



Evaluation of the project "Emergency response and support to vulnerable populations in at-risk areas of Burkina Faso"

Phase I

Project Evaluation Series
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**Evaluation of the project “Emergency
response and support to improve the
resilience of vulnerable populations in at-
risk areas of Burkina Faso”
Phase I**

OSRO/BKF/801/SWE

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Abstract

The project "Emergency response and support to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations in at-risk areas of Burkina Faso", financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), is implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in partnership with the Government of Burkina Faso under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Hydro-agricultural Development and Mechanisation. The objective of the project is to improve access to food and means of production for vulnerable households.

This first phase of the evaluation is primarily aimed at improving the implementation of the project in its remaining months and focused on outcomes related to the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the project. The first-phase evaluation resulted in the following recommendations: i) intensify support at the level of beneficiaries, so that the latter benefit from all project support; ii) strengthen the capacity of communities and Committees for Complaints Management for greater efficiency; iii) improve beneficiary targeting processes; iv) strengthen the effectiveness of the implementation of nutrition, cowpea storage, and access to land for internally displaced populations; v) review internal procedures in order to simplify them and adapt them to activities, particularly with regard to the signing and payment of memoranda of understanding (MOU) instalments with partners; vi) improve the processes for distributing animals and ordering vaccines; vii) improve the sustainability of interventions by introducing farmer field schools (FFS) for capacity building through the *Caisse de resilience* approach. The implementation of these recommendations should allow the project and more generally FAO, the FAO Office in Burkina Faso and the Government, to close a project that has achieved its objectives.

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The evaluation was carried out with the valuable assistance of FAO personnel in Burkina Faso. Her availability and her contributions and advice facilitated the conduct of this evaluation.

The evaluation benefited from the contributions of other stakeholders, including representatives of the state technical services involved, non-governmental organizations that are implementing partners, and beneficiaries of the intervention who were mobilized to respond to the requests of the consulting team. Their contributions were essential to the work of the evaluation team and are greatly commended.

Abbreviations and acronyms

CFW	Cash for work
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FGD	Focus group discussion
OCADES	<i>Organisation catholique pour le développement économique et social</i>
OED	FAO Office of Evaluation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
IDP	Internally displaced person
NTFP	Non-timber forest product
PICS	Purdue improved crop storage
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework

Executive summary

1. The project “Emergency response and support to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations in at-risk areas of Burkina Faso”, financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), is implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in partnership with the Government of Burkina Faso under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Hydro-agricultural Development and Mechanisation. The objective of the project is to improve access to food and means of production for vulnerable households. The issues addressed in this evaluation (Phase I) are relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. The other evaluation questions (partnership, sustainability, and cross-cutting dimensions) will be analysed in the upcoming Phase II evaluation.
2. The project appears to be relevant. It is aligned with the FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF), the priorities identified by the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the strategy for development cooperation between Sweden and Burkina Faso. Moreover, it is consistent with national strategies and programs. Nevertheless, some of the modalities proved inadequate: the methodology, household economy analysis, was not adequately resourced and key partners were not consulted during project design. The project takes into account the principles of accountability and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus: the four main pathways proposed by the project foster FAO's contribution to peacekeeping, reducing the likelihood of violent conflict, preventing conflict, and increasing the prospects for peace.
3. The effectiveness of the project is Moderate. The successive distribution of quality food crop seeds over two years to the same beneficiaries has ensured good production. Support for vegetable production has enabled thousands of beneficiaries to earn substantial income, and thanks to the distribution of small ruminants, many beneficiaries have rebuilt their herds. Despite attacks on cowpeas, production has been good, except for internally displaced populations due to the poor quality of the land allocated to them. Technical support was overall insufficient. The implementation of the mobile payment system did not allow for the timely availability of funds to beneficiaries, to give them access to food during the lean season. Many of the nutrition awareness sessions remained theoretical and are likely to have little lasting impact. Despite FAO's support, beneficiary communities have remained less resilient to shocks according to the self-evaluated resilience analysis.
4. The efficiency of the project is low. Results were not always obtained in a timely manner. Delays affected strategy, outputs and outcomes. The project's monitoring and evaluation system is functional and makes good use of the data to ensure adaptive management. Finally, FAO contributed significantly to the implementation of the project from a technical point of view, and the multi-year funding limited the adverse effects of low project efficiency.
5. The evaluation makes the following recommendations to improve project implementation:
 - i) intensify support at the level of beneficiaries, so that the latter benefit from all project support;
 - ii) strengthen the capacity of communities and committees for complaints management for greater efficiency;
 - iii) improve beneficiary targeting processes;
 - iv) strengthen the effectiveness of the implementation of nutrition, cowpea storage, and access to land for internally displaced populations;
 - v) review internal procedures in order to simplify them and adapt them to activities, particularly with regard to the signing and payment of memoranda of understanding (MOU) instalments with partners;
 - vi) improve the processes for distributing animals and ordering vaccines;
 - vii) improve the sustainability of interventions by introducing farmer field schools (FFS) for capacity building through the *Caisse de résilience* approach.

1. Introduction

1. This report presents the results of the mid-term evaluation of the project OSRO/BKF/801/SWE entitled "Emergency response and support to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations in at-risk areas of Burkina Faso", fully funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The project is implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in partnership with the Government of Burkina Faso through the ministries in charge of rural development and food security under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Hydro-agricultural Development and Mechanization. Approved on 24 May 2018, the project officially started on 1 June 2018, initially for a period of 24 months (until 31 May 2020). A budget revision approved in December 2019 extended the project end date to 31 December 2020, providing the project with a budget of USD 13 879 059 compared to the original budget of USD 9 500 000. A further 12-month extension was granted on 7 November 2020, with an estimated budget increase of USD 6 677 053 (SEK 65 000 000).
2. The independent evaluation mission took place between January and March 2021. It was conducted by a team of independent experts under the coordination of the FAO Office of Evaluation (OED).

1.1 Purpose, scope and objective of the evaluation

3. This final evaluation is part of several recently completed or ongoing evaluations, including: i) the evaluation of the five FAO SIDA-funded projects in Cameroon, Mali, the Niger and Chad (ongoing); ii) the OED evaluation on the humanitarian-development-peace (HDP) nexus (FAO, 2020); and iii) the evaluation of the response to pastoral crises in the Sahel (FAO, 2019).
4. The first purpose of the evaluation was to analyse the project design and progress in terms of:
 - i. The relevance of the project approach to: beneficiaries, the national context, FAO and SIDA institutional context, and the needs of the country and communities. Project relevance in terms of its insertion into the HDP nexus, with particular attention to the latter dimension, through the analysis of impact pathways.
 - ii. Project efficiency – implementation of activities and achievement of planned objectives, contribution to planned impacts, management, and monitoring and evaluation of activities, with particular attention to the administrative and institutional constraints or processes of both FAO and SIDA that may have affected efficiency.
 - iii. Project effectiveness – identification of target households and intervention activities carried out based on context analysis and food security and nutrition data, and review of outcomes (effects) achieved, anticipated or unanticipated, with a focus on achievements related to each project output. The evaluation also aimed at examining the project effectiveness in terms of resilience, using different subjective dimensions (detailed in Appendix 5) to determine short- and longer-term resilience and the influence of its different dimensions on the different target groups.
5. The second purpose of the evaluation was to collect and propose lessons learned and recommendations both for this project and for other projects implemented on similar themes in Burkina Faso and the region. The analysis thus focused on:
 - i. the sustainability of the project, where particular attention was paid to the multi-year funding model, its role in the SIDA-FAO partnership and the success of projects using it;

- ii. the partnerships and cooperation developed by FAO with SIDA in terms of quality, efficiency, coordination, but also with project implementers, national and local government counterparts, and the humanitarian country team; and
 - iii. existing or potential cross-cutting dimensions and other factors that may have a positive or negative impact on project implementation, such as gender and minority group issues.
6. In order to answer these key questions, they were broken down and developed in an evaluation matrix developed by the evaluation team, in coordination with the OED, during the initial phase of the mission (see Appendix 4).
7. In terms of scope, this evaluation examines all of the activities implemented in the project and covers the entire duration of the intervention, from the beginning to the end of the project. However, given the time frame between project amendments and actual implementation, the evaluation will be divided into two phases, which together will cover all evaluation criteria, but will each present a separate report. Their recommendations and conclusions will focus on the project's achievements to date and possible modifications that could be made to ensure better implementation (in this report) or on how to ensure the sustainability of the outcomes achieved, as well as a proposal for a possible programmatic continuation in the medium term.
8. The primary intended users of this evaluation are FAO personnel, departments implementing similar projects, and the donor (SIDA). Secondary users are the Government of Burkina Faso, project implementing partners, and humanitarian and development stakeholders, including other donors carrying out interventions with similar objectives in the country.

1.2 Methodology

9. With regard to relevance, the team conducted a literature review to analyse the project's alignment with:
 - i. relevant national policies (food security and livelihoods, environment, climate change adaptation, social protection and humanitarian support);
 - ii. FAO strategic objectives (SOs) and priorities at the country level;
 - iii. the United Nations (UN) Development Assistance Framework (UN System in Burkina Faso, 2017, United Nations Development Assistance Framework [UNDAF] 2018–2020) and/or the Humanitarian Response Plan (UN System in Burkina Faso, 2015); and
 - iv. the SIDA Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance (Government of Sweden, 2017) and the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation (Government of Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).
10. The team also conducted interviews with key stakeholders at the central and local levels on issues of alignment with national policies and with Sweden's country strategy.
11. Investigations also focused on the HDP nexus, the policies of the humanitarian emergency team, the pathways to impact followed by the project based on the five proposed pathways¹ – through which FAO interventions can potentially contribute to sustaining peace, reducing the potential for

¹ Pathway 1 (P1). Improve social capital both horizontally (inter and intra-community) and vertically (community-state); Pathway 2 (P2). Strengthen local capacity for conflict management, including over natural resources; Pathway 3 (P3). Increase the opportunity cost of violence; Pathway 4 (P4). Reduce horizontal inequalities and related grievances within groups; Pathway 5 (P5). Reduce competition over natural resources.

violent conflict, and increasing prospects for peace – and the seven intermediate pathways² (FAO-Interpeace, 2020). Based on discussions with beneficiaries and exchanges with partners, the team analysed the relevance of project activities to the needs of beneficiaries and the context, the quality of targeting, the relevance of the arrangements chosen, and the risk of conflict creation at the community level related to the implementation of activities.

12. With regard to effectiveness, the evaluation adopted a qualitative approach in the first phase through the organisation of focus group discussions (FGDs) with beneficiaries.

Figure 1. Focus group discussion, women beneficiaries of Cissin, Northern Region, Burkina Faso



Figure 2. Focus group discussion, men beneficiaries of Cissin, Northern Region, Burkina Faso



13. These discussions made it possible to review if and how the expected outcomes had been achieved and to analyse the communities' subjective self-evaluated resilience score (see Appendix 5). The project sites visited were selected in consultation with the project team, taking into account the security situation and accessibility. The sample offers a good representation of the different intervention typologies (direct distribution of rainfed and vegetable seeds, distribution of small ruminants, etc.). The data collection tools were used on groups of male/female beneficiaries, most of whom had benefited from the same types of activities per village. In total, 16 FGDs were

² Collaborative capacities are increased (within and between communities) (P1, P2); Constructive engagement between communities and local institutions is increased and decision making is more inclusive (P1, P2, P3); Conflict management mechanisms function more effectively (formal and/or informal) (P2); Regulatory frameworks are strengthened and institutions govern natural resource use and entitlement more effectively (P2, P4, P5); Household resilience to shocks is increased (P3); Natural resources are used more equitably among community members and social groups (P1, P4, P5, 5 and thus P3); Productivity and access to natural resources are increased and scarcity is reduced (P3, P5).

conducted with beneficiaries in eight villages in four provinces, namely Sanmatenga (Centre-North region), Namentenga (Centre-North region), Seno (Sahel region) and Yatenga (North region). These FGDs were as follow: eight for men and eight for women. About 189 beneficiaries (99 men and 90 women, or 48 percent women) participated. Finally, 49 direct interviews were conducted with contact persons, partner organisations, FAO, the Swedish Embassy and technical services (37 men and 12 women).

14. To analyse efficiency, the team discussed with beneficiaries, operational and technical partners (including non-governmental organisations, cash distribution operators, relevant ministries and decentralised services) as well as with the FAO Country Office and the FAO Sub-Country Offices in the three intervention regions (Centre-North, North and Sahel). In this way, it was able to analyse: i) the achievement of outcomes in a timely manner and according to the planned schedule; ii) the effectiveness of cash transfers and the cash-for-work (CFW) modality; iii) the existence and functionality of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism.
15. With regard to partnerships, sustainability and cross-cutting dimensions, the evaluation team will deepen its analysis in the second phase of the evaluation. However, the information gathered now can already inform this report.
 - i. In terms of partnership, the team discussed with operational and technical partners (non-governmental organisations, relevant ministries, decentralised services, SIDA) as well as with the FAO country office and sub-offices. The team found that the cooperative arrangements developed within the project contributed to the quality of interventions and was able to assess the improvements made through learning from other projects.
 - ii. In terms of sustainability and multi-year funding, in Phase I of the evaluation, the evaluation team interviewed FAO personnel, technical services and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners. The team also interacted with beneficiaries to analyse the level of ownership of achievements and lessons learned. In phase II of the study, the evaluation mission will organise exchanges with FAO personnel and the Swedish Embassy to analyse whether the multi-year approach has enabled: i) a more rapid and effective response to needs arising during project implementation; ii) the mainstreaming of elements of "humanitarian response" and "structural change"; iii) the identification of outcomes at the level of social cohesion and conflict management over natural resources; and iv) awareness to potential conflicts.
 - iii. With regard to cross-cutting dimensions, the evaluation team includes a gender expert; thus, particular attention was paid to the consultation of women in FGDs with beneficiaries. In addition, for data collection, the team formed separate male and female groups to allow women to express themselves. The FAO Policy on Gender Equality (FAO, 2021) was used as a reference for the evaluation, as well as the guidelines developed by OED on assessing gender mainstreaming in FAO interventions (FAO, 2017). The evaluation applied the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG, 2016) as well as UNEG ethical guidelines (UNEG, 2008). It adopted a collaborative and transparent approach towards internal and external stakeholders throughout the evaluation process. The triangulation of evidence and information collected, as well as the feedback received at the end of the mission, supported the validation and analysis and reinforced conclusions and recommendations.

1.3 Limitations

16. The mission experienced some difficulties that could be considered as limitations for this evaluation:
 - i. Beneficiaries were confused between different interventions. Indeed, in the project intervention areas, several other interventions are being implemented by FAO or other stakeholders. As a result, there was often a risk that beneficiaries would get confused between the different activities. However, this difficulty was mitigated as facilitators of implementing NGO partners accompanied the evaluation team in the field.
 - ii. The delay in the process of recruiting the consulting firm to conduct the mid-term survey. The survey was planned to take place at the same time as the quantitative evaluation so that the data could be used to strengthen the qualitative analysis. However, the firm was only recruited at the beginning of May 2021 and its results will not be available until July 2021 at best. The inputs of the consulting firm will be valuable for the second phase of the evaluation but are not available for the results of this report.

1.4 Structure of the report

17. This Phase I report is structured as follows:
 - i. Section 1 provides an overview of the evaluation including its purpose, target audience, scope, objectives, methodology and limitations.
 - ii. Section 2 presents the background and context of the project.
 - iii. Section 3 presents the evaluation findings organised around the three³ main evaluation questions addressed in this report: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency; it also provides a brief update on the analysis of multi-year financing and gender.
 - iv. Section 4 sets out the main conclusions and recommendations.

³The other evaluation questions (partnership, sustainability, and cross-cutting dimensions) will be analysed in Phase II (second report).

2. Background and context of the project

2.1 Context

18. In Burkina Faso, at the start of the project, the March 2018 *Cadre harmonisé* analysis (CILSS, 2018) estimated that, according to projections for the 2018 lean season, if nothing was done, the number of severely food insecure people would amount to 954 315 people (phases 3 and 4), including 90 138 people in emergency situations (Phase 4). A total of 2 671 867 people were food insecure for the same period in 2018 (June, July, August 2018).
19. The results of the September 2017 national nutrition survey (Burkina Faso, Ministry of Health, 2017) showed a deterioration in nutritional status among children under five, pregnant and breastfeeding women. The survey estimated that 789 296 people would be affected by acute malnutrition in 2018, including 187 177 children under five at risk of severe acute malnutrition, 356 355 at risk of moderate malnutrition and 245 764 pregnant and breastfeeding women. Poor rainfall⁴ has led to a deterioration in grazing and an early drying up of water points, thus affecting Burkinabè livestock and the population. This was particularly the case in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso, one of the three project regions (North, Centre-North and Sahel).
20. In addition, a shortage of biomass and a fragile security situation in the Sahel, North, Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-North regions have led to transhumant pastoralism. To support priority actions aiming at strengthening the resilience of populations to food and nutrition insecurity and reducing the impact of security crises on populations and livestock, the government, in collaboration with its technical and financial partners, has developed a response and support plan for vulnerable populations for 2018 (Burkina Faso, 2018). In parallel, a 2018 Emergency and Resilience Plan for Burkina Faso was developed by the United Nations System and its humanitarian partners in Burkina Faso (United Nations System, 2018).

2.2 Project description

2.2.1 Overall description of the project

21. In light of this, emergency and recovery actions were essential to meet the immediate needs of vulnerable populations and their livestock, and to improve their resilience. It is in this context that the project "Emergency response and support to improve the resilience of vulnerable populations in at-risk areas of Burkina Faso OSRO/BKF/801/SWE", which is the subject of this evaluation, was implemented.
22. The project was designed to address three concerns: i) the poor access of vulnerable households to food and means of production; ii) the degradation of the agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso, and iii) the poor nutritional quality of vulnerable household diets in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso.
23. The project initially aimed to support 10 000 poor or very poor households in the Centre-North (in the provinces of Namentenga, Sanmentenga and Bam), North (provinces of Passoré, Zondoma,

⁴ In Burkina Faso, the 2017–2018 agricultural season was marked by prolonged pockets of drought, army worm attacks in all regions of the country, attacks by granivorous birds in the Sahel, East and Boucle du Mouhoun regions. These various events have had negative impact ranging from a significant drop in yields to the total loss of production in certain municipalities, recognised as being at high risk of food and nutrition insecurity.

Yatenga and Lorum), and Sahel (provinces of Soum, Seno and Oudalan) regions. This geographical distribution is the result of the need to assist food insecure people during the 2017–2018 agropastoral season, who have been defined as vulnerable.⁵

24. It was also initially intended that beneficiaries would receive a variety of cash assistance. Following the project amendment due to the increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host households, the amounts have been revised upwards. The projects, through FAO, commits to carry out the following: develop, in partnership with the Ministry of Agriculture, Hydro-agricultural Development and Mechanization, 500 ha of landscaped perimeters available to hosts and IDPs; set up a food security alert and analysis system; capitalise on achievements and measure changes in the resilience of the target population; and assess the impact of insecurity on crop production.
25. The direct beneficiaries of the project are the 30 200 targeted vulnerable households, i.e. more than 200 000 people; indirect beneficiaries include the ministries in charge of agriculture and animal resources, the regional directorates in charge of agriculture and animal resources (technical partners), local authorities, NGOs and development associations (operational partners) as well as electronic payment agencies.

2.2.2 Theory of change

26. The project intends to achieve its impact ("improved resilience of vulnerable pastoralist and agropastoralist households to climatic and economic shocks") through three specific objectives or effects, which are in turn achieved through different outputs, the result of project activities. The project's contribution to this impact can be verified through the following two objectively verifiable indicators: at least 90 percent of beneficiaries (men/women) have reduced their reliance on negative coping strategies by the end of the project and 75 percent of households (men/women) have maintained or increased their productive assets by the end of the project. The three impact pathways to expected change can be described as follows:
 - i. Output 1.1 "Households benefit from unconditional cash transfers" through three activities: i) conducting a baseline study of market evolution; ii) supporting 10 000 vulnerable households through an unconditional cash transfer; and iii) conducting four post-distribution monitoring studies.
 - ii. Output 1.2 "Vulnerable households participate in CFW activities" through two activities: i) supporting 6 000 vulnerable households through the CFW modality⁶; and ii) conducting market monitoring (post cash distribution).
27. **Specific Objective 1/Effect 1:** Improve vulnerable households' access to food and productive assets. To achieve this, the project intends to finalise two outputs:
 - i. Output 1.1 "Households benefit from unconditional cash transfers" through three activities: i) conducting a baseline study of market evolution; ii) supporting 10 000 vulnerable households through an unconditional cash transfer; and iii) conducting four post-distribution monitoring studies.
 - ii. Output 1.2 "Vulnerable households participate in CFW activities" through two activities: i) supporting 6 000 vulnerable households through the CFW modality⁶; and ii) conducting market monitoring (post cash distribution).
28. With these additional resources (cash and CFW assistance), vulnerable households should be able to achieve Effect 1. This will be verified by the following objectively verifiable indicator: at least three meals per day on average are consumed by households (male/female) that benefited from cash assistance during the lean season.

⁵ A vulnerability in phase 3 or 4 according to the *Cadre harmonisé* for identification of risk areas and vulnerable populations (CILSS, 2018).


⁶ Expected outcome according to the project document.

29. **Specific Objective 2/Effect 2:** Replenish the agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso. Two outputs are expected to achieve this:
- i. Output 2.1: "The livestock of vulnerable households after the food and nutrition crisis in Burkina Faso is rebuilt" is expected to be achieved through two activities: providing 2 500 kits composed of a choice of sheep, goats, pigs or poultry, food and veterinary products to vulnerable households, and training 2 500 households in animal maintenance, hygiene, health care and feeding. These two activities contribute directly to the rebuilding of household livestock in terms of both material goods (animals) and knowledge, thus helping to achieve the expected Effect 2.
 - ii. Output 2.2 "the cereal and vegetable production capacity of vulnerable households is increased" should be achieved by: i) developing and/or rehabilitating 500 ha of vegetable and non-timber forest product (NTFP) production sites; ii) providing vulnerable households with 2 800 vegetable and NTFP production kits; iii) training 2 800 households in vegetable and NTFP production techniques; iv) providing vulnerable households with 2 800 cereal production kits composed of improved seed varieties and fertilizers; v) training 2 800 households in cereal production techniques based on improved seed varieties; vi) training 500 women heads of household in cowpea production, protection and storage techniques. These six activities contribute directly to the production capacities of households both in terms of material goods (kits) and knowledge, thus helping to achieve the expected Effect 2. The following objectively verifiable indicator will be used to verify this: at least 70 percent of vulnerable households (men/women) have rebuilt their livestock by the end of the project and at least 90 percent of beneficiary households (men/women) have increased their agricultural production by 5 percent by the end of the project.
30. **Specific Objective 3/Effect 3:** Improve the nutrition situation of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso. To achieve this effect, the project intends to "promote healthy and balanced diets through nutrition education" (Output 3.1) and to implement two activities to achieve this: i) disseminate messages of good nutrition and food hygiene practices; and ii) hold 68 training sessions in feeding, storage and cooking practices. As these activities increase the knowledge of participants (education) and promote healthy and balanced diets (nutrition education), the expected output should be achieved and thus contribute to the achievement of Effect 3. The following objectively verifiable indicators will be used to verify this: at least 20 percent of women of childbearing age have an acceptable dietary diversity score (of 5) at the end of the project and at least 50 percent of beneficiary households (men/women) have an acceptable food consumption score (above 35) at the end of the project.
31. **The expected impact of the project** is to improve the resilience of vulnerable pastoralists and agro-pastoralists to climatic and economic shocks. If the nutrition situation is improved through greater availability of food – in quantity and quality – and income that can contribute to its access (Effect 1), the resilience of vulnerable households to economic shocks (impact) will increase, because the additional resources distributed can be allocated to better cope with these shocks than before. In other words, the proportion of total household income spent on meeting nutrition needs will decrease, allowing greater flexibility and resilience to shocks. Replenishing the agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital of vulnerable households (Effect 2) also contributes to the resilience of vulnerable pastoralist and agropastoralist households to climatic and economic shocks (impact), as these resources should enable them to bounce back better from these crises. However, this depends on the quality of the knowledge shared and the quality of productive inputs (particularly improved seeds and breeding nuclei for livestock) which contribute to

resilience to climatic shocks. Finally, the nutrition situation of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso (Effect 3) also contributes to the project's impact insofar as the additional nutritional resources in these provinces allow the remaining resources to be allocated to other needs, thus improving resilience. Although this link is the least obvious and direct in terms of contribution to the project impact, Effects 1 and 3 are mutually reinforcing: better access to food and means of production leads to a better nutrition situation, especially in provinces heavily affected by the crisis. This project logic depends on the social and security political stability being maintained over the life of the project. If this hypothesis does not hold, the use of negative coping strategies would increase and the maintenance of productive assets would be compromised, thus affecting resilience to both economic and climatic shocks (especially due to negative coping strategies).

32. The project also foresees cross-cutting activities supporting all effects, including the production of a documentary film, communication and visibility activities (success stories, kakemono, banners, flyers, media coverage, etc.), and the implementation of monitoring and supervision activities ensuring the strengthening and smooth running of the project.
33. The project theory of change was well developed taking into account the hypothesis made at the beginning of the project. It is summarised in the project theory of change, reconstructed by the evaluation team from the project document (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Project theory of change reconstructed by the evaluation team



2.2.3 Implementation mechanism

34. At the national level, the National Project Coordinator is based in Ouagadougou. The Coordinator is responsible for the implementation of the project and coordinates all activities, centralises data and organises procurement. The Coordinator is assisted by a person in charge of monitoring and evaluation.
35. In each of the three regions of intervention, the project is supported by the FAO Sub-Office, which is composed of a multidisciplinary team with officials responsible for the different thematic areas (agriculture, livestock, cash transfer, monitoring and evaluation) who ensure the quality of FAO activities. The sub-offices ensure the follow-up of the implementation and the coordination of activities in the field, as well as the follow-up of memoranda of understanding (MOU) execution and the respect of the MOU content. They serve as intermediaries with the Coordinator. They are informed when service providers deliver inputs in the field and in turn, they inform the technical services who give them feedback on the quality of these inputs.
36. The project was implemented in close collaboration with the Government's technical structures. These technical partners are local agricultural and livestock services. They receive inputs, materials and equipment, validate their quality and make them available to partner NGOs. They are responsible for the closer implementation with farmers. A MOU is signed between FAO and each technical service to govern the collaboration.
37. FAO does not intervene directly in the field but uses the get-it-done approach through local technical services, implementing NGO partners and municipalities, which are responsible for the operational implementation of activities in the field. NGO operational implementing partners are responsible for identifying beneficiaries in the field, distributing inputs and monitoring beneficiaries. At the local level, MOUs are signed between FAO and local authorities to ensure the follow-up of activity implementation in the field by the partner associations or operational partners.
38. A MOU is developed and signed between FAO and each technical and operational partner. It defines the commitments, responsibilities and schedule for implementation. MOUs are elaborated and amended if necessary with partners before signature.
39. All reports undergo a validation process, allowing the monitoring-evaluation team at the central level to follow everything that happens at the regional level: the sub-offices send the reports written by the partners. They are reviewed by the FAO Country Office (with the endorsement of the National Coordinator and the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer) for validation to ensure that key information is available at headquarter level.

3. Main findings

3.1 Relevance

Finding 1. The project is aligned with the FAO Country Programming Framework (CPF) and more specifically with FAO SO 5 "Improving resilience and livelihoods", the priorities identified by UNDAF, the Plan of Response and Support to Vulnerable Populations and the Development Cooperation Strategy between Sweden and Burkina Faso.

40. The project is aligned with the FAO strategic framework. It contributes to FAO SO5 by improving the resilience and livelihoods of chronically food insecure farmers.
41. The project is aligned with FAO's 2017–2020 CPF for Burkina Faso (FAO-Burkina Faso, 2017), particularly at the level of Priority Area 1 "Food and nutrition security and resilience of vulnerable populations to climate change", through Output 1.4 "Vulnerable households and their communities have kits to build resilience to climate hazards and other shocks".
42. The project contributes to Pillar 4 of the UNDAF 2018–2020 (UN System, 2017) "Resilience to climate change effects, natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies" and its Effect 4.2 "By 2020, populations, especially vulnerable groups in target areas are more resilient to climate and environmental shocks"
43. It is consistent with the Plan of Response and Support to Vulnerable Populations 2018 (Burkina Faso, 2018a) and contributes significantly to Outcome 1 "Vulnerable populations have access to food" and Outcome 2 "Livelihoods of populations affected by the food and pastoral crisis are preserved".
44. Sweden's development cooperation strategy with Burkina Faso 2018–2022 (Government of Sweden, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018) aims at contributing to greater respect for human rights, institutional capacity development, increased resilience to crises and disasters, environmentally and climatically sustainable development, and improved opportunities for people to provide for themselves in a sustainable manner. The project fits well into this perspective, particularly in the area of "increased resilience to crises and disasters".

Finding 2. The project is relevant and coherent with national strategies and programmes, and is in line with the priorities in the sectors of intervention (agriculture, food and nutrition security, economic situation of vulnerable populations).

45. The project contributes to Strategic Axis 3 of the National Plan for Economic and Social Development (Burkina Faso, 2016): "Boosting sectors that are conducive to the economy and jobs", and to its Effect 3.1.2: "The resilience of agro-sylvo-pastoral, wildlife and fisheries households to risks is strengthened" through, in particular, its overall objective (improve the resilience of vulnerable pastoral and agropastoral households to climatic and economic shocks) which therefore reinforces this Effect 3.1.2.
46. The project contributes to Strategic Axis 1 of the National Rural Sector Programme II (Burkina Faso, 2018b) on food and nutrition security and the resilience of vulnerable populations, particularly through its Effects 1 and 3 (see Section 2.2).
47. Finally, the actions proposed by the project (i.e. replenishing agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital, improving access to food and means of production, and improving the nutrition situation)

are adequate to achieve the planned outcomes and aligned with priorities in the intervention sectors as confirmed by the provincial technical services of the agriculture and livestock sectors. For example, by supporting vulnerable households through the CFW modality, the project provides them with income to buy food; by providing households with sheep or goat kits, feed and veterinary products, the project also enables them to rebuild their livestock. These activities are also in line with the various regional and municipal development plans.

Finding 3. The approach and activities planned by the project and facilitated by multi-year funding contribute to strengthening the livelihoods of beneficiaries. However, more consultation with beneficiaries at an earlier stage would have been beneficial.

48. The project chose not to support all households with the same activities. Indeed, apart from the unconditional cash transfer, which all benefited from, livestock support, food crop seed support and vegetable seed support were provided to separate groups of beneficiaries. This did not allow vulnerable households to benefit from the full package of activities offered by the project to build their resilience. The analysis of subjective self-evaluated resilience showed how difficult it is to have an impact on the resilience of highly vulnerable households through a short period of support – only two years – and through only some of the activities initially proposed. Multi-year funding allows some of these weaknesses to be addressed in the second year.
49. Indeed, the unconditional cash transfer activities during the lean season (June-July-August), paid in three or two instalments, were intended to enable poor and very poor households to meet their immediate needs and protect their assets. In order to continue supporting the most vulnerable families and rehabilitate degraded community livelihoods during and after the lean season, the project also proposed CFW activities in the North and Centre-North regions around the following eligible activities: rehabilitation of vegetable sites and *boulis* – water ponds – (for humans and animals), cleaning and rehabilitation of irrigation canals, water and soil conservation activities or soil defence and restoration, rehabilitation or restoration of degraded land, desilting of water points, rehabilitation of rural tracks, etc.
50. The proposed actions (improved seeds, support for vegetable growing, support for small ruminants, fodder seeds) are relevant and meet the real needs of the beneficiary communities. Improved seeds are better adapted to the local crop cycle and vegetable growing is an off-season activity that provides vulnerable households with an alternative livelihood. This is confirmed by the technical services, the communities and the beneficiary communities. Nevertheless, it appears that beneficiaries would have preferred a wider choice of vegetable seed kits. Indeed, the evaluation mission reports that the project, as agreed, asked all beneficiaries to choose between tomato and onion seeds. However, while the onion perfectly meets the needs of the beneficiaries, this is not the case for the tomato, which is less appreciated due to pest attacks and poor sales for some time now. Thus, beneficiaries report that they would have preferred the project to offer a range of about five seeds and to give each of them the choice of at least two types of seeds. A direct consultation of the beneficiaries upstream, during project design, would have made it possible to better take into account these needs and preferences.
51. With regard to vegetable production, the project supported vulnerable households with vegetable seeds (tomato and onion), moringa and baobab seeds. It is planned that nutritious gardens (moringa and baobab seeds) will be twinned with vegetable gardens for greater efficiency and economic sustainability. For cereal production, the project supported vulnerable and poor agro-pastoralist and pastoralist households with improved certified seeds (sorghum, millet and cowpea), fertiliser (nitrogen phosphate potash [NPK], and urea). Organic fertiliser was used to avoid the use of fertiliser for explosive purposes by unidentified armed men, but also to enhance

fertility. Furthermore, the relevance of interventions as designed is severely undermined when the intervention turns out to be partial⁷ and no longer corresponds to the needs or choices of beneficiaries. For example, support for small ruminants, fodder seeds, pigs and poultry was provided to the poorest of the unconditional cash transfer beneficiary households: after the crisis, these beneficiaries received animal kits (sheep, goats, pigs and poultry). However, in the North and Centre-North, these animals correspond to the beneficiaries' choices and were distributed. Beneficiaries in the Sahel region only received support for cattle feed and zootechnical and veterinary inputs, because previous projects had already distributed small ruminants there. According to the technical and operational partners and beneficiaries interviewed, in the Centre-North region, particularly in Namentenga, for example, animals were distributed without veterinary products (vaccines), fodder seeds were also distributed without the accompanying mowing equipment promised (Centre-North), and vegetable seeds were often distributed without the accompanying compost or small equipment.

52. With regard to vegetable production, the project supported vulnerable households with vegetable seeds (tomato and onion) and moringa and baobab seeds. It is planned that the nutritious gardens (moringa and baobab seeds) will be twinned with the vegetable gardens for greater efficiency and economic sustainability. For cereal production, the project supported poor and vulnerable agro-pastoralist and pastoralist households with certified improved seeds (sorghum, millet and cowpea), fertilisers (NPK, and urea; organic fertiliser was used to avoid the use of fertiliser for explosive purposes by unidentified armed men, but also to enhance the sustainable fertility of the soils in the affected areas) and triple-layer bags in order to improve their agricultural productivity at the level of the affected municipalities. These activities are considered relevant.
53. The weaknesses mentioned above are mainly based on a qualitative analysis of the evaluation team's field findings in a sample of two or more villages in each of the project's three sub-regions of intervention. They were corroborated by telephone interviews and meetings with project stakeholders and thus apply to the entire project.
54. With multi-year funding, the project planned to focus on capacity building in nutrition-sensitive agriculture to support beneficiary education on: food and food group selection, the multiple benefits of a varied diet, and the importance of the nutritional value of food for good nutrition, good health and productivity. To achieve this, radio programmes aiming at raising awareness among the general public were broadcasted. Based on a new analysis of the situation, this choice is relevant to the needs of the beneficiaries.

Finding 4. The household economy analysis methodology was not strictly adhered to due to insufficient time and resources allocated by the project design.

55. Targeting was supposed to be conducted according to the household economy analysis methodology. The implementing partners responsible for this task were provided with rapid training and orientation manuals on this methodology in line with FAO expectations. Most of these partners have been working with FAO for several years and are familiar with the household

⁷ This failure is not linked to a change in the initial strategy. An example would be the distribution of animals in Namentenga without the planned veterinary inputs, due to a time lag between ordering the animals and ordering the veterinary inputs, which arrived much later; it was then difficult to find the beneficiaries in their villages to vaccinate the animals.

economy analysis targeting methodology.⁸ However, the time and resources available did not allow them to carry out the targeting activity in the proper manner. To overcome the shortcomings in the field, a selection committee and a complaints committee were set up in each village with the support of municipal authorities. The evaluation team found that in most villages visited, communities were in charge of targeting, especially neighbourhood leaders who presumably know the people in the neighbourhood well and can communicate the names of vulnerable people. And these names were not verified, as it was told during interviews with the technical services and the implementing NGO partners. In order to respect time constraints and the limited resources available, which are incompatible with the household economy analysis methodology, certain shortcuts were taken. This choice to save time resulted in a loss of relevance of the targeting and the chosen implementation modality.

56. According to several testimonies in most villages: "the team explains to us the objectives of the project, with "Y" neighbourhoods in our village. We ask each neighbourhood leader to give us "X" names of vulnerable people. They know the people in their neighbourhood better. Once the names are collected, we communicate the list of the project beneficiaries.
57. Indeed, the project was intended to address the needs of the most vulnerable. However, the evaluation team found that in all three regions, group leaders or village chiefs, who are not considered vulnerable people, were on the lists of beneficiaries in the villages visited.
58. Again, due to the lack of time and resources required for the household economy analysis methodology, the lists of final beneficiaries drawn up by FAO contained several duplications in that the selected IDPs were already receiving support from other partners. At the level of IDPs, the project has sometimes experienced difficulties in collaborating with the Social Action Service, which is the supervisory service responsible for monitoring the various forms of support to IDPs. The social action, as the supervisory body, has a file of IDPs and documents the types and forms of support provided to them. A comparison or confrontation between the social action files and the project's lists of beneficiaries would have made it possible to avoid duplication. In the Sahel region, where collaboration with social action proved difficult,⁹ the operational partner *Organisation catholique pour le développement économique et social* (OCADES) targeted beneficiaries directly with the IDP managers in the neighbourhoods. In contrast, in the Centre-North, social action lists were used and guidelines was given to exclude IDPs who had already received support, thus contributing to the relevance of targeting.

Finding 5. Technical services, local authorities and beneficiaries were not strongly involved in project design but were consulted later to identify intervention areas and on certain needs.

59. The government technical services consulted at the regional level claim not to have been involved in the initial project design. However, the project was based on the guidelines of the 2018 Plan of Response and Support to Vulnerable Populations (Burkina Faso, 2018a), which was drafted by technical services at all levels and benefited from consultation with these stakeholders. In addition, FAO, having worked with these stakeholders in previous projects, has an updated database (reports, studies) that gives it a good knowledge of the intervention areas. Nevertheless, technical

⁸ There is a growing call in the Localisation Agenda to put local stakeholders at the heart of the humanitarian system process. Empowering communities to target and choose the implementation modality should encourage the maturity of communities to define their own needs.

⁹ For example, given the context in the Sahel region, FAO's efforts to speed up targeting and administrative procedures related to the social action prerequisites generated some tensions between FAO and the social action service. Consequently FAO was only able to compare its lists with those of the World Food Programme and not with those of the social action service, which has the most complete lists.

services are consulted on the targeting of vulnerable areas and on the targeting of beneficiaries. For example, the targeting of intervention municipalities was carried out during a session of the "Technical Committee of the Regional Food Security Council", in the presence of state partners, NGOs and UN agencies. The communities were not involved in project design either, but were consulted on their needs for small ruminants or rainfed seeds once the project was developed. They were strongly involved in the targeting of beneficiaries at this second stage.

Finding 6a. The project design and implementation took into account the principles of accountability and the HDP nexus.

60. In terms of accountability, FAO has signed MOUs with communities: these agreements give communities a say in what is done by implementing NGO partners for the benefit of communities. Municipalities in particular can thus monitor the implementation of activities with operational partners. This allows for a first level of control by the communities. Indeed, the idea of involving municipalities in implementation monitoring helps to ensure monitoring at the local level, getting the implementing NGO partners to carry out the work as seriously as possible – as the FAO does not have the necessary human resources to carry out this local monitoring in all the intervention sites.
61. The regional technical committee of the National Food Security Council held its sessions three times a year, with FAO in charge of organising these sessions. These also made it possible to report to regional stakeholders as well as technical and financial partners. These sessions allow for the presentation and justification of all the activities implemented by FAO in terms of food security and resilience to all the stakeholders in the region. This allows for synergy of action at the level of the different interventions and alignment with the priorities of the regions.
62. In order to consolidate support and improve the integration of the HDP aid (nexus), FAO has initiated this project through its Emergency and Resilience Division, in order to enable vulnerable populations to continue their drive towards development. The project is part of this nexus approach as the intervention's objective is to rapidly restore the livelihoods of vulnerable communities, protect and strengthen them and promote animal and plant self-production.
63. The intervention created an environment that facilitated the social inclusion of IDPs and host communities: by providing cash to promote community work and "living together" (soil fertility, lowland development, etc.); by creating a space for dialogue and "living together" between host and IDP communities (targeting IDPs and host households to benefit from the project support, CFW job sites carried out by groups of host households and IDPs). It fostered integration and harmony between these communities by making available all FAO's approaches in the field of promoting social cohesion and peace building, by setting up assets for sustainable production and by supporting both displaced people and host communities.
64. The FAO Emergency and Resilience Division is divided into four units: the Cash and Voucher Unit, the Early Warning and Response Unit – Covid, the Peace Building Unit and the Technical and Quality Programme Coordination Unit. The nexus is fully taken into account in this approach and is thus an integral part of FAO's strategy in Burkina Faso. In the framework of this project, there are areas of arrival of displaced people, mainly from the provinces of Oudalan, Soum, Yatenga, Bam, Tapoa, Komandjari and Kompienga, which have been heavily impacted by conflict and insecurity. These areas were initially peaceful, but are now facing the effects of climate change, land degradation, insufficient cultivated land and low agro-sylvo-pastoral production. On the humanitarian side, FAO provides cash support and ensures, in the medium term, the strengthening of food-crop production in agriculture and vegetable growing to support their

resilience and promote development. On the peace side, it strengthens the rapprochement between host populations and displaced populations.

Finding 6b. The evaluation identified four main pathways, all relevant, undertaken by the project through several intermediate pathways that foster FAO's contribution to peacekeeping, reducing the likelihood of violent conflict, preventing conflict, and increasing the prospects for peace.

65. **In terms of improving social capital**, by distributing cash and inputs to the most vulnerable, the project enables them to develop solidarity chains. In fact, several beneficiaries reported sharing or giving part of what they received to a relative, neighbour or acquaintance. The targeting of women and young people in the activities (small ruminants, vegetable seeds, CFW) has helped to strengthen inclusion and cohabitation between members of the same community. The pathway is rated as relevant.
66. **In terms of strengthening local conflict management capacities**, the project is working to make conflict management mechanisms functional by setting up a Committee for Complaints Management in each beneficiary village to denounce poor targeting and distribution practices. These are local committees made up of resource persons specific to each village. This pathway is only rated as partially relevant. During project design, these recent committees had neither training nor tools on the procedures for filing/registering complaints, and had not communicated on their use to beneficiaries, thus compromising their potential effectiveness from the outset.
67. **In terms of increasing the opportunity cost of violence**, the project will provide nearly 10 000 households with cash, food crop and vegetable inputs and livestock kits. As a result, these households will be able to improve their food-crop production, rebuild their herds and improve their income. The resilience of many of them will thus be improved. This contributes to reducing scarcity and therefore to reducing the use of violence. The pathway is rated as relevant.
68. **In terms of reducing inequalities and related grievances within groups**, the project has adopted the household economy analysis targeting approach which identifies the most vulnerable communities for priority support. The project also targeted displaced people for support, as well as households that were hosting these displaced people. This approach has been successful in promoting the acceptance and integration of IDPs into their host communities, thereby helping to reduce the potential for conflict. The pathway is rated as relevant.
69. However, despite the relevance of these pathways, targeting could become a source of conflict or tension of various kinds: for example, the fact that an IDP is selected to benefit from the project automatically cancels his possibility of being supported by another project. If support is delayed, this may be perceived as an injustice and become a source of tension, and may call into question the choice of the "cash transfer" modality. This targeting can also negatively affect FAO's credibility in the medium to long term with these beneficiaries and populations and lead to a lack of confidence in the project actions in subsequent phases. Feelings of injustice and grudges may arise towards neighbours or neighbouring communities and contribute to exacerbating tensions. The relevance of the cash distribution tool is based on the "do-no-harm" principle, but this principle is only partially respected.

Finding 7. The various project extensions in Burkina were relevant.

70. The project benefited from two extensions granted by the donor. The first extension allowed the project to be extended by seven months and the second extension by 12 months.
71. These extensions were justified and relevant because they allowed new needs to be taken into account in line with the changing context. Indeed, this type of funding is flexible and results-based; it allows the project to be reoriented each year according to the evolution of the context. At the beginning of the project, IDPs were not included among the beneficiaries, but could be included later.

Partial conclusion 1. The project is relevant. It is aligned with the FAO CPF, the priorities identified by UNDAF and the strategy for development cooperation between Sweden and Burkina Faso. It is consistent with national strategies and programmes, and in line with priorities in the different sectors of intervention. However, some of the modalities proved inadequate and the project design, which did not allow for intensified activities to the same beneficiaries, limited the potential for improving resilience.

72. The necessary resources were not allocated to implement the household economy analysis methodology. There was little or no consultation with technical departments and key stakeholders during project design. The project takes into account the principles of accountability and the HDP Nexus: the four main pathways proposed by the project foster FAO's contribution to peacekeeping, reducing the likelihood of violent conflict, preventing conflict, and increasing the prospects for peace. The relevance of the project in terms of contributing to peace is therefore theoretically strong, although neither the time nor the means to implement it were provided at the outset. Furthermore, the various project extensions have proven to be relevant.

3.2 Effectiveness

Finding 8. The project made quality food crop seeds available to beneficiaries. The successive distribution of seeds over two years to the same beneficiaries ensured good production; despite attacks on cowpeas, production was also good, except for IDPs because of the poor quality of the land allocated to them. Technical support was insufficient. Finally, double- or triple-layer bags for cowpea storage were not often distributed and were not of good quality.

73. With regard to food crop production, all beneficiaries are unanimous on the quality of the seeds and fertilisers received. According to them, the project has contributed to improving the availability of improved and high quality seeds. Moreover, the seeds were made available successively over two seasons. Several vulnerable households were supported with certified improved seeds (sorghum, millet and cowpea) and fertilisers (NPK and urea) as well as triple-layer bags to improve agricultural productivity¹⁰. In addition, according to monitoring reports, 140 tonnes of organic fertiliser were purchased and distributed to beneficiaries as a result of the food crop seed support.

¹⁰ During the 2019-2020 wet season, 21,666 tonnes of cowpea, sorghum and millet seeds were purchased and distributed to 2,800 beneficiaries, of which more than 40 per cent were women in the three project intervention regions for food crop production.

Figure 4. Millet and cowpea production in Bogoya, North region, Burkina Faso



74. The project has led to improved production. Overall, production has been good and some farmers are still using these seeds. When they could not sow, they kept the seeds for the next season. Several beneficiaries said in FGDs that they had good cowpea yields thanks to the project's support for quality seed. However, due to pest attacks on cowpeas and a lack of treatment products, some households lost between 30 and 50 percent of their production. Sorghum production is estimated at 100 kg to 200 kg per household in the villages visited, and cowpea production at 50 to 100 kg per household.¹¹
75. Due to the security situation, technical support for food production was overall insufficient. During the first year of the project, some awareness-raising activities were carried out for the beneficiaries by the agricultural services on good agricultural techniques, the *zai* technique and half-moons. But insecurity put a brake on this momentum when facilitators were no longer able to visit certain sites. The awareness-raising activities that were organised focused on the *zai* technique and half-moons, but their exact number is not available in the project monitoring reports and could not be corroborated.
76. The project also provided beneficiaries with triple-layer bags for cowpea storage. According to FAO, 2 800 good quality bags were distributed in the 2018–2019 season. For the 2019–2020 season, a total of 2 800 Purdue improved crop storage (PICS) bags were purchased and distributed to beneficiaries in all three regions. But in the Centre-North region, the evaluation found that the bags provided were not of good quality. According to the provincial agricultural service of Boulssa, the plastic used for the bottom of the bag is of poor quality compared to the PICS bags they receive from the Environment and Agricultural Research Institute to distribute to cowpea producers. The reason for the poor quality of the plastic could not be determined by the evaluation team.
77. But for IDPs met in Dori, the yields did not live up to expectations. Indeed, the seeds arrived late and IDPs were allocated land with FAO support late. The evaluation team noted that in Dori the land allocated to IDPs is often very degraded and marginal. Thus, despite a project design that takes into account both IDPs and hosts within the same community to, in theory, mitigate

¹¹ These figures are estimates given by farmers during the evaluation mission. They reflect an improvement and their assessment of the project; the initial yield is unknown.

differences and reduce tensions, in practice the project's effectiveness with IDPs has been less successful.

78. The testimonies collected during the first evaluation mission speak for themselves. According to an IDP in Dori: "Last season, the land we were given was swampy and all the crops were flooded. We harvested almost nothing". For another: "It is true that host communities allocate land to us to cultivate, yet they graze their animals in our fields and we are not allowed to chase them away at the risk of having the land confiscated".

Finding 9. The implementation of the mobile cash payment modality had so many constraints: complex system, weak capacity of operational partners, displacement of populations, changes in telephone numbers, expired or soon-to-be-expired Burkinabè national identity cards, limitation of risk through instalment allocations; it did not allow cash to be made available to beneficiaries in time to enable them to access food during the lean season and protect their assets. However, the conditional payment modalities had good results.

79. At the level of the unconditional cash transfer, it was planned to distribute cash to all project beneficiaries in the initial phase (in 2018, XOF 105 000 to be paid in three instalments and in 2019, XOF 70 000 to be paid in two instalments) and in the extension phase (in 2020, XOF 105 000 for IDPs to be paid in three instalments and XOF 70 000 for hosts in two instalments). For example, the 10 000 households that benefited from the unconditional cash transfer in 2018 were due to receive another round of the transfer in 2019, but this was postponed to 2020. All beneficiaries were selected to receive the unconditional cash transfer, but the mobile payment method was not well mastered and many beneficiaries received the cash nine to 12 months after the planned deadline. In the initial phase, almost all beneficiaries received cash at the time of the evaluation, however in the extension phase, which ended in December 2020, more than 60 percent of beneficiaries are still waiting to be paid. In the Centre-North, with the operator Yup, payment has been significantly delayed. In general, problems of payment to beneficiaries are linked to: the existing constraints of the financial fabric, which is still underdeveloped or in the process of being developed; the lack of a means of national identification; insufficient electronic infrastructure and network coverage; the constraints of the volatile situation of IDPs and the security situation. Furthermore, the one-year delay is justified by, among other things, the introduction of MS 702 (Manual Section 702) which governs cash transfers within FAO), the mobility of beneficiaries (especially IDPs) and a technical problem with a Free Software Foundation (Orange).
80. For the Wendkuni Association in Namentenga, "in phase 1, all beneficiaries were paid. The last payments were made in 2020 (November). The planned amounts were XOF 105 000 (2018) and XOF 70 000 (2019), to be paid in three and two instalments respectively. But the payments were cumulated and paid in one instalment because of the delay. According to FAO, this was justified by the application of COVID-19 procedures which recommended reducing contact with beneficiaries to minimise security risks.
81. The cash distribution system is composed of two instruments: Kobo for beneficiary registration and CashView for data cleansing before transfer to the payment operator who creates the accounts and makes the payments. Operational partners have access codes to the platform and can check the status of cash distribution. But the process is complex and slow because it requires the collection of up-to-date information and identity documents from all beneficiaries. Very often, there are real constraints such as the displacement of a beneficiary who cannot be found to complete their information, an error in the recording of information by the operational partner, a change in the beneficiary's telephone number or the expiry of their national identity card. This leads to lengthy verifications and increases the delay in individual payments.

82. In order to avoid any financial risk, FAO only makes part of the total cash amount to be distributed available to the operator. It inputs a new amount only once this amount is fully distributed by the operator and once a report detailing this distribution is submitted to it. This precautionary measure is under the authority of the Finance Division to limit the risk of fraud. However, all of this delays the next tranche of payments for all beneficiaries; the estimate of these delays range from six to nine months, according to what the evaluation team was told. According to FAO, this delay of six to nine months is the time taken for the payment of the last remaining instalments and not the time between two instalments.
83. In the Sahel region, the implementation of this cash transfer has been heavily impacted by the lack of available and competent microfinance institutions; insecurity in the region has also contributed to these difficulties. Indeed, FAO tried, but failed, to implement unconditional cash transfer activities as foreseen in the project design with several microfinance institutions. In particular, it started working with the operator Orange, but the latter did not master its databases and was unable to visit the field.¹² The contracting by FAO of another operator, Wizall, to assist Orange, greatly improved the implementation of the project in the Sahel, but Wizall only got involved after the extension of the project (2020 beneficiaries).
84. To ensure the implementation of cash transfer activities, the project adopted the Kobo platform¹³ to refine its information on beneficiaries. The handling of Kobo requires a good ownership of the tool (mastery and understanding of the system), which was not always within the reach of all facilitators, although all partners were trained on Kobo in April 2020 and further training will be provided in 2021. FAO intends to develop this type of platform for verification purposes, which will allow to assess the evolution of the recording of species distributions. Kobo has been deployed for the registration of beneficiaries of all types of support while CashView has been deployed for beneficiaries of cash transfers. Thus, the Kobo platform was extended to the entire project portfolio in Burkina Faso. It could not be established that this development is attributed to this project.
85. The process of cash distribution by operators has been fraught with difficulties, involving beneficiaries travelling long distances to be enrolled, or the operator making numerous trips to collect missing data and update certain data. This also contributed to delays in cash distributions. At the time of the evaluation, almost 50 percent of the planned 2 322 beneficiaries in Sanmatenga had already been enrolled. However, only 150 out of the 1 150 enrolled beneficiaries have been paid (less than 15 percent). In all three regions, the evaluation found that beneficiaries from the initial phase are still waiting to be paid. The same is true for almost 50 percent of the beneficiaries of the extension phase.
86. For the implementing partner in Sanmatenga: "not later than 6 August 2020, the identification of beneficiaries had been done and all information was deployed on the platform. A first list of beneficiaries was established between September and October 2020, authorising their enrolment by the cash distribution operator Yup. However, due to shortcomings in the information

¹² The operator (Orange) sometimes transferred cash to an account held by two different people even though the database should have prevented this. As a result, the identity of the real beneficiary had to be verified before the next payment was disbursed, which contributed to the delays.

¹³ Kobo is a platform used to register households, check their vulnerability and monitor the targeting quality. It is used by FAO and field facilitators from the partner organisation. It is the latter that validates targeting and payments, which FAO then verifies.

recorded,¹⁴ beneficiaries in Sirgui village had to travel to Kaya to be enrolled (20 km). In Malou and Yabo it was much more difficult because the operator first had to collect the beneficiaries' national identity cards and telephones and then go back to Kongoussi to scan them (and return them to them). This took a lot of time."

87. In terms of the conditional cash transfer, beneficiaries were expected to carry out work that would benefit the community and households, and in return receive money to improve their access to food and thus be able to cope with the difficult periods of the year (June, July, August, September) in the North and Centre-North.¹⁵ There was great enthusiasm for community work during self-targeting and these activities were carried out over a four-month period from February to May 2019.¹⁶ Here too the results are mixed as communities mobilised and completed several works during the initial phase, but payments were made more than a year later. This resulted in some beneficiaries being demotivated and some activities planned during the extension phase were unimplemented or uncompleted. This is the case, for example, in the villages visited during the evaluation mission in Yatenga (Cissin and Hypo villages).
88. In the North, the CFW modality has enabled communities to carry out small-scale development/rehabilitation (boulis, wells, rural tracks, gullies, stone barriers). Thanks to these projects, animals have water points for their watering and the populations have water to make the bricks needed to pave the tracks facilitating access to the villages. Some villages' achievements exceed what was planned (two boulis instead of one, for example). To ensure transparency in the conduct of CFW activities, the number of people who worked and the number of days worked were reported to FAO by the beneficiaries.
89. According to the Association d'aide aux enfants et aux familles défavorisées, "To date, about 90 percent of beneficiaries have been paid; there have been omissions of names and telephone numbers that no longer exist. Some 2018 beneficiaries were only paid in 2019, more than a year later. For the extension period (2020), at the time of the evaluation, no payments had yet been made in the North, Centre North and Sahel regions under CFW activities.
90. During the 2019–2020 season, the implementation of these activities allowed for an increase in cultivated areas thanks to the recovery of degraded land through the implementation of water and soil conservation/soil defence and restoration activities and the development of more than 241 ha of vegetable-growing areas. It has also improved the physical accessibility of some villages, increased the production of organic manure and mobilised surface water (*boulis*).

¹⁴ The implementation of a facial recognition or fingerprinting system is underway and should help to overcome the problems linked to the identity of beneficiaries, especially in an environment subject to large population displacements, as in the project areas.

¹⁵ 4 100 beneficiary households in 2019 in the North and Centre North regions.

¹⁶ The total amount paid to households is XOF 259 815 400, equivalent to the work done in February, March and April. A residual amount of XOF 94 364 400, corresponding to the work of May 2019, was paid to beneficiaries during 2020. Eligible activities for the CFW modality included the rehabilitation of vegetable-growing sites and boulis, the cleaning and rehabilitation of irrigation canals, water and soil conservation activities, the desilting of water points and the rehabilitation of rural tracks.

Figure 5. Rehabilitation of a track through the “Cash for Work” modality in Koulogo, Centre North Region, Burkina Faso



91. The effects of the delay in payments on beneficiaries were greater in terms of impact in the first year than in the second due to beneficiaries' preferences. The results of post-distribution monitoring 1 indicate that the majority of households (70.3 percent) were unanimous that the lean season from July to September is the period they prefer to have cash. To accommodate these preferences, the original project plan was to distribute cash to poor and very poor households during the lean season to facilitate their access to food and thus protect their assets; however the project was unable to concretise this due to delays in payments. In contrast, beneficiaries of post-distribution monitoring 2 indicate a preference for the October-December period (43.3 percent), and this results in a lesser negative impact of the delays on beneficiaries. This also suggests a tendency for some beneficiaries to prefer multi-seasonal cash assistance that includes not only the lean season, but also the harvest period for stockpiling food and making certain investments, which can be postponed to a later date if necessary.

Finding 10. The project provided the planned livestock support, and this support was sometimes greater than expected, contributing to the reconstruction or support of the beneficiaries' livestock. Beneficiaries received cattle feed and animals that generally matched their types of choice. Although not initially planned, some beneficiaries continued to receive cattle feed during the extension phase, to their great satisfaction.

92. In terms of livestock support, the project provided vulnerable households, beneficiaries of unconditional cash transfers, with goats, sheep (one male and two females), fodder seeds, cattle feed and veterinary inputs in the North and Centre North. These short-cycle animals were identified according to beneficiary choice for the entire project, with the exception of beneficiaries in the Sahel region, where beneficiaries only received support for cattle feed and zootechnical and veterinary inputs, to complement the work of previous projects that had already distributed small ruminants in the same areas.
93. Beneficiaries of livestock reconstitution support were able to rebuild their herds according to their preferences. The planned support had the expected results; some beneficiaries received support

for a longer period of time than planned, which contributed to the replenishing of this productive capital. Beneficiaries were given the opportunity to express their needs in terms of species per beneficiary region, province and municipality. On the basis of these expressed needs, technical specifications on the animal species and cattle feed to be procured were developed and approved by the relevant FAO services. Procurement procedures were then initiated for the acquisition and supply of animals and cattle feed to the beneficiaries.¹⁷

94. For the initial phase there was only one allocation of small ruminants and fodder seeds. During the extension phase, the allocations were only for cattle feed and very often the project moved to new areas. However, some small ruminant beneficiaries of the initial phase also continued to receive cattle feed in the villages visited at the time of the evaluation. This is the case, for example, of Sirghin village in Sanmatenga, which received support during both phases. This support was highly appreciated and ensured continuity in these villages. However, it should be noted that this distribution was not originally planned and took place because the original beneficiaries and IDP beneficiaries (after the project was extended) were present in these villages.
95. In Sanmatenga, 250 households benefited from small ruminants, according to their preference (sheep, goats) – one male, two females – and a 50 kg bag of agro-industrial by-products. The needs were assessed by the technical services in charge of animal resources and the implementing partner. They consulted the beneficiaries on their preference and communicated the information to FAO, which then arranged the orders.

Finding 11. Mortality rate of small ruminants were high among beneficiaries, especially as vaccination was not carried out systematically in some localities. Nevertheless, some beneficiaries were able to rebuild their herds.

96. As concerns the distribution of small ruminants, it was planned to organise fairs and offer vouchers so that beneficiaries could choose animals at their convenience. However, in the context of insecurity, the strategy was changed. The project contracted with a provider in each region to supply the animals.
97. The technical services in the Centre North note that the animals arrived very tired: "The animals were underfed while in quarantine and there was a problem with their caretaking. Actually, the supplier was not prepared for this and the animals were left unattended. Fortunately, no theft was reported".
98. According to the chief of Sirghin village in the Centre North, "given that animals were tired and in order not to show favouritism, the agents chose the animals at random to distribute them and to each his own", this was also confirmed in the North.
99. The effectiveness of activities to strengthen and support animal productive capital was heterogeneous across the regions. In Yatenga, the activity was implemented in full: when the animals arrived, they were quarantined and then treated (dewormed, vaccinated) before being given to the beneficiaries. Suppliers delivered surplus animals, which made it possible to replace those that did not meet the required specifications without prejudice to the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries' choices were respected, all activities were implemented and the planned impacts were achieved. However, in the Centre-North region, not all activities were implemented: the

¹⁷ The distributions of animals and cattle feed were carried out from the end of October to December 2019 and resulted in kits comprising a total of 7 468 sheep and goats being made available to 2 460 beneficiaries. A total of 122 tonnes of cattle feed were distributed to the beneficiaries of the breeding nuclei to feed the animals received.

animal resources department claims that the animals were distributed without the planned prior vaccination and were not distributed afterwards either, which reduces the effectiveness of the planned support.

100. Furthermore, implementation difficulties have had negative impacts on both beneficiaries and animals: it was planned to deliver the animals to the villages, but beneficiaries were forced to travel to distribution centres, often more than 20 km away. In Sanmatenga, for example, the distribution was supposed to take place in villages, but the supplier did not agree to go to villages and the animals were collected in Boussouma, Gabou and Barsalogho centre. Beneficiaries in the villages had to travel long distances (3-20 km) to collect their animals from the distribution centre and return them to the village.
101. According to the Yatenga livestock technical service, "we had proposed to find the animals on the spot, but in the end this did not work out because of FAO requirements. As a result, the animals, most of which came from the Sahel, were disoriented and the adaptation period was very difficult".
102. There was therefore a high mortality rate, although it should be noted that during livestock distributions there is always a certain level of mortality. In the North and Centre North, some beneficiaries interviewed said that the animals were not in their ecosystem. Many of the animals came from elsewhere and had difficulties with the locally available cattle feed. This perception is confirmed by the focal point at the Regional Directorate of Livestock, who confirms that the animals came from far away and were not adapted to the locality, although the selection of animals took these characteristics into account and did not find any incompatibility. However, the evaluation must also note that according to beneficiaries, the assistance provided was not entirely appropriate. These animals were purchased on the basis of validated technical specifications, including Peulh sheep and goats for the Sahel and Mossi or mixed breed sheep and goats for the North and Centre-North; moreover, the animals were received by the regional services in charge of livestock in each region.
103. A beneficiary from Sirghin in the Centre Nord said, "When I took my three goats, one died on the way, and another died on the second day. They were all tired".
104. For beneficiaries in Yatenga, "some animals did not eat and suffered for a long time before dying".
105. In Namentenga, the beneficiaries themselves chose the type of small ruminant they wanted (sheep, goats). The beneficiaries say that the animals were very tired and suffering. During their quarantine, they were underfed. The animals often died before the beneficiary even arrived in his village. There was no vaccination because it was not made available. This is confirmed by the technical services who note that the products arrived later and that it was difficult to go around the villages to vaccinate all these animals.
106. In terms of production, however, several beneficiaries claim to have kept their nuclei. Some claim to have a nucleus of between four and six heads thanks to calving. The beneficiaries unanimously confirm that the activity has been well targeted. They also believe that, without the difficulties reported, production would have been better.
107. The NGO partner operating in Yatenga (*Association d'aide aux enfants et aux familles défavorisées*, ADEFAD) said that "it is in the reconstitution of the livestock that they note the greatest change. The activity was well targeted and met the needs of the beneficiaries. Thus, despite the difficulties, there was a great deal of enthusiasm among beneficiaries, especially women, many of whom were able to keep their core herd."

Finding 12. The inputs distributed by the project were of high quality (cattle feed, forage seed and vegetable seed) and appreciated by the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, they deplore the fact that inputs are often delivered late, which compromises production.

108. Several beneficiaries claim to have received cattle feed during the rainy season, when there was already grazing on site. In six of the eight villages visited, several beneficiaries said that their animals suffered greatly during the dry season from malnutrition and some were sold because the project did not provide cattle feed. Nevertheless, they are very happy to have received cattle feed – though late – which was of good quality.
109. The beneficiaries of the fodder seeds (cowpea and sorghum) distributed in one go during the extension phase are unanimous on the good quality of the seed received, but almost all of them (in six of the eight villages visited) say that the seeds arrived late. Those who sow the seeds are satisfied with the fodder harvest. Indeed, due to the exceptionally long rainy season in 2020, the fodder harvest was good in the North region.
110. On the contrary, in the Centre-North region, production remained mixed, as there were more farmers who did not sow because of the delay. This is confirmed by the technical service for animal resources in Boulsa (Centre Nord), which states that when the seeds arrived, there was a great risk that they would be used for other purposes (sales, consumption). The seeds were nevertheless distributed and some beneficiaries planted a small quantity as a trial with encouraging yields.
111. Seed distribution was based on the variety adaptability to the agro-ecological zone as well as on the seasonal forecast for the season. Although based on a very small sample, the evaluation team is confident that this finding can be extended to the entire project, given the unanimity of opinions expressed about the quality of inputs and the confirmations received by some technical services.

Finding 13. Households have benefited from quality vegetable seeds. Support for vegetable production is a well-targeted activity that has enabled thousands of beneficiaries to produce and earn substantial incomes, but technical supervision has been weak and NTFPs were not found in the sites visited.

112. In relation to vegetable production, several households benefited from tomato and onion seeds and compost. The support was provided in one go during the initial phase and in one go during the extension phase which involved new villages.
113. According to beneficiaries, the activity to support vegetable production was well targeted. Indeed, the seeds distributed are of good quality, but their high cost makes it out of reach of vulnerable households. By providing them with these seeds, the project has given them a great deal of support, and despite the delay in supplying the seeds, they are still able to produce and earn an income. In Bogota, beneficiaries report receiving about 70 g of onion seed and 20 g of tomato seed per person. With these quantities, each person can produce on ten beds and earn between XOF 45 000 and XOF 70 000. However, it would have been more profitable to receive these seeds in time to take advantage of the cold period (December, January). Indeed, with the delays, and at the beginning of the heat period, pest attacks become frequent, causing production losses. According to beneficiaries, these losses represent between 30 and 40 percent of their yield.

Figure 6. Livestock and vegetable growing activity in Dantchadi, Sahel region. Burkina Faso



114. Moreover, this delay impedes the beneficiaries from initiating a second production season. Beneficiaries also deplored the lack of training on vegetable growing. The IDP vegetable growers at the Dori mare claim to have lost almost half of their seeds in the nurseries due to a lack of knowledge on how to carry out the nursery (seeds sown too deep). Technical supervision for vegetable growing was weak, although it was provided for in the memorandum of understanding with the technical partner which is the regional directorate in charge of agriculture in each region. Beneficiaries were often visited by the agricultural officer, but nothing was planned to accompany them in the creation of nurseries. The IDP beneficiaries claim that they learn by doing from the host populations.
115. Finally, the project had planned to provide vegetable growers with seeds of non-timber forest products (moringa and baobab), in order to introduce them to nutritious gardens coupled with vegetable gardens for greater effectiveness and economic sustainability.¹⁸ Unfortunately, this activity was not implemented during the project in all the sites visited in the three regions during the evaluation. This information is confirmed by the implementing partners (at the local level) who claim not to have distributed baobab and moringa seeds under the project.
116. The project conducted nutrition awareness sessions during the initial phase. In practice, a four-day session was held for technical and operational partners who were later on given the responsibility of replicating this training to some beneficiaries. During this session, practical cooking demonstrations were carried out. These awareness-raising activities focused on the benefits of a varied diet, the importance of the nutritional value of food to be well nourished, healthy and productive. Emphasis was placed on the choice of foods and food groups.
117. In the villages visited during the evaluation, the people we met no longer remember these awareness-raising activities because they were theoretical. No training materials or participant notebooks were found on site. It would have been necessary to combine theory and practice to ensure longer-term effects and sustainability of the knowledge acquired. This lack of support can therefore be extended to the whole project. For example, the project could have included cooking demonstrations or nutrition clubs.

¹⁸ Nutritious gardens allow intensive production of *Moringa oleifera* and *Adansonia digitata* (baobab) leaves in the form of vegetable growing. The nutritional value of moringa and baobab products inspired the name "nutritious garden".

Finding 14. The impacts of building or rehabilitating productive assets through the CFW modality are well appreciated at the community level.

118. In Boulsa, in the Namentenga region, work was carried out over three months to build *zai* and half-moons, and to develop tracks and *boulis*. The beneficiaries took ownership of the activity.
119. In Boala, the established groups were maintained to continue the work, despite the end of the project. Thanks to the CFW modality, they have built stone barriers to stop the silting of the dam. The mayor of Boala congratulated the groups for their work on the tracks, which has made it possible to open up this part of the municipality. In Tougouri, the Wend Kuni Association received a certificate of recognition for the CFW activities that were carried out.
120. In the North, thanks to this modality, the communities have carried out small developments/rehabilitation (*boulis*, wells, rural tracks, gullies, stone barriers, etc.) activities that have allowed animals to drink, people to have water for making bricks or to have easy access to villages. Some villages' achievements exceed what was planned (two *boulis* instead of one, for example).
121. All of this is confirmed by the technical services and the implementing NGO partners who recognise that the CFW activities have led to the establishment of infrastructures that are very useful for the communities.

Finding 15. Despite FAO's support, beneficiary communities have remained less resilient to shocks according to the self-evaluated resilience analysis.

122. The evaluation also collected data on communities' subjective self-evaluated resilience. The analysis was organised per capacity,¹⁹ in the event of the following main shocks: climatic risks, phytosanitary/pest risks, conflicts/violence). Each shock is then rated on an evaluation score of 1 to 5, where 1 represents high resilience and 5 represents no resilience at all. The average of all evaluation scores is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Communities' subjective self-evaluated resilience score

Self-evaluated resilience	Men	Women
Climate risks	3.6	3.0
Phytosanitary/pest risks	3.6	3.0
Conflicts/violence	3.9	2.9
Average	3.7	3.0

Source: Evaluation team.

123. Analysis of data from Table 1 indicates average scores above 3.4 which reflect very low resilience and difficulties for beneficiary communities in coping with each of these three types of shock. The evaluation team is aware that these data are only an insight from a small sample and is awaiting the results of the consulting firm hired to give out this questionnaire to all project targets.
124. It is clear that in the project design, not all beneficiaries have benefited from the full package of activities proposed. The beneficiaries of food seeds are different from those of vegetable seeds, themselves are different from those of livestock support. Only in a few rare cases, food seed beneficiaries also benefited from vegetable growing support. As a result, the low concentration

¹⁹ Absorption, adaptation, transformation, anticipation, knowledge and information, learning, financial, social and political.

of activities on the same beneficiaries does not allow for further strengthening of resilience, which is a combination of different assets (need for production, need for training, need for income-generating activities). Most of those who do not develop income-generating activities will not have the income to cope with certain situations. In addition, the deteriorating security situation has contributed to slowing down the project's efforts and increasing the need for assistance.

Finding 16. The security situation and the COVID-19 have strongly influenced the implementation and therefore the effectiveness of the project.

125. The deteriorating security situation in several of the project intervention areas in the three regions (North, Centre-North and Sahel) affected project implementation. Indeed, it was difficult for FAO, the technical and operational partners to deploy as required in all the sites (Titao, in the North, practically the whole Sahel). As a result, FAO had to make do with the partners' reports without the possibility of going to the field for monitoring and supervision missions at several forbidden sites.
126. For example, in Lorum, in the North region, insecurity had a significant impact on the effectiveness of the implementing partner in the field. The latter experienced delays, for which it cannot be held responsible. The return of reports from these areas has often been difficult and the security situation is very volatile. These areas are very difficult for FAO to access and therefore impossible to visit for monitoring missions. There was also a high degree of instability among the project beneficiaries: they were moving from one place to another due to the growing insecurity, whereas the interventions are integrated to have impacts within a given territory. This thus affected the expected outcomes.
127. As a result of the barrier measures put in place by the state to break the chain of contamination of COVID-19, the project came to a standstill.²⁰ Large gatherings were banned, affecting coordination meetings and training sessions. The ban on travel at one point also contributed to slowing down the implementation of activities. Teams were forced to postpone certain activities. Travel to the field was also restricted for FAO teams, which prevented the very important field monitoring of partners.
128. To cope with the situation, the teams set up small working groups in the lowland rice fields to avoid large groupings. Similarly, they set up rotation systems at the perimeter level to work with beneficiaries in small groups.
129. FAO also helped in facilitating fieldwork and preventing the spread of the disease by providing beneficiaries with protective masks.

Partial conclusion 2. The effectiveness of the project is Moderate. The project made quality inputs available to beneficiaries. The successive distribution of food crop seeds over two years to the same beneficiaries has ensured good production. Despite attacks on cowpeas, production has been good, except for internally IDPs due to the poor quality of the land allocated to them. Support for vegetable production has also enabled thousands of beneficiaries to produce and earn substantial incomes. Technical support was overall insufficient. Moreover, PICS bags for cowpea storage were not often distributed and were not of good quality. The implementation of the mobile cash payment modality was challenging and not well-mastered. It was not possible to make cash available to beneficiaries in time to enable them access food during the lean season. Despite difficulties encountered during the distribution of small ruminants, some beneficiaries have rebuilt their herds. Many of the nutrition awareness sessions

²⁰ The first cases were recorded in March and during the next 4 months, most activities were paralysed.

remained theoretical and are likely to have little lasting impact. Despite FAO's support, beneficiary communities have remained less resilient to shocks according to the subjective self-evaluated resilience analysis.

3.3 Efficiency

Finding 17. Delayed implementation: the complexity of FAO procedures, the weak capacity of partners and the poor coordination between stakeholders, had a negative impact on outputs and expected outcomes, and in particular on the timing of input distribution to beneficiaries.

130. As mentioned earlier, the evaluation noted that delays to pay unconditional and conditional cash transfers to vulnerable households and IDPs are long. The mobile payment modality used was highly inefficient due to delays.
131. The evaluation further deplored the fact that food crop seeds arrived late in the localities at a time when many beneficiaries had already sown on their good land, especially in the first year when the seeds arrived in August – in the middle of the rainy season – whereas the sowing period had passed. The beneficiaries would have preferred to have the seeds before the sowing period.
132. According to a beneficiary in Sirghin, "When the seeds arrived in late July/early August the first year, I had only a few marginal lands still available and that is when I tried the project seed. The sowing period is crucial and you don't take the risk of waiting". This situation is experienced more acutely by women in the North and Centre North, and even more so by IDPs who do not have access to land. According to a village chief, "If the seeds arrive on time, we have time to do good planning to allocate the right land, otherwise it is not easy". Most of those who planted did so in the first year on degraded land with low productivity. Nevertheless, some have had good harvests in the first year and appreciate the quality of the sorghum flour, both in terms of colour and taste.
133. In the second year, food crop seeds were late again, but many beneficiaries had kept the seeds received late the previous year (Year 1) and some, although they had sown in Year 1, had kept some seeds. For most beneficiaries, the harvests were good in the second year. This confirms the validity of the multi-year nature of the support.
134. According to the Namentenga technical service in charge of agriculture, "the seeds always arrive late, but the delay was more serious in 2018²¹ because the sowing period had passed. All beneficiaries had already sown in 2018. Many who took the seeds, no longer had the necessary surface area to sow them. Many beneficiaries used their seeds in 2018 because they were in need and had already sown".
135. Multi-year activities were an important added value even though they were not planned: in 2019, the quantities sown were greater than in 2018, because most beneficiaries still had food crop seeds received in 2018 that they had not sown or were able to collect seeds. All agreed that food crop seeds were of very good quality. In the Sahel, most of those who received vegetable seeds in November-December, during the initial phase, preferred to keep it in order to start the next season on time. Some of them were thus able to do two production campaigns and are satisfied with the project, which allowed them to draw resources from the vegetable growing activity. During the extension phase, the seeds also arrived late.

²¹ July-August

136. According to beneficiaries in the Hypo village (Yatenga), "the food seeds arrived very late during the first year, in August when they had already sown". And according to the Yatenga technical service in charge of agriculture, "lowland rice needs fertiliser in July, and it was in October when some producers were harvesting that the fertiliser was delivered".
137. Vegetable seeds were often delivered late, exposing plants to the sun, lack of water and pest attacks and making it impossible to carry out two production campaigns. During the initial phase, seeds were supplied late (November, December), for a season that traditionally starts in September-October. According to beneficiaries, it was risky to start production because of the low availability of water, as water points start to dry up in February. This has a particular impact on IDPs, who are often located far from the watercourse – as the water progressively dries up during the season. Moreover, the lack of equipment and means to properly irrigate their plots has a negative impact on harvests.

Figure 7. End of February 2021, plots of initial phase beneficiaries who had their own seeds and were able to plant earlier, Burkina Faso



Figure 8. End of February 2021, plots of extension phase beneficiaries who received seeds late, Burkina Faso



138. Moreover, in the Sahel, beneficiaries said they are still waiting for the compost they were promised. Field observation at the time of the visit showed that beneficiaries were at the transplanting stage, while other initial phase beneficiaries who had their own seeds and started earlier, were already harvesting (see Figure 7 and Figure 8).
139. According to Bogota beneficiaries in Yatenga, when onion is sown late, attacks occur on the seedlings, especially as heat increases. It is thus necessary to treat the seedlings with insecticide, following good practices learned from the technical services. The same applies to tomatoes; without treatment, yields cannot be successful, and these challenges are exacerbated when plants are sown late. Nevertheless, these delays may have had a positive impact on those who harvest in December, as prices are quite remunerative. Indeed, the price of a tin of tomato is almost XOF 3 500, compared to a price of XOF 1 500 for the same quantity produced in March. However, with the tomato produced with seeds provided by the project for other producers, the plants are still very small and will reach maturity when the market is saturated, thus causing a shortage of sales due to delays.
140. Finally, in Yatenga, the vegetable production planned by the project extension had to be accompanied by support in fertiliser and small equipment. But at the time of the evaluation, beneficiaries had not yet received this support. The implementing NGO partner confirms that it is waiting for this equipment to start distribution.
141. For an extension phase beneficiary in Cissin, Yatenga, "we are in February 2021 and while people are eating potatoes, we are still waiting for the promised fertilisers and watering cans".
142. Several other inputs have generally been delivered late to beneficiaries, with repercussions on production:
- i. Cowpea storage bags, especially in Boulsa (Centre-North region), were delivered to the technical service of agriculture after the harvest and the technical partner chose not to distribute them. These bags are still stored in the warehouse of the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture in Boulsa.
 - ii. Animal vaccination products arrived much later than the distribution of animals. According to the technical service for livestock in Kaya, "it was difficult to reach the beneficiaries individually in their villages to vaccinate the animals. This led to losses".
 - iii. Cattle feed was distributed late. Several beneficiaries claim to have received cattle feed during the rainy season, when there was already grazing on site. For beneficiaries in the North and Centre North, "they would have preferred to receive the feed during the dry season, which is a critical period for them, as there is no pasture at all".
 - iv. Fodder seed was also distributed late during the extension phase. As a result, some beneficiaries did not dare to sow, at the risk of losing their seed, as the season was already advanced.
 - v. Animals from the extension phase were delivered late in Yatenga. Indeed, the extension phase ended in December 2020 and the animals were delivered around the same time, whereas they were expected since the beginning of the phase (May 2020).
143. In the field, partners and communities are unanimous about the late arrival of inputs each year. The reasons for these delays are many and are related to the procurement process, the capacity of partners in the field and coordination between technical and operational partners in the field and between partners and FAO.

144. In the chain of responsibility and distribution, FAO is responsible for all procurement. Once procurement is done, FAO makes the inputs available to the technical and operational partners in the field for validation and distribution.
145. The first and most important level of delay here is related to making inputs available to field partners. This delay is generally due to orders that are associated with restrictive FAO procedures and supervision chains. These procedures have not evolved to accommodate the emergency and besides, the procurement manual is cumbersome. For example, each year FAO buys seeds, but has to repeat the process of requesting and validating specifications, although some existing measures can be adopted.²²
146. Within this chain, there are several levels of decisions or authorisations that can progress more or less quickly depending on the observations made and the need for feedback. For example, sub-offices must first draw up a work plan which must be approved by the Head of the emergency cluster, the Programme Officer and finally the Country Office. Any change follow the same path and, if rejected, this circuit must be repeated from the beginning.
147. Procurement requests should be returned to the Country Office with specifications for approval. Once all approvals have been received, the purchase orders should be initiated; they will follow the same circuit (Sub-Country Office, Emergency Cluster Officer, Programme Officer and Country Office) to send and wait for approval. These procedures have proven to be too long and have not allowed for timely procurement, which has very often resulted in delays in obtaining inputs and delivering them to the field.
148. This delay was often compounded by the low capacity of operational partners to come and collect inputs quickly once they are available for distribution. Indeed, inputs were often delivered to the field and remained undistributed for more than two or three weeks. Some partners do not always have sufficient resources on their own to pre-finance urgent actions while waiting to be paid by FAO. They rely on FAO payment instalments to operate, while these payment instalments depend on reporting requirements that may delay payment. The situation of operational partners is not better, as they were still waiting for payment instalments from the Phase 1 project MOU at the time of the evaluation. OCADES Dori explains that the total amount of the second instalment of the extension phase payment does not allow it to cover the logistics of transporting and distributing inputs to the villages. Yet it signed the MOU knowingly. It is also worth noting the haste of partners who sign MOUs without taking time to read them thoroughly.
149. Finally, as observed in the field, this delay is also often amplified by weaknesses in the coordination between stakeholders as follows:
 - i. In Seno, for example, it was difficult to coordinate the action of the technical service in charge of agriculture and OCADES for the distribution of vegetable seeds, due to conflicts of agenda (unavailability of one or the other). As a result, several appointments were missed. For example, the last distribution of vegetable seeds took place on 19 December 2020 in Seytenga and Bani, which is late for vegetable farmers who prefer to have seeds as early as October. The agriculture service receives and approves the quality of seeds that are stored in its shops. It then coordinates with OCADES to transport the seeds to the field.

²² Such as the use of rosters that can be validated over two or three years (with market price monitoring) and the adoption of input catalogues that can be developed with periodic review and also valid over two or three years, with technical specifications approved by the technical services.

If the schedules do not synchronise well, postponements will occur further delaying the availability of seeds.

- ii. In the Centre North region, the evaluation also found that there was little coordination in the provision of seeds by FAO and the technical services. In Boulssa, all the seeds (food crop and fodder) were delivered with a single slip without explanation and stored at the Boulssa provincial agricultural service. More than a month after removing the food crop seeds, the teams realised that the rest was fodder seeds, unfortunately, the right sowing period had passed. This lack of coordination amplified the delay in the distribution of fodder seeds in Namentenga province.

150. More generally, it is important to note that these inputs, due to a lack of systematic monitoring of their movements, can disappear or be forgotten for a time. Without overburdening the work of field agents, a better monitoring would make it possible to avoid these losses, even temporary, and would help to better manage delays in the transport and distribution of inputs.

Finding 18. Several institutional delays in the signing and payment of MOU instalments have often compromised the strategy in place and the capacities of implementing agents at all levels; these delays are aggravated by implementation delays (see Finding 17).

151. The evaluation noted delays in signing MOUs with technical and operational partners. MOUs with technical services and NGOs were signed per phase. Thus, there was a MOU for the initial phase and another one for the extension phase. For the last extension, another MOU was also signed with each partner. This offered continuity to the partners, avoiding interruptions in the objectives and progress of the activities, which reinforced their ownership of the project. All the partners are unanimous about the delays in signing the MOUs, which do not allow the agricultural calendar to be respected. Several months elapse between the submission of the first version of the MOU to the partners, its amendment and the exchanges between the partners and the FAO. For example, in the Sahel (Dori), for the extension phase, the MOU was signed and made effective by OCADES on 20 July 2020 and by FAO on 11 August 2020 for eight months, with activities supposed to start in May 2020 (before signature). In the Centre-North (Sanmatenga), the Boussouma council signed its initial phase MOU on 10 September 2018, to monitor the activities of an operational partner that had already begun in May 2018; consequently, activities that needed to be followed up, like targeting and first distributions, were already done.
152. For FAO, the project officially started its activities on 1 June 2018, and after start-up, partners had to be identified and MOUs developed. Assessing partner capacity and initiating contracting took time; several months were needed to finalise these documents. These delays which are already long on FAO side are compounded when partners take a long time to send their comments on the MOU versions or to return the signed document, thus postponing the effective date of signing the MOUs.
153. According to FAO principles, partners should not start or pre-finance activities before the MOU is signed. But, to save time and increase efficiency, some operational partners with resources (for targeting for example in some cases) do not always respect this rule.
154. At the level of municipalities, getting an agreement signed, and especially organising payments, was sometimes difficult. Indeed, their procedures complicated disbursements once the transfers had been received in the council's account. It also took a long time to get information on the financial records of the councils before the transfers could be made, which contributed to the delay in signing the agreements with these councils.

155. Delays have also been recorded in the payment of the instalments governed by MOUs. All operational and technical partners are unanimous on the subject. For example, for the third instalment of the initial phase MOU payment that ended in 2019, no partner had been paid till February 2021. For the implementing operational partner in the Namentenga province (Association Wend Kuni in Boulsa), the extension has been completed since December 2020, but none of the payment instalments had been received by February 2021. For the implementing operational partner in the Yatenga province (ADEFAD in Ouahigouya), the last instalment of the initial MOU, which ended in December 2019, was paid in January 2021.
156. In principle, payments are made in three instalments of 30 percent, 50 percent and 20 percent respectively. To receive the first payment, the partner must submit an inception report at the end of the targeting. OCADES in Dori applied for its second instalment in October 2020, but has still not been paid.
157. OCADES says: "we were obliged to pre-finance, because at one point the fertiliser had to be transported to the beneficiaries; and the amount of transport alone exceeded the total amount of the second instalment requested. We did this so in order not to penalise the beneficiaries.
158. In order to receive their payments, partners have to provide activity reports, which are time-consuming and not always submitted on time, which also contributes to delays in payments. In addition, the poor quality of the reports submitted and the failure to follow the template provided by FAO leads to back and forth between FAO and the partners and contributes to delays in the acceptance of reports and therefore payments.
159. Very often, delays in providing inputs by FAO have the greatest impact on the time taken to prepare reports and therefore on payments, with cascading effects. In principle, according to the MOUs, FAO should send inputs at a certain time; a report should then be sent to FAO to account for the end of these inputs; this report is a contractual obligation of the partner and should also be sent at specific dates. However, the delay in the supply of inputs creates a period of inaction or latency on the partners' part with no activities to carry out. The latter are then faced with the difficulty of having to provide a report on the activities undertaken over a period where nothing has been done.
160. For example, in the North, the technical service in charge of animal resources says that it was supposed to receive animals, produce a report and send it to FAO. However, during the entire period of the MOU, animals were not delivered and the technical service was therefore unable to produce a report because there was no activity. The partner must provide and have FAO validate this report, so that FAO can launch the next activities. This phenomenon accentuates the delays in the supply of inputs and consequently the execution periods of MOUs. Moreover, the project does not employ salaried staff, but contracted agents on a task basis: these long periods of inactivity and administrative bottlenecks contribute to a great instability of the staff, which does not strengthen partner organisations.
161. This is also confirmed at the Centre-North, where the operational partner says: "you are given an activity that should start in January, but in the end the activity starts in April or six months later. You are asked to make a report when nothing has been done. They send you tons of cake four months after the end of the project and ask you for a report."
162. These delays in payment, depending on the inputs, are also undermining the motivation of some stakeholders, especially the technical services agents at the grassroots level who indirectly accuse the managers. MOUs are signed at the level of the regional directorates, which must share them with the provincial directorates and the main parties involved in implementation. Payments by

FAO are also made at the regional level. However, the situation in the field often shows a lack of knowledge of the MOU content by the implementing agents (Boulsa) or a partial knowledge of the contents, which makes some of the required activities meaningless. Moreover, in this context, it also happens that payment is made but grassroots agents are not paid. Staff who have worked on project activities have been assigned to other areas without being paid. This lack of follow-up and understanding also contributes to a high degree of instability among project staff and does not strengthen partner organisations.

Finding 19. The project's monitoring and evaluation system is functional. It makes good use of data to ensure adaptive management.

163. The methods and indicators chosen to measure the impact of project activities are relevant. The project has defined a logical framework, with well-defined indicators that go beyond outputs to assess changes. The project has one overall objective, which is "Improve the resilience of vulnerable pastoralist and agropastoralist households to climatic and economic shocks", and three strategic effects or objectives, which are outlined here:
- i. SO 1 "Improve vulnerable households' access to food and productive assets". This SO 1 will be verified by the indicator "at least three meals per day on average are consumed by beneficiary households (M/F) during the lean season".
 - ii. SO 2: "Replenish the agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso". This SO 2 will be verified by indicators "at least 70 percent of vulnerable households (M/F) have rebuilt their livestock by the end of the project" and "at least 90 percent of beneficiary households (M/F) have increased their agricultural production by 5 percent by the end of the project".
 - iii. SO 3: "Improve the nutrition situation of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso". This SO 3 will be verified by indicators: "at least 20 percent of women of childbearing age have an acceptable dietary diversity score (of five) at the end of the project" and "at least 50 percent of beneficiary households (M/F) have an acceptable food consumption score (above 35) at the end of the project".
164. These three effects are coherent, achievable and should contribute to the achievement of the overall objective. Improving access to food and means of production for vulnerable households; replenishing the agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital of vulnerable households; and improving the nutrition situation of vulnerable households in the provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso, should contribute to the resilience of vulnerable households.
165. Monitoring was carried out at several levels: i) at the field level through implementing and technical partners who provided data to the sub-offices through periodic implementation reports; ii) by the sub-offices and the Coordination through ad hoc supervision visits, which also provided information through mission reports; and iii) finally, through interim reports produced annually by FAO on the basis of a model oriented towards the various outputs, semi-annual reports and annual project reviews with the donor.
166. In each sub-office, one person is in charge of the monitoring and evaluation of project activities at the regional level. The project benefits from the support and follow-up of the Head Office Monitoring and Evaluation Officer. This has had a positive impact on the quality of activity monitoring.
167. The project has developed a baseline and conducted several post-distribution monitoring missions (1, 2 and 3). It also planned an endline situation. A dashboard was drawn up to monitor the indicators and is filled in regularly. Following the extension of the project, a mid-term

evaluation which was not foreseen in the initial project seemed necessary. This evaluation is part of this process in order to learn from the experience and improve future interventions. A consulting firm, responsible for collecting data on all of the project outcomes, was to make these outcomes available to the evaluation, but the firm was only recruited in May 2021.

168. A reporting template was developed and made available to each partner, along with a checklist to assess the quality of reporting. A division of tasks and training was carried out for the different partners (what is expected of each in targeting, distribution and monitoring). Similarly, a monitoring and evaluation plan was drawn up with indicators and indications on how to fill them.
169. The implementation of the kobo platform to register beneficiaries since last year (2020) can also be included in the monitoring-evaluation framework. Initially, this tool was not part of the project. It is thanks to another project that FAO integrated it into this project to monitor and verify the quality of targeting. The level of wider use of kobo by the project in the entire FAO programme in Burkina Faso could not be determined with certainty.
170. Other elements identified as part of the monitoring and evaluation contribute to the project visibility, the capitalisation of experiences, the intervention strategy and learning:
 - i. video recording of success stories where the monitoring-evaluation unit works with the communication unit to capture the various impacts observed;
 - ii. periodic capitalisation (semi-annual reports, annual reports) of lessons learned and good practices; and
 - iii. grouped field missions for several projects.
171. Finally, with cash aid, the monitoring and evaluation unit works on accountability. Field missions are carried out to talk to a sample of households to see if cash has been delivered to them. In the case where cash has not yet been received, technical partners asked implementing partners to escalate the information to the sub-office level so that it could reach the Representation, thus ensuring a consistent feedback mechanism.

Finding 20. FAO has made a significant technical, if not administrative, contribution to project implementation. However, some of the modalities proved to be inadequate in their implementation, although the multi-year funding partially compensated for this inefficiency.

172. FAO managed the project administratively and financially with the delays mentioned. However, thanks to its contribution, the allocated funds were managed according to established procedures.
173. FAO also provided technical input in the implementation of activities such as the procurement and control of vegetable, food crop and fodder seeds and small ruminants. In addition, it provided technical support staff (Coordinator, staff in the sub-offices) in the field.
174. Although the delays (Finding 17 and Finding 18) have had significant negative impacts, multi-year financing has played an important mitigating role. Indeed, even if the lean season or the seed season was not aligned with the distribution as it should have been, the multi-year financing ensures a link between the beneficiaries, the implementing partners and the project over a longer period. Thus, instead of turning away from the project, beneficiaries were able to enjoy all the cumulative benefits of the project (technical assistance, quality inputs, etc. for the beneficiaries but also learning from the previous year for all implementing partners) but with a delay compared to the planned schedule. In terms of results and impact, the multi-year financing helped to catch up with the rather low efficiency of the project.

175. The evaluation expected greater involvement on part of FAO in the facilitation of *caisses de résilience* as an exit strategy to strengthen the sustainability of the achievements. *Caisses de résilience* is a community-centred approach that integrates three dimensions:
- i. a productive/technical dimension (such as the use of sustainable agricultural practices through agropastoral field schools);
 - ii. a financial/economic dimension (such as mobilising community savings and accessing loans); and
 - iii. a social dimension (e.g. strengthening social cohesion and raising awareness on nutrition).
176. According to the *caisses de résilience* approach, supporting all three dimensions in a complementary way increases the opportunities of beneficiaries and builds sustainable resilience so that they are better prepared for multiple risks ahead. FAO could have played a more prominent role in facilitating and adopting these *caisses de résiliences*, but did not use them to strengthen sustainability (the project's exit strategy), thus losing the opportunity to add greater value to the overall project.

Partial conclusion 3. The efficiency of the project is low. Results were not always obtained in a timely manner. At different levels, the project experienced delays in implementing activities and institutional delays in the signing and payment of MOU instalments with its partners, with repercussions on strategy, outputs and outcomes. The main reasons for these delays are related to the poor mastery of the mobile cash payment process, the complexity of FAO procedures, the insufficient capacity of partners and the weak coordination between stakeholders. However, the project's monitoring and evaluation system is functional and makes good use of the data to ensure adaptive management. Finally, FAO contributed significantly to the implementation of the project from a technical point of view, and the multi-year funding limited the adverse effects of low project efficiency.

3.4 Multi-year financing and gender

177. In this first phase of the evaluation, the mission briefly analysed the issues of gender and multi-year financing. These issues will be further explored in the second phase of the mission.
178. The multi-year financing approach has contributed to increasing the effectiveness and sustainability of the project: i) It is not possible to speak of continuous support, as the two phases use different areas, different targets (hosts and IDPs). However, for example in livestock support, some targets continued to receive cattle feed support during the extension phase. ii) During the two years of the initial phase, beneficiaries received rainfed seeds and unconditional cash transfer each year (although the cash did not arrive at the right time to help households protect their assets). iii) The project went beyond humanitarian response by supporting activities such as fodder and vegetable seed support, small ruminant support, and cash support to foster structural change toward development. iv) The fact that the project signed a single MOU with operational and technical partners that took into account the entire duration of the phase, and selected beneficiaries only once for this phase, shows that the project did not consider multi-annuality as the sum of Year 1 and Year 2, but capitalised on sustainability.
179. The targeting of beneficiaries took into account gender issues which were fully integrated into the process. In addition, a gender-based socio-economic study was carried out to take into account gender-specific needs with recommendations. The gender dimension was considered more in terms of women's participation in actions than in terms of reducing disparities and inequalities between men and women, which would have required a defined policy or strategy.

Nevertheless, a high proportion of women benefited from the interventions, which contributed to strengthening their access to capital and leadership roles in households.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

180. Based on the results of this evaluation, the evaluation team developed the following conclusions and recommendations.

4.1 Conclusions

Conclusion 1. The project is aligned with Burkina Faso's main policies and priorities in the intervention sectors of agriculture, food and nutrition security, and the economic situation of vulnerable populations. Its design was based on a good understanding of the context. Technical services, particularly through their reports, local authorities and beneficiaries participated in project design through consultations to identify intervention areas and certain needs (even though more thorough consultations from the design stage, would have been useful). Finally, the project benefited from two extensions that were relevant to the outcomes and the changing context.

181. The project was in line with the HDP nexus approach in its formulation. The approach and activities planned for implementation contributed to strengthening the livelihoods of beneficiaries, but the project design did not allow for activities to be concentrated on the same groups of beneficiaries and limited the possibilities for improving community resilience. As a result, beneficiary communities were largely non-resilient to shocks, despite FAO support and despite the activities implemented. The humanitarian context, with the huge needs of vulnerable people and existing budgetary constraints, does not always allow activities to be concentrated on the same groups at the risk of marginalising the vast majority.

Conclusion 2. The four main pathways selected by the project foster FAO's contribution to peacekeeping, reducing the likelihood of violent conflict and increasing the prospects for peace. However, certain developments in the project, such as the fact that some beneficiaries have already received cash payments while others have not, for several months, could be a source of conflict or various tensions. In terms of strengthening local conflict management capacities, the project worked to make conflict management mechanisms functional by setting up a committee for complaints management in each beneficiary village. However, the evaluation did not find any complaints to these committees, which are actually not sufficiently known, trained and equipped.

Conclusion 3. Targeting deficiencies, including duplication and the designation of wealthy officials to receive project support, resulted from the failure to comply with the household economy analysis methodology, due to time and resource constraints. In addition, as concerns the identification of IDP beneficiaries, the project did not often collaborate effectively with social action departments, which could have avoided duplication.

Conclusion 4. Overall, the project was able to ensure good production, despite attacks on cowpeas and delays in distribution. This good production was facilitated by the distribution of seeds over two years to the same beneficiaries.

182. Support to vegetable production, including the distribution of high-quality inputs (forage seed and vegetable seed), is a well-targeted activity that has enabled thousands of beneficiaries to produce and earn substantial income. The project conducted nutrition awareness-raising sessions during the initial phase, but did not implement this with practice, thus putting at risk the sustainability of achievements. For IDP beneficiaries, production did not live up to expectations due to the poor quality of the land allocated to them. PICS bags for cowpea storage were not often distributed and were not of good quality.

Conclusion 5. The efficiency of the project is low. At several levels, the projects experienced delays in implementing activities and institutional delays in the signing and payment of MOU instalments with its partners, with repercussions on strategy, outputs and outcomes. But thanks to the multi-year financing, project outcomes and impacts have not been further affected; they were simply postponed in time. The project's monitoring and evaluation system worked well and FAO significantly contributed to project implementation from a technical point of view.

Conclusion 6. Some beneficiaries were able to rebuild their herds, in line with the objectives of the project, which provided households with quality cattle feed and de-wormed and vaccinated animals of the desired type.

183. However, the evaluation found that the animals provided were often tired, and some beneficiaries had to travel long distances (over 20 km, often on foot) to receive their animals. This exacerbated the mortality rate, especially as vaccination was not carried out systematically in all localities. It should also be noted that some beneficiaries continued to receive cattle feed during the extension phase even though this was planned, thus benefiting from more sustained support.

4.2 Recommendations

Recommendation 1. Intensify support at the beneficiary level, so that the same beneficiaries benefit from all the project's support: cash+, livestock, food crops and/or vegetable crops (to be implemented in future projects).

Recommendation 2. Strengthen the capacity of stakeholders to take greater ownership of the tools available and be able to use them (as part of the current project). To do this, train members of the committees for complaints management and beneficiaries so that everyone can play their role fully. The turnaround process can only be useful and sustainable if committees and beneficiaries are aware of the existence of these structures and are able to use them.

Recommendation 3. Improve beneficiary targeting processes (future projects). This requires the following actions:

- i. build on lessons learned from previous targeting practices at the FAO level to improve targeting, plan for the time needed to train stakeholders, and make arrangements to plan for the time and resources needed to conduct the process; and
- ii. strengthen collaboration with social action to conduct the targeting process of IDPs in IDP camps.

Recommendation 4. Strengthen the effective implementation of nutrition, cowpea conservation and IDP access to land. This requires the following actions:

- i. conduct theoretical and practical actions, combining nutrition awareness-raising with cooking demonstrations and nutrition club activities (as part of a future intervention, but also as part of the current project);
- ii. control the quality of PICS triple-layer bags by comparing them with PICS bags recognised by the Environment and Agricultural Research Institute in order to provide beneficiaries with good quality equipment (current project); and
- iii. strengthen the land negotiation process in order to facilitate IDPs' access to fertile land or land suitable for agro-sylvo-pastoral production (current project).

Recommendation 5. Review internal procedures to simplify them and adapt them to activities, especially with regard to the signing and payment of MOU instalments with partners. This requires the following actions:

- i. accelerate the processes of acquisition and provision of inputs; to do this, input catalogues with technical specifications approved by FAO technical services can be developed in advance with periodic review and updating (current and future projects);
- ii. validate two- or three-year supplier directories with contract price monitoring to minimise contracting time and simplify procedures (current project; future projects);
- iii. speed up the availability of moringa and baobab seeds to facilitate the development of nutritious gardens (current project);
- iv. accelerate the process for cash payments to avoid perpetuating this situation which can exacerbate tensions on the basis of the capacities acquired during the project (current project);
- v. document the mobile cash payment modality based on the project experience and draw lessons for the implementation of future projects (future projects);
- vi. strengthen coordination/communication between stakeholders in order to better match intervention schedules and share sufficient information for greater efficiency; in this context, seeds under the responsibility of each technical partner should be labelled and transmitted with separate slips (current project);
- vii. strengthen collaboration/proximity between the FAO project team and the FAO procurement service in order to operationalise the processes efficiently and avoid delays in the acquisition and distribution of inputs (current project);
- viii. strengthen the capacities of partners on payment modalities and on the drafting of a quality report according to the template made available (current project);
- ix. study existing modalities or practices to allow for advance payments, which the partner justifies before receiving the next payment in order to facilitate the implementation of activities that may be adopted (future projects); and
- x. organise discussions on MOUs with technical services in each region and all stakeholders involved in the MOU to clarify the roles and tasks of each one (current project).

Recommendation 6. Improve animal distribution and vaccine ordering processes. This requires the following actions:

- i. plan the distribution of animals right to villages to avoid moving vulnerable people, especially women, over long distances and organise quarantine well with suppliers, including cattle feeding and caretaking (current project); and
- ii. systematically order animals with vaccines (valid for all inputs that go with animals) in order to avoid huge gaps between the supply of animals and that of vaccines (current project).

Recommendation 7. Improve the sustainability of interventions. To this end, introduce FFS as a capacity-building approach that could be used to support farmers in different activities (rainfed, vegetable or livestock production) through the *Caisse de résilience* approach that complements the FFS with a financial and social component (future projects).

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Appendix 1. People interviewed and focus group discussions

Last name	First name	Organisation/Location	Position
Badini	Soumaila	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, North Region	Provincial Director of Agriculture, Ouahigouya, North Region
Bamogo	Boukary	AVAD Kaya, Centre-North Region	President
Belem	Madi	Boussouma council	Secretary General
Björkdahl	Göran	Swedish Embassy	Person in charge of this support at FAO,
Dabilgou	Paul Florent	Regional Directorate of Animal Resources, North Region	Livestock focal point, North Region
Dango	Boureima	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, Dori, Sahel Region	Director
Diallo	Fatimata	OCADES Dori, Sahel Region	Focal point, OCADES Dori, Sahel
Dingamtouloum	Tobrome	FAO Sub-Office, Sahel Region	Cash Transfer Officer
Do	Do	FAO Sub-Office, North	Field Assistant Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, FAO Sub-Office, North
Ekoulou Kam	Kanwar	Regional Directorate of Agriculture, North Region	Focal Point of Project Ouahigouya
Gueguenré	Zenabo	FAO Sub-Office, Sahel Region	Head of FAO Sub-Office, Sahel Region
Hamado	Ouattara Kalo	FAO Sub-Office, Sahel Region	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
Hinrichs	Angela	FAO Headquarters	Liaison Officer SIDA/FAO
Imma	Marguerite	Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region	Vice President
Imma	Zonabo	Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region	Facilitator
Keini	Abdoulaye	Provincial Directorate of Animal Resources, Centre-North	Director
Kouacou	Koffi	FAO Burkina Faso	Programme Officer
Kouraogo	Illiasa	Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region	Facilitator
Nacanako	Dramane	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, Boulssa, Centre-North,	Interim Director
Nanema	Léopold S.	FAO Burkina Faso	Head of Department of Institutional Governance at the Executive Secretariat, CNSA
Nikiéma	Jean-Claude	Provincial Directorate of Animal Resources, Sanmatenga, Centre-North region	Director
Nombré	Estel	Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region	Accountant
Non-Naaba	Dieudonné	Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region	President
Non-Naaba	Emile	Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region	Focal point for FAO Project, Wend Kuni Boulssa Association, Centre-North Region
Ouedraogo	Sidiki	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, Sanmatenga, Centre-North region	Director
Ouedraogo	Emilie	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, Sanmatenga, Centre-North region	Agriculture Focal point
Ouedraogo	Mathieu	FAO Sub-Office, Kaya, Centre-North Region	Head
Ouedraogo	Somalegré	FAO Sub-Office, Centre-North Region	Field Assistant Livestock Specialist, FAO Sub-Office, Centre-North Region
Ouédraogo	Basile Boureima	Ouahigouya, North Region	Ouahigouya Council, North Region

Last name	First name	Organisation/Location	Position
Ouédraogo	Souleymane	UAT Ouahigouya	Head of UAT Ouahigouya
Ouédraogo	Malick	Provincial Directorate of Livestock, Ouahigouya, North Region	Interim Director
Ouédraogo	Mahamadi	ADEFAD, North Region	Executive Director, ADEFAD, North Region
Ouédraogo	Issouf	ADEFAD, North Region	Focal point for Project FAO/ADEFAD, North Region
Ouédraogo	Ousmane	Wend Kuni Boulsa Association, Centre-North Region	Facilitator
Ouédraogo	Delphine	Swedish Embassy	Programme Officer
Sallé	Barkissa	Wend Kuni Boulsa Association, Centre-North Region	Facilitator
Sanou	Issa	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, Dori, Sahel Region	Head of Production
Sau	Daouda	FAO Burkina Faso	FAO Representative
Sawadogo	Adama	ADEFAD, North Region	Assistant focal point for Project FAO/ADEFAD, North Region
Sawadogo	Véronique	Wend Kuni Boulsa Association, Centre-North Region	Intern
Sawadogo	Madi	FAO Burkina Faso	Project Coordinator
Sebga	Abbé Olivier	OCADES Dori, Sahel Region	Executive Secretary
Sedogo	Adama	AVAD Kaya, Centre-North Region	Monitoring-Evaluation and Capitalisation Officer
Silga	Paul	FAO Sub-Office, North	Livestock Assistant, Head of FAO Sub-Office, North
Soubeiga	Benjamin	FAO Sub-Office, North	Assistant Agriculture Specialist, FAO North
Tebda	Edmond	OCADES Dori, Sahel Region	Project Officer OCADES Dori, Sahel
Traore	Yacouba	AVAD Kaya, Centre-North Region	Focal point
Traoré Lamien	Fleure	FAO Sub-Office, Centre-North Region	Zootechnician, Food Security Analysis System, MEAL focal point, Early warning Early action,
Traoré, Kiemdé	Diane	FAO Burkina Faso	Monitoring and evaluation manager
Yé	Abdias	Provincial Directorate of Animal Resources, Seno, Sahel region	Director

List of focus group discussions (FGD) and distribution of male/female participants

No.	Location	Men's FGD	Women's FGD
1	North Region, Bogota village	15	10
2	North Region, Cissin village	15	12
3	North Region, Hypo village	12	11
4	Sahel Region, Dori pond	17	12
5	Sahel Region, Dantchari village	4	13
6	Centre-North Region, Sirghin village	14	10
7	Centre-North Region, Koulgo village	11	10
8	Centre-North Region, Boulsa village, zone 3	11	12
	Sub-total	99	90
	Total	189	

Appendix 2. Number of beneficiaries in different phases who received inputs

Project document	At the beginning of the project	After project amendment (support to new vulnerable host households and IDPs)	Estimated total
Total number of poor and very poor vulnerable beneficiary households	10 000		
Households receiving unconditional cash transfers (Output 1.1)	10 000 , at the rate of XOF 3 500/household/month in three instalments (June, July, August)	+8 700 including 3 300 hosts	18 700
Households benefiting from the "Cash for Work" modality (Output 1.2)	4 100 , all very poor, ²³ over a period of four months at a rate of two months per year with an average daily rate of XOF 1 200 (20 days max/month/household) Approximately 10% will be able to combine this support with the unconditional transfer during the period (specific highly vulnerable targets)	+2 910 new vulnerable households	7 010
Households receiving material support to rebuild their herd (Output 2.1)	4 400 of which: 2 500 in the North and Centre-North regions receive short-cycle animal kits 1 900 in the Sahel receive vouchers (cattle feed, zootechnical and veterinary inputs)	+6 900 of which: 3 100 vulnerable IDP households 3 800 vulnerable host households	11 300
Households receive material support to improve their cereal and vegetable production capacity (Output 2.2)	2 800 households receive vegetable and NTFP seeds 2 800 households receive support for improved fortified seeds, fertilizer, and triple-layer bags	+2 800 new households +2 800 households	11 200
Vaccination and veterinary health care		12 400 cattle and 24 800 small ruminants	

²³ Household economy analysis method.

Appendix 3. Table drawn during the mid-term review

Intervention logic	Objectively verifiable indicator	Change achieved at mid-term (August 2021)
Impact: the resilience of vulnerable pastoralist and agro-pastoralist households to climatic and economic shocks	At least 90% of beneficiaries (M/F) have reduced the use of negative coping strategies by the end of the project	76.9% of beneficiaries (76.9% among male-headed households and 76.8% among female-headed households) no longer use negative strategies, compared to 42.3% in the baseline year.
	75% of households (M/F) maintained or increased their productive assets at the end of the project	70.2% of households (M/F) are classified as middle to rich class in terms of asset ownership, compared to 62.4% at the start of the project
Specific Objective 1/Effect 1: Improve vulnerable households' access to food and productive assets	At least three meals/day on average are consumed by cash beneficiary households (M/F) during the lean season	Two meals on average are consumed by households and 38.7% of households (including 39.3% female-headed households and 38.4% male-headed households) have access to at least three meals per day
Specific Objective 2/Effect 2: Replenish the agro-sylvo-pastoral production capital of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso	At least 70% of vulnerable households (M/F) have rebuilt their herds at the end of the project	61.1% of beneficiary households say they have rebuilt or maintained their herds
	At least 90 % of beneficiary households (M/F) have increased their agricultural production by 5% at the end of the project	80% increase in cereal production and 45% increase in other crops, compared to the baseline year. 62.4% of households say that production is similar or increasing.
Specific Objective 3/Effect 3: Improve the nutrition situation of vulnerable households in provinces heavily affected by the crisis in Burkina Faso	At least 20% of women of childbearing age have an acceptable dietary diversity score (of 5) at the end of the project	13.8 %
	At least 50 % of beneficiary households (M/F) have an acceptable food consumption score (above 35) at the end of the project	33% of households (36.3% female-headed households and 31.5% male-headed households) have an acceptable food consumption score

Appendix 4. Evaluation matrix

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
Evaluation Question 1 (Relevance) – To what extent is the project relevant to the needs and priorities of the country, FAO, SIDA and the target populations?						
1.1	Is the project relevant and coherent with national strategies and programmes and in what way?	1.1.1 Level of alignment of project objectives and activities with relevant national policies (food security and livelihoods, agriculture, livestock, environment, climate change adaptation, social protection and humanitarian support, etc.) 1.1.2 Level of appropriateness of the actions implemented to the priorities in the intervention sectors	FAO personnel Implementing partners Technical services Project design documents and national strategies	Semi-structured interviews Literature review FGD Surveys Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
1.2	To what extent have stakeholders been consulted and involved in the project (project design through workshops with potential partners, preliminary field survey, setting of major and minor project objectives)?	1.2.1 Level of communities' participation (men, women and youth) in the selection, design and targeting of beneficiaries 1.2.2 Level of local authorities' participation 1.2.3 Level of technical services' participation in the selection, design, planning and targeting of beneficiaries	FAO personnel Implementing partners Technical services Community leaders Municipal authorities Beneficiaries Design and planning documents Activity reports	Semi-structured interviews Literature review FGD Surveys Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
1.3	Were the approach and activities planned and implemented by the project adequate to strengthen the livelihoods, resilience and protection of beneficiaries?	1.3.1 Level of relevance of project objectives and activities to these needs 1.3.2 Level of relevance of modalities (unconditional/conditional cash, distribution of ruminants, fertilizer, seeds, etc.) 1.3.3 Quality of targeting	FAO personnel Implementing partners Technical services Municipal authorities Community	Semi-structured interviews Literature review FGD Surveys Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities

Appendix 4. Evaluation matrix

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
			leaders Beneficiaries Project design documents			
1.4	To what extent does the project contribute to the FAO CPF, the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation, organisational results and SOs of the UN system?	1.4.1 Level of alignment of the project with FAO SOs 1.4.2 Level of alignment with the FAO CPF 1.4.3 Level of alignment with UNDAF and/or the Humanitarian Response Plan 1.4.4 Level of alignment with the SIDA strategy for humanitarian assistance 1.4.5 Level of alignment with the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation	FAO personnel Project design and strategy documents Swedish Embassy FAO Resilience Division	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
1.5	Analysis of the project's impact pathways	1.5.1 What were the impact pathways followed by the project? 1.5.2 Were these impact pathways a smart choice? 1.5.3 Are there other pathways that should be followed before the project stops?	FAO personnel	Literature review Semi-structured interviews	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
1.6	To what extent has the project taken into account, in its design and implementation, the principles of accountability to affected populations, protection and conflict sensitivity, respect for humanitarian principles and the HDP nexus?	1.6.1 Accountability to affected populations and respect for humanitarian principles 1.6.2 In terms of protection and conflict sensitivity: i) What arrangements have been made? ii) What has been implemented? iii) Have security analyses been carried out? iv) If so, have these analyses been used? 1.6.3 HDP nexus (strategy, nature of activities developed, level of resilience of beneficiaries)	FAO personnel Technical services Partner NGOs Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
Evaluation Question 2 (Effectiveness) – Have the intended outcomes on households, communities, institutions and local organisations been achieved and have there been any unintended outcomes (both positive and negative)?						
2.1	To what extent has FAO contributed to improving resilience to climate and economic shocks?	2.1.1 To what extent did FAO implement the planned activities: selection of beneficiaries, level of implementation of planned activities, justification of gaps, quality, strengths and weaknesses 2.1.2 What were the main outcomes achieved, successes and difficulties encountered? - Use of negative coping strategies - Changes in productive assets - Number of meals consumed per day - Reconstitution of herds - Increase in agricultural production - Improved knowledge of healthy and balanced diets -Improved nutrition situation 2.1.3 What were the main negative outcomes of the project?	FAO personnel Technical services Implementing NGO partners Municipal authorities Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
2.2	FAO's added value in the implementation of activities?	2.2.1 FAO's added value in the implementation of activities?	FAO personnel Technical services Implementing NGO partners Municipal authorities Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD Surveys	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
2.3	Has the project been designed on the basis of available resilience, food security and nutrition data and appropriate context analysis?	2.3.1 What is the communities' self-evaluated resilience? 2.3.2 What is the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis	Beneficiaries	Survey on Self-Evaluated Resilience Short RIMA (Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis) protocols	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
2.4	To what extent has the security situation, which has continued to deteriorate since the project implementation, and the health situation related to Covid-19, as well as the measures taken by the Government to slow down the spread of the virus, influenced the project implementation progress?	2.4.1 Did the security situation have an impact on project implementation? 2.4.2 Has Covid-19 (and the measures taken by the Government to slow its spread) had an impact on project implementation? 2.4.3 What are the consequences for the achievement of project objectives?	FAO personnel Technical services Implementing NGO partners Municipal authorities Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
Evaluation Question 3 (Efficiency) – Did FAO's internal operational support functions facilitate project efficiency?						
3.1	Were outcomes achieved in a timely manner and according to the planned schedule?	3.1.1 Implementation delays and reasons for these delays? 3.1.2 Analysis of delays due to SIDA procedures. 3.1.3 Analysis of delays due to FAO internal procedures 3.1.4 Are FAO and SIDA able to adapt their procedures for greater efficiency?	FAO personnel Regional technical services Implementing NGO partners Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD Surveys	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
3.2	How effective is the monitoring and evaluation system?	3.3.1 Existence and functionality of the monitoring and evaluation system (tools, frequency of collection, means and mode of collection, by whom, etc.) 3.2.2 Adaptive management: how are data used to influence decision-making? 3.2.3 Analysis of performance indicators: quality of formulation, relevance, number 3.2.4 Main weaknesses of the system	Monitoring and Evaluation Plan Project document and logical framework Routine and annual monitoring tools Minutes of internal programme meeting Annual project progress reports	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD Surveys	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
3.3	To what extent has the work relation with donor affected project implementation?	3.3.1 Project monitoring by the donor 3.3.2 Donor guidance that has influenced the project (positively or negatively)	FAO personnel Swedish Embassy	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
3.4	Were the cash transfers undertaken, including through the CFW modality, carried out effectively, particularly in terms of the transfer itself, but also in terms of the choice of transfer modality, the implementation of these modalities, and the impact achieved through the productive assets built or rehabilitated?	3.4.1 Were the cash transfers undertaken effective? 3.4.2 How efficient is the choice of the transfer modality? 3.4.3 What is the impact achieved by the constructed or rehabilitated productive assets?	- FAO personnel - Technical services - Implementing NGO partners - Municipal authorities - Beneficiaries - Cash transfer operators	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
Evaluation Question 4 (Partnership) – To what extent have partnerships and cooperative arrangements within the project between sector partners, Humanitarian Country Team, local institutions, implementing partners, FAO and SIDA contributed to the quality, ownership, timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of the interventions?						
4.1	What is the quality of collaboration between FAO and its implementing partners (NGO partners and technical services)?	4.1.1 How FAO selects partners. 4.1.2 Effectiveness of the mechanisms put in place to assess their performance, strengths and weaknesses of the collaboration. 4.1.3 Quality of coordination and monitoring of partners. 4.1.4 Quality, ownership, effectiveness and efficiency of interventions through FAO's collaboration with partners 4.1.5 Contribution and effectiveness of the FAO Regional Office and Resilience Division	FAO personnel Local technical services Implementing NGO partners Lead Technical Officer	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities

Appendix 4. Evaluation matrix

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
4.2	To what extent have the lessons learned from other SIDA-funded projects, the humanitarian component, and other UN agencies allowed for improvements to be incorporated into the project?	4.2.1 To what extent has FAO sought and taken up opportunities for collaboration with other stakeholders to enhance the effectiveness of its activities? 4.2.2 Evidence of shared experiences and learning 4.2.3 Ownership, quality, effectiveness and efficiency of interventions through collaboration 4.2.4 Improvements thanks to learning with others	FAO personnel Humanitarian Country Team Other executing partners Swedish Embassy	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
4.3	Is there coordination with other humanitarian stakeholders to incorporate improvements into the project?	4.3.1 How is coordination with other humanitarian stakeholders (NGOs) carried out, is there evidence of complementarity without overlapping or an overlapping of actions? 4.3.2 Does targeting rely on other partners (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Single National Registry, Social Action?	FAO personnel Humanitarian Country Team	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, restitution workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
Evaluation Question 5 (Cross-cutting dimensions) – Have gender issues been reflected in the project objectives and design to address the needs, priorities and constraints of women and men, and in the identification of beneficiaries?						
5.1	To what extent have gender issues been taken into account in the design, implementation and monitoring of the project?	5.1.1 Measures taken for gender mainstreaming 5.1.2 Existing reference frameworks for gender mainstreaming, resource persons involved or familiar with the issue. 5.1.3 Level of gender mainstreaming	FAO personnel Implementing partners Project design documents	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
5.2	Have gender relations and equality been affected by the project?	5.2.1 Existence of gender-disaggregated statistics of beneficiary groups 5.2.2 Different groups' (M/F) self-	FAO personnel Implementing partners Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder	Affected by: - security and health situation - access

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
		evaluation of the project impact 5.2.3 Effect of the project on gender relations and equality	Technical services		feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	restrictions to communities
5.3	To what extent has climate change been taken into account in project design?	5.3.1 How did the project take climate change into account?	FAO personnel Partner NGOs Beneficiaries Technical services	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
5.4	To what extent have protection needs been taken into account in project design?	5.4.1 How did the project take into account the protection needs of women and men? 5.4.2 Changes in these needs as a result of the project	FAO personnel Partner NGOs Beneficiaries Technical services	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
Evaluation Question 6 (Sustainability and multi-year financing model) – To what extent are the project outcomes sustainable?						
6.1	Has the project developed and implemented an exit strategy?	6.1.1 Exit strategies developed by the project 6.1.2 Sustainability of beneficiary support	FAO personnel Technical services Partner NGOs Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
6.2	To what extent have the populations taken ownership of the project's achievements and lessons learned?	6.2.2 Level of ownership of the achievements and lessons learned by the populations	FAO personnel Technical services Implementing NGO partners Beneficiaries	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
6.3	What factors can favour or compromise the sustainability of outcomes achieved?	6.3.1 Positive factors 6.3.2 Negative factors	FAO personnel Technical services Implementing	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder	Affected by: - security and health situation - access

Appendix 4. Evaluation matrix

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/indicator	Main sources of information	Data collection methods	Data analysis methods	Information quality
			NGO partners Beneficiaries	FGD	feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	restrictions to communities
6.4	Has SIDA's multi-year financing approach contributed to increased sustainability?	<p>6.4.1 Relevance of the multi-year approach to meeting HDP commitments</p> <p>6.4.2 Does the long planning brought on by multi-year projects give partners more time to think strategically?</p> <p>6.4.3 Has multi-year financing been conceived as the sum of individual years or has it capitalised on the multi-year humanitarian aspect?</p> <p>6.4.4 Have there been changes in approach (duration of NGO partner contracts, delays each year in contracting, in the provision of inputs, etc.) in relation to the multi-year issue?</p> <p>6.4.3 To what extent has multi-annual financing facilitated the integration of "humanitarian response" and "structural change"?</p> <p>6.4.4. Did other factors not related to financing modalities contribute, or not, to the sustainability of outcomes?</p>	FAO personnel FAO Resilience Division Swedish Embassy	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities
6.5	Social cohesion and conflicts	<p>6.5.1 What are the outcomes at the level of social cohesion and conflict management over natural resources?</p> <p>6.5.2 Was the project sensitive to potential conflicts?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FAO personnel - Technical services - Implementing NGO partners - Beneficiaries 	Semi-structured interviews Literature review Restitution of preliminary results FGD	Triangulation of Information Validation through: stakeholder feedback, analysis workshop and validation workshop	Affected by: - security and health situation - access restrictions to communities

Appendix 5. Questionnaire on Self-Evaluated Resilience

Capacity	Question	Shocks	Note
Absorption capacity	If any of the following shocks occurred tomorrow, my household would be well prepared in advance:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
	If any of the following shocks occurred tomorrow, my household could fully recover within six months:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Adaptive capacity	If the following shocks were to become more frequent and intense, my household would still find a way to cope:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Transformative capacity	When the following shocks occur, my household can change its main source of income or livelihood if necessary:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Anticipatory capacity	My household is fully prepared to deal with the following future shocks:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Knowledge and information	My household receives in advance frequent warnings of the following future shocks:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Learning capacity	My household has learned important lessons from past challenges, which help us to better prepare for the following future threats:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Financial capital	When the following shocks occur, my household has adequate financial resources and/or in-kind savings to cope them:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Social capital	When coping with the following shocks, my household can rely on the support of family and friends:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	
Political capital	When coping with the following shocks, my household can rely on the support of politicians and the government:	- Climate risks - Conflicts/violence - Phytosanitary/pest risks	

Rating scale for answers:

1: Strongly agree; 2: Agree; 3: Neither agree nor disagree; 4: Disagree; 5: Strongly disagree.

Office of Evaluation
evaluation@fao.org
www.fao.org/evaluation

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Rome, Italy