June 2013 • Discussion paper

Reflections on the inequities of humanitarian assistance

Possible courses of action for Germany

Andrea Binder, Kai Koddenbrock, András Horváth

GPPi
global public policy institute

Imprint

Disclaimer

This discussion paper was prepared by the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) and financed by the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt). The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Auswärtiges Amt.

Auswärtiges Amt

Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Reinhardtstr. 7
10117 Berlin
Phone: +49 • 30 • 275 959 75-0
Fax: +49 • 30 • 275 959 75-99
gppi@gppi.net • www.gppi.net

Authors: Andrea Binder, Kai Koddenbrock, András Horváth

Published: June 2013

Table of contents

Executive summary 2

1 Introduction 6

2 What is inequity in humanitarian assistance and is it a problem? 7

2.1 A paradigm shift: From 'forgotten crises' and 'underfunded sectors' to inequity in humanitarian assistance 7

2.2 Dimensions of humanitarian inequity 8

2.3 Humanitarian needs and distributive principles 10

3 Why is there inequity in humanitarian assistance? 14

4 The inequity of German humanitarian response 17

4.1 The German Foreign Office perspective 17

4.2 The NGO perspective 20

5 Courses of action – a bold basis for discussion 22

Course of action 1: Continue current practice, but make it more coherent: The results-based approach 23

Course of action 2: Change the current practice to tackle unintended global humanitarian inequity: The results-based approach with a global ambition 24

Course of action 3: Change the current practice to refocus on the neediest: The selective duty-based approach 25

Annex 1: Existing mechanisms to tackle the inequity of global humanitarian assistance 27

ECHO's Forgotten Crisis Assessment 27

UN OCHA Central Emergency Response Fund (Underfunded Emergencies Window) 28

The IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund 30

Government donors: Sweden and the UK 30

Bibliography 33

About GPPi 41

About the authors 42

Acronyms

AA .... German Foreign Office, Auswärtiges Amt
ALNAP .... Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
BMZ .... Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
CAP.............. Consolidated Appeals Process
CDAC............ Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities initiative
CERF............. Central Emergency Response Fund
CNN .... Cable News Network
DETA .... Development-oriented emergency and transitional aid
DFID............. British Department for International Development
DREF .... IFRC's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
DRK.............. German Red Cross, Deutsches Rotes Kreuz
ERC .... Emergency Response Coordinator
ESÜH............ Entwicklungsorientierte Struktur- und Übergangshilfe
EU................ European Union
FCA .... ECHO's Forgotten Crisis Assessment
GHD............. Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative
GIZ............... Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GNA .... Global Needs Assessment
IASC .... Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC .... International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC .... International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHL................ International humanitarian law
IOM .... International Organization of Migration
LRRD .... Linking relief, rehabilitation and development
MSF.............. Medicines Sans Frontiers
NGO............. Non-governmental organization
OCHA .... UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
SIDA............. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
THW............. Technisches Hilfswerk
UFE .... CERF underfunded emergency window
UK .... United Kingdom
UN .... United Nations
UNHCR .... United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF .... United Nations Children's Fund

Executive summary

For nearly two decades there has been growing concern within international humanitarian assistance with 'forgotten crises' and 'underfunded sectors'. These terms were conceived as an advocacy tool to help mobilize funds and awareness. They have helped to raise the profile of humanitarian actors and divert attention to places and people in need, which are often overlooked.

In this discussion paper we aim to consider the problem of forgotten crises and underfunded sector less from an advocacy and fund-raising perspective, but rather from a normative-analytical angle that identifies the underlying conceptual and normative issues. We therefore suggest abandoning the terms 'forgotten crises' and 'underfunded sectors' for the purposes of this paper. Instead, we will talk about inequity as uneven distribution of financial resources and political attention across places, sectors and population groups.

Given the limited financial and political means available, we consider inequities within global humanitarian assistance to be inevitable. The internet has ensured that information is constantly accessible, but the sum of our priorities and actions produces and sustains varying levels of political and financial attention to crises. The decisions of donors and humanitarian organizations, taken within the confines of limited resources, produce global inequities in humanitarian response. Addressing this imbalance does not automatically imply their equalization; it may well mean that we accept the disparity as the intended or unintended result of our moral choices.

In chapter 2 we hone in on normative principles of distribution and the basic understanding of need. We argue that there are two core normative principles at play in current humanitarian assistance – the principles of duty-based and results-based distribution. The duty-based principle gives priority to those with the greatest need and tends to abstract from all other practical concerns like media attention, interests, institutional path-dependencies and cost-effectiveness. Results-based distribution, by contrast, strives to reduce overall need and integrates all the practical factors shaping humanitarian assistance.

Despite all discussion of resilience, vulnerability and rights, need remains the key rallying call for humanitarian assistance. Building on four sources of uncertainty concerning the nature of human need – the definition of need, whether we can ever know the needs of others, how we can measure them and how we can respond to them – we argue that there is reason to complement a biological with a social understanding of need. Moreover, given the uncertainty about the nature of human need, the needs declarations by those concerned should become a major priority. This creates the possibility of dealing with the reality of German

humanitarian assistance in a new way, since German humanitarian practice has never as yet worked according to a narrow understanding of need.

Chapter 3 delves more deeply into the reasons for the inequities of humanitarian assistance. It takes stock of the broad academic literature on humanitarian decision-making and provides a nuanced panorama of the factors shaping humanitarian assistance beyond identified need. These factors include imperfect information, the media's attention cycles, political interests, historical and cultural ties and the mandates and specialization of humanitarian agencies.

While chapters 2 and 3 are a general analysis, chapter 4 focuses on the (in)equity of *German* humanitarian assistance. The AA is set to reform the way it conducts humanitarian action. Until now, a range of factors has shaped the AA's humanitarian decision-making: the structure of the humanitarian budget, the capacities and priorities of partner organizations, external pressure, assessed needs, and the perceived value added and political priorities within the foreign office. Similar factors determine NGO decision-making and action: the availability of funds, the feasibility of the operation, media coverage, the needs of the affected population, and the perceived added value of an NGO engaging in a specific crisis.

This variety of factors indicates that there is an inherent normative tension within German humanitarian assistance with regards to the applied distributive principle: while language implies a commitment to duty-based (i.e. impartial) humanitarian assistance, practice is implicitly shaped by the idea of added value and the requirements of developmental humanitarian assistance, reflecting a results-based approach.

Chapter 5 develops three courses of action for German Foreign Office to address humanitarian inequities. They are meant to be food for thought, not prescriptions of the next steps. The *results-based approach* aims to be transparent and predictable about the reality of selective and long-term oriented German humanitarian assistance, in order to further strengthen the good working relationship between the AA and its partners. The *results-based approach with a global ambition* aims to tackle the inequities of global humanitarian assistance by channeling funds and investing political attention to those places, sectors and groups that have received too little attention based on a broad conception of need. The selective duty-based approach, then, accepts the reality of selective assistance, but aspires to be absolutely needs-based where German humanitarian assistance becomes active. This leads to a much stronger focus on longer-term assistance, preparedness and *community-based* programming since these are the needs repeatedly expressed by those concerned in many of the current humanitarian crises in different parts of the

world. The focus on the German Foreign Office in this chapter does not mean that German NGOs do not have a role to play in reforming German humanitarian assistance. They too, need to think about the distributive principle they want to apply and align their actions accordingly. However, developing courses of action for the NGOs would have meant to treat them as a collective actor. Given the differing mandates, histories and capacities of these organizations we felt that this approach would be unsuitable.

The discussion paper deliberately focuses on German humanitarian assistance. The role other donors, NGOs, international organizations, local governments and communities could play in addressing the inequity in humanitarian assistance is only addressed at the margins of this study.

1 Introduction

For its annual retreat 2013, the German *Koordinierungsausschuss Humanitäre Hilfe*, bringing together the Foreign Office, relevant other ministries and German humanitarian organizations, chose the longstanding topic of forgotten crises and underfunded sectors and the quest for better ways to deal with them as its focus. This reflection paper aims to provide input to this discussion.

Forgotten crises and underfunded sectors have been on the minds of humanitarian actors for a long time. This paper does not therefore look to reinvent the wheel. However, by adopting a reflective style we hope to elucidate some underlying issues and concepts which are rarely made explicit in the practical discussion about what we term the inevitable inequities of international humanitarian action. We chose this approach because we think a retreat is the perfect moment to take the time to reflect on the essence of problems humanitarians usually have to deal with operationally and under time pressure.

Basing our arguments on the literature of political philosophy[1] and humanitarianism, we aim to help practitioners reflect upon the implicit difficult moral choices involved in allocating financial and political resources for humanitarian purposes. However, the paper is not an academic exercise of navel-gazing. Instead, we show that the underlying philosophical and sociological issues have direct policy implications.

Our analysis of the reasons for international humanitarian inequity and German humanitarian practice reveals that particular moral choices and the resulting actions consolidate or modify the level of inequity in humanitarian assistance. Each choice and subsequent course of action has its strengths and weaknesses. This paper highlights the logic and potential implications of three courses of action in order to stir discussion about a coherent, transparent and courageous approach for the German government and NGOs to deal with humanitarian inequities.

The paper is built on an extensive review of the academic literature on humanitarian decision-making of the last ten years, key works of political philosophy and the grey literature on forgotten crises, as well as the relevant strategies and concept notes of donors and agencies active in this issue area. Furthermore, we conducted 13 in-depth interviews with German Foreign Office and NGO staff, donors and the UN. The AA perspective is based on interviews with officers from the UN division, the humanitarian division, regional divisions and the policy planning division. It is also based on a review of the recent evaluation of German humanitarian assistance and key policy documents and reports. The NGO perspective is based on interviews with German NGO managers.

1 The authors thank Jahel Queralt for her invaluable philosophical input during the early stages of the research process.

This is by no means an exhaustive piece of research. This paper serves to highlight issues that are clearly recurrent after a limited number of interviews. One particular limitation is the number of interviews we could conduct with other bilateral donors. To understand the constraints and choices of other governments, a considerable amount of further research would have been necessary. Therefore we chose to provide the limited information we have in an annex to this paper rather than including it within the main text. The triangulation with existing research, however, makes us confident that the concerns identified have fairly wide purchase in the international and German humanitarian realm.

2 What is inequity in humanitarian assistance and is it a problem?

'Forgotten' crises and 'underfunded' sectors have been part of humanitarian reflection and advocacy for nearly twenty years. Various instruments to tackle the problem have been developed (see annex 1), but the overall issue remains the same: Humanitarian assistance is not evenly balanced across countries and sectors, but has its hotspots and voids. From a moral perspective, these inequities do not themselves constitute a problem. Whether they have the potential to become one, however, depends on the normative underpinnings of the humanitarian assistance provided. That is, only if donors and humanitarian agencies root their actions in a clearly defined normative principle can we decide whether and if so how to address 'forgotten' crises and 'underfunded' sectors.

2.1 A paradigm shift: From 'forgotten crises' and 'underfunded sectors' to inequity in humanitarian assistance

There is rarely enough assistance to address humanitarian needs. The United Nations' (UN) consolidated appeals (CAPs) and those of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) tend not to be fully funded.[2] The general expectation is that more money could help address more needs.[3] Therefore, humanitarian agencies had to devise strategies to attract more funding. Labelling a crisis 'forgotten' or a sector 'underfunded' was one of them because the terms resonated well with policy makers and the general public.[4]

Humanitarian agencies such as the ICRC and Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) started to use the term in the 1990s to point to particularly needy places *within* and *beyond* their assistance portfolio.[5] The urgency expressed by the term 'forgotten crisis' differs from the more technical 'underfunded sector'. The term 'underfunded sectors' has become humanitarian parlance with the rise of the cluster system and the evolution of the CAP.

2 About 20-40% of the CAPs have gone unmet between 2000 and 2011 (Development Initiatives 2012: 63).

3 Note that this expectation is contrary to the views of many recipients who rather want "smarter aid" as they feel that currently "too much is given too fast" (Anderson et al 2012: 2).

4 German NGO, Bonn, personal interview, May 2, 2013; Rubin 1996; Pratt 1999; International Crisis Group 2006; Green and Mitchell 2007; Fitzgerald 2009; Kokrajhar 2012; Food and Agriculture Organization 2002; AFP 2003; WHO 2004; World Food Programme 2006; Foulkes 2011.

5 See, for example, ICRC news release "Geneva/Bern: ICRC and Swiss Red Cross launch joint campaign for victims of forgotten conflicts," available online at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jlzj.htm, accessed February 28, 2014.

But what does it actually mean to say that a crisis is 'forgotten' or a sector 'underfunded'? These advocacy terms are vivid expressions of inequities of global humanitarian assistance. However, they also scandalize a phenomenon – some places, sectors and population groups receive more resources than others – that is arguably inevitable. There is not the political will, the financial means and the operational access to globally help all people in need. Donors are increasingly wary of sensationalist tactical language and the methods for identifying and measuring 'forgottenness' are controversial.[6] Considering the ambiguities of the terms 'forgotten crises' and 'underfunded sectors', we suggest abandoning them for the purposes of this input paper, to allow for a more informed approach to the challenges of humanitarian inequity.

Inequity denotes, for us, the uneven distribution of financial resources and political attention across places, sectors and population groups. We argue that looking at the various *dimensions of inequity* of humanitarian assistance better captures the underlying issues of humanitarian inequity. This approach enables donors and humanitarian agencies alike to decide more calmly on their priorities without a language that ultimately distracts from the underlying problem: In the age of the internet little is forgotten but our priorities and actions interact to produce and sustain different levels of political and financial attention to crises. Yet, these discrepancies may not reflect our moral choices. Responding to these inequities, however, does not necessarily imply to even them out; it may well mean that we accept them as intended or unintended results of our moral choices.

2.2 Dimensions of humanitarian inequity

The humanitarian principles appeal to a *global* and *all-encompassing* capacity of humanitarian response. Yet, donors and humanitarian organizations make decisions with an awareness of their limited resources. Humanitarian assistance of individual actors is thus by nature selective. The accumulated results of these individual choices constitute the global inequities of humanitarian response. There are three dimensions of humanitarian inequity:

1. Lack of financial attention: humanitarian funds are distributed unevenly across geographical spaces, different sectors and specific population groups who all face humanitarian needs.[7]

6 German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 27 and May 2 and 10, 2013; another example is that Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) started in 1998 to issue an annual top ten list of forgotten humanitarian crises. The list named crises that received much less relative coverage in major US nightly newscasts than what was considered appropriate by MSF's field staff. In 2010 the list was abandoned because its methodology had attracted increasing criticism.

7 The 2012 ALNAP State of the Humanitarian System report negotiates the relationship between funding and needs under the headlines of 'coverage/sufficiency' and 'relevance/appropriateness' (ALNAP 2012: 43-52). The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report uses the term 'proportionality' (Development Initiatives 2012: 67-69).

2 Lack of political attention: donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tend to engage much more actively in gaining access, promoting international humanitarian law or coordinating their actions in some situations than in others. They also tend to focus their political attention in a crisis on one population group (e.g. children) to the detriment of another (e.g. the elderly).

3 Lack of participation: the needs assessed by the humanitarian community and the needs articulated by the affected population do not correspond to one another.[8]

In practice, we know relatively little about the real dimensions of global humanitarian inequity. At first sight, humanitarian inequity appears as follows:



Source: Development Initiatives (2012: 30)

8 Anderson et al 2012; Binder and Grünewald 2010.

Some places – Sudan, Palestine, Afghanistan – received much more financial attention than other countries, which do not even figure in the graph above, e.g. the Central African Republic.

In per capita terms, inequity means that in 2010 and 2011, for instance, Haitians received $1.167, Libyans $307 and Ivoirians $159 in humanitarian assistance per person.[9] However, these numbers are not particularly revealing as we do not know whether operations in Haiti are more expensive than those in Libya and we do not know whether needs were greater in Libya than in the Ivory Coast and so on. In addition, there is little data on the lack of financial attention given to different population groups. Did children in Ivory Coast receive aid to the detriment of the elderly or girls at the detriment of boys? On the other hand, we do know a bit more about sectoral imbalances. Globally, the food sector is the best covered and early recovery, protection (particularly child protection) and education the worst.[10]

With regards to political attention, our knowledge about inequities is severely limited. Much of humanitarian diplomacy takes place behind closed doors. We will never know how many hours of staff time of the ICRC or foreign offices currently go into negotiations with Syria's government to start respecting international humanitarian law (IHL) and allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. We will never know the amount of resources that currently go into making the global humanitarian response discern the different needs of women, girls, boys and men and so on.

2.3 Humanitarian needs and distributive principles

The debate over humanitarian inequity is intrinsically linked to identified humanitarian need. Despite attempts to promote alternative basic concepts like vulnerability, risk or capacity, need continues to feature as the core normative concept of humanitarian assistance.[11] Interestingly, the centrality of need in today's humanitarianism is at odds with the ever-present notion that there is an obligation to support people and countries in peril. The idea that the better-off are *obligated* to assist implies that the recipients are *entitled* to help. Longstanding debates on rights-based humanitarian assistance frequently draw on this assumption.[12] In the course of these debates, the term charity has gained a negative connotation.

9 ALNAP 2012: 44.

10 ALNAP 2012: 45.

11 Darcy and Hofmann 2003: 17; Anderson et al 2012; IASC 2006; Geneva Conventions and Protocols; Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative 2003, European Commission 2008; German Federal Foreign Office 2012; German Federal Foreign Office and BMZ 2012: 3.

12 Slim 2002.

Nevertheless, focusing on needs rather than entitlements makes humanitarian assistance an act of charity, not an act of justice. Charity means using one's own resources to help people in need at reasonable cost to oneself. That is, it is morally defensible to do selective humanitarian assistance and focus your resources to help a certain group of people in need.[13]

The concept of need itself – as opposed to the practice of needs assessment – is rarely discussed in the humanitarian domain.[14] Yet to come to terms with the question of whether and how to tackle humanitarian inequity, it is essential to address the concept of need comprehensively by asking:

1 What are human needs?

2 Can we know the needs of others?

3 How can we measure needs?

4 How can we respond to needs?

When asked *what needs are*, political philosophers debate whether needs are purely physical or whether social needs and the need for autonomy are just as important. The same question informs the humanitarian debate on whether assistance should be only life-saving or whether it should also address livelihood, education and other developmental needs. We argue that humanitarian assistance – to keep its promises to save lives and restore dignity – must conceptualize human needs both as physical *and* social needs. Humanitarians must therefore respond to both physical needs and so-called 'autonomy needs' of the individual.[15] Autonomy needs are a precondition for living a life in dignity and they are all too often neglected by international humanitarian assistance.[16]

Philosophers have long pondered the question *whether we can know the needs of others*. In his brilliant essay "The Needs of Strangers" Michael Ignatieff (1984) comes to the conclusion that, ultimately, we cannot, because need is a lot about individual identity which can only be *communicated*, not identified from afar. In the humanitarian field, his claim is backed by evidence: According to ALNAP, only 20 per cent of polled recipients said that the aid they received addressed their most important needs.[17] Following this insight has clear policy implications. It means

13 Valenti 2012: 492.

14 Representative of a large body of literature: Ignatieff 1984; Hamilton 2003; Nussbaum 2003; Sen 2009; Darcy and Hofmann 2003; Binder et al 2011; DARA 2009.

15 Hamilton 2003: 21ff.

16 Hamilton 2003; Anderson et al 2012.

17 ALNAP 2012: 48; The 'Listening Project' by the CDA Collaborative Learning identifies needs that are also significantly different from what humanitarian assistance provides (Anderson et al 2012: 17ff).

that needs assessments must be accepted as a 'best guess' and that the articulation of needs by the affected population must have priority over the results of needs assessments, depending on the normative convictions held by the concerned.

Need is a concept that stresses a shortage. Asking, for instance, Haitians what they need instead of what they *have* yields completely different answers and concomitant responses. Building on capacities and existing assets would enable humanitarian action to become more sustainable, preventive and in line with the priorities of the concerned. The question about *how we measure needs*, then, turns into one about how we better listen to the preferences of affected populations. The evidence from Mary Anderson's ambitious 'Listening project' strongly backs this approach.[18]

Finally, *how to respond to needs* – whether imperfectly measured or directly articulated by the affected population? Although rarely made transparent or evaluated, donors and humanitarian organizations allocate their resources based on two main distributive principles:[19]

1. Duty-based distribution refers to the moral duty to help a person in need. It gives strict priority to the *neediest* in absolute terms because it is considered the morally most pressing thing to do. All others would only get assistance once the neediest were helped. The concern is individual need. The underlying ethical belief is that the intention for the assistance is more important than its result.[20]

2. Results-based distribution strives to reduce overall need.[21] Assistance must be delivered in so that it reduces *the sum of total needs*. That is, assistance should be provided where it has the highest chance of being effective. Effectiveness implies both that a humanitarian organization chooses to become involved on the basis of its comparative advantage and that beneficiaries are chosen on the basis of their potential to help reduce the sum of

18 Anderson et al 2012.

19 This is a gross simplification of the many nuances of the debate in political philosophy. This two-pronged structure, however, serves a useful role in helping us articulate our position in this reflection paper. Rubenstein, for example discusses a third distributive principle, proportional distribution. This approach contributes to the overall equality of satisfied needs by giving proportionally more to the needier and less to the less needy. The underlying ethical believe is again that the result of the assistance is more important than the intention. Yet, the goal is equality more than reduction of need. Since this principle does not play an explicit or implicit role in German humanitarian assistance, we exclude it from the discussion (Rubenstein 2008: 232-234). Political philosopher Thomas Pogge explains the proportionalist view well in his 'Moral Priorities of International Human Rights NGOS' (2006: 229; fn. 23).

20 This resonates with Max Weber's distinction between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics of conviction mad in his famous 'Politics as Vocation' (Weber 2004 [1919]).

21 In political philosophy 'results-based' distribution is usually called 'consequentialist' (Cf. Pogge 2006). We prefer here the label 'results-based' to indicate that results are morally prioritized over intentions. While 'results-based' distribution is not congruent with recent attempts for 'results-based management' or 'value for money' approaches, it can provide the normative framework for such approaches.

> total needs. The concern is collective need. The underlying ethical belief is that the results of the assistance are more important than the intention.

Duty-based distribution is in line with strictly principled humanitarian assistance because impartiality calls for assistance to all in need, or even to the neediest.[22] The results-based approach is not strictly principled, because it prioritizes the overall well-being of a group over helping the neediest individuals within this group. It reflects the added value humanitarian actors can provide and it takes into account the capabilities of recipients. In the moral framework of duty-based distribution inequity is problematic; in the results-based approach it is less so.

22 Impartiality means for the International Committee of the Red Cross: "It makes no discrimination as to nationality, race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided *solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of distress*" (1996:4) and the EU proclaims: "Humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations" (European Commission 2008: paragraph 13; Cf. Koddenbrock 2013: 219).

3 Why is there inequity in humanitarian assistance?

As we can see from the discussion above, inequities in humanitarian assistance can be the consequence of a sum of *intentional choices* – to perceive humanitarian assistance as charity and provide it as you see fit; to consider the value added of your organization and become active where you can; to help where your assistance can be used to reduce overall needs; to help where you believe the neediest persons to be and – given limited resources –refrain from providing assistance to the rest.

But humanitarian inequity can also be a result of *unintentional action*. This is the case when distributive principles remain implicit or change on a case-by-case basis. As a result, action and conviction fall apart. Inconsistent humanitarian action is problematic. For instance, it makes coordination difficult as the behaviour of a specific humanitarian actor becomes unpredictable. But unintentional humanitarian action has its reasons:

1. Imperfect information ranging from a shaky evidentiary basis about humanitarian needs (see chapter 2.3) to being unfamiliar with faraway crises and local contexts makes it difficult for decision makers to allocate attention in accordance with a distributive principle. This problem is further exacerbated by limited analytical capacities within foreign ministries and humanitarian organizations. After all, keeping an overview of global and local humanitarian issues is skill and resource intensive. One way that less equipped organizations deal with the problem is by following the decisions of their better equipped peers. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) or the British Department for International Development (DFID) become models for "smaller" donors, and MSF, Oxfam or Save the Children, act as models for "smaller" NGOs. The outcome is often a herding effect around specific crises.[23]

2. The biased 'making' of international crises. It is not enough for a humanitarian crisis to simply exist. To be addressed, the crisis needs to come to the attention of decision makers in distant countries. Obviously, the media plays an important role in the making of a crisis. They can drive private and public donors' attention to certain places, sectors or population group. The selection of places, sectors or population groups is not based on needs, but on what sells in mass media. The results are well-known: reporting is limited to iconic humanitarian situations – starving children

23 United Nations, Berlin, telephone interview, April 30, 2013; international donor, telephone interview, Geneva, May 2, 2013, German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013; "On average, the likelihood to provide aid after a natural emergency increases by 15–33 percentage points when any other major donor participates in the aid process" (Fink and Radaelli 2011: 742).

in Africa, miserable Syrian refugees, etc. These pictures have the power to stir public attention and public donors as well as NGOs are pressed to respond to high-visibility crises. Since attention spans are short on mass media, new crises tend to supersede older ones from public attention.[24] Nonetheless, research suggests that media pressure alone is not sufficient to drive foreign policy. The attention of other partners – allies, the UN, key humanitarian organizations – to a certain humanitarian situation is also important in the 'making' of a humanitarian crisis.[25]

3 Political interests also influence allocation of funds and political attention to a certain crisis. Research suggests that allocation of funds by traditional donors is strongly driven by security interests, former colonial relationships and geographic closeness to crises.[26] In humanitarian circles, this political bias is controversially discussed with a view to how security policy "highjacks" humanitarian assistance.[27] However, even beyond this contested and widely discussed field, political interests play a role. High-level political visits to a crisis country usually come with an aid package not necessarily put together on the basis of any distributive principle. Moreover, some donor governments openly advance their domestic economic interests by shipping food abroad,[28] while others identify "priority needs," such as protection and education to further a wider political agenda.[29]

4 Historical and cultural ties also often influence aid allocation decisions. Kofi Annan campaigned against this bias toward "ex-colonies, countries close to the donors' hearts or in which they have a strategic interest" upon launching the consolidated appeal for forgotten crises in 2003.[30] On the other hand, focusing assistance on countries with a longstanding relationship is in line with the results-based distribution principle. After all, historical and cultural ties determine a comparative advantage of a longstanding donor or humanitarian organization over "new comers."[31]

24 International donor, Geneva, telephone interview, May 2, 2013; Darcy and Hofmann 2003; Holm 2002; Moszinsky 2005: 165; Mukhier 2006; Oxley 2001: 28; Jeffreys 2002: 4; Economist 2003. Based on an analysis of more than 200 English-language newspapers from around the world research by AlertNet (2005) shows that media coverage of most crises dropped when news about the Indian Ocean tsunami took the headlines.

25 Robinson 1999; Jakobson 2000: 132-137; Olsen et al 2003; German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013; Büthe, Major and Souza 2012; Dury, Olson, Belle 2005.

26 Olsen et al 2003; Fink and Radaelli 2011; Raschky and Schwindt 2012.

27 As most recent examples of this longstanding debate, see: Dörner 2013; Staudinger 2013.

28 Binder, Gaus, Steets et al 2011: 1; for the development of US food aid policy, see Thurow and Kilman 2010.

29 International donor, Geneva, telephone interview, May 2, 2013.

30 Economist 2003; this has eventually led to the establishment of CERF; see also Oxfam 2000; Oxley 2001; Jefferys 2002; Darcy and Hofmann 2003.

31 International donor, Geneva, telephone interview, May 2, 2013.

5 Mandates and specializations of humanitarian organizations also cumulatively produce unintended humanitarian inequity. For example, MSF will naturally prioritize health issues, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will predominantly focus on protection and shelter and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) on children. That is, irrespective of the distributive principle a donor chooses, its humanitarian attention will be channeled to a specific sector or population group on the basis of its partners' specialization.

4 The inequity of German humanitarian response

Just as the collective action of humanitarian donors and agencies determines the (in)equity of *global* humanitarian assistance, the interplay between the key *German* humanitarian actors defines the inequity of German humanitarian assistance. Key German actors are the German Foreign Office (Auswärtiges Amt, AA), with its partner organizations (German and foreign NGOs, UN agencies, the ICRC and the German Red Cross (DRK)) and implementing agencies (Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) and Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)).[32] Although the main responsibility for humanitarian assistance now lies with the AA, the lessons of the longstanding debate on linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) and transition prove that the relationship with the Federal Ministry for Development Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ) is also crucial.[33]

There is an inherent normative tension in German humanitarian assistance with regards to the underlying distributive principle: While official language implies a commitment to duty-based (i.e. impartial) humanitarian assistance,[34] German practice is shaped by the notion of added value and developmental humanitarian assistance, reflecting the results-based approach.

4.1 The German Foreign Office perspective

The AA understands humanitarian assistance as a collective responsibility; a common duty of the German government and civil society vis-à-vis people in need; a shared obligation of all donors – traditional and emerging – to coordinate humanitarian response and reach the largest possible coverage of global humanitarian needs. The government's own contribution to this collective responsibility consists of financial and political engagement. Next to providing funds – which are limited compared to Germany's overall political weight – the AA aims to use its political influence to advance humanitarian diplomacy. Examples for Germany's engagement in humanitarian diplomacy are the initiation of the European

32 Other ministries like interior, defense and environment are also involved (Channel Research 2011b: 93). It is important here to clarify the difference between implementing agency and partner. The THW and GIZ work on the basis of procurement contracts, whereas partners work on the basis of grants (NGOs) or contributions to the core budget and project related grants (ICRC and UN agencies). In practical terms this means projects of THW and GIZ are fully paid for, whereas NGOs only receive co-financing. This means that – depending on the share of other sources of financing – NGOs are more independent from German government policies than implementing partners.

33 Steets 2011; Koddenbrock 2009; in the past, responsibility for humanitarian assistance has been divided between the AA and the BMZ. With a *Ressortvereinbarung* in 2012, the overall responsibility for German humanitarian assistance was given to the Foreign Office (German Federal Foreign Office and BMZ 2013).

34 German Federal Foreign Office 2012.

Consensus on Humanitarian Assistance and the preparedness initiative initiated as co-chair of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHD) in 2011/12.[35]

In 2011/12 the responsibilities for humanitarian assistance within the Federal government were reorganized. As a result, the funding line "development-oriented emergency and transitional aid" (DETA) was dissolved and the larger part of it moved to the foreign office. The funds are dedicated for emergency food assistance and "longer-term" humanitarian assistance (projects up to three years), but they are not a separate funding line anymore.[36] With this new setup, AA leadership started to focus on making German humanitarian assistance more strategic. The AA devised a strategy outlining the government's humanitarian priorities and principles. In addition, the humanitarian division is currently reworking its decision-making processes to reflect these priorities and principles.[37]

The aim is to have a coordinated procedure in place by the end of 2013. The procedure is supposed to be embedded in the international and national humanitarian landscape. The ambition is to move towards a forward-looking funding approach by 2014. The decision-making processes will also be revised. It will include, for example, "humble"[38] regional and country strategies to be developed in cooperation with the different internal and external partners of the humanitarian division. Financial mechanisms will also be overhauled. The precise contours of the future financial mechanisms are still under discussion, but they will include possibilities to fund longer-term partnerships, innovation and system development.

The humanitarian division enjoys relative independence within the foreign office compared to humanitarian divisions that are integrated within Foreign Offices in other countries. This reflects that on a leadership level, it has been accepted that humanitarian assistance at times has to follow its own rules and principles. Nevertheless, the humanitarian division coordinates closely with other divisions within the AA.[39] Staff members in the foreign office describe funding decisions as "fiddling work" due to the low level and flexibility of the humanitarian budget. At the same time, decision-making is deliberately open and flexible so as to allow for swift reactions to political priorities or European Union (EU) and UN initiatives.[40]

35 German Federal Foreign Office Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013; German Federal Foreign Office (2012); Schumacher 2012.

36 In German: Entwicklungsorientierte Not- und Übergangshilfe (ENÜH). The funding line amounted to €130-140 million per year. The overall sum of German public humanitarian aid was not affected by the *Ressortvereinbarung* from BMZ to German Federal Foreign Office.

37 German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013; German Federal Foreign Office 2012.

38 German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013; German Federal Foreign Office 2012.

39 German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013.

40 German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 25 and May 2 and 10, 2013.

Within this setup, five elements shape the distribution of funds:[41]

1. The structure of the humanitarian budget. Despite the current flux of affairs within the humanitarian department, the size and structure of the German humanitarian budget remains largely the same: the budget amounted to ca. €186[42] million in 2013 and is evenly divided among its three components multilateral funding (contributions to the UN and the ICRC), bilateral funding (mainly channeled through German NGOs, GIZ, THW and DRK) and an annual reserve for sudden-onset emergencies.[43] The structure of the budget leaves relatively little room for maneuver, allowing the AA to fund a maximum of two or three larger crises per year. The main strategic impact of the *Ressortvereinbarung* is that the AA is now able to finance "non-reactive humanitarian action," including preparedness, capacity-building or transition financing.

2. Capacities and priorities of partners. The foreign office depends on other organizations for aid delivery. The choices, capacities and specializations of these partner organizations determine where and in which sectors the German government can support humanitarian assistance. This dependency is reinforced by AA's practice of working with partners it already knows, in order to reduce the risk of poor quality implementation.

3. External pressure. The German general public is largely unaware of most humanitarian situations, not least because of limited German media coverage of these issues. As a result, the AA tries to accommodate the priorities of parliamentarians and civil society organizations as proxies of their constituency – the German people.

4. Value added and political priorities within the foreign office. The AA believes that, given limited resources, Germany should engage where it can make a difference.

5. Needs of the affected population. Needs-based humanitarian assistance is the normative core commitment of the German government.[44] Nevertheless, it does not produce independent needs assessments. This is an explicit decision, since the German government supports common needs assessments on the global level. In practice this means that resources which

41 The discussion is based on interviews with the German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, April 25, May 2 and 10, 2013; German Federal Foreign Office 2012; German Federal Foreign Office and BMZ 2012.

42 German Parliament 2013: Haushaltsplan; Kapitel 05, Titel 687 72.

43 Channel Research 2011a: xii; between 2006 and 2009 The German implementing agencies received a total of €358 million for humanitarian assistance, NGOs received €276 million and UN agencies and the ICRC €308 million (Channell Research 2011b: 94).

44 German Federal Foreign Office 2012.

are not allocated due to external or internal pressures are allocated on the basis of the ECHO Global Needs Assessment (GNA) and the CAP. In the past, the humanitarian division divided its funding in proportion to these assessments. Dependency on partner choices adds to the constraints on needs-based assistance.

4.2 The NGO perspective

Between 2005 and 2010, more than 50 German and foreign NGOs have received humanitarian funding from either the AA or the BMZ (Channel research 2011b: 88-90). The German NGO market comprises mostly small to medium sized NGOs with an annual budget of €30 million or less.[45] Only Welthungerhilfe has an annual budget of more than €100 million.

These NGOs emerged from development and civil society initiatives between 1960 and 1980. For this reason, the BMZ has been the key government partner of many German NGOs in terms of humanitarian financing and normative power. As a consequence, most of them pursue a long-term approach to humanitarian assistance. Barely any of the German NGOs can be compared to principled humanitarian organizations such as MSF or the ICRC. Among German NGOs, creativity in dealing with the principles has always reigned.

We can again identify five factors that shape the German NGO's distribution decisions:

1. Availability of funds. NGOs acquire their humanitarian funds through various channels. Private donations make up 10-30% of the overall budget. AA funding in the past amounted to less than 10% among most German NGOs.[46] The past BMZ- ENÜH funding, UN and ECHO are a more important funding base for most NGOs. Public and private funds are different. Private donations can hardly be used, for instance, to open new offices, because fundraising campaigns promise that an overwhelming part of donations will reach the recipients. The use of public funds, by contrast, needs to conform to the legal, budgetary and political rules imposed by the funder. NGOs must therefore constantly negotiate over the provenance of their funds, how they are entitled to use them and how they should be spent.

2. Feasibility of operation. The feasibility of a particular operation depends on the available funds and the security situation in the area concerned, the availability of staff, knowledge of the area and existing relationships

45 See for example the annual budgets of Malteser, Help, Care Germany, and the German Red Cross; Welthungerhilfe 2011.

46 Help 2011: 29-31; Malteser 2011: 6; Welthungerhilfe 2011: 36.

with local partners. For German NGOs, only operations with a long-term perspective (minimum three years) are attractive. The costs of setting up a new operation are high and the NGOs' mindset is development-oriented. As a consequence, it is much more likely that they will continue or modestly expand existing operations than start new ones.[47]

At a given point in time, an NGO has a particular assistance portfolio. Institutional memory, existing country operations, local partner organizations and relationships with recipients determine this portfolio. Whatever new activity is discussed relates to the existing portfolio. For example, when Malteser considered setting up shop in Banda Aceh, they could not afford it because they already had a security intensive operation going on in Pakistan at the time. When Help e.V. could no longer work inside Iraq they decided to shift their operations to Syria, to assist Iraqi refugees.[48]

3 Media attention also plays a role in NGO decision-making, because some mediatized crises generate large private and public donations. Yet our own research does not confirm that the 'CNN-effect' strongly shapes the German NGOs' humanitarian response. The overall stream of operations among German NGOs is more tied to the organizations' history, identity and portfolio.

4 The role of needs. German NGOs do not usually conduct their own needs assessments. They take stock of existing international needs assessments, relate these to their portfolio and chose a country, sector or population group to assist. Within the country, they conduct local investigation missions to decide which specific village or populations group shall receive support. Need is one, but by no means the most important, decision-making criterion among German NGOs.

5 Added value, conversely, is a crucial criterion. Added value means operating on the basis of existing know-how, considering the presence of other NGOs in the area or sector concerned and using funds efficiently. If a particular crisis region is already replete with humanitarian actors, there might be little added value in joining their ranks. If the costs for setting up the operation are excessively high, little added value will be created by investing them there instead of somewhere else. Although added value is the primary concern of German NGOs it does not mean that in practice, they never "follow the money." The presence of most German NGOs in Haiti is a case in point.

47 One interviewee in the German Federal Foreign Office argued that the German NGO's tendency to sit tight is actually positive for humanitarianism. If the organization has been operating for a long time in a country and does a good job, it has significant political influence within this country. In a crisis situation, such an organization can gain more access than NGOs foreign to the context (German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 27 and May 2 and 10, 2013).

48 Help and Malteser, personal interviews, May 1 and 2, 2013.

5 Courses of action – a bold basis for discussion

The previous chapters have shown how inequities of global and German humanitarian assistance come about. Because of the reality of financial and political attention and the limits of beneficiary participation, these inequities are inevitable. What is more, the uneven distribution of assistance across places, sectors and population group can even be the *intended* result of a strategic decision-making process. But it even gets more complicated than this: unintended global inequities are often the *cumulative result* of the intentional and morally justifiable foci of individual donors and humanitarian organizations on specific places, sectors or population groups.

To achieve a collective German strategy towards addressing global humanitarian inequities, the AA, German NGOs and other relevant stakeholders need to decide on three intrinsically normative questions:

1. According to which *distributive principle* should German humanitarian response allocate available financial and political resources?

2. What should be the *core criterion* for German humanitarian response, need or added value?

3. What does this imply for Germany's positions among the international humanitarian community?

In looking for answers, we cannot pretend to operate in a political vacuum. German political realities impinge on the scope for action, as Chapter 4 explained. They range from the developmental focus of German NGOs to the German public's "friendly ignorance"[49] of humanitarian issues and to Germany's international responsibilities as a civilian power. Moreover, trying to progress German humanitarian assistance, presupposes openness about its current nature. This implies being transparent about the inherent normative tensions in current German humanitarian assistance, rather than echoing the prevailing politically correct international humanitarian discourse.

Two normative tensions are particularly relevant in this regard. First, although in rhetoric and doctrine, *need* is the core principle for German humanitarian assistance, we found that all German practice is shaped by the notion of *added value* (cf. chapter 4). Considerations guiding decision-making are not uniquely based on where the neediest people are (duty-based principle). The key concern is where German assistance can achieve the best results with the given resources and com-

49 German Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, personal interview, April 27 and May 2 and 10, 2013.

petences (results-based principle). Need and added value are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, these principles can be pursued jointly. Yet, if one prioritizes need over added value, the allocation of resources must be as unselective as possible in order to reflect the underlying normative commitment. If added value is prioritized over need, the allocation of resources must be strategically selective.

The second normative tension is a consequence of the first one. Despite opposing rhetoric German humanitarian assistance is more *pragmatic* than *principled* for the humanitarian principle of impartiality demands a duty-based approach. This does not mean that the German government does not defend humanitarian principles when necessary; it means that principled humanitarian assistance is an option, not a dogma.

There is no objective, evidence-based or correct way to answer the three questions above. The choice of distributive principle, core criterion and international behavior is inherently normative. As with all normative choices, there is a tragic element to it. One might improve assistance to affected populations by following their needs more closely. Yet this implies helping fewer people, because resources are not used in the most efficient way. On the other hand, one might maximize the number of people helped by focusing assistance on where one can make a difference. Again, this implies that many people will be left out who might be needier than the ones reached. Acknowledging this "tragedy of choice" (Isaiah Berlin), we abstain from making recommendations. Rather, we outline three possible courses of action to be discussed among all German humanitarian actors. The courses of action are suggestions, not prescriptions. They are three out of a potentially unlimited set of courses of action. We picked those that we believe reflect what is possible within the scope of German realities. At the same time, they constitute bold suggestions on how to improve current practice.

Course of action 1: Continue current practice, but make it more coherent: The results-based approach

Selective results-based distribution is the status quo of German humanitarian assistance. It aims to reduce overall humanitarian needs by emphasizing developmental approaches, preparedness and added value. As a result, it focuses on a few crises per year and organization. To improve this practice, the first course of action suggests more transparency about the implicit normative choices in order to increase the predictability of German humanitarian assistance. The structure of German humanitarian assistance provides unique opportunities for a broader and more comprehensive understanding of human need and a more prepared approach to the recurrence of crisis and disaster. A precondition for this is the development of clear and *transparent criteria* for the selection of places, sectors and population groups. Firstly, this would result in a deliberate and justified partiality

of assistance. Secondly, it would constitute a more strategic approach compared to current practice. This line of action would decrease transaction costs between the AA and its partners and facilitate coordination with other donors. The current approach and the relative lack of transparency forces operational organizations to spend considerable resources in trying to access public funds.[50] This approach does not aim at further increasing the international profile of German humanitarian assistance. If successfully implemented, the results-based approach would make German humanitarian assistance pragmatic, prepared and transparent.

Course of action 2: Change the current practice to tackle unintended global humanitarian inequity: The results-based approach with a global ambition

Course of action 2 pursues the explicit aim to tackle the unintended global inequity of humanitarian assistance by adopting a *global and coordinated* results-based approach to humanitarian assistance. Like option 1, this line of action acknowledges that added value and other concerns shape the reality of German humanitarian assistance and global humanitarian inequities more broadly. However, this course of action openly articulates the need for a coordinated attempt to reduce inequity. Germany's focus would, as a result, not be based on current political and operational realities, but would aim to change these so as to counteract global inequities. This track would entail strategically reaching out to partners who are able to deliver assistance in those places, sectors and for those population groups that are neglected by the international system.

Since Germany does not have the resources to counterbalance these inequities alone, course of action 2 also includes *advocacy* towards other humanitarian donors. This more ambitious approach would come with a need for greater political clout, which can only be achieved if the humanitarian department works closely with the political units within the ministry. The inherent challenges of this approach arise because of existing incentives among donors and NGOs to concentrate on high-profile crises hoping that others will not do the same. It is unrealistic to expect any donor to become a 'gap donor'. A shared responsibility among humanitarians to address the inequities would most likely lead to similar approaches to the ones we have seen in the past – indices and funds dedicated to "forgotten crises".

Overall, it is likely that course two would not cause a fundamental shift in current global practice. Nevertheless, there is one important opportunity of this approach to improve global practice. Knowing that the current approach to tackle global humanitarian inequities is unsuccessful, German humanitarian could *ad-*

50 United Nations, Berlin, telephone interview, May 8, 2013; this problem applies, but is not specific to, German public assistance.

vocate for and practice a new understanding of humanitarian needs. Given the genuine challenges of knowing and measuring human need (cf. chapter 2), this would entail spearheading initiatives that center on listening to affected populations and their priorities and allocating funding and political attention accordingly. Addressing autonomy needs or non-life-saving approaches (e.g. livelihoods, skills training, preparedness) are in line with this approach. Pursuing this track would make cooperation and coordination with other units in the AA, additional partners and other donors central. It therefore demands a significant global ambition on behalf of all German humanitarian actors. If implemented successful, this course of action would make German humanitarian assistance ambitious, coordinated, prepared and innovative.

Course of action 3: Change the current practice to refocus on the neediest: The selective duty-based approach

Principled humanitarian assistance is currently held to be the core aim of German humanitarianism. Yet Germany practices a predominantly results-based approach. To resolve this normative tension, the AA and German NGOs could seek to reform practice and move towards selective duty-based distribution. That is, *absolute humanitarian needs and added value would become core criteria* of German humanitarian assistance. This would mean that, instead of following global needs assessments combined with the human development index to arrive at the most urgent needs, as is currently international practice, this course of action would be selective with regards to places, sectors and population groups who would be treated on the basis of added value. Unlike course of action 1, this strategy offers assistance to the neediest within a certain crisis rather than ensuring that overall humanitarian need is reduced (because this may require helping the person with the greatest capacities). In doing so, it would *consciously contribute to unintended global inequities* and accept this side effect as unavoidable.

This move towards duty-based distribution essentially adopts the principle that the neediest take priority. This idea is enshrined in the ICRC principle of impartiality (see page 8) and hence builds on the practice of medical assistance. In emergency medical assistance, it is easier than in other humanitarian sectors to determine the neediest person: It is the person that will perish first if not immediately helped. Yet, as discussed in chapter 2, if we consider human need more broadly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to objectively determine the neediest person, place or sector. Acknowledging these difficulties, the selective duty-based approach would be designed as community-based. The neediest would be identified by community based programming. In this respect, the selective duty-based approach tends towards *local determination*. Taking this track to humanitarian assistance would make German humanitarians assistance principled, selective and

community-based. Humanitarian diplomacy for the respect of IHL and humanitarian access would be the core of Germany's international engagement.

During the above mentioned *Klausurtagung* this study and the three courses of action were presented to the German humanitarian community. As intended, the paper stirred discussion about collective German humanitarian assistance. It also triggered reflections about the individual organizations' priorities in terms of distributive principle. Concerning courses of action, there was no clear priority for one particular track. At the same time, the courses of action seemed to capture the overall landscape of positions since no additional approach has come out of the discussions.

Annex 1: Existing mechanisms to tackle the inequity of global humanitarian assistance

This annex provides a brief overview of existing funding mechanisms and donor strategies which actively tackle the inequity of global humanitarian assistance. The OCHA-administered Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and ECHO's Forgotten Crisis Assessment (FCA) serve to "signal to donors"[51] when crises are underfunded. The two use distinct methodologies to identify forgotten crises. In 2012, only five countries were listed in common on ECHO's and CERF's list. This is further evidence for the argument we make in chapter 2 about the limited possibilities to objectively determine what a 'forgotten crisis' actually is. The International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) has also set up a fund to address underfunded crises, the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF). The DREF can only be accessed by national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.[52] The annex concludes with a briefly summary of how Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) deal with the issue of inequity and the question of need.

ECHO's Forgotten Crisis Assessment

Since 2001, ECHO has set aside roughly $100-200 million per year (i.e. 10-20% of its annual geographical humanitarian and food aid budget) to fund "severe, protracted humanitarian crisis situations where affected populations are receiving no or insufficient international aid and where there is no political commitment to solve the crisis, due in part to a lack of media interest."[53] The funds can be accessed by ECHO's regular implementing partners: NGOs, UN agencies, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. In 2013, $150 million is earmarked for nine forgotten crises.[54]

Long-term displaced people are in ECHO's view often the "victims of ignored

51 United Nations, Berlin, telephone interview, April 30, 2013.

52 "Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF)," available online at http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/40861/DREF%20Background%20paper.pdf, accessed on February 28, 2014; In 2009-2010, Sweden led efforts within the GHD to critically reflect on factors influencing funding decisions and, particularly, underfunded appeals (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative 2010). Other efforts to improve the equity of humanitarian contributions: the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, an informal donor forum established in 2003, has made equitable response a key priority.

53 European Commission 2001-2012; European Commission 2002; European Commission 2011.

54 European Commission 2001-2012.

crises."[55] They are the result of the lack of financial and political attention to specific population groups. In recognition of this, Sahrawi refugees in Algeria have received assistance from ECHO's forgotten crisis budget since 2001. Myanmar has consistently appeared on the list since 2003 and India since 2005. Pakistan became 'forgotten' only in 2013.[56] Other crises are no longer on the list "either because the situation changed (as in the case of the Lao Hmong refugees in Thailand who were involuntary repatriated in 2010) or because international media and donors have given them more attention, due to significant developments (Haiti, the Sahel Region and Somali Refugees in Kenya)."[57]

ECHO FCA is rather complex.[58] Countries or regions are assessed by ECHO field staff and then measured against indicators such as media coverage, a vulnerability index and public aid per capita to decide on funding priorities each year.[59] The FCA serves as a means of increasing transparency and creditability of ECHO assistance but is not used as an automatic funding mechanism. It informs funding decisions but does not determine them. In 2012, Yemen, which scored low on the FCA index, received $66 million as opposed to the highest ranking forgotten crisis, the Central African Republic, which received $14.7 million.[60] Similar tendencies could be observed in 2010 and 2011.[61] The reasons for the mismatch between the FCA rank and the funds disbursed by ECHO lie in the multiplicity of factors we have identified for the overall inequity of global humanitarian response.

UN OCHA Central Emergency Response Fund (Underfunded Emergencies Window)

Since 2006, one-third or a maximum of $150 million[62] is set aside from the grant facility of the UN OCHA administered Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

55 Horner 2006.

56 European Commission 2001-2012. Access restrictions were matched with donor fatigue. See news article "Millions still need aid in Pakistan's "forgotten" crises" at http://www.trust.org/item/?map=millions-still-need-aid-in-pakistans-forgotten-crises, accessed on February 28, 2014.

57 European Commission 2001-2012.

58 Compare this to the political decision-making within ECHO as described in Weiss 2013.

59 ECHO 2011.

60 Sudan received $88.1 million in 2012, but this sum covered a wide range of activities within the country; only part of it was earmarked for the forgotten crisis of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

61 In 2011, Yemen (score 9) received $28.7 million while the highest ranking forgotten crisis, Myanmar (score 11), received $21 million. Other forgotten crises, such as the DRC and the Sudan (both ranked at 9), received $84.4 million and $109.4 million respectively (ECHO 2010-2012; OCHA 2013).

62 CERF is a pooled fund set to collect $500 million per year: $450 in grants and $50 million in loan. The grant component is split into rapid response window ($300 million) and underfunded emergencies window ($150 million).

each year to "mitigate the unevenness and slowness of the voluntary humanitarian contributions system by targeting emergencies that have not attracted or are unlikely to attract sufficient and timely funding for life-saving activities."[63] In 2013, the CERF will spend roughly $130 million for 12 to 15 forgotten crises.[64]

Twice a year,[65] the CERF Secretariat nominates a number of countries for consideration to be funded by the CERF UFE. The Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) makes the final decisions. Nominations by the CERF Secretariat are primarily based on relative CAP funding, but also take into account the implementation capacity of humanitarian agencies.[66] This is a strong indicator for the importance of results-based distribution even among mechanisms like the CERF.

To avoid a sector-bias within and across CAPs, the best-funded sector (most often the food sector) is excluded in the second step of the short-listing process. In addition, up to ten countries without CAPs are nominated and ranked by the UN's Interagency Underfunded Working Group. The shortlist is checked against an aggregate vulnerability index composed of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) priority score and ECHO's vulnerability index.[67] Once country-level allocations are approved by the ERC, the respective humanitarian or resident coordinators can apply for the funds and determine country-level priorities.

Only UN funds, programs and agencies are eligible to apply for the country-specific CERF underfunded emergency window (UFE) and only life-saving activities[68] are eligible for funding. Projects yielding the "highest impact" are preferred.[69] In 2011, CERF has provided $26.8 million (i.e. one-fifth of the UFE window) to displaced persons in protracted crises situations, 35 million for draught-related interventions in the Horn of Africa. The Central African Republic, Chad and Ethiopia have been regular recipients of CERF UFE funds since its inception.[70]

63 OCHA 2011.

64 CERF 2012d; Donor contributions to CERF's grant facility (in millions; generally one-third was earmarked for forgotten crises): $226 in 2006, $376 in 2007, $431 in 2008, $357 in 2009, $449 in 2010, $459 in 2011, $405 million in 2012 and $384 million in 2013 Channel Research 2011; UN News Centre 2012. Number of recipient countries of the CERF UFE: 18 in 2006, 24 in 2007, 22 in 2008, 21 in 2009, 18 in 2010, in 2011 and 20 in 2012.

65 CERF UFE is "front-loaded," i.e. most of the funds are disbursed in the first round.

66 "Operational capacity, access and be able to implement CERF funds in time and monitor their projects accordingly" CERF guidelines (CERF 2012).

67 The IASC's priority score is contained in the IASC's early warning/early action reports (OCHA 2011: 8). ECHO's vulnerability index is composed of 9 indices among them the human development index, the gender inequality index etc. (ECHO 2011).

68 For example, disaster preparedness, economic recovery, poverty reduction, disarmament are not eligible. (CERF Secreatriat).

69 OCHA 2011.

70 CERF 2012a; CERF Secretariat 2012.

Money is allocated to selected countries proportionally according "to their respective funding shortfalls" when compared to other shortlisted countries. The allocated contributions therefore also reflect the size of the original appeal. In 2012, South Sudan's and the Philippine's CAP received 54% of funding. CERF allocated $4 million to the Philippines and $20 million to South Sudan. The minimum recommended grant per country is $1 million.[71]

In general, CERF enjoys a good reputation.[72] Ban Ki-Moon called the pooled fund a "United Nations success story" for it is "guaranteed to go to the people who need it most, in time to make a difference."[73] The five-year review of the CERF found no acute problems, but recommended that international NGOs be involved in the country selection process and that the CERF advocate for better reporting to the OCHA Financial Tracking Service.[74]

The IFRC Disaster Relief Emergency Fund

Since 1985, the grant facility[75] of the IFRC's DREF addresses "small- and medium-scale disasters and health emergencies for which no international appeal will be launched or when support from other actors is not foreseen." Only Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies can apply for small operational grants.[76] In 2011, $14 million was disbursed in grants.[77]

"DREF supports the impartiality of the global humanitarian system: National Societies can assess and meet needs free from the media, donor or political interests that surround major events. The fund is demand-driven and locally owned. National Societies initiate applications and their plans of action reflect priorities that have been locally identified. DREF complements the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), but while CERF is used by the UN and donors to channel money to UN agencies and international NGOs in support of response to sudden-onset or under-funded disasters, DREF money goes direct to National Societies and through them to beneficiaries."[78]

71 OCHA 2011; CERF 2012c; CERF 2012b.

72 http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/profilark2011/E886_E_CERF.pdf, accessed on February 28, 2014.

73 "Every dollar going humanitarian aid must have maximum effect, Secretary-General stresses at high-level conference on Central Emergency Response Fund," available online at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sgsm14024.doc.htm, accessed February 28, 2014.

74 Channel Research 2011.

75 The other, "loan facility" is used for rapid response.

76 Individual grants are worth 300,000 Swiss francs (or in exceptional cases up to 500 thousand Swiss francs.

77 In 2010: CHF17,5 million (IFRC 2011-2012).

78 IFRC n/a.

Government donors: Sweden and the UK

Sweden is the third largest humanitarian donor after the US and ECHO, and the second largest contributor to the CERF. About 15-20% of Sweden's development budget is earmarked for humanitarian aid. About 80% of all Swedish assistance is provided as unrestricted core support or in response to CAP appeals. The remaining 20% is earmarked by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) to certain crises and sectors.[79]

SIDA is renowned for its analytical capacity in assessing information from the field (e.g. embassies) and multilateral agencies (e.g. OCHA, ICRC). It has been improving its analytics by employing country and thematic experts and by investing in computer software to support its decision making; as a result, an interviewee states that "Sweden has sufficient information related to humanitarian needs."

The distribution of SIDA's humanitarian funds to CAPs is informed by a portfolio analysis of each CAP.[80] Sweden is also continuously evaluating multilateral humanitarian agencies (similar to the more recent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review by DFID).[81] It rewards the most effective organizations, but ensures that prioritized needs are sufficiently funded, notably those of displaced persons, as well as cross cutting issues, such as protection, gender, education and early recovery.[82] Sweden takes the liberty to support those it deems important and to provide help where it can achieve the best results.

DFID takes the opposite approach – in rhetoric. Despite the inherent problems determining a clear concept of need and of measuring it, DFID has adopted the language of objective need. The emphasis on evidence-based and cost-effective assistance called for by their recent resilience strategy and their response to the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review of 2011 creates greater demand for research into needs and risks.[83] The underlying thrust of the strategic reorientation is that "our humanitarian action will be based on need, and need alone."[84]

As shown in chapter 2, this is a variation on the ICRC's understanding of the prin.

79 International donor, Geneva, personal interview, May 2, 2013. Core support is paid by the Foreign Ministry. SIDA administers support to CAPs and earmarked funds. In addition, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) has a roster of 2500 people to deploy.

80 OCHA's assessment of the CAPs is roughly 90% in line with SIDA's own needs analysis on average. Sweden supports the reforms within CAP ("program cycle"), because CAPs haven't been strategic so far; rather, they are just like "Christmas trees" (international donor, Geneva, personal interview, May 2, 2013).

81 Swedish assessment of multilateral organisations, available online at http://www.government.se/sb/d/11747/a/122004, accessed on February 28, 2014.

82 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010; international donor, Geneva, personal interview, May 2, 2013.

83 DFID 2011.

84 UK Government 2011: 5.

ciple of impartiality, the reality of which has always been complex. By choosing an advocacy strategy that is not transparent at all about the various factors shaping the distribution of humanitarian assistance, DFID misses the opportunity to take the debate on assistance delivery to the next level. Germany could seize the chance and play the role of the honest arbiter within a more transparent and predictable global humanitarian assistance system.

Bibliography

AFP (2003): War in northern Uganda world's worst forgotten crisis. UN. Nairobi, updated on 11 November, checked on 26 March 2013.

AlertNet (2005): Tsunami coverage dwarfs 'forgotten' crises-research. London (AlertNet). Available online at http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/tsunami-coverage-dwarfs-forgotten-crises-research/, checked on 26 March 2013.

ALNAP (2012): The State of the Humanitarian System. London, checked on 26 May 2013.

Anderson, Mary B.; Dayna Brown; Isabella Jean (2012): *Time to Listen. Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid.* CDA Collaborative Learning Projects. Cambridge, MA.

Auswärtiges Amt (2012): Strategie des Auswärtigen Amts zur humanitären Hilfe im Ausland. Berlin, checked on 26 May 2013.

Auswärtiges Amt (2013): Konzept des Auswärtigen Amtes zur Förderung von Vorhaben der Humanitären Hilfe der Bundesregierung im Ausland (Kapitel 0502 Titel 687 72). Berlin, checked on 26 May 2013.

Auswärtiges Amt and BMZ (2012): Leitfaden zur Erläuterung der Aufgaben des Auswärtigen Amts (AA) und des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) in den Bereichen der Humanitären Hilfe und der Entwicklungsfördernden strukturbildenden Übergangshilfe. Berlin, checked on 26 May 2013.

Bar-Joseph, Uri (1996): Rotem. The Forgotten Crisis on the Road to the 1967 War. In *Journal of Contemporary History* 31 (3).

Barnett, Michael (2009): Evolution Without Progress? Humanitarianism in a World of Hurt. In *International Organization* 63 (Fall), pp. 621–663.

Binder, Andrea; François Grünewald (2010): Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake. Global Public Policy Institute/Groupe URD. Berlin.

Binder, Andrea; Gaus, Alexander; Steets, Julia; Barrett, Christopher B.; Lentz, Erin C. (2011): How to reform the outdated Food Aid Convention. Global Public Policy Institute; University, Cornell. Berlin.

Brass, Jennifer N. (2011): Why Do NGOs Go Where They Go? Evidence from Kenya. In *World Development* 40 (2), pp. 387–401.

Büthe, Tim; Major, Solomon; André de Mello e Souza (2012): The Politics of Private Foreign Aid. Humanitarian Principles, Economic Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation. In *International Organization* 66 (Fall), pp. 571–607.

CERF (2012): Annual Report 2011. UN Central Emergency Response Fund. New York.

CERF (2012): CERF 2012 First Underfunded Round. Overview of Country Selection and Apportionment. UN Central Emergency Response Fund. New York.

CERF (2012): CERF 2012 Second Underfunded Round. Overview of Country Selection and Apportionment. UN Central Emergency Response Fund. New York.

CERF (2012): Guidance Note for the CERF 2013 First Underfunded Round. Central Emergency Response Fund. Available online at https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/CERF%20Underfunded%202013%20First%20Round%20Guidance%20Note.pdf.

CERF Secretariat (2011): Application of the CERF Life-Saving Criteria. An Update. UN Central Emergency Response Fund. New York.

CERF Secretariat (May): CERF Allocations to Responses to Consequences of Chronic Conflict Situations. UN Central Emergency Response Fund. New York.

Channel Research (2011): 5-Year Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund. Synthesis Report. Final Draft. Research, Channel. Ohain.

Channel Research (2011): Die deutsche humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland. Band I: Hauptbericht. Berlin, checked on 26 May 2013.

Channel Research (2011): Die deutsche Humanitäre Hilfe im Ausland. Band II: Anlagen. Berlin, checked on 26 May 2013.

Cooley, Alexander; Ron, James (2002): The NGO Scramble. Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of Transnational Action. In *International Security* 27 (1), pp. 5–39.

DARA (2009): The Humanitarian Response Index 2008. Donor Accountability in Humanitarian Action. Available at http://daraint.org/humanitarian-response-index/humanitarian-response-index-2008/; checked on 3 May 2013.

Darcy, James; Hofmann, Charles-Antoine (2003): According to need? Needs assessment and decision-making in the humanitarian sector. Humanitarian Policy Group, O. D.I. London (HPG Report).

Development Initiatives (2012): Global Humanitarian Assistance Report. London, checked on 26 May 2013.

DFID (2011): Defining Disaster Resilience: A DFID Approach Paper. DFID/UK Aid.

Dörner, Frank (2013): Helfer in Gefahr. Süddeutsche Zeitung, update on 25 April.

Drury, A. Cooper; Olson, Richard Stuart; Douglas A. Van Belle (2005): The Politics of humanitarian Aid. U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, 1964-1995. In *The Journal of Politics* 67 (2), pp. 454–473.

ECHO (2010-2012): Forgotten Crisis Assessment (2011-2013). Brussels: European Commission.

Economist, The (2003): A United Nations appeal. Forgotten disasters. No news is not always good news. Available at http://www.economist.com/node/2237863, update on 20 November, checked on 3 May 2013.

Ethics in Action. The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations (2006). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

European Commission (2001-2012): Commission Staff Working Document. General Guidelines on Operational Priorities for Humanitarian Aid (2002-2013). Brussels: European Commission.

European Commission (2002): Annual Report 2001. Brussels: European Commission (COM/2002/0322 final).

European Commission (2008): EU Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (2008/C 25/01).

European Commission (2011): Technical Note. Methodology for the Identification of Priority Countries for the European Commission Humanitarian Aid "GNA and FCA". Brussels: European Commission (ECHO A/3EN D(2011)).

Fink, Günther; Radaelli, Silvia (2011): Determinants of International Emergency Aid - Humanitarian Need Only? In *Wolrd Development* 39 (5), pp. 741–757.

Fitzgerald, Melissa (2009): Northern Uganda. The Biggest Forgotten Humanitarian Crisis (Huffington Post). Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/melissa-fitzgerald/northern-uganda-the-bigge_b_334266.html, updated on 3 November, checked on 26 March 2013.

Food and Agriculture Organization (2002): Democratic Republic of Congo - a forgotten emergency. Rome (FAO Newsroom), updated on 19 November, checked on 26 March 2013.

Foulkes, Imogen (2011): Ivory Coast. UN warns of forgotten humanitarian crisis.

London (BBC News). Available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12827243, updated on 22 March, checked on 26 March 2013.

Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (2003): 23 Pinciples and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship. Available online at http://www.goodhumanitariandonorship.org/gns/principles-good-practice-ghd/overview.aspx, checked on 26 March 2013.

Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (2010). Taking Stock of GHD – 2003 to date: A non-paper prepared by the 2009 – 2010 Co-chairs.

Green, Michael; Mitchell, Derek (2007): Asia's Forgotten Crisis. A New Approach to Burma. In *Foreign Affairs* 86 (6), pp. 147–158.

Hamilton, Lawrence A. (2003): The Political Philosophy of Needs. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Holm, Hans-Henrik (2002): Failing Failed States. Who Forgets the Forgotten. In. Forgotten Humanitarian Crises. Conference on the Role of Media, Decision-makers and Humanitarian Agencies. Copenhagen.

Horner, Simon (2006): European Commission focuses on 'forgotten crises'. In *Forced Migration Review* 25 (May), pp. 56–57.

IASC (2006): Gender Handbook in Humanitarian Action. Women, Girls, Boys and men. Different needs – equal opportunities. Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

IFRC (2006): World Disasters Report. Focus on neglected crises. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Geneva (World Disasters Report).

IFRC (2011-2012): Disaster Relief Emergency Fund Annual Report (2010-2011). International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Geneva.

IFRC (n/a): Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF). International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Geneva.

Ignatieff, Michael (1984): *The Needs of Strangers*. Chatto & Windus. London.

International Committee of the Red Cross (1996): The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Geneva, checked on 26 May 2013.

International Crisis Group (2006): Katanga. The Congo's Forgotten Crisis. Group, International Crisis. Nairobi/Brussels (Africa Report).

Jefferys, Anna (2002): Giving Voice to Silent Emergencies. In *Humanitarian Exchange* March, pp. 2–4.

Koddenbrock, Kai (2009): The Will to Bridge? European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development. Global Public Policy Institute. Berlin, checked on 26 May 2013.

Koddenbrock, Kai (2013): The ambiguous practice of intervention: A critique of the self-evidence of humanitarianism and peacekeeping in the Congo. University of Bremen.

Kokrajhar, Assam and Pune (2012): A neglected crisis. Violence in distant Assam boils over in the rest of the country. London (The Economist). Available online at http://www.economist.com/node/21560901, updated on 25 August, checked on 26 March 2013.

Krause, Monika (2009): How Humanitarians make Decisions about Relief. In Pursuit of the Good Project. In. Graduate Student Spring Conference. Department of Sociology, New York University, USA and the 103rd meeting of the American Sociological Association, Boston, USA, pp. 1–20.

Livingston, Steven (1997): Clarifying the CNN Effect. An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention. In The Joan Shorenstein Center, John F. Kennedy School of Gevernment, Harvard University Research Paper R-18, pp. 1–18.

Loescher (2001): The UNHCR and World Politics. State Interests vs. Institutional Autonomy. In *International Migration Review* 35 (1), pp. 33–56.

Malteser International (2011): Finanzbericht. Köln, checked on 26 May 2013.

Moszynski, Peter (2005): Generosity after tsunami could threaten neglected crises. In *British Medical Journal* 330, p. 165. Available online at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC545020/, checked on 26 March 2013.

Mukhier, Mohammed Omer (2006): Global generosity after crises must reach people in need (IFRC Opinion Pieces). Available online at http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/opinions-and-positions/opinion-pieces/2006/global-generosity-after-crises-must-reach-people-in-need/, updated on 14 December, checked on 26 March 2013.

Nussbaum, Martha C. (2003): Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice. Feminist Economics 9 (2-3), pp. 33-59.

OCHA (2011): Guidelines. CERF Underfunded Emergencies Window. Proce-

dures and Criteria. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

OCHA (2013): Financial Tracking Service.

OECD (2010): Germany - DAC Peer Review. Paris, checked on 26 May 2013.

Olsen, Rye Gorm; Carstensen, Nils; Hoyen, Kristian (2003): Humanitarian Crises. What Determines the Level of Emergency Assistance? Media Coverage, Donor Interests and the Aid Business. In *Disasters* 27 (2), pp. 109–126.

Oxley, Marcus (2001): Measuring Humanitarian Need. In Humanitarian Exchange September, pp. 28–30.

Parker, Stephanie (2012): Interview. Many more humanitarian crises totally forgotten: UN refugee chief (Xinhua). Available online at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-10/02/c_131885006.htm, updated on 2 October, checked on 26 March 2013.

Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2000): Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point. The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect. In *Journal of Peace Research* 37 (2), pp. 131–143.

Pogge, Thomas (2006): Moral Priorities for International Human Rights NGOs. In: Ethics in Action. The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 218–256.

Pratt, David (1999): Sierra Leone. The Forgotten Crisis. Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P. from David Pratt, M.P., Nepean-Carleton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone. Available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/crisis-e.htm.

Rashcky, Paul A.; Schwindt, Manijeh (2012): On the Channel and Type of Aid. The Case of International Disaster Assistance. In *European Journal of Political Economy* 28, pp. 119–131.

Robinson, Piers (1999): The CNN Effect. Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy? In *Review of International Studies* 25, pp. 301–309.

Rubenstein, Jennifer C. (2008): The Distributive Commitments of International NGOs. In Michael N Barnett (Ed.): Humanitarianism in question. Politics, power, ethics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, pp. 215–234.

Rubin, Barnett R. (1996): Afghanistan. The Forgotten Crisis. In *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 15 (2), pp. 1–35.

Schumacher, Hanns (2012): Speech by H.E. Ambassador Hanns Schumacher Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations. Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) High Level Meeting (HLM) in the session on Enhancing Preparedness and Disaster Risk Reduction, Response and Resilience. Geneva, 17 July 2012. Available online at http://www.genf.diplo.de/contentblob/3609632/Daten/2536990/20120717_ODSGGHDRedeBoSchumacheren.pdf, checked on 27 May 2013.

Sen, Amartya (2009): *The Idea of Justice*. Harvard University Press. Boston.

Silberstein, Gerard E. (1976): Germany, France and the Casablanca Incident, 1908-1909; An Investigation of a Forgotten Crisis. In *Canadian Journal of History* 11 (3).

Slim H. (2002): Not Philanthropy But Rights: The Proper Politicisation of Humanitarian Philosophy. In *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6 (2), pp. 1–22. Available online at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/jhr/2002/00000006/00000002/art00002, checked on 27 May 2013.

Staudinger, Melanie (2013): Helfer in Gefahr. Süddeutsche Zeitung. Available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/gewalt-gegen-rettungskraefte-helfer-in-gefahr-1.1253912, updated on 10 January, checked on 3 May 2013.

Steets, Julia (2011): Donor Strategies for Addressing the Transition Gap and Linking Humanitarian and Development Assistance. A Contribution to the International Debate. Global Public Policy Institute. Berlin.

Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010): Saving lives and alleviating suffering. Policy for Sweden's Humanitarian Assistance. Stockholm.

The Economist (2003): A United Nations appeal. Forgotten disasters. No news is not always good news (The Economist). Available online at http://www.economist.com/node/2237863, updated on 20 November, checked on 27 March 2013.

Thomas G. Weiss (2013): Humanitarian Business. Cambridge: Polity.

Thurow, Roger; Kilman, Scott (2010): Enough. Why the World's Poorest Starve in an Age of Plenty. New York: PublicAffairs.

UK Government (2011): Humanitarian Emergency Response Review: UK Government Response. DFID/UK Aid.

UN News Centre (2012): Donors pledge $384 million for life-saving UN humanitarian fund in 2013. Available online at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43738&Cr=response+fund&Cr1=#.UVLPDFcueSq, updated on 11 December, checked on 27 March 2013.

Walker, Peter; Maxwell, Daniel G. (2008): Shaping the Humanitarian World. New York: Routledge (Global Institutions).

Weber, Max (2004): The vocation lectures. Indianapolis [u.a.]: Hackett Publ.

Welthungerhilfe (2011): Jahresbericht. Bonn, checked on 26 May 2013.

WHO (2004): Darfur overshadows "forgotten" crisis in neighbouring Uganda. In *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 82 (11), p. 886.

World Food Programme (2006): East Sudan. A forgotten crisis. Available online at http://www.wfp.org/stories/east-sudan-forgotten-crisis, updated on 15 June, checked on 26 March 2013.

About GPPi

The Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) is an independent think tank based in Berlin and Geneva. Our mission is to develop innovative strategies for effective and accountable governance and to achieve lasting impact at the interface of the public sector, business and civil society through research, consulting and debate.

Our approach

We are an independent and non-profit institute. We receive project funding from foundations as well as our project partners and clients from the public and private sectors. We re-invest profits from consulting activities into our research work.

We build bridges between research and practice. Our international team combines research and public policy expertise with management consulting skills. We foster the exchange of knowledge and experience between researchers and practitioners.

We promote policy entrepreneurship. Our work strengthens strategic communities around pressing policy challenges by bringing together the public sector, civil society and business.

GPPi works primarily with clients from the public and non-profit sector. Past and present project partners include the UN Global Compact Office, the UN Development Group, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Development Programme, the International Labour Organisation, the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the UN Environment Programme.

About the authors

Andrea Binder is associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi). Her areas of expertise include humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and monitoring and evaluation. Andrea has been involved in many GPPi evaluation and research projects, including the Uniting on Food Assistance project and the IASC Real-time Evaluation of the Disaster Response to the Haiti Earthquake. As part of the IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation Phase II, Andrea was responsible for methodology and indicator development as well as the country studies in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Andrea has field experience in Ghana and Sri Lanka, and she has conducted field research in DRC, Haiti, Uganda and the Central African Republic.

Kai Koddenbrock is a GPPi fellow and a lecturer at the University of Duisburg-Essen. He has consulted for ECHO, UN OCHA, GIZ and the SIDA-Harvard University training program on humanitarian action. In the academic world, he was recently a visiting scholar at Columbia University. He acts as one of the speakers of the working group of the German Association of Political Science on 'Orders of violence' and has recently submitted his Ph.D. thesis at the University of Bremen on 'The ambiguous practice of intervention' in the Congo. He has published among others in *International Peacekeeping* and the *Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding*. Kai Koddenbrock has field experience in South Africa and Togo and has conducted extensive field research in DRC.

András Horváth is a research associate with GPPi. His areas of expertise include humanitarian assistance, foreign policy and oriental languages and cultures. András has worked for the International Relations and Security Network as an editor, for GPPi as a research assistant, and the Global Debate and Public Policy Challenge as an independent consultant. During his studies, he volunteered for the Association of Diplomacy in Practice, a student association at Corvinus University of Budapest. He also interned at the Middle East desk of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Reinhardtstr. 7
10117 Berlin

Phone: +49 • 30 • 275 959 75-0
Fax: +49 • 30 • 275 959 75-99

gppi@gppi.net • www.gppi.net