



CENTER ON  
INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION

# **Building on Brahimi**

## Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty

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*Lead Authors:*  
Dr. Bruce Jones, Richard Gowan, and Jake Sherman

*With contributions from:*  
Rahul Chandran, Victoria DiDomenico,  
Benjamin Tortolani, & Teresa Whitfield

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# Executive Summary

**The politics of peacekeeping: crisis and opportunity.** United Nations peace operations face an extended and dangerous period of strategic uncertainty. A series of setbacks have coincided with military overstretch and the financial crisis, raising the risk that UN peacekeeping may contract, despite high demand.

Much would be lost if it did. UN peacekeeping has proved to be a versatile tool for deterring or reversing inter-state conflict, ending civil wars, mitigating humanitarian crises, and extending state authority in areas where state capacity is weak or contested. Mediation and peacekeeping have contributed to an 80% decline in total armed conflict since the end of the Cold War. Not all operations succeed, or succeed in full. But to meet future challenges, both individual operations and the peacekeeping system as a whole require continued political, military and financial commitment by states and institutions.

That necessitates distinguishing the symptoms from the causes of the current crisis of confidence in peacekeeping. Symptoms include long delays in deploying troops, reversals on the ground, personnel overstretch at headquarters, mounting financial pressures, and diffuse attention in the Security Council.

The causes are two-fold. First, operationally, peacekeepers have been sent to larger, tougher settings, straining management and command systems; and they have been staying longer, substituting for post-conflict recovery mechanisms not yet well adapted to purpose. Second, politically, peacekeepers are deployed where peace processes have collapsed, or where there is no real consent from the state; and all this against a backdrop of divisions at the UN stemming from the Iraq intervention debates.

The good news is that a broad majority of UN Member States still see the importance of making peacekeeping work, and work better. Moreover, several of the major and rising powers have renewed interests in peacekeeping – including China, which has expanded its contributions, and the US, where the new administration has signaled that effective peacekeeping is a priority in its multilateral policy.

Broad support for UN peacekeeping is important because an assessment of future conflict trends suggests rising not falling demand, and increased not decreased complexity. New operations will likely face opposition from hardened and sophisticated ‘spoilers’, sometimes with international backers, and be called upon to play a primary or supporting role in extending the authority of weak or contested governments. Capacity and political factors ensure that much of the upcoming demand will land on the shoulders of the UN.

To meet these challenges, UN peacekeeping will need a new coalition of support. Over the past decade, the Security Council has had the shared political vision to authorize ambitious and robust operations; financial contributors have been willing to pay the rising bill; and troop contributors, critically from South Asia, have contributed troops based on a combination of prestige, financial reward and capacity.

All three factors are now in doubt. There are constraints on political consensus, funds and personnel – unless addressed, these are all likely to grow worse in future. A coalition that crosses institutional boundaries at the UN could bring joint focus on: *effectiveness* – there is no point in peacekeeping if it does not perform against clear goals; *efficiency* – the financial crisis will amplify demands for more efficient use of resources, including through non-military options where feasible; and *equity* – maintaining political support for peacekeeping will require sharing the burden and more closely aligning decision-making to risk-taking.

**Peacekeeping and the alternatives – strategy, mandates and resources.** The decision to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation should follow a considered discussion of strategic options, and rigorous analysis of alternatives. These include: mediation missions (Middle East); mediation and coordination missions (Afghanistan); civilian observers (Nepal, Nuba mountains in Sudan); civilian observers with over-the-horizon protection (OSCE in Kosovo); military observers (Israel-Syria); police, training and rule of law missions (Balkans); logistical support to and oversight of national police capabilities (Chad); preventive deployments

(Macedonia); and partnership with multi-national forces (Timor-Leste) or Member State supported forces under UN command (Lebanon summer 2006.)

The UN also has the option of partnering with other organizations (NATO, EU, AU, OSCE, CIS). Lessons from past partnership operations suggest that these work best when there is a shared political framework, a sharing of personnel, and joint planning mechanisms. Partnerships with the EU and the AU look set to deepen – this will require greater predictability (of deployments, and of financing in the case of the AU.)

Whatever the strategy and mode of operation, well crafted mandates matched to political strategy and resources matched to mandates are critical determinants of success. These were central lessons of the ‘Brahimi report’, largely abided by from 2000 to 2005 but neglected of late – with the consequence rising tensions between the Security Council, troop contributors, and the Secretariat. Such tensions could be ameliorated by investment in informal and semi-formal modes for strategic dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States. One such mode: the political and military advisors of Member States could perform a vital “challenge” function to Secretariat drafts of missions’ concept of operations (ConOps.) This, with two caveats: that that process include not just Security Council members but key troop contributors; and that the Secretariat retains the right to propose, and with it (as Brahimi also emphasized) the ability to say ‘no’, or ‘yes, if.’

‘Yes, if’ is a particularly important response when the Security Council is contemplating peacekeepers for missions where one actor on the ground implacably opposes negotiated settlements. Opposition from non-state actors does not intrinsically transcend the limits of peacekeeping; international support to a recognized and viable state is another form of ‘a peace to keep’, one that UN peacekeeping operations have supported through ‘extension of state authority’ operations. These missions are hard, however; and in each case where the UN has pursued extension of state authority as its baseline stance its forces have been either led or supported by states with advanced military capabilities, operating within unified command structures (e.g., France and Italy in Lebanon 2006, UK in Sierra Leone 1999, Brazil within MINUSTAH in Haiti 2006, the EU in DRC) Opposition from the state is a different challenge altogether, which arguably does transcend the limits of UN peacekeeping – witness the strategic muddle that constitutes UN engagement in Sudan.

Alternatives to heavy peacekeeping should not be viewed as easy options, however. Making them work requires rapid deployment and strong political backstopping from the Security Council. Both are aided if states with advanced military capabilities contribute more directly to UN operations. It is no disservice to leading troop contributors to say that greater contributions are required from other states if (i) a sufficient supply of specialized assets is to be maintained; and (ii) a political consensus on peacekeeping is to last.

**Delivery on the ground – and preparing for exit.** Strategy, mandate and resources are one part of the challenge; delivery on the ground is another. Here, a central issue is that mission functions have proliferated in recent years, and this has impeded prioritization. In Part III of this report, we lay out a common sense framework for thinking about priority roles for missions and others involved in early recovery. These are grounded in a key conclusion from lessons learned: that the basic condition for exit of an *international security* presence is the consolidation of *national political* institutions and processes.

Missions contribute to that goal in three core ways. First, through *transitional security* functions, designed to create and secure space for politics – including by guaranteeing ceasefires, demobilizing combatants, observation, protection of civilians, and defusing tensions. Second, through support to national *political institutions* and processes – helping to implement a peace agreement, or extend state authority, or both. Third, missions are playing growing roles, with others, in laying the foundations for secure development by supporting security sector reform and fostering *rule of law* institutions. International support to the rule of law is in its infancy though, and a hard look at policy and organizational division of labor is warranted.

Although political stability is the acid test of progress, it can be reinforced by early economic, social and institutional recovery. Performance in the terrain of early recovery (for which we propose a common sense

definition) requires broad collaboration. Some critical goals of broader early recovery efforts include restoration of effective *public finance management*, sometimes neglected but vital to the functioning of government; *economic recovery*, especially in the provision of jobs to youths and restoration of the agricultural sector (often neglected); *delivery of social services*, preferably by local government, often with support from NGOs or UN agencies; and *capacity building* in the civilian arms of the government.

Early recovery would be enhanced by: (a) building (small) standing teams to *support mission leadership* for the coordination of early recovery; (b) *improved strategic planning*, possibly through adaptation of a 'light' version of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy alongside existing post-conflict needs assessment processes; and (c) *closing the gap in financing* for early activities: through donor reform, and expanded use of the Peacebuilding Fund to support political and rule of law activities of missions. Also needed is greater creativity and flexibility in coordination models; to date, the focus on integration of UN mechanisms has displaced a focus on *integration of strategy*, which requires deeper engagement especially with the international financial institutions.

**Managing and supporting operations.** If UN peace operations are to fulfill their mandates effectively on the ground, they must be managed efficiently as enablers of Member States forces, be able to protect staff, deploy more rapidly, and sustain a strong sense of Member State engagement with missions.

Adaption of management systems could increase the speed with which the UN can deploy. Slow deployment, especially in the first year of operations, hobbles missions' performance at a time when political and security needs are often greatest. Two obstacles to rapid deployment will have to be tackled: procurement rules that are ill suited to fast-moving arrangements in the field; and a logistics/budgeting system that is mission-specific rather than global or regional. Investment in information technology (IT) systems is necessary if the UN is to move towards an ability to present to Member States an overall picture of the distribution of resources at a global level.

Adaption of management systems is necessary also to protect both military and civilian personnel of missions. This requires effective political strategy, use of technology to track and assess risk, and sometimes deliberate force protection. Commercial progress in information technology for threat monitoring and assessment has changed the options available to the UN, but training and doctrine have not kept pace. Investment in training and more deliberate use of Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) and equivalents could improve performance.

More rapid, more flexible operations will also require reforms to UN command and control mechanisms. These are much stronger than commonly assumed, and stand up well to a side-by-side comparison with NATO and the EU. Nevertheless, there are three weaknesses in UN command systems viewed through the lens of future challenges: they do too little to sustain political support for risky operations; they cannot manage regional processes; and they are insufficient to handle strategic capacities, such as over-the-horizon or rapid reaction forces, should those be available for UN operations – as we argue below they may be. It would be detrimental to curtail the UN's decentralized command system too much – the flexibility and civilian-led qualities of the system cannot be sacrificed lightly. However, it may be necessary to increase the ability of Headquarters to adjudicate decisively in inter-mission disputes and green-light high-risk operations. There is also a case for renewing Member States engagement in monitoring and sustaining missions, either through 'Friends' groups; high-level political conferences; or formalized operational advice.

**Moving Forward – a three-track strategy.** Coping with current pressures while building an ever more effective mechanism will require action along three tracks - which can operate in parallel, at different speeds.

*Track 1 – Concerted action on hardest cases.* Collective support to peacekeeping will be severely weakened if there are significant gaps between expectations and performance on the cases that attract most political scrutiny. Three sets of cases warrant priority attention from the Secretariat and major troop and financial contributors.

- **Large peacekeeping operations.** The Secretariat, the UNSC, and key troop and financial contributors should launch informal strategic dialogues to align political process, peacekeeping and resources in major peacekeeping operations – especially the DRC and Somalia. DPKO should prioritize these efforts.
- **Preparing for exit.** Overstretch is generating pressure to advance the schedules for exit from Haiti, Timor-Leste and Liberia. While the question must be assessed case by case, the prospects for responsible exit would be enhanced in each case, and overall costs reduced, by three sets of commitments: *enhanced economic support*; *political oversight*, perhaps through new PBC country-specific mechanisms; and *security guarantees* – in the form of pre-authorized and pre-committed rapid reaction or over-the-horizon forces, provided by Member States or regional organizations. Advanced commitment to return rapidly in the face of deteriorating conditions can have an important deterrent effect. The World Bank/UNDP could lead efforts in these cases with DPKO/PBSO.
- **Political cases.** The UN’s mediation and political performance in three cases – the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq – will heavily shape the strategic environment and support to the UN. The SG and DPA should prioritize support to and oversight of performance in these political missions.

*Track 2 – Institutional reforms: revitalizing and modernizing Brahimi.* On a separate track, the Secretariat should initiate those reforms that are within its remit, through its ‘New Horizons’ action plan; and engage with Member States in the Security Council and General Assembly on those requiring new authorities or new financing. The Security Council has already begun to examine its own performance through the UK/French initiative and the Peacekeeping Working Group. Although no formal coordination of these processes is required, movement both on the Member State and Secretariat tracks will add salience to each effort.

Priorities for institutional reform include:

- Increased investment in pre-training and pre-equipping forces for UN deployment (building on the existing work of the G8-based Global Peace Operations Initiative);
- Giving DFS the ability the necessary budgetary authority for advance procurement of standard components of mission start up (which involves regulatory change), including transport;
- Investment in logistics systems that move past mission-by-mission to global or more likely region-by-region (using hubs);
- Addressing the civilian capacity gap through (small) standing teams and predictable centers of capacity/excellence;
- Member State investment in police reserves and Rule of Law personnel for the UN;
- Investment in the management systems (including IT) to manage this;
- Adjusting the decision-making relationship between UN headquarters and the field to ensure that choices on risky operations have full political support;
- Developing innovative structures to allow Member States to engage with operational decision-making on a mission-by-mission basis, without compromising UN command and control.

*Track 3 – Strategic efforts.* Making peacekeeping more effective and more efficient will require those Member States with the most advanced operational capabilities to wield them more consistently in support of UN operations. This is necessary if UN peacekeeping is to meet the challenge of new, complex missions in contexts of hardened spoilers, regional conflict dynamics, extremist groups, or if UN peacekeeping is to perform more consistently and more effectively in such functions as extension of state authority. It will require greater consensus between governments on the limits and possibilities of peace operations, as neither current or potential force contributors will offer personnel or assets unless they have confidence in how they will be employed.

Member States could explore initiatives including some or all of the following:

- Authorization of commitments for pre-training of forces for deployment into UN operations (again, potentially building on the work of the Global Peace Operations Initiative);
- Enhanced commitments for tactical and strategic airlift;
- Revisiting the question of financing for stand-by forces (under national command) for UN operations for those Member States that have expressed an interest in making such forces available;
- Direct major power participation in UN peacekeeping – even small contributions can have both operational and political ‘multiplier’ effects;
- Joint initiatives by the P5 and other major powers to bolster stand-by and rapid reaction forces for the UN, including through use of UNIFIL-style arrangements that fuse Member State support and UN-commanded capacities (so-called ‘green/blue’ options).

Although these issues have been on the agenda since the Brahimi Report of 2000, the political space for deliberation about them at the UN has been sharply constrained ever since. Notwithstanding the contradictory pressures of the financial crisis, 2009 provides a new political moment in which to review these issues and make at least some forward progress on them.

We believe that movement on the strategic track should start with an informal process among Member States, with input from the Secretariat but not led by it. If Member States are to make the kind of sustained commitment that the challenges ahead call for, they will have to feel concrete ownership of the proposals. That could take the form of a ‘Friends of UN Peacekeeping’ mechanism, or a Task Force. It would ideally be launched with the encouragement of the Security Council during or before the 2009 General Assembly.

**Conclusion.** Movement on the strategic track should be constructed in a manner that reflects the UN’s main strategic advantage as a peacekeeping actor: it is the only organization through which the forces of the P5 and all the major powers, including the rising and regional powers, can jointly participate in providing stability. Western-based mechanisms like NATO and the EU are implementing Security Council mandates in important cases, and regional organizations like the AU offer critical advantages in their respective areas. Nevertheless, only the UN offers the option of a political diverse but operationally capable mission – but only if the P5 and other major powers invest in UN operations.

# Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty

## Introduction

United Nations (UN) peace operations face an extended and dangerous period of strategic uncertainty. Since the end of the Cold War, global peacekeeping has undergone cycles of expansion and contraction. After a round of boom and bust in the 1990s, UN operations expanded through the last decade, as did those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU) and other organizations. But a series of set-backs have coincided with military overstretch and the financial crisis, raising the risk that UN peacekeeping may contract once more.

Much would be lost if it did. UN peacekeeping has proved to be a versatile tool for deterring or reversing inter-state conflict, ending civil wars, and mitigating humanitarian crises. UN operations have also started to play important roles in the extension of state authority in areas where state capacity is weak or contested. Not all operations succeed, or succeed in full. But both individual operations and the peacekeeping system as a whole require continued political, military and financial commitment by states and institutions. Even an optimistic forecast of future conflict trends suggests that demand for global peacekeeping will rise, not fall.

How will that demand be met? What types of operation and mandates will be necessary? Will supply meet the demand? What role will the UN play relative to other institutions and coalitions? What capabilities will it need? What are the limits of UN-commanded operations, and what are realistic alternatives?

This report addresses these and related questions to forecast some aspects of the likely future of UN peacekeeping over the next five to seven years. It is necessarily speculative and raises issues not easily discussed in formal settings. The paper is not normative or prescriptive. It sets out a series of politically charged challenges and choices, but aims to be as objective as possible in its assessments.

In projecting high demand for peacekeeping, this report identifies six factors that are likely to complicate operations in the next 3-7 years:

- A particular need for the UN and other organizations to undertake operation, sometimes in large-scale theaters with limited infrastructure, requiring robust “expeditionary” capabilities;
- Likely opposition from hardened and sophisticated ‘spoilers’, often with international backers (state and non-state) in both internal and inter-state contexts;
- Further pressure on peacekeepers to play a primary or supporting role in extending the authority of weak or contested governments;
- Complex and divisive politics not only within conflict settings but also at the regional and international levels about conflicts and the interests and values involved in resolving them;
- Major financial and political obstacles to increasing supply among existing troop contributors to the UN, requiring reinforcements from diverse sources;
- The fact that NATO’s operations in Afghanistan will, likely for the next 3-5 years, sharply constrain the capacity of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) contributors to mount or lead Multi-National Force (MNF) operations, limiting the alternatives to robust UN peacekeeping.

The convergence of these trends requires a multi-track response from the UN Secretariat and Member States. Alternatives to peacekeeping, drawing on political and civilian options, must be fully utilized where conditions allows. When peacekeeping operations are needed, they must be sufficiently resourced and mobile to operate in challenging environments – and have the political sophistication and coherent mandates to assist states to extend their authority responsibly, respecting international norms. Flexible models that combine UN,



Member States and regional capacities (while maintaining unified command) will be increasingly relevant. The Secretariat will need to develop the managerial and logistical structures necessary to sustain more complex missions running in parallel.

In achieving these goals, the UN must continue down a path mapped by the 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* – better known, and henceforth referred to as, the “Brahimi Report” or just “Brahimi”. The UN Secretariat has made progress on meeting that Report’s recommendations, but still has a great deal of unfinished business, especially in the areas of procurement and human resources, information technology (IT) (where the Brahimi recommendations need updating) and command and control. Meanwhile, the Security Council and Member States also made great headway in implementing the Report’s vision after its release, but recent decisions have fallen short of the political and strategic approach to peacekeeping advocated by Brahimi. Both Secretariat and states would profit from re-alignment with key Brahimi principles.

A strategic approach to UN peace operations must take into account three overarching contextual factors highlighted in this report. First, peacekeeping can only ever be one part of the response to conflict. This study looks beyond the internal dynamics of peacekeeping. It touches on political mediation and early recovery from conflict, and examines how best missions can support wider recovery efforts and vice versa. In the absence of such efforts peacekeeping risks being futile.

Second, when it comes to peacekeeping itself, a focus on the UN – as in this paper – should not detract from the fact that the organization operates in the context of a multi-actor system encompassing NATO and regional organizations. Developments in the politics, ambitions and capabilities of these actors will affect the UN’s role.

Third, for the past decade, peacekeeping has run on a coalition based on three premises: that the Security Council has the shared political vision to authorize ambitious and robust operations; that financial contributors are willing to pay the rising bill; and that troop contributors, critically from South Asia, will continue to contribute troops, based on a combination of prestige, financial reward and capacity.

All these premises are now in doubt. There are growing tensions over decision-making around peacekeeping that risk creating mistrust between troop contributors, members of the Security Council and the UN Secretariat. Ironically, all three sides are motivated by concerns over control of operations. The Secretariat and troop contributors are wary of micro-management of operations by the Security Council, while the Council and some troop contributors question the efficacy of the UN command and control. These tensions come into focus in the 2008 crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in which all sides blamed each other for the UN’s slow and ineffectual response. Clashes such as this have the potential to do lasting damage to peacekeeping, because all sides – not only the Security Council – can undermine operations by withdrawing their support or troops or money.

Fortunately, there is still a general desire to make peacekeeping work across the full spectrum of UN members. The DRC crisis stimulated a series of initially unconnected but increasingly interactive efforts by various stakeholders to review their own performance and generate an agenda for reform. This report is one contribution to this wider process.

We argue that, in addition to revitalizing reforms rooted in the Brahimi Report, UN operations require a new coalition between Member States – with the Secretariat as a proactive partner. This should involve joint responsibility for three aspects of peacekeeping:

- *Effectiveness* – there is no point in peacekeeping if it does not perform against clear goals;
- *Efficiency* – the financial crisis will add significantly to a pre-existing demand for more targeted use of peacekeeping resources, and more efficiency within operations;

- *Equity* of response – maintaining political support for peacekeeping over time will require sharing the burden more consistently and more closely aligning decision-making to risk-taking.

These conclusions derive from an assessment in four parts.

First, we examine the symptoms of peacekeeping's current malaise and its causes. We assess progress on the Brahimi Report's agenda and outline the current limits of peacekeeping, both with respect to expeditionary logistics and with respect to the need for political consent. We highlight conclusions from an examination of potential future demand and assessment of potential supply. (More detailed versions are in Annex 1.) We outline what we believe are the essential features of a coalition capable of sustaining peacekeeping at these limits.

Second, we explore the interaction between security and politics in shaping strategy; lay out a number of alternatives to heavy peacekeeping; and set out key lessons learned from partnership operations (particularly with the EU and the AU) that form a growing part of the peacekeeping business. Then we turn to the critical challenge of matching resources to mandates, and explore mechanisms for informal strategic dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States that could generate better results. (Readers primarily interested in the politics of peacekeeping will want to focus on these first two parts.)

Third, we examine the priorities for peace operations in the field, highlighting key deliverables: in providing transitional security of a variety of forms; in securing and fostering national political dialogue; and in helping national authorities 'take the force out of politics', by supporting security sector reform and the rule of law. We review the roles of missions in coordinating international efforts across the wider early recovery effort, and the challenge of integrating political, security and economic strategy – and briefly touch on key reforms in the broader post-conflict architecture that would enhance this.

Fourth, we address the management of complex operations: examining the deployment of troops, civilians, and leaders; command and control; human resources, staff security, and the IT infrastructure required these; effective oversight and reporting; and finance. (This section is particularly relevant for those directly engaged in managing operations.)

Fourth, we analyze the question of how to connect peacekeeping reforms to the broader array of conflict management tools. We highlight five particular factors affecting performance in the field: the management of political processes; the development of better tools for early recovery from conflict; the provision of rule of law support, and the sequencing of peace and justice initiatives; and the need for more effective integration of strategy and effort. (This section is relevant for readers interested in a comprehensive account of the UN's role in conflict management.)

Drawing on these four sections, finally, we propose a way forward: a three-pronged strategy that would address the immediate challenges to current operations; allow for a resumption of institutional reforms; and lay the foundation for a strategic transformation of peacekeeping to ensure that future UN operations are operationally robust and politically credible.

As we draft this report, the Secretariat and Security Council have been buffeted by reversals and the financial crisis alike. The atmospherics suggest an agenda of doing less. But looking ahead, we see growing not shrinking demand and rising complexity. This report thus calls for doing more – but doing it more effectively and more efficiently, and with greater equity in sharing the burden. The alternative is that conflict and humanitarian suffering will rise, as will threats to regional and international peace and security.

# Part I. The politics of peacekeeping: Crisis and opportunity

## The functions and value of peacekeeping

Between 1992 and 2006 the total armed conflict worldwide declined by 80%. Major wars declined by 40%.<sup>1</sup> This was partially attributable to the end of the Cold War.<sup>2</sup> But it was facilitated by – and might have been impossible without – a huge expansion of international mediation and peacekeeping. During the Cold War, the UN launched 18 peacekeeping missions. Since 1990, it has launched 50, alongside an even greater number of mediation efforts. Some of these efforts ended in failure, most horrifically in Rwanda. Mediation efforts fail four times more often than they succeed.<sup>3</sup> One in three countries that have emerged from civil war have relapsed back into violence. But UN and non-UN operations alike have scored successes, primarily through performing three sets of functions:

- *Assisting countries transition from civil war to stable governance.* As recent analysis has shown, the presence of a peace operation reduces the chances of a post-conflict country returning to war by 70%.<sup>4</sup> This has become the UN's "core business" over the last two decades. Successes include Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador – and, more recently, Sierra Leone and Burundi. NATO and EU operations in the Balkans have played similar roles. UN operations in cases such as Liberia and Haiti remain incomplete, but have provided enough sufficient security to permit gradual progress towards stability. The UN also has unique experience in the executive administration of states and territories – in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Kosovo and Timor-Leste.
- *Reducing tensions across borders.* Although overshadowed by its involvement in intra-state conflicts, UN peacekeeping continues to play a role in preventing inter-state war. This is most true in the Middle East. Since 1974 the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) has helped stabilize relations between Israel and Syria, and a multi-national force still observes the Israel-Egypt border. In 2006, the UN Mission in Lebanon (UNMIL) expanded to secure the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel and support the government.
- *Mitigating humanitarian crises.* In addition to contributing to conflict resolution and prevention, peace operations often provide a framework within which humanitarian agencies and NGOs can aid the vulnerable. The deployment of a peace operation may also pressure combatants in unresolved conflicts to at least limit their violence. The presence of peacekeepers has not brought peace to Darfur but all sides know that they are under international (and media) scrutiny – violence has remained below earlier levels. And despite setbacks in DRC, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which the absence of peacekeepers would not have allowed worse violence. It is very difficult to define "success" in such situations, but at least worse atrocities have been averted.

These sets of functions are not mutually exclusive, and are often mutually reinforcing. UN missions involved in ending civil wars are often drawn into inter-state affairs: its operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire were set up to resolve crises within those states, for example, but soon found it necessary to cooperate on cross-border security issues. Conversely, its mission in Lebanon is not only concerned with border security but also assists the Lebanese government and armed forces in extending their authority in the south – in addition to humanitarian activities like mine clearance.

In fulfilling these tasks, UN and non-UN peacekeeping has been recognized as a strategic tool in the maintenance of international peace and security. Peacekeeping has also grown exponentially – collectively, peacekeeping organizations have almost 200,000 troops in the field, and the UN has more troops on active service under its command than any other actor except the U.S. military. Peace operations are not merely deployed in response to low-stakes and low-intensity conflicts, but have been mandated to play a role some of the most urgent crises of our time. In Afghanistan, Lebanon and Sudan, NATO, the UN and the AU have

missions of major strategic significance. Contributing to peace operations has become a sign of international responsibility: this is as true for the African governments that deployed to Darfur and the European states that rushed troops to Lebanon as for China, which has shifted from non-involvement in peacekeeping to an growing role.

In spite the importance of these efforts, peacekeeping currently faced a crisis of confidence. Some of this is warranted, some of it a reflection of other failures. Improving the performance of peacekeeping necessitates distinguishing the symptoms of this crisis – in various forms of overstretch – from its causes, which lie as much in political as operational problems.

## Symptoms of the current crisis


Throughout the last year, some of the largest UN and non-UN peace operations faced challenges that posed new questions about the viability of peacekeeping. In Darfur, the deployment of UN forces was severely delayed in 2008. In the DRC, peacekeepers were unable to fend off rebel attacks that displaced over 200,000. In Afghanistan, NATO has struggled to contain the Taleban. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, tensions left unresolved by long-term peace operations regained political prominence. In Georgia, UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers neither mandated nor equipped to influence events were sidelined by the military clash between Georgian and Russian forces. In Haiti, where there has been much progress towards stability in recent years, that progress seemed threatened by stalled economic recovery. The UN has also faced calls to deploy a mission to Somalia – where a small AU force is presently deployed – that many observers feared would prove unmanageable.

It is not surprising that individual peace operations are required to handle serious crises. That is their purpose, even if international institutions and governments play down the risks. But there have been enough common factors in the crises of the last year to suggest that the whole peacekeeping system (including UN and non-UN operations) has become dangerously overstretched, and is underperforming.

Warnings of peacekeeping overstretch had circulated well before 2008 (the authors of this report first used the phrase in 2006, on the basis of data showing that the UN was finding it increasingly difficult to deploy operations in a timely manner). However, it can be broken down into three main sets of challenges: *(i)* personnel overstretch; *(ii)* financial overstretch; *(iii)* headquarters overstretch.

### *Personnel overstretch*

The military dimensions of overstretch are the easiest to quantify. The UN is the largest institutional provider of peacekeepers worldwide, accounting for 50% of global peacekeeping deployments. Currently, nearly 80,000 military personnel – and a further 12,000 police – are serving in 18 UN missions worldwide. The organization has nearly ten times as many personnel as it did a decade ago.



However, the UN is finding it increasingly difficult to find and deploy the personnel necessary for new missions. This is not only a matter of numbers: operations often face shortages of critical force enablers and force multipliers including airlift, helicopters and field hospitals. Even in cases where the UN has sufficient infantry to meet its needs, the absence of these other assets can severely slow down deployments, as the infantry lack the mobility, force protection and field support to operate. This problem has been particularly significant in South Sudan, Darfur, and the eastern DRC, disrupting these missions.


A shortage of such assets can also constrain deployed forces' ability to fulfill their mandated tasks, especially in the protection of civilians. Faced with risky conditions, some troop and police contributors are placing caveats on where or under what conditions their troops will operate.

Similar problems affect other organizations involved in peacekeeping. The AU has failed to meet its target of deploying 8,000 troops to Somalia. Even better-resourced alliances like NATO and the EU have had difficulty mustering sufficient assets – in particular helicopters. While NATO is now a close second to the UN in terms of troops deployed, and may surpass it in terms of numbers this year, only six of the twenty-six nations with troops in Afghanistan send them without caveats.

#### *Financial overstretch*

Although UN operations are cheap relative to those of an advanced military alliance such as NATO, which cost five times as much per capita<sup>5</sup>, their total cost has risen steadily. The budget for UN peacekeeping reached a record US\$8 billion in 2008-2009.<sup>6</sup> This marks a ten percent increase over the previous year and a five-fold increase in just under a decade. The peacekeeping budget is now three times as great as the annualized UN regular budget. As we note in Part IV, the combination of these costs with the financial crisis and political obstacles to funding in Member States is complicating the UN's peacekeeping finances, with governments increasingly likely to fall into arrears.

The UN's peacekeeping budget must be set in context of rapidly rising costs at the EU, the AU and NATO. Many of the large contributors to the UN budget also underwrite these organizations, both through paying for their own forces under NATO or EU command and making substantial voluntary contributions to AU operations.



Their ability and willingness to cover the UN's costs will be weighed against these other priorities during the financial crisis. Globally, the net budget for peace operations almost certainly exceeds \$30 billion.<sup>7</sup> Questions are likely to be raised about the expense of long-running missions, creating pressure to draw them down.


#### *Headquarters overstretch*

The hardest dimension of overstretch to quantify is its effect on command and control structures, but these are obviously vital to successful operations. The UN has a decentralized command structure, with decision-making powers vested in the mission leadership in the field. This arrangement of autonomous political and military control, with modest backstopping from New York, was designed in response to traditional operations where the challenges faced were largely political in nature. In empowering Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) to craft context-specific strategies, the system has often served the organization well.

It is not certain, however, that this system is well-adapted to sustaining large-scale missions in complex threat environments. SRSGs and force commanders sometimes struggle to maintain authority over large forces: the general appointed to the DRC resigned shortly before last year's crisis, citing a lack of intelligence, plans and reserves. Decisions on high-risk operations – such as the 2008 police operation in Mitrovica (Kosovo) in which a policeman died – are often taken without sustained discussion with headquarters, and thus without sufficient political support if they go wrong.

These dynamics have fueled debate about the appropriate management balance between UN headquarters and the field, which we address in Part IV of this report. One contextualizing point can be made here: although Secretariat capacity has expanded in recent years, its growth has been outpaced by the number and size of operations in the field, and even more so by the territorial scale of those operations.

**Growth of UN Peacekeeping Deployments and Headquarters Staff: 2005-2008**



Although the Secretariat bears the brunt of this form of overstretch, the Security Council is not unaffected. One recent source of tension between the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat was the question of timely and adequate reporting about the crisis in the eastern DRC. Had DRC been the only mission of scale and strategic importance on the Security Council's docket, Security Council Ambassadors would have been seized of issues like force disposition, logistical conditions and operational challenges. As it was, the Security Council was in fact largely pre-occupied with issues arising from Sudan, Somalia and Gaza, to say nothing on non-conflict briefs like Iran.

## Causes of the crisis: Operational problems

Military, financial and Secretariat overstretch are all symptoms of the current peacekeeping crisis. But they are not its causes. The roots of the crisis can be divided into two sets. The first is operational, concerning how missions are mandated and run. The second set, addressed in our next section is political, concerning how operations are legitimized on the ground and internationally.

The operational causes of the crisis include: (i) stalled reforms at UN headquarters; (ii) the scale and complexity of the UN's operating environments; and (iii) a failure to devise effective exit strategies for peace operations, linked to the UN and international community's lack of effective strategies to promote early recovery.

### *Incomplete reforms*

In 2000, the Brahimi Report set out an agenda of reforms for UN peacekeeping that remains only partially complete. After a slow start, significant elements of the Brahimi agenda were adopted between 2000 and 2005. However, the growth in operations coincided with more divisive politics at the UN after the start of the Iraq war, and this eventually slowed the momentum for change: reforms aimed at enhancing personnel quality, logistics and command and control all suffered. Efforts to develop “integrated missions” by linking all elements of the UN family to peace operations have been frustrated on the ground.

More recent reform efforts, such as the “Peacekeeping 2010” agenda and the fundamental reorganization of peacekeeping machinery launched by the Secretary-General in 2007, have yielded some initial benefits. The medium and longer-term impact of these initiatives - such as the creation of an Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) and Integrated Operating Teams (IOTs), and the publication in 2008 of DPKO’s first “principles and guidelines” – remains to be seen. UN staff caution that such alterations do not necessarily transform daily business: significant decisions are not regularly channeled through IOTs, for example. It remains unclear whether these reforms will gain traction over time.

The problems are compounded by the perception that the Security Council has also forgotten to observe the “rules” of Brahimi: the need to match politics to peacekeeping, and resources to mandates. After a period of improvement in Security Council performance on mandates and resourcing, some lessons have gone unheeded in recent Security Council debates, resulting in a negative attitude among UN staff towards the mandates they receive.

### *Problems of scale*

Delivering on mandates in the field is increasingly complicated by the nature of the operational theaters involved. The growth in the number of UN peacekeepers, and especially those in large-scale missions, has been offset by the size and logistical difficulty of the environments they deploy to. For example, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) at the start of this decade deployed 17,500 troops in a country of 28,000 square miles – a ratio of one soldier for every 1.6 square miles. The UN now has a similar number of troops in the gigantic DRC, with a ratio of one soldier for every 50 square miles.

**Ratio of Peacekeeping Troops to Country Size in Selected Operations**

Year Deployed	Country - UN mandated military mission	Troop/sq. miles
1999	Kosovo - KFOR	3.6 to 1
2006	Lebanon - UNIFIL II	3.4 to 1
1999	Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL	1 to 1.6
2004	Haiti - MINUSTAH	1 to 1.6
2003	Liberia-UNMIL	1 to 3.7
2001	Afghanistan - ISAF	1 to 4.03
2007	Somalia - AMISOM	1 to 30.3
1999	DRC - MONUC	1 to 48.6

In cases like the DRC, Chad and Sudan a lack of infrastructure exacerbates the problem of scale. Implementing complex mandates in such environments often leads to an excessive dispersion of forces, reducing the chances of effective responses to military challenges, especially where quick reaction forces and air assets are lacking. This problem is not confined the UN. NATO may have more sophisticated capacities, but has struggled to project security across Afghanistan. There are exceptions: the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has a relatively small space to cover but has tackled urban operations in Port-au-Prince. But from Nepal to Somalia, the UN is mounting operations that strain its logistics to the limit.

The strains on the UN are magnified by the fact that many states with advanced military capabilities deploy under its command highly selectively or not at all. Today, fewer than 2% of UN troops in Africa come from Europe or North America. Many countries' limited role in UN forces is offset by major contributions to UN-mandated missions through other organizations. But in purely operational terms, it constrains the UN's access to specialized military assets, and places a burden on a number of large contributors – most obviously India and Pakistan – to fill the “asset gap” in an increasing number of missions.

#### *Exit strategies: Transitioning to peacebuilding and development*

The challenges facing UN peacekeeping are not of peacekeeping's making alone. Limited as reforms to the peacekeeping system have been, they have outpaced efforts to overhaul parts of the UN and wider international architecture to foster economic recovery activities vital to sustainable peace. As CIC observed in its 2008 report *Recovering from War* those tasks fall to an “ad hoc and fractious groupings of bilateral and multilateral development actors who are not mobilized primarily to combat conflict...do not operate primarily in conflict zones...are under-resourced, and have limited authority vis-à-vis their in-country counterparts”<sup>8</sup>.

The consequence is that early initiatives to build a functioning government and to jump-start economic activity are frequently not launched. Local confidence in both local leaders and the international community suffers. In some cases, such as Haiti, the mismatch between peacekeeping and ineffectual recovery efforts creates a situation in which the peacekeepers cannot leave without renewed violence – a very poor reward for risk-taking by blue helmets.

### **Causes of the crisis: Political problems**

The operational causes of overstretch are acute, but they reflect deeper political causes of peacekeeping's current malaise. Those include (i) a failure to link peacekeeping to effective political processes, not least by the Security Council; (ii) problems of consent around UN missions, challenging long-standing assumptions about how UN peacekeeping functions; (iii) divisions between states and the Secretariat over the goals, limits and management of peacekeeping.

#### *Political process failures*

That peacekeeping cannot substitute for an effective political process was a central lesson of the Brahimi Report. “Political process” has a variety of meanings: it may include ongoing contacts between parties to a peace agreement; a democratic process involving elections or the approval of a constitution; or regional and international contacts on the status of a contested territory. Most UN operations are mandated to protect or sustain one or more such processes, and their utility varies according to the political progress they contribute to.

Many missions have had to operate in the absence of effective political processes. 2008 witnessed the failure or suspension of political processes in the DRC, Sudan, Georgia and Kosovo (though in the latter, the UN and EU did engender political progress at the end of the year). The UN and NATO missions in Afghanistan have suffered public dissatisfaction with the government they support, and must negotiate high-stakes elections this year.

All these cases highlighted the limitations of peacekeeping. In the cases of Darfur and DRC, the UN decided to hand responsibility for mediation processes to teams separate from the peacekeeping missions reducing the peacekeepers' leverage. Such divisions of responsibility may sometimes be necessary. But they can be problematic in that political judgments should determine the overarching strategy for UN operations, rather than being on a separate track. In the absence of viable political frameworks, UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed with high expectations, but without real consent from the host state or other parties to the



conflict. Full consent need not be a determinant of success of an operation - but its absence certainly adds to the challenge, the complexity and the likelihood of failure.

### *The challenge of consent*

The greatest single conceptual challenge for UN peacekeeping today may be defining how the principle of consent applies to modern operations. Consent, along with impartiality and non-use of force, is a core principle of UN peacekeeping doctrine, derived from Cold War operations – and reaffirmed in DPKO’s 2008 “principles and guidelines”. Yet over the last decade Security Council mandates have grown increasingly ambitious, especially around the use of force, and peacekeepers are deployed in theaters where they cannot expect the consent of all parties. In some circumstances, such as in the DRC, UN missions may be on collision courses with rebel groups with substantial external backing. Well-organized extremist groups have targeted UN forces in Lebanon and Darfur as part of their rejection of the West (in both, the attackers have targeted African as well as Western personnel).

More problematic still is the question of consent by host states themselves. Some UN missions have had to operate in the face of explicit withdrawals of consent by governments, as recently in Ethiopia/Eritrea. Others have had to contend with constraints on their actions as a price for continued consent, as in Darfur and Chad.

Such cases raise the problem of how far the UN can operate contrary to the will of a host government. This is not merely an operational problem, but a political one that goes to the heart of UN peacekeeping. It highlights divisions between states that emphasize the importance of sovereignty (including major troop contributors) and those that give humanitarian concerns and human rights precedence in some cases. These divisions are exacerbated by wider tensions over international intervention, which have poisoned debate at the UN since the Iraq war, eventually infecting what had been a strong consensus on peacekeeping. In particular, debates over Darfur were affected by a false but potent analogy between the idea of a UN presence in Darfur and the role of Western forces in Iraq – and the UN’s peacekeeping role there has since been complicated by arguments over the International Criminal Court’s indictment of President al-Bashir.

Indeed, the Darfur operation has encapsulated virtually all the obstacles to effective peacekeeping noted above. It is deployed in a vast space, lacks sufficient forces to handle that space, is overshadowed by international differences over its role, has no credible peace process to maintain – and does not enjoy the genuine consent of either the host state and many non-state actors. The consequence is that the UN has found itself in a strategic muddle, operating neither in an enforcement mode nor with a political basis for consent-based peacekeeping. Even with weak consent from the state the mission was able to mitigate the humanitarian crisis – but the limitations on even that mode of operation have been highlighted by the fact that it has not stopped Sudan expelling many NGOs from Darfur.

## **The extension of state authority**

Divisions over peacekeeping and sovereignty are misleading because **the majority of large-scale UN operations are deliberately designed to extend rather than limit the authority of states.** While diplomatic debate at the UN is still shaped by the legacy of Iraq, the Security Council is normally in the business of *strengthening* governments rather than changing regimes. This fact, often overlooked, is essential to explaining some recent successes and failures of peacekeeping – and may help guide future deployments.

The evidence shows that the extension of state authority, through military means and policing as well as civilian assistance, has become an core function of the UN peacekeeping. The UN’s large, multi-dimensional missions now frequently use (or at least project) force not merely to fend off direct attacks from spoilers, but as part of deliberate strategies to expand and secure the authority of a government in contested territories.

In Haiti, UN operations in Port-au-Prince have successfully given the government authority across the capital. In Chad, the Security Council mandated UN police to train and operate with Chadian police in refugee camps. In Lebanon, it is similarly mandated to assist the government extend its authority throughout the south – and has the military muscle to do so despite the potential limits to the consent to UNIFIL’s presence from Hezbollah. In DRC, the UN has mounted a series of operations designed to extend the elected government’s authority in the east. In spite this being an explicit part of its mandate, the force has not necessarily been fully equipped to perform this function, leading to confusion in fall 2008.

Nor is this an entirely new phenomenon. In 1999, at a decisive turning point for UN peacekeeping, the UN operation in Sierra Leone backed the government and national army when the Lomé Peace Accord collapsed, and the government was attacked by rebel forces. This operation, with vital UK support, helped salvage the tarnished reputation of UN peacekeeping and lay the foundation for the Brahimi reforms.

Missions often shift over time from having the implementation of a peace agreement as their base-line stance to extension of state authority as the central mission goal. This was certainly true of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 2006-7, after elections. It was true of earlier mission such as the UN Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), which was deployed to oversee implementation of a peace agreement but found itself helping to extend the authority of the state into the countryside after installation of the transitional government.

Military and police operations to extend a state’s authority fit with wider UN thinking on “statebuilding”. The concept of extending state authority and capacity is now widely accepted on the civilian side of operations and post-conflict peacebuilding (although the terminology is confused.) Unfortunately, neither UN missions nor the wider international community are well organized to rapidly and coherently deploy civilians in theatre to support this function – an issue we explore in Part III.

While there may be a parallel between civilian and military/police operations to extend state authority, there are self-evident differences between the two. The use of force still represents a different level and form of international commitment. And in the present moment, the concept is being pushed to its limits, as the UN is being asked to face increasingly daunting opponents, often with insufficient means.

Current debates about a possible UN peacekeeping operation for Somalia present an extreme case of what the extension of state authority may require. There are roughly 80,000 armed individuals in Somalia, but there loyalties are fluid, and it is unlikely that they will ever form a coherent coalition for or against a UN mission. Yet at the present time, factions deemed hostile to the UN control a large swathe of Somali territory, while the government (with an army of approximately 2,000 only) has control primarily in and around the capital. Additionally, there is a substantial threat from foreign fighters using Somalia for a proxy war. While deployment of a peacekeeping operation to extend the authority of the Somalia government is a conceptual possibility, it faces three key obstacles: the scale of the challenge would require UNIFIL-scale resources; a lack of international and regional confidence in the viability of the current Somali state has meant that no such concentration of troop contributors is available; and in the absence of a broader political settlement, there is some evidence that international forces would not just encounter resistance but exacerbate it.

Conversely, the last year has seen halting yet real progress towards a political settlement. It is possible that a viable peace – and, by extension, a viable Somali state – could emerge on two conditions. The first is sufficient political support to a national government from domestic actors, the UN and international community. The second is the deployment of a substantial international force against the backdrop of that political settlement to protect that government from inevitable spoilers and deter revolts. So long as those conditions do not apply (as they do not at present), the question of whether the Security Council decides to authorize a UN force for Somalia is secondary; the primary reality is that no one will contribute forces.

The odds of such an outcome remain doubtful. Yet it striking that, if these conditions were met, the political basis for a successful mission would be stronger than that now prevailing in Darfur. The Security Council’s

decision to deploy a force to Darfur without a sustainable peace deal or true consent of the state has left the UN in a worse quandary than its still-incomplete debates on Somalia.

The fact that earlier missions were able to use force decisively (or at least project it), while the mission in Darfur has been far more troubled, suggests that rather than talking about a ‘Mogadishu line’ in peacekeeping (deploying where there is no consent from some non-state actors) we should identify a ‘Darfur line’ that the UN peacekeeping cannot afford to cross: deploying where there is no (real) consent by the state. With only weak consent of the state missions may be able to mitigate humanitarian crises, but they will not be able to establish or sustain a political or security framework. Lack of consent by a *non-state* actor does not necessarily undermine the logic or support for peacekeeping, if there is a recognized state and a broadly supported political framework for that state’s extension of its authority in the country. Haiti’s gangs did not consent to the use of force to clear them from the slums of Port-au-Prince – but the operations against them have still contributed to peace.

## **The politics of peacekeeping: A new coalition?**

Operationally, effective extension of state authority operations cannot be undertaken without substantial advanced capabilities. In Haiti, Brazilian troops led by a Brazilian force commander were in the lead for Cité Soleil. In DRC, the rapid deployment of Operation Artemis in 2003 created a window for stability in the east of the country – although it also created false hopes of European support in all future DRC crises. Instead, India and Pakistan have played the role of military enablers – providing attack helicopters and conducting offensive operations – alongside African troops. In UNIFIL, European nations have provided logistics and intelligence, twinned with large Asian infantry contingents. This is true also of missions deployed to help implement peace agreements and/or protect civilians in large-scale territories where states have limited capacities.

Such combinations of forces are not available to all UN missions all of the time. They are glaringly absent from any potential mission to Somalia. However, cases from Haiti to Lebanon show that the UN should not fall prey to low expectations: the UN can provide the framework for ambitious missions with diverse troop contributors. The opportunities for them to do so will depend on two elements. First, it will depend on the extent to which the Security Council, UN Secretariat and wider international community can establish a viable political framework, either for support to the extension of state authority or in the form of peace agreements that are genuinely sustainable through peace operations. Second, it will depend on the balance between demand for such operations and the supply of forces.

### *Future demand for peace operations*

Part II of this report reviews the link between politics and effective peace operations. Our estimate of likely demand and supply is laid out in detail in Annex 1 to this report. In brief, however, we see the following factors affecting the medium-term future for the UN:

- Stable or slightly rising demand for peacekeepers in Africa; and potentially rising demand in the broader Middle East;
- Limited demand outside those regions – where existing political and economic frameworks look likely to be able to handle new sources of instability;
- A particular need for the UN and other organizations to undertake operation, sometimes in large-scale theaters with limited infrastructure, requiring robust “expeditionary” capabilities;
- Likely opposition from hardened and sophisticated ‘spoilers’, often with international backers (state and non-state) in both internal and inter-state contexts;


- Further pressure on peacekeepers to play a primary or supporting role in extending the authority of weak or contested governments – and the likelihood that rather than being separate concerns, regionalized conflicts and extension of state authority challenges will frequently coincide.

### Supply

The UN thus faces a complex variety of operational environments. Many are not suitable for large-scale blue-helmeted missions. In later sections of this report, we review potential models for light-weight UN missions (Part II) and review obstacles to effective civilian deployments (Part IV). But high ongoing and potential demand for UN military and police forces in Africa and the Middle East ensures that the supply of uniformed personnel is a recurrent and intensifying challenge.

The supply of military forces for UN peace operations necessarily rests on decision-making by Member States. Overall, their choices on UN commitments will depend on two factors:

- Overall global military capacity. The number of troops in peace operations today represents a miniscule percentage of all armies worldwide: 200,000 soldiers relative to a pool of over 14 million, or just over 1%.<sup>9</sup> But this figure obscures significant obstacles to increasing peacekeeping forces. The first is financial – and the situation will be exacerbated by the financial crisis. Second, the primary concern of many states remains their own defense. Over half the top twenty troop suppliers to UN operations border on at least one fragile state.
- Demand for forces by other organizations and coalitions. A further challenge for UN deployments is competition for resources from other organizations and coalitions. In many cases these are partner organizations operating under UNSC mandates. But a soldier or engineer under NATO command simply cannot serve in a UN-commanded mission simultaneously. And experience has shown that differences in command structure and standards can significantly complicate cooperation with non-UN forces.



In a context of limited supply, three sets of factors will likely shape states' choices as to whether to deploy through the UN or other platforms. First, *risks and rewards*: governments are inevitably motivated to deploy forces where they see their national security or interests at risk; conversely, states will also weigh the risks of casualties and potential rewards present in any theater. Second, *range and regionalism*: with the important exceptions of European forces under NATO and Asian forces under UN command, the majority of peacekeepers deploy within their region of origin or its immediate neighborhood. Third, *responsibility*: involvement in peacekeeping is a sign of international responsibility, as in China's growing commitment to UN operations and the efforts of AU members to tackle Darfur. States are also drawn to the incentive of responsibility within or over a mission. Countries that are given operational command positions in the field, or political decision-making power within institutions, tend to be more committed to operations. Brazil's leadership role in Haiti provides an example of both points.

### *The basis for a new coalition?*

The good news in all of this is a broad majority of UN Member States still see the importance of making peace-keeping work, and work better. Moreover, several of the major and rising powers have renewed interests in peacekeeping – including China, which has expanded its contributions, and the US, where the Obama administration has signaled that effective peacekeeping is a priority in its multilateral policy. Broad support for UN peacekeeping is important if the challenges ahead are to be met.

In resolving the range of challenges described in this section – from the purely operational to the deeply political - this report argues for (i) a revitalization of reform processes rooted in the central arguments (if not all the technical details) of the Brahimi Report; and (ii) a longer-term effort to build a new coalition combining states and the Secretariat to deliver efficiently and effectively on future missions. The logic for a new round of institutional and political reforms is set out below, with two main sets of priorities:

- **Secretariat reforms**, especially in the management of personnel, command and control, and logistics/procurement/IT – reforms that allow the UN to become a more effective enabler of Member States' forces;
- **Renewed UN Security Council attention to the lessons of Brahimi** – especially in matching peacekeeping to political process; and in matching mandates to resources.

Connecting these two is the need for more flexible interaction between key stakeholders in UN peacekeeping, especially in the design and oversight of operations, to more closely align decision-making with risk-taking.

The need for this interaction also points to the broader need for efforts to form a new coalition around peacekeeping, with goal of delivering effective operations through: (i) greater attention to alternatives to peacekeeping, including political and civilian operations (ii) sufficient logistical and procurement capacities for the rapid deployment and longer-term sustenance of peacekeeping missions; (iii) sufficient tactical mobility and specialized assets to give missions freedom of movement; and (iv) sufficient robust units and force protection.

Creating a coalition committed to these goals cannot be achieved through updating UN systems alone, but requires a series of political understandings and bargains if it is to succeed. These include a bargain between the Secretariat and Member States by which the Secretariat improves its peacekeeping mechanisms in return for an increased investment of resources by governments – and a bargain between current core contributors to UN missions and states currently absent from them, to ensure a sufficient supply of specialized assets and other necessary units to new missions.

In Part III below, we lay out reforms we believe are essential for the Secretariat to meet its side of the first bargain with Member States. Although these are complex, they essentially fall into three categories (i) developing more expeditionary and robust capabilities to support missions; (ii) overhauling staff systems to ensure the quick deployment of top-class civilians to support missions; (iii) encouraging Member States to engage more flexibly in mission management issues. However, it must be clear that the necessary reforms are not a matter for the Secretary-General e, but require the active approval and support of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

The second bargain – between Member States – must address the imbalances in UN forces that result in the UN's recurrent lack of specialized assets. This requires both the ongoing enhancement of current troop contributors' capacities – in many cases requiring multilateral or bilateral assistance – with new commitments to the UN by countries that have largely stayed away from its operations in recent decades. In blunt terms, this means increased African capacity building and increased western and major power involvement. But the

UN also requires continued engagement by (and political incentives to) those states, especially from Asia, that lead in filling the “asset gap” at present.

**Deployment of Peacekeepers 2009**

	Africa	Asia	Americas	Europe	Middle East
<i>Total Troops in Region</i>	65,000	54,000	7,000	18,000	17,000
<i>Origin of Troops</i>					
Africa	40%				6%
Americas	3%	42%	60%	10%	8%
Asia	46%	7%	30%		30%
Europe	9%	51%		90%	56%
Middle East	2%		10%		

We also believe that future operations require a renewal of the basic political consensus at the UN about the uses and limits of force – in defense of the mandate; in defense of the mission; in defense of civilians; and, crucially, in the extension of state authority. This might ultimately be encoded in a ‘strategic concept’ for UN peacekeeping – perhaps building on DPKO’s Capstone Doctrine process.

## **Part II. Peacekeeping and the alternatives: Strategy, mandates and resources**

In much of what follows, we examine the performance and requirements for peacekeeping operations with substantial military components. First, we explore lighter models. The decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation should follow a considered discussion of strategic options, reflecting country and region-specific realities. That strategic discussion should include rigorous analysis of the alternatives – including political missions, lighter operations and partnership operations. These options are not always available, however, and function only under certain circumstances.

Credible strategy grounded in political realities must in turn be reflected in the mandate of an operation – and resources matched to it. In some recent cases, Security Council mandates have been detached from realities on the ground; the Secretariat or Security Council have pursued strategies that have lacked political credibility; and missions have mustered resources insufficient for their tasks, especially during crucial initial deployment phases, when security functions of the mission may be in highest demand. The resulting tensions are particularly significant where large-scale military and police deployments are at stake.

Such tensions could be ameliorated by investment by the Secretariat and Member States in informal and semi-formal modes for strategic dialogue between the Secretariat and Member States. In this section, we review (i) the relationship between political and military factors in shaping successful strategies for peace operations; (ii) alternatives to heavy peace operations available to the UN, including through partnerships; (iii) the processes by which Security Council mandates are designed and resources matched to them, including options for enhanced strategic dialogue.

### **Strategy: Political and military factors**

If almost everyone agrees that UN peace operations must be based on coherent strategies, there is much less agreement over who should design on those strategies. Within the Secretariat, as is in all bureaucracies, turf wars at times displace or distort strategic discussion of options (though recent innovation in strategic assessment through the Policy Committee may help). More seriously, the relationship between the Secretariat and the Member States is unclear. Does the Secretary-General propose strategy for Member States to endorse or reject? Do inter-governmental bodies themselves undertake strategy? The reality is much messier: UN strategy is a product of multi-tiered negotiations between the Secretary-General (who will have to implement it); the Security Council (which will have to authorize it); General Assembly bodies (who will have to agree to pay for it); and relevant regional and international powers (who will have to back it if it is to work).

This process is further complicated by the fact that resources for operations and headquarters are split between the assessed budget (which pays for Security Council mandated operations), the peacekeeping support account (which pays for headquarters capacities to backstop peacekeeping), the regular budget (which pays for established political missions) and voluntary funds (for which the smallest, and least expensive responses – like political envoys – have to scramble.) Different scales of assessment for different types of action lead Member States to lobby for or against one mode of operation or another based on their relative scale of payment; lead departments to compete for lead roles in part on the basis of resources that then accrue to them; and result in the fact that mission support units housed in one department (e.g., Electoral Affairs Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions) are not properly resourced to backstop missions led by another department.

The most important factor in deciding the success or failure of any peace operation is the credibility of the political strategy it is meant to serve. Political strategies evolve over time. In Part III, we discuss integrating all aspects of post-conflict strategy around the objective of establishing or re-establishing national political processes and state authority – the only sustainable exit strategy for large-scale operations. When considering

whether to deploy at all, however, the Security Council should keep in mind that the most effective political strategies for concluding conflicts may be implemented through mechanisms other than a peace operation.

The last several years have witnessed a trend towards large-scale peace operations, both in the UN and other organizations. But cases from the Sudan to Afghanistan have shown the limits on what troops can achieve when the credibility of national political process or national government is weak. Recent research has emphasized that, in many positive cases, peace operations succeed thanks to effective mediation by their civilian leaders rather than simply by their military presence.<sup>10</sup> Of course, a military presence is sometimes a precondition for mediation, deterring ex-combatants and creating “political space” for cooperation. Yet in cases, political negotiation can result in self-sustaining peace deals, removing or reducing the need for troops.

Credible political process and credible military presence should reinforce one another. Ideally, they are inversely related: the more credible the political process, the less the need for a military presence.

Three factors complicate this equation. First, spoilers: as the Brahimi Report established, even where there is broad support for a political process, splinter groups, rogue actors or individuals may use violence to undermine the process, and missions must be able to respond to them. The spoiler problem is greater when (i) there are several parties to the conflict; (ii) spoilers include groups motivated by factors outside the immediate conflict, such as international terrorist networks; or (iii) spoilers include factions of a recognized government.

Second, politics is unpredictable. Even where there is broad support for a peace process up front, delays in implementation (a common feature of peace agreements), deferral of tough decisions, and unforeseen complications (such a leader’s death) can erode support for peace agreements, creating temptations for parties to return to war. An international military presence can deter them, and extend the chance of political negotiations resuming. In such circumstances, the need for military presence could be partially met on a ‘surge’ or over-the-horizon basis, rather than in-country capacity – but only if that presence is credible and predictable.

A third factor in the relationship between politics and international peacekeeping is legitimacy. Where forces are deployed as part of a peace agreement or political settlement (either a national process, or a Security Council process with broad support) that is widely viewed as legitimate, this will defuse potential tensions around their presence. Where this is not the case, forces may generate greater resistance and hostility.

Beyond these three factors, potentially present in all missions, lies the question of operating where “there is no peace to keep”: situations in which one or more party on the ground is implacably opposed to negotiated solutions. This may be true of rebel forces that profit from natural resource exploitation and have no conceivable political future in an organized government; terrorist organizations; of gangs and gang-lords. Our projection of demand for UN operations (see Annex 1) suggests that such opponents will be common in future.

We do not believe either that it is viable that such groups should be given a permanent veto over political processes - or that the Security Council will sit idly by in circumstances where such a group threatens the integrity of a recognized state or threatens that state’s civilians. Indeed, the Security Council and UN peacekeepers – as argued in Part I – have already shown both the willingness and an ability to shift from ‘implementation of a peace agreement’ as a baseline stance towards the ‘extension of state authority’.

Put differently: there are two forms of “a peace to keep”: (i) a viable political settlement between opposing forces; and (ii) international support to a recognized state, whose authority (within the framework of the rule of law) can be defended and extended. Either one has been shown to constitute a viable political strategy within which the UN can operate. Many missions shift from one mode to the other, especially after elections.



The second type of operation is obviously harder. In each case where the UN has pursued “extension of state authority” mode as its baseline stance, its forces have been either led or supported by states with advanced military capabilities.

This mode of operation is not always viable. Although it is exceedingly difficult to identify the precise characteristics of where it will and will not work, an essential factor must be the international community’s belief in the legitimacy and long-term viability of a state in need of support. The Security Council will not consider authorizing such options if the state in question does not enjoy a degree of international legitimacy. But this is also a question for troop contributors, who will not volunteer to undertake such an operation if they do not see believe the state involved can ultimately cohere, or if the support that the state enjoys is outweighed by the dangers of the operation. The fact that DPKO has virtually no volunteers for a potential mission in Somalia makes the point. Not only the Security Council but troop contributors have an effective veto over such operations - reinforcing our argument for a broad political coalition for peacekeeping.

## **Modes: Options other than heavy peacekeeping**

If the relationship between military peacekeeping and political mediation is complicated, the UN has considerable (if underestimated) experience in implementing peace agreements through mechanisms other than heavy peacekeeping. Yet both the Secretariat and the Security Council are often inclined to treat larger, military missions as a default option, even where operational circumstances are forbidding, as in Somalia and Darfur. Planning for UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was complicated by proposals from the Secretariat to deploy over 2,000 personnel, despite arguments from the field that only a few hundred were needed.

Political and observer missions take case-specific shapes. However, some basic types of mission are identified, and should be held in mind by the Security Council:

- **Mediation missions.** Standing missions devoted to mediation are suitable for the best and worst cases that face the UN: (i) those where there is a high level of consent and chances for mediation are good, reducing the need for military deterrence; (ii) cases where consent is absent and violence so high that peacekeeping is not a viable option, yet there is a need for some sort of political channel (as currently in Somalia). Given inevitable threats to such missions, it might be possible to deploy small protection contingents with them, although this has not been tried.
- **Mediation and coordination (integrated) missions.** In some cases, the UN may wish to integrate mediation activities with the delivery of humanitarian and development aid, to allow for common strategies. This option is useful in cases where other actors have a military presence but lack an integrated aid delivery mechanism of their own, as with NATO in Afghanistan.
- **Civilian observer missions and civilian inspections.** In cases where tensions take non-military forms – such systemic human rights abuses – the most effective way to monitor a peace deal may be through civilian observers. These may take the form of standing missions or routine inspections. This approach is not associated with Security Council-authorized missions: the work of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and, outside the UN family, the OSCE have been important. However, both actors face constraints, and the Security Council should consider civilian missions in future.
- **Civilian observers with protection.** Where civilian observation may be sensible but conditions are insecure, it may be possible to deploy a civilian observer force with a light military capacity to protect the observers. A further variant of this is civilian observation with over-the-horizon protection forces – as with the OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was backstopped by a US-managed over-the-horizon force. As that example showed, civilian observers cannot halt

deterioration in a situation; but they can provide the international community with real-time information on the situation on the ground.

- **Military observer missions.** Military observer missions are the oldest tool in the UN's operational toolbox, with 1940s missions to the Middle East and India/Pakistan pre-dating the launch of military peacekeeping. This option is often treated as outmoded – and the negative experience of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) shows its limitations. But military observation (armed or unarmed), sometimes alongside civilian/electoral observers and political mediation, can be a flexible light-weight tool, as in the Nepali case and the Joint Military Commission in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan (2002-5), which successfully covered 80,000 square kilometers with just 20 uninformed personnel. But, as the recent Nordic mission in Sri Lanka attests, military observers alone cannot forestall a return to conflict.
- **Police observation/training and rule of law missions.** In cases where public order is a recurrent problem, it is possible for the UN to deploy police training/monitoring missions – an option used by the UN in Haiti and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the later 1990s, and more recently adopted by the EU in the Balkans, DRC and Afghanistan. The creation of the joint UN-Guatemalan Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CIGIC) to investigate illegal security groups and promote the rule of law points to the potential utility of rule of law/police missions in countries where there is no need for a peacekeeping presence. Mechanisms like this have preventive potential: if state requests UN support in developing their police or rule of law capacity or in bolstering it, providing support can help prevent the descent into violent conflict. There are both formal obstacles - such as questions over the necessary legal and institutional basis for such support - and capacity obstacles to this, but the issue warrants exploration.
- **Logistical support to and oversight of national police/military capacities.** International forces or police are often called upon when the state cannot or will not deploy its own capacities to protect civilians. When the question is capacity not will, one option is supporting the state to deploy its own capacities, and monitoring their performance against international standards. This mechanism was used in refugee camps in eastern Zaire in 1996, when the UN supported (logistically and financially) the deployment of Zairian Presidential Police into refugee camps (Zairian Camp Security Contingent), with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing monitoring on civilian protection. The current UN mission Chad similarly involves a mix of international and national units designed to provide security in refugee camps and related areas. (In addition to providing training and mentoring, the UN is paying stipends for the unit and facilitating its outfitting with basic police equipment.)
- **Preventive deployments.** The UN has only authorized one preventive deployment in its history – in Macedonia in the 1990s. Nonetheless, the Security Council should not preclude repeating this successful experiment in future cases where there is evidence of looming conflict, and reason to believe it can be deterred by an international presence. One can imagine the potential for this form of deployment in several sensitive cases in the broader Middle East, where inter-state tensions are high.

It should also be stressed that, while most of these options are lighter and cheaper than full-scale peacekeeping, they are not easy options. Operationally, flexible observer missions in large theaters require sufficient helicopters to move rapidly between trouble spots – the observers should also be of a high caliber, capable of handling local political challenges. Authorizing a mediation mission is not a get-out clause for the Security Council: its presence should actually stimulate greater political attention to resolving a conflict, providing a channel through which states can use their leverage.<sup>11</sup>


*Partnership with Member State-led forces ('Green/Blue' arrangements)*

When political/security realities mean that these alternatives to heavy peacekeeping will not suffice, the UN also has the option of drawing on Member State-led forces rather than DPKO-supported/commanded operations. This can take two forms:

- **Multi-national Force Operations.** Member State-led operations remain part of the menu of options available to the Security Council, especially for early, rapid deployments to secure conditions for more static forces. However, there are political limitations on MNF operations that may diminish their salience in the next several years; and most of the states who have the operational capacity to lead MNFs have most of that capacity already committed to UN-mandated operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere.
- **Member State support Blue Helmet operations.** The reinforcement of UNIFIL in summer 2006 was undertaken through the fusion of DPKO-managed assets and direct Member State implementation (in terms of deployment, logistics, and strategic management – through the Strategic Military Cell [SMC]). This had the advantage of allowing Member States with advanced logistics capabilities to deploy rapidly to the field, while not requiring any one of them to lead the MNF alone – which would have been politically challenging in the Lebanese context, as well as potentially straining for any of the participating nations, all of whom were simultaneously heavily deployed in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere. The speed, scale and sophistication of the deployment diminished the necessity of using force – the deployment itself changed the calculation of forces on the ground.

*Partnership with other organizations*

It is commonplace to refer to the trend in peacekeeping towards regional organizations. Commonplace, but inaccurate – at least if measured through the lens of numbers of troops deployed through different organizations. In reality, the number of troops deployed through the UN and NATO has risen steadily since 2000 while the number of troops deployed through regional organizations has fluctuated but against a generally negative trend since 2004.



That being said, regional organizations and other actors are increasingly frequently a part of how the UN deploys. Peacekeeping organizations now have substantial experience – and have shown significant flexibility – in matching UN with non-UN capabilities to meet mission demands.

Although each variation of this approach (from Timor-Leste to Sudan) has been *sui generis*, the following broad categories of arrangements has been used:

- **Sequential operations.** In several instances, regional organizations, MNFs or other military providers have undertaken the first deployment to a theatre, laying the groundwork for a follow-on UN operation (e.g., Timor-Leste, Liberia, Chad). We are also now witnessing a second generation of sequenced missions, wherein regional organizations maintain follow-on presences after UN operations close down (e.g., Bosnia).
- **Parallel operations.** In several contexts, there has been a simultaneous division of labor between the UN and other organizations. This, of three types: short-term military support to the UN from a regional organization (e.g., EU Operation Artemis in the DRC); linked military-observer missions (e.g., UN and CIS operations in Georgia); and parallel civilian-military operations (e.g., UN and NATO in Kosovo, Afghanistan.)
- **Integrated operations.** The UN has run or been part of integrated operations with the OAS in Haiti in the early 1990s, with the EU and the OSCE in Kosovo and with the AU in Darfur.

These missions have to date been treated as one-off operations and have at times also been a significant source of tension between organizations.

Lessons learned from these operations suggest that four factors will be critical for future success in circumstances – which are highly likely to eventuate – that call for matching UN and non-UN capacities. First, the different entities involved must have a *shared political framework* under which their joint or parallel operations work. Second, *sharing of personnel* is an important tool for ensuring effective inter-institutional cooperation – this includes rehatting of troops in the handover from regional to UN operations or vice-versa. Third, *joint planning mechanisms* can help different organizations ensure that their efforts are coherent. Fourth, *predictable financing* is necessary – particularly with regards to the African Union.

Two sets of partnerships look most likely to deepen in coming years. The first is with the European Union, which is building its rapidly deployable security capacity and has plans to develop its civilian capacity. The EU has a structured relationship with the UN over peacekeeping, based on a 2004 joint declaration, and the two have cooperated in military, police and civilian missions (most obviously in Chad, DRC and Kosovo). The EU can often provide resources the UN lacks, but the 2008 DRC crisis – when the European Council chose not to fulfill a request for reinforcements by the UN Secretary-General – is a reminder that the UN cannot expect *automatic* support from European forces. This creates a degree of uncertainty for the UN in planning and sustaining missions where it might need high-order capabilities. Close cooperation between the two organizations in Kosovo threw up technical differences, which may complicate future collaboration.

Second is the African Union. Though the UN still deploys eight times more soldiers on the African continent than does the AU, the AU has taken on a new importance for two broad reasons: political legitimacy on the continent, during a period when UN legitimacy was strained due to divisions over Iraq; and willingness to act, during a period when western states have shown modest will at best to act – at least through the deployment of their own forces – on the African continent.

Two factors currently constrain the relationship and will have to be worked through if this potential partnership will prosper. The first is predictability. The UN Security Council has felt boxed in when the AU has deployed operations and signaled that it is counting on UN operations to replace them – but without prior negotiations with the Security Council. The flip side of this argument is a different version of predictability: the AU has felt that the UN has been unreliable in terms of its willingness to authorize forces, or adequate forces, to meet some of the continent’s most traumatic challenges – to wit, Darfur and Somalia,

and before that Rwanda. The question of predictability can only be resolved by the UN Security Council – AU Peace and Security Council negotiations or discussions, which will start in later 2009.

The second is financing. The question of better-structured financing to the African Union has been percolating for some time. The issue has been the subject of a series of panel reports (including the High-level Panel, and more recently the Prodi Panel), each of which has recommended a combination of multi-donor funding for capacity building and use of the UN assessed budget for operations. The former is likely to be constrained by the financial crisis; the later, equally, but also because a number of Member States retain one of two objections in principle: that the UN should only pay for actions it itself implements; and/or that if the AU can have access the UN's assessed budget, so to should other regional organizations.

Neither of these arguments seem compelling. The case that the AU has a greater need for access to external funding than other organizations seems self-evident, as does the point that the UN has a far greater investment in peacekeeping in the African context than in any other region. And the point of principle can surely be addressed through negotiations with the AU that would stipulate that should the AU want to access UN financing it would seek prior authorization from the Security Council under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter for those operations – remaining free to act on its own, within the context of its own Charter, where it did not seek UN financing. This might also assist the 'predictability' problem. The UN could, if necessary, join forces with the AU on managing UN-provided funding. And the simple fact of the matter is that AU operations – by virtue of proximity and of cost structure – are less expensive than UN operations, a significant virtue in current conditions.

#### *Private military companies*

Whenever shortcomings of the peacekeeping enterprise are addressed, the debate over whether or not to utilize private military and security companies (PMSC) is renewed – as it has been in the margins of the Security Council's informal consultations on peacekeeping this year. It is necessary to distinguish between PMSCs and contractors providing the UN with goods and services – the latter are essential to all expeditionary forces. Although we note UN procurement problems below, the basic fact that the UN needs contractors is a given – but could it ever employ contractors in combat?

Reluctance among Member States and many UN staff to engage substantially with PMSCs is understandably rooted in issues of accountability and regulation. And were PMSCs to be deployed under direct UN command, without an intervening national authority, the accountability issues would be serious indeed. One other model perhaps worthy of exploration is use of PMSCs by national contingents. This has been done before in non-UN contexts – including the above referenced over-the-horizon capacity for the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission, which was supplied by Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) under US command. Utilizing PMSCs as either a "first responder" or force multiplier *within a national command structure and under their authority and accountability* could complement national capabilities. Even here, however, we foresee substantial ethical and financial objections.

### **Mandate-making and matching resources to mandates**

When the Security Council authorizes an operation of whatever type, the mandate given to the operation will shape its performance; and matching resources to the mandate is a vital factor in shaping its likelihood for success.

Formally, strategy is embedded in the mandate, although mandates are closer to goal-statements than to strategy documents. Only rarely, as in the most recent mandates for MONUC, do they provide developed lists of mission priorities. At the outset of a mission, ensuring that mandates reflect the realities of a specific peace agreement or political framework, and are matched to in-country realities, requires advanced planning.

Here, an example of best practice comes from South Sudan, where the lead negotiators (the US, UK and Norway) ensured that DPKO sat in on negotiation sessions where the option of an international force was discussed, to allow DPKO to engage in pre-planning and ensure that Secretariat and Security Council strategies aligned.

Unfortunately, less collaborative planning is the norm. And among the consequences has been a failure by both the Security Council and the Secretariat to observe three central tenets of the Brahimi Report: that the deployment of forces should be tied to a viable political strategy (“a peace to keep”); that mandates should be linked to the reality of available resources (or, but better, that resources must be matched to mandates); and that when one or both of these conditions is not met, the Secretariat should say “No”.

Recent UNSC and Secretariat decisions that have deviated from concepts these have caused a great deal of strain in the current peacekeeping system. These central tenets of the Brahimi Report still hold – with some adaptation. What has been absent has been the kind of strategic dialogue between the UNSC, the Secretariat, and troop contributors to translate these guidelines into concrete action.

Faced with any request to develop an operation, the Secretariat’s first task is to develop a strategic concept of engagement (discussed above) and – if a peacekeeping operation is proposed – to propose a concept of operations (ConOps) for the size and nature of the force. The Brahimi Report recommended that the Security Council leave resolutions authorizing large-scale missions in draft pending confirmation by the Secretary-General of firm troop commitments. While the merits of a two-step mandating process remain a subject for debate, the underlying rationale is sound. Earlier and more substantive consultation by the Security Council with troop and police contributors would enable the design of mandates based on a clear picture of available troops and police, providing realistic options for what can – and cannot – be achieved. Resulting mandates would have earlier buy-in from troop contributors, hopefully limiting the exercise of national caveats by contingents in fluid environments. The Secretariat should thus aim to say “Yes, if...”

In the absence of such consultations, the Secretariat – also steeped now in a pattern of the most advanced states *not* contributing to the majority of UN operations (i.e., those in Africa) – has tended to recommend large forces, conscious of the fact that numbers may be required to make up for a lack of mobility and capacity to employ deliberate force. The consequence of this, however, has been rising costs, and a Security Council that is suspicious of DPKO’s military estimates.

Partially in response to this, the Security Council has begun considering ways in which it could improve the quality of its military advice through which to judge Secretariat proposals. Some of this discussion has been framed as the re-activation of the Military Staff Committee (MSC) essentially out of service since the 1940s. It should be stated clearly that few members of the Security Council are imagining an activation of the MSC remotely similar to that envisaged by the Charter – which specifies that the MSC would be staffed by the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5). Rather, the Security Council is discussing something rather more modest: using regular, if informal meetings of its military advisors to pre-vet Secretariat military plans, and/or meetings of political directors to review political strategy with the Secretariat.

We see some merit in this thinking, with two important caveats. First, we believe it would be more effective if it operated – again, informally – in active consultation with major troop contributors. This is entirely consistent with the MSC references in the Charter, which clearly stipulate that it would include all states required for the “efficient discharge” of the Committee’s work. Dialogue with non- Security Council troop contributors would bring an important degree of breadth and realism to the dialogue. Moreover, there is clear evidence that if the Security Council activated a version of the MSC without troop contributors it would actively undermine the cooperation necessary to actually implement any of the Security Council’s decisions.

Second, we believe it essential that the Secretariat retain the right to make independent recommendations to the Security Council, notwithstanding advice of Security Council military advisors. In such a mode of informal strategic dialogue, the Security Council would not redraft ConOps – Security Council members and non-Council troop contributors would provide comment back to DPKO, which would respond to the comments (the Charter notes that the MSC should provide “strategic direction”, but distinguishes this from command). Responsibility for mission design would rest with the Secretary-General. The Security Council would of course retain the right to reject that advice.

However, the military advisors of the Security Council could perform an important ‘challenge’ function on Secretariat plans. Informal meetings of military advisors (ideally, including those of major non-Security Council troop contributors) could provide a “Red Team” function for mission plans, testing the Secretariat’s assumptions, planning metrics, and proposing alternatives. Military and police advisors could point out potential vulnerabilities and limitations in concepts of operation, suggest how better to integrate military and police capabilities, and how to clarify mandates so they can be transformed into clearer rules of engagement.

In addition to providing a stringent test to Secretariat proposals, this kind of informal strategic dialogue could have a second merit: that of validating Secretariat plans for more robust operations where those were warranted. Sound technical advice from military advisors of the Security Council and non-Council troop contributors would presumably reaffirm the case for robust, mobile, and advanced capabilities when missions are intended to be deployed to challenging environments, logistically or politically (or both.) Potential troop contributors would have a particularly strong interest in realism in these plans.

All this being said, the Security Council will have to take into consideration the fact that asking DPKO to engage in this kind of strategic dialogue with Member States, while potentially warranted, will *add* to not subtract from Secretariat overstretch in the short term. This kind of strategic dialogue is personnel intensive.

#### *Other factors: rapid deployment and P5 participation*

In matching resources to mandates and mandates to political realities, two additional, inter-linked factors warrant discussion: contributions to UN operations by the P5 and other major powers; and rapid deployment. One of the sources of political strain on UN peacekeeping in recent years has been the tendency for western states not to deploy in African operations – although with exceptions including Liberia and Chad. Several Western countries proposed to deploy forces in Darfur, only to be rejected by the Sudanese.

Yet this issue remains important. There has been a split between those UN missions that have deployed or expanded rapidly thanks to commitments by militarily capable states, and those suffering delays due a lack of resources. The former include the mission to Ethiopia-Eritrea, deployed using the Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and the reinforcement of UNIFIL. The latter include the recent slow progress in reinforcing MONUC – the latter’s expansion has not taken place five months after it was mandated.

Reviewing those cases where deployment or reinforcement has been rapid, two factors recur: contributions by states with specialized assets usually absent from UN forces (such as Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark in Ethiopia/Eritrea and the Europeans in Lebanon) *balanced by significant commitments from core troop contributors*. Within the first six months of UNMEE’s deployment, Jordanian, Kenyan and Indian forces moved in alongside the European contingent. Similarly, the reinforced UNIFIL involved significant pre-existing forces from India and Ghana, plus new contributions from Indonesia, China and South Korea.

Such rapidly deployed, diverse forces create the ability to shape the tactical environment on the ground at the most important, most fluid moment – that when peace deals have just been struck, or missions just authorized. Rapid deployment capacity also creates options for over-the-horizon and surge operations, which can add flexibility, credibility and protection to light missions, and add deterrence in contexts of drawdown.

As the Security Council explores alternatives to ‘heavy peacekeeping’, it will find that it has far more options in terms of mixing political tools and light military tools if it has sophisticated and mobile forces on offer.

Diversity of forces is not guaranteed to deliver rapid deployment – a similar mix of forces deployed very slowly in South Sudan through 2005. But more often, diversity brings a range of benefits. Governments are more likely to commit specialized assets if they are confident that other states stand ready to take their place as a mission evolves, ensuring that they will not have to carry the burden indefinitely. The delivery of large infantry formations, as well as police and civilian staff, may only be possible if smaller, more robust forces can secure initial entry-points. A similar combination of “new” and “traditional” UN peacekeepers has been the basis of the mission in Haiti, sustained through a unique mix of Latin American and Asian forces.

Nonetheless, a fairly small number of countries – primarily India, Pakistan and more capable African militaries – are increasingly being asked to provide the bulk of specialized assets across the majority of large UN missions. India and Pakistan have borne the brunt of operations in the DRC in particular: they provide not only significant numbers, but face significant risks, raising questions of how long their commitment can be.

It is no disservice to governments that make up the bulk of UN forces to say that greater contributions are required from other states if (i) a sufficient supply of specialized assets is to be maintained; and (ii) a political consensus on peacekeeping at the UN is to last. There are additional arguments for P5, Western and other major power contributions to UN peacekeeping. Even small contributions from major powers, especially the P5 and key regional powers, provide important *political* multipliers to missions. Participation of major powers in operations signals to potential spoilers that opposition to the mission carries real political costs.

This question also points to the UN’s main comparative advantage as a peacekeeping organization: it is the only organization through which the forces of the P5 and all the major powers, including the rising and regional powers, can jointly participate in providing stability. The P5 and other Western states are making major contributions to UN-mandated operations – especially in Afghanistan. The UN would be well-served if discussions of peacekeeping in New York took more account of UN-mandated and not just UN-commanded operations. Nevertheless, it is only in UN-commanded operations (or mixed UN-commanded, Member State supported operations like UNIFIL II) that major powers from all regions can cooperate.

The alternatives for tough missions are Western organizations (e.g., NATO, the EU) which, in spite of substantial military capabilities, may not be politically suitable for some operations - and UN operations with inadequate capabilities, which may not be up to the challenges ahead. Only the UN offers the option of a political diverse but operationally capable mission – but only if the P5 and other major powers invest in UN operations.



## Part III. Delivery on the ground and preparing for exit

Once a mission has been authorized and deployed to the field, it has to deliver. Mission functions have proliferated in recent years, partially to help coordinate a similar proliferation of other post-conflict actors. What are the *essential* priorities for UN peace operations, and what capacities must they have to deliver against them? How can mission strategies and those of other actors most effectively be aligned? What must others deliver to foster stable recovery from conflict, and allow international forces to draw down?

Priority activities differ by function of the mission – whether to implement a peace agreement, secure inter-state borders, mitigate a humanitarian crisis or extend state authority in contested areas. And they differ – or should – from case to case: the specific national and regional circumstances of an operation must shape mission priorities. But this does not mean that it is inadvisable to plan; the UN cannot simply conjure up capacities when suddenly they are needed in-country; and lessons learned from nearly two decades of mediation and peace operations do allow for some generic discussion of priorities.

There are two different ways of framing this discussion:

- What can UN peace operations do to foster ‘early recovery’ from conflict, recognizing that many of the tools to generate that recovery lie outside the hands of the UN?
- What do missions and others need to do to prepare for ‘exit’? The fact of peacekeeping ‘overstretch’, now compounded by the financial crisis, has revived discussion of when and under what conditions peacekeeping operations can draw down militarily, even if leaving political and aid missions behind?

### *Early recovery*

What constitutes ‘early recovery’? In UN debates, the most frequently referenced definition is the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP), which incorporates pre-peace agreement action and highlights the socio-economic elements of recovery, less so political and security elements. There are numerous other terms. ‘Transition’ is one which remains ill-defined. ‘Stabilization’ captures something of the appropriate goals, but is associated primarily with military operations and tends to be interpreted as referring only to political/security action. ‘Statebuilding’ has no agreed definition in international usage. The term ‘peacebuilding’ is still used in two ways – either to refer to the entire post-conflict exercise, or to refer to the post-peacekeeping phase of recovery and the transition to development.

We prefer a common-sense approach to the terminology, focusing simply on: early efforts to *secure stability*; early efforts to *establish the peace*, early efforts to *resuscitate markets, livelihoods, and services*, and the *state capacities* necessary to foster them. Below, we focus on distinguishing between elements of this work that missions are liable to do themselves; and those that missions cannot or should not undertake directly – but can coordinate and/or enable through military, policing and political means.

What constitutes conditions for exit also depends heavily on the functions of the mission and the specifics of local conditions. But comparative lessons learned suggest a simple conclusion: that **the basic condition for exit of an international security presence is the consolidation of a national political stability**. As we argued in Part II, there is an inverse relationship between the strength of the national political framework and the requirement for international security forces. Exit strategies require processes aimed at solidifying the former.

### *Integrated strategy*

A focus on national political stability is the basis, too, for a concern with the integration of political, security, and economic strategy in support of national authorities (central and local). On the one hand, research shows

that neither the articulation of the rule of law nor security sector reform nor resumption of economic activity nor the delivery of social services are *necessary* conditions for stability. On the other, progress on any one of those fronts can aid political stability, and lack of progress on any of them can undermine it, increasing the risk of relapse into conflict. Finally, efforts to stimulate economic recovery, facilitate security sector reform, etc., if not undertaken through the lens of supporting the consolidation of national political authority, can actually create new sources of conflict.

Ten years of experimentation with ‘integrated missions’ and variations on that theme have taught three lessons: the UN performs better than any other international peacekeeping organization on questions of integrated strategy; the UN’s performance is still rather weak; and among the reasons is the fact that the UN’s ‘integrated missions’ model displaces a focus on integration of *strategy* by a focus on integration of *organizations* (with a narrow focus on the UN family in particular). In some cases this complicates prioritization, rather than enabling it.

## Mission priorities

One result has been a gradual loss of attention to what experience suggests should be the three foci of peacekeeping operations: (i) providing security for the consolidation of peace agreements and national political process; (ii) directly supporting those political processes through facilitation and substantive support; (iii) reducing the risk of recourse to arms by demobilizing forces and helping national authorities articulate the rule of law.

### *Transitional security: Creating and securing space for politics*

To say that a peacekeeping operation (or political mission, or variant) should focus on the consolidation of national political process and authority does not mean that its actions will all lie in the political arena, narrowly construed. As we argued in Part II, even the strongest political settlement can be tested by rogue actors, spoilers and sudden shocks. Security functions play critical roles in protecting the political settlement.

Peacekeeping operations have performed a range of security functions associated with the four major functions described in Part I. These include:

- *Guaranteeing ceasefires.* Peacekeeping operations nominally provide ‘security guarantees’ to parties to enable each of them to trust that the other(s) will abide by the terms of a ceasefire or political settlement. After a first generation of UN operations that did not have the force capacity to actually live up to these guarantees, in the 1999-2006 period the Security Council started mandating larger and more robust forces that could credibly provide such guarantees. The credibility of this guarantee is lost or diminished when forces are stretched thin across large terrains, or have no capacity to use well-targeted force to backstop political processes.
- *Defusing tensions.* International forces or observers often serve to diffuse tensions associated with the implementation of peace agreements by undertaking neutral communication and coordination between the parties’ forces; undertaking confidence building measures; and similar.
- *Demobilization and disarmament.* Peacekeepers often help to demobilize parties’ forces, thereby helping to secure space for politics. Successful demobilization often constitutes a critical benchmark of progress towards political recovery. The political gains from demobilization are undermined when, as has often been the case, when there are inadequate funds for soldiers’ reintegration and/or the economic recovery of the communities to which they return lags.
- *Protection of civilians.* Peacekeeping operations are now frequently mandated to protect civilians. Far less often do they have the density of forces to actually do so. Nor do many troop contributors have

the doctrine and training to support this function. Missions have limited capacities to develop protection strategy, with or without cooperation from humanitarian protection agencies.

- *Protecting political process and sites.* Peacekeeping operations have occasionally been tasked with protecting politicians, key political sites (i.e., Parliaments, Loya Jirgas, etc.) or international mediators. The UN has for example, provided guards for the special court in Sierra Leone.
- *Observation.* Military observers have sometimes been deployed to patrol and observe borders to help de-escalate inter-state wars. Military or civilian observers have also been used in internal war contexts to monitor demobilization efforts (e.g., Nuba Mountains, Sudan) and weapons storage (e.g., Nepal).

The relative weight of these functions fluctuates not only mission-to-mission but across time. It is frequently the case that the most security intensive period of an operation is at the outset, when ceasefires or political settlements are newly forged and being tested. But missions can be tested at key turning points in the implementation of peace agreements or the consolidation of national authority, as political actors who lose out in the political shuffle pose new challenges or attempt to return to violence (e.g., Timor-Leste in 2006.)

Thus, while we noted in Part II that robust, mobile forces are often most needed at the outset of operations, ongoing stabilizing forces – or an over-the-horizon surge capacity – may also be necessary. Several UN missions are deployed in contexts where the government does not have the capacity to project its authority across the entire country and so does not have the capacity to ensure the rule of law and protect civilians across the entire countryside. In such contexts missions can play important roles in extending state authority.

These functions may be the visible focus of an operations activity; but at core they are – or should be – designed to secure space for the central task involved in ending conflict: resuscitating national politics.

#### *Transitional politics: Implementation of the peace agreement, or extension of state authority*

Conflicts are triggered by political factors (ethnic grievance, resource competition, elite competition, religious tension), and short of outright victory for one side, political solutions must always end them. Across the entire range of circumstances – from ceasefires with little political credibility to comprehensive agreements – it is essential to foster a *domestic* ability to lead and manage sustainable political processes after war's end.

This message has been lost in recent years. Containment efforts in counter-terrorism contexts gave rise to a notion of 'security first' – the idea that a situation must be secure before political negotiations. But the empirical record shows that the reverse is often true: political settlement is frequently a pre-condition for security.

Helping parties to a conflict forge national political stability requires several things: helping to consolidate national political process; frequently, assisting national authorities articulate political arrangements within the framework of revised constitutions; and often helping states build the capacity of their political institutions.

By and large, UN peacekeeping operations have been good at the first (mediation), reasonably good at the second (supporting national process), but are totally ill-equipped for the third (capacity building for national political institutions). That is a problem, because the more a political process is *institutionalized* – through inclusive and responsive structures – the more likely it is to manage challenges and avoid new violence.<sup>12</sup>

To perform their political functions effectively, peacekeeping operations need five things. First, they need strong political teams backstopping the political functions of SRSGs – which they frequently have.

Second, they need effective substantive backstopping from headquarters – which they increasingly get, as the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO and other parts of the UN system professionalize (as through the creation of Mediation Support Unit, Security Sector Reform [SSR] Unit, Electoral Affairs Divisions, etc.).

Third, because all politics is local, they need effective political presence outside of capitals – a capacity that is sometimes denied by budget decisions.

Fourth, missions need a way to spend money against these political activities, especially as regards capacity building, and this they do not have. Substituting for this authority, but not predictably so, missions have sometimes had voluntary Trust Funds (sometimes managed by or through UNDP) and now sometimes access to the Peacebuilding Fund.

Fifth, they need force contingents able to interpret and adapt to local political conditions. This is most difficult – even well-led force contingents are frequently deployed without adequate situation awareness or local political knowledge (an issue we address in our discussion of the pre-training of forces in Part IV.)

More than all of this, however, UN field presences need to be linked to and supported by broader political mechanisms, at the Security Council and beyond, that can reinforce their political role and bring weight and authority to bear on UN messages. Consolidating national political stability also often means corralling regional political actors – a task not often suitable for heads of missions, but one that must be closely coordinated with them. In many recent cases, UN missions have not been tied to effective regional processes.

### *Securing future politics: building the rule of law*

Both the political and security functions of missions are transitional and deliberately time-bound. To help states secure future politics, and reduce the risk of slippage back into violent conflict, missions have increasingly been tasked with ‘taking the force out of politics’ – helping national states articulate frameworks for the rule of law and supporting security sector reform.

While the importance of these issues is now widely recognized, missions are grappling with two types of challenge for which they are typically poorly prepared. The first is countering organized crime, which often *grows* after conflicts end. Specialized institutions, such as the Italian *Guardia di Finanza* deployed under the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), have proven a critical component of criminal justice and stabilization. Yet such specialized expertise and capabilities – including criminal intelligence and financial asset tracking – are in limited supply.

The second SSR challenge is supporting traditional security and justice systems, which may be partially or fully detached from government. Although an estimated eighty percent of security and justice provision in post-conflict settings occurs through non-state actors and traditional institutions<sup>13</sup>, international programming still focuses overwhelmingly on central state institutions. The challenge is to recognize that in the (hopefully short term) absence of state capacity, local and traditional solutions may have legitimacy and protect populations; but to approach the issue with caution for fear of undermining the authority of the state.<sup>14</sup>

A related challenge is in transitional justice. It is impossible to determine the right time and place for transitional justice processes within a society – each case and context is different. The short-term tension between peace and justice can be very real. It is, however, clear from the difficult experiences of Rwanda and others that the process must be domestically driven. International actors can support efforts for transitional justice, but humility is the order of the day, and outsiders will rarely know enough about domestic culture and society to know what is appropriate. Careful attention then, to ensuring that the domestic political processes are robust enough to manage the issues that arise from transitional justice and that the demand comes from within should guide international efforts in transitional justice. In the large majority of cases, this will mean that transitional justice processes come after the main thrust of political mediation and stabilization.

Broader engagement in the rule of law lacks coherence.<sup>15</sup> To some, rule of law refers to the entire regime by which order and predictability, both of government and citizen behavior, are secured. As the World Bank has noted, “Economic growth, political modernization, the protection of human rights, and other worthy

objectives are all believed to hinge, at least in part, on ‘the rule of law.’<sup>16</sup> By contrast, the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) at DPKO has a more narrow focus on the ‘security side’ of the rule of law, specifically mine action, police, disarmament-demobilization and reintegration (DDR), SSR, criminal law and corrections.

The creation of OROLSI has given DPKO a core capacity to develop policy and provide guidance to missions in this area. However, it is small (e.g., an SSR Unit of six support the UN’s 20 operations), and its existence does not solve the two challenges laid out above. (We return to the question of civilian capacities for the rule of law below in Part IV). More broadly, missions’ performance even in the narrow confines of the security aspects of the rule of law suffers from two things: the inability of missions to spend money in areas where they have clear leads; and the lack of a clear division of labor between missions and development agencies about who does what.

International support to the rule of law is in its infancy. International norms and domestic expectations are not aligned, leading at times to efforts to impose standards that do not have domestic legitimacy, eroding confidence in operations. The judicial sector is at the core of any system of rule of law, but the weakest area of international support. International policing is growing rapidly, but standards and training lag. Police capacity is heavily strained, all the more so for specialized units; states do not retain reserves of police they way they do soldiers – to say nothing of judges. In the short term, improved performance will require mission leaders to work with a range of partners to integrate programs from bilateral actors (often to the justice sector), the World Bank (on economic governance), UN agencies, and missions themselves into effective strategy that leverages these collective efforts. In the longer term, deeper questions need to be asked about whether the current approach of a hard/soft divide and a disaggregated capacity is the most effective way to support states with limited capacity.

## Managing early recovery

The results of peacekeeping are dependent on far more than just the performance of missions. Economic recovery, recovery of key social service delivery, and restoration or expansion of state authority and administrative capacity, can all bolster political stability and make a return to violence less likely. But the goal of mounting early, effective action to foster recovery has dogged efforts at reform. In the first period after conflict ends (the first 12-24 months) these tasks are assigned to *ad hoc* and fractious groupings of bilateral and multilateral development actors for whom conflict response is not core business; who have no reserves of civilians and public administrators to draw on; and whose funds are raised voluntarily, sporadically, and slowly.

The unsurprising consequences are that early initiatives to build core government capacity and jump-start economic activity are frequently not launched. Lapses include investment in public administration, vital to the functioning of the state and service delivery; investment in agricultural recovery, vital to livelihoods; and security-sector reform, vital to sustained peace. Confidence in the political process is not maintained. All this contributes to poor outcomes: either international actors are compelled to stay longer (Bosnia); or recovery efforts falter (Afghanistan); or both (Timor-Leste).

There are bright spots – innovative and flexible funding instruments piloted in Nepal; a UNDP start-up fund that provided basic office equipment and paid salaries after the Bonn Accords in Afghanistan; good collaboration between the UN mission and the international financial institutions in Haiti. But they are few and far between, and are more a function of personalities overcoming systems than being supported by them.

Although political stability is the acid test of progress, it can be reinforced by early economic, social and institutional recovery. Performance in the terrain of early recovery (for which we propose a common sense definition) requires broad collaboration. Some critical goals of broader early recovery efforts include restoration of effective *public finance management*, sometimes neglected but vital to the function of government;

*economic recovery*, especially in the provision of jobs to youths and restoration of the agricultural sector (often neglected); *delivery of social services*, preferably by local government, often with support from non-governmental organizations (NGO) or UN agencies; and *capacity building* in the civilian arms of the government.

As the Security Council has noted, there are three primary weaknesses in international performance in early recovery: there is a strategy gap (i.e., few tools to link strategy for implementation of peace agreements to other aspects of recovery); a financing gap (i.e., funding instruments that are neither flexible, rapid nor dynamic); and a capacity gap (especially in terms of civilian capacity in areas like the rule of law.) These weaknesses reduce the ability of missions and others to support the restoration of national political authority. (An additional flaw of early recovery efforts is that they do not start with an assessment of national capacity, both within and outside the state.)

Post-conflict financial assistance is also locked into a development orthodoxy that many post-conflict authorities themselves have argued is not suitable for recovery. As recently argued by the Congolese authorities (in an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) meeting in Accra), an emphasis on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and long-term development fails to recognize the fundamentally political nature of the early post-conflict moment or the importance of focusing early efforts on fostering stability. International development actors have only begun to recognize that the sustainability is not the sole objective for post-conflict aid; stability matters too. This means a willingness to spend money to secure the peace dividend – in ways that may not be ideal in the long-term, but that serve the important short-term goal of stability and sustainability of recovery. It also means a willingness to be flexible, and adapt programs to shifting political climates, shifting institutional capacities and underlying political, social and economic realities.

An example of the phenomenon of ‘supply-driven’ aid: since 2000, in post-conflict cases, an average of 3% of development assistance has gone to agriculture; in those cases, on average, the agricultural sector constitutes 70% of GDP. At the level of bilateral donor governments, there has been until late a failure of vision to place the necessary resources or political priority on conflict-related (preventative or curative) development, or to change business practices to accommodate it. Finally, donors have not yet completed the necessary political reforms (for example to OECD official development assistance (ODA) criteria) to allow for sufficient spending on critical recovery programs in such areas as the rule of law and policing.

International action in early post-conflict recovery should be aligned against two core objectives: implementing the peace agreement; and building national capacity to sustain the political process, maintain security, and lead national development efforts. Improved performance will require closing the strategic gap; closing the capacity gap; and closing the financing gap. Elsewhere we have developed the argument that post-conflict recovery would be more effective, more efficient, and more quickly create conditions for exit were the following steps taken: building (small) standing teams to *support to mission leadership* for the coordination of early recovery; development of a ‘light’ version of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy process used by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) country-specific mechanisms in Burundi and Sierra Leone, to add breadth and political focus to existing mechanisms such as the Post-Conflict Needs Assessment methodology; *closing the financing gap* by (i) donor reform to provide earlier and more flexible financing for socio-economic and administrative recovery and (ii) expanding use of the Peacebuilding Fund to support political and rule of law activities of missions, and (iii) limited continued expansion of the peacekeeping assessed budget for core activities supported by DPKO, especially in the areas of police, corrections, and security sector reform.

Each of these reforms is small in scope, but potentially significant in impact – especially in terms of fostering earlier recovery, and thereby laying the foundations for earlier exit of the military arms of peacekeeping operations. The cost savings involved are potentially large.

## **Managing integration**

The responsibility for integrating strategies for early political, security, socio-economic and state administrative recovery often lie with peacekeeping operations or political missions. There is logic in this, given the importance that such efforts reinforce a stable political settlement and the development of national political authority.

On the other hand, the starting point for thinking more creatively about how to integrate strategy must start with the recognition that the UN mission is not the focal point of all aspects of strategy, nor is the UN Country Team. In the humanitarian/social sphere, UN agencies play key roles. In the economic sphere, the international financial institutions and bilateral donors play carry more weight. In the field of transitional justice, NGOs and human rights organizations play more critical roles. Thus, the existing integrated mission model (which sees the UN Resident Coordinator serve as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General) is at best a starting point for integrating the various tools through which international actors support national strategy.

Several variants on the model exist, which highlight both the challenge and the options:

- Informal collaboration between the political, military and/or aid presences (Lebanon, Nepal)
- Launch of a international presence-wide process for joint planning (MONUC)
- Integration of the international financial institutions into the UN mission structure (UNAMI early stages)
- Use of several Deputy SRSGs in different ‘pillars’ – e.g. for political, rule of law / public administration, economic development (UNMIK, UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) at times)
- Use of a Strategic Planning Cell to forge joint operations between different mission components and other actors (UNMIK, early stages)
- Development of an in-country ‘strategic compact’ that forge national and international commitments (Afghanistan, in 1998 and in 2005)
- PBC Country-specific mechanisms – which link the national authorities, the SRSG, the UN country-team, the International Financial Institutions (IFI), bilateral donors, and key regional actors, and have also used ‘compacts’. (Burundi, Sierra Leone)

The pros and cons of different models of integration of strategy are beyond the scope of this report. What can be briefly noted is that the weight of the UN mission as lead actor in coordinating the international effort is likely to shift over time, as political and security conditions stabilize and a broader suite of actors’ programming comes into play. Nevertheless, sustained attention to the political and security dimensions of recovery, beyond the military phase of peacekeeping, is warranted to reduce the risks of relapse into conflict.

## **Preparing for exit**

As political stability takes hold; as parties’ recourse to military options diminish; and as these goals are (ideally) bolstered by early results in social service delivery, economic recovery and the building of core public administrative capacities, missions prepare to exit.

### *Benchmarks of progress*

How does the Security Council now when such conditions are met? A related question: how does the Peacebuilding Commission know when its engagement would be productive?

The UN, across its work in conflict prevention, peace operations, and peacebuilding, is grappling with the question of how to measure progress. The DPKO Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping makes explicit

reference to benchmarks, noting “reliable benchmarks and indicators are required to determine when the United Nations peacekeeping operation can begin the process of hand-over and withdrawal, without jeopardizing ongoing efforts to consolidate the peace.”<sup>17</sup>

There are several challenges to measuring “success” through benchmarking, however. First, there is diverse understanding of what constitutes minimum progress towards stability. Second, there is a substantial risk that benchmarks driven by the political imperatives of the Security Council (and of donors) result in goals that have no national ownership, are unrealistic in content, and/or ambiguous enough to declare success when political and donor fatigue sets in. Third, the critically relevant measures – emergence of a viable national political process – is (a) exceedingly difficult to measure and (b) fluid.

Having a mechanism to pull all of the relevant information into a consolidated picture of progress towards the medium-term goal of political stability was an important rationale for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission. In authorizing the PBC, the Security Council and the General Assembly also authorized the creation of the Peacebuilding Support Office [PBSO], explicitly mandating it to “measure progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals”.<sup>18</sup>

Rather than construing the question of ‘benchmarks’ in a static or metric sense, then, the Security Council and DPKO may want to explore – together with PBC and PBSO – a more dynamic model of regular, in-country stock-taking against key political and security stability goals. This could also draw in non-Secretariat expertise – in Haiti, Nepal and elsewhere, UN missions and the World Bank have commissioned outside experts to assess the ‘state of statebuilding’ and pathways for economic growth as stability takes hold.

Earlier engagement by the Peacebuilding Commission may be an important part of how the Security Council can explore earlier but sustainable exit from the military phase of peacekeeping operations. If so, it will require a more engaged stance by the Security Council – above all by P5 Ambassadors – on the role and agenda of the PBC, as well as a more genuine sense of partnership with its non-Security Council members. Earlier development of the kinds of “compacts” between national governments and international actors that the PBC has developed in Burundi and Sierra Leone could also be a useful way of translating ‘benchmarks’ into action. The PBC will need to develop far more nimble methods if it is this is to be a viable option.

In 2001, the Secretary-General argued that there is “no exit without strategy”. We would add that there is “no strategy without capacity”. Helping states create the space for, and develop the capacity for, sustained national political processes is the minimum condition for exit. Early social and economic recovery and the resumption of core state services may not be necessary conditions for exit, but they can substantially reduce the risk of relapse. Extending the authority of the state – in administrative terms, in political terms, in security terms, and within the framework of the rule of law – is the best guarantee against relapse.



## Part IV. Managing and supporting operations: Speed, security and supervision

If the UN is to contribute to the creation of sustainable political processes within and between states - as we have argued in the previous section - it must be sensitive to the specific characteristics of every mission environment. But if the UN is to deploy missions rapidly, sustain multiple operations simultaneously and ensure oversight consistently then it must also have standard operating procedures that are robust and have the faith of Member States.

At present, the UN's systems for field support, command and control and oversight suffer from significant weaknesses – but debates on those flaws are highly politicized and frequently poorly informed. DPKO and DFS are too often required to choose between operational necessity and political expediency in making administrative decisions. This distracts the Secretariat from resolving very real gaps in its capabilities that have been exacerbated by the high tempo of operations in recent years. This demands a bargain between Secretariat and Member States to ensure UN resources are better applied in future.

Among the consequences of gaps in capabilities is the slow deployment of both forces and civilians that has bedeviled recent UN operations. Looking ahead, two additional concerns loom: protecting staff in an era of enhanced threat to personnel; and adapting command and control systems to the realities of expeditionary, higher-risk, and often trans-boundary conflicts – the likely future.

Improving capabilities in three areas – rapid deployment, staff security and command and control – would allow the UN to serve as a more effective *force enabler* for Member States. These are essential at a time when both advanced and less developed militaries lack expeditionary capabilities; the UN plays a poorly appreciated role in enabling deployments by forces that could not manage them on their own.

The UN's enabling role is not always necessary. In 2006, European forces deployed to Lebanon using their own logistics. In 2008, the European Union deployed into Chad for the first year, creating time for the UN to assemble its follow-on force. In our conclusion we suggest further exploration of such partnership and 'green/blue' arrangements. And we have already argued that the Security Council and militarily capable governments should offer the UN a greater range of specialized assets to meet the significant challenges implicit in current mandates. Nevertheless, such assets will not always be available. And militarily capable governments will be more willing to deploy assets into or alongside blue helmeted operations if they are speedier, more secure, and better supervised.

In this section we review the innovations required to meet these goals. Refining them will require greater degree of realism in debates between the Member States and Secretariat as well as within the Secretariat itself. But it is also necessary to acknowledge the financial context for innovation.

### *The financial context*

In the present financial crisis, it is essential that UN mechanisms are cost-efficient – with “efficiency” defined according to operational realities as well as financial pressures. As we noted in Part I, the main funders of UN operations have other expensive international security commitments to service. Budgetary constraints and competing military priorities have already led at least one government – Poland – to withdraw its forces from UN operations.

A more general early impact of the crisis has been to slow down the UN's cash flow. In the past, the UN has relied on a number of medium sized financial contributors paying their entire assessed contribution at the outset of the year, creating a cushion while other contributors work their payments authorization through

legislative bodies. Already in 2009, fewer contributors have been able to disburse funds this rapidly. Negotiations in fall 2009 over the assessed budget will likely be tense, partly because some reliable developed countries are feeling an acute short-term pinch from the financial crisis exactly as UN peacekeeping costs are ballooning. The absence of measures for short-term relief, deferred payments or loan arrangements hamper effective management of the immediate impacts of the crisis.

As we argued in Part I, it is necessary for the Secretariat and Member States to confront the financial crisis together. The Secretariat must reassure Member States that it is innovating to ensure that missions are cost-efficient, while Member States must not cut costs without reference to the resulting damage to missions. Indeed, in some areas there is a case for ‘counter-cyclical’ spending by Member States on UN capacities – with the aim of reducing the much greater costs associated with ineffectual missions dragging on or states reverting to conflict.

In the meantime, we believe that the priority areas for investment within the UN system during the financial crisis should be as follows – if left unimproved, they will only serve Member States poorly.

## **Speed – Training, logistics and procurement mechanisms for rapid deployment**

The first months after the signing of a peace agreement or adoption of a Security Council resolution are a critical period in which to consolidate new political arrangements and lay the foundations for new security arrangements. But UN peacekeepers are rarely present in bulk during that timeframe.

Peacekeeping veterans are fond of recalling that the UN office of special political affairs was able to deploy over 14,000 peacekeepers, an air force, and a civilian command to the UN Operation in the Congo (UNOC) in five weeks in 1960. This rapid deployment was facilitated by American airlift - provided gratis; over the course of the entire four-year operation, the US lifted 118,091 troops. Forty years later, the DPKO took 12 months to reach authorized troop levels for MONUC. MONUC was average, not exceptional.

DFS will never be the US Department of Defense (DoD). And while the comparison has flaws, it is striking that the UN deploys and supports more troops in the field than any actor in the world other than DoD – more than the UK, France, China and Russia put together. But shrinking the gap between what is possible when militarily capable governments self-deploy and what the UN can do on a routine basis is a critical goal for enhancing the performance of UN operations.

To go from authorization to deployments of forces on the ground requires: identifying willing and suitable troops; training them; procuring transport to move them to the mission; and procuring the various logistics and support facilities on which the mission will rely. The relevant UN systems (for force generation, training, logistics and procurement) have all been on a path of steady improvement – and have all been outpaced by the tempo and scale of demand. On the civilian side, the logistics and support requirements are lighter, but the pools of available capacity much thinner – and the problem of large-scale, low-infrastructure operating environments are still significant.

Existing systems for force and civilian generation and deployment operate, in the main, on an ‘everything starts from scratch’ model. There are no standing teams of civilians, and no stand-by forces (*issues we address later*.) When it comes to logistics and procurement, things aren’t much better. The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund does provide some up-front financing for operations, but growth in that account (now at US\$150 million) has been rapidly outpaced by the tempo and scale of operations.

So too have stockpiles of logistics have also been outstripped by demand. The UN Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) stores the equipment necessary to rapidly start up a UN peacekeeping mission in 30 to 90 days, at the UN Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi. SDS has supported 40 operations with equipment of a value of over US\$300 million since its creation in 2002. But the current demand of the UN's peacekeeping operations and the addition of supporting the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have outstripped the SDS. It has become commonplace for existing missions to fallback on SDS start-up resources in situations of urgency, despite this falling well outside its intent. Nor have stocks been replaced in timely manner. SDS has been left depleted, defeating its intended purpose.

Improving the effectiveness of future operations will mean shrinking the deployment gap. This will require six things:

- Investment in pre-training and pre-equipping forces for UN deployment (building on the existing work of the G8-based Global Peace Operations Initiative);
- Giving DFS the ability the necessary budgetary authority for advance procurement of standard components of mission start up (which involves regulatory change), including transport;
- Strategic enhancement of logistics systems that move past mission-by-mission to global or more likely region-by-region (using hubs);
- Addressing the civilian capacity gap through (small) standing teams and predictable centers of capacity/excellence;
- Member State investment in police reserves and Rule of Law personnel for the UN;
- Augmentation of management systems (including IT) to manage this.

These challenges must be addressed in parallel with the potential for developing standby forces to initiate or reinforce UN missions, noted in Part II. These issues overlap: the existence of standby forces might alleviate pressures on DFS during mission start-ups. But it would not remove them altogether: the willingness of Member States to commit to stand-by arrangements would increase if they knew that the Secretariat could move quickly to assist and then replace them in the field.

Pre-training of forces and force generation. In theory, troops contributed to UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to be trained, fully equipped and able to support themselves. In practice, none of these characteristics routinely apply. A critical weakness in UN peacekeeping, in contrast to NATO and EU operations, is that there is little or no centralized pre-deployment training of forces – and while many force contributors take training very seriously there is little *joint* pre-deployment training of the various national contingents that make up a mission. This substantially reduces the effectiveness of UN operations, especially on the most challenging and critical elements, such as the use of force in defense of the mandate.

DPKO is responsible for providing Member States with training standards (although these have not always been absolutely clear) but only has a limited power to enforce them. There are inconsistencies in the training of military observers and staff officers, as opposed to regular troops. Of 46 UN military observers deployed to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), none underwent pre-deployment training. Pre-deployment training will soon be required for individual Military Observer and Field Staff Observer positions – but the pattern remains a problem.

For formed military units (battalions) the question of pre-deployment training in basic peacekeeping doctrine and technique is often less of a problem *per se*. But problems recur. Units receive little situational training. Member States often prepare their contingents not on the basis of a mission's concept of operations and rules of engagement, but rather on 'Force Requirement' statements provided by Mission Planning Service – statements that contain no mission-specific threat or risk assessment. Where rules of engagement and concepts of operation have been made available to capitals, they do not always filter down to trainers.

Finally, training has traditionally been seen within DPKO (including within specific missions) as a routine, cyclical event, rather than as a tool to influence skills in the field, build necessary competencies, or implement a course correction in mission-specific implementation. Some recently authorized changes – including Integrated Mission Training Cells (which handle induction training rather than pre-deployment training) new web-based platforms for mission-specific information, and an Operational Advisory Team – should begin to improve this, though the scale of training resources at the UN is still miniscule by comparison to scale of operations (to say nothing of by contrast to NATO, EU or national military comparisons).

Both in the area of pre-training and pre-equipping forces (as well as providing some airlift) the G8+ ‘Global Peace Operations Initiative’ (GPOI) has been making a substantial contribution. Since its establishment, GPOI has provided training to 57,000 troops, mostly from Africa, and facilitated the deployment of 42,000 troops into UN and non-UN missions.

Bringing GPOI to scale (and broadening the burden-sharing; at present, the US provides the bulk of GPOI contributions) would be one important way to address the train-and-equip gap for UN peacekeeping. Partnership with better-resourced organizations (in particular NATO) could be another. DPKO and DFS might also explore the question of facilitating country-to-country partnerships for UN peacekeeping, in which countries with advanced military logistics and support capabilities could agree (subject of course to national decision-making) to consistently co-deploy with countries with more available infantry but less advanced support capacity.

Advanced procurement and budgetary authority. In the start-up phase, to procure each mission element – from transportation and infrastructure to communications and catering – the Logistics Support Division (LSD) within DFS must identify mission requirements, field tenders, receive bids for services and undertake technical assessments of the bids received. The bids then go a prolonged three-stage review process with the Department of Management (DM). Each mission element requires a separate process. This process is especially problematic in the critical early months of a mission. It is unable to respond to immediate demands placed on it by the Security Council, as with authorization of a support package to AMISOM. DFS has attempted to expedite the process through outsourcing – but even the competitive bidding process involved can be so lengthy as to negate any added advantage.

The process is also limited financially. Lessons learned in the 1990s led to the creation of a Peacekeeping Reserve, but the per mission limit for draw downs from that account is fixed at US\$50 million – irrespective of whether the mission in question involves 4,000 troops deployed in an area with good infrastructure or 20,000 troops deployed in an area with none.

This is especially true when large-scale transport is required to move troops into place. Commercially-provided transport, especially airlift, is expensive and in scarce supply. Slow procurement procedures added to intrinsic limits on the commercial transport market translate into long gaps in deploying forces. Increasing the predictable availability of Member State airlift would substantially loosen the bottlenecks to rapid deployment. This would require overhauling regulations affecting contracts with Member States for airlift.

*Improving performance will require the UN will have to come to grips with the fact that its procurement model is fundamentally unsuitable for rapid military and civilian deployment.* UN peacekeeping operations are subject to the same rigid rules for procurement and contracting as the rest of the UN Secretariat – these are fundamentally unsuitable for the purposes of DFS in supporting missions in the start up phase.

Advance procurement authority for some predictable components of the mission start up phase is the *sine qua non* of speedier deployment. Other issues like using sole source suppliers are also relevant. Trying to move quickly in insecure environments often means that there is nothing like the panoply of potential suppliers that a competitive bid system assumes. However, DFS has been criticized by the General Assembly for using

single source contracts even in the early phases of missions – leaving UN officials the choice of risking operational paralysis but avoiding criticism, or keeping operations moving but taking political flak for it.

Better performance will thus require revisiting the question of procurement rules and regulations as they pertain to peacekeeping. This may or may not mean revisiting the division of authority between DFS and the DM. The Brahimi Report recommended that “responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be moved out of the DM and placed in DPKO.”<sup>19</sup> The Secretariat explored the option of revisiting this question during the DPKO/DFS split, and decided that the politics weighed against it.

Eight years after Brahimi, procurement processes remain absurdly complex, exposing the UN personnel to risk and weakening performance. Indeed, evolutions in the UN’s oversight system have arguably made the problem worse (an issue we address at the end of this section.) Whether or not revisiting the DM/DFS dividing line is necessary, tackling the rules and regulations around procurement in the start-up phase of peacekeeping certainly constitutes a critical part of implementing the unfinished business of Brahimi.

Logistics done strategically. UN logistics are designed for mature theatres with infrastructure and security, as well as local contracting providers. DRC, Sudan, and Chad, however, highlight a growing trend of expeditionary missions, for which the UN must bring in all materiel. The fundamentally civilian logistics system of the UN is not keeping pace with the demands of mission startup in these harsh environments.

DFS is currently exploring options for decentralizing logistics capacity support away from Headquarters to “hubs” in the field that would serve multiple missions, aiming to produce greater efficiencies in work and cost. A possible hub based in Entebbe, for example, could provide services to missions in the greater Horn of Africa and Central Africa (although it is far from a sea port).

A second option is to explore a UN “military logistics system” to handle the first 12 – 18 months of an operation, until mission support structures are sufficiently in place to handover to the civilian system. Rather than developing UN-owned capabilities, Member States could provide military logistics capacities through a “Letter of Assist”.

A third option is for the UN to contract out start up logistics, including supply, engineering, air and ground transport, and contract management, to experienced civilian companies. This would bring UN practice closer to that of most militaries. But it would require substantial reform to UN procurement rules – as would any of the models.

Of these, the model of regional hubs appears to follow the logic of likely demand; that is, a continued concentration of UN missions in Africa and the Middle East, frequently involving overlapping conflict dynamics and probable similarities in terms of expeditionary logistical requirements (in Africa), similar equipment, and staffing expertise. The presence of such hubs would greatly facilitate the ability of the UN to repurpose assets from one mission to another, to reinforce existing missions, or to rapidly standup a new mission within a region. It may also be easier to attract highly qualified staff to regional hubs, which would be lower-risk, and the system would allow for local contracting with side-benefits for host economies.

Civilian capacity. As mandates have grown increasingly multidimensional, the requirement for qualified civilian expertise has grown apace. Specialists in the design and management of programs to strengthen governance institutions, reform public administration, justice and security sectors, and management public finance and early economic recovery are today a critical factor for stabilizing post-conflict countries and expanding state authority.

There is, however, an overall shortage of civilian experts to support peace operations, whether in a UN context or not. This is partly a problem of numbers. In Afghanistan, a dearth of police trainers from the EU

jeopardizes efforts to build a credible police service and has resulted in an over reliance on military trainers. Where skilled capacity does exist, individuals are usually already employed, difficult to replace (even temporarily), and, for the UN, hard to second.

Appropriate expertise is no less important. To fill the gap in numbers, bilateral and multilateral institutions are developing mechanisms to identify and rapidly deploy civilians, like judges. Yet, in Liberia, Timor-Leste, Haiti, and elsewhere, public reliance on the formal justice sector is minor compared to informal systems about which Western legal professionals know little. This suggests the need for a serious effort to engage and support Southern capacity.

The slow speed of deploying civilians can severely impair peace operations. Elsewhere we have proposed a tiered model for deployment of civilians: a three phase system that recognizes: (i) that the entire staff needed over the course of a mission is not required up front; (ii) that planning for the staffing profile of a mission should be driven based on an in-country assessment of needs; and (iii) that costs associated with maintaining standing civilian capacity militate against that model.

Managing civilians – both in the field and at headquarters – requires effective human resources strategy and management tools. In the past, human resource management has been the “Achilles heel” of the Secretariat. However, there are indications that the joint DFS/DM reform strategy will address many of the core problems facing human resources, and that the necessary support exists among Member States to authorize a planned General Assembly resolution on human resources. The reforms aim to revamp the manner in which DPKO determines what staff capacities are needed through better work force planning and how it goes about recruiting them. DFS Field Personnel Division (FPD) is also focusing on creating and managing careers, providing greater ability and incentive for mobility. Finally, it has set its sights on overhauling the woefully inadequate performance management system. These reforms are a tall order, but completion of them should be a priority for the two USGs and the membership.

If the UN faces difficulties in preparing troops, it has experienced even greater problems in the area of police and rule of law personnel. A recent survey found that only a third of the UN’s formed police units are fully operational, an indictment of the processes used to select and deploy them. But the UN has taken steps to address rapidly deployable capacity in the areas of police and rule of law.

The Standing Police Capacity (SPC) established in May 2007 is now able to field two teams to support start-up or reinforce existing mission capacity, a minimal presence amid current demand for its services. Building on the success of the SPC model, OROLSI is exploring the establishment of a Rapidly Deployable Rule of Law Capacity (RoLCAP) team, with a complement of corrections, and other rule of law related staff. The SPC is a promising model that could be expanded to some other critical occupational sectors recognized as common to nearly all peace operations.

The deeper problem is simply the availability of suitable police. GPOI has been making investments in training stability police (“gendarmerie”), the biggest gap in policy supply. But as with civilians, Member States simply don’t maintain reserve capacities of police – especially specialized units (as discussed in Part III.) Greater investment by Member States in reserve corps of police will likely be necessary if this critical gap in peace operations is to be filled in year ahead.

A management system for rapid deployment. The UN’s management systems – particularly IT for human resources and financial accounting – lag behind the scope and scale of its operations. DFS has lacked modern IT infrastructure commensurate with supporting UN operations, though some new systems are being introduced. DPKO and DFS have developed policies to ensure the proper handling and sharing of information at headquarters and in operational theaters.

Among the goals of such systems should be to enable the Secretariat to present to Member States not just mission-specific resource information but data about overall resource flows of at a regional and global level. This would enable the Member States to make judgments about priorities, and where necessary shift resources to missions under stress. Such decisions to allocate resources will and should remain those of Member States; but the Secretariat needs the tools to present Member States with an accurate picture of resource gaps and constraints. The Secretariat's systems should also be able to make operational and performance indicators accessible to decision-makers at headquarters and in the field.

## **Security – Staff security and information technology**

Information technology systems are important not just for management, but also staff security. The UN also faces considerable day-to-day managerial challenges, concerning the safety and security of personnel and applying modern IT to peacekeeping.

### *Safety and security of personnel*

Robust mandates, limited consent of parties, difficult operating environments, and deployments along side other military actors expose United Nations personnel, both civilian and uniformed, to comparatively greater risks than more traditional peace operations. Though these risks are not limited to personnel on peacekeeping missions – as underscored by the deadly 2007 attacks in Algiers – the recent attacks on the UN in Darfur and Lebanon highlight the nature of the threats faced.

The Independent Panel on Safety and Security of UN Personnel and Premises Worldwide (IPSS) undertook the most recent and thorough evaluation of the UN security management system. The recommendations of the Panel are being implemented by a high-level steering committee chaired by USG for DFS. The committee is reviewing key recommendations concerning security risk management – essential for aligning what are often viewed as competing priorities: operational delivery and ensuring the safety of personnel; pre-deployment training, particularly for high-risk duty stations; strengthening accountability mechanisms, and overhauling the security phase system. Priorities are likely to include: replacing the security phase system in favor of the Security Risk Assessment; and shifting to a security culture that enables safe delivery of program activities by all parts of the UN system. Here, commensurate measures are needed to mitigate the risks faced by national staff in environments deemed too dangerous for internationals, as well as the moral dilemmas associated with employing contractors.

### *Information technology systems and security*

Information Technology, commercially available and relatively affordable, has the potential to revolutionize UN operations. Such technology would permit, for example: (i) monitoring and jamming of combatant communications; (ii) infrared or satellite tracking, enabling preventive engagement to protect civilians or pursuit of combatants even in dense forests, as well as to track mission personnel or refugees; and (iii) advanced GIS mapping to guide military and civilian convoys.

While these technologies are increasingly accessible to the UN, the ability to utilize them as a force multiplier is dependent on technical proficiency that incoming national contingents and UN personnel will not have unless properly trained. Incoming senior mission management likewise may be unaware of the potential application of IT to their work. Briefing and training are thus required at all levels to make UN missions fully aware of how IT can help them.

Central to information sharing in operations is the development of Joint Mission Analysis Cells (JMACs) and Joint Operations Centers (JOCs). First introduced in 2006, JMAC/JOCs are designed to serve an information integrating and analyzing role across a mission environment (including political affairs, military and police

components, staff security, administration). JMACs and JOCs are intended to serve a wider purpose beyond staff security, respectively serving strategic planning and crisis management functions. Day-to-day situational awareness (in the case of JOCs) and the medium and long-term analysis of trends (in the case of JMACs) are critical inputs to threat and risk assessment.

There has been progress in resourcing and staffing the two mechanisms and the once sensitive role of JMAC/JOCs has moved beyond the realm of controversy with their endorsement during the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) meetings in 2009. Despite this, the effectiveness of JMAC/JOCs' has often been undermined either by mission leadership who do not share their analysis within the mission and/or with the UN country team, or by internal rivalries and competition over their purpose. Relations between humanitarians and military/police elements are often fraught with concerns of preserving "humanitarian space", while the UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) views threat and risk assessment narrowly as a security and safety issue, rather than one effecting a mission's long-term planning, strategy and tactical performance as a whole.

In highly insecure environments, UNDSS has begun establishing Security Information and Operation Centers (SIOC). The function of the SIOC is to provide proactive mitigating and security information to enable security managers to make timely and well-founded decisions. The UNAMA SIOC has been lauded as a particular success, partly due to personalities. Another factor is the absence of UN military and police deployments, which narrowed the scope of the UNAMA's JMAC. Elsewhere, however, tensions have emerged over the lack of clarity between the SIOC and mission JMAC functions. As the SIOC is not limited to UN peacekeeping missions (e.g., Sri Lanka and Somalia), DPKO and UNDSS need to clarify the respective roles and inter-relationship of the two mechanisms where they coexist in a mission environment. A reasonable division of labor may be for the SIOC to focus on mitigating threats to the security of staff; the JMAC on mitigating threats to the achievement of the mission mandate.

## **Supervision – Command and control and oversight**

UN command, control and oversight mechanisms must keep pace with scale of operations. The UN has moved from the scattered missions of the late 1990s to a series of regionally inter-connected operations that requires a new level of strategic command and control – capable of (i) addressing political and security problems that cut across missions and (ii) overseeing support systems that, as we have noted, are now at an unprecedented level of complexity. In short, the idea of "global peace operations" – a term coined to cover training activities – must be translated into an operational reality, both by the Secretariat and by Member States.

### *Command and control*

In military terms, the UN continues to vest command and control of troops in individual force commanders and police commanders, answerable in most cases to civilian SRSGs. The relationship between commander and SRSG increases the chance of an effective politico-military strategy. Decisions do not have to be referred up and down a chain of command as in NATO or EU missions, nor are use of force decisions subject to national veto by every organizational member. Far from the standard perception, UN command and control systems have shown substantial merit.

But this decentralized command system displays a number of flaws relative to the high tempo of UN operations. One is political: troop contributors find it hard to track events through UN headquarters, although DPKO does provide myriad and regular briefings for troop contributing countries (TCCS). Governments and missions in New York are nonetheless liable to rely on diverse and conflicting news from the field.



Second, an in-country command system has disadvantages where missions face regional challenges. All but one of the UN's operations in Africa is a country abutting at least one other operation. This results in inter-mission friction. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the Great Lakes region, for example, affects UN missions in the DRC, south Sudan and the Central African Republic. When MONUC proposed intensified operations against the LRA in 2006, UNMIS objected lest it drive the militia into Sudan. An *ad hoc* coordination system has emerged, and force commanders hold frequent joint conferences – but the case is indicative of how regional crises complicate country-level command.

A third danger in devolving command and control to the field level is that SRSGs and Force Commanders may initiate high-risk operations without sufficient consultation. The March 2008 police operation in Mitrovica (Kosovo) that led to the death of a Ukrainian police officer was only peremptorily cleared with DPKO. The series of ill-fated support operations mounted by MONUC in support of the Congolese army in recent years have similarly not always been based on full prior political support from the Security Council and relevant states. Given the risks inherent in such operations, the view that headquarters is not consulting sufficiently exacerbates political concerns.

In an effort to mitigate these concerns, DPKO has expanded its Office of Military Affairs (OMA), giving it greater capacity to generate situation reports and monitor events in the field. However, OMA's capacity is still small relative to the scale of UN operations – so is DPKO's as a whole. The US ratio of HQ staff to military personnel in the field is roughly 3:1; the NATO ratio is 1:18; the UN ratio is 1:100 – *after* the addition of a considerable number of new posts through the creation of the DFS.

This is all the more salient if the changing character of operations compels further robust operations, more mobile missions and/or over-the-horizon reserve capacities to reinforce lighter operations. If these formations were authorized, deploying them in a crisis could not be the responsibility of a hard-pressed Force Commander alone, but would require back-stopping from Headquarters.

A further risk is that gaps in strategic perspective between the Security Council and TCCs may erode compliance with command. On the one hand, this means that it is incumbent on TCCS to recognize that UN command is real, and ensure that their forces in the field follow Force Commanders directions. On the other, it means that the Security Council has to take seriously the requirement for consultation with troop contributors, lest they be confronted with a proliferation of 'caveats'.

It would be detrimental to curtail the UN's decentralized command system too much – the flexibility and civilian-led qualities of the system cannot be sacrificed lightly. However, it may be necessary to increase the ability of Headquarters to adjudicate decisively in inter-mission disputes and green-light high-risk operations. Vesting these rights in headquarters would not substantially reduce the day-to-day autonomy of Force Commanders, and might have additional positive benefits: strengthening Headquarter's role might give the UN a greater chance of managing the regional dimensions of operations and sustaining political support for higher-risk operations.

#### *Appointment of leaders: SRSGs, DSRSGs and Force Commanders*

If the UN is to maintain a modified but credible version of its decentralized command and control, it must ensure that field-level mission leaders are capable of taking on all the tasks imposed upon them.

It is commonplace to criticize the UN for the excessively political nature of leadership level appointments, especially in terms of SRSGs and Force Commanders. But choices of SRSGs will always be political – they are political roles. The key for the UN is to expand its network of contacts to ensure that it has access to the best-qualified candidates, especially in the developing world.

The selection of Force Commanders has been politicized at points as well. Here, the consequences are more problematic. Whereas an SRSG will always be different nationality to the majority of his/her staff, the connection between a Force Commander and large contributors can be a vital tool in exercising effective command and control. Because national contingents frequently look to national decision-making systems even within mission structures, having the Force Commander of the same nationality of the largest contributor can make an important contribution to mission effectiveness. This is irrelevant in observer missions; of moderate importance in peace implementation contexts with limited spoilers; and of extremely high importance in contexts of extension of state authority or other contexts where force is likely to be used in a meaningful way.

In all mission contexts, greater attention needs to be paid to the key senior posts that support the SRSG. Deputy SRSGs can be critical to mission performance, as can senior political, civilian and administrative staff. The multiple functions that they perform have been widely commented on.<sup>20</sup> Training has recently improved, as has pre-selection. But more priority could be given by DPKO, DPA, UNDP and other parts of the system to develop a cadre of seasoned Deputies, Chiefs of Staff, and senior mission staff.

And a more diverse talent pool could be drawn upon. The norm has become that UNDP Resident Coordinators are appointed to serve as Deputy SRSGs. Several of these have actually been Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) personnel appointed identified in the first instance to serve as Humanitarian Coordinators. This has been shown to be effective in conditions where large-scale humanitarian operations and coordination with them is a critical determinant of early stabilization. It is far less relevant in contexts where rebuilding state capacity and restoring national economic activity is the greater concern. In such contexts, drawing Deputy SRSGs from international or regional financial institutions might be more appropriate.

#### *Oversight (1): The relationship of Member States to mission command structures*

Given the operational and political risks that the UN faces in cases like the DRC, it is natural that Member States (and especially TCCs and major financiers) want an increased say in how operations are run. This is not new: in cases back to the UN's 1960s deployment to the Congo, the Secretariat has often found itself in disputes with TCCs. But it is very important that the Secretariat retains the trust of force suppliers and engenders trust between contingents offered to it.

Member States and the Secretariat alike thus have reasons to promote more constructive engagement by governments with how missions are run – but it is essential that these do not compromise the integrity and flexibility of UN command structures. There have been number of experiments with how to include Member States more effectively in monitoring and sustaining missions, of three types:

- *Groups of Friends.* The most frequent mechanism for allowing governments to interact with the UN on a country hosting a peace operation is a “group of friends”, or some variant of it such as the International Committee in Support of the Transition in the DRC. A study for the Center on International Cooperation in 2006 noted that such mechanisms had been involved in a majority of post-Cold War peacekeeping cases.<sup>21</sup> However, the utility of different groups to different missions has varied widely – and the members of these groups are usually distinct from troop contributors to the missions involved, although there have been exceptions including Haiti and Sierra Leone. In considering new mechanisms, one option would be to enlarge the number of TCCs included in groups of friends.
- *Higher-level political conferences.* In cases where long-term peace operations require political attention and ongoing negotiations to maintain force levels, Member States can facilitate talks through regular conferences such as the “Two Times Seven” talks on Haiti. These bring together the deputy foreign and defense ministers of seven Latin American troops contributors twice a year to discuss (*inter alia*) the future of the mission. DPKO is always involved. The EU convened a special session of the European

Council with then Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, to discuss forces for Lebanon in 2006. The political convening power of such events helps increase public political clarity over the goals and needs of peacekeeping.

- *Formalized operational advice.* An alternative to political mechanisms for monitoring and sustaining peace operations is the creation of mission-specific operational support elements, separate to normal UN structures. This has been tried just once, in the formation of the Strategic Military Cell (SMC) for UNIFIL in 2006. The SMC, set up to counter European military concerns over UN command and control, consists of officers seconded from troop contributors to UNIFIL and the P5 and is based on NATO structures (non-NATO nations like India and China have fitted into the structure smoothly). Although initially controversial, the SMC initially played an important role in drafting new guidance for the enlarged force, and it can handle issues like intelligence that the UN usually avoids. However, it has no operational authority of the mission, and so does not compromise UN command. It is generally agreed to have lost utility after the 2006 crisis as operations have grown routine.

The structures noted here are not necessarily incompatible – nor are they essential in all missions. The variety of mechanisms underlines that the UN is more flexible in creating or accepting routes for Member States to track missions and influence them. The UN should maintain this degree of flexibility in future: no one model of is likely to be appropriate for each mission and mission environment. However, some mechanisms may also be repeatable: for example, it is arguable that high-level conferences of African states and the AU based on the “Two Times Seven” model may be a viable alternative to formalized hybrid political decision-making on the UNAMID model in future.

#### *Oversight (2): Managing the peacekeeping system*

This report has covered a wide range of complex problems confronting future peace operations. None, however, is as politically thorny as the question of oversight of the peacekeeping system as a whole.

The oversight system has been driven in recent times by two issues: the “oil-for-food” debacle; and the scandal of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. On the later, several initiatives, including the introduction of management training modules and the launch of a misconduct tracking system in mid-2008 have yielded early, if mixed, signs of minimizing misconduct through better monitoring and reporting.

However, the concept of ‘oversight of the peacekeeping system as a whole’ is misleading. Official oversight systems are not specific to peacekeeping but rather cover the Secretariat as a whole. Moreover, reporting on peacekeeping by the Secretariat to Member States is undertaken on a mission-by-mission basis, not on the basis of the system as a whole. There are two results.

The first is that Member States do not have a global picture of the peacekeeping system. Decisions about allocation of resources (troops, logistical assets, money, etc.) are made on a case by case rather than a comparative basis. There is some logic to this, in that the mandate and resourcing of a specific mission is inevitably the result of a political bargain between Security Council members and others, and interests differ dramatically from mission to mission. Nevertheless, the lack of information flow to the Security Council or the General Assembly about the global picture in peacekeeping limits the ability of Member States to gain an adequate appreciation of overall strains in the system, or to prioritize.

This is a comparatively easy problem to fix. With modest investments in staff time and IT, DPKO/DFS could prepare regional and/or global reports on peacekeeping, providing Member States with an overview of mission capacities and requirements, costs, staffing and gaps. While there should be no pretence that this would diminish the bargaining that surround specific missions, at the very least it would ensure that decisions were made with some degree of reference to the implications for the system as a whole.

The second result of the existing oversight system is that DPKO/DFS labor under management, procurement and oversight rules designed for a headquarters Secretariat providing political/economic advice and conference services – not for the management of 100,000 troops in 20 missions in the field. The unsuitability of existing procurement rules for rapid deployment of missions is but one example. A senior DFS staff member recently characterized the situation like this: “We can perform, or we can follow the rules; not both.” That is an accurate depiction of an unacceptable reality. It is a particularly bizarre reality given that expenditure under the peacekeeping budget is now triple that of the rest of the Secretariat.

This is much harder to fix. And this report is not the place to wade into the broader management reform miasma that would be necessary to do justice to the oversight question. But this examination of the current state and likely future demands on peacekeeping does suggest that a re-examination of oversight of peacekeeping will be necessary, and that a more effective, more efficient system for oversight would be (a) based on a more realistic assessment of the specific requirements of peacekeeping, as distinct from those of the rest of the UN Secretariat; and (b) provide for greater latitude for rapid mission start-up. A move towards a management oversight and accountability framework that is specific to peace operations should not be ruled out.

## Part V. Moving forward – A three track strategy

Despite the scale and complexity of the challenges facing UN peace operations today, this is a moment of opportunity. There is willingness both in the Secretariat and among Member States to review and reform how the UN system responds to conflicts – captured not only in debates around peacekeeping, but discussions of peacebuilding, mediation, special political missions and the protection of civilians.

It is still not certain where each discussion will lead, or whether they can cohere into a consensus on conflict management. But together, they demonstrate a strong desire for fresh ideas about collective security at the UN. These ideas will not gain traction, however, unless there is a framework ready to implement them. Fortunately, the decision to create DFS has increased the UN's institutional readiness to innovate, as have reforms like the strengthening of OMA within DPKO and the expansion of DPA to tackle political missions.

The UN has, therefore, already made progress towards adapting to a changing strategic environment. This report has highlighted many policy areas where internal reform is already underway, and others where it could potentially take place relatively rapidly if approved by Member States. But this progress is far from complete.

If more progress is to be made, it can only be achieved through the bargains we set out in our introduction: Member States and the Secretariat must align their positions to ensure that UN operations are well-resourced and those resources are well-managed. This requires a further bargain between states on the principles of mandating and implementing UN operations – and the relative commitments and mutual obligations of states necessary to meet those commitments. Either bargain would be difficult in a period of relative calm for peacekeeping and as we have shown, this is the reverse: a period of intense and rising demand for operations.

This means that there cannot be a single, linear reform of UN peacekeeping. Instead, it is necessary to work on three tracks simultaneously: immediate and urgent action to resolve the hardest cases already on the UN's agenda; institutional reforms aimed at facilitating the bargain between Secretariat and Member States over managing resources effectively; and strategic cooperation by Member States to reinforce UN missions.

### *Track 1 – Concerted action on hardest cases*

Collective support to peacekeeping will be severely weakened if there are significant gaps between expectations and performance on the cases that attract most political scrutiny. Three sets of cases warrant priority attention from the Secretariat and major troop and financial contributors.

- **Large peacekeeping operations.** The Secretariat, the UNSC (building on the UK/France initiative), and key troop and financial contributors should launch informal strategic dialogues to align political process, peacekeeping and resources in major peacekeeping operations – especially the DRC and Somalia. DPKO should prioritize these efforts.
- **Preparing for exit.** Overstretch is generating pressure to advance the schedules for exit from Haiti, Timor-Leste and Liberia. While the question must be assessed case by case, the prospects for responsible exit would be enhanced in each case, and overall costs reduced, by three sets of commitments: *enhanced economic support*, *political oversight*, perhaps through new PBC country-specific mechanisms; and *security guarantees* – specifically in the form of pre-authorized and pre-committed rapid reaction or over-the-horizon forces. Advanced commitment to return rapidly in the face of deteriorating conditions can have an important deterrent effect. The World Bank/UNDP could lead these efforts with DPKO/PBSO.
- **Political cases.** The UN's mediation and political performance in three cases – the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq – will heavily shape the strategic environment and support to the UN. The SG and DPA should prioritize support to and oversight of performance in these political missions.

### *Track 2 – Institutional reforms: revitalizing and modernizing Brahimi*

On a separate track, the Secretariat should initiate those reforms that are within its remit, through its ‘New Horizons’ action plan; and engage with Member States in the Security Council and General Assembly on those requiring new authorities or new financing. The Security Council has already begun to examine its own performance through the UK/French initiative and the Peacekeeping Working Group. Although no formal coordination of these processes is required, movement both on the Member State and Secretariat tracks will add salience to each effort. To repeat the main targets we have outlined in Section IV:

- Investment in pre-training and pre-equipping forces for UN deployment (building on the existing work of the G8-based Global Peace Operations Initiative);
- Giving DFS the ability the necessary budgetary authority for advance procurement of standard components of mission start up (which involves regulatory change), including transport;
- Investment in logistics systems that move past mission-by-mission to global or more likely region-by-region (using hubs);
- Addressing the civilian capacity gap through (small) standing teams and predictable centers of capacity/excellence;
- Member State investment in police reserves and Rule of Law personnel for the UN;
- Investment in the management systems (including IT) to manage this;
- Adjusting the decision-making relationship between UN headquarters and the field to ensure that choices on risky operations have full political support;
- Developing innovative structures to allow Member States to engage with operational decision-making on a mission-by-mission basis, without compromising UN command and control.

### *Track 3 – Strategic efforts*

Making peacekeeping more effective and more efficient will require those Member States with the most advanced operational capabilities to wield them more consistently in support of UN operations. This is necessary if UN peacekeeping is to meet the challenge of new, complex missions in contexts of hardened spoilers, regional conflict dynamics, extremist groups, or if UN peacekeeping is to perform more consistently and more effectively in such functions as extension of state authority. It will require greater consensus between governments on the limits and possibilities of peace operations, as neither current or potential force contributors will offer personnel or assets unless they have confidence in how they will be employed.

- Authorization of commitments for pre-training of forces for deployment into UN operations (building on the work of the Global Peace Operations Initiative);
- Expanded commitments from Member States for tactical and strategic airlift;
- Revisiting the question of financing for stand-by forces (under national command) for UN operations;
- Direct major power participation in UN peacekeeping – even small contributions can have both operational and political ‘multiplier’ effects;
- Joint initiatives by the P5 and other major powers to bolster stand-by and rapid reaction forces for the UN, including through use of UNIFIL-style arrangements that fuse Member State support and UN-commanded capacities (so-called ‘green/blue’ options).

We believe that movement on the strategic track should start with an informal process among Member States, with input from the Secretariat but not led by it. If Member States are to make the kind of sustained commitment that the challenges ahead call for, they will have to feel concrete ownership of the proposals. That could take the form of a Task Force, or a ‘Friends of UN Peacekeeping’ mechanism – in either case involving capitals as well as Missions to the UN. It would ideally be launched with the encouragement of the Security Council during or before the 2009 General Assembly. It could do three things: extract specific

commitments of Member State resources for enhanced UN operations; provide inputs to the C-34, Security Council and 5<sup>th</sup> Committee for action, within a defined timeframe; and – potentially – work on an ongoing basis to ensure that Member States are matching the authorization of new missions with commitments to enable them to operate with speed, safety and effective supervision.

### *Conclusion*

Movement on the strategic track should be constructed in a manner that reflects the UN's main strategic advantage as a peacekeeping actor: it is the only organization through which the forces of the P5 and all the major powers, including the rising and regional powers, can jointly participate in providing stability. Western-based mechanisms like NATO and the EU are implementing Security Council mandates in important cases, and regional organizations like the AU offer critical advantages in their respective areas. Nevertheless, only the UN offers the option of a politically diverse but operationally capable mission – but only if the P5 and other major powers invest in UN operations.

# Annex 1 – Demand and Supply

## Demand

Predicting future demand for peacekeeping is notoriously difficult. In 1998 for example, it was generally agreed that large-scale UN operations were coming to an end, discredited in the Balkans and Central Africa. Yet the next year, UN transitional administrations were launched in Kosovo and Timor-Leste. But these operations did not give a clear picture of peacekeeping's future. No further transitional administrations have been mandated since 1999. No new UN missions of any kind have been deployed in South America and the Asia-Pacific region. The UN will face similar surprises and anomalies in future.

This degree of uncertainty is intensified by the financial crisis and the experience of the food crisis that preceded it. A number of largely stable countries experienced disorder over the price of foodstuffs in 2008 (as did Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire, threatening progress towards lasting peace supported by UN operations). Had food prices remained high for a longer period, greater instability might have required a UN response in unexpected cases. The financial crisis has stimulated limited disorder in a quarter of all countries, and the last six months have seen a series of coups in Africa. It is difficult to predict how disorder may spread and intensify if the global downturn is prolonged. Worryingly, past trends suggest that rapid decline in state income (“development disasters”) is a likely predictor of internal conflict.<sup>22</sup>

Nonetheless, it is possible to identify a number of regional trends that are likely to shape the future of UN operations. We have noted that the last decade has seen a reduction in both civil wars and inter-state wars. But the mechanisms used to end these conflicts and sustain peace vary by region:

- In both Asia/Pacific and continental South America, large-scale peace operations are not a typical feature of conflict resolution. Although a number of regional organizations do deploy monitoring missions in these areas, there is currently little demand for a UN role.
- In Europe, peacekeeping remains an important tool for stability. However, strong regional organizations limit the demand for the UN and it retains only a residual role in Kosovo and Georgia.
- The main potential theaters for UN operations are Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia and the Caribbean and Central America (in the last case, the UN is now confined to Haiti).

In projecting future demand for peacekeeping, it is necessary to ask three questions. First, do conflict trends suggest that the UN may be required to deploy to those regions where it is currently absent? Second, do conflict trends in areas where it now operates imply continued demand in future? Third, how will the UN and other organizations share the burden of response in those areas?

We return to the third question in our section on supply below. In addressing the initial two questions, we conclude that the bulk of large-scale UN operations are likely to remain in Africa and the Middle East. But new light-weight UN missions may be required in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. It should also be noted that the types of UN missions required will vary considerably by region.

We estimate that the demand for UN operations is likely to remain lowest in continental South America and Europe. In South America, the strong emphasis on diplomatic solutions to conflict promoted through the Organization of American States (OAS) is likely to remain predominant. Although many South American countries suffer severe challenges from organized crime, often in border regions, these are likely to be countered by state action or inter-governmental cooperation. In Central America and the Caribbean, the UN is likely to maintain a continued presence in Haiti; it has been suggested that it might also provide justice and government support to other states in the region (building on past experiences in El Salvador and Guatemala) through light-weight missions.



In Europe, the burden of large-scale operations – including civilian and police missions – has moved decisively to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, recent disputes over Kosovo and Georgia have shown that the UN may still have a role in the region where action by NATO, the EU or CIS is controversial. The UN contribution to European security is likely to involve light-weight missions, primarily involved in border monitoring or operating alongside regional organizations to ensure international legitimacy and accountability in their work.

Any UN operations in Asia (excluding Central Asia and the Middle East) are also liable to be light-weight, comparable to the current UN presence in Nepal. This region faces a wide range of inter and intra-state tensions – in addition to many frequently overlooked low-level conflicts (fewer than 1,000 battle deaths a year). But with the obvious exception of Timor-Leste, responses have tended to come from coalitions of regional powers and individual states rather than the UN. The involvement of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in monitoring peace in Aceh and Australia's ongoing engagement in Pacific island nations reinforce these trends. Large-scale military operations to stabilize fragile states are likely to involve multinational forces other than the UN itself. However, the Nepal case shows that the UN can provide political and other expertise where regional powers are supportive of its presence, as it does also in Afghanistan.

Of those regions where the UN is currently a major operational actor, Africa shows a high vulnerability to future conflicts. After the Cold War, Africa experienced a growth in conflict while other regions saw a decline in violence. A brief period of decline in the number of wars occurred in 2003-5; but the number has stayed steady since, and the number of small conflicts has risen slightly. The impact of the food and financial crisis is likely to exacerbate these.

Over the last decade, the UN has increasingly engaged in Africa through peace operations that are large (involving forces of over 7-8,000 troops or more), long (with a lifetime of over five years) and mandated to resolve internal wars. The only mission in Africa mandated to support an inter-state peace agreement in the last decade, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, was a failure. Africa is a focus of the “extension of state authority” operations noted in the last section, with examples including UN operations against rebels in Sierra Leone, support to the Liberian government and recent operations in the eastern DRC.

However, the distinction between inter- and intra-state conflicts in Africa is often weak, as the UN's experiences in West Africa and the Chad/Darfur complex of conflicts demonstrates. Peacekeeping in Africa is liable to have a focus on tackling regionalized conflicts, with or without explicit mandates.

The demand for peacekeeping is likely to vary across Africa. There has been progress towards stability in much of West Africa – home to several large multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations since the late 1990s – allowing the UN to draw down forces. But tensions in Guinea, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau have raised the prospect of reversals and a continued UN presence.

Conflicts in the Horn of Africa and in central Africa are at a very different stage of development: the situations remain volatile and violent and likely to necessitate peacekeepers in significant numbers for some time. Currently there are over 47,000 UN and AU peacekeepers in these regions, and the numbers are still rising. When all mandated operations are fully deployed, there may be over 60,000 uniformed personnel in theater. If a UN force is deployed to Somalia (though this is unlikely), this number might rise to 80,000.

A significant setback for the UN or a precipitous withdrawal of one or more missions for budgetary reasons might result in a rapid reduction of UN personnel in Africa. If these scenarios are avoided, options for the UN will be to maintain very high force levels; to hand off responsibilities to other actors (see “supply” below); or both. Africa is thus likely to remain the UN's main operational focus.

The UN does, however, also have a continued operational investment in the Middle East. Unlike Africa, the primary focus here is inter-state peacekeeping, especially on Israel's borders (on every one of which, with the exception of that with Jordan, there is a significant UN or non-UN peace operation). Predicting future missions in this region is particularly difficult, as forces tend to be deployed rapidly in the context of frenetic diplomatic activity – the size and shape of a mission like the enlarged UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), authorized in 2006, can be a relatively arbitrary choice.

However, just as peacekeeping in Africa may shift from a focus on intra-state conflict to regional challenges, UN operations in the Middle East could move from prioritizing inter-state affairs to internal issues. In the Lebanon case, UNIFIL was mandated not merely to observe the Israeli border in 2006, but to help extend the government's authority over its own territory. The UN's small mission in Iraq is gradually taking on greater responsibilities as the U.S. draws down. There is also the persistent prospect of a UN or non-UN mission in the Occupied Palestinian Territories after a peace deal. It is thus possible (but not certain) that the overall demand for highly sensitive state-building and "extension of state authority" operations in the Middle East may rise in the short to medium-term.

The potential requirement for peace operations in Central Asia is a particularly problematic. At present, NATO has almost as many troops in Afghanistan as the UN has worldwide, but the longevity of this mission (at least at current levels) is uncertain. Nor is Afghanistan necessarily the only country in the region to require peacekeepers – there is a risk of wider regional instability. The UN has a political locus in Central Asia, have deployed a series light-weight missions to Afghanistan and Tajikistan (and maintaining an office focused on regional conflict prevention in Turkmenistan). To date, however, it has not been required to deploy significant military or police forces there – any demand for a large-scale UN operation in the region would present a particularly major challenge.

## Supply

The UN thus faces a complex variety of operational environments, many of which are not suitable for large-scale blue-helmeted missions. In the next section, we review potential models for light-weight UN missions and review obstacles to effective civilian deployments. However, the very high demand for UN military and police forces in Africa and the Middle East ensures that the supply of uniformed personnel is a recurrent, urgent and intensifying challenge for the organization.

The supply of military forces for UN peace operations necessarily rests on decision-making by Member States. Their choices on UN commitments will depend on three factors: (i) overall global military capacity; (ii) demand for forces by other organizations and coalitions; and (iii) the capacity of the UN to manage, transport, and if necessary equip, forces that lack expeditionary capabilities.

### *Overall global military capacity*

The number of troops in peace operations today represents a miniscule percentage of all armies worldwide: 200,000 soldiers relative to a pool of over 14 million, or just over 1%.<sup>23</sup> But this figure obscures significant obstacles to increasing peacekeeping forces. Many soldiers, including those employed in advanced militaries, are neither trained nor expected to deploy abroad, being conscripts or reserve forces. Many smaller nations do not have contingents (as opposed to individual military, police and civilian personnel) that meet minimum UN standards for deployment. Only 62 UN Member States – roughly 40% of the total - maintain forces ready for more intensive missions.

Critics of the UN argue that it relies too heavily on infantry forces – and so focuses too heavily on numbers rather than the effects of operations. But the current level of activity appears to be taking a particular toll on the UN's ability to deploy assets required for robust, effects-based operations. This problem is encapsulated in the frequent shortage of helicopters for UN missions, but the organization also frequently lacks the

engineers and force protection assets that it requires. Globally, the availability of troops and prospects for their adaptation to peacekeeping breaks down as follows:

*Africa (overall forces 1,869,320; current UN peacekeeping deployments 23,309; current non-UN commitments 3,600).* African states deploy nearly 30,000 troops through the UN, AU and other organizations – 50% more than was thought credible at the start of this decade. This reflects a major commitment by the continent’s leaders to tackle their region’s conflicts. However, African contributions suffer from two imbalances. First, the high level of demand places pressure on a relatively small number of individual contributors: just 12 states provide over 85% of the African troops contributed to UN and AU peacekeeping. Second, the ability of these states to provide personnel is not matched by a supply of force enablers: only three of the UN’s 26 engineering units worldwide are from African nations, as are just 5 of its 177 helicopters.

*Asia (overall forces 5,882,718; current UN peacekeeping deployments 35,778; current non-UN commitments 920).* Asian forces are essential to UN peacekeeping. At present, South Asia is the primary source of contributions – but East Asian and Pacific nations are also taking a greater role. Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan collectively supply nearly 30,000 troops – 38% of the UN’s current deployments. India and Pakistan fill the gap in specialized assets in African missions, providing 40% of the UN’s helicopters. This supply of forces is not guaranteed. India’s defense costs are increasing in such a way that deploying UN personnel will soon represent a financial loss, while Pakistan’s deployments will be influenced by their own internal security requirements. By contrast, other Asian states are playing a growing role: Indonesia contributes 1,324 troops, 36 military observers and 164 police; and China provides 1900 troops, 54 military observers and 222 police. Nepal may represent an opportunity: with a significantly large armed services, pressure to engage in security sector reform, and a peace deal holding (albeit tenuously), the country may be in a position to increase its contributions.

*Europe and North America (overall forces 2,735,654; current UN peacekeeping deployments 10,600; current non-UN commitments 75,000).* Although the European contribution to UN operations is limited numerically, Western European troops represent 62% of UN forces in the Middle East (in contrast to just 2% of those in Africa). European suppliers also make a significant contribution to UN air capacities: include figures for Ukrainian and Russian helicopters here. Nonetheless, there remains a significant discrepancy between European military capacities and support for the UN. This reflects two factors. First, although European NATO nations have almost 2 million forces under arms, only 400,000 are deployable (meaning that only 200,000 can be fielded at any one time). Second, these forces have increasingly been deployed under NATO command in Afghanistan and – to a much lesser extent – EU missions in Africa, typically mounted alongside UN operations. US and Canadian contributions are similarly focused on Afghanistan and (in the US case) Iraq, although it is probable that these two missions will shrink in the medium term, freeing military capacity.

*Latin America (overall forces 1,058,051; current UN peacekeeping deployments 6,348; current non-UN commitments n/a).* Latin American forces play a central role in the UN Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) - where regional forces make up 60% of the mission - and a supporting role in Africa and the Middle East. Significantly, Latin American contingents are relatively self-sustaining: can we include some figures about how Latin American’s provide specialized assets for MINUSTAH as well as troops here? Beyond infantry troops, Latin American countries provide MINUSTAH with seven transport helicopters and three aviation units to support them. They also provide two engineering companies, and a level II hospital. In the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Uruguay provides riverine units, an infantry battalion, an engineering unit and an airfield support unit, while Bolivia provides an infantry mechanized unit.

*Middle East (overall forces 1,338,457; current UN peacekeeping deployments 2,200; current non-UN commitments n/a).* The politics surrounding UN peacekeeping in the Middle East constrain regional contributions from the region. But it is notable that Middle Eastern states do not typically deploy to Africa or other regions either - Jordan being the only consistent exception. However, renewed Egyptian interest in peacekeeping – including significant recent deployments to Sudan and the DRC - could signal shifts in the region’s approach, depending heavily on its internal security dynamics.

In all regions, it is possible to identify ways of increasing peacekeeping capacity, in part through training and spending on necessary specialized assets. However, there are currently major obstacles to many capable countries expanding their peacekeeping forces significantly. The first is financial. Even prior to the global economic crisis, many states with historical commitments on UN and non-UN operations were reducing defense expenditures to increase domestic spending. Between 1998 and 2007, when economic growth was the norm, defense expenditure by sub-Saharan African states fell from 1.75% of regional gross domestic product (GDP) to 1.47%. The comparable drop in South Asia was from 3.33% to 2.25%, and that in NATO (excluding the US) 2.06% to 1.73%. These declines reflect increased security in many cases, but they have reduced the potential for expenditures on assets for peacekeeping.

Financial pressures will be exacerbated as states try to balance budgets during the financial crisis. Some countries, like Poland, have already cut their UN contributions for budgetary reasons. The profile of forces available to the UN may alter as the financial crisis continues, as budget pressures will disproportionately affect the ability of advanced militaries to contribute to the UN (as UN reimbursements will not fully cover their military costs). The supply of specialized assets will reduce.

Moreover, the primary concern of many states remains their own defense. Over half the top twenty troop suppliers to UN operations border on at least one fragile state. For some countries, deploying peacekeepers is a direct response to these threats or a quid pro quo for UN engagement in their neighborhoods. But these threats set limits on what states can offer international organizations.

#### *Competing demand for resources*

A further challenge for UN deployments is competition for resources from other organizations and coalitions. The UN has worked hard to build positive relations with regional bodies, signing various agreements with the AU, EU and NATO. These organizations maintain their forces under Security Council mandates, and they should be accepted as part of the UN's peace and security framework. Nonetheless, a soldier or armored personnel carrier (APC) under NATO command cannot simultaneously be in a UN mission.

This is significant in that the rapid growth of UN peacekeeping from 1999 to 2003 took place alongside a net decline of troops deployed by regional organizations. By contrast, since 2003 there has been a net rise in the forces deployed through these organizations and coalitions of the willing. These figures are somewhat distorted by NATO's mission in Afghanistan, but the trend further reduces the UN's potential access to troops and specialized assets, especially from the West.

Military cooperation within regional organizations may have long-term benefits for UN operations, however. In Africa, the development of the African Standby Force promises to give the AU and UN alike rapid deployment capabilities. Similarly, the EU's efforts to develop a defense identity have resulted in a series of mission to help sustain the UN. Nonetheless, such capacity-development programs do not guarantee future support to the UN – and experience has shown that differences in command structure and standards can significantly complicate cooperation with non-UN forces.

In this context, it is necessary to recognize the factors that are likely to affect states' choice of which organizations (if any) to deploy forces through. Three recurrent sets of factors stand out:

- *Risks and rewards.* Governments are inevitably motivated to deploy forces where they see their national security or interests at risk – be it through regional instability or the potential for weak states to harbor terrorists, as in Afghanistan. Conversely, states will also weigh the risks of casualties and potential rewards present in any theater. The latter include (i) financial rewards, as through the UN

reimbursement system and (ii) political advantages from action, such as privileged relations with the host state of an operation or with coalition partners or interested international and regional powers.

- *Range and regionalism.* With the important exceptions of European forces under NATO and Asian forces under UN command, the majority of peacekeepers deploy within their region of origin or its immediate neighborhood. This does not necessarily mean that deployments are short-range – East African troops are common in West African operations, and vice versa, and Argentina and Chile are a long way from Haiti. However, there is a clear preference for regional deployments, broadly defined, among many states. This can include regional deployments under UN command, as for the Latin American forces in Haiti. Nonetheless, political concerns reaching beyond effective peacekeeping will incline African countries to operate through the AU, Europeans through the EU and NATO in particular.
- *Responsibility.* Involvement in peacekeeping is a sign of international responsibility, as in China's growing commitment to UN operations and the efforts of AU members to tackle Darfur. States are also drawn to the incentive of responsibility within or over a mission. Countries that are given operational command positions in the field, or political decision-making power within institutions, tend to be more committed to operations. Again, Haiti provides an example of both definitions of responsibility. Brazil agreed to the mission in part to show its commitment to hemispheric security - and a Brazilian Force Commander has taken greater risks with Brazilian troops than would have been possible for an officer from another country.

### *The UN as an enabler*

Given the factors affecting governments' choices over peacekeeping, it is essential that the UN offer sufficient incentives for countries to deploy through its mechanisms. It is necessary to ensure that the UN's mechanisms: (i) mitigate potential risks to UN forces (without compromising operational effectiveness); (ii) compensate for the difficulties inherent in long-range operations; and (iii) ensure that troop and police contributors feel a strong sense of responsibility for the missions they join.

These factors relate to the role of the UN as a force enabler and multiplier, supplying logistics and equipment necessary to sustain operations; command and control mechanisms required for effective operations; and the political framework for action. The operational dimensions of this role are often overlooked, but are essential in a context in which advanced and less developed militaries alike lack expeditionary capabilities. There is a mismatch between this shortage and new operations demanded of the UN and other organizations: long-range deployments in areas with minimal infrastructure.

To sustain forces in these environments the UN relies on a network of contractors, like all modern militaries. Although the Security Council mandates missions in terms of personnel, the supply of peacekeepers relies on a combination of national capacities and UN-owned or contracted capacities. MONUC operates 68 aircraft, of which 38 (55%) are commercial hires rather than nationally-owned assets. In smaller operations, especially those where the UN deploys police but no troops, the ratio of UN-provided vehicles and equipment to national contributions is even higher. In Timor-Leste, where the UN still fields 1,500 police, 90% of the mission's vehicles are UN-owned.

The supply of peacekeeping relies on a dynamic relationship between troop and police contributors and the UN as an enabler. Without the organization's logistics systems, many of the states presently deployed in peacekeeping could not operate abroad. The UN's technical, logistical and administrative support has been particularly important to helping African militaries overcome obstacles to deployment, as in its provision of light and heavy support packages to the AU in Sudan prior to the creation of the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and its January 2009 mandate to give logistical support to the AU in Somalia.

The UN's enabling role is not always necessary. In 2006, European forces deployed to Lebanon using their own logistics. But even European militaries lack logistical assets, with air-lift programs behind schedule and a lack of helicopters for missions such as the recent EU Force in Chad. Given that the world's only truly global military – the U.S. – relies on contractors for essential services, the UN is very likely to continue to do so. This places the UN – and specifically the recently created Department for Field Support - under significant day-to-day strains. Resolving the numerous difficulties identified there is integral to maintaining UN as an enabler capable of sustaining the supply of peacekeepers in multiple theaters.

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Human Security Center, *Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 153. See also the 2006 update at: <http://www.humansecuritybrief.info/2006/access.html>. For another useful data set on recent conflict trends see, Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflict, 1989-2006," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, no. 5 (2007): pp. 623-634.

<sup>2</sup> See Human Security Reports from 2005 and 2006.

<sup>3</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and Patrick Regan, "Mediation and International Conflict Management: a Review and Analysis," in Zeev Maoz (ed.), *Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations* (Lexington Books, 2003): pp. 249-272. For a recent study looking the peace-inducing effects of mediation see, Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 1 (2006): pp. 58-86. Also see, Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton University Press, 2004): pp. 186-196.

<sup>4</sup> Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* (Princeton University Press, 2008), p.113.

<sup>5</sup> The per capita cost of operations is a different metric than cost effectiveness. Here, there are more questions. A 2006 GAO study on UN operations in Haiti is widely cited in the UN for its note that UN operations cost roughly half what a US-led operation would cost. However, a careful read of that report highlights the second part of the argument: that a US-led operation would deliver roughly twice as much. That part of the argument is less often cited at the UN. See, United States Government Accountability Office, "Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. Operations in Haiti", Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives (February 2006) at: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06331.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Except where noted otherwise, figures in this report are derived from the Center on International Cooperation's Annual Review of Global Peace Operations series (Lynne Rienner, 2006 onwards).

<sup>7</sup> This figure is extrapolated from cost comparisons between UN, NATO and other missions, but is only an estimate.

<sup>8</sup> Center on International Cooperation, *Recovering from War: Gaps in Early Action*, Center on International Cooperation, New York (July 2008) <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/earlyrecoveryfinal.pdf>.

<sup>9</sup> Donald C.F. Daniel, "Why So Few Troops from among So Many?," in Donald C.F. Daniel, Patricia Taft and Sharon Wiharta (eds.), *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress and Prospects* (Georgetown University Press, 2008): pp. 47-62.

<sup>10</sup> Lise Morje Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>11</sup> It is also important to note that modes of operation other than full-blown peacekeeping have different logistics and human resource requirements. A simple but potent example is the Land-Cruiser: a basic operating tool for peacekeeping operations, but a excessively heavy physical symbol for the UN when conducting light, sensitive political operations. DFS is currently review support to these missions.

<sup>12</sup> OECD-DAC, *From Fragility to Resilience: Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile Situations* (OECD, 2008) at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/51/41100930.pdf>, especially p. 34 onwards.

<sup>13</sup> OECD, "Enhancing the Delivery of Justice and Security: Governance, Peace, and Security," (OECD, 2007).

<sup>14</sup> Volker Boege, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan, "On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility,'" Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, at: [http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/boege\\_et\\_al\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/boege_et_al_handbook.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> See <http://tinyurl.com/dcabjd> or

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:20763583~menuPK:1989584~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062,00.html>.

<sup>16</sup> See <http://tinyurl.com/dfyymq> or

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:20934363~menuPK:1989584~pagePK:210058~piPK:210062~theSitePK:1974062,00.html>.

<sup>17</sup> See, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," at: [http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone\\_Doctrine\\_ENG.pdf](http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf), p. 88. This document is commonly referred to as the Capstone Doctrine.

<sup>18</sup> For UNSC Resolutions see, S/RES/1645, 20 December 2005, and; S/RES/1646, 20 December 2005. For UNGA Resolutions see, A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005; A/RES/60/180, 20 December 2005, and; A/RES/60/287, 21 September 2006.

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<sup>19</sup> UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. This document is commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report.

<sup>20</sup> Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: A report on findings and recommendations* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008): pp.37-41, at: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/final\\_operations.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/final_operations.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Specifically: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwaanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and the Western Sahara. See, Teresa Whitfield, *Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict* (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

<sup>22</sup> James Fearon and David Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): pp. 75-90.

<sup>23</sup> See Daniel, "Why so few troops from among so many?"