff). Nevertheless, stakeholders noted that improvements in communication and coordination could be facilitated by **more regular bilateral dialogue** between DG ECHO and ICRC particularly in headquarters (as recommended by the previous evaluation of the partnership⁴⁵⁰) and that the **secrecy and confidentiality applied by ICRC** limited the extent to which key knowledge and information (e.g. situation/conflict analysis) as well as outcomes of some actions (e.g. protection) could be shared (see Section 3.4.2).⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 02, 12 and Scoping Interview no 03, 04


⁴⁴⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 03, 05, 07, 09, 13, 15, 17

⁴⁵⁰ Evaluation of the partnership between DG ECHO and ICRC and of ICRC's activities funded by DG ECHO (Recommendation N15). 2006. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2006/cicr_final_en.pdf.


⁴⁵¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 10, 15. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of project documentation.

Figure 51. Communication, coordination and collaboration: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements

There is space for open and honest dialogue: we feel comfortable to question the essence of partnership, express room for doubt and voice any concerns with ICRC



There are effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices); ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation).


On the other hand, perceptions of DG ECHO and ICRC staff on the **timeliness and efficiency of the information sharing** (JC3.3) between the two partners were somewhat discordant (see Figure 52). While most ICRC staff reported that information was shared in a timely way (56%), only a minority of DG ECHO staff considered that strategic (17%) and operational/field (17%) level information was shared in a timely manner. Regarding efficiency, stakeholders reported that there was a need for **increased communication between field offices and headquarters** (on both DG ECHO and ICRC side). This would help foster collaboration by ensuring that all developments stemming from these discussions were relayed across different levels of each organisation. Similarly, there was a need for **more structured communication between DG ECHO and ICRC's equivalent desks**. For example, there is limited communication between DG ECHO geographical Desk officers (HQ) and ICRC operational coordinators at HQ level (equivalent of DG ECHO in ICRC).⁴⁵²

Furthermore, the evaluation found that information exchanges, coordination and collaboration mechanisms were institutionalised only to a moderate or limited extent (JC 3.7), pointing at a lack of such mechanisms being embedded with the organisations rather than depending on specific individuals. This confirms that coordination and exchanges of information, particularly in the field, happen mostly on a bilateral, informal basis and are subject to the willingness of field officers to cooperate.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09

⁴⁵³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 07, Survey of DG ECHO Staff. N = 36 (8% - to a great extent), Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18 (16% - to a great extent)

Figure 52. To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices); ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation).

As highlighted in Figure 53, **opportunities for collaboration were proactively identified and acted upon only to a limited extent (JC 3.4) at strategic level**, while the level of operational collaboration in the field was appreciated by both partners. Desk monitoring activities, field monitoring visits as well as regular meetings between the ICRC action team and the DG ECHO field (and HQ) officers (e.g. held in the context of report submissions) allowed for closer cooperation and more proactive collaboration between the partners.⁴⁵⁴ For example, several action reports analysed for this evaluation highlighted that the Covid-19 emergency posed a number of challenges in terms of access to specific areas and, consequentially, target beneficiaries. Regular meetings between ICRC and DG ECHO officers allowed them to reach shared solutions and to effectively redefine objectives, targets and operational modalities in all affected actions.

⁴⁵⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09, 17

Figure 53. To what extent are opportunities for collaboration identified and acted upon



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices); ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation).

Field monitoring visits between ICRC Delegates and DG ECHO staff also fostered complementarity in both partner's approaches towards humanitarian action, as well as closer and more proactive cooperation, which also helped to **minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication in the humanitarian response at country level (JC3.6)**. For example, in Syria DG ECHO and ICRC staff conducted joint monitoring visits and worked together to ensure that the action was in line with priorities established by the DG ECHO HIP, while in Colombia discussions held at the early stages of the Covid-19 emergency allowed to develop and put forward a common approach for the completion of activities.⁴⁵⁵ During the Covid-19 pandemic, monitoring visits were, in number of cases, organised remotely (e.g. in Ukraine) to overcome challenges posed by travel restrictions.⁴⁵⁶

Lastly, the evaluation did not find sufficient evidence to provide a conclusion on whether the **partnership allowed to effectively leverage knowledge and resources of each partner (JC3.5) at strategic level**. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that this **happened particularly in the field**.⁴⁵⁷ ICRC field delegations appreciated the knowledge of DG ECHO on particular humanitarian challenges (e.g. compared to other donors), as well as its widespread field presence, which helped ICRC in gaining access and opportunities for dialogue with other donors and the international

⁴⁵⁵ Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche.

⁴⁵⁶ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 17

⁴⁵⁷ Survey of DG ECHO Staff. N = 36 (66% - to a great/moderate extent in the field, 30% - to a great/moderate extent at HQ level), Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18 (83% - to a great/moderate extent, 22% - to a great/moderate extent at HQ level)

community (e.g. in Ethiopia).⁴⁵⁸ Similarly, ICRC's access to hard-to-reach areas and beneficiaries was considered as unique and contributed to the achievement of DG ECHO's objectives⁴⁵⁹ (see also Section 3.4.2).

3.3.2 EQ4. Did DG ECHO and ICRC embed a learning culture in the partnership?

Table 32. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
JC 4.1 Both partners reflect and act on factors that enable or impede partnership including the ability/freedom to question the essence of partnership, express room for doubt and voice any concerns	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both partners considered that there was room to collectively reflect on actions that enable or impede the partnership, and that they felt comfortable to question the essence of the partnership, express room for doubt and voice any concerns. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was a strong channel of communication between DG ECHO and ICRC at an informal level and in the field. However, there were few opportunities to conduct stocktaking exercises or organise high level formal meetings to discuss any issues.
JC 4.2 Both partners reflect and act on lessons learned from implementation of humanitarian action in different contexts and settings	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field monitoring visits between ICRC delegates and DG ECHO Officers have been effective at allowing DG ECHO to understand how ICRC responds to needs and provide ICRC with key insights in how to improve their operations in certain contexts. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO's representatives in the field also supported formal and informal exchanges with ICRC, and acted as a conducive force to facilitate discussions regarding their operations.

The evidence suggests that there was an open and continuous dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC, where both parties had the ability to question the essence of the partnership and express any doubts or concerns (JC 4.1). Over four-fifths of respondents from DG ECHO strongly agreed or agreed that there was space for open and honest dialogue with ICRC, and that they felt comfortable to question the essence of the partnership, express room for doubt and voice any concerns. This view was shared by ICRC respondents, with almost all respondents strongly agreeing or agreeing with this statement.⁴⁶⁰ Information provided from the KIIs suggested that such activities were more common at field level than at strategic level and that they were primarily conducted through informal channels as opposed to stocktaking or lessons learned exercise.⁴⁶¹ As a result, at operational level both parties are well-equipped to deal with challenges arising on the ground, and able to support and learn from each other in an effective manner.⁴⁶² Multiple interviewees stressed that they were not aware of any formal process to capture lessons

⁴⁵⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 12, 13

⁴⁵⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 08, 09, 15. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche

⁴⁶⁰ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 83%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 89%, N = 18.

⁴⁶¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 12, 13, 18

⁴⁶² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 15

learned, to facilitate information sharing and co-operation, and that this could be a potential area for improvement in terms of the development of the partnership between DG ECHO and ICRC.⁴⁶³ Evidence from the Grand Bargain PPP case study suggests that the pilot enhanced the dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC. A pertinent example of this is the organisation of two regional workshops held in Amman which facilitated constructive exchanges and better operational communication overall.⁴⁶⁴ Although most interviewees from both organisations valued these experiences positively, such activities were seen as an isolated outcome of the Grand Bargain rather than the overall DG ECHO-ICRC partnership.

Both partners reflected and acted on lessons learned from implementation of humanitarian action in different contexts and settings, however this was more common at field level than at strategic level (JC 4.2). Evidence from the document review indicates that there were existing structures in place to reflect and take action on lessons learned from implementation of humanitarian action in different contexts and settings. These included the invitation of Commission representatives to participate in the main evaluation missions relating to the performance of EU-funded ICRC actions, and a stocktaking exercise led by the Commission which took place to map out policy initiatives, relevant instruments, actions, lessons learned and gaps at EU level as part of DG ECHO's Strategic Plan 2016-20.⁴⁶⁵ Furthermore, as part of the Grand Bargain PPP, DG ECHO published an internal document detailing the lessons learned from implementation over the period 2018 to 2020.⁴⁶⁶ The key findings included recommendations regarding the design of the pilot programme, strategic orientation, the budget, and implementation, reporting and monitoring, efficiency, and visibility and communication.

Data collected from the KIIs suggests that reflection on lessons learned was more present in the partnership at field level than at strategic level. In particular, DG ECHO field and monitoring visits were considered to be highly useful to ICRC in improving their operations, facilitating formal and informal exchanges between the two parties, and also in helping DG ECHO actors to understand how ICRC responds to needs.⁴⁶⁷ However, the KIIs provided no mention of lessons learned exercises conducted at strategic level or in a formalised manner. Furthermore, the survey responses provided mixed perspectives on whether the partnership offered a culture to jointly discuss the lessons learned from humanitarian actions. While across both surveys at least half of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed that they regularly reflected and acted on lessons learned from DG ECHO funded humanitarian actions,⁴⁶⁸ approximately one-third of DG ECHO and ICRC disagreed or strongly disagreed.⁴⁶⁹ Overall, although there were formal mechanisms in place to facilitate reflection and communication between DG ECHO and ICRC, in practice these activities have mostly been conducted at field level.

3.3.3 EQ5. To what extent did the partnership contribute to improving the efficiency of DG ECHO's humanitarian response?

Table 33. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
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⁴⁶³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 5, 9

⁴⁶⁴ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁶⁵ DG ECHO-ICRC, 2014. Framework partnership agreement with the international committee of the Red Cross.

⁴⁶⁶ DG ECHO, 2020. Lessons learned DG ECHO – ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Programme (2018-2020)

⁴⁶⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 2, 12, 13

⁴⁶⁸ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 58%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 50%, N = 18.

⁴⁶⁹ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 36%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 39%, N = 18.

<p>JC 5.1 The partnership provided ICRC with greater funding flexibility and predictability</p>	<p>S</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The partnership between DG ECHO and ICRC allowed ICRC to benefit from a better predictability of funds through a multi-annual funding framework, in addition to increasing the flexibility of around the distribution of funding across countries under the Grand Bargain PPP agreement through a simplified grant management system. • This provided ICRC with greater means to shift funding between different contexts to efficiently react to changing needs and operational circumstances across countries under the Grand Bargain PPP agreement. • This flexibility allowed ICRC, consequently, to better adapt its response to evolving needs on the ground, in changing humanitarian contexts.
<p>JC 5.2 The partnership improved the timeliness/ speed of response</p>	<p>M</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was limited evidence to indicate whether the partnership as a whole improved the timeliness/speed of response. Nevertheless, the Grand Bargain PPP has empowered and supported the ICRC to be more agile and flexible to respond in a timely manner to the needs of the affected populations.
<p>JC 5.3 The partnership resulted in reduced operational and administrative costs.</p>	<p>S</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reductions in the operational and administrative costs for ICRC actions funded by DG ECHO happened only to a partial extent
<p>JC 5.4 Partnership ensured accountability to affected populations and on how European aid funds were spent.</p>	<p>S</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Insufficient evidence was available to confirm that the partnership ensured accountability to affected populations and on how European aid funds were spent. • Overall, measuring accountability is hampered by the lack of data provided by ICRC. For example, ICRC did not report on DG ECHO's gender and age markers, nor it provided disaggregated data on beneficiaries (as agreed with DG ECHO due to confidentiality issues) . • There was also a lack of accountability concerning the cost of outputs and the number of outputs produced within each action. For example, within the context of one ICRC action, an interviewee stated that ICRC did not disclose how much money was required to buy a latrine nor how many latrines they planned to build.

Evidence collected suggests that the partnership provided ICRC with greater funding flexibility and predictability (JC 5.1). Findings from the document review indicate that the Grand Bargain PPP agreement between DG ECHO and ICRC allowed ICRC to benefit from increased predictability of funds, through a multi-annual funding framework. The Grand Bargain PPP case study highlighted that the prospect of guaranteed funding over time provided ICRC with a degree of

continuity regarding the actions under the remit of the pilot.⁴⁷⁰ However, it was noted that the positive impacts of increased financial visibility are on average better perceived at Headquarters (e.g. REM) than in the delegations due to the fact budget management in ICRC is centralised, and consequently delegations do not oversee fundraising responsibilities.

In addition, flexibility around the distribution of funding across countries was increased under the PPP agreement through a simplified grant management system. Specifically, an internal flexibility provision was included, specifying that ICRC could move up to 15% of a country envelope without prior DG ECHO agreement.⁴⁷¹ This provided ICRC with greater means to shift funding between different contexts, to efficiently react to changing needs and operational circumstances across countries under the Grand Bargain PPP agreement. However, it is also important to note that, despite the aforementioned flexibility provisions, in 2019 and 2020 the distribution of Grand Bargain PPP funds across countries remained unchanged.⁴⁷²

Furthermore, the project mapping indicated that 84% of mapped ICRC actions showed evidence of flexibility in response to the evolution of needs on the ground.⁴⁷³ Specific changes requested to actions included:

- Requests of additional budget to address urgent developments in humanitarian needs (i.e. WASH, forced displacement, food assistance);
- Adjustment of existing funding for ICRC actions to re-focus actions among various sectors to align with the most urgent humanitarian needs;
- The review and adaption of ICRC general security regulations, passive security measures, as well as forewarning and reactive procedures in response to an evolving security environment;
- Adaptation of the transfer modality used to provide humanitarian assistance to further support recovery (i.e. transition of benefits from in-kind to cash);
- Changes to design of actions in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, including the prioritisation of cash transfers when aid distributions were not possible, the expansion of beneficiaries eligible for humanitarian assistance (i.e. FSL, Essential House Items (EHI) assistance, and income support); and the adaption of all aid distributions and distributions of productive inputs in line with Covid-19 prevention measures (i.e. setting up handwashing stations; provision of anti-bacterial gel; distribution of face masks and gloves; introduction of disinfection procedures).

These findings were supported by evidence from the DG ECHO and ICRC staff surveys. Two-thirds of ICRC staff respondents stated that greater funding flexibility was at least a moderate benefit of their partnership with DG ECHO,⁴⁷⁴ whilst almost four-fifths stated that greater funding predictability was at least a moderate benefit.⁴⁷⁵ Moreover, when asked whether the partnership contributed to providing a quicker and more flexible humanitarian response (e.g. via greater funding flexibility and predictability), over two-thirds of both DG ECHO and ICRC staff agreed that this was the case to at least a limited extent.⁴⁷⁶ Information obtained from the KIIs further corroborated the view that the partnership increased flexibility and predictability. Specifically, one significant benefit of flexibility at regional level was the ability for ICRC to easily shift funding in order to reflect changing humanitarian priorities, such as the redistribution of funding across

⁴⁷⁰ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁷¹ DG ECHO. 2020. Lessons learned DG ECHO – ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Programme (2018-2020) .

⁴⁷² ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁷³ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

⁴⁷⁴ ICF. 2021. ICRC Staff Survey: 67%, N = 18.


⁴⁷⁵ ICF. 2021. ICRC Staff Survey: 77%, N = 18.

⁴⁷⁶ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 64%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 61%, N = 18.

countries within the same region.⁴⁷⁷ The increased predictability of funding also allowed ICRC to be more reactive to developments on the ground and invest more of their resources into supporting their humanitarian responses as opposed to ensuring that they had the funding capacity to undergo such operations.^{478 479}

There was not sufficient evidence to assess whether the partnership improved the timeliness/speed of response (JC 5.2). Data from the survey (see Figure 54) indicates that the majority of DG ECHO and ICRC staff agreed that the partnership contributed to providing quicker and more flexible humanitarian response to at least a limited extent. However, the identification of the driving factors behind the timeliness/speed of response specifically was not available from the documentation review or the KIIs. While no data is available for actions funded under the HIPs, evidence shows that the Grand Bargain PPP has empowered and supported the ICRC to be more agile and flexible to respond in a timely manner to the needs of the affected populations.⁴⁸⁰

Figure 54. DG ECHO and ICRC staff views on whether the partnership contributed to providing quicker and more flexible humanitarian response



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). ICRC Staff Survey. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). ICF Analysis.

Furthermore, the partnership only partially resulted in a reduction in administrative costs (JC 5.3) The document review highlighted that the Grand Bargain PPP reduced the operational and administrative costs associated with the provision of humanitarian aid. The administrative simplifications associated with the pilot approach translated into long-term savings primarily related to human resources. However, these savings were offset by an initial increase in the workload during the first year of the pilot, given the novelty of the framework.⁴⁸¹ This included additional restructuring costs at HQ level and in the field, such as an increase resources dedicated to the monitoring and management of multi-year budgets, and the opening of a special unit to manage contracts falling under the Grand Bargain PPP.⁴⁸²

The structure of the pilot reduced the administrative burden as only one agreement was required over the three-year period as opposed to four agreements and four modifications to extend the funding.⁴⁸³ Information collected from the KIIs validated this claim, and emphasised that the reduction in the number of required contracts under the agreement greatly decreased the administrative burden for actions covered by the Grand Bargain PPP.⁴⁸⁴ However, there was no

⁴⁷⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 5

⁴⁷⁸ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP; Scoping interviews; and documentation review.

⁴⁷⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 5

⁴⁸⁰ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁸¹ DG ECHO. 2020. Lessons learned DG ECHO – ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Programme (2018-2020)

⁴⁸² ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁸³ DG ECHO. 2020. Lessons learned DG ECHO – ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Programme (2018-2020)

⁴⁸⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 5

evidence to substantiate that similar cost-savings occurred under the FPA. In the DG ECHO-ICRC staff survey, a relatively small portion of both DG ECHO and ICRC staff stated that reduced operation and administrative costs were a major benefit,⁴⁸⁵ whilst one-third stated that it was not a benefit.⁴⁸⁶ This suggests that the majority of DG ECHO and ICRC staff did not consider the partnership to significantly contribute to administrative cost savings.

There was little evidence to suggest that the partnership ensured accountability to affected populations and on how European aid funds were spent (JC 5.4). Regarding accountability to affected populations, data from the survey indicated that around half of both DG ECHO and ICRC staff agreed that the partnership contributed to improving accountability to affected populations to at least a limited extent.⁴⁸⁷ Nevertheless, due to the limited availability of disaggregated data on beneficiaries (as foreseen by DG ECHO-ICRC contractual agreements), outputs, and indicators in project documentation, there is no sufficient information to draw meaningful conclusions regarding the impact of ICRC actions.⁴⁸⁸ Evidence from the project mapping also indicated that ICRC did not sufficiently report on DG ECHO's gender and age markers, particularly by not elaborating on the way in which implemented actions met DG ECHO's criteria in relation to gender and age. Across all mapped actions, the comments provided in relation to the Gender and Age Marker referenced ICRC's publications detailing their strategy towards women and children, rather than explicitly demonstrating how this strategy has been integrated into the response.⁴⁸⁹ In relation to the Resilience Marker, ICRC's definition of resilience and the markers provided by DG ECHO do not correspond to those used by the ICRC, hence they did not provide information within the framework used by DG ECHO in the Single Forms.⁴⁹⁰ This lack of data hampered the assessment of the level of accountability to affected populations, as it is not possible to understand the demographics of the targeted beneficiaries, nor determine how the actions met the DG ECHO's quality markers. Therefore, it is not possible to ascertain whether the ICRC was able to provide inclusive and accessible programmes in line with its framework in ensuring accountability to affected populations.⁴⁹¹

Evidence from the KIIs suggested that there was also a lack of accountability concerning the cost and number of outputs within each action. For example, within the context of one action, ICRC did not disclose how much money was required to buy a latrine, nor how many latrines they planned to build.⁴⁹² Furthermore, findings from the Grand Bargain PPP case study indicated that although the pilot led to improvements in ICRC's reporting standards, the quality and detail of the reporting was still well below the level of reporting expected from the partners.⁴⁹³ Issues cited include a lack of information surrounding the precise activities that DG ECHO funding was spent on, and an absence of explanation for the low number of beneficiaries reached under certain actions.⁴⁹⁴ However, some KIIs indicated that although ICRC did not uphold the same requirements related to reporting and transparency as other partners, the quality of the services provided using DG ECHO funding was still very high given the strong level of communication between DG ECHO and ICRC.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁸⁵ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 3%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 17%, N = 18.

⁴⁸⁶ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 33%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 33%, N = 18.

⁴⁸⁷ ICF. 2021. DG ECHO Staff Survey: 50%, N = 36, ICRC Staff Survey: 62%, N = 18.

⁴⁸⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 15

⁴⁸⁹ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

⁴⁹⁰ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions)

⁴⁹¹ ICRC. Accountability to affected populations. <https://www.icrc.org/en/accountability-affected-people>

⁴⁹² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 18

⁴⁹³ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁹⁴ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP

⁴⁹⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 7

3.4 Effectiveness

3.4.1 EQ6. To what extent were the joint advocacy efforts of DG ECHO and ICRC's effective in improving protection of civilians and compliance with IHL?

Table 34. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
There were mechanisms in place to identify and act upon suitable opportunities for joint advocacy (JC6.1)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The advocacy priorities of DG ECHO and ICRC were aligned and complementary at both global and country level, particularly on IHL and protection. • While mechanisms to identify opportunities for joint advocacy exist both at strategic level (e.g. yearly joint strategic dialogue) and at country level (e.g. participation in international humanitarian fora, bilateral discussions), evidence suggests that DG ECHO and ICRC did not exploit such opportunities in a systematic way.
Joint advocacy activities leveraged the strengths of each partner (JC6.2)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The partnership helped to raise awareness of humanitarian issues among decision-makers, as provided by the FPA. To this end, DG ECHO was approached and mobilised by ICRC in several contexts, particularly to leverage its weight within the international humanitarian aid community and its long-standing engagement in the field.
Joint advocacy activities (where these were undertaken) contributed to improving protection of civilians and compliance with IHL (JC6.3)	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The nature of joint advocacy efforts (e.g. through “mobilisation/ sensitization”) carried out during the evaluation period was varied (e.g. roundtables, high-level missions, awareness raising campaigns, etc.). Although it is challenging to quantify their impact, the joint advocacy efforts contributed to improving the protection of civilians and compliance with IHL in several countries (e.g. Mali, Palestine, Ukraine, Ethiopia, etc.)

As stated in the preamble of the FPA,⁴⁹⁶ DG ECHO and ICRC committed “to raise awareness of humanitarian issues among decision-makers and the general public in order to foster the overall effectiveness of and support to humanitarian assistance”. **Advocacy priorities of DG ECHO and ICRC were generally aligned at both global and country level.** The European Commission has consistently prioritised the promotion of humanitarian principles⁴⁹⁷ as well as its humanitarian advocacy, in particular for the respect of IHL.⁴⁹⁸ Similarly, ICRC is committed to advocate in favour of IHL, helping to disseminate and teach it, and urging States to adopt national measures necessary for its implementation.⁴⁹⁹ A large majority of DG ECHO staff consulted agreed that advocacy priorities were strongly aligned both at global (80% of survey respondents) and country

⁴⁹⁶ Paragraph 7 of the FPA, see <https://www.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/io/framework-partnership-agreement/the-icrc-fpa>.


⁴⁹⁷ See Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Strategic Plan 2016-2020.

⁴⁹⁸ See Directorate-General Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Strategic Plan 2020-2024.

⁴⁹⁹ The International Committee of the Red Cross as guardian of international humanitarian law, see <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm>.

(75%) levels. While only half of the ICRC staff in Regional delegations confirmed such strong alignment (at both levels), the overall figures mirror the perceptions expressed by DG ECHO.⁵⁰⁰

Figure 55. Share of DG ECHO and ICRC staff who believe that advocacy priorities are aligned at global and country level



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey (global level). ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices); DG ECHO Staff Survey (country level). ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices); ICRC Staff Survey (global level). ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation); ICRC Staff Survey (country level). ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation).

While **mechanisms to identify and act upon opportunities for joint advocacy exist (JC6.1)** both at strategic level (e.g. yearly joint strategic dialogues) and at country level (e.g. participation in international humanitarian fora, bilateral discussions) were in place, evidence suggests that DG ECHO and ICRC did not exploit and acted upon such opportunities in a systematic way throughout the evaluation period, particularly in the field. **At strategic level**, both partners have consistently increased their effort to raise awareness of humanitarian issues, notably by organising high-level discussions, joint campaigns (e.g. campaign towards the government of South Sudan to address needs related to Covid-19)⁵⁰¹ as well as joint field visits (e.g. Mali, Ethiopia). DG ECHO and ICRC also initiated an “Off-site meeting” in 2020, where they brought together a restricted group of people to discuss sensitive issues on IHL matters⁵⁰² and organised several roundtables to discuss protection and IHL matters, such as the joint roundtable on Sahel which brought together all relevant European Commission services.⁵⁰³ Conversely, the frequency and regularity of joint

⁵⁰⁰ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36 and ICRC staff. N = 18 and ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interviews no 03, 09, 13, 17, Field Interview no 17.

⁵⁰¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 12 and 15.

⁵⁰² ICF. 2021. Scoping Interview no 03.

⁵⁰³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09.

advocacy discussions **in the field** strongly depended on the level of collaboration between DG ECHO field officers and ICRC delegates locally, and often happened through informal dialogue rather than structured cooperation mechanisms.⁵⁰⁴

Evidence also shows that **joint advocacy activities moderately fostered the strength of both partners** (JC6.2). DG ECHO was approached and mobilised by ICRC in several contexts, particularly to benefit from its weight within the international humanitarian aid community and its long-standing engagement in the field. This has happened for example in **Ethiopia**, where ICRC needed to bring the conflict situation to the attention of other donors as well as the Ethiopian government, and DG ECHO contributed to sensitise the international community (e.g. Switzerland and the United States) on the issue.⁵⁰⁵ However, although over 70% of DG ECHO staff consulted through the survey agreed that joint advocacy activities leveraged the strength of both partners,⁵⁰⁶ that ICRC's mandate, as well as the context and nature of the emergency, may influence and in some cases limit the effectiveness of joint advocacy efforts, particularly in contexts in which joint interventions could be seen negatively by some parties to the conflict.⁵⁰⁷

On the ground, **activities to promote the respect of IHL and the protection of civilians have been implemented by ICRC in 20 DG ECHO funded actions** (out of the sample of 31 analysed) and **contributed to improving protection of civilians and compliance with IHL** (JC 6.3) in several countries (e.g. Mali, Palestine, Ukraine, Ethiopia, etc.). The nature of joint advocacy efforts carried out during the evaluation period was varied (e.g. roundtables, high-level missions, awareness raising campaigns, etc.), and activities were implemented **country-wide** in 13 out of 20 actions, while others on **specific regions** within the country (3) or on specific themes such as **detention facilities** (2)⁵⁰⁸.

Although there is limited information on the impact of these advocacy efforts, particularly due to confidentiality reasons and ICRC's mandate, there are several examples of immediate results related to the protection of civilians as well as the compliance with IHL. In **Syria**, concrete positive results were brought thanks to ICRC's efforts to pursue a dialogue on IHL and other applicable norms with government authorities. This led to the **adoption by the national IHL Commission of an action plan on promoting IHL** and to **an IHL course and a public event** to enhance awareness of the Commission's work. Successful awareness raising campaigns on the protection of civilians were also implemented by ICRC through participation in high level conferences, publications and production of communication material.

Similarly, greater adherence to IHL principles was reached in **Iraq**, where government authorities became more responsive to allegations of improper arrest and cooperated more with investigations into disappearances and undisclosed detention raised by ICRC. In **Nigeria**, ICRC's engagement with the military forces and national authorities led to an increased respect for the rights under IHL (and other laws) of communities affected by conflicts, which resulted into more frequent access to and delivery of essential services, including health care. Lastly, in **Mozambique** the ICRC signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Defence and delivered information sessions to the military forces on IHL principles. Also, protection clinics were set up and a telephone hotline was made available to those in need to contact the ICRC to report or discuss their protection-related concerns.⁵⁰⁹

In **Palestine**, the joint advocacy cooperation between ICRC, DG ECHO and UN OCHA brought positive results. UN OCHA developed an advocacy tool with DG ECHO funding, based on ICRC data

⁵⁰⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 05, 09, 12, 15.

⁵⁰⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 03.

⁵⁰⁶ DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of DG ECHO staff. N = 36.

⁵⁰⁷ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09, 12, 13, 15.

⁵⁰⁸ Project mapping (31 actions).

⁵⁰⁹ Project mapping (31 actions).

and information. The tool included several detailed maps highlighting, for example, restrictions of movements and security incidents, which supported the partners' influence on Israeli authorities to change, to some extent, their approach to humanitarian access to vulnerable populations in Palestine.⁵¹⁰

3.4.2 EQ7. To what extent did the partnership contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of both partners' humanitarian response?

Table 35. Key findings


Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
DG ECHO-ICRC partnership contributed to improved effectiveness of humanitarian response (JC7.1)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DG ECHO funded actions implemented by ICRC brought concrete operational results on the ground, particularly in terms of impacts on target beneficiaries.
The same results would not have been achieved in absence of the partnership (JC7.2)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both partners benefited from each other's strengths and unique features to enhance the effectiveness of their activities; One of the main added values of the partnership was that ICRC provided DG ECHO with the ability to reach segments of target populations in hard-to-reach areas. Similarly, the quality and knowledge of DG ECHO field staff provides a unique added value for the partnership.
The synergistic effect ensured that the overall positive effect was greater than the sum of each partners' effects (JC7.3)	M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Challenges towards the achievement of a synergistic approach remain, particularly in terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The secrecy and confidentiality applied by ICRC, which limits the extent to which key knowledge and information (e.g. situation/conflict analysis) as well as outcomes of some actions (e.g. protection) can be shared. The use of DG ECHO funds in the context of multi-annual funding arrangements (e.g. Grand Bargain PPP), particularly when ICRC shifts funding from one country to another one (e.g. leading to priority misalignment).

Overall, the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership **contributed to enhancing the effectiveness of both partners' humanitarian response, particularly in terms of impacts on target beneficiaries**. Over the period 2016-2020 DG ECHO allocated €643,5 million to ICRC, which corresponds to an average of 6% of DG ECHO's total humanitarian funding made available within the period. The funding provided by DG ECHO to ICRC's actions over the evaluation period went mostly to FSL (39%), protection (34%) and health (17%) (see Figure 46 in the Coherence Section), with the large majority of the funds (excluding Grand Bargain PPP) implemented in the MENA Region (43%) and Africa (35%).


⁵¹⁰ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 15 and Field Interview no 12

Figure 56. Percentage and geographical coverage of DG ECHO funding to ICRC

Proportion of DG ECHO funding directed to ICRC



Geographical coverage of DG ECHO funding to ICRC actions (excluding the Grand Bargain PPP)*



(*) Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Sector contracted amount, Number of actions; HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: ICRC Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Amount, EC Amount; ICRC Figures, provided by DG ECHO.

DG ECHO funded actions implemented by ICRC have brought concrete operational results on the ground.⁵¹¹For example, out of 31 actions mapped, 14 fully achieved the intended results, while 17 partially reached their targets. Nevertheless, the qualitative analysis of action data revealed that, in the latter group, there was significant overachievement in several of the activities implemented. Table 36 below presents examples of how actions implemented by ICRC produced concrete results on the ground.

The main challenges hindering the achievement of expected results, and thus leading to partially completed activities, regarded the (unanticipated) movements of IDPs, security issues (e.g. sudden evacuation of hospitals, difficulty to access field locations due to conflict, etc.), government-imposed movement restrictions due to Covid-19, overestimation of the target group and/ or shift in targeting strategy.

Table 36. Evidence of results achieved by ICRC

Country	Sector(s)	Evidence of results / overachievements
Ukraine	FSL Health	The number of direct beneficiaries reached was 148,554, which is 57% overachievement compared to the 94,325 initially targeted.
Syrian Arab Republic	FSL WASH Health Protection	While there was an underachievement in some activities, ICRC reached a total of 22,676,519 people (107% of the total target) against the cumulative target of 21,135,000 beneficiaries. The total results per sector are: FSL: overachievement of beneficiaries reached by 126% (2,552,344 vs. initial target of 2,000,000); WASH: underachievement of beneficiaries reported at 82% (12,300,000 vs. initial target of 15,000,000); Health: beneficiaries reached were highly overachieved by 500% (28,197 vs. initial target of 4,000);

⁵¹¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09, 15. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche

Country	Sector(s)	Evidence of results / overachievements
		Protection: a total of 13,126 detainees were visited by the partner in 4 central prisons (no target was set at proposal stage).
Iraq	Health Protection	Beneficiaries reached were more than double the target (73,341 vs. initial target of 30,200). For the detention specific objective (protection sector), 43,886 people were reached, against the planned 12,000.
Nigeria	FSL Health Protection	ICRC successfully delivered on its outputs with a 187% beneficiary outreach (1,946,676 reached vs. initial target of 1,040,560). While there was an underachievement on the health component, the action was extremely successful under FSL, which accounted for 97% of the action beneficiary reached.
South Sudan Republic	WASH Health Protection	ICRC exceeded the target (258,040 beneficiaries) and reached a total 443,835 people or 172% of the target. The main increase in the number reached are due to ICRC's response to the Covid-19 emergency, primarily through safe water provision, sanitation and hygiene measures. Despite the overall overachievement of the action objectives, some of the targets for individual results were not achieved: for example, in the health component ICRC only reached 35.7% (2,872 people) out of a target of 8,040 people under surgical care, including weapons wounded patients.

Source: ICF. 2021. Project mapping (31 actions).

Also, the peculiarity of each partner's role, mandate and operational capacity ensured that **the same results would not have been achieved in absence of the partnership** (JC7.2). Both partners benefited from each other's strengths and unique features to enhance the effectiveness of their activities. In particular, DG ECHO benefitted from: 1) ICRC's unique mandate, which is accepted and endorsed by all States and allows it to often be the only humanitarian actor in contact with all parties of a conflict;⁵¹² 2) ICRC's ability to deliver humanitarian assistance quickly in areas/ contexts which are not accessible by other DG ECHO partners and to reach a segment of the target population in hard-to-reach areas;⁵¹³ 3) ICRC's ability to bring messages to very high-level actors in terms of requirements under IHL;⁵¹⁴ 4) the high quality of ICRC's humanitarian action.⁵¹⁵ Figure 57 highlights opinions of DG ECHO staff on the main benefits of the partnership with ICRC reported through the survey.


⁵¹² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 07, 08, 10 and Scoping Interview no 06. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche.

⁵¹³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 08, 09, 15. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche.

⁵¹⁴ Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche

⁵¹⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 09, 15. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche.

Figure 57. DG ECHO staff opinions on the main benefits of the Partnership with ICRC



Source:

DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices).

Similarly, ICRC benefited from DG ECHO's funding flexibility (e.g. the Grand Bargain PPP allowing to shift resources towards protracted emergencies which are not prioritised by other donors)⁵¹⁶ and predictability⁵¹⁷ as well as support in providing response on key sectors that fall within DG ECHO's mandate. Also, ICRC sees DG ECHO as an important partner and catalyst for their work with other European Commission services.⁵¹⁸

Overall, **the partners reached synergies at both strategic and operational levels**. However, additional efforts towards a synergistic approach could guarantee that the overall positive effect was greater than the sum of each partners' effects (JC7.3). During the evaluation period, the partners have consistently increased their coordination efforts, particularly at strategic level, and reinforced their open and positive relationship. DG ECHO and ICRC organised and took part in over six meetings and events each year, including two strategic meetings, three DSG policy forums, as well as meetings between ICRC's President and DG ECHO Commissioner. Nevertheless, challenges towards the achievement of a synergistic approach remained, particularly in terms of:

- The secrecy and confidentiality applied by ICRC, which limits the extent to which key knowledge and information (e.g. situation/conflict analysis) as well as outcomes of some actions (e.g. protection) can be shared (see Table 30)⁵¹⁹. Although some confidentiality in information related to protection activities was considered as justified by DG ECHO, the overall level of detail in ICRC's reports is also very low (also when compared to other DG ECHO partners) in other areas such as EcoSec, water and sanitation, health, etc.;
- The use of DG ECHO funds in the context of multi-annual funding arrangements (e.g. Grand Bargain PPP). For example, as highlighted in Section 3.1, ICRC's shifting of funds from Yemen to Palestine resulted in some misalignment with DG ECHO's priorities in the

⁵¹⁶ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP; DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18 (50% - major benefit, 17% - moderate benefit).

⁵¹⁷ ICF. 2021. Case study on the Grand Bargain PPP; DG ECHO. 2021. Survey of ICRC staff. N = 18 (33% - major benefit, 44% - moderate benefit).

⁵¹⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 10, 11, Scoping Interview no 07

⁵¹⁹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 10, 15. Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of actions documentation.

latter country. Nevertheless, it should be noted that DG ECHO approved the transfer of funds.

3.4.3 EQ8. To what extent did the joint communication actions between ICRC and DG ECHO fulfil their purpose?

Table 37. Key findings

Judgement criteria	S	Key findings
Joint communication actions had a clear rationale and purpose (JC8.1)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was a common understanding and alignment of the rationale and priorities for DG ECHO-ICRC joint communication actions, facilitated by the regular formal and informal dialogue between DG ECHO Communication Unit and the ICRC Communication Officer.
There was common understanding of these among the partners (JC8.2)		
Opportunities for joint communication actions were proactively identified and acted upon (JC8.3)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opportunities for joint communication were actively discussed between DG ECHO and ICRC and recorded in the yearly shared Communication Plan on Joint Visibility. The Plan is jointly used as a flexible working tool which allows to act upon suitable opportunities even during its implementation period (as was done, for example, in the context of the UN-EU Syria conferences).
Results and impacts of the joint communication actions were monitored and documented (JC8.4)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> While ICRC derogated from field visibility activities in all actions analysed, as provided under Article 8 of the FPA, joint communication campaigns were carried out in Europe, particularly through photo exhibitions, projections of short films, cartoons, poster campaigns. DG ECHO was satisfied with the overall quality of ICRC's communication campaigns. Nevertheless, visibility in the field was still considered important as it generates impact outside of Europe. While limited quantitative data on the results of joint communication activities was provided by ICRC to DG ECHO (e.g. number of screenings of films, number and location of poster campaigns, number of visitors to exhibitions, etc.), their impact was not monitored nor documented by ICRC during the evaluation period.
Joint communication actions reinforced/ amplified messages – thus having more impact than communication actions undertaken individually (JC8.5)	S	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint communication activities allowed the partners to amplify messages, particularly towards EU citizens. ICRC relies on the network of national Red Cross societies to further magnify their communication campaigns and reach a larger audience. Better target setting (e.g. quantification of the expected audience) as well as additional requirements for the number of yearly ICRC communication products could support the monitoring of joint communication actions.

The FPA (Article 8) between DG ECHO and ICRC sets out a series of visibility and communication actions to be undertaken by ICRC (and, to a lesser extent, DG ECHO) with the aim to *promote in Europe the visibility of the European Union's contribution to humanitarian aid*, as summarised in Table 38 below. Overall, the **joint communication actions by ICRC and DG ECHO fulfilled their purpose**, particularly in Europe, where ICRC produced high quality communication campaigns to make the work funded by DG ECHO visible to the EU citizens.

Table 38. Visibility and communication measures outlined in the FPA⁵²⁰

Responsibility	Action
DG ECHO and ICRC	ICRC and the Commission maintain a regular dialogue to identify possible activities ensuring joint visibility in Europe.
ICRC	<p>ICRC shall submit, at the beginning of each year, to the Commission a Preliminary Communication Plan of Action covering not less than three joint communication activities in the European Union to be implemented jointly. The preliminary Plan shall also include a list of other possible activities to be implemented jointly.</p> <p>The Preliminary Communication Plan shall establish a calendar for the actions and activities, specify the target audience, explain the general content and type of activity, indicate how European Union visibility will be ensured, as well as provide a preliminary budget.</p> <p>This Preliminary Communication Plan shall be complemented during the year with additional activities in Europe jointly identified and by the Commission's own initiatives in Europe to which the ICRC may be associated according to opportunities and which underline the support given by the Commission to the ICRC.</p> <p>For each of these activities the ICRC and the Commission shall ensure visibility for the European Union, for instance as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At joint public events and exhibitions, poster campaigns: display of the European emblem; • For joint publications, audio-visual productions or interviews: indication of the Commission support and when appropriate display of the European emblem; • At conferences and seminars: participation of Commission representatives (as speakers when appropriate).
DG ECHO and ICRC	At the end of the annual cycle and before agreeing on actions for the following 12-month cycle, the ICRC and the Commission shall jointly analyse the impact and outreach of the past year's visibility and communication activities.

Evidence suggests that **joint communication actions had a clear rationale and purpose** (JC8.1) and that there was **common understanding of their objectives and related activities among the partners** (JC8.2) throughout the evaluation period. DG ECHO and ICRC's communication units had regular formal and informal (almost weekly) meetings and discussions throughout each implementation year to identify the priorities for public visibility and to fine-tune communication activities. Themes and priorities were timely discussed for each subsequent year and formalised in shared Communication Plans on Joint Visibility. Generally, ICRC sought to plan and develop

⁵²⁰ Framework Partnership Agreement with ICRC. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/partnerships/humanitarian-partners_en

communication campaigns reflecting DG ECHO yearly priorities, thus guaranteeing a strong thematic alignment and relevance to the overall goals of the European Commission.⁵²¹ For example, IHL was always a common theme which figured in every year's communication activities, as it directly reflects the mandate of ICRC as well as EU policy priorities. One relevant example is the ICRC campaign on healthcare in danger "Not a target!", which address the widespread and severe impact of illegal and often violent acts that obstruct the delivery of healthcare, damage or destroy facilities and vehicles, and injure or kill health-care workers and patients.⁵²² Nevertheless, both partners should make more effort to increase the **internal visibility** of the joint communication campaigns, as several DG ECHO and ICRC stakeholders were not aware of any joint visibility work.⁵²³

Thanks to the structured and functional communication between the two partners, **opportunities for joint communication actions were proactively identified and acted upon** (JC8.3). Both partners reported that the collaboration allowed for the necessary flexibility to incorporate emerging themes or communication needs in the Draft Communication Plan,⁵²⁴ and DG ECHO appreciated ICRC's initiative and creativity to address specific requests on content and themes.⁵²⁵ The Communication Plan was jointly used as a flexible working tool which allowed to act upon suitable opportunities even during its implementation period (as was recently done, for example, in the context of the UN-EU Syria conferences).

As provided under Article 8 of the FPA, ICRC can derogate from field visibility when it "would jeopardize ICRC's humanitarian access, the safety and security of the ICRC's staff or undermine the perception of the ICRC's neutrality, independence and impartiality⁵²⁶". While ICRC derogated from field visibility activities in all actions analysed,⁵²⁷ joint communication campaigns were carried out in Europe, particularly through photo exhibitions, projections of short films, cartoons and poster campaigns. Although DG ECHO emphasised that ICRC's communication products in Europe were of high quality, visibility in the field was still considered important as it generates impact outside of Europe,⁵²⁸ particularly in third countries where the European Commission is funding major humanitarian operations.

⁵²¹ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 18 and 19

⁵²² ICRC. Not a target! The European Union, ICRC and Belgium Red Cross message. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/not-target>

⁵²³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 07, 08, 09, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15.

⁵²⁴ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 18 and 19

⁵²⁵ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 19

⁵²⁶ Paragraph 8. of the FPA. Available at: <https://www.dgecho-partners-helpdesk.eu/io/framework-partnership-agreement/the-icrc-fpa>

⁵²⁷ Project mapping (31 actions): qualitative analysis of DG ECHO operational fiche

⁵²⁸ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 01, 19

Joint communication actions reinforced/ amplified messages, particularly towards EU citizens, **thus having more impact than communication actions undertaken individually** (JC8.5). Between 2016 and 2020, the Commission and ICRC organised a number of successful communication campaigns in Europe to promote the work funded by DG ECHO in third countries. For example:

- **“Women and war”** was a successful audio-visual exhibition organised in 2017 at the European Parliament exhibition centre. Through the work of an award-winning photographer and filmmaker, the exhibition told the stories of eleven women living in some of the world's most notorious conflict zones, such as Afghanistan, Colombia or Sierra Leone, and registered over 970.000 visitors;⁵²⁹
- **“Not a target!”**, a short film produced by ICRC, was screened between 2018 and 2020 in eight EU Member States (Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden). The film was screened in cinemas and on public television (only in Ireland) and received a high response from the public, with over 319.000 spectators in Sweden, over 300.000 in Spain and over 237.000 in Belgium (data related to cinema screenings) as well as over 900.000 viewers in Ireland (TV);⁵³⁰
- **“Missing”**, an exhibition organised in Brussels in 2019 to tell the story of missing persons from armed conflicts, crises, disasters and migrations and their relatives, whose questions still remain unanswered. The exhibition registered over 242.000 visitors and included six events focused on four different contexts: El Salvador, Ukraine, the Balkans and Greece. To promote the exhibition, ICRC organised a considerable poster campaign (see picture) with 214 locations in Brussels and surrounding municipalities.⁵³¹

Eleven women facing war





Photo Exhibition by Nick Danziger
Parlamentarium - Brussels
8 March - 14 May 2017



To roll out some of the joint communication campaigns in multiple EU Member States, ICRC relied on the **network of national Red Cross societies**, which helped to further magnify their message and reach a larger audience. The broad network of the Red Cross family is considered as a key advantage point by both partners,⁵³² particularly as a mean to bring the DG ECHO-ICRC work closer to the citizens.

As provided by the FPA, ICRC and the Commission are to regularly analyse **the impact and outreach** of the past year's visibility and communication activities. Whilst ICRC shared quantitative data on the **results of joint communication activities** with DG ECHO (e.g. number of screenings of films, number and location of poster campaigns, number of visitors to exhibitions, etc.), **the impacts of the joint communication actions were not monitored and documented by the partners** (e.g. satisfaction rate, persons writing about the communication activities / engaging with them on social media, extent to which activities led to public or political debate, etc.) (JC8.4)

⁵²⁹ ICRC communication statistics

⁵³⁰ ICRC communication statistics

⁵³¹ ICRC communication statistics

⁵³² ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 18 and 19

throughout the evaluation period. There is consensus amongst the communication units of both partners that the ICRC should collect and share additional data on impacts of joint communication actions with DG ECHO , for example through the use of qualitative data collection methods, which can be used to gather feedback from participants in the different types of events organised.⁵³³ Furthermore, better target setting (e.g. quantification and segmentation of the expected audience) as well as additional requirements for the number of yearly ICRC communication products could further support the systematic monitoring of joint actions.

⁵³³ ICF. 2021. Key Informant Interview no 18 and 19

4 Conclusion and recommendations

This section presents the main conclusions of the evaluation per evaluation criteria as well as three prospective strategic recommendations to support DG ECHO in its partnership with the ICRC.

4.1 Conclusions

Relevance

The partnership was mutually beneficial and brought added value to DG ECHO and the ICRC' responses to humanitarian crises. In particular, the evaluation found that the partners' mandates, competences and resources are highly complementary, which benefited both partners in addressing humanitarian needs. This was particularly true with regard to the promotion of IHL as well as when it came to the financial and human resources that both partners brought to address humanitarian needs. On the other hand, the evaluation also evidenced some differences in the partners' understanding of the "grey zone" between humanitarian aid and development, which led to some discrepancies in their approaches to some protracted crises and the operationalisation of the Nexus in some contexts.

The evaluation also found that the partnership remained relevant in the face of evolving humanitarian needs and changes in the humanitarian architecture both at global and country level. At country level, the partnership was able to adapt to changes in needs on the ground, for example, in the face of the additional constraints posed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Coherence

The objectives of the partnership were generally well-understood by DG ECHO and ICRC staff although with different levels of understanding within both organisations. Additionally, the evaluation found that, overall, ICRC and DG ECHO staff were well-aware of and respected each other roles and mandates and were committed to the partnership.

The evaluation also concluded that there was a good degree of alignment and complementarity between the partnership and each partner's priorities and objectives both at strategic and operational level. A few minor differences in terms of strategic and operational priorities were identified, which however were considered as "natural" given the specific mandate of each organisation, and not considered to have had a negative impact on the partnership. The partnership was also generally coherent with DG ECHO and ICRC internal corporate policies and instruments (e.g. HAR, European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, Seville Agreement, both partners' approaches to needs assessments etc.). However, some minor inconsistencies were also identified with regard to DG ECHO's visibility guidelines and its monitoring and reporting requirements, as well as with the European Commission's Financial Regulation.

Efficiency

During the evaluation period, strategic level communication and coordination between DG ECHO and ICRC were facilitated by a series of regular meetings and events organised by the two partners. However, at field level, dialogue and exchanges of information between DG ECHO and ICRC officers mostly happened informally, and to a limited extent through participation in Humanitarian Country Teams meetings and other platforms. The partnership also provided a space for open and honest dialogue, and there were effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, improvements in communication and coordination could be facilitated by more regular bilateral dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC, particularly in headquarters. Some improvements are also needed in terms of the timeliness and efficiency of the information sharing, particularly through a more structured communication between DG ECHO and ICRC's equivalent desks.

There was room to collectively reflect on actions that enable or impede the partnership, and both partners felt comfortable to question the essence of the partnership, express doubts and concerns. Both partners also reflected and acted on lessons learned from implementation of humanitarian action in different contexts and settings. However this was more common at field level, while more should be done at strategic level to create opportunities for stocktaking exercises and collection/discussion of strategic lessons learned.

The partnership provided ICRC with greater funding flexibility and predictability, particularly in the context of the Grand Bargain PPP. The Grand Bargain PPP also provided flexibility in the operations at regional level through the possibility of funds transfer between countries, particularly through the ICRC's request to support underfunded operations, which is perfectly in line with the commitments to the Grand Bargain. However, this funding flexibility made it more difficult for DG ECHO to pursue its own strategy both at regional and a country level. Despite exercises such as the Grand Bargain PPP contributed to reduce the operational and administrative costs associated with the provision of humanitarian aid, overall the partnership only partially produced a reduction in administrative costs during the evaluation period.

Regarding accountability to affected populations, although the quality of the actions implemented by ICRC using DG ECHO funding was very high, the limited availability of relevant disaggregated data on beneficiaries (as foreseen by DG ECHO-ICRC contractual agreements), outputs, quality markers and indicators in project documentation did not allow to generate meaningful conclusions.

Effectiveness

The advocacy priorities of DG ECHO and ICRC were aligned and complementary at both global and country level, particularly on IHL and protection. While mechanisms to identify opportunities for joint advocacy exist both at strategic level (e.g. yearly joint strategic dialogue) and at country level (e.g. participation in international humanitarian fora, bilateral discussions), DG ECHO and ICRC did not exploit such opportunities in a systematic way. Nevertheless, joint advocacy efforts (e.g. through "mobilisation/ sensitization") were carried out during the evaluation period through different means (e.g. roundtables, high-level missions, awareness raising campaigns, etc.), and contributed to improving the protection of civilians and compliance with IHL in several countries (e.g. Mali, Palestine, Ukraine, Ethiopia, etc.).

The DG ECHO-ICRC partnership contributed to improved effectiveness of humanitarian response, particularly in terms of impacts on target beneficiaries, and the peculiarity of each partner's role, mandate and operational capacity ensured that the same results would not have been achieved in absence of the partnership. Both partners benefited from each other's strengths and unique features (e.g. ICRC's mandate and ability to deliver humanitarian assistance in certain areas/ contexts on one side, and DG ECHO's funding flexibility and predictability on the other) to enhance the effectiveness of their activities. Additional efforts towards a synergistic approach could guarantee that the overall positive effect of the partnership was greater than the sum of each partners' effects.

Overall, the DG ECHO-ICRC joint communication and visibility actions achieved notable results in Europe, while limited efforts were done to ensure visibility in the field. Between 2016 and 2020, there was an excellent collaboration between the communication offices of both partners, and opportunities for joint communication actions were proactively identified and acted upon, resulting in a series of successful communication campaigns in Europe to promote the work funded by DG ECHO in third countries. More should be done by both partners, however, in terms of analysis of the impact and outreach of the visibility and communication activities, which were not monitored and documented during the evaluation period.

4.2 *Strategic recommendations*

As requested in the ToR, this section presents the three key strategic recommendations which have come out of this evaluation. Each recommendation is accompanied by a short background setting out the rationale and a series of suggestions on how to operationalise it.

1. In future multi-annual agreements (such as the Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot), DG ECHO should promote the adoption of a more inclusive and efficiency-driven programmatic approach

As recommended in the Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016, multi-annual programming and funding of actions can help make humanitarian aid more effective and cost-efficient, as well as more predictable to implementing partners⁵³⁴. The three-year DG ECHO-ICRC Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East provided a platform for testing the strategic and operational collaboration between the partners at the regional level, thus representing an opportunity for assessing its potential for replication in other areas of the world.

Overall, the evaluation concluded that the Grand Bargain PPP has provided advantages in terms of effectiveness of the humanitarian response, particularly through the guaranteed and less-earmarked funding committed by DG ECHO over a longer time-frame, which allowed the ICRC to be more agile and flexible to respond in a timely manner to the needs of the affected populations. Nevertheless, the analysis of the efficiency of the Grand Bargain PPP has highlighted several criticisms related to the overall programming process, as well as to the practical management of the pilot at operational level.

In this context, when discussing similar future exercises, DG ECHO should, in line with the commitments of the Grand Bargain, further:

- **Promote the adoption of an inclusive programming approach** which takes into account the perspectives of DG ECHO and ICRC officers in headquarters and in the field. One of the main findings of the Grand Bargain PPP case study related to the low level of ownership towards the pilot project at field level, with the limited participation of DG ECHO and ICRC field officers at the design stage of the Grand Bargain PPP standing out amongst the possible reasons. Therefore, DG ECHO should promote the involvement of all the relevant headquarter and field units when designing and outlining the strategic elements, operational objectives and mechanisms (including, for example, monitoring and reporting) of the project, thus creating a horizontal design process rather than adopting a top-down approach. The inclusion of all relevant field units could guarantee a stronger alignment between the objectives at regional level and the strategy at country level, as well as budget distribution within the region. Furthermore, DG ECHO should ensure that relevant field officers are consulted in the case of shifts in funding (e.g. between countries), which might guarantee a higher level of alignment with the priorities and budget allocations in all countries involved;
- **Ensure that the flexibility brought by a multi-annual funding approach and simplified grant management (i.e. one regional contract) is translated into operational efficiency.** While the Grand Bargain PPP brought efficiency gains through administrative simplification, additional resources were required by both partners to manage the coordination in both headquarters and the field. This occurred in particular during the first year of the Grand Bargain PPP, since no established procedures existed previous to the pilot project. DG ECHO should, ideally, promote the adoption of a similar structure at regional level – i.e. through the introduction of regional management or coordination positions with specific responsibilities over the implementation of the regional programme. Furthermore, DG ECHO could consider adapting its reporting requirements to the multi-annual nature of the project. Reporting requirements under the Grand Bargain PPP were fulfilled through the same tools (i.e. DG ECHO Single Form) used for more traditional funding mechanism, normally based on

⁵³⁴ European Commission, Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), Comprehensive evaluation of the European Union humanitarian aid, 2012-2016 : final report, Publications Office, 2018, <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2795/119375>

annual funding (e.g. HIPs). In this context, intermediate reporting requirements could be reduced to one report to be presented mid-way through the implementation of the project, compared to the two Grand Bargain PPP Interim Reports which were presented one month before the end of the project's first year and nine months before the end of the action⁵³⁵. This might contribute to reduce the resource burden and avoid redundancy of information. Nevertheless, the current level of detail required for the interim report should be maintained, with ICRC reporting on progress against all specific objective indicators (in all countries). Additionally, the partners should consider introducing general objectives indicators, which could be partially measured at intermediate stage and constitute the main focus of the final report (thus reporting on the impacts of the project).

2. DG ECHO should engage with the ICRC to develop more opportunities to increase mutual learning at strategic level and improve information sharing

The evaluation found that, while there was an open and continuous dialogue between the partners, reflections on lessons learned were not carried in a structured, systematic manner, and occurred more at field level than at strategic level. DG ECHO and ICRC had regular opportunities for strategic dialogue between 2016 and 2020, particularly through strategic policy meetings and forums organised by both partners as well as bilateral high-level exchanges. However, there were no formal lessons learned and stocktaking exercises at strategic (headquarters) level. Therefore, **DG ECHO should promote the introduction of at least one stocktaking meeting every two years**, during which the lessons learned both at strategic (headquarters) and operational (field) level should be captured and discussed in an objective and unbiased way. Throughout the year, both partners should collect lessons from all relevant headquarters units (e.g. administration, finance, grant management, etc.) and exploit the already well-established dialogue at field level (e.g. as a result of joint monitoring visits, etc.) to compile a list of key lessons, which will be the focus of the stocktaking discussion.

Furthermore, as outlined in the evaluation's findings, **DG ECHO should encourage ICRC to enhance the current quality of information sharing**, particularly in regard to the submission of documents (e.g. proposals, reports, etc.) as well as evidence of impact achieved by the funded actions and joint visibility activities. While it is clear that throughout the years, and particularly in the context of the Grand Bargain PPP, the ICRC has made efforts to better adapt its reporting to DG ECHO standards, showing an understanding of DG ECHO's role and requirements for its humanitarian partners, additional efforts could guarantee a better alignment with DG ECHO's expectations. Moreover, the level of detail included in ICRC proposals and reports (e.g. action interim/ final reports) could be further enhanced. The evaluation found that DG ECHO understood and accepted certain data limitations, particularly when linked to ICRC's protection actions. However, proposals and reports presented in the context of actions covering other sectors (e.g. health, EcoSec, etc.) should uphold the necessary level of detail and quality of reporting. Lastly, evidence highlighted that joint visibility and communication activities should better reflect the provisions of the FPA, and that their impact and outreach should be assessed by the partners.

In order to enhance the quality of information sharing and better comply with technical requirements, DG ECHO should engage with the ICRC to:

- **Improve the level of detail of information provided in proposals and reports**, particularly to meet DG ECHO's requirements and ensure that impacts of actions (e.g. on target population) are properly recorded and communicated. For example, DG ECHO could encourage the ICRC to better and more consistently present the outputs produced as well as the achieved impacts on beneficiaries, and consistently populate indicators with a necessary level of detail allowing to ascertain the impact of its actions. Furthermore, ICRC could be encouraged to consistently report on DG ECHO's gender and age

⁵³⁵ DG ECHO. ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Partnership Project FichOp

quality markers, avoiding redundancy of information and the provision of information not directly related to the action (e.g. by providing references to ICRC's policies rather than explaining how they were implemented in the specific action);

- **Jointly collect and analyse data on the outcomes and, when possible, impacts of joint communication activities.** The ICRC could be encouraged by DG ECHO to collect data on outcomes and impacts of the communication activities, as they directly implement them and collect related monitoring data. This could happen, for example through the use of qualitative data collection methods, which can be used to gather feedback from participants in the different types of events organised (e.g. satisfaction rate, persons writing about the communication activities / engaging with them on social media, extent to which activities led to public or political debate, etc.). Furthermore, DG ECHO could make use of the regular evaluations of its communication and visibility (e.g. the ones carried out in 2007 and 2015⁵³⁶) to assess the outcomes and impacts of the joint communication activities carried out with the ICRC;
- **At planning stage, DG ECHO should engage with ICRC to better align the joint communication activities with the requirements outlined in the FPA,** particularly by including additional information on the general content of the activity (aside for the title of the event/ activity and the geographical location), on how the visibility of the European Commission will be ensured, and on the budget allocated to each planned activity.

3. DG ECHO should reinforce ongoing dialogue and cooperation with ICRC on the operationalisation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus

The Humanitarian-Development Nexus aims to ensure coordination between humanitarian and development actors to maximise existing synergies and complementarities, without compromising the independence and mandate of each of the actors involved, and enable the process of transitioning from emergency relief to rehabilitation and development where this is possible. Given the increased number of protracted crises, discussions around the operationalisation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus are increasingly relevant.

As the evaluation concluded, both the ICRC and DG ECHO are committed to the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. Both organisations recognise the importance of implementing humanitarian actions that address urgent needs, while also contributing to longer-term development goals. Nonetheless, the evaluation also found some differences in the way ICRC and DG ECHO understand the 'grey zone' between humanitarian aid and development which has led to some discrepancies in the operationalisation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus in certain contexts.

Within the European Commission, humanitarian and development competences are clearly separated, with DG ECHO coordinating the delivery of humanitarian aid and DG INTPA and DG NEAR working on the development side. This division of competences (and budget lines) within the European Commission requires additional coordination among Commission services and with partners – including ICRC - to enable an adequate operationalisation of the Nexus.

Even though there is ongoing dialogue between ICRC and DG ECHO on the Humanitarian-Development Nexus, the following actions could contribute to reinforcing the partners' cooperation in this context:

- **DG ECHO should engage with the ICRC to develop more opportunities for bilateral discussions and cooperation on the operationalisation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.** Enhanced dialogue around the Nexus would allow the partners to: 1) better navigate the grey zone between humanitarian

⁵³⁶ The Evaluation Partnership Limited, Evaluation of Communication, Information and Visibility Actions in Humanitarian Aid, 2007. Available at <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2007/communication.pdf> and Transtec, EY, Evaluation of DG ECHO's Approach to Communication under the Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIP), 2015. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2015/approach_communication_en.pdf

aid and development; 2) define common objectives and priorities in relation to the Nexus (both at strategic and operational level); 3) develop coordinated programmatic approaches in relevant contexts; 4) ensure that actions and programmes implemented under a Nexus approach are strictly grounded in the humanitarian principles; 5) incorporate lessons learned on the Nexus; 6) identify opportunities towards transitional funding and development programmes (including funding provided by other Commission services);


- **DG ECHO should promote dialogue between ICRC and other relevant Commission services (i.e. DG INTPA, DG NEAR) on the implementation of the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.** Given the internal division of development and humanitarian aid competences within the European Commission, collaboration and coordination with and among other Commission services is key for the effective operationalisation of the Nexus. The DG ECHO-ICRC partnership is seen by other Commission services as an entry point for discussions with ICRC on the Nexus. Every year DG ECHO organises a Strategic Policy Dialogue with other relevant Commission Services and the ICRC to discuss issues of common interest (including aspects related to the Nexus). At operational level however, consultation between DG ECHO, ICRC and other Commission services is sometimes missing. In this regard, DG ECHO, could act as catalyst to facilitate the collaboration/cooperation between ICRC and other relevant Commission services on the implementation of the Nexus. Tripartite collaboration with relevant Commission Services should be actively sought after (where relevant and possible) and regularly discussed at strategic and operational level.

ANNEXES

Annex 1. HoA portfolio analysis

A1.1 Regional overview of DG ECHO humanitarian aid in HoA


Figure 58. Evolution of DG ECHO funding to HoA



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (DG ECHO funding), HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (Number of projects). ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number.


Note: these values are based on consumption year. To estimate the number of projects per year in cases where there were projects containing multiple contracts in different years, the year of the first contract was used. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Figure 59. DG ECHO funding relative to total humanitarian aid funding in HoA (2016-20)



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution, Total amount. Note: these figures are based on the total contracted amount between 2016-20.


Figure 60. DG ECHO funding to HoA by country



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount.

Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 61. Share of DG ECHO HoA funding per country



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA.

Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 62. Evolution of number of projects per HoA country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number. Total number of projects = 283.


Note: These values are based on contracting year. The total number of projects in this graph (287) exceeds the actual number of projects within the scope of the evaluation (283) as one project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019), and has therefore been counted multiple times.

Figure 63. Number of beneficiaries reached by projects in HoA by country




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Total beneficiaries. Total number of beneficiaries = 133,474,489

Figure 64. Number of beneficiaries reached by beneficiary type by DG ECHO funded projects in HoA




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Total beneficiaries. % represents % of total beneficiaries: N = Total number of beneficiaries = 133,474,489

Figure 65. DG ECHO funding to main partners




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA. Main partners is defined as the top 10 partners receiving DG ECHO funding.

Figure 66. DG ECHO funding to type of partners



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA.


Figure 67. Proportion of DG ECHO funding to types of partner per country



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA.

Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 68. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (DG ECHO funding), HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (Number of projects). ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number.

Note: these values are based on consumption year. To estimate the number of projects per year in cases where there were projects containing multiple contracts in different years, the year of the first contract was used. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 69. Percentage of funding directed towards projects related to forced displacement by year



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. N = € 1,059,090,847 = Total DG ECHO funding to HoA.

Note: these values are based on consumption year.


Figure 70. Percentage of funding directed towards projects related to forced displacement by country



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. For N values per country please refer to Figure 1.2.

Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 71. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement by sector



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. N = DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement = € 1,011,540,847.

Note: One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 72. Number of actions targeting specific groups



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number. Total number of projects = 283.

Note: These values are based on contracting year. The total number of projects in this graph (707) exceeds the actual number of projects within the scope of the evaluation (283) as individual projects can target multiple groups.


Figure 73. Number and % of projects related to FD by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number.


A1.2 Funding to HoA per sector

Figure 74. Total funding by sector



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 4.3; Variable: Result amount latest. N = Total funding = € 2,422,877,972. This includes funding received from DG ECHO and other donors.

Figure 75. DG ECHO funding by sector



Source: EVA data extracted on 21/07/21. (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Sheet: sectors matched Variable: Sector amount. N = DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Table 39. Annual DG ECHO funding by sector (€ million)


Sector	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
Child protection	€ 0.2	€ -	€ -	€ -	€ -	€ -	€ 0.2
Coordination	€ 15	€ 18	€ 7	€ 6	€ 2	€ 0.4	€ 49
DRR/DP	€ 5	€ 5	€ 12	€ 13	€ 18	€ 0.0	€ 54
EiE	€ 5	€ 7	€ 8	€ 21	€ 17	€ 0.1	€ 59

PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

Sector	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Total
FSL	€ 138	€ 139	€ 58	€ 32	€ 29	€ 0.2	€ 396
Health	€ 10	€ 13	€ 20	€ 19	€ 18	€ 1	€ 81
MPCT	€ -	€ 6	€ 24	€ 22	€ 21	€ -	€ 74
Nutrition	€ 19	€ 17	€ 16	€ 18	€ 18	€ 1	€ 89
Protection	€ 15	€ 39	€ 14	€ 15	€ 14	€ 1	€ 97
Shelter and settlements	€ 3	€ 12	€ 16	€ 3	€ 4	€ 4	€ 42
Support to operations	€ 1	€ 1	€ 8	€ 1	€ 0.3	€ -	€ 10
WASH	€ 21	€ 37	€ 22	€ 15	€ 12	€ 0.3	€ 108
Total	€ 232	€ 296	€ 205	€ 164	€ 154	€ 8	€ 1,059


Source: EVA data extracted on 21/07/21. (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Sheet: sectors matched Variable: Sector amount. DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847. The annual figures are based on consumption year, hence a large decrease in 2021 is expected as few projects within the remit of this evaluation include funding consumed in 2021. Note: green highlight indicates a positive year-on-year change of at least €5 million. Orange highlight indicates where there has been an absolute year-on-year change between €0 and €5. Red highlight indicates a negative year-on-year change of at least €5 million. 2016 is used as the base year and is therefore not highlighted.

Figure 76. Proportion of total funding by sector




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 4.3; Variable: Result amount latest. Total funding = N = € 2,422,877,972. This includes funding received from DG ECHO and other donors.

Figure 77. Proportion of total funding by sector



Source: EVA data extracted on 21/07/21. (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Sheet: sectors matched Variable: Sector amount. N = DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847 .

Figure 78. Number of projects per sector



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Classification; Variable group: sectors. Total funding number of projects = 283. Figures do not sum to 283 as one project can cover multiple sectors.

Table 40. Main framework partners per sector⁵³⁷

Partner	Total funding	Percentage of total funding per sector
Child protection		
NRC	€ 146,695	100%
Coordination		
OCHA-CH	€ 60,350,228	59%
IRC-UK	€ 24,544,480	24%
IOM-CH	€ 9,467,512	9%
UNHCR-CH	€ 3,505,347	3%
FAO-IT	€ 1,412,679	1%
DRR/DP		
IRC-UK	€ 26,320,464	42%
WFP-IT	€ 9,821,647	16%
IRC-DE	€ 3,086,970	5%
OXFAM-UK	€ 2,607,569	4%
CONCERN WORLDWIDE-IR	€ 2,199,123	3%
EiE		
UNICEF-US	€ 15,142,249	25%
STC-NL	€ 12,564,051	21%
UNHCR-CH	€ 5,540,317	9%
NRC-NO	€ 5,520,454	9%
STC-NO	€ 4,893,001	8%
FSL		
WFP-IT	€ 987,791,022	83%
CICR-CH	€ 89,434,084	8%
FAO-IT	€ 32,452,220	3%

⁵³⁷ This is defined as the top five partners based on funding for projects for which they act as framework partners. The funding includes contributions from DG ECHO, the framework partners, and other donors


PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

Partner	Total funding	Percentage of total funding per sector
NRC-NO	€ 14,813,828	1%
STC-UK	€ 12,127,847	1%
Health		
UNHCR-CH	€ 58,894,014	38%
CICR-CH	€ 44,476,079	29%
IRC-UK	€ 14,931,239	10%
SOS KINDERDORF INT-AT	€ 8,916,366	6%
UNICEF-US	€ 7,169,332	5%
MPCT		
CONCERN WORLDWIDE-IR	€ 47,730,539	61%
ACTED-FR	€ 8,347,922	11%
DRC-DK	€ 7,683,783	10%
WV-DE	€ 4,285,725	5%
CROIX-ROUGE-UK	€ 3,321,601	4%
Protection		
UNHCR-CH	€ 184,944,202	75%
UNICEF-US	€ 12,119,747	5%
DRC-DK	€ 7,407,709	3%
CICR-CH	€ 6,911,674	3%
CARE-DK	€ 5,571,786	2%
Shelter and settlements		
UNHCR-CH	€ 20,456,670	37%
IOM-CH	€ 19,756,988	35%
DRC-DK	€ 7,402,221	13%
NRC-NO	€ 3,802,263	7%
UNICEF-US	€ 1,525,269	3%

Partner	Total funding	Percentage of total funding per sector
Support to operations		
WFP-IT	€ 44,872,575	95%
OCHA-CH	€ 925,963	2%
SOS KINDERDORF INT-AT	€ 701,002	1%
DRC-DK	€ 311,026	1%
CROIX-ROUGE-UK	€ 287,479	1%
WASH		
CICR-CH	€ 26,503,456	20%
UNICEF-US	€ 19,390,159	14%
NRC-NO	€ 11,171,286	8%
DRC-DK	€ 10,978,459	8%
OXFAM-NL (NOVIB)	€ 9,378,705	7%

Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 4.3; Variable: Result amount latest. N = total funding per sector, information for which can be found in Figure 2.1. This includes funding received from DG ECHO and other donors.

Figure 79. Number of single and multi-sector projects by country




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Multi-sector. Total number of single sector projects = 80, and total number of multi-sector projects = 203. Values in the figure above sum to 287 as one project was conducted across multiple countries and has thus been counted in each country (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019).

A1.3 Multi-year funding and project duration


Figure 80. Number of projects by project duration

Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis).




Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number. Total number of projects = 283.

Figure 81. Proportion of projects within project duration groups




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Agreement number. Total number of projects = 283.

Figure 82. DG ECHO funding by project duration group




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Figure 83. Cumulative share of DG ECHO funding by project duration




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Figure 84. Proportion of DG ECHO funding per duration by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847. For N values relevant to each specific country please refer to Figure 1.2.


Figure 85. DG ECHO funding to and number of projects categorised as single and multiple actions



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: multiple actions were identified by projects within the scope of the evaluation whose titles were repeated within the database.

Figure 86. Frequency of project rollovers amongst multi-action projects




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: ECHO contribution. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: multiple actions were identified by projects within the scope of the evaluation whose titles were repeated within the database.

A1.4 Transfer Modalities


Figure 87. Annual DG ECHO funding in HoA by transfer modality



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.


Figure 88. Total DG ECHO Funding 2016-20 in HoA by transfer modality



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

Figure 89. DG ECHO funding for cash and vouchers as a share of total funding per year




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

Figure 90. DG ECHO funding for cash and vouchers and number of projects containing at least one cash or voucher element


Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = €



1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.


Figure 91. Number of projects containing both cash and voucher elements



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: Agreement number. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.


Figure 92. DG ECHO funding for cash and vouchers by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.


Figure 93. Proportion of total funding dedicated to cash and vouchers per country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Total DG ECHO funding = € 1,059,090,847.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

Figure 94. Number of projects with different transfer modalities



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: Agreement number.


A1.5 Country-level analysis

For each country, the following analysis is presented:

- Annual DG ECHO funding;
- Annual funding to different transfer modalities;
- Annual funding for cash and vouchers⁵³⁸;
- Annual funding to projects related to forced displacement;
- Annual funding to and number of project by duration;
- DG ECHO main partners

A1.5.1 Djibouti


Figure 95. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Djibouti



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


⁵³⁸ Excluding Eritrea as in this country no funding was directed towards cash and vouchers

Figure 96. DG ECHO funding by sector: Djibouti



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. N = DG ECHO funding to Djibouti = € 4,960,000

Figure 97. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality: Djibouti



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

Table 41. Annual cash and voucher funding: Djibouti

Year	Cash	Voucher
2016	€ 21,050	€ -


PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

Year	Cash	Voucher
2017	€ 83,161	€ -
2018	€ 51	€ -
2019	€ -	€ 91,100
2020	€ -	€ -
Grand total	€ 104,262	€ 91,100

Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.


Note: this analysis was based on contracting year, rather than consumption year, as this was not available in the transfer modalities dashboard.

Figure 98. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement: Djibouti




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.

Figure 99. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding by duration: Djibouti



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.

Figure 100. DG ECHO main partners: Djibouti



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Percentages are calculated as a proportion of total DG ECHO funding to the country in reference. Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.

A1.5.2 Eritrea

Table 42. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Eritrea

Year	DG ECHO funding
2016	€ 1,000,000
2017	€ 0
2018	€ 0
2019	€ 0
2020	€ 0

PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020


Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year.

Table 43. DG ECHO funding by sector: Eritrea

Sector	DG ECHO funding
FSL	€ 1,000,000

Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year.

Figure 101. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality: Eritrea



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. Only one project was funded in Eritrea over the evaluation period.

Table 44. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement: Eritrea

Year	DG ECHO funding for FD	% total DG ECHO funding
2016	€ 1,000,000	100%
2017	€ -	-
2018	€ -	-
2019	€ -	-
2020	€ -	-
Grand total	€ 1,000,000	100%


Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount. Only one project was funded in Eritrea over the evaluation period.

Table 45. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding by duration: Eritrea

Duration	Number of projects	Funding
Less than 3 months		
3-6 months		
6-12 months		
12-18 months	1	€ 1,000,000
18-24 months		
2 years or more		

Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount. Only one project was funded in Eritrea over the evaluation period.


Figure 102. DG ECHO main partners: Eritrea



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Percentages are calculated as a proportion of total DG ECHO funding to the country in reference. Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


A1.5.3 Ethiopia

Figure 103. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Ethiopia




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Figure 104. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Ethiopia




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. N = DG ECHO funding to Ethiopia = € 413,935,197

Figure 105. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality: Ethiopia




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version. **Note: these values are based on contracting year.**

Figure 106. Annual cash and voucher funding: Ethiopia




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 107. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement: Ethiopia




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount

Figure 108. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding by duration: Ethiopia



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


Figure 109. DG ECHO main partners: Ethiopia



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Percentages are calculated as a proportion of total DG ECHO funding to the country in reference. Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


A1.5.4 Kenya

Figure 110. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Kenya




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Figure 111. DG ECHO funding by sector: Kenya




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. N = DG ECHO funding to Kenya = € 85,481,737

Figure 112. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality: Kenya




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 113. Annual cash and voucher funding: Kenya




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 114. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement: Kenya




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount

Figure 115. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding by duration: Kenya



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


Figure 116. DG ECHO main partners: Kenya



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Percentages are calculated as a proportion of total DG ECHO funding to the country in reference. Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


A1.5.5 Somalia

Figure 117. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Somalia




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Figure 118. DG ECHO funding by sector: Somalia




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. N = DG ECHO funding to Somalia = € 362,262,150

Figure 119. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality: Somalia




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 120. Annual cash and voucher funding: Somalia




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 121. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement: Somalia




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount

Figure 122. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding by duration: Somalia



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.

Figure 123. DG ECHO main partners: Somalia




PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Percentages are calculated as a proportion of total DG ECHO funding to the country in reference. Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


4.2.1 Uganda

Figure 124. Annual DG ECHO HoA funding: Uganda




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.

Figure 125. DG ECHO funding by sector: Uganda




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: EVA Extraction 080721; Variable: Sector contracted amount. Note: these values are based on consumption year. One project was conducted across multiple countries (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91019). The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. N = DG ECHO funding to Uganda = € 191,451,763

Figure 126. DG ECHO funding by transfer modality: Uganda




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 127. Annual cash and voucher funding: Uganda




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM contract amount latest version.

Figure 128. DG ECHO funding towards projects related to forced displacement: Uganda




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount

Figure 129. Number of projects and DG ECHO funding by duration: Uganda



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


Figure 130. DG ECHO main partners: Uganda



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Percentages are calculated as a proportion of total DG ECHO funding to the country in reference. Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: EC amount.


A1.6 Cost-effectiveness analysis

Figure 131. Number of beneficiaries reached by transfer modality




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM individual beneficiaries. Total number of beneficiaries = 133,474,489, however note that the values in this figure sum to 155,490,723 as a result of double counting as one project can include multiple transfer modalities.

Figure 132. Number of beneficiaries reached per sector




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: TM; Variable: TM individual beneficiaries. Total number of beneficiaries = 133,474,489, however note that the values in this figure sum to 155,490,723 as a result of double counting as one project can include multiple sectors.

Figure 133. Cost per beneficiary




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2; Variable: Total costs / total direct beneficiaries. Number of projects = 273 as 10 projects did not target individual beneficiaries.

Figure 134. Direct support costs as a % of total costs




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: B&B 3.2, TM; Variable: TM direct specific cost /Total costs. Number of projects = 272 as 11 projects had direct support costs of over 100% and were thus excluded as outliers.

Figure 135. Proportion of actions achieving at least one KRI target



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: Key Results Indicators. KRI target achieved: N = Number of actions = 283, however information was not available for 48 actions.


Figure 136. Proportion of actions achieving at least one KRI target by country



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Document: Key Results Indicators. KRI target achieved: N = Number of actions per country that included information on KRIs = 11 (Djibouti), 37 (Kenya), 35 (Uganda), 72 (Ethiopia), 80 (Somalia). No information was available for Eritrea.

A1.7 Gender-Age and Resilience Markers

Figure 137. Percentage of DG ECHO funded actions integrating women and girls, and resilience




Source: HOPE data extracted on 07/07/21 (ICF analysis). Document: HoA Portfolio Analysis; Gender Age Marker; Resilience Marker; Variable: Desk officer mark (FR RM). N = Number of projects = 283. The category N/A includes projects which were marked as N/A or left blank.

Annex 2. Survey analysis

A2.1 HoA Framework Partners


A2.1.1 General information

Figure 138. Number and % of respondents by type of organisation



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122. Question 1: Which organisation do you work for?

Figure 139. Primary thematic focus areas – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 3: What is your organisation's primary thematic focus in the Horn of Africa (HoA) region? Please tick all that apply.

Other thematic focus areas were described by 22 respondents. These included security, women's empowerment, multi-purpose cash transfers, peace and mediation, DRR/DP, and mine reductions.

A2.1.2 DG ECHO's strategy and approach in the HoA region during the period 2016-2020

Table 46. DG ECHO's strategy and approach in the HoA region during the period 2016-2020: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of organisation (%)

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/Can't say
DG ECHO has tried to connect humanitarian cash transfers with the emerging safety nets and in particular its shock response component					
The UN System	25.8%	29.0%	3.2%	3.2%	38.7%
International Organisation	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	43.5%	34.1%	3.5%	1.2%	17.6%
Overall	40.2%	31.1%	3.3%	1.6%	23.8%
DG ECHO's response was guided by humanitarian principles					
The UN System	74.2%	25.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International Organisation	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	89.4%	10.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	86.1%	13.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
DG ECHO placed a key role in promoting respect for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) through its advocacy efforts					
The UN System	64.5%	16.1%	0.0%	9.7%	9.7%
International Organisation	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	45.9%	27.1%	3.5%	0.0%	23.5%
Overall	51.6%	23.8%	2.5%	2.5%	19.7%
DG ECHO has contributed to the broader goal of resilience building in the HoA region					
The UN System	32.3%	38.7%	3.2%	12.9%	12.9%
International Organisation	66.7%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	38.8%	43.5%	10.6%	1.2%	5.9%
Overall	38.5%	41.0%	9.0%	4.1%	7.4%

PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/Can't say
DG ECHO's use of cash transfers versus other modalities, was appropriate					
The UN System	35.5%	25.8%	6.5%	0.0%	32.3%
International Organisation	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	67.1%	20.0%	3.5%	0.0%	9.4%
Overall	57.4%	22.1%	4.9%	0.0%	15.6%
DG ECHO's Humanitarian Implementation Plans (HIPs) correctly identified the most urgent humanitarian needs in the region					
The UN System	48.4%	35.5%	9.7%	0.0%	6.5%
International Organisation	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	65.9%	29.4%	3.5%	1.2%	0.0%
Overall	61.5%	31.1%	4.9%	0.8%	1.6%
DG ECHO is a leading actor in mainstreaming and scaling up the use of humanitarian cash transfers in the region					
The UN System	45.2%	19.4%	3.2%	0.0%	32.3%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	64.7%	21.2%	3.5%	0.0%	10.6%
Overall	59.0%	20.5%	3.3%	0.0%	17.2%
DG ECHO showed sufficient flexibility in adjusting its approach to changes in the context					
The UN System	48.4%	19.4%	16.1%	12.9%	3.2%
International Organisation	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	62.4%	31.8%	4.7%	0.0%	1.2%
Overall	59.0%	27.9%	7.4%	3.3%	2.5%
DG ECHO should have adopted a more regional approach to its response in the HoA region					
The UN System	25.8%	22.6%	19.4%	12.9%	19.4%
International Organisation	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%
International NGO	28.2%	30.6%	12.9%	9.4%	18.8%

PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/Can't say
Overall	27.9%	28.7%	13.9%	10.7%	18.9%
DG ECHO's response to forced displacement in the region showed sufficient understanding of the differentiated needs of refugees, IDPs, returnees and host communities					
The UN System	58.1%	25.8%	3.2%	6.5%	6.5%
International Organisation	83.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	57.6%	34.1%	2.4%	1.2%	4.7%
Overall	59.0%	31.1%	2.5%	2.5%	4.9%
DG ECHO actively encouraged the consideration of humanitarian principles in the design and delivery of actions					
The UN System	64.5%	32.3%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%
International Organisation	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	84.7%	11.8%	2.4%	0.0%	1.2%
Overall	78.7%	18.0%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%
DG ECHO is a leading humanitarian actor on forced displacement in the region					
The UN System	41.9%	35.5%	12.9%	6.5%	3.2%
International Organisation	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	55.3%	29.4%	2.4%	1.2%	11.8%
Overall	50.8%	32.0%	4.9%	2.5%	9.8%
DG ECHO's intervention contributed to developing durable solutions for forcibly displaced populations (refugees, IDPs, returnees)					
The UN System	29.0%	32.3%	19.4%	6.5%	12.9%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	37.6%	41.2%	11.8%	2.4%	7.1%
Overall	36.1%	37.7%	13.1%	3.3%	9.8%
DG ECHO's response was sufficiently tailored to country level specificities					
The UN System	67.7%	22.6%	6.5%	0.0%	3.2%
International Organisation	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%

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	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/Can't say
International NGO	65.9%	30.6%	2.4%	0.0%	1.2%
Overall	66.4%	27.9%	3.3%	0.0%	2.5%
DG ECHO's response in the region was in line with the Basic Needs Approach (BNA)					
The UN System	58.1%	32.3%	3.2%	3.2%	3.2%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	71.8%	20.0%	4.7%	0.0%	3.5%
Overall	67.2%	23.0%	4.1%	0.8%	4.9%
DG ECHO played a key role in advocating for humanitarian access and space					
The UN System	61.3%	22.6%	0.0%	9.7%	6.5%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	54.1%	28.2%	4.7%	1.2%	11.8%
Overall	55.7%	26.2%	4.1%	3.3%	10.7%

Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 4: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Please tick one box for each row.


4.2.1.1 You said that you agreed DG ECHO's response was guided by humanitarian principles. Can you tell us why this is?

Over a third (35%) of the total 121 respondents highlighted that DG ECHO's actions upheld the humanitarian principle of impartiality by ensuring that actions are not biased toward specific groups or related to vested interests, in addition to not being influenced by governments or other local power-holders. Over a quarter (28%) of respondents stated that DG ECHO upheld the principle of humanity by adopting a needs-based approach towards funding humanitarian actions, the foundations of which are presented in the annual HIPs. A few respondents (7%) indicated that ECHO also played a role in advocating for framework partners and other donors to uphold humanitarian principles in their actions. One respondent stated that that DG ECHO's vocal response to proposals seeming to have breached humanitarian principles has reinforced this effort, by flagging areas which did not align with the principles and making an active effort to change these.

A2.1.3 DG ECHO funded action(s) implemented by your organisation in HoA during 2016-2020

A2.1.3.1 Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment to your action(s) with the following Humanitarian Principles?


Figure 140. Humanity – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 6: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment to your action(s) with the following Humanitarian Principles?

Some respondents who responded "Yes" to the above question elaborated on the fact that in some cases it is not always possible to reach the population in need as they live in locations controlled by armed groups that cannot be accessed by humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the issue of funding was also highlighted. One respondent from an INGO stated that in Somalia the need for humanitarian assistance is significant, however given that the funds allocated are not enough to cover the whole of the in-need population, they are forced to determine which beneficiaries are most in-need.

Figure 141. Neutrality – total and by type of organisation (%)




Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 6: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment to your action(s) with the following Humanitarian Principles?

Some of the challenges faced by respondents in regard to the humanitarian principle of neutrality included the issue of government interference with key components of humanitarian

programmes (i.e. geography, beneficiary targeting); and the issue of not being able to support the in-need population in locations controlled by armed groups, which in some cases could be perceived as humanitarian actors taking sides in conflicts between governments and armed opposition groups.


Figure 142. Impartiality – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 6: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment to your action(s) with the following Humanitarian Principles?

Some respondents stating that they had experienced challenges with impartiality emphasised the issue of government pressure on humanitarian actors to align their assistance with government objectives. One respondent highlighted the challenges faced as a result of DG ECHO's strict requirement to only provide assistance to registered refugees. They stated that whilst they always strive to register all refugees, in some cases this not possible and therefore hinders their ability to fulfil their protection mandate


Figure 143. Independence – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 6: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment to your action(s) with the following Humanitarian Principles?

Respondents answering "Yes" to the above question highlighted the issue of political interference in humanitarian actions, including government interference in coordinating actions in addition to identifying locations and beneficiaries to receive assistance. In these cases it is often difficult to carry out proper needs assessments independent of government objectives.


Figure 144. Experience of challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policy – total (%)




Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122. Question 7: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policies?

Figure 145. Experience of challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policies – by type of organisation (%)


The UN System



International Organisation



International NGO



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 7: Did you encounter any challenges or difficulties in ensuring alignment of DG ECHO's thematic or sectoral policies?

Please briefly explain (if Yes).

Cash and vouchers: Some respondents answering "Yes" to the above question stated that in some cases, market assessments of interventions are often quite broad, thus making it difficult to clearly define a basis for specific cash and voucher transfers (i.e. who to provide cash and vouchers to and for what specific reason). The challenge of beneficiary selection was also highlighted, as in many cases the process of identification of beneficiaries can be complex. Furthermore, one respondent emphasized the issue that in some cases government agreement is needed to provide cash to certain segments of the population, which is not always possible to obtain.

Food assistance: The main challenge posed by respondents regarding the provision of food assistance was that when providing food assistance to some remote areas, it can often be difficult and expensive to transport and distribute the food. Furthermore, one respondent highlighted the lack of clarity regarding DG ECHO's KOI/KRI related to food assistance, which makes it difficult to monitor the progress of certain interventions.

Nutrition: Of the respondents who encountered difficulties, one of the highlighted challenges was the process of targeting of the most vulnerable groups. One respondent stated that this is especially relevant with regards to children under 5 years old, in communities where malnutrition is associated with cultural taboos. Furthermore, the effectiveness of actions related to nutrition can also be hindered by the lack of available supplies in countries where nutritious food is scarce.

Health: One challenge raised by humanitarian actors in the provision of health-related assistance included the fact that in some cases actors have found it difficult to explain to national health authorities their requirement to internationally procure drugs with DG ECHO rather than through the national drugs supply chain.

WASH: The main challenge raised in the implementation of WASH actions was the fact that DG ECHO generally funds emergency WASH activities which are not necessarily sustainable. This often overlooks the consistent high need for water by vulnerable populations. Furthermore, one respondent highlighted that in their experience DG ECHO only funded actions related to health facility based WASH rather than community WASH, which did not alleviate communicable disease spread in community settings and resulted in a strain on health services.

Shelter and settlements: The main challenge highlighted with regard to shelter and settlements was the lack of transparency related to cost-effectiveness parameters detailed in proposals. Several respondents stated that they had had their proposals rejected by DG ECHO without a clear reason as to why beyond budgetary limitations.

EiE: The main issue highlighted in the context of EiE was that there is often limited scope within the project cycle to build recovery and/or resilience. Given that most interventions are of short duration, and sometimes don't cover the full school calendar year, it is difficult to support continuity of access to quality education.


Protection: Respondents experiencing challenges in implementation of actions related to protection highlighted that in some cases cultural barriers can sometimes prevent assistance being fully delivered, especially in project targeting disadvantaged communities such as women and children. One respondent contextualized this in the case of child marriage, where girls become married during their schooling years at the request of their parents.

Table 47. The contribution of DG ECHO-funded action(s) implemented by organisations to objectives – total and by type of organisation (%)

	Fully	To a large extent	To a limited extent	Somewhat	Not at all
Providing sufficient measures for the safe implementation of humanitarian action					
The UN System	6.5%	61.3%	19.4%	12.9%	0.0%
International Organisation	16.7%	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%
International NGO	24.7%	61.2%	9.4%	4.7%	0.0%
Overall	19.7%	60.7%	12.3%	7.4%	0.0%
Development of durable solutions for forcibly displaced populations					
The UN System	3.2%	32.3%	29.0%	22.6%	12.9%
International Organisation	16.7%	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%
International NGO	5.9%	28.2%	44.7%	12.9%	8.2%
Overall	5.7%	29.5%	40.2%	15.6%	9.0%
Alleviation of human suffering (e.g. via meeting basic needs, providing protection services etc.)					
The UN System	22.6%	45.2%	22.6%	9.7%	0.0%
International Organisation	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	37.6%	49.4%	8.2%	3.5%	1.2%
Overall	34.4%	47.5%	12.3%	4.9%	0.8%
Protection of human lives (e.g. via provision of life saving assistance)					
The UN System	22.6%	51.6%	19.4%	6.5%	0.0%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	45.9%	41.2%	7.1%	4.7%	1.2%
Overall	40.2%	42.6%	11.5%	4.9%	0.8%
Building resilience of affected populations					
The UN System	0.0%	35.5%	38.7%	9.7%	16.1%
International Organisation	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%
International NGO	5.9%	40.0%	44.7%	9.4%	0.0%
Overall	5.7%	39.3%	41.0%	9.8%	4.1%

Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 8: To what extent did DG ECHO-funded action(s) implemented by your organisation contribute to the following objectives?

Table 48. Inclusion of advocacy components in action(s) – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 9: Did your action(s) include any advocacy components?

A2.1.3.2 Please briefly describe the objectives and nature of the advocacy components included in your action?

Responses to this question included:

- Non-intervention in forced return programmes
- Children's rights and protection
- Right to education for FDPs
- Promotion of efficient and sustainable approaches to the provision of safe water
- Strengthening the capacity of humanitarian actors and communities to influence policy making
- Contingency planning for disasters
- Conflict mitigation
- Access to government protection services for POC
- Development and adoption of minimum expenditure baskets (MEBs)
- Data collection for evidence-based programming
- Environmental protection
- Creation of durable solutions for IDPs
- Provision of legal assistance to vulnerable groups
- Promotion and respect of IHL
- Advocacy of cash and voucher-based initiatives

A2.1.3.3 If there were any significant outcomes of the advocacy activities (e.g. changes in policy / practice / behaviour or attitudes of authorities), please describe them briefly.


Responses to this question included:

- Provision of legal aid to vulnerable groups

- Engagement of armed forces and groups, and release and reintegration of children
- Increased awareness of children's rights
- Increases in EiE funding
- Creation of standards on the use of hybrid solar powered water supply systems to increase sustainable water access to refugees
- Increased enrolment of vulnerable groups and better student retention in schools
- Measures to end child military recruitment
- Change in attitudes towards the importance of linking humanitarian assistance towards longer-term assistance, and the importance of social protection for the population as a whole
- Increased provision of assistance to beneficiaries in urban areas
- Increased use of cash and vouchers amongst humanitarian actors


A2.1.4 The use of cash transfers

Figure 146. Provision of cash to beneficiaries through action – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 12: Did your action provide cash transfers to beneficiaries?

Figure 147. Contribution of the use of cash transfers to meeting beneficiaries' basic needs – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 75; n = 11 (The UN System), n = 4 (International Organisation), n = 60 (International NGO). Question 13: To what extent did the use of cash transfers contribute to meeting beneficiaries' basic needs?

A2.1.4.1 What are the three most important lessons learned from the use of cash transfers by your organisation in the HoA region?

Responses included the following main points:

- Cash dignifies and empowers beneficiaries by giving them more agency and flexibility over their spending decisions, especially when targeted towards women. This tends to lead to a better coverage of needs.
- Needs are too high in relation to funding
- Cash transfers need to be able to respond to changing needs context
- It is important to coordinate the value and timing of the transfer so that it is most effective for beneficiaries
- It is important to engage all household members in cash related activities to reduce conflict over who receives which resources
- A proper analysis of the MEB adjusted for inflation and exchange rate fluctuations is important to ensure that transfer is adequate
- Cash provision should be targeted based on needs-based criteria and be informed by market assessments
- Cash is an efficient modality with which to distribute humanitarian assistance, even in difficult contexts, and is very effective at responding to emergencies
- Cash transfers should be accompanied with medium term actions, which contribute towards building resilience and development among the targeted communities as well
- Cash programmes need to be designed using a community-led approach, with well-developed and explained targeting criteria, and available support with the administrative process for beneficiaries (e.g. bank accounts, ID verification etc.)
- Cash transfers must always be delivered using systems and/or mechanisms that prevent any misuse or security issues, ensuring protection to the most vulnerable beneficiaries such as women and the elderly

- Co-ordination with other partners or cash groups operating in the area is essential to ensure that cash transfers are not duplicated
- The delivery of cash in remote locations which have no mobile money services can be challenging as it increases the costs of delivery


Table 49. Cash transfers: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of organisation (%)

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/ Can't say
DG ECHO supported innovative solutions to meet the needs of the forcibly displaced populations					
The UN System	25.8%	48.4%	3.2%	9.7%	12.9%
International Organisation	50.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	34.1%	45.9%	4.7%	1.2%	14.1%
Overall	32.8%	45.9%	4.1%	3.3%	13.9%
DG ECHO engaged with partners in moving forward the cash agenda in the HoA region					
The UN System	32.3%	19.4%	3.2%	0.0%	45.2%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	57.6%	21.2%	3.5%	2.4%	15.3%
Overall	50.8%	20.5%	3.3%	1.6%	23.8%

Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 15: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

4.2.2 Efficiency of DG ECHO funded action

Figure 148. Appropriateness and proportionality of the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO – total and by type of organisation (%)




Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 16: Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO appropriate and proportionate to what the action(s) were meant to achieve?

A2.1.4.2 Please explain the reason for your answer and what could be improved/ done differently going forward

Many respondents highlighted the fact that in general the funds provided by DG ECHO are not enough to cover all needs, especially against the backdrop of changing humanitarian contexts. One respondent stated that although the use of crisis modifiers provides the option for some expansion and flexibility in planning, the uncertainty around DG ECHO's budget allocations means budgets often fall short of what is required.

Figure 149. Efficiency and/or cost-effectiveness of projects and activities carried out with DG ECHO's support compared to other activities carried out – total and by type of organisation (%)



Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 18: Were the project and activities carried out with DG ECHO's support in HoA more efficient and/or cost effective as compared to other activities carried out by your organisation in other similar settings elsewhere?

A2.1.4.3 Please briefly explain your response

Those who agreed that DG ECHO support in HoA resulted in an increase in cost effectiveness/efficiency emphasized that this was due to DG ECHO's strict VfM calculation regarding humanitarian activities; the high degree of flexibility of ECHO allows the implementing body to adapt its intervention to evolving needs; and the strong needs analysis and community engagement in the design of programmes.

Those who disagreed that DG ECHO support in HoA resulted in an increase in cost effectiveness/efficiency highlighted that as humanitarian actors they apply the same cost allocation and budgeting procedure for all the projects implemented in one country, thus making all of their activities similarly as cost efficient/effective; and the fact that efficiency and cost-effectiveness is very subjective to the operational context, as well as the availability of complementary funding to bring impact to scale.

4.2.3 Added value of DG ECHO's support

Table 50. What would have been the likely consequence(s) for your action if your organisation had not received DG ECHO funding? Total and by type of organisation (%)

	Total	The UN System	International Organisation	International NGO
<i>The action would have gone ahead unchanged with funding from an alternative source(s)</i>	6%	19%	17%	0%
<i>The action would have gone ahead, but with a reduced scale or a different scope</i>	45%	61%	17%	41%
<i>The action would have gone ahead, but with a delay</i>	14%	13%	17%	14%
<i>We would have abandoned or delayed other activities to be able to implement this action</i>	18%	26%	0%	16%
<i>Other (please specify)</i>	11%	10%	0%	13%
<i>The action would not have gone ahead at all</i>	25%	3%	50%	32%

Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 20: What would have been the likely consequence(s) for your action if your organisation had not received DG ECHO funding?

Other (please specify)

Respondents choosing other stated that had DG ECHO not provided support, this would have limited the scope of the intervention in terms of beneficiaries, priority sectors, and location. Furthermore, another impact is that humanitarian actors would have tried to find funding from different sources.

Table 51. What were the specificities or distinguishing features of DG ECHO's intervention in the HoA region? Total and by type of organisation (%)

	Total	The UN System	International Organisation	International NGO
<i>Scale of funding</i>	32%	23%	50%	34%
<i>Consistency of funding</i>	57%	45%	33%	64%

	Total	The UN System	International Organisation	International NGO
<i>DG ECHO's approach, particularly its focus on the Basic Needs Approach</i>	69%	58%	50%	74%
<i>DG ECHO's field presence</i>	57%	39%	67%	64%
<i>DG ECHO's independence and impartiality</i>	46%	45%	17%	48%
<i>Other (please specify)</i>	7%	16%	0%	4%
<i>None of these</i>	2%	6%	0%	1%

Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 21: What were the specificities or distinguishing features of DG ECHO's intervention in the HoA region?

Other (please specify)

Those selecting "Other" highlighted the following:

- DG ECHO's advocacy role
- The flexibility of DG ECHO's working approach
- Support from centralized DG ECHO staff

A2.1.5 Coordination and complementarity

Table 52. Coordination and complementarity: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of organisation (%)

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/ Can't say
<i>DG ECHO's response complemented the actions of other donors in the region, i.e. it filled gaps and avoided overlaps</i>					
The UN System	58.1%	19.4%	3.2%	12.9%	6.5%
International Organisation	50.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	65.9%	24.7%	2.4%	0.0%	7.1%
Overall	63.1%	23.8%	2.5%	3.3%	7.4%
<i>DG ECHO's humanitarian response in HoA promoted synergies with development and peace initiatives in the region</i>					

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	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/ Can't say
The UN System	22.6%	38.7%	6.5%	6.5%	25.8%
International Organisation	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	28.2%	42.4%	9.4%	1.2%	18.8%
Overall	27.0%	41.0%	8.2%	2.5%	21.3%
DG ECHO encouraged or facilitated agencies programming cash to apply a harmonised approach with regard to targeting criteria					
The UN System	29.0%	32.3%	6.5%	0.0%	32.3%
International Organisation	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%
International NGO	61.2%	20.0%	3.5%	0.0%	15.3%
Overall	51.6%	22.1%	4.1%	0.0%	22.1%
DG ECHO played a key role in developing and sharing best practice with relevant actors					
The UN System	32.3%	38.7%	12.9%	12.9%	3.2%
International Organisation	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
International NGO	35.3%	42.4%	10.6%	2.4%	9.4%
Overall	36.1%	39.3%	10.7%	4.9%	9.0%
DG ECHO encouraged our organisation to cooperate and coordinate with relevant government institutions, humanitarian and development actors					
The UN System	61.3%	19.4%	3.2%	12.9%	3.2%
International Organisation	66.7%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
International NGO	67.1%	25.9%	4.7%	0.0%	2.4%
Overall	65.6%	23.8%	4.9%	3.3%	2.5%

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	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/ Can't say
DG ECHO played an important role in making sure that humanitarian and development actors coordinated their efforts to develop durable solutions for the forcibly displaced					
The UN System	16.1%	48.4%	9.7%	19.4%	6.5%
International Organisation	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%
International NGO	30.6%	41.2%	16.5%	1.2%	10.6%
Overall	28.7%	41.8%	13.9%	5.7%	9.8%
DG ECHO encouraged or facilitated agencies programming cash to apply a harmonised approach with regard to transfer size					
The UN System	19.4%	29.0%	6.5%	0.0%	45.2%
International Organisation	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
International NGO	52.9%	22.4%	2.4%	1.2%	21.2%
Overall	43.4%	23.8%	3.3%	0.8%	28.7%
DG ECHO encouraged or facilitated agencies programming cash to apply a harmonised approach with regard to cash distribution (e.g. modality and frequency)					
The UN System	22.6%	22.6%	3.2%	0.0%	51.6%
International Organisation	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
International NGO	54.1%	24.7%	1.2%	1.2%	18.8%
Overall	45.1%	23.8%	1.6%	0.8%	28.7%
DG ECHO played an important role in making sure that relevant humanitarian actors in HoA worked together in sharing analysis of the humanitarian situation and needs					
The UN System	45.2%	29.0%	3.2%	16.1%	6.5%
International Organisation	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%

PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

	Agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Disagree	Don't know/ Can't say
International NGO	50.6%	32.9%	7.1%	0.0%	9.4%
Overall	49.2%	31.1%	5.7%	4.1%	9.8%
DG ECHO-supported cash transfer programmes explored and developed synergies with national safety net programmes					
The UN System	29.0%	22.6%	3.2%	6.5%	38.7%
International Organisation	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%
International NGO	42.4%	21.2%	5.9%	1.2%	29.4%
Overall	38.5%	20.5%	4.9%	2.5%	33.6%

Source: HoA Framework Partners Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 122; n = 31 (The UN System), n = 6 (International Organisation), n = 85 (International NGO). Question 22: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

A2.1.5.1 *If you have any other comments on DG ECHO's response in the HoA region, please add these here*

Further comments on DG ECHO's response in HoA included:

- The decision making and discussion process for country-level funding were not always driven by the on-the-ground needs at country level
- DG ECHO is the first responder when there is an emergency crisis by provided funding quickly or allowing ongoing project activities to realign their objectives
- The support of ECHO in complex emergency responses is very valuable because of the technical level and support of its field staff, the very principled approach, and the leadership and advocacy to shape the response and focus on covering most important gaps.
- More flexibility, increased multi-year funding and less cumbersome and more streamlined reporting could be encouraged to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of DG ECHO funded projects
- DG ECHO could consider scaling up the financing of protection interventions, especially child protection in emergencies, as there is still a lack of community-based protection systems.

Annex 3. Case study: multi-purpose cash

The case study on multi-purpose cash transfers explored:

- The operationalisation of multi-purpose cash transfers taking into account the specificities of each country.
- Factors affecting the take-up, effectiveness, and efficiency of cash transfers, and
- Referrals between the different interventions / levels of assistance.

A3.1 Key findings

Multi-purpose cash received 7% of total funding (73 M Euros), while in-kind assistance decreased. From 2017 onwards, DG ECHO promoted MPC as the preferred modality of assistance. Coordination among Framework partners gradually improved, with expert support.

Refugee policies in all HOA countries were guided by the CRRF, particularly in Uganda, a pilot country.

The operationalisation of MPC was most successful in Somalia, where mobile money transfers helped to reach beneficiaries in remote and insecure areas.

In Ethiopia, Framework and Implementing partners were faced with the technical challenges of service provision in the less accessible areas, where the majority of forcibly displaced persons were hosted, as well as by government reluctance to assist conflict related IDPs.

In Uganda, the national refugee response framework set out the strategic approach. In 2018, the government together with WFP, UNHCR and donor representatives, drew up a joint plan of action promoting transparency and accountability of the refugee response.

Vulnerability criteria and limited national resources remained obstacles to linking humanitarian MPC for refugees to long-term safety nets. In Uganda, conditionality (participation in public works) and low coverage impeded the integration of refugees.

Most forcibly displaced people in Somalia were IDPs. The World Bank and the EU funded safety nets for vulnerable host populations. DG ECHO and development partners considered piloting a shock responsive safety net component, including the possibility of expanded safety net coverage targeting IDPs during crises.

A3.2 Background

During the period under review, the 2013 cash policy was being used, while a new policy was being drafted. In 2021 DG ECHO updated its policy on cash transfers⁵³⁹ with a new 'Thematic policy on cash transfers'.⁵⁴⁰ The document provides operational guidance on humanitarian cash assistance. The cash policy also contain a "Large Scale Cash Guidance Note" applicable to programmes with cash amounts equal or above 10 million euros.

The cash policy framework is built on "cumulative EU commitments and experience", referring to the Grand Bargain (2016), and to the "Joint Donor Statement on humanitarian cash transfers" (2019). The new policy evolved based on emerging evidence from evaluations and consulting

⁵³⁹ DG ECHO, March 2022. Thematic Policy Document No 3 - Cash Transfers. Available online https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/sectoral/thematic_policy_document_no_3_cash_transfers_en.pdf

⁵⁴⁰ Replacing the previous 2013 version.

between 2015-2020 and promotes unconditional/unrestricted cash transfers, with a preference for cash compared to vouchers. It incorporates existing sectoral and cross cutting policies, targeting the most vulnerable. Digitisation is favoured as a safe and secure means of transfer. Cash is also seen as a tool facilitating the Nexus, building links with social protection (shock-responsiveness), and as a catalyst of innovation. As part of its Basic Needs Approach, DG ECHO encourages the use of MPC and encourage Framework partners to work in close collaboration on risk analysis, targeting, referrals and monitoring.

The new cash policy restates the requirement to reach effectiveness and efficiency in all funded actions. Accordingly, to enhance their effectiveness, project proposals must include an assessment of the appropriateness of the transfer modality before starting. And in order to measure the efficiency of transactions ECHO has been using the Total Cost Transfer Ratio (TCTR) since 2017.⁵⁴¹ For programmes above 10 million euros, at least 85% of any funds should go directly to beneficiaries.⁵⁴²

A3.3 Ethiopia

A3.3.1 Background

Ethiopia had a growing population of more than 112 million people (2019) with a per capita annual income of \$850. It is predominantly agricultural with more than 80% of the population living in rural areas. The country aims to become a middle-income country by 2025.

Ethiopia's population growth put an increasing pressure on land resources, expanding environmental degradation, and raising vulnerability to food shortages in a worsening climate. The country faced significant food security challenges. The 2020 Humanitarian Development Plan (HRP) reported that an estimated 8 million people required food assistance.

In addition to natural disasters, resource-based and ethnic conflicts caused large internal displacement in areas along the northern and eastern border, and in the south-west. The most recent civil war occurred in and around the northern Tigray region at the end of 2020.

Ethiopia is also home to a large refugee population, hosting over 750,000 registered refugees from Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.

While COVID 19 impacted the broader economy, Ethiopia experienced the worst locust invasion in decades in 2020. All this weakened the currency and fed inflation. Official statistics showed the rising cost of basic consumer goods, on average around a quarter more expensive in July 2021 than a year earlier.

Until 2019, the international humanitarian response, except for the needs of refugees, was guided by the Humanitarian Requirement Document (HRD) based on an annual, government-led assessment, and the Humanitarian Disaster Resilience Plan. In 2020, OCHA led the Humanitarian Needs Overview and Humanitarian Response Plan, which was validated by the government.⁵⁴³

A3.3.2 Operationalisation of multi-purpose cash transfers taking account of country specificities

⁵⁴¹ Which is also elaborated in Annex.4 of the new cash policy

⁵⁴² Guidance to partners funded by the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) to deliver large-scale cash transfers

⁵⁴³ ICF. 2021. Analysis of [DG ECHO HIPs]

Ethiopia, with a functioning economy, and accessible trade and retail, overall provides a suitable basic framework for the delivery of cash.

DG ECHO has been pushing the cash agenda in Ethiopia for more than 10 years, and they were first to adopt cash-based responses to food insecurity, which overall had a good result. They convinced WFP to set up a pilot project (in north Shewa). Conversely, humanitarian cash was also introduced in social safety net programming, but the result was less satisfactory, mostly because of the limitations of the Government-linked bank that was mandated to manage transfers of this kind. DG ECHO and the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office FCDO collaborated on resolving these obstacles, and DG ECHO was influential in setting the donor cash agenda during the evaluation period as a member of the international Donor Cash Forum, with relative success in Ethiopia.

During the evaluation period, cash made up 10% of DG ECHO's funding allocated to Ethiopia, thus representing a significant part of the humanitarian response. In most cases, cash was often not a stand-alone activity, with other support such as food and non-food items, WASH and shelter being provided as well. One stakeholder indicated that MPC could cover around 50 percent of the total household needs, and that the response, which focused on lifesaving, was provided for 3 months.

While DG ECHO overall favoured MPC, they asked organisations to overall prioritise cash and justify the intended modality in their proposals. Framework Partners indicated that they developed their cash strategies based on the situation on the ground and according to context.⁵⁴⁴ Their assessments of markets, security, and local context usually concluded that it constituted the best tool for supporting IDPs. They also consulted with beneficiaries before deciding on modalities for each sector.

When implementing cash, beneficiary selection criteria included gender and other aspects of vulnerability. Security was another important criterion, as banks were not always nearby for beneficiaries. These issues are further discussed below.

The Cash Working Group (CWG), established in Ethiopia in 2016, initially needed strengthening and a Cash Learning Partnership (CALP) advisor was brought in to assist the CWG and encourage the adoption of a more streamlined approach. Whilst the coordination and administration of the CWG improved, and several tools were developed to streamline approaches, partners struggled to agree on the transfer size. DG ECHO participated in the development of tools and regularly consulted with the CWG on key decisions.

DG ECHO mostly supported (funded) MPCT, but other elements such as protection and gender were part of the cross-cutting agenda, although cash for protection-related assistance was minimal according to some stakeholders.⁵⁴⁵ IPC classification and sector needs, such as WASH, were included in needs assessments, as well as environmental concerns.

DG ECHO recommended post distribution monitoring (PDM) of MPCT use. The PDM also checked whether cash use was aligned with the needs, priorities, and preferences of beneficiaries. It

⁵⁴⁴ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. d4

⁵⁴⁵ ICF.2021. Field Interview no. a4

showed that cash was mainly used for food, suggesting that the it may have been insufficient to cover other needs, e.g., school uniforms and debt repayments.

As part of the People in Need's action, IDPs were receiving 3 rounds of cash, and typically there was no exit strategy other than an intention to transition beneficiaries into longer term development actions where these existed, as most IDPs had no return opportunity. The money was enough for the proposed intervention to assist IDPs. But host populations often experienced similar levels of vulnerability to IDPs.

The Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) assessments were challenging due to variations between regional states. Partners were requested to harmonise the MEB assessments between them. However, not all had the capacity to undertake such assessments and for this reason they were only conducted in priority areas. In addition, they were further constrained by changing degrees of access (example: Tigray).

There were no serious problems in implementing the (2013) EU thematic cash policy, although the suggested decision trees were not used in practice, and those consulted found that the questionnaires were too cumbersome to fill in. Framework partners found the support from the cash experts from the ECHO Nairobi office helpful. They reported that DG ECHO's key results indicators (KRIs) were very clear, easy to use and applicable to the cash programmes in Ethiopia. However, they would benefit from the inclusion of more qualitative aspects to allow the submission of data that would improve the quality of programming.

A3.3.3 Take-up, effectiveness, and efficiency of cash transfers

As indicated above, for sectoral and conditional cash, beneficiary selection was based on gender and other aspects of vulnerability. However, those consulted as part of the field mission agreed that given the huge needs, and the wide range of vulnerabilities, inevitably some vulnerable people were excluded from this form of support. Some claimed that because DG ECHO funding was used largely to support food security objectives, some non-food security sectors remained under-funded (with the possible exception of protection, the monitoring of which is conducted by cluster lead agencies).

From a payment perspective, mobile money was a new development in Ethiopia, and not yet widely used for cash transfers. As such, banks were used in many cases, although they were often inconvenient for beneficiaries as they were located far from where recipients were staying. A few NGOs successfully negotiated with key suppliers/banks to move cash to a closer location for distribution and while this could be challenging, private banks were willing to participate as they were given access to a "hard" currency.

Another obstacle influencing take-up was that many beneficiaries had no ID documents and were thus unable to open a bank account. In some cases, NGOs were able to provide administrative support to beneficiaries to open bank accounts.

Whilst many outcome indicator targets were not fully achieved, most projects did reach the anticipated number of beneficiaries. Other indicators, for example those related to increase dietary scores, imply support until the situation changes, which is often longer than the usual three-month duration of MPC assistance.

MPC was overall considered to offer more opportunities for improving resilience than other forms of assistance. [An example mentioned was Jiga in the Somali region, where refugees were able to set up small businesses and grow their own food. Sectoral cash transfers were said to be less suitable for resilience building than MPC, because sectoral cash can only be used for a single purpose. On the other hand, it is possible that the effect of MPC assistance on food security was somewhat diluted as people could use cash for other urgent needs such as WASH, shelter, healthcare.

The adequacy of transfers was jeopardised when the number of IDPs increased, and budgets were insufficient to cover the needs of all vulnerable households. According to one Framework partner,⁵⁴⁶ one solution was to identify locations that received the least support from other sources and within these locations, prioritise the most vulnerable groups of beneficiaries.

NGO representatives highlighted that the imposed public official restrictions on assistance to IDPs meant that they had less control over targeting MPC to IDPs than to refugees. This not only influenced the effectiveness of cash, but also put the humanitarian principles at risk, in particular that of neutrality.

Initially, when DG ECHO started rolling out cash in Ethiopia (2012), it was not cost-effective, but the cost-to-transfer ratio gradually improved over time, as programmes expanded and Framework partners gained more experience.

Advocacy

Views on the effectiveness of ECHO's advocacy efforts were varied. Some saw it as a 'leader among the donor-community in pushing the protection agenda', while others saw it as an organisation that was 'more keen on lecturing rather than solving problems' and 'vocal in a confrontational manner'.

Stakeholders in Ethiopia all agreed that advocacy was a difficult activity, first because it was not entirely clear who to target, and secondly, because no one wanted to "dig their heels in vis-à-vis the Government". Indeed, some particularly outspoken NGOs were prohibited from working in the country, by the Government, particularly since the outbreak of war in the Tigray region. One stakeholder noted that DG ECHO 'had no interface with the government', hence its 'public and confrontational manner'. A UNICEF interviewee suggested a new approach to advocacy which would go beyond common messaging, to rather prioritise an understanding of 'when and how to speak up and at what level'.

Stakeholders interviewed could not identify any instances where policies or practices had been adapted following DG ECHO's advocacy, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of these efforts

There was general agreement that advocacy efforts did have a higher chance of success if the activities focussed on a more local (rather than central) level, and that increased empowerment of clusters, local CSOs, and stakeholders to perform this role was needed.

Framework partners also actively engaged in advocacy. UNICEF continually sought to keep protection on the Government's agenda, while ICRC focussed advocacy on various sectors of the

⁵⁴⁶ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. d4

humanitarian response in the country, through its multi-layered engagements with various stakeholders and through its participation in cluster coordination meetings at various levels.

A3.3.4 Referrals

Cash transfers were used for refugees and IDPs, who were not integrated into safety nets. During the period under evaluation, DG ECHO sought to create stronger linkages to the safety nets, focusing on the possibility to integrate MPC recipients into these.

As part of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), a government-managed programme for the general population supported by the World Bank and funded by the EU and several Member States, a document on integrating cash and food security was produced. DG ECHO sought to support the programme, but was not included in the donor group for the PSNP, although DG INTPA was. DG ECHO was aware of INTPA's financial engagements on IDPs and refugees, but collaboration was limited.

Decisions on targeting of MPC for IDPs were guided by the relevant government authority. This had a negative effect on the potential for sectoral referrals by humanitarian partners. UNHCR remained the overall coordinating agency for refugees, working with the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA).

A3.3.5 Nexus

Throughout the evaluation period, DG ECHO sought to link cash actions to the triple nexus, but encountered several challenges. First, donors including DG ECHO disagreed with the government's approach to returning IDPs, as this was not in accordance with IASC guidelines on voluntary movements, and therefore were reluctant to become involved in the politicisation of the actions.

Second, the nexus to social protection was limited, as inclusion in safety nets was only possible for non-displaced disaster-affected populations. The EU, over time, donated around 300 million euro to the PSNP, which provided cash-for-work for vulnerable families. The long term orientation of the programme is to achieve a sustainable, government-led and implemented programme of basic social protection, beyond crisis interventions. Inclusion criteria were based on household needs assessment. Some families "graduated" to follow up activities, i.e., employment-generating or –supporting activities. DG ECHO approached INTPA with the intention of linking humanitarian cash programmes to these initiatives. However, technical issues, such as DG ECHO using vulnerability criteria addressing acute humanitarian needs for targeting, while the PSNP used standardised benchmarks, limited opportunities for collaboration. According to a development partner,⁵⁴⁷ cash-based humanitarian programming was a utilitarian issue (in the sense of reducing donor transaction costs, increasing transparency, providing flexibility).

Sometimes, however, humanitarian aid recipients could be transferred to the PSNP from humanitarian food assistance. This only worked for villages where no displacement occurred, when food assistance had been ongoing for 3 years. But the results were limited.

In 2019, the GoE and the durable solutions group began working on legislative, policy and operational measures, aiming to align all actors amongst themselves, and with the Government,

⁵⁴⁷ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. b5

to develop and implement durable solutions. The humanitarian and resilience donor group (HRDG) was also involved in policy development. Covid-19 and the new conflict in Tigray however negatively affected the process.

A3.4 Uganda

A3.4.1 Background

Uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soil, regular rainfall, substantial reserves of recoverable oil, and small deposits of copper, gold, and other minerals. Oil revenues and taxes are expected to grow as a larger source of government funding as oil production starts in the next three to 10 years.

Uganda's real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 2.9% in 2020, less than half the growth recorded in 2019, mostly due to the effects of COVID-19. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, structural transformation was driving a decline in poverty, despite a slowdown in average economic growth over the last decade. The transformation was characterised by a reduction in the total workforce employed in agriculture and a take-off in industrial production, largely in agro-processing.

Uganda faces numerous challenges including explosive population growth (3% per annum), power and infrastructure constraints, corruption, underdeveloped democratic institutions, and human rights deficits. Although the country produces more food than it consumes, poor people remain highly vulnerable to shocks, as seen in the temporary rise in poverty following the 2016/17 drought. Undernutrition is high and stunting affects 29% of children in Uganda aged 5 years and below.

Uganda hosts a large refugee population, representing around 1.4 million persons, having almost tripled since mid-2016 due to the instability in South Sudan. This placed significant pressure on existing amenities and strained the delivery of services in host communities. The Government gives refugees plots of land (400 m²) to cultivate. As numbers grow, these plots become gradually smaller.

A3.4.2 Operationalisation of multi-purpose cash transfers taking account of country specificities

During the evaluation period, cash made up 29% of DG ECHO's funding allocated to Uganda, thus representing a significant part of the humanitarian response.

The types of cash assistance used were unconditional MPCT and one-off NFI. Transfers methods were mobile bank (cash distribution from a truck), mobile money (phone), and card (debit card presented to a banking agent). MPCT mostly relied on Agency Banking with cash cards and direct cash distribution. Refugees, especially women, had relatively low mobile phone ownership, and network coverage in some settlements was insufficient. Beneficiaries had access to feedback and complaints mechanisms, including a telephone-based system.

The cash agenda was accelerated in 2017, when the refugee influx increased from South Sudan, and later from the DRC. With a functioning economy, Uganda provided a conducive environment for cash-based programming. In 2017, WFP set up a steering group on cash with USAID, the UK and DG ECHO to strengthen dialogue among donors.

In 2017, DG ECHO funded a joint vulnerability assessment to refine the targeting of food assistance to the population, independent from their status in host districts.^{548 549} The report argued that a blanket approach to assisting both refugees and host population would be the most rational response, as both groups had similar needs. The authorities rejected the study findings and recommendations.

DG ECHO (co)-funded another study in 2018 to further understand vulnerability in socio-economic and protection terms. The study was conducted by REACH in partnership with UNHCR.⁵⁵⁰ The results showed that 90 percent of refugees were extremely vulnerable. Therefore, targeting remained complex. The study also found high levels of (undifferentiated)

disability. Looking at geographical differences, refugees in the West-Nile region were more vulnerable than those in the South-West.

As resources were constrained and new arrivals further increased in 2019-20, the amount distributed per household covered a smaller proportion of basic food needs. Coordination mechanisms existed, yet coordination of cash assistance remained difficult due to price variations. The Cash Working Group (CWG), established in 2016 for implementing agencies and partners, allowed for exchanges of information at national level. The Uganda Cash Consortium, an ECHO funded consortium of NGOs, was active in five of the 14 settlements. The consortium targeted the most economically vulnerable ten percent of households in each settlement to top up food assistance with sectoral cash transfers for EIE, shelter and WASH . Cash management committees existed at settlement level and included beneficiary representation.

There was no single unified database for humanitarian cash assistance. The UNHCR (ProGres) database of refugees (and asylum seekers) identified the most vulnerable from a protection viewpoint. The critical issue was the referral system being initially hampered by data protection and confidentiality requirements. During the period under evaluation, attempts were made to better integrate the (UNHCR) database into the cash system and to allow for data sharing, by signed agreements between the partners.

A3.4.3 Take-up, effectiveness, and efficiency of cash transfers

Upon their arrival in Uganda, refugees were registered and entitled to three months of food assistance in kind. Thereafter, beneficiaries received cash for food. The effectiveness of the assistance was monitored (Food Security and Nutrition Assessments), which included food consumption scores and dietary diversity and CSI. In 2020, following Covid-19 restrictions and reduction of food assistance, the food security situation deteriorated with all refugee settlements in Uganda moving to IPC Phase 3 (from IPC Phase2+)⁵⁵¹ and thus, in need of urgent food assistance. By late 2020, due to Covid-19 induced increase of beneficiary numbers, the amount of MPC⁵⁵² was further reduced from 70% of basic needs (MEB) to 60%.⁵⁵³

⁵⁴⁸ ICF. 2021. Field interview. Uganda.

⁵⁴⁹ WFP Uganda Country Brief, July 2017 - Uganda | ReliefWeb

⁵⁵⁰ UNHCR, REACH. Uganda Joint Multi-Sector Needs Assessment. August 2018.

⁵⁵¹ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is a set of standardised tools used to classify the severity of food insecurity using a five-phase scale, that is, Minimal (IPC Phase 1), Stressed (IPC Phase 2), Crisis (IPC Phase 3), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe or Famine (IPC Phase 5). Further information available [here](#)

⁵⁵² MPC was based on the MEB, estimating households' own ability to cover 35 percent basic needs.

⁵⁵³ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

81.56% of the estimated total direct eligible costs (excluding transfer and implementation cost) was allocated to cash transfers to beneficiaries.⁵⁵⁴ Over the period of evaluation, project implementation costs increased due to higher financial service provider costs, Covid-19, and increasing distribution costs, according to another Framework partner.⁵⁵⁵

A3.4.4 Referrals between the different interventions / levels of assistance

The Framework and Implementing partners consulted stressed that the BNA facilitated linking humanitarian assistance to development and national social protection systems, by identifying and addressing priority sectors, with synergies and referrals between NGO consortia.⁵⁵⁶

In 2018, following allegations of corruption and fraud concerning the inflation of refugee numbers, the Government of Uganda (GoU), UNHCR, WFP and donors representing the UK, EU, and US, drew up a one-year Joint Plan for Action to address financial and protection-related risks in the refugee response. This included actions for the registration of refugees and the administration of assistance, to improve transparency and accountability, and ensure a more effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. A biometric verification exercise confirmed 1.15 million refugees who were in the previous refugee information management system, i.e. a decrease of 25% from the previous 1.4 million registered, due to double-counting and movements within and outside the country. The plan also streamlined procedures in beneficiary identification and logistics.⁵⁵⁷

An initial bottle neck for referrals at settlement level was the lack of a shared, accessible database. Data-sharing agreements were subsequently signed to access the UNHCR database, which contains activity information.

Links with social protection

In Uganda, social protection was at an early stage. People living in rural areas of Karamoja, a region with chronic environmental problems, were included in conditional safety nets (food for work). A few opportunities existed to link refugees to safety nets, such as the externally funded (Danish funding) safety nets in the West Nile region (Arua), using nutrition of women and children as the entry point, which had been extended to refugees. Other efforts to integrate refugees into the social protection system, to move them from short-term humanitarian assistance to longer-term support were less successful.

A3.5 Somalia

A3.5.1 Background

In Somalia close to 70% of the population lived below the poverty line in 2019. The highest proportion were people living in IDP camps (estimated to be 88%) followed by rural areas (75%) and urban areas at 67%⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁴ ICF. 2021. Project mapping (70 projects)

⁵⁵⁵ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no e2

⁵⁵⁶ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

⁵⁵⁷ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

⁵⁵⁸ IGAD. Somalia Country Programming Paper. 2019-2024.

Frequent and intense shocks related to conflict, climate, and economics created disruption in the majority of households from loss of human lives, as well as huge losses of livestock and crop failures. Approximately three million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2020. Every major drought caused a significant drop-out of households from pastoralism.

Despite these challenges, Somalia demonstrated progress and improving economic resilience largely through the relative vibrancy of its private sector. The country's GDP has shown modest growth in the last few decades, now estimated at between 3 and 4% with significant capital inflow from its diaspora.

4.2.4 Operationalisation of multi-purpose cash transfers taking account of country specificities

During the evaluation period, cash made up 44% of DG ECHO's funding allocated to Somalia, thus representing a significant part of the humanitarian response.

Before 2011 ECHO did not have any cash transfer programmes in the country, whilst by mid-2017, half of its budget was spent on cash assistance, given that in particular electronic cash transfers were considered to be preferable given staff security and access concerns. Markets overall functioned relatively well, despite some occasional disturbances due to internal conflict. When there was no other alternative, in-kind food aid assistance could be made available.

Prior to determining cash as a transfer modality, relevant Framework partners consulted with the government and the communities concerned, and a market assessment and surveys were conducted to check the feasibility and appropriateness of using cash. These established the following key factors for selecting cash: delivery options and existing infrastructure, coverage, effectiveness, resilience, cost effectiveness and timeliness, security risks and corrective measures, impacts on local economy and market and acceptability of the targeted vulnerabilities.

DG ECHO encouraged and funded the formation of the Cash Alliance, made up of the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Danish Refugee Council, Save the Children, Concern Worldwide, and Cooperazione Internazionale and, at a later stage, Forcier Consulting, which is now the NGO Cash Consortium. They worked together with relevant UN agencies to further elaborate the cash programme. Cash-based interventions were well aligned with the new DG ECHO policy on cash.

The geographical targeting of cash was informed by bi-annual food security and nutrition assessments, and DG ECHO generally insisted that only areas which fell into IPC levels 3 or 4 were targeted. Focus group participants reported that the selection of beneficiaries by a community committee was "fair and transparent." The committees responsible for selection were given training on the importance of recognising the way that gender, disability and age could increase a person's vulnerability.

The cash programme used 18 different cash transfer values, corresponding to regions / livelihood zones in Somalia. Food MEB and complete MEBs were also considered separately, which meant that de facto a total of 18 x 2 transfer values were used. To reduce the number of transfer values ECHO and FCDO combined the 18 regions into 3 supra regions based on the full MEB value (\$60 – 85 per month). They hoped that other donors would follow suit. However, USAID had a food security objective and continued using the 'old' food MEB (60% of the full MEB = 80% of the food MEB). Beneficiaries reported that the transfer amounts had been reviewed twice since 2020.

Challenges to operationalising MPCT were mostly related to technical issues and human error. They included, for example, typing errors when sending money to beneficiary numbers, inactive

sim-cards of beneficiaries due to lack of mobile phone ownership, and delays in addressing such errors due to a lack of direct contact between the local mobile company branches and the field teams of Implementing partners. Failed payments first had to be reported to the head office in Nairobi, which held the contract with the mobile company, before they could be addressed, which caused delays of several weeks, thus limiting the beneficiary's ability to address their needs.

Key lessons learnt included:

- Community engagement and awareness should be done early when top-ups were made to ensure early reporting for the beneficiaries not receiving their entitlement.
- Coordination between partner field teams and their country and head offices should be continually strengthened to ease reporting and to address these problems early.
- Creating linkages and contracts between the local mobile company agents and the framework partner's field offices to ease the transfer of services and follow ups for errors.

The introduction of MPCT had been appreciated and commended within the target communities. It had transferred the power of independence to the beneficiaries, empowering their management and budgeting skills in prioritising their needs and addressing them. Interviewees highlighted easy access, use, cost effectiveness and fungibility of cash.

Through the community feedback mechanisms, surveys and monthly monitoring activities, the agency (FP) was able to understand the level of sufficiency of transferred amounts. The action's budget was flexible as several revisions were made to the amounts provided. In addition, the action was flexible in the sense that it had changed from in kind to e-vouchers to mobile money transfers.

It was considered imperative to streamline and harmonise humanitarian cash with other donors (UK, USA).

A3.5.2 Take-up (acceptance), effectiveness, and efficiency of cash transfers

Around 70% of the unconditional and unrestricted MPC was used for food. The remainder went to education, repayment of debts and healthcare. The available cash assistance was not sufficient to address all the basic needs of the beneficiaries, and the transfer value was for example too low to cover needs such as shelter and medical treatment bills. However, some women who participated in the focus group reported being able to save around USD 3.00 per month into a revolving community fund.

Hard evidence on effectiveness of the cash assistance was lacking as the monitoring tools in place did not measure the effects of the different transfer modalities on beneficiaries' food security. DG ECHO commissioned a study on needs analysis and a review of the MEB methodology, to find determine the most appropriate transfer amount. The Framework partners commented that the transfer values were too low, and the budgets insufficient to cover longer timelines and the large communities affected by shocks. Resource limitations meant that only a small proportion of extremely vulnerable persons benefited from MPCT. Some respondents reported bribery attempts from individuals wanting to be enrolled as beneficiaries.

A3.5.3 Referrals between the different interventions / levels of assistance

There was an overall assumption that that linking up people in chronic need of assistance to longer-term programmes would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of both humanitarian and livelihood / development measures. DG ECHO was a leading player in advocating for the establishment of a Shock Responsive safety net system.

Safety nets have indeed, over the last two-three years, been seen as appropriate tools to link humanitarian cash to longer-term initiatives, in certain contexts (i.e. not when crises are acute), as they allow for predictability. During the evaluation period, efforts were made to connect the humanitarian cash interventions to safety nets, and to include a shock-responsive component, to complement the humanitarian assistance.

By 2020, around 10% of the population in need were covered by the safety nets. DG ECHO helped the World Bank and the EU delegation to design and pilot the safety nets, as graduating beneficiaries into these was considered part of DG ECHO's exit strategy. More specifically, DG ECHO worked with the World Bank on the >\$300m Baxnaano Safety Net programme, which focused on rural areas, and the EC supported the SAGAL (social protection) project, which covered urban areas. SAGAL had adopted a geographical focus to targeting, as well as a lifecycle approach (e.g., pregnant women, youth, elderly), whereas Baxnaano used community- based targeting and quarterly transfers of \$20 per month (\$80 per quarter). The Baxnaano (safety net) programme transfer value was also \$20 per month.

One key informant ⁵⁵⁹claimed that the transfer values were “picked out of the air, really driven by the coverage needed.” According to the same source, SAGAL had transformational objectives which could not be achieved with a transfer value of \$20. There were also questions about the unified social register used by Baxnaan, which could not be kept updated as beneficiaries' were concerned about the use of their data.

In spite of considering the safety nets as a possible exit strategy, DG ECHO did not (yet) see their annual caseload reduced since the introduction of Baxnaano. This may in part be explained by the fact that DG ECHO was not involved in targeting decisions. DG ECHO had agreed to fund the shock-responsive components, and DG INTPA and other agencies the developmental safety net component. More coordination was needed in this area, which was mostly hampered by structural issues, such as DG ECHO and other DGs working with different financing calendars and funding modalities.

The Somali Government was strongly involved in the development and implementation of the safety nets. DG ECHO worked with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs on targeting, and with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) on safety nets. UN Agencies and the EU Delegation also supported capacity building of the ministries. Whilst some good progress was made, it was estimated that it would take several years to set up a fully streamlined cash programme linked to longer-term shock-responsive safety nets.

The use of 'universal' beneficiary registration systems, using biometric cards, promoted by WFP and UNHCR, could also be critical in implementing future actions, although this will require capacity building and training of government administrations and other organisations that may be involved in its rollout.

⁵⁵⁹ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

MPC beneficiaries can contact service providers to flag any issues that they may encounter, to obtain a referral to an appropriate organisation. One respondent explained working closely with groups for advocacy and protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) within the target communities to prevent abuse. Other humanitarian issues identified were also referred and linked to the relevant agencies implementing the concerned intervention, so they could be addressed. Coordination with other sectors was assured as part of cluster meetings.

A3.6 Conclusions

Since 2017, unconditional humanitarian multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) were increasingly used in all three case study countries, applying a range of methods, from e-vouchers and bank transfers to mobile phone transfers.

In all countries, the beneficiary targets for MPCT were met, but stakeholders and end beneficiaries, while appreciating the cash modalities made available, all considered that the transfer value was too low to cover all basic needs, and to address all groups in need.

The national context determined the implementation of DG ECHO's exit strategies and efforts to establish a nexus to peace and development. Emerging safety nets with a shock-responsive component opened the possibility for short term MPCT to evolve into longer term and conditional assistance. Government policies were overall aligned with the CRRF, especially in Uganda, but the inclusion of forcibly displaced persons in social services remained incomplete.

In (rural) host areas, education and healthcare services were overstretched or unavailable. The introduction of shock-responsive mechanism was still in a pilot phase in Somalia, a fragile country with many IDPs. In Ethiopia, political arguments against conflict-related internal displacement caused obstacles to the integration of IDPs in the PSNP.

Annex 4. Case study: Triple Nexus and Durable Solution

The case study on the triple nexus explores how humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actors were working together to develop long-term solutions for those forcibly displaced, taking account of local specificities and DG ECHO's strategy/effort in the country displacement

A4.1 Key findings

The focus of the humanitarian-development-peace continuum (nexus) varied between countries and was influenced by events taking place during the evaluation period. The Covid-19 pandemic slowed down economies worldwide, and also hampered the further development of the nexus.

DG ECHO's actions in terms of conflict prevention and resolution concentrated on advocacy for human rights and IHL and obtaining impartial evidence of possible breaches. Peace building became a major issue in Ethiopia as the number of conflict-related IDPs increased.

Successive droughts, severe floods, and a locust invasion, which devastated parts of Ethiopia and Somalia, made resilience-building a more viable action than handing over actions to development partners.

The achievement of durable solutions for forcibly displaced persons was affected by the rapid increase in the number of those who were displaced, both internally and across borders. DG ECHO engaged in the process by supporting and facilitating settlement and integration, particularly for IDPs in Somalia. In Uganda, assistance to host communities and support to social systems (health, education) improved the integration of refugees, most of whom were unable to return to their home country.

A4.2 Background

The concept of "durable solutions" for refugees covers three options: voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement to a third country. For IDPs, the options are sustainable reintegration (voluntary return), sustainable local integration, or sustainable integration in another part of the country.⁵⁶⁰

Large numbers of refugees remain unsettled after many years. Resettlement to a third country is rare, estimated around 1%. IDPs are often faced with a lack of political commitment to find satisfactory solutions.

Consequently, the EU has opted to focus on conditions during displacement, aiming to enhance self-reliance. The European Council requested a coordinated development cooperation approach to forced displacement. Experience from SHARE (Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience) and AGIR (Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative, in the Sahel and West Africa) indicates that resilience strengthening lies in the interface between humanitarian and development. To address the root causes of crisis, longer term sustainable development is needed.

Perceptions around the links between humanitarian and developmental actions have evolved from the linear transition approach embodied in the LRRD (Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development), first quoted in 1996. The model initially relied on exit strategies to move towards development. As it was modified to encompass peacebuilding, a distinction was made between conflict-related crises and natural disasters. In the case of conflict, the emphasis is on linkages, while handing over remains the aim. In areas prone to natural disasters, the focus is on building resilience, moving away from the idea of handing over.

⁵⁶⁰ Commission staff working document 142 final. Lives in Dignity: from aid dependence to self-reliance. Forced displacement and development. 26/04/2016.

It has been recognised that operationalising the Nexus requires that development actors maintain a presence during crises to support resilience and transition to development at an early stage. Root causes of vulnerability and conflict need to be tackled in accordance with peacebuilding and state-building goals. Joint analysis and timely exchange of information are needed. Collective outcomes should be defined in line with the objective to strengthen resilience, participation, livelihoods, and local capacities. Internal and external coordination need to be strengthened and multi-annual planning promoted. Do-no-harm implies that development in fragile contexts needs to be flexible and able to adapt rapidly to a changing environment. National and local ownership needs to be fostered, ensuring disaster risk insurance mechanisms.⁵⁶¹

Successive HIPs for the Horn of Africa between 2016 and 2020 first included a chapter on LRRD (until 2018), and subsequently on the Nexus (2019 and 2020), with information about relevant ongoing development initiatives in each country. There was no specific guidance as to the process of creating linkages at the national or regional level. Prolonged drought and floods, a locust infestation in 2019, and the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, affected the region, influencing economic growth and forced displacement. The global pandemic required unprecedented precautionary measures to enable the continuation of ongoing actions.

A4.3 Ethiopia

- Number of refugees: (UNHCR mid-2021) 785,472 refugees and asylum seekers (most from South Sudan, Somalia, and Eritrea)
- Number of IDPs: (IOM September 2020) 1,846,551 IDPs of which 61% conflict-related; and 1,810,053 returning to 1,294 villages.

The number of IDPs in Ethiopia has rapidly increased from around 600,000 in 2016 (54% conflict related) to around 1.9 million (61% conflict related) by the end of 2020. The precipitated flow of returning IDPs caused serious concern about the voluntary nature of people movements.

Key informants agreed on the strong development potential for Ethiopia, the fastest growing economy in the region,⁵⁶² while pointing out that the Nexus process had stalled. Since the Tigray conflict started (November 2020) violations of IHL by all parties to the conflict led to public confrontation and subsequent reprisals, also targeting humanitarian actors and actions. Development donors suggested that a post-conflict context could create a suitable environment for structural rehabilitation projects to be envisaged in collaboration with the GoE when humanitarian assistance is phased out.

A4.4 Peace Building

Regional peace-building challenges were highlighted concerning refugees, including the weakness and potential conflict of interest of IGAD, which is strongly influenced by the GoE. Without a neutral regional forum to promote a peace dialogue among neighbouring countries, opportunities (for DG ECHO) to act on durable solutions for refugees were limited. Advocacy towards the African Union remained possible, but it had less effect.

The majority of refugees were living in the Tigray region, and in four “emerging regions:” Benishangul-Gumuz, Afar, Gambella and Somali. The “emerging regions” were the least developed regions in the country, with harsh weather conditions and poor infrastructure.⁵⁶³ In the Somali region in east and southeast Ethiopia, some refugees have lived in camps for 20 years.

⁵⁶¹ General Secretariat of the Council. 9417/17 Annex: Operationalising the humanitarian-development nexus. Council conclusions. 19 May 2017.

⁵⁶² World Bank. The World Bank in Ethiopia. Accessed online 06/06/2022.

⁵⁶³ UNHCR, Briefing Note: comprehensive refugee response framework. CRRF Ethiopia. July 2018.

Large-scale internal displacements in 2017-18, due to local territorial ethnic-based conflict and climate shocks (prolonged drought and floods) threatened the balance of coexistence between forcibly displaced people and the host population. While the CRRF received strong donor support at the start, conflict, drought and Covid-19 slowed down the process of refugee integration. DG ECHO provided multi-sectoral funding for the recently displaced and most vulnerable persons. DG ECHO advocacy on behalf of IDPs was limited by the fact that DG ECHO has no direct interface with the government. Framework partners praised DG ECHO for its role in lobbying for IDPs from the conflict in Gedeo and West-Gudji in southwest Ethiopia in 2018.⁵⁶⁴ There was recurrent displacement in some areas in the south. Covid-19 and the 2020 conflict in Tigray affected the Nexus negatively and development stopped in Amhara, Afar and Tigray. While DG ECHO was vocal in denouncing violations of IHL and human rights, there were further reductions of humanitarian access and space. Some framework partners suggested an advocacy strategy, with clear guidance on who should speak up and how, and at what level (national and international).

*A4.4.1 Humanitarian-development coordination*⁵⁶⁵

Efforts to coordinate gradually improved throughout the period under evaluation. DG ECHO supported the cluster system and promoted corrective actions to improve it. Coordination has intensified since the Tigray conflict.

The Ethiopia Humanitarian Country Team (UN agencies, Humanitarian and Resilience Donor Group –[HRDG] representatives, HINGO representatives; ICRC as an observer) is another coordination platform where DG ECHO has a strong influence.

DG ECHO and EU development partners invite each other to meetings, and DG ECHO made presentations to the political/diplomatic section of the delegation (EEAS) about humanitarian questions.

With the objectives of resilience building and increasing the coping capacity of the most vulnerable in 34 drought-prone and food insecure districts, the EU RESET programme (2014-2020), financed a series of converging humanitarian and developmental projects, using financing tools such as HIP, SHARE and EDF.⁵⁶⁶ When collaboration with the Ethiopian government on developmental initiatives (with EDF funding) was suspended in 2017, the EU delegation and DG ECHO set up a Regional Development and Protection Plan (RDPP).⁵⁶⁷ The EU Trust Fund for Africa facilitated linking resilience actions without a need for government involvement.⁵⁶⁸

An example of decision-making based on joint situation analysis was the negative response at the end of 2020 to a government request for structural rehabilitation (schools, hospitals, etc.) in Tigray. The humanitarian-development community agreed at that time that the conflict was not settled, which turned out to be an accurate assessment

A4.4.2 Exit strategies

⁵⁶⁴ ICF. 2021. Field Interview no. 4d

⁵⁶⁵ "In Ethiopia, the (IASC) mission found a need to tighten the linkages between different parts of the coordination architecture to provide better support to the northern Ethiopia response, including by improving the links between the national and regional/local levels, the HCT and inter-cluster, and individual clusters." Source: IASC Operational Policy and Advocacy Group Meeting, Analysis of Peer2Peer Mission Findings, Dec 2020- Oct. 2021, Peer2Peer Support Project, (November 2021).

⁵⁶⁶ ECHO Ethiopia/EU Delegation to Ethiopia, Concert Note: Linking EUs humanitarian and development interventions in the context of resilience building: the case of Ethiopia, 2014.

⁵⁶⁷ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

⁵⁶⁸ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

Exit strategies were constrained by the contextual developments during the period of evaluation, in particular as the conflict-related crises in the northern part of Ethiopia remained unresolved, requiring continuing humanitarian assistance.

The education system was unable to absorb the growing number of children that were out-of-school. DG ECHO involvement in education for forcibly displaced children was considered insufficient. Local capacity in education and protection was low and would have to be gradually built up (CSOs, churches, local NGOs). The GoE has been historically reluctant to allow NGOs in certain sectors (education, protection).

Stakeholders considered that health, WASH and nutrition were stronger sectors. Nutrition could be taken over by primary health care and the community. Regional authorities could potentially assure maintenance of rehabilitated WASH facilities.⁵⁶⁹

A4.4.3 Nexus

Development actors doubted whether DG ECHO had played a major role in the nexus process, pointing out that humanitarian projects had run in parallel to those focusing on development, without their being any direct linkages.⁵⁷⁰ Although cash could be linked to increased resilience (and thus the nexus) through livelihood initiatives, DG ECHO worked with many partners, which meant dispersing the funding. Livelihood assistance was overall said to be lacking.

Humanitarian MPCT was not integrated in the PNSP (a national, government-led initiative funded by the World Bank) and the potential for future integration was low, because the selection criteria are different. DG ECHO field staff did work with the government on a technical level.

While DG ECHO promoted proposals with nexus opportunities, the focus in Ethiopia was primarily on emergency and life-saving assistance. Joint situation assessments and information exchanges took place with development-oriented partners. As mentioned above, the EU Delegation and DG ECHO cooperated on RDPP in terms of project selection, including actions in the areas of social cohesion, livelihoods, protection, capacity building and resettlement. Funding was channelled through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, outside the control of the national government.

The humanitarian budget exceeded development funding during the evaluation period, as the latter was partially stopped. It was difficult to harmonise actions geographically because, according to Framework partners, humanitarian organisations needed to work in conflict and disaster areas, while development actors were more risk averse and development actions could not be implemented in geographic areas in great turmoil.

A4.4.4 Durable solutions

The durable solutions initiative was financed by the Swiss government, and initially attached to the office of the UN humanitarian and resident coordinator. The arrangement has since changed, with the initiative now being undertaken from within the IOM, which de facto meant that its profile has been lowered.

In 2017, Ethiopia accepted to be considered as a CRRF focus country. A roadmap was prepared in 2018, with a national comprehensive refugee response strategy aiming to achieve self-reliance for refugees and host populations by 2027.⁵⁷¹ In 2019, the Government of Ethiopia and the durable solutions working group began working on legislative, policy and operational measures, to align all actors with the Government planning. The Humanitarian Resilience Donors Group (HDRG) was

⁵⁶⁹ ICF.2021. Field Interview n.4c

⁵⁷⁰ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

⁵⁷¹ UNHCR. CRRF Ethiopia Briefing Note. August 2018.

also involved. Whilst much remains to be done, there have been a few government initiatives, such as housing of refugees and IDPs in relocation areas. However, stakeholders noted that the fact that the WG was co-chaired by the government might restrict the decision-making space for UN and donors. They suggested the creation of a “superstructure” of international donor and UN agency representatives to facilitate Nexus discussions.

Managing forced displacement requires collaboration between humanitarian and development actors. Acutely displaced people are a humanitarian priority, whereas protracted displacement, and inflated numbers of urban poor, can be the focus of development programmes. Reintegration in displacement areas is an issue, as well as the return for many IDPs to their areas of origin. The GoE discouraged local settlement of IDPs. For example, humanitarian organisations were not permitted to construct sanitary facilities for newly displaced people. As conflict-related internal displacement increased, DG ECHO slowly changed its focus of action from natural disasters. The 2018 HIP captured the needs of IDPs affected by conflict, and the importance of building resilience by improving living conditions. In 2019 and 2020, building resilience and self-reliance, while strengthening emergency preparedness and response through EWS and ERM, were part of the exit strategy outlined in the HIP.

A4.5 *Uganda*

- Number of refugees: (UNHCR July 2020) 1,428,961
- Number of IDPs: (IDMC Dec.2020) 34,000 of which 1000 conflict-related

There are no programmes targeting voluntary returns of refugees to their respective countries of origin, as the conditions for return are not yet met, except for people from Burundi.

In 2016 there was an accelerated influx of refugees from South Sudan into Uganda, and in 2018 from the DRC. Uganda also hosts refugees from other neighbouring countries. Initially DG ECHO had no active country office in Uganda and the response was managed from Nairobi, but in 2017 the office in Kampala was (re)opened. DG ECHO focused on life-saving interventions to cover basic needs: food and non-food items, health (epidemic preparedness and response), WASH (emergency water supply and sanitation), education in emergencies (EiE), and protection. Up to 2017 all assistance was provided in kind.

As economic growth slowed down during the second half of the previous decade, Uganda remained a low-income country. The northern region, which was affected by prolonged severe drought, also hosts the largest number of refugees. The World Bank financed a safety net for the poorest inhabitants of Karamoja, piloting a shock-responsive component to combat the effect of the drought. Beneficiary entitlements were conditioned by participation in public works, except during Covid-19 lockdown.⁵⁷²

A4.5.1 *CRRF*

The main focus of DG ECHO was on refugees, mainly covering crisis response. Actions integrated the host population as per the Uganda Response Framework that requires all actions to also target 30 percent of host population. Refugees in settlements were provided with a plot of land, that allowed them to settle and engage in subsistence farming. Uganda does not have a health insurance scheme, and the capacity of the national health system is constrained by staff shortages and inadequate infrastructure. Additional health centres built in refugee settings were integrated in the national health system, while support to hospitals targeted existing structures. Education

⁵⁷²ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

and WASH actions also included host beneficiaries, while household assistance such as food and NFI were given to refugees only.

Action targeting refugees were informed by the CRRF, under which refugees are allowed settle in an area, move around the territory and work, and which also provides access to basic social services.

The CRRF has played an important role in that it is centred on an “open door policy” for asylum seekers. It recognises the need for registration and durable solutions. Encouraging self-reliance is one of its pillars. It feeds into Uganda’s National Development Plan, which means that refugees are integrated into national planning and government statistics that inform sectoral plans on jobs, education, health, livelihoods etc. DG ECHO is a permanent member of the CRRF Steering Group. The CRRF Secretariat is within the Uganda Office of the Prime Minister. The national Refugee Response Plan, Settlement Transformation Agenda (STA) and ReHoPE Strategy on self-reliance and empowerment are all aligned with the CRRF.

DG ECHO facilitated and funded the (global) humanitarian initiative REACH to draw up refugee settlement profiles in Uganda, and a multi-sector needs assessment in 2018. The results provided baseline data for the Refugee Response Plan 2018-2020.

The implementation of the Inter-agency Country Refugee Response Plan was started in 2018. The plan provides the guiding document for a coordinated humanitarian response. After two years, the plan was extended into 2021. Sectoral working groups are coordinated through the Refugee Coordination Mechanism, with DG ECHO active at technical level.

The CRRF guides DG ECHO’s nexus programming which represents joined up thinking between DG ECHO and DEVCO (INTPA) as it channels longer term funding to areas where refugees are.⁵⁷³

A4.5.2 Nexus

Uganda is hosting the largest number of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa. The UN regional office for south and east Africa (ROSEA) in Nairobi coordinates humanitarian needs. The nexus process in Uganda benefited from a generous government attitude towards refugees, who are allowed to integrate, thus making investment from development partners easier.

Due to prolonged drought and a simultaneous refugee crisis, developmental and humanitarian actors were active in the same geographical area (Karamoja). In 2016, Karamoja (north Uganda), at risk of recurrent droughts, was included in regional surveillance and resilience programming. A contiguous approach added value to the response, making outcomes more sustainable. The situation changed after the arrival of large numbers of refugees from South Sudan. Karamoja has safety nets for the host population from development donors and the World Bank. DG ECHO supported the Uganda Cash Consortium, which targeted refugees with multi-purpose and sectoral cash. As mentioned above, the provision cash and non-food items (NFI) for refugees was separate from safety net programmes for vulnerable Ugandans.

DG ECHO supported education in refugee camps, through accelerated education centres and additional primary schools, and envisaged to hand over the structures to the national systems as exit strategy, where it could further be supported through development actions. However, this depends heavily on the capacity of the national education system, which due to the various recurrent crises requires strengthening.

Overall, establishing a successful nexus requires coordinated programming, and this can be difficult on the ground despite the expressed will of policy makers. It was not helped by the initial policy to provide “blanket food assistance” for refugees. Whilst there is a movement from

⁵⁷³ ICF. 2021. Field Interviews

categorical targeting to vulnerability-based targeting, discussions around the problem have become resource- based. Currently, upon arrival refugees receive hot meals at reception centres and, once registered, they are given a plot of land and an NFI kit which provides the minimum requirements to set up a household.

It is recognised that livelihoods are important for generating income, as it means that households do not have to be integrated into a social protection scheme. However, interviewees noted that not all refugees had the skills to become a farmer. In addition, they may reside in Kampala and other cities (although the government does not allow registration in secondary cities (other than Kampala), hence livelihoods schemes must be context adapted.

Initially only Ugandan nationals were eligible for insertion into Uganda social protection programmes, but these were later expanded to refugee hosting areas. Under the third National Development Plan refugees should be given access to all national programmes, although in practice this commitment is not operational. Options for linking refugees to regional/national safety nets are limited at present.

A4.5.3 Coordination

There is a good basis for coordination with the Refugee Engagement Forum, created as one of the main channels for the refugee voice in the CRRF coordination structure.

After (re)opening the Kampala office in 2017, ECHO funded UNHCR to ensure WASH coordination (with the relevant Ministry) to ensure linkages with development from the start (national level). ECHO also funded the OXFAM-led consortium on WASH and protection to improve coordination at settlement level. The Uganda Cash Consortium is linked to the EiE Consortium by targeting families with out-of-school children.

A4.5.4 Common Platform & Nexus

The BNA improved coordination because referrals had to be made between sectors, with the intention to ultimately link the humanitarian effort with social protection. DG ECHO 'forced' the issue onto the agenda to some extent, but their approach worked, as currently there are ongoing discussions on linking beneficiaries to Uganda's social protection system.

Whilst there is a recognised need for linking short term humanitarian response with longer term assistance, data protection is an area of concern. At present, WFP has started working on these issues with relevant government departments.

Multi-purpose cash can refer beneficiaries to other programmes, and vice versa. Before 2018, organisations were working in parallel, doing needs assessments only for their own purposes. However, here too data management remains an issue. The original UNHCR data base was not user-friendly and access could not be provided. Now, access to the database is subject to a data sharing agreement.

A4.5.5 Disaster risk reduction, preparedness, response

Uganda is a country prone to natural disasters and communicable disease outbreaks. Regarding disaster preparedness, the capacity for disaster risk management needs further strengthening. Disaster preparedness intends to strengthen the system by training responders as well as improved risk management. DG ECHO played a significant role in Disaster Risk Management. Epidemic preparedness, early response and monitoring were funded in connection with Ebola haemorrhagic fever. During the Covid-19 epidemic, DG ECHO extended its financing, and also included primary healthcare and resilience.

DG ECHO approached resilience in an enabling mode by:

- Providing documentation
- Covering basic needs with financial support and service provision. Mental health and psychological care are examples of support to resilience building after trauma, during the stabilisation phase. The need for people to become self-reliant is acknowledged.
- Paying holistic attention to individuals in need as human beings, respecting each person, aiming to help them to recover their potential.

Funded actions increasingly moved towards a consortium approach, detecting multiple issues and creating referral pathways intra-and inter consortium, for example in the area of protection.

A4.6 *Somalia*

- Number of refugees and asylum seekers: 30,000
- Number of refugee-returnees: 130,000
- Number of IDPs: 2.6 million (source: Somalia Durable Solutions Strategy)
- Add IDPs in Somaliland: 600,000

There are an estimated 700,000 Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya. Today, the refugee camps are better organised than they were previously, and some have existed for decades (example: Dadaab in Kenya). Education in camps is a sector covered with support from the EU delegation.

DG ECHO focus for assistance is on “recently” displaced, defined as displacement within the last four years.

A4.6.1 *Durable Solutions*

Since 2016, there is increased political commitment to Durable Solutions for Displacement Affected Communities (DAC) by federal, and local leadership. Displaced persons in Somalia are mainly (80%) located in accessible urban and peri-urban areas. The Directorate for Durable Solutions is part of the Ministry of Planning, Investment, and Economic Development.⁵⁷⁴ The Norwegian Refugee Council and the Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Somalia support the initiative.

The “Durable Solutions Initiative” (DSI) was launched in 2015, providing a collective framework for government, UN, donors, and NGOs to collaborate in support of the National Development Plan. A total of 90 million USD was invested in the implementation of the initiative between 2016 and 2019. A Durable Solutions Secretariat was set up in 2019, combining 14 government institutions. DSI guides the implementation of the CRRF.

The Theory of Change for the National Durable Solutions Strategy is based on four strategic objectives:

- Protection from eviction,
- Participation in public affairs as full citizens,
- Access to sustainable livelihood and employment, and
- Access to justice.

According to interviewees, acutely displaced people are a humanitarian priority, whereas protracted displacement situations inflate the number of urban poor and should therefore be

⁵⁷⁴ The Federal Government of Somalia, *Somalia, the national durable solutions strategy 2020-2024* (accessed on ReliefWeb, 31/12/2021)

covered by development programmes. However, reintegration in displacement areas is an issue, and many IDPs still are unable to return to their areas of origin.

DG ECHO respondents noted they had successfully implemented and achieved several durable solutions, including:

- Successfully securing land for IDPs (in Galkaio, Garowe, Bosaso and Qardho) through coordination with the government,
- Supporting large numbers of vulnerable groups through vocational skills training to improve their capacity and empower them,
- Contributing to the development of policies concerning vulnerable groups and IDPs through supporting the local government in IDP profiling and technical expertise,.
- Installing sustainable community infrastructures and WASH facilities across various districts,
- Supporting and facilitating the safe return of IDPs to their original homelands, and supporting them with relief and cash assistance.

A4.6.2 Coordination

Coordination is ensured through the Donor Group on Social Protection, and humanitarian donor group exchanges.

A4.6.3 Sustainability, cash, and safety nets

The Somali Government is strongly involved in the various programmes. DG ECHO works on the vulnerability aspects of targeting with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, and with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MOLSA) on the design of shock responsive safety nets. WFP, the EU, and UNICEF are also building ministerial capacity. Discussions on programme design and transfer values are ongoing. The EU delegation and DG ECHO have co-chaired the donor working group on cash from 2017 onwards. DG ECHO is progressively leaving the lead to the EU Delegation.

With EUTF funding, DG ECHO and partners are running a pilot to link humanitarian cash to shock responsive components integrated into social safety net programming..

Safety nets have grown over the last 2-3 years, with the potential of linking humanitarian cash to long-term initiatives. By 2020, around 10% of the population were covered. DG ECHO, the World Bank and the EU delegation collaborated on the design of these safety nets.

SAGAL is the social transfer component of the EU Trust Fund's "Inclusive Local Economic Development" (ILED) programme. It mainly focuses on urban areas, and it takes a life cycle approach, targeting pregnant women, the elderly, youth etc. The "Baxnaano" Safety Net programme (World Bank, supported by the EU) focuses on rural communities with quarterly transfers of 80 (US?) dollars.

The ECHO viewpoint is that humanitarian cash must be streamlined and harmonised among donors. Safety nets provide a predictable, longer-term approach which is overall suitable for protracted crises, provided there is some degree of stability. By connecting humanitarian cash programmes with safety net which include a shock-responsive component, cash recipients can gradually transition into livelihoods and/or resilience programmes for IDPs and refugees, thus ensuring a nexus to development and providing an exit strategy for DG ECHO.

Exit strategies for WASH relied on community ownership for maintenance, and on government administration. Adherence to the "do-no-harm" principles reportedly prevented disputes and conflict.

However, limited access to education and health services in their country of origin constitutes a major obstacle to return for many Somali refugees abroad. Education has been a priority of DG ECHO in the past 4 years, and education in emergencies received a high budget, but during the period under evaluation, it was not possible to establish a connection to longer-term solutions with the government, or with development actors (including the EU Delegation / DG INTPA).

A4.6.4 Nexus

The “Joint Resilience Action” between UN agencies (2018-2022), co-funded by DG ECHO, targets the same households with responses to varying needs.

A task force to promote the operationalisation of the nexus was established in 2020. A discussion paper proposed a steering committee comprising relevant ministries, OCHA, the RH/HC, the World Bank, and donor and NGO representatives.

Somalia lacks any type of population register or national ID system, and the civil registry is poorly functioning. Apart from limited government initiatives, WFP, UNOPS and UNICEF have registration systems in place, but their coverage is low, and there is no interoperability .

The level of inactivity (no enrolment in education or labour force) is high among refugees, IDPs and returnees.

One of the main unresolved problems for DG ECHO is to determine how shock-responsive safety nets can be scaled up to include more beneficiaries.

ECHO sought to make links with safety net programmes through Baxnaano and the Sagal programmes, by funding research into how the latter could help the humanitarian effort. Targeting is one area. Sagal works in 18 Districts and has a shock responsive component in 3 Districts. There is a technical committee in each district, that makes the case for allocation of shock responsive resources. Generally, the trigger for release is multi-hazard, not a single threat trigger.

The EU Trust Fund provides the main mechanism for Nexus programming – under the auspices of ‘durable solutions.’

UNHCR advocates for the inclusion of all IDPs into the National Development Plan – including into social protection systems. .

Fault lines exist between development and humanitarian assistance, making joint programming towards a nexus complicated at operational level. However, DG ECHO and the development partners in the EU are better placed to bridge programmes to create resilience (source: interview USAID).

A4.6.5 Disaster preparedness

Disaster preparedness and prevention of displacement are especially related to natural disasters.

Floods are increasing in frequency and severity. A flood and water management task force has been set up including humanitarian and development donors and stakeholders. DG ECHO is trying to get more involvement from the Delegation and other actors, as well as acute support for immediate response. Development donors can assist with preparedness, prevention, and mitigation.

A4.7 Regional approach

The regional perspective in the Horn of Africa overall has not been strong, whilst some opportunities existed to adopt regional approaches:

- *Refugee policies* are an obvious domain for regional reflections and solutions, however, not enough has been done in this area.
- *Desert locust infestations*: since 2019 DG ECHO, together with FAO, successfully tackled the problem at a regional level, using the ALERT tool for funding.
- *Migration management* also offers some potential for collaboration, including with Yemen and Saudi Arabia. For the past two years, DG ECHO has covered the topic of migration from Nairobi, together with IOM. The problem is overwhelming, considering the high levels of clandestine migration, as illustrated by the forced return of tens of thousands of Ethiopians from Saudi Arabia. While essential, the regional approach to migration is not yet well-developed or managed.
- *Cross-border water management*, including floods. The amount of rainfall and management of the dams in eastern Ethiopia have a direct influence on the flooding levels on the Shabelle and Juba rivers in Somalia. Water management also requires a developmental perspective.

A4.8 Conclusions

DG ECHO advocated for protection of conflict-displaced people from forced return. They were instrumental in restoring access to humanitarian assistance and contributed to EU peace building efforts in Ethiopia.

Durable solutions for refugees required a regional inter-governmental approach. DG ECHO was supportive of the African Union. Liaison with partners in development, and with government-led programmes, was promising in Somalia, and to some extent in Uganda. As a pilot country hosting 1.4 million refugees, Uganda aligned its national development plan with the CRRF. In Ethiopia, DG ECHO contributed to EUTF financing for programmes targeting refugees and host communities with the RDDP strengthening protection, livelihoods, and local capacity.

Building resilience to natural disasters such as prolonged drought and floods was an ongoing challenge. DG ECHO and partners contributed to early warning and response systems, and food security and nutrition monitoring, averting drought-related famine in Somalia in 2017. EU funding supported IGAD and the initiative on drought, disaster resilience and sustainability.

Annex 5. DG ECHO-ICRC Case studies

A5.1 Introduction

This document presents the main findings from the two case studies undertaken as part of the evaluation of DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross. The report is structured as follows:

- **Section 1** presents an overview of the objectives of the case studies and methodologies used to collect data;
- **Section 2** provides an overview of the mission to the Middle East region and the main findings from the case study on the implementation of the Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot (Grand Bargain PPP);
- **Section 3** provides an overview of the mission to Colombia and the main findings from the case study on the Triple Nexus;

A5.1.1 Case study objectives

The case study is used to generate an in-depth, multi-faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context. Two case studies were carried out to explore the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership. The case studies were conducted in countries of operation in the Middle East and Latin American regions through a remote consultation approach. The topics were selected during the inception stage and agreed with DG ECHO and ICRC. The following two thematic areas were explored:

1. The implementation of the Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East region (see section 2);
2. The Triple Nexus in Colombia (see section 3).

The objectives of the case studies are:

- To analyse the collaborative relationship between DG ECHO and the ICRC, in these select countries;
- To explore specific aspects of the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership in selected countries;
- To complement the information gathered through the previous phases of the evaluation with more in-depth evidence;

A5.1.2 Methodological approach

Semi-structured interviews were carried out to complement other data collection activities. The evaluation team consulted with a wide range of stakeholders, mostly from DG ECHO and the ICRC, at various levels (see Table 1). Due to the Covid-19 restrictions and based on recent experience of conducting fieldwork, the two case studies were carried out through a fully remote approach.

The interviews focused on different research issues/aspects, reflecting the experience and insights of the different stakeholders interviewed and aimed to complement data collected as part of the Desk phase. More specifically, the interviews were carried out to:

- Support our understanding of DG ECHO-ICRC partnership, including elements relating to strategic dialogue, communication, coordination, and the alignment of priorities and objectives;
- Outline the lessons learned, success factors, gaps and areas for improvement in the partnership with regard to the Grand Bargain PPP and the Triple Nexus in Colombia;
- Specific topic guides were designed for each stakeholder groups.

- Table provides an overview of the interviews carried out. Interviews were carried over the video platforms (Zoom, Microsoft Teams and Skype).

Table 53. Overview of stakeholders consulted

Stakeholder	Consulted
DG ECHO	12
ICRC	16
Other donors: BPRM SDC	2

In coordination with DG ECHO and ICRC, it was decided at inception stage that the case studies should mainly focus on ICRC and DG ECHO stakeholders, to maximise the opportunity to learn and gather data from the people directly involved with the Grand Bargain PPP and Triple Nexus in Colombia. This is due to the fact that other external stakeholders have a limited knowledge, for example, of the mechanisms and operationalisation of the Grand Bargain PPP, so the added value of interviewing them was very limited.

Findings from the interviews were analysed, synthesised and triangulated with other sources of information to feed into the Final report of the evaluation.

A5.2 Case study I: Implementation of the Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot (Grand Bargain PPP) in the Middle East region

A5.2.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken

The case study aimed at exploring the implementation of the Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East region. The three-year Grand Bargain PPP in the Middle East (2018, 2019, 2020) stems from DG ECHO and ICRC's willingness to concretely implement the Grand Bargain commitments. The Grand Bargain PPP was developed in six countries of the Middle East Region - Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon - with an annual budget of €75 million. After consultations with DG ECHO and ICRC, the objective of this research exercise has been to identify the lessons learned and the positive/ negative effects that the implementation of the Grand Bargain PPP has generated. In particular, DG ECHO was interested in better understanding the operational challenges for DG ECHO's officers in the field and the ICRC in general.

A5.2.1.1 Methodology

The case study made use of primary and secondary data collection methods:

- The evaluation team designed an interview questionnaire which included open questions adapted to the role and organisation of the interviewee, as well as some cross-cutting control questions for all participants. Table 54 provides a snapshot of the consultations conducted during the mission in the Middle East region;
- Additional data has been collected from public and internal ICRC and DG ECHO documents such as the reports of the two technical workshops organised in the framework of this Pilot Programme, interim reports, lessons learnt exercises and various monitoring reports as well as inputs from both field and HQ personnel from both organisations. Documents extracted from the Grand Bargain Official website⁵⁷⁵ have also been consulted as well as

⁵⁷⁵ IASC. The Grand. Bargain (Official website). Available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain>

key documents such as the HPG ODI Independent Review,⁵⁷⁶ the Grand Bargain 2.0 Framework,⁵⁷⁷ the foundational shared Commitments⁵⁷⁸ and the CHA Grand Bargain 2.0 launch event.⁵⁷⁹

Table 54. Consultations conducted

Stakeholder type	Number of interviewees	Positions.
DG ECHO HQ	3	Regional, Partnership
DG ECHO Field Offices	4	Middle East
ICRC HQ	4	REM, Near and Middle East (NAME) regional unit.
ICRC Delegations	9	At Head of Delegation or Deputy Head of Delegation level

A5.2.1.2 Challenges encountered

Apart from the limitations brought by the Covid-19 emergency, there were no significant challenges encountered throughout the implementation of the case studies. Despite a high turnover in both DG ECHO and the ICRC since the period 2018-2020, a sufficient number of key interlocutors who participated in the pilot project was identified.

However, the fact that the ICRC's operational, financial and fundraising mechanisms are highly compartmentalised made it difficult to find interlocutors within the ICRC who were informed and could provide input on all three areas at the same time. This meant that, for example, an ICRC officer who was familiar with budgetary aspects did not have the necessary knowledge of the Grand Bargain PPP's operating mechanisms and vice versa, therefore not being able to provide views on the project as a whole. Conversely, DG ECHO's TAs provided a more comprehensive view of the Grand Bargain PPP impact on their work. Both DG ECHO and the ICRC showed great interest in following up on the pilot experience to improve future projects under the Grand Bargain.

A5.2.2 Background

A5.2.2.1 Key background elements of the Grand Bargain and the Grand Bargain PPP

Under the auspices of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in Istanbul in May 2016, representatives of 18 donor countries and 16 international aid organisations from the United Nations, international Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (RCRCM) agreed on a 'Grand Bargain', a unique agreement outlining 51 commitments aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of international humanitarian aid.⁵⁸⁰

⁵⁷⁶ ODI. 2021. The Grand Bargain at five years An independent review. Available at: <https://odi.org/en/publications/the-grand-bargain-at-five-years-an-independent-review>.

⁵⁷⁷ IASAC. 2021. The Grand Bargain 2.0 Endorsed framework and annexes. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/grand-bargain-20-endorsed-framework-and-annexes-june-2021#:~:text=The%20Grand%20Bargain%202.0%20Framework,%20Accountability%20and%20inclusion%2C%204>.

⁵⁷⁸ IASAC. 2016. The Grand Bargain— A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need Istanbul. Available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain/grand-bargain-shared-commitment-better-serve-people-need-2016>.

⁵⁷⁹ Centre for Humanitarian Action. 2021. The GB 2.0 and new dynamics for humanitarian reform. Available at: <https://www.chaberlin.org/en/event/the-grand-bargain-2-0-and-new-dynamics-for-humanitarian-reform-2/>.

⁵⁸⁰ Currently 64 Signatories (25 Member States, 23 NGOs, 12 UN agencies, two Red Cross movements, and two inter-governmental organisations) are working across workstreams to implement the commitments. The workstreams are described in table 3. See: IASAC.

In January 2018, DG ECHO and ICRC launched a two-year pilot project (Grand Bargain PPP) encompassing a wide range of ICRC operations in six countries in the Middle East Region, notably in Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon. With an additional third year agreed in early 2020, the action came to an end on 31 December 2020, amounting to €175 million over the three years period.

The objective of this pilot project was “to yield mutual benefits in terms of effectiveness of the humanitarian response, efficiency in the use of funds, better accountability and enhanced coordination in the region”⁵⁸¹ in line with the Grand Bargain commitments.

Following the completion of the pilot project, DG ECHO has developed multi-annual agreements with other partners, which do not necessarily follow the same format as the Grand Bargain PPP with the ICRC. There has been no further extension of the Grand Bargain PPP with the ICRC, nor there is any intention from both sides at the moment of repeating the experience in the same terms and/or in the Middle East area. In the inception phase of the current partnership evaluation, both the ICRC and DG ECHO stated that the interest of the exercise was to understand, in its totality, the impacts of the Grand Bargain PPP experience in both organisations’ working modalities. As a consequence, it was not considered a priority to evaluate specific mechanisms of the pilot project which were not considered representative of the partnership.

A5.2.3 Key findings from the case study

The objectives of the Grand Bargain PPP were fully aligned with the “Grand Bargain workstreams” agreed in Istanbul by over 30 donors, agencies, and humanitarian actors.

Table 3 presents the summary goals of the Istanbul document, as well as the progress reported by the signatories as assessed by HPG-ODI. The last column highlights the DG ECHO-ICRC pilot project’s goals and the correspondence with the overall Grand Bargain workflows. The table shows that the Grand Bargain PPP objectives were clearly aligned with the overall objectives of the Grand Bargain. The extent to which these objectives were achieved is partially assessed in the sections below.

Table 55. Summary goals of the Istanbul document

Original workstreams Grand Bargain 2016 Istanbul	Commitments under the Grand Bargain	ODI HPG Independent review	Pilot project ICRC DG ECHO ⁵⁸²
Greater transparency	Identifying and implementing a shared open-data standard and common digital platform which will enhance transparency and decision-making”	“The International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), was not well-understood by many signatories at the time and, as has become clear, publishing financial data to this standard requires technical capacities or investments that are simply beyond some signatories”	Better accountability was one of the pilot projects considerations.

2016. The Grand Bargain– A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need Istanbul. Available at: <https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/grand-bargain/grand-bargain-shared-commitment-better-serve-people-need-2016>.

⁵⁸¹ Lessons Learned DG ECHO – ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Programme (2018-2020)

⁵⁸² Lessons Learned DG ECHO – ICRC Grand Bargain Pilot Programme (2018-2020); and ICF. 2021. Filed interviews.

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Scaling-up of cash programmes	Donors and aid organisations commit to routinely consider cash when evaluating response options and some donors may wish to scale up significantly.	“The Grand Bargain has had significant success in relation to many of the commitments on this theme – from engaging local partners to securing agreements on better tracking and monitoring of cash programming.”	There were no particular provisions in the pilot project regarding enhancement of cash programs. Cash projects are part of the Economical Security ICRC Strategy and regularly implemented by ICRC in its programs, when appropriate. Cash is also fully supported by DG ECHO.
Harmonised reporting to reduce bureaucracy	Reduce duplication and management costs to increase the proportion of funding used for the direct benefit of affected people.	Was central to the overarching aim of the Grand Bargain to increase efficiency and effectiveness but has perhaps been the most disappointing area of the Grand Bargain’s work. This workstream was disadvantaged from the outset by the inclusion of a shopping list of commitments	The Pilot Project aimed at reducing bureaucracy. See below.
Improve joint and impartial needs assessments	Provide a single, and comprehensive assessment of needs for each crisis Coordinate and streamline data collection Share needs assessment	Coordinated needs assessments and increased coordination with local responders as well as with development actors.	No particular provision was found in this regard, although there is an objective of improving coordination on the ground.
Enhance participation.	Include people receiving aid in making the decisions which affect their lives.	This workstream has been hampered by a lack of collective political interest from signatories and has failed to deliver on the original ambitions of a ‘revolution’. There has evidently been a lot of activity at institutional and to some degree at collective level. But much of this seems to have	No particular provision was found in this regard.

		focused on engaging with affected populations for information purposes	
Multi-annual funding and reduced earmarking	Increase collaborative humanitarian multi-year planning and funding	There has not yet been a substantive system-wide shift in the funding landscape.	The Grand Bargain PPP introduced multi-year funding in the ECHO- ICRC partnership as well as a reduced earmarking.

The design and implementation of the Grand Bargain PPP were carried out through a top-down approach. The evidence shows that greater participation from the field at design stage would have made it possible to better exploit the potential of the Grand Bargain PPP.

ICRC and DG ECHO interviewees, at headquarters and in the field, pointed out that the Grand Bargain PPP was a top-down decision agreed, in principle, at the DG ECHO Commissioner and ICRC General Direction level. There was insufficient or no consultation with the field or, in some cases, with the management level at HQ. The Grand Bargain PPP was perceived by many stakeholders within ICRC and DG ECHO as the result of political commitments that did not necessarily respond to the realities on the ground.

The lack of internal discussions was particularly highlighted by the staff in charge of implementing the pilot project, particularly within DG ECHO. The lack of consultation concerned, in particular, the opportunity to influence the selection of recipient countries. DG ECHO officers indicated that, in some countries, the level of funding to the ICRC was not in line with DG ECHO's country strategy and that the funds distributed under the Grand Bargain PPP were not complementary to the budget portfolio of each country. The funds were committed without consulting the field officers, affecting their ability to manage the budget distribution for the other partners under the HIPs, particularly in the first year.

The Grand Bargain PPP partially contributed to making operations more effective and efficient by improving the predictability of funds and strengthening regional approaches.

The Grand Bargain PPP represented the first contract between DG ECHO and ICRC involving multi-year funding (2018, 2019 and 2020). The Grand Bargain PPP amounted to €175 million for the three-year period. Table 4 presents a comparison of DG ECHO funding for the ICRC at the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region level and at the global level, before the Grand Bargain PPP (2016 and 2017) and during the Grand Bargain PPP.

Table 56. MENA, Grand Bargain and global ECHO funding to the ICRC, in Euros

Year	Israel & Occupied territories	Iraq	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria	Yemen	Grand Total MENA region	Total DG ECHO Funding to the ICRC globally	Total DG ECHO Funding to the ICRC without MENA region
2016	6,500,000	18,000,000	2,000,000	0	25,000,000	10,000,000	61,500,000	177,022,500	115,522,500

PART B : EVALUATION OF DG ECHO'S PARTNERSHIP WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2016-2020

2017	3,000,000	8,000,000	0	0	31,300,000	9,100,000	51,400,000	88,506,812	37,106,812
2018	14,000,000	4,000,000	2,000,000	6,000,000	31,000,000	5,500,000	62,500,000	139,866,243	77,366,243
2019	5,000,000	4,000,000	2,000,000	6,000,000	31,000,000	14,500,000	62,500,000	119,800,000	57,300,000
2020	5,000,000	4,310,934	1,000,000	3,000,000	31,000,000	7,000,000	51,310,934	112,470,000	61,159,066

Source: ICF, Inception report

A substantial amount (45%)⁵⁸³ of the global DG ECHO funding to the ICRC in the period 2016-2020 has been allocated to the MENA region. In 2018, the Grand Bargain PPP confirmed the interest of DG ECHO in financing the ICRC in the region, as can be seen in the table above. According to the consultations held, **ICRC staff valued the financial support very positively, but was hoping that the Grand Bargain PPP would have triggered an increased DG ECHO support to the global operations.** As shown in Table 4, while the funding for the MENA region has increased, the global funding has decreased if compared to the global figures of 2016. According to ICRC stakeholders, the Grand Bargain might have negatively affected the expected financial support from DG ECHO at global level.

According to ICRC, Grand Bargain PPP instalments were received earlier if compared to other DG ECHO funding mechanisms (e.g. HIPs), which was beneficial for the treasury. In 2018, ICRC received an 80% advance payment of €62.5 million, while €62.5 million were received in March in 2019 and €50 million in April 2020. The payment modalities were particularly appreciated by ICRC stakeholders, resulting in a better quality of funding.

The rationale behind the pilot project was that multi-year funding and a simplified grant management (one regional contract) would provide greater predictability and flexibility to use the funds across country's envelopes. This new funding modality was supposed to enhance efficiency and effectiveness together, as it would allow ICRC to react in a timely manner to the humanitarian crises. The Grand Bargain PPP ensured less earmarking to the funding, allowing ICRC to shift funds between different contexts so as to react to changing needs and operational circumstances. According to the ICRC interviewees, **the Grand Bargain PPP has empowered and supported the ICRC to be more agile and flexible to respond in a timely manner to the needs of the affected populations.** A clear example of this flexibility was the option activated in the first year of the pilot (in red in table 2), when the ICRC requested to reallocate €9 million from Yemen operations into Israel/OT. According to ICRC, this made it possible to respond to the unmet needs of the underfunded operation in the Occupied Territories (which went from 3 million euros in 2017 to 14 million euros in 2018).

On the other hand, DG ECHO do not see this experience so positively in terms of effectiveness. **DG ECHO recognises that, in principle, the more flexible the funding is, the better it is for the partner's work and therefore for the people in need. However, there is not always a causal connection between flexibility and timely response to armed conflict and crises.** In the case of Yemen-Israel/OT, DG ECHO allocated funds to Yemen precisely to respond to the humanitarian crises, whereas the ICRC used the flexibility provided by the Grand Bargain PPP to support operations in an underfunded context that, according to DG ECHO interviewees, did not constitute a priority of DG ECHO at that time. Therefore, flexibility among sectors could limit the ability of DG ECHO to design and support coherent humanitarian strategies and projects tailored to the context and to the identified sectorial priorities. For example, ICRC's support to Detention activities in Palestine, was reported to be not aligned with DG ECHO's sectorial priorities.

⁵⁸³ Average for the period 2016-2020.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the shift of funds from Yemen to Israel/OT was approved by DG ECHO.

For the ICRC, the clear advantage of the Grand Bargain PPP in terms of effectiveness is having a significant guaranteed funding over time. This has allowed ICRC to implement, in a multi-annual continuity, the planned programmes. Evidence shows, however, that the positive impacts of increased financial forecasting are better perceived at headquarters (e.g. ICRC Resource Mobilization Division - REM) than in the delegations. This is due to the fact that budget management in ICRC is strongly centralised, and that the delegations do not manage fundraising directly. This also explains that, at delegation level, ICRC's perception is that the Grand Bargain PPP did not produce significant changes, positives or negative, in the way of working or with regard to the effectiveness of operations.

Nevertheless, considering that ICRC's strategy to keep a long-term presence in conflict prone settings is not only based on the need to fulfil its mandate in terms of dissemination of IHL, the longer-term funding also empowers effectiveness, and particularly allows to:

- Maintain a constant and solid structure in vulnerable countries regardless of the fluctuation and the level of the crises;
- Keep a long-term presence, which reinforces a better understanding of the needs and also allows creating the required degree of trust with national stakeholders to operate in times of acute crises;
- Assess and respond to needs independently and impartially;
- Not limit operations to a particular community or area in the country (as might happen with funding lines earmarked geographically).

The Grand Bargain PPP did not produce relevant reductions in terms of administrative burden or human resources.

The multiyear, multi-country project implemented by the partners allowed to have only one contract instead of 18 (six contracts/contexts x 3 years), hence reducing the administrative burden for ICRC at HQ level, but not necessarily the volume of reporting. According to DG ECHO interviewees, **the gains in human resource costs through administrative simplification are at least equalled by the additional costs of coordination in both headquarters and the field.** This was particularly the case during the first year of the Grand Bargain PPP due to the fact that no established procedures existed previous to the pilot project.

Evidence also indicates that monitoring and **managing multi-year budgets and operations require a specific structure and changes in the organisation which take time and resources to be implemented.** For example, within its headquarters, DG ECHO established a specific Unit to manage the Grand Bargain PPP and to ensure a proper quality management of this type of contracts. DG ECHO also appointed a regional focal point in its Regional Office in Amman to ensure a smooth coordination of the pilot project. The role of this field focal point has been essential for the proper follow-up and coordination between the six countries, consolidation of contributions for modification requests, interim reports and various briefing requests, and to keep an open and fluent dialogue with HQ and with ICRC across the region.

Conversely, ICRC's architecture did not experience relevant changes for the implementation of the pilot project both at headquarters and in the field. However, several interviewees indicated that, while the ICRC is used to ensure regional understanding of the contexts and operations throughout the regional units at the HQ, the pilot project was the first experience where funding was allocated with a strong regional logic. However, ICRC has limited experience in establishing regional coordination/management positions at the field level. **Regional management or**

coordination positions could have strengthened ICRC's ability to connect with regional stakeholders/ coordination mechanisms and to fully develop the logic behind a regional approach.

The Grand Bargain PPP has not fundamentally transformed the partnership/communication on the ground but has generated positive innovative experiences for better coordination/dialogue and monitoring.

ICRC and DG ECHO agreed on a Grand Bargain PPP monitoring system which was functional at HQ level to reinforce the traditional reporting requirements (single forms), which continued to be used. Country sheets were introduced and used as “living documents” to record the outcome of formal dialogues between the partners at field/country level. They reflected a two pages narrative with the outcomes and activities expected per year per country, however no indicators were provided in the sheets. The regular revision of these documents allowed for a better follow up and for a much closer alignment in terms of programming and strategic orientation. However, according to DG ECHO, the quality of these Country sheets was not homogenous, and their content was not followed up consistently in all the countries. Similarly, some ICRC staff interviewed considered the Country sheets as an additional administrative reporting burden with limited added value.

On the other hand, the Grand Bargain PPP did not introduce fundamental changes to the traditional reporting requirements. According to ICRC, DG ECHO’s reporting tool (Single form) remained too detailed and rigid, and was not adapted to the multi-annual nature of the contract - i.e. reporting annually (with more than one report per year) against the information requirements of the Single form was not considered in line with the purpose of a multi-annual contract. Overall, at the field level, both partners indicated that they did not find notable differences, neither positive nor negative, regarding the reporting mechanisms.

With regard to the quality of reporting, evidence suggests that ICRC’s reporting on the activities covered by the Grand Bargain PPP were above the standards and level of detail compared to other DG ECHO funded projects. DG ECHO recognised the effort made by ICRC in describing the activities performed, with Interim reports providing detailed information, in some cases.⁵⁸⁴ **Nevertheless, the overall quality and detail of reporting was still well below the level of reporting expected by DG ECHO.** In particular: 1) the reports did not provide information on which precise activity DG ECHO funding was spent on and the rationale for it; 2) only a low number of the expected beneficiaries have been reached in some cases and limited explanation was provided on the reasons; 3) the information provided in the Interim report in 2018 did not reflect the transfer of the €9 million from Yemen to Israel/OT, and how these additional funds have been allocated across the different ICRC programmes.

In terms of coordination, most of DG ECHO interviewees considered that the Grand Bargain PPP enhanced the dialogue with ICRC, particularly at field level. One example is the organisation of two regional workshops in Amman, which allowed for fruitful exchanges and for a better operational communication. The partners valued these experiences positively, but saw it as an isolated outcome of the Grand Bargain PPP. At the same time, **both DG ECHO and ICRC recognised that communication and information sharing on the ground relied heavily on personal relationships and not on institutional commitments.** Within this partnership, this is a reality that the Grand Bargain PPP has not changed. DG ECHO particularly remarked the difficulty of engaging in an operational/programming dialogue with ICRC, indicating that, due to the limited information on how ICRC spent DG ECHO funds, they were not in a position to hold technical discussions, as normally happens with other partners. On the other hand, dialogue and exchanges

⁵⁸⁴ DG ECHO internal communication document.

related to more strategical issues, such as the contextual situation, were reinforced under the Grand Bargain PPP.

A5.2.4 Key conclusions

The design of the Grand Bargain PPP adopted a pragmatic approach that allowed DG ECHO and ICRC to advance their commitments as signatories to the Grand Bargain. Evidence shows that the Pilot Project focused on specific actions/commitments that were innovative in the context of the ICRC- DG ECHO partnership - i.e. multi-annual funding and the development of a regional approach. In this sense, there was no ambition to implement the (51+) actions committed to in the Grand Bargain PPP.⁵⁸⁵

However, while the partner's pragmatic approach to start with a Pilot Project was efficient in quickly pushing the Grand Bargain agenda, **it did not allow enough time to develop a common strategy between the partners**, and did not clarify what exact objectives the pilot was intended to achieve in concrete operational terms.

The top-down approach adopted for the conception and operationalisation of the Grand Bargain PPP did not create the necessary sense of ownership at field level, particularly during the first year of implementation, and limited the full development of the expected potential of this new mechanism. In future initiatives, it is recommended to follow an inclusive approach with Headquarters and the field, involving all the relevant units to take into account the definition of operational objectives, strategic elements and operational mechanisms, including reporting.

For the ICRC, the Grand Bargain PPP has not brought fundamental changes or substantial impacts on its programmes or its action mechanisms. The Grand Bargain, the idea of a multi-year fund, is well received and is considered an interesting option for the future at headquarters and operational level, provided that the allocation of resources for the Grand Bargain does not imply less funding at a global level.

The clear advantage of the Grand Bargain in terms of effectiveness is having a significant guaranteed funding over time. This has allowed ICRC to implement in continuity the planned programmes. The ICRC's strategy to keep a long-term presence in conflict prone settings is not only based on the need to fulfil its mandate in terms of prevention of IHL violations, but also empowers the effectiveness of operation.

The Grand Bargain PPP also provided flexibility in the operations at regional level through the possibility of funds transfer between countries, particularly through the ICRC's request to support underfunded operations, which is perfectly in line with the commitments to the Grand Bargain. However, **this funding flexibility made it more difficult for DG ECHO to pursue its own strategy both at regional and a country level.** The Grand Bargain PPP flexibility could substantially alter delicate budgetary balances of country envelops.

For DG ECHO, the Grand Bargain PPP introduced a major cultural transformation experience. In the pilot project, flexibility was positively valued, resulting in the ICRC having more tools to achieve its objectives, which is considered valuable for the target population. However, if DG ECHO loses the ability to steer its funding strategy, its value as a donor could be undermined as it could bring limited influence over where funds are spent and ultimately as a humanitarian actor. This is due, in particular, to the potential loss of influence over the geographic and financial sectors to which aid should be directed.

⁵⁸⁵ Specifically, there has been a concern among the humanitarian community that the Grand Bargain objectives and processes could become a "shopping list of good intentions", difficult to implement, rather than a strategic response to improve efficiency of the humanitarian action. See: ODI. 2021. The Grand Bargain at five years An independent review. Available at: <https://odi.org/en/publications/the-grand-bargain-at-five-years-an-independent-review>.

A5.3 Case study II: The Triple Nexus in Colombia

A5.3.1 Overview of the fieldwork undertaken

Case study II aimed at exploring the extent to which DG ECHO and ICRC were complementary in their approaches to Triple Nexus and what were their combined and individual roles in Colombia. The analysis of the Triple Nexus allowed to explore the roles of DG ECHO and the ICRC in balancing opportunities and tensions in the areas of humanitarian aid, development, and peacebuilding.

A5.3.1.1 Methodology

The case study made use of primary and secondary data collection methods:

- The evaluation team designed an interview questionnaire which included open questions adapted to the role and organisation of the interviewee, as well as some cross-cutting control questions for all participants. Table 57 provides a snapshot of the consultations conducted during the case study;
- Further information to triangulate data has been collected from internal ICRC and DG ECHO documents as well as documents extracted from secondary sources.

Table 57. Consultations conducted

Stakeholder type	Number of interviewees	Positions.
DG ECHO HQ	1	Regional, Partnership
DG ECHO Field Offices	4	Colombia
ICRC HQ	1	REM
ICRC Delegations	2	At Deputy Head of Delegation level
Donors in Bogotá	2	BPRM and SDC

A5.3.2 Background

Internal armed conflict in Colombia has produced around 220,000 casualties, 25,000 missing persons and 8 million displaced persons over the last half century, becoming one of the longest armed conflicts in modern history. A peace process between the government and leaders of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC), the country's largest insurgent group, supposedly halted the violence in 2016. However, despite the country's efforts to continue on the path of development and advance the peace agenda, organisations such as the ICRC have denounced that Colombia continues to suffer from situations of internal armed conflict, with serious humanitarian consequences that need to be addressed.⁵⁸⁶ In relation to the context in Colombia, the case study explored the role of ICRC and DG ECHO in the protracted crisis and how their actions relate to the Triple Nexus key concept and principles.

The Triple Nexus refers to an approach that promotes cooperation between actions in the areas of humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding. It promotes further coordination between

⁵⁸⁶ ICRC. 2018. Cinco conflictos armados en Colombia ¿qué está pasando?. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/es/document/cinco-conflictos-armados-en-colombia-que-esta-pasando>.

various actors working in conflict and crises affected communities and aims to ensure that existing initiatives in fragile situations are complementary. The Triple Nexus is a shared vision in the EU, and DG ECHO has worked to identify synergies between members of the humanitarian, development and peace community in various country contexts.⁵⁸⁷ Nevertheless, critics of the Triple Nexus argue that the approach allows for humanitarian aid operations to be subsumed under political agendas.⁵⁸⁸

The humanitarian-development nexus has constituted a priority both for DG ECHO and for the ICRC at global level and has effectively been integrated in relevant policies and operational tools. The protracted and complex nature of many crises has re-enforced the importance of developing longer-term interventions addressing humanitarian needs as well as development.⁵⁸⁹ The European Commission has translated its response to long-term crises into commensurable commitments and concrete policy initiatives based on the Council of the EU's May 2017 Conclusions on operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus.⁵⁹⁰ DG ECHO has developed specific tools on the matter such as the resilience compendium,⁵⁹¹ through a nexus approach, as a central objective in EU development and humanitarian assistance.

ICRC has also developed a policy framework adapted to operationalise the humanitarian-development nexus or, more precisely, to operationalise a response to the needs in health, protection, food security, etc. with a clear short and long-term focus. For example, an activity such as food distribution, in the view of the ICRC, is one among many other activities which fall under the umbrella of Economic Security, which is defined as 'the ability of individuals, households or communities to cover their essential needs sustainably and with dignity'⁵⁹²— and involves mid to long term planning.

A5.3.3 Key findings from the case study II

Peace is not an ultimate goal for the ICRC, whatever the context.

From the ICRC's perspective, the nexus "looks like a triangle of everything",⁵⁹³ including the prevention of violent conflict and disasters, and the promotion of justice, political stability and peace. The Triple Nexus thus goes beyond the aspirations of the ICRC,⁵⁹⁴ which "emphasises capacity-building, inclusion, resilience, developmental improvements and environmental sustainability but does not set its sights on peace".⁵⁹⁵ For the ICRC, the Triple Nexus is not a programmatic model, but a pool of expertise and influence – outside the humanitarian sphere – which ICRC can leverage to build sustainable humanitarian impact for people affected by armed conflict. In other words, the important part of the "nexus" for the ICRC are the stakeholders

⁵⁸⁷Council of the European Union. 2017. Council Conclusion on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf>.

⁵⁸⁸ ICRC. 2017. Nexus thinking in humanitarian policy: How does everything fit together on the ground?. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nexus-thinking-humanitarian-policy-how-does-everything-fit-together-ground>.

⁵⁸⁹ DG ECHO. Resilience & Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/resilience-and-humanitarian-development-peace-nexus_en

⁵⁹⁰ Council of the European Union. 2017. Council Conclusion on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus. Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf>.

⁵⁹¹ European Commission. EU Resilience Compendium Saving lives and livelihoods. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/resilience/eu_resilience_compendium_en.pdf.

⁵⁹² ICRC. ECOSEC response. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4377_002_Ecosec_response_WEB.pdf

⁵⁹³ ICRC. 2017. Nexus thinking in humanitarian policy: How does everything fit together on the ground?. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nexus-thinking-humanitarian-policy-how-does-everything-fit-together-ground>.

⁵⁹⁴ ICF. 2021. Field interviews.

⁵⁹⁵ ICRC. 2017. Nexus thinking in humanitarian policy: How does everything fit together on the ground?. Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/nexus-thinking-humanitarian-policy-how-does-everything-fit-together-ground>.

behind “development” and “peace”⁵⁹⁶ and how they can help to address the long-term needs and suffering of affected populations.

Evidence shows that DG ECHO does not expect humanitarian partners to implement peace building and there is particularly no push for that on the ICRC.⁵⁹⁷ In particular, partners are expected to incorporate a do-no-harm approach to peacebuilding efforts into their operations. Humanitarian aid on its own does not – and cannot – tackle the complex underlying drivers of conflicts and other crises.⁵⁹⁸

In Colombia, the partnership and collaboration between the two organizations was consistent with the implementation of the Triple Nexus.

Evidence shows a complementarity of approach between the two organisations in Colombia. For example, following the peace agreement, DG ECHO and other humanitarian actors, including OCHA, had difficulties in making the case for the need of a sustained humanitarian assistance. The dominant narrative at the time was that the peace agreement with the FARC in 2019 ended the conflict and provided an environment of peace.⁵⁹⁹ Therefore, most efforts of the Colombian government and international community were aimed at developing the country to capitalise on that opportunity, turning the page on conflict and on humanitarian aid. Conversely, the ICRC advocated that the humanitarian crisis was still a reality in many parts of Colombia, denouncing that the internal armed conflict was still in force, with five active Non International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) in the country. ICRC’s advocacy efforts allowed DG ECHO and OCHA to mobilise the necessary funds to pursue a relevant presence in the country, despite the narrative of development. DG ECHO also conveyed the ICRC concerns to the relevant development stakeholders. Therefore, the combined efforts of the ICRC and DG ECHO allowed to better balance the humanitarian, development and peace pillars in Colombia.

The role of the ICRC was particularly valued by DG ECHO⁶⁰⁰ and is considered to be unique⁶⁰¹ in the Colombian context due to the respect gained by the ICRC from most armed actors, in light of the ICRC’s independence and neutrality. DG ECHO did not perceive the ICRC in Colombia as being a peace actor and did not expect them to engage in the peace agenda or to have a prominent profile in any peace initiative in the country. On the contrary, in Colombia, DG ECHO would like to see the ICRC focussed on its added value related to its mandate towards IHL. ICRC’s access to rural areas under control of non-state armed actors is considered as essential to facilitate humanitarian assistance and protection to the affected communities. For this reason, the operations of the ICRC in urban spaces in Colombia such as Medellín or Bogotá might have a limited contribution to the overall humanitarian needs, which are mostly located in rural areas where state actors, civil society organisations and INGOs have limited or no access. In addition, international partners and national counterparts working in more accessible areas developed a better technical expertise in some sectors like Food Security.⁶⁰²

However, DG ECHO has supported the ICRC in urban areas and in sectors that would not be purely humanitarian, such as education as a proxy to support protection in these communities. In fact, most of the objectives of the ICRC- DG ECHO projects in Colombia in the period under review had

⁵⁹⁶ ICRC. 2019. Donor Support Group. The ICRC’s reflections and experiences regarding the “Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus.

⁵⁹⁷ ICF. 2021. Field interviews.

⁵⁹⁸ Council of the European Union. 2018. Council Conclusions on the Integrated Approach to External Conflicts and Crises. Available at: <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5413-2018-INIT/en/pdf>.

⁵⁹⁹ ICF. 2021. Field interviews.

⁶⁰⁰ ICF. 2021. Field interviews.

⁶⁰¹ ICF. 2021. Field interviews.

⁶⁰² This is not only the case in Colombia, according to the stakeholders interviewed as part of the case studies.

a focus in urban areas - i.e. "Civilians living in underserved neighbourhoods most affected by urban violence, as well as civilians located in conflict-affected rural areas are: 1) protected against the major environmental hazards linked to their living conditions; 2) have increased safety through the recuperation of key community spaces; and, 3) have strengthened their resilience mechanisms."⁶⁰³

Field realities challenged the operationalisation of the double or Triple Nexus - i.e. a sustained support to local communities over decades was not always translated into a significant protective environment.

The ICRC has carried out sustained assistance and protection activities for decades in Colombia with DG ECHO support. Part of its work consisted in supporting local communities and strengthening capacities at the local level, for example, through the construction of school infrastructure, water and sanitation, or EcoSec activities. These efforts, however, have not always translated into capacity development at national or regional level, beyond community impact⁶⁰⁴. Interviewees acknowledged that additional efforts are needed for the ICRC presence to have a transformative impact on the protective environment in the longer term. For example, the support to local schools has not been accompanied by a strategy to support national education, to build capacities at a more structural level, which would have allowed to have a more strategic long-term approach.

Beyond Water and Habitat, EcoSec or Health in Colombia, the central component of ICRC's workload was Protection, including detention activities, dissemination of IHL, and protection of civilian population. On this regard, ICRC has developed a short medium- and long-term approach summarised in "the protection egg framework",⁶⁰⁵ which has been adopted as a model for the centrality of protection. This includes activities such as: 1) responsive actions in connection with an emerging or established pattern of violations; 2) remedial actions to re-establish the dignity of the victims and restore the basic conditions for safety and security; and, 3) environment building actions aimed at creating or consolidating a conducive environment (political, legal, etc.) to ensure full respects of the rights of the people in accordance with relevant bodies of law. These layers model appears to be in line with the principles of the Triple Nexus.

In Colombia, these three approaches were combined and translated into a longer-term approach which challenges key actors, mostly state actors, by aiming at changing policies, attitude, legal frameworks and practices, etc. For example:

- The Colombian Ministry of Justice, with a number of initiatives to adapt laws to the international obligations of the country;
- The Colombian Ministry of Defence: dissemination and incorporation of IHL doctrines;
- The support to INPEC, the national detention authorities;
- Missing persons: providing assistance to the families of victims but also strengthening national services through technical support;
- The support to the Victims Attention Unit;
- Building the capacity of Migration State Services in Colombia (following the Venezuela crisis)

⁶⁰³ ICRC. 2020. Project proposal.

⁶⁰⁴ ICF. 2021. Field interviews.

⁶⁰⁵ Hugo Slim and Andrew Bonwick. Protection, and ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies. Available at: https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/aors/protection_mainstreaming/ALNAP_Guide_2005_EN.pdf.

This approach fully corresponded to the ICRC's profile in the country and its long-term presence, and continuity was one of the key factors for the strong acceptance of ICRC by the national actors. In turn, acceptance allows continuity and presence on the ground. To this end, the sustained funding from DG ECHO (and other donors) has been paramount to guarantee the continuity of actions in Colombia.

The key concept of complementarity in the Triple Nexus emphasises the importance of diversity and cooperation in the protection system, including with regard to peace building.

The Triple Nexus does not entail that an organisation must develop activities that cover a very ambitious triangle and are, in practice, almost impossible to achieve for a single actor. The aim of the Triple Nexus is to ensure that coordination exists to maximise the activities of each actor. In this sense, all the stakeholders consulted agree that the key for the achievement of the Triple Nexus' objectives is good coordination to add complementarities, when possible, without compromising the independence and mandate of each actor involved.

In Colombia DG ECHO and the ICRC approaches were coherent and complementary as indicated in Finding 2. However, as clear from the experience in other countries, tensions could arise between humanitarian needs and other EU priorities.⁶⁰⁶ EU humanitarian aid could be caught between nexus and independence tensions, and it is considered as crucial for DG ECHO to strengthen its commitment to and leadership on humanitarian matters to support independence and neutrality of the humanitarian action. This may require a thorough reflection of the role that humanitarian aid plays in the EU's crisis management actions, and implies that humanitarian actors should distance themselves from political agendas.

In this context, Colombia provided a somehow unique example of ICRC's actions which can directly provide a contribution to a peace agreement. For example: 1) ICRC was involved logistically in the peace conversations with FARC, to the point that the ICRC was instrumental to facilitate the peace agreement; 2) ICRC influenced the negotiations with its expertise on IHL and provided suggestions on themes such as missing persons, tracing, victims' law, minors and child soldiers. These arguments found space in the final peace agreement.

Most of the peace process in other areas of the world happen on a very political level and often involve a relatively low number of actors. The Colombian case was, in this sense, unique, because the process was more comprehensive and included the contribution of several actors, allowing the ICRC to have a more relevant participation in the process.

ICRC and DG ECHO in Colombia had a very pragmatic approach and understood their limitations (e.g. limited budget and weight), which affected the transformational impact. This also explains why both organisations have been very active in Colombia in developing networks (i.e. DG ECHO participation and leadership in donor groups, clusters, etc). Evidence also shows that, regarding coordination with other stakeholders, the mindset of ICRC changed, and there is more readiness to engage with other actors and to build partnerships, including localisation and development actors. For example, the ICRC increased coordination with the International Development Bank (IDB), particularly on vocational training for victims and work with partner organisations.

A5.3.4 Key conclusions

⁶⁰⁶ European Think Tanks Group. 2020. EU humanitarian aid: Caught between nexus and independence. Available at: <https://ettg.eu/institute/ettg/eu-humanitarian-aid-caught-between-nexus-and-independence/>.

There was significant donor fatigue in Colombia due to the decades-long crisis in the country, which affected the availability of resources. In this context, DG ECHO's effort in Colombia focused on avoiding humanitarian gaps and preserving the added value that its humanitarian partners – including ICRC – can bring to the country above triple-nexus considerations.

DG ECHO sought to develop the nexus approach at a more institutional level by improving its engagement with development actors: “by working together, humanitarian and development actors can improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable people, increase their resilience and thus reduce long-term humanitarian needs”.⁶⁰⁷

While peace is not an ultimate goal for the ICRC, in Colombia the ICRC made its experience and neutrality available to all the actors involved in the peace process, to the point of being instrumental for its execution. Additionally, the ICRC influenced the negotiations with its experience in IHL and provided suggestions in terms of gaps. This experience was only possible due to the characteristics of the peace process, with a strong institutional component respected by all the actors.

It was well understood by most actors that the establishment of peace is the responsibility of political and development actors, not humanitarian ones. However, evidence shows that the Colombian civil society and some authorities are pressing the ICRC and international organisations to play a much higher role as “peace actors”, denouncing human rights violations or violations of the peace agreements.

Overall, **the good collaboration and complementarities between DG ECHO, ICRC and other actors to ensure a Triple Nexus focus faced many limitations in the field**, beyond the political and independence dilemmas mentioned in the previous sections. In regions where there was limited funding available for humanitarian action, the possibilities to engage with development actors were reduced. This was due to the fact that, on the one hand, humanitarian donors tend to focus on the most critical needs of vulnerable populations, and development actors on development opportunities, not vulnerabilities.

⁶⁰⁷ DG ECHO. Grand Bargain factsheet. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/grand-bargain_en.

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
Annex 6. ICRC portfolio analysis

The analysis below was based on data retrieved from DG ECHO's HOPE/EVA databases. In total, 116 actions were identified as being within the remit of the ICRC evaluation. This list was of actions was compiled based on two lists of actions provided by DG ECHO (ICRC actions 2016-29, ICRC actions 2017-20). The analysis is broken down into "General DG ECHO funding", which comprises of funding directed towards 115 ICRC actions, and "DG ECHO funding to Grand Bargain PPP", which consists of action ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001. This action is part of the Grand Bargain and thus must be considered separately from other ICRC actions.

The EVA database details the breakdown of funding by consumption year, and disaggregates the funding provided to each action by the year it was consumed. This is not the same as the year the funding was contracted. In many cases, actions have received different levels of funding across multiple years and this is reflected in the analysis.


Overview: 115 ICRC Actions

Figure 150. Breakdown of DG ECHO funding to ICRC



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Sector contracted amount, Number of actions.


Figure 151. Annual DG ECHO funding to ICRC actions by consumption year



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Sector contracted amount, Number of actions.

Note: values are based on consumption year. To estimate the number of actions per year in cases where there were actions containing multiple contracts in different years, the year of the first contract was used. Eight actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 152. Breakdown of ICRC budget



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: ICRC Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Amount, EC Amount.


Note: DG ECHO funding for action ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001 was not included in this analysis as this funding is covered under the Grand Bargain, and no total project funding was included in HOPE data.

Figure 153. Proportion of DG ECHO funding directed to ICRC




Source: ICRC Figures, provided by DG ECHO. ICF Analysis. N = €11,100,000,000

Figure 154. Breakdown of DG ECHO funding for ICRC actions by sector




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Sector contracted amount.

Figure 155. Number of ICRC actions by sector




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. Total number of actions (247) exceeds 116 as one action can cover multiple sectors.

Figure 156. Top ten countries receiving DG ECHO funding for ICRC actions



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 116 ICRC actions = €643,415,555. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Figure 157. Geographical coverage of DG ECHO funding to ICRC actions (excluding Grand Bargain PPP)



Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 115 ICRC actions = € 468,104,601. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally.


Note: Action ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001 was not included in this analysis as this funding is covered under the Grand Bargain

Figure 158. Geographical coverage of DG ECHO funding to ICRC actions (including Grand Bargain PPP)




Source: EVA data extracted on 08/07/21. ICF analysis. Documents: EVA Extraction 080721 ICRC; Variable: Number of actions. N = total DG ECHO funding to 116 ICRC actions = €643,415,555. Seven actions were conducted across multiple countries. The assumption made is that the funding was distributed across all countries equally. This excludes the Grand Bargain (ECHO/SYR/BUD/2018/91001), an action covering six countries, for which data was obtained from DG ECHO detailing the distribution of funds across recipient states.

Figure 159. Number of DG ECHO funded ICRC actions by region



Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: ICRC Portfolio Analysis; Sheet: Overview; Variable: Action title.
Note: number of actions sums to more than 116, as actions can be implemented in more than one country.

Figure 160. Proportion of actions achieving at least one KRI




Source: HOPE data extracted on 29/04/21 (ICF analysis). Documents: Key Results Indicators. N = 116 actions.

Annex 7. DG ECHO-ICRC survey analysis

DG ECHO staff survey

Figure 161. General Information

Number and % of respondents by type of staff



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36. Question 1: Where are you based?

Table 58. Alignment between DG ECHO and ICRC

Alignment between DG ECHO and ICRC: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of staff (%)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
DG ECHO and ICRC are highly complementary in nature in terms of their mandates, core competencies and the resources they bring to address humanitarian needs					
DG ECHO Headquarters	37.5%	62.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	45.5%	50.0%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	41.7%	52.8%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%
The partnership is mutually beneficial: each partner gets added value out of their taking part in the partnership					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	75.0%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%

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	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
Regional offices	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	27.3%	59.1%	9.1%	0.0%	4.5%
Overall	19.4%	63.9%	13.9%	0.0%	2.8%
The objectives of the partnership are well understood at all levels in DG ECHO					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	62.5%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	9.1%	59.1%	22.7%	0.0%	9.1%
Overall	8.3%	61.1%	25.0%	0.0%	5.6%
There is commitment to the partnership at all levels within DG ECHO					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	37.5%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	18.2%	68.2%	13.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	13.9%	61.1%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
ICRC staff we deal with, have a good understanding of DG ECHO's mandate					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	87.5%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	9.1%	86.4%	4.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	5.6%	88.9%	5.6%	0.0%	0.0%

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
	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
Through the partnership with ICRC, DG ECHO can better realise the objectives of its (relevant) HIPs					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	62.5%	12.5%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	16.7%	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	31.8%	54.5%	13.6%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	25.0%	58.3%	13.9%	0.0%	2.8%
Through the partnership with DG ECHO, ICRC can better realise its mandate					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	87.5%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	13.6%	77.3%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	8.3%	83.3%	5.6%	0.0%	2.8%
In non conflict settings, ICRC's role is less critical as there are sometimes other actors who may be able to fulfil some of ICRC's functions more effectively and/or efficiently					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	18.2%	63.6%	13.6%	0.0%	4.5%
Overall	22.2%	58.3%	11.1%	0.0%	8.3%
ICRC willingness to engage with humanitarian partners depends in large part on the particular ICRC delegates in country					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	50.0%	12.5%	0.0%	25.0%
Regional offices	16.7%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	No opinion
Country and sub-country offices	27.3%	45.5%	27.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	22.2%	50.0%	19.4%	0.0%	8.3%

Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 2: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?


Figure 162. To what extent is there regular dialogue (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 3: To what extent is there regular dialogue (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?

Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 3: To what extent is there regular dialogue (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Influence of dialogue with ICRC on greater alignment of priorities between DG ECHO and ICRC – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 4: To what extent does the dialogue with ICRC lead to greater alignment of priorities between DG ECHO and ICRC?


Figure 163. To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 5: To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 5: To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Figure 164. To what extent are opportunities for collaboration identified and acted upon?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 6: To what extent are opportunities for collaboration identified and acted upon?


Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 6: To what extent are opportunities for collaboration identified and acted upon?


Figure 165. To what extent are the knowledge and resources of each partner effectively leveraged?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 7: To what extent are the knowledge and resources of each partner effectively leveraged?


Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 7: To what extent are the knowledge and resources of each partner effectively leveraged?


Figure 166. To what extent are information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms institutionalised (i.e. these mechanisms are embedded within the organisation and are not dependent on the specific individuals only)?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 8: To what extent are information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms institutionalised (i.e. these mechanisms are embedded within the organisation and are not dependent on the specific individuals only)?

Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 8: To what extent are information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms institutionalised (i.e. these mechanisms are embedded within the organisation and are not dependent on the specific individuals only)?

Table 59. Communication, coordination and collaboration: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of staff

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/can't say
We regularly reflect and act on lessons learned from DG ECHO funded humanitarian actions implemented by ICRC					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	50.0%	37.5%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	4.5%	59.1%	31.8%	0.0%	4.5%
Overall	2.8%	55.6%	36.1%	0.0%	5.6%
There is space for open and honest dialogue: we feel comfortable to question the essence of partnership, express room for doubt and voice any concerns with ICRC					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	62.5%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%

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	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/can't say
Country and sub-country offices	18.2%	72.7%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	13.9%	69.4%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
There are effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest					
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	37.5%	37.5%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	0.0%	66.7%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	0.0%	63.6%	13.6%	4.5%	18.2%
Overall	2.8%	58.3%	19.4%	2.8%	16.7%


Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 9: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

If you have any suggestions for improving communication, coordination and collaboration between DG ECHO and ICRC, please add these here:

There were two main points were made by respondents to this question. Firstly, improvements in communication and coordination could be facilitated through regular bilateral dialogue between DG ECHO and ICRC country offices. This regards communication between DG ECHO and ICRC staff in the field and in HQ. This communication channel takes the form of both organised formal meetings, and more casual ongoing discussions regarding operations. Furthermore, increased communication between field offices and HQ (on both DG ECHO and ICRC side) would help foster collaboration by ensuring that all developments stemming from these discussions are relayed across different levels of each organisation.

Secondly, communication, coordination, and collaboration could be further enhanced through improvements in ICRC proposals and reporting to DG ECHO, and wider information sharing between the two organisations. One respondent presented the example of promoting the inclusion of DG ECHO's standard indicators (KOs and KRIs) within ICRC reports.

Figure 167. Staff that deals with communication with ICRC – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 11: Do you deal with communication with ICRC in your role?

Table 60. Joint communication actions between DG ECHO and ICRC: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of staff (%)

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/can't say
Joint communication actions had a clear rationale and purpose					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
Country and sub-country offices	14.3%	57.1%	0.0%	14.3%	14.3%
Overall	8.3%	58.3%	8.3%	8.3%	16.7%
Results and impacts of the joint communication actions were monitored and documented					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%
Regional offices	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%
Country and sub-country offices	14.3%	14.3%	28.6%	14.3%	28.6%
Overall	8.3%	16.7%	33.3%	8.3%	33.3%


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	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/can't say
Opportunities for joint communication actions were proactively identified and acted upon					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	0.0%	28.6%	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%
Overall	0.0%	41.7%	33.3%	16.7%	8.3%
Joint communication actions reinforce/ amplify messages – thus having more impact than communication actions undertaken individually					
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	0.0%	83.3%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%

Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 12; n = 3 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 2 (Regional offices), n = 7 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 11A: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?


Figure 168. To what extent are ICRC's advocacy priorities aligned with those of DG ECHO at global and country level?

Global level – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 12: To what extent are ICRC's advocacy priorities aligned with those of DG ECHO at global and country level?

Country level – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 12: To what extent are ICRC's advocacy priorities aligned with those of DG ECHO at global and country level?

Presence of mechanisms to identify and act upon suitable opportunities for joint advocacy – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 13: Are there mechanisms in place to identify and act upon suitable opportunities for joint advocacy?


Joint advocacy activities leverage the strength of each partner – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 14: Do joint advocacy activities leverage the strengths of each partner?


Figure 169. To what extent have the joint advocacy efforts of DG ECHO and ICRC been effective in improving protection of civilians and compliance with IHL?

Global level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 15: To what extent have the joint advocacy efforts of DG ECHO and ICRC been effective in improving protection of civilians and compliance with IHL?

Country level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 15: To what extent have the joint advocacy efforts of DG ECHO and ICRC been effective in improving protection of civilians and compliance with IHL?

Table 61. Main benefits of the Partnership with ICRC for DG ECHO – total and by type of staff (%)

	Major benefit	Moderate benefit	Minor benefit	Not a benefit
Benefitting from ICRC's expertise on IHL (staff training, knowledge sharing)				

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
	Major benefit	Moderate benefit	Minor benefit	Not a benefit
DG ECHO Headquarters	75.0%	12.5%	12.5%	0.0%
Regional offices	50.0%	16.7%	33.3%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	40.9%	45.5%	13.6%	0.0%
Overall	50.0%	33.3%	16.7%	0.0%
Strengthening of advocacy efforts on IHL issues				
DG ECHO Headquarters	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	40.9%	50.0%	4.5%	4.5%
Overall	47.2%	44.4%	5.6%	2.8%
Reduced operational and administrative costs				
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%
Regional offices	0.0%	33.3%	16.7%	50.0%
Country and sub-country offices	4.5%	40.9%	27.3%	27.3%
Overall	2.8%	38.9%	25.0%	33.3%
Delivering humanitarian assistance in difficult situations				
DG ECHO Headquarters	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	66.7%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	63.6%	31.8%	4.5%	0.0%
Overall	72.2%	19.4%	8.3%	0.0%
Risk sharing				
DG ECHO Headquarters	0.0%	62.5%	25.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%
Country and sub-country offices	27.3%	31.8%	31.8%	9.1%
Overall	22.2%	38.9%	25.0%	13.9%

	Major benefit	Moderate benefit	Minor benefit	Not a benefit
Reliability (DG ECHO can reliably work with ICRC in order to achieve the objectives laid out in its HIPs)				
DG ECHO Headquarters	50.0%	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%
Regional offices	50.0%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	50.0%	36.4%	9.1%	4.5%
Overall	50.0%	30.6%	11.1%	8.3%

Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 16: What have been the main benefits of the Partnership with ICRC for DG ECHO?


Figure 170. What are the risks associated with the partnership?

Lack of innovation – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 17: What are the risks associated with the partnership?

Lack of transparency – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 17: What are the risks associated with the partnership?

Lack of accountability – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 17: What are the risks associated with the partnership?

Other: please specify – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 17: What are the risks associated with the partnership?

Other: please specify

One of the main risks associated with the partnership highlighted by respondents was the absence of detailed monitoring information on the implementation, operation, and results of ICRC actions. This makes it difficult for DG ECHO to understand the progress of actions on an operational level, in addition to being able to assess the achievements of the actions.

Table 62. Benefits and impact of the partnership: to what extent has the Partnership contributed to.... Total and by type of staff (%)

	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
<i>... improving the effectiveness of DG ECHO's humanitarian response (e.g. via the above channels)</i>					
DG ECHO Headquarters	25.0%	62.5%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	16.7%	50.0%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	40.9%	31.8%	13.6%	9.1%	4.5%
Overall	33.3%	41.7%	8.3%	8.3%	8.3%
<i>... improving DG ECHO's ability/capacity to respond to protracted or slow onset crises (e.g. via greater funding flexibility and predictability)</i>					

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
	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
DG ECHO Headquarters	12.5%	25.0%	25.0%	12.5%	25.0%
Regional offices	33.3%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	27.3%	31.8%	27.3%	13.6%	0.0%
Overall	25.0%	25.0%	30.6%	11.1%	8.3%
<i>... developing common understanding between DG ECHO and ICRC of humanitarian situation, needs and priorities in particular crisis contexts (e.g. via improved communication, coordination and collaboration)</i>					
DG ECHO Headquarters	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional offices	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
Country and sub-country offices	50.0%	36.4%	9.1%	4.5%	0.0%
Overall	47.2%	41.7%	8.3%	2.8%	0.0%
<i>... minimising/ avoiding any overlaps or duplication in the humanitarian response of DG ECHO and ICRC (e.g. via improved communication, coordination and collaboration)</i>					
DG ECHO Headquarters	25.0%	37.5%	25.0%	0.0%	12.5%
Regional offices	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	0.0%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	31.8%	36.4%	18.2%	13.6%	0.0%
Overall	27.8%	33.3%	25.0%	8.3%	5.6%
<i>... providing quicker and more flexible humanitarian response (e.g. via greater funding flexibility and predictability)</i>					
DG ECHO Headquarters	37.5%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%
Regional offices	16.7%	33.3%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%

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	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
Country and sub-country offices	50.0%	22.7%	22.7%	0.0%	4.5%
Overall	41.7%	22.2%	27.8%	2.8%	5.6%
... improving accountability to affected populations					
DG ECHO Headquarters	37.5%	12.5%	25.0%	12.5%	12.5%
Regional offices	0.0%	33.3%	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%
Country and sub-country offices	31.8%	22.7%	31.8%	13.6%	0.0%
Overall	27.8%	22.2%	30.6%	13.9%	5.6%

Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 18: To what extent has the Partnership contributed to....


Figure 171. Overall positive effects of the Partnership are greater than the sum of each partners' effects – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 19: In your assessment, are the overall positive effects of the Partnership greater than the sum of each partners' effects?


Figure 172. How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?

Quality of reporting – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?

Alignment of priorities – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?

Overall performance (in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in delivery of humanitarian assistance) – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?

Quality of dialogue – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?

Quality of proposals – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?

ICRC's operational capacities – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?


Figure 173. Collaboration – drawing on shared analysis and using relative strengths – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 20: How does ICRC compare with other framework/ strategic partners that DG ECHO works with?


Figure 174. To what extent has ICRC influenced the following aspects of DG ECHO's approach to humanitarian action?

Thematic policy on protection – total and by type staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 21: To what extent has ICRC influenced the following aspects of DG ECHO's approach to humanitarian action?

Prioritisation of humanitarian needs – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 21: To what extent has ICRC influenced the following aspects of DG ECHO's approach to humanitarian action?

Promoting compliance with IHL – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 21: To what extent has ICRC influenced the following aspects of DG ECHO's approach to humanitarian action?

Other: please specify – total and by type of staff (%)




Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 21: To what extent has ICRC influenced the following aspects of DG ECHO's approach to humanitarian action?

Other: please specify

Other areas that respondents stated that ICRC has influenced included:

- Community based protection
- Operations in places of detention
- Counter terrorism measures
- Approach to conflicts context
- Advocacy

Figure 175. Rating of partnership with ICRC – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: DG ECHO Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 36; n = 8 (DG ECHO Headquarters), n = 6 (Regional offices), n = 22 (Country and sub-country offices). Question 22: Overall, how do you rate the partnership with ICRC?


If you have any suggestions for improvement or any other comments, please add these here:

The following overarching points were highlighted by respondents to this question:

- The partnership needs to place more focus on funding actions related to ICRC's core mandate
- There could be greater transparency regarding ICRC operational and reporting information. A more open dialogue regarding the operational details of actions would improve the mutual understanding of the intervention and priorities in complex crisis. Furthermore, ICRC should have the same reporting requirements as other framework partners and adhere to DG ECHO's standard indicators.
- Improvements in communication between DG ECHO and ICRC at both field and HQ level could increase coordination between the two organisations

ICRC staff survey

Figure 176. Number and % of respondents by location



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 19. Question 1: Where are you based?

Table 63. To what extent are each of the following partnership objectives⁶⁰⁸ aligned with ICRC's own organisational mandate and objectives? Total and by type of staff (%)

	Very strong alignment	Strong alignment	Weak alignment	No alignment
To develop a strategic partnership to ensure effective, efficient and rapid delivery of humanitarian assistance				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	37.5%	56.3%	6.3%	0.0%

⁶⁰⁸ As articulated in the Framework Partnership Agreement between the two organisations and the Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot

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	Very strong alignment	Strong alignment	Weak alignment	No alignment	
Overall	42.1%	52.6%	5.3%	0.0%	
To raise awareness of humanitarian issues among decision-makers and the general public in order to foster the overall effectiveness of, and support to, humanitarian assistance					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Regional Delegation	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Delegation	56.3%	43.8%	0.0%	0.0%	
Overall	52.6%	47.4%	0.0%	0.0%	
To bring more efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of the assistance, including for instance joined-up approach with development actors					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	
Regional Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	
Delegation	6.3%	75.0%	12.5%	6.3%	
Overall	5.3%	68.4%	21.1%	5.3%	
To promote and strengthen compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and universal humanitarian principles					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	100.0%		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50.0%		50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	68.8%		25.0%	6.3%	0.0%
Overall	68.4%		26.3%	5.3%	0.0%

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N=19; n = 1 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 2: To what extent are each of the following partnership objectives aligned with ICRC's own organisational mandate and objectives?

Table 64. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of staff (%)

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The partnership is mutually beneficial: each partner gets added value out of their taking part in the partnership				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	18.8%	75.0%	6.3%	0.0%
Overall	15.8%	78.9%	5.3%	0.0%
DG ECHO staff we deal with, have a good understanding of ICRC's mandate				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	50.0%	43.8%	6.3%	0.0%
Overall	47.4%	42.1%	10.5%	0.0%
The objectives of the partnership with ICRC are well understood at all levels in DG ECHO				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Regional Delegation	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	0.0%	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%
Overall	5.3%	63.2%	26.3%	5.3%
The objectives of the partnership with DG ECHO are well understood at all levels in ICRC				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	0.0%	56.3%	43.8%	0.0%

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
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Overall	0.0%	57.9%	42.1%	0.0%
DG ECHO and ICRC are highly complementary in nature in terms of their mandates, core competencies and the resources they bring to address humanitarian needs				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	6.3%	87.5%	6.3%	0.0%
Overall	5.3%	78.9%	15.8%	0.0%
The partnership with ICRC contributes to the achievement of DG ECHO objectives of its (relevant) HIPs				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	18.8%	75.0%	6.3%	0.0%
Overall	21.1%	73.7%	5.3%	0.0%
DG ECHO's willingness to engage with humanitarian partners depends in large part on the particular DG ECHO delegates in country				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	37.5%	37.5%	18.8%	6.3%
Overall	42.1%	36.8%	15.8%	5.3%
The partnership with ECHO contributes to the achievement of ICRC mandate.				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Regional Delegation	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	31.3%	56.3%	12.5%	0.0%
Overall	31.6%	47.4%	21.1%	0.0%

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N =19; n = 1 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 3: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?


Figure 177. To what extent is there regular dialogue (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N =19; n = 1 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 4: To what extent is there regular dialogue (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N=19; n = 1 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 4: To what extent is there regular dialogue (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?

Figure 178. To what extent does the dialogue with DG ECHO lead to greater alignment of priorities between ICRC and DG ECHO?


Influence of dialogue with DG ECHO on greater alignment of priorities between ICRC and DG ECHO – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N=19; n = 1 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 5: To what extent does the dialogue with DG ECHO lead to greater alignment of priorities between ICRC and DG ECHO?

Figure 179. To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Extent to which there is timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff – total and type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 6: To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Figure 180. To what extent are opportunities for collaboration identified and acted upon?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 7: To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 7: To what extent is there timely information sharing (formal and/or informal) between DG ECHO and ICRC staff?


Figure 181. To what extent are the knowledge and resources of each partner effectively leveraged?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 8: To what extent are the knowledge and resources of each partner effectively leveraged?


Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 8: To what extent are the knowledge and resources of each partner effectively leveraged?


Figure 182. To what extent are information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms institutionalised (i.e. these mechanisms are embedded within the organisation and are not dependent on the specific individuals only)?

Strategic level e.g. HQ level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 9: To what extent are information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms institutionalised (i.e. these mechanisms are embedded within the organisation and are not dependent on the specific individuals only)?

Operational/ field level – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 9: To what extent are information exchange, coordination and collaboration mechanisms institutionalised (i.e. these mechanisms are embedded within the organisation and are not dependent on the specific individuals only)?


Table 65. Communication, coordination and collaboration: to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Total and by type of staff

	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know/can't say
We regularly reflect and act on lessons learned from DG ECHO funded humanitarian actions					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	37.5%	0.0%	12.5%
Overall	0.0%	50.0%	33.3%	5.6%	11.1%
There is space for open and honest dialogue: we feel comfortable to question the essence of partnership, express room for doubt and voice any concerns with DG ECHO					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	25.0%	62.5%	12.5%	0.0%	0.0%
Overall	27.8%	61.1%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%
There are effective ways of dealing with issues such as disagreements or potential conflicts of interest					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Delegation	12.5%	56.3%	12.5%	0.0%	18.8%
Overall	11.1%	55.6%	16.7%	0.0%	16.7%

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 10: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?


Figure 183. To what extent are DG ECHO's advocacy priorities aligned with those of ICRC at global and country level?

Global level - total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 11: To what extent are DG ECHO's advocacy priorities aligned with those of ICRC at global level?

Country level - total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 11: To what extent are DG ECHO's advocacy priorities aligned with those of ICRC at country level?

Table 66. What have been the main benefits of the partnership for ICRC?

Main benefits of the partnership for ICRC - total and by type of staff (%)

	Major benefit	Moderate benefit	Minor benefit	Not a benefit
Greater funding flexibility				

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	Major benefit	Moderate benefit	Minor benefit	Not a benefit
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0.0%	50,0%	0.0%
Delegation	50,0%	18,8%	18,8%	12,5%
Overall	50,0%	16,7%	22,2%	11,1%
Greater funding predictability				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	31,3%	50,0%	12,5%	6,3%
Overall	33,3%	44,4%	16,7%	5,6%
Risk sharing				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	6,3%	43,8%	31,3%	18,8%
Overall	5,6%	44,4%	33,3%	16,7%
Reduced operational and administrative costs				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0.0%	0.0%	50,0%
Delegation	12,5%	31,3%	25,0%	31,3%
Overall	16,7%	27,8%	22,2%	33,3%
Strengthening of advocacy efforts on IHL				

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	Major benefit	Moderate benefit	Minor benefit	Not a benefit
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Delegation	56,3%	25,0%	12,5%	6,3%
Overall	55,6%	22,2%	16,7%	5,6%
DG ECHO's knowledge and expertise				
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0.0%	50,0%	0.0%
Delegation	31,3%	50,0%	12,5%	6,3%
Overall	27,8%	50,0%	11,1%	11,1%

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 12: What have been the main benefits of the partnership for ICRC?

Table 67. To what extent has the partnership contributed to...

Main benefits of the partnership: to what extent has the Partnership contributed to...- total and by type of staff (%)

	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
...developing a common understanding between DG ECHO and ICRC of humanitarian situation, needs and priorities in particular crisis contexts (e.g. via improved communication, coordination and collaboration)					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	56,2%	18,5%	18,7%	6,2%	0,0%
Overall	55,5%	16,7%	22,2%	5,5%	0,0%
... providing quicker and more flexible humanitarian response (e.g. via greater funding flexibility and predictability)					

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
	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	37,5%	25,0%	12,5%	12,5%	12,5%
Overall	38,9%	22,2%	11,1%	16,7%	11,1%
... minimising/ avoiding any overlaps or duplication in the humanitarian response of DG ECHO and ICRC (e.g. via improved communication, coordination and collaboration)					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	18,8%	31,3%	18,8%	12,5%	18,8%
Overall	22,2%	27,8%	16,7%	16,7%	16,7%
... improving the effectiveness of ICRC's humanitarian response (e.g. via the above channels)					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	25,0%	25,0%	25,0%	12,5%	12,5%
Overall	27,8%	22,2%	27,8%	11,1%	11,1%
... improving accountability to affected populations					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	6,3%	56,3%	18,8%	18,8%	0,0%
Overall	5,6%	55,6%	22,2%	16,7%	0,0%

	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
...improving our ability/capacity to respond to protracted or slow onset crises (e.g. via greater funding flexibility and predictability)					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	6,3%	50,0%	18,8%	18,8%	6,3%
Overall	11,1%	44,4%	16,7%	22,2%	5,6%

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 13: To what extent has the partnership contributed to...

Figure 184. In your assessment, are the overall positive effects of the Partnership greater than the sum of each partners' individual effects?

Positive effects of the Partnership that are greater than the sum of each partners' individual effects - total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 14: In your assessment, are the overall positive effects of the Partnership greater than the sum of each partners' individual effects?

Table 68. How does DG ECHO compare with other donors supporting ICRC?

DG ECHO in comparison to other donors supporting ICRC - total and by type of staff (%)

	DG ECHO is much better than other donors	DG ECHO is slightly better than other donors	DG ECHO is about the same as other donors	DG ECHO is slightly worse than other donors	DG ECHO is much worse than other donors	Don't know/ can't say
Independence and neutrality as a humanitarian actor						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	31,3%	37,5%	31,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Overall	27,8%	38,9%	33,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
DG ECHO's knowledge and expertise						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	37,5%	25,0%	12,5%	12,5%	12,5%	0,0%
Overall	44,4%	27,8%	27,8%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Compliance with IHL						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	25,0%	50,0%	12,5%	0,0%	0,0%	12,5%
Overall	22,2%	50,0%	11,1%	5,6%	0,0%	11,1%
Alignment of priorities with ICRC						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%

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	DG ECHO is much better than other donors	DG ECHO is slightly better than other donors	DG ECHO is about the same as other donors	DG ECHO is slightly worse than other donors	DG ECHO is much worse than other donors	Don't know/ can't say
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	25,0%	43,8%	31,3%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Overall	22,2%	44,4%	27,8%	5,6%	0,0%	0,0%
Quality of dialogue						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	37,5%	43,8%	18,8%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Overall	33,3%	44,4%	22,2%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Collaboration – drawing on shared analysis and using relative strengths						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	12,5%	50,0%	37,5%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Overall	11,1%	50,0%	33,3%	5,6%	0,0%	0,0%
Funding flexibility						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	6,3%	12,5%	37,5%	18,8%	6,3%	18,8%
Overall	5,6%	16,7%	33,3%	16,7%	11,1%	16,7%
Funding predictability						

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	DG ECHO is much better than other donors	DG ECHO is slightly better than other donors	DG ECHO is about the same as other donors	DG ECHO is slightly worse than other donors	DG ECHO is much worse than other donors	Don't know/ can't say
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	12,5%	18,8%	37,5%	12,5%	0,0%	18,8%
Overall	16,7%	16,7%	33,3%	16,7%	0,0%	16,7%
Administrative burden						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	0,0%	12,5%	31,3%	12,5%	18,8%	25,0%
Overall	0,0%	11,1%	33,3%	11,1%	22,2%	22,2%
Reduced operational and administrative costs						
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	12,5%	6,3%	31,3%
Overall	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	11,1%	11,1%	27,8%

Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 15: How does DG ECHO compare with other donors supporting ICRC?

Table 69. To what extent has DG ECHO influenced the following aspects of ICRC's approach to humanitarian action?

DG ECHO's influence on ICRC's approach to humanitarian action - total and by type of staff (%)

	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
Meaningful engagement with local partners(localisation agenda)					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	0,0%	43,8%	12,5%	37,5%	6,3%
Overall	5,6%	38,9%	11,1%	38,9%	5,6%
Increased use of cash-based responses					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Delegation	12,5%	56,3%	18,8%	12,5%	0,0%
Overall	16,7%	50,0%	22,2%	11,1%	0,0%
Facilitated connections with other Commission DGs e.g. DG INTPA (previously. DG DEVCO) and DG NEAR, on certain issues, or in specific crises contexts					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	6,3%	18,8%	25,0%	18,8%	31,3%
Overall	5,6%	22,2%	22,2%	22,2%	27,8%
Enhanced engagement with development actors					
ICRC Headquarters in Geneva	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%

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	To a great extent	To a limited extent	To a little extent	Not at all	Don't know/ can't say
Regional Delegation	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%	50,0%	0,0%
Delegation	6,3%	37,5%	37,5%	18,8%	0,0%
Overall	5,6%	38,9%	33,3%	22,2%	0,0%


Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N=18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 16: To what extent has DG ECHO influenced the following aspects of ICRC's approach to humanitarian action?

Other: please specify

Other aspects that respondents stated that ICRC has influences included:

- The neutrality of DG ECHO not as strong as perceived by DG ECHO
- Analysis of the situation
- Accountability to affected populations, particularly regarding the development of feedback mechanisms on ICRC programs but also on the behaviour of ICRC staff
- Centrality of Protection

Figure 185. Rating of partnership with DG ECHO – total and by type of staff (%)



Source: ICRC Staff Survey. ICF Analysis. N = 18; n = 0 (ICRC Headquarters in Geneva), n = 2 (Regional delegation), n = 16 (Delegation). Question 17: Overall, how do you rate the partnership with DG ECHO?

Annex 8. Mapping of in-country priorities in Syria, South Sudan, Nigeria and Ukraine

Syria		
DG ECHO priorities	ICRC priorities	Activities prioritised under the partnership
<p>Multi-sector- Emergency response and preparedness: Including contingency planning and first line multi-sectorial emergency response capacity</p> <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promoting respect for IHL, IHRL and Refugee Law including, advocacy, and awareness raising Protection of populations (e.g. IDPs) and vulnerable groups; Prevention and response to SGBV; Humanitarian demining and Mine Risk Education (MRE). <p>FSL: Since 2020, promoting the transition from emergency response to early recovery programmes; and strengthening livelihood opportunities. Cash modality was prioritised.</p> <p>Health:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improving access to quality services and assistance to war wounded In 2020, Specific COVID-19 related health activities were also a priority for DG ECHO <p>WASH: WASH interventions were eligible for funding with a priority on restoration of access to safe water.</p> <p>Education in emergencies: Providing support to meet the needs of children in conflict affected contexts that are out of school or risk education disruption.</p>	<p>Multi-sector- Emergency response: Provision of assistance to cover basic needs (including relief distribution) (i.e. to residents, IDPs and returnees)</p> <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Upholding IHL and other pertinent norms: notably, to protect civilians and ensure their access to medical and humanitarian aid. Monitoring the treatment and living conditions of detainees (especially with regard to access to healthcare) Providing family-links services to facilitate contact between members of dispersed families <p>FSL: Promoting that resident and returnee households took steps to improve their livelihoods. ICRC used both food distribution and vouchers as transfer modalities.</p> <p>Health:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring that wounded or sick people had access to preventive and curative care including through the delivery of medical supplies Vulnerable people have access to health specialised services (e.g. disable people, pregnant women, children etc.) In 2020, The ICRC's COVID-19 response was incorporated to their health program <p>WASH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing access to safe water. Repairing water infrastructure, and providing supplies and spare parts 	<p>Protection: 35% of total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promoting appropriate treatment and detention conditions (i.e. through visits to detainees, monitoring reports and confidential dialogue, better access to basic needs) Promoting compliance with IHL (i.e. advocating for the impartial provision of medical care and adequate treatment of detainees) Helping detainees reconnecting with family members <p>FSL: 46% of the total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covering basic food needs and essential household items (i.e. provision of food distribution) Provision of grants to increase agricultural/livestock production, cleaning and rehabilitation of irrigation canals, cash for work activities. Provision of essential household items kit <p>WASH: 15% of the total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meeting immediate water needs Improving access to clean water (including through the reparation of damage infrastructure) Improving living conditions in conflict-affected areas by improving WASH services <p>Health: 4% of the total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve quality of First-aid emergency health responses Health treatment to wounded people Supplying surgical and medical supplies Improving the quality of healthcare including through trainings

South Sudan		
DG ECHO	ICRC	DG ECHO funding to ICRC's actions
<p>Multi-sector:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Addressing critical humanitarian needs through emergency lifesaving activities in particular in the case of new shocks (conflict-related displacement/refugee influx, natural disasters/climate shock, epidemic outbreaks). Contributing to the reduction of excess mortality and morbidity related to conflicts, addressing in particular Global Acute Malnutrition linked to emergency level of malnutrition and severe food insecurity. <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocacy, IHL and humanitarian access Address protection needs of displaced populations Child protection, including family tracing and reunification for separated, unaccompanied and missing children Prevention of SGBV <p>Health:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved access to basic health services in situations of high risks of morbidity and mortality In 2020, Specific COVID-19 related health activities were also a priority for DG ECHO <p>WASH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved access to basic WASH services in situations of high risks of morbidity and mortality In 2020, following the Covid-19 pandemic, provision of hygiene items and improvement of access to safe water <p>Education in emergencies:</p> <p>Providing support to meet acute needs of Education in Emergencies; basic literacy and numeracy in primary education for conflict-affected or forcefully displaced children</p>	<p>FSL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of food rations and household essential (i.e IDPs and residents) Provision of assistance for households to produce food. Provision of food assistance to malnourished detainees <p>WASH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing access to safe water. Repairing water infrastructure <p>Health:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring that wounded or sick people had access to health services including surgical care and medical evacuation, from medical personnel and facilities Vulnerable people have access to health specialised services (e.g. victims of SGBV) In 2020, The ICRC's COVID-19 response was incorporated to their health program <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Upholding IHL and IHRL. Monitoring the treatment and living conditions of detainees Providing family-links services to facilitate contact between members of dispersed families 	<p>FSL: 60% of total funding (received funding up to 2019)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of essential Household Items (EHI) distributions to improve living conditions Food distribution to address immediate, urgent food needs Agricultural and livestock interventions to improve food production Distribution of fishing kits to improve additional food production Distribution of Seed and Tools to increase resilience <p>Health: 32% of the total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improving health treatment of war wounded Emergency response preparedness (e.g. first aid training and stabilization) Provide access Secondary Health Care Capacity building to hospital staff <p>Protection: 5% of the total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dialogue with weapon bearers and bilateral and confidential interventions to state and non-state weapon bearers Health care in danger campaign Activities to reduce child (re)recruitment and treatment (incl SGBV) Activities to reduce abuse of civilians Facilitate access to Education (in 2019 and 2020) <p>WASH: 3% of the total funding (only received funding in 2020)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improving rural and urban access to water supply Emergency response, access to basic WASH services Building renovation and construction of WASH facilities

Nigeria		
DG ECHO	ICRC	DG ECHO funding to ICRC's actions
<p>Multi-sectorial approaches to addressing acute needs of conflict-affected populations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> In particular, DG ECHO prioritised the provision of protection and live saving emergency assistance to the most vulnerable in the north-east of Nigeria. Priority was given to food security and livelihoods (42% of the total funding to Nigeria) (especially until 2018) followed by WASH. <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Protection-oriented multi-sectoral response to populations whose freedom of movement continues to be limited Enhancing humanitarian access Promotion of IHL <p>FSL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Priority was given to covering emergency food needs (especially in the north-east) As a second priority, DG ECHO also aimed to foster the resilience of the most vulnerable populations <p>Nutrition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Addressing acute nutrition needs to reduce excessive morbidity and mortality of children under 5 <p>Strengthening of preparedness and capacity to respond to emergencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> With a focus on local, regional and national systems in order to increase their capacity to provide timely and quality information with a view to early warning and early action <p>Promoting the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus at local level, with a focus on livelihood, gender and conflict sensitivity</p>	<p>Multi-sectorial approach to addressing the immediate needs of conflict affected populations (i.e. IDPs, refugees, host communities and residents):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> With a focus on addressing the needs of affected population in the north-east (and to a lesser extent also in the Middle Belt and the south mostly in connection to the provision of assistance to IDPs) <p>FSL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of food or provision of cash assistance to address basic needs Support livelihoods to enhance resilience* (e.g. provision of agricultural supplies/equipment, cash and training) <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promoting awareness of IHL and its implementation. Reminding the authorities of the rights of IDPs and other vulnerable people, and weapon bearers of their obligations under IHL Strengthening its engagement with authorities, weapon bearers and communities, with a view to fostering acceptance for its work and broadening its humanitarian access to people in need Restoring family links Improving detainees' treatment and living conditions <p>Health and nutrition:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Providing good quality care, including physical rehabilitation services, to the wounded and sick Providing first-aid training/supplies Treatment of malnourished children Distribution of EHIs <p>WASH (water and habitat for ICRC):</p>	<p>FSL: 82% of total funding (until 2019)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of EHI, food distribution and unconditional cash to vulnerable populations (especially in the north-east) Reinforce/Support the resilience and restoration of livelihoods of vulnerable IDPs and residents/returnees <p>Health and nutrition: 15% of total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> improve patients' access to health care services provision of first-aid training and materials provision of health services to weapon-wounded and IDPs (particularly emergency surgical care) Provision of assistance to treat severely malnourished children with medical complications Provision of nutritional inputs to prevent malnutrition in specific vulnerable groups provision of mental health and psychosocial support to wounded patients <p>Protection: 3% of total funding (from 2018 onwards)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Healthcare in Danger campaign Documented protection-related issues reported by civilians, and attacks on health-care personnel and facilities Dialogue with the authorities, weapon bearers and civil society in Nigeria on compliance with IHL and Human Rights Law Training sessions for members of the armed or police forces and civilian self-defence groups

- Upgrade/repair water systems and urban water infrastructure
- Construct latrines
- Set up emergency shelters and reconstruct houses

Strengthening cooperation with the Nigerian National Society and building their capacity

**Overall priority: Helping people building their resilience to the effects of conflict by implementing projects to support livelihoods, rebuild houses or upgrade urban water infrastructure (especially in 2017 and 2018 before the worsening of the security situation in the north-east)*

Ukraine		
DG ECHO	ICRC	DG ECHO funding to ICRC's actions
<p>Providing urgent and life-saving humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable people affected by the conflict prioritising:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The population living along the contact line both under GCA and NGCA directly affected by the fighting • The particularly vulnerable resident population in NGCAs outside the contact line: <p>Health:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emergency and primary health services • War-wounded surgery • Supplying medical equipment, medicines and capacity building • Mental health and psychosocial support (except in 2018) <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Registration and access to documentation and freedom of movement • Family separations • Assistance to victims of all kinds of violence (including GBV) • Legal counselling • Mine action • Enhanced housing conditions 	<p>Addressing the most immediate needs of conflict-affected people particularly along the contact line and NGCAs:</p> <p>Health:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of primary healthcare to conflict-affected populations • Treatment of weapon-wounded • Provision of medical supplies/equipment • Provision of psychosocial support to conflict affected people • Rehabilitative care and advance social inclusion for physically disabled people • Repairing and upgrading health facilities • Capacity building to health professionals <p>Protection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promotion of IHL • Bilateral dialogue with weapon bearers • Protecting humanitarian space • Improving detainees' treatment and living conditions • Restoring family links • Mine-awareness 	<p>FSL: 59% of total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Distribution of food parcels; vouchers; and cash assistance to peoples affected by conflict (Especially, but not only, along the contact line) • Distribution of warm drinks at crossing points • Livelihood support to people along the contact line (e.g. distribution agricultural inputs, monthly cash assistance to improve access markets, provision of training, microeconomic initiatives) <p>WASH (ICRC Water and Habitat program): 28% of total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activities to ensure adequate water supply and access to drinking water (e.g. provision of equipment and materials, reparation of water infrastructures) • Reparation of homes and public buildings • Distribution of hygiene kits • Distribution of emergency shelter items

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promotion of IHL and humanitarian access <p>FSL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prioritisation on MPCT where possible Livelihood support on an ad hoc basis (although not the main priority) <p>Shelter and NFIs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance Housing conditions including through the e rehabilitation and repairs works of conflict-damaged or destroyed accommodation Supply NFIs (especially in the face of winterization) <p>WASH:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitation of water supply and sanitation infrastructure Water quality treatment, testing and monitoring Access to basic WASH NFIs and hygiene promotion <p>Education in Emergencies: Ensuring access to safe, quality and accredited primary and secondary education; protection for students; repair schools; school equipment; capacity building etc.</p> <p>Disaster Risk Reduction and disaster preparedness (in 2019 and 2020)</p>	<p>FSL:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of food parcels and cash assistance to meet food needs Provision of livelihood support (e.g. agricultural and other supplies/equipment to start/resume income-generating activities) especially in GCAs <p>WASH (Water and Habitat for ICRC):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of basic hygiene items Restoration of water services (e.g. restore water supply facilities, Through technical and material assistance to water companies to provide clean water etc) Reparation and rebuilding of homes Provision of EHIs (especially in the context of winterization) <p>Education in Emergencies: Reparation of schools</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of EHIs (specially to respond to winterization e.g. with heating devices) <p>Health: 11% of total funding</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of support to hospitals along the contact line (e.g. provision of medical supplies, capacity building, first-aid training) Provision of surgical care for weapon-wounded Provision of first-aid to wounded and sick near the contact line
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Source: ICF analysis. DG ECHO HIPS for Syria, South Sudan, Nigeria and Ukraine 2016-2020; ICRC Annual Reports and Annual Appeals 2016-2020; Project Mapping; Portfolio analysis.

Annex 9. Terms of Reference



EUROPEAN COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR CIVIL PROTECTION AND HUMANITARIAN
AID OPERATIONS – DG ECHO

Terms of Reference

for the combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2016-2020, and DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross

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1. EU HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

1.1. FRAMEWORK

1. The **legal base** for Humanitarian Aid is provided by [Article 214](#) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and the [Humanitarian Aid Regulation](#) (HAR). The objectives of European Union (EU) humanitarian assistance are outlined there and could – for evaluation purposes – be summarized as follows: *From a donor perspective and in coordination with other main humanitarian actors, to provide the right amount and type of aid, at the right time, and in an appropriate way, to the populations most affected by natural and/or manmade disasters, in order to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity.*
2. The [European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid](#) (the Consensus) – which has been jointly endorsed by the Council, the EU Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission – provides a reference for EU humanitarian aid, and outlines the common objectives, fundamental humanitarian principles and good practices that the European Union as a whole pursues in this domain. The aim is to ensure an effective, high-quality, needs-driven and principled EU response to humanitarian crises. It concerns the whole spectrum of humanitarian action: from preparedness and disaster risk reduction, to immediate emergency response and life-saving aid for vulnerable people in protracted crises, or to situations of transition to recovery and longer-term development. The Consensus has thus played an important role in creating a vision of best practice for principled humanitarian aid by providing an internationally unique, forward-looking and common framework for EU actors. It has set out high-standard commitments and has shaped policy development and humanitarian aid approaches both at the European Union and Member State level. Furthermore, with reference to its overall aim, the Consensus has triggered the development of a number of humanitarian [sectoral policies](#).
3. The humanitarian aid budget is implemented through annual funding decisions adopted by the Commission, which are directly based on Article 15 of the HAR. The World Wide Decisions (WWD) define inter alia the total budget, and budget available for specific objectives, mechanisms of flexibility and for humanitarian operations in each country/region. The funding decision also specifies potential partners, and possible areas of intervention. The operational information about crises and countries for which humanitarian aid should be granted is provided through the General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid and the '[Humanitarian Implementation Plans](#)' (HIPs). They are a reference for humanitarian actions covered by the WWD and contain an overview of humanitarian needs in a specific country or region at a specific moment of time.
4. DG ECHO has more than 200 partner organisations for providing humanitarian assistance throughout the world. [Humanitarian partners](#) include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), international organisations such as ICRC and IFRC and the United Nations agencies and specialised Member States agencies. Having a diverse range of partners is important for DG ECHO because it allows for comprehensive coverage of the ever-expanding needs across the world – and in increasingly complex

situations. DG ECHO has developed increasingly close working relationships with its partners at the level of both policy issues and management of humanitarian operations.

5. DG ECHO has a worldwide network of **field offices** that ensure adequate monitoring of projects funded, provide up-to-date analyses of existing and forecasted needs in a given country or region, contribute to the development of intervention strategies and policy development, provide technical support to EU-funded humanitarian operations, and facilitate donor coordination at field level.
6. DG ECHO has developed a two-phase framework for assessing and **analysing needs** in specific countries and crises. The first phase of the framework provides the evidence base for prioritisation of needs, funding allocation, and development of the HIPs.

The first phase is a global evaluation with two dimensions:

- Index for Risk Management (INFORM) is a tool based on national indicators and data which allows for a comparative analysis of countries to identify their level of risk to humanitarian crisis and disaster. It includes three dimensions of risk: natural and man-made hazards exposure, population vulnerability and national coping capacity. The INFORM data are also used for calculating a Crisis Index that identifies countries suffering from a natural disaster and/or conflict and/or hosting a large number of uprooted people.
- The Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) identifies serious humanitarian crisis situations where the affected populations do not receive enough international aid or even none at all. These crises are characterised by low media coverage, a lack of donor interest (as measured through aid per capita) and a weak political commitment to solve the crisis, resulting in an insufficient presence of humanitarian actors.

The second phase of the framework focuses on context and response analysis:

- Integrated Analysis Framework (IAF) is an in-depth assessment carried out by European Commission's humanitarian country and regional teams (including experts and desk officers). It consists of a qualitative assessment of humanitarian needs per single crisis or per region, also taking into account the population affected and foreseeable trends.

1.2. SCOPE & RATIONALE

7. The European Union aims at being a **reference humanitarian donor**⁶⁰⁹, by ensuring that its interventions are coherent with the **humanitarian principles**⁶¹⁰, are relevant in targeting the most vulnerable beneficiaries, are duly informed by needs assessments, and promote [resilience building](#) to the extent possible. The Commission also takes the role of – when necessary – leading, shaping, and coordinating the response to crises, while respecting the overall coordination role of the UN OCHA.

⁶⁰⁹ I.e. a principled donor, providing leadership and shaping humanitarian response.

⁶¹⁰ Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality and Independence

8. Interventions have a focus on **funding critical sectors and addressing gaps** in the global response, mobilising partners and supporting the overall capacity of the humanitarian system. As a consequence of the principled approach and addressing gaps in overall response, the EU intervenes in **crises**⁶¹¹ where vulnerability of affected people is the highest, i.e. severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is little possibility or no political commitment to solve the crisis.. This refers primarily to protracted conflict situations, but can also refer to crises resulting from the cumulative effect of recurring natural disasters, or, a combination of different factors.
9. Actions funded comprise **assistance and protection operations** on a non-discriminatory basis to help people in developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable among them, victims of natural disasters, man-made crises, such as wars and outbreaks of fighting, or exceptional situations or circumstances comparable to natural or man-made disasters. The actions should extend the time needed to meet the humanitarian requirements resulting from these different situations.
10. **Health** is both a core sector of humanitarian aid interventions and the main reference for measuring overall humanitarian response. With the global trends of climate change and a growing and ageing population, together with the increasing frequency and scale of natural disasters and the persistency of conflicts, humanitarian health needs are continuing to increase. Given the significance of Commission humanitarian health assistance for the health sector in emergencies, and of the sector for Commission humanitarian health assistance, the Commission developed a set of **Guidelines** (operational in 2014) to support an improved delivery of affordable health services, based on humanitarian health needs.
11. The poorest people carry the greatest exposure to the consequences of disasters such as **food insecurity and under-nutrition**. Insufficient food production or an inability of vulnerable people to purchase enough nutritious food leads to malnutrition and under-nutrition. Moreover, dramatic interruptions in food consumption heighten risks of morbidity and mortality. Addressing **under-nutrition** requires a multi-sector approach and a joint humanitarian and development framework. **Humanitarian food assistance** aims to ensure the consumption of sufficient, safe and nutritious food in anticipation of, during, and in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. Each year, the European Commission allocates well over EUR 100 million to humanitarian assistance actions that are explicitly associated with specific nutrition objectives. Cash-based assistance has played a growing role in this sector over the last years.
12. **Protection** is embedded in DG ECHO's mandate as defined by the HAR and confirmed by the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. The purpose of EU-funded protection interventions is to prevent, reduce and respond to the risks and consequences of violence, deprivation and abuse. The Staff Working Document Humanitarian Protection: Improving protection outcomes to reduce risks for people in humanitarian crises,

⁶¹¹ See also http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/humanitarian-aid/needs-assessments_en

released in May 2016, outlines the definition and objectives of the European Commission's humanitarian protection work. It provides guidance for the programming of protection work in humanitarian crises, for measuring the effect of interventions and for planning related capacity building activities. Besides targeted protection actions protection mainstreaming in all projects, regardless of the sector, is also key. This implies incorporating protection principles and promoting meaningful access, safety and dignity in humanitarian aid.

13. **[Education in emergencies](#)** is crucial for both the protection and healthy development of girls and boys affected by crises. It can rebuild their lives; restore their sense of normality and safety, and provide them with important life skills. It helps children to be self-sufficient and to have more influence on issues that affect them. It is also one of the best tools to invest in their long-term future, and in the peace, stability and economic growth of their countries. Yet it has traditionally been one of the least funded humanitarian sectors. With the level of funding at 1% of its annual humanitarian budget still in 2015, the European Commission increased this share to 8% in 2018 and reached 10% in 2019, with an unprecedented funding target of 164 million euros. Globally, less than 3% of global humanitarian funding is allocated to education.
14. **[Urban areas](#)** are complex settings to implement humanitarian assistance and are different from rural areas in terms of needs and vulnerabilities of the affected people. Furthermore, capacities, methods, and preparedness of local actors, institutions, and partners vary considerably between cities. Humanitarian actors, including DG ECHO, have developed an extensive range of policies, practices, standards and tools for humanitarian work that are often adapted to rural areas, but far less to urban areas. In the past few years a number of studies have been conducted to explore the drivers of urbanization and its consequences and implications to humanitarian aid. Some of these studies have formulated suggestions on how international humanitarian aid can best engage with the changing settlement patterns.
15. **[Humanitarian air services](#)** (including ECHO Flights) provide a lifeline for millions of people who are caught up in humanitarian emergencies. When a crisis hits, guaranteeing fast and safe access to the field is vital to save lives. In contexts where there are no reliable roads, ports or other infrastructure, access to crises by land or water becomes difficult, if not impossible. Humanitarian air services are often the only way to get access to remote places and reach people in need. In addition to transporting humanitarian supplies and workers, humanitarian air services also carry out medical and security evacuations.
16. Strengthening the **gender** approach within the EU humanitarian aid is a commitment made in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, which highlights the need to integrate gender considerations, to promote the active participation of women in humanitarian aid and to incorporate protection strategies against sexual and gender-based violence. A **[Commission Staff Working document](#)** has been established to address this issue.

17. DG ECHO has been instrumental in establishing and funding **Emergency Response Mechanisms (ERMs)** in several contexts, enabling early, localised response in conflict and natural disaster situations. ERMs are contractual arrangements with one or multiple partners in a given country to ensure that humanitarian organisations can access sufficient personnel, financial and material resources to respond to recurring localised, small-scale emergencies as soon as possible after they occur. They allow a network of humanitarian organisations to rapidly assess and respond to recurring localised emergencies thanks to pre-positioned relief goods, agreed-upon processes, and staff capacity. To inform an overall reflection on ERMs, DG ECHO has commissioned a study⁶¹² on five ERMs currently in operation in Horn of Africa, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Iraq. Apart from stand-alone ERM actions, partners can also introduce flexibility (“**Crisis Modifiers**”⁶¹³) to mobilise resources from on-going actions and swiftly respond to any new emerging shocks occurring in where they have capacities to intervene (a crisis within a crisis). The objective of the Crisis Modifiers is to timely address immediate, life-saving and essential needs across all sectors as a result of rapid onset disasters. Flexibility measures can be triggered to provide immediate life-saving response in the aftermath of a rapid onset crisis; such responses should be based on multi-risk analysis, and multisector preparedness plans, including, but not limited to prepositioning of stocks. The two main scenarios are: i) to fill the time gap while waiting for additional resources; ii) to respond to small scale humanitarian needs which would otherwise remain unattended.
18. The [cash-based assistance](#) approach (See [DG ECHO Thematic Policy document no 3](#)) ensures humanitarian aid reaches directly those with the greatest need in a timely manner. DG ECHO uses cash and vouchers and other alternative forms of humanitarian assistance only after thoroughly evaluating all options. It recognises that cash and voucher programmes have to be cautiously planned in order to prevent unintended inflation, depression or social imbalances in local markets while reaching the most vulnerable groups (women, children and the elderly). In March 2015, the EU developed [10 common principles for multi-purpose cash-based assistance](#) to guide donors and humanitarian partners on how best to work with multi-purpose assistance. The principles introduce the notion of a humanitarian response across sectors to address basic needs, with dignity, flexibility and choice for the beneficiaries. They stress efficiency and effectiveness while acknowledging that solutions are context-specific, and recall the need to uphold the humanitarian principles. The principles received political endorsement through the resulting Council Conclusions adopted in June 2015. Donors and partners are encouraged to take the principles into account when designing and implementing their responses to humanitarian crises.
19. Each year millions of people are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge from conflicts, violence, human rights violations, persecution or natural disasters. The number of [forcibly displaced persons](#) (refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced

⁶¹² Available on request

⁶¹³ More information can be found on the Crisis Modifier activation can be found in the HIP Technical annex

persons) has continued to rise in 2017, calling for increased humanitarian assistance worldwide. The majority of today's refugees live in the developing world, which means that they flee to countries already struggling with poverty and hardship. In April 2016, the European Commission adopted a new [development-led approach](#) to forced displacement, aimed at harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced and their host communities. The new approach stipulates that political, economic, development and humanitarian actors should engage from the outset of a displacement crisis, and work with third countries towards the gradual socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced. The objective is to make people's lives more dignified during displacement; and ultimately, to end forced displacement.

20. The EU attaches great importance to the link between humanitarian aid, as a rapid response measure in crisis situations, and more medium and long-term development action. The **humanitarian-development-peace nexus** is complex and requires increased coordination – leading to joint humanitarian-development-peace approaches and collaborative implementation, monitoring and progress tracking. In order to address crisis situations, humanitarian, development and peace actors need to work from the early stage of a crisis – or, in case of slow onset events, before a crisis occurs. The common humanitarian-development-peace agenda has long been referred to as [Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development \(LRRD\)](#). The need to further invest in this approach was reaffirmed in the [Agenda for Change](#) in 2011 and reinforced by the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The [Council Conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus of 19 May 2017](#) welcomed cooperation between EU humanitarian and development actors, including in the [framework of the EU approach to forced displacement and development](#). The Council encourages the Commission and the Member States to take forward humanitarian and development work in a number of pilot countries, starting with joint analysis and leading, where possible, to joint planning and programming of humanitarian and development partners. The response should address not only the humanitarian needs in a country (deriving from an environmental crisis (prolonged drought), a natural disaster or a conflict) but also the improvement of resilience with a view to better managing different types of risks. In a number of countries Joint Humanitarian and Development Frameworks (JHDF) have been developed as a basis for humanitarian and development planning and programming.

2. CONTEXT OF THE EVALUATION


This is a combined evaluation, consisting of the following two separate parts:

- Part A: will focus on DG ECHO's interventions in **the countries covered by the Horn of Africa HIPs**;
- Part B: will focus on DG ECHO's **Partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross** globally.

2.1. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa is characterised by a plurality of crises, both protracted and acute, which continue to affect a significant number of people, resulting in widespread food and nutrition insecurity, and severe protection risks leading to large-scale forced displacement both within and across borders. Drivers of displacement include armed conflicts, intercommunal violence, natural disasters compounded by climate change, increasing desertification and land degradation, and recurrent epidemics plus livestock diseases and agricultural pests. Many crisis-affected people lack livelihood opportunities and live in extreme poverty, whilst access to basic social services is often inadequate or absent. This situation has been compounded by the multidimensional impact of the CoVID-19 pandemic on the region. Overall, around 22 million people are in immediate need of humanitarian assistance in the region.

- Conflict and Displacements



Conflicts in the Horn of Africa are dynamic and cause forced displacement within and across every national border in the region. The South Sudanese crisis has led to massive displacement within the region, with over 2.25 million refugees. The region still hosts over 2.6 million refugees. Uganda is the


largest refugee hosting country in Africa with over 1.42 million refugees, of whom about 882,058 are coming from South Sudan. Refugees and host communities are sharing the same resources.

Ethiopia is the third largest refugee hosting country in Africa with over 770 000 individuals, comprising South Sudanese (45%), Somalis (26%), Eritreans (23%), and Sudanese (6%) living in 26 refugee camps and out-of-camp / host community settings in peripheral regions of the country. However, a majority of people have been displaced within their own countries: around 2.6 million people are still internally displaced in Somalia and around 3.2 million are either displaced or returned (often forcibly) in Ethiopia.

The presence and intensity of conflicts in the region leave millions of people food insecure as a result of displacement and disruption of livelihoods. More recently, the restrictive preventive measures taken to limit the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic restrict the possibility to seek international protection in neighbouring countries and is, at time, instrumentalised to coerce people home.

- Populations affected by food insecurity and under-nutrition

The HoA is characterised by high levels of food insecurity, mainly triggered by the recurrence of natural and man-made disasters. After 2015/2016, years marked by drought and floods caused by El Niño, 2017/2018 saw a devastating drought affecting all



countries of the region, especially Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. The 2019 spring rainy season failed across the Horn of Africa, compounding the underperforming 2018 late rainy season. This led again to drought and severe food insecurity across the region, and further postponed prospects for recovery from the 2016-17 drought. In 2019 and 2020, the region was also affected by flooding, which

caused fatalities, displacement, and damage to infrastructure and cropland. In 2020, much of the flooding has occurred in areas that had been recently affected by floods, and were still recovering, hereby increasing the vulnerabilities and the number of people in need.

- Upsurge of Desert Locust

Since the end of 2019, there has been a rapid upsurge of Desert Locust in Eastern Africa, spreading across 8 countries at rates not seen in several decades. These [big swarms of desert locust](#) have impacted negatively the production season, as in their movements they have fed on the young green stages of crops, and on pastures. According to the September 2020 bulletin from the FAO the situation was still very serious in Ethiopia where an increasing number of immature swarms were forming from breeding in the northeast region of Afar. Some swarms had moved into the Amhara region, and cross-border movements by several swarms had been reported between Ethiopia and northwest Somalia. Immature swarms were increasing in northeast Somalia. With some 25 million people already food insecure in the

region, the desert locust upsurge represents an unprecedented threat to food security and livelihoods particularly for the most vulnerable population.

Since 2016, the overall humanitarian needs in the region across the different crises have been multiple and have accentuated some of the critical humanitarian needs to scales that are now beyond the capacity of humanitarian actors. Over the last years, DG ECHO's strategy has been focused on addressing the most urgent needs through life-saving interventions, using an early warning/early response in a no regrets approach.

Detailed data on risks per country and per year can be found on the INFORM Risk website: <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index> .

2.2. ECHO RESPONSE

DG ECHO has allocated resources to the region under the following Multi-country [Humanitarian Implementation Plans](#) (HIPs):

- ECHO/-HF/BUD/2016/91000, EUR **104,800,000**
- ECHO/-HF/BUD/2017/91000, EUR **227,250,000**
- ECHO/-HF/BUD/2018/91000, EUR **199,500,000**
- ECHO/-HF/BUD/2019/91000, EUR **163,000,000**
- ECHO/-HF/BUD/2020/91000, EUR **105,500,000** + EUR **25,000,000** from ECHO/-AF/BUD/2020/91000 for Uganda⁶¹⁴

These HIPs were complemented with additional funding mobilized through emergency funding tools and Disaster Preparedness budget line, etc.

Overall from 2016 to 2020, approx. 279 actions were funded through these different sources of funding.

2.2.1 Ethiopia

Ethiopia has evolved since 2016 from a humanitarian crisis mostly caused by climate-related shocks (drought and floods) and diseases to a complex emergency where humanitarian needs caused by conflicts and violence have been increasing in scale and highly politicized, while climate-related vulnerabilities remained very high and recurrent. Presently, Ethiopia faces three main types of humanitarian crisis: conflict (internal displacement and refugees), climate shocks (desert locusts, drought, and floods) and disease outbreaks (cholera, COVID-19).

The multiplication of different types of shocks affecting the same populations has further amplified their humanitarian needs. Violence/ conflict require a close follow-up of the political situation together with in-depth understanding of ethnic dynamics and of field

⁶¹⁴ In 2020, Uganda was part of the Upper Nile Bassin HIP which also covers Sudan and South Sudan

reality. The overall humanitarian operating model requires massive revamping not only in terms of rapidity in order to respond to acute / rapid onset shocks but also to ensure humanitarian principles are respected as this is essential in man-made crises and in a country where humanitarian assistance is often instrumentalised.

In the last few years, DG ECHO's priority in Ethiopia has been to provide life-saving assistance to populations affected by natural and, in the past 2 years, man-made disasters. DG ECHO, prioritises the most acute and recent needs. In the case of displacement, assistance to new influxes (refugees or IDPs) is a priority. ECHO also supports cash interventions that are contributing to mitigating COVID-19 impact on food security and livelihoods of most vulnerable populations.

Total contracted (2016-2020)	Approx. 260M EUR for 84 actions
Main sectors funded	Food security and livelihoods, Nutrition, WASH
Main partners	WFP, IOM, UNICEF

2.2.2 Djibouti

Djibouti is faced with chronic extreme dry climate, widespread and severe poverty, food insecurity and acute malnutrition. Continuous conflict and drought-related displacements from neighbouring countries (Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia) are creating additional pressures on already overstretched basic social services. Djibouti is hosting a steady number of refugees and has become the epicentre of a complex migration crisis (so-called Eastern corridor). With the roll-out of the CRRF, EU development funding has been increasingly used to support services in refugee camps.

In the last few years, interventions funded by DG ECHO in Djibouti have been mainly focused on supporting newly arrived and protracted refugee populations as well as vulnerable migrants with response to core humanitarian needs in camps, including basic needs such as access to WASH services and food assistance, or protection activities. DG ECHO's emergency funding was also used to address epidemics (cholera) and flash floods.

Total contracted	Approx. 3,5M EUR for 11 actions
Main sectors funded	WASH, Food security and livelihoods
Main partners	NRC, WFP, IOM

2.2.3 Kenya

Kenya continues to host almost half a million refugees and asylum seekers, who remain fully dependent on international humanitarian assistance, in view of the ongoing encampment policy and the limited possibilities for durable solutions, including voluntary return and local integration. In addition, Kenya is regularly affected by climate-related events and, since late 2019, by the worst desert locust upsurge in the past 70 years, primarily impacting the most vulnerable households in remote areas. Kenya also faces recurrent conflict caused by competition over limited resources, as well as insecurity, especially near the borders with Somalia and Ethiopia. The recurrence of these different shocks undermined households' coping capacities.

DG ECHO's support for Kenya has focused on basic survival services (food assistance, WASH, health-nutrition, protection and education) for refugees and asylum seekers (including the undocumented) living in camps. Additionally DG ECHO has mobilised support during drought situations, floods and the desert locust upsurge, focusing on lifesaving needs for the populations affected by the unfolding crisis in the hardest hit areas.

Total contracted	Approx. 80M EUR for 48 actions
Main sectors funded	Food security and livelihoods, Protection, WASH
Main partners	WFP, CROIX-ROUGE, UNHCR

2.2.4 Somalia

Somalia represents one of the most serious and complex humanitarian crises in the world. The country suffers for decades of armed conflict between the Government, regional security forces, and Al-Shahab, but also compounded by recurrent inter-clan fighting. These conflicts cause massive displacement, mostly internally and more limited across borders, civilian casualties, destruction of property and decimation of livelihoods. Restricted access and high insecurity are major challenges for aid agencies and result in widespread protection risks for the Somali population.

Somalia is also severely affected by climate change in the form of more frequent droughts and floods. With limited or no time for recovery, people's ability to cope with any additional shock is highly constrained. Crop failure and accelerated decline in livestock productivity and trade have rapidly pushed communities in many parts of Somalia into acute food insecurity and high levels of chronic poverty. Against a background of widespread poverty, it is now also facing the worst desert locust infestation in 25 years and a rapidly escalating CoVID-19 outbreak.

EU humanitarian funding is and has been supporting emergency response through life-saving activities to the most vulnerable people, particularly people recently displaced by acute crises or exposed to high levels of food insecurity or outbreaks of epidemics. The use

of unrestricted cash has been very much encouraged in Somalia along the past 5 years, particularly to cover basic needs and in response to food security and floods emergencies. Since 2018, Education in emergencies, and more specifically, recently displaced out of school children has also been an important priority for EU humanitarian funding.

Total contracted	Approx. 330 M EUR for 92 actions
Main sectors funded	Food security and livelihoods, Multi-purpose cash transfer, Health
Main partners	CONCERN WORLDWIDE, WFP, ICRC

2.2.5 Uganda

Uganda hosts the largest refugee population in Africa. Around 62% of the refugees in the country are from South Sudan. Constant conflict reactivations in South Sudan and DRC are pushing thousands of people on a yearly basis to flee their home country and seek refuge in Uganda. The sheer number of refugee arrivals since 2017 has put Uganda's progressive refugee policy under pressure. Today, the EU provides humanitarian funds to help address the needs of more than 1.42 million refugees who have settled in Uganda and their host communities.

Uganda continues to be a disaster prone country recurrently affected by epidemics (Marburg, Ebola virus disease) and natural disasters such as droughts and floods.

Since 2014 with a peak in 2017, EU humanitarian aid has focused on providing rapid and effective emergency assistance to recently arrived refugees. EU funding helped humanitarian organisations to provide protection, shelter, food assistance, healthcare, access to safe water and sanitation services, and education assistance to refugees and their host communities. In addition, and due to the profile of the country, the EU has supported Uganda's preparedness and response to natural hazards and epidemics.

Total contracted	Approx. 180 M EUR for 44 actions
Main sectors funded	Food assistance, multi-purpose cash, , Protection, WASH, Health, Education in emergencies, Disaster Preparedness (DP) (since 2018)
Main partners	WFP (Food assistance) UNHCR (health and protection); DRC (multi-purpose cash); Save The Children (Education); Oxfam (WASH); IRC (Health); IFRC/DCA/IRC (DP).

2.2.6 Nexus opportunities with other services

In all the countries covered by the Horn of Africa HIP, the European Development Fund (EDF) was the main EU instrument to provide external development assistance. The 11th EDF covers the period 2014 to 2020 with substantial resources programmed for food security

and resilience. In November 2014, the EU, the countries of the Horn of Africa and transit countries launched a regional cooperation framework for dialogue on migration to enhance cooperation, focusing in the first phase on human trafficking and smuggling, known as the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative or "Khartoum Process". The **"EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa"** (EUTF for Africa) and especially its [Horn of Africa "window"](#) has been one of the main sources of funding for several countries in the region, for instance in Somalia.

The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is also funding several projects in the region. A full mapping of activities funded can be found on the following website: <https://icspmap.eu/>

2.3. DG ECHO – INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

2.3.1 Introduction

Established in 1863, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) operates worldwide, helping people affected by conflict and violence and promoting the laws that protect victims of war. An independent and neutral organisation, its mandate stems essentially from the Geneva Conventions of 1949. The ICRC's humanitarian mission, as an "impartial, neutral and independent organization" rooted in international humanitarian law (IHL), is "to protect the lives and dignity of people affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence and to provide them with assistance". The ICRC is part of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Its headquarters are located in Geneva and it is present in more than 90 countries, with over 18,000 staff members working around the world. In 2019, ICRC's largest operations were in Syria, South Sudan, Iraq, Nigeria and Yemen.

2.3.2 DG ECHO's partnership with ICRC

The ICRC is one of the oldest and most important partners of DG ECHO, with a unique mandate under IHL and often one of the few organisations with access to hard-to-reach conflict-affected areas. DG ECHO and the ICRC have developed over the years an excellent and privileged partnership, both in terms of advocacy and operational support.

The [Framework Partnership Agreement](#) applicable to the period covered by the evaluation was signed by ICRC and the European Commission in 2014 and specific arrangements were agreed in 2015 on simplified proposal drafting and reporting, as well as specific provisions on information sharing and visibility.

Middle East Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot

At the World Humanitarian Summit, the world's major humanitarian donors and aid organisations signed the Grand Bargain. Its main objective was to improve the way humanitarian aid is delivered by making it more effective and efficient, thereby reaching more people in need. In line with these objectives, the Commission has been seeking to develop new and more strategic ways of working with main humanitarian partners.

In 2018, DG ECHO signed a "Grand Bargain pilot" with ICRC in the form of a two-year multi-sectoral programme in the Middle East (encompassing Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq and Yemen) with a strong protection component and reinforced operational dialogue at headquarters and field level. The initial amount was EUR 125 million over two years. The pilot has been extended with an additional allocation of EUR 50 million for a third year (ending on 31 December 2020).

ICRC is one of DG ECHO's most significant partners also in terms of funding. In 2017, around EUR 128 million were provided as financial support to ICRC operations; in 2018 EUR 138 million and in 2019 EUR 129 million. Following the signature of the Grand

Bargain contract mentioned in the paragraph above, the total funding of EUR 175 million was allocated in three tranches (2018, 2019 and 2020). According to the ICRC annual report, in 2019 the European Commission was the fifth largest donor of the ICRC, after the US, UK, Germany and Switzerland.

1. Figure 1 Contract Amount signed by Partner (by consumption year)

2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
167.162.500,00 €	128.190.000,00 €	138.062.100,61 €	129.700.000,00 €	97.720.000,00 €

DG ECHO's partnership with ICRC was last evaluated in 2006. The report can be found [here](#).

ICRC strategic orientations

The period covered by this evaluation (2016-2020) encompasses two ICRC institutional strategies adopted by the ICRC assembly. Specific objectives for each strategic orientation described in the table below can be found on the ICRC website.

ICRC Strategic orientations 2015–2018	ICRC Strategic orientations 2019-2022
1. Strengthen the ICRC's capacity to protect through law, operations and policy	1. Influencing behaviours to prevent violations of IHL and alleviate people suffering
2. Enhance the ICRC's distinctive response to growing needs	2. Building relevant and sustainable humanitarian impact with people affected
3. Secure the widest possible support for ICRC action	3. Working with others to enhance impact
4. Contribute to a more significant response by the Movement to large-scale emergencies	4. Creating an inclusive and diverse working environment
5. Adapt and strengthen organizational capacities to sustain growth and the continued relevance of ICRC action	5. Embracing the digital transformation

It should be noted that DG ECHO held the chairmanship of ICRC's Donor Support Group (DSG) for the period of June 2018-June 2019. DG ECHO's chairmanship of the DSG focused on two priority areas: 'Digital transformation as part of humanitarian action' and 'How to preserve IHL and the humanitarian principles in a counter-terrorism environment'.

2.3.2 Interventions funded by DG ECHO globally and specifically in the Horn of Africa

An initial analysis of DG ECHO's humanitarian project database recorded more than 100 actions carried out by the ICRC with financial contributions from DG ECHO for a total value of over EUR 600 Million globally, and about EUR 50 Million in the region covered by the HoA HIP, during the evaluation period – figures to be confirmed in the course of the evaluation. The ICRC is one of DG ECHO's major humanitarian partners in the Greater Horn of Africa with an important presence in Somalia and South Sudan but it should be noted that a substantive part of the partnership is also focused on other regions, specially the Middle East. Globally ICRC activities funded by DG ECHO were mostly focused on the three following sectors: Food security and livelihoods, Protection and Health.

For the Horn of Africa HIPs, the sectors in which ICRC operated in the region during the evaluation period were mainly food security and livelihoods (EUR ~25,500,000), Health (EUR ~16,500,000), WASH (EUR ~7,000,000), and protection (EUR ~2,800,000). Outside the HoA HIP and looking at the greater Horn of Africa region it should be also noted that ICRC is a major partner in South Sudan with actions funded for approx. EUR 50 Million.

2.4. COVID-19 RESPONSE

In February 2020, through its humanitarian aid funding, the EU was among the very first to respond to the World Health Organization's Coronavirus Response Plan. €30 million of direct funding was allocated to meet the most pressing needs in some 10 countries already facing humanitarian crises, in line with the EU's priority to have a global, coordinated response to support countries most at risk, based on assessment and needs.

In view of the magnitude of needs, an additional amount of €50 million was made available on 20 May to help vulnerable people facing major humanitarian crises due to the coronavirus. Furthermore, in order to facilitate the delivery of relief items and facilitate the movement of aid workers, the temporary EU Humanitarian Air Bridge was set up.

In the [Horn of Africa the humanitarian situation has been further aggravated by the Covid-19](#) pandemic, as countries affected in the region were taking restrictive measures (confinement, airport closure, etc.). This pandemic and its effects have, in turn, worsened the situation of the different countries, and will continue to do so, as current humanitarian responses might be hampered, slowed down or adapted. Needs will increase in the months to come, particularly for the health sector, but also for other sectors such as WASH, and, due to the economic impacts, food and nutrition.

3. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

3.1. PURPOSE AND GENERAL SCOPE

Based on Art. 30(4) of the Financial Regulation and Regulation (EC) 1257/96, the purpose of this Request for Services is to have a combined, independent evaluation, covering the period of **2016 – 2020**, of

- the EU's humanitarian interventions in **the Horn of Africa**; and
- DG ECHO's **partnership** with the **International Committee of the Red Cross**.

The evaluation should provide:

- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's interventions funded under the multi-country HIP “Horn of Africa”, covering the evaluation issues of **relevance, coherence, (EU) added value, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability**. This analysis should help to shape the EU's future approach in the region.
- A retrospective assessment of DG ECHO's partnership with the ICRC globally (not restricted to actions in the Horn of Africa region), with a focus on identifying lessons learned and good practice, in particular taking into account the lessons learnt from the MENA partnership during the period 2018 – 2020.

A maximum of **5 prospective, strategic recommendations** to support ECHO's future actions in the Horn of Africa and a maximum of **3 prospective, strategic recommendations** to support its partnership with the ICRC. These strategic recommendations could possibly be complemented by further, related, operational recommendations.

The main users of the evaluation report include inter alia DG ECHO staff at HQ, regional and country level, national and regional stakeholders, the ICRC and other partners, other humanitarian and development donors and agencies.

The evaluation should take account of relevant existing evaluations and studies from the European Commission and its partners, such as (non-exhaustive):

- *Comprehensive Review (CR) of 2016-17 DG ECHO Horn of Africa (HoA) Drought Response*
- *DG DEVCO: Strategic Evaluation of EU cooperation with the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean regions 2008-2015*
- *Evaluation report of the ECHO-ICRC partnership, 2006*
- *Ethiopia: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2012-2017)*
- *Somalia: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2012-2017)*
- *Ethiopia, Satellite Index Insurance for Pastoralists (2017-2019): WFP Impact Evaluation*
- *Ethiopia, WFP Fresh Food Voucher Programme: an Evaluation 2019*
- *Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Drought Response in Ethiopia 2015 – 2018, IAHE/IASC, by Dr. J. Steets, C. Meier, D. Berhanu, Dr. S. Tsehay, A. H. Abreha, November 2019.*
- *IRC report: The double burden of COVID-19 and locusts in East Africa (2020)*
- *2019 Ethiopia: Formative evaluation of UNICEF Ethiopia Country Program Evaluation Report*
- *Unicef 2018 Kenya: Real Time Evaluation on Emergency Drought Situation Response in Kenya, 2017*

3.2. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The conclusions of the evaluation will be presented in the report in the form of evidence-based, reasoned answers to the evaluation questions presented below. These questions

should be further tailored by the Evaluator, and finally agreed with the Steering Group in the inception phase.

Part A: Specific questions focusing on DG ECHO's intervention in the HoA

Relevance

1. To what extent did the design and implementation of EU-funded actions take into account the needs of the most vulnerable population, in particular women, children, elderly and disabled people? *Specific assessment should be provided of the refugee response strategy in Ethiopia and Uganda. The contractors are also invited to develop an analysis of how well did DG ECHO address host communities in the design of its strategy and funding decision-making.*
2. To what extent was a clear and context-adapted regional strategy designed and applied in the Horn of Africa? *(Link with section 3.3, task #4)*
3. To what extent were EU-funded actions timely and sufficiently flexible to allow partners to have an adapted response, including to new crises?

Coherence

4. To what extent was DG ECHO's response in the Horn of Africa aligned with:
 - a. DG ECHO's mandate as provided by the Humanitarian Aid Regulation,
 - b. The European Consensus on humanitarian aid,
 - c. The humanitarian principles, and
 - d. DG ECHO's relevant thematic/sector policies? *There should be a specific focus on cash and voucher policy.*
5. a) In the context of the triple Nexus and coordination instruments, what measures were taken by DG ECHO to contribute to the coordination with EU's development and peace actions, and how successful were these measures to enhance resilience of the beneficiary populations to new shocks? *(Link with EQ11)*
b) To what extent was DG ECHO successful in coordinating its response with the response of other donors, including EU Member States, and by that avoiding overlaps and promoting synergies?

EU Added Value

6. What was the EU added value of DG ECHO's actions in the region during the evaluation period?

Effectiveness

7. To what extent were DG ECHO's objectives (as defined in the HAR, the Consensus and the specific HIPs) achieved in the Horn of Africa? What concrete results were achieved during the evaluation period? *There should be a specific focus on the results achieved by resilience programming and livelihoods support.*

8. How successful was DG ECHO through its advocacy and communication measures in the Horn of Africa in influencing other actors by direct and indirect advocacy on issues like humanitarian access and space, respect for IHL, addressing gaps in response, applying good practice, and carrying out follow-up actions of DG ECHO's interventions?

Efficiency

9. To what extent did DG ECHO achieve cost-effectiveness in its response? What factors affected the cost-effectiveness⁶¹⁵ of the response and to what extent? *For this EQ contractors are invited to develop specific judgment criteria considering access limitation but also the digitalisation of tools for cash and voucher assistance.*
10. Was the size of the budget allocated by DG ECHO to the Horn of Africa HIPs appropriate and proportionate to what the actions were meant to achieve?

Sustainability/Connectedness

11. To what extent did DG ECHO shock responsiveness safety nets approach contribute to improve sustainability of its interventions? What could be further done (enabling factors, tools, mechanisms, change in strategy, etc.) to strengthen links to interventions of development actors? *(Link with EQ4)*

Part B: Specific questions focusing on DG ECHO's partnership with the ICRC

12. How well aligned were DG ECHO and the ICRC in terms of
- a. needs assessments and vulnerability analyses?
 - b. priorities, strategies and objectives?
 - c. advocacy priorities and efforts, including in terms of IHL?
13. To what extent did a structured, strategic, timely and functional dialogue take place between the two partners, and by what means? At operational level, how this partnership was understood and put into practice?
14. To what extent did the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership succeed in:
- a. maximising efficiencies and decreasing management and related costs, including administrative burden?
 - b. improving cost-effectiveness in their response?

For this EQ, the contractors are invited to develop judgement criteria and indicators integrating the Middle East Grand Bargain Programmatic Partnership Pilot.

15. To what extent did the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership contribute to

⁶¹⁵ The methodology applied for responding to this question must be based on the Cost-effectiveness guidance for DG ECHO evaluations, which is to be adapted to and applied proportionally to the current exercise.

- a. An improved exchange of information/cooperation between both partners and with other humanitarian actors?
 - b. Enhancing the impact of activities, notably in the protection sector
 - c. Enhancing advocacy efforts on the protection of civilians and compliance with IHL
16. To what extent did the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership ensure timeliness and flexibility of response? *Attention should be given to the following cases in view of drawing lessons learnt: Greater Horn of Africa and the MENA pilot programming exercise from 2018 to 2020.*
17. To what extent did the joint communication actions between ICRC and DG ECHO fulfil their purpose?

3.3. OTHER TASKS UNDER THE ASSIGNMENT

The Contractor should:

1. Draw up separate **intervention logics** for DG ECHO's interventions in each country covered during the evaluation period;
2. Define and analyse **DG ECHO's portfolio** of actions, during the evaluation period,
 - a. for the Horn of Africa HIP (including projects funded and other actions), and;
 - b. for actions implemented **by the ICRC** globally;
3. Identify the **main lessons learnt**
 - a. from DG ECHO's intervention in Horn of Africa in the different sectors covered (Food Assistance, Nutrition, WASH, coordination, Protection, ...);
 - b. for the DG ECHO-ICRC partnership in general, including a specific attention to the MENA pilot partnership;
4. Include an **analysis on possible approaches** to implement a more integrated and regional programming in the Horn of Africa;
5. On the basis of the research carried out for responding to the evaluation questions, and at a general level, identify the main factors **limiting the success of the projects** funded in the country over the period covered by the evaluation;
6. Provide a statement about the **validity of the evaluation results**, i.e. to what extent it has been possible to provide reliable statements on all essential aspects of the intervention examined. Issues to be referred to may include scoping of the evaluation exercise, availability of data, unexpected problems encountered in the evaluation process, proportionality between budget and objectives of the assignment, etc.;
7. Make a proposal for the **dissemination** of the evaluation results;
8. Provide a French **translation** (in addition to the English version) of the executive summary of the Final Report;

9. Provide an **abstract** of the evaluation of no more than 200 words.

4. MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF THE EVALUATION

The Evaluation Sector of DG ECHO is responsible for the management and the monitoring of the evaluation, together with the DG ECHO Units responsible for the evaluation subjects, i.e. ECHO.D1 and ECHO.D3. Other DG ECHO Units working with ICRC will also be involved on an ad hoc basis during the course of the evaluation to facilitate the consultation process and information gathering. The DG ECHO Evaluation manager is the contact person for the evaluator and shall assist the team during their mission in tasks such as providing documents and facilitating contacts. The Evaluation manager assigned to the evaluation should always be kept informed and consulted by the evaluator and copied on all correspondence with other DG ECHO staff.

A Steering Committee, made up of Commission staff involved in the activity evaluated, will provide feedback on the evaluation exercise, and discuss the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. ICRC staff will be consulted through all stages of the partnership evaluation component to ensure the highest possible participation, quality of the approach and robustness of findings.

5. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

5.1. METHODOLOGY

In their offer, the bidders will describe in detail the methodological approach they propose in order to address the evaluation questions listed above, as well as the tasks requested for both parts of the evaluation.

This will include a proposal for indicative **judgment criteria**⁶¹⁶ that they may consider useful for addressing each evaluation question. The judgement criteria, as well as the information sources to be used in addressing these criteria, will be discussed and validated by the Commission during the Inception phase at a workshop facilitated by the evaluator. This workshop will also give the evaluation team the opportunity to refine the evaluation questions, which will have to be included in the inception report, discuss the intervention logic, and analyse external factors at play.

To the extent possible the methodology should promote the participation in the evaluation exercise of all actors concerned, including beneficiaries and local communities when relevant and feasible.

⁶¹⁶ A judgement criterion specifies an aspect of the evaluated intervention that will allow its merits or success to be assessed. E.g., if the question is "To what extent has DG ECHO assistance, both overall and by sector been appropriate and impacted positively the targeted population?", a general judgement criterion might be "Assistance goes to the people most in need of assistance". In developing judgement criteria, the tenderers may make use of existing methodological, technical or political guidance provided by actors in the field of Humanitarian Assistance such as HAP, the Sphere Project, GHD, etc.

The conclusions of the evaluation must be presented in a transparent way, with clear references to the sources on which they are based.

The evaluator must undertake a number of **field visits**, to be proposed in the tenderer's offer and agreed in the inception phase. The set of field visits will have to take into account COVID-19 travel and meeting limitations but also the security situation in the Horn of Africa, particularly in view of the 2021 Ethiopian and Ugandan general election, and the postponed Somalian elections that will take place in 2021 as well. Security affects to a lesser extent Uganda.

The tenderers are also invited to foresee travel to other regions to meet ICRC staff and beneficiaries outside the countries included in the HoA HIP, for instance in the greater Horn of Africa region, in the MENA region but potentially also in South America. In the current context, the evaluation team will have to show a high degree of flexibility regarding the dates and modalities of the field visits, and back-up plans should be provided in the tenderer's offer, addressing the risk of not being able to carry out field visits at all due to health and security problems.

DG ECHO has a regional field office in Nairobi and country office in Addis Ababa and Kampala, which will provide a certain level of support to the evaluation team, mainly in the form of information and advice on practical issues like accommodation, transport and the like. It will not be able to provide direct support like organising their transport. As a contractor to the European Commission, the evaluation team should be entitled to use the services of [UNHAS](#) (against a fare). There are also commercial flights available to move around the region. The evaluation team will be responsible of catering for their own protection and security.

5.2. EVALUATION TEAM

In addition to the general requirements of the Framework Contract, as referred to in section 10.1 below, the team should include experts with previous evaluation experience in Eastern Africa. Additionally, it is recommended that the team should have experience assessing institutional partnerships and a solid knowledge of ICRC.

The contractors are invited to present two sub-teams, one for each part of the combined evaluation, and to include expertise from beneficiary countries to build on local knowledge and enhance flexibility during the fieldwork phase in case of limited international travel.

6. CONTENT OF THE OFFER

- A. The administrative part of the bidder's offer must include:
1. The tender submission form (annex C to the model specific contract);
 2. A signed Experts' declaration of availability, absence of conflict of interest and not being in a situation of exclusion (annex D to the model specific contract – please use corrected version sent by e-mail on 12 April 2018).

B. The technical part of the bidder's offer should be presented in a maximum of **30 pages** (excluding CVs and annexes), and must include:

1. A description of the understanding of the Terms of Reference, their scope and the tasks covered by the contract. This will include a graphic reconstruction of the intervention logic of the Commission's humanitarian activities concerned. It will also explain the bidder's understanding of the evaluation questions, including a first proposal of judgement criteria to be used for answering the evaluation questions and the information sources to be used for answering the questions. The final definition of judgement criteria and information sources will be validated by the Commission during the inception phase;
2. The methodology the bidder intends to apply for this evaluation for each of the phases involved, including a draft proposal for the number of case studies to be carried out during the field visit, the regions to be visited, and the reasons for such a choice. The methodology will be refined and validated by the Commission during the desk phase;
3. A description of the distribution of tasks in the team, including an indicative quantification of the work for each expert in terms of person/days;
4. A detailed proposed timetable for its implementation with the total number of days needed for each of the phases (Desk, Field and Synthesis).

C. The CVs of each of the experts proposed.

D. The financial part of the offer (annex E to the model specific contract) must include the proposed total budget in Euros, taking due account of the maximum amount for this evaluation. The price must be expressed as a lump sum for the whole of the services provided. The expert fees as provided in the Financial Offer for the Framework Contract must be respected.

7. AMOUNT OF THE CONTRACT

The maximum budget allocated to this study is EUR 300 000.

8. TIMETABLE

The indicative duration of the evaluation is **8 months**. The duration of the contract shall be no more than **9 months**).

The evaluation starts after the contract has been signed by both parties, and no expenses may be incurred before that. The main part of the existing relevant documents will be provided after the signature of the contract.

In their offer, the bidders shall provide a schedule based on the indicative table below (T = contract signature date):

Timing	Event
---------------	--------------

January 2021	Kick-off
T+1 week	
T+3 weeks	Inception workshop
T+5 weeks	Draft Inception Report
T+6 weeks	Inception meeting
T+11 weeks	Draft Desk Report
T+12 weeks	Desk Report meeting
T+14 – 17 weeks	Field visits
T+18	Draft Field Report
T+19	Field Report Meeting
T+27 weeks	Draft Final Report
T+29 weeks	Draft Final Report meeting
T+34 weeks	Final Report

9. PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK TENDER SPECIFICATIONS

- 1) **Team composition:** The Team proposed by the Tenderer for assignments to be contracted under the Framework Contract must comply with Criterion B4 (see Section 5.2.4 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract).
- 2) **Procedures and instructions:** The procedures and instructions to the Tenderer for Specific Contracts under the Framework Contract are provided under Section 6 of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract.
 - Sections 6 – 6.4 are fixed and must be fully taken into account for offers submitted in response to Requests for Services. E.g. the **Award Criteria** are presented under Section 6.2.2;
 - Section 6.5 is indicative and could be modified in a Request for Services or discussed and agreed during the Inception Phase under a Specific Contract.
- 3) **EU Bookshop Format:** The template provided in Annex M of the Tender Specifications for the Framework Contract must be followed for the Final Report. Any changes to this

format, as introduced by the Publications Office of the European Union, will be communicated to the Framework Contractors by the Commission.

10. RAW DATA AND DATASETS

Any final datasets should be provided as structured data in a machine readable format (e.g. in the form of a spreadsheet and/or an RDF file) for Commission internal usage and for publishing on the Open Data Portal, in compliance with Commission Decision (2011/833/EU)⁶¹⁷.

The data delivered should include the appropriate metadata (e.g. description of the dataset, definition of the indicators, label and sources for the variables, notes) to facilitate reuse and publication.

The data delivered should be linked to data resources external to the scope of the evaluation, preferably data and semantic resources from the Commission's own data portal or from the Open Data Portal⁶¹⁸. The contractor should describe in the offer the approach they will adopt to facilitate data linking.

⁶¹⁷ If third parties' rights do not allow their publication as open data, the tenderers should describe in the offer the subpart that will be provided to the Commission free of rights for publication and the part that will remain for internal use.

⁶¹⁸ For a list of shared data interoperability assets see the ISA program joinup catalogue (<https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/catalogue/repository/eu-semantic-interoperability-catalogue>) and the Open Data Portal resources.

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The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - ECHO

ECHO Mission

The primary role of the Directorate-General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) of the European Commission is to manage and coordinate the European Union's emergency response to conflicts, natural and man-made disasters. It does so both through the delivery of humanitarian aid and through the coordination and facilitation of in-kind assistance, specialist capacities, expertise and intervention teams using the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM)



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