

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities

Sri Lanka country report

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

TEC

April 2006

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

IMPACT OF THE TSUNAMI RESPONSE ON LOCAL AND NATIONAL CAPACITIES

Sri Lanka Country Report

Arjuna Parakrama
with contributions from
Elisabeth Scheper and Sudarshana Gunawardena

April 2006

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Steering Committee

Khurshid Alam (ActionAid International), Mihir Bhatt (AIDMI), Inge Leuverink (CordAid), S. Nanthikesan (UNDP), Yin-Yin Nwe (UNICEF).

Working Group

Amna Al-Ahmar (IFRC), Rachel Bedouin (FAO), Johan Boersma (Tearfund, NL), Ian Christoplos (independent), James Darcy (ODI), Dayan Wolde (AHA), Zen Delica (UNDP), Belinda Duff (Oxfam GB), Alistair Dutton (CAFOD), Paul Harvey (ODI), Bryan Heal (ICMH), Maurice Herson (independent), Christoph Jacob (SDC), Simon Lawry-White (UNICEF), Wayne MacDonald (UNICEF), Robert Ondrusek (UNICEF), Nicole McGarry (WHO), Carin Norberg (Transparency International), Gill Price (RedR), Hans Van den Hoogen (Oxfam NL), Bert Van de Putte (independent), Inka Stock (Intermon Oxfam), Kristin Teigland (Norad).

ACRONYMS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADPC	Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, Thailand
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CBO	Community-Based Organisations
CMG	Core Management Group of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
CNO	Centre for National Operations
DMI	All India Disaster Mitigation Institute
DSD	Divisional Secretary Division
EAC	Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
GA	Government Agent
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHDI	Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative
GN	Grama Niladhari
GOSL	Government of Sri Lanka
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HR	Human Resources
HRBA	Human Rights Based Approaches
HQ	Head Quarters
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent
ILO	International Labour Office
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KPNDU	*Koralai Pattu* North Development Union
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD DAC	Development Cooperation Directorate, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OI	Oxfam International
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
P-TOMS	Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (Sri Lanka)
RC/HC	Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SITREP	Situation Report
TAFREN	Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (Sri Lanka)
TEC	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TRO	Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAC	UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDGO	UN Development Group Office
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNFPA	UN Fund for Population Activities

UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNIFEM	UN Development Fund for Women
UNV	UN Volunteers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organisation

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

The 26 December 2004 tsunami, triggered by a massive earthquake off the coast of Sumatra, was the worst natural disaster in living memory in Sri Lanka. The challenge of the relief, recovery and reconstruction remained enormous alongside the most impressive show of human kindness and sharing the local people demonstrated in the immediate aftermath. Vulnerable groups, such as poor fishermen living close to the shore in simple houses and shelters, have borne the brunt of the negative impacts. Coastal communities are comparatively poor in the Sri Lankan context (between 25 and 33 per cent of the affected population lived below the poverty line) and the tsunami compounded previously existing vulnerabilities. The northeast is the region worst affected by the tsunami.

Just as the tsunami itself was without precedent, so too was the speed, breadth and magnitude of international support for survivors in Sri Lanka. This abundance, even excess, of resources created a new experience for the international agencies engaged in the tsunami response. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) were able to obtain funds directly from the (first world) general public and, therefore, became less dependent on traditional (bilateral) institutional donors. Here, then, was an unprecedented opportunity to respond to this complex humanitarian emergency, without the usual debilitating resource constraints. For once, INGOs had the luxury of designing and implementing programmes as they wished, which, coupled with the learning from Rwanda and elsewhere, provided an opportunity to demonstrate best practices in the humanitarian sector, thereby silencing critics of the international system. Thus, very early on in the crisis it became clear that the established humanitarian relief system was being tested in the crucible of the Indian Ocean Tsunami.

However, with the increase in resources came an equivalent increase in profile and public visibility. The Western public wanted to know how their money was being spent. The media followed up with detailed stories from affected areas, including assessments on the three-month and six-month anniversaries. Agencies faced pressure to scale up immediately in order to include new sectors, geographical areas and adopt new administrative regimes so as to spend the additional money received. These sectors often transcended the agencies' proven specialisations. The areas included some outside the staff's ability to respond effectively, and the regimes included procedures that further centralised decision-making in the name of speed and efficiency.

This Sri Lankan country study is one of four undertaken by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) Local and National Capacities Evaluation, which in turn is one of six evaluations undertaken by TEC. The purpose of this evaluation is to 'determine the impact of the international tsunami response on local and national capacities for relief and recovery and risk reduction.' The international team consisted of Arjuna Paprkrama and Betty Scheper. This evaluation is based not only on consultations with formal stakeholders in government and aid agencies but also on a survey of more than a thousand claim-holders in affected communities. For further background to the evaluation, see the Regional Report. For a list of the claim-holder survey questions, see Annex 5. The findings of the evaluation were validated by one-day exit stakeholder workshops conducted in Colombo and Habarana on 24 and 25 April 2006. Officials from the government, INGOs, national NGOs and CBOs participated and provided valuable feedback.

The Capacities Evaluation in Sri Lanka seeks to assess how the spectrum of international actors and their national partners fared in delivering goods and services, in enhancing the access of affected populations to the relief and recovery process, and in holding themselves accountable to claim-holders. All this is mediated through the lens of local and national capacities. Capacities to deliver, provide, address, absorb and articulate are well known, but capacities to recognise and nurture are less well understood, and still less those capacities which serve to resist elite capture at all levels and among all stakeholders.

Capacities are not sets of abstract or context-independent aptitudes and skills that are reducible to technical criteria, but, rather, can be seen to be played out within a complex political economy that is mediated by unequal power relations. In summary, local capacities cannot be understood as neutral in relation to context or culture, and require a safe environment for their articulation.

Findings

Overall results of the claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka show declining satisfaction with the tsunami response (Figure E.1).

Figure E.1: Assessment of Tsunami Response Performance during First Week, Three Months, Eight months and Overall Rating



Q1 How well were your needs provided in the first week after the tsunami?
Q2 How well were your needs provided in the first three months after the tsunami?
Q3 How well were your needs provided in the next five months after that?
Q16 In general, how do you rate the international assistance to the tsunami?

This Capacities Evaluation assesses the impact of the international tsunami response and relates its findings to several different actors.

International agencies

- Fund-raising appeals led to unprecedented donations for tsunami aid, but put high pressure on delivery and capacity to scale up capacity;
- Serious contradictions exist between the normal programming of aid agencies and their tsunami response in terms of planning processes, community participation, gender-sensitivity and targeting of marginal groups;

- Pressure to spend has favoured capital-intensive programmes to the potential detriment of more sustainable livelihood initiatives and partnership opportunities with local organisations;
- Aid has not been distributed according to need: for example, more assistance for fisheries sector over others; within the fishing sector, concentration on boats not nets, boat-owners not wage labourers; support unevenly divided between districts;
- Inappropriate recruitment procedures with a focus on technical skills rather than contextual knowledge;
- Problems in the transition from relief to recovery with insufficient attention to development issues; and
- Tensions between imperatives to nurture participation in decision-making (including abiding by decisions taken by national and local stakeholders) and international standards (including those on building on local capacity, non-discrimination and gender sensitivity) constrain the effectiveness of international agencies.

National government

- Personal commitment was shown by local officials, but they were disempowered at the central level;
- National government had insufficient capacity, understanding and human resources to deal with multi-agency response;
- Differences in resource allocation and policy implementation raised questions about government bona fides, particularly in conflict-sensitive areas;
- Confusion and lack of transparency over key policy issues, such as the coastal buffer zone, have debilitated both the relief and recovery phases; and
- Major communication and information-sharing problems occurred between government agencies and with the international community.

Local government

- Roles of national, provincial and district government in capacity building need streamlining and joint planning to make these efforts more sustainable;
- Innovative and people-sensitive local officials need to be supported by the system, not penalised or placed at risk, particularly in conflict areas;

- District government needs more structural capacity building support to absorb new staff, fill positions and face new challenges;
- The lack of accurate data make planning, coordination and monitoring extremely difficult, while existing data are insufficiently used;
- Separation between tsunami, conflict recovery and development funds and their different timeframes, prevent strategic and holistic reconstruction programming;
- A comprehensive plan and funding is needed to resolve the land acquisition issues that have been slowing down the shelter programmes for the displaced; and
- Awareness and planning for disaster risk preparedness programming in tsunami reconstruction is minimal at all levels.

Community leadership and community based organisations (CBOs)

- Empowered and articulate CBOs and their leaders are not treated with due respect by some national and international agencies;
- There was a lack of information sharing and basic consultation processes in community programmes implemented by international agencies, disempowering local leaders;
- The continuation of Cash-for-Work programmes beyond the initial emergency phase requires systematic analysis to determine its impact on the local economy and the possibility of corruption;
- Changing conflict and political dynamics force changes in governance approach, from control to participation and accountability and vice versa;
- Faced by new obligations and responsibilities such as multiple land disputes, planning decisions and the peace process, local leaders will need to interact more with international agencies in the tsunami recovery process;
- There has been inadequate targeting of marginal groups within communities;
- The tsunami response has tended to exacerbate regional disparities and perceptions of grievance among ethnic groups;
- Discrepancies in the treatment of conflict-affected and tsunami-affected communities has resulted in lost opportunity;
- International agencies could have used this opportunity to build or strengthen civil society, especially in the field of participatory community development and grassroots mobilisation;
- There is a need to build accountable partnership relations, instead of subcontracting;

- CBOs that specialised in advocacy and peace building, working in conflict zones mostly, are drawn into community based recovery programmes, outside their expertise and experience, without adequate support and capacity enhancement;
- There is a huge unmet need for capacity building and institutional development with civil society organisations due to vast increases in staff, change in structure and approach and expansion to new areas; and
- Three-month funding time-frames, monthly reporting, different formats per agency and slow procedures are too cumbersome and hamper institutional development.

Claim-holders

- Unintended bias exists toward richer people, while there is insufficient inclusion of the most vulnerable, such as the landless, renters and self-employed affected by tsunami;
- The TEC survey identified significant dissatisfaction among claim-holders toward their community leaders, with 28 per cent unhappy with their performance and only 6 per cent happy with it. Reasons for this were found among the qualitative responses and included failure to distribute assistance equally, unfair cash distribution, collection of wrong information, and not recognising people with different opinions;
- Equity and asset creation principles have been inadequately articulated and remain exceptions even among agencies that implement them elsewhere, thereby marginalising the poorest;
- Women have suffered most from both conflict and tsunami: livelihood programmes should prioritise most vulnerable war and tsunami widows, and actively engage them in the information loop;
- Conflict-affected and already marginalised districts are suffering from neglect in the tsunami response; and
- Lack of participatory policy affects communities adversely and leads to slow overall progress of shelter and livelihood rehabilitation.

Other issues

Human resources

- General: Immediate efficiency and delivery was privileged over sustainability and longer-term capacity building;

- International agencies: high staff turn-over, inappropriate job profiling, loss of institutional memory, marked disparity in remuneration, 'poaching', conspicuous isolationism through security-related frameworks;
- National/provincial level: disparities among national and local staff leading to resentment; and
- Local level: insensitivities to local traditions and culture.

Unintended bias toward 'richer' population

- Planning phase: speed and size of programming reduces room for participation of marginalised. At best, procedures have replaced real participatory processes;
- Implementation phase: lacks flexibility to nuance projects to the needs of most vulnerable groups (squatters, tenants, self-employed) and improve the group's capacity to access services; and
- Monitoring and evaluation: most vulnerable and marginalised groups are not well monitored.

The need for more equal distribution of aid emerges strongly in the claim-holder survey (Figure E.2).

Figure E.2: What Aspects of the International and National Tsunami Response Would You Like to See Changed?



Conclusions

In general, there has been inadequate recognition of extensive and diverse local and national capacities existing at both institutional and individual levels. The international response has not been able to facilitate nascent local capacities in a serious and sustainable manner, nor national capacities beyond providing de-contextualised technical support to engage with these issues, thereby not merely losing an opportunity to link this humanitarian intervention with longer-term structural concerns, but also, in some cases, unintentionally exacerbating inequalities and tensions.

In Sri Lanka, the constant refrain of INGOs and donor agencies was that humanitarian response and sectoral capacity as well as post-disaster experience was woefully lacking in-country, necessitating the ad hoc hiring of international staff on short-term contracts to perform immediate tasks. Yet, the time taken by these recruits to become familiar with the complex and dynamic local contexts, as well as the costly mistakes precipitated by such ignorance, was not accounted for, nor was the perfectly reasonable alternative of hiring local staff with appropriate contextual knowledge and then training them in the relevant sectors used. Moreover, there is very strong and persistent evidence across the board on the question of 'poaching' within the United Nations (UN) system, across INGOs, and between INGOs and CBOs.

International agencies have gone far beyond their core mandate and competencies. This has been a major obstacle to sustained engagement with local and national capacities. The problem was worsened by an overestimation of international capacity to deliver, coupled with an underestimation of delivery costs. Delays in permanent housing and livelihood support have compounded this problem, even creating serious three-way tension among claim-holders, government and donor agencies.

Considered collectively, the international tsunami response has not demonstrated the capacity to address fundamental issues of equity and inclusion within and across sectors and geographical areas, to utilise gender and conflict-sensitive approaches, to integrate poverty and marginalisation concerns, and, most importantly, to set in place transparent mechanisms and modalities of accountability to claim-holders.

The majority of programmes have no specific targeting mechanism and seek to mainstream a uniform response, which may in practice only serve to exclude the most vulnerable and marginalised who are less able to access common services or have special needs and constraints. While a handful of good initiatives have emerged, in general the tsunami response framework in Sri Lanka serves the 'lowest common denominator' in the recovery phase, by privileging house-owners and boat-owners. In general, the

vulnerable position of women has been acknowledged, but gender-sensitive programming has been inadequate. Often women are the majority of participants, but their decision-making role remains unclear. Gender-based violence is a serious concern throughout the region. The majority of programmes have adopted a 'gender neutral' or 'gender blind' policy, whereas what is required is specific targeting or affirmative action.

The Claim-Holder Survey indicates that systems of sharing accurate information in a timely and user-friendly manner have not improved in the second and third phases of the tsunami response, when they are even more urgently needed since long-term choices are at stake. Downward accountability and transparency has been almost entirely lacking. International agencies need to ensure accountability through basic practical mechanisms. No significant change has taken place relating to either accountability or transparency in the recovery and rehabilitation phases. The essential conditions for the empowerment of claim-holders include comprehensive information sharing and setting up appropriate contextually sensitive communication strategies. These need to be addressed through the engagement with and enhancement of local and national capacities to ensure that no unnecessary risks and challenges are imposed on local communities.

Recommendations

1) Involve claim-holders in the design, planning, implementation, monitoring and assessment of rehabilitation initiatives in general, but especially in the permanent housing and livelihoods programmes;

2) Establish guidelines or a code of conduct that would govern the procedures for recruitment and working conditions of INGO staff, both local and international, which would include modalities to be adopted regarding employing staff of other agencies and government;

3) Adopt the principle of a 'right to information' and provide, proactively, accurate, timely and user-friendly (for example, translated into the appropriate local language and presented simply and clearly) information on a regular basis to all claim-holders to enable them to make informed decisions;

4) Ensure transparent and mutually accountable partnerships between donors and local organisations through sharing of budgets (including salaries and overhead costs) and reports;

5) Address poverty–equity and conflict–exclusion issues through providing livelihood and housing options to the poorest and conflict-affected people, even if they are not directly affected by the tsunami;

6) Address issues of intra- and inter-district equality through better coordination and greater flexibility of programmes;

7) Identify (through participatory processes) the context- and phase-specific needs and rights of vulnerable and marginal groups, including women, the aged and children, and address these needs and rights as matters of the highest priority;

8) Facilitate advocacy around issues and concerns of claim-holders, and ensure that their voice is heard at the sub-national and national levels in order to influence policy formulation;

9) Adopt a rights-based approach in the humanitarian sector, and develop an agreed upon code of conduct and guiding principles that incorporate existing codes and standards; and

10) Jointly support independent watchdog movements and mechanisms of redressing grievances, and provide them with complete access to information.

INTRODUCTION

The Tsunami Disaster

Just as the tsunami disaster was without precedent, so too was the speed, breadth and magnitude of international support for survivors in Sri Lanka. This abundance, even excess, of resources created a new experience for the international agencies engaged in the tsunami response. INGOs were able to obtain funds directly from their donor public and therefore became less dependent on institutional donors. Here then was an unprecedented opportunity to respond to this complex humanitarian emergency, without the usual debilitating resource constraints. For once, INGOs had the luxury of designing and implementing programmes as they wished. Coupled with the learning from Rwanda and elsewhere, this provided an opportunity to demonstrate best practices in the humanitarian sector. Thus, very early on in the crisis it became clear that the established humanitarian relief system was being tested in the crucible of the Indian Ocean Tsunami.[1]

However, with the increase in resources came an equivalent increase in profile and public visibility. The donor public wanted to know how their money was being spent. The mass-media that launched the appeal followed this up with detailed stories from affected areas, including assessments at the three-month and six-month anniversaries. Even international agencies with a long and distinguished history of work in Sri Lanka had new imperatives to scale up immediately in order to include new sectors, geographical areas and adopt new administrative regimes so as to spend the additional money received. These sectors often transcended the agencies' proven specialisations; the areas included some outside the staff's ability to respond effectively, and the regimes included procedures that further centralised decision-making in the name of speed and efficiency.

Box I.1: Impact of the Tsunami in Sri Lanka: Some Key Figures

Human
- Number of people killed by the tsunami: 35,322[2]
- Number of people injured by the tsunami: 21,441
- Number of Internally Displaced People: 516,150 (approximately 1,000,000 initially displaced)

Economic
- About US $900m worth of assets were destroyed
- 200,000 lost their livelihood (including 75 per cent of total fishing fleet)
- 75 per cent of the total fishing fleet was destroyed, leading to a dramatic slump in the sector to 70 per cent in the first quarter and 50 per cent in the second quarter (year on year)
- 23,449 acres of cultivated agricultural land was salinated
- 53 out of 242 registered large hotels, 248 small hotels/guesthouses and 210 small tourism-related enterprises were damaged; tourism earnings in the first 8 months fell by 10 per cent
- 88,544 houses destroyed
- But: GDP growth for 2005 not significantly affected and is projected to be between 5.2 per cent and 5.4 per cent
- 25–33 per cent of tsunami-affected population lived beneath the national poverty line

Social
- 40,000 widows, orphans, elderly, and disabled individuals were left in need of long-term or permanent income support
- 97 health facilities damaged by the tsunami
- A total of 182 schools, 4 universities and 15 vocational training centers were damaged, affecting 200,000 students
- 446 schools used as camps for Internally Displaced People s in immediate aftermath of tsunami

Funding the Tsunami Response
- Estimated total cost of emergency relief to long-term recovery is US $2.1bn, comprising east (45 per cent), south (26 per cent), north (19 per cent) and west (10 per cent)
- Estimated cost of relief disbursements is US $408m
- Domestic contribution to relief and recovery is US $150m
- 53,221 transitional shelters completed, 2,138 being constructed as of 30 October 30 2005
- Number of INGOs registered for tsunami relief work in Sri Lanka was 150 on 31 October and 350 on 31 January 2005
- Amount of money collected by international agencies for tsunami-related work in Sri Lanka is US $955m. This is comprised of NGO $600m, UN $105m, IFRC $250m, but excludes bilateral donor $525m

Sources: Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation, Central Bank, MOF-National Planning Department and Sectoral reports (Volume II) and information provided in 'Tsunami: Building Back Better Sri Lanka Achievements, Challenges and Way Forwar'd. Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, Humanitarian Information Centre, Development Assistance Database and World Bank data have also been included.

A large proportion of the homes destroyed by the tsunami were 'illegitimate' structures on the beachfront, belonging to fishing people in the rural areas and the urban underclass in the outskirts of Colombo.[4] Juxtaposed with this destruction of temporary, makeshift structures was the damage to tourist hotels along

the beach. About 25 per cent of the 242 registered hotels in the country were affected.[5] Since the tourist sector is better organised and is more articulate, the large and medium scale hotels have already obtained around US $150m in insurance claims, and even the buffer zone regulations have not affected the sector adversely. Furthermore, a disproportionate number of the victims of the tsunami were poor, with nearly a third being below the national poverty line. While in general the claim has been that there was 'too much money' for the response, sectoral and geographical disparities and gaps still need to be filled.

Defining Local and National Capacity

This TEC Capacities evaluation of the international tsunami response in Sri Lanka seeks to assess how international actors and their national partners fared in: delivering goods and services, enhancing the access of affected populations to the relief and recovery process, and in holding themselves accountable to claim-holders. All this is viewed through the lens of local and national capacities. Capacities to deliver, provide, address, absorb and articulate are well known, but capacities to recognise and nurture are less well understood.

A more comprehensive description of the nature and scope of capacities can be found in the Regional Report but this can be summarised as follows (in the words of the evaluation inception report):

> 'Capacities' will be taken to encompass the interconnected set of aptitudes, skills and abilities to access immediate and mid-term services and programmes, to influence, shape and set policies and longer-term recovery/reconstruction agendas, as well as to open and utilise the space to hold duty-bearers at all levels accountable, and will include the continuing processes through which these outcomes are achieved ... Capacities, therefore, are not sets of abstract or context-independent aptitudes and skills that are reducible to technical criteria, but, rather, can be seen to be played out within a complex political economy that is mediated by unequal power relations.[6]

Purpose, Objectives and Scope of Study

This Sri Lankan country study is one of four undertaken by the TEC Local and National Capacities Evaluation: Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The Terms of Reference state that 'the *purpose* of the evaluation is to determine the impact of the international tsunami response on local and national capacities for relief and recovery, and risk reduction.' It is envisaged that the evaluation will both provide

lessons that serve to strengthen ongoing activities and future responses, as well as hold international actors accountable to individual, institutional and country donors.

The following six *objectives* are identified in the Terms of Reference:

1) To assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response;
2) To assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance;
3) To assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result of the tsunami response by international actors;
4) To assess the extent to which transition/risk reduction/recovery programming, planned and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities;
5) To distill lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future crisis response and recovery; and
6) Ensure that all the above assess and highlight gender differences and the varied experiences of women and men.

The Terms of Reference state that the assessment will consider the response in three phases- immediate emergency, early recovery phase and the phase of initiating the transition from recovery to development. It is understood that the transition between these phases is blurred across sectors, locations and contexts, sometimes occurring in parallel and lasting for different lengths of time. The evaluation will consider capacities at all levels of society, from individuals through communities and civil society groups to local and national government.

Approach and Methodology

The assessment team adopted the following methodological principles:

- The evaluation team itself should demonstrate good practice vis-a-vis capacity development at the national and sub-national levels, including through participation in the evaluation process as well through training;
- The evaluation seeks to include a claim-holder survey, focus group discussions, key informant and snowball interviews, local and headquarters workshops, individual and group discussions, case studies and significant change narratives etc;

- At the end of each stage of the evaluation, an informal debriefing will be conducted, open to all those who contributed or participated;
- The evaluation will take special care not to be extractive or exploitative of local communities and others;
- The evaluation will use resources such as steering committee member organisations or their partners on the ground in accessing affected communities and facilitating an open dialogue at the various stakeholder levels and sectors;
- The evaluation will distinguish between different levels of actors;
- The evaluation will design questionnaires and discussions in a professional way;
- Throughout its work, the team will address gender and conflict sensitivity;
- The evaluation will institute internal checks and balances; and
- If possible, the evaluation will be translated into local languages.

To this end, a summary of the near-final draft of this report was translated into Tamil and Sinhalese; and the findings of the evaluation were validated by one-day exit stakeholder workshops conducted in Colombo and Habarana on 24 and 25 April 2006. Officials from the government, INGOs, national NGOs and CBOs participated and provided valuable feedback.

Claim-Holder Survey

For Indonesia and Sri Lanka, a survey was designed using a questionnaire in the relevant local languages to elicit both quantitative and qualitative feedback from a random sample of the affected population in the worst-hit districts. The selection of experienced and trained facilitators/interviewers who belong to the respective demographic strata and locations selected for in-depth analysis is crucial to this study. The survey was designed to elicit key responses on capacity changes in relation to the international tsunami response. The survey itself was implemented in a manner that enhanced local capacity through the three processes:

1) Administering the questionnaire through local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and CBOs;
2) Training of fieldworkers in each selected area; and
3) Reinforcing the training during the team field visits and providing regular feedback to fieldworkers.

This survey was loosely modelled on the work done by the Disaster Mitigation Institute, and particularly on a modification of the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake Survey.[7] The duration of this survey was one month in each district, and with two exceptions this part of the work as completed by the end of November 2005. The survey process was hampered by the illness of the evaluation team leader, which has resulted in delays in completing the survey in Jaffna district. At the time of revising this evaluation, a total of 1,055 questionnaires had been completed and tabulated from three districts in the North East Province (Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Amparai) and three districts in the Southern Province (Galle, Matara and Hambantota). The analysis of responses in complete, with the exception of the questionnaires from Jaffna district which had not been received in time for inclusion. For a list of the claim-holder survey questions, see Annex 5.

Table I.1: Numbers of Claim-holders and Areas of Claim-Holders Surveyed

Districts	Number of Qualitative and Quantitative Interviews	Location Level and Details of Interviewees
Batticaloa	263[8]	Sub-District and Sub-Village claim-holders of different categories, including multiply marginalised (including women, children, the aged), and most vulnerable sub-groups
Jaffna	50	
Amparai	206	
Trincomalee	194	
Matara	142	
Galle	126	
Hambantota	172	
Total	2,155[9]	

Of the survey responses, 1,055 have been used in the general tabulation and analysis.

Interviews and Focus

The team interviewed key representatives of government, INGOs, NGOs, UN agencies, bilateral donors, international financial institutions, research organisations, academics and independent practitioners. It also participated in sector working group meetings, and jointly conducted an information-sharing workshop in Colombo (the full list of persons interviewed is attached in Annex 1). Based on feedback received from these conversations and a preliminary desk review, a schedule of visits was made to the

districts of Galle, Matara and Hambantota in the south, Ampara and Batticaloa in the east, and Mullaitivu, Klinochchi and Jaffna in the north. This covered all the worst-affected districts with the exception of Trincomalee, where the security situation at the time precluded travel. A special Impact Assessment was conducted in Vaharai division in the Batticaloa District. Table 1.2 summarises the interviews and discussions conducted during the country visit, which spanned a period of nearly two months, broken down in terms of the stakeholder tiers or levels identified below:

Table I.2: Interviews and Discussions

Level	International (including INGO expatriate staff based within Sri Lanka)	National	District (including INGO staff based in districts)	Village	Sub-Village
Persons met and/or interviewed (including at joint meetings)	75	45	60	60 (some overlap with next column)	75 (some overlap with previous column)

The evaluation identified five levels or tiers within which multiple stakeholders operated in the post-tsunami context. These levels are:

1) International;
2) National;
3) Sub-National (Provincial or District);
4) Sub-District (Village or Community); and
5) Sub-Village (including vulnerable and marginalised groups).

At each of these levels or tiers a range of stakeholders or actors take on diverse roles and responsibilities. A list of key actors is provided below, many of whom work at each of the five levels, albeit in different ways:

- Government actors at National, Sub-National and Sub-District levels;
- International agencies, including INGOs, donors, the UN and Red Cross system;
- National civil society organisations, including humanitarian and development NGOs;
- The corporate or private sector, operating at national and district levels;
- Political parties and their affiliates, at national, district and village levels;
- The unorganised 'general public' (particularly active during emergency phase);
- More localised civil society organisations, including district NGOs;
- Village-level community organisations, such as CBOs;
- Traditional leaders, local elites; and
- Marginalised and vulnerable groups.

On the basis of preliminary discussions, the following areas were singled out as being of special interest, though not all were treated with equal rigor due to the constraints outlined above:

- International and national NGO capacity to advocate effectively for claim-holder friendly policy change, information-sharing and downward accountability;
- Capacity of the general public, including those from affected communities, to save lives and provide emergency relief in the earliest phase;
- International and national NGO capacity to work with district government to ensure that service delivery is transparent and accountable at the sub-national level;
- NGOs institutional capacity to support both sub-national and sub-district interventions in sustainable and cost-effective ways;
- International agencies' capacity to maximise local capacities at the sub-national and sub-district levels;
- The relative capacities that affect the quality of engagement of NGOs, CBOs and others to reach the most vulnerable and marginal excluded groups at the sub-community level; and
- The capacity of vulnerable and marginal groups including women to minimise elite capture and access resources at the sub-district, village and sub-village levels.

Special attention was given to the following sectors:

- Shelter including initial camps, temporary shelters and permanent housing;
- Livelihoods focusing on the fisheries sector; and
- Psychosocial trauma mitigation.

Special attention was also given to the following *cross-cutting themes*:

- Land ownership, displacement and resettlement;
- Marginalised and vulnerable groups, including the sick and elderly;
- Strengthening local community structures and downward accountability; and
- Natural disaster risk reduction.

Constraints and Challenges

The major weakness of the TEC process is that it is unabashedly top-down and first-world-centric in its conceptualisation and design. The fact that key stakeholders in the tsunami-affected countries were not consulted until the process was well underway is telling, even ironic, in a context where, *inter alia*, the evaluations seek to assess the quality of participation and extent of downward accountability of the international response in these countries. It is important that just as the *international response* to the tsunami needs to be measured in terms of its sensitivity and accountability to affected populations, *the international response to this international response* should be measured in the same way. From the point of view of the Capacities Evaluation, this benevolent yet top-down approach has led inevitably to a lack of ownership and even understanding of the vision/objectives in-country.

It is important to note that the overall rationale for such an evaluatory study, particularly in terms of its accountability function, was quickly understood and taken on board by affected communities as a matter of common sense[10] but less readily by humanitarian agencies and their staff. Many of the latter were much more comfortable with the learning component of this exercise, but tended to think of 'accountability' as either an internal matter or one that was somehow subordinate to the work on the ground. Added to this was the fact that the culture of evaluation in Sri Lanka has not empowered institutions, organisations or individuals to consider constructive self-criticism as the *sine qua non* of healthy and effective programmes. The general outcome of all this was a vague sense of unease, even a feeling of being threatened, at a number of levels, which the Evaluation did not have the time to redress in any great depth.

The three-month timeframe of the study of four countries would inevitably be an obstacle to a careful and sustained assessment of the international tsunami response, but it was most debilitating for the Capacities Evaluation because it minimised claim-holder engagement in design and planning. Due to unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the evaluation team, the Sri Lankan country visit was extended to six weeks, with mid-term disruptions, but even this additional time proved inadequate.

Contextual constraints such as the run-up to the presidential election had direct repercussions on the administration of this evaluation. The November pre-monsoon rains caused flooding in some of the tsunami-affected areas and there were serious security concerns in the conflict-affected north and east. UN security restrictions and resource constraints curtailed our flexibility. In the future, it may be best for similar studies to be set up with a more independent administrative structure, with dedicated logistical and planning support that will enable a clear division of labour in-country and permit the consultants to focus on substantive issues. Optimally, there should also be a gestation period after the selection of the evaluation team and before commencement of the study proper, which would serve as planning and thinking time.

CHAPTER ONE: CONTEXT

1.1. Pre-Disaster Context and Capacities

Sri Lanka has suffered two decades of violent conflict, costing over 70,000 lives and causing the internal displacement of up to 900,000 people. It is also vulnerable to natural disasters, the major risks being floods, mudslides, cyclones and droughts. Sri Lanka has been identified as possessing a significant capacity for disaster mitigation, mainly developed in the context of two decades of conflict, but it has never been tested on the scale and geographical dispersion of the tsunami.

This pre-tsunami capacity included national governmental structures such as the National Disaster Management Centre at the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Social Welfare, Human Disaster Management Council under the Presidential Secretariat with a coordination mandate for war and conflict, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, Ministry of Health, Planning Unit within the Ministry of Finance, and the Commissioner General of Essential Services. Yet none of these agencies had comprehensive disaster management plans, nor (with the possible exception of the first two) were they staffed with any specialists in the field.

There is also a well-entrenched nationwide local administration involving Provincial Councils, but centered especially on the District Secretary (formerly the Government Agent), the Divisional Secretariats (with Divisional Secretaries or Assistant Government Agents heading this sub-district level) and Grama Niladhari (GN) Divisions (grouping several villages), with the GN as the lowest level government representative. Many national and provincial line ministries have branches at the district and even sub-district levels.

UN agencies have been involved in conflict-related relief work in Sri Lanka for many years, with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and World Food Programme as key players. There are also a number of international organisations that for years have been working in Sri Lanka, particularly although not exclusively in the context of the conflict. There has been experience with coordination mechanisms (although of variable effectiveness), within government, within the UN, among NGOs and between these three major organisational sectors. Over the years there have been repeated attempts to develop project databases, to match aid to needs and avoid duplication. Yet, this mixed history of coordination and working together has been driven by centralised, even narrowly politicised imperatives and structures, one measure of

which is that there has been no continuity across different administrative regimes, nor any district-level buy-in.

In addition, there are well over 200 long-standing local and national Sri Lankan non-governmental and civil society organisations,[11] some with a charitable and welfare orientation, others more focused on stronger structural support. There are also a handful of Sri Lankan institutes with significant experience in research and policy analysis, mainly related to the ethnic conflict, which remain primarily Colombo-based in structure and orientation. A large variety of Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and other civil society organisations exist but remain under-resourced and disempowered. Thus, the 26 December catastrophe provided an opportunity to test whether the expertise and lessons identified through the conflict could be transferred to natural disasters of such magnitude.

In the 'uncleared areas', controlled by the LTTE, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) has many years of experience in the context of war and economic blockade. The LTTE itself has established a Planning and Development Secretariat that coordinates all civilian activities in the areas under its control. It is important to note, however, that the state administrative structure comprising District Secretaries, Divisional Secretaries and GNs, still functions in the four districts under LTTE control.

1.2. Immediate Post-Tsunami Response

From the first day, local communities assisted in the rescue and relief operation. From day two onwards, relief supplies and services were provided from all across the country. This private philanthropy took the form of individual, small community group and business initiatives, which ranged from the delivery of food and Non-Food Relief Items (NFRIs) to staffing ad hoc medical clinics or constructing toilets. This assistance cut across religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, geographical and political boundaries. Within the affected communities people helped each other in innumerable ways. The initial public response was unprecedented in a context of mutual distrust and sectarianism, combined with the brutalisation of two decades of near civil war.[12]

No reliable data on this spontaneous public response is available, but widespread anecdotal accounts have already become part of the folk history of the tsunami in Sri Lanka. Without exception, all the persons interviewed either had a personal anecdote to recount or had a tsunami story from someone who had. The affected communities too acknowledged the support they had received first from neighbouring villages and then from other parts of the country. This public 'participatory philanthropy' continued at least for the first two weeks. One reason that this non-institutional capacity did not extend beyond this period was the

fact that there was no mechanism or modality by which this resource could be sustained. For instance, UN staff reported that they received perhaps a hundred telephone calls from potential volunteers with specific urgently-needed skills (engineers, doctors, teachers, contractors) and resources (vehicles, NFRIs, construction materials), but there was no one to record them and coordinate their offers with the needs of affected communities.

Though this telephone voluntarism was predominantly an urban phenomenon and included significant numbers of Sri Lankans living and working abroad, it was more than matched by the hands-on engagement of rural community organisations. Among the more organised interventions were those initiated by welfare societies of government departments and private firms, social service clubs such as the Rotary, Lions and Jaycees, religious organisations of all denominations, non-profit organisations including those specially concerned with women's and children's issues, professional associations across the spectrum, trade unions and political parties.

The response at the earliest stage had both strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, it was near-immediate and unimpeded by bureaucratic red-tape and it reached those directly affected. However, because the selection criteria were often arbitrary, ideological or media-driven, the public response tended to over-service the south and relatively neglect the northeast. There were allegations of religious, linguistic and ethnic biases. As these were predominantly one-off interventions which were not followed up, local elites were able to obtain greater assistance than others. No mechanisms of accountability or record-keeping were in place, and hence, the potential for corruption and misuse was high. Coordination was poor to non-existent, leading to duplication, waste and, in a few cases, stark inequities even within the same general area.

Most experts interviewed by the evaluation team were of the view that this voluntary public support was not sustainable. One expatriate head of an INGO said that- 'The powerful sense of a broad common humanity that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami was a kind of aberration in the violent Sri Lankan context, which soon gave way to the 'sanity' of narrowly divisive ethnic and religious identities.' While most of this public relief took place outside the conflict areas, some Colombo-based assessments tended to romanticise the response in the Jaffna, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts, while at the same time pointing out the fact that the government response had been inadequate. In one such comment:

> The LTTE responded to the emergency with military precision, mobilizing cadres to support its humanitarian wing, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, but the response of the government was inefficient and delayed. ... In the western and southern provinces where the state should have responded directly and immediately to the needs of the affected people, the state machinery took in most instances five to seven days to reach stricken communities. Local officials, when interviewed, revealed that they were extremely reluctant to take any initiative on their own, because of fear of making mistakes that would bring rebuke from central government.[13]

International agencies that had been working in Sri Lanka before 16 December 26 2004, were quickly able to adjust existing programmes to accommodate the urgent needs generated by the humanitarian crisis. The majority of newcomer agencies arrived from one week to one month after the disaster. The common feature between these two groups was the reliance on expatriates brought in to manage and shape their respective interventions. The economic and social outcomes of this process were further exacerbated by a combination of ignorance and arrogance, particularly at the district level.

At least six major needs assessments were conducted, the first within days of the tsunami. These assessments ranged from purely single-sector single-agency initiatives with a geographically restricted focus to multi-sectoral national studies involving government, donors, local and INGOs. While they did identify and prioritise engagement with local capacities,[14] there was no serious attempt to consult or include community-level controls, or to share the outcomes of these assessments.

Table 1.1 points to the complete lack of disaster preparedness plans and the absence of risk reduction strategies in the pre-tsunami context in Sri Lanka, despite the fact that floods and droughts are a regular phenomenon in the country, and cyclones have ravaged the eastern coast in the recent past:

Table 1.1: Tsunami Baseline and Immediate Response Capacity Assessment

Ground Reality	National	Sub-National (District)	Sub-District (Village)	Sub-Community
Prolonged state of war and protracted violence in North-East Province	Central Government 'control' tenuous in some areas, minimal in others. Military logic prevails – inimical to capacity development	Local Government officers face tremendous pressure from multiple sources. Initiative and innovation often carries risks.	Communities traumatised, disempowered by conflict. Capacities remain hidden as a survival strategy; some conflict-internally displaced persons also tsunami-affected	In general conflict constraints obtain, but there is also the loosening of hegemony which allows some space for autonomy
Unequally resourced and differentially empowered areas, resulting in different capacity demands and levels	Limited and limiting jurisdictions of governmnet officials not conducive to sharing of resources and capacities, even among adjacent administrative areas	Southern districts more empowered, with higher capacity to influence policy and demand redress vis-a-vis north and east	More articulate and powerful groups were able to access greater resources, both from private and public sources. At one level 'capacity is an outcome of opportunity	The 'capacity' to survive in catastrophic contexts requires 'invisibility' and even minimal engagement in 'village life', hence isolation from the mainstream
Spontaneous public support during first two weeks, which cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious divides	Not institutionalised, and therefore unable tap into this capacity	Some attempts to coordinate and facilitate this phenomenon, but with mixed success	Local elites captured the greatest benefits, often hijacking it away from the common interest	In general they were unable to access the assistance and goodwill due to remoteness, elite capture, trauma, etc.
Local NGOs/ CSOs and individuals undertook crucial immediate emergency work at the community level	National NGOs and Government less able to reach inaccessible worst-affected areas; also a question of low priority and weak political will for them	Some local NGOs incapacitated by tsunami itself, but others came together in initial phase	Mixed results (as seen in Claim-Holder Survey), but best outcomes seen when local CSOs were effectively involved	In early relief phase these groups appeared even more marginalised than before. Some improvement when local CSOs persisted
International agencies with a prior presence in area were best able to respond quickly and efficiently to the disaster	Mutual Familiarity between Government and Agencies, including MoUs etc., facilitated quick and relatively efficient working relationship	Incomprehension, even panic at local level. No disaster preparedness planning. Compounded by fact that many officials were also victims	The best results were seen when real partnerships were made between NGOs (local or international) and affected communities	In general, international agencies do not have the 'capacity' to access the weakest, poorest and most vulnerable, and this is exacerbated during a disaster of this magnitude
Absence of early warning system, and complete lack of awareness of appropriate immediate response to tsunami	General lack of preparedness and ignorance of nature and effect of tsunami. Therefore, no guidance could be provided to affected areas and confusion prevailed	Some delays in getting organised, and panic that stemmed from ignorance, but also evidence of courage and heroism	Early rescue and provision of food etc was provided from within affected communities and from neighbours, well before outsiders arrived	No evidence in Sri Lanka that indigenous knowledge helped mitigate the carnage and loss of life

CHAPTER TWO: FINDINGS

2.1. International Engagement with Local Capacity

Figure 2.1 indicates overall levels of satisfaction with external interventions.

Figure 2.1: Appropriateness of Regulations, Longer-Term Impact of Tsunami and Suitability of Tsunami Response at village level



Q 8: How appropriate were the rules/decisions that affected you after the tsunami?
Q 9: What is your view of the longer-term impact of the tsunami assistance on you?
Q 13: How suitable was the response to the tsunami in the way affected your village?

Notes: The longer-term impact of the tsunami response is deemed to be quite negative (Q 9), while the appropriateness of tsunami regulations are criticised by nearly 35 per cent of all claim-holders interviewed (Q 8). Again, Q 13 on the suitability of the tsunami intervention at the village level is generally considered to be negative.

The success of the early responses was not carried forward. As Senanayake has written:

> While it is generally agreed that the national and international relief that arrived after the Tsunami contributed significantly and in timely fashion during the emergency relief phase, it is evident that these early gains have been and may be further eroded in the rehabilitation phase in Sri Lanka.[15] Project implementation and delivery of permanent

housing and sustainable livelihoods – the most important needs of Tsunami survivors at the current phase of rehabilitation almost a year after the disaster appears unsatisfactory.[16]

Declining satisfaction with the tsunami response can be clearly seen in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Assessment of Tsunami Response Performance during First Week, Three Months, 8 Months and Overall Rating



Q1 How well were your needs provided in the first week after the tsunami?
Q2 How well were your needs provided in the first three months after the tsunami?
Q3 How well were your needs provided in the next five months after that?
Q16 In general, how do you rate the international assistance to the tsunami?

The overwhelming majority of projects studied at field level showed the following weaknesses:

- At best, decision-making by affected communities was confined to suggesting preferred modalities and procedures *within* a pre-determined project, where budgets, timelines etc were not generally negotiable;

- 'Institutional imperatives' invariably prioritised quick spending and immediate scaling up. This did not allow time for real community consultation or engagement with local capacities;
- The immediate deployment of expatriate staff for short periods was widely practiced, often to the extent that their local staff felt marginalised; and
- In identifying the appropriate skills and capacities for relief and recovery work, experience at the sectoral level was valued over knowledge of local contexts and cultures.

Many of these problems arise from:

- Inadequate or superficial specific local knowledge;
- The need to work in English,[17] and hence the placing of advertisements only in the English language press even for sub-district level appointments;
- The demand for previous natural disaster sectoral experience;
- Placing a premium on prior work with the same organisation; and
- Using personal contacts and non-transparent channels of recruitment.

For example, Oxfam International's affiliates in Sri Lanka engaged approximately 200 foreigners on short-term contracts ranging from two weeks to two months during the first three months of the tsunami, most of whom had no prior experience or expertise in the country. Costs incurred for this staff, including airfares, per diems, accommodation and stipends, estimated at an average of well over US $5,000 per head, are not categorised separately or included under administration or overheads, but appear seamlessly within individual project budgets. This was not atypical at all, and the case of agencies new to the country the staff was almost exclusively foreign.

Positions filled by foreigners in the first phase included media and public relations officers, documentation specialists, IT personnel, as well as, ironically, procurement and logistics officers (for local purchases). These could easily have been filled by qualified Sri Lankans, according to the former Director General, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction—a point of view echoed by the majority of senior government officials interviewed by the team. Even in cases where Sri Lankans with the required core competencies were unavailable, such as in the area of documentation in English, little attempt was made to recruit from the subcontinent or to explore more innovative short-term arrangements with Sri Lankans living abroad. Volunteers with excellent credentials and proven track records were ignored in favour of others manifestly less suitable. Suffice to say that the entire early recruitment and remuneration process of INGOs and other international agencies lacked transparency and accountability.

The early recovery stage saw inter-agency competition for staff as well as 'poaching' from government, local NGOs and even village-level organisations. As noted by district secretaries (government agents) in the Northeast Province,[18] this resulted in unrealistic and unsustainable increases in salaries across the spectrum, from daily wage-labourers to professionals. The increases ranged from 30 per cent to over 150 per cent. The worst affected have been local government and community-based organisations, who can neither compete nor voice their concerns as effectively as they are caught in an unequal relationship.

The claim was invariably made that there was insufficient or inappropriate capacity at the district and sub-district levels and that this lacuna had to be filled through foreign or Colombo-based recruitment. However, many counter-examples were cited of international and national agencies hiring staff from these very district and local agencies.

Successful fundraising appeals led to unprecedented donations for tsunami aid, but put high pressure on delivery and scaling up capacity. This led to serious contradictions between normal programming and the tsunami response in terms of planning processes, community participation, gender-sensitivity and targeting of marginal groups. Quick spending imperatives favoured capital-intensive programmes to the potential detriment of sustainable livelihood initiatives and partnership opportunities with local organisations

In a natural disaster of such international importance in terms of public support and media visibility, with no effective government control or regulation, it is inevitable that an excessive number of international agencies parachuted into the country, often with no sectoral, regional or even broad humanitarian experience to fall back on. Table 2.1 demonstrates that the mushrooming of local NGOs matched this influx of international agencies and that there has been a sharp decline in numbers of agencies present after the initial response.

Table 2.1: Changing Numbers of Organisations for Tsunami Response

	International Agencies		National Organisations	
	Jan 31, 2005	**October 31, 2005**	**Jan 31, 2005**	**October 31, 2005**
Working on Tsunami Relief/Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka	350	150	500	250 – 300
Decline in agencies during the first 10 months of the tsunami response	200 Equivalent to a nearly 60% decline		200 – 250 Equivalent to between a 40 and 50% decline	

Source: Complied with assistance from Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) and Development Assistance Database databases, with assistance from Ms N Jayamaha of HIC.

Due to problems with documentation and record keeping, no one knows what the absent or missing NGOs may have committed to or accomplished. This issue is particularly relevant in the housing sector, where many NGOs which signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the government to build permanent houses as early as March and April 2005, but are no longer in the country, having exhausted their funds or interest.

Virtually no individual projects were holistically integrated in ways that would seek to deliver 'one program' results with community-level initiatives building on each other and exerting a wider influence. Typically, transitional shelter programmes operated independently of livelihood initiatives, and were conceived as quite distinct from health and sanitation work. This was a direct result of the sectoral specialisation of staff, combined with the increased need to deliver results rapidly within these sectors.

2.2. Role of National Government

The personal commitment of dedicated local staff was not supported at the central level. National government had insufficient capacity, understanding and human resources to deal with multi agency responses. Decentralised provincial, district and sub-district administrations were disempowered by artificially centralised, arbitrarily categorised and narrowly politicised structures such as the Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (TAFREN), TAP, Presidential Task Force for Relief etc. Housing

agreements still continue to be signed in Colombo without adequate consultation at the district level, leading not merely to confusion and duplication, but also to the relative disempowerment of district administrators. Dissatisfaction over this process was expressed bygovernment agents, senior Colombo-based officials and NGO sector coordinating committees. There appeared to be no mechanism to advocate change.

The fact that many key government departments and statutory institutions functioned at the districts through skeleton staffs and with minimal authority led to delays. For instance, two dredging machines were despatched in August from Colombo on the urgent request of the GA/Batticaloa by the Low Lying Areas Reclamation Board to deal with a flooding problem in Thiraimadhu, the largest transitional shelter camp in the country. The equipment left Colombo bound for Batticaloa, but was apparently redirected to Hambantota with no explanation or consultation!

The buffer zone policy has come under criticism from all quarters. Though the most recent policy revision instituted in October has made the coastal buffer flexible, its implementation in the northeast districts is hampered by the fact that the administration does not feel empowered enough to make further exceptions to the 200 metre rule, and so it is rigidly followed.

Communication and information sharing remain crucial problems across the board in the tsunami response, as identified by all our respondents. The lack of clear, accurate and timely information has affected the entire spectrum from participatory decision-making and ownership to efficient implementation and monitoring.

2.3. Regional Variations

The tsunami response has caused an unintended bias toward the richer population. Communities with reduced aid assistance show more own initiative to rebuild their lives, but this is no justification for skewed delivery and allocation.

Table 2.2 presents the main claim-holder responses to the question above.

Table 2.2: Responses to the Question 38: 'If there has been injustice how would you remedy it?'

Options for response	Southern (%)	North & East (%)	Overall (%)
Through tsunami committees	15.18	5.38	9.49
Inform HR organisations	2.17	10.94	7.27
Inform authorities	41.93	36.63	38.85
Organise protest	26.75	24.31	25.33
Accept anything without questioning	5.06	8.85	7.27
Put up with injustice in relief distribution	18.80	5.21	10.90

Note: Respondents were permitted to put down more than one choice.

The responses have been disaggregated by province; 15.59 per cent of the Southern Province respondents and 5.07 per cent of those from the north and east felt that the remedy for injustice should be sought through the tsunami committees. The survey response, disaggregated by district, provides a subtle indicator of the different realities that obtain in conflict and non-conflict areas. For instance, the number of respondents from the non-conflict south would use the tsunami committee mechanism to air their grievances. This is three times the number in the north and east where the committees are less effective. The ability to protest and inform the authorities is slightly higher in the south, and there is a corresponding difference in the north and east population's disempowerment. What is difficult to understand, however, is the high percentage of respondents from the south who feel unjustly treated during the early relief supply distribution, but did not do anything about it. One possible explanation is that this occurred too close to the trauma of displacement and loss at a time when these communities were less organised.

The claim-holder survey also demonstrates that affected communities in the north and east are significantly more accepting of the relief and rehabilitation intervention than their colleagues in the south. Table 2.3, taken together with other survey responses and interview data indicate that this 'acceptance' is mediated by the structures of power that obtain in these areas which serve to constrain other responses.

Table 2.3: Overview of Responses to Survey Questions – Southern Compared with North and East

Question	Southern Responses			Northern and Eastern Responses		
	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Mean	Good (%)	Bad (%)	Mean
Q-1	29.00	10.27	2.49	55.85	9.25	2.06
Q-2	7.31	15.30	3.11	25.48	9.77	2.40
Q-3	2.30	26.44	3.60	7.96	14.16	3.05
Q-4	4.60	31.49	3.78	5.24	22.86	3.41
Q-5	10.98	11.44	2.91	16.58	8.73	2.75
Q-6	7.55	10.76	3.14	12.63	11.93	2.94
Q-7	4.37	24.37	3.53	7.01	31.52	3.63
Q-8	11.06	38.25	3.55	8.06	33.63	3.70
Q--9	7.60	27.40	3.48	10.40	17.90	3.31
Q-10	6.48	22.22	3.52	8.86	27.12	3.42
Q-11	7.28	17.37	3.43	5.96	26.63	3.51
Q-12	9.79	9.56	3.07	11.95	13.42	2.94
Q-13	11.09	13.86	2.96	14.42	19.04	3.20
Q-14	9.22	17.28	3.14	23.36	10.40	2.64
Q-15	7.39	18.48	3.41	11.86	11.13	2.99
Q-16	33.56	4.83	2.17	25.23	9.51	2.59

Ethnicity, class and caste again mediate the relatively higher level of freedom experienced by affected communities in the south. Yet, taken as a whole, communities in the north and east are less free to negotiate for assistance, though here too the same demographic categories further nuance this situation. For example, under-caste and under-class communities have the least flexibility and bargaining power, while Tamil and Muslim respondents both felt the least empowered. In general, respondents to the survey held that Sinhala communities were most able to bargain for resources.

2.4. Psychosocial Issues

Data from the Humanitarian Information Centre indicates that as of 27 November 2005 post-tsunami psychosocial trauma mitigation services are offered at the district level by a large number of national and international agencies as described in Table 2.4.[19]

Table 2.4: Organisations Involved in Psychosocial Responses

District	Organisations In Health and Psychosocial Sector	Total Number of Organisations Working In Area	%
Ampara District	68	142	48%
Batticaloa District	59	109	54%
Galle District	49	141	35%
Hambantota District	35	76	46%
Jaffna District	34	63	54%
Kilinochchi District	14	29	48%
Matara District	47	105	45%
Mullaitivu District	19	41	46%
Trincomalee District	49	116	42%

Despite over ten months of continuing engagement and a common specialist forum, neither common training curricula or modules nor an accepted range of approaches has been agreed upon. There does not seem to be either a mapping of activities, or the systematic documentation of lessons learnt and best practice. The recently concluded report 'Tsunami: Building Back Better Sri Lanka -Achievements, Challenges and Way Forward' jointly produced by Government, UN-system, international financial institutions, international and national NGOs is broadly congratulatory[20]. But this positive assessment is not borne out by our analysis.[21] The entire sector appears to be marked by a lack systematic coordination, coherence or standardisation, leading to significant variation in quality, geographical and demographic gaps in response.

Despite the decades of institutionalised and sustainable responses and the publication of excellent material, little use has been made of this in the current case. The following extract from a report demonstrates a broadening of definition to the extent that it becomes meaningless.

> Psychosocial support is not an attempt at providing a substitute for professional psychiatric help. It serves as a means for trained volunteers like Subatheepan to help create an environment where people can slowly return to normalcy and their daily routines. Psychosocial support can mean a number of things. It could mean simply sharing someone's concerns or bringing laughter back into a child's life through a game. It could also mean basic support such as providing a widow with a handloom to generate a small income or helping a [claim-holder] fill in forms to secure their entitlement to government assistance. Regardless of the approach, the aim is to help reduce people's distress by providing practical or emotional support that helps them to move on with their lives.[22]

This account of psychosocial support is confused and misleading. If we take this description seriously, every possible humanitarian and development intervention is included. It is not that psychosocial support includes income generation or filling government forms, but rather that livelihood and awareness programmes, among others, must be implemented in psychosocially-sensitive ways. There is little merit in broadening the definition and thus enlarging the turf of 'psychosocial support' so that it swallows up all livelihood, shelter, health, and education initiatives. But there is an urgent need to include key elements of awareness and sensitivity to psychosocial trauma in these diverse initiatives.

For example, while providing safe space and opportunity for tsunami-affected children to draw and play is an important part of addressing their trauma, this relatively safe approach needs to be supplemented by an analysis of the structural and family-related parameters of a child's pain, such as the economic and social stress of his or her father's loss of employment, the destruction of their home, the lack of family space in camps and transitional shelters, etc. Moreover, though communicative-sensitivity, cultural awareness and appropriateness are universally acknowledged as crucial to successful psychosocial trauma relief, well over 50 per cent of the programmes are designed and run by foreigners who have no knowledge of the local languages or cultural specificities.

2.5. Conclusions

The roles of national, provincial and district government in capacity building need streamlining and joint planning to make efforts more sustainable. Local officials need to be supported by the system, not penalised or placed at risk, particularly in conflict areas. District government needs more structural capacity-building support to absorb new staff, fill positions and face new challenges. Currently, lack of accurate data makes planning, coordination and monitoring extremely difficult.

Informal local leaders were disempowered by lack of information and consultation. Overwhelmed by new obligations and responsibilities such as multiple land disputes, planning decisions and peace processes, local leaders need to interact more with international agencies in the tsunami recovery process, to strengthen their horizontal and vertical social capital. The survey identified significant dissatisfaction among claim-holders toward their community leaders, with 28 per cent unhappy with their performance and only 6 per cent happy with it. Reasons for this were found among the qualitative responses and included failure to distribute assistance equally, unfair cash distribution, collection of wrong information, and not recognising people with different opinions.

CHAPTER THREE: GENDER ISSUES AND CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

3.1. Gender Issues

Women and children suffered significantly higher casualties than adult men during the tsunami, but actual statistics are to obtain. The Sri Lankan casualties have been estimated at a male to female ratio of 60 to 40, but women's groups have contested these figures.

> According to the January 2005 data of District Secretariat of Batticaloa, the disaggregated statistics of the dead in the tsunami indicate that 60 per cent of the deaths are women. However, the survey conducted by Suriya Women's Development Centre found 80 per cent of the dead in the sample were women and girls.[23]

Women as survivors are doubly vulnerable, particularly if they have become heads of households or carry the additional burden on behalf of their extended families. Incidents have been reported of husbands holding their wives responsible for not saving their young children. Particularly in the immediate post-tsunami period, domestic violence increased significantly as a result of the general trauma.

Foremost among the structural tsunami-related issues confronting women is the state policy on land allocation which only recognises the male head of household as the legitimate owner of land. This creats the very real risk that in post-tsunami allocations, women may lose their rights to their house and land. In addition, religious and cultural practices and rites have served to marginalise displaced women and girls. The Muslim women's period of mourning for their dead husbands, *Itha*, requires four months of isolation from society during which time they are likely to be excluded from most government and international assistance.

Women's organisations and rights groups have taken up protection issues. Transitional camps have become a breeding ground for gender-based violence. An example of good practice has been recorded from Batticaloa where a Gender Watch group has been established which monitors such concerns and advocates for women's participation in decision-making. Developed under the aegis of the Women's Coalition for Disaster Management (WCDM), the initiative was a response to the rising violence against women from both inside and outside the family. Representatives of local women's organisations, women leaders in transitional camp and gender focal points in INGOs have come together to create this structure. They address complaints deposited in boxes in camps, respond to oral and written complaints and also work toward making the tsunami response more gender-sensitive. Support from the government and some

international agencies has been slow in coming. Yet, as a result of this advocacy, some village-level tsunami committees meant to address community complaints have included a women's representative—though the regulations have yet to institutionalise this arrangement. Hence, some GNs and Divisional Secretaries are unwilling to, as they see it, 'bend the rules to accommodate women'. In the team's view, Gender Watch is an excellent initiative which needs to be given greater publicity, to be documented in greater detail and replicated in other areas of the country.

At the same time, catastrophes of the scale of the tsunami may carry opportunities for marginalised and vulnerable groups. It has been observed that:

> One of the most important outcomes of the tsunami has been the creation of small but significant space for women to articulate their opinions. 24.8 per cent of the women in the survey mentioned that learning to negotiate with government and NGO officials, participating in decision making, participating in public life and accessing information had been a positive experience for them after the tsunami. Women have been supported by women's groups to take on decision-making positions in camp committees and village committees. Though this has not been in anyway [sic] an unchallenged phenomenon, it is definitely a positive step. [24]

Space had opened up for women but the enabling policy framework to facilitate and institutionalise this was missing. For instance, the tsunami committees, which theoretically were appointed to arbitrate on disputes and address grievances, had no provision for women's representation. Lobbying and advocacy at the national level proved inadequate in this case, but in some districts (Batticaloa, for instance) women were included in these committees on an ad hoc basis due to strong and sustained pressure. In the case of decision-making in camp and village committees, it would appear that though women's participation is more visible, the agenda is still male dominated. The People's Commission on Post-Tsunami Recovery, a UNDP-led initiative, provided an invaluable platform for hundreds of women to voice their views on the consequences of the tsunami and their grievances.

A local NGO worker with a long history of engagement with grassroots gender empowerment issues described it best when she said:

> The men in the camps and transitional shelter areas have more important things to do with their time, so they send their wives to the meetings and allow some of them to get on

> the committees, but when it comes to making important decisions, the women have to dance to their husbands' tune. The way the demand for livelihood support develops is a good example. First and foremost, the men's livelihood needs have to be addressed right down to the smallest detail, and only then are the women's livelihoods even discussed. We have seen examples of this even when the woman earns more than the man.

Figure 3.1 from the Claim-Holder Survey indicates that men and women have slightly different perceptions of the performance of the tsunami response.

Figure 3.1: Gendered Assessment of Tsunami Response Performance during First Week, Three Months, Eight Months and Overall Rating



Q1: How well were your needs provided in the first week after the tsunami?
Q2: How well were your needs provided in the first three months after the tsunami?
Q3: How well were your needs provided in the next five months after the tsunami?
Q16: In general, how do you rate the international assistance provided to you after the tsunami?[25]

Notes: Both men and women share the sense that the first week was better than the first three months, which in turn was better than the next five months. Women are consistently 2–7 per cent less positive across the board, and correspondingly 1–3 per cent more negative in their assessment. The difference appears to be widening as time passes, with the assessment of the first week differing by 2 per cent, the assessment of the first three months by 4 per cent, and the overall assessment by 8 per cent. This difference could well reflect the additional problems that women face, as well as the fact that specific targeting of women needs improvement. This difference is statistically significant, given the fact that women are traditionally considered as being easier to please and more understanding of shortcomings.

3.2. Cross-Cutting Themes

The following four themes were identified through preliminary consultations:

1) Land ownership, displacement and resettlement;
2) Marginalised and vulnerable groups, including the sick and elderly;
3) Strengthening local community structures and downward accountability; and
4) Natural disaster risk reduction.

3.3. Land Ownership, Displacement and Resettlement

The tsunami destroyed around 100,000 houses and damaged 46,000 partially, most of which were within 500 metres of the shoreline. Some 235,000 families were displaced in the initial days. The first reaction of the government was to declare a coastal buffer zone, where no new construction would be permitted. Unfortunately, this decision took on an ethnic interpretation because there were two different limits: 100 metres for the mainly Sinhala south, and 200 metres for the predominantly Tamil and Muslim northeast. Further confusion arose because of other restrictions in local areas, for example 400 metres in Amparai.

Given the fact that many coastal areas, particularly in the east, offered no suitable resettlement options outside the buffer zone, and that the tourist industry appeared to have preferential treatment over the displaced fishing community, this policy led to widespread dissatisfaction and frustration. Finally in October 2005, after months of uncertainty and lobbying, the buffer zone was made more flexible, with definite exceptions identified in certain areas and in others discretion granted to the decentralised administration. Yet, in the northeast areas the district secretaries interpreted the revised regulations narrowly and claimed that they had no authority to make exceptions.

In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, people were housed in schools and temporary camps, as described in the ‘Building Back Better' report:

> Internally displaced persons were accommodated by family and friends and others were housed in schools, temples and other places of worship. Initially fifty-one IDP welfare centers were set up. On the 7th of January a total of 597 schools and places of worship were used to provide shelter for the affected population. In the 2nd week of January the GoSL made a request to the international community for 50,000 tents and received nearly 35,000. It was unanimously agreed by the Government and the relevant agencies that it will be utilised only during the emergency phase - until transition accommodation was

> organised. GoSL aimed at reopening schools by the end of January 2005 and there was an urgency to vacate school buildings.[26]

The desire to quickly reopen schools resulted, at least in Ampara district, in the premature forced evacuation of some of the poorest and most vulnerable families who were living in the schools. Public protests against the relocation of IDPs out of schools at the end of January was recognised in Batticaloa district, where the GA wrote an open letter to the affected families assuring them that no sudden and unfair decisions would be taken without their knowledge. No such gesture was made in Ampara, however, where the situation was most acute and the decision was most arbitrary.

Government guidelines on transitional shelter included size specifications (200 square feet, for example) and a maximum cost (originally US $300, including labour, later increased to $500)**.** Two different perspectives have been expressed vis-a-vis the construction of transitional shelters. The 'Building Back Better' report reflects the mainstream view as follows:

> Transitional shelter is almost completed and it can be claimed as a success story of the government and all the donor agencies and NGOs involved in it. However it had some issues in relation to coordination, database information, the situation of host families, de-commissioning and disaster risk.[27]

In contrast, the following extract from a eport by Habitat International Coalition based on field work in Sri Lanka in June and July 2005, applies the human rights based approach in its critique of the transitional shelter programme:

> Yet, despite sufficient funding, adequate housing needs of the tsunami survivors had not been met. Not even seven months after the disaster struck ... The major problem in Sri Lanka was that the process for allocating and building temporary housing had been painfully slow and uncoordinated, with people languishing in emergency shelters for up to seven months. The timeframe for both emergency and temporary housing was constantly being extended – flouting all internationally accepted norms – for a range of reasons ranging from a lack of concern and priority, a lack of participation and consultation with affected communities, and a lack of coordination and planning.[28]

Claim-holder survey respondents were critical of the time taken in providing transitional shelters, but their greatest opprobrium was reserved for delays in permanent housing construction. Hardly any criticisms were leveled against the quality of the transitional shelters themselves in the survey, but field interviews elicited negative responses toward the suitability of transitional shelter locations (Thirayamadhu), as well as the cramped and unstructured nature of the sites (general, but particularly in Ampara district). The scarcity of appropriate land both for transitional and permanent shelters is an insurmountable problem along the densely populated eastern coast, necessitating a radical rethinking of the buffer zone. Unfortunately, however, only the areas of Kalmunai and Kattankudy have been listed as exceptions to the 200 metre rule, though many other areas were also worthy of the same treatment. See Box 3.1.

Box 3.1: Thiraimadu, Sri Lanka's Largest Transitional Shelter Complex

The problems with Thiraimadu in Batticaloa begin with the selection of the site itself, which is some distance from the town and off the main road, but it is still quite far from the sea. This location adds economic burdens to both fishing and non-fishing communities alike. Further, as pointed out by Habitat, Thiraimadu is 'located on low-lying areas which were susceptible to flooding. People consistently complained that not only did the houses leak when it rained, but it was also impossible to live in them as water and mud entered their homes.' The recent pre-monsoon rains exacerbated the problem of flooding, and a disagreement seems to have surfaced between two government departments -- the Low Lying Areas Reclamation Board, which maintains that the land is unsuitable without costly and time-consuming filling and drainage systems, and the Urban Development Authority, which does not seem too worried about this issue.

When the TEC evaluation team consulted the government agent on the controversy, his response was that there was no other land available in Batticaloa, so the IDPs had to put up with whatever problems came up. He also identified delays in some government agencies due to lack of resources and capacity which had compounded the issue, and provided an example of two heavy earthmoving machines that had left Colombo for Batticaloa, but had been diverted midway to Hambantota.

Government authorities made key decisions, apparently without consulting the community. While people were not too keen to go back to their own land yet, Thiraimadu offered little that was attractive to the fisherfolks, as it was about one kilometer from the ocean and even further from the commercial area of the city. The area retained water even after the lightest rain, and there was no protection from the harsh sun during the day. Altogether, Thiraimadu represents an unsatisfactory choice and one that would cost millions of rupees to make even minimally habitable. Therefore, Thiraimadu provides yet another cogent reason for the further relaxation of the buffer zone in the entire Batticaloa district.

The claim-holder survey indicated the greatest dissatisfaction over what was perceived as delays in providing permanent shelter. This sentiment has been echoed by government officials who have gone to the extent of publicly identifying INGOs that are at fault. The government would like them to build the contracted number of houses quickly and hand them over for allocation. The INGOs wish to deal directly

with the claim-holders and complain that lists are both slow to appear and contain many errors. The truth, inevitably, is somewhere in-between. On one side there are delays and bottlenecks in under-resourced government departments, notably the survey department that is responsible for all site maps, together with poor coordination and excessive centralisation. On the other side there is lack of expertise and experience, exacerbated by the scarcity of materials and skilled labour.

Yet the demand for quick completion of permanent housing must be placed in its proper context. Sri Lanka has a history of building nearly 4,000-6,000 houses per year for the entire country. Rebuilding around 100,000 houses – in addition to hospitals, schools and other public buildings – poses a challenge to the government and all housing donors, particularly in relation to the availability of timber, sand and other raw materials, and the lack of human resources such as architects, masons, carpenters and skilled labourers. Hence, the housing sector alone will require the rapid training and capacity development of thousands of people throughout tsunami-affected areas.

There are two types of house construction, owner-driven and donor-driven. The suggestion that the former is a means of circumventing the human resource shortage is shortsighted, unless carefully supervised, it may result in a number of sub-standard dwellings. In addition, this provision is most often availed by the less poor or vulnerable, that is, those who have other resources at their command. In the owner-driven programme there are 54,563 households, of which 33,208 are classified as partially damaged houses and 21,355 as fully damaged houses. The donor-built housing programme has been allocated 49,233 houses, of which 29,050 have MOUs signed and 24,850 have commenced construction (according to TAFREN). Yet, as of November, only 2,164 have been completed and 930 units have been handed over to the new owners. Table 3.1, taken from the 'Building Back Better' report, demonstrates the inter-district disparities that have plagued this sector and which can only get worse if the conflict intensifies.

Table 3.1: Donor-Built Housing Programme: District Summary

District	Total Houses Damaged	No of Units MOUs signed	Balance	No of Units Cons. Commenced
Ampara	12,481	3,477	9,004	3,136
Batticaloa	4,426	3,650	776	1,048
Colombo	5,150	936	4,214	764
Galle	5,196	3,814	1,382	3,004
Gampaha	650	268	382	379
Hambanthota	1,057	3,703	0	4,471
Jaffna	4,551	2,878	1,673	3,938
Kalutara	4,275	2,208	2,067	1,434
Kilinochchi	288	0	288	1,241
Matara	2,316	2,957	0	2,212
Mullaitivu	3,011	700	2,311	0
Puttlam	95	0	95	0
Trincomalee	5,737	4,459	1,278	3,223
Total	49,233	29,050	23,470	24,850

Source: TAFREN, November 2005 (taken from 'Building Back Better' report)

Hambantota is by far the best served district, with more houses contracted than were damaged. In Ampara, where there is the highest demand, only 25 per cent have been allocated to donors. Matara too is over-supplied, whereas Colombo, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi are in a situation similar to Ampara. The same report concludes:

> [Claim-holders] now residing in transitional shelters are not all aware of the future permanent housing solutions for their families. This reflects a lack of communication with the [claim-holders] by governmental and non-governmental organisations. It may also relate to the fact that not all families that are now residing in transitional shelters are eligible to government assistance for permanent housing, as the selection criteria for the donor-driven programme is humanitarian based and that for the owner-driven programme is ownership based.

3.4. Marginalised and Vulnerable Groups

In the fisheries sector there has been a serious problem of marginalisation of vulnerable groups. Of the estimated 200,000 people who lost their livelihoods, at least one-third were fisher-folk, though in some areas this figure is much higher; in Jaffna it is close to 90 per cent.[29] Many members of the fishing community were already poor and were operating in the informal sector. In contrast, immediate job losses in agriculture were estimated at around 30,000, but these losses are believed to be temporary until damaged infrastructure has been repaired and paddy fields desalinated, which may take several growing seasons.[30]

Though accurate figures are difficult to obtain, around 19,000 fishing craft are estimated to have been lost or damaged. Such craft range from 'small rafts (*thepppam*), wooden dugout[s] or fiberglass outrigger[s], large wooden or fiberglass sea canoe[s] (*oru*), fiberglass day boat[s] with outboard or inboard engine[s], and multi-day boats'. [31] Add to this a variety of nets and gear, including those cast from boats and pulled in from shore, and it is clear that replacing the losses within this complex artisan industry is not going to be easy. It has been argued that many of the problems arise because INGOs are in too much of a hurry to spend funds in this sector.[32] Among the problems are:[33]

- Limited local boat and net manufacturing and repairing capacity, which results in delays and iniquities in distribution;
- The supply of unsuitable and even defective equipment as a result of ignorance of the specific constraints that operate in specific areas;[34]
- The fact that distribution is based mainly on the replacement of registered boats (and nets to service these boats), which leaves out smaller and older craft, as well as fishing communities located in remote and conflict-affected areas where registration is difficult;
- Lack of effective national, district and sub-district coordination leading to disparities in the resourcing and distribution of boats, motors and nets;
- The non-availability of accurate information combined with the absence of meaningful participatory and transparent decision-making processes;
- The relocation of fisher families to areas far from the beachfront creates huge problems for small-scale artisan fishing;
- The danger of reproducing or exacerbating existing inequalities in the sector;
- The perception of injustice felt by conflict-affected fisher-folk who have been repeatedly victimised by a combination of security regulations, capricious and arbitrary military practices, as well as direct violence;

- The politicisation of fisheries cooperatives such that they may not adequately represent the interests of the vast majority of poor fisher-folk;
- The lack of resources and capacity of the Fisheries Corporation, particularly at the sub-district level, upon whom the onus of certification of all assets for replacement is placed; and
- The lack of a post-tsunami decentralised national plan for the fishing industry.

The evaluation team found that the fisheries sector had been significantly privileged over all others, and particularly self-employment and small businesses. Moreover, even within the sector, pre-tsunami inequalities had either been reinforced or exacerbated by the focus on asset replacement. Here too distribution has not been uniform within a district or across districts. In the Jaffna District, the fisherman's cooperatives appeared relatively empowered and articulate but understandably entirely membership-oriented, thereby marginalizing all those who did not come under this category. We could discern no alternate mechanism in place to include the others, who may be itinerant fisher-folk, wage labourers, aged former fishers, disabled people and others. As indicated above, the leadership of these organisations reflects an upwardly mobile and relatively better-off ethos. While this group is crucial in revitalizing the sector, there may also be a need to explore other avenues to reach those who may be excluded from these cooperatives due to poverty, vulnerability and social marginalisation.

Placing the fisheries sector in the broader context, Sarath Fernando of the Movement for Land and Agricultural Reform (MONLAR) has forcefully argued that the 'Rebuilding the Nation' plan is not likely to restore the lives and livelihoods of the majority of tsunami affected people, notably the small-scale fisher-folk and those living from the related small scale food processing industry informal beach guest houses, etc. Analysing TAFREN's plans to spend $3 billion in loans and grants from international agencies, he argues that the poorer people are being 'pushed off the beaches' by the coastal buffer zone, to make way instead for up-market tourist resorts and infrastructure (for example, the detailed development of Arugam Bay in the southeast), marinas and modern harbour infrastructure that will facilitate large-scale industrial fishing fleets, and highways that again will primarily serve the tourist and export industries.

The vast majority of programmes have no specific targeting mechanism and seek to mainstream a uniform response, which may in practice only serve to exclude the most vulnerable and marginalised who are less able to access common services or have special needs and constraints. In general, the tsunami response framework serves the lowest common denominator in the recovery phase, by privileging house-owners and boat-owners. Housing and livelihoods provide both the challenge and opportunity for

addressing the special needs of vulnerable or marginal groups, but inadequate attention has been paid to these issues thus far. In Figure 3.2, the Sri Lanka Claim-Holder Survey indicates that the tsunami response exacerbated economic and social inequalities.

Figure 3.2: Has Everyone in Your Community Benefited Equally from Tsunami Assistance?



3.5. Strengthening Local Community Structures and Downward Accountability

Mechanisms of downward accountability and transparency are generally absent and there are no clear complaint mechanisms, locally and internationally, nor any systematic public accountability. International agencies need to ensure accountability through basic practical mechanisms. Issues have emerged with local government officials who are responsible for both distribution and monitoring. No significant change has taken place relating to either accountability or transparency in the recovery and rehabilitation phases.

The essential conditions for the empowerment of claim-holders include comprehensive information sharing and setting up appropriate contextually sensitive communication strategies. There is a need to resist the kinds of disbursement pressure that leads to non-consultative and inappropriate interventions on the ground. In general, agencies need to build accountable partnerships, not resort to subcontracting as they do now. Some INGOs require local CBOs to spend less than 1 per cent on their overheads, whereas they have a much larger margin themselves. As a rule, local agencies are required to be accountable at the district and sub-district levels, but larger international and national NGOs are either not required to do so or the requirement cannot be enforced. Agencies whose presence in-country pre-dated the tsunami and who had long-standing partnerships demonstrated a greater sensitivity and responsiveness to this issue. Yet, in the first flush of the tsunami response some of these relationships were forgotten in the face of new imperatives and reporting structures, and they have had to be re-learnt gradually.

Some evidence has emerged that key decisions on funding and allocation were often made abroad, at the international headquarters of INGOs and donor agencies. In the case of Sri Lanka at least, hierarchies were even visible among headquarters, Colombo and field offices within the same agency. The ubiquitous poor downward information flow is not accidental but systemic. Often the centralised government system and traditional culture work against independent participation.

The 'humanitarian imperative' often overrides advocacy issues, and tends to reduce marginalised people's control over policy and advocacy. In Sri Lanka, child protection, gender-based violence issues require greater focus.

The independent assessment of tsunami relief accountability involving claim-holders was slow to get started and has not yet achieved credibility. Aidwatch, and two citizens' commissions have just begun to work. The Claim-Holder Survey identified this as an important-felt need of the affected communities.

3.6. Natural Disaster Risk Reduction

Recent work on early warning systems initially focused on tsunamis as a major hazard, although this is actually a very rare occurrence. The focus has now broadened to include the various other hazards to which Sri Lanka is prone, such as floods, storm surges, cyclones, landslides, etc. This focus on a multi-hazard early warning system will benefit Sri Lanka, and will help to make the system more sustainable over the long run. While much of the focus is on the sophisticated, high-end of the early warning systems, UNDP has also been advocating the need to focus on the lower-end or the 'soft' side of the early warning systems and has been providing policy support to the government (see Case Study in Annex 2).

Substantial progress has been made since the tsunami in the area of disaster management legislation and policies. A bill in the making for more than the last seven years has finally been passed. This Disaster Management Act is an important piece of legislation which is key to putting in place an effective disaster management institutional structure to proactively engage in disaster reduction activities. The Disaster Management Centre set up under the legislation has very recently managed to incorporate disaster management into the national budget.

The Sri Lankan Parliament Select Committee on Natural Disasters was also a big step in the right direction. This bipartisan committee deliberated on the various issues around the state of disaster management in Sri Lanka after the tsunami, and received inputs from various national, international and UN Agencies. The Committee has at the end of its study, come up with key recommendations toward a safer Sri Lanka. Their recommendation to offer the people a choice on the buffer zone issue has been accepted recently.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1. National Capacities

Existing legislation and post-tsunami emergency regulations adversely affected the empowerment of local government in Sri Lanka. Further, the tsunami response was affected by the narrow politicisation of some umbrella government authorities, resulting in disempowerment of district and sub-district administrations. Conflict continually hampered independent decision-making at all levels in the five affected districts. The UN system has initiated a number of programmes to enhance local capacity, but little appears to have been done to empower local authorities vis-à-vis their national counterparts.

The survey indicates deep dissatisfaction with the government, and not a very high regard for either local or international NGOs. What is striking, however, is the strong suspicion cast on local leaders. This was borne out in general by the individual and focus group interviews. The overall negativity of the claim-holders' assessment of the responsiveness and accessibility of government, local and international agenciesand local leaders is a measure of the general dissatisfaction with the delivery of goods and services, particularly in the last phase. This is shown in Figure 4.1 from the claim-holder survey.

Figure 4.1: Accessibility and Responsiveness of Government Officials, International and Local Agencies, Community Leaders, and Dependability of Agencies Working In-Village



Q 4: How accessible and responsive were government officials to your concerns?
Q 5: How accessible and responsive were international agencies to your concerns?
Q 6: How accessible and responsive were local agencies to your concerns?
Q 7: How accessible and responsive were community leaders to your concerns?
Q 12: How reliable/dependable were the agencies that worked in your village?

4.2. International Engagement with Local Capacities

In perhaps the most directly relevant set of responses to the current study, the claim holders have unequivocally refuted the claim that the tsunami response used their skills and abilities. See Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: Use of Local Skills and Abilities, Changes in Capacity, Relating to Vulnerable Groups and Nature of Community Consultations



Q 10: How well did the tsunami response use your skills and abilities?
Q 11: How would you assess the changes in capacities that took place as a result?
Q 14: How well did the tsunami response take into account women, children and most vulnerable groups?
Q 15: How useful do you think were the consultations held at the community level regarding providing you with goods and services, including housing?

Notes: The changes in capacity that have taken place are considered negative (Q 11) though the respondents acknowledge that women and children have been taken into account to some extent in tsunami programming (Q 14). Yet, the consultations held at the village level are, according to the survey, less than useful, often a token gesture after decisions have been taken (Q 15).

The issue of participation is fully recognised in international standards and norms relating to capacities (see Annex 2) and yet has been generally observed in the breach by both international and local organisations. As Habitat International concludes:

> Whether in the case of relief or rehabilitation, the absence of community participation in the process is obvious. Relief continues to be ad hoc and does not seem to be meeting the

> needs of the people. This is largely because survivors are not involved in the rehabilitation processes. A lot of the complaints with temporary housing, restoration of livelihoods and inadequacy of relief material would have been resolved had the community been consulted. A lack of information or in some cases the exist[ence] of conflicting information, paralyses decision-making, especially when local authorities are not clear as to what decision-making powers they have been granted. People do not know about their entitlements, neither do they have clarity on various policies and government orders. This has resulted in insecurity, anger and frustration.[35]

In general, there has been inadequate recognition of extensive and diverse local and national capacities existing at both institutional and individual levels. This has resulted in under-utilisation, competitiveness, and even the systemic undermining of this body of capacity. It has reduced claim-holder ownership of relief and recovery initiatives and facilitated an excessive and often inadequately prepared foreign presence. It has significantly eroded the sustainability, appropriateness and efficacy of the international tsunami response by donors and INGOs. The international response has neither supported nascent local capacities in a serious and sustainable manner nor developed national capacities beyond providing de-contextualised technical support. In some cases it has unintentionally exacerbated inequalities and tensions.

The bias of INGOs against local cultures in identifying appropriate local capacity was found to be widespread. As in Indonesia, UN-led security classification hinders any real engagement between internationals and nationals, and hampers capacity development. The exceptions to the general practice came entirely from organisations which had long-standing relationships with CBOs and local NGOs. However, here too the exigencies of scaling up appeared to demand a renewal of these partnerships, which were not always equally successfully. This capacity misrecognition problem was most acute in the emergency phase, and has gradually improved through the recovery and transition to rehabilitation phases, so there is clearly learning that has taken place.

In Sri Lanka, the constant refrain of international agencies was that humanitarian response and sectoral capacity as well as post-disaster experience was woefully lacking in-country, necessitating the hiring of international staff on short-term contracts to perform immediate tasks. Yet, the time taken by these recruits to become familiar with the complex and dynamic local contexts, as well as the costly mistakes precipitated by their ignorance, was not accounted for, nor was the perfectly reasonable alternative of hiring local staff with appropriate contextual knowledge and then training them in the relevant sectors

followed. Such perspectives tended to value institutional knowledge (such as knowledge of procedures), over most other forms of experience or preparation. Learning and improvement in these areas has been less marked, though today institutional knowledge is emphasised less. There is strong and persistent evidence on the question of 'poaching', within the UN system, INGOs and in relation to CBOs. This appears to have peaked at the early recovery phase and has since declined.

Pressure to spend is identified as the main problem relating to international agencies, leading them to scale up in ways alien to their core mandate and competencies. This has been cited as the biggest single obstacle to sustained engagement with local and national capacities. The problem was worsened by an overestimation of international capacity to deliver, coupled with an underestimation of delivery costs. Abrupt departure from proven sectors of experience often resulted in unacceptable performance, although in some cases this reflected a genuine need to maximise use of additional funds received with strings attached. The need for both prior technical expertise and contextual experience was most strongly felt in the housing sector.

The majority of programmes have no specific targeting mechanism and take a uniform response, which may in practice only serve to exclude the most vulnerable and marginalised who are less able to access common services and have special needs and constraints. While a handful of good initiatives have emerged, in general the tsunami response framework serves the 'lowest common denominator' in the recovery phase by privileging house-owners and boat-owners. In general, the vulnerable position of women has been acknowledged, but gender-sensitive programming has been inadequate. Often women are the majority of participants, but their decision-making role remains unclear. Gender-based violence is a serious concern throughout the region. The majority of programmes have adopted a 'gender neutral' or 'gender blind' policy, whereas what is required is specific targeting or affirmative action.

Information-sharing was minimal. This led directly to lack of ownership, impossibility of proper coordination, and the absence of meaningful participation. The Claim-Holder Survey indicates that systems of sharing accurate information in a timely and user-friendly manner have not improved in the second and third phases of the tsunami response, when they are even more urgently needed. Downward accountability and transparency have been almost entirely lacking. International agencies need to ensure accountability through basic practical mechanisms. No significant change has taken place relating to either accountability or transparency in the recovery and rehabilitation phases. The essential conditions for the empowerment of claim-holders include comprehensive information sharing and setting up appropriate contextually sensitive communication strategies. These need to be addressed through the

engagement with and enhancement of local and national capacities to ensure that no unnecessary risks and challenges are imposed on local communities.

4.3. Recommendations

Figure 4.3 indicates that, looking to the future, affected people are mostly concerned about the fair distribution of aid.

Figure 4.3: What Aspects of the International and National Tsunami Response Would You Like to See Changed?



Source: Claim-holder survey, Sri Lanka, 2005.

In this context, the team offers the following recommendations:

1. Involve claim-holders in the design, planning, implementation, monitoring and assessment of rehabilitation initiatives in general, but especially in the permanent housing and livelihoods programmes;
2. Establish guidelines or a code of conduct that would govern the procedures for recruitment and working conditions of INGO staff, both local and international, which would include modalities to be adopted regarding employing staff of other agencies and government;

3. Adopt the principle of a 'right to information' and provide, pro-actively, accurate, timely and user-friendly (for example, translated into the appropriate local language and presented simply and clearly) information on a regular basis to all claim-holders to enable them to make informed decisions;
4. Ensure transparent and mutually accountable partnerships between donors and local organizations through sharing of budgets, including salaries and overhead costs, and reports;
5. Address poverty–equity and conflict-exclusion issues through providing livelihood and housing options to the poorest and conflict-affected people, even if they are not directly affected by the tsunami;
6. Address issues of intra- and inter-district equality through better coordination and greater flexibility of programmes;
7. Identify through participatory processes the context- and phase-specific needs and rights of vulnerable and marginal groups, including women, the aged and children, and address these needs and rights as matters of the highest priority;
8. Facilitate advocacy around issues and concerns of claim-holders, and ensure that their voice is heard at the sub-national and national levels in order to influence policy formulation;
9. Adopt a rights-based approach in the humanitarian sector, and develop an agreed upon code of conduct and guiding principles that incorporate existing codes and standards; and
10. Jointly support independent watchdog movements and mechanisms of redressing grievances, and provide them with complete access to information.

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[1] See, for instance, "Humanitarian Assistance and The International Aid Architecture After the Tsunami: Lessons from Sri Lanka and India", Dr. Darini Rajasingham Senanayake, ASEAN Roundtable, Nov 17, 2005 for a more detailed account on the relationship between tsunami assistance and the architecture of humanitarian aid.

[2] According to World Bank and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) figures used as the common standard by all the TEC teams, the population loss in Sri Lanka is 35,262, while 519,063 people are displaced. See USAID (May 6, 2005), Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis: Fact Sheet #38, and Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort, BRR & World Bank, October 2005. Thanks to John Cosgrave, TEC Secretariat, for his compilation. Please see TEC Local and National Capacities Thematic Report for a comparison of the consequences of the tsunami on Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives.

[3] According to World Bank and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) figures used as the common standard by all the TEC teams, the population loss in Sri Lanka is 35,262, while 519,063 people are displaced. See USAID (May 6, 2005), Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis: Fact Sheet #38, and Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort, BRR & World Bank, October 2005. Thanks to John Cosgrave, TEC Secretariat, for his compilation. Please see TEC Local and National Capacities Thematic Report for a comparison of the consequences of the tsunami on Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives.

[4] Though there is no quantitative evidence available to support this claim, it has been reinforced through the stakeholder and expert interviews conducted by the TEC team.

[5] See Steele, Paul *Phoenix from the Ashes? Economic Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka*, Institute for Policy Studies: Working Paper No 7, April 2005, pp 13–15 for details on the damage to the tourist industry.

[6] TEC Evaluation of Local and National Capacities, Inception Report, September 2005.
[7] The Team is grateful to Mihir Bhatt for sharing this draft report with us, and for his expert advice on survey methodology.
[8] Includes 100 respondents from Vaharai and Thirayamadu, where the 'impact, assessment and transitional shelter assessment were made in Sri Lanka.
[9] Though it was planned that 200 families would be interviewed from each district in Sri Lanka, the actual numbers varied considerably as indicated in the final count contained in this Table.
[10] Though, as the following pages will demonstrate, this understanding and acceptance of the logic of such an evaluation had to be mediated by the complex and unequal power relations that obtained in each context, thereby producing a nuanced response to the international response that refracted the political economies of class, ethnicity, gender, language, region, age and so on.
[11] See The Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) Sri Lanka website for details.
[12] Though more accurate data is required, it appears that the US $150m in Box I.1 includes the more formal parts of this contribution.
[13]Uyangoda, p 31
[14] For instance, the 'Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment' which was undertaken 10–28 January 2005 by the ADB, Japan Bank for International Cooperation & World Bank:

- acknowledges the existing capacities at various levels;
- draws attention to the need for institutional capacity building, including a National Disaster Management Authority, underpinned by a Disaster Management Bill, and that would clarify roles and responsibilities and streamline coordination across administrative levels and various stakeholders in a National Disaster Management Plan;
- advocates for a Multi-hazard Risk Management Approach, that acknowledges that vulnerability to hazard is related to physical, environmental and legal-institutional weaknesses;
- advocates for more decentralised emergency preparedness, as it is at local level that one must act upon early warning information ('The enhancement of emergency preparedness capacity of the communities, District and GN level administration in high disaster risk areas would be the most effective way of improving public resilience and rapid response to future events.' (Annex XV p 3). Subsidiarity as a key principle for national disaster management (see also p 8 of 29). This is an opportunity to support wider decentralisation in Sri Lanka (Annex VI p 3)); and
- recommends focused consideration to risk transfer mechanisms such as insurance, micro-credit and micro-finance, and how to make these more accessible to the poorer sections of society.

[15] These sentiments were expressed both by GoSL authorities in the Tsunami-affected districts as well as the Planning and Development Secretariat of the LTTE.
[16] Senanayake, 2005, p 3
[17] Though less than 5 per cent of the national population speaks even basic English. This figure is significantly less in the outlying districts, where even the key district government leadership has some difficulty communicating in English.
[18] Covering the districts of Kilinochchi, Batticaloa and Jaffna, but this view has much wider currency in the post-tsunami context.
[19] This list is dependent on the self-reporting of organisations, with no follow-up or documentation serving as corroboration. There is a mechanism by which agencies that have not provided information can be included. Updating is also only on the basis of new information supplied by the respective agency, which means that some organisations may have left the country but remain in the records. As a result, the list contains agencies that have hardly any engagement, expertise or interest in psychosocial issues and omits others that are directly involved.
[20] *The psychological support requirements of those who had experienced the Tsunami were identified with immediate and long term interventions conducted in the form of field counseling and appointment of special committees ... The international community assisted the government in establishing a coordination mechanism within the Ministry of Health to organise alternate temporary health facilities, restore basic services through supporting the deployment of foreign medical and relief/rescue mobile groups, distribution of emergency medical/surgical kits, conducting nutritional surveillance, replacing children's health records, implementing psychosocial activities for children, restoring cold chain facilities, conducting rapid assessments and providing medical (including over 500 medical and relief workers) transportation* (p 17 One Year Report Draft, emphasis

added). It is claimed that the 'Achievements in mental health include over 500 Community support Officers trained throughout the 13 tsunami districts to address mental health needs in the affected population.' (Op Cit p 45)

[21] The study of the psychosocial sector in Sri Lanka included the following: (a) contacting over leading 50 agencies engaged in the sector through emails and/or telephone and/or individual visits, (b) examination of over 25 reports, assessments, project proposals and other documents provided by these agencies and other sources, (c) district and community level consultations, (d) attendance at psychosocial working group meeting coordinated by the CHA, and (e) detailed interviews with national experts in the sector, and (f) a mini-desk review of available literature on the psychosocial response to the tsunami in Sri Lanka.

[22] IFRC Sri Lanka, November 2005 (Quoted in One Year Report, p 46)

[23] Emmanuel, Sarala "Sri Lankan Women's Small but Significant Gains in the Post Tsunami Reconstruction Process", Forum News, May – August 2005, Vol 18 No: 2. However, it should be noted that the survey comprised only 200 households 'selected representatively', which may have distorted the result.

[24] Emmanuel, ibid

[25] Note that though a superficial assessment will discern a contradiction between the responses to Q 2 and Q 3 with Q16, it is our view that this can be explained on the basis of the dominant or accepted 'culture' or 'discourse' of such responses. Whereas, the men and women are permitted in terms of this normative discourse to make critical judgments of performance (Q 1 – 3), which is disembodied from the actors who provided this service (the needs, in this case), the final questions calls for something more in the nature of a sentiment rather than an objective judgment of performance. Hence, this elicits the 'polite' (read: exaggeratedly placatory) response which is identified with the persons who have provided the service. In checking on this 'discrepancy' with a few respondents, this is the reply that was forthcoming: 'True, our needs were met less and less, particularly in terms of housing and livelihoods, but after all these people seemed to work hard, and anyway we have said that our needs were not met so why should we repeat that again here? They have helped us, and we are not blaming them because they may have done their best.' This is not a rigorous analysis, but simply an attempt to demonstrate that claim-holder responses are very complex and context-sensitive.

[26] Op cit p16

[27] Op cit p22

[28] Op cit p21

[29] World Food Programme (2005) cited in Steele, Paul op. cit. p 6

[30] See, LTTE Needs Assessment of North-East (NENA), op. cit. p 23

[31] Steel, pp 6ff

[32] *Aid organisations are competing for a space in which to help by offering a diverse array of appealing livelihood assets. In the short term such practices may have a benefit on livelihoods as fisher-folk can immediately restart their trade. In the longer term however, the implications for sustainable livelihoods may be disastrous. Providing ad hoc assets without community consultation and participation in analyzing the potential impact on local relationships, market capacity and the environment could result in rapid degradation of available fish stocks. This would undermine livelihoods in the longer term and increase the likelihood of inter-communal tensions in an already ethnically charged conflict-affected environment.* (Harris 2005:34)

[33] This section is indebted to Steel, Paul op. cit. p 6ff

[34] Already in March 2005 the FAO issued a warning that the technical quality of some canoes provided did not meet safety standards.

[35] 'Post-tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation: A Violation of Human Rights, Report of a Fact-finding Mission to Tsunami-affected Areas of Tamil Nadu, India and Sri Lanka' Habitat International Coalition, August 2005, p 6

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ANNEX 1: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

No	Organisation	Name	Designation
01	TAFREN	Rohini Nanayakkara	Chief Executive Officer
02	TAFREN	Rachel Perera	Director, NGO/Civil Society/Donor Coordination
03	TAFREN	Yudish Omprasaadam	IT Specialist (in charge of DAD)
04	TAFREN	Ramesh N Selliah	Director, Housing, Urban Development & Environment
05	TAFREN	Kaushal Rajapaksha	Director – Livelihood
06	TAFREN	J.H.Bambarandage	Community Facilitator, Galle
07	TAFREN	A.D.Nanayakkara	Livelihood Project Coordinator – Galle
08	TAFREN	V.Kamaladhas	Livelihood Coordinator - Baticaloa
09 to 17	TAFREN-led Guiding Principles Meeting	09 participants representing UN, TAFREN, UNICEF, ADB	[To prepare Guiding Principles section of One Year Report]
18	Central Bank of Sri Lanka	Dr H N Thenuwara	Director, Economic Research
19	Ministry of Finance and Planning	Dr. Sarath Amunugama	Minister of Finance
20	Ministry of Education	Tara de Mel	Secretary
21	Ministry of Education	K.H.N.Premasiri	Director of Guidance and Counseling
22	Ministry of Education	Mr M J M Sameer	Assistant to Director, Guidance and Counseling
23	Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process	Jayantha Dhanapala	Secretary General
24	Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process	Seneka Abeyratne	Adviser
25	Ministry of Relief Rehabilitation & Reconciliation	Harim Peiris	Director General
26	Ministry of Public Security	Tilak Ranavirajah	Secretary
27	Ministry of Labour	Mahinda Madihahewa	Secretary
28	Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies	Jeevan Thiagarajah	Executive Director
29	World Vision	Yu Hwa Li	National Director
30	International Committee of Red Cross	Thierry Meyrat	Head of Delegation
31	UNDP	Miguel Bermeo	Resident Representative
32	UN RC Office	Pablo Ruiz Hiebra	Senior Coordination Adviser for Recovery
33	UNDP	Sanaka Samarasinha	Deputy Resident Representative
34	UNDP	Dev Anand Ramiah	Programme Specialist
35	UNDP	Dorine Fernando	Programme Officer

36	HIC	Nishanie Jayamaha	National Information Management Officer
37	THRU	Mr Dharmasena	Additional Government Agent For Tsunami Recovery
38	TAP	Mr Amaratunga	Coordinator, Galle
39	TAP	Mr Jeganathan	Coordinator, Batticaloa
40	UNDP, CADREP Program	Chandra Maliyadde	Project Manager
41	UNDP, Transition Program	Dr Gnana Sivapathasunderam	Senior Programme Officer, Jaffna
42	British High Commission	Mandeep Kaur-Garewal	
43	Ministry of Health	Marsha C. Davids	Psychosocial Trauma Unit
44	Southern Province	Ranjith Wickremaratne	Chief Secretary
45	District Secretariat, Hambanthota	M.A.Piyasena	Government Agent
46	District Secretariat, Galle	Asoka Jayasekara	Government Agent
47	Oxfam International	Claudette van Rijn	Monitoring & Evaluation Officer
48	Action Aid	Khurshid Alam	International Tsunami Programme Coordinator
49	Action Aid	Mr Pushpendra	International Tsunami Policy Coordinator
50	UNICEF	Dr.Yasmin Haq	Senior Programme Officer
51	UNFPA	Malathie Weerasooriya	Assistant Representative
52	WFP		
53	IOM	Christopher Gacon	Chief of Mission a.i.
54	FORUT	Paul Henrik Kielland	Resident Representative
55	Save the Children	Divya Lata	Emergency ECE Advisor
56	UNHCR		
57	USAID		
58	World Bank	Dr Naresha Duraiswamy	Senior Program Officer
59	Asian Development Bank	Dr Brian Smith	Post Conflict Specialist
60	GTZ	Dr Dietrich	Coordinator, Batticaloa
61	GTZ	Eng. K Devarajah	Deputy Team Leader, Batticaloa Field Office
62	GTZ	Kumar Gunaratnam	Consultant, Batticaloa
63	ILO		
64	FAO	Mona Chaya	
65	CARE International	Praveen Abhayaratne	Research & Advocacy Coordinator
66	CARE, Batticaloa	Mr Newton	
67	District Secretariat, Kilinochchi	Mr S.Rasanayagam	Government Agent
68	District Secretariat, Jaffna	Mr Ganeshan	Government Agent
69	District Secretariat, Batticaloa	Mr Puniyamoorthy	Government Agent
70	Northern Province Fishermen's Cooperative	Mr Thavaratnam	President
71	CORDAID	Mr Maharoof	Program Coordinator
72	DFID		

73	Norwegian Refugee Council	Siri Elverland	Communication Officer
74	Royal Norwegian Embassy	Eric F Brede	Counsellor
75	Norwegian Institute for Urban & Regional Research (NIBR)	Dr Marit Haug	Researcher
76	Results Matter Consulting	Abhijit Bhattacharjee, Director	DEC Evaluation Team Leader
77	Centre for Policy Alternatives	Dr P Saravanamuttu	Executive Director
78	INFORM, Women & Media Collective	Sunila Abeyasekera	Head UN Expert on NGOs
79	Shanthiyam, University of Jaffna	Prof. Daya Somasundaram	Professor of Psychiatry
80	HUDEC / Caritas	Rev.Fr. Jeyakumar	President
81	NGO Consortium, Jaffna	Mr Vigneshvaran	President
82	Lanka Humanitarian and Development Foundation	Rasaratnam Rajaram	Director
83	National Housing Development Authority, Batticaloa	Mr Jeganathan	Director
84	Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka	Mrs. Senanayake	
85	Presidential Task Force ?	Major Gen. Gamini Hettiarachchi	
86	Urban Development Authority, Batticaloa		Coordniator
87	NGO Consortium, Kilinochchi		President
88	Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation	Mr Thilagar	Director
89	Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation, Kilinochchi	Laurence Christy	Director, Planning Division
90	Women's Development Centre, Jaffna	Saroja Sivachandiran	Coordinator
91	LTTE Peace Secretariat, Kilinochchi		
92	Planning and Development Secretariat, Kilinochchi	Mr Maran	Deputy Director
93	Habitat Forum (CARE – led)		
94	UN OCHA	David Evans	
95	Fisheries Department, Batticaloa	Selvarajah	Asst. Director
96	Samasam, Fisheries Cooperative, Kathiraveli	Sathya	Secretary President
97	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit		Head of Unit, Batticaloa
98	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit	Gemunu Alawattegama	CEO, Colombo
99	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit	Dharmasiri De Alwis	Colombo
100	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit	Harsha S De Silva	Director – Planning and Coordination
101	Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit		Coordinator – Galle
102	North East Housing Reconstruction Unit		
103	Oxfam – Australia	Sarath Wijesiri	Coordinator – Hambantota

104	Ruhunu Rural Women's Organization (RGKS)	Ms Daya Dadallage	Director
105	Koralaipattu North Development Union (KPNDU)	Ms Parimala	Coordinator
106	Divisional Secretariat – Hikkaduwa	Ms. Kusum Piyarathne	Divisional Secretary
107	UNDP, Galle	Mr Kalansuriya	Coordinator / Team Leader
108	UNDP, Galle	Saman	Project Officer
109	Oxfam Australia	Subathra Yogasingham	Batticaloa District Coordinator
110	BRAC SriLanka	Mr.Rustom Ali	Regional Manager, Hambantota
111	BRAC SriLanka	Mr. M.A. Motin	BRAC Staff Member, Hambantota
112	BRAC SriLanka	Ms. Deepamala Jegadeevan Raj	Divisional Manager, Hambantota
113	Plan Sri Lanka	Mr. Thushara Marasinghe	Deputy District Coordinator
114	Sarvodaya – Hambantota	Ms. Daya Jayalath	Social Program Coordinator
115	Sarvodaya – Hambantota	Mr. Wasanta Deshapriya	District Legal Aid Coordinator
116	Sarvodaya – Hambantota	Mr. W.G. Waidyarathne	Former District Coordinator
117	SEEDS – Colombo	Mr.R. Wanigatunga	Engineer
118	Gemidiriya – Galle	Mr. Ajantha Weerathunga	Consultant
118 to 129	Oxfam Field Staff in the South	Wasantha Manamperi Chandrani Ubesinghe Samanthi Latha Neerthi Thanuja P.B.Rasika Kumari S.A.P.Nilanthi Ashoka Dissanayake D.K.Sarath M.S.B.Kumara Munasinghe L.M.Saman Jayantha Dissanayake	Representing 12 villages
130 to 138	Psychosocial Sector Working Group	09 members , including CIDA, IOM, UNFPA, Maltesa, IFRC, AAR, Min of Health	Also email correspondence with all 40 members of the network
139	Danish Development Cooperation Office	Jeanne Samuel	Programme Officer
140 to 184	Tsunami Evaluation Coalition – Briefing Workshop	Malteser Int. Caritas Sri Lanka CRWRC UNFPA Save The Children CHA Habitat For Humanity World Vision CCF World Bank French Embassy WHO	

		ILO Oxfam Australia Centre for Policy Alternatives Oxfam International Shelter For Life Fulbright Architects Without Borders Norwegian Refugee Council CHF TRO THRU FORUT CARE CIDA Tearfund ITDG UNICEF SLPSM SFC/WDC Italian Civil Protection Hambantota Chamber of Commerce Department of Foreign Aid	
185	Kobian Technologies	Krishan Thodore	Formally CNO, Min Foreign Affairs
186	TERM	Shivaji De Zoysa	Head
187	UNICEF	Sarah Graham	
188	UNICEF	Sheema Sen Gupta	
189	IOM – Baticaloa	Giovanni Cassani	Shelter Coordinator
190	IOM – Baticaloa	N Suthesh	Livelihood Assistant
191	UNDP	Kamal Kishore	Regional Advisor – Delhi
192	OCHA	Cecilia Kaijser	Batticaloa
193	NGO Council, Kilinochchi	E. Ganeshhpillai	President
194	Solidar/ASB	Ghada Ajami	Project Manager
195	Solidar/ASB	Florien Meyer	Program Manager
196 to 200	Wannankulum a Muham – Mullaitivu	05 Camp Members and Families	
201 to 207	Idathangal Muham – Mullaitivu	08 Camp Member families	
208	NHDA	Mr Jayanthan	District Manager, Batticaloa
209	THRU	Mr J Thavarajah	District Engineer, Batticaloa
210	BRAC – Jaffna	Wazedul Islam Pahlowan	Regional Coordinator
211 to 213	Fisheries Cooperative Union – Maradankerni	03 members of union	
214 to 219	Fisheries Cooperative Union, Alvai NW	06 members of society	
220 to 225	Fisheries Cooperative Union – Point Pedro	06 members	
226	Northern Province Fishermen's Cooperative Societies Union Ltd	Mr Thavaratam	President
227	UNHCHR	Rory Mungoven	Human Rights Adviser
228	UNDP	Mr Ramraj	International UNV (natural disaster specialist
229 to 243	KPNDU	Central Committee	

		Members (15)	
244 to 261	KPNDU	18 participants	Field Officers and other staff
262 to 271	Patchenai Village, Vaharai	10 villagers and their families	
272 to 285	Ooriyankattu Village, Vaharai	14 villagers and their families	
286 to 290	Thiruperunthurai Community Development Organization	05 Central Committee Members	
291 to 293	Thirayamadu Transitional Shelter Camp	04 Camp Committee Members	President Secretary & Members
294 to 298	Oxfam International Meeting	Cherian Matthews Rene de Vries P B Gowthaman Kris Eichmann	Oxfam Great Britain Humanitarian Program Manager, OGB Oxfam Australia Oxfam Hong Kong Oxfam Netherlands
299 to 308	Tsunami Coordination Team	UN agency focal points, IOM representative	
309 to 312	IOM Programme at Panichchankerni, Vaharai	04 families	Housing claim-holders and community members

ANNEX 2: CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1: UNDP's Role in Early Warning Systems and Disaster Risk Reduction

The TEC Capacities Claim-Holder Survey identified the need for greater awareness of natural disaster risk mitigation, which goes beyond the tsunami and covers floods, droughts and other more common calamities. In this sense, the following examples of good practice stand out in an overall context in which sufficient attention has not been paid to risk reduction and early warning systems. This approach by UNDP is very different from one that relies on the importation of sophisticated equipment and the training of metropolitan professionals, which appears to be the norm elsewhere. Moreover, it builds on the longer term partnerships established through an ongoing dialogue with the more advanced Indian program. The strategy is three-pronged and needs to be seen in its entirety to understand how the different components interact and mutually reinforce each other.

Basically, the intervention includes a hands-on field-level engagement through the UNVs with immediate and tangible results to affected communities, then moves out to the planning of a sustainable early warning system that incorporates responses to floods and drought as well as rarer occurrences such as the tsunami, and finally rests on a policy-advocacy intervention which has resulted in the passing of the Disaster Management Act and the establishment of a Disaster Management Centre. The facilitation of the work of the Parliamentary Select Committee has reaped rich dividends in their recommendation to relax the buffer zone, for instance. This achievement demonstrates the bottom-up and top-down linkages required for a successful strategic intervention of this kind.

Immediate deployment of UNV support

Within a few hours after the tsunami, disaster management UNVs were on the ground to support the district secretaries. Additional UNVs with experience in disaster response were also flown in from India through UNDP's Bureau of CPR in the first few days. These UNVs supported the GAs in information coordination, identification of needs, NGO coordination and in linking up with the CNO, and, in the words of one GA - 'a big help' and requested 'more people like them'.

Case Study 2: Vaharai, KPNDU Case Study

Vaharai is located in the Batticaloa district, a so-called 'uncleared area' 25 miles north of the district capital. It is in the Divisional Secretariat of Koralaipattu North, one of the most remote and insecure areas in the North-Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. The residents are among the poorest in the country, having suffered through two decades of conflict, and where even the ceasefire has had little effect as there are 'three regimes to deal with virtually on a daily basis'. The forests, which cover a large portion of the area, had been a great provider and almost a third of the population were solely dependent on it for survival, but this conflict has severely threatened this livelihood option. The area along the eastern coastal belt is traditionally known for fishing. There were many restriction on fishing, most of which were relaxed following the peace talks in January 2002.

Only one peripheral unit served the area's medical needs, and electricity was a luxury unavailable to the villagers. The tsunami struck 13 of the 16 Grama Niladhari divisions where 18,500 persons from 4625 families were directly affected by the 26 December tsunami. Of these 3,497 families were physically displaced and 318 people died. 197 of the dead, or 62 per cent were women, and 121 or 38 per cent were men, again demonstrating the disproportionate toll on women.

Koralai Pattu North Development Union (KPNDU) was formed in 1994 as a community organisation or CBO and has now developed its programs in 14 villages with a total population of 5,013 families. Of this total population, KPNDU members number 2,584, each representing his/her family, and formed into 474 small groups. KPNDU's members comprise 1,564 women and 1,020 men. The criteria of selection was poverty, and KPNDU had adopted a participatory poverty checklist which was used to identify the 'poorest of the poor'. They started working with savings groups and then after an impact study in 1999 decided to work with the poorest families who were found to have been excluded from their list of claim-holders, as they could not save monthly. They have been working in 14 GN divisions in the Koralaipattu Divisional Secretariat covering both Tamil and Muslim communities.

Over and above the years of destruction caused by conflict, the tsunami had a devastating effect on the eastern coast and almost all the people in this DS division were affected. Three thousand families were made homeless and another 2,000 completely lost their livelihoods. It is the worst affected area in the district. As most of the communities live in regularly contested areas, the relief and reconstruction operation is problematic.

The current reconstruction environment is saturated with new and old aid agencies, leading to competition for territory, claim-holders and publicity. Incoming agencies have exercised greater influence over local

authorities and tend to overlook local capacity and implement their programs directly. KPNDU coordinated the emergency relief assistance in 14 GN divisions and providing relief to 5,000 families in the area, putting a lot of effort into ensuring that tsunami-affected communities were actively engaged in the decision-making, coordination, distribution and management process. KPNDU was also instrumental in providing the necessary information tsunami-affected communities required to make informed decisions regarding resettlement issues.

They took responsibility for the distribution of food and non-food relief items to nine camps, mainly in the form of cooking utensils and dry rations in order that families were able to cook for themselves and thus regain some degree of normalcy and control over their lives. KPNDU also supported emergency, preventive and curative health activities including training on hygiene and health in selected camps. They strengthened the social infrastructure in camps by mobilising and supporting community-based camp committees.

As a result of the tsunami, 2,656 families were displaced to camps in the area, while the others stayed with relatives and friends in areas like Valachchenai. Most of the field staff and office bearers of the organisation have lost family, home and livelihood. The Coordinator, Parimalar, lost over 10 members of her extended family, as well as her home and all the family's possessions, but she has been working for the community from day one. This level of dedication and altruism is the stuff of real heroism.

KPNDU was able to achieve all this with a significant reduction of administrative and overhead costs in comparison with both government and NGOs. As has been reiterated elsewhere, the capacity to deliver relief in a cost-effective manner is crucial to any serious assessment of success. Excluding stipends for staff/volunteers and direct capital expenditure, during the first three months KPNDU spent over Rs 4,500,00 on the affected communities at 8 per cent total overhead cost, including transportation and communication expenditure. Up to end-November 2005, KPNDU had built nearly 700 transitional shelters, provided over Rs 10 million in livelihood support, conducted health and nutrition programmes, disbursed food and non-food relief items for over 2,000 families, as well as initiated capacity building and training programmes, costing over Rs 27.5 million. Of this only 3 per cent were overheads.

Of those in the camps only 1,201 were members of KPNDU, though the responsibility for administering all the camps during the first three months fell on the shoulders of the organisation. The first challenge was, therefore, for KPNDU to become accountable to the entire camp community and not merely its long-standing membership. What complicated this process was the fact that very poor and conflict-displaced

(but not tsunami-displaced) members of KPNDU were not deemed eligible to receive any assistance, and this led to soul-searching within the organisation.

How could they justify providing relief to non-members (who had been better off than their members, and who even now remained less needy than the conflict-affected members), while their own members suffered the same catastrophic loss of livelihood and housing (due to the conflict)? It was this existential question of justice and equity that prompted KPNDU to argue with donors and partner NGOs such as Oxfam Australia for an alternative modality and mechanism that would allow both conflict- and tsunami-affected families to receive urgent assistance on the basis of need alone.

In terms of their relationship with government officers and international donors, the situation has not been entirely without problems and misunderstandings. At first KPNDU's authority to handle such responsibility was questioned by others, due at least in part to the competition to work in this area. The TEC team also encountered some misgivings on the part of international agencies who felt that KPNDU did not have the 'capacity' to perform these onerous tasks, They also felt that KPNDU was 'preventing others from coming in to the area'. KPNDU's response was that others had already come in and made all sorts of serious mistakes and injustices due to ignorance and worse, and that KPNDU had responsibility by the community not to let this happen again. 'What capacities do we lack, they asked? Is it knowledge of English?' Our gentle probing of the INGO response also elicited unclear results. The levels of sophistication and analysis that was perceived as lacking in KPNDU were also not to be found in many other organisations that these NGOs were already working with. However, no claims or counter-claims of corruption or waste were made.

Regarding KPNDU's relationship with the local administration, we were informed that the previous Divisional Secretary was excellent, but that he had been transferred as 'he was in control of the area, and would not allow INGOs and/or other local/national forces to have their own way.' Though we were unable to verify this claim, our field work in Sri Lanka lends support to the thesis that weaker and less committed local government officials may be preferred by international and national agencies working in the area, as this allows them a freer rein.

KPNDU's current challenge is to integrate conflict-sensitivity into their tsunami reconstruction program. They have planned to use livelihoods as a means of bridging this divide. They also plan to supplement the mainstream response of asset replacement with asset creation for the poorest, thereby addressing equity issues as well. [The background material on KPNDU is derived mainly from Oxfam Australia's records]

ANNEX 3: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND STANDARDS

Table A.1: International Norms and Standards Relating to Engagement with Local Capacities

Standard or Criterion	Red Cross Code[1]	HRBA Guiding Principles	OECD/ DAC Evaluation Criteria[2]	Sphere Common Standards	UNDP Good Governance Principles	Other Principles and Norms[3]	TEC Capacities Evaluation Criteria
Non-Discrimination	✓	✓	Coverage	Response (Targeting)	Equitable		#3 Attention to the related concerns of equity, inclusion and downward accountability
Build on Local Capacities	✓	Empowerment	✓ Sustainability, Connectedness	Support of Personnel, Participation	Responsive	Subsidiarity	#2 Sustained and Respectful Engagement with local and national capacity
Participation	Involve Claim-holders	✓	Sustainability Connectedness	✓	Participatory decision-making, Consensus-orientation	Consultation, public engagement in decision-making; Full and consistent participation (WB)	#2
Accountability	✓	✓	Coherence	Aid-worker competence & responsibilities	✓	Downward Accountability	#3
Transparency					✓	Communication, Information-sharing	#3
Efficiency & Effectiveness			✓		✓	Coordination, Cost-effective, Timeliness	#1, 2 & 3

[1] In an evaluation of the first three months of Oxfam Australia's programmes in India and Sri Lanka, the Red Cross Code was complemented by the evaluation criteria nominated by the affected communities themselves, and this proved to be an interested counterpoint to the international standard and provided a mild corrective to the Northern-centricity of these norms and standards (see Parakrama, Arjuna 2005a)

[2] As included in the ALNAP Evaluation Proforma. Hence, this set of criteria is used as common to both to the ALNAP and DAC/OECD systems.

[3] This column is a composite 'hold-all' which includes standards and norms extracted from a range of other sources, including but not confined to those found in other tsunami evaluations, such as UNEP's Feb 2005 Cairo Principles and the World Bank's April 2005 response to the tsunami disaster.

Table A.1 (cont-d): International Norms and Standards Relating to Engagement with Local Capacities

Reduce Future Vulnerability	✓		Advocacy, Protection	Response		Environmental sensitivity, Disaster-risk preparedness	#1 Fostering an Enabling Policy Framework and Safe Environment that will Facilitate the Expression/ Exercise of National/Local Capacities
Linkage with International Standards		✓	✓	✓		Adherence to ICCPR and ICESCR	#1, 2 & 3
Respect for local culture & customs	✓		Relevance, Appropriateness		Strategic Vision	Context-sensitivity, Valuing local knowledge	2
Gender Sensitivity		Non-Discrimination	✓ Protection				#3
Reaching vulnerable and marginalised groups		✓ (Not optional)	✓	Participation, Initial Assessment		Pro-poor policies, affirmative action	#1, 2 & 3
Fostering an enabling policy framework and safe environment	Dignity in images	Empowerment Right to Information	Advocacy	Initial Assessment	Strategic Vision	Environmental sensitivity, Subsidiarity, channels of grievance resolution (WB)	#1 Including watchdog function

Note: A 'tick' denotes that the identical term has been used in the code/guidelines/principles under consideration.

Note on Guiding Principles for Measuring the International Tsunami Response

Arjuna Parakrama

The TEC Capacities study has identified the key need to relate, even integrate, the relief and early recovery 'humanitarian' response with medium-term 'development' concerns, in order to 'do no harm' to local and national capacities. This innovative juxtaposition of so-called humanitarian and development standards demonstrates clearly the similarity of goal and purpose that they share, hence reinforcing our point that the rigid distinction between these two types of intervention may, in fact, be overstated and unnecessary. While the above Table accounts for the international norms and shows their relationship to one another as well as to the criteria adopted by the TEC study, it still remains to be demonstrated that in the specific Sri Lankan case there is a consensus of such principles.

The first joint WB – ADB – JICA Needs Assessment (completed in January 2005) is the closest to a benchmark and baseline widely accepted by INGOs, national NGOs, the UN system and government, and is therefore the most frequently cited document in the assessment of the tsunami response. While we have issues regarding the (unstated) methodology, the top-down process, and the fact that this document still remains unshared with the communities whose very needs it claims to present/analyse, this report is important because it lays out the guiding principles, norms and standards governing the tsunami response that have gradually become the self-selected yardsticks of the supply-side of this response. These principles include:

- The Principle of subsidiarity: each reconstruction activity should be designed and implemented at the lowest competent tier of government – allowing for locally appropriate solution and a range of sub-national structures and organisations to be directly engaged in the process.
- Enhanced and solid **consultation** with local affected communities and stakeholders is essential, and **local communities should be empowered to make their own decisions** during recovery, and participate fully in reconstruction activities.
- Better **communication and transparency** in decision-making and implementation. Mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure access to information regarding policies, entitlements and implementation procedures, and to permit more regular feedback to implementing authorities, as well as **grievance redress.**.
- Reconstruction should **reduce future vulnerabilities** to a wider spectrum of natural hazards in Sri Lanka.

- Individual interventions need to consider their potential impact on the cease fire and prospects for peace, and also incorporate considerations such as **governance, gender-sensitivity, environment**, resettlement/land issues and human rights concerns.
- A **coordinated approach** is critical – agencies should 'adopt behaviour that will minimise the burden on stretched government administration, not least by maximizing their own coordination.'

These have been adopted by other agencies and there is now an emerging consensus, on paper at least, to what CIDA refers to as 'Sri Lanka Guiding Principles for Tsunami Recovery: Summary'. Even the LTTE Needs Assessment of the North-East posits the requirement of a consultative and participatory process, and all of the key project documents that were shared with us include elements relating to consultation/participation and enhancing local capacities. The existence and acceptance of these principles constitutes a real advance in the tsunami response process, though it is hoped that a Human Rights Based Approach may also inform these norms in the future.

This also complements the work done in February 2005 when the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Tsunami Task Force developed 12 guiding principles, known as the Cairo Principles, which recognise that 'how things are done is as important, sometimes more important, than what is done', emphasizing that:

- local knowledge and insights are critically important to successful planning and decision-making
- public engagement is necessary in local decision-making
- public participation should be enhanced through capacity building and the effective utilisation of all means of communications.

A number of other documents and consultations support this view that local capacities need to be facilitated and enhanced in the humanitarian response in Sri Lanka. Key elements in this process have been identified as:

- Subscription to international standards
- Consultation and participation
- Transparency and communication: about the nature of assistance programmes and their implementation – the right of information and the duty of agencies to disclose
- Grievance processes: mediation and arbitration facilities
- Maximizing economic recovery by strengthening local capacities

- Capacitating disaster preparedness and reducing vulnerabilities at the community level[4]

The task of the various TEC Evaluations become easier in this context since the key parameters of Equity and Non-Discrimination as well as Conflict-Sensitivity can be extrapolated from these principles and, therefore, do not need to be belaboured here.[5] In fact, the joint one year report, *Tsunami: Building Back Better Sri Lanka Achievements, Challenges and Way Forward,* which was a collaborative effort bringing together Government, the UN system and the IFIs, International NGOs and bilaterals and (Colombo-based) Civil Society Organisations and Think-Tanks, though still in draft form, takes this one step further and explicitly includes equity, even to the extent of advocating a form of 'affirmative action' or targeted intervention. Chapter VIII (p. 71 ff) which outlines these principles, measuring progress against them, is worth citing in detail as it is the clearest statement of the equity-conflict sensitivity-marginalisation nexus that has appeared in the mainstream literature on the tsunami response. This is all the more important as it is a document with a virtually universal supply-side ownership.

- **Identified needs and local priorities**

  Any recovery process has to be carried out according to the identified needs and local priorities of the community in question. This requires sensitivity to existing and emerging differences between geographic areas, various groups (e.g. Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim), gender and individuals (e.g. Tsunami and conflict affected IDP, poor and non-poor) at every stage of the recovery process. Equity in the allocation of resources is a critical dimension of the recovery process.

  At the outset, a considerable number of people subscribed to the rhetoric of the tsunami as an 'equal-impact disaster' that cut across geographic, ethnic, religious, class, socio-cultural and gender differences. However, the identification of needs and local priorities has shown that different geographic regions, communities, groups as well as individuals were impacted differently, and hence some were more disadvantaged than others. It is of special importance to consider that approximately two-thirds of the impact and reconstruction needs were in the conflict affected areas of the North East. . . .

[4] "Evolving Role of the NGO sector in Post-Tsunami Recovery in Sri Lanka" Jeevan Thiagarajah, Executive Director, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, May 2005

[5] Please see the TEC Capacities Evaluation's Thematic Report for a detailed analysis and synthesis of appropriate norms and principles that should govern humanitarian interventions in complex emergencies and link them to longer-term sustainable development.

> The recovery process should continue to be underpinned by a sound assessment of needs and priorities and a nuanced sensitivity to differences. What is required in the year to come is, firstly, a mechanism for consolidating the identification of needs and local priorities and sharing of information with a view to avoiding duplication of effort (for example, consolidating a list of claim-holders used for the provision of assistance). Second, it is important to move beyond rhetorical references to disadvantaged groups and to pay closer attention to the new forms of vulnerability that have emerged as a result of the tsunami disaster (for example, the conflict affected victims, orphaned children, widowed men and women, single-headed households, etc). Finally, as the recovery process moves into its second year, it is important that stakeholders pay attention to the cross-intersection between tsunami recovery and longer-term development. This calls for a wider net of interventions that, among other things, include those groups that are peripherally affected by the tsunami as well as those groups that are typically marginalised in the development process, particularly the conflict-affected and the poor. These people's needs were somewhat eclipsed by the tsunami recovery effort in the past year.' [p. 71]

The invocation of 'identified needs and local priorities' which includes 'sensitivity to existing and emergent differences' of location, ethnicity, gender, class, conflict-effect etc., and the reiteration that equity is phase-sensitive (e.g. different at different stages of the recovery process) is remarkably nuanced. The proposed agenda to address inequality is clearly outlined. The differential impact of the tsunami (two-thirds of the reconstruction needs are in the war-ravaged North-East Province) combines with the creation of 'new forms of vulnerability' (such as conflict-affected victims, orphaned children), all this needs to be addressed in terms of the 'cross-intervention between tsunami recovery and longer-term development'. To this end, 'a wider net of interventions' must be cast to include groups 'peripherally affected by the tsunami' and those 'typically marginalised in the development process, particularly the conflict-affected and the poor.' Finally, there is an acknowledgement that in the first year the tsunami response has not addressed the needs of these groups. The TEC Capacities Country Report has unpacked this guiding principle in such detail, echoing the one year report, as we feel this represents a paradigm that can and should be applied even in other national contexts.

The other guiding Principles include the following:

- **Subsidiarity**

  The success of a recovery effort depends in part on the application of subsidiarity, whereby recovery activities are decentralised and localised to the maximum degree possible. This requires an environment that facilitates bottom-up decision-making, supports flexible and creative procedures and builds and sustains capacities and competencies at all levels of authority.

  This principle parallels the criterion 'nurturing an enabling environment and creating safe contexts for the exercise of local and national capacity' espoused by the TEC Capacities Team.

- **Consultation with local affected communities and stakeholders**

  A good recovery process must engage in systematic and sustained consultation with affected communities and stakeholders, to empower survivors to make their own decisions regarding recovery and participate fully in reconstruction activities as well as to ensure that the recovery takes places in due accordance to local needs and with due respect to local culture and structures.

- **Communication and transparency**

  The tsunami recovery process has to be underpinned by a systematic and deliberate effort to ensure communication and transparency at all levels. This requires that those engaged in the recovery process make concerted efforts to adopt mechanisms and measures to ensure communication and transparency. It also requires a vibrant civil society that demands this of all actors throughout the process.

- **Reduce future vulnerabilities**

  The '*Build Back Better'* commitment also means that future vulnerabilities ought to be reduced. Risk has to be factored in the recovery process (as when land planning for new sites) in order to be able to reduce disaster risk.

- **Analysis of individual interventions**

  The recovery processes should be analyzed for their potential impact on the cease-fire and the prospects for peace, and, for long-term sustainability, such interventions should also incorporate considerations such as governance, gender-sensitivity, environment, resettlement/land issues and human rights concerns. The process should be guided by international standards and best practice for protection, with special attention to the needs of vulnerable groups. While protection issues,

gender sensitivity and environment have been addressed in the report, it is extremely difficult to measure impact on the cease-fire and the prospects for peace.

- **Debt Relief**

  Sri Lanka's scheduled total external debt service payments in 2005 (excluding to the IMF) amounted to $546 million, of which $143 million on account of interest payments, and $403million on account of principal repayments. To assist Sri Lanka in addressing a potentially sizable need for foreign exchange following the tsunami, the Paris Club members decided to extend a 1-year moratorium on about $260 million in unpaid debt service payments falling due in 2005, of which $76 million in interest and $164 million in principal repayments

- **Coordination**

  A coordinated recovery process is essential for ensuring the maximum utilisation of resources and for preventing duplication and replication of interventions. A coordinated approach includes the development of and subscription to structures that lend themselves to coordination, a systematic and sustained process of information-sharing across stakeholders and culture of open communication among the same. Where necessary, it also requires the development of capacities for improved coordination.

Two principles which require explicit formulation are (a) commitment to gender equity, and (b) instituting mechanisms of downward accountability, though they are both implicitly contained in the above framework. It is also a measure of the fragility of political sensitivities involved that the principle of 'conflict sensitivity' which was contained in both the Joint Assessment and CIDA Guiding Principles has been watered down under the heading 'Analysis of individual interventions,' but nonetheless this document remains an important effort that needs to be recognised and developed further.

ANNEX 4: STAKEHOLDER MATRIX

STAKEHOLDERS/ LEVELS	Government Central District Local	Military	Private Sector	General Public (not directly affected)	National / District NGOs	International Agencies	CBOs	Traditional Religious / Community Leadership	Other (Subaltern Groups)
HQ / International		Security in Indonesia & Sri Lanka			---	Planning thru RADICCAL Staff capacity	--	--	--
National	Policy ---- ----		Mobilizing resources		Advocacy		--	--	--
Sub-National / District	----- Service Delivery Transparency Accountability -----		Mobilizing resources		Institutional Strengthening	Maximizing Local capacity resources	?	?	--
Sub-District / Village / Community	----- ------ Service Delivery + Accountability	Service Delivery in conflict areas	--	Assisting during first phase	Institutional Strengthening, Training	Maximizing consultation, accountability	Ensure broad participation		Minimizing elite capture
Sub-Village / Sub-Community / Marginalised Group (Subaltern)	----- ------ Service Delivery + Accountability	Service Delivery in conflict areas	--	Assisting during first phase	?	Targeting, accountability	Reaching most vulnerable, marginal Immediate Emergency Response		Accessing resources, participating in decision-making Immediate Emergency Response

ANNEX 5: CLAIM-HOLDER SURVEY QUANTITATIVE QUESTIONS

1. How well were your needs provided in the first week after the tsunami?
2. How well were your needs provided in the first three months after the tsunami?
3. How well were your needs provided in the next five months after that?
4. How accessible and responsive were government officials to your concerns?
5. How accessible and responsive were international agencies to your concerns?
6. How accessible and responsive were local agencies to your concerns?
7. How accessible and responsive were community leaders to your concerns?
8. How appropriate were the rules/decisions that affected you after the tsunami?
9. What is your view of the longer-term impact of the tsunami assistance on you?
10. How well did the tsunami response use your skills and abilities?
11. How would you assess the changes in capacities that took place as a result?
12. How reliable/dependable were the agencies that worked in your village?
13. How suitable was the response to the tsunami in the way affected your village?
14. How well did the tsunami response take into account women, children and most vulnerable groups?
15. How useful do you think were the consultations held at the community level regarding providing you with goods and services, including housing?
16. In general, how do you rate the international assistance to the tsunami?